Changing Families, Changing Workplaces

Suzanne M. Bianchi

Summary
American families and workplaces have both changed dramatically over the past half-century. Paid work by women has increased sharply, as has family instability. Education-related inequality in work hours and income has grown. These changes, says Suzanne Bianchi, pose differing work-life issues for parents at different points along the income distribution.

Between 1975 and 2009, the labor force rate of mothers with children under age eighteen increased from 47.4 percent to 71.6 percent. Mothers today also return to work much sooner after the birth of a child than did mothers half a century ago. High divorce rates and a sharp rise in the share of births to unmarried mothers mean that more children are being raised by a single parent, usually their mother.

Workplaces too have changed, observes Bianchi. Today’s employees increasingly work nonstandard hours. The well-being of highly skilled workers and less-skilled workers has been diverging. For the former, work hours may be long, but income has soared. For lower-skill workers, the lack of “good jobs” disconnects fathers from family obligations. Men who cannot find work or have low earnings potential are much less likely to marry. For low-income women, many of whom are single parents, the work-family dilemma is how to care adequately for children and work enough hours to support them financially.

Jobs for working-class and lower middle-class workers are relatively stable, except in economic downturns, but pay is low, and both parents must work full time to make ends meet. Family income is too high to qualify for government subsidized child care, but too low to afford high-quality care in the private market. These families struggle to have a reasonable family life and provide for their family’s economic well-being.

Bianchi concludes that the “work and family” problem has no one solution because it is not one problem. Some workers need more work and more money. Some need to take time off around the birth of a child without permanently derailing a fulfilling career. Others need short-term support to attend to a family health crisis. How best to meet this multiplicity of needs is the challenge of the coming decade.

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All workers face times during their lives when the demands of family caregiving grow so intense that balancing work and family life becomes a struggle. A web of obligations—to a child who needs care, a spouse who is ill, an older parent who needs support, a sibling undergoing a divorce—connects workers with their families. Workers are also obligated to their employers, on whom they depend for the income and other satisfactions that paid work provides. The many responsibilities that workers have to their family members and to their jobs are both important—and often in conflict.

Major changes in American families and workplaces over the past half-century form the backdrop for the work and family challenges that face workers today. The biggest changes in the family itself have been increases in paid work by women and in family instability, both of which have altered family-related activities such as housework and child care. Population aging has also increased demand for care of parents and older relatives. Workplace changes include an increase in nonstandard work schedules and greater education-related inequality in work hours and income. Although these family and workplace changes affect all American families, they result in quite different work-life issues for parents at the top, middle, and bottom of the income distribution.

Changing Families
Over the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. family life changed dramatically in two ways. The employment of women, especially mothers of young children, outside the home surged. Family instability too increased sharply, as did the likelihood that children would be raised, at least for part of childhood, in a household with only a single parent, usually the mother. As a result of these changes, adults in households with children became much more likely to juggle paid work and unpaid family caregiving responsibilities—making the tension between the two spheres much more apparent than it had been during the 1950s and 1960s, when women tended to stay out of the labor force to rear children while men brought home a “family wage” large enough to support everyone.¹

Increased Maternal Employment
Between 1975 and 2009, the labor force rate of mothers with children under age eighteen increased from 47.4 percent to 71.6 percent (figure 1). For mothers of children under age six, the share in the labor force rose from 39.0 percent to 63.6 percent. Mothers’ employment rates rose steadily until about 2000 and then flattened out, leading some observers to believe that a retrenchment in the trend toward gender equality might be under way in the United States.² The ensuing debate about whether mothers were increasingly “opting out” of the paid workforce, however, has subsided during the recent recession and its aftermath.³

In 2009, 74 percent of all employed mothers worked full time (defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics as at least thirty-five hours a week at all jobs), and the full-time rate was almost as high—71 percent—for mothers with children under age six. Fathers’ rates of participation in the labor force remained higher than those of mothers: 94 percent of fathers who were living with their children were in the labor force, and 94 percent of employed fathers worked full time.⁴

Mothers today work during pregnancy more often and return to work much sooner after the birth of a child than did mothers half a century ago. During 1961–65, the
The share of women working during their first pregnancy was 44 percent; by 2001–03 it had climbed to two-thirds (based on data collected in the Survey of Income and Program Participation). More dramatic was the change in the speed at which women returned to work after the birth of their child, as shown in figure 2. Among all women having their first child during the early 1960s, only 10 percent were back at work three months after the baby’s birth. By 2001–03, that share was 42 percent; the share back at work six months after the birth was 55 percent; and the share back at work by the child’s first birthday was 64 percent.

Some observers might argue that comparisons with the 1960s exaggerate the change.
because family roles were highly specialized along gender lines during that decade, with women providing the bulk of unpaid care in the home and men providing the wage labor that economically supported the family. Earlier in the twentieth century—during the 1920s and 1930s—women often combined rearing children with paid work, or unpaid family work, either on farms or in urban ghettos where they took in boarders, laundry, or piecework. Until the mid-twentieth century, however, married women most often did their paid work later in life, after they had raised their children, or in the household, where they could keep an eye on those children. During the second half of the twentieth century, women of childbearing age moved into the workplace. To engage in paid work, they had to leave their children and arrange for other people to care for them.

Susan Short, Frances Goldscheider, and Berna Torr show that as women’s paid work was increasingly moving outside the home, the household itself was being transformed. At the very time that parents could have used the help of others in the household to care for children, households were “emptying out” of adult kin. Families that included three generations of kin during the Great Depression and World War II uncoupled as housing expanded and postwar affluence allowed for more privacy in living arrangements. The large baby boom families with older daughters who could help care for younger children began to disappear as families reduced fertility to replacement levels (two children per family) by the 1970s. Increasingly, parents were “on their own” to juggle the work and family demands of modern life.

Greater Family Instability and More Single Parenting
As mothers’ labor force rates were climbing, families were facing other big changes. Divorce rates rose sharply during the 1970s, causing more children to be raised by a single parent, usually their mother. The divorce rate plateaued (at high levels) around 1980, but a second trend—the increase in the proportion of births to unmarried mothers—continued to rise. Today, 40 percent of U.S. births are to a woman who is not married. Sara McLanahan and Audrey Beck document that almost half of unmarried mothers are cohabiting with the father when the child is born and another 30 percent are romantically involved with the baby’s father. But these relationships are extremely unstable. Forty percent of cohabiting relationships and 80 percent of those where the couple is romantically involved but not living together dissolve by the child’s fifth birthday. An unmarried mother in the United States today faces a high probability of becoming both the main caregiver and the main breadwinner for her family during at least part of her child’s life.

High rates of nonmarital births are also common today throughout Europe, but the United States tends to be exceptional in the high rates of dissolution of these nonmarital relationships, their short duration, and the lack of sustained father involvement in rearing children.
Andrew Cherlin, in his book *The Marriage-Go-Round*, documents that 10 percent of all U.S. women have been in at least three different marriages or cohabiting relationships, or both, by the time they turn thirty-five, more than twice the share for women in the European countries with the highest rates of union dissolution.\(^9\) The family system is more turbulent in the United States than elsewhere, and women spend more time as lone mothers, rearing children without a father present, than do their European counterparts.

Single parents now head about one-quarter of U.S. households with children under the age of eighteen. Even though fathers now head about 15 percent of all single-parent households, the overwhelming majority (85 percent) of single parents are mothers.\(^10\)

Single parents may have as many child-related demands on their time as married parents do, but their households have only half as many adults to meet those demands.\(^11\)

In 2009, single mothers had an overall labor force participation rate of 75.8 percent, and an unemployment rate of 13.6 percent. Married mothers had a lower rate of participation in the labor force, at 69.6 percent, but their unemployment rate, at 5.8 percent, was less than half that for single mothers. Thus, the ratio of “employment to population” was similar for the two groups of mothers.

Single mothers’ high unemployment rates in part reflect their relatively low educational attainment: 16.4 percent have no high school degree and 30.3 percent have only a high school degree. Not all single mothers are poorly educated: 17.2 percent have college degrees (or higher) and 36.1 percent have spent some time in college. Fully 38.5 percent of two-parent households with children, however, have a parent with a college degree or higher, and an additional 27.3 percent have a parent with some college education.\(^12\)

### Changes in Nonmarket Activities in the Home

Labor force surveys, such as the Current Population Survey, track trends in the number and share of parents who work in the paid labor force but not in what parents do in their nonwork hours. Researchers interested in trends in unpaid work in the home have turned to evidence from time diaries in which representative samples of respondents record their activities over a twenty-four-hour period. Time diary data, which are relatively easy to collect, force respondents to respect the constraint of the twenty-four-hour day when reporting activities. Numerous methodological studies confirm that time diary estimates are both reliable and valid.\(^13\)

Aggregating diary days across respondents and across days of the week and weeks of the year yields a representative picture of time use for groups such as fathers or single mothers. Beginning in 2003 in the United States, the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) has provided evidence for large representative samples. Combining the ATUS data with data from earlier U.S. time diary studies makes it possible to track trends over longer periods.

Time diary data show that housework hours for U.S. mothers fell from an average of thirty-two hours a week (reported in 1965 time diaries) to just under eighteen hours (reported in the 2003–08 ATUS), a decline of fourteen hours, on average. The change turns out to be close to an equal work-housework trade: mothers averaged thirteen more hours of market work during 2003–08 than in 1965 as they shed housework hours. Most of the change was in “core housework” tasks: The time spent preparing and cleaning up after meals and doing laundry was almost halved, and housecleaning time fell more than one-third.\(^14\)
Mothers’ time devoted to child care followed a different pattern. In the United States it declined from ten hours to eight and one-half hours a week between 1965 and 1975 (as large baby boom households gave way to households with fewer children). After 1985, however, mothers’ primary child-care time began rising—and reached almost fourteen hours a week during 2003–08 (according to estimates from the ATUS). Time use data from European countries show similar patterns. Maternal time invested in child-care activities increased during the same period, despite rapid increases in women’s labor force participation in virtually all European economies. Employed U.S. mothers today spend less time doing child care than non-employed mothers, but the allocation of time to children has ratcheted upward for both groups. A comparison of mothers’ diaries shows that employed mothers were recording as much time doing primary child care in 2000 as nonemployed mothers did in 1975.

As mothers increased their market work, fathers’ time use patterns at home changed too. Fathers living with their children spent more time on both housework and child care. They more than doubled hours spent on housework between 1965 and 1985, from four to ten hours a week on average. And after 1985, they nearly tripled time devoted to primary child-care activities, averaging seven hours a week during 2003–08 compared with two and a half hours a week during 1965–85. Extra time spent on child care came on top of long work hours—an average of forty hours a week (based on time diary reports)—that varied little by the age of their children.

Numerous qualitative studies suggest why time allocated by mothers to child care may remain the same or even increase despite their greater paid work effort. Sharon Hays describes what she calls the cultural contradiction of modern motherhood: Mothers assume the co-provider role but still feel compelled to be “all giving” and “ever available” to their children. Mary Blair-Loy analyzes a schema of “devotion to family” that competes with “devotion to work” even among high-income professional mothers who are most heavily invested in their jobs. Being a good mother, devoted to one’s children, is a core identity that does not change when women take on more hours of paid work.

As adults, especially highly educated adults, postpone parenthood and have smaller families, they may be planning their childbearing for a point in life when they want to devote time to parenting. Middle-class children participate in numerous extracurricular activities, many of which require active parental involvement, such as providing transportation. Parents may increasingly believe that involving their children in a wide range of activities ensures their ultimate educational success. Annette Lareau, in her book Unequal Childhoods, labels such parenting “concerted cultivation,” and her follow-up interviews with children thus cultivated suggest they perform well in young adulthood, especially compared with peers from families with less education and less involved parenting.

Raising children in the United States today also requires substantial financial investment, because the lengthening transition to adulthood often requires parents to “backstop” children unable to secure a foothold in the job market. The vast majority of children in their early twenties—regardless of whether they are enrolled in school—receive economic assistance from their parents. Frank Furstenberg Jr. argues that as the transition
to adulthood grows longer, the burden of supporting adult children grows heavier for U.S. parents than for their counterparts in Europe, where governmental programs invest more heavily in education, health care, and job prospects for young people. Young adults in the United States also experience more inequality in outcomes, reflecting inequality in the economic resources available to parents to assist their children.26

Population Aging and Care of Older Adults
One final family change that looms large, as the baby boom begins to retire, is the increased likelihood that working adults will have elderly parents who need care. Getting a reliable sense of either the number of older adults who need care or the number of working-age adults who have an older parent, spouse, or other relative who requires care is difficult, and estimates vary widely. For example, the National Alliance for Caregiving, in collaboration with AARP, estimated in 2009 that 65.7 million Americans, or 29 percent of the adult population, provided care for an adult or a child with special needs in the previous year.27 The Family Caregiver Alliance has compiled a wide range of estimates of informal caregivers from different data sources. The highest estimate, from the 1987 National Survey of Families and Households, is that 52 million people care for someone aged twenty or older who is ill or disabled. The lowest estimate, from the 1994 wave of the National Long-Term Care Survey, is that between 6 million and 7 million people care for family, friends, or neighbors aged sixty-five and older who need help with everyday tasks.28

Another approach to assessing the “risk” of becoming a caregiver is to estimate the number of potential caregivers per elderly adult in need of care. Based on the National Long-Term Care Survey in 1994, when the average number of adult children was at its peak, 5.5 million chronically disabled elderly adults had a total of 14.5 million potential spousal or child caregivers—about 3.1 potential caregivers per care recipient.29 The baby boom generation, now reaching retirement age, had much smaller families in adulthood than the ones into which they were born—an average of two, rather than three or four, children per family.30 Smaller family sizes translate to fewer siblings with whom to share care when a health crisis emerges for one’s parents. The older baby boom cohorts have also experienced considerable lifetime marital instability, as have their children. Because of the increase in births outside marriage, cohabitation before and after marriage, divorce and repartnering, older parents now have numerous stepchildren, but norms of obligation to assist family members may be less strong among stepfamily than among biological kin.31

Improved health and declining disability rates among older people also complicate the task of estimating the future need for elder care. In part because they are healthier, older adults today are working longer than did their peers five decades ago. Over the past fifteen years, in particular, the labor force rates for those in their sixties and seventies have risen.32 The working lives of older adults are also being extended by the broad societal shift away from traditional defined-benefit retirement plans, the security of which tends to encourage earlier retirement, and by older Americans’ increased educational attainment, which enables them to stay in the labor force longer than their less well-educated counterparts.33

The lengthening of healthy life expectancy means that most workers do not face serious...
caregiving demands from their parents until their own children are older and less in need of day-to-day care. Here again, though, estimates vary widely. Depending on the definition of caregiving responsibilities, between 1 and 33 percent of women in their late forties and early fifties are providing care and support to children and parents simultaneously. The best estimate is that about 9 percent of women in this age group are “sandwiched” caregivers who are providing substantial care and support both to children and to parents.34 Although sandwiched caregivers are a little less likely to be in the labor force than those who are not supporting two generations, labor force rates are high for both groups (72 percent compared with 76 percent). The likelihood that middle-aged workers will need to provide care both up and down the generations may increase in coming years, because of delayed childbearing, especially among highly educated women. And because of the increase in women’s employment, more and more of the potential caregivers of unmarried elderly parents, the group who most often require assistance from their adult children, will be in the workforce.

Changing Workplaces
As families have changed, so too have workplaces—as well as the economic outlook for working families. Harriet Presser has chronicled the growth in the “24/7” economy—work at nonstandard hours, part-time work, work without fixed hours, and rotating schedules.35 And because inequality in the workplace has increased, workers at different points in the income distribution face quite different work-family dilemmas.

Nonstandard Work Hours
The standard full-time workweek is typically considered to be thirty-five to forty hours, Monday through Friday, mostly during the day. About one-fifth of employed Americans, however, work more than half of their hours outside the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. standard daytime hours, or work a rotating schedule, or work varying hours. The incidence of nonstandard work schedules in the United States is roughly in line with that in Europe, where between 15 and 25 percent of the workforce works nonstandard hours. One in three employed Americans works at least one day on the weekend, though less than 1 percent work only on the weekend. Weekend work is more variable in Europe, ranging in one study of twelve countries from a low of 10 percent (in Sweden) to a high of 35 percent (in Italy).36

Because inequality in the workplace has increased, workers at different points in the income distribution face quite different work-family dilemmas.

Some analysts are concerned that nonstandard work schedules, and the workplaces that require them, may be “family unfriendly”—affecting adversely the health of workers and curtail the time that parents spend with each other and their children. Virtually all studies of the “effects” of nonstandard work schedules on families find correlations, but not causal links, between the two, because the studies are based on observational rather than experimental designs. One study, which finds that preschool-age children of mothers with nonstandard work hours have lower cognitive scores than do children whose
mothers work during the daytime, posits that the lower scores may be attributable to lower-quality child care. Other studies explore whether parental work in the evenings or on weekends may be costly to older children, in terms of lack of supervision, more behavioral problems, less parental availability to help with homework, and poor child mental health. The studies do not establish causal connections, however, because parents who work nonstandard schedules are not a random subset of all workers: Their children may have experienced the same outcomes regardless of their parents’ work schedules.

Descriptive evidence from the ATUS suggests that married parents record spending less time with each other and with their children when they work nonstandard hours on their diary day. Mothers who work evening hours spend less time in routine child-care activities, such as bathing children, and less time reading to children than do mothers who work during the day. Evening work schedules reduce the likelihood of parents being present at the family dinner table, and parents who work in the evening or at night spend less time with their spouses, and less time watching television and sleeping.

Work schedules may also affect the mental health of adult family members. A study of nurses in dual-earner families found that those who worked evening shifts had more conflict and distress than those working day shifts. Among new parents in working-class, dual-earner families, shift work was linked to higher levels of depression. Parents working a rotating shift experienced lowered marital relationship quality. Particularly stressful were mismatches between children’s school schedules and parents’ work schedules.

Because all of these studies are observational, however, these links may not be causal.

Not all associations between nonstandard work schedules and the quality of family life are negative. Nonstandard hours may enhance children’s welfare when parents coordinate their work schedules (at least in two-parent homes) to reduce the use of nonparental care and make one parent available to their children during both the day and evening hours. Care of children in two-parent families may also be more equitably distributed between mothers and fathers when one or both parents work nonstandard schedules. When mothers work evenings rather than daytime hours, fathers are more involved in child care, spend more time with and take more sole responsibility for children, and are generally more knowledgeable about their children’s lives and activities. Parents working at night often spend more hours supervising children than do those working other schedules.

**Part-Time Work**

In 2007, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported that 17 percent of all workers aged sixteen and over worked part time—defined as usually working less than 35 hours a week. Part-time workers tend to be younger than full-time workers, although many older workers are employed part time. Women much more often work part time than men. The BLS categorizes part-time work as being involuntary (primarily because of economic reasons such as slack work) or voluntary. Working part time because of family caregiving responsibilities is considered voluntary, even though choosing part-time work to meet caregiving obligations may not in fact be completely voluntary. Part-time workers in the United States are much less likely than full-time workers to have benefits such as
health care or pension coverage, in part because part-time work evolved to attract married women into the labor market during the 1940s and 1950s, with the presumption that these “secondary” workers would have husbands whose jobs had fringe benefits.46 Today, however, a little more than one-third of part-time workers are the family’s major breadwinner, and that share has been rising. Part-time workers who are a family’s primary earner are much less well-off, given their low incomes and lack of fringe benefits, than part-time workers who are secondary earners and enjoy benefits from another household earner.47

Inequality in Employment and Work-Family Dilemmas
Workplaces have been characterized by growing inequality in the income of highly skilled and less-skilled workers during the past few decades.48 For workers at the top of the income-skill distribution, the work-family dilemma often involves well-remunerated, interesting jobs that have long work hours and offer few alternatives to full-time “devotion” to the workplace. For the low-skill worker, a major work-family dilemma often involves work that offers too few hours with too little pay to support a family adequately, or that offers too little flexibility in work shifts to enable workers to care adequately for their children. For families in the middle of the income distribution, the dilemma is that wages are too high to qualify for public assistance, but that work offers little flexibility, requires mandatory overtime on short notice, or offers wages that can support a family only if both parents in two-parent families work full time or if single parents hold multiple jobs. These middle-income families have, in addition, been more deeply affected by the recent recession than higher-income families.49

High-Income Families, High-Skill Workers
At the high end of the skill distribution, work hours may be long, but remuneration is high and income has soared. Dual-earner couples increasingly fill these ranks. Growing marital homogamy by educational status means that workers in long-work-hour “good jobs” are increasingly married to each other.50 Although men have increased their time in the home, this solution to the work-family dilemma has its limits. Hence, upper- and middle-class couples seem to make one of two adjustments in this context of “too much work.” Either they forgo having children—childlessness has risen recently among women in the United States (and in Europe and Japan). Or mothers (but not fathers) scale back labor market hours and move in and out of the labor force when children are young.

Childlessness
A sizable proportion of highly educated women in recent cohorts has remained childless. Among American women today aged forty to forty-four, 20 percent have never had a child, double the share thirty years ago. The share rises to 27 percent for those with graduate or professional degrees.51 Highly educated women, as a group, tend to have fewer children than they say they wanted earlier in their lives. The 1979 BLS National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, which interviewed a large, nationally representative group beginning when they were teenagers or young adults and then regularly conducted follow-up interviews over many years, asked young women how many children they wanted to have. Over time the total fertility rate for college-educated women was lower (by about one-half a child, averaged over the group) than their stated intentions at the beginning of their childrearing years, suggesting either that these women had difficulty
realizing their preferences for motherhood or that their preferences changed as they grew older.\textsuperscript{52}

Some observers have suggested that sharp fertility declines over the past decade or two in Southern and Eastern Europe and in some countries in Asia, most notably Japan, are attributable to rigid family role expectations for women in these countries.\textsuperscript{53} In countries where women’s labor market opportunities expand but women are still expected to do most of the housework and child care with little assistance from men, women may remain childless when work and family roles are too difficult to reconcile. The United States has not experienced these sharp declines in fertility: the U.S. average continues to be about two births per woman. But even in the United States, among some groups such as highly educated women, motherhood may also be forgone as women increasingly hold jobs that are both fulfilling and highly remunerative but also demanding of time and energy.

Reduced Employment and Pay Penalties for Women

Many occupations, especially those that are the most highly paid, require almost total absorption in the job, which is problematic for workers who want to spend time with children and other family members. The tension between work and family life may be especially pronounced in the United States, where parents work longer hours and vacation less than do parents in Europe and where a higher share of dual-earner couples work long weeks.\textsuperscript{54} Observational studies suggest that a father’s long work hours are negatively associated with the breadth of activities he shares with his children, involvement with adolescent children, time with a spouse, and marital quality when he feels high role overload.\textsuperscript{55} Mothers often respond to long work hours—either their own or those of their husband—by cutting back their paid work hours.

Using the 2003–09 ATUS samples, Betsy Thorn has recently calculated how women reallocate time after the birth of a first child. Comparing the diary days of mothers of one child under the age of one year with those of a comparable group of childless young women (aged twenty-three to thirty-four), she shows that mothers spend almost three and a half more hours on family care and housework a day. Mothers average half an hour less in personal care, an hour less in leisure activities, and almost two hours less a day in paid work.\textsuperscript{56}

Mothers who can afford to do so exit the labor force or reduce work hours despite the economic disadvantage of interrupted labor market participation and part-time employment. When mothers return to (full-time) employment, they may choose jobs whose hours allow as much overlap as possible with children’s school schedules.\textsuperscript{57} Mothers may also face subtle discrimination in the labor market—known as the “motherhood wage penalty” or “the family gap”—because they are assumed to be less committed workers than men or women without children.\textsuperscript{58}

Mothers’ adjustments in their work hours coincide with their subjective reports of time pressure. One-quarter to one-third of workers report feeling that they do not have enough time for themselves or their family because of their jobs.\textsuperscript{59} The share of mothers who say that they would prefer to work fewer hours a week is increasing. According to a 2007 report by the Pew Research Center, about 21 percent of mothers reported that full-time work was the ideal situation for
them (down from 32 percent in 1997), whereas 60 percent of mothers preferred part-time work (up from 48 percent in 1997).\textsuperscript{60} The desire to reduce work hours stems from both job demands and personal and family life considerations.

The noneconomic costs of “too much work” may spill over into subjective assessments of parenting and the quality of family life. In attitudinal surveys, parents express feelings of regret about not spending enough time with children, though expressions of “parental guilt” are higher for fathers who spend more hours away from home in the paid workforce than for mothers.\textsuperscript{61} Parents also evidence a yearning for elusive high-quality family time, with some research suggesting that the lack of time for shared family activities may have negative consequences for children, such as more risky behaviors for adolescents.\textsuperscript{62}

\textbf{Low-Income Families, Low-Skill Workers}

Although work and family research has been dominated by the assumption that “too much” work is the major problem in balancing the demands of family life, analysts are increasingly noting that “too little” work is also a major work-family issue. The lack of “good jobs” for lower-skill workers tends to disconnect fathers from family obligations and from involved parenting. Low-skill mothers must often balance work and children as a single parent and may rely on older children to help care for younger siblings.

\textbf{Men’s Family Involvement}

Breadwinning remains core to men’s identity, and when men struggle to find work or have low earnings potential, they are much less likely to marry.\textsuperscript{63} Avner Ahituv and Robert Lerman describe a feedback loop in which stable employment enhances the likelihood of marriage. Once married, men work more hours, leading to higher earnings and, in turn, to greater marital stability.\textsuperscript{64} Parenting too is tied to men’s ability to provide financially for their children. Fathers with higher earnings more often reside with their children throughout childhood than do fathers with lower earnings, leading to increased inequality in children’s life chances.\textsuperscript{65} Among low-income families, in which couples are often not married when a child is born, a father’s financial contribution is correlated with active parenting—visiting, caring for, and taking responsibility for children.\textsuperscript{66}

Family involvement and commitment to children also seem to strengthen ties to the workforce for men, particularly low-income fathers. Observational studies offer some support for several hypotheses about why this might be the case. One hypothesis is that becoming a parent may make men adjust their priorities and commitments, thus strengthening their attachment to extended kin and to paid work. A second is that parents, coworkers, and (prospective) spouses may expect more maturity from a man who marries or becomes a father, or both, and that men may internalize these expectations. Another is that extended kin may provide more support when they think a father is acting responsibly. Finally, it may be that men do not randomly take on responsible adult roles: more mature men may “select” themselves into the father role—marrying, holding onto a job, working hard—and thus fulfill it better than less mature men.\textsuperscript{67}

Other studies link the economic hardships and financial insecurities caused by too little or too poorly remunerated work with family health. For parents who experience unemployment, downward mobility, forced early
retirement, or economic deprivation, worries about job security or the adequacy of their income may be associated with negative health outcomes, strained marital relationships, and lower parenting quality for both adolescents and young children.68

Maternal Employment and Child Outcomes in Low-Income Families
For low-income women, many of whom are single parents, the work-family dilemma is how to care adequately for children and work enough hours to support them financially. Mounting evidence from random-assignment, experimental research with welfare-eligible families shows that young children often benefit from programs that increase a mother’s stable employment or income. Maternal employment tends to improve the home environment and encourage stable routines, especially when mothers have a good social support network and good mental health.69

Other experimental studies, however, show negative effects for low-income adolescents when their mothers transition from welfare to work. In a meta-analysis of eight random-assignment experimental studies, Lisa Gennetian and her colleagues reported small declines in adolescents’ school performance and in their likelihood of performing in the top half of the class, as well as an increased likelihood of grade repetition. One explanation for the negative effects on adolescents is that mothers moving from welfare to work rely on their older children to care for younger siblings and that the new responsibility of child care interferes with adolescents’ school attendance and performance.70

The finding that maternal work negatively affects older adolescent children is consistent with research that suggests that child care costs are a barrier to employment and often curtail work hours, particularly for low-income mothers.71 Using older children as caregivers can be one way to find stable, affordable child care. Single mothers commonly have multiple child care arrangements. Patchwork child care arrangements are particularly prevalent among low-income mothers trying to move from welfare to work. Low-income mothers who use small, home-based nonrelative care are especially likely to stop working. Although mothers using centers and large family day-care settings are more likely to miss work because of sick children than are mothers using small, home-based caregivers, they are less likely to quit their jobs.72

Other studies examine whether working parents leave older children unsupervised at too young an age. To date, analysts find that self-care by older children is less common among minority and low-income children than among white, higher-income children, who begin small amounts of self-care between ages eight and ten.74 Older siblings may substitute for parents in poor, urban settings to ensure that young children are not left alone, perhaps to the detriment of those older children.

For low-income women, many of whom are single parents, the work-family dilemma is how to care adequately for children and work enough hours to support them financially.
Families in the Middle
A large segment of the workforce is neither in highly remunerated professional occupations nor in highly unstable and low-skill jobs. These working-class and lower middle-class workers are in jobs that, in most periods, are relatively stable, but that pay too little to permit one parent in two-parent families to support the family. Both parents must work full time to make ends meet. Finding high-quality child care is difficult and expensive because family income is too high to qualify for government subsidized programs, such as Head Start, but too low to make it easy to afford high-quality care in the private market.

[Some] working-class and lower middle-class workers are in jobs that, in most periods, are relatively stable, but that pay too little to permit one parent in two-parent families to support the family.

These families may often engage in “tag-team parenting” and work different schedules to reduce child-care costs. They also may be in jobs that are unionized but whose rigid work schedules make it difficult to mesh work and family life. Workers may have to work mandatory overtime on short notice and face a high likelihood of losing their jobs if they do not comply with employers’ scheduling. Joan Williams and Heather Boushey’s review of research on job litigation illuminates the work-family challenges for this large segment of working families. These families feel that they have done everything right—completed high school or some college, married before having children, worked hard at their jobs—and yet they still struggle to carve out a reasonable family life and hold onto jobs that are critical to their family’s economic well-being. The authors describe parents who are exhausted by the multitude of work and family demands, worried about debt and bills, and fearful that they are one crisis away from job loss. These are the families who have increasingly lost jobs and faced housing foreclosure in the recent economic downturn.

Conclusion
Men and women seeking to balance work and family life today face intensifying challenges. Since the middle of the twentieth century, women, the nation’s unpaid caregivers, have entered the paid workforce in great numbers. They return to work after their children are born far more rapidly than did their peers five decades ago. Their families are more diverse, with more single parenting and greater inequality in employment and income. As the U.S. population ages, issues of elder care loom large on the work-family horizon.

Too little work, most often a problem for low-income workers, is likely implicated in the erosion of less-educated men’s connections to families. Although the overhaul of the nation’s welfare system in 1996 evoked some concern about the negative impact on children of forcing welfare mothers to work, research has found that increased maternal employment is often neutral or even beneficial for young children in low-income families, though new concerns have arisen about possible negative effects on adolescents.
Too much work may be related to increased childlessness in the United States and elsewhere, particularly among more highly educated workers. The issue is especially intense in Europe, where the need to support an aging population is even more pressing than it is in the United States. Too much work may also slow progress toward greater gender equality in the labor market, because women continue to curtail paid work more often than do men in the face of the need to care for children and close kin.

Families in the middle of the income distribution may be least likely to be able to manage financially if mothers cut back their paid work. These families may thus be especially “time stretched,” having much less ability than higher-income workers either to pay substitutes to do their work at home or to negotiate flexible work hours that might ease work-family strains.

The “work and family” problem has no one solution because it is not one problem. Some families need more work and more money. Others need assurances and safeguards that taking some time off from the job around the birth of a child will not permanently derail fulfilling careers. Yet other workers will likely need short-term support later in life to attend to the health (or other) crises of spouses, adult children, and aging parents. Understanding how best to meet this multiplicity of needs—what makes up the best mix of support from employers, the unpaid care of the (extended) family, and incentives from the public sector—is the challenge of the coming decade. Solutions must focus not only on the workplace and home life but also on the institutions that support healthy working families—schools, child care centers, after-school programs, the medical care system, and support systems for elder care.
Endnotes

1. In 2009, in two-parent families with children under age eighteen, 96 percent had at least one parent employed and 59 percent had both parents employed. In families headed by women, 68 percent had the mother employed. In families headed by a man, 77 percent had the father employed. See the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Economic News Release—Table 4: Families with Own Children: Employment Status of Parents by Age of Youngest Child and Family Type, 2008–09 Annual Averages” (www.bls.gov/news.release/famee.t04.htm).


15. Estimates are of the time mothers are doing direct child-care activities, not the overall time mothers spend with their children, which is much higher. Suzanne Bianchi, “Family Change and Time Allocation in American Families,” paper prepared for the Focus on Workplace Flexibility Conference, Washington, D.C., November 29–30, 2010, table 1.


45. Wight, Raley, and Bianchi, “Time for Children, Spouse and Self among Parents Who Work Nonstandard Hours” (see note 39).


47. Ibid., table 2.


74. Williams and Boushey, *The Three Faces of Work-Family Conflict* (see note 49); Perry-Jenkins and others, “Shift Work, Role Overload, and the Transition to Parenthood” (see note 42).