A Practical Logic of Socially Just Education in Late Modernity and its Inevitable Dilemmas: Suggestions from Critical Educational Studies

Minoru Sawada [*]

This paper inquires into a practical logic of what can be called socially just education in late modern societies, based on a reexamination of critical pedagogy, and clarifies the boundary-crossing nature of this education and the dilemmas that it inevitably entails. The discussion first addresses and reexamines certain oppositional arguments made by the most influential authorities of critical pedagogy, Michael Apple and Henry Giroux, to discern the directionality for a practical logic of socially just education. Second, to underpin the theoretical considerations, the paper refers to Nancy Fraser's concepts of social justice—the politics of recognition, redistribution, and representation—and, by reinterpreting the politics of redistribution based on the theory of cultural capital of Pierre Bourdieu, seeks to construct the vital part of a practical logic of socially just education in late modernity. To complement this model, the paper invokes Gert Biesta's discussion of how schools should teach democracy. Last is an overview of the dilemmas that must be faced when attempting to put socially just education into practice in the late modern era, along with proposed guidelines for tackling these dilemmas.

1. Introduction: The purpose and methods of this paper

This paper inquires into a practical logic of what can be called socially just education in late modern societies, based on a reexamination of critical pedagogy, and clarifies the boundary-crossing nature of this education and the dilemmas that it inevitably entails. "Socially just education" here is usually called "education for social justice," but this paper uses the former term, as it communicates the aim not only to achieve social justice through education, but

[*] Sophia University
  e-mail: sawada@sophia.ac.jp

also to make education itself socially just. Also, the term "practical logic" is used here because the paper develops an examination that goes beyond the philosophical discussion of socially just education and puts into perspective curriculum and instruction as practical aspects of education[1].

The discussion first addresses and reexamines certain oppositional arguments made by the most influential authorities of critical pedagogy, Michael Apple and Henry Giroux, to discern the directionality for a practical logic of socially just education. Second, to underpin the theoretical considerations, the paper refers to Nancy Fraser's concepts of social justice—the politics of recognition, redistribution, and representation—and, by reinterpreting the politics of redistribution based on the theory of cultural capital of Pierre Bourdieu (1984), seeks to construct the vital part of a practical logic of socially just education in late modernity. To complement this model, the paper invokes Gert Biesta's discussion (2011) of how schools should teach democracy. Last is an overview of the dilemmas that must be faced when attempting to put socially just education into practice in the late modern era, along with proposed guidelines for tackling these dilemmas.

A Japanese-language paper by the author develops a similar argument (Sawada, 2016). That paper, however, fails to put into perspective the whole of Frazer's conception of social justice theory, which forms the theoretical pillar of this paper; it also omits the "politics of representation" in particular and does little to explore the dilemmas and conflicts that can arise between the three politics mentioned above. Thus, it fails to point out the importance of the factor of border-crossing in the context of these issues. Therefore, this paper, which focuses on these issues, has its own academic significance.

2. Controversial issues concerning practical logic in critical pedagogy

From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, critical educational studies became an independent or relatively autonomous academic field of educational research in the United States. Since then, Apple and Giroux have become the two most notable scholars in this field. This chapter gains a perspective on the practical possibilities of critical pedagogy by estimating the distance between the theoretical discourses established by these two researchers and by considering a certain theoretical change that Apple underwent.

It can be said that critical pedagogy or critical educational studies began as curriculum studies; Apple made his debut in the curriculum field in 1976 and has since always worked as a "curricularist" (Apple & King, 1977). However, there is a clear, unignorable gap between traditional curriculum studies and critical studies. The former mainly tries to address issues of curriculum development, or to decide on curriculum design to implement in schools, while the latter might be called curriculum critique; in other words, its analytical discussions academically and critically clarify how the curriculum truly functions in the reproduction of social inequality or discrimination, although public education and its curriculum claim to be politically neutral and to be based on the modernized and liberal idea of liberation for all. Again, critical curriculum studies were built on neo-Marxist social thought, and in addition apply much more complicated and sophisticated theoretical tools of the social sciences than those referenced in traditional curriculum studies.

It is noteworthy that the tendency of critical curriculum studies to focus on analytic dis-

cussion has resulted in the creation of a new genre of educational research which might be called education criticism, and that this critically analytic style of educational research has helped us realize how school education contributes to the reproduction of social inequality or existing power relations. However, on the other hand, critical educational studies have often been criticized as too theoretical or dwelling at the level of critical analysis, unable to show schoolteachers any alternatives or specifics concerning the future direction of school education.

Here, Giroux's approach is significant because his discussions were more than simply descriptive and analytic; rather, he became engaged in more future-oriented normative and propositional arguments. Giroux (1992) criticizes the traditional and "liberal" thought of education—which omits the important political factors of curriculum and teaching—as well as "reproduction theories." Giroux admits that the significance of the latter is an effective criticism of the former, but points out that social and cultural reproduction theory is too pessimistic to bring more affirmative and positive aspects of education into view. He argues that it fails to discuss what schools and teachers should do, and calls for a new educational philosophy based on resistance theory, or "the language of critique and possibility," by applying Paulo Freire's thoughts on literacy and theories of postmodernism and postcolonialism (Freire, 1970/2018). In addition, he mentions that the purpose of schooling should be to develop critical and politically engaged citizens, and emphasizes the schema of "teachers as transformative and emancipatory intellectuals." These teachers listen attentively to social minorities and their silent voices and pay careful attention to their cultures. He calls this educational ideology the pedagogy of and for difference, or "border pedagogy" (Giroux, 1988; Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, pp.138-139).

We can interpret the relationship between Apple's and Giroux's approaches as oppositional and controversial. Critical educational analyses, like the early works of Apple, were of great consequence in that they clearly exposed how the modern, seemingly egalitarian educational system which included such politically liberal policies as affirmative action and Head Start truly functioned as a key factor contributing to the reproduction of social and cultural inequality. Despite this, these analyses did not provide any clear answers to the questions about how the loop of social and cultural reproduction can and must be broken, or how to reconstruct the system of public education. While unsatisfied with this academic situation, Giroux tried to tackle the problem squarely and clarify it from his own theoretical perspective (Giroux, 1992). Meanwhile, Apple criticized what Giroux calls border pedagogy and the language of possibility as "romantic possibilitarianism," characterized by political radicalism of some kind or compositions of a variety of novel concepts used in an acrobatic way (Apple, 2006; Whitty, 2013). Given the debate between these two educational theorists, how can we find a more realistically effective proposition or logic for what school education should be? To seek a clear answer to this question, let us examine the educational argument of Lisa Delpit, which Apple quotes positively and affirmatively and Giroux negatively and critically.

Delpit calls the dominant culture "the culture of power," and insists on the necessity for school education to transmit the elements of this to the dominated, such as poor, non-white people, as well, at least until the social liberation of the socially dominated has been realized to some extent. While she willingly admits the importance of democratic or progressive styles of teaching, which attach importance to self-esteem for the socially disadvantaged, she thinks that teachers must work to enable children to gain knowledge and skills related to the

dominant culture as long as that culture's dominance effect lasts (Delpit, 1988).

Apple supports the ambiguity of Delpit's opinion. Although he warns about the overuse of standardized testing and supports more democratic and progressive styles of curricula and instruction, such as the whole language approach and performance or portfolio assessment, he says:

> One of the historic problems of many progressive curriculum ideas (and one reason they have often lacked support in nonprivileged communities) is that they appear to de-emphasize the kind of official knowledge and skills that young people need to negotiate their way past the gatekeepers of socioeconomic access (Apple & Beane, 2007, p.18).

Giroux, on the other hand, criticizes Delpit's idea of "the culture of power," arguing that her concept of power is simply a form of domination and neither critical nor emancipatory. From his viewpoint, educators must understand that the daily experiences of marginality lend themselves to forms of oppositional and transformative consciousness. He finds it necessary "for those designated as Others to both reclaim and remake their histories, voices, and visions as part of a wider struggle to change those material and social relations that deny radical pluralism as the basis of democratic political community" (Aronowitz & Giroux, 1991, pp.138-139). In his argument, the importance of the reclamation of their own voices is emphasized, while entry into "the culture of power" is considered collateral, or rather negative. What he tries to highlight is not power that functions as a force of oppression, but rather power that works as a basis for resistance and self- and social empowerment. He puts much weight on the "authority" leading the process of empowerment; those able to assume this authority are those teachers that he names "transformative intellectuals" (Giroux, 1988).

How can we understand this contentious relationship between Apple and Giroux in envisioning a more socially just education? What practical logic can we derive from it regarding the concept of socially just education?

3. Toward a practical logic of socially just education in late modernity

3.1 The intermediate approach of "nonreformist reform"

To achieve the aim of solving the dilemmas of the dominated suffering in social situations where hierarchical power relations exist among such cultural elements as knowledge and skills, Apple's incremental remedy seems quite ambiguous compared to the resoundingly transformative approach of Giroux, as the latter considers it necessary to shift radically the existing power structures of cultures (the system of relations between the dominant and the dominated cultures). However, it is probable that Apple adopts this approach because he judges it to be more realistically effective.

Although this paper's inquiry is into the extended line of the normative and propositional arguments that Giroux can be said to have introduced to the field of critical education, the vector of its ensuing discussion is not oriented toward the course Giroux takes to radically change the power structures of cultures; rather, it follows the same approach as Apple, who was resigned to accepting the existing power structures of cultures as given and hard to change immediately, considering it important to guarantee every child the opportunity to acquire skills regarded as necessary in the dominant culture to correct inequalities in the status

quo. This is one of the aspects of this paper's approach to socially just education.

To make even clearer the difference between Apple's and Giroux's approaches to a more just education and society, it seems useful here to refer to a set of theoretical concepts formulated by Fraser (1997) to remedy social injustice. Fraser distinguishes two broad approaches to remedying injustice, which she calls "affirmation" and "transformation" respectively. By affirmative remedies for injustice, she means "remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the underlying framework that generates them," and by transformative remedies, she means "remedies aimed at correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework" (Fraser, 1997, p.23). She also directs our attention to a dilemma between the two strategies, where an affirmative strategy may be politically feasible but substantively flawed and a transformative strategy may be programmatically sound but politically impracticable (Fraser et al., 2003, p.79). Notable here is that Fraser mentions the possibility of taking a middle path between the two strategies which she calls "nonreformist reform" (Fraser et al., 2003, pp.78-82). She maintains: "At its best, the strategy of nonreformist reform combines the practicability of affirmation with the radical thrust of transformation, which attacks injustice at the root" (Fraser et al., 2003, p. 82).

Considering this series of theoretical concepts by Fraser, it can be understood that Apple positively acknowledges the importance of not only transformative but also affirmative strategies, while Giroux, who clearly criticizes Delpit, as seen above, takes a negative view of affirmative strategies to realize a more just education and society. In fact, Apple (1996) even highlights the significance of nonreformist reform in his own way, inspired by Andre Gorz (1967), while, on the other hand, Giroux's approach seems biased to a transformative and utopian strategy, based on their theoretical positions on Delpit.

Needless to say, it is always crucial to keep a transformative strategy in view to build a more just society, but because it is impossible to transform the social structure of dominance immediately and radically, we must adopt the intermediate approach of nonreformist reform while being aware of the dangers or dilemmas there. The final section of this paper revisits related implications.

3-2 Reorientation of the politics of redistribution and recognition in critical education

Next, it is possible to identify twisted relations between Delpit's perspective of the "culture of power" and what we see as the contemporary or late modern "culture of power." Delpit reminds us of the danger that progressive or democratic pedagogies tend to adopt a belittling attitude toward transmitting basic knowledge and skills as constituent elements of the dominant majority-centered culture and, as a result, to keep or put socially disadvantaged children in the same or more disadvantaged positions. On the other hand, the "culture of power" in a contemporary, globalized society in the era often called VUCA—volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity—mainly consists of so-called generic skills or problem-solving skills for real situations, which definitely have a closer affinity to the performance-based or portfolio assessment adapted by progressive education. Of course, such elements of what Delpit calls the culture of power, such as standard English, will continue exerting the effect of dominance as cultural capital in some ways, so Delpit's concern with the "culture of power" is not meaningless even today; yet, if the importance of late-modern or 21st-century skills is increasing in our society, we should recognize these types of skills as

a substantial part of the contemporary "culture of power."

This may well encourage us to introduce a viewpoint unlike Delpit's or Apple's by placing heavier emphasis on so-called generic skills, or an "open" education affinitive to the fostering of such skills, even while following Apple (1996) in terms of the nonreformist reform. It is true that Apple clarifies critically in his early work that in more "open" or progressive educational settings, "emotionality, dispositions, physicality, and other more general attributes are added to the usual academic curricula as overt areas one must be concerned with," and that consequently students will be stratified by an increased range of attributes, based on an ethnographic study by English sociologists (Apple, 1979, p.143; Sharp, Green, & Lewis, 1975). It may be said, however, that Apple changed his theoretical stance, at least in part. In 1995, he and the progressive curricularist James Beane edited *Democratic Schools*, along with school administrators and teachers who were familiar with both the traditions of progressive and critical education (Apple & Beane, 2007). This book includes several chapters of remarkable school or classroom stories by these educators, concerning the governance, curriculum, and instruction they implemented in their own public schools, located in areas of socially difficult circumstances. Since then, Apple has committed to some propositional arguments of curriculum and instruction and has come to hold "open" or progressive education in high regard. In his recent book, he applauds the experimental educational reform that has achieved amazing success in Porto Alegre in southern Brazil. Based on this case, which he thinks undoubtedly belongs to the tradition of progressive education and, at the same time, contributes to the empowerment of children of lower socioeconomic status, he writes the following passage, borrowing several concepts from Basil Bernstein:

> This emphasis on what has been called weak classification and weak framing demonstrates that such proposals for integrated curricula and more responsive pedagogies need not be simply middle-class phenomena, something that is assumed too often in the literature in the sociology of education (Apple, 2013a, p.109).

What factors should we consider as underlying his theoretical conversion? A memoir included among his early works indicates that since the 1990s, he has developed a sense of crisis concerning the expansion of neoliberalism and neoconservatism which have done serious damage to the strides achieved by liberal and more egalitarian policies: he bemoans the fact that the right has had such success in pulling people under their ideological umbrella, while the left has not (Apple, 2013b). He thus argues:

> The 'romantic possibilitarian' rhetoric of a good deal of the writing on critical pedagogy is not sufficiently based on a tactical or strategic analysis of the current situation, nor is it sufficiently grounded in its understanding of the reconstructions of discourse and movements that are occurring in all too many places. (Apple, 2013b, p.11)

He argues further that critical pedagogy must deliver to many schoolteachers something to "connect critical educational theories and approaches to the actual ways in which they can be, and are, present in real classrooms" (Apple, 2013b, p.10). The fruit borne by these ideas was *Democratic Schools*, published by an exceptionally large "professional" organization in the United States—the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development (ASCD)—which has more than 150,000 members, most of whom are teachers or administrators in elementary or secondary schools. Editing this book presented a valuable oppportunity for Apple

to learn from his coeditor and coauthors about brilliant examples of contemporary progressive educational practices also in line with critical pedagogy. In summary, he changed part of his theoretical position following deeper understandings of concrete practical examples. This is likely true of his appraisal of the educational reform in Porto Alegre. We should also remember that Apple emphasizes these educational practices as good examples of nonreformist reforms in public education (Apple, 1996; 2013a).

Let us note here the twin concepts of "the politics of redistribution" and "the politics of recognition," which form the backbone of Fraser's theory of justice and to which Apple often refers in his discussion on critical pedagogy (Fraser 1997; Apple et al., 2009; Apple 2013a). The former concept refers to the political dynamics and strategy concerning economic redistribution for redressing the unfairness of economic inequity, while the latter concept concerns the political dynamics and strategy of cultural recognition for redressing the unfairness of cultural non-recognition or misrecognition, such as discrimination and exclusion. Although Fraser admits that economic and cultural injustices are practically intertwined, she continues to distinguish the two analytically, along with two correspondingly distinct kinds of remedies, political-economic restructuring and cultural-symbolic change. This paper, however, considers the redistribution of "cultural capital," including certain skills, as its discussion focuses on and limits itself to school education. In fact, Apple takes note of Bourdieu's theory of reconversion strategies, or the attempt to convert between different types of capitals, such as economic capital and cultural capital, in order to realize effectively upward social mobility into a better social class or social status maintenance (Apple, 2006, p.106; Bourdieu, 1984, pp.125-68). Cultural capital, such as degrees and licenses, is closely connected to economic capital, such as salaries and property, which largely determines socio-economic status. In this sense, student achievement guarantees in education are a matter of the politics of redistribution in unequal societies. On the other hand, the politics of recognition are related to what is called identity politics, or the politics of the socially just recognition of minorities. The politics of recognition should be differentiated from the matter of guaranteeing every child certain academic achievements or skills; they signify the rendering of schools as inclusive cultural spaces where every child is respected, their existence is affirmed, and they can feel at home and learn safely and comfortably.

In light of this conceptual framework, this paper's approach to the issue of "culture of power" mentioned above, as part of a strategy for aiming at socially just education, corresponds to the politics of redistribution. Not only basic academic knowledge and skills but also more generic problem-solving skills, including non-cognitive skills, are needed, as they are essential elements of the dominant culture in late modern societies. Further, critical pedagogy as socially just education must place a high value on progressive curriculum and instruction, which is generally affinitive to these generic skills as an effective example of the politics of redistribution in late modernity, so that many disadvantaged children will not become further socially underprivileged and can obtain the necessary cultural capital.

Let us now turn to the issue of what the politics of recognition means to critical pedagogy, which we have not considered from this perspective thus far. Fraser (1997) illustrates it as "upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the cultural products of maligned groups" or "recognizing and positively valorizing cultural diversity" (p.15). When we apply this viewpoint to curriculum and instruction, it leads to shaping learning communities to be as inclusive as possible, out of consideration for class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, disa-

bilities, etc., setting learning tasks affinitive to minority as well as majority cultures without assuming only cultural elements familiar to the majority or the middle class. Finally, it will involve devising effective pedagogical methods to foster the self-esteem and self-efficacy of children with diverse cultural backgrounds, especially of socially disadvantaged children.

In the meantime, we must consider the conflicts between the politics of redistribution and of recognition, which Fraser calls "the redistribution-recognition dilemma" (1997, p.13). The politics of recognition tends to promote group differentiation, whereas the politics of redistribution tends to undermine it (Fraser 1997). In fact, there is a possibility that for the minority to acquire the majority culture, they may lose some or many of their own cultural characteristics. Regardless, it is reasonable to work out a sort of multicultural or bilingual education that can treat multiple cultures as equally as possible and enable children to learn about more than one culture, including their own, as well as the conflicts between them. Critical pedagogy for social justice must devise curricula and instruction that consider both the politics of redistribution and of recognition but do not present "the redistribution-recognition dilemma" to any serious extent.

3-3 Repositioning of the politics of representation in critical education

The last part of this section introduces one more factor as a constituent of critical pedagogy. Critical pedagogy based only on the politics of redistribution and recognition leaves children or learners as the object or target of the measures (redistribution and recognition) taken to realize a more socially just society, and lacks a clear link to the moment of the subject or agency taking actions to make the existing society more socially just. Critical pedagogy must aim not only toward building and practicing curricula and instruction through which children can acquire knowledge and skills so as to adapt themselves to contemporary society or to attain a certain social status, where their cultural and social backgrounds are respected and everyone is cared for, but also toward developing and spreading education through which children can grow to be critical, participatory, and active citizens. This kind of education seeks to cultivate political agency and literacy, important characteristics of any member of a democratic society. Further, it is not merely education built on the politics of redistribution and recognition, but moves beyond. In short, the politics of redistribution and of recognition are only necessary conditions for socially just education, not sufficient ones.

That said, this does not mean Fraser lacked a perspective on this in her theory of social justice. Actually, she has already added a third dimension beyond redistribution and recognition to her theory, calling it "the politics of representation" (Fraser, 2008). Of course, her motive for including this dimension differs very much from the author's; her focus is on ensuring "participatory parity" for those who are excluded from meaningful participation in the politics of social justice in the post-Westphalian regime arising from globalization, while the author's is to introduce the factor of democratic education as the political dimension of socially just education. However, there seems to be a clear parallel between Fraser's and the author's standpoints in that Fraser suggests that the theory of justice cannot be satisfactorily developed when dependent only on the two dimensions of redistribution and recognition; rather, it needs another political dimension. Meanwhile, the author asserts that socially just education cannot be built based only on the politics of redistribution and recognition; it requires the political dimension of democratic education as well. Just as Fraser explores the possibility of guaranteeing participatory parity to immigrants and refugees who are excluded

from political decision-making in an increasingly globalized world, the aim here is to do the same for children who are excluded from policy decision-making in public education and from political decision-making at various societal levels. In this sense, the right of children to be heard, or to express their views in all matters affecting them, as identified in the Convention on the Rights of the Child, is an important frame of reference (UNCRC, 1989).

What form is taken by logic which develops democratic education for social justice as "the politics of representation" in this context? Highly suggestive in this respect is the discussion by Gert Biesta (2011a), who develops the following argument, inspired by the French philosopher Jacques Rancière and the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe: although some liberal views about politics and the political community begin from the assumption that political identities are formed and must be formed before the activation of democratic politics, tending to focus on the insertion of individuals into existing socio-political orders, Biesta critically dismisses this kind of preparatory education for democracy as a "socialization conception" of civic learning and political education. He considers democracy as an ongoing experiment, and brings to the fore the notion that the formation and ongoing transformation of political subjectivities is what democratic politics is about. From this viewpoint, learning is not simply about acquiring knowledge, skills, competencies or dispositions, but also also involves exposure to and engagement with the experiment of democracy, which Biesta calls the "subjectification conception" of civic learning. In contrast to the socialization model, which sets the task of readying "newcomers" for participation in democratic deliberation and decision making, the subjectification model focuses heavily on how children and youth are engaged with the experiment of democracy, which is fundamentally open and always escapes its own full determination, as well as through which processes their political subjectivity is being formed and transformed.

To regard democracy as an experiment—and as "always undetermined political processes" (Biesta 2011b, p.141)—and to value children's and youth's engagement with this experiment would require a strong emphasis on their learning about democracy or politics through participation in a real democratic community or society, or real politics in democracy. If we understand democracy as always involved with conflicts and continually updating while pursuing universal values, the subjectification approach of civic education, as Biesta proposes, signifies a kind of citizenship education through which children and youth can enter into real politics in a democratic community or society to grapple with problem solving, and to sustainably transform themselves and the community or society at the same time.

Biesta points out that the socialization approach of civic education runs the risk of the "domestication" of citizens by setting the existing socio-political order as a reference point, while, on the other hand, the subjectification approach explicitly adjusts the focus to a more difficult method by which political agency and democratic subjectivity are supported and promoted through the engagement with the experiment of democracy. Political and democratic subjectivity in this sense is underpinned by the same sort of logic as critical pedagogy, because this subjectivity is not domesticated in the existing socio-political order but keeps a certain distance from it and transforms it into an object of critical reexamination (Biesta, 2011a). When we consider late modernity not only from the economic aspect of post-industrialism but also from the political aspect of the crisis of democracy, which is commonly seen in many advanced countries, critical pedagogy as socially just education must deepen its own consideration of curriculum and instruction, making it possible to cultivate political and

democratic subjectivity, as Biesta demonstrates. This is an educational translation of what Fraser calls the politics of representation.

To interpret and extend these arguments in a more practical way, let us consider the curriculum and instruction concerning the politics of representation in public education as follows. First, students' activities within a school or school community for students must include the opportunities to participate in school management with adults and to actively develop self-government in their own lives at school. Second, students must address real political issues existing outside school. As the issue of social justice cannot be isolated from the various political agendas with which we are faced, we would do well to develop curricula dealing with issues of real politics and apply teaching methods through which children can experience political judgments about actual issues and deliberations and discuss these judgments critically. Here this paper emphasizes the significant importance of designing curricula and instruction through which children can grapple with the same sort of authentic agendas with which adults are faced and the kinds of activities that lead to or promote real social and political participation.

4. Conclusion: Bottlenecks of socially just education

After elucidating the practical logic of what can be called socially just education in terms of three issues, that is, nonreformist reform, the dual politics of redistribution and recognition, and the politics of representation, the paper briefly organizes the boundary-crossing nature and inevitable dilemmas of socially just education as its bottlenecks.

As far as the nonreformist reform approach is concerned, it "quickly may become excuses for simple 'reformism,' for working in local sites … without struggling equally hard to make the connections to larger transformative movements" (Apple, 1996, p.110). We are unable to escape this dilemma, either practically or logically, which is why taming this dilemma and identifying some provisional solutions as needed each time requires bearing in mind that the nonreformist reform is not an approach that enables us to resolve simply the dilemma between an affirmative and a transformative strategy; rather, it compels us to constantly reflect upon and respond to this dilemma.

We will be always faced with a dilemma between the politics of redistribution and recognition as well, in that the former tends to aim toward the negation of differences while the latter aims toward the affirmation of differences. In addition, the former risks complicity in assimilating into the dominant culture and the latter in the conservation of cultural hierarchical relations. This dilemma becomes the more acute when the politics of redistribution includes the factor of cultural capital. In Fraser's theoretical framework, the politics of redistribution is basically the economic dimension of the emancipatory struggle for the realization of social justice, while the politics of recognition represents the cultural dimension. In contrast, as mentioned earlier, because this discussion aims to explore more equitable or just methods of public education, it is necessary to include knowledge and skills, as well as such competencies as self-regulation and perseverance, in the dimension of the politics of redistribution. Thus, in the field of education, because the issue of culture is rooted in both dimensions of the politics of redistribution and recognition, the conflict between these two dimensions becomes the sharper. The key here is to accept the inevitability of this dilemma and, at the

same time, to scrutinize specific manifestations of the dilemma in each particular context, and to be committed to developing educational practices that render the dilemma as minor as possible, through a reflective trial-and-error approach and as an interactive and collaborative effort.

Noteworthy here is a stance for integrating the politics of redistribution and recognition to surmount the dilemma between the two, which Frazer refers to as "cross-redressing." It means "using measures associated with one dimension of justice to remedy inequities associated with the other—hence, using distributive measures to redress misrecognition and recognition measures to redress maldistribution" (Fraser et al., 2003, p.83). As space disallows a detailed discussion of its multiple practical examples, the paper will briefly refer to just one case at a public school in Boston[2]. This school is characterized by its demographic diversity—racial and economic integration—and at the same time by its emphasis on a progressive, project-based, and collaborative curriculum and instruction, inclusive of all learning abilities. Here let us consider the function of a small space named "Peace Corner" in each classroom there.

This teaching method was originally created as part of the Montessori educational method, mainly as a learning environment in early childhood education. However, in recent years in the United States, it has developed its own unique style, named Calm Corner, Calming Corner, Calm Down Corner, or Zen Zone. It has been noted as a part of the innovations in learning environments for inclusive education, and in some states, has been recommended as an effective tool to support the learning of children with developmental disabilities. It is a kind of indoor shelter set up at the edge of each classroom where students can escape from their learning activities and rest on a couch on their own. During class, if they are feeling frustrated and don't feel like learning, they can go there whenever they like. In principle, this corner can be used for up to five minutes, with each student promising to set their own timer.

In what sense, then, can we say that Peace Corners function as a measure of the cross-redressing mentioned above? To understand this, let us review the dilemma that arises between the "politics of recognition" and the "politics of redistribution" surrounding Peace Corners.

From the perspective of the "politics of redistribution," or the guarantee of academic achievement for all students, the discipline that all students should concentrate in class can be seen as well worth endorsing. However, this discipline is likely to function in an exclusionary way, at least for some students. This is because children with socioeconomic disadvantages or with certain types of disabilities often face some difficulties in their learning activities at school. Therefore, recreating a classroom as a space where students who have difficulty concentrating in class are not simply regarded negatively, but are given a certain degree of positive recognition, is affinitive to the perspective of "politics of recognition." Nevertheless, again, allowing some students to disengage from learning activities is seemingly incompatible with the "politics of redistribution," which seeks to correct inequalities related to academic achievement. Such a dilemma seems inevitable in many schools. With this in mind, let us analyze how Peace Corners, as a "cross-redressing" strategy, contribute to partially resolving this dilemma.

To put it simply, the introduction of Peace Corners is, in a sense, a paradoxical strategy. In other words, they are expected to function as a tool to support students by empathetically

allowing them to temporarily skip learning, and by approving their temporary withdrawal from learning activities, and thereby to prevent them from withdrawing from learning for longer periods of time or even completely, and to help them to return to learning or to re-focus on the class. In short, Peace Corners can be seen as a strategy anchored in the "politics of recognition" which can contribute to the "politics of redistribution."

But that is not all. It is important to note that in the use of Peace Corners, it is in principle left to each child to decide when to enter and leave the corners and return to learning activities. While students are given approval to temporarily escape from learning, how and at what stage they should return to learning activities from there must be regulated and determined by the students themselves. Teachers do not tell them to go to Peace Corners. Children are essentially approved and encouraged to make their own decisions. The idea here is to foster a competency psychologically referred to as self-regulation, which is now being focused on as a part of academic skill. This is reflected in the approach often referred to as "the Zones of Regulation" in Peace Corners. Although not described in detail here, the Zones of Regulation are tools for helping even young children develop metacognition of their own mental states and self-regulation (Kuypers, 2011). If the competencies of metacognition and self-regulation are the "culture of power" or important cultural capital in late modernity, which socially disadvantaged students can be said to have more difficulty in gaining and building up, then Peace Corners can contribute not only to the "politics of recognition," but to the "politics of redistribution" at the same time. In this sense, it can be concluded that Peace Corners are a good example of the strategy which Fraser calls "cross-redressing."

Finally, the issue of the politics of representation partly "concerns the boundary-setting aspect of the political" and arises when "the community's boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly exclude some people from the chance to participate at all in its authorized contests over justice" (Fraser, 2008, p.19). Applying this viewpoint to public education, we focus on the presence of children and youth as excluded from the decision-making community of school management and educational policy, and consider ensuring that their voices are heard in this community and that they have the opportunity to participate in it as important components of the politics of representation for socially just education. However, various conflicts and tensions will inevitably arise, and there are no simple answers as to how and to what extent their voices can be reflected in the final decision-making process and their opportunity to participate can be guaranteed.

In consideration of these points, what we call a practical logic of socially just education is highly proximal to the approach Fraser describes using the term "a grammar of justice" with respect to what she names "reflexive justice." That is, it "incorporates an orientation to closure [i.e., problem solving], necessary for political argument, but that treats every closure as provisional—subject to question, possible suspension, and thus to reopening" (Fraser, 2008, p.72). However, this paper has not been able to address sufficiently the critical estimation of the distance between these politically philosophical arguments and their pedagogical application. This is an issue to be addressed in the future.

Notes

1 In academic research on curriculum and teaching, as in this paper, neither a theory of practice devoid of theoretical reflection nor a theoretical discussion without practical trials and underpinnings can be said to be meaningful. In this sense, we dare to use the term practical logic is de-

liberately used to suggest that this study emphasizes the reciprocal circulation between theory and practice. However, this scheme schema may be open to reconsideration, as is the issue of the so-called micro-macro link in the social sciences.

2 The brief case study here is based on data obtained by the author through a site visit at Mission Hill School, a public K-8 school in Boston, from June 10 to 14, 2019. Also, the practices described in Democratic Schools, edited by Apple and Bean (2007) and those introduced as "culturally relevant education" by Ladson-Billings (1995) are good examples.

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