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COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS--IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH.

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THE AUTHOR STATES THAT CONFLICT, CONTROL, AND BARGAINING ARE PRIMARY ELEMENTS FOR RELEVANT THEORY AND RESEARCH ON COLLECTIVE TEACHER NEGOTIATION. COLLECTIVE ACTIVITY BY TEACHERS IS ATTRIBUTED TO THEIR INCREASED PROFESSIONALIZATION AND IS REGARDED AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE GENERATED BY AN EMERGING MANAGERIAL-PROFESSIONAL-BUREAUCRATIC DISCONTINUITY IN SCHOOL ORGANIZATION. BARGAINING IS A GENERALIZED SOCIAL CONTROL TECHNIQUE FOR DEALING WITH COMPLEX AUTHORITY AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. SUGGESTED AREAS OF RESEARCH INCLUDE--(1) THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE ROLE OF THE TEACHER AND ITS EFFECT UPON COMPLEMENTARY ROLES, (2) THE FORMS OF CONFLICT GENERATED BY PROFESSIONAL-EMPLOYEE ORIENTATIONS, (3) FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FORMATION OF AN ORGANIZED TEACHER GROUP, (4) OPERATIONAL CLARIFICATION OF AUTHORITY, POWER, AND CONTROL, (5) THE SCHOOL AS A CLOSED SYSTEM, AND (6) EFFECTS OF EMERGING FORMS OF COLLECTIVE TEACHER ACTION ON THE TOTAL POWER OF THE SCHOOL SYSTEM. CYBERNETIC AND COMMUNICATION THEORY ARE SUGGESTED AS TOOLS FOR RESEARCH ON CONTROL STRUCTURES AND PROCESSES CONSISTENT WITH A MULTIPLE POWER BASE. GAME THEORY IS SUGGESTED AS A VALID APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF CONTROL TRANSFORMATION FOR ARTICULATING THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMPLEXITY OF SCHOOL SYSTEMS AND FOR FORMULATING NEW ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNS AND PROCESSES. THE COMPLETE DOCUMENT "COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS AND EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION," OF WHICH THIS IS CHAPTER 7, IS AVAILABLE FROM THE UNIVERSITY COUNCIL FOR EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, 65 SOUTH OVAL DRIVE, COLUMBUS, OHIO 43210, AND FROM DR. ROY B. ALLEN, COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS, FAYETTEVILLE, ARKANSAS 72701, FOR \$2.50. (JK)

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**CHAPTER 7**

**COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH**

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The implications for research of collective negotiations in the schools is a problem area covering an extensive disciplinary and methodological territory, ranging from state and federal legislation to theories of games of strategy for dealing with conflict. As a way of finding a critical path through the territory, the restricting problem is defined as the research implications of conflicts of control generated by an emerging managerial-professional-bureaucratic discontinuity in school organization and an analysis of organizational responses to this discontinuity. The problem restricts this paper to relevant theory and research in the behavioral sciences and focuses on the elements of conflict, control, and bargaining. In the process of identifying research implications deriving from an analysis of the problem, an argument is developed for an analytic framework for research. Specifically we will argue that the emergence of collective activity on the part of teachers and the conflicts generated by this activity proceed from the increasing professionalization of teachers, that the conflicts are organizational conflicts involving discontinuities in the traditional monocratic view of an organization; that these discontinuities and conflicts have been confronted as multiple authority and control system problems; that several basic organizational responses to multiple authority and complex control have or are being tried; that the collective activity of teachers is a response to the problem of dealing with a multiple authority system; and that bargaining is

a social control technique for dealing with complex authority and control systems.

### CONFLICT AND PROFESSIONAL ROLES IN ORGANIZATIONS

The interrelations among the three elements are such that any one of them could serve as a point of departure. Wildman's<sup>1</sup> position paper in group conflict and school organization provides a useful lead-in. He states that the underlying concepts and procedures of the collective action phenomenon have, as their underlying rationalized purpose, an accommodation of group conflict within an organization, and questions whether the conflict that exists needs to become institutionalized or formalized group conflict leading to collective bargaining of the administration vs. teachers type. He warns that such a formalization of relationships may be a form of the self-fulfilling prophecy that produces and maintains conflict situations because an alignment for conflict exists.

The research implications of Wildman's analysis may be stated as questions.

1. What is the nature of conflict, and of conflict in school organizations?
2. Do propositions about conflict relate to organizational responses to conflict?

Conflict as a dynamic factor in social systems in general and organizations as a special case has historical roots. Heraclitus held that life was movement and that it developed through the conflict of opposites. This notion of conflict as a dynamic and central force in human affairs is found in the work of the early sociologists and, though the interest in social conflict has been cyclical, social conflict is a resurgent interest in current sociological research.

Simmel's<sup>2</sup> essay on conflict and Coser's<sup>3</sup> analysis of Simmel's essay are sources of current thinking on conflict. Simmel's central thesis is that conflict is a form of socialization. This means that groups require conflict as well as cooperation and that conflict is not necessarily dysfunctional but is an essential element in group formation and the persistence of group life.

Coser extended Simmel's ideas to provide several insights with implications for research in collective action. He suggests that the toleration and institutionalization of conflict is an important stabilizing mechanism for a system; that conflict is a mechanism for the adjustment of norms adequate to new conditions; that the need for safety-valve arrangements increases with the rigidity of a system; and that conflict tends to be dysfunctional for a social structure in which there is no or insufficient toleration and institutionalization of conflict. Conflict can be unifying and integrative as well as dysfunctional, and, as Coser has pointed out, it is the rigidity with which it is dealt rather than the conflict itself that leads to dysfunctional consequences. The implications of this for research on formalized teacher group structures in organizations are worth pursuing.

Conflict theories of organization and administration are not new. Conflict may be said to be endemic to organizations or a characteristic of organizations in pursuit of goals. It is a function of the limitations of individuals and groups to agree on goals, to communicate, to change, and to behave rationally. The normative nature of organizational conflict is suggested by Bennis<sup>4</sup> in his analysis of superior-subordinate relations; by Guba and Bidwell<sup>5</sup> in their study of the contradictory expectations inherent in the role system of an organization; and by March and Simon's<sup>6</sup> specification of the non-rationalities of organization structure. Potentially disruptive and dysfunctional consequences of conflict are balanced by such positive functions as the establishment of group identities and the determination and maintenance of sub-system boundaries. The absence of conflict within a relationship cannot serve as an index of its underlying stability. Instead, as Likert<sup>7</sup> points out, effective organizations are characterized by extraordinary capacity to deal constructively with conflict and to resolve it.

The type of conflict rationalized or normalized by the collective activity of teachers is seen as a function of the managerial-technical, professional-employee, and bureaucratic-professional cleavages that are emerging as the number of professionals in organizations increases. According to Thompson,<sup>8</sup> a primary source of conflict in modern organizations is the relation between hierarchical and special-

ist roles in the accomplishment of organizational and professional goals. Those in hierarchical positions are dependent on the expertise of specialists for decisions for which they have the cultural right but not the ability to make. In turn, specialists are dependent on a superior-subordinate relation for certain important categories of rewards and personal satisfactions that tend to be independent of their technical ability.

Parsons<sup>9</sup> sees the problem as one of articulation between the managerial and technical systems of the organization, which, when the personnel of the technical organization reach a full professional level of competence, requires their participation in the technically crucial decisions. The break is qualitative and decisions are a process of weighing the considerations for which each is responsible and then reaching some kind of balance of agreement. Etzioni<sup>10</sup> has proposed that the traditional concepts of line and staff tend to be reversed in institutions whose defining characteristic is the creation, interpretation, application, and dissemination of knowledge. Hierarchical authority tends to become directed toward instrumental or maintenance goals such as stability, efficiency, satisfaction, and morale, while the characterizing or substantive goals of the organization become the immediate responsibility of the specialist staff. As the dependence of the organization on technical or professional expertise increases, professional personnel have increasing authority and autonomy for making decisions and carrying on activities essential to the achievement of substantive goals.

This source of conflict in organizations in general was investigated by Corwin,<sup>11</sup> as a problem of the professionalization of the role of the teacher in the school, leading to conflict between professional role orientations and employee role orientations of teachers. A major conclusion is that there is a consistent pattern of conflict between teachers and administrators over control of work and that professionalization is a militant process. He proposes further that the almost exclusive attention that has been given to individual versus organization conflicts has obscured the more fundamental organizational conflicts between one part of the system and the other—between the professional and bureaucratic principles of organization.



The set of conflicts generated by organizational rigidity in the face of professional role concerns is escalated by a basic weakness in the bureaucratic or monocratic form of organization. Thompson<sup>12</sup> has pointed out that in a monocratic organization with only one point or source of legitimacy, conflict cannot be legitimate. Coalition, and other conflict-settling activities, therefore, take place in a penumbra of illegitimacy and this inability to legitimize conflict depresses the creative and innovative activity for which professionals are trained and hired. He goes on to suggest that, with increased inputs of professionals, bureaucratic organizations seem to be evolving in the direction of a looser and more untidy structure with freer communication and lessened emphasis on monocratic authority.

The implications for research at this point are numerous and include the continuing study of the professionalization of the role of the teacher and its effects on complementary roles, depth studies of the qualitative and quantitative forms of conflict generated by professional-employee orientations, and the forms of activity and situational variables that lead to the formation of a formally organized teacher group.

#### **ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES TO A MULTIPLE AUTHORITY SYSTEM**

One way of viewing the tension or cleavage of the managerial-technical-bureaucratic relation is to define it as a problem in dealing with a multiple authority system, and organizational responses to a multiple authority system as transitions to a more complex authority, power, and control structure in organizations.

One early organizational response to an emerging multiple authority system was a part of the human relations movement in administration, particularly the move toward widespread participation of the members of an organization in the making of decisions affecting their work.

Individual member and group participation in the making of organizational policy and decision was shown to increase morale and job satisfaction, to lower member resistance to organizational change, and to increase worker moti-

vation through identification with organizational goals. In addition, as March and Simon<sup>13</sup> point out, "participative management" can be viewed as a device for permitting management to participate more fully in the making of decisions as well as a means for expanding the influence of lower echelons in the organization. They go on to suggest that felt participation in decision making lowers the visibility of power difference in the organization, that the greater the amount of felt participation, the greater the control of the organization over the evocation of alternatives, and that the perception of individual participation is equivalent in many respects to actual participation. Actual influence over the specific decision being made may be of less importance to the individual than acknowledgment of his influential position.

However, the extent to which an administrator shares decision making authority with one or more formally organized subgroups in the organization, while being held responsible for the decisions that are made, is an unresolved issue. Halpin has pointed out that the leader must decide within what spheres "group decision" will be permitted and to what extent he will be bound by such decisions.<sup>14</sup> The issue is made clear in the question, "Will the group role be advisory or will its decisions on every issue be a mandate to the administrator?"

The leader-group dilemma was examined by Leavitt<sup>15</sup> in comparing the findings of small group research with its emphasis on a high degree of participation, maximum joint responsibility for decision making, and maximum freedom of expression, with the constrictions of operating subgroups in a hierarchical setting with its emphasis on hierarchical control. He suggests that thrusting a democratic substructure into an otherwise hierarchical and directive kind of parent structure is likely to lead to trouble. Argyris<sup>16</sup> makes the same point in asking, "How truly participative, (i.e., spontaneous and free) can subordinates be if they are to be dependent upon their leader and how democratic can the leader be if his job is to control the processes of organization?"

Participative management practices have had a vogue. However, the usual participative arrangements have been



made within a monocratic or strongly bureaucratic framework, thus failing to confront the authority break between the managerial and technical systems and deal in a lasting way with the inherent stress of this break within a monocratic structure. As Corwin<sup>17</sup> has stated:

The myth that a central office must stand responsible for every decision throughout an organization is now deterring administrators from considering alternative designs by which organizations could be adapted to accommodate the fact of professionalization.

The research implications of general responses to conflict are complex and varied. One potentially productive track is the analysis of alternative designs that have emerged in response to conflict. An example of such a comparative analysis is the work of Burns and Stalker.<sup>18</sup> They compare the mechanistic (monocratic or bureaucratic) form appropriate to a stable environment with an organic form appropriate to changing conditions which give rise constantly to fresh problems and unforeseen requirements for action. The two types are polar rather than dichotomous with a real organization a mix of each type. Among the characteristics of the organic form relevant to a multiple authority system are the following:

1. The adjustment and continual redefinition of tasks through interaction with others.
2. A network structure of control, authority, and communication.
3. Extensive lateral rather than exclusively vertical directions of communication.
4. The location in the network of technical knowledge about the here and now task becomes the ad hoc center of control authority and communication.
5. Status and prestige attach to affiliations and expertise valid in the professional milieu external to the organization.

They note that the organic form, based on a rationale of nondefinition, a reasoned basis in which designation of status, function, and live responsibility and authority is

deliberately ambiguous or avoided, is often experienced by the individual manager as an uneasy, embarrassed, or chronically anxious quest for knowledge about what he should be doing, or what is expected of him, and similar apprehensiveness about what others are doing.

This organic model clearly defines a form of multiple authority and complex control. It is proposed that the collective action movement of teachers can be understood as another response to the problem or dilemma of dealing with a multiple authority or power system through a restructuring of the dominant, monocratic view of schools as organizations toward a more organic form. The focus of the current concern in this transition is on the concept and nature of control.

### CONTROL

The concepts of authority, power, and control do not have sharp operational definitions nor do theorists agree on the territory covered by each concept. Considerable overlap exists with power and control being used as interdependent concepts. The three, taken together, seem to be generating most of the concern over the emergence of more or less militant collective action by teachers. The existence of a movement toward a new, formally organized and represented power group in the school system is seen as a threatening source of conflict by school boards and administrators.

This perceived threat is, in part, due to an assumption, borrowed from union-management relations, of what Tannenbaum<sup>19</sup> calls the assumption of a fixed power "pie"; increases in union power in the plant are seen as equivalent to decreases in management power. In school systems this fixed or finite amount of power is distributed in favor of those who have the responsibility for the operation of the system; i.e., school boards and school administrators. The intervention of a new power group in the system, such as a formally recognized teachers' organization, is seen as producing an inevitable redistribution of power with the administrator ending up with insufficient power for the effective discharge of his responsibilities. Consequently it may appear that a redistribution of power without a con-

cern for total system responsibility may do more harm than good, and therefore, should be resisted by those in control.

The assumption of a fixed amount of power in a system is related to the view of the school as a closed system. In reality, however, the school is an exceedingly open system. The extensive and rapidly increasing interchange between the school and the economic, governmental, technological, industrial, and other parts of the social system is well documented. The role of the school in "the war on poverty," civil rights, and the "cold war" indicates the pace and scope of the increasing centrality of the school in this mutually productive interchange. Since we are, in reality, dealing with an open system in a state of transition and growth, the closed system view of a fixed amount of power "properly" distributed is open to question. If we assume, instead, that the total amount of power in a system is subject to change and may be increased and reordered so that those parts of the system that require it have as much power as needed to carry out their responsibilities, collective action by teachers may be viewed in a new light.

The fixed power pie assumption has been questioned as a result of a series of investigations by Smith and Tannenbaum<sup>20</sup> of the organizational control structure of over two hundred organizational units representing a wide variety of business, industrial, union, and voluntary organizations. In a summary of this research, they concluded that the assumption that an increase in control by one group implies a decrease in control by others is questionable. Instead such findings as the following support the assumption that control in an organization is open rather than closed.

1. Organizations were found to differ in total amount of control; i.e., the sum of the control perceived by members as being exercised in the organization.
2. A relationship between the amount of total control and organizational effectiveness was found in the voluntary organization, the unions, and one company. Substantial control exercised by both leaders and members appears to be a correlate of high organizational performance and positive member attitudes to-

ward the organization in the majority of the organizations investigated.

3. Perceived high mutual influence or control by and at all hierarchical levels within an organization may be the basis for the effective coordination of organizational activity as well as for integrating the goals of individual members with those of the organization.

These findings on control suggest that it is as reasonable to assume that the emerging forms of collective action by teachers may increase the total power of the school system and increase that form of coordination and integration of organizational activity conducive to high organizational effectiveness, as it is to assume that administrative power will be reduced and organizational effectiveness diminished. An increase in power and control by teachers does not necessarily decrease the power and control of administrators. In fact, it has been found that unions may act to expedite and enhance management control because they themselves have power in the plant.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, administrative resistance to collective action by teachers may be dysfunctional for the system by preventing an increase in total power and the correlates of more effective coordination and integration of member activity. This assumption and its correlates need to be tested in research on collective activity taking place in the schools.

The assumption that the total power of a system can be increased gains additional support from the concept of the school as an open system in significant interchange with the larger communities and institutions it serves. Strong, formally organized groups of teachers have influence or power in the larger community or social system and this power can be mobilized and used for the benefit of the school. The addition to and formal board recognition of an organized teacher group by the school system may increase the total power of that system in relation to the larger community and enable it to achieve its purposes more effectively.

Another source of unrecognized, conflicted control inheres in the set of relations connecting increased technical specialization of role with the increase in the internal coordination required as a consequence of the complexity of

specialization. Dubin<sup>22</sup> identifies this in stating that specialization has a centrifugal influence on organization, but at the same time, specialization creates automatic dependence, which has a centripetal influence and gives rise to unity of work and coordination. The resulting tension between the specialization and coordination creates a basic control problem.

A further control complexity is identified in Corwin's<sup>23</sup> proposition that specialization, complexity, and coordination enhance the power of both the professional and the administration, thus challenging the principle of lay control. Since schools continue to assert the primacy of local, lay control, the conflicts of a multiple authority and control system are likely to be exacerbated for some time to come as teachers push for professional status and control over their work.

Another questionable perception about control has its origins in the general acceptance of the monocratic view of organization. Control is seen as exerted through directives originating at the apex of the authority pyramid and communicated down through channels to the operatives at the base with support from a centralized system of sanctions and rewards.

Variants of this hierarchical control include the impersonal mechanisms of control designed by management. Blau<sup>24</sup> describes one of these as the assembly line mechanism in which the line makes most of the demands on the workers. In schools, this is the scheduling process in which teachers must be prepared to face groups of students for specified periods. A second is the use of performance records on which the employee is evaluated. According to Blau, performance records, like the assembly line, reverse the flow of demand in the organization so that the advice and help of superiors are sought. However, the basic control continues in the hands of those who program the assembly line and who design the records. And it is this basically monocratic view of control in an essentially complex, partly undefinable, multi-controlled school as a system, that is producing problems requiring the design of new control structures.

What is needed is extensive research on control structures and processes that are consistent with a multiple au-



thority and power base. And this is the problem to which cybernetic theory, the science of communication and control, has addressed itself.

Probably the most insightful statement on the relation of cybernetics to management has been made by Stafford Beer.<sup>25</sup> In his analysis, the system characteristics of self-regulation and complexity require different forms of control. The approach to self-regulation is through negative feedback or governing mechanisms to homeostasis. The approach to complexity is through the Black Box concept of control in which much of the mechanism remains unspecified. An exceedingly complex system, such as a school, is one that is indefinable in detail. It has high variety some of which is unknowable. Only variety in the control mechanism can deal successfully with variety in the system controlled. The formal requirement for control is that it contain enough information in the control sub-system and a set of rich inter-connections between the control sub-system and the larger, complex system of which it is a part.

Beer concludes by proposing that the primary aim of a control sub-system is to increase the ability of the complex system to teach itself optimum behavior. Elements of such a system include the right flow of information in the right places; rich inter-connectivity; and facilities for the growth of feedbacks, and many-one transformations.

Control pattern designs for exceedingly complex systems, particularly those having a multi-authority, multi-power base, will differ radically from the simple negative feedback form characterizing the notion of control in hierarchical monism. Research on the effect of collective action on organizational control from a control theory based on organizational learning has the potential for producing significant, new understandings in this area. Viewing collective bargaining as a many-one transformation in a control system suggest the nature of this contribution.

#### COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Collective action through teacher unions or formal professional groups is not readily defined. According to Tannenbaum<sup>26</sup> a labor union is what it does. Many unions with



similar, formal structures, constitutional provisions, and national affiliations differ radically in what they do. Their styles of operation, levels of member interest and activity, internal distributions of power, patterns of relations with management are so different that descriptions of formal structure alone are not sufficient. While the preceding suggest sources of problems for research, this section will be restricted to a brief look at the basic function of unions: collective bargaining.

Bargaining is a generalized social control technique. Within the framework of this paper it is seen as a many-one transformation in a control system; i.e., it is a set of relatively simple rules for transforming some of the high variety of a complex, multi-authority system into order. This notion is probably behind Steven's<sup>27</sup> definition of collective bargaining negotiation as, "a social control technique for reflecting and transmuting the basic power relationships which underlie the conflict of interest inherent in an industrial relations system." He clarifies this with the statement that it is a technique for directing, controlling, and explicating power in conflicts of interest and for containing conflict in forms which do not lead to mutual disaster.

It should be noted here that within this framework, collective bargaining versus professional negotiations is not a real issue. Negotiation is considered to be a particular form or part of the more basic bargaining process. Before negotiating, one must be in a position to bargain.

Up to this point, conflict has been taken as a dependent variable and several major sources of conflict have been described. Bargaining processes accept conflict as an independent variable differentiated according to type of source. March and Simon<sup>28</sup> hypothesize that the more organizational conflict represents intergroup differences, the greater the use of bargaining. They predict further that, because bargaining places strains on the status and power systems in the organization and acknowledges and legitimizes heterogeneity of goals in the organization, the organizational hierarchy will perceive (and react to) all conflict as though it were in fact individual rather than intergroup

conflict. They note that these hypotheses have not yet been tested.

The research approach to bargaining in general, and collective bargaining as a specific form, has been through the theory of games of strategy. Schelling<sup>29</sup> was one of the first to extend game theory to apply to the strategical analysis of wars or threats of wars, blackmail, maneuverings in a bureaucracy, and collective bargaining negotiations. These situations can be approached as mixed motive games in which there is a conflict of interest and mutual dependence is a part of the logical structure demanding some kind of collaboration or mutual accommodation—tacit, if not explicit, even if only to avoid mutual disaster. The elements of a mixed-motive situation include (1) the possibility that both parties may gain by concerting their actions even though one party may gain more than the other; (2) each party having, as a final option, the possibility of destroying the situation by refusal to bargain or by withdrawal so that both lose all that is available for gain; and (3) each has to act so as to take the outcome of the other's behavior into account.

Schelling extends this basic framework by examining the perceptual and suggestive element in the formation of mutually consistent expectations and the "moves" that may occur in actual games of strategy plus the structural elements on which the moves depend. He focuses on tacit and explicit communication, particularly the communication context of a sequence of moves or maneuvers, whereby behavior is regulated, and intentions communicated to a point where the players are led to some meeting of the mind to avoid mutual destruction of potential gains; in short, the bargaining process.

The productivity of extensions of game theory to the more complex interactions of collective bargaining is demonstrated in Walton and McKersie's<sup>30</sup> comprehensive theoretical treatment of collective bargaining in industry.

They start with the notion that labor negotiation, as an instance of social negotiations, is comprised of four systems of activity or subprocesses:

1. Distributive bargaining; the resolution of pure conflicts of interest.

2. Integrative bargaining; the process of finding common or complementary interests and solving the problems of both parties.

3. Attitudinal structuring; the process of influencing the attitudes of the participants toward each other and to effect the basic bonds which relate the two parties they represent.

4. Intra-organizational bargaining; a process of achieving consensus within each of the interacting groups.

Each subprocess is represented by a separate model and each has its own identifiable set of instrumental acts or tactics.

The models for distributive and integrative bargaining derive from game theory but are extended to cope with the complexity of actual bargaining situations and the tactics employed. The importance of Walton and McKersie's work for researchers in educational administration lies not only in the development of models that can be applied to real situations but the theoretical base provided for research on the collective action of teachers.

Before concluding this section, a word of warning and advice from one of the leading users of game theory is in order. Rapoport warns that:

"A thorough knowledge of game theory will not make anyone a better chess or poker player or a more brilliant strategist. However, such knowledge can impart a profound understanding about the basic nature (i.e., the underlying logical structure) of a great variety of conflicts."

The implications of theories of games of strategy for research in educational administration has just begun to be recognized. The realities of collective bargaining by teachers should provide a stimulus for a greatly expanded and accelerated research effort in educational administration since it is or has the potential of becoming a major intervention and change in the relatively static and traditional pattern of school organization.

## SUMMARY

The present militancy and increase in the collective activity of teachers may be understood as a set of conflicts, generated by the increasing professionalization of teachers, which, at the organization level, are discontinuities or breaks in the traditional monocratic or bureaucratic pattern of school organization. The conflict may be viewed as an organizational problem in dealing with an emerging multiple authority system and consequent complex control system. One means of dealing with complex authority and control is through bargaining and its institutionalized form: collective bargaining negotiations. Bargaining is hypothesized as a many-one type of control transformation for articulation organizational complexity and arriving at new organizational designs and processes.

This analysis supports the prediction of others that the long range prospect is for a growing conflict between teachers and administrators and the plea for extensive and intensive research on the problem.

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<sup>5</sup> E. G. Guba and C. E. Bidwell, *Administrative Relationships* (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1957), pp. 65-68.

<sup>6</sup> J. G. March and H. A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958).

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<sup>8</sup> Victor A. Thompson, "Hierarchy, Specialization, and Organizational Conflict," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, V (March, 1961), pp. 485-521.

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<sup>10</sup> Amitai Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and Suggestion," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, V (Sept., 1960).

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- <sup>12</sup> Victor A. Thompson, "Bureaucracy and Innovation," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, XX (June, 1965), pp. 1-20.
- <sup>13</sup> March and Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
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- <sup>16</sup> Chris Argyris, "Organizational Leadership and Participative Management," *The Journal of Business*, XXVII (January, 1955) pp. 1-7.
- <sup>17</sup> Ronald Corwin, "Professional Persons in Public Organizations," *Educational Administration Quarterly*, I (Autumn, 1965), p. 17.
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