A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION WAS MADE WITHIN A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK INVOLVING SOCIAL SYSTEM TERMS. ATTENTION WAS FOCUSED ON DIFFERENCES AMONG ORGANIZATIONS IN TERMS OF FUNCTIONS PERFORMED FOR SOCIETY. FOUR MAJOR COMPONENTS OF ACTION SYSTEMS USED TO COMPARE SEVERAL ORGANIZATIONS WERE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS—(1) THE ORIENTATION BASE OF THE SYSTEM, THE NEEDS, OR INTERESTS, OR VALUES OF ACTORS THAT ARE AT STAKE IN THE PROCESS, (2) THE PROPERTIES OF OBJECTS IN THE SITUATION OF ACTION THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO ACTORS IN THE LIGHT OF THESE INTERESTS, (3) THE NORMATIVE RULES DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN LEGITIMATE AND ILLEGIILE M0DES OF ACTION IN PURSUIT OF A PARTICULAR INTEREST IN QUESTION, AND (4) THE GENERALIZED FACILITIES THAT ACTORS ARE EXPECTED TO RESORT TO IN SECURING CONTROL OF OBJECTS ESSENTIAL TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THAT INTEREST IN QUESTION. THE PLACEMENT OF EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS WITHIN THE COMPARATIVE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK LED TO THE POSITION THAT THE PRIMARY EMPHASIS OF THE EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION IS IN THE AREA OF PATTERN MAINTENANCE OR SOCIALIZATION. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT THE PRIMARY CONTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION TO SOCIETAL FUNCTIONING IS THUS IN THE MAINTENANCE OF THE VALUE PATTERNS WHICH DEFINE THE STRUCTURE OF A SOCIETY, AND THAT SCHOOLS ARE CRITICIZED PRIMARILY FOR DEVIATIONS FROM INSTITUTIONAL VALUES RATHER THAN FOR PRODUCING A COMMODITY OF LOW TECHNICAL QUALITY. (JH)
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SOME PROBLEMS OF EDUCATIONAL ORGANIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

BY

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Introduction

Although it may be a matter of belaboring the obvious, the author wishes to state at the outset that this paper is as much, if not more, an attempt to acquire understanding as it is to communicate the same. To the extent that understanding has been acquired, there may also be communication. If so, well and good. But this is not a finished product, or a definitive statement of either theoretical or empirical knowledge. It is a beginning, a working paper, one acknowledged to suffer from a great many ambiguities, inconsistencies, and errors of interpretation and formulation.

Given this state of affairs, it is the author's hope that conference participants will exercise their critical facilities to their fullest capacity in pointing out ambiguities, identifying inconsistencies, and suggesting alternative interpretations. In this way, our endeavor, at least with respect to this paper, stands a reasonable chance of being mutually beneficial.

The Lack of Perspective in the Field

By and large, it seems fair to say that students of educational administration have not fully exploited comparative analysis as a means of acquiring insight into the nature and problems of educational organization. Although it is true that our scholarly base has been broadened greatly by the inclusion of social science
perspectives, it is no less true that there has been little effort to advance understanding of educational organizations through systematic inter-organizational comparisons based on those perspectives.

Three major consequences seem to follow from this oversight. First, educational administration as a field suffers from a kind of provincialism that leads us to treat as problematical some phenomena that, from a comparative perspective, are not only not problematical at all, but rather are quite predictable consequences of the institutional structure of the educational enterprise. Thus, for example, the "50 year lag", or the generally slow rate of change in education, is a baffling and frustrating problem to both students and practitioners of educational administration. Second, given the tendency to treat certain phenomena as problematical, there appears to be a parallel tendency to attribute these problems either to inadequacies in the quality and quantity of talent being attracted to the field, or to a lack of ability, courage, motivation, or imagination on the part of persons already in the field. The factors accounting for the lack of innovation, for example, are thus sought in the attributes and motivations of individuals. Finally, lack of perspective leaves us unaware of the extent to which what is actually done, and what can realistically be expected, in educational organizations differs from what we say is being done, and from what we say ought to be done. For example, although much is made of the administrator's responsibility for evaluating the effectiveness of teachers' performances, a comparative analysis not only suggests that this is not done, but cannot realistically be done.

A major thesis of this paper is that much of what we in the field of educational administration take as problematical from our somewhat provincial point of view, and much of what we tend to explain on the basis of individual motivations
and attributes, is precisely what we should expect to find, given the institutional structure of the educational enterprise, and its location in the structure of American Society. Granted that making phenomena more explicable in terms of variables different from those ordinarily identified does not make them less problematical in the action sense, i.e., it may not make the "50 year lag" any more acceptable to those to whom it is a source of concern. However, to the extent that some of the phenomena can be made understandable and predictable in terms of structural elements, one is forewarned and forearmed on two counts. First, it should be clear that neither the source of, nor the remedy for, the situation is to be found by focusing on the attributes of individuals. Second, it may become apparent that in changing structural elements in order to remedy one problem, new problems of even greater magnitude are created. Put another way, it may well be that the phenomena which appear to be problematical and dysfunctional from the point of view of the educator, appear entirely reasonable and functional from the perspective of the comparative analyst.

The Comparative Framework

For my purposes, it will be useful to formulate the analysis in social system terms. Social systems are constituted by the relations of one or more actors to one or more objects in its, or their, situation. Actors may be individual persons in roles, or collectivities constituted by pluralities of persons in roles, capable of action in concert. Within the frame or reference adopted for use here, all systems of social interaction are subject to the exigencies of four functional imperatives, the fulfillment of which is a condition of the stability and effectiveness of the system. The four functional imperatives may be defined
in relation to two dichotomous points of reference, internal-external, and instrumental-consummatory. Cross-classified, these yield an internal-instrumental function, an external-instrumental function, an external-consummatory function, and an internal-consummatory function. These, in turn, may be identified respectively, as the imperatives of pattern-maintenance and tension-management, adaptation, goal-attainment, and integration.

The first of these, the pattern-maintenance tension-management function, concerns the problem of maintaining the integrity of the institutionalized value patterns which define the structure of the system. From the point of view of the individual participant, the problem involves the maintenance of motivational commitment to act in accordance with institutionalized patterns of normative culture. Although the normative patterns in question are those internalized in the processes of socialization—itself an aspect of the pattern-maintenance and tension-management function—they are none the less vulnerable at at least two points. In considering this problem it is important to recognize that no participant is totally engaged in any specific system of social interaction. The part of him that is involved is a sector of the personality; a role. But the role is interdependent with other parts of the personality, and if a given role, or sector of the personality, is to have a modicum of stability, it must to some degree be insulated against disturbing effects from other roles, and from the personality as a whole.

The first point of vulnerability lies at the cultural level. Here, due to strains toward consistency, changes taking place outside the relevant value area, e.g., in the belief system, or in scientific knowledge, may give rise to pressures to change important values within the relevant value sector. Thus, familiarity with research evidence concerning the effects of different leader-behavior patterns may lead to changes in the internalized value patterns of the leader. Similarly,
research evidence concerning the effects of nonpromotion on the mental health of students may give rise to pressures to change the relevant commitments of teachers to institutionalized value patterns. The tendency to stabilize values against pressures of this kind is termed the pattern-maintenance function. It constitutes an inertial tendency of system of social interaction.

The second locus of vulnerability is at the motivational level of the individual participant. Here, tensions arising from strains in the social situation, from other role demands, or from intra-personal sources may threaten motivation to conformity with institutionalized value patterns. The bank employee who desperately needs money to pay for his child's operation may become an embezzler, and the student who is in danger of failing may cheat. Similarly, the father who is too devoted to his family may find that he is less than fully motivated to conformity with occupational expectations. In either case, the tensions arising from such sources may threaten motivational commitment to internalized values. Given a sufficient level of tension there is a tendency toward change, or deviance, which may take a direction away from the pattern which defines the structure of the system. The function of stabilization against motivational pressures for changes has been termed tension-management.

Every social system functions in relation to a situation defined as external to it. The relations to the external situation are the focus of the second and third functional imperatives. The first of these relations concerns the significance of the external situation as a source of consummatory goal-gratification, or goal-attainment. Although indirectly including the physical environment and other social systems, the situation here refers primarily to the behavior and motivations of the human individuals who are members of the system itself. That is, where common sense
would have it that only the physical environment and other social systems are external, the conception adopted here treats the psychological and cultural components of action as external as well.

A goal state is defined as a relation between the system of reference and its situation which, given the institutionalized value pattern, is maximally favorable to the stability of the system. It is a state of the interaction system, in relation to its situation, toward the attainment of which the system may be said to be striving. Such a state, once present, will tend to be maintained, and if absent, will tend to be sought by action on the part of one or more actor-units in the system. Since situations are inherently unstable, goal states are necessarily transitory, and require constant efforts to mobilize resources for their re-establishment. Mobilization, in turn, requires control of resources which, as we have seen, includes human motivations as a key element.

A system experiences a goal-attainment deficit when its capacity to attain its goals, or fulfill its expectations, is frustrated. A goal of a given family, for example, may be to send its children to college. But, loss of earning power on the part of the father due to unemployment—a situational change—may frustrate the attainment of the goal. The goal may still be attainable if the wife works, but if the values institutionalized in the role of the wife-mother role conflict with this pattern, there will be a problem of motivating not only the wife, but other family members as well, to contribute what is necessary to goal-attainment. Here, the potential conflict between pattern-maintenance and goal-attainment is apparent.

If social systems had only one goal, it would be impossible to distinguish between goal-attainment and the third functional imperative, that of adaptation. When a system has a single, simply defined goal there may be little need to
differentiate between the two. But in complex systems where not only does the system pursue multiple goals, but also where subsystems pursue a variety of independent goals, the problem of generalization of facilities arises. That is, a new order of problem arises in that there is a need for generalized facilities, facilities that are not inherently ascribed to any particular goal, but which have the feature of maximum disposability, or availability, for a variety of uses. If the sole objective of the family were to maintain a given relation between the system and its situation, and if all members of the family were irrevocably committed to its maintenance, then there would be no need for generalized facilities. A simple subsistence farm arrangement in which every member knew his part, and did it, would suffice. However, not only do most systems pursue a multitude of goals, but also the commitment of members to any given goal is less than complete and subject to change. Hence, the need for generalized facilities which, it is important to note, includes a variety of mechanisms for securing results in interaction, e.g., power as well as money. A goal of American society, or elements within it, for example, is racial equality, but the changes required to implement this goal are certainly not acquired through processes of economic exchange.

Finally, all complex systems of social interaction are differentiated and segmented into relatively independent units and subsystems, the relations among which may be mutually supportive, or mutually obstructive. The fourth functional imperative, that of integration, concerns the problem of maintaining solidarity in the relations among units and subsystems in the interest of effective functioning of the system as a whole.
An Approach to Comparative Analysis

One way of conducting a comparative analysis within this framework is to focus attention on differences among organizations in terms of the function performed for society. These differences have implications not only for the relation between the organization and the larger society, but also in their internal operation. One approach to this, in turn, is to compare the several organizations on the basis of four major components of action systems. These may be identified as follows:

1. The orientation base of the system, the needs, or interests, or values of actors that are at stake in the process.
2. The properties of objects in the situation of action that are important to actors in the light of these interests.
3. The normative rules discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate modes of action in pursuit of the interest in question.
4. The generalized facilities that actors are expected to resort to in securing control of the objects essential to the implementation of the interest in question.

The Orientation Base of Systems of Action

The orientation base of a system of social interaction may be characterized in terms of the two pattern-variables specificity-diffuseness and affectivity-neutrality. It is easy to lose one's way in the interpretation of the several orientations, so it may be useful to illustrate each on the person-to-person level before proceeding to the organizational level. There are, within this framework, four different orientations, or bases of interest, that I might have in a person of the opposite sex. On the one hand, I may be interested in getting her to perform a specific act, or series of acts, that will aid me in accomplishing some goal, e.g., getting this paper typed. Such an orientation is specific in the
sense that I am not concerned about her global character, reputation, or personality. All that matters, is, can she type with sufficient proficiency to do the job? It is neutral in the sense that the action sought is not an end in its own right. That is, there is a purpose beyond its consummation. My interest, or need, therefore, is in utilizing her services, and the orientation may be termed a need for instrumental capacities. The value principle being emphasized is utility.

On the other hand, I may be interested in a specific act that has no purpose beyond its consummation, i.e., my interest may be affective. If this is the case, then to be sure, I will not be terribly concerned about her character, her reputation, whether she is honorable, whether she drinks, smokes, or is a loyal wife and dependable mother. Indeed, some of these considerations are positively obstructive to some kinds of specific-affective interest. My interest, or need, in this case is not instrumental utilization, but a need for consummation. Fulfillment of my need requires collective action, hence the emphasis is on accomplishment of purpose (effectiveness) through collective action. It should be noted parenthetically that the goal need not be the one likely to be inferred. The lady in question may very well be a colleague who's support I want in the resolution of an issue within our university division.

In the third case, I might be very much concerned about the kinds of diffuse considerations listed above. I might want to marry the lady. In that case, my orientation would be no less affective, but in all probability it would include a concern for a great many considerations beyond the immediate consummatory possibilities. The relation to the person would still have no purpose beyond its consummation, but it would encompass the whole, diffuse person rather than the specific concern of the moment. This may be termed an interest in, or a need for,
affiliation, or solidarity. The fourth case is similar in its diffuseness, but involves neutrality. The person may very well be my son’s teacher. If this is the case, I am likely to be interested in diffuse questions such as whether or not she is a solid citizen, whether she goes to church, whether she drinks, smokes, etc. The interest, or need, here is for cultural commitment, or integrity. The concern is with the "ritual state" of the person.

Now then, what can be said of the interests involved in the orientations of persons and collectivities to different categories of organizations? The general need, or interest, of elements within society in relating to the business or industrial firm would seem to be specific-neutral need for instrumental utilization. The interest is specific in the sense that there is little emphasis on the diffuse considerations that go with the concepts of honor and integrity. Although times have doubtless changed since the days of the "Robber Barons," or the "Captains of industry"—depending on one's point of view—but business is still business. The orientation is neutral in the same sense indicated above; what is sought from the firm is action useful in achieving goals beyond the product received, not, for the most part, products that are gratifying in their own right.

Quite the contrary is true with respect to the political administration, or the governmental body. Here the need, or interest, that is at stake is not for actions that are helpful in the attainment of more distant goals, but actions that need no justification beyond their consummation. Politics and government is the area in which the purposes themselves are realized, or frustrated. As Brogan put it, "... it is still possible to be a power in politics without serving any known public purpose. But private purposes must be served, and the first private purposes to be served were and are those of the voters ... ." What is involved
in this case is the authoritative allocation of values. As Easton puts it,

When individuals or groups dispute about the distribution of things considered valuable, whether they be spiritual or material, and when these disputes are not resolved to the satisfaction of the parties through some customary processes of private negotiation, then a policy is enunciated with the authority of society behind it and with its acceptance by society as authoritative.

Every society provides some mechanisms, however rudimentary they may be, for authoritatively resolving differences about the ends that are to be pursued, that is for deciding who is to get what there is of the desirable things. An authoritative allocation of some values is unavoidable.

Where political parties themselves—as distinct from governmental bodies—are involved, the orientation becomes more diffuse. As Rossiter has pointed out:

Thanks to the fuzzy nature of our political system, the major parties have not been especially effective in performing this [policy formulation] function. In the words of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, 'the American two-party system has shown little propensity for evolving original or creative ideas about public policy; it has even been rather sluggish in responding to such ideas in the public interest.' The platforms of the parties, which are presumably the most eloquent statements they can make of their current intentions have never been noted for originality or clarity.

The interests involved where political parties and interest groups are involved are no less affective, but highly diffuse. Again, in the words of Rossiter:

Finally, parties serve a symbolic function—or should we start from the other direction and call it psychological?—by providing an object, large and friendly and often exciting, to which men can extend allegiance. Graham Wallas, in his memorable study of Human Nature in Politics, was perhaps the first observer to isolate and examine this function. Having taken note of the multitude of voters and of the psychical inability of any one voter to deal with more than a few men and ideas, he went on: 'Something is required simpler and more permanent, something which can be loved and trusted, and which can be recognized at successive elections as being the same thing that was loved and trusted before; and the party is such a thing.'
The contrast between the three examples given above on the one hand, and educational and religious organizations, on the other, is too apparent to dwell upon at length. While the interest may be no less diffuse, it is certainly not affective in the same sense as it is in government or in political parties. The need at stake in these instances is neither for instrumental utilization, consumption, nor affiliation, but for diffuse commitment. Although the instrumental significance of the educational organization has undoubtedly increased since Sputnik, the basic interest is diffuse rather than specific.

The general orientation to the military organization is perhaps the most dramatic and clear cut of all. The interest of society and its constituent elements in the military is highly specific. It serves one primary purpose, that of maintaining a satisfactory relation between the system and its situation. This is easy to grasp in connection with foreign affairs, but it applies equally in an internal sense as the involvement of the military in the Little Rock affair illustrates. The need of society in relation to the military is for effective action in the interest of collective goals. The global properties of the enterprise are of little concern, what is of concern is its capacity to perform specific functions that are of a consummatory significance to society, or to elements within it. Note that in the Selma, Alabama, affair a substantial number of persons are calling for the use of military force.

With these patterns in mind, we may now turn to an examination of organizational orientations to personnel. The orientation of the business or industrial firm as well as the military organization, the militant union, and the political organization, is specific. In each of these instances the global properties of persons as persons are quite irrelevant. Whether the employee of the firm is honorable, kind,
generous, whether he is a good husband and father, whether he squanders his pay
check at the race track, is a matter of relative indifference so long as he
possesses the requisite instrumental capacities. Similarly, whether the off-
duty soldier drinks, gambles, seeks the company of disreputable women, etc., is
of little concern to the military organization. One might even say that some
of these activities, if not positively encouraged, are at least treated with
extreme tolerance. When such activities are discouraged it is not due to moral
considerations, but because of treats to the capacity for effective collective
action. For example, at one time it was the standard operational procedure of
the military forces on occupational duty in Japan to punish enlisted men who
contracted venereal diseases by sending them to "rehabilitation" camp for a
period of several weeks. In reality the rehabilitation camp was a work camp,
a punishment camp. No attempt was made to discourage personnel from partici-
pating in the activities in which the disease was contracted. The entire concern
was on encouraging those who did participate to take proper precautions to avoid
contraction of the disease. The emphasis was primarily on maintaining one's
capacity to fulfill specific responsibilities that are essential to collective
effectiveness.

The relatively greater emphasis on specific-affective orientations may
be seen in several characteristics of the military organization. Note, for
example, that the technical rating, or rank, is less prestigious than the
line or command rank. Although both ratings and the situation have changed,
at the time about which I am writing, the rank of Technician Fifth Grade,
although objectively equivalent, was simply not as respectable as that of Corporal. Instrumental capacity is, or was, less valued than responsiveness to demands for collective effectiveness. A second indication of this focus is the almost obsessive concern of military officers with the phenomena of "soldiering" or malingering. The concern is not lack of competence, or instrumental capacity, but lack of willingness to contribute what is essential to the effectiveness of the organisation, i.e., goal-commitment.

Thus, the business firm, the military organisation, as well as the political organisation (as distinct from the party) share the emphasis on, or interest in specific properties of personnel. The emphasis in the political realm may be illustrated by excerpts from Brogan's discussion of the alliance between the New Deal and several political machines.

The alliance between the New Deal and some of the great machines gave scandal to the more zealous New Dealers and ammunition, or at least blank cartridges, to the Republicans. Liberals might denounce Frank Hague and talk of the Berlin-Rome-Jersey City axis, but Hague delivered the vote.
In accepting these allies and in giving them tangible proofs of federal benevolence with which to dazzle their voters, Roosevelt and Farley were playing sound politics. It would have taken years to build up a voting machine of equal efficiency; the New Deal mandate might have been exhausted before the foundations of an alternative structure were well and duly laid. And in accepting support from machines, Roosevelt may have remembered that some effective support was given to the great Progressive Crusade of 1912 by William Flinn, the Boss of Pittsburgh, for motives very unlike those animating William Allen White, Gifford Pinchot, Hiram Johnson, Alfred M. Landon, Harold Ickes and other more representative progressives. And Woodrow Wilson owed his nomination in 1912 not only to William Jennings Bryan, but to Roger Sullivan, Boss of one of the competing Chicago machines, the ancestor of the Kelly-Nash-Arvey machine which was turning in such satisfactory New Deal Majorities.

Thus, the diffuse properties of persons, or collectivities, e.g., the integrity, honor, etc., are of little concern in any of these cases. Indeed, diffuse commitments of this kind can be positively dysfunctional in the kinds of settings described above. The soldier who is too devoted to his family may be less willing to risk his life than is necessary for greatest effectiveness in combat. And the soldier who is too strongly committed to religious principles may find it impossible to take the life of another even in mortal combat. Similarly, the politician who is obsessed with his own integrity, or the integrity of those with whom he must deal, may introduce dysfunctional rigidities into the political system. Senator Dirksen might, for example, have taken an all or nothing stance in the fight for civil rights legislation.

Burns has indicated the manner in which such an orientation can be dysfunctional in politics. In *The Deadlock of Democracy: Four Party Politics in America*, Burns attributes the demise of the Federalist party to an unwillingness to depart from rigid principles. "...the Federalist party was dying. For two decades its leaders had elevated principles over party; in the end they kept the former and lost the latter." Similarly, in
The downfall of the Republican party in the 1930's was precipitated in large part by the refusal of Hoover and his colleagues and the business leaders of the day to use the right methods to attain the ends they wished. They meant well: they wanted to help the unemployed; they were willing for state and local governments to help the distressed; some of them made personal sacrifices of their own. They simply stuck to the rigid principle that certain things, like unemployment insurance or old-age pensions, should not be undertaken by the national government. The Republican party is still wounded by the crippling effect of that doctrine.8

Here, of course, the orientation is to cultural objects, rather than to persons, but the pattern remains the same.

Similar observations can be made concerning the orientation of the union. As Kornhauser has pointed out, "Trade unions... concentrate on reaching short-run goals in the immediate situation, and show little interest in ideology and broad social reform. Therefore, expectations for trade union race relations based on ideological conceptions often are not supported by actual practices."9 I interpret this to mean that trade unions are relatively unconcerned about the actions of their members as they relate to diffuse, moral, or ideological considerations. Perhaps the best indication of this emphasis is the seeming susceptibility of unions, at least during their militant stages, to infiltration by deviant influences, e.g., organized crime, and communism.

On the other hand, the properties of candidates for teaching positions in the public schools that are of concern to school administrators and boards of education are precisely those that are irrelevant in the above contexts. Although there have been vast changes in the past two or three decades — teachers are no longer required to teach Sunday School, attend
church, and avoid all appearances of sin -- it is still safe to say that no person of questionable moral character is likely to receive serious consideration for any public school position, or to remain in one once employed. And, despite the fact that few unmarried teachers are now required to pledge celibacy for the duration of their contracts, there are yet communities in the United States where public school personnel dare not, on pain of dismissal, be seen in a public cocktail lounge.

As recently as 1956, when I accepted my first full-time administrative position in a public school, the superintendent of schools, on the occasion of the staff meeting at the opening of school, remarked to the assembled faculty in effect, "We don't care what church you attend, but we consider it advisable for you to attend some church."

Similar considerations govern the orientation of the educational organization to non-normative elements of culture -- from one point of view, innovations. Where the probable orientation in a business firm to a new idea would lead to the question, "What is the utility of this idea given our goal?" the question in education is more likely to be, "How compatible is the idea with our image of 'good education.' " Like the family with difficulties in adapting to situational changes, the school is concerned about the maintenance of an established pattern. It is interesting to speculate about the relationship between this pattern and the necessity for the establishment of Job Corp Centers.

An even more extreme example of the emphasis on diffuseness may be seen in the orientation of the religious collectivity toward the clergymen. Few aspects of the clergymen's life, or his family's, escape the notice
of the congregation. Here too, there have been changes occurring unevenly across the denominational spectrum, but the basic diffuseness of the orientation remains. Similar elements may be seen in the orientations of local communities, kinship groups, ethnic solidarities, and other solidary collectivities, such as political parties. In the latter case, however, the emphasis is on diffuse affectivity, or solidarity rather than integrity, or commitment.

Some indication of the solidarity emphasis in political parties may be inferred from Burns' description of the congressman from a safe seat:

The congressman:

... placates the dominant social forces in the district; "protects" his district against hostile outside forces; does a great many individual favors; lobbies for benefits for the district; maintains a friend and neighbors political organization that scares would-be opponents out of the primary or trounces them if they come in; and comfortably overwhelms the opposition party's candidate -- if there is one -- on election day. His main commitment politically is to the status quo. He wishes nothing to disrupt his easy relationships with the public officials and private interests that rule the area. He views with alarm the great issues that sweep the nation and threaten to disrupt the familiar and comfortable politics of his district. He does not want to broaden the franchise or encourage more voting, because this might disturb existing arrangements.10

The contact between the diffuse-affective, or solidarity, emphasis on the one hand, and the specific-affective, or effectiveness, emphasis on the other is apparent in Burn's comparison between the presidential and congressional political parties.

The former, to use Dahl's apt expression, is an "executive-centered coalition." The President has means of direction and discipline unmatched by the congressional parties or by the presidential party out of power. He has public position, a command of the media, a control over personnel, and a direct electoral link with the people that enable him to maintain and exploit a somewhat hierarchical system in the presidential party. The
congressional party is led by a coalition of parties, allied through their common attitudes and mutual dependence, and with an internal party system marked more by bargaining than by hierarchy. The essential operational process differs: the congressional reliance on committees, with their tendency to protect an existing consensus over the status quo, contrasts with the executive emphasis on single-leader activism.11

Just as the soldier who is too scrupulous to kill reduces the effectiveness of the military organization, and just as the technical specialist who is too obedient to his superiors becomes less than fully useful to the firm, so does the minister who behaves in one way on Sunday, and another on Friday, and the teacher who violates cultural commitments, compromise the integrity of their respective organization. Similarly, the politician who bolts his party is a threat to solidarity. Rossiter's discussion of the "Solid South" provides a case in point:

To be short and blunt about this matter, the Democratic party exercises a near-monopoly of political allegiance in the South because this system appears to be the stoutest bulwark of white supremacy. Whatever differences of class or interest or political principle may divide the white community of the South -- and these differences are no less impressive than those that divide men in the North -- they are muffled and suppressed and, as it were, sacrificed to unity in the transcendent interest of the whole community in 'keeping the Negro in his place.' Men carry on their struggles, which can be hot and vicious, within the party. The party itself presents a united front to the rest of the country.12

Vidich and Bensman provide a similar example on the less grand scale in their account of village politics in a rural New York community.

Within the formally constituted governing agency of the village, the village board, politics is conducted on the principle of unanimity of decisions. In two years of observation of village board meetings in Springdale all decisions brought to a vote were passed unanimously. The dissent, disagreement and factionalism which existed in the community are not expressed at board meetings.13
In the ordinary conduct of business in this manner, potential issues and conflicts never become visible at the public level. Undisciplined appeals to outside groups which would threaten the monopoly of power of the controlling group do not occur. The board, especially the trustees who alone possess the voting privilege, openly state that they do not want to 'stir up trouble.' Since the board members themselves carry responsibility for their actions, they do not take action until the appropriate individuals are consulted and until it is apparent that responsibility is diffused into unanimity.14

The military organisation, the political party, and the union share the emphasis on patterns of activity that are valued for their own sake. In the military this emphasis is suggested by the common statement, "There's a right way, a wrong way, and the Army way." The distinction between the military and the political party is in the scope of the interest. The need of the military is highly specific; those of the party, diffuse. In the former case, the need is a consummatory one, in the latter, one of solidarity.

Without going through the entire analysis again, it should be possible at this stage to point out that the same distinctions that have been made among organisations can also be made among roles within organisations. Although there are many complications, it seems clear that there are important distinctions not only between administrators, supervisors, and teachers, but between different levels in the educational organisation within each of these categories. For example, I would hypothesise that the administrative orientation is characterized by a consummatory emphasis, while teachers tend toward an emphasis on cultural commitment, or integrity, and secondarily on instrumental capacities.

It is also clear that the orientations of collectivities must be differentiated for different categories of personnel. Although the previous
discussion has treated orientations globally, it is obvious that the interest of the business firm in its executive personnel is not the same as its interest in technical personnel. While the consummatory emphasis in relation to technical personnel is minimal, organisations typically emphasise consummatory needs in relation to managerial personnel. This would seem to be the burden both Whyte’s and Reisman’s concepts of “organization man” and “other directedness.” These considerations, however, are tangential to our main concern.

Figure 1 summarizes the discussion thus far by presenting the several orientation categories in tabular form.

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<tr>
<th>SPECIFICITY</th>
<th>AFFECTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEEDRALITY</td>
<td>AFFECHIVITY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for instrumental utilization</td>
<td>Need for consummation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value emphasis - utility</td>
<td>Value emphasis - effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for commitment</td>
<td>Need for affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value emphasis - integrity</td>
<td>Value emphasis - solidarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 1
CATEGORIES OF INTEREST
IN OBJECTS
The Categorization of Object Properties

Thus far we have dealt exclusively with the orientations of actors to, of the needs of actors in relation to, situational objects. That the structure of any concrete action system cannot be described adequately in these terms alone can be made clear by noting that, given the specification of need, there remains the problem of categorizing objects with reference to their bearing on the needs in question. This is to say that the meaning of objects is not given in the nature of the objects themselves. A cow, for example, has entirely different meanings to the American rancher, and the Indian of Hindu background. For the Indian, the cow is not an object that can be exploited legitimately for certain kinds of interests, e.g., utilitarian interests, but a sacred object, an object of generalized respect. Thus, given the fact that the primary orientation of the business firm is an interest in instrumental utilization, there remains the question of what aspects of situational object bear significantly on the fulfillment of the interest in question, and what objects can and cannot be legitimately exploited in the implementation of that interest.

The question at issue here is, "What aspects of the individual person, viewed by the collectivity as an actor, are significant in terms of its interests?" That is, "What is the meaning of the person to the collectivity?" The meaning of situational objects to actors may be categorized in terms of the two pattern-variables universalism-particularism, and performance-quality. Since the distinctions made in terms of these categories are illuminated in sharp relief at that level, it is useful to begin with the meaning of various organizations to other elements within our society.
We may then proceed to an application of these patterns at the level of the meaning of individuals to organizations. One way of making these distinctions clear is to focus attention on the factors that determine the success, survival, or prosperity of different organizations. The success or survival of a political organization, in the sense of an administration, not a party, clearly depends on the extent to which it achieves in relation to the demands of its constituents. That is, from the point of view of other units within society, the significance of the political organization is given in the extent to which it produces in relation to its interests. Or, if one speaks in terms of the standards in terms of which the activities of political elements are evaluated, the emphasis may be said to be on standards of relational responsibility. To other elements of the society, the political organization, as well as the individual politician, is categorized as a goal object.

In the case of the business firm, the situation is both similar and different. It is similar in that the emphasis remains on performance, or achievement, and different in that the relevant performances are defined universalistically. Thus, the predominant factor in determining the prosperity of the firm is not the extent to which it achieves, or produces, in relation to any particular interests, but the extent to which it produces independently of such interests. Within our society, the significant thing about the firm is the extent to which it produces in relation to the demands of consumers. Whereas the political organization is categorized in terms of particularistic performances, or as a goal object, the business firm is categorized in terms of universalistic performances, or as an object of utility.
The meaning of the educational organization, like the religious organization and the family, is given not by its performances, however, but by its qualities. This pattern is somewhat difficult to see on the organizational level, but it is well illustrated on the level of individuals in pre-Nazi Germany. Here, the meaning of the individual was given not by what he did, or could do, but by what he was, e.g., a professor, doctor, lawyer, etc. Regardless of what the person does, it is what he is that is important. The best indication of this emphasis is found in the prominent and pervasive use of titles. Parsons' discussion of the German pattern is germane:

We give titles to high government officials, and various other persons in positions of dignity such as physicians, ministers, and priests, sometimes officials of large organizations. But at least three differences are conspicuous as compared with pre-Nazi Germany. First, the system of titles is far less extensive. One could almost say that the prominence of formal rank and titles which we feel to be appropriate to the armed services applies in Germany to the whole occupational world, reaching down even to statuses on the skilled labor level... The number of people who are plain Herr Braun or Herr Schmidt is relatively small. Secondly, titles are continuously used, so that in addressing a letter, or even in personal address it is a definite discourtesy to omit the full title.15

The universalistic-quality categorization means an emphasis on formal status, independent of any relational context. An object thus defined may be termed an object of generalized respect. To the extent that there is evaluation of behavior, it is in terms of the extent to which the object's behavior expresses values and attitudes that are appropriate to its status, i.e., which are ascribed to it.

The educational organization is perhaps some place between the religious and the business organization, but closer, I think, to the church.
It is not evaluated primarily in terms of what it produces in relation to consumer or constituent demands, but in terms of the extent to which its activities express values and attitudes appropriate to its status. Although I know of no firm evidence on this point, there are a good many impressionistic observations that one could advance in support of this position. The most relevant one might be the relative infrequency with which schools are criticized—except for the immediate post-Sputnik era—for the quality of its product. Much more frequent, it seems, are criticisms having to do with violations of the moral sensibilities of patrons.

The fourth pattern is that which probably applies best to interest groups and political parties, the particularistic-quality emphasis. As Rossiter has pointed out, we in the United States do not look, or at least should not realistically look, to political parties for specific proposals or achievements. The significant thing about a party is not what it produces, but again what it is in relation to the categorizing actor. The evaluative standard is not what it does produce in relation to my interests but what are the attitudes and values expressed in relation to my attitudes and values. The party or interest group is thus not a goal object, but an object of identification. Insofar as its activities are evaluated the standards emphasized have more to do with loyalty than with responsibility.

From the perspective of the actor, then, objects may be categorized in four major ways: (1) in terms of universalistic performances, or as objects of utility; (2) in terms of particularistic performances, or as goal objects; (3) in terms of universalistic qualities, or as objects of generalized respect, and; (4) in terms of particularistic qualities, or
as objects of identification. Viewed as performance standards, they emphasise, respectively, technical efficiency, relational responsibility, cultural responsibility, and loyalty.

Before proceeding to a consideration of differences at the organisational level, it may be worthwhile to consider the implications of the four patterns for the objects being categorized. In the universalistic-performance case, the impact is clear. The business firm is clearly obliged to abandon any course of action that does not fulfill the demands of consumers. The question that must be posed by the business firm in relation to any proposed course of action is, "What are its probable consequences in relation to the satisfaction of consumer wants?" For the political administration, which is subject to the particularistic performance standard, the obligation just as clearly is to abandon courses of action that do not fulfill the demands of a sufficient proportion of its constituents. Here, the question to be asked is, "What are the probable consequences of this action in relation to the interests of these particular persons and groups?"

For the educational organisation, the church, as well as political parties and interests groups, the problem is not to abandon actions that do not fulfill demands, but to avoid those that violate the values ascribed to them. The question to be posed by the school or the church is, "To what extent does the proposed action coincide with values ascribed to this unit?" For the political party, or interest group the question is, "To what extent is the action compatible with the values ascribed to the party by particular groups?" Thus the great concern in writing a party platform is to offend as few members, or potential members, as is humanly possible.
There is an inevitable element of distortion in the kinds of operations being carried out here, and it may be useful to point out some exceptions. One exception to the universalistic-quality categorisation of educational organisations may be seen in the tendency for state universities to be evaluated by patrons in terms of particularistic rather than universalistic standards. The same probably applies with greater frequency to public schools. That is the important values to be observed are not those which are independent of any relational context, but those that are ascribed by the local community.

Turning now to the organisational level, what can be said of the differences between the school and other organisations? With some important exceptions to be noted later, the significance, or meaning, of the individual to the business or industrial firm is defined by universalism and performance. The individual is an object of utility. The important thing about the individual is the extent to which he achieves independently of particular interests. That is, the results gotten on a lathe, or in an accounting department, can be assessed quite independently of whether the activity takes place in a Ford plant, or a General Motors plant. Good lathe work is good lathe work regardless of the organisation for which it is performed. Similarly, what constitutes good medical practice is independent of the hospital, the community, or the state (but not the nation) in which it is performed. Both the industrial work and the physician are subject to universalistic standards of performance.

In the case of the military organisation, and to some extent the union, the case is different. In both these instances there is no universalistic standard against which performances may be evaluated,
and the criterion, or the criteria, are more or less unique to the relational context in which the activity occurs. The standards of the military organisation and the union are strictly their own, and need not be legitimated on the basis of comparability with similar organisations. In terms of the criteria for the evaluation of the individual this means the precedence is given responsiveness to the demands of the collectivity, i.e., responsibility.

The impact of these two patterns, seen from the perspective of the individual, is precisely the same as that pointed out in the context of societal categorizations of organizations. The physician will abandon any course of action which does not contribute to achievement in relation to the health needs of patients, and the soldier will consider the impact of his actions on the interests of this collectivity as defined by his superiors. From the organization's point of view the emphasis is on securing the performance of binding obligations in the interest of effective collective action. The very term "collective bargaining" in the union case is significant. In neither case can the organisation permit an emphasis on achievement independently of the interests of the collectivity; the interests of the collectivity must prevail. Note the strong opposition of unions to "right to work" laws. Unions, like military organisations, are not even willing to grant participants the right to decide whether or not to participate.

In contrast to both these patterns is that typified by the religious organisation, and to a lesser extent, by the educational organisation. For these organisations the significance, or meaning, of the individual is given in his universalistic qualities. Thus, within limits which vary from one situation to another, the minister, the professor, and the public school
teacher are evaluated not in terms of their achievements, but in terms of the extent to which their actions express values that are ascribed to them. While the physician may reasonably be expected to abandon modes of action that do not achieve the desired results in relation to the needs of his patients, only the most naive would expect the clergyman to abandon prayer because it yields no practical results. No one expects the clergyman to stop praying for peace because we go on having war, and no one expects him to abandon prayer because it does not rain when he prays for rain. Similarly, it would be completely out of character for the public school teacher to dispense with the morning pledge of allegiance to the flag because it does not have a direct impact on the educational state of the student. In the same way, we should not expect the elementary school teacher to abandon willingly the self-contained classroom just because greater academic achievement is possible with departmentalization. The teacher, like the minister, is evaluated, and in turn, evaluates, not in terms of the extent to which he achieves in relation to either universalistic or particularistic standards. He is evaluated in terms of the extent to which his actions express values ascribed to him.

Given a bare minimum level of technical skill a teacher is assured of having his contract renewed indefinitely. What teachers are evaluated on is attitudes and attributes that have little to do with actual performance. So long as the behavior of the teacher expresses the values and attitudes appropriate to his status, the question of competence rarely arises. The best evidence that I can marshall in support of this assertion is the predominance of subjective, qualitative, and attitudinal items on the typical
teacher rating device. Although I know of no extensive survey on this question, I would feel quite comfortable in hypothesizing that the proportion of items related to technical skill, to those related to attributes and attitudes, would be no greater than one to five, or in that general vicinity.

Another source of evidence in this regard is the fact that educators do not, and indeed cannot, place students in categories in a manner similar to the categorization of medical patients by disease. There simply is no categorization of the "educational state" of students that is comparable. This, it would seem, is the great obstacle to be overcome in the development of a science of education. It could be argued that our inability to determine the effect of teacher performance, rather than the structure of the system, is the reason for the emphasis on qualities. Cogent arguments can be advanced in support of the interpretation, but unless one is willing to assume that educational states are inherently unknowable in scientific terms, one cannot answer the inevitable question as to why a science of education has not developed where other sciences have. That is, it is not enough to say that there is no science of education because the product cannot be measured at this time. One must also ask, why is the product not measurable at this time? Other, even more elusive problems, have been treated scientifically, e.g., in the field of mental health.

The particularistic-quality pattern again is most apparent in the context of interest groups and political parties. The significance of the party member lies not so much in his achievements but in the extent to which his actions express values and attitudes ascribed to him as a member of the collectivity. The evaluative standard applied in this case is not
cultural responsibility, as in the case of the teacher, but loyalty.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UNIVERSALISM</th>
<th>PARTICULARISM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>Objects of Utility</td>
<td>Goal Objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUALITY</td>
<td>Objects of Generalized Respect</td>
<td>Objects of Identification</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE II**

**CATEGORIES OF OBJECT MEANING**

Figure II summarizes the discussion concerning the categorization of situational objects.

Again, it should be possible to point out, without extensive illustration, that the same four differences in terms of object categorization that have been identified at the level of organizations, may also be identified among roles within organizations. Thus, within the family, the least organized of collectivities, there occurs differentiation among roles not only in terms of object categorization, but also in terms of orientations. That is to say, what is treated as an actor at one level of analysis may at another level, be treated as a differentiated system with units specializing in the four functional areas.

We might summarize quickly by indicating that the four patterns of orientation elaborated in the preceding sections categorize actors in terms of their needs in relation to the situation. The need of the business firm is thus for instrumental capacities; that of the religious or educational organization, for cultural commitment; that of the interest group, for solidarity; and that of the military organization, for goal
commitment. Similarly with respect to the meaning of objects, or the definition of the meaning of situational objects with respect to their bearing on needs, (i.e., the standards of performance applied by actors) the standards of the business organization are standards of efficiency; those of the religious or educational organization, cultural responsibility; those of the political party or interest group, standards of loyalty; and those of the military organization, standards of system, or relational, responsibility.

But, in addition, we need to note that any particular actor, viewed as a system in its own right, will contain elements of all four patterns. Thus, the industrial organization, even though its predominant need is for instrumental capacity, will contain subsystems emphasizing goal-commitment and relational responsibility. That is to say, the same four patterns exist within collective units in the form of individual actors in roles each of which emphasize different patterns. Thus, the orientation of the executive must be differentiated from that of the technical specialist, etc. This is the major contribution of Bales' research with small, task-oriented groups. Since our primary interest here is comparative, we shall not dwell on these distinctions, significant as they may be.

Normative Rules and Generalized Facilities

Given the needs of actors in relating to their situations, and the definition of the significance of situational objects with respect to their bearing on these needs, there remain the problems of specifying the normative standards governing the pursuit of those interests, and the generalized facilities to which actors are expected to resort in securing
control of objects in the implementation of interests. Without more extensive elaboration, let us simply say: (1) Insofar as the primary need of the actors involved is for instrumental utilization, and the significance of objects lies in their utility, then the generalized facility to which actors are expected to resort in securing control of the relevant objects is money, and the normative framework governing the acquisition of objects is specified within the institutions of property, contract, and occupation. That is, for the organization specializing in the adaptive function money is the major mechanism for getting results in interaction. Money is both a generalized symbol of economic value, and a medium of exchange. Moreover, the measure of a unit's contribution to system adaptation is given in its degree of solvency. (2) Insofar as the primary need of the actors involved is a consummatory need, and the relevant objects are goal objects, then the institutionalized medium to which actors are expected to resort in securing control of the relevant objects in the implementation of interest is power, and the normative framework governing its use is specified in the institutions of regulation, authority, and leadership. Power, in this sense, is exercised in the communication of decisions that activate binding obligations. It is the generalized capacity to secure the performance of such obligations. Or, put another way, power is a generalized symbol of effectiveness and a medium of exchange. The measure of its effective use in system goal-attainment is given in the unit's success. (3) Insofar as the primary need of the actors involved is for affiliation, and the relevant objects are objects of identification, the institutionalised medium to which actors are expected to resort in securing the relevant objects is influences, and the normative framework controlling its usage is
found in the informal norms of association and the obligations of common membership. Influence is the generalized symbol of solidarity. It is the generalized capacity to persuade through offers of acceptance. A person, or a collectivity, with influence is one that has high persuasive capacity in controlling the actions of other units. The distinction between influence and power is that the former is based on mutual acceptance, not contingent negative sanctions. Hence, the measure of a unit's contribution to system integration is consensus. Insofar as the primary need of the actors involved is cultural commitment, and the relevant objects are objects of generalized respect, then the institutionalized medium to which actors are expected to resort in securing results in interaction is generalized commitments, and the normative framework regulating its usage is found in generalized concepts of honor, and good faith. That is, if the problem of the system is one of pattern maintenance, then the way of getting results in interaction is through the activation of commitments, typically through appeals to honor, integrity, and conscience. Generalized commitments are thus the generalized symbol of integrity, and the measure of their successful use is given in the concept of pattern-consistence.

Figure III summarizes these generalizations in tabular form.
### Categories of Generalised Facilities vs. Object Meaning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories of Generalised Facilities</th>
<th>Categories of Object Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>Objects of Utility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>Goal Objects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activation of Commitments</td>
<td>Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Objects of Generalised Respect</td>
</tr>
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<td>Need for Instrumental Utilisation</td>
<td>Consumer Needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value emphasis-utility</td>
<td>Value emphasis-effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need for Commitment</td>
<td>Need for Affiliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value emphasis-integrity</td>
<td>Value emphasis-solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conceptions of Honor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Informal rules of membership and association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Categories of Interest in Objects vs. 16 Categories of Normative Standards

**FIGURE III**

The Components of Social Systems
Some Problems of Educational Organization in Perspective

The burden of this paper has been a comparative analysis of educational organization within a particular theoretical framework. Although an exhaustive discussion of the implications of the analysis would require a great deal more time and thought than is presently available, some general points can be made. The placement of education within the analytical framework seems reasonably clear; there is little question that the primary emphasis of the educational organization is in the area of pattern-maintenance, i.e., socialization. The primary contribution of education to societal functioning is thus in the maintenance of the value patterns which define the structure of American Society. Despite some shifting of that emphasis in the direction of adaptation in the post-Sputnik era, the primary emphasis remains unchanged. Whether it will continue to do so, given the massive intervention of the federal government is another question.

If this analysis is correct, then obviously the measure of success that is to be applied to educational organizations is that of pattern-consistency. That is, a school is to be evaluated not in terms of the extent to which it contributes to utility, or to system adaptation — although in an adaptively oriented society this is to some extent inevitable by definition, simply in the maintenance of values — but in terms of the extent to which it contributes to pattern, or value consistency throughout society. This it seems, is not only as it should be, but seemingly, the way things are. As observed earlier, schools are criticized primarily for deviations from institutionalized values, rather than for producing a commodity of low technical quality. Again, however, where the post-
Sputnik reverberations will stop, no one knows.

Thus, both schools and personnel within schools, are evaluated not so much in terms of the extent to which they achieve in relation either to particularistic or universalistic standards, but in terms of the extent to which they maintain pattern-consistency. Given this "fact" it is not difficult to understand the "50 year lag" in education. An additional factor contributing to this situation is the fact that, at one level, education is somewhat particularistic. That is, unlike the physician, or perhaps the hospital administrator, the educator cannot say that good education is good education regardless of the setting, and make it stick. Neither can he say that the values maintained are appropriate regardless of the locals. Hence, the question that administrators and boards of education must inevitably ask with respect to any proposed course of action is not, "Is this the most effective way of attaining educational goals?" but, "Is the proposed course of action compatible with the values of this particular community?" Thus, it seems fair to say that resistance to change is institutionalised in the very structure of the educational organisation, and in the location of that organisation in the more inclusive structure.

A second implication that one might draw is that given the present internal emphasis on qualities in the evaluation of teacher performances, rapid change is not realistically possible. Moreover, given the present authority structure of the school there is little possibility of changing this emphasis. If one assumes, as I do, that the administrator cannot possibly possess the technical skill required to evaluate the performance of teachers in the universalistic-achievement sense, then he must inevitably emphasise
relatively easily indentified qualities and attitudes. If this assumption is accepted, then one must, it seems to me, agree that one of the major obstacles to change in the educational organisation is the administrator -- as a role, not as a person. So long as we perpetuate the myth that it is the administrator who must be the "innovator," the "change agent," the "instructional leader," in education, so long as we perpetuate the belief that it is the administrator who is responsible for the improvement of educational practice, then change in educational organisations will continue to be a series of traumatic breaks with tradition. So long as teachers are evaluated solely by administrators, which means evaluation, in terms of the extent to which they accept patterns of operation as given in the nature of things, they are not likely to be motivated to be ingenious in devising improved methods, or in accepting improved methods as they are devised.

Although evidence on this point is fragmentary, there is some reason to believe that administrators are alone in the belief that they are "instructional leaders." Professors of educational administration probably support them in this, but teachers, for the most part, do not view the administrator as a source of ideas for improving teaching, or for new teaching methods. In the one school system from which we have data, the percentage of teachers who viewed the principal as a source of ideas for improving their teaching was 2.8, and the percentage who viewed the principal as source of help with questions concerning teaching methods was 18.6. On the other hand, 61 percent and 79 percent, respectively, viewed the principal as a source of help with problems related to discipline and school policy interpretation.
The educational administrator is in a position somewhat similar to that of the clergyman and the administrator of higher education. His ability to make commitments to constituents in the name of the collectivity is severely limited. That is, the generalized facility to which he is expected to resort in getting results in interaction is not primarily power or money, but activation of commitments. The tendency of teachers to label as politicians those administrators who are too receptive to external influences, and the extreme resistance to merit pay plans are suggestive in this regard. It would seem that the charismatic administrator, rather than the politically astute one, would be most successful in educational organizations, at least in internal affairs.

One might suggest that educational organizations have suffered from the same condition that plagued the Federalist party and the Republican party of the 1950's — as well as the 1960's. By sticking to the rigid principles, the public schools are "dead" as far as the training of vast numbers of Americans is concerned. Adherence to rigid principles may have made necessary the by-passing of existing educational facilities in the creation of the Job Corps.

One very common complaint of persons in education is that society is not willing to allocate sufficient resources to schools to attract the best minds to the field. The most obvious response to such a statement is to say, "True, but then the maintenance of value patterns probably does not require the highest level of talent available." It is my impression that those societies that have allocated major resources to education and have given high status to educators, are either those in which the primary
societal commitment was to pattern-maintenance, e.g., societies with a transcendental religious emphasis, or those in which education serves functions other than pattern-maintenance, e.g., in Soviet Russia. The question for proponents of increased resources to ask themselves is, "Am I willing to live with the narrow, utilitarian conception of education that goes with the definition of education as an object of utility?"

DeWitt's description of education in the Soviet Union may assist them in arriving at an early answer.

...first, last, and always, the Soviet commitment to education is a commitment to scientific education, to technological education, to an education which will enable Soviet citizens to perform specialized functional tasks to the best of their ability in their expanding industrial society.

The Russians orient their educational efforts so as to maximize the returns from it for the advancement of their political, military, and economic objectives. The communists do not believe in education for education's sake. They do not believe in education for the individual's sake. The Russians want no part of liberal or general humanistic education. They want no generalists—only specialists. Their main objective is to offer functional education so as to train, to mold, to develop the skills, the professions, and the specialists required by their long-run development programs—specialists who are capable of performing the tasks of running the industrial and bureaucratic machinery of the communist state. And in order to accomplish this, the Russians were, are, and will be, training an army of scientists and technologists.

Although professing the aims of general and well-rounded education, the Soviet educational system in reality is uniquely geared to the training of specialized manpower. By means of mass persuasion, of coercion if necessary, and of bold incentives, the Soviet state makes every effort to channel the best and largest share of available talent into engineering and scientific professions in particular.

Finally, although it is generally acknowledged that the intellectual capacities of persons being recruited to education is well below that being attracted to some other fields, there is no guarantee, given the
structure of the educational enterprise, that more able persons would do any differently than is now being done. The problem is not so much one of lack of either talent, or motivation, but the manner in which available talent and motivation is channeled by the structure of the educational enterprise. The structure of that enterprise is, in turn, related to the function performed for society, and there is, it seems, no changing the one without changing the other.
Notes

1. The frame of reference adopted here is that of Talcott Parsons, et. al. This paper draws on a number of Parsons' works, but especially the following:


5. Rossiter, Ibid., p. 57.


16. It should be pointed out that this represents the author's interpretation of the Parsonian scheme. It is emphatically not advanced as the correct, and certainly not the only, interpretation.
