THREE CHILDREN WITH EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS TELL WHY
PEOPLE DO RIGHT

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This paper presents the results of a small preliminary investigation of the moral
judgment of three children with emotional and behavioral disorders (EBD) using case
study research methodology to describe their moral orientations and explore how their
reasoning patterns might affect the development of a cooperative moral orientation.
Data were gathered using a moral dilemma interview protocol developed specifically
for the study. Results showed that all three of the children valued punishment because
it defines right from wrong and coerces obedience, but they also reasoned that
avoiding punishment can sometimes motivate people to do that which they know they
should not. The implications of the results are discussed with respect to the overuse of
punishment, the placement of children with EBD in highly restrictive special education
settings, and the potential social cognitive benefits of using positive behavioral
supports to include students with EBD in the classroom community.

Three Children with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders Tell Why People Do Right
Almost everyone knows the “do right” rule. This familiar rule represents a convenient shortcut to what is
actually a long list of behaviors that are obligated by community building values such as civility,
cooperation, care, trust, and respect for the rights of others (c.f. Kauffman, Lloyd, Baker, & Riedel, 1995;
Nucci, 2001; Walker, Ramsey, & Gresham, 2004). Community building values such as these appear to
form during childhood and are assumed to lay the foundation upon which social competence is built,
although it is not clear exactly how (e.g., Damon, 1988; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998). Piaget (1932/1965)
advised researchers to move beyond merely observing how precisely children comply with rules and
examine instead their moral judgment, how they judge the good and evil in the performance of their own
actions. Piaget also acknowledged that “Difficult children, whom parents and teachers send or ought to
send up for psycho-therapeutic treatment, supply the richest material for analysis.” (p.12)

In today’s schools, emotional and behavioral disorders (EBD) is the special education designation given
to students who are referred for services because they exhibit antisocial behavior, distorted cognition,
and/or disordered emotion to a marked degree (Kauffman & Landrum, 2009; Rutherford, Quinn, &
Mathur, 2004). The behavioral manifestations of EBD occur along two dimensions, externalized or
aggressive, acting out behaviors and internalized or withdrawal. Children may display either or both of
these dimensions but externalized behaviors characterize the most prevalent types of EBD and cause the
most concern in classrooms (Langdon, 1997). In fact, teachers view students who exhibit aggressive,
acting out behaviors as the most difficult to teach and report that they are least liked by their peers
(Kauffman & Wong, 1991). The behavioral characteristics of these students has received much attention
from the research community (Rutherford et al.) while only a few have examined the moral judgment of
children with EBD to describe how their judgment differs from that of typical peers, focusing
specifically on the development of a cooperative moral orientation (Hardman, 2002).

The Development of Moral Judgment
Judgment is a term used to describe an intentional endeavor to discover the connections between what
one does and its consequence (Dewey, 1916/1944). Assuming that moral realities are constructed in the
same way, Piaget (1932/1965) conducted the seminal study of the development of moral judgment in
childhood by exploring how children’s past experiences and thinking affected present perceptions of the
way in which their actions and their consequences are related. Piaget’s subjects were infants to 12-year
olds living in Geneva and Neuchatel, Switzerland. He initiated his research by first observing children of
various ages as they played games and questioning them about the fairness of various deviations from the rules as they played. He then tested the explanatory power of the reasoning patterns he discovered by presenting children ages three through thirteen with moral dilemmas about clumsiness, stealing, and lying; retributive versus distributive punishment; collective and/or communicable responsibility; immanent justice; equality and authority; and justice among children. The results showed that the practice of rules develops in four stages; sensorimotor, egocentric, cooperation, and codification; but that the consciousness of obligation develops in three; non-moral, heteronomy, and autonomy. Although Piaget found that the age of onset for each stage varied somewhat from child to child, he described the stage sequence itself as invariant and universal.

The first stage in the practice of rules is defined as sensorimotor, a time in infancy when children manipulate the accoutrements of games for the purpose of sensory stimulation alone (Piaget, 1932/1965). Infants are not aware of moral obligation and are non-moral with respect to obligation. Egocentrism develops at about age two or three as children become aware of rules but practice them only to suit their own purposes. They are heteronymous with respect to obligation, believing that rules are imposed by all powerful external authorities who must be obeyed to avoid certain punishment. Children continue to be externally focused with respect to obligation as the cooperation stage and perspective taking emerge at about age five or six (Siegler, 1998). With perspective taking, children gain insight into others’ thoughts and desires and are able to understand that others may have legitimate interests and desires that are different from their own. Without it, they continue to look to external authorities for moral direction and must rely almost entirely on salient clues like reward, punishment, and the severity of damage done to determine obligation (Siegler, 1998). Egocentrism and heteronomy both seem to serve an important protective function during early childhood but may increase the risk for antisocial behavior when they continue into adolescence because. While moral realism renders them dependent upon external authorities for moral direction, egocentrism allows rule-oriented behavior only when it suits selfish needs but at a time when size and level of freedom enjoin cooperation and moral autonomy (Gibbs, 1995). Piaget found that it is through experiences of cooperation in respectful society with others that children transition into the codification stage at about age twelve at which time they are able to realize that laws and rules are mutually agreed upon social constructions that allow society to function fairly and harmoniously.

In 1987, Colby and Kohlberg defined moral judgments as imperatives derived from some rule or principle that the speaker believes is binding on one’s actions. Moral judgments are (a) judgments of value, not fact; (b) social judgments involving people; (c) prescriptive or normative judgments, and (d) value judgments about rights and responsibilities as opposed to liking and preference. They also refined Piaget’s theory (1932/1965), identifying six moral orientations grouped into three levels: (a) the pre-conventional level which is egocentric in intent and includes the punishment-obedience and personal reward orientations; (b) the conventional level which is cooperative in intent and includes the good boy/nice girl and law and order orientations; and (c) the principled or post-conventional level which includes the social contract and universal ethical principle orientations. Their research with children showed that by age nine, conventional level reasoning characterized most of their reasoning but with a few exceptions. For example, juvenile delinquents, adult criminals, and individuals with low SES tend to judge from an egocentric orientation and develop cooperation at a slower rate and sometimes not at all, an effect attributed to the limited opportunities these individuals have to participate in society and its institutions (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Lieberman, 1987).

Similar to Piaget (1932/1965), Colby and Kohlberg (1987a) presented their stage sequence as universal and invariant. One cannot simply internalize higher stage reasoning but can only move forward in the next logical step of cognitive reorganization. To provide support for claims of universality, Colby, Kohlberg, and Nisan (1987) studied the development of moral judgment in Turkish males and found that their patterns of reasoning fit the stage structures and sequence described but only with respect to the first four stages. In a longitudinal study of the moral judgment of kibbutz adolescents, Colby, Kohlberg, Snarey, and Reimer (1987) found patterns similar to those reported for samples in the United States and other cultures but also observed that the maturation of judgment in kibbutz adolescents was accelerated when compared to adolescents in other cultures, an effect attributed to the living in a democratically organized community such as an Israeli kibbutz (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989).

Subsequent Research
Stage theories about the development of moral judgment (Colby & Kohlberg 1987a; Piaget, 1932/1965) have received much attention from researchers who study it as an invariant sequence of stages, a function
of social domains, or a reflection of cultural norms and values (e.g., Kurtines & Gewirtz, 1995). Social constructivist, in particular, have challenged the universality of stage theories with the results of cross-cultural studies that suggest that the structural elements of children’s moral judgment is a reflection of cultural specific norms and values (e.g., Brown, Tappan, & Gilligan; Edwards, 1987; Gilligan, 1982; Shweder et al., 1987). For example, Edwards conducted an ethnographic study comparing the moral judgment of young African Oyugis children and American preschool children in a Vassar College Nursery School. Her results showed that the Oyugis children conformed to cultural conventions according to the salience of the social benefits connected to cooperation with rules. Edwards reported that Oyugis parents did not need to preach to their children about the rationales underlying rules because the routines of their lives contain ample evidence. In comparison, the values and norms taught in the Vassar College Nursery School differed from those taught to Oyugis children but the method of inculcation was the same. As a result, Edwards concluded that the learning environment, not the child, subdivides morality into separate domains, such as moral and conventional and that with increasing age and experience, "children apply progressively more complex and mobile logical schemas to cultural distinctions and categories; they transform what they are told and what they experience into their own self-organized realities." (p. 149)

Gilligan (1982) and her colleagues (e.g., Brown et al., 1995) studied the development of moral judgment in females and found that females were more likely to interpret moral dilemmas from a care orientation as opposed to a justice/rights orientation. Cassidy, Chu, and Dahlgasgaard (1997) investigated children’s use of care and justice orientations when presented with four types of moral dilemmas designed to prompt a care perspective (one dilemma), a justice perspective (one dilemma), or either justice or care (two dilemmas) and found that children used justice and care orientations at equal rates and would accept both orientations to the same dilemma regardless of gender. Others have also studied gender differences in children’s judgment and have found no significant difference (c.f. Barchard & Atkins, 1991; Smetana, 1993).

Researchers do not agree about how moral judgment develops but, as a result of their research, have uncovered several variables that may differentiate, slow, or terminate its development such as negative emotionality, low SES, immature social skills, and antisocial behavior (c.f. Hardman, 2002; Astor, 1994; Astor & Behre, 1997; Colby et al. 1987; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998; Gibbs, 2003; Hoffman, 2000). Interestingly, all of these variables are also related to the development of EBD (e.g., Kauffman & Landrum, 2009; Rutherford et al., 2004). Since childhood represents a critical time for the development of moral judgment (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Piaget, 1932/1965) and intervention in the development of antisocial behavior (Reid, Patterson, & Snyder, 2002; Walker et al., 2004), the present study represents a necessary first step in the study of the moral judgment of children with EBD, focused specifically on the development of a cooperative moral orientation during childhood.

Methods

Data were collected and analyzed to address the following research question. What are the values expressed in the moral judgments of three children with EBD and how might those values affect the development of a cooperative moral orientation? Case study research was employed to investigate the research question because qualitative research methods are particularly well suited for facilitating the discovery process in preliminary investigations such as this one, where the relationships among the variables of interest are not well-researched or understood (Strauss & Corbin). Data were collected using moral dilemma interviews and then analyzed for the purpose of facilitating insight into subjectively experienced phenomena in terms of the meanings the children might bring to them (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Via moral dilemma interviews, it was hoped that the children would be able to elaborate the intricate details of their feelings and thought processes (Strauss & Corbin) as they undertook interpretive activities, moment by moment, to construct, manage, and sustain a sense that their social worlds existed as factual and objectively "there" (Gubrium & Holstein, 1997).

Setting and Participants

Lacking previous research on the moral judgment of children with EBD, the informant sample was limited to three in number and included only children with EBD in anticipation that there might be communication problems, inadequate motivation to participate in the interviews, and/or problems comprehending the moral stories and the questions that would follow. Conducting individually administered interviews and interpreting the results is also labor intensive, so the informant sample was limited to three. Since the internal validity of case study results is established using multiple data sources, multiple data collection methods, and the degree of match with theory (Gall, Borg, & Gall,
three seemed to be the minimum number of points needed to test the generalizability of any patterns and themes that might develop across interviews and informants and would allow for the selection of one third, one fourth, and one fifth grade student from a previously selected random sample of 21 third through fifth grade children with EBD who had parental consent to participate in this and another related study (see Hardman, 2002). The random sample from which the three informants were selected included only two students who did not have low SES as measured by free or reduced lunch status, one Caucasian and one African American male student. There were only two female students in the EBD sample and both had low SES. All three of the children in the informant sample had low SES, were African American, and attended a self contained classroom for students with EBD. One was female and two were male. The third grade boy was given the pseudonym Henry, the fourth grade girl Violet, and the fifth grade girl Jessie. Henry and Violet went to the same school but were not in the same classroom. At the time of the first interview, Violet’s teacher characterized her as disruptive, noncompliant, and aggressive when she was placed in her classroom but reported that her behavior was now much improved since that time. Henry and Jessie’s teachers described their behavior as disruptive, noncompliant, and aggressive and warned that they might not cooperate during the interviews.

Research Procedures

Data were collected using an interview protocol developed specifically for the study comprised of 12 hypothetical moral dilemmas selected from Colby and Kohlberg (1987b), Piaget (1932/1965), and The Boxcar Children (Warner, 1977). Each story presents informants with a conflict in values that poses no clear choice between right and wrong. Only a small sample of the many Piagetian dilemmas was selected for inclusion in the interview protocol, but these dilemmas were selected because they are child friendly and depict scenarios familiar to most children. Louise’s Dilemma was selected from Colby and Kohlberg’s interview protocol because it is the only story that is focused on issues familiar to children. All of the other stories are more sophisticated and adult focused, including the Heinz Dilemma, which was selected because it is one of the most well known. Kolbergian and Piagetian dilemmas were also selected because both had been used for theory building and submitted to subsequent research. In contrast, The Boxcar Children Dilemma was created specifically for this study because it opposes solidarity among children against adult authority in a way that seemed to entice children to value cooperation with peers over obedience to authority. The wording for the Piagetian and Kohlbergian dilemmas was slightly edited, but The Boxcar Children Dilemma was worded exactly as it is in the book. By using a variety of dilemmas from multiple sources, the researcher hoped to increase the generalizability of any patterns and themes that might develop across interviews and informants. Table 1 lists the dilemmas by title, interview number, issue choice, and plot and the text for each story can be found in the Appendix.

Interview were scheduled in consultation with each child’s teacher and lasted approximately 30 minutes each. The interviewees were given a copy of The Boxcar Children as a thank you gift at the final interview. After each dilemma was read aloud, the researcher asked, “Tell me what this story is about,” to check comprehension of the characters, setting, and plot. If any critical information was omitted, the story was reviewed and the child questioned again about the critical story elements before the researcher continued the interview by asking the informant to make an issue choice. For example, the Heinz Dilemma is about a man named Heinz who wants desperately to save his dying wife and is considering stealing a lifesaving drug from a greedy local druggist who will not lower the inflated price or sell the drug to him on time. After confirming story comprehension, the research asked, “Should Heinz steal the drug?” The answer to that question, which could be a simple yes or no, was then followed by additional open ended questions intended to probe the child’s reasons for choosing one issue over another.

The interviews were audiotaped, transcribed, and entered into The Ethnograph (v5.0) for coding and analysis. The 9 interviews (3 informants x 3 interviews) produced 130 pages of data that were coded using Colby & Kohlberg’s Standard Issue Scoring (1987b) as a guide. A comprehension category (COMP) was created to include the children’s responses to questions about the major story elements so that story comprehension could also be evaluated. The remaining data were then broadly categorized as either an issue choice (IC) or moral judgment (MJ). For example, when asked, “Should Heinz steal the drug to save his wife,” a simple no indicated that upholding the law was the issue choice. If the child changed his or her mind after further deliberation, the final decision was coded as the issue choice. All other responses to the open ended questions about the issue choice were then coded as moral judgments as long as the response included a valued norm and was prescriptive.
Throughout each interview, the researcher repeatedly probed the children’s reasoning about each dilemma both for and against the issue choice with simple why questions to generate as much information as possible about the children’s values and increase the generalizability of the themes and patterns that developed both within and across informants (Gall et al., 1996). Judgments offered in support of the issue choice were coded with a plus (MJ+) and for the issue not chosen with a minus (MJ-). The norm (N), which represents the moral value or object of concern offered in support of the issue choice (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987b), was then identified and coded. For example, in The Heinz Dilemma, the informant might decide that Heinz should not steal the drug because you should not take things that do not belong to you. The issue choice is to uphold the law (IC: LAW), but the norm offered in support of that choice is respect for individual property rights (N: PROP). This researcher would then follow up with why questions to generate information about the child’s reasons for endowing the norm with value, which was coded as either a modal element (ME) or a value element (VE). The model element expresses the mood or modality of the moral language and may represent the terminal value or justification for the issue choice and the value element provides the terminal value or justification for the issue choice. For example, an informant might decide that Heinz should not steal the drug because, “It’s wrong.” One should not steal simply because society disapproves of stealing (ME: BLAME). No terminal value is given. Or, an informant might say, “Stealing is wrong because you might go to jail,” indicating that the ultimate end or reason for the valuing the norm is to avoid punishment (VE: PUNISH).

Table 1 Issues Represented in Twelve Dilemmas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Dilemma</th>
<th>Issue Choice</th>
<th>Plot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>The Heinz</td>
<td>Heinz steals a drug to save his wife, is caught, and tried.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dilemma</td>
<td>life/law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part 1</td>
<td>conscience/law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part 3</td>
<td>conscience/punishment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Louise’s Dilemma</td>
<td>A mother breaks a promise.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Father’s Pen</td>
<td>conscience/punishment</td>
<td>A child finds Father’s lost pen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mother’s Scissors</td>
<td>punishment/fairness</td>
<td>Two girls play with mother’s scissors, but one does not.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doing Chores</td>
<td>authority/contract</td>
<td>A scoutmaster asks a scout to do someone else’s chores.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Foolish Brother</td>
<td>authority/contract</td>
<td>A father asks his son to tell on his brother.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Long Walk</td>
<td>equality/equity</td>
<td>One big boy and one little boy must share one lunch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>The Boxcar Children</td>
<td>affiliation/authority</td>
<td>An adult asks runaway siblings to identify themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part 1</td>
<td>affiliation/law</td>
<td>The siblings run away from the baker’s wife.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part 3</td>
<td>affiliation/life</td>
<td>The youngest sister becomes ill.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Reliability and validity.** Evidence of construct validity for data collected using moral dilemma interviews is represented in the degree to which the patterns and themes identified match the hypothesized theoretical framework for the development of moral judgment (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a). An associate professor in special education who was familiar with Colby & Kohlberg’s theory and scoring procedures conducted an external audit of the results by randomly selecting one of the nine interviews to review independently and marking a plus (+) for agree or a minus (–) for disagree for every code in the 14 page
interview. The reliability of the interpretation was then calculated by dividing the number of agreements by the sum of disagreements and agreements, obtaining the following results: comprehension 1.00, issue choice 1.00, moral judgment 1.00, norm 1.00, and modal element 1.00, and value element .93.

Results

The analysis of the comprehension data showed that, in most cases, the children understood the basic elements of plot, character, and setting presented in each story before deliberating the moral issues represented. Henry had difficulty recalling the characters’ names in three of the Piagetian dilemmas (1932/1965) after first hearing the story but was able to remember them after listening to the story for a second time. Over the course of the nine interviews, the results showed that the informants made 36 issue choices in response to 12 dilemmas (see Table 1) and justified those issue choices with 375 moral judgments that were prescriptive and included both a valued norm and a moral element.

Issue Choice

An analysis of the issue choices revealed that Jessie and Henry generally made quick, firm issue choices in response to the issue prompt but that Violet tended to equivocate as she explored various solutions to the dilemma before returning to her original choice and confirming it. Table 2 shows that Henry and Jessie tended to make heteronymous issue choices obligated by external sources such as authority figures, law, or punishment but Violet was more likely to select autonomously obligated choices such as maintaining affiliation and appealing to one’s good intentions. For example, in Part 3 of The Heinz Dilemma, Jessie and Henry decided that Heinz should go to jail if he steals regardless of his intentions while Violet reasoned that the judge should exonerate Heinz because his intentions were good. Likewise, in The Foolish Brother, Violet chose maintaining a good relationship with a sibling over reporting a foolish brother’s bad behavior at their father’s request. Henry and Jessie determined, however, that if the father asks, the brother must tell.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Choice</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Henry</th>
<th>Violet</th>
<th>Jessie</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority (4)</td>
<td>authority</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment (3)</td>
<td>retribution for wrongdoing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law (3)</td>
<td>laws or rules</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fairness (2)</td>
<td>equality</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. The number of times the issue was presented is in parentheses. Fairness represented a choice between judging with equality or equality.

Moral Judgments

Table 3 shows that all of the children tended to value the norms authority, punishment, and law in support of their issue choices. For example, Henry said that a mother can break a promise because, “If she changed her mind then you just can't go [to the concert]. That's how it is. She [is] a grown person.” Jessie agreed. “Cause your momma says you got to buy new clothes [with your money], you got to buy new clothes. You can't go to no concert.” A scoutmaster has unlimited authority because “he's older than them” and “you do what grownups tell you to do,” even if the request does not seem fair. Jessie and Violet limited adult authority somewhat saying that only those who have an intimate relationship with a child have this level of absolute authority because, “That's your child. Can't nobody else say that.” In contrast, Henry judged that an adult must always be obeyed, even if the person is a stranger or might wish to hurt them. “She might want to kill them. So what? Don't walk up to her then.”
The children valued the norm punishment a total of 55 times even though it was offered as an issue choice only twice. In *Father’s Pen*, all of them reasoned that the punished boy was the one who returned his father’s pen and would not play with his father’s papers again. Similarly, they concluded that a parent explaining the impropriety of his actions to a child would do no good. The child would do it again unless he was punished. They all stated that the nicest father is “one that punishes” and that the fairest choice is to punish. Violet imposed a caring perspective on punishment saying, “Your father won’t whip you if he don’t love you, but like he do whip you and then he love you anyways.” She was also not as consistent as the other two in her preference for punishment. For example, in Part III of *The Heinz Dilemma*, Jessie and Henry judged that Heinz must be punished if he breaks the law, but Violet decided that, “But for him, it’s like, I would have let him go free because of the position that he was in.”

### Table 3 Summary of Norms Valued by Interview and Informant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>Henry</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>78</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>Autonomous Choices</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscience</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contract</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Upholding the law was also a popular norm choice, but inconsistencies occurred when affiliation, or maintaining relationships, was the opposing choice. For example, the researcher asked Jessie if Heinz’s love for his wife would justify his stealing the drug to save her life. Jessie softly responded, “Yeah,” but when the researcher tried to confirm her choice, Jessie began shaking her head no as the researcher spoke. They researcher then asked, “So, it doesn't matter how much he loves her. He should not steal the drug?” This time, Jessie nodded in agreement and softly responded, “Yeah.” In her words and actions, it seemed clear that Jessie was not really sure if Heinz should obey the law or listen to his heart.

Henry was also inconsistent in his preference for upholding the law when affiliation was the opposing choice. In Part 1 of *The Heinz Dilemma*, he adamantly proclaimed that stealing was wrong under any circumstances but in Part 2, qualified this position saying that if Heinz and Officer Brown “roll together”, the officer should not report the crime. While Henry was not mature enough to understand the intimacy of marriage, he did know about friendship. One should not report a friend’s wrongdoing. Similarly, Violet reasoned that the boxcar children should run away from the baker and his wife but also stated that people should always do “everything in their power” to obey the law. Yet, “Sometimes you just have to not do it.”
Table 4 shows that avoiding blame and/or seeking approval was the most frequently cited model element and that Henry and Jessie referenced this model element more frequently than Violet. For example, when asked why stealing is wrong, Jessie replied, “Cause it’s not right.” When pressed to explain why, she reiterated saying, “Cause you can’t, can’t be doing that. Cause that’d be wrong.” Obeying was the second most frequently cited modal element. A scout should do another scout’s chores at the scoutmaster’s request, “[Jessie] Because she's supposed to listen to her master.” Obedience is necessary, “[Henry] to learn, to teach.” Neither child offered a terminal value to support the decision. Quite simply, people should do right to avoid blame and/or to obey. In contrast, Violet seemed more likely to provide a value element and when any of the three asserted a terminal value, it was usually to avoid punishment and/or other troubles or to seek personal reward. For example, the child obeys his father, “[Henry] cause he didn’t want to get a whipping again.” Stealing is wrong, “[Jessie] Cause people don’t like people to steal and stuff, and you will go to jail.” Children should not break the law because, “[Violet] When they young like that they don’t need to be going to jail . . . And another thing is that if they gonna steal, all they gonna do is get beat up and stuff . . . And he can get killed for that.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant Interview Modal Elements</th>
<th>Henry I II III</th>
<th>Jessie I II III</th>
<th>Violet I II III</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>blame/approve</td>
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<td>41 10 19</td>
<td>34 9 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>obey/consult</td>
<td>23 24 12</td>
<td>22 19 10</td>
<td>17 22 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retribute/exonerate</td>
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<td>1 2 0</td>
<td>0 7 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>a right</td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
<td>2 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A duty</td>
<td>2 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0</td>
<td>1 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Total</td>
<td>Henry 130</td>
<td>Violet 126</td>
<td>Jessie 119</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<th>Violet I II III</th>
<th>Jessie I II III</th>
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<tr>
<td>avoid punishment</td>
<td>1 6 10</td>
<td>17 5</td>
<td>17 7 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avoid trouble/seek reward</td>
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<td>14 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Henry 32</td>
<td>Violet 57</td>
<td>Jessie 28</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Cooperative Value Elements</th>
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<th>Violet I II III</th>
<th>Jessie I II III</th>
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<td>2 9</td>
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<td>0 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>equality/equality</td>
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<td>0 0</td>
<td>0 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>role taking</td>
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<td>0 0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Henry 18</td>
<td>Violet 16</td>
<td>Jessie 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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*Note. Since a moral judgment must have a model element to be complete, this number also represents the total number of judgments rendered by each informant.*

**The Children's Values and the Development of Cooperation**

The development of a cooperative moral orientation is represented in a gradual understanding of the rational rule as self-imposed through mutual consent. The cognitive structures that support the development of cooperation typically emerge at about age five and are usually fully developed by about age nine or ten (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a; Piaget, 1932/1965), except in cases when children have low SES or exhibit significant levels of antisocial behavior. In these cases, researchers have found that cooperation may develop differently or sometimes not at all (c.f. Astor, 1994; Astor & Behre, 1997; Hardman, 2002; Colby et al., 1987; Gibbs, 2003, fueling speculation that any factor that limits a child’s experiences of equal participation and equality of opportunity in society might also slow and/or truncate the development of cooperation and preclude the emergence of autonomy in adolescence. All of the children who participated in the present study ranged in age from nine to twelve, attended special education classrooms for students with EBD, and had low SES and the interview results showed that 338 (90%) of their 375 judgments were normative order (221) or egocentric (117) in orientation and that only 37 (10%) were cooperative. Henry and Jessie’s judgments were characteristically punishment-obedience in orientation while Violet’s were consistent with a personal reward orientation.

**Henry and Jessie’s Values**

The interview results showed that Henry and Jessie expressed a normative order orientation motivated by a desire to avoid blame or seek approval and to obey authority or any law or rule backed by
punishment. This perspective allowed them to judge concisely and with confidence most of the time. For example, when asked why people have to obey the law, Jessie responded indignantly,

> Because they have to! Then you go to jail if you break the law! Then they have to! Then God will come down and tell you, you break the law and stuff . . . God's going to tell you. You don't break the law no more cause that would be wrong!

She could not explain why breaking the law is wrong even though she was given many opportunities to do so. The formula was simple. People must obey the law given to use by God or face certain punishment. Likewise, Henry explained that a father should whip his disobedient son instead of appealing to his good conscience because a whipping would make “him stop from stealing and touching stuff he ain't supposed to be touching. And keep you from out of trouble.” Explaining would do no good; he would disobey again without punishment. Neither of these examples contains a value element but on occasions where one was provided, the terminal value was to avoid punishment, which set the stage for a most interesting conflict in values.

For example, in Louise’s Dilemma, Jessie judged that a mother must use punishment to coerce obedience but also reasoned that her daughter should “Keep quiet,” lie if necessary, to avoid being “hollered at and stuff . . . and put on punishment.” Similarly, Henry stated that it was wrong for the boxcar children to run away from home because it is against the law. They would be punished when caught but reversed his decision when he found out that the baker’s wife was going to mistreat the older children and send the youngest child Benny to an orphanage. Once again, Henry pensively reconsidered the children’s choices saying,

> If they take away the baby, then . . . they'll take him away. They don't want him to go away. If they go home they might get in trouble. Where he at, where she at? . . . [Should they run away if it is against the law?] Yes. No. [No? Why?] Because it's wrong and [pause]. No. Yes. Yes. I say yes.

Running away is wrong and would be punished but so is losing one’s little brother. Henry was confused, perhaps because he lacked insight into the adverse consequences and psychological harm that might come to Benny if the children did not run away. Thus, he could only conclude that although running away is wrong, they must do it anyway. When punishment was eminent, Henry and Jessie both became confused about what ought to be done and often prescribed that which they knew was wrong. According to Henry, “They ain't got to [obey], but it's what they're supposed to do.”

**Violet’s Values**

Violet’s judgments differed from the other two in that she more frequently chose affiliation as an issue or norm choice and justified her choices with the value elements to avoid trouble in addition to punishment and to seek personal reward. This moral stance allowed her to resolve the conflict between valuing punishment and avoiding it as well by reasoning that what serves one’s own best interest is the ultimate test of what one ought to do. This pattern of reasoning became most apparent when she engaged in perspective taking, attempts that usually amounted to nothing more than a projection of her own wants and desires onto another. For example, when asked if it is right for a mother to break a promise about how her daughter could spend babysitting money, Violet replied

> If I was the mother, yes, I would have told her no because she probably paid for Judy’s school clothes every year and she gonna be getting tired of that. She probably want to buy her[s]elf some new outfits or something.

In this example, Violet reduced the moral context of a broken promise to a simple matter of competing self-interests. Similarly, in The Heinz Dilemma, she clearly calculated the assets and liabilities of each choice, deciding at first that Heinz should not steal the drug.

> That doesn’t make no sense because even if he do get the medicine and give it to his wife, he’s still not going to get away with that. They gonna catch him eventually. . . . If his wife do get unsick or she do get well, he’s not gonna be able to see her.

On the other hand, if he steals the drug and his wife gets well, “If she works hard, she loves him to death too. She will have to earn money to get him out. She’ll recover, or whatever. Try to get him out, in a way.” The problem is to figure out how Heinz can cut the best deal for himself.
In *The Long Walk*, Violet was asked to decide how to fairly divide one lunch between two children when one child is younger than the other. At first, she assumed the role of the older child and said that she would split the lunch evenly with the younger one. The researcher then forced a change in perspective and asked if that would be fair if she were the younger child. Violet began to equivocate, “Either split it up with me or give it all to me.” Probing still further, the researcher asked if it would be fair for the older child to give all of the food to the younger child. Violet responded, “Probably not for her, but for me, yeah.” Quite simply, what is fair for one may not be fair for another; that is the nature of fairness. As she deliberated each dilemma, Violet consistently prefaced her thoughts by repeating the same phrases over and over again. “In a way . . . , It could be wrong or could be right . . . ,” and “It depends on what kind of situation it is.” The right choice is the one that provides the most benefit to the actor.

**The Development of Cooperation**

The children did not always judge from a normative order or egocentric moral orientation. In fact, 10% of their judgments were cooperative in orientation and in all of these cases, affiliation was the issue choice. For example, in *The Foolish Brother*, Violet advised that a boy should not tattle on his brother because, “Well he should say the boy didn’t do anything cause that’s his brother and he might do something like his brother did and he wouldn’t want nobody to tell on him, what he did.” In Parts 1 and 2 of the *Boxcar Children Dilemma*, all of the children valued affiliation over authority and law but Violet was the only one who valued affiliation in Part 3, as well. As the story goes, the youngest girl of the four siblings becomes ill and the children are faced with a choice between taking her to the doctor and being discovered or caring for her themselves and risking her recovery. Jessie and Henry were certain that the little girl must see a doctor, even if it meant that the children would be found and sent to live with their mean grandfather. Violet, however, arrived at a different conclusion, however, deciding that the children should not take the little girl to the doctor. “Not if they want to stay together.” In Violet’s case, the story of the boxcar children seemed to inspire a nascent sense of solidarity, defined as the desire to stand with others to protect collective as opposed to individual interests. Right or wrong, we will equally bear the burdens and share the benefits of our life together. Piaget (1932/1965) identified solidarity as a cognitive phenomenon of critical importance in the development of moral autonomy because it is a necessary prerequisite of understanding the rational rule as self-imposed through mutual consent.

**Building Relationships through Cooperation**

Regardless of what children know about right or wrong or how precisely they practice the rules that define appropriate social behavior, their actions cannot be predicted with any certainty across all social contexts. This does not mean that behavior and judgment are unrelated but suggests instead that this relationship is mediated by the social context itself (Damon, 1988). For example, all three of the children with EBD who participated in the present study demonstrated cooperative behavior throughout every interview without incident. They were eager to share their thoughts and were always polite and respectful. They consistently maintained that any behavior prohibited by society is wrong and that disobedience should be punished, but an clear conflict in values emerged when they also determined that one is not obligated to do right if disobedience would allow an escape from punishment and other trouble or might result in personal reward.

Although punishment and other negative consequences serve the purpose of defining the behaviors society sanctions, the results of the present study indicate that avoiding these same consequences may motivate children to do that which they know they should not. This conflict in values bears particular significance in the education of children with EBD and at risk peers since research in classrooms indicates that punishment, trouble, and few opportunities for personal reward often define the moral context of the classroom community for many of these students (e.g., Books, 1998; Jack et al. 1996; Kaufman, 2003; Walker et al., 2004). When the moral context is punitive and unfriendly, children may perceive the classroom as harsh and uncaring, a place where they have been defined as outcasts and must fend for themselves for no one else will (Nucci, 2001). Egocentrism then serves as an adaptive response to a hostile environment (Hardman, 2002).

A cooperative moral orientation develops in a friendly, nurturing social context deliberately focused on building mutually respecting, trusting relationships among peers and with authority figures. It is in this social context that children acquire the courage to tell the truth and do what they know is right in spite of the consequences (Nucci, 2001; Piaget, 1932/1965). Recent research indicates that friendships play an important role in supporting children’s social cognitive development because they provide a buffer against the adverse consequences associated with feeling isolated and rejected (Aunola & Nurmi, 2007; Dodge et al., 2003). The results of the present study also showed that when the children’s judgments
were anchored in affiliation, cooperative moral motives emerged and the children expressed concern about the wants and needs of others. Yet friendly is not a word typically used to describe the social context of classroom for many children with EBD. On the contrary, many of these children experienced years of alienation and rejection prior to their placement in a special education program for students with EBD and after placement, they will likely remain sequestered from the mainstream of school society in a highly restrictive educational setting for the duration of their schooling (e.g., Kauffman & Landrum, 2009; Rutherford et al., 2004).

Regardless of placement, best practices in special education prescribe the use of positive behavioral intervention supports (PBIS), not punishment, to facilitate the inclusion and reintegration of students with EBD in the general education classroom (e.g., Walker et al., 2004). PBIS grew out of applied behavior analysis, but theory and research on the development of moral judgment implies that the provision of PBIS in diverse educational settings may also support the development of community building values such as civility, cooperation, care, trust, and respect for the rights of others. In a benevolent but diverse learning community, children’s conceptions of fairness, human welfare, and rights are naturally stimulated as they acquire a critical moral orientation toward their own conduct, the conduct of others, and prevailing societal norms and internalize the intent of societal conventions and social organization (Nucci, 2001). Thus it seems that PBIS may do more than facilitate the learning and practice social conventions but may also transform a harsh, uncaring classroom into the kind of inclusive learning community children with and at risk for EBD need to internalize community building values that support the development of cooperation and a gradual understanding of the rational rule self-imposed through mutual consent.

Limitations and Future Research
The focus of this research was to describe the values expressed in the moral judgment of three children with EBD. Caution should be observed, however, in generalizing case study results to persons or situations other than those included in the study (Gall et al., 1996). The results describe the moral judgment of the three children who participated in the present study only in response to the 12 dilemmas presented and may or may not indicate how these children would have responded given a different set of dilemmas. In addition, the reliability of the analysis was high as measured by agreement between the researcher and an external auditor on a small sample of interview data, but there is no method for evaluating the reliability of judgment with respect to predicting behavioral responding in real life events (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987a). The children explained only what they thought they might do which may or may not be what they actually would do in any given situation. This limitation does not mean that the results of this and other similar research efforts have no relevance with respect to the relationship between behavior and the development of moral judgment, for that is not the case. In fact, functional behavioral assessments are widely used in special education to determine behavioral intent by observing the connections between behavior and its consequences (Alberto & Troutman, 2006). Moral dilemma interviews are conducted for the same purpose but in this case, intent is revealed by exposing the child’s perceptions of the connections between behavior and its consequences (Piaget, 1932/1965). The difference lies in the point of analysis, behavior versus judgment, but the underlying assumption is the same. Behavior is motivated by judgment.

Case study research is also limited with respect to determining causal effects but the results of the present study seem to suggest that unraveling the mysterious relationship between behavior and judgment may be more complex than simply applying more rigorous research methodology. The problem seems similar to the one faced by the three blind men who were trying to determine what an elephant looks like by separately investigating the front, middle, and hind parts of the enormous creature using only their sense of touch. It was not until they engaged in respectful dialogue about what each had discovered that they were finally able to form an accurate mental picture of the animal. Likewise, the results of the present study indicate that understanding the relationship between behavior and judgment will not be accomplished without first accepting the challenge of integrating two very different perspectives of child development, one focused on behavioral change and the other on cognitive transformation. The present study represents only a small but necessary first step in perhaps opening that dialogue, but with continued study of the moral judgment of children with EBD, the research community may be able to develop a clearer picture of the assumed relationship between judgment and behavior and at the same time, improve current methods of intervention in and prevention of EBD via inclusive classrooms that afford every child the opportunity to become a productive, well respected citizen in a diverse community of learners.
References

Appendix

Interview I
Colby & Kohlberg (1987b)

The Heinz Dilemma

Part 1. In another country, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one kind of medicine that the doctors thought might save her. The medicine was called radium and a druggist in the woman’s town had recently discovered how to make the medicine. The medicine was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what it cost him to make the medicine. He paid $400 for the radium, but charged $4000 for a small dose of the medicine. The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about $2000, which is half of what the medicine costs. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, “No, I discovered the medicine and I’m going to make money from it.” So having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man’s store to steal the medicine for his wife. (p. 1, life versus law)

Part 2. Heinz did break into the store. He stole the medicine and gave it to his wife. In the newspapers the next day there was an account of the robbery. Mr. Brown, a police officer who knew Heinz, read the account. He remembered seeing Heinz running away from the store and realized that it was Heinz who stole the medicine. Mr. Brown wonders whether he should report that Heinz was the robber. (p. 2, conscience versus law)

Part 3. Officer Brown did report Heinz. Heinz was arrested and brought to court. A jury was selected. The jury’s job is to find whether a person is innocent or guilty of committing a crime. The jury finds Heinz guilty. It is up to the judge to determine the sentence. (p. 2, conscience versus punishment)
Louise’s Dilemma
Judy was a twelve-year-old girl. Her mother promised her that she could go to a special rock concert coming to their town if she saved up from babysitting and lunch money so she would have enough money to buy a ticket to the concert. She managed to save up the $15 dollars it cost plus another $5. But then her mother changed her mind and told Judy that she had to spend the money on new clothes for school. Judy was disappointed and decided to go to the concert anyway. She bought a ticket and told her mother that she had only been able to save $5. That Saturday she went to the performance and told her mother that she was spending the day with a friend. A week passed without her mother finding out. Judy then told her older sister, Louise, that she had gone to the performance and had lied to her mother about it. Louise wonders whether to tell their mother what Judy did. (p. 281, authority versus contract)

Interview 2
(Piaget, 1932/1965)
Father’s Pen
A boy was playing in his room, while his daddy was working in town. After a little while the boy thought he would like to draw. But he had no paper. Then he remembered that there were some lovely white sheets of paper in one of the drawers of his father’s desk. So he went quite quietly to look for them. He found them and took them away. When the father came home he found that his desk was untidy and finally discovered that someone had stolen his paper. He went straight into the boy’s room, and there he saw the floor covered with sheets of paper that were all scribbled over with colored chalk. Then the father was very angry and gave his boy a good whipping.

Now I shall tell you a story that is nearly the same, but not quite (the story is repeated shortly, except for the last sentence). Only it ends up differently. The father did not punish him. He just explained to him that it wasn’t right of him. He said, “When you’re not at home, when you’ve gone to school if I were to go and take your toys, you wouldn’t like it. So when I’m not there, you mustn’t go and take my paper either. It is not nice for me. It isn’t right to do that.

Now a few days later these two boys were each of them playing in their yards. The boy who had been punished was in his yard, and the one who had not been punished was playing in his yard. And then each of them found a pen. It was their fathers’ pen and each of them remembered that his father had said that he had lost his pen and that it was a pity because he wouldn’t be able to find it again. So then they thought that if they were to steal the pen, no one would ever know, and there would be no punishment.

Well now, one of the boys kept the pen for himself and the other took it back to his father. Guess which one took it back—the one who had been well punished for having taken the paper or the one who was only talked to? (pp. 219-220, conscience versus punishment)

Mother’s Scissors
A mother tells her three boys that they mustn’t play with the scissors while she is out. But, as soon as she is gone the first one says, “Let’s play with the scissors.” Then the second boy goes to get some newspapers to cut out. The third one says, “No, Mother said we mustn’t. I will not touch the scissors.” When the mother comes home, she sees all the bit of cut-up newspaper on the floor. So she sees that someone has been touching her scissors, and she punishes all three boys. Was that fair? (pp. 234, punishment versus fairness)

Doing Chores
Once there was a camp of Boy Scouts (or Girl Scouts). Each one had to do his/her bit to help with the work and leave things tidy. One had to do the shopping, another washed up, and another brought in wood or swept the floor. One day there was no bread and the one who did the shopping had already gone. So other Scoutmaster asked one of the Scouts who had already done his/her job to go and fetch the bread. What did he/she do? (p. 277, authority versus contract)

The Foolish Brother
Once, long ago, and in a place very far away from here, there was a father who had two sons. One was very good and obedient. The other was a good sort, but he often did foolish things. One day the father goes off on a trip and says to the first son, “You must watch carefully, and when I come back you can tell me what your brother does.” The father goes off on a trip and says to the first son, “You must watch carefully to see what your brother does, and when I come back you shall tell me.” The father goes away and the brother goes and does something foolish. When the father comes back he asks the first boy to tell him everything. What ought the boy to do? (p. 290, authority versus affiliation)
The Long Walk
Two boys, a little one and a big one, once went for a long walk in the mountains. When lunch time came they were very hungry and took their food out of their bags. But they found that there was not enough for both of them. What should have been done? Give all the food to the big boy or to the little one, or the same to both? (p. 310, equality versus equity)

Interview III
(Warner, 1977)
The Boxcar Children Dilemma
Part 1
One warm night four children stood in front of a bakery. No one knew them. No one knew where they had come from. The baker’s wife saw them first, as they stood looking in at the window of her store. The little boy was looking at the cakes, the big boy was looking at the loaves of bread, and the two girls were looking at the cookies. Now the baker’s wife did not like children. She did not like boys at all. So she came to the front of the bakery and listened, looking very cross.

"The cake is good, Jessie," the little boy said. He was about five years old.
"Yes, Benny," said the big girl. "But bread is better for you. Isn’t it, Henry?"
"Oh, yes," said Henry. "We must have some bread, and cake is not good for Benny and Violet."
"I like bread best, anyway," said Violet. She was about ten years old, and she had pretty brown hair and brown eyes.
"That is just like you, Violet," said Henry, smiling at her, "Let’s go into the bakery. Maybe they will let us stay here for the night."
The baker’s wife looked at them as they came in.
"I want three loaves of bread, please," said Jessie.
She smiled politely at the woman, but the woman did not smile. She looked at Henry as he put his hand in his pocket for the money. She looked cross, but she sold him the bread. Jessie was looking around, too, and she saw a long red bench under each window of the bakery. The benches had flat red pillows on them.
"Will you let us stay here for the night?" Jessie asked. "We could sleep on those benches, and tomorrow we would help you wash the dishes and do things for you."
Now the woman liked this. She did not like to wash dishes very well. She would like to have a big boy to help her with her work.
"Where are your father and mother?" she asked.
"They are dead," said Henry.
"We have a grandfather in Greenfield, but we don’t like him," said Benny.
Jessie put her hand over the little boy’s mouth before he could say more.
"Oh, Benny, keep still!" she said.
"Why don’t you like your grandfather?" asked the woman.
"He is our father’s father, and he didn’t like our mother," said Henry. "So we don’t think he would like us. We are afraid he would be mean to us."
"Did you ever see him?" asked the woman.
"No," answered Henry.
"Then why do you think he would be mean to you?" asked the woman.
"Well, he never came to see us," said Henry. "He doesn’t like us at all."
"Where did you live before you came here?" asked the woman.
But not one of the four children would tell her. (pp. 7-11, affiliation versus authority)

Part 2
"We’ll get along all right," said Jessie. "We want to stay here for only one night."
"You may stay here tonight," said the woman at last. "And tomorrow we’ll see what we can do."
Henry thanked her politely.
We are all pretty tired and hungry," he said.
The children sat down on the floor. Henry cut one of the loaves of bread into four pieces with his knife, and the children began to eat.
"Delicious!" said Henry.
"Well, I never!" said the woman.
She went into the next room and shut the door.
"I’m glad she is gone," remarked Benny, eating. "She doesn’t like us."
"Sh, Benny!" said Jessie. "She is good to let us sleep here."
After supper the children lay down on their red benches, and Violet and Benny soon went to sleep. But Jessie and Henry could hear the woman talking to the baker.

She said, “I’ll keep the three older children. They can help me. But the little boy must go to the Children’s Home. He is too little. I cannot take care of him.”

The baker answered, “Very well. Tomorrow I’ll take the little boy to the Children’s Home. We’ll keep the others for awhile, but we must make them tell us who their grandfather is.”

Jessie and Henry waited until the baker and his wife had gone to bed. Then they sat up in the dark.

“Oh, Henry!” whispered Jessie. “Let’s run away from here!”

“Yes, indeed,” said Henry. “We’ll never let Benny go to a Children’s Home. Never, never! We must be far away by morning, or they will find us. But we must not leave any of our things here.”

Jessie sat still, thinking.

“Our clothes and a cake of soap and towels are in the big laundry bag,” she said. “Violet has her little workbag. And we have two loaves of bread left. Have you your knife and the money?”

“Yes,” said Henry. “I have almost four dollars.”

“You must carry Benny,” said Jessie. “He will cry if we sake him up. But I’ll wake Violet. Sh, Violet! Come! We are going to run away again. If we don’t run away, the baker will take Benny to a Children’s Home in the morning.”

The little girl woke up at once. She sat up and rolled off the bench. She did not make any noise.

“What shall I do? She whispered softly.

“Carry this,” said Jessie. She gave her the workbag.

Jessie put the two loaves of bread into the laundry bag, and then she looked around the room.

“All right,” she said to Henry. “Take Benny now.”

Henry took Benny in his arms and carried him to the door of the bakery. Jessie took the laundry bag and opened the door very softly. All the children went out quietly. They did not say a word. Jessie shut the door, and then they all listened. Everything was very quiet. So the four children went down the street.

(PP. 11-15, affiliation versus law)

Part 3

It was morning, but the sun was covered by clouds. She sat up and looked all around her, and then she looked at the sky. It seemed like night, for it was very dark. Suddenly it began to thunder, and she saw that it was really going to rain.

“What shall we do? Where shall we go?” thought Jessie.

“Then she saw something ahead of her in the woods. It was an old boxcar.”

“What a good house that will be in the rain!” she thought.

She ran over to the boxcar. There was no engine, and the track was old and rusty. Ti was covered with grass and bushes because it had not been used for a long time.

“It is a boxcar,” Jessie said. “We can get into it and stay until it stops raining.”

Henry took Benny’s hand, and they all ran through the woods after Jessie. The stump of a big tree stood under the door of the boxcar and was just right for a step. Jessie and Henry jumped upon the old dead stump and rolled back the heavy door of the car. Henry looked in.

“There is nothing in here,” he said. “Come, Benny. We’ll help you up.”

Violet went in next, and, last of all, Jessie and Henry climbed in.

“What a beautiful place!” said Violet.

“Henry!” cried Jessie. “Let’s live here!”

“Live here?” asked Henry.

“Yes! Why not?” said Jessie “This boxcar is a fine little house. It is dry and warm in the rain.”

“We could wash in the brook,” said Violet.

“Please, Henry,” begged Jessie. “We could have the nicest little home here, and we could find some dishes, and make four beds and a table, and maybe chairs!” (PP. 27-31)

Jessie laughed and laughed until she almost cried. Violet laughed until she did cry. Then she could not stop crying. She cried and cried. At last Jessie made up her mind that Violet was really sick.

“You must go to bed, Violet,” she said. She helped her carefully into the boxcar and put pine needles all around her and under her. Then she wet a handkerchief in the cold water of the brook and laid it on her little sister’s hot head.

“If Violet is very sick, she ought to go to the hospital,” said Jessie.

“Yes, I know that,” said Henry. “And we don’t want her to go to a hospital if we can help it. We should have to tell her name.”

“Yes,” said Jessie. “Then Grandfather could find us.”
The two older children sat up with Violet. They put cold water on her head. But after dark Violet shook all over, and Jessie was frightened. She covered Violet all over with pine needles, but still she shook. They could not get her warm. (pp. 121-122, affiliation versus life)