THE DEFINITE AND INDEFINITE DETERMINERS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS TO MODIFYING CLAUSE STRUCTURES IN ENGLISH AND MANDARIN CHINESE ARE STUDIED WITHIN THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF TRANSFORMATIONAL GRAMMAR, AS PRESENTED BY KATZ AND POSTAL. A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE FORM-CLASS AND EARLIER TRANSFORMATIONAL APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM IS MADE WITH THE CONCLUSION THAT THEY ARE INADEQUATE, WHEREAS THE REVISED MODEL OF KATZ AND POSTAL, IN CLARIFYING THE CONCEPTION OF THE SEMANTIC COMPONENT AND ITS ROLE IN RELATIONSHIP TO THE SYNTACTIC AND THE PHONOLOGICAL COMPONENTS IN AN INTEGRATED LINGUISTIC DESCRIPTION, CAN BEST EXPLAIN THE NATIVE SPEAKER'S USE OF THE DETERMINERS OF HIS LANGUAGE AND HIS COMPREHENSION OF THE MODIFYING CLAUSE SENTENCES. A FORMAL UNIVERSAL IN WHICH THE DETERMINERS IN THE SHARED NOMINALS OF TWO STRINGS IN A MODIFYING CLAUSE STRUCTURE NEED NOT BE IDENTICAL IS CLAIMED AND ILLUSTRATED WITH ENGLISH AND MANDARIN CHINESE. (IT)
ENGLISH AND MANDARIN CHINESE:
DEFINITE AND INDEFINITE DETERMINERS AND MODIFYING CLAUSE STRUCTURES

S. S. Annear

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I. APPROACHES TO THE DETERMINER IN ENGLISH

A. The Form-class Approach

Attempts have been made to define the definite and indefinite determiners (*the, a/some*) in purely formal terms as members of classes which have formal properties.

According to Bloomfield, for example, as a subgroup of the class of limiting adjectives,

the determiners are defined by the fact that certain types of noun expressions are always accompanied by a determiner.

Further:

A definite determiner can be preceded by the numerative *all*, but the indefinite determiner cannot. (pp. 202-203)

Gleason asserts that:

articles . . . serve to signal the presence of a nominal

and that:

the differences [between *a, the* and *some*] mark either the sub-class of the nominal phrase or the position of the nominal in the discourse. (pp. 156-7)

Fries' formal analysis is carried to the extreme:

Group A consists of all the words that can occupy the position of *the* in a particular test frame:

*The concert was good.* (p. 89)

This point of view, the direction in which it leads, and the definitions which it supports must be rejected, however, if
we are interested in a linguistic theory which will contribute toward an understanding of how fluent speakers produce and understand novel sentences. Not only does a formal analysis of this sort fail to enlighten us in this respect, but it precludes investigation toward this explanation. That this is the case is indicated by additional remarks of Bloomfield and Gleason, each of whom apparently recognized and attempted to justify an incompleteness in the proposed analysis. From Bloomfield:

The class meaning of definite determiners is "identified specimens." A precise statement of how the specimens are identified is a practical matter outside the linguist's control. (p. 203)

From Gleason:

In rare cases the occurrence of one rather than another [of the determiners] may signal a meaning difference. But the pair of contrasting sentences commonly advanced to illustrate the difference in meaning are, for the most part, either artificial or cited out of context. Much of the grammatical control over the articles operates within stretches larger than single sentences and so easily escapes the notice of grammarians. (p. 157)

In fact, as we shall point out below, neither the notion of "how the specimens are identified," nor the notions "artificial," "cited out of context," or "grammatical control over the articles" are outside the scope of an "explanatorily adequate theory" (Chomsky, 1964), insofar as these notions indicate something about the way these determiners are used and understood.

B. Transformational Approaches

Until recently, writings in transformational analysis have been characteristically concerned with the presentation and jus-
tification of a set of rules to produce well-formed sentences. In early grammarettes\(^1\), the determiner was recognized as a constituent of a well-formed noun phrase and PS rules were written accordingly:

\[
S \rightarrow \text{Nom} + \text{VP} \\
\text{Nom} \rightarrow \text{NP} + \text{No} \\
\text{NP} \rightarrow \text{T} \text{ (or Det)} + \text{N} \\
\text{T} \rightarrow \text{the, some, a . . .}
\]

Some later writings show attempts to provide rules to account for certain supposedly syntactic restrictions on the occurrence of various determiners. For example, in a recent presentation of rules, Lees (1963) introduces a distinction between definite and non-definite determiners on the basis of their relationships with relative clauses. The PS rules provide for the obligatory choice of a relative clause marker if the definite determiner has been chosen. Provided that the N is preceded by the definite determiner, the relative clause marker may then be deleted, without ever having been expanded, by a "relative clause ellipsis" rule. In addition to objections to be raised below, we may point out one here. The obligatory choosing, then optional deletion, of a relative clause marker which has not been expanded, while it reveals something of the anaphoric nature of the definite determiner, seems to me to rob the concept of dummy symbol of its essential function in a grammar of this type. That is, it is meaningless to first base the selection of the definite determiner on the selection of a symbol whose raison d'être is that it must be expanded as a mutation of some pre-sentence, and to then delete this symbol before the
expansion has taken place. Lees' rules also provide for a distinction between the indefinite and the generic determiners according to a restriction involving the main verb be.

Also in 1963 appeared two papers dealing specifically with the relationship between determiners and relative clauses. Beverly Robbins, while not excluding the possibility of a "kernel sentence" containing "the N," does not allow the occurrence of the in relative clause sentences:

The girl who smiled recognized you

or right conjuncts of conjoined sentences:

A vase was dropped and the vase broke except as "part of the operations which adjoin the wh- clause to the noun." In conjunctions, "the wh-clause, being simply a repetition in adjunct form of the first conjunction, can be deleted." (pp. 3-4, 62-54)

It can be seen that this position is different from that taken by Lees. Whereas he asserts that a definite determiner cannot be chosen unless a relative clause is chosen, Mrs. Robbins suggests that the in a relative clause sentence is the result of applying the relative clause transformation.

A relationship between definite determiners and relative clauses was also noticed by Carlota Smith, though her unfounded conclusion that "definiteness is associated with A [appositive] relative clauses, indefiniteness with R [restrictive] relative clauses" (p. 38) appears to be a direct contradiction to the assumption from which both of the preceding analyses start, that
Definite determiners are associated with restrictive relative clauses. Her next step, though it does not support the conclusion above, is to categorize determiners as "specified" or "unspecified," the latter being the, a, and Ø, which may take either restrictive or appositive relative clauses. Distinctions between them appear only in restrictions on embedding predicate sentences (those with BE as the main verb) as relative clauses. Carlota Smith ends her article with a suggestion that the distinction between anaphoric and generic determiners be handled, not in a manner similar to that proposed by Lees, but in the following way:

Since anaphoric the cannot always be established syntactically, an interpretive rule based on the grammar must classify many occurrences of the as ambiguous — that is, it must allow either a generic or an anaphoric interpretation. An interpretive rule can apparently do no more than exclude (as definitely not generic) instances where the grammar points to an anaphoric interpretation of the. (p. 51)

Thus, while she recognizes that the generic determiner is not grammatically distinguishable from the definite determiner, she maintains that the anaphoric nature of the definite determiner is grammatically discoverable.

Though the decisions made as to how to account for the observations differ considerably, two assumptions are inherent in the approach of these three transformational analyses. The first is that there is a distinction among definite, indefinite, and generic determiners which can be traced in part to this anaphoric nature of the definite determiner, which prompts the
posing of a grammatical relationship between it and the relative clause. The second is that the differences among these determiners and the restrictions on their occurrence are syntactic in nature.

We shall attempt to show that within the framework outlined below the first assumption seems to be justified, but that the second does not.

C. A New Approach

According to Katz and Postal,

a linguistic description of a natural language is an attempt to reveal the nature of a fluent speaker's mastery of that language... [It] must reconstruct the principles underlying the ability of speakers to communicate with one another. Such a reconstruction is a scientific theory whose statements represent the linguistic structure characteristic of the language and whose deductive consequences enable the linguist to explain sentence use and comprehension in terms of features of this structure. (p. 1)

Since determiners play a large role in sentence use and comprehension, and since we accept the goal of explaining these in terms of features of the linguistic structure, we are led to inquire what features of the linguistic structure can provide the basis for this explanation.

In order to clarify our task, let us take a closer look at some of the observations about determiners which must be accounted for in an explanation of how we use and understand sentences in English. Specifically, what are some of the differences between determiners and what are some of the restrictions on their occurrence?
1. The Anaphoric Nature of the Definite Determiner

As mentioned above, the fact that the definite determiner seems to "refer back to something" is not a new observation. None of the proposed attempts to deal with this fact in a linguistic description seem adequate, however, when we consider, for example, the use of the in the following sentences:

A. Did you feed the dog?
B. While I was doing the dishes, the phone rang.
C. The moon is full tonight.
D. Give it to the girl who's wearing a red dress.
E. The man hit the ball.

It has often been noticed that there is something "incomplete" about the use of the in such sentences as E. Relating the to a relative clause would be an ad hoc solution, however, to all occurrences except D and E; in fact, relative clauses play no role in the way we normally use and understand sentences like A, B, and C. Insisting that the be related to some previous sentence would be superfluous in A, B, and C as well, since these are used and can be perfectly understood without any "previous mention." In other words, the concept of "grammatical previous mention" will lead to an incomplete account of how the is used and understood.

2. Distinction between Anaphoric and Generic the

It is equally clear that syntactic features cannot define the distinction between the in its generic and anaphoric occurrences, as numerous examples of ambiguity indicate:
The cat is a ferocious animal.

The college professor is highly respected.

Not only do sentences taken as generic not have a characteristic structure, as was pointed out by Carlota Smith (p. 51), but, as we have shown, the notion of anaphoric is not syntactically definable.

3. The Indefinite

An attempt to explain the way we use the indefinite in English must take into account such sentences as the following:

A. I have a dog.
B. I want a dog.
C. A man is outside.
D. A man eats rice for lunch.
E. A man is tall.

To my knowledge, attempts to account for these sentences have been restricted to disallowing structures like E and possibly D. D and E are usually interpreted as deviant in some little-understood way, C seems to be existential, but B does not, while the noun phrase in A may refer to something not "indefinite" at all.

One plausible means of handling these observations would be in terms of some kind of theory of usage. This, I believe, is misleading, first, because there is much about the way determiners are used and understood which is consistent and systematic, and second, because statements can be made about the
way determiners are used and understood without referring to the real-world context or to the truth value of the sentences in which they appear. For example, a theory of usage could not describe the difference between these two sentences, since this difference has nothing to do with the truth of either or the existence of the object named by the noun phrase:

The Easter Rabbit came this morning.

An Easter Rabbit came this morning.

In other words, part of the fluent speaker's mastery of English is his knowledge of how to use the and a, and this should be revealed in the linguistic description itself.

Two related recent developments in linguistic theory now make it desirable and possible to discuss some of these observations made regarding determiners in a more revealing and satisfying way. The first of these is the revised model of grammar recently outlined by Chomsky (1964). The concept of a base component with no context-restricted rewriting rules raises doubts as to whether the differences and restrictions discussed above are indeed syntactic in nature; it certainly excludes an account such as that given by Lees (1963) in which the choice of a REL clause marker depends on the choice of the definite determiner. In addition, the concept of the "deep structure" of a sentence as being the input to the semantic component suggests that many sentences which have been thought to be ungrammatical may now be considered grammatical, their deviance attributable
to semantically explainable features. Finally, as we shall see below, the fact that a semantic interpretation is to be placed on a deep structure in which two related sentences are involved (as in a relative clause structure) justifies prior consideration of what the semantic rules must indicate about how each of these is understood.

The implications of this revised model have led directly to the second development, the clarification of the conception of the semantic component itself and the role it must play in relationship to the other two components, the syntactic and the phonological, in an integrated linguistic description. Because of the unrestricted nature of the rewriting rules whose output is the deep structure of a sentence, and because of the nature of the goals of a linguistic description, it can be seen that the semantic component plays an extremely important role in enabling the linguist to explain sentence use and comprehension.

A further clarification has been the introduction of the concept of entailment rule in a semantic theory, as outlined by Fillmore (1964). The claim being made here is that certain modifications of this concept will provide the basis for explaining a great part of the way determiners are used and understood. According to Fillmore,

Entailment rules can be described, roughly, as operating in the following way: There is a sentence X which cannot by itself be interpreted by the ordinary semantic rules. Based on the grammatical structure of X, the entailment rules will convert X into a set of sentences Y* such that each of these sentences can be interpreted by the ordinary semantic rules. The semantic interpretation of the set of sentences Y, then,
is provided as the semantic interpretation of the sentence X.

where footnote 1 reads:

Perhaps the word "proposition" should be used instead of "sentence." It is not necessary to an understanding of entailment rules that the elements of Y be realizable as sentences. (p. 6)

In discussing entailed propositions introduced by "One would expect that . . .", it is suggested that:

The entailed proposition can be represented more abstractly if "expectation" can be presented as a modality on an entire sentence. (p. 12)

In a similar way, it appears that the use of the determiner entails certain assumptions about the ability of the hearer to discover what is being referred to in the noun phrase containing that determiner, and that 'assumption' can also be represented as a modality, not on an entire sentence, but on a noun phrase. In this respect, these assumptions differ from the examples of entailment given by Fillmore, since the latter concern the interpretation of a complete sentence. This modification seems to be a reasonable one, nevertheless, and the assumptions seem to fall naturally within the domain of entailment, since, as we have seen, they are not explainable in syntactic terms, nor do they refer to the context, either situational or linguistic. In addition, just as the contribution of the word 'even' in:

She even reads Sanskrit

cannot be explained by assigning it semantic features of the usual kind, it appears that the native speaker's understanding of the determiners cannot be explained in terms of semantic
features which might be assigned to it, since there is no provision, within the framework of semantic markers as presented by Katz and Fodor, for the type of contribution made by the determiner to the interpretation of a sentence in which it is found. Thus, this point of view seems to reveal in the most natural way the essence of the way we understand determiners, and allows us to make more precise the notions of "definite" and "indefinite" noun phrases in English as well as in language like Mandarin.

Let us examine each of these notions in greater detail.

Considering the definite determiner, we may review the five examples given above.

A. Did you feed the dog?
B. While I was doing the dishes, the phone rang.
C. The moon is full tonight.
D. Give it to the girl who's wearing a red dress.
E. The man hit the ball.

The assumption being made by the speaker when he uses the definite determiner is that the hearer has some basis for discovering which item of the set named by the noun is being referred to, and that it is necessary to be able to do so. The assumption holds as well for the with plural nouns, where the hearer is able to select a certain subset from the set named by the noun, as in:

F. The boys that we saw yesterday will be here today and with mass nouns, where the hearer is able to select a certain "part" of the mass named by the noun:
G. The water in the sink is too hot.

The difficulty in articulating this kind of assumption is evident from the looseness with which we use the term *item* to include such nouns as *concert, dance, crash, theory, answer*, etc. Yet the concept is intuitively sufficiently clear to justify this somewhat inadequate formulation. The differences among the occurrences of *the* in the above examples can be accounted for by the fact that there are different ways in which the basis for this discovery may be provided.

The hearer may know which of the set is being referred to by *convention*, an agreement as to the limits of the universe in which the item referred to is the only *of its kind*. This agreement may be between just the speaker and the hearer, as in A, where, for example, both may know that there is only one dog in the household; or it may be agreed upon by larger groups, as in B or C. The similarity between this kind of convention and proper names, which are also agreements about what to call something, may be seen from their use with relative clauses. A relative clause added to the noun phrases in A, B, or C, or to the noun phrase in:

John is coming over tonight

as:

John who lives next door is coming over tonight

means that the sentence is no longer understood in this "conventional" sense.

Accordingly, another means, illustrated by D, F, and G,
by which the hearer can discover what is being referred to is by the use of a relative clause which performs the function of picking out for the hearer from the set named by the noun the particular item which the speaker has in mind.

The speaker may assume that the hearer has a way of discovering what is being referred to on the basis of knowledge derived from previous conversation, or from the immediate environment, either of which would be a reasonable account of how sentence E is understood.

A sentence containing a definite determiner, then, may be said to entail, among other things, this assumption regarding the hearer's ability to discover what the referent of the noun phrase is. In terms of this entailment, statements about some previously vague notions concerning the definite determiner may perhaps be clarified. First, we can describe the definite determiner as being anaphoric in those cases in which the speaker assumes that the hearer must glean his knowledge of the referent in some way other than by convention or extra-linguistic knowledge. Thus, in D, the is related to another part of the sentence, while in E, it is related to something outside the sentence, which accounts for our judging E to be "incomplete" as it stands. In addition, the distinction between the definite and the generic the depends on the presence of the assumption discussed above with the use of the former, its absence with the latter. We see, then, that a definite determiner may be either anaphoric or conventional, but that this is a semantic and not
a syntactic distinction. Likewise, we may distinguish a

**definite** and a **generic** determiner semantically but not syntactic-

cally. Finally, a definite determiner can be said to be

"misused" if this assumption is not borne out, in which case
the characteristic response would be a question demanding that
more information be provided. For example, if the hearer of
the sentence:

Give it to the girl.

actually had no basis for discovering which girl was being
referred to, he would ask:

Which girl?

We may consider a definite noun phrase in English, then,
as one which entails the same assumption as the "marker" of
definiteness, the definite determiner. This would include at
least proper nouns, pronouns, and noun phrases containing de-

monstratives and genitives.

As an example, considering the sentence:

She even reads the textbook

we might add to the proposition entailed by the presence of the

word 'even':

One would expect that she does not read the textbook
(Fillmore, p. 8)

the proposition entailed by the definite noun phrase as marked

by the:

It is assumed that you have a way of discovering what
the referent of the noun textbook is, and that it is
necessary that you be able to do so,
where you represents the fact that the assumption concerns the hearer.

Turning to the indefinite determiner, the examples which were given above were:

A. I have a dog.
B. I want a dog.
C. A man is outside.
D. A man eats rice for lunch.
E. A man is tall.

The assumption entailed by the indefinite is that it is not necessary that the hearer be able to select one item from the set of items named by the noun (where the same extensions as given for the definite determiner for plural nouns and mass nouns apply). The speaker may or may not know what item is being referred to, and the hearer himself may or may not know; the assumption is that this is irrelevant. For example, in a situation in which the sentence:

Here is a cookie

might be heard, both the speaker and the hearer may know which item from the set of all cookies is being referred to; the use of a indicates that there is no necessity to distinguish this particular one. It can be seen that the use of the definite determiner would be inappropriate:

Here is the cookie

unless there were some reason to distinguish this cookie from others like it.
In terms of this assumption we may informally explain why we judge sentences D and E to be somewhat deviant. We may consider them to be examples of sentences which are grammatically well-formed and semantically interpretable, but infrequently used because of the nature of the assumptions entailed and of the purposes to which we put language. If the use of a entails the assumption that the "referent" need not be distinguished from others of its kind, then to make an assertion or a proposition of the kind which is made when we use the simple present tense in English is tautologous; as has been often pointed out, sentences which are patently true or false are not very useful in ordinary discourse. The "usefulness" of this particular type of indefinite sentence will be demonstrated below in the section dealing with relative clauses.

These indefinite noun phrases must be distinguished from the alternate form of the generic determiner, which is a, as in:

A lion has a mane.
A dog is a man's best friend.

As with the the form, there is no syntactic difference between the generic and the indefinite. The dictionary component of the semantic rules will reveal this ambiguity by giving two readings for the and two for a. The fact that one interpretation rather than the other comes to the hearer's mind first seems to be a result of his knowledge of facts about the world and of his appraisal of the situation at hand, rather than a result of the presence or absence of other syntactic elements in the sentence,
since a careful choice of lexical items can provide counter-examples to any proposal to define generic or definite noun phrases on the basis of syntactic features. Entailed by a generic noun phrase is the assumption that there is no "item" being referred to; the noun phrase refers to the entire class named by the noun. Because of this there is no semantic difference between the singular and the plural:

An apple is a fruit.
The apple is a fruit.
Apples are a fruit.\(^3\)

A structure very closely related to sentences with indefinites as subjects is the existential sentence:

A thread is on your coat.
There is a thread on your coat.

It appears that the rule by which existential sentences are formed is a late stylistic rule which takes sentences of the shape

(a) Indef + Noun + Be + \( \{ \text{LOC} \, \text{ING} + V + X \} \)

moves the Be to the sentence-initial position and precedes it with a There. It will be noticed that with the first option Be is a main verb, with the second it is part of the Aux complex. The main verb Be must be followed by a locative phrase if the sentence is to be transformed into an existential one:

*There's a girl tall
*There's a girl my sister
There's a girl in the kitchen.\(^4\)
We can define an indefinite noun phrase, then, as being one which entails the same assumption as does the indefinite marker; thus the use of numerals as determiners would provide another example of an indefinite noun phrase:

Three books are on the table.

There are three books on the table.
II. THE ROLE OF DETERMINERS IN RELATIVE
CLAUSE STRUCTURES IN ENGLISH

A noun with a definite or indefinite determiner may be
followed by a restrictive relative (REL) clause in English.
The fact that there appear to be various ways of understanding
REL clauses leads us to inquire, first, what kinds of differences in the deep structures would account for this ambiguity,
and second, whether REL clause formation might be a slightly
more involved process than simply matching identical nouns in
the two parts of a REL clause structure, and then pronominal-
izing one of them, and in fact, whether the identity condition
itself might need to be modified.

At this point, we may make several remarks about the
analysis given here. First, though the argument is presented in
terms of examples whose noun phrases are singular, the claims
made would not be modified if plural noun phrases had been con-
sidered instead. Second, the stress pattern associated with
these examples is a neutral one; relative clause sentences with
special emphasis on any constituent may have different deep
structures than those with neutral stress. Third, though this
analysis is not a formal one, it is felt that the rules of the
syntactic and semantic components must take into account the
points to be presented here. Finally, consideration will not be given here to the sources of generic nouns with relative clauses; the the and a mentioned in the following pages will be the definite and indefinite determiners respectively.

An example of a sentence with the and a REL clause which we would understand in two different ways would be:

I heard the symphony that Smith wrote.

This sentence can mean either that Smith wrote only one symphony or that the symphony which the speaker heard was one that had been previously referred to. The same sentence with a substituted for the:

I heard a symphony that Smith wrote

can be understood as indicating either that Smith wrote several symphonies of which the speaker heard one, or that the symphony which the speaker heard is being further described by naming its composer.

Before further discussing the various types of REL clauses, it will be helpful to introduce the distinction made by Katz and Postal between a sentence and a sentoid.

We use the term "sentence" to refer to a fixed string of formatives regardless of the structural description it receives. We introduce the term sentoid to refer to a string of formatives with a unique associated structural description. (p. 24)

A sentoid, then, refers to one of the interpretations of an ambiguous sentence.

One of the motivations for the concept of deep structure is the fact that the syntactic relationships in each of the underly-
ing strings of a complex sentence must be taken into account in order that the semantic interpretation of the entire structure can be given. The way in which this semantic interpretation is to be given for structures of this type, however, has not been clearly formulated as yet. It was proposed by Katz and Fodor that semantic interpretations for sentences could be provided by two types of projection rules, one to operate on single source sentences, one to operate on complex sentences. As Katz and Postal summarize the function of the latter type:

(a) The P2 are to derive meanings for a sentence so as to reflect the manner in which those meanings were composed from the meanings of the sentence structure(s) used in its transformational derivation as well as the character of this derivation. (p. 23)

Katz and Postal then go on to suggest that since the revised model of grammar provides a single formal object, the generalized P-marker, upon which the semantic rules can operate, the type 2 projection rule may be abolished (p. 67). They claim, then, that in the more recent formulation

it is evident that the full semantic interpretation of a sentoid can be obtained by the operation of P1 on generalized P-markers exclusively. (p. 67)

It has been argued, however (Fillmore, 1964), that a semantic interpretation of a sentence involves more than what is given by projection rules; it must show what the sentence entails. Adopting this point of view, and replacing Katz and Postal's terms P1 and P2 by this broader notion of semantic interpretation, I would like to claim that two types of interpretations are indeed needed, since it is only in terms of what
is entailed by each of the source sentences that we can interpret the generalized structure. Reformulating it in terms of Chomsky's revision, the position we reassume, then, is the original one (a) of Katz and Fodor. In other words, it is not desirable that the rules which interpret a simple P-marker be the same as those which interpret a complex one, since it will take a different type of rule to show how the interpretation of each of the source sentences contributes to the interpretation of the whole.

Specifically this latter type of rule seems to be necessitated by the fact that the way the determiners in the underlying sources of a REL clause structure are understood plays a role in explaining the ways we understand the sentence as a whole. In fact, only in these terms can we answer the questions posed above and explain the various ways we interpret these REL clause sentences.

The role played by the determiners in these underlying sentences can be said to correspond, in an as yet imprecise way, to that played by the determiners in the same two sentences used together in normal discourse. That is, in one of the pair a appears, in the other, the. In earlier conceptions of transformational grammars, where the relationship between the two sources of a REL clause sentence was thought to be exhibited only by means of the transformation by which they were associated, this formulation would not be justified. But in terms of the deep structure of the sentence which unmistakably
reveals the relationship between the sources, this point of view seems to be quite natural. In normal discourse, as we have said, the use of the entails the assumption that the hearer is able to distinguish the item referred to. If a sentence with a plus an identical noun immediately preceding it can be said to provide the basis upon which the hearer can make the distinction, and if this situation is paralleled in the deep structure of a REL clause sentence, then the two noun phrases can be said to be identical in reference, which is what we mean by the "identity condition."

At this point, an important distinction must be made between the following three concepts: the abstract relationship between the determiners in the strings of a complex deep structure, the "order" in which semantic rules operate on these strings, and the temporal order in which the strings would appear in spoken discourse. Clearly, the essence of the way we understand the following two sentences:

Smith wrote a symphony
I heard the symphony

depends on the order in which they are spoken. But this is precisely because of the relationship between the assumptions entailed by the determiners in these two sentences. It is this relationship, then, that must be revealed by the deep structure. But there is no obvious connection between the order in which isolated sentences are spoken and the fact that one or the other of them appears as the matrix string in a complex structure,
and hence appears "above" the constituent sentence in a two-
dimensional representation of this structure. The question of
whether the semantic rules would read the two parts of the
complex structure in the same order in which they are spoken
does not arise if we consider there to be two types of seman-
tic rules, one type to operate on simple structures, those
containing just one initial symbol $S$, and one type to operate
on complex structures containing more than one initial symbol,
where each string is taken account of in assigning an inter-
pretation to the whole.

It might seem more plausible and simple to indicate this
identity of reference by noun phrases whose determiners, as
well as nouns, were identical. In terms of the claims which
have been made here, this proposal must be rejected. First,
if we can show identity of referent by the choice of deter-
miners which furthermore corresponds to the way we would show
identity of referent were these two subsequent sentences in
discourse, this seems to bring us closer to our explanatory
goal than would the imposition of an arbitrary condition, that
two noun phrases could be considered to be related semantically
if they were exactly identical. Second, not only does "matching
determiners" remove the possibility of utilizing the normal
interpretation of each of the underlying sentences to interpret
the sentence as a whole, but it fails to provide a way to ex-
plain the differences in the way we understand sentences such
as those given above. 9
REL clauses may be interpreted in various ways. Relevant to the discussion of MOD clauses will be a type of descriptive REL clause which follows a deictic determiner and a noun:

I saw that dog you bought.

The three types with which we will be concerned here, however, will be those associated with the definite and indefinite determiners, the Descriptive, the Restrictive, and the Selective.

1) The Descriptive type can be illustrated by the sentence:

(A) I heard a symphony that Smith wrote

whose deep structure under one interpretation would be:

```
  NP
  VP
    NP
    Det
      (C) I heard a REL symphony

(B)

(D) Smith wrote the symphony
```

The Descriptive REL clause follows an indefinite noun and is interpreted as a further description of that noun. It can be seen that this is exactly the way we would understand the sequence (C) (D) in a conversation. (C) refers to any undifferentiated symphony, while (D) provides some additional information about it.

2) The Restrictive REL clause may be illustrated by the sentence:

(E) I heard the symphony that Smith wrote
whose deep structure may be represented by the diagram:

This sequence entails exactly the same assumptions as (E); the
the in the matrix signals to the hearer that he is assumed to
have some way of finding out what is referred to by the noun.
The two ways of understanding (E) which were pointed out above
can be traced to the nature of the way in which (H) is taken
by the hearer to provide the basis for his discovery of what is
being referred to by the use of the in (G). If (E) is equiva-
ent to something established in a previous conversation, then
the hearer interprets (E) as referring to a symphony previously
discussed. If not, or if the hearer knows that Smith wrote
only one symphony, he may take this fact as the basis for his
selection of referent. It can be seen that (...) is not ambiguous
in the technical sense of having more than one structural de-
scription, but that it has two interpretations depending on how
the assumptions entailed by (G) and (H) are related to extra-
linguistic factors.
It is here that the constituent sentence may be one of the "deviant" indefinite subject sentences mentioned above such as:

A man is tall
without the surface structure itself being deviant since it is the matrix sentence the which appears in the surface structures.
In fact, "deviant" sentences like this underlie many examples of surface sentences containing pre-nominal modifiers, such as:

The tall man is my brother
from:

It is precisely this fact that the grammar will generate sentences which are interpretable but not often used in discourse which lends support to the claim that it is the semantic interpretations, in the technical sense, of the underlying strings which account for the interpretation of the complex structure.

3) The Selective REL clause may be illustrated by the other interpretation of the sentence:

(I) I heard a symphony that Smith wrote.

Under the interpretation that Smith wrote several symphonies of
which the speaker heard one, we do not understand the relative clause in the descriptive sense as discussed in the analysis of (A), nor do we understand this a in the same way as we do the a in:

(C) I heard a symphony

which would be the matrix in a Descriptive REL clause sentence. Instead, we understand (I) in the same way as the strings of its deep structure:

\[
\begin{align*}
(K) & \quad \text{I heard one of the REL symphonies} \\
(J) & \quad \{ \\
(L) & \quad \text{Smith wrote some symphonies}
\end{align*}
\]

It can be seen that this structure differs considerably from those of the other two types we have presented. Although it seems clear that only in terms of a pair of underlying strings like this can we explain our understanding of (I), the formulation of the rule which will convert (J) into (I) will necessarily be somewhat complicated.

Another example of the Selective REL clause may be provided by the sentence:

(M) A man I know speaks 27 languages.

If the REL clause is interpreted as being a Descriptive one, the
sentoid is understood as being deviant in exactly the same way as the matrix sentence of its deep structure:

(N) A man speaks 27 languages.

If the REL clause is interpreted instead as being a Selective one, the sentoid is not deviant at all, and the way we understand the subject of (M) is reflected not by (N), but by the pair:

I know some men

One of the men speaks 27 languages. 11

To recapitulate, then, the differences among these three types of REL clauses may be viewed as a function of the determiners which appear in each of the sentences of their deep structures.

1) Descriptive: ... a Noun which ...

\[
\begin{align*}
& \text{I heard a REL symphony} \\
& \quad \text{Smith wrote the symphony}
\end{align*}
\]
2) **Restrictive:**

... the Noun which ...

I heard **the** symphony

Smith wrote **a** symphony

3) **Selective:**

... a Noun which ...

I heard **one of the** symphonies

Smith wrote **some** symphonies

It can be seen that we have answered the questions raised at the beginning of this section. We have shown the different deep structures which underlie the various ways in which REL clause sentences are understood, and we have modified the identity condition to the extent that the determiners of the identical nouns will not be the same, in order to provide the basis for a more revealing semantic interpretation.
III. THE DETERMINER IN MANDARIN

This investigation may indicate a way to approach determiners and their relationship to definiteness and indefiniteness in a language like Mandarin.\(^\text{13}\) The difference between the two languages is that definiteness and indefiniteness are obligatorily expressed syntactic categories in English,\(^\text{14}\) as well as in most Indo-European languages, whereas they are optionally expressed in Mandarin.

The aim of comparative syntax, from the synchronic point of view, may be considered to be the examination, within a common theory, of "similar" structures in two languages with an eye toward the kinds of difficulties which any translation procedure must face. From this point of view, we are led to inquire not only into the means by which Mandarin expresses the same thing which is expressed by a or the, but also into the concepts of definiteness and indefiniteness themselves, and to determine what percentage of the "semantic load" of each of these is carried by the markers.

We have argued that definite and indefinite noun phrases may be characterized by referring to the assumptions in the interpretation of each. For two reasons, this must be the basis for a study of the determiner in Mandarin. The important point,
as we have mentioned, is that definiteness and indefiniteness need not be overtly marked in Mandarin. Thus, if we are to study determiners in this language, this optionality must be recognized and the conditions under which a determiner may appear must be stated. Secondly, only after this has been done, and the relationship between these optional determiners and the categories they express has been made clear, can we proceed to compare them with the determiners in English, whose relationship with these categories is relatively straightforward.

One other point should be borne in mind. The use of the determiner in Mandarin may be likened to the optional use of the numeral two in English if it is desired that duality, an obligatory syntactic category in some languages, be expressed. Within the framework of the description of Mandarin, it would appear that there is little motivation for pursuing an investigation of this type of problem. However, from the point of view of comparison with a language in which these markers are obligatory, with translation procedures providing the point around which the comparison revolves, it can be seen that this investigation may be quite well motivated. This approach will provide the basis upon which this analysis will proceed. Without a formal justification, then, we will assume the universal categories of definiteness and indefiniteness to be given.

Thus we will begin by noting that, in contrast to English (see footnote14), a noun in Mandarin may appear without a determiner. Since the indefinite, however, must be marked,
such a noun without a determiner is not open to the indefinite interpretation.

An indefinite subject must be accompanied by what we may call the existential marker, 你们 (see Appendix for character representations):

1. **(1)** 你们 rán zài wâimian.16
   Exist person located outside
   (Someone is outside)17

2. **(2)** 你们 sān -ge háizi zài chī fān.18
   Exist three-classifier child asp. eat rice
   (Three children are eating rice)

Accordingly, in the subject position the distinction between indefinite and non-indefinite noun phrases is clear: those accompanied by 你们 are indefinite, those unaccompanied by this marker are not.

In any other position the indefinite must be marked by a numeral-plus-classifier:

- **yi - ge** one
- **wǔ - ge** five

or one of the plural indefinite markers:

- **yi - xīe** a group of
- **jī - ge** several, some.

Thus, an unmarked noun may be definite or generic. If the speaker wishes to specify that the noun is definite, he may choose the definite determiner nàí-plus-classifier. Though this determiner is homophonous with the obviate deictic nàí-plus-classifier (that), there appear to be good reasons for considering them to be two distinct lexical items in the dictionary. First, though the distinction between definiteness and deixis...
has not been clearly defined, there are occurrences of nèi- which
are not deictic in any sense, such as:

(3) Zuòtìan wǒ kànjian nèi-ge rén.
Yesterday I saw the-cl. person
(Yesterday I saw the person)

An indication that this is not the deictic marker is that the use
of the proximate deictic marker zàièi- (this) which is not homo-
phonous with any other word cannot be understood in any way ex-
cept as a deictic:

(4) Zuòtìan wǒ kànjian zàièi-ge rén.
Yesterday I saw this-cl. person
(Yesterday I saw this person)

Second, this distinction appears to be crucial in explaining
certain differences in the way we interpret modifying (MOD)
clause sentences.

The conditions of definiteness under which the is ob-
ligatorily used in English correspond to those under which
nèi- is optionally chosen in Mandarin except in one instance.
In the discussion of the definite determiner in English, it
was mentioned that one of the ways in which the hearer can
discover what is being referred to is by convention, an agree-
ment as to the limits of the universe in which the item referred
to is the only one of its kind:
A. Did you feed the dog?
B. While I was doing the dishes, the phone rang.
C. The moon is full tonight.

In the translations of such sentences as these, the definite
determiner is prohibited:
Thus, it is only when anaphoric definiteness is expressed that the definite determiner may be used.

The deictic marker may be used, in which case it is usually used to express contempt or impatience, exactly as in English:

(8) Nǐ wèi-le nǎi-ge gǒu méi-yōu?
    You feed-asp. that-cl. dog NEG-asp.
    (Did you feed that dog?)
IV. THE ROLE OF DETERMINERS IN MODIFYING
CLAUSE STRUCTURES IN MANDARIN

The surface structure of a MOD clause sentence in
Mandarin may be represented by the formula:

\[ X (D) [A B] -de (D) N Y \]

where \( X N Y \) represents the matrix string, \( N \) being the shared
noun, and where \([A B]\) represents what is "left" of the con-
stituent string after the shared noun has been deleted. \( D \) re-
presents the two possible positions of the determiner, either
preceding or following the MOD clause. For example:

(9) \[ \]

\[ Wō kàn-le Grimm xiē-de nōi-bēn shū \]
I read-asp. Grimm write-de that-cl. book

(I read the book that Grimm wrote)

The distinction between these two positions of the determiner
will be discussed below.

In terms of the points made above concerning the role of
determiners in REL clauses, and the behavior of determiners in
Mandarin, we will attempt to show the role of determiners in
MOD clauses in Mandarin. Specifically, the points to be kept
in mind are two.

First, brought out in Section II was that it is not only
unnecessary but undesirable that the determiners be identical in
the shared Nominals of two strings in a modifying clause struc-
ture. The arguments were presented in terms of the description of English, but the claim constitutes a formal universal. We will try to show how the normal semantic interpretation of the underlying strings contributes to the understanding of the MOD clause structure in Mandarin.

Second, it will be recalled that the definite determiner nêi- is homophonous with the deictic determiner. The distinction between the two appears to be significant in the interpretation of MOD clause structures.

Three types of MOD clause structures may be recognized, differing in the determiners themselves, their positions, and in interpretation. Their correspondences with the REL clause types will be brought out in the course of the discussion. We may call them Descriptive (a) and (b), and Restrictive.

1) The Descriptive (a) type may be illustrated by the sentence:

(10) (A) Wô diû-le yî-jian wô xîhuăn-de yîfu
I lose-asp. one-cl. I like -de dress
(I lost a dress that I like)\(^{19}\)

whose deep structure would be:

![Diagram of deep structure]

(B) Wô ASP-diû yî-jian MOD yîfu
(C) Wô xîhuăn nêi-jian yîfu
The characteristics of this type are that the yi- of the matrix sentence (B) appears in the surface structure, and that the MOD clause in (A) is interpreted as being a Descriptive one, exactly as is the English Descriptive REL clause represented in the translation of (A). Again, (A) exactly represents (B) (C) as this sequence would be understood in normal discourse. 20

2) The Descriptive (b) type may be illustrated by the sentence:

\[(11) (D) \text{W}6 \text{ diu-le nai-jian w6 xihuan-de yifu} \]
I lose-aspect. that-cl. I like -de dress
\[(I \text{ lost that dress that I like})\]

and its underlying structure:

\[(E) \text{W6 ASP-diu nai-jian MOD yifu} \]
\[ (F) \text{W6 xihuan yi-jian yifu} \]

In (D) the determiner nai- can be seen to precede the MOD clause. The interpretation of (D) parallels the interpretation of (F) (E) where the nai- in (E) is the deictic determiner. The MOD clause describes the noun yifu in the same way that the REL clause describes the noun dress preceded by the deictic that in the English translation.

3) Keeping in mind the characteristics of (D) and its deep structure, and considering now the Restrictive MOD clause sen-
tence in which the determiner nēi- follows the MOD clause:

\[(G) \text{ Wǔ } \text{ diū-} \text{-le } \text{ wǒ } \text{ xīhūan-} \text{-de } \text{nēi-} \text{-jian } \text{ yīfu}
\]
I lose-asp. I like -de the-cl. dress
(I lost the dress that I like)

\[(H) \text{ Wǔ } \text{ ASP-diū } \text{nēi-jian } \text{ MOD } \text{ yīfu}
\]

\[(I) \text{ Wǒ } \text{ xīhūan } \text{ yī-jian } \text{ yīfu}
\]

we notice several points of comparison. First, the surface structures (D) and (G) are identical except for the position of nēi-jian. Second, their deep structures look exactly identical. The interpretation of the MOD clause in (G), however, is not as a Descriptive clause, but as a Restrictive, or contrastive, one. Whereas the noun in (D) is further described by the MOD clause, the noun in (G) is restricted, or implicitly contrasted with another noun phrase, such as:

\[\text{ wǒ } \text{ bùxīhūan-} \text{-de } \text{nēi-jian } \text{ yīfu.}
\]
I not like -de that-cl. dress
(the dress that I don't like)

The difference between these two deep structures which accounts for the difference in surface structure and in interpretation between (D) and (G) is that the determiner nēi- in (H) is the definite determiner. The fact that (G) is interpreted as
contrastive, then, is a direct result of the fact that the definite *nēi*- in its matrix string entails the assumption that it is important to be able to distinguish the referent from others like it, which is what contrast means. (G) and its deep structure are equivalent, then, to the Restrictive REL clause type which is represented by the English translation of (G).

It is here that the import of basing the interpretation of a comple. structure on the interpretations of the underlying strings taken together becomes most obvious. Depending on whether *nēi*- in (D) and (H) is definite or deictic, the effects of the MOD transformation and the interpretation of its resulting structure will both be altered.

The difference between these two types may perhaps be even more clearly illustrated by the pair:

(12) (J) Wǒ kān-le nēi-bēn hōu-de shū
     I see-asp. that-cl. thick-de book
     (I saw that thick book)

and:

(K) Wǒ kān-le hōu-de nēi-bēn shū.
     I see-asp. thick-de the-cl. book
     (I saw the thick book)

The deep structure of both is:

```
(L) Wǒ  ASP-kān nēi-bēn  MOD  shū  
     -de

(M)  Yǒu  yī-bēn  shū  hōu
```
The MOD clause in (J) is interpreted as a Descriptive one, while that in (K) is interpreted as Restrictive, implying a contrast with, perhaps:

```
báo-de nài-běn shū
thin-de the-cl. book
(the thin book)
```

The distinction between the two results from the fact that the nài- in the matrix string (L) may be either a deictic or a definite determiner. It can be seen that (M) corresponds to the English sentence discussed above:

A man is tall

in its grammaticality and its degree of usefulness.

It remains to illustrate the MOD clause structure in whose surface representation no determiner appears.

```
(N) Wǒ diū-le wǒ xīhuān-de yīfu.  
   I lose-asp. I like-de dress  
   (I lost the dress(es) that I like)
```

This sentence does not represent a fourth type, however, since its interpretation indicates that it results from the deletion of nài-plus-classifier from a Restrictive MOD clause containing either the singular or the plural definite determiner:

```
Wǒ diū-le wǒ xīhuān-de nài-{jiēn} yīfu.21
```

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Summarizing the three types of MOD clauses we have discussed:

1) **Descriptive (a):** ...

2) **Descriptive (b):** ...

3) **Restrictive:** ...

---

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In terms of the relationship between the interpretation of a MOD clause structure and the position of the determiner therein, we may informally propose an "explanation" for the non-occurrence of a MOD clause sentence of the form:

\[ \ldots X-de \ yì- \ N \ldots \]

where \( yì- \) follows the MOD clause. The explanation is that the indefinite, by the nature of the assumption which is part of its interpretation, is incompatible with the notion of contrast, which is the interpretation of a sentence whose determiner is in this position, the assumption being that it is unnecessary to distinguish the item referred to by the noun from others like it.\(^{22}\) Mandarin type 1), the Descriptive (a), and type 3), the Restrictive, correspond exactly to their English counterparts, while type 2) corresponds to the use of a REL clause with noun and that. Mandarin has no MOD clause counterpart of the Selective REL clause.
V. CONCLUSION

We have tried to show that underlying the fluent speaker's ability to use and understand the determiners of his language are certain assumptions which he has about the necessity that his hearer discover what he is referring to, and about the ability of his hearer to make this discovery. We have shown how these assumptions underlie the speaker's comprehension of a modifying clause sentence, and we have argued that these facts can and should be reflected in the linguistic description.

We have assumed the universal categories of definiteness and indefiniteness, in spite of the fact that they are marked only optionally in some languages. Though this assumption appears to be intuitively sound, strong support could be provided by proving the following hypothesis, which I judge to be a reasonable one: in many languages which do not obligatorily express definiteness and indefiniteness, these categories are optionally marked by "borrowing" elements from two categories which do appear to be universal, the deictic marker and the numeral.²³

It is hoped that through investigations of this type, comparative syntax may yield new insights into the nature of language universals and their importance to translation from one language to another.
FOOTNOTES


2 In English, a plural definite noun can be distinguished from a plural generic noun because of the absence of a determiner with the latter:

The books are red.
Books are red.

The fact remains, however, that there seem to be no syntactic conditions on the occurrence of one rather than the other of these.

3 There are some semantic restrictions on and differences among these generics, but these will not be taken up here.

4 There are at least three other kinds of existential sentences which do not seem to have structures like (a) as sources. One kind is exemplified by:

There's somebody I'd like you to meet
which contains a relative clause. Another is exemplified by:

There's a solution to that problem
which obviously does not come from:

*A solution is to that problem.
A third can be illustrated by the listing form which can be an answer to a question, such as:

Who's coming to the party?
There's Sue, Jane, Bob, and Dick.

5 In this study, for the purpose of explication, we will refer to a modifying clause in English as a REL clause, and to that in Mandarin as a MOD clause, although they are obviously syntactically (but not translationally) equivalent.

6 Again, for the purpose of explication, only those structures containing one relative clause symbol will be dealt with here.

7 For discussion of the identity condition, see Chomsky, 1964, p. 95.

8 This was precisely the objection raised by Beverly Robbins.
(p. 4) to the "kernelization" of a complex sentence into a pair of simplexes, one containing "a N," the other "the N."

It appears that the following analysis, suggested by Professor D. T. Langendoen, may provide additional support for this formulation. The sentence:

How good a boy is John?

comes from:

John is a boy
How good is the boy?

where the deep structure will have the following form:

```
NP
  ADJ
  PHR
    The
    boy
    is
    good
    Q
    Indef

John
  is
  a
  REL
  boy
```

Support for the hypothesis advanced here is provided by the fact that the determiners in these strings must be the ones indicated by this diagram. It can be seen that the ungrammaticality of:

*How good the boy is John?

precludes the use of the in the matrix string, while to substitute a for the in the constituent string would result in a noun phrase which native speakers consistently accept as being generic:

How good is a boy?

Because the strength of this argument depends in part on the decision made concerning the means by which speakers are able to distinguish generic from definite and indefinite determiners, it appears that this decision will play an important role in our description of determiners in the grammar.

Surface structures containing certain verbs cannot be analyzed in this way, but these will not be discussed here. For example, the sentence:

I would like a dog that doesn't shed

cannot be considered as having the deep structure:
since "The dog does not shed" entails a referent where in fact there is none.

11 Although the details of the implications of this conception of the sources of Selective REL clauses have not been sufficiently worked out, support for an analysis of this type is provided by an account of the superlative in which a sentence containing a singular noun phrase, as in:

She was the prettiest girl on the stage

is derived from a sentence containing the same noun phrase in the plural:

Some pretty girls were on the stage

which is a reasonable account of the derivation of this structure. I am indebted to Professor Charles J. Fillmore for pointing out this relationship to me.

12 Support for the fact of this relationship between a and the in sentences related in the syntactic component of the grammar is given by the relationship between a and the in phrases as:

the King of France

and its syntactic source:

France has a king

where the appropriateness of the former can be seen to depend on the truth of the latter. Though the relationship between the derivation of this type of phrase and that of a modifying clause structure highlights some of the points made here concerning the nature of determiners, we will not pursue it further in this study.

13 Although many of the claims made here concerning Mandarin are doubtless true of the Chinese languages in general, my lack of familiarity with any of them except Mandarin precludes generalizations of this type. The term Mandarin is used, then,
not to specifically exclude the other Chinese languages, but simply to represent a language capable of being the object of a study of comparative syntax.

14. This is to say that a non-generic, non-proper noun must appear with a definite or indefinite marker: *Book is on the table.

15. One important difference between this existential marker 你 and the existential there is in English is that the former appears to be generated by means of rewriting rules in the base component, while the latter seems to be the result of a stylistic transformation. Such differences will be ignored in the present analysis, as will the interesting problem of the relationship between the indefinite and the existential marker in these two languages.

16. The transcription system used here will be Pinyin.

17. It should be kept in mind that a noun in Mandarin is also unspecified as to number, though the examples will be translated with singular English nouns.

18. This fact was interpreted somewhat differently by Y. R. Chao (1948), p. 51, where he states that "a noun in subject position is usually definite:

(13) Shū zài nàr?
Book located where
(Where is the book?)

[where the romanization and translations are mine], while a noun in object position usually refers to something indefinite:

(14) Nàr yǒu shū?
Where exist book
(Where is a book?)

These examples clearly indicate, however, that definiteness and indefiniteness are a function of the presence of the existential marker.

An exception to this generalization might be thought to be the occurrence of the existential marker with proper nouns. These can usually be shown, however, to be found in the first clause of a complex conditional, and are usually understood this way even if the second clause is deleted:

(15) Yǒu Zhāng-Sān zhàogu tāde háizì, Exist Zhang-San take care of his child

bùyǒng pà.
NEG use afraid

(Since there is Zhang-San to take care of his child, you don't need to worry.)
Again, it must be emphasized that these examples are all to be considered as being associated with a normal stress pattern.

With a deep structure involving a different pair of sentences, it could be seen that the constituent strings need not appear in the form in which it would be spoken if it were an isolated sentence in normal discourse. For example, the surface structure:

(Q) Wǒ kàn-le yī-běn Grimm xiě-de shū
   I read-asp. a-cl. Grimm write-de book
   (I read a book that Grimm wrote)

has the deep structure:

(Q) Grimm xiě nèi-běn shū

(Q) would normally appear in spoken discourse as:

(R) Nèi-běn shū shì Grimm xiě-de

which is the result of applying an optional transformation to (Q). Since this transformation does not change the meaning of (Q), however, there is no reason to insist that it apply to (Q) before the MOD transformation applies. In fact, a universal restriction that optional transformations may not apply to the strings of a complex deep structure appears to be a reasonable one.

This conception of "determiner-less" surface structures was suggested to me by Anne Hashimoto in personal conversation. It should be emphasized that this is the derivation for the non-generic interpretation of a sentence like (N).

A sentence such as:

(16) Wǒ xīhuān zuòtiān lái-de sān-ge rén
   I like yesterday come-de three-cl. person
   (I like the three people who came yesterday)

in which the indefinite numeral-plus-classifier follows the
MOD clause, appears to be a counterexample to this explanation. It seems, however, that this is an example of a surface MOD clause structure which results from a deletion, as discussed above. Thus, this sentence is semantically equivalent to:

Wǒ xīhūn zuǒtiān lái-de nèi sān-ge rén.

and is best viewed as its syntactic equivalent as well, with the nèi deleted.

23 This hypothesis was suggested to me by Professor D. T. Langendoen, though I take the responsibility for its interpretation.
APPENDIX

(1) 有人在外面.
(2) 有三個孩子在吃飯.
(3) 昨天我看見那個人.
(4) 昨天我看見這個人.
(5) 你餵狗沒有?
(6) 我洗碗的時候電話鈴響了.
(7) 今天晚上月亮很圓.
(8) 你餵了那條狗沒有?
(9) 我看《Grimm》寫的那本書.
(10) 我丟了那件我喜欢的衣服.
(11) 我丟了那件我喜欢的書.
(12) 我看了看那本書.
(13) 那兒有書?
(14) 有張三照顧他的孩子,不用怕.
(15) 我喜歡昨天來的三個人.
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