THE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS LOOK AT LATIN AMERICA--SIX POSITION PAPERS.

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TEXAS UNIV., AUSTIN

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THIS COLLECTION OF SIX POSITION PAPERS ON LATIN AMERICA WAS PREPARED BY UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS SPECIALISTS IN THE FIELD OF GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, ECONOMICS, SOCIOLOGY, ANTHROPOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT. EACH WAS ASKED TO WRITE A POSITION PAPER ON WHAT A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE, OR A REASONABLY LITERATE ADULT, OUGHT TO KNOW ABOUT LATIN AMERICA FROM THE STANDPOINT OF HIS FIELD. THEY WERE TO FOCUS ON THE BASIC IDEAS, THE KEY UNDERSTANDINGS, AND THE MAJOR GENERALIZATIONS. SUPPORTING DETAILS AND EXAMPLES WERE TO BE USED ONLY TO ILLUSTRATE THE LARGER IDEAS WITH NO INTENT OF PROVIDING AN EXHAUSTIVE TREATMENT. THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THESE EXPERTS AS TO WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO KNOW ABOUT LATIN AMERICA REPRESENT THEIR OWN PERSONAL JUDGMENTS. (TC)
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AUSTIN, LATIN AMERICA

This collection of six position papers on Latin America was prepared by University of Texas specialists in the field of geography, history, economics, sociology, anthropology, and government. Each was asked to write a position paper on what a high school graduate, or a reasonably literate adult, ought to know about Latin America from the standpoint of his field. They were to focus on the basic ideas, the key understandings, and the major generalizations. Supporting details and examples were to be used only to illustrate the larger ideas with no intent of providing an exhaustive treatment. The views expressed by these experts as to what is important to know about Latin America represent their own personal judgments. (TC)
THE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS LOOK AT LATIN AMERICA:
SIX POSITION PAPERS.

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Clark C. Gill and William H. Conroy, Directors
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Robert K. Holz, Assistant Professor of Geography, The University of Texas
This is a collection of six position papers by specialists on Latin America at The University of Texas in the fields of geography, history, economics, sociology, anthropology, and government. Each was asked to write a position paper on what a high school graduate, or a reasonably literate adult, ought to know about Latin America, from the standpoint of his field. They were to focus on the basic ideas, the key understandings, and the major generalizations; supportive details and examples were to be used only to illustrate the larger ideas with no intent of providing an exhaustive treatment.

After an initial meeting at which the *modus operandi* was agreed upon, each specialist was to prepare an outline of his paper to circulate among the others to minimize duplication and avoid gap. Other than the outlines and the finished papers, there were no further formal exchanges of ideas, and each specialist fulfilled his task independently with the minimum of consultation with his colleagues.

Working independently, each specialist developed his own approach and his own style. Professor Brand, with his vast storehouse of geographic information, saw fit to include more specific details, not with the intent that a high school graduate might be expected to know all these specifics, but to provide greater illumination for larger concepts. Professor Schmitt in his paper on Latin American Government and Politics chose to emphasize various teaching approaches rather than key content ideas, on the theory that existing references
could readily furnish the necessary content background but might not suggest teaching strategy. Professor Browning, a demographer, elected to write on population factors rather than the broader field of sociology, while Professor Adams, an anthropologist, included considerable attention to contemporary social institutions.

All of the writers faced some common difficulties. One was to present their ideas in a non-technical manner so that they would have maximum utility for teachers and curriculum makers. This is not an easy task for scholars used to writing for their colleagues. Another problem was to distill the most important concepts from their abundant knowledge and present those in limited space. One specialist remarked that he would have found it easier to write a book. Still another difficulty was to make a realistic judgment about what a high school graduate, or a non-specialist, could be expected to know about a field in which the writer himself had devoted a life-time of research and study.

Even definitions of terms like "Latin America" involved some difficulties. Professor Brand in his paper distinguishes "geographic" Latin America from "cultural" Latin America and extends his treatment to include the newly formed nations which were former British possessions. The other papers focus mainly on the 20 Latin American republics which were formerly colonies of Spain, Portugal, or France. No one knows better than the scholars how risky it is to generalize about an area so large and so disparate.

It should be emphasized that the views expressed by these experts as to what is important to know about Latin America represent their
own personal judgments, which may or may not be shared by other experts. Although there may be differences of opinion about ideas expressed or conclusions reached, no doubt should exist about the superior credentials of the writers themselves. Among them they combine long years of research, study, travel, government service, and teaching -- all connected with Latin America.

The writers of the position papers were asked not to involve themselves with curriculum or instructional problems. This is the job that remains to be done by the classroom teacher and curriculum committees. If these position papers have set forth useful goals and if they prompt a re-examination of the current social studies curriculum to determine the extent to which these goals are being realized, then they will have served a valid purpose.

Clark C. Gill and William B. Conroy
Directors
The University of Texas
June 1, 1967

Note: The position papers included herein were written pursuant to a contract with the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education, Washington, D.C.
Regional geography attempts to integrate and provide all of the information that is necessary to describe and understand a given region. Obviously there are limitations set by the length of the course or of the textbook, by the background of the teacher, and by the grade or level of the students.

In academic practice there are two kinds of regional geography. The first is nearly total in coverage and reflects the fact that geography is the oldest of the so-called "social sciences", dating back more than two thousand years, and the fact that geography is one of the three integrating disciplines along with history and philosophy. This first kind of regional geography is implied in the War Manpower Commission's initial statement concerning the professional occupation of geography: "The geographer studies the nature and use of areas and is trained to interpret the distributions, inter-relationships, and interactions of physical and cultural phenomena on the earth's surface." It is this kind of regional geography that should be taught when the student presumably has had little or no exposure to the given region in courses in other disciplines.

The second kind of regional geography of Latin America assumes that the student already has been or shortly will be exposed to courses on the history, anthropology,
economics, etc. of Latin America. The resultant course stresses the more innately geographic items such as physiography, climatology, biogeography, population geography, economic geography, political geography, historic geography, etc. Inasmuch as papers on Latin America have been written by specialists in the other social science disciplines, this paper will consider this second kind of regional geography.

**Definitions and Location**

There are three somewhat differing regions that are called Latin America. The most comprehensive is that part of the Americas or the New World that lies south of the United States (map 2). This is a geographic Latin America that, along with Anglo-America, comprises all of the New World. In regard to these two areas, it should be noted that commonly in the countries to the south of the United States, the term America or Americas is used for the great compound continent of North America-South America. Intermediate in comprehension is a cultural Latin America which comprises the countries with a language of Latin origin (Spanish, Portuguese, French). This cultural Latin America includes all of the republics to the south of the United States, and also such entities as Puerto Rico and the French overseas departments, but usually does not include the "Spanish Borderlands" within the United States nor French Canada. The smallest Latin America is a political concept as it comprises all of the members of the Organization of American States (and its secretariat the Pan American Union)
THE NEW WORLD

North America

Middle America

Central America

Latin America

South America

Anglo-America

MAP 2
excepting the United States but including Cuba, which was a member until recently. The Latin America with which this paper is concerned is the geographic Latin America; otherwise such entities as Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, etc. will not be considered in any normal regional treatment of the world.

The meaning of such ethnically derived regional terms as Ibero-America or Hispano-America (Spanish America and Lusco-America), Indo-America, and Afro-America, and the definitions of such terms as Middle America, Meso-America, Caribbean America, Central America, West Indies, Antilles, Spanish Main, Andean America, Guianas, Pampas, etc. should be known. Many U.S. citizens, including journalists and radio-TV commentators, have fuzzy ideas about these terms.

It is important also to know the location of Latin America, with respect to such regional divisions and concepts as New World, Western Hemisphere, Americas, the Indies (archaic), and Northern and Southern Hemispheres. The significance of the great latitudinal spread of Latin America on both sides of the bisecting Equator to beyond the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn should be understood, as well as the barrier nature of the great American continent from the time of Columbus until the Panama Canal. Also, although Middle America tapers as it advances into the Tropical region, the broadest part of South America is within the tropics and South America has the largest Tropical Rainforest of any continent. The extension
of South America into high southern latitudes should be noted, especially its being the only continent in the "Roaring Forties." In terms of orientation it is important to realize that most of Latin America lies not south but southeast of the United States, e.g., Antofagasta on the Pacific coast of Chile is east of the meridian that passes through Boston on the Atlantic coast of the United States (map 2), and the airline distance from Buenos Aires to Capetown, South Africa, is less than to Mexico City or New Orleans. Also not generally known is that the isthmus of Central America runs more east-west than north-south, and that it was because Balboa went south from the north sea (Atlantic-Caribbean) across the Isthmus of Darién to the shores of the Pacific that he gave the Pacific the name South Sea -- which name is still used in the form The South Seas.

Physical Geography

Geomorphology, surface configuration, elevation:

According to age and nature of the rocks, geomorphologists divide the surface of the earth into the ancient Old Lands, the intermediate Old Highlands, and the Young Highlands. All three major divisions are represented in Latin America (map 3). The rugged and labile Young Highlands dominate Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, and Andean South America. They have three main tectonic sub-divisions: the Cordilleran in northern Mexico with a general north-south trend or strike, the Antillean in southern Mexico, Central America, the West Indies, and northern South America with an east-west strike and an arrangement of mountain chains and depressions in great arcs, and the
Andean division with a north-south trend.

This Young Highlands region is one of the most tormented in the world by earthquake, tsunami, and volcanic eruption, especially along the eastern Pacific which is a portion of the "Girdle of Fire" which encircles the Pacific basin. In this connection, the role of earthquake and volcanic eruption is noteworthy in the cosmogony of a number of the native peoples, the movements of capitals and other cities such as the several locations of Guatemala City and of San Salvador, the replacement by modern cities of those ruined by quake and fire (as in such cases as Guatemala City after 1917-18 and Managua after 1931; the complete abandonment of St. Pierre in Martinique after the 1902 eruption of Mont Pele, and of the agricultural villages around Paricutin volcano in Michoacan, Mexico, in 1943), the enrichment of soils with volcanic ash in various areas, the special accommodations of architecture to earthquake menace in both colonial and modern times, and the avalanches and altered drainage patterns in such areas as south central Chile, the Callejon de Huaylas in Peru, and the Sierra basins of Ecuador. For these reasons, the significance of the location of the main zones of seismic and of volcanic activity in Latin America, all of which are located within the Young Highlands division or region, is apparent.

Also within this region are all of the great mountain ranges, high plateaus, and all of the mountain peaks with an elevation more than 10,000 feet. Knowledge of the various functions of the major mountain chains (mainly the Andes,
but somewhat the several Sierras Madres in Mexico and Central America) in conditioning climate, serving as a partial barrier to human movements, revealing mineral deposits, etc. is important to understanding the geography of this region. For comparison, it might be mentioned that South America has some 40 peaks higher than Mt. McKinley -- the highest in Anglo-America and North America; that three of the seven highest peaks in North America are in Mexico; and that the two highest mountains that look down on Atlantic waters are the Pico Colón in Colombia and Orizaba in Mexico.

Most of mankind live at elevations below 600 feet above sea level. This also is true for much of Latin America, as in Argentina, coastal Brazil, the West Indies, etc. Nevertheless, in Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and the Andean countries from Colombia to Bolivia, more than half of the population lives at elevations of more than 3,000 feet. Furthermore, Mexico City is the highest large city (more than 1,000,000) in the world; La Paz is the highest city of intermediate size (more than 300,000), and has the highest commercial airport in the world; and the highest permanent settlement in the world is in Perú. The highland areas are well inhabited by man, and should be stressed in the study of Latin America -- partly because they are mainly within the geographic tropics, and partly because of accessible mineral wealth. Of considerable interest is the adaptation of Mexicans and Andean peoples to living at relatively high elevations, and of fugitive interest is the trepidation with which the
athletes of many countries look forward to the next Olympic Games in Mexico City at nearly 8,000 feet elevation.

The Old Lands dominate most of South America, overtly in the Brazilian and Guyana Highlands, and presumably as the fundament under the north-south series of lowlands that runs from the Orinoco Delta to the Rib de la Plata (map 3). The many streams that flow off these highlands usually pass over a series of fall lines, and the resultant rapids, cascades, and falls contribute towards making the hydroelectric potential of this region one of the highest in the world. There are hydroelectric plants in operation in the region and planned projects for further development. Here also, in the Guyana Highlands, are some of the highest waterfalls in the world. Other items of significance in this region include the erosional remnants such as Roraima and Duida which served as the locale for Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's mythical Lost World, and the wealth of the region in diamonds, gold, iron, bauxite, manganese, other metals, and certain rare elements. Similarities between the Old Lands of South America and those of Africa can be noted, providing evidence for the theory of continental drift.

The Old Highlands region is represented chiefly in the Patagonian Plateau of southern Argentina.

Climates, Soils, and Vegetation:

Practically every major climate is represented in Latin America. For ease of presentation, precision, and comparability, it is advisable that the Koeppen system of climatic classification (which is widely used in college textbooks, and for
which commercial wall maps are available) be employed, but
descriptive classifications can be used. The major climate
most poorly represented in Latin America is the high latitude
and continental microthermal (D of Koeppen) climate, because
as southern South America advances into higher latitudes the
elevations become lower and the landmass tapers off. Seasonal
distribution, amount, and variability of precipitation should
be noted. A major part of Latin America has a summer concentra-
tion of precipitation; next in areal importance come the
climates with precipitation in all seasons; third are the
areas of constant drought; and a very minor fraction has a
winter concentration of precipitation. The rainiest areas
include the northern Choco of Colombia and eastern Panama,
where the annual precipitation is among the highest normally
recorded over the world, as well as areas of tropical rain-
forest and tropical monsoon scattered from southeastern
Mexico to eastern Brazil, and areas of temperate rainforest
from eastern Mexico to southern Chile. The driest regions
are in northwestern Mexico, coastal Peru and northern Chile.
Although the deserts of Latin America do not compare with
Old World and Australian deserts in size, probably the areas
most lacking in precipitation are to be found in northern Chile.
Of note is the somewhat analogous nature of the terrain,
climate, and vegetation of the Chilean coast and of the coast
from Baja California to British Columbia -- desert, succeeded
by steppe, then Mediterranean climate, followed by a humid
temperate climate of increasing precipitation polewards for
a ways (in which grow the redwood and other big trees in North
America, and the alerce in Chile). Also, in both regions
are a great central valley, many islands, and fiords. Factors
conditioning the regime and quantity of precipitation should
be understood, such as cyclonic control in the "roaring forties",
cold equatorward moving currents plus upwelling cold water
along the Pacific coast steppes and deserts, the northeast and
southeast trades, the checking effect of the Andes, monsoonal
effects, etc.

Pressure structures, wind systems, and the distribution
of temperature climates should be investigated in considerable
detail, as well as the nature, relationship, and effects of
the main marine currents and streams. Some attention should
be given to the cold pamperos and nortes, as well as to the
hurricanes (name originated in the West Indies) of both the
Caribbean and Pacific areas. Stress should be placed on the
fact that the tropics of Latin America do not have the highest
temperatures, which are encountered in the Gulf of California
coastlands and the Argentine-Paraguayan Chaco. However, the
human body "feels" the heat -- the sensible temperature --
most in the humid tropics as along the geographic Equator in
the Amazon basin and along the heat equator in the Guyana
coastlands although the maxima temperatures practically never
reach 100° F. Quite small absolute temperature ranges occur
in parts of both lowland and highland areas within the tropics
although there are great ranges of temperature in parts of
Mexico and Argentina -- amounting to nearly or even more than
100 degrees. The reaction of different peoples and races to
the humid tropics vary; the Old World Negro and even the White
man seem to be better able to endure the climate than the
native Amerindians.

Relatively little is known about the soils of most of Latin America. However, it is evident that between areas of waterlogged soils or too much precipitation, areas of insufficient precipitation, too steep slopes for cultivation, hard rock surfaces, very thin soils, too porous soils, too saline soils, and otherwise poor soils, there really is not much good arable soil in Latin America. However, pressure of population on the land has caused many stringers of alluvium and areas of less-good soils in the arid and semi-arid regions of Mexico, Perú, Chile and elsewhere to be brought under cultivation with irrigation. Theoretically the best soils in Latin America include, besides alluviums, the chernozems of the Pampas, the terra roxa of southern Brazil, the calcareous soils of western and central Cuba, the volcanic-ash enriched soils of Central America, and the varied but frequently fertile soils of many mountain areas. There probably is the most argument about the ultimate value and productivity of the latosols of the continuously humid tropics in the Amazon basin. Although it is now possible to tailor-make soils through the use of fertilizers and other additives, most of Latin America does not have either the capital or the technology to accomplish this on a large scale. It is important to realize that in terms of climate, soil, and terrain, the United States probably has more good arable soil than does all of Latin America, although Latin America is nearly two and a half times the area of the United States.
A varied mosaic of vegetation types reflects the variations in climate, soil, and terrain. These range, in tree or forest formation, from the subarctic "beech" forests of southern Chile, through the tropical rainforest selvas of the Amazon basin, to the pine and oak forests of Mexico. Shrub or scrub formations vary from the montes of the outer Argentine Pampas, and the caatingas of northeastern Brazil to the thorny scrub of northwestern Mexico. The Patagonian steppe, pampas, campos, and llanos of South America and the north Mexican mesquite-grasslands are dominantly herbaceous, but vary greatly in the proportion of tree and scrub to herbaceous elements. A general picture should be developed of the Latin American vegetation primarily in terms of formation and of climatic relationship. Also, some of the outstanding products of the wild or natural vegetation should be noted, such as mahogany, Spanish cedar (which is a relative of the mahogany and not a conifer), Paraná pine (which is not a pine but an Araucaria), true pines in parts of Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies, oaks through Mexico and Central America into Colombia, dyewoods such as brazilwood and mora, balsa, rubbers, chicle, various drugstuffs, quebracho and cascabel tannins, etc. It would be useful to know that true pines extend southward only into Nicaragua. Although there is a deficiency of softwoods, Latin America has an enormous supply of tropical hardwoods which are used for everything from digging sticks and charcoal to fine cabinet woods and bearings. Also significant are the more important contributions of the Latin American flora to the world, including
such items as Hevea or Para rubber, coca, cinchona, and the vanilla orchid.

**Fauna and Biogeography:**

The outstanding fact of biogeography is the extension of northern or Nearctic forms in a dominant fashion out of the United States in a wedge form over the Mexican plateau and in attenuated fashion into Central America, while southern or Neotropical forms extend out of South America over most of Central America and then extend in a V-shape along the Pacific and Gulf of Mexico lowlands of Mexico to approximately southern Sonora and southern Tamaulipas. The ranges of a few animals can illustrate these distributions. Mountain or bighorn sheep, antelope or pronghorn, beaver, and prairie dogs extend out of the United States into northern Mexico; badgers and wolves reach the southern portion of the Mexican plateau; and the coyote is found south into Costa Rica. Examples from the south include the tapir which reaches southeastern Mexico, spider monkeys and kinkajous which extend farther north within Mexico, and jaguars, javalinas, and armadillos which are found at varying distances into the United States. A third element may have been contributed by the desert and steppe lands centering in the Chihuahau-Coahuila desert, whence such floristic items as the entire cactus family, the yucca group, and the Agave genus may have spread. Most students will be interested in such forms as the capybara (the largest rodent known), the cameloids of South America (llama, alpaca, vicuna, and guanacu), the poisonous bushmaster and fer-de-lance, the giant condor of the Andes, the sloth, the chinchilla, the guinea pig (actually
a rodent native of western South America), the piranha fish, and the anaconda (possibly the largest snake known). Overall, the Neotropics are poor in ungulates and insectivores, and relatively rich in such forms as marsupials, primates, edentate rodents, and other mammalian orders. The hummingbird family is native to Latin America, as are some other avian families including the rhea or New World "ostrich". In terms of ecology or habitat forms, Latin America is especially well endowed with riparian, amphibious, and arboreal forms, as well as desert dwellers. Although the Amerindians domesticated very few animals, Latin America has contributed to the world such animals as the llama and alpaca, the guinea pig, and the turkey, and the Amerindians had a variety of dogs but no domesticated cats.

Hydrography:

An outstanding fact is the abundance of great rivers and the paucity of great lakes. The Amazon river dwarfs all other rivers of the globe in every respect excepting length, and if one takes the farthest removed headwaters (Ucayali-Apurimac) instead of the customary Marañón, the Amazon probably is longer than either the Nile or the Mississippi-Missouri. The annual flow of the Amazon is estimated to equal or exceed that of the next six to nine greatest rivers of the world combined. It also has more miles of streams in its drainage basin, and more miles of navigable streams by any draft criterion, and the largest drainage basin by about a million square miles. The Plata-Parana would rank between second and sixth in the world
by flow, and the Orinoco, Tocantins, and São Francisco would also rank among the mighty rivers. It is evident that although most of South America is well supplied with great rivers, the Pacific coast of South America and most of Middle America have only relatively small rivers. However, some of the rivers on the Pacific coast of Colombia, and several of the rivers of the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean vertinent of Mexico and Central America are of considerable size and importance. Only coastal lake Maracaibo and lakes Titicaca and Nicaragua rank among the larger lakes of the world in surface area or in water content.

Natural Resources:

Latin America is outstanding for its resources of minerals, tropical hardwoods, marine products, and waterpower. Petroleum, natural gas (mainly utilized in Mexico), and waterpower (leading resources are in Brazil) comprise the chief sources of energy to date as there is relatively little coal, the radioactive rocks of Mexico and Brazil have not been exploited, and geothermal energy (geysers and drilled steam wells in volcanic areas) is still in a pioneer stage in such areas as northwestern Mexico, Hidalgo, and the Lesser Antilles. Due to the poor distribution of known and exploited petroleum pools, most of Latin America must import petroleum and products, e.g., the West Indies outside of Trinidad and a slight production in Cuba, Central America, Mexico outside of the Gulf of Mexico lowlands, Brazil outside of the northeast coastal sector, Chile outside of Tierra del Fuego, etc.
There is a great wealth and variety of metals, excepting in the Lesser Antilles, Uruguay and Paraguay. Apparently Mexico has the greatest variety, which ranges from antimony to zinc. Large deposits of high-grade iron ore are known in Brazil, and important deposits are known and worked from Chile to Mexico and Cuba. Eastern Latin America from Jamaica through the Guianas to Brazil produces a large fraction of the world's bauxite, while the Young Highlands of western South America and Middle America produce large quantities of such items as silver, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, antimony, bismuth, molybdenum, tin, platinum, nitrate, and iodine. Gold is produced widely, and eastern Latin America produces manganese, chromite, beryllium, etc. A number of Latin American countries are among the top three or four producers of many minerals, e.g., silver (Mexico), copper (Chile), petroleum (Venezuela), tin (Bolivia), bauxite (Jamaica), and sulfur (Mexico). Actually, we tend to rate a country's resources in terms of production or export, which frequently are not reliable criteria as witness Argentina, an important petroleum producer which imports petroleum, or Jamaica which produced no bauxite a relatively few years ago and which now leads the world in production and export. It would be useful to organize the study of mineral resources and production in terms of such groups as fuels, ferrous metals, ferro-alloys, non-ferrous primary metals, etc.

The hardwoods of tropical America and the hydroelectrical potential of Brazil have been mentioned previously. Although most Latin Americans eat little fish (relatively or absolutely),
there has been a great development of fishing for the tuna group of fishes in the eastern Pacific waters, of catching and processing shrimp in Middle American waters, and most recently, of catching the anchovies and other small fish off the coast of Peru and converting them into fishmeal -- which has made of Peru the leading fish-catching nation of the world by tonnage.

Cultural Geography

Cultural geography is concerned with the distribution of man and his works over the face of the earth, and with human ecology or the interrelationship of groups of humans and their physical and social (or cultural) environments. Historical geography normally is cultural geography with historical depth or perspective, but in this outline little attention is given to historical geography. However, the cultural landscape today is quite different from what it was one hundred, or two hundred years ago, and so on. For example, two hundred years ago coffee was practically unknown in Brazil, Colombia, Central America and Mexico; the eucalyptus tree was unknown in the New World including Brazil, Argentina, and Chile where now there are important plantings; the bougainvillea and jacaranda ornamentals were to be seen only in their native South America; and the mango was practically unknown in the American tropics.

A number of cultural elements might best be treated in some disciplines other than geography, but from the point of view of the geographer he must discuss them at least briefly in order to obtain the type of treatment that he feels is
essential to understanding a given region. Among these elements are race, language, religion, education, and nationalism and regionalism.

Race:

Race is properly a biologic fact, but widely over the world -- including Latin America -- the definitions of race are more cultural than biologic. Because the white man conquered the Amerindian and brought the Negro over to serve as a slave, there is a widely spread attitude that places White blood at the top as a "good" thing and a mark of prestige, while Indian blood and Negro blood rank at the bottom of the totem pole, and the mixed blood mestizo or mulatto ranks in between. However, unlike the United States where anyone with perceptible Negro blood is considered to be a Negro, in the West Indies and other areas a colored person with perceptible White blood is ipso facto a White man. Also, it is possible for a person born an Amerindian to progress during his lifetime through the "culture race" of mestizo to that of a White merely by acquiring the speech, education, clothing, occupation, social position, and other trappings commonly associated with the breed or race. Consequently, widely throughout Latin America the official or popular statements of the racial composition of any given country are to be considered to be more of economic and social class than of race. For example, by census reports Cuba and Puerto Rico are more than three-quarters "white," while we would be inclined to state that Cuba is biologically about 50% Negroid and that Puerto Rico is at least 60% Negroid. Overall, we
would estimate Latin America to be about 33% Mestizo, 30% White, 22% Negroid, and 15% predominantly Amerindian. The Whites are mainly in Argentina, Uruguay and southern Brazil; the Negroids occupy a great arc sweeping through the West Indies, the Caribbean coasts, the Guianas, and much of Brazil; the Mestizo population is scattered from Brazil and Chile to Mexico; and the Amerindians are in two discrete blocks -- south and eastern Mexico, Guatemala, and western El Salvador and Honduras, and in the Andean countries of South America. Probably the Mestizo countries (more than 50% Mestizo) are Nicaragua, Venezuela, Chile, Mexico, Colombia, and El Salvador. The Amerindian countries are Guatemala, Paraguay, Ecuador, Bolivia and possibly Perú.

Language:

Spanish (correctly it is Castilian as there are other Spanish languages such as Catalan and Basque) is the language spoken as a mother tongue by the greatest number of people in Latin America, and it is the national language of most of the nations in Latin America. However, Brazilian Portuguese is the second language, and probably is spoken by more people in South America than is Spanish because of the large blocks of non-Spanish speakers in Spanish South America. Far behind these two would come French (mainly in Haiti and the French West Indies), and the Amerindian Quechua (Perú, Ecuador, Bolivia, and the other Andean countries). Other Amerindian languages of fair importance would be Aymara (Perú, Bolivia, Chile),
Mexicano (Mexico and Central America), Maya (Mexico, and Central America), Quiché (Guatemala), Guarani (Paraguay), and Zapotec (Mexico). Among other fairly important European languages are English (West Indies, Guianas, and scattered wherever United States, British or Canadian capital is invested), Italian (scattered in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay), German (scattered in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Paraguay), Dutch (Surinam and the Dutch Antilles), and Slavic and Indic languages and Japanese. The "national" languages, it will be noted, are Spanish, Portuguese, French, English, Dutch, and Guarani (which vies with Spanish in Paraguay). The Lesser Antilles and certain areas of Amerindian languages such as the Mexican states of Oaxaca and Chiapas, the republic of Guatemala, and certain parts of Brazil, Paraguay, Perú, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador probably have the greatest variety of different languages within relatively small areas. However, such great metropolises as Mexico City and Buenos Aires house representatives of many languages from widely over the world. English has tended to replace French and German in such roles as the language of diplomacy and science, as well as of technology and commerce. Spanish (Castilian) is so widely spread and has developed within areas of locally important Amerindian languages for so long that regional dialects have developed. Commonly six are recognized: the West Indian (West Indies, Venezuela, coastal Colombia) influenced by Ardwak and Carib; Mexican (Mexico and Central America into Panama) influenced by Mexicano and to a lesser degree by Maya; Andean (Highland Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, Bolivia) influenced by Quechua;
Chilean; Platean (Argentina and Uruguay); and Paraguayan influenced by Guarani. Comparing the Spanish of the educated classes, probably the "best" Castilian is spoken in the Mexican and Andean regions, and the "poorest" is spoken in the Platean and Chilean. Brazilian Portuguese also can be divided into a number of regional dialects plus the Tupi-based Lingoa Geral of the interior.

Religion:

The Roman Apostolic Catholic religion is nominally at least the religion of some 95% of the population of Latin America. Protestants, Pagans and atheists, and Jews would represent most of the remaining population, followed distantly by such groups as Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist. The importance of the Roman Apostolic Catholic religion for a geographic treatment of Latin America is not so much its tremendous historical impact on theology, education, and mores in the region, as it is its expression in the landscape, on the map, and in the development of administrative jurisdictions. The effect on the landscape is very striking, and it is expressed chiefly through religious structures and crosses. Normally the largest and most imposing structure in a Roman Catholic Latin American community is the church or chapel, and the first indication one gets of the presence of a community is the bell tower of the church or one or three crosses on a nearby mound or hill. Usually when the missionary priests of the colonial period found a pagan (native) temple, shrine or other sacred place, it was partially or completely razed and in its place would be erected a church, chapel, shrine or at least a cross.
Also, where people have died or been killed, at the tops of mountain passes, and on top of most dominant hills and mountains there will be a cross, often nearly engulfed by the votive stones deposited by the passersby. A glance at almost any map of Latin America will show the influence of Roman Catholic Christianity on the place names -- which range from the names of countries (El Salvador, República Dominicana, Trinidad and Tobago), major cities (Santiago de Chile, Santiago de Cuba, São Paulo, etc.), and governmental subdivisions (Mexican state of Veracruz, Guatemalan departments of Verapaz Alta and Baja, Argentine province of San Juan), to practically every other category of place name (river Madre de Dios, Todos Santos bay, Sangre de Cristo mountains, etc.). A refinement of the distribution of religion-connected place names is the predominance of the names favored by a given missionary order in the areas in which it had been dominant, e.g., San Ignacio and San Javier in Jesuit areas, of San Nicolás and San Agustín in Augustinian areas, etc.

The Roman Catholic religion was the state religion throughout the colonial period in the Spanish and Portuguese possessions, and continued to be in the resultant republics into the second half of the nineteenth century. In fact, six of the republics still exercise the patronato, and in a majority of these the Roman Catholic faith is the state religion. This long history of close relationship between Church and State is expressed in the fact that a very large portion of the civil administrative jurisdictions (from states down to municipios) have grown out of the colonial dioceses, provinces of the regulars, doctrinas,
parishes and other ecclesiastic administrative units. The degree of official religiosity in Latin America ranges from that of such nations as Argentina and Paraguay where there is a religious test for office down to that of Mexico, which is the only Latin American republic which does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Vatican. Latin America has about 35% of the world's Roman Catholics (Brazil leads the world in number of Roman Catholics), and Latin America recently has been receiving increased representation in the college of cardinals.

Government, International Relations, and Political Geography:

The geographer is interested in the nature of government and in international relations for a number of reasons -- both of a general nature and specifically geographic. Commonly the nations with a federated form of government are termed "United States" (Mexico, Brazil and until recently Venezuela), and these nations are subdivided into "states" (Argentina is the exception, which is divided into "provinces"). The other nations have as the secondary subdivision entities that are termed departments in ten nations, provinces in six, counties in three, and parishes in Barbados. In many instances where the department is the secondary subdivision, the province is the tertiary subdivision, and vice versa. The student should be warned of this confusion; and also it should be pointed out that throughout most of Latin America the municipio is the basic governmental unit, but this is not to be equated with a United States municipality but rather with something between a New England town and a southern county. Furthermore, most English language reference works on Latin America commonly
give as city populations what are actually populations of municipios embracing varying numbers of rural population.

There are now 24 independent nations in geographic Latin America, but a number of these are so small in area or population or natural resources, or all three elements, that their viability is questionable. The range in area and population is from giant Brazil (5th largest in the world with 3,286,470 square miles and eighth most populous with more than 82,000,000 population) down to tiny Barbados (166 square miles and 245,000 population). Attempts to improve the economic position of various of these nations have been made through such regional groupings as LAFTA, the Central American Common Market, and an association of all the official petroleum companies or monopolies in the petroleum producing nations of Latin America.

The Geographer to the United States Department of State has been most concerned with such items as the extent of territorial waters, boundary disputes, and claims to various islands. Some of these involve the United States (such as the recently resolved Chamizal dispute with Mexico, and unresolved claims to a number of Caribbean Islands), but most of them do not. However, a matter of much concern to the United States and many other maritime nations is the claim by Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Argentina to fishing rights out some 200 miles from their shores, as well as the claim by some other nations to territorial waters out some nine miles versus the old commonly accepted three miles. Knowledge of the work of the United States-Mexican Boundary and Water Commission,
and also of our various leaseholds and other impermanent possessions in Latin America such as Guantánamo Bay and the Corn Islands is also important in the study of conflicting territorial claims in Latin America. Wall maps show disputed boundaries, such as the recently settled Honduran-Nicaraguan boundary, and the once-settled boundary between Ecuador and Perú which has come "unstuck". Famous settlements of such disputes include the resolution of the Tacna and Arica dispute between Perú and Chile, and those arbitrated by presidents of the United States (e.g., Paraguay-Argentina, Brazil-Argentina), or by various European monarchs (Argentina-Chile, etc.). Also mentionable is the fact that the boundary between the United States and Mexico is one of the very few carefully surveyed and marked international boundaries in Latin America. Knowledge of the various types of law pertaining to land tenure and survey systems and units that obtain in Latin America is useful in considering the subject of boundary claims.

Education and Literacy:

The amount and quantity of education available is highly important in determining the quality of resource inventories and national planning. There are tropical agricultural schools in Puerto Rico, Honduras, Costa Rica, Trinidad, etc., as well as universities and technical schools. Nevertheless, a high percentage of illiteracy obtains in general. Although the basis for computing illiteracy percentages vary, the most literate among Latin American nations is Barbados (with less than one per cent illiteracy), followed by Uruguay, Argentina, and Costa Rica (9 to 12% illiteracy). The most illiterate nation is Haiti (about 90% illiteracy), which probably is
followed by Guatemala and Bolivia (around 69%). Apparently some ten nations have an illiteracy percentage of more than 50%, and these nations contain more than half of the population of Latin America.

Nationalism and Regionalism:

Although the first independent nation in Latin America was Haiti in 1804, and 18 other nations came into existence during the nineteenth century, it has been chiefly in this twentieth century that most of these countries achieved a strong feeling of nationality. Along with this has gone an attempt at greater economic self-sufficiency, chiefly through industrialization. These Latin American nations vary greatly in their cohesiveness and in the strength of regionalism. Chile might stand for those countries which have achieved a very strong sense of nationality, with very little regionalism; while in such countries as Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, there are large blocks of the population that do not effectively participate in the national life, and in which there are marked differences between the Costa and the Sierra, or the North and the South, or the Puna and the Valles.

Population Geography:

The population explosion, uneven distribution of population, and the trend to the cities or urbanization are perhaps the most noteworthy demographic items. Improved sanitation, medical care, drugs, diet and the more stable political situation have contributed importantly to the high rate of growth. Latin America in 1960 had approximately the same population as Anglo-America (an estimated 198,000,000),
while in 1965 apparently Latin America had about 240,000,000 versus some 220,000,000 in Anglo-America. This population is very unevenly distributed. The majority of the population in South America and the West Indies live in the lower lands and within 200 miles of the seacoast, while the bulk of the population in Mexico and Central America is in the highlands. Density of population in the 24 nations varies from more than 1,400 to the square mile in Barbados to about eight in Guyana. However, the major densities are in the West Indian and Central American countries where nine nations have a higher density than does the United States, while every country in South America (including even Ecuador) has a lesser density. It is in South America that a number of countries (notably Brazil and Peru) offer the greatest opportunities for new frontier areas.

Throughout its history Latin America has been essentially rural and agricultural, and despite a relatively recent and highly important trend towards urbanization more than half of the population is still rural by any of the common definitions of rural versus urban habitation. Here it should be mentioned that there is no agreement as to the size of the native population within the bounds of geographic Latin America as of 1492. However, increasingly many anthropologists and geographers are raising their estimates, and it now seems likely that the 1492 total population was as large as the current rural population of Latin America.

Despite the trend towards urbanization and the modern development of huge cities and conurbations (Latin America
has five cities with more than 2,500,000, and perhaps a
dozen altogether with more than a million population),
the domination of the city goes back to pre-conquest times.
From Mexico to Chile, within the areas of higher civilization,
the bulk of the people were dominated from a relatively small
number of "cities" which combined religious, market, and admin-
istrative functions. By the time of the European conquest,
the military function was well combined with the theocratic --
from Tzintzuntzan and Tenochtitlan to Quito and Cuzco. The
European cities for the most part continued throughout the
colonial period and well into the nineteenth century with the
same main functions -- religious, commercial, civil adminis-
trative and military. The chief exceptions were the cities
that developed at ports and mining camps. In the latter part
of the nineteenth century, and especially during the past 30
years, modern industrialization has both augmented some of the
older cities and converted villages and towns into competitors.
A useful concept to develop is that of the "primate city" --
so much larger and more important in nearly all functions than
any other in the country. Montevideo, Mexico City, Santiago
de Chile, and Lima are excellent examples -- several times
larger than any other city, and the political, ecclesiastic,
commercial, financial, educational and cultural centers of
their nations. There are also several examples of dual rivalry--
such as between Guayaquil and Quito in Ecuador, or between Leon
and Granada in Nicaragua which was solved by developing a third
center at Managua, or the old triple rivalry in Brazil which
turned into a competition between Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo
which has been complicated by the building of a new capital at
Brasilia.

The nature of population movements or migration needs to be outlined, at least briefly. There was relatively little European immigration until the second half of the nineteenth century, and then chiefly to southeastern South America — Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina. Most countries, from Mexico to Chile, neither send out nor receive many migrants. The chief areas of emigration are in the densely populated islands of the West Indies. The motives for migration have been primarily economic, and secondarily political. Internal migration has been chiefly to the larger cities; however a variety of new settlement frontiers are being developed in various countries, e.g., the irrigation frontier of north Mexico, the petro-chemical frontier on the Veracruz coast, the banana frontiers of the Central American coastlands, and the sporadic settlements into the tropical and subtropical interior of South America — from Brazil to Peru and from Argentina to Colombia. Examples might be given of "hollow frontiers" (e.g., São Paulo and Paraná in Brazil), and of the rather rare well-settled international boundary area (United States - Mexico, Colombia - Ecuador, Peru - Bolivia).

Economic Geography:

Too much stress cannot be placed on the basically agricultural nature of Latin America. More than half of the labor force is engaged in agriculture (agropecuarian activities which include livestock raising). Probably in all of the nations, excepting Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela, agriculture engages more than 50% of the gainfully employed. However, thanks to
the higher wages paid in industry, in recent years the manufacturing sector has nosed out the agricultural in terms of contributions to the Gross National Product. These two sectors, along with commerce and construction, contribute nearly 80% of the GNP. In such great agricultural nations as Argentina and Mexico, the agricultural sector is behind both manufacturing and commerce.

Variety characterizes Latin America's agriculture: subsistence farming and commercial farming (which includes both large plantations such as banana and small farms such as many coffee fincas); agriculture in humid areas, in dry-farming regions, and under irrigation; and an agricultural technology which ranges from the most modern type of mechanized farming to primitive reliance on the digging stick. Maize (Indian corn) is of great importance to Latin America's economy and diet. It occupies the greatest acreage of any crop, is the leading crop by acreage in more than half of the nations including such agricultural giants as Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, and is the single most important element in the diet. Sugarcane dominates the acreage and agricultural landscape in the West Indies, while alfalfa and wheat dominate Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Overall, the leading crops of the Latin American agricultural landscape are, in approximate order of acreage, maize, wheat, cotton, coffee, beans, sugarcane, alfalfa, rice, sunflowers, flax for linseed, barley, manioc, oats, potatoes, rye, and bananas and plantains. More than 40% of Latin America's exports are agricultural -- led by coffee, sugar, and cotton. These exports supply more than half of the world's exports of coffee, bananas, linseed oil, and
sugar, and substantial shares of the cacao, maize, meats, cotton, and wool. However, despite the great importance of agriculture, food production has not kept pace with the growth of population. This is chiefly because about 80% of the crop area in Latin America yields less than the world average for the staple commodities. Native agricultural contributions of Latin America to the world are numerous, including such plants as maize, the New World cottons, potato, tobacco, kidney beans, sweet potato, manioc, cacao, tomatoes, pumpkins, and squashes, chile peppers, pineapple, avocado, anonas, coca, etc. (listed in approximate order of world acreage and value).

Latin America (especially Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay and Paraguay) holds an important position in the world as a producer and exporter of meats, hides and skins, wool, and other animal products. Also, despite increasing mechanization of farms and use of automotive transportation in Latin America, there still is a great reliance on draft and pack animals.

Important areas of livestock raising range from the artificial meadows and natural ranges of Argentina, through the campos and llanos of Brazil, Venezuela, and Colombia, to the grasslands of northern Mexico. In most Latin American countries the bulk of the livestock are not in the open range-lands but in the more densely settled crop farming regions. This is comparable to the dense livestock population in the agricultural heartland of the United States from Kansas and Iowa to Ohio and Kentucky. With the exception of the native cameloids in the Andean countries, the important species of livestock are natives of the Old World. These are cattle
(more properly termed oxen), sheep, hogs, equines (horses, asses and mules), and goats. Here it should be pointed out that Brazil and not Argentina is the leading livestock raising nation of Latin America. Furthermore, Brazil commonly ranks among the five leading nations of the world in numbers of such animals as oxen, hogs, and goats. There are more than 215,000,000 head of oxen in Latin America, more than half of which are in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Colombia. These are mainly creole (descendants of animals introduced in the colonial period), Herefords, and other western European strains of Bos taurus, but increasing numbers of the zebu (Bos indicus) are being raised because of its better resistance to tropical climates and parasites. The multiple role of oxen should be pointed out -- work, meat, milk, hide and entertainment.

Mexico is the only country in the world where bull fights and bullfighters compare with those in Spain, although there is some bullfighting in several other Latin American countries. There are more than 130,000,000 sheep in Latin America, mainly in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Peru. Also, there are more than 90,000,000 hogs, of which more than half are in Brazil. Chickens are present very widely, but the turkey (although probably first domesticated in Mexico) is relatively unimportant as are the other barn fowl. Mention also should be made of bees since Brazil and Mexico are among the world's leading exporters of honey and beeswax.

For historical reasons, much has been made of mining in Latin America. However, not even in colonial times was mining as important as agriculture, and today it contributes only about
6% to the Gross National Product. Only in Venezuela, Trinidad, and possibly Bolivia is mining the leading sector of the economy, and in no country does mining employ more than a very small fraction of the labor force. Petroleum is the most valuable mineral produced, and petroleum and products constitute the leading export from Latin America. Other important minerals to be mentioned are bauxite, iron ore, copper, silver, lead, zinc, tin, gold, sulfur, nitrate, and manganese. Also brief mention might be made of emeralds from the ancient mines of Colombia, diamonds in the production of which Brazil once led the world, platinum from Colombia, quartz crystal from Brazil, and the many types of gem stones and rare elements found in Brazil. The United States is playing an important role in Latin American mineral extraction, especially in the mining of iron ore, bauxite, copper, and silver.

Despite a history going back into early colonial times, the exploitation of forest products never has been an important element in the economy of most of the countries of Latin America. The earliest items of exploitation for other than local use were dyewoods (such as Brazil wood that gave its name to Brazil, and logwood or Campeche), leguminous woods such as dividivi and cascalote for use as tannins, and various sources of drugs such as ipecac, jalap or raiz de Michoacan, and the like. Somewhat later cabinet woods and other hardwoods (mahogany, Spanish cedar, etc.), rubber (from Hevea, Castilloa), chicle, cinchona (for quinine), coca and other forest products made an appearance in the export lists. Currently there is a considerable production of softwoods in Mexico and Central America (chiefly pine),
in Brazil (Paraná pine which is an *Araucaria*), and to a lesser extent in Chile (*Araucaria* and formerly *alerce*). The great forest wealth of Latin America rests in its tropical hardwoods, but the exploitation is limited and is mainly for local consumption. Among other items of some current importance are the quebracho (for tannin) from Argentina and Paraguay, wild yerba mate collected in southeastern South America, the extraordinarily light balsa, various palms (for oil, wax, fiber, etc.) especially in Brazil, oleoresins (such as the misnamed Balsam of Peru, and Tolu balsam), various drug plants and insecticides, various fiber plants, candelilla wax, orchids, balatá, orchilla, tonka bean, vegetable ivory, and Brazil nuts. Basically, the main use of forest products has been for construction, fuel, fiber, food, drugs, etc., for local consumption.

Although the Europeans who colonized Latin America came from fishing and fish-eating nations, nevertheless the majority of Latin Americans both relatively and absolutely eat little fish or other marine foods. With the exception of the immediate coastal areas (especially in the Caribbean region), there has been little attempt to tap the resources of the sea until quite recently. However, in the past ten or so years there has been such a boom in the fishing industry that a number of countries (from the United States and Mexico to Brazil and Uruguay) have extended their marine jurisdiction out to twelve miles, and four nations (Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Argentina) claim jurisdiction over fishing rights out 200 miles. This has been chiefly because of the intrusion of foreign fishing craft searching for tuna, anchovy, sardines, and shrimp, as well as other marine inhabitants.
Since 1962 Peru has been the leading fishing nation in the world in terms of tonnage landed, principally anchovies. Chile ranks about twelfth. However, in these two leading fishing nations of Latin America, the overwhelming bulk of the catch is converted into fishmeal and fishoil which are used mainly in preparing animal foods. Since fishmeal and fishoil (in the export of which Peru leads the world) are quite less valuable than marine products for human consumption, Peru ranks relatively far down the list of fishing nations by value of the catch, although it does lead the Latin American countries. The other important Latin American fishing nations by tonnage are Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela. In these nations, inland waters contribute an appreciable although minor fraction of the fish catch. A great variety of marine products is involved in the Latin American fisheries industry. These include food fish (such as the tunas, sardines, catfish, mackerels, sea bass, flying fish, red snapper, swordfish, drumfish, mullet, snook, sawfish, etc.), fish for meal and oil (mainly anchovies, sardines, hake, and sharks), crustaceans (shrimp, spiny lobster, crabs), mollusks (oysters, mussels, clams, abalone, scallops, octopus, and squid), whales, and turtles. Shrimp and anchovies are the most valuable. In an earlier period, pearls and mother-of-pearl from Venezuela, Panama, and Mexico were important in world markets, as well as sponges from the West Indian waters. Also of note in considering this aspect of Latin American geography are: the Peruvian current which swarms with anchovies, the different products and techniques of the inland waters, the brackish coastal lagoons, the fishing
grounds on the continental shelf, the deep sea fisheries, and the growing importance of coastal resorts and areas which specialize in sports fishing (such as the Bahamas, Acapulco, etc.), where world records have been set for such fish as barracuda, bonito, dolphin, wahoo, snook, white sea bass, marlin, swordfish, sailfish, and tarpon.

Manufacturing is now the chief sector contributing to the Gross National Product in Latin America as a whole. Such industrial development depends on fuel and power, as well as on raw materials, capital, skilled labor, markets, etc. Most of the power developed in Latin America is of the thermal type (i.e., derived from combusting petroleum, natural gas, wood and charcoal, or coal -- in that order of importance -- to produce electricity or steam power). Electricity is the chief form of power used in Latin American industry, and most of this is thermal-electricity (as in Mexico and Argentina) although in such countries as Brazil and Chile, hydro-electricity is dominant. Other sources of energy, besides internal combustion engines and steam engines, are wind power (used to a minor extent to pump water), and sources which as yet are in the experimental stage in Latin America (such as geothermal in Mexico and the West Indies; nuclear or atomic in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina; solar, and tidal).

The leading nations in total energy consumption are Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia. Among these nations, with the exception of Brazil, petroleum is the chief source of energy (providing 60% to 80% of the total), usually followed by natural gas (16% to 33%), coal, hydroelectricity,
and wood and charcoal. In Brazil hydroelectricity is dominant, and wood and charcoal are more important than in any other of the industrial nations. Venezuela, as the third largest producer of petroleum in the world, has ample supplies of petroleum, as does Mexico (the second producer in Latin America), and also Argentina and Colombia. However Argentina's production of petroleum is frequently hampered by nationalistic politics. The leading producers and consumers of natural gas are Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina and Colombia. However, until recently Venezuela flared a major portion of her natural gas production. Latin America is relatively poor in coal. The leading producers are Colombia, Brazil, Mexico and Chile. Hydroelectricity is being developed at a very rapid rate, both for its own sake and in connection with irrigation and flood control projects. In overall installed capacity for electricity of all forms the leading countries are Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Cuba. Between 2/3 and 3/4 of the kilowat-hourage produced in Brazil is hydroelectrical. To date, most of this has been along the coastal escarpment in São Paulo state, on the São Francisco river, and elsewhere near the east coast. However, currently several large projects are building on the Rio Grande and the Paraná, and in the future the world's greatest hydroelectric source will be exploited at the Sete Quedas. Currently (since 1964) a project is being developed on the Caroni river in the Guayana of Venezuela which, when completed, will provide 6,000,000 KW and this will be one of the two or three largest installations in the world. Other great hydroelectric projects are completed or in construction,
including the Infiernillo on the Balsas and the Malpaso on the Grijalva in Mexico, and the San Juan-Atrato canal and the hydroelectric project being planned by Colombia. Although the absolute quantities of electricity produced are important, it is of equal or greater importance to know the per capita production of electricity -- in which Venezuela and Chile lead Latin America.

Now that the power or energy that is available in Latin America has been described, industrial development of Latin America will be considered. The traditional items of manufacture have been the so-called light, soft, or consumer goods, such as foodstuffs and beverages, textiles and wearing apparel, items of leather and wood, ceramics, tobaccos, soap, candles, and matches. Such items were the products of small factories and shops and of homes (cottage craft products). In a number of the smaller and poorer countries (such as Haiti, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Honduras) these manufactures continue to dominate. However, there is a growing trend towards production of basic or primary materials and equipment that are needed for expansion, improvement and diversification of manufacturing, agriculture, production of energy, construction, etc. Among these basic materials and items of equipment are such "industrial indicators" as iron and steel, chemicals and petrochemicals, cement, and automotive equipment. In terms of total amount and value of production, Brazil is the most highly industrialized nation in Latin America. However, Argentina has the best industrial development per capita (it should be pointed out that Brazil has about twice the population of Mexico, and Mexico has nearly
twice the population of Argentina), while Mexico has the best balanced industrial development.

The only appreciable iron and steel industries are to be found in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Together, Brazil and Mexico account for about two-thirds of the iron and steel production of Latin America. However, as an indicator of the low position of Latin America in the industrial world, these two countries only rank 23rd and 25th in iron and steel production. Although Mexico produced its first iron and steel in late colonial times, it was not until 1900 that the first modern steel plant was established in Latin America -- at Monterrey in Mexico. Other leading iron and steel centers include Monclova in Mexico, Paz del Río in Colombia, Volta Redonda and others in Brazil, Matanzas in Venezuela, etc., together with the origin of the power, coke, iron ore, etc. utilized. Sulfuric acid is one of the leading elements in the industrial chemical field. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Chile are the chief producers of sulfuric acid. Mexico is second only to the United States in production of sulfur and most of this sulfur comes from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The petrochemical industry is even more recent in Latin America than most of the other branches of industry. Mexico is also the leader in this area, followed by Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, while Venezuela is advancing rapidly. The location varies from in or near areas of petroleum-natural gas-sulfur (as near Minatitlán and Tampico in Mexico, to such great industrial cities as São Paulo, Buenos
39.

Aires, and Mexico City). Among the leading products of this industry are artificial rubber, detergents, fertilizers, insecticides, tetraethyl lead, chlorine compounds, and plastics. The leading producers of cement are Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and Venezuela. The necessary ingredients of Portland cement (calcareous and argillaceous material) are widely distributed, and cement plants are proliferating over Latin America. Although in most cases the development of an automotive industry in a Latin American country is a luxury that only nationalistic pride and import tariffs can justify, three countries both assemble and manufacture automobiles, trucks, buses, and tractors (Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina). In addition, there are a number of assembly plants in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Cuba. The bulk of these automotive manufacturing and assembly plants belong to subsidiaries of companies in the United States, Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. There are various "Detroits" in Latin America, such as the Toluca-Mexico City and São Paulo areas.

Transportation and communications facilities are of importance to nearly every phase of a nation's life. The natives of what became Latin America had no wheeled vehicles, no draft animals, and only the Andean cameloids as pack animals. Consequently the roads were mere paths or trails, except for the highly formalized highways of the Inca Empire. Although wheeled vehicles were introduced early by the Europeans, the roads for such vehicles were few and poor, and commonly lacking in bridges, until well into the Independence period. In fact, railways were established in most countries of Latin America
before there was anything approaching national highway systems, and many countries still lack an adequate system of highways. Since there are no consistent criteria for what might be termed an all-weather traversable highway, it is difficult to give comparable mileages of highway systems in the various Latin American countries. However, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina (the three largest countries, but in a slightly different order) claim, and undoubtedly have, the most mileage, followed distantly by Chile and Venezuela. Apparently Mexico has the greatest mileage of improved or surfaced highways, followed by Argentina and Brazil. Among the larger countries, Mexico and Argentina have the most efficient national coverages, while such smaller countries as El Salvador, Cuba, Uruguay and Chile have fairly adequate road systems. Because of mountains, rivers, forests and comparable difficult terrain, such countries as Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador, Guatemala, etc., have grossly inadequate road systems.

Prominent in Latin American road construction in the past century has been the still to be completed Inter-American Highway and its various branches. Also of significance is the recently completed bridge over the Orinoco near Ciudad Bolívar which is the longest suspension bridge in Latin America.

The number of motor vehicles (passenger automobiles, trucks, and buses) is relatively small at best (from about 2,000,000 down to 1,000,000) in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, followed distantly by Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, and Cuba. An item that impresses most visitors from the United States to Latin America is the large proportion of commercial
vehicles (trucks and buses) to passenger cars. This varies from more commercial vehicles than passenger automobiles (as in such countries as Ecuador and Chile) to about 1:2 (as in such countries as Mexico and Guatemala). An interesting experience is to ride in a camión mixta in Mexico where the passengers and cargo may include humans of varied condition and dress, sacks of maize, chickens, pigs, stacks of pottery, etc.

The airplane (passenger and cargo) was introduced relatively early into Latin America where it was of great importance in connecting areas which had no communication by highway or railway. This was especially true for Colombia which developed the first national air system in Latin America. Also, because of its size and the difficulty of much of its terrain, Brazil has made great use of the airplane. The leading nations in air-passenger-miles are Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Argentina, followed by Venezuela, Chile and Peru. In terms of air-freight-miles the leading nations are Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico. Some of the largest and most advanced airports in the world are to be found near such cities as Mexico, Buenos Aires, and São Paulo. Besides a number of the great international airlines headquartered in the United States and Europe, there are both private, commercial and national airlines in most of the countries of Latin America.

Because of its location across the seas from the mother countries, and because of the need for shipping to carry away the raw products and bring in elaborated goods, Latin America has a long maritime tradition. However, until relatively
recently the ships involved were owned outside of Latin America. Today Brazil and Argentina have respectable mercantile fleets of more than 1,000,000 gross tons, followed distantly by Venezuela, Chile, Mexico, Peru, and Colombia. Panamá is not mentioned above, despite its more than 2,000,000 registered gross tons, because nearly all of this tonnage is a registry of convenience. Chile probably has the most authentic and respectable maritime tradition (military, hydrographic, mercantile, and fishing), which is not surprising when one looks at its elongated coast line and also realizes that Chile is the only Latin American nation to have a possession far from American waters, namely Easter Island in Polynesia. There are a number of leading ports such as petroleum exporting ports (Tampico and Coatzacoalcos in Mexico, Maracaibo, etc. in Venezuela), coffee exporting ports (Santos, etc. in Brazil, Barranquilla, Buenaventura, etc. in Colombia), banana exporting ports (Guayaquil in Ecuador, Puerto Cortés in Honduras, etc.), and great ports in general such as Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro, Valparaíso, Callao, Havana, Veracruz, San Juan de Puerto Rico, etc. Here also is the place to discuss the history and importance of the Panama Canal, and the plans for a new canal in that isthmus area.

The telegraph was introduced relatively early into such parts of Latin America as Mexico and Brazil, and the telegraph line and cable are still of importance. However, the telephone, radio, and television dominate telecommunications today. In terms of number of telephones in use the leading countries are Argentina and Brazil, followed somewhat distantly by Mexico,
then Colombia, and then closely bunched Venezuela, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay, and Puerto Rico. Such absolute rankings, however, do not tell the complete story. In terms of number of telephones per 100 inhabitants the leading countries are Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and Argentina with more than six, followed distantly by Cuba, Venezuela, Chile, and Colombia. Even such data are misleading, since in most countries there is a disproportionate concentration of telephones in a few of the larger cities. The leading countries in both commercial broadcasting and TV stations are Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. However, the leading countries in number of radio receiving sets per 1000 inhabitants are Panama, Argentina, Puerto Rico, Chile, Venezuela, Uruguay and Colombia (373 down to 221), while the leaders in number of TV sets per 1000 inhabitants are Uruguay, Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama (67 down to 58). All this also is somewhat deceptive since in many countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, and Brazil there are many poor and remote settlements where perhaps only one storekeeper may have a radio receiving set (battery run), but he will attach an amplifier and this one set serves as a newspaper, propaganda mill and source of useful information from the government for an essentially illiterate populace. The radio has been an outstanding contributor to national unification and education in most of the Latin American countries. In this general context there should be mentioned the great publishing centers of books and magazines, as well as newspapers, in Latin America. Without attempting to rank them, the more important are São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, Buenos Aires, Santiago de Chile, Mexico City,
and Havana, followed by the other national capitals and larger cities.

International trade consists chiefly of the familiar manufactured products of the more industrialized nations (machinery, foodstuffs, etc.) which dominate the imports, and a variety of raw materials and semi-elaborated goods that characterizes the exports. Many countries in Latin America have but one commodity which dominates the exports by value (e.g. sugar in Cuba and most of the West Indian islands; coffee in Brazil, Colombia, and most of Central America; petroleum in Venezuela; copper in Chile; tin in Bolivia; etc.). However, the term "monoculture" is incorrect even when applied to a nation whose main export is an agricultural product. For example, coffee is second to maize (corn) by acreage in such countries as Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and El Salvador. Often a country is thought of primarily as a mining country dominated by some one or several minerals, yet mining in no Latin American country employs more than an exceedingly small fraction of the population, even in such known "mining" countries as Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Mexico, and Venezuela. A useful exercise is to make a chart from the latest data available for each country of those commodities or groups of commodities which comprise half or more by value of the exports, e.g., petroleum for Venezuela, coffee for Colombia, bananas for Ecuador, fishmeal-copper-cotton for Peru, tin for Bolivia, copper for Chile, meats and cereals for Argentina, meats and wool for Uruguay, coffee and cotton for Brazil, and sugar for Cuba. Mexico not only has the greatest number and variety of goods in its exports, but also exports provide a smaller
fraction of the Gross National Product than is true for any other Latin American country, as opposed to nations like Guatemala, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela where a very considerable fraction (40% or more) is provided by exports.

Nearly all of the countries import principally from the United States (except a few such as Cuba and Guyana), followed commonly by Western Germany, and in third place by one or another of several countries such as the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, etc. Very seldom is one of the top three trading partners another Latin American country excepting in such special cases as landlocked Bolivia and Paraguay which import from Argentina, or Brazil which imports petroleum and products from Venezuela and the Dutch West Indies, and a few other examples. Exports go primarily to a greater variety of countries, e.g., the United Kingdom, Canada, and Argentina, as well as the United States, the leading importer from one or more Latin American countries. A type of international trade which merits special treatment is tourism. This is big business which is approaching a billion dollars a year in value in Latin America. So far, Mexico has been the chief recipient, accounting for some two-thirds of the total in 1963. The Caribbean area is developing rapidly in this respect, especially Puerto Rico, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, which have benefitted from the isolation of Cuba. Central America commonly earns less from tourism than do the Bahamas alone, and all of South America does not equal the tourism trade of Jamaica alone.
SELECTED LIST OF REFERENCES


LATIN AMERICAN HISTORY
Warren K. Dean

Introduction

It is an arduous task to try to express in a few brief pages the major issues of Latin American history. The historical experiences of these twenty countries have been diverse and consequently they are difficult to generalize about. It would be necessary, then, in any survey course concerning Latin America, to discuss the history of individual countries in order to avoid excessive abstraction. It is also necessary, especially in American schools, to deal amply with the points of contact between United States and Latin American history. The territorial acquisitions of the United States, the volume of its trade relations, the comprehensiveness of its strategic concerns, and the pervasiveness of its cultural artifacts have all profoundly influenced Latin America, and all of these influences are still expanding.

The familiar episodes of Latin American history, those which are "colorful," such as the conquest, or conventionally heroic, such as the career of Bolivar, are perhaps less significant than other events, or at least they suggest to a professional historian concerns different from those of narrative suspense or the inculcation of nationalism. This paper will attempt to deal with Latin American history analytically rather than descriptively, and yet its author recognizes that a disparity in approaches and

1. Excludes those countries formerly British colonies
2. The terms "America" and "American(s)" as used in this paper refer to the U.S. and its citizens
goals exists; the terms of trade are historically of more consequence than the heroic personality of Bolívar, yet J.B. Trend's little biography will be on the shelves of many libraries, the writings of Urquidi or Prebisch will be on very few.

The American teacher of Latin American history must face squarely the problem of ethnocentrism. To a much greater degree than is the case in the study of other foreign areas, the existence of cultural differences seems not to be acceptable to Americans. Perhaps it appears unreasonable to the American that people who share a European heritage should be at all different from him, therefore the differences that exist are made out to be pathological and the cause of Latin America's political or economic difficulties. The judgments of English-speaking historians up to now have fairly often betrayed a condescension toward a culture that has not been as materially successful as ours, and they have sometimes written off as mere perverseness the viewpoints of Latin Americans when they conflicted with the American or English interpretation. Very few of the works of Latin American historians have been translated, even on such critical questions as the Mexican War, therefore the historical dialogue is one-sided.

The teaching of the history of Latin America involves grave responsibilities. It requires a constant posture of objectivity, and a consciousness of the influence that historical writing can have upon the cultural self-awareness of Americans of Latin descent, upon the attitudes of Americans toward Latin America, and ultimately upon the understanding by all mankind of its universal history.
COLONIAL HISTORY

The history of the colonial period is perhaps more useful in the case of Latin America to an understanding of the present than in the case of the United States. It lasted longer, less has changed since, and it began not with the gradual accretion of immigrant Europeans, but with the conquest of huge indigenous empires which the Spanish set out immediately and energetically to restructure. The following discussion emphasizes aspects of colonial history that influenced the course of events in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, it should also be noted that other kinds of analysis of that period are possible. Both the Spanish and the Portuguese colonies are early examples of European empires; they are "conquest societies" according to the concept of the anthropologist George Foster. The institutions of peasant communal property, of the plantation, of African slavery, and of mercantilism are all phenomena that might be generalized about in comparisons with European or American history.

The discovery of the New World is part of world history; it involves the revival of European trade in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Ottoman conquest in the East, and the technical and commercial inventiveness that made it possible for the seafaring countries of Western Europe to conceive of extended voyages around Africa to the Orient and directly across the Atlantic. The explorations of Columbus and the other discoverers are universally recounted in the U.S. school curriculum. The Spaniards and the Portuguese divided the non-European world between them: Spain
received most of the "New World," Portugal received Asia, Africa, and the eastern tip of present-day Brazil.

As Richard Adams explains in another chapter, the earlier and greater successes of the Spaniards occurred in the subjugation of those Indian groups that had developed the highest cultures (Adams, page 112, par. 3). The conquest itself was carried out ruthlessly, assisted by epidemics, superior weaponry, and the astonishment of the Aztecs and Incas upon facing creatures who seemed to them extraterrestrial. Nevertheless, in each case it took the Spaniards more than a generation to wipe out all resistance.

The question of political control was hastily resolved by the crown. The voyages of discovery and conquest, including Columbus', had all been carried out as private concessions, thus eliminating risks to the royal treasury, but involving the potential hazard of a feudal nobility in the new domains. These concessions were revoked or quickly brought under the control of royal officials. The first audiencia, or royal court, was sent to Santo Domingo in 1511. The Council of the Indies, a sort of colonial office, was created in 1524. Ten years later, the first viceroy was sent to Mexico, accompanied by a powerful and loyal professional bureaucracy. In Brazil, too, the Portuguese king initially thought to colonize by means of prietors, but by 1549 he was obliged to appoint a royal governor. The town council was the only political institution that retained at least partial autonomy.

The conquerors also had to be restrained in regard to their treatment of the Indians. The crown rejected enslavement and yet
temporized by accepting as a compromise a restricted kind of tribute right called encomienda. The conqueror, as a sort of royal pensioner, had no rights to the Indian's land, but only to a specified payment in kind or cash. The encomiendas gradually lapsed after several generations. In the meantime their descendants and other Spaniards more recently arrived began to build their fortunes upon more certain grounds by acquiring title to the land itself. The estates thus created, called haciendas, were easy to piece together from Indian communal lands because the Indian population was quite literally decimated by epidemics by 1570, and because the remaining Indians were either powerless to resist encroachment or looked upon life on an estate as at any rate more secure than life in their communities. The haciendas usually produced cattle or wheat for cash, but were designed more particularly for self-sufficiency than profit and their owners considered themselves aristocrats. In some coastal areas, however, another sort of economy arose. In Brazil and on some of the islands and coasts of the Caribbean certain tropical products, especially sugar, were produced in a capitalistic fashion for export to Europe. Indians were sometimes employed as labor, but more often African slaves were imported.

Although the activities of the planters yielded a certain amount of revenue for the Spanish and Portuguese kings, they constituted only a minor interest of these monarchs compared to the mining of gold and silver. The discovery of gold on Santo Domingo provided the initial impulse for the conquest of the
continent. In the 1540's silver ores were discovered in southern Bolivia and in several areas in Mexico. A river of silver flowed forth to Spain, reaching its apogee in the 1590's, with tremendous impact on the political balance and the financial and commercial structure of Europe. The discovery by the Portuguese of gold and diamonds in Brazil in the 1690's again provided a considerable stimulus to European commerce, more especially that of Great Britain, whose satellite Portugal had become.

Most of the regional trade of the colonies and most of their contacts with the outside world were organized around the production and export of minerals. The Spanish allowed trade only through the merchant houses of Seville, where yearly convoys were organized and sent to designated ports in the New World. Within the colonies the mines created much of the demand for the products of the haciendas' foodstuffs, draft animals, and timber for shoring the galleries and for charcoal smelting. Mine labor was mostly Indians; obtained, in Mexico, at least partly through wage incentives; in Bolivia through forced labor drafts. In Brazil the placer operations were worked mainly by African slaves. The mines were owned by the crown, but were leased to individuals. The wealth of the mining towns is proverbial. They were, except for the viceregal cities, the largest in the New World, and in them could be found luxuries from every part of the world.

The formation of a powerful bureaucracy, the absorption of Indian communal properties by vast haciendas, and the exclusive interest of the crown in extractive enterprises all tended to
produce an authoritarian society devoted to routine and preoccupa-
tion with status. Racial characteristics were associated with
social position in a legally recognized system of castes. The
Whites, called creoles (*criollos*) if they were born in the New
World, of course occupied the highest ranks in society, and enjoyed
various legal immunities. The Indians were evidently subordinate,
but were legally entitled to the protection of the crown as his
vassals. A more precarious position in society was occupied by
the half-breeds, the *Mestizos*, who not only lacked special privileges
in law but also suffered the imputation of illegitimacy.

The most important institution in colonial society, aside
from the state and the *hacienda*, was the church. The church
possessed an economic power in its own right, because it came to
acquire its own lands and engaged in trade. However, the colonial
church was politically more subservient to royal control than any
other in Western Europe. The Spanish and Portuguese kings had
been granted extraordinary rights of patronage over the church in
the New World by Popes anxious to provide incentives for the work
of proselytization. The church's role in the colonies was there-
fore extremely supportive of royal aims. It was the principal
vehicle for the assimilation of the Indians not only in the centers
of the former Indian empires, but also in the frontier missions
where the non-agricultural tribes had to be persuaded to accept a
sedentary life. In protecting the Indians against the rapacious-
ness of the *encomenderos*, manifestly a matter of conscience, it
was also preserving the king's vassals. The process of assimila-
tion, it should be noted, was not entirely a matter of persuasion;
the Europeans were generally intolerant of indigenous religious beliefs and accepted their survival as "superstitions" only after it became clear that they were too strong to be eradicated. The Inquisition was brought to the Spanish Empire, but used mainly to deal with the heresies of Europeans. The priesthood was in practice reserved to Whites and assimilated Mestizos. Indians and Negroes were considered wards, and therefore the Christian religion, although pervasive, was yet another manifestation of an aristocratic and hierarchical colonial society.

The colonial societies were formed by 1600. The century following was a time of almost constant reverses. The population, of the Spanish possessions at least, continued to decline, as did silver production. Aggressive competitors began to harass the Spanish and Portuguese. The Dutch, French, and English introduced contraband, attacked the convoys, and finally began to occupy the smaller islands and stretches of uninhabited coast. The Dutch captured the Brazilian sugar plantations, then carried the business off with them to the Guianas. As the revenues from the mines decreased, so did Spain's political fortunes in Europe. Portugal lost to the Dutch almost all of her extensive chain of trading forts in Asia. The two kingdoms were for sixty years united, then in 1640 the Portuguese rebelled and were once more independent. In the meantime they had extended their outposts far beyond the theoretical dividing line of 1494, thus establishing Portuguese claims to the Amazon basin and initiating endless quarrels over the left bank of the Plata.
During the eighteenth century the agonizing decline of the two empires ended. The Bourbon dynasty brought to Spain a renewed impulse toward centralization of administration, economic development, and modernization. Colonial governmental institutions were standardized, trade was encouraged by loosening many of the mercantilist restrictions and by forming trading companies, the university curriculum was reformed, tax collection was improved, the colonial armies were greatly enlarged, and the northern boundaries of the empire were once again energetically defended. It was during this period that mission chains were strung across California and Texas.

It was also a period of intensified warfare over colonial issues. The Spaniards, who consistently allied with the French against the English, found the defense of their empire increasingly more difficult and expensive. Portuguese Brazil, allied to the English, was more sheltered and prospered through gold exports. Contraband trade increased everywhere. Local mutinies over taxation occurred in Peru and New Granada. The Spaniards joined the alliance of the French and the American rebels in order to embarrass the English, instead they found they had set an unfortunate example for the creole elite. The French Revolution as an active expression of enlightenment ideology was still more offensive to the traditional conceptions of loyalty on which the colonial system rested.
The independence movement in Latin America might be described as an unforeseen outcome of the Bourbon reforms. By lifting the creoles out of their secular routine and introducing them suddenly to a world of enlarged trade possibilities, of rationalized administrative control, and of self-evaluative and critical intellectual standards, they awakened in some of them a thirst for still more change. Many of the actions of the imperial governments, furthermore, as well conceived as they may have been from the point of view of imperial security, were regarded by the creoles as grievous impositions. Thus the more rigorous collection of taxes, the favoritism shown the monopoly companies, and the centralization of control within the viceroyalties were the subject of petitions and finally of rebellion.

This sort of explanation would account for the greater success of the patriots in areas of the Spanish empire that the crown had attempted to develop rapidly late in the eighteenth century -- Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela. It would also affirm the comparability of the Latin American and American independence movements. But, other aspects of the Latin American movements are strikingly distinct. The rebellion against Spain might have been averted if a fortuitous event had not created a vacuum of power on the peninsula: the French invasion in 1808 brought on the abdication of Charles IV and his son, who were replaced by Napoleon's brother, Joseph. Both the Spaniards and the colonials regarded him as a mere usurper, and resisted, while some of the latter employed the
occasion to agitate for independence. After the restoration of the Bourbons in 1813, the patriots achieved only limited success in dislodging the Spaniards. In the heartland of the empire the institution of the monarchy continued to appear to most of the creole elite indispensable to the traditional system of privileges they enjoyed. The independence movement, therefore, became a civil war. In 1820, however, another fortuitous event occurred. The Spanish Army, undermined by liberal ideas, and reluctant to repress the liberal creole cause, rebelled against the king and forced him to accept a constitutional regime. A liberal revolution was successful almost simultaneously in Portugal. In the colonies the conservative creoles were therefore presented with the alternatives of maintaining their allegiance to an authority suddenly grown menacingly liberal, or of commandeering the cause of independence and directing it to their own ends. They chose the latter, and the patriotic cause triumphed very quickly.

All the nations hewn from the Spanish Empire (except Mexico, briefly) adopted republican forms of government. Although many of the new leaders of the independence movement desired constitutional monarchy under a European prince, only in Brazil was this achieved. Because the eldest son of the Portuguese king was present in Rio de Janeiro and ambitious for the position, the creoles rallied around him and made him emperor. The republican regimes of the Spanish American countries all suffered, to a greater or lesser degree, crises of legitimacy. In the case of Gran Colombia, Central America, and Argentina one of the results
was the break-up of the federation into smaller states, a process that went on until 1839. In all of the Spanish American states the lack of central authority engendered regional politico-military chieftains, caudillos, whose control was highly personalistic but usually dependent on connections with the local hacendados.

The United States played only a marginal role in the Latin American struggle for independence. The area attracted Americans as a potential market and as potential allies, but a more immediate interest was the acquisition of Spanish Florida and the definition of the western boundaries, which depended in part on Spanish goodwill. The U.S. government, therefore, limited itself to an early recognition of the new governments and to the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Of more practical significance to the patriots' cause, both from the military and diplomatic standpoints, were the activities of the English, who foresaw the possibility of a vast new sphere of influence.

It can be seen that the consummation of independence was, at least circumstantially, a reaction against European revolutionary currents, rather than a contribution to them. It is not surprising, then, that only modest indications of changed social relationships can be discerned as a result of the wars -- for example, a new landed class of revolutionary generals, and the abolition of slavery in countries where it was not significant. Nor is it surprising that the political program of the liberals, although formally incorporated in the new constitution, would not be acted upon until more blood was spilled. The liberals, who most often
were merchants, bureaucrats, or landowners who desired to create an export economy, and therefore had strong reasons for undermining traditional forms of land ownership and labor employment, adapted much of the program of European liberalism: individualism, civil liberties, anti-clericalism, free trade, equality before the law, and secular education. To the church and the landowners who did not possess the resources for accompanying a transformation from subsistence to cash-cropping, such ideas were extremely threatening.

The liberal program was also a weapon wielded by the ambitious mestizos and mulattos in their struggle to appropriate the lands and labor of the unassimilated Indians. Although individualism and freedom of contract appeared to be demonstrably democratic goals, they would remove the immunities and special status reserved to the Indian corporations under Spanish law and condemn their properties eventually to fall into mestizo hands.

The positions taken by the conservatives and liberals envisaged totally different conceptions of society: on the one hand a restoration of a pre-Bourbon subsistence culture, both theocratic and aristocratic; on the other hand a capitalistic, secular society, producing agricultural and mineral products for a world market, constitutional and limitedly democratic. It is not possible to generalize about the course of this struggle, or even on its outcome, for all of the countries of Latin America, since the local economic and social, and even geographical, conditions that determined them were so varied. In Argentina, the liberals dreamed of a Europeanized nation, populated by small-holding, literate, immigrant farmers,
and controlled by a commercial elite in the city of Buenos Aires. They were opposed by the caudillos of the interior provinces who regarded them not only as argumentative, atheistic, effete, and dandified, but also as parasitical, which was undoubtedly the case, since Buenos Aires received all exports and imports, taxed them both and spent the proceeds. After almost twenty years of stalemate a caudillo arose within the province of Buenos Aires itself who combined the business acumen of the liberals with the rustic conservatism of the land owners of the interior. This was Juan Manuel de Rosas, a rancher who created a local cartel for the production of salt beef that was sold in Brazil and Cuba for the ration of slaves. This economic base was viable at least for the province of Buenos Aires through the 1850’s and had the very great advantage over the more ambitious dreams of the liberals that it required no immigration, no new investments in land improvements, and no new techniques. Rosas worked out a rough compromise of non-intervention in the other provinces mixed with fairly frequent treachery, and within Buenos Aires he ruthlessly persecuted the liberals who were more or less functionless in his arcadian monopoly enterprise. Rosas was finally overthrown in 1852, partly because other caudillos had begun to sense the market potential and because other exports, at first mainly wool, were beginning to take the place of salt beef.

In other countries there were similar developments of trade within existing landholding regimes, that led to political arrangements akin to that of Rosas. In Chile Diego Portales managed to create stable political institutions supported by landowners who
exported wheat and silver. In Brazil African slavery was employed to develop coffee in the area around Rio de Janeiro. The first emperor, Pedro I, was forced to abdicate because of his ill-concealed designs of restoring the union with Portugal. The regency that succeeded him was hard-pressed by local rebellions. However, the accession of Pedro II in 1840 marked the beginning of an era of institutionalized government that knew no irreparable crises until 1889. In Mexico the liberal attack was directed against the Catholic church, which possessed more wealth than any other institution in the country. Primarily for fiscal reasons each liberal government found it necessary to threaten the church's holdings. By 1862, the eternal debts of the Mexican government and the importunities of exiled churchmen provided Napoleon III with a pretext for imposing a monarchy on Mexico. This attempt failed and a liberal government was restored not only because of the resistance of the liberals, whose cause became identified with nationalism, but also because the French administration was necessarily also liberal, disillusioning its conservative erstwhile supporters.

In other places, such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay, the conservatives were entirely dominant, no economic developments occurred, and no grafting of liberal concerns to the traditional system is discernible. In these places the central government possessed scanty revenues and only slight control over the countryside. The central government was frequently overthrown, and still more frequently did regional caudillos rebel to obtain autonomy from the central government.
In the last three decades of the nineteenth century the dynamism of the European and American industrial systems was beginning to induce changes in Latin America. Improved technology involved the wider employment of certain raw materials, such as rubber, tin, and nitrates, and the new technology also provided the necessary means of transport, railroads and steamships. The increased population of Europe and the United States made locally-produced beef and wheat more expensive, thereby opening markets for the Latin American pampas as well as the U.S. prairie. The industrial laborer, more productive and therefore earning more discretionary money, could now afford bananas, coffee, and sugar. Thus the market for Latin America's products grew very quickly from the 1880's onward. Its ports were connected to Europe by undersea cable, its ranges criss-crossed with barbed wire and dotted with windmills. Smelters, sugar centrals, docks, and railroad yards were constructed.

Much of this economic expansion was created with foreign capital, primarily from Great Britain and the United States, but also from France, Germany and other European Countries. A considerable part of the work force was also imported. Millions of farm workers came to Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Cuba from southern Europe, in lesser numbers to Peru and Cuba from China, and to the British possessions from India. Indeed, there was even considerable migration within Latin America to the new economic frontiers -- to Panama to build the canal, to the Amazon to collect rubber, to western Cuba to cut sugar cane. Many of these new migrants became
city dwellers, because the functions played by the city had expanded as a consequence of the export trade. By 1914 Buenos Aires contained a population of more than a million and Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro contained three quarters of a million. By this time, too, the capital cities and many interior cities possessed electrified trolley lines and lights, gasworks, and modern water and sewerage systems.

The rapid increase in exports provided the central governments with a constantly growing source of income because imports and exports were easily taxed and did not antagonize the existing landed interests. The growth of foreign trade, therefore, is closely associated with the increased power of the central governments. The private armies of the caudillos were either defeated or absorbed into the national armies, and the caudillos themselves were demoted to the position of rural ward heelers. A bureaucracy arose which was capable of handling national concerns such as diplomacy, finance, public health and education. A middle class began to appear in the cities and raised new political issues. They saw the landed oligarchy not as their patrons or their benefactors, but as their political opponents, and therefore they demanded honest elections, monetary stability, more schools, and an end to corruption in government. Concerns such as these, paralleling the issues raised by the Progressive movement in the U.S., brought reform governments to power in Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile by 1920, dominated the initial stages of the Mexican Revolution, and were evident in political movements in other countries.
The expansion of American economic and strategic interests in the Caribbean also profoundly affected the politics of the countries of that area. The history of the Spanish American War, the acquisition of the Panama Canal, and the implications of the Roosevelt Corollary and "Dollar Diplomacy" need not be recounted here, but it should be noted that American history texts do not detail the full extent of U.S. intervention into the affairs of the Caribbean countries. Besides the manifest evidence of protectorates, occupation governments, troop landings, and customs receiverships, more subtle and continuous means of influencing domestic policy were employed that made the nine small republics of the Caribbean an American sphere of influence.

CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

For the Latin Americans the First World War was a crucial event. Although none of the Latin American countries took up arms, several declared war against the Central Powers, and all experienced severe economic dislocations because of shortages of imports and working capital. The United States accelerated its policy of intervention in the Caribbean and bought the Virgin Islands, partly because of a heightened concern for the security of the Panama Canal.

The most extraordinary occurrence of these years was the outbreak of a shattering social revolution in Mexico. It began in 1911 with the overthrow of the dictator Porfirio Díaz by the reformer Francisco Madero, however, it entered its really violent phase in 1914. In its first stages it was a movement designed
simply to replace one circle of politicians with another, but the demand of the middle class for honest government and free elections was amplified by the peasant soldiers of the rebel armies into a deafening roar of outrage against the land expropriations, debt servitude, and repression of the Díaz regime. Throughout the decade of violence, the United States influenced, or tried to influence, the course of events. An American ambassador conspired against Madero and supported his successor Huerta. Woodrow Wilson was so insistent on the overthrow of Huerta that he supplied his enemies with arms and countenanced the U.S. occupation of Vera Cruz. In 1916 a punitive expedition crossed the border in search of the legendary Pancho Villa.

By the time the revolution had run its course hundreds of thousands of lives had been lost, and an entire class of hacendados had been swept aside. New doctrines of nationalism, agrarian reform, and trade unionism had been added to the liberal goals of constitutionalism and anticlericalism. The country's Indian heritage was glorified by a revolutionary government that actively sought the support of the masses. By 1920, with the coming to power of Alvaro Obregón, the most violent phase of the revolution was over.

In Uruguay a reform party under José Batlle y Ordóñez accomplished many of the same goals without violence. Between 1904 and 1920 Batlle led a coalition of Montevideo's middle and lower classes to power and then organized a successful constitutional system employing plural executives and rigorously honest elections. His party developed an ample program of social welfare and economic
nationalism which guaranteed the continued support of the majority although it was to prove expensive.

Meanwhile, the rest of Latin America became preoccupied with the failure of Europe to revive after Versailles. It no longer generated funds for investment in Latin America, nor did its demand for raw materials and foodstuffs grow as fast as Latin America's population. Inevitably the area became more dependent on the United States as a source for capital and as a trading partner. The emergence of New York in the twenties as a center of international finance, and the rapid development of U.S. productive capacity during the war had better fitted the United States to play an enlarged role in hemispheric trade; yet the new arrangement was a poor substitute for the multilateralism of the turn of the century.

The prices of agricultural products sagged alarmingly in 1920 and began a steady decline in 1926. The invention of an inexpensive process to draw nitrogen from the air had by 1925 ruined the Chilean trade in natural nitrates. The U.S. market crash practically extinguished Latin America's foreign trade; within a single year the value of each country's exports fell to a third or a quarter of the average during the decade of the twenties.

Not only income suffered. The collapse of trade pulled down with it presidents, administrations, and whole constitutional regimes. There were twelve successful coups in 1930 and 1931, and by 1935 fifteen of the countries had experienced at least temporary military control. The thirties were markedly a time of waning interest in liberal democracy and of the rise of authoritarian
ideologies influenced by European Fascism and corporativism. In part this was opportunism, but it also reflected the general dis-credit of a political system associated with an export economy that seemed to be a failure, and it harmonized with hierarchical and non-individualistic attitudes to society that were perhaps more congenial to Latin American culture than the tardily-imported liberalism of Europe. Only the Mexican government preserved through the 1930's a leftward direction in politics. Under Lázaro Cárdenas agrarian reform was very much accelerated, the labor movement played a larger political role, and a foreign policy opposed to the Fascist countries was consistently pursued. Chile's more moderately reformist governments were under considerably more pressure from the right, and a "popular front" coalition dissolved in 1941 because of the defection of the Communists. Elsewhere radical movements were generally unsuccessful. The Indianist APRA movement in Peru was driven underground. The revolutionary government of Grau San Martin in Cuba was overthrown by the military.

It should also be noticed that American occupation forces in the Caribbean had not left behind new democratic institutions, but instead only one effectively functioning organization, the army, which quickly assumed power. The Good Neighbor Policy, in essence a commitment to non-intervention, was paradoxically inaugurated during a wave of authoritarianism in Latin America.

The governments of Latin America were impelled by the severe problems caused by the decline of the export trade, and indeed by the example of the industrialized countries to intervene in the
economy to a far greater extent than ever before. Early in the twenties cartelization was fostered in order to bolster the prices of exports, and when they continued to fall despite such arrangements several governments turned to the control of foreign exchange and to import licensing. In a few countries intensified feelings of nationalism led to government encouragement of industry and to the expropriation of some foreign holdings in utilities and extractive industries. These interventions increased in scope during the Second World War because of the need to ration scarce resources and to encourage the production of strategic materials.

American diplomacy succeeded in aligning almost all of the Latin American governments on the side of the allies within a few months of Pearl Harbor, in spite of the military successes of the Axis and the preferences of some within governing circles for the defeat of the Allied Powers. For the governments of Central America and the Caribbean there was really no strategic alternative to an alliance with the United States, therefore, they immediately declared war or broke relations; the countries of the South American continent followed suit in January, 1942. Two countries, however, saw less reason to compromise themselves in an uncertain struggle. Argentina saw itself as a counterweight to the power of the United States, and potentially able to carve its own sphere of influence in southern South America. Chile was understandably concerned about the ability of the United States to protect its extended coastline against the Japanese. Eventually even these two abandoned neutrality in 1943 and 1944 as the Allied cause appeared more certain of victory.
The prosecution of American war aims involved a reversal of the policy of non-intervention, nevertheless the Latin Americans willingly collaborated. Military bases were established in the Caribbean and on the Brazilian and Pacific coasts, and blacklisting, propagandizing, and intelligence activities were carried out. A large technical and commercial organization was created for the purpose of stimulating the production of a long list of critical raw materials. In return special priority was accorded the import requirements of the Latin American countries. Both Mexico and Brazil contributed troops to theatres of war.

As the war drew to a close, significant political realignments began to take place in several countries. It could be clearly foreseen that those regimes which remained Fascistic in style or program would be embarrassingly isolated at the peace conferences. The United States began, as early as 1942 in the case of Panama, to apply strong diplomatic pressures against them. On the other hand, domestic liberal democrats were inspired by the victory of the Allies and by the resumption of the export trade to demand a redemocratization of their governments. These movements effected a considerable recession of military influence. In nine countries moderately liberal governments took power between 1944 and 1948, and in all the others that were still ruled by dictators some concessions were made to democratic forms.

Although these liberal movements might have eventually developed significant political institutions and resolved the tension between the exigencies of nationalism and those of the
American government, two new political factors caused almost all of them to falter and give way once more to the revived power of the military. The first was their inability to deal with an urban lower-class electorate that had grown hugely and had become more completely politicized. The population of metropolitan Buenos Aires, for example, grew from 2 to 4.6 million between 1914 and 1946, and much less of this population was foreign-born (naturalization was quite rare, and therefore the immigrants had been politically inert). The incorporation of these burgeoning masses in a democratic political movement would require a distinct political style, more extensive organization, and new appeals. Furthermore, new appeals, if acted upon, would be expensive -- in the short run they would involve a redistribution of income. It was conceivable that concessions too rapidly granted would endanger the privileges of the liberal middle class. In Bolivia and Guatemala strong appeals to lower class support did indeed awaken new political forces, but the middle class and the army were alienated by these moves, and a revolutionary situation was created. The leaders of the democratic parties therefore divided on the position to take toward a vast electorate that represented both a threat and an opportunity.

In this impasse it frequently happened that charismatic figures uncommitted to parties, parliaments, or elections gained the largest mass following. They had the most to gain and the least to lose. Thus in Argentina in 1943 the position of Secretary of Labor was given to an ambitious young colonel by the military
junta because no one else wanted the job. This colonel, Juan Perón, was the only man clever and daring enough to recognize the potential power of the city working class. He built a political machine by tying the unions to his secretariat and by consistently favoring them in their disputes with employers. In 1945 the Junta lost confidence in Perón's loyalty and jailed him, but the enraged working class of the city called a general strike which obliged the junta to free him. Within a year Perón had become president. He was to continue in power until 1955, constantly more authoritarian and constantly more demagogic in his use of power.

The second misfortune that befell the liberal democrats was the onset of the cold war. The United States, distracted by the economic crisis of Europe and the direct confrontation there with the Soviet Union, desired of the new liberal parties an absolute guarantee of their loyalty. The new governments were by their nature unable to repress dissent or anti-Americanism, and hesitated to suppress the local Communist parties; therefore, they were subject to suspicion. The Latin American military, on the other hand, appeared to regard the threat of internal subversion more seriously, and therefore was considered more reliable by the U.S. government. Their prestige was further enhanced by an increase in the flow of U.S. military assistance.

By the early fifties there appeared a shift from reformist democratic and demagogic authoritarian politics to conservative military regimes. The Auténticos in Cuba were replaced by Batista, the radical Guatemalan government was overthrown by Castillo Armas
with covert American aid, Perón and his counterpart in Brazil, Cetúlio Vargas, were both removed by the army, and the Bolivian revolution turned sharply toward the right. It is worth noticing that in Uruguay and Mexico, where the issues of popular representation and the influence of foreigners in politics had already been dealt with, confrontations such as these did not occur.

All of the Latin American governments, whether civilian or military, faced crucial economic problems. Although the post-war economics of the industrialized countries expanded, and although international trade also revived strongly, nevertheless the Latin Americans could no longer expect the export sector to generate enough income to elevate them from the ranks of the underdeveloped countries. Calvin Blair explains (Part 7, p. 90 to end of para. 1, p. 91), the perils that inhere in a high degree of dependence on export earnings to produce income. It should also be noted that the claims on foreign exchange earned by exports increased disproportionately since 1914 or even since 1930. A greater percentage of the population was living in urban areas, and less of the rural population was engaged in subsistence farming. Consequently, each country had to approach its industrialized trading partners with a want list that reflected a more complex and interdependent economy: petroleum, DDT, electric generating equipment, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, construction steel, and so on.

In retrospect it seems clear that Latin American countries would have to begin to produce these goods themselves, yet even
in the early fifties there was opposition to the direct subsidization of industrial growth. It implied a shift of income, and therefore, of political power, away from the plantation and extractive sectors, and it demanded an ideology of national development to counter the feelings of inferiority towards the industrialized countries that had always accompanied a dependence on exports.

Nevertheless, internal economic development became more constantly the concern of Latin American governments, and won ever greater support from the bureaucracy, the army, and technologically-trained people within the middle class, all of whom interpreted industrialization in terms of nationalism, more jobs, and more goods to consume. The administration of Juscelino Kubitschek in Brazil (1955-1960), for example, marked the beginning there of total commitment to industrialization, by means of immense government investments in power and roads, the redirection of foreign exchange toward the purchase of capital goods, and the encouragement of foreign branch manufacturing. In several of the other countries of Latin America similar programs of economic development were pursued.

Since the late fifties the military has been challenged in several countries by a resurgence of political figures who wished to create a following among the urban working class, and even among the peasantry. This continuing struggle, however, had been charged with an extraordinary significance by the Cuban Revolution of 1959. Fidel Castro, its leader, had overthrown the dictator Batista by grasping certain revolutionary currents that were traditional in
Latin America, including the "cult of personality," anti-Americanism, the yearning for a more just society, for honest government, and for economic development. Then his revolutionary government became much more radical, alienating the support of the middle class and the United States. It was transformed by 1961 into a Communist state, its economy state-owned and managed, its party structure at least partly controlled by the pre-revolutionary Cuban Communist party, and its foreign policy aligned with the Soviet Union and committed to spreading the same sort of revolution all over Latin America. The interpretations put upon this transformation are as yet highly polemical. Castro's opponents insist that he had always been a Communist and that he had betrayed a liberal middle-class movement; his sympathizers insist that he had no choice, but was driven to an alliance with the East by the truculence of the United States. The unsuccessful invasion at the Bay of Pigs and the missile confrontation of October, 1962, have defined roughly the limits of the situation: the Castro regime was allowed to survive, but not to threaten American security.

Nevertheless the Cuban example has provided a profound object lesson for the United States and for all the Latin American governments. Their reactions to Cuban Communism have further redefined the political situation. The U.S. government accepted the proposition that other defections from its sphere of influence could only be prevented by fostering rapid social and economic development, and therefore it hurriedly adopted a series of proposals that the Latin American countries had been unsuccessfully promoting for as long as
a decade. The largest of these in scope and cost was the Alliance for Progress, originally a conception of Brazil's President Kubitschek, that committed the United States to a greater expenditure of funds, mainly in the form of loans, over a period of ten years and also called for correlative social and administrative reforms on the part of the Latin American governments. The effectiveness of these programs in bringing about economic development has been the subject of debate. It seems indisputable, however, that the dispersal of such large sums of money tends to increase U.S. influence over domestic fiscal and administrative policies, and perhaps over politics as well.

Within each Latin American country the most radical political sectors at first enjoyed increased prestige because of Castro's success. Continental revolution seemed at least possible, and many young politicians courted mass followings with a more extreme style than they would otherwise have attempted. The army officers were outraged at this display, because the Cuban example had demonstrated to them that a revolutionary government would not merely arm a militia, it would also disband the army and perhaps execute its officers. The rich increasingly sent their profits abroad, since Kennedy's Alliance seemed as revolutionary to them as Castro, and even the local branches of U.S. firms began to send back more dollars in profits than the home offices sent out as new investments.

All of these critical developments were in part reversed by early 1963. It became plain during the missile crisis and during the Dominican intervention, that the United States possessed immense power to maintain its interests, even in a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. It was also becoming fairly clear that
the Castro regime was suffering gravely from the economic blockade imposed on it, from its own internal political problems, and from the ambiguity of its position regarding the Sino-Soviet disagreements. These factors caused revolutionaries in other countries to become less certain of their future success, and suggested to many the advisability of a more conciliatory political style. In 1964, for example, a moderately leftist candidate, Eduardo Frei, won the presidency of Chile in the face of strong opposition from a Socialist-Communist candidate by employing a charismatic and demagogic appeal that was represented to the conservatives, nevertheless, as the only alternative to a much more radical outcome. It is not yet possible to say how successful his Christian Democratic Party, or other similar reformist movements in Peru, Guatemala, and Venezuela will be in averting revolution.

On the other hand, in South America's two largest countries, Brazil and Argentina, the military resolved political crises in 1964 and 1965 by taking direct power; they have proved up to this writing to be reluctant to relinquish it to civilians whom they increasingly tend to regard as incompetent or incorrigibly corrupt. Their attitude is mirrored on the left by small, but possibly growing groups of activists who regard guerrilla warfare as a practical means of attaining power, and in the circumstances the only practical means. Their actions have already been the cause of anxiety to the United States, which has provided weapons and counter-guerrilla training to the local police forces and army. On the whole, the prospects for the development of stable political institutions in Latin America appear at this moment to be rather uncertain.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


1. Introduction: Variety of Characteristics and Community of Problems

Some 250 million persons inhabit the 20 nations of Latin America. They command a land area twice the size of the United States (excluding Alaska and Hawaii). Their geographic, ethnic, economic, and political diversity is something at which one marvels. In geographic size, they run from a giant Brazil (3.3 million square miles) to a tiny El Salvador (8,000 square miles). Their population ranges from Brazil's 80 millions to Panama's 1.2 millions. Their political structure varies from participatory democracy in open societies to outright dictatorship. They are different in so many important respects that many observers have questioned whether there exists any meaningful "unit" which could be called "Latin America," aside from the arbitrarily-defined geographical boundaries.

The answer to the question would have to be "yes." Despite their many differences, there are important elements of unity. Latin America has been described as "an intellectual and emotional community;" its inhabitants are the heirs of common elements of Mediterranean (or Luso-Hispanic) culture; it has political and economic organisms which represent it before the world (e.g., the Organization of American States, the Economic Commission for Latin America); and the other countries of the world consider it as a unit for certain purposes of foreign policy. Moreover, the Latin American countries have in common, albeit in varying degree, all of the fundamental problems of the "underdeveloped" regions.

1. Latin America as used in this paper comprises the following countries:

- Argentina
- Colombia
- Ecuador
- Honduras
- Paraguay
- Bolivia
- Costa Rica
- El Salvador
- Mexico
- Peru
- Brazil
- Cuba
- Guatemala
- Nicaragua
- Uruguay
- Chile
- Dominican Republic
- Haiti
- Panama
- Venezuela
The area offers us, as it were, twenty variations on a theme: how to create and use resources in such a manner as to raise per capita incomes and to improve the welfare of a large population which is growing faster than that of any other area of the world.

2. Latin America's Relative Underdevelopment

One measure of Latin America's relative underdevelopment is given -- however imprecisely -- by estimates of national product per capita. For the Latin American area as a whole, annual produce per capita is now about $400, which is well above that of the poorest countries of Asia and Africa but scarcely one-eighth of that in the United States or Canada, and about one-fifth of the levels found in most of Western Europe. Argentina and Venezuela are the "rich" countries of Latin America, with per capita products of some 700 or 800 dollars, while Haiti and Bolivia are the poorest, with something on the order of 100 to 150 dollars per person. In recent years, product has grown faster than population for the area as a whole, but at such rates that income per capita has increased slowly, about 1.7 percent per year. And not all of the countries have enjoyed a growing product per capita: the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Uruguay have scarcely been able in the past few years to keep production up with population growth. The low incomes of Latin America are very unequally distributed, so that the majority of the people are much poorer than average incomes would indicate.
Low incomes are correlated with employment in a low-productivity agriculture. Some 47 percent of Latin America's labor force is still to be found in the agricultural sector, where they produce barely over one-fifth of the total national product.

Latin America's relative underdevelopment is also reflected in a high degree of "export-dependence". Each of the 20 economies relies heavily on one or a few commodities; earnings from these exports fluctuate widely and are subject to competition from other producers (both within and without the Latin American area) and to the tastes, technology, incomes, and trade policies of relatively few industrial nations.

Further indicators of underdevelopment are to be found in data on housing, health, and education. New housing construction has been insufficient to take care of the needs of even one-third of the annual addition to the population, to say nothing of the backlog needs of the existing populace. The deficit in low-cost housing is frightening. Diets have been classified by nutrition experts as deficient in caloric intake, in protein, or in both, in 12 of the 20 nations: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela. School construction has hardly kept up with growth in school-age population, and illiteracy rates are actually rising. Nearly half of the population over fifteen-years-old has attended school less than one year, and many of them not at all. Scarcely one percent of the
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same age group has even begun any higher education.

3. Population and Labor Force

Latin America's population, already near 250 million, is growing at a rate of nearly three percent per year. If that rate continues, population will double in 24 years. Only Argentina and Uruguay have growth rates below two percent per year; eight of the countries have rates in excess of three percent; and in Costa Rica and Venezuela the rate is about four percent. Rapid population growth has left Latin America with an age-distribution concentrated in the "unproductive young." This phenomenon creates a series of pressures and requires the allocation of many resources to maternity and infant care, housing, schools, and all of the social equipment needed to raise the young up to economically productive ages.

Not all aspects of rapid population growth are negative, however. A growing population may be a positive stimulus to private investment; and demographic pressures themselves might in fact force public-sector investments which will favor economic development. With the exceptions of Haiti and El Salvador, no Latin American country is really "overpopulated"; and some of them suffer from being too small to make a viable national economic unit. Overall population density is relatively low, about 30 persons per square mile; but density by country varies from the low of 8 in Bolivia to well over 300 in Haiti and El Salvador. Internally, population has shifted rapidly from rural to urban areas, creating pressures for urban services and nonagricultural employment, and leading to
severe slum conditions in the major cities. Urban population, which was just over one-third of the total in 1940, is rapidly nearing one-half.

Latin America's labor force amounts to about one-third of its total population, which leaves the area with a high "dependency ratio" of persons to be supported by the work force. Forty-seven percent of the labor force is in agriculture; 15 percent is in manufacturing; 27 percent is in trade, government, and other services; and the rest is in mining, construction, communications, and public utilities. The nonagricultural labor force is growing much faster than the general population, and within this group, employment in services is growing fastest of all. Still, total employment opportunities are not keeping pace with growth of the labor force and its shift from rural to urban setting, and public authorities are much concerned with the problem of creating employment. A surplus labor supply creates strong pressures for excessive employment in public agencies, and it mitigates against labor-saving technical improvements in production. At the same time, new industries which are growing up in Latin America demand a better trained and educated labor force, which in turn creates a demand for professional and technical education.

4. Agriculture

While the agricultural sector employs 47 percent of Latin America's labor force, it accounts for only 22 percent of the national product. Value of output per worker in agriculture is less than one-third of that in manufacturing, and considerably less than one-third of that in trade, finance, and government. Some significant
Improvements have been made in the past two decades in selected products (e.g., cotton, cattle); and some export-oriented plantation-type production is both modern and makes intensive use of capital; but agriculture in general is a low-productivity sector. One-fourth of Latin America's land area is classified as "unproductive"; and vast expanses are too hot, too high, too wet, too dry, or too leached to offer much in the way of agricultural potential. Cultivated lands comprise only 5 percent of total land area and pastureland 20 percent more. Output per man and per acre is generally low (with some notable exceptions), due in part to illiteracy, a lack of modern equipment and scientific knowledge, and to land-tenure systems. Ownership is concentrated in a few large and under-utilized estates (latifundia) accompanied by millions of over-exploited, uneconomically small subsistence holdings (minifundia). With the better commercial plantations oriented almost exclusively to export, and with low productivity in subsistence farming and in commercial production for internal consumption, the agricultural sector fails to meet internal food requirements. Every nation except Argentina and Uruguay is a net importer of food grains, fats and oils, or other staples. Patterns of output, levels of productivity, and the relative importance of agriculture in national product all vary significantly among the 20 countries. For example, agricultural production accounts for over half of the total national product in Honduras, but less than 8 percent in Venezuela.
The generally unsatisfactory nature of product and income has led to frequent political pressures for agrarian reform or some variety of "transformation" of agriculture. Almost all of the 20 countries have agricultural reform laws on the books, and agrarian reform was made a major issue in the "Alliance for Progress." "Agrarian reform" began in a number of Latin American countries as simple land-redistribution programs designed to satisfy the land-hunger of the peasantry or to do "social justice" to landless groups who were political or revolutionary threats to internal order. Recent experience has indicated that mere redistribution is not enough; and "agrarian reform" policies now embrace land taxes, extension service, agricultural credit, export promotion, and public investments in transportation and storage facilities -- all designed to improve productivity and incomes in the agricultural sector. Many countries with idle public lands have experimented with large-scale colonization projects --- with only a modicum of success.

5. Industrial Development

Despite the concentration of employment in agriculture, the industrial sector in Latin America is now more important in terms of output. For the area as a whole, output in manufacturing industry alone is slightly greater in value than the combined output of agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. More than a fifth of total product originates in manufacturing, and another 10 percent in mining, construction, and public utilities. Employment in industrial production has grown rapidly over the past three decades, and output in
the industrial sector has grown more than twice as fast as it has in agriculture. Because it started from a small base, even the impressive recent growth of industry leaves Latin America at present with manufacturing output per capita approximately 40 percent of world average, and about 10 percent of the levels achieved in the United States or Canada. Two-thirds of manufacturing employment is found in "light" industry: food products, beverages, tobacco, textiles, furniture, printing and publishing. With about 7 percent of the world's population, Latin America produces only some 4 or 5 percent of world manufactures. Of these, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico account for nearly two-thirds. The relative importance of the manufacturing sector varies a great deal among the 20 countries; it is highest in the three just mentioned and lowest in Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.

Prospects are good for future industrial expansion, especially in countries such as Brazil and Mexico, where the combined influence of large population, a well-established industrial base, and financial, managerial, and technical know-how make it possible to establish a variety of industries based on national talent -- or to enter joint ventures with foreign capital without fear of domination. The recent industrial experience of Peru and Colombia indicate that middle-sized countries, too, can have rapid industrial growth; and El Salvador has proved that the small ones can do it as well. The "easy" phase of manufacturing simple consumer goods to substitute
for imports is over in many countries, and attention is being directed to prospects for capital goods and intermediate products. Expanded markets brought about by regional integration within Latin America or by special concessions on exports to advanced industrial countries may provide the stimulus for development of heavy industry and for the export of manufactured goods. In addition to larger markets, expanded industrial output will require an enlarged supply of technical and professional manpower, increased access to capital loans and technology from the industrialized nations, and major new investments by both private enterprise and the public sector within the Latin American countries.

6. Financial Problems

In the course of their economic development, Latin American countries have experienced repeated financial crises. Almost all of them have suffered at least occasionally from inflation, and in the cases of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, inflation has been accompanied by political unrest, and attempts to analyze and control it have given rise to coherent, identifiable, "schools of thought." Broadly, a "structuralist" school, largely of native Latin American origin, has arisen to explain the phenomenon of inflation in terms of the structure of output, problems of immobility of labor, adverse influences from the land-tenure system, and selected adverse policies of taxation and protective tariffs.
A second, "monetarist" school, drawing largely on rather "orthodox" analysis and policy of the more advanced countries, has blamed inflation on excessive expansion of the money supply and related deficit finance in the public sector. While both "schools" have much of relevance to say, and the two have much in common, they differ a good deal in the kinds of policy actions which they recommend. Latin American governments have often sought the advice of outside experts, and they have often had it forced upon them as conditions of aid from international institutions. But the advice comes from quarters without comparable experience, and the recommendations have often been economically or politically impossible to follow. Inflation continues, with all its disruptive effects. It may be somewhat surprising that real growth in incomes and production has been achieved, sometimes to an impressive degree, even in countries with severe and chronic inflation.

Patterns of taxation and government expenditure have been a bottleneck to economic development in Latin America. In the past, heavy reliance on export and import taxes and excises on internal production and consumption has resulted in low levels and wide fluctuations in public revenues; and it has discouraged production in many lines, while saddling the low-income population with much of the tax burden. Past expenditure patterns, with their concentration, in many countries, on the military establishment and general government, failed to give much of a fillip to the economic
development process. Tax reform has become a new byword in Latin America, advocated by many political groups and held up as one of the goals of the "Alliance for Progress." And progress has been notable. Governments have initiated or improved taxes on corporate and individual incomes, and the rate of tax collection has risen markedly in almost every country. Public expenditures have risen in relation to national product, and with some exceptions, there has been marked improvement in channeling these expenditures into development-oriented uses: education, health, and investments in "infrastructure," such as transport and power. No Latin American country now spends less than 10 or 12 percent of its annual budget on education, and the proportions run between 20 and 25 percent in several countries. Public investments now account for one-fifth of total investment in Argentina and Uruguay; they run to nearly one-half in Mexico and to over 60 percent in Chile. While much remains to be done in improving the administration of tax systems, the levels and structures of taxes themselves, and the development impact of public expenditures (and the "arms race" clearly needs to be brought under control), a significant amount has been accomplished in recent years.

All of the Latin American countries have suffered from balance of payments problems of one kind or another. Export earnings are not adequate in general to provide all of the foreign exchange desired for imports of capital equipment and technical services for development, for imports of major foodstuffs for current consumption, and for servicing outstanding international debts and
earnings on direct foreign investments. Latin American countries have attempted to cope with balance of payments problems by rescheduling debts, imposing exchange controls, licensing imports, or occasionally devaluing their currency. They have promoted import-substitution industries, sought frequently (and sometimes gotten) commodity control schemes designed to share markets and support prices, made genuine efforts to promote new exports, appealed for special compensatory financing through international institutions to stabilize export earnings (without success, thus far), and urged the advanced industrial countries of the world to allow preferential access to their markets for exports of manufactured goods from underdeveloped countries, including Latin America (also unsuccessful, thus far). Balance-of-payments pressures will undoubtedly continue indefinitely into the future, as the economic development process itself generates a growing demand for imports.

7. International Trade, Foreign Aid, Foreign Investment, and Regional Integration

Every one of the economies of the 20 Latin American nations is "export-dependent" to a high degree. The export sector is a major generator of economic expansion or stagnation; export earnings constitute a significant fraction of income earned in the money economy; exports earn most of the foreign exchange with which Latin America buys its capital goods for development purposes (and much of its current necessities for consumption, as well); export taxes account for a major part of public revenues; and the
value of exports greatly affects the internal money supply. Latin America's exports consist principally of crude foodstuffs and industrial raw materials: coffee, bananas, cacao, sugar, beef, wheat, cotton, wool, copper, tin, lead, zinc, and petroleum. Each country relies heavily on one or a few export commodities for most of its foreign exchange earnings. Those exports are subject to wide swings in prices determined by foreign market conditions, by competition from other producers and from substitute products, and by significant lack of control over quantity or quality of output within the Latin American economies (especially in the case of agricultural commodities). Latin America is also dependent to a high degree on a few industrial countries (especially the United States) as markets for exports and source of imports. More than a third of the exports of the region goes to the U.S. and another third to Western Europe, while the area gets one-third of all of its imports from the United States and a fifth from Western Europe. This high degree of dependence makes Latin America very sensitive to price levels in the industrial countries and to any changes in import duties, excise taxes, import quotas, "Buy American" - type of legislation, or even to threats or proposals made by protectionist interests in those industrial countries. Latin America's petroleum and nonferrous metal exports have been subject to import quotas in the United States; their temperate-zone agricultural exports (wheat, beef, cotton, oils, wool) have met competition in world markets from subsidized exports from the United States or have met import barriers from protectionist policies; their coffee exports have been restricted by excessively high
consumption taxes in Europe; and their tropical products in general have met the European Economic Community's policy of preferential treatment of the same products from former European colonies.

Since export earnings alone are not likely to provide the total external resources which Latin America needs for development purposes, it must turn to two other sources: foreign aid and foreign investments. Each of these is viewed with ambivalence by both provider and recipient.

Prior to 1961, Latin America's score was not very high as a recipient of foreign aid. While the United States had provided a trickle of aid in the form of grants and "soft" loans, dating back to the first technical assistance missions of World War II years, Latin America simply had not commanded the focus or the funds of U.S. interest, which was directed elsewhere to European recovery and the military and economic containment of the Soviet Union. From 1946 to 1961, nonmilitary aid provided annually by the United States had averaged $13 per capita for Greece, $9 per capita for France, but less than $2 per capita for Latin America. Moreover, of the aid provided to Latin America, only one-fifth had been outright grants (compared to 60 percent for France and 91 percent for West Germany); the rest had been "hard" loans, to be repaid with interest. Policy-makers in the United States were clearly preoccupied with Europe and Asia, and they were by-and-large convinced that private capital could do the less-urgent job in Latin America. The U.S. showed itself rather cool toward Latin American demands for development aid, and its representatives continually admonished the Latin Americans
to put their own house in order by controlling inflation and creating a "favorable climate for foreign investment." Latin American outbursts of anger against Vice-President Nixon in 1958 caused some second thoughts; later, the radical turn of the Castro government in Cuba stirred the U.S. to initiative: Latin Americans had addressed themselves to the problems of social and economic development in Kubitschek's "Operation Pan America" in 1958. After the events of 1958, the United States supported the ideas for an Intra-American Development Bank and for a regional common market, both of which it had opposed earlier. Then in 1961, the U.S. proposed a large-scale cooperative effort, the "Alliance for Progress."

The Charter of Punta del Este, signed by the United States and by all of the Latin American countries except Cuba, established the "Alliance." The charter called for sweeping reforms in taxation, land tenure, and public policy administration. It cited as major social goals the early elimination of illiteracy and the education of the masses, major improvements in life-expectancy, sharp reductions in infant-mortality rates, improved conditions of sanitation and water supply, eradication of communicable diseases, and a vast housing program. It embraced the ideas of a common market for Latin America, diversification of their economies, redistribution of income, stabilization of export prices and export earnings, and the principle of national development programs. The general economic objective was quantified as a minimum target rate of growth of real income per capita of 2.5 percent per year (a rate which would
double per capita income in 28 years). The charter declared that external capital resources in amount of $20 billion would be needed over a 10-year period. The United States pledged itself to provide "a major part" of the $20 billion, principally in public funds. But the total amount of capital was to include surplus food disposals by the United States and loans from international agencies, as well as private capital from the United States (and, presumably, from Europe and Japan).

It was almost inevitable that such an ambitious declaration would prove to be long on rhetoric and short on results. Within two years, it was possible to gather together a veritable torrent of criticisms from politicians and the press (both Latin American and North American, in both cases). Latins of various persuasions were disappointed at the small amounts of aid involved, or at the "scare" or the "confusions" surrounding the "ideological" language of the charter, or at the emphasis on "government-to-government" loans, or at the thought that the "Alliance" would be a label for things which might better be done under other auspices and which might be done even if there were no "Alliance for Progress." On the U.S. side, exaggerated expectations and ignorance of some of the problems prompted disaffection; and private enterprise continued to plump for less emphasis on public-sector help and more admonitions to "create a favorable climate for foreign capital." Regional integration went slowly, land reform was put mainly "on paper" and left there, and growth-rate targets simply were not realized. In the Spring of 1966, the 9-member committee which had been created to review the Alliance's progress (including national programs and
achievements) resigned en masse, protesting the behavior of both Latin American and United States participants!

Nonetheless, some significant progress has been made. Selected social investments have come off reasonably well; agricultural productivity (if not land reform) has been promoted in a number of instances; tax collections have run ahead of expectations in many countries; and some notion of "programming" (if not "planning") is now acceptable, even to the United States. Much of this achievement would have been realized, even in the absence of the "Alliance," however; and the latest review of the program (April, 1967) had to conclude, once again, that the "Alliance for Progress" had fallen short of meeting most of its stated objectives.

Closely related to efforts at aiding Latin American development is the question of the role of foreign capital. Public loan capital, even when it is tied to the finance of exports from the lending country, and even when it contains no major concessions on interest rate or amortization period, is usually regarded by the lender as a form of "aid." Hence, the question of foreign capital is really a question of the role of private investment.

Given free choice, private foreign investors in Latin America would ordinarily prefer to own their investments outright, rather than share ownership. They are convinced that foreign investment creates few problems, that it transfers technology and managerial know-how, creates jobs, promotes complementary investments, trains nationals, and pays taxes. What more could a Latin American want?
From their point of view, Latin Americans argue that the free choice of investments by foreign firms has led to a concentration in extractive industries, with resultant export-dependence and minimal impact on the rest of the host economy; that foreigners use scarce credit and scarce resources, preempting from nationals by virtue of a position of superior bargaining power; that foreign corporations often use transfer-pricing techniques that minimize tax revenues and other economic benefits to the host country; that they often treat their Latin American operation as a "marginal" source of supply to be adjusted to changing world demand; that they move to replace imports from captive suppliers outside of Latin America only under severe pressure; that often they hire nationals only when they are forced to do so, and always reserve top positions for foreigners; that trademark, brand name, easy access to foreign credit, and support by the International Monetary Fund and by the home government may give them "unfair" advantages over Latin American competitors; and that income remittances or repatriation of capital may create severe balance of payments problems for the Latin American host country. Foreign firms may dominate large or important sectors of the economy, and attempts to control them may bring diplomatic reprisals from their home country.

The foreign investor and his Latin American critic are both right. Foreign investment can bring all of the advantages cited; it can also create all of the problems cited, including the balance-of-payments one. To the foreign investors' insistence that Latin American countries "create a favorable climate for foreign investment"
the Latin American retort might well be to "create a foreign investment favorable to our climate." Some far-sighted businessmen have already gone a long way toward the latter by creating joint-ventures, planning for reinvestment of earnings, hiring nationals in numbers and at levels above those required by law, and shifting decision-making functions to the Latin American location. But conflict of interest is still the order of the day; and private investments will surely be progressively "Mexicanized," "Brazilianized," or "Chileanized."

In efforts to broaden Latin American markets for goods and investments, two regional integration movements are underway in Latin America. The larger of them is the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), created in 1960 by the Treaty of Montevideo, and now including 10 countries: Mexico, and all of the republics of South America except Bolivia (and excluding Guyana).

The treaty proposed the gradual establishment of a common market and a move toward complementarity and integration of economies, with reciprocal benefits to all. It provides for gradual reduction of barriers to trade among members, with elimination of restrictions on "substantially all" of their trade with one another by 1973. It does not provide for uniform trade barriers or trade policies toward the rest of the world. Escape clause procedures are offered for serious problems created by trade liberalization; agriculture is accorded special treatment; and special concessions are made to the less-developed members of LAFTA.
An expansion of regional trade followed the Treaty, but the expansion was unevenly distributed among participants and among products. Certain new trade flows of importance have begun, but most trade among LAFTA members is still in traditional agricultural and mineral products. There is no provision for scheduled, across-the-board tariff cuts; each reduction has to be negotiated item-by-item, year-after-year. Most of the easy concessions have been negotiated; vested interests are reluctant to see barriers fall if they spell early and stiff competition; and there is some danger that large foreign corporations will be the chief beneficiaries of the enlarged markets gradually emerging. The movement originated under conditions of slow growth in the participating countries, and intra-regional trade started from very low levels. Removal of tariff or quota barriers must be accompanied by investments in transportation, creation of new channels of trade, development of new commercial contacts, new sources of supply, and new methods of doing business. LAFTA's success is seen as increasingly depending upon economic development, while offering something to that development process in the form of enlarged potential markets. More and more, Latin Americans are thinking in terms of using LAFTA as a form of regional planning or programming unit. United States interest in the common market idea, negative when the subject was first broached, has now become strong enough to be the main point for discussion in a meeting of presidents at Punta del Este in mid-April, 1967.
The other integration movement in Latin America is the Central American Common Market (CACM), created in 1960 by a general treaty of economic integration. The CACM has five members: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. By mid-1966, free trade among members had been established in virtually the entire list of tariff items, and uniform duties toward the outside world had been negotiated on nearly every trade item. The CACM approach was essentially across-the-board and rapid. Trade was not freed, however, in several items of importance to tax revenues; and it was never envisioned that traditional export commodities would be free-traded among members. Intra-zone trade has expanded significantly, but it still accounts for scarcely 15 percent of exports.

The agreements have removed many barriers which were barring nothing, since the members traded so little with each other before the treaty. Trade in manufactures has expanded rapidly, and many plants formerly producing at levels well-below capacity have increased output to take advantage of the larger market. Much progress has been made in creating regional institutions, including a regional development and integration bank; and some progress has been made in coordination of monetary, fiscal, industrial-promotion, and development-planning policies. The CACM has opted clearly in favor of major and rapid moves toward freedom of trade and investment. But there is not yet any provision for the free movement of labor; and all of the countries are plagued with the problem of insufficient employment opportunities. The area, even
taken as a whole, is a tiny unit of scarcely 12 million people; each of the five countries is similar in economic structure; incomes are low; and all of the difficult problems of economic development are present. Markets, even consolidated across the five member-countries, are tiny. Many types of manufacturing are still not feasible on anything like economic scale; and efforts to promote special regional "integration industries" met with sharp criticism and strong opposition from the United States, which provides so much of the aid for the regional development effort. Foreign firms are taking up many of the new opportunities being created, and many "industries" are mere assembly operations. Despite heroic policy decisions made on the integration treaty, Central America is still far from being either developed or integrated.

8. Public Policy and Private Enterprise

Latin American countries have experimented with a variety of roles for the public sector: outright ownership of selected industries; joint ventures with public and private capital; public development banks and special promotion funds for agriculture, industry, small business, artesans, tourism, border development, regional development, or foreign trade; and the more "traditional" role of manipulating taxes, subsidies, tariffs, monopoly regulations, price controls, and trade laws. In general, the involvement or "interference" of Latin American governments in the economy has tended to be somewhat more pervasive and more particularistic than one would find in the United States, for example. Government
ownership of productive enterprises often extends to petroleum, steel, chemicals, paper, or other major industrial goods. But, on the whole, outright ownership is infrequent; and measured by almost any economic standard (e.g. expenditure, output, employment) all of the Latin American countries have predominantly private-enterprise economies -- with the obvious exception of Cuba. If one measures the role of the government in the economy in terms of its expenditures in relation to national product, then the United States ranks with countries such as Argentina, Costa Rica, or Ecuador; and the U.S. ranks well ahead of Mexico, which is sometimes erroneously thought to have a large degree of "socialism." The public sector's role has frequently been approached in Latin America with an experimental attitude; no country (with the possible exception of Cuba) has pursued a policy of public ownership for its own sake. Latin Americans do assign an important role to "planning" (or to "programming," which is a term both more descriptive of the process and more "acceptable" to U.S. prejudices).

Latin American business community is much like the private business community everywhere: it seeks profit; it is not averse to enjoying monopoly privilege; it lobbies and otherwise influences legislation which is important to its power and prosperity; it makes major investment decisions (including the keeping of funds abroad) in response to motives of return, risk, safety, and fear; it forms innumerable interest groups for both technical and propaganda functions; and it issues frequent criticisms of "government interference" (except "interference" in its favor). To no
one's surprise, many of Latin America's successful businessmen started with family wealth derived from agriculture or trade; but there is a growing body of national entrepreneurs coming up out of the middle classes; and immigrant entrepreneurs arriving with capital have been important to selected business sectors.

Criticisms of Latin American business "attitudes" are frequent; they often reflect the anxiety of messianic observers from the United States, who find that Latin businessmen do not use "modern" management techniques or feel the same way about the business game as do U.S. businessmen.

Latin American labor movements, where they have been effective, have tended to be part of a political apparatus; where they are not politically important, they have little power. Missionary envoys from U.S. labor organizations and from religiously-oriented unions in the United States and Europe have made repeated efforts to get "free" trade unions started in Latin America. They have had only moderate success, in part, it seems, because they do not understand the really weak status of labor in most Latin American settings.

Economic ideology has much to do with the drive to development. In the Latin American case, there is an eagerness to develop their own solutions and their own style. Latins are eager for outside help, but not for outside control or outside prescriptions. There are some inevitable frictions with the United States, their principal aid partner, deriving in part out of different attitudes toward the "menace" of Communism, toward government and "free enterprise," and toward the locus of power in this world. Latin
Americans want to become an economic, political, and moral force independent of the United States; as they move toward that goal, some occasional surfacing of "anti-Americanism" is inevitable.

Despite the many obstacles which stand in the way of Latin America's economic and social development, there are already visible some very promising elements which augur well for the future: a recent history of cooperation among Latin American countries; a technically competent bureaucracy which already reaches transnational levels; an active private sector which is often Latin American, and not merely national, in scope; a wealth of experience, a prevalent confidence, and an experimental attitude toward economic policy.
A SHORT, SELECTED, ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SOURCES ON LATIN AMERICA USEFUL FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

Note: All sources listed treat the Latin American area as a whole, or some regional sub-part of it. No individual country sources are included.

A. CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL FACTORS


Essays on the culture, politics, and economics of contemporary Latin America and on the special problem of our diplomatic relations with the area.


A succinct review by a distinguished historian, with emphasis on recent and contemporary problems. Each volume also contains short, selected readings from Latin American and North American sources on a variety of economic, political, social, and philosophical issues.


Essays reviewing ideologies of development, social forces, inter-American relations, the structuralist and monetarist controversy over inflation, movements toward regional trading groups, and land reforms.


B. GENERAL SURVEYS AND STATISTICAL SOURCES


A short volume which surveys Latin America topically: population, agriculture, minerals, transport and power, manufacturing, international trade. A second part gives brief reviews of trends (to 1958 or 1959) in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.


A comprehensive review of policies, problems, practices, and institutions surrounding questions of market organization, welfare, economic development, and trade and finance. Two introductory chapters give a synopsis of Latin America's economic history.


Detailed review of export products, regional integration movements, balance of payments problems, monetary and fiscal policies, and production by major sectors.


A descriptive and analytical source book on Latin America's economic history since 1945, with abundant statistical data. Major trends in product and income, with emphasis on internal and external factors. Chapters on savings and external finance, income and its distribution, population characteristics, development by groups of countries, and foreign trade.


Studies on political developments, commodity problems, the OAS, U.S.-Latin American relations, economic development, Soviet Bloc Latin American activities. Especially useful is the study on United States business and labor in Latin America.

University of California, Los Angeles, Center of Latin American Studies. Statistical Abstract of Latin America (Los Angeles: University of California, Center of Latin American Studies, annual), (Processed).

First issued for the year 1955, annually beginning in 1960. Gathers from national and international sources data on area, population, social characteristics, production, national accounts, and foreign trade and investments. Arranged by topic, with data shown by country, and with Latin American regional totals; for purposes of comparison, data are also given for Canada, The United States, and the world.


A classic statement of the "ECLA view" of development problems of Latin America. Largely the work of Raul Prebisch, it amounts to a revised version of his earlier essay, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems.


English translation of a major treatise by a prominent Mexican economist on the problems and processes of regional integration of markets. Reviews both the Latin American Free Trade Area and the Central American Common Market.
E. PERIODICALS.


Designed to supplement ECLA's annual economic surveys. Includes analytical articles on subjects related to Latin American development problems. Occasionally has statistical supplement.

Inter-American Economic Affairs (Washington, D.C., quarterly).

A quarterly journal of articles on a variety of economic and related topics.

P. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND DICTIONARY


A bibliography of relatively inexpensive paperback books in English, available at U.S. college bookstores and newsstands as of 1963. Coverage is general, but many entries are in economics, politics, and other social sciences.


A selective and annotated guide to recent publications. Beginning with Vol. 27 (1965), a separate volume appears for the social sciences.


A comprehensive index of Latin American sources containing some quarter of a million entries, many of them on business and economics topics.


A scholarly and thoughtful review of the common market and economic integration movements in Latin America, with special attention to problems of transport and communications, reciprocity and the payments system, the role of foreign enterprise, and institutional requirements. One chapter is devoted to a cogent review of the Central American Integration Program. Appendices give the texts of relevant treaties.


A collection of readings reviewing a variety of cases, problems, and attitudes from the early nineteenth century to very recent times. Included are selections by politicians, statesmen, academicians, businessmen, and international and governmental agencies. Latin American, North American, and European views are included.
The peoples of Latin America are fundamentally westerners. Although their cultural inheritance is derived in part from indigenous traditions, the predominant orientations and background are European. Their evolution has been distinct from that of the other western countries, however, and actually parallels in some respects that of the Middle East. Most of the area has only lately become directly involved in industrialization, and most of it is still relatively underdeveloped. The primary purpose of this chapter is to explore some conditions and factors that have brought Latin America to the situation that it finds itself in today. While some space will be devoted to variations in culture and society, descriptions are interminable and variations so great that it is wiser for each instructor to become familiar with some of these materials directly from the literature itself.

Latin America is of increasing interest for the people of the United States. Prior to the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, it was generally considered an area of backward peoples, readily available for energetic North Americans to exploit and make an easy dollar. From the 1930's until about 1960, relations underwent a change. Efforts were made to establish a "Good Neighbor Policy," and during the Second World War, the cooperation of many Latin Americans was important. The advent of Fidel Castro, however, literally scared the United States into recognizing how important Latin America was.
Today, Latin America is made up of nations of varying degrees of development, varying degrees of similarity to the Latin cultures of Europe. It is important in dealing with materials about the area to keep well in mind that there are profound regional and class differences, as well as national differences. The leaders of these countries are trying to achieve better living conditions for their people, and are increasingly demanding to be accorded the rights of equals in the world at large. Within perhaps not too many years, Brazil may well be on its way to being a major world power, Mexico will have specialized industries of world importance, and the population of Latin America as a whole will vastly outnumber that of North America.

I. Cultural Antecedents

Contemporary Latin America contains societies that are strongly European in derivation as well as some residual groups with an almost unbroken Indian culture history. To understand these variations, it is necessary not only to recognize the diverse origins, but to realize that the indigenous and the European were themselves diverse, and depending upon the circumstances of contact, rather different cultural "mixes" have ensued.

A. American Indian Variations

At the time of the discovery of the New World, there were distinctly different kinds of Indian culture in the Western Hemisphere. Most famous and picturesque were the high cultures of Middle America and the Andes. These had evolved over millenia to the point that when the Spanish arrived in the 15th century, they
consisted of expanding empires that were variously using writing, complex kinds of metals, and experimenting with socialistic and imperial governments. Trade was widespread, and goods made in the Andes have been found in Middle America as well as the reverse. Artistically they produced sculpture, paintings, and architecture that are still the wonder of students today.

These highly developed societies, however, occupied only a small portion of the New World. To the north and south, in the southwest and southeast of the United States, in the Amazon and Orinoco valleys of South America, and through Central America and the Caribbean were other less advanced Indian tribes and states. All were agriculturally based, but they were not so developed that they could marshall significant armies for their defense, and some were socially broken up into quite distinctive small communities and sets of communities. These groups varied from agriculturalists who had evolved incipient state organizations to less developed tribes that based their way of life on horticulture, often combined with hunting and gathering. As one moved north and south from the equator, the societies became even less complex.

Finally, at the continental extremes where agriculture had never penetrated, were bands of hunters and gatherers. These peoples lived on foods such as wild animals, forest plants, riverine, lake, and ocean fish and animals. Their social organization was simple, as was their material culture. They lived in separate family bands, and the bands came together in times of plenty for annual celebrations. Life was simple from one standpoint,
but survival was difficult and required an astute knowledge of the natural environment and the ways of animals and plants.

The five and one half centuries since Columbus first signaled the arrival of Europeans have brought stark and bitter changes to the Indians of the New World. In general, the more complex and advanced the Indian culture, the more useful were its peoples to the conquering Spanish and Portuguese. The horticultural and less developed agricultural peoples were unable to adapt to the yoke of servitude and the diseases brought by the Europeans. Epidemics and enforced labor, combined with futile defensive wars all but eliminated most of these peoples as they gradually came into increasing contact with the white man. The hunting and gathering peoples, living in more difficult environments, were not early disturbed. The Spanish had little interest in Tierra del Fuego and the endless pampas of southern South America. Consequently, some of the most primitive peoples survived well into the 19th century with relatively little change to their cultures. Few survivors have remained until today, however, and these only in a much acculturated condition.

Of major interest to the Spaniards were the high cultures of Middle America and the Andes. It was here that they found evidence of gold and wealth, and here too were large laboring populations that could be harnessed to exploit the mineral resources, and to grow the crops and animals necessary to support the reigning Spaniards and the laboring Indians. These peoples also suffered an extraordinary population decline under the first few centuries
of European domination. Estimates vary, but in some major areas, such as the Andean valleys and Central Mexico, the population was reduced by as much as seventy-five percent or more. Millions of Indians disappeared, and with them, much of their elaborate and exotic culture.

By the middle of the 18th century, the European and New World civilizations apparently were reaching an adjustment. The population decline stopped, and by the beginning of the 19th century, the number of Indians in the former areas of high culture was on the rise. There was also, of course, an even greater increase in the new mixed population, the mestizo. The mestizo was a racial, i.e., biological, mixture. Of greater importance, however, he was basically a bearer of a new, evolving culture. His cultural origins were fundamentally European, but they were of a colonial, subjected, and socially inferior element of the population. North Americans, who place so much emphasis on racial matters, have tended to misunderstand the significance of the emergent mestizo culture. It is not a simple mixture of Indian and European, but rather a European nursed outside the European tradition. So it was that later in the 20th century when the emerging nations of Middle America and the Andes were seeking symbols of their cultural inheritance, they rejected the European, and turned instead to the Indian symbolism and heritage of the Aztecs, Mayas, and Incas. Europeans they were, but Europe had shared little of its rich inheritance with them.
B. European Varieties

Just as there were important variations in Indian culture, so Europeans arrived with significant differences. Aside from the varieties that existed in the Iberian peninsula, a much more important variation resulted from the time of arrival of the Europeans. The original conquest and colonization of the Latin was done by Iberians, Spaniards still fresh from the conquest of the Moors, and with a medieval, ecclesiastically dominated culture. Their technology, aside from steel, gunpowder and the horse, was really no better than that of the New World empires they toppled.

The pre-industrial culture that the Iberians brought to the New World did not develop further. While the rest of Europe was accelerating with the forces generated by the Industrial Revolution, the Latin American colonies were generally kept in a state of dependent mercantilism to the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. These empires, however, especially the Spanish, were coming on hard days. The gold had long since run out and the colonials were expressing discontent under the Spanish crown. With the fall of the Spanish crown in the Napoleonic wars, the creole and mestizo populations took the sign and in a series of wars of independence set up new and independent states.

The pattern of Latin America being a hinterland to European industrial development however, had been set and in the 19th century the new countries tended to continue this role rather than to take on the industrialization of their European cousins. As a result, the colonial pre-industrial technology continued throughout most
of Latin America, and even continues until today in almost all peasant and some hacienda areas.

The European population expansion and urbanization that came on the heels of the Industrial Revolution brought a wave of new immigrants to the New World in the 19th century. Most went to North America, but very important contingents also went to Latin America, especially to Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. These peoples were mainly from southern Europe and Spain. They arrived and crowded the littoral regions. The older landholders had long since laid claim to the land, so as new colonists moved into the countryside, they did so not as homesteaders but as tenants to the established farmers. Having been pushed out of Europe by the increasingly crowded conditions, the newcomers found themselves forced into a position of economic subjection. Although they were from industrial and industrializing countries, in the main they did not come from the industrializing segments of those populations.

Really industrially oriented immigrants did not begin to make themselves felt until the 20th century. Although factories had been started by local and migrant entrepreneurs, they had nowhere had the success or effect of their prototypes in Europe. Only in Argentina was a real industrial proletariat emerging by early in the century. But even there, due to electoral laws, the migrants had no legal participation in the political process. In southern South America many of the migrants eventually returned to their homeland. The cultural and social relations of this portion of Latin America were much stronger with the Old World than were those
that characterized Middle America and the Andes. Buenos Aires today is in many respects a European city; Mexico City, Bogotá, and Lima are clearly cities of the New World.

C. Peoples of Other Backgrounds

As was the case in North America, Africans were brought to Latin America as slaves. A few accompanied early expeditions, but they were first brought in large number to replace the Indian populations that had died off rapidly after the conquest in the Antilles. Later, a parallel event took place in Brazil, and great numbers of slaves were brought to that area. Brazil today shows both the cultural and racial inheritance of these African relatives. Slaves were also brought to the West coast of South America and to Middle America, but never in such numbers. As the centuries wore on, they tended for the most part to blend into the local populations and form merely part of the general Mestizo biological mixture. They are still remembered as distinctive groups in Indian and Mestizo dance groups in Peru and elsewhere, and certain communities in Mexico are clearly still heavily negroid in racial ancestry. Culturally, however, nothing remains to distinguish these peoples from the Mestizo population in general.

The Caribbean negroes were brought in under various European powers so that today there are populations entirely English speaking, French speaking, and in the case of Haiti, Creolo speaking. In Panama there have remained strong elements of negroid racial strains from the colonial period, but the work on the railroad
and later on the Panama Canal and during the two World Wars, brought significant contingents of Antillean Negroes, their English speech and Caribbean customs standing in great contrast to the local culture.

In the last century many Chinese were imported to Latin America as labor, as they were to help build the North American transcontinental railways. Even more than was the case in the north, these peoples stayed on to occupy an important place in the commercial life of many of the countries. Later, colonies of Japanese, primarily interested in farming enterprises, came to Brazil, Peru, and other countries much as they did to California. Latin America collectively boasts as broad and varied an immigrant population as does North America, but it generally has been scattered along the coastal areas and, like their mestizo friends, is only now venturing deeply inland.

D. The Industrial Hinterland

The circumstances that caused the variety of cultures and societies that mark Latin America to carry a common cast and common flavor were in part the common Iberian heritage, but also that the entire region failed to participate as a primary participant in the Industrial Revolution. While Northern Europe and the United States were evolving major industrial centers, Latin America continued primarily as an agrarian and mineral supplier to the rest of the Western world. The events that brought such profound changes to the northern countries were at best reflected in the knowledge of the cosmopolitan Latin Americans, and in occasional naval and armament
races deemed necessary to assure the confirmation of some of the still uncertain national boundaries.

There were, however, some important regional differences in what occurred during these years. Following the independence, the Middle American states vacillated for some years and finally Mexico and Guatemala turned strongly economically liberal in the latter part of the 19th century. Local economic growth was seen as crucial, and political policies encouraged bringing in better workers, new enterprises, larger haciendas and greater export production. This meant that the Indian was increasingly subjected to forces designed to destroy his community life and agricultural independence. Efforts were directed to incorporate him in a large manual labor force. In the Andes, however, conservative governments tended to continue in power, and the intrenched position of the Church was little threatened.

The 20th century brought some major changes to the Latin American scene. In the Caribbean, the United States built the Panama Canal and began its extended military interventions in Nicaragua and Haiti. In Mexico the Revolution broke, bringing to the New World the first major social revolution of modern times. Far to the south, war broke out between Paraguay and Bolivia, opening the eyes of the Bolivian Indian to the fact that the world was broader than he had imagined, and leading significantly to the Bolivian revolution of the early 1950's. World War II forced from their positions of security dictators who had comfortably run many countries and led to the Guatemalan Revolution. Finally, the cold
war opened the possibility of a real socialist revolution, and such eventually occurred in Cuba. The societies that had slept so long in the shadow of the industrial west were beginning to seek a new kind of place in the world.

II. Contemporary Cultures and Social Systems

A. The Style of Modern Latin Americans

Although I have emphasized that no two Latin American countries are alike and that even regions within countries hold strong variations, it is nonetheless true that there are features of common culture that seem to pervade much of the region. Clearly the Iberian heritage of language and Catholicism have been dominant in leaving similar patterns of values and thought over the whole region.

Some of the traits that widely mark the Latin American are individualism, personalism, formalism, and fatalism. The individualism of the Latin American is marked in a strong pride of each individual in himself. Each person is regarded as the repository of a soul of special value, to be polished and given a good front on all occasions. Insults are most intolerable when they impugn one's dignity or his honor. In many portions of the region a manifestation of this in men is the so-called machismo complex, the super-evaluation of selected masculine qualities. It is conceived, in its most extreme form, in the practice of double sex standards, the readiness to defend insults to one's honor, pride in having sired many children, and so forth. Another aspect of individualism is evident in a kind of one-upmanship in conversations. Sometimes it is in terms of making just the right tweaking comment that leaves
your companion obviously inferior to your cleverness. To a native speaker of English, Spanish may appear to be among the easier of foreign languages to learn. To achieve the ability to handle double meanings and punning that characterizes this kind of verbal exchange may take years if, indeed, the foreigner can ever acquire such command.

Personalism in Latin America is related to the individualistic quality, but refers more to the quality of interpersonal relationships. Real confidence in an individual can only be had if one is recommended through a common friend. The hallways of public offices may be full of people waiting with appointments, but it is perfectly well accepted by everyone waiting that an individual who has an "in" will be seen ahead of the others. Those who can lay no claim to such confianza usually remain in a position of being potentially available for manipulation. If a personal relationship does not exist, then it is also generally accepted that a petitioner places himself within the power of the person whom he addresses. So it is that personalism has two sides: an advantageous side for those who stand within such a relationship, and a disadvantageous side for those who are denied such access. The personalistic quality is manifest in politics, business, administrative and bureaucratic procedures, as well as in the more obvious areas of family, kinship, and friendship.

The formalism of the Latin American is apparent in the usually extremely courteous manner of address among equals or from a social inferior to a social superior. A superior may tend to be brusk
with an inferior, but when one is dealing with an equal, there are important rituals of politeness that must be observed. Formalism is manifest in public speaking and in literary styles used both in correspondence as well as in essays. It is marked in the retention of Spanish of Usted, a formal pronoun of address.

The quality of fatalism has long been noted in Latin American values, but may in fact be decreasing in importance. In part it is obviously related to the fatalistic quality of Catholicism, wherein death, sickness, and happier events are often taken as the uncontrollable will of God. As modern medicine, for example, is increasingly available to provincial peoples, however, some of this acceptance of what used to be the inevitable is being modified. There is in the urban areas especially, and in the middle and upper income groups, much behavior that can be better described as rational and calculated. In the lower economic portion of the population, however, where there is less access to the goods needed to control one's life, fatalism continues to be marked. Peasants reflect it as do the poor in the cities. Political rulers, the weather, and God are all equally thought to be undependable, and the worst may be expected of them.

Although it is impossible in an essay of this scope to detail them, it is everywhere recognized that there are regional traits of character and behavior. The people of certain countries or districts are recognized or reputed to be especially humorous, or particularly stupid. Some towns are said to be inhabited only by thieves, others by men of strictly high honor, and so on. The
Andean highlander strikes one as being morose and sad, whereas the Brazilian is relatively merry, and the Porteño (from Buenos Aires) is reputed to be snobbish and superior in attitude. These variations one must learn for himself when he visits and becomes familiar with the diverse regions to the south.

B. Variations in Modernization

Since it is still in many respects the hinterland of an expanding world economy based on industrial and scientific development, one may expect to find great divergencies within Latin America. Among the most obvious variants that reappear over much of the area are the peasants and rural laborers; the urban poor; the middle income sector; and the cosmopolitan urbanites.

Peasants and rural laborers are for the most part Mestizos, but in specific regions, such as the central Andean highlands (Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) and in parts of Mexico and Guatemala, many are predominately of an Indian culture. The Latin American peasant is marked by the continued use of a primitive technology, a general level of poverty and simplicity of material culture, by a regionally limited outlook, but with an increasingly political concern with what he can get out of his nation. The machete, the hoe, the digging stick, the ax, and in some places the simple plough are the basic tools of agriculture. Boys learn to use them as children helping their fathers in the fields. The peasant's home is usually made by the owner, although where adobe bricks are used, a mason may be called in to help. Friends and relatives may be
asked to join at some point in the labor, or a few workers may be paid. Peasant communities may consist of scattered houses, but much more common are villages and towns, some of which date back to aboriginal times or the colonial period.

Rural laborers may live in much the same manner as peasants, and many peasants double as labor. On most large farms, however, laborers live in houses provided by the farm. These vary in quality, but they can never be called luxurious. In some areas, mainly the Andes and Middle America, the laborer may work a little land for himself, a privilege allowed him by the landlord in return for service. In general, living conditions reflect little of the advances visible in wealthier homes. In many areas, peasants and rural laborers participate in a regional trade system, and handicrafts still provide many of the goods and equipment used in the countryside.

In the cities, the poorer people increasingly tend to occupy the older sections of town, those areas that were in former days occupied by wealthier families, and the latter have moved to the outskirts. As the massive migrations to urban centers have continued without let-up, vast areas have been converted into shack cities where living and rent is cheap, and where the city provides few or no public services. "Favelas" in Brazil, "barriadas" in Peru, or by whatever name, the shack cities provide the poor with an important source of residence since most cities are far from handling the incoming migrants through public housing facilities. For the most part, the migrants come to the city more because of the lack of land
in the country than because the industrial development of the urban centers dreadfully needs them. Governments go to great lengths to encourage new industries in order that the thousands arriving daily will have some sources of income.

 Everywhere in Latin America the middle income population is growing. There are increasingly large neighborhoods of white collar workers, small businessmen, government employees, and so on; people who comprise an important portion of the urban populations. Their ambitions are usually high, although the fatalism mentioned earlier is by no means entirely absent. They are literate, politically involved, sensitive to the sway of world events, and trying to hang on to what in many countries is a creeping or spiraling inflation. Education is generally free, but relatively few from the lower sectors can yet afford secondary schooling; they must work to survive. So the mobility into the middle income bracket is not yet very rapid.

 In every country the wealth and ownership of properties and facilities are still largely in the hands of relatively few. In some instances these are families that trace their ancestry as far back as the colonial period. Much more commonly, however, they are descendents of more recent immigrants and of people who have risen to wealth within the past generation or two. From among these there is usually separated off an "upper class," usually through some combination of wealth and proper family relations. In a few countries these upper classes are really oligarchies, almost impervious to penetration. For the most part, however, the newer wealth
derived from business, new industries and more advanced forms of large scale farming has penetrated the older social crusts, and it is now almost impossible to distinguish an "old aristocracy." The wealthier population is generally very cosmopolitan, being familiar through their travels with parts of Europe and North America. They are yet somewhat divided, however, among those who still see the greatest opportunity for wealth to be derived from the continuation of export crops and minerals, thereby continuing the basic economic pattern derived from the past, and those who increasingly look to internal markets, increasing consumer demand within the country or within a larger Latin American trade area. These latter tend to be more "developmentally oriented," being interested in the economic betterment of the country in general.

C. Institutional Networks

All societies have certain social institutions that are particularly important in maintaining a degree of order and coherence in social life. Four of these will be touched upon here. Two, the family and the Church, have been important since early in the colonial period. Two others, the military and interest groups have played varying roles in the past, but are emerging today as being of particular importance in modern Latin America.

The family has been classically important in Latin America, and continues so today. This is, however, truer in some segments of the total society than in others, and in some countries and regions than in others. In Brazil, for example, the family is still a major manner of relating to people. Relatives often make
a special point of living close together, and in some instances, related households will occupy an entire apartment house. As may be expected, it is relatively more important among the wealthy where there is something to inherit than among the poor where such is not the case. However, among poorer peoples, the fact of having large families and the need to have knowledge of relatives in other places has kept knowledge of kin relations alive in many areas. Migrants who move from towns to the cities almost always seek out relatives to help them to adjust to city life, to find work, and to keep them until they can venture out on their own. Lateral family relationships are particularly important among the poor, therefore, whereas among the rich, recognition of relational depth is valued. In the middle income population there is immense variety in these matters, and it is difficult to make any generalization that has broad utility.

The Catholic Church has, since the conquest, been one of the major institutions over all of Latin America. For some reason, it has, until recent years, received relatively little attention from Rome even though the Latin American population is the largest single mass of Catholics anywhere on earth. The Latin American Church has classically been conservative, supportive of the wealthy elites, and little interested in social problems or economic development or welfare. Today, fortunately, there is marked evidence that the Church is changing its attitude, and many priests are in the forefront of welfare and local development programs. The long history of disinterest in the social and economic condition of the population
however, has left its mark. While nominally Catholics, it is probably correct to say that most Latin Americans pay little attention to religious practice. It is retained most strongly among the women and in the upper class. Middle and lower economic strata men are generally little interested. In rural areas there is often more interest in the Church, especially if a priest has been active. However, the Church for the most part is not wealthy, and cannot count on great financial support from its members, most of whom are extremely poor. Because of this, it receives support from other countries in many regions.

Protestant missionaries have been working in Latin America for many years, and in most towns of any size there are to be found small congregations of one or more Protestant sects. In general, they have made little impact on the cultural life of the area, although their numbers are continuing to grow slowly. They tend to draw upon those who see some specific advantage in joining; recent activation on the part of the Catholic Church in matters of welfare will probably dampen the attractiveness of the Protestant efforts.

There have always been soldiers in Latin America, but it was not until the end of the last century that there were widespread efforts to establish well-trained professional officer corps. One of the results of this has been that the military are gradually occupying an increasingly prominent place in the life of the area. Because local wealth has strongly inhibited measures sounding like socialism, and popular support is often poorly organized, governments in Latin America are often relatively weak. While generals
have usually been conservative, in recent years a few of them have proved to be liberal in the economic sense, and have pushed for economic development. The military in general is active almost everywhere in Latin America and, aided by the material support from the United States' military, forms the best organized and strongest single element in almost every country. Fear of a Castro-type revolution has led many military establishments to intervene more readily in the affairs of their country than was the case in the past. During the two decades following the second World War, there was some effort to avoid the appearance of dictatorships on the part of these groups, but it now appears that this delicacy is of less concern.

The major form of expression of interests in the population in general has evolved through the appearance of a large variety of interest groups. For the most part, these are strongest when composed of individuals who are already wealthy and hold positions of power in a country, but syndicalism and labor unions first made their appearance in the last century and today play an important part in the welfare of many of their members.

Interest groups of the wealthier sector of society are of many varieties and include clique arrangements that provide help to individual members in their political or business interests as well as large scale organizations such as national associations of farmers and Chambers of Commerce or Industry. They usually deal directly with the government to look out for the best interests of their members. Within these communities of common interest, however, there will often be competing groups, each seeking a larger share of the privileges or income.
Among poorer members of the society, such groups form around specific laboring groups or common interests. In general, they seldom have an effective collective bargaining position, and are as often as not utilized by the government for its interests. Until recent years, such organizations were found almost exclusively in the cities, but today there are widespread efforts to form such groups of countrymen, the poorer farmers and laborers who until now have rarely had any consistent way to seeing to their own betterment. In a few instances these have been formed by the countrymen themselves, but more commonly they have been organized through the aid of individuals with such experience in the cities, and who have some political interests in seeing to the formation of the organizations.

III. Modern Problems

In the above much has been said to suggest that many kinds of problems confront the modern Latin Americans. In the space remaining, I will discuss a few of these briefly.

A. Agrarian Problems

The combination of technological backwardness and a fact of a growing population have brought a serious dilemma to the country dweller. The land cannot hold the number of people that are appearing on the scene. The partial solutions used to date include movement to urban areas, movement to colonization areas where there is underpopulation, and agrarian reforms. Colonization obviously can go only so far since without increased production through a better technology, the good lands of some countries will soon be used up.
Agrarian reform has been attempted in Mexico, Bolivia, and Cuba, although there was an abortive attempt in Guatemala. Cuba's has been the most extreme case. More modest efforts have been undertaken elsewhere. Only Cuba's has been so radical as to place real control in the hands of the state.

B. Modernization

This is not a single problem or process, but covers a complex set of issues. Both for development and as a means of resolving the problem of employing the increasing population most countries are encouraging industrialization. Governments have established institutes to help technically, and offered special privileges for entrepreneurs. The problems are great, however, and range from the issue of obtaining sufficient capital to the education and training of personnel. The rapid appearance of huge urban concentrations has brought problems of housing, sanitation, education facilities, and general standard of living. Finally, running throughout the region is the very real concern with the identification with the nation, the politicization of the population, and the general development of a nationalist orientation. Nationalism as an ideology is to be found almost everywhere, and while conducive to efforts toward development, also poses many of the same problems of prejudice and narrow-mindedness that characterize it elsewhere.

C. Power and Mobility

The Latin Americans of the middle and upper economic strata tend to be extraordinarily concerned with matters of power. Wealth in itself is not so much a goal as is the prestige that attaches to one who has proved himself adept and capable of manipulating
things and people. Most of the Latin American population, rural and urban, are oriented more toward survival than toward this upper sector urge for mobility. The peasant cannot afford the game. The middle income urbanite, however, is concerned with obtaining the "better things of life," and these in general are things that require some money and education. In some parts of Latin America a middle class of the kind with which we are familiar in North America and Europe has evolved. This is particularly true in southern South America. Elsewhere, however, the middle income groups tend to identify with the aspirations of the upper class. Where a middle class has evolved, it has set its own goals and values. The presence of such a population segment in Argentina, combined with the degree of governmental instability in that country, suggests that the North American idea that the middle class offers stability to a society is not always true.

D. The United States and Latin America

The United States has generally given Latin America second place in its foreign interests. Through World War II, Europe always occupied a more important place, and now Asia is looming as being the area of major importance. From the Latin American point of view, this has disadvantages because it has meant that the United States has generally used its southern neighbors as an area for convenient investment with quick returns, and it has shown no basic interest in the full development of the area. The recent Alliance for Progress is the continuation of an effort at technical and economic aid begun during the Second World War, but it is
marked by the fact that a great deal more is taken out by U.S. private investors and corporations in profits from Latin America than go into it through the Alliance for Progress.

The consequence of this is that Latin Americans see the United States not merely as a colossus of the North, but as an exploiter of astronomical proportions. Since wealthy Latins themselves play in this game, however, this role of the United States receives much support from conservative governments. Because of the national ambivalence toward the United States, many Latin American countries are trying to bring Europe in as a greater participator in economic and cultural interchange, and to inhibit the tendency of the United States to pervade the economy and inundate the cultural life with products and tastes.

Unfortunately, with the good things the United States has to offer, also go the bad. With the better technology and elements of a better standard of living go also such things as an ideology that continues to support racial prejudice. With great economic activity go the gangsters, bringing social and cultural problems of North America which Latins do not need in addition to their own. It is because the United States gives promise of both good and bad, however, that Latin Americans are ambivalent about their northern neighbor. Latins looking at the United States see that their northern neighbor is having great difficulty in solving its own problems and therefore, doubt that it can so readily solve the very difficult problems of so many countries with such different cultural traditions.
Below are given a limited series of references in terms of the three major sections of the present paper. To these should be added a number of readily available volumes, issued by Alfred A. Knopf, New York, as the Borzoi Books on Latin America, under the general editorship of Lewis Hanke. The magazine América, published monthly by the Pan American Union carries both interesting and useful material, although it is politically unhelpful.

Part I. Cultural Antecedents


Part II. Contemporary Cultures and Social Systems


Part III. Modern Problems


The single most important population fact of Latin America, and indeed one of the most important characteristics of this region by any criterion, is its unprecedented current rate of population growth. Never before in human history has such a sizeable number of people (about quarter of a billion) been able to reproduce itself so rapidly. The current annual rate of growth of 2.7 per cent may not seem at all impressive until we remember it is sufficient to double the population within 26 years, something less than a generation. This fact takes on added meaning when we contrast it to Europe. The current rate of growth will require three generations (78 years) for Europe to double itself. And in the United States, despite all the talk of baby boom and population explosion, the rate of growth is only 60 per cent of that of Latin America.

It is the function of the office of population studies to provide an understanding of the causes and consequences of this unprecedented rate of population growth. For any given area or region or country, population change can only come through the operation of three factors: births, deaths and migration. Just as with any other living organisms, human beings are born, they live and die. Unlike other species, however, man increasingly has been able to dramatically control the timing of births and deaths and in so doing he has greatly reduced the importance of the purely biological factors in reproduction and mortality. As a consequence, current
population trends cannot be understood without a deep appreciation of the social structure of the societies under consideration. It is the interplay between the strictly demographic variables of fertility, mortality and migration on the one hand with those of the social structure on the other that provides us with the most complete understanding of population dynamics.

**Barriers to the Understanding of Demographic Facts**

It is not an easy task to bring about this understanding. Generally speaking, both within the mass media and the social sciences, demographic factors are often given only limited and passing attention, a sort of hurried and impatient pause, on the way to a more intensive and complete consideration of the social, economic and political conditions that bring about change in countries. Why is there a comparative neglect of population factors? There are several aspects of the field of population and its subject matter which help contribute to an explanation.

One of the problems of population as a discipline is that it has never been able to establish itself clearly as an independent field of study. Although rooted in biology it is agreed that the most problematic aspects of population change are to be found in the realm of the social sciences, particularly sociology and economics. Since there are few departments of population or demography, this discipline has generally found a home either in sociology or economics but always as a sub-field. Then too, population by itself has not formulated any sort of model of man and his behavior that constitutes a meaningful whole. We can conceive of and discuss economic man,
political man, sociological man and psychological man while at the same time recognizing that these are segmental constructions. But the notion of a population man makes very little sense, even in a segmental framework. Because it lacks this kind of model of man, population is often perceived by students to be boring, simply a collection of dry statistics. The subject matter does not lend itself to personification even though it deals with "people." There are no "good guys" or "bad guys" and it makes no difference to a demographer interested in fertility whether or not the children come from "happy" families or if husband and wife "love" each other.

An additional feature of population studies serving to limit its appeal is the fact that there are no "events" as such. Births, deaths and migrations occur continuously and although they may increase or diminish over time these changes generally do not provide dramatic interest. There are no crises in this field. It is difficult to introduce causal relationships. Overpopulation may be a contributing factor, but we would never say it "causes" the outbreak of a war, a change of government, etc.

There is one final feature of population studies that renders it less accessible and certainly less attractive to many students and lay people. Compared to some other social sciences, the field of population is in the unusual position of having an abundance of numerical data. Demographers are fortunate in having other people (namely census bureaus and departments of vital statistics) to do the job of collecting and processing their basic data. These governmental agencies generate an enormous amount of factual information and this
has proved to be something of a curse as well as a blessing. Faced with such masses of data demographers are often in danger of drowning in their own material. Rather than being rigorously selective, they often succumb to the temptation of presenting all of their data in long, formidable, table-filled publications. By often failing to interpret adequately their own data demographers have, it must be confessed, laid themselves open to the criticism of raw empiricism.

But the distaste that many people feel when confronted with a population publication is not always entirely the fault of the writer. Most people simply are not well prepared to read tables effectively. They are taught to read prose but no one ever teaches them to read tables. When confronted with a tabular presentation they are often at a loss as to how to interpret it and to extract its meaning. This is unfortunate, for tables are like pictures; a good table is worth a thousand words. When properly constructed, tables can show relationships far more effectively than any textual exposition. In covering population materials, therefore, it is highly desirable that students first be given some training in "how to read a table."

The above points should help us to understand why population factors are not usually given prominent attention in the interpretation of a country and its development. This is unfortunate because population factors, when properly placed within a social context, can contribute much to deepen our understanding of basic societal change. Population both affects and is affected by social structure and it is the interplay between the two that can help us to understand the dynamics of change. There are, for example, advantages for the
comparative study of Latin American countries owing to the numerical nature of population data. It is easy to rank countries according to their birth rates, death rates or the percent of population living in urban centers. In some other social sciences, by contrast, it is very difficult to arrive at a consensus regarding such important questions as, "How democratic is country X compared to country Y?" or "Does country A have proportionally more persons mentally ill than country B?"

This does not mean, of course, that demographic data are completely reliable and that they can be accepted at face value. On the contrary, all censuses, whether in Latin America or elsewhere, contain errors. As the countries of this region differ considerably in their level of economic development we would also expect considerable differences within the region in the reliability of their census information. Nevertheless, by the means of internal and external checks we can make a fairly good evaluation of the accuracy of these data more readily and more easily than we can for many other kinds of social phenomena.

A final advantage of population data when compared to those of other social sciences is that they are helpful in interpreting historical change because, for at least a number of countries, we have a succession of censuses spanning many decades that are a source of reasonably accurate and useful information. Within error limits we can have confidence that the population of Argentina in 1869 was 1.7 million and in 1960 was 20.0 million. We can never be as sure about the changes in the "character" or "basic personality" of
Argentines over the last one hundred years.

What will be done in this paper is to take up a number of basic demographic characteristics and interpret their importance in Latin America today. In doing so the reader is advised to make continual reference to Table I containing some of the basic population characteristics for Latin America. By doing so he will best be able to appreciate the diversity that exists within Latin America.

**The Big and the Small**

Seen in the context of the world total, the population of Latin America is not large. In 1966 the estimated 252,000,000 inhabitants of Latin America represented only 7.5 per cent of the world's population. Nevertheless, it has passed that of Northern America (the United States and Canada) within the last decade and if the present trend persists until the end of this century Latin America will be almost twice as large as Northern America.

It is noteworthy that while Latin America has only 7.5 per cent of the world's population it has 15.1 per cent of the land area. Taking this fact at face value, many people, including some Latin Americans, have concluded that Latin America is an "empty" continent. It is true that when compared to other major world regions such as Europe or Asia, Latin America is sparsely populated. As any population distribution map of the area will reveal, excepting for Central America and Mexico and the Andean countries, the population tends to be concentrated around the rim of the South American continent. Large areas of the interior are very lightly populated, presumably rich virgin lands awaiting to be occupied. But this is the "myth of
open spaces" for crude density figures are often treacherous. Generally there are good reasons why areas of the earth are not well populated in this age. The Amazonian basin, for example, doubtless will witness a considerable increase in population but it will be a very long time before man will be found there in great numbers because it is not a hospitable area for human habitation. The leaching of the soil gives lie to the common notion that this jungle area represents a great unexploited agricultural potential. It will take advanced technology to make the basin productive. Other parts of the empty interior are mountainous terrain that can never support large populations.

One of the most important features to remember about the 25 countries of Latin America is the tremendous disparity among them in population size. Brazil by itself makes up one-third of the entire population of Latin America and when Mexico is added the two represent almost exactly one-half of the total population. By adding on the next pair of countries, Argentina and Colombia, we can account for about two-thirds. The next groupings of four countries of comparable size (Peru, Venezuela, Chile and Cuba) contribute another 15 per cent. This means that the remaining 17 political entities account for less than one-fifth of the population of Latin America! The implications of these great differences in population size are not always recognized. Take, for example, the Organization of American States, or for that matter any other regional organization. It is easy to see that a coalition of small Latin American countries could effectively block, if they so desired, countries
representing two-thirds of the population of Latin America. One of the reasons behind the idea of the Central American and the Latin American common markets was to enable some countries to overcome the limitations inherent in the small size. But the very imbalance in population (along with the fear of all the countries of loss of sovereignty) undoubtedly is one of the reasons for the slow progress to date in setting up these common markets.

The Unprecedented Rate of Population Growth

As already mentioned, the single most important demographic fact about Latin America today is its rate of population growth. Many people believe that demographers are needlessly alarmistic about current population trends in Latin America but this is probably because they do not fully comprehend the nature of geometric rather than arithmetic rates of growth. To illustrate, assume an initial population of ten million and that after twenty years it grows to twenty million. If growth proceeded arithmetically then each twenty years another ten million would be added. At the end of 100 years the total would be 60 million. However, population grows geometrically with ever-expanding bases with the result that the population would grow to 320 million within 100 years. It is the future that concerns demographers and the consequences of a rapidly expanding population, not necessarily the present population size.

It is important, therefore, to realize that the vital question is not, "Is Latin America now overpopulated?" for the only answer to this question is an emphatic "No!" There are adequate resources
to support a population many times the present size. But given the current rate of growth, that "many times" will be reached far sooner than most people believe. When the question is altered to read, "Is Latin America growing too rapidly at the present time?" it becomes an entirely different matter. Consider what would happen to Latin America's population at current rates of growth for periods as long as 100 or 200 years. At the end of 100 years, Latin America would have nearly 4 billion people, or almost 16 times its current population. At the end of 200 years, it would have skyrocketed to about 62 billion people. Scarcely anyone will seriously entertain the possibility that this second figure will be attained. It is, therefore, not a matter of determining if the rate of population growth in Latin America will slow down but only when it will do so.

So far, only the entire region and its growth has been considered and as a glance at Table I will show, there is considerable variation in growth rates for the 25 countries. One of the major countries, Argentina, is growing only about one-half as fast as the others. The other large countries (Brazil, Mexico and Colombia) are growing at approximately the same rate, 3.0 to 3.2 per cent per annum. Countries with the same rate of growth do not necessarily have the same fertility and mortality rates, however. Bolivia and Uruguay both are growing at about 1.4 per cent per annum but this common figure is the result of completely different combinations of birth and death rates, with both being much higher in Bolivia. Costa Rica has the distinction of being the fastest growing bona fide country in the world with an astonishing rate of 4.3 per cent per annum, sufficient to double her population every 17 years!
It is important to be aware that for most of the countries in Latin America, the current rapid increases are a relatively recent phenomenon. For much of the history of the region since the conquest growth was only a slow and painful process in which the gains achieved during periods of good health conditions were virtually wiped out by epidemics and occasional famines. The Latin American societies came into being and their institutional arrangements were evolved during this long period of slow and faltering population growth. The transition to a much larger rate of growth, while it has not occurred overnight, has been a relatively abrupt phenomenon. As a result it is fair to say that most of the Latin American countries (always excepting Argentina, Uruguay and perhaps Cuba that apparently have made the transition to a lower level of natural increase) are still attempting to accommodate themselves to the new conditions. How well they succeed in doing so over the next generation is a matter of utmost importance.

The Precipitous Decline in Mortality

Latin America, in common with many developing regions throughout the world, has experienced impressive declines in mortality rates for the last twenty years or so. Crude death rates (number of deaths per annum divided by the total population times 1,000) have declined from the mid-twenties or above to the low teens. Perhaps a better index of the improvement in mortality is gained from life expectancy figures. For the whole region within the last thirty years, roughly twenty years have been added to life expectancy at
birth. A striking but not unrepresentative example of the tremendous improvement in life expectancy is Mexico. In 1930 the life expectancy for males has been calculated at about 32.5 years. Thirty five years later, or a little more than the span of a generation, males born into Mexican society have a life expectancy of about 61 years. The virtual doubling of life expectancy within the space of a generation is an historically new phenomenon.

This great improvement in the reduction of mortality in Mexico and other Latin American countries unquestionably is an impressive accomplishment and the question naturally arises as to how it was brought about. In the main the answer is greater control over contagious disease. Epidemics are now rare. In addition, some widely spread illnesses such as malaria, which are not killers in themselves but debilitate individuals and render them vulnerable to death by other diseases, have largely been brought under control throughout Latin America.

Public health programs, both domestic and international in origin also have played an important part in helping to reduce the risk of death. During the last twenty years or so a number of countries, including Mexico, have instituted health programs and created numerous health facilities, although they are still limited mainly to urban centers. In addition they have sponsored direct pre-natal care for mothers and inaugurated educational campaigns to encourage correct practices on the part of the mother both before and after the delivery of the baby. International health agencies such as the World Health Organization have also played an important part. They
provided not only the supplies but the skilled personnel necessary
to set up and conduct malaria eradication campaigns and other
health services. Both through their own direct programs and by
their assistance to health organizations of the countries them-
selves, the health standards within the countries have been elevated.
At least for a part of the population, the improvement in general
living conditions (including also such improved community facilities
as safe drinking water and sewage disposal) when combined with
higher levels of education has made the people better able to cope
with illnesses as they occur.

The dramatic reduction in mortality in Latin America has been
achieved without a marked alteration in the social structure of
these countries. By this is meant that the customary patterns of
behavior on the part of the population have not in most cases had
to be changed. For example, the importance of magic in coping with
illness still remains fairly strong. People did not have to give
up their curandero (folk healer); he simply has been augmented by
the recourse to a physician and a clinic. Thus people have found
it possible to adapt new health practices without greatly modifying
their traditional ways of coping with illness.

While the factors that have contributed to the decline in
mortality in Latin America have not had much impact on the social
structure the consequences of lower mortality sooner or later will
affect significantly both the people and their institutions. To
show why this is so let us return to the example of Mexico and
male life expectancy at birth of 32.5 years in 1930 (A) and 61.2
in 1965 (B) so as to indicate the number surviving from a hypothetical 100,000 births to various ages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>A (1930)</th>
<th>B (1965)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>90,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>47,598</td>
<td>85,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>18,343</td>
<td>58,427</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By age fifteen, a time when the boy is soon to enter the labor force if he has not already done so, four out of ten males born under mortality conditions A have been lost (most within the first few years of life) while in case B only one of ten has been lost. The same general relationship holds for later years. At age 35, a time when men are near their peak productivity period, less than one-half of the original number still survive under A, whereas 85 out of 100 still remain alive under B. Finally, at age 65, a time of retirement or at least a slowing down of activity, less than one-fifth survive in A whereas nearly three-fifths still are alive in B.

The rapid drop in mortality has come about so quickly we have not had an opportunity to witness or to investigate all of the changes that will derive from it, but some of the implications are clear enough. There will be fewer disruptions of the marital bond by death and this will mean fewer orphans, either partial (one parent dead) or complete. This in turn may reduce the "need" for more extended kin networks that in the past took over the child-rearing obligations of broken families and will place greater reliance upon the "nuclear" family, made up only of the husband, wife,
and children. Fatalism is a concept often invoked to explain behavior in Latin America and this is understandable, for one had to develop some sort of defense against the ever-present threat of death. But fatalism, at least in terms of mortality, should have less force in the future, and families as well as individuals will be able realistically to do more long-term planning. It also bears mentioning that a person born under these improved health conditions has much greater probability of surviving throughout his work life span. Consequently, the investment made in him for education on the part of his parents and his society will bring forth, on the average, greater returns because of the much lower risk of his dying before completing his work life. There is insufficient space to go into other consequences of the lowered mortality.

Looking into the future the prediction may be made that, barring catastrophe, death rates will continue to decline and life expectancy will rise. The amount and timing of this improvement will depend, of course, upon the circumstances in each country. Generally speaking, marked improvements in life expectancy will be more difficult to accomplish in the future than in the past. As the principal causes of death change from early childhood and contagious diseases to those of a more degenerative nature, it will require much better and far more expensive health services than are generally now available in Latin America.

**Birth Rates: High and Heading Higher**

With some important exceptions Latin America is currently a region of high fertility, at a higher level than any other major world region. Argentina and Uruguay, perhaps because of the impor-
tance of European immigration, have much lower fertility than the other countries. Before her revolution Cuba also had materially lower fertility than Latin America as a whole. (Since 1958, we know little demographically about what has happened in Cuba.)

As noted in Table I, the crude birth rates (number of live births per annum divided by the total population times 1000) for most countries are in the mid-forties. In contrast the current rates in the United States are less than half that figure and even during the peak of the baby boom they never exceeded 30 per thousand.

In the past, it was not surprising to find high births in Latin America for, as we have just seen, death rates also were quite high, leaving only a moderate rate of natural increase. What is surprising at the present time is the fact that fertility rates continue to be high and appear to be moving higher. There is some evidence that birth rates may be ten percent above those of twenty years ago. This has taken place at the very same time that most countries in Latin America have experienced considerable urbanization and industrialization. This contradicts the expectations of the "theory of the demographic transition." In its most general form this theory attempts to explain the transition of a society from a state of high birth and death rates to one with low birth and death rates. Its formulation was based upon the experience of western Europe and northern America. The theory assumes a sequence whereby at first death rates decline and then after an interval birth rates also decline. The latter drop because of the societal changes inherent in industrialization, urbanization and the entire
modernization process. Large families are not "functional" under these conditions.

The problem with this theory is that to date Latin America (always excluding Argentina, Uruguay and perhaps Cuba) isn't performing according to expectations. Probably this discrepancy is a short-term phenomenon and that over the long term fertility will decline. It has been suggested that in the very earliest stages of modernization fertility may rise because the old institutional arrangements surrounding the control of fertility have been shattered but there has been as yet insufficient time to evolve new ones.

There is, it should be pointed out, differential fertility in Latin America just as everywhere else. The better educated persons of high income and occupational status have, on the average, fewer children than do persons with very low education, income and occupational status. But they are all at a much higher level than in developed countries. The professional man's level of fertility is lower than that of the worker in Mexico, for example, but it is still higher than that of the worker in the United States.

Fundamentally, the question to be answered is why, if it has been relatively easy to bring about a decline in mortality in Latin America, has it been so difficult to do the same for fertility? The answer is to be found in social institutions and social structure. Recall that the amazing decline in mortality was brought about with a minimal alteration of the social structure, particularly that of the family. Some of the decline was induced by agencies external
to the society, such as the World Health Organization. And, of course, any agency, national or international, is welcome if it can help in reducing the risk of death. No society, after all, can afford to be indifferent to this menace. But it is quite a different matter to reduce the birth rate, for in this case efforts to change things run against, not with, the grain. The values surrounding the family are such as to support high fertility. Just as many children are proof of the man's highly prized virility, so, too, many children are a demonstration that the woman is fulfilling her chief responsibility and role as mother within the family. To change these values and sentiments means in effect to change this basic institution.

It is within this context that the troublesome problem of birth control must be seen. This is a topic saturated with misinformation and emotionalism. It is, for example, asserted that all women in Latin America very much want large families, whereas, as a number of studies have demonstrated, a large proportion of mothers report that they have more children than they desire. It is also asserted that the reason for high fertility in Latin America is religion; well over 90 per cent of the population is Catholic and everyone knows that Catholics forbid any form of birth control. Not only is it untrue that Catholics doctrine forbids all means of birth control, but many nominal Catholics in Latin America are little influenced in any direct manner by the Church's position on birth control, either because of their ignorance or their indifference. If contraceptives were widely available and if the people were
sufficiently educated to properly use them it is certain that many persons would do so. But, of course, the above conditions do not hold throughout Latin America.

It has been stated at an earlier point that over the long run it is not a question of whether or not population growth in Latin America will slow down but only a question of when the slowdown will occur. Obviously this implies a substantial drop in the birth rate. Even though the current evidence indicates rising birth rates, there is evidence that Latin America is on the threshold of a substantial decline. Coupled with a growing public awareness of the problems attendant upon high fertility, there is an increasing willingness on the part of the Church and national governments to deal directly and less emotionally with the problem.

**Internal Migration: The Massive Redistribution of Population**

All over Latin America large numbers of people are on the move. Whatever the historical validity of the common notion of a Latin America made up mainly of peasants who are born, live and die in the same village, the current situation is quite different; it is one of flux and movement. This movement takes various forms. Excluding seasonal migrations, the main types of migration are: (1) rural-to-rural migration; (2) rural-to-urban migration; and (3) urban-to-urban migration. In no country of Latin America is it now possible to have an accurate estimate of the total movement represented by these three types, but we can be sure that a substantial part of the population at one time or another during its lifetime is involved in one or more of these movements.
Perhaps the least known of the three types is rural-to-rural migration, although increasingly anthropologists are studying this phenomenon. Included here would be agricultural colonization, especially movements from highland to lowland areas and into newly established irrigation systems. Much of this migration involves entire families and it represents a way of relieving population pressure on the older traditional agricultural areas. Although the male migrants most often remain employed in agriculture it is possible that a change from subsistence to commercial agriculture may require as much of an adjustment as that required for rural-to-urban migration.

The movement out of rural areas to the cities is the most visible form of migration and it has drawn the most attention. The fact that urban areas in most countries in Latin America are growing at least twice as rapidly as rural areas is to be accounted for by internal migration, for fertility is still somewhat higher in rural rather than urban areas. The importance of this type of migration varies from country to country, depending upon the level of urbanization, the reservoir of potential migrants in rural areas, and the rate of economic growth. Rural-urban migration is significant because it reflects the structural transformation of societies from a predominately agrarian to predominately urban types.

Unfortunately, an understanding of the migratory process is handicapped by lack of data, even more so than is the case with either fertility or mortality. Census information is limited generally to place-of-birth and place-of-residence comparisons.
This "lifetime" measure of migration tells us nothing about multiple migrations or return migrations. Recently, field surveys have established the importance of the latter phenomenon. Of any five persons migrating to a given destination between one and two of them at some future time will return either to their place of origin or to some other place they have lived in at some period of their life.

Quite as important as the magnitude and direction of migration streams are the characteristics of those who form them. In terms of age, the answer to the question, "Who migrates?" is much the same as in other countries of the world; most migrants are between the ages of 15 and 29. On the other hand, in terms of the balance of the sexes Latin America is somewhat unusual. Unlike the pattern of Asia where there is a marked excess of males among migrants to the cities, in most Latin American cities there is a clear excess of females, due mainly to the large flow of girls and women to cities to work as domestics in middle and upper class homes. Some eventually return to their villages but many stay and get married. It should be stressed that there is considerable selectivity of migrants vs. nonmigrants. In terms of education, for example, many of the migrants have more years of schooling than those who don't migrate. This is especially true of urban-to-urban migration, including those who move to advance their careers.

This last point leads into the question as to why people migrate why they chose to leave their homes. In Latin America, as elsewhere, the single most important reason is economic opportunity. The
principal migration streams are to areas of economic growth. It is more correct to say relative economic opportunity for it is not to be implied that all migrants are assured of good jobs upon arrival at their place of destination. All that can be said is that general economic conditions are better in place of destination than in place of origin. Although work is the most important factor influencing migration, for men at least, familial reasons are important. Perhaps as many as one of every five moves are set off by factors connected with the family -- either to join relatives in a new destination or to return to them after a prior move.

The importance of kinship, incidentally, has been overlooked by those who believe that migration is a very unsettling and traumatic experience, especially for those coming directly from the village to the metropolitan area. In matter of fact, only a small proportion of migrants strike off on their own into the unknown. In one study of Monterrey, Mexico, it was determined most migrants move as part of a family group and that four of every five migrants had relatives or friends in Monterrey prior to their move there. Two-thirds of all migrants received some form of aid (generally food and shelter) from these relatives or friends. Moreover, nine of ten migrants expressed satisfaction with their decision to move to Monterrey. Of course, a good many of those who weren't happy in Monterrey went back home or to another place, but the fact still remains that most migrants do not experience their move in negative terms.

Internal migration in Latin America, as in all countries throughout the world, plays an important role in the process of economic
development and modernization. It effects a redistribution of the population, thus permitting a better allocation of manpower by moving people from over-populated regions of traditional subsistence agriculture either to new agricultural lands or to the cities. While it is unquestionably true that cities do not always have employment opportunities adequate to support the large numbers of in-migrants, over the long run the city is a better environment because of its superior educational facilities. Migration not often is an easy or painless experience, but it is a stimulus for greater development, both for the individuals and their societies.

The Relation of Population Growth to Economic Development

All over Latin America there is agreement on one point: economic development must be speeded up so as to provide significant improvement in per capita income. But if there is agreement on the goal itself there is little consensus on how best to arrive at it. Some argue for a completely planned economy, others for a traditional capitalistic economy and others for a mixture of the two. Imbedded in this debate is the effect of population growth on economic development, a debate that is, of course, not peculiar to Latin America.

Arguments for the positive impact of population growth on economic development are related to the factors of consumer markets, economies of scale and degree of specialization. If the population of a country is limited in numbers then naturally its domestic market will be small. Therefore it will not be able to reach the most efficient level of operations that large enterprises enjoy as a consequence of economies of scale. Also, if a population is dispersed
thinly over a large area this inevitably increases transportation and communication costs.

A different type of argument has been advanced by economists, among others, that sees favorable consequences stemming from the "challenge" that rapid population growth presents to the country's institutions. Entrepreneurs and governments are stimulated by the environment of rapid growth and the expansion in markets. Consequently, they step up their efforts to provide the goods and services necessary to accommodate these additional consumers.

On the other side of the ledger are the arguments against the positive role of rapid population growth. While some of these arguments derive from Malthus they need not be stated within his framework. Essentially, the argument goes that if a marked improvement in per capita income is to be attained this requires a rapid build-up of capital, both private and public. Too rapid a population growth will serve to divert scarce capital resources to a simple maintenance rather than the increase of capital per worker. Population growth is seen as putting additional pressure on the limited natural resources, and this includes everything from housing to educational facilities. Rapid population growth leads to high "dependency ratios, that is, the relationship of persons in the labor force to those who are not, principally children.

Economists, through their review of the partial evidence at hand, have not been able to arrive at any clearcut statement regarding the role of population growth with respect to economic development. Historically, some countries, including the United States, have been
able to grow very rapidly both in terms of population and per capita income. On the other hand, many of the small European countries have been able to develop high per capita incomes without the large internal markets which the population growth advocates stress. Basically, the matter resolves down to the decision as to how rapidly one wants to increase production per head. If a country's population growth is between three and four percent per annum, this means that the increase in gross national product must be at least double this figure to yield a rather moderate increase of three to four percent per annum. Such a level of performance, while it is indicative of a dynamic economy in a long-run perspective, is not sufficient to satisfy the rising expectations of the peoples of Latin America. While it is quite true that a number of countries in Latin America could derive economic advantages from a larger population and high density, no one is advocating or predicting that there will be an absolute cessation of population growth in Latin America. These countries will grow, densities will increase, markets will expand.

Unfortunately, debate in Latin America regarding the role of population growth tends to assume an either-or character. Either one increases productivity or one limits sharply population growth. If a rapid rise in per capita income is desired, and no one questions this, then it would seem entirely reasonable to use both methods for they are not mutually exclusive. A country can raise its productivity at the same time that the rate of population growth is declining. It is false counsel to assume that only one of these two alternatives is open.
## Table 1

SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region &amp; Country</th>
<th>Population estimates mid-1966 (millions)</th>
<th>Annual rate of increase 1953-1954</th>
<th>Number of years to double population</th>
<th>Birth rate per 1,000 population ca. 1966</th>
<th>Death rate per 1,000 population ca. 1966</th>
<th>Population under 15 years (percent) ca. 1960</th>
<th>Population in Metropolitan Areas 100,000+ 1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td><strong>Middle America</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32-37</td>
<td>7-10</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47-51</td>
<td>14-17</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<td>43.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>20-25</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>14-17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>7.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45.3</td>
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<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>13-16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
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<td>39.1</td>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
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<td>2.0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>27.6</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42-46</td>
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<td>10-13</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td>55.9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Many publications deal with population but only in a partial, often superficial manner. The following publications have demographic factors as the focus of their attention. All but the first one are collections of articles and they offer the most up-to-date treatment of population changes in Latin America.


TEACHING ABOUT LATIN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

A Prospectus

Karl M. Schmitt

A. Some postulates about the general approach to the subject

I. Point of Departure

Teaching "foreign" governments to students at any age poses problems of reference. Certainly students of high school age have already formed notions and concepts about government and politics from their own experience. We can see these at work in their general environment when they elect class officers in school or when they form social clubs among themselves. The latter frequently have in addition to provisions for election of officers, a written constitution and by-laws. In other words the American child, especially of middle class background, begins his process of political "socialization" at an early age and thereafter tends to judge government and political process at these terms. At The University of Texas we have seen this same process at work in reverse with foreign students who enroll in the basic course in American government. Government limited in its power over the citizen, government divided between a central and constituent authorities, politics with procedures that avoid violence, elections conducted with a high level of honesty, and a court system that can and does limit the executive authority are difficult to grasp and believe by students whose experience has been largely a denial of these modes of operation in their own environment.
The American high school student, then, approaching the study of foreign governments needs a thorough grounding first of all in the government and politics of the United States. He needs a solid point of departure from which he can perceive and evaluate the operations of a system or systems of government that may appear superficially similar to his own but that are in substance different from his own on many essential features. We have found that the "comparative" method is a useful tool in teaching about foreign governments at the college level; it seems even more important at the high school level where the degree of student sophistication about the world around him is presumably lower. Obviously, a "comparative" study of Latin American government and politics will require a high level of skills on the part of the teacher.

II. Terminology

The current jargon of political science should probably be used sparingly in teaching about Latin America. The teacher, of course, needs to be well grounded in modern concepts of comparative politics, and prepared to translate complex terminology into ideas and terms relevant to the high school level. "Structural-functions" analysis, for example, is basically not very difficult to understand and not really very new, and a good high school teacher should find little difficulty in getting the concept across to the students. More difficult are the terms in ordinary usage such as "politics," "power, and "democracy." While we may be able to slide by these terms without much depth or precision in our usage in teaching American government we are certain to experience grave problems in teaching them
relevant to foreign governments. Too frequently these terms take on aspects of an entirely different meaning or coloration as we change the locale of their usage. "Democracy" cannot be defined simply as government of, by, and for the people; neither can it be equated with the government of the United States. Certainly it cannot be defined in rigid absolute terms, particularly in the Latin American context where aspects of "democratic" government may be found in most parts of Latin America if we use the term in a flexible way. On the other hand, the students should be aware of the fact that terms that evoke favorable responses in the United States frequently evoke indifferent or even hostile responses in Latin America since the terms may well be associated with situations and conditions that millions desire to change or abolish. "Democracy" is not universally a good term in Latin America; "capitalism" is more often than not a bad term; while "socialism," frowned upon in the United States, is a good term. Communism does not evoke nearly the hostile reaction in Latin America that it does in the United States.

III. Government or Politics or Both

What contact I have had with high school teachers of American Government leads me to believe that for the most part attention is focused on laws, constitutions, and structures of government. Those of us who teach at the college level, and many who teach at the high school level have long deplored this situation as entirely inadequate to an understanding of political reality in the United States.
I realize that high school teachers are frequently placed under political restraints in teaching about the facts of political life. If such restraints in the teaching of American government cannot be overcome, if teachers cannot teach the realities in an honest and objective manner, then there is no point in introducing materials on foreign governments into the high school curriculum. A student needs a point of departure in his own experience and knowledge of American government with all its conflicts, irregularities, and limitations. Furthermore, what must be taught are the realities of American government, not just fanciful hopes or expectations of what it ought to be.

As inadequate as the simple legal and structural approach may be, a student of U.S. government will get some notion of the American system because to some extent structures and constitutions approximate political practice. In Latin America this approach would be disastrous. Constitutions are theoretical statements of ideal political conditions to be achieved in the future, not outlines and limitations for government and its officials. Structures of government, it frequently appears, are made only to be circumvented. Practices that U.S. students may believe at first glance to constitute "corruption," e.g., bribe taking, may be integral parts of the system with more positive than negative aspects for the harmonious functioning of the system. In other words, we must get below the grandiose statements of constitutions and bills of rights, below the orderly structure of political institutions, and study the interplay of citizen, bureaucrat, and elected officials in an incredibly complex conflict of interests and organizational patterns.
We must study not only what government does and what effects government has on people, but why government acts as it does, what pressures and interests of citizens and organizations are brought to bear in the formulation of public policy.

IV. The Concept of "Latin America"

Unquestionably Latin America can be studied in some contexts as a unit. The areas enjoy a broad background of similar historical and cultural developments that have created both objective and subjective conditions that invite area identification. On the other hand, separate national developments have had many years to take root. The great majority of the countries have experienced an independent national existence for well over a century, and the most recent (Panama) for more than 60 years. (We do not include the recently independent British Caribbean countries nor the remaining European dependencies as part of Latin America for our present purposes.)

As a result of separate political developments, variations in ethnic make-up, availability of natural resources, and rates of economic growth and development, the several countries of Latin America have developed political systems substantially different from one another, however similar their cultural underpinnings. Obviously not all twenty countries can be studied, but I would suggest studying selected countries and their political systems rather than attempt the usual approach of studying generalities such as presidents, congresses, constitutions, political parties, interest groups, and elections. Some broad and careful generalizations
(noting exceptions to the rules) might be made at the beginning of the course, but the teacher should move quickly to specific countries and their political structure and operations. Comparisons and contrasts should be made in terms of the generalizations outlined above.

Selections of countries to be studied may be made on several bases: (1) geographic distribution (2) size and importance (3) types of political systems. It might be wise to attempt a combination of all three categories, and probably no single one should be rigidly followed. Some countries like Mexico and Brazil cannot be neglected, but honest differences of opinions among scholars will lead to disputes over whether to include Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and Chile in the group. Most scholars would probably insist on Argentina; few would opt for El Salvador. On the other hand, I would suggest including a small and poor country, and certainly one still governed by frankly authoritarian methods. Perhaps Nicaragua or Paraguay could be included on the list since both are small, poor, and ruled by dictators.

V. Relationship of Politics and History

The high school teacher of Latin American politics and government needs to be grounded in the history of the area. He or she need not be an "expert" or "research scholar" but must be well read in the basic books. Too often political scientists have approached contemporary Latin America with a high degree of naïveté and have been led to false or distorted generalizations because of a lack of historical perspective. So many of the "problems" of present-day Latin America
can be explained and understood best in terms of what preceded. In the past lie the roots of militarism, coups and revolutions, social unrest, economic underdevelopment, and political instability. The problems facing the countries of Latin America are of course not the same as those of a century ago or even of a generation ago. But neither are they entirely new. Frequently they are old problems with a new twist or urgency, or they are new problems of the modern age created or exacerbated by old attitudes and values. In any case they are intimately related to the past. History can be neglected in the study of Latin America's politics only at the cost of distortion if not outright error.

B. Areas of specific study
I. Values and Attitudes

In a sense, under this heading the student will study broad cultural aspects of the countries selected for investigation. The focus, however, will be directed primarily toward political attitudes and norms of the citizenry. I strongly recommend that the study of Latin American politics begin with this approach because national values and attitudes are basic determinants of the political system, of the manner and style in which political life is carried on. Such study will go far toward explaining the discrepancies between the formal structures of government which may well reflect aspirations toward which little more than lip service is given, and the actual operations of politics (including by-passing of the institutions) which reflect more accurately what people believe and adhere to more deeply.
In this opening section, the constitutions of the selected countries should be introduced. But the constitutions should not be approached as realistic documents for defining the outlines of politics and government except in the most loose and flexible manner. Rather the constitutions should be read as documents reflecting the highest ideals of the countries' political thinkers, as propaganda pieces to win political support, as documents of a faction or party. They may be all or one of these things, but few political leaders or participants take them seriously as laws for immediate and full implementation. Most constitutions of Latin America contain broad social and economic welfare programs that are far beyond the present limited resources of the countries to fulfill. These are not necessarily cynical additions as sops to the underprivileged (though they may be, for some politicians who support them) but rather statements of what the nation should strive for. Some countries (Mexico, e.g.) have systematically tried to extend and deepen the benefits promised by its constitution now 50 years old.

Public opinion surveys are relatively scarce in Latin America, the people on the whole more resistant to answering questions about their personal affairs than those of the United States. At the same time, Latin American political scientists have just begun to apply methods used for many years in this country. As a result, studies from disciplines other than political science must be utilized in the study of attitudes and values.

II. The Citizen and Politics

We know that in the United States the degree of participation of the citizen in political life varies enormously on the issues
at stake and from class to class, and from person to person. These differences are even more pronounced in Latin America with its greater disparities of wealth, education, and cultural background. In several countries with large Indian populations, half or more of the people are almost entirely outside national life, political and economic. Care must be taken about generalizing on this situation, however, since this obviously would not apply to Argentina, Uruguay, or Chile. Recent studies have tried to classify people in relation to government as parochials (Indians referred to above), subjects (people who are aware of government but have little sense of influencing decision making), and participants (those who are fully integrated into the system). This may be a useful classification for distinguishing Latin American countries in terms of citizen response to and role in the political system.

In this area, the student should study political parties and interest groups, determining the degree of active citizen participation, the strength of organized movements, the modes of operations, and the ideal, ideology, or program under which organized groups function in political life. The student will also study at this stage elections and electoral participation, voting rights and procedures, civil rights in both theory and practice, and the role of the police in the society. Obviously not all of these things can be studied in depth, but they should be brought into the readings and discussion, and viewed in relation to other parts of the political system.

Finally, the student should study in this section the place of violence and revolution in the life of the countries selected. In
much of Latin America, violence is accepted by broad sectors of the population as a proper means of influencing political action or overthrowing governments. Here we must be careful to distinguish what people say they believe in (most will disavow violence) and the way they act (in most countries resort to violence for political ends has been used by all classes and groups at one time or another). Here, too, we must be careful to point out that some countries have achieved a high degree of consensus about the political system. While some forms of low-key violence are permissible and expected in this last group of countries, few people would contemplate changing the government or overthrowing the regime by force.

III. Structures and Institutions

Having set the scene by looking at the people and the values, attitudes, and activities in political matters, we are now ready to examine the structure of government and its specific institutions that reflect some of the political ideas and ideals of the nation. Without exception for any country, the primacy must be given to the presidency. Although the office and person of the chief executive may be boxed in with various legal and constitutional restraints, the president is the central feature of government in every country. The strong executive is a result of centuries-old political practices and attitudes. People look to the strong man to solve their problems, extend favors, protect interests. They have little trust in legislative bodies and Judicial systems. In their experience these have never been able to stand against the supreme leader. Again
variations occur throughout the area. The Congress in Chile is an important political body in that it can effectively tie up new presidential programs; it cannot very well push through new programs of its own. In Mexico to the contrary, the Congress serves largely as an arena for political patronage and training ground for aspiring young politicos. The courts can never effectively stop executive actions on constitutional grounds, but their ordinary judicial role in deciding controversies is adequately performed.

In this section, the student should also study some aspects of state and local government, contrasting the unitary systems of Latin America with the federal system of the United States. This study offers some good opportunities to contrast theory and practice in Latin America in view of the constitutional provisions for federalism in several of the countries, notably Brazil and Mexico.

Finally, at this point, the student will study the bureaucracies of the area. In recent years these have expanded enormously not only to administer a wide variety of new government programs but to serve as sinecures for the thousands of university graduates whom the economies cannot absorb. A discontented intellectual is a potential revolutionary, but a government job with steady income gives him a stake in the society which he is loathe to risk by rebelling. In this context, too, the student will study the role of bribe-taking, pay-offs, controlled contacts for government undertakings, and other forms of activities that are considered corrupt practices in this country. These should not be approached as "evils" so much as simply facts-of-life in Latin America to be understood
and seen in perspective. They may be "bad" but they may also be "useful" or "necessary" to the functioning of the system.

IV. Public Policies

This section will attempt to answer the question: What does the government do? Again, not all activities can or should be studied in depth -- the teacher must be selective. Certain areas, however, stand out. Most countries of Latin America today are seriously concerned over problems of economic development. Social unrest is rife in much of the area, and basic needs of the inhabitants must be filled. In this area, the student should become acquainted not only with the government's attitude toward control of natural resources, industrialization, banking, and agriculture, but must attempt to discern what actual measures have been taken and what programs are under way. Obviously, the play of politics is involved in administration, and the student should come to understand what pressure groups desire these measures, which ones oppose them, why these positions are taken, who ultimately wins, or what compromises are reached. The same approach can be taken and the same questions asked with respect to education, social welfare programs, land reform, tax reform, and other measures designed to achieve a more equitable distribution of national resources. It should here become evident that the middle classes, often thought of be the great hope of reform in Latin America, are in fact some of the primary obstacles to fundamental change and therefore a root cause of social ferment and political unrest by the masses. Why this is so, should be a primary interest.
Public security (including the roles of the police and military) should be studied in this section. Again these activities cannot be separated from the political roles of these agencies, but some assessment must be made of the effectiveness of these forces in view of the widely held view that Communist subversives are a serious threat to the peace of the area.

Finally, the foreign policies of the selected countries must be studied. Major concern will center about their relations with the United States but some attention must be given to their attitudes toward the Soviet Union and Red China, particularly with respect to the Cold War. Their relations with Europe and Asia might well be given some attention, and their roles in international organizations such as the OAS and the UN.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


