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Democracy, dialogism, therapy, progressivism, anarchism, and other values in Martin Duberman's innovative pedagogy

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Abstract

My essay aims to develop my authorial map-account of Martin Duberman's various educational paradigms manifest in his experimental seminars at Princeton University, Hunter College, and Lehman College CUNY, 1966-1971 (and beyond) that I abstracted from his claims about his innovative educational teaching. I tried to develop a terrain of educational philosophical paradigms that shaped his goals, judgments, definitions of success, frustrations, and so on, and engage in a dialogic analysis of this terrain. His innovative pedagogy was driven by diverse and often conflicting educational philosophies involving democracy, dialogism, and therapy, among other values. I discuss the synergies and conflicts of these values in Duberman's pedagogy.

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Acknowledgment

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[1] https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Duberman

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Introduction

My interest in Martin Duberman's pedagogical experiment started on January 8th, 2019, with an email from my close colleague, educational historian Bob Hampel:

> Yesterday I read a terrific chapter by historian Martin Duberman[2]. In the mid-1960s at Princeton, he decided to drop grades and tests in an undergraduate seminar. He writes about coercion and authoritarianism in traditional education & yearns to escape those. The chapter focuses on how he and his 24 students (2 sections of 12 each) struggled with their new freedoms. The article resembles the book[3] you and I admire so much by Ira Shor[4].

I paid attention to this reference because Bob's prior reading recommendations were super interesting. The timing of his email was also good because it was winter break for both of us (in early 2019), and I could freely pursue my scholarly and teaching interests.

As an educational researcher, theoretician, and practitioner-innovator, I have frequently critiqued conventional education and developed deep research and teaching interests in Progressive Education (and its shortcomings), Dialogic Education, Democratic Education, and Education for Authorship (Matusov, 2009, 2011, 2015b, 2015c, 2021a; Matusov & Brobst, 2013; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016, 2017; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019; Rogoff, Matusov, & White, 1996). Reading Martin Duberman's (1969) chapter on his educational experiment and then his archives and other relevant writings, I immediately saw our affinity in some, but not all, educational concerns, innovations, struggles, emergent tensions, educational values, goals, trajectories of pedagogical experimentations, and pedagogical paradigms. Duberman's innovative pedagogical practice was complex, exciting, and inspirational for me, so I wanted to dive deeper to make sense of it. I also hoped that by examining his new approach, I would better understand my own practice and struggles. Specifically, I hoped that it might allow me to rethink the complex relationship between democratic and dialogic education.

The goal of my essay was to develop a map-account of Martin Duberman's various educational paradigms manifest in his experimental history seminars at Princeton University, Hunter College, and Lehman College CUNY, 1966-1971 (and beyond) that I abstracted from his claims (espoused educational paradigms) about his innovative educational teaching (in-use paradigms). In other words, I tried to develop a terrain and tensions of educational philosophical paradigms that shaped his goals, judgments, definitions of success, frustrations, and so on. I briefly discuss each paradigm using his texts, the relevant literature, and my own pedagogical experimentation. I acknowledge that I only scratched the surface in my discussion here because each educational paradigm of Martin Duberman deserves a separate article, if not a book (see such a book: Hampel, 2021). I wanted to engage in a dialogue with Martin Duberman, his pedagogical inspirations, challenges, discoveries, shortcomings, and failures to better understand them and inform my own internal dialogues and struggle for the development of my vision and practice of "authentic education." I expect that I am not alone in this endeavor so other innovative educationalists may join and extend our dialogues.

My primary sources were an article about his first experiment in the Fall of 1966 at Princeton University (Duberman, 1969), a chapter about his Spring 1969 seminar at Hunter College, CUNY, in his

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[2] Duberman, M. B. (1969). An experiment in education. In M. B. Duberman (Ed.), *The uncompleted past* (pp. 259-294). New York: Random House.

[3] Matusov, E., & Brobst, J. (2013). Radical experiment in dialogic pedagogy in higher education and its centaur failure: Chronotopic analysis. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.

[4] Shor, I. (1996). When students have power: Negotiating authority in a critical pedagogy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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book *Cures: A Gay Man's Odyssey* (Duberman, 2002a, pp. 144-161), several of Duberman's diary entries about his 1970 fall seminar in his book about Black Mountain College (Duberman, 2009a, pp. 268-274), and recollections of his 1977 and 1991 seminars (Duberman, 2002b, 2009b). I also read unpublished transcripts of his conversations with Peter Janney about his Fall 1969 seminar at Princeton University (PJ, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive), Peter Janney's 1970 senior thesis about the 1969 seminar (Janney, "History 308 revisited," 1970, Box 73, Folder 4, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive), Duberman's correspondence with Princeton faculty, administration, former students, and other educators located in the New York Public Library (NYPL archive) archive in several boxes titled "Duberman Papers." Finally, we met twice and engaged in email correspondence.

As with any map, my map is static, not fully reflecting important transformations in Martin Duberman's thinking. It also sought breadth more than depth. My goal was to start a discussion through these provocations rather than deeply examine each philosophical tendency in Martin Duberman and their often-complex relationships. By writing this essay, I wanted to make sense of and evaluate Martin Duberman's educational philosophies, and indirectly my own, and address educational theoreticians and practitioners who wonder what Duberman was trying to do and might want to affirm and/or critique some of his (and my) pedagogical ideas. I also wanted to explore the relationship between democratic education and dialogic pedagogy in a grounded way but studying a particular democratic dialogic pedagogy.

My account is "interested" and authorial rather than "objective." Thus, I do not try to eliminate my subjectivity from my account. On the contrary, I embrace my subjectivity – the history and the present of my own pedagogical struggles, innovations, aspirations, and values – as a guiding force of my authorship to highlight features of Duberman's educational philosophy that might be visible only from my perspective. Russian philosopher of dialogism Mikhail Bakhtin shared an old joke relevant to my discussion here: "the ancient Greeks did not know the main thing about themselves, that they were *ancient* Greeks, and they never called themselves that" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 6). I hoped to notice many philosophical features in Martin Duberman that come from my particular theoretical and pedagogical vista and my relationship with his vista that he might not know. In other words, the fact that Martin Duberman or somebody else might disagree with my observations or judgments of his educational philosophies does not *automatically* undermine their or my depiction or analysis. As I take full responsibility for my observations and judgments, I also welcome challenges. I commit to open-minded and honest replies to these challenges, which may involve changing my mind when I see an argument collapse or staying by it when I feel my argument still stands. I believe that the worth of my observations and analysis, or lack of it, lies in the totality of an unfolding critical dialogue. This research is not "me-search" (Nash & Bradley, 2012) but rather "you-search" of my dialogue with Martin Duberman and his innovative pedagogy. I use a lot of quotes, some of which are prolonged, not only to ground my dialogic analysis in Duberman's texts and pedagogy but also no create heteroglossia (cf. Bakhtin). In a dialogic tradition, I included Martin's and Bob's authorized comments on my paper (its earlier drafts), marked in brackets.

My primary goal in this paper is to understand the philosophical struggles of an educator starting democratic education for his college undergraduates. I begin with a brief description of Duberman's innovative educational practices and their most salient features as I see them. This description is a composite — it combines variations across his seminars. My goal here is to give the reader a sketch of his innovations, so the reader can visualize this educational experiment. Then I proceed to an abstraction of Duberman's espoused educational goals and his statements about what, from his point of view, constitutes meaningful education. My next and primary section is central to my essay as I focus on my description and analysis of Martin Duberman's educational paradigms. In this core section, I consider tensions among these educational paradigms. In my conclusions, I offer several ruminations about Martin Duberman as a particular innovative educator.

Description of Martin Duberman's innovative teaching practice

The declared goal of Martin Duberman's educational experiment in the second part of the 1960s was deceptively simple: "*The chief purpose of this experiment, as I saw it, was to seek new ways of establishing the kind of emotional climate of trust and honesty (so absent in most seminars) which would, in turn, make possible an authentic exchange of ideas*" (Duberman, 1969, p. 294). On the surface, Professor of History at Princeton University Duberman sought improvement of seminar teaching by turning his pedagogical attention to the "emotional climate of trust and honesty." However, in reality, his experiment was a radical redefinition of education and teaching. Before describing the substance of this redefinition, I will describe his class design.

HOW: Class Design

Duberman's class design involved what is often called "a rich learning environment" (Grabinger & Dunlap, 1995) and self-directed learning (Gray, 2013) – i.e., providing opportunities for students' self-study on their own terms. Duberman apparently invented what I later created and called "a curricular map" in my innovative teaching practice – a list of options students can amend (Matusov, 2015c; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). In each class meeting, in Duberman's and my classes, students decided what to study next class by deliberating and voting on the topics from the Curricular Map. The number of topics on the Curricular Map often exceeds the number of class meetings. Duberman felt responsible for providing diverse readings for each topic with comments on each reading in his history class on American Radicalism. "In order to preserve individual preference, I would make no assignment on any given subject, but would prepare lengthy reading lists, describe each book in detail, and encourage the student to choose that aspect or approach to a given topic which most appealed to him and to read those books which related to it" (Duberman, 1969, p. 267). In his and my classes, students also could/can add new topics and readings. In my case, when a student proposes a new curricular topic, I ask the student if they are interested in searching for relevant literature or other instructional materials – some do, while some do not (I provide literature in this case).

In both cases – Duberman's and mine – the Curricular Map was suggestive and inviting, providing learning choices for the students. It helped to develop the student-centered and student-chosen curriculum. "I hoped to accomplish both purposes-group identity and individual variety-through 'open-ended' reading lists. I had prepared in advance, I told them in that first session, about a dozen topics which I felt could concern us during the term: the Abolitionists, the Wobblies, the Socialists, the Populists, and so forth. None of these topics was mandatory; after each session, we would discuss, as a group, what we wanted to do the following week. I expected each group to reject some of my suggested topics, to deal with others only in passing, and to suggest alternative topics of its own" (Duberman, 1969, p. 267). In other words, the readings on the Curricular Map were recommendations, not assignments. However, although Duberman made non-reading legitimate in his class, he expected that the students would read at least something. For me, that assumption of students' engagement with reading reflects a Progressive educational philosophy tacitly adopted by Duberman. I will discuss this point later when I describe Duberman's educational philosophy paradigms.

The first meeting reviewed the course content and split the class into two smaller groups. Duberman wanted to start the seminar with what he called an "authority void." He believed that the teacher should not be the leader of the class (cf. Smith, 2017). This authority void led to an ambiguity observed by Peter Janney, a senior psychology major who took Duberman's history seminar and was writing the senior thesis about it. In his senior thesis, Janney described the authority void in the following way: "The first three formal sessions (9/23, 9/30, 10/7 [1969]) turned out to be a 'shakedown period.' There was a great amount of floundering; participants were not sure of themselves nor really sure of what was supposed to happen.

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This general insecurity created a sense of uneasiness which functioned to impede the group" (Janney, "History 308 revisited," 1970, pp.60-61, Box 73, Folder 4, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive). The students had to decide who would lead them and what they wanted to accomplish in the class. Sometimes students disagreed strenuously with each other when they had different preferences.

Duberman seemed to expect that the organization of the class would emerge from the students, by the students, and for the students[5], without much prompting by the teacher. This initial process might involve chaos, ambiguity, disorientation, and fights among the students. From Duberman's point of view, it might be good for students to take ownership of and responsibility for their education. Through this initial disorientation, Duberman wanted to (1) shake up the students' preconceptions and expectations about "normal class" and "normal education," (2) encourage students to ask what they want from education – take ownership of their own education, and (3) engage in philosophical, pedagogical, and organizational shared decision making. It seems to me that this initial authority void might be the best example of Duberman's "unstructured education" (his term) as education where the organizational structure and pedagogical design emerge from and are designed by the students and not imposed by the teacher.

After reading various descriptions of his innovative seminars, I visualize the "typical class" meeting in the following way. Duberman came in advance and stayed until the end of the class. The students trickled in, some early and others late, and could leave the class at their will. Depending on the meeting place, food and/or drinks could be available. At the beginning of the class, Duberman kept quiet, waiting for his students to start a discussion on the suggested literature or the curricular topic the students selected in the previous class. On a good day, students became engaged in a passionate, deep, intellectual, and open-minded discussion with each other while Duberman silently wrote notes, probably recording his impressions on their "group dynamics," group leadership, emotions, reflections on emerging ideas, relations, how people felt about each other, and their psychological dysfunctionalities. We lack his classroom notes, but we get an idea of their content through Duberman's reflective conversations with Peter Janney that occurred after the class meetings. For example,

> I [Duberman] think Brian's reaction is probably very complicated, and I can't pretend to know what all the elements that it consists of were. The way John challenged Matt seemed to me very effective. And I don't feel that way about the way Brian challenged Matt. At the end, it seemed that John's frustrations were over Matt's arguments, and it was on that level that he put his objection. Brian put his objection on a level that I'm not at all convinced was the level that was actually disturbing him. … I don't know, for sure, what was actually disturbing him, but I don't think it was the fact that the course wasn't proceeding chronologically. Which is one of the things he said. Or the fact that we were devoting time to theory. Something else I think was primarily bugging him, and I don't know what it. But whatever it is, I think he has the responsibility to try to find out what it is, and then to say it. I mean, to get it out. Instead of complaining after the session (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 7, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

Occasionally, some students addressed Duberman, and he replied, at times, reluctantly (e.g., when he was asked by a student why he became a historian, he "cleverly"[6] said that because he had attended graduate school). Occasionally he jumped into the students' discussion because it was interesting for him or painfully boring. Sometimes he provided provocations for the students' follow-up. At times, he joined the discussion because he wanted to introduce an alternative idea or provide the important missing information.

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[5] Cf. Abraham Lincoln's Gettysburg address, "government of the people, by the people, for the people" http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm
[6] I put the word "cleverly" in the quotation marks to reflect that I think his answer might have sounded a bit condescending and disingenuous to some of his students.

He also kept track of the students who were passive listeners, peripheral participants, or non-participants altogether (e.g., reading a newspaper during a class discussion). I did not find evidence that Duberman tried to summarize or conceptualize a discussion by recapping students' alternative positions.

As the semester progressed, Duberman often became increasingly dissatisfied with his students, the discussions, and the entire educational and interpersonal process[7]. Duberman was seemingly frustrated and irritated (he often called himself "impatient") when his expectations were not met. As expressed in his writing and in conversations with Peter Janney, Duberman occasionally felt bored or upset with some of the students' discussions, and he blamed his students for their passivity, disengagement, lack of preparation (readings), narrow mindedness, lack of curiosity and immaturity, irresponsibility for their own education and life, and dysfunctional dependency on professors. Even more, Duberman felt that the students' personal and interpersonal psychological dysfunctionalities, developed by the students long before the seminar began, spilled out in the class through students' egos, vanity, defensiveness, emotional and intellectual dishonesty, and so on. Furthermore, some students complained to Duberman about their perceptions of chaos, a lack of direction, other students' bossiness, and so on.

To address these problems, Duberman introduced a periodic practice of "self-criticism" in his classes as an offshoot of his interest in group therapy. The practice involved a participant (often Duberman himself) publicly sharing a concern or a grievance, analyzing it with the students, and developing proposals to deal with it. The self-criticism sessions interrupted regular discussions of the readings and curricular topics. Often Duberman defined the problem at hand as the students' lack of responsibility for their education and their life. For example, during one session, Duberman and Mrs. Green (a guest scholar) blamed the students for a poor discussion of "American Pragmatism" – the topic that the students chose themselves at the previous class meeting and for which Mrs. Green, an expert on this topic, was invited. The students were visibly unprepared because they did not read the suggested readings in advance, and Duberman admitted that the topic did not excite him. Students agreed, reluctantly, that they were irresponsible. "Mrs. Green joined the discussion at this point. She said that the refusal to take responsibility for one's own life – or, as a subdivision of that, to assume direction for one's own education – was probably the single most characteristic trait of Princeton (perhaps of all American) undergraduates. Her remarks cut deep. A few admitted the indictment painfully. More protested it, though not with much conviction. Later, with leisure to digest Mrs. Green's remarks and to confront them in privacy, others came to admit their validity" (Duberman, 1969, p. 279).

It seems that Duberman wanted his students to internalize his concerns about their educational irresponsibility. Often people (teachers, parents, other authorities) want the students "to take responsibility for their own learning," – but they treat the students as if accountable to some other authority beyond the students themselves. The teachers or other authorities (parents, schools, bosses, etc.) still judge them on the fact that the students did or did not take responsibility. This very act – and its legitimacy – annuls the purpose of students owning their own responsibility, confusing responsibility with accountability. The students start to feel accountable to some other authority, rather than becoming responsible to themselves – where the students would be the sole legitimate authority to judge their own responsibility and the acts that fulfill or not this responsibility[8].

In my own innovative teaching in the past, I had recognized these types of "self-criticism" sessions (without naming them that) as important educational practices and even a form of a curriculum (e.g., see my description and critique of my "peanut butter sandwich" learning activity in Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019). In one of my innovative graduate classes in 2007, in the middle of the semester, I

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[7] Especially in his evening sections in Fall 1966 and Fall 1969.
[8] I am thankful to Ana Marjanovic-Shane for this point.

refocused the class on blaming and shaming my students for their lack of responsibility for their own education, professional development, and life. For example, I asked my graduate students to give examples of their engagement in academic material of their interest beyond what was required from them by their professors. When they provided examples, I showed them that in all cases, these examples were embedded in the classroom assignments and not their self-initiated learning. Later, in my book written with the help of one of the participants in the class, I labeled it "the blame-and-shame educational chronotope[9]" (Matusov & Brobst, 2013) – the teacher's impatience with, irritation by, annoyance with, putting blame and shame on their students for them coming short of the teacher's high expectations of the students. At times, it seems to me that Duberman was also aware of this blame-and-shame chronotope that he promoted in his classes,

> Yes ... yes, I was uncomfortable too. I felt it was maybe precipitous, brought out then, and also it was maybe too emotionally I myself was too emotional. That's not the right word – … things about my motivation for bringing it up were showing and were contaminating the discussion. Like, my annoyance. You know – "Come on, shape up!" – that was implied. And it shouldn't have been. Because that just provokes guilt. It was tantamount to my saying, to the group, you know, You're a bunch of dullards. You're boring the shit out of me. Do something! Let's get a little action! And that's not constructive.
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> Because it makes people feel guilty. [Peter Janney, "yes" under this several times] It makes people feel like dopes. You know. "We're not performing well. Duberman is bored" (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 31, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

Analyzing post-class interviews with my own students, I concluded that this practice is extremely problematic and even irresponsible, professionally unethical, on the professor's part. It is often disabling and might even, at its extreme, induce a sense of existential despair in some students (see Matusov & Brobst, 2013, for example). Since 2007, I have abandoned this practice. I replaced it with a "Mid-term town hall meeting" in which my students discuss what works and what does not work for them in our class. They make proposals for class improvements, and we vote to accept or reject them after collective deliberations on their pros and cons (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017). Although the students' educational desires are often a subject of our classroom public discourse (e.g., what kind of student they are to select a particular pedagogical regime to fit them), the issue of their (ir)responsibility remains private for my students unless they want to share it with the class and/or with me as their teacher. We address other emerging ad hoc issues in my classes, which cannot wait or occur after the mid-term, in the spirit of the Mid-term town hall meeting.

Apparently, Duberman paid a lot of attention to the therapeutic effect of his seminar on his students and himself, focusing on "group dynamics," "T-groups," "encounter groups," and "sensitivity groups" fashionable in his time.[10] Duberman prompted his students to reveal their feelings (especially negative feelings) about themselves, other students, and him. These feelings were considered to be true,

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[9] Russian philosopher of dialogism Bakhtin defined "chronotope" as a unity of time, space, and axiology where events are tied and untied (Bakhtin, 1991; Matusov, 2015a). For example, in my classes with graduate students, I ask them the question, "What is 2+2?" out of the blue, and they all answer: "Four," even though my question did not make sense in the context of our ongoing discussion. Even when I explain my experiment to them and repeat the question, the students report how difficult for them to resist and not say, "four." I am always surprised by the ease with which my students reply: "Four," despite the fact that my question is out of context, and it is a known-answer question. However, when I asked this same question out of the blue when I bumped into them on the campus, outside the class, they become perplexed, "What?" "Why?" "I'm sorry…" "Hmm?!" In my analysis, in the classroom, the assignment chronotope of conventional is invoked – it forces the students to answer any question that the teacher asks without questioning the legitimacy or the purpose of the question. In contrast, everyday chronotope focuses people on searching for reason and purpose of questions that other people ask, assuming that the other people search for unknown information of their interest.

[10] In the fall of 1970, Duberman began to use encounter group techniques, such as the "hat game' (whoever held the hat was the discussion leader), falling backwards to be caught by a classmate, or standing in the center of a circle for others to touch, followed by a discussion of the feelings evoked.

unquestionable, and unjudgable – genuine and valuable feedback for a person to work with. Duberman believed that these revelations promote not only intellectually honest dialogic academic endeavors but also personal growth in the participants, including himself, which seemed to be even more important for him than the former.

In sum, Duberman's class design aimed to promote deep ontological critical discussions and his students' ownership of their education (and life). At the same time, he struggled to see the students' educational activism, passion, and depth of their contribution and commitment. To address these issues, he introduced self-criticism and group therapy.

WHY: Goals of the education defined by Martin Duberman

Reading Duberman's claims about his innovative pedagogy, I abstracted his notions of the ideal features of education. He proposed the following goals in his analysis of the 1966 seminar:

- Self-discovery: "Who the hell am I?" What do I want to do with my life?" curiosity, self-exploration, and risk-taking (Duberman, 1969, p. 262).

- Students' self-evaluation and definition of their own educational goals and successes rather than pleasing the teacher.

- Students' setting learning tasks for themselves (i.e., self-assignments, learning journeys) rather than the administrators and the teachers imposing their tasks, students' ownership of their own education.

- Students taking "pleasure in their own lives."

- Emotional and relational self-exposure: Students should expose their deepest personal assumptions.

- Self-awareness. "The seminar should hold one and only one pursuit sacrosanct: self-knowledge through group interaction" (p. 281).

- Students' "digestion and personalization" of the learned information (p. 265).

- Student's personal life growth through group interaction. "The chief function of a university should not be, as is currently assumed, the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge, but rather the encouragement of individual growth. Factual information can aid in that growth, but to do so it must be made relevant to the individual's needs; it must pose some problem, extend some challenge, answer some longing if it is to be incorporated rather than merely appended" (p. 289).

- Students become their own authorities in their education and life.

- Students are actively involved in self-studies and discussions through self-regulation and taking responsibility for themselves.

- "We want students to 're-examine their beliefs'; that, we like to say, is the whole point of education. Since those beliefs were first formed in a multidimensional setting, they cannot be successfully challenged in a setting that is one-dimensional" (pp.289-290).

At the same time, Duberman strongly criticized traditional pedagogy, separating cognitive and affective aspects of learning. "Indeed, little important information can be transmitted if an emotional transaction is not simultaneously in process, for an individual will not expose his deepest assumptions nor be able to perceive those of another if their relationship is purely intellectual" (Duberman, 1969, p. 261).

Philosophical paradigms

I am amazed by the complexity of Duberman's pedagogical ideas, doubts, values, frustrations, and goals, as if there were many different Martin Dubermans, some in conflict with each other and some in temporary alliance or in deep affinity. Their relationships changed over time. They differently populated the Real Martin Duberman – the person he was and wanted to be. To capture Martin Duberman's complexity, I abstract his diverse educational philosophical paradigms. I define an educational philosophical paradigm as an educator's relatively cohesive and self-contained value-driven vision of desirable education.

Below I define Duberman's educational philosophical paradigms that I perceive, provide examples of them in his writing, and briefly comment on them from my own pedagogical vista. I was coming to these paradigms from his texts rather than imposing the paradigms in advance. Of course, knowing some of the paradigms in advance helped me to recognize them in Duberman's texts. Some of the paradigms were conceptually new to me. I am aware that my list of his seven paradigms might be incomplete and problematic, revealing not only Martin Duberman's views (and struggles) on education but my own views and struggles. Also, the order in this list is somewhat random, probably reflecting my own interests. I also briefly focus on the relationships among these paradigms and Duberman's philosophical struggles. I provide evidence of these paradigms in Duberman's espoused theories, class design, critique of conventional education, his goals and expectations, his frustrations, and so on. I consider how much Duberman was aware of these paradigms. Finally, I analyze the limitation of each paradigm in Duberman's practice and thinking.

Democratic Education

The democratic education paradigm requires an educator's full faith that their students are the final authority for and authorial agency of their own education and life (Klag, 1994; Neill, 1960). The students have an unalienable right to define the purposes of their own education, their own curriculum, instruction, and organization of their education (with or without the help of a teacher or peers), including their decision to engage or not to engage in their education. Essentially, democratic education is the affirmation of education as self-education (Matusov, 2021b). When faced with conflicting choices for their collective education, the students have the right to make decisions democratically, which may include public deliberation, voting, delegation of a decision to others, flipping a coin, deliberative consensus, compromising, splitting the class into smaller groups, studying solo, and so on. Democratic education rejects the imposition of curriculum on the students, teachers' unilateralism, legitimacy of the institutional authority unsanctioned by the students, mandatory attendance, non-consensual assignments, unconditional obedience, pleasing the teachers and institutions, grading (unless asked by the students), and so on (Gray, Riley, & Curry-Knight, 2021; Greenberg, 1991; Holt, 1976; Illich, 1983; Llewellyn, 1998; Neill, 1960; Rietmulder, 2019).

Almost all these themes can be found in Duberman's experiment. He had no grades, no teacher-imposed assignments, no mandatory attendance, and no imposition of the curriculum. To facilitate his students' curricular choices, he introduced an open-ended Curricular Map, where the students could add new topics and vote on a topic for the next class.[11] He was clearly trying to avoid the teacher's unilateralism.

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[11] In the available texts, Duberman did not mention if some of his students chose to do some other learning projects on their own even when a topic of their interest was not picked up for a class discussion. In my classes, some of the students reported doing that.

He was sharing his and other students' concerns and problems experienced with the class and the students. "I had played a more active role which, by the end of the session, left me uneasy, so I asked whether the group thought the meeting had been too structured in comparison with the earlier sessions, and my role too prominent" and encouraged a group decision making and searching for solutions (Duberman, 1969, p. 271).

Duberman was familiar with the contemporary literature on democratic education and deliberately subscribed to this paradigm. He had developed his interest in democratic education around 1962 "when some students suggested that I read A. S. Neill's Summerhill. I did, and was moved by Neill's candor and exhilarated by his demonstration that children flourish when they are allowed freedom. After discovering Neill, I read Paul Goodman, Edgar Z. Friedenberg, and, most significantly and most recently, John Holt[12] – in other words, the 'romantics' of educational theory, as they have been dubbed by their critics" (Duberman, 1969, p. 260).

At the same time, the paradigm of democratic education was internally challenged by Duberman's frequent frustrations, dissatisfactions, and impatience with his students' lack of engagement in the academic material, their passivity in the classroom discussion, coming unprepared to class, skipping class, lacking commitment to the chosen topic, intellectual closed-mindedness of some students in some discussions, and lack of curiosity, self-discipline, and maturity. Throughout his reflections on his innovative teaching practice, Duberman was resentful when his students "abused their educational freedoms": when, in his view, they were not capable of or were not ready for the educational freedoms and opportunities he provided. At times, during his reflective conversations with Peter Janney, he felt temptations to go back to traditional education because the quality of the academic classroom discussions had frequently been more satisfactory, in his judgment. But I did not find an example that he actually moved back.

In my own innovative teaching and pedagogical experimentation, I have also registered similar resentment toward my students (Matusov & Brobst, 2013). I suspect this partly reflected the educators' struggle caused by a competing educational philosophical paradigm, namely a paradigm of progressive education, which was very powerful but apparently invisible for Duberman (and for me in the past). As I will discuss below, democratic education and progressive education paradigms are profoundly incompatible (Matusov, 2021a).

Ontological Dialogic Pedagogy

Dialogic pedagogy involves educators' appreciation of dialogue for education. I have conceptualized two major types of dialogic pedagogy: instrumental and ontological. Instrumental dialogic pedagogy views dialogue as a tool/instrument/means for effective learning and teaching or promoting social justice. Ontological dialogic pedagogy views dialogue as the main process, the quality of human relationships, and the main medium of human sense-making, understanding, and humanity itself (Matusov, 2009; Sidorkin, 1999). Ontological dialogic pedagogy sees education as students' development of their own authorship and voice in the practices of their interest. This dialogic pedagogy is called "ontological" because it is concerned about the "being of knowledge" – i.e., "why do I care about this particular knowledge?"[13]

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[12] In my reading, John Holt represents a crossover of democratic education and anarchist education. I am thankful to Christel Hartkamp for pointing to an anarchist side of Holt's pedagogy.

[13] This understanding of ontology as "being of knowledge," highly developed in the existential philosophy of the 20th century, is directly opposite to the classic theological-philosophical tradition of defining the term "ontology" as "knowledge of being." Bakhtin articulated the difference between these understandings of ontology in the following way, "Thought about the world and thought in the world. Thought striving to embrace the world and thought experiencing itself in the world (as part of it). An event in the world and participation in it. The world as an event (and not as existence in ready-made form)" (Bakhtin, 1986, p. 162). The ontology as "being of knowledge" ("thought in the world") is concerned with the questions of "why and how I care about knowing" – "why bother and who cares." In contrast, ontology as "knowledge of being" ("thought about the world") is concerned with the questions of verification, "how you know that it is true."

According to this educational paradigm, students study what concerns them here-and-now with *their hearts and minds* – what excites, puzzles, and troubles them in their lives – rather than as preparation for life in the future (Matusov, 2018; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019). According to the ontological dialogic paradigm, in genuine education, participants' ideas are not just intellectual but also deeply ontological. Similarly, Duberman argued that,

> Opinions, never shaped solely by reasoning, are always influenced by personal relationships and encounters, themselves freighted with emotion, and thus are most likely to be exposed and examined in an environment that contains an emotional dimension. We want students to "re-examine their beliefs"; that, we like to say, is the whole point of education. Since those beliefs were first formed in a multidimensional setting, they cannot be successfully challenged in a setting that is one-dimensional (Duberman, 1969, pp. 289-290).

Likewise, Mikhail Bakhtin insisted that "A person enters into dialogue as an integral voice. He participates in it not only with his thoughts [worldviews] but with his fate and with his entire individuality" (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 293).

As I suggested above, a part of Duberman's class design was driven by this ontological dialogic pedagogy. He organized his class as a discussion-based seminar of small groups (12 students) with no preset curricular endpoints. This small-size dialogic seminar reminds me of an insight by dialogic philosopher Dmitri Nikulin who insisted that a genuine dialogue is possible in a small group limited by the numbers of Greek Graces (3) and Greek Muses (9) (Nikulin, 2010)[14]. Duberman argued for earned epistemological and pedagogical teacher authority rather than for institutional teacher authority. He insisted on students' critical self-evaluation of their education rather than summative assessment via grades, which often leads to students' subordination to the teachers' demands. He constantly asked his students for feedback on the class and his teaching; I also organized problem-solving of emergent issues in my courses through classroom dialogue. Moreover, Duberman welcomed surprises: "'Rituals of legitimacy,' as one student put it, should not take precedence over the unorthodox and the unexpected, especially since the latter could often produce authentic experience" (Duberman, 1969, p. 281). He wanted his students to challenge their own cherished ideas: "The special value of an unstructured classroom setting is that it throws together a heterogeneous group able to challenge rather than simply reinforce each other's views" (Duberman, 2009a, p. 270). He expected, valued, and even actively promoted the messiness of the class discussions:

> Talk, by its very nature, is spasmodic, discursive, repetitive, even at times incoherent. To try to trim it into neat, orderly packages is to drain it of life… human exchange is fullest when it operates on a variety of levels, including the emotional, the irrational, the fantastic. Unfortunately, most educational situations concentrate on only one level of human interaction-the rational. In doing so, they try to make people into what they are not-thinking machines-and end by turning the average seminar into an exercise rather than an experience (Duberman, 1969, pp. 288-289).

One of Duberman's consistent goals was the ontologization of education, uniting the study of academic content and the students' lives. "Opinions, never shaped solely by reasoning, are always influenced by personal relationships and encounters, themselves freighted with emotion, and thus are most likely to be exposed and examined in an environment that contains an emotional dimension" (Duberman,

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[14] Alternatively, Duberman's class design of having small-size groups could come from his interest in encounter group therapy (see below). Also, it may have two sources: dialogic and therapeutic. In addition, as Bob Hampel shows in his book, small-size groups also reflect Princeton's tradition of precepts (Hampel, 2021).

1969, p. 289). As education gets ontologized, it attempts to transform life. "In about the fourth week, Sherm and a few others suggested that since the seminar was studying radicalism and was itself a radical experiment in education, it followed that its members should take the lead in 'radicalizing' its own community-namely, Princeton University. Aside from the inherent value of the undertaking, it would, secondarily, enable seminar members to discover empirically the problems characteristic of all radical movements" (Duberman, 1969, p. 281). The students proposed what my colleagues and I called an "Open Syllabus" (Matusov, 2015c; Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2017) – students have the right to design their own syllabi. The Princeton students' "Statement of Principles" called for even more—students should be able to create the (ungraded) course and select the professor. Shared with several administrators and faculty, the manifesto by itself changed nothing.[15]

According to Duberman's sensibility, a terrific classroom dialogue involves passionate drama of "person-ideas" (Bakhtin's term, see Bakhtin, 1999; Matusov, 2009). Duberman encouraged disagreements as a sign of genuine education and dialogue:

> At Black Mountain [college], everyone was constantly learning — at lunch, weeding the gardens, anywhere — and you had to get along. Yes, people left and friends fought. It was hardly a peaceful environment. But conflict is an essential part of development, and that is another thing I find lacking in Princeton. At Black Mountain, the whole person put himself on the line and dealt with other whole persons, which meant, inevitably, a great deal of confrontation and disagreement, much of which, if the spirit is right, can be educative. Agreement should not be the highest value. But Princeton prizes agreement, consensus, and moderation (Interview with student "Jeff," Spring 1969, The audiotape is in Series VIII, Sr. 2781, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

A good example of that is the dramatic dialogue between two students in Duberman's history seminar on American Radicalism at Lehman College in the spring of 1977 in a class meeting on the topic of "Utopias, Past and Present" (Duberman, 2002c). According to Duberman, the class had good chemistry of "trust among people of widely differing temperaments" where the participants could "risk disagreements without creating lasting dislike" (p. 238). "The basic disagreement throughout was between Janet, strongly committed to radical feminist values and scornful of politics as an agency of change, and Tony, a macho, twenty-year-old Italo-American, furious at the "system" that had kept his hardworking family bound to a wretched tenement in the South Bronx. Tony had announced early that he *thought* he was a socialist… A strong woman and a strong man with differing outlooks on the world, … the discussion of Utopias brought them into direct conflict" (pp. 238-239). Janet experienced life in a commune, liked it a lot, and planned to join it after graduation. Meanwhile, Tony considered communal life basically as bourgeois frivolous escapism ignoring class-based structural inequality in the broader society.

> [Tony to Janet:] "How the hell can you go off and plant vegetables when the country's falling apart? For Chrissake! Unemployment's 40 percent in the ghettos, the corporations are getting bigger and fatter every day while the rest of us grub for rent money, ecological disaster is—"
> "—I can't solve any of that. Nobody can."
> "You can damn well try."
> Some sniper action started on Tony's right: exceptions were taken to his figures (40 percent of *teenagers* in the ghettos), halfhearted interjections were made on the order of "where is it any better? Russia? China? Ha!" Still, almost everyone bought Tony's description of our society as one in which the privileged few

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[15] From Bob Hampel: one year later, a much tamer version began: up to ten student-initiated courses could be approved by Princeton's Course of Study Committee. The requirements fell short of the freedom of Open Syllabus: at least eight students had to commit to take the class, and the proposal had to include the course readings and requirements. Minutes of the Committee on the Course of Study, October 26, 1967, in Box 56, folder 4, Office of the Dean of the Faculty Papers, PUA.

exploit the many. Janet bought it too. She simply reiterated her view that nobody knew what to do about it. The mess had gotten out of control. The only way to lead a decent life was to get the hell out, find some kind of meaning within oneself and with a few close friends. She didn't mean drugs, sex, and discos, but several nods of agreement in her direction seemed prompted more by visions of hedonism in the streets than asceticism in the woods. Because Tony himself seemed at an impasse at that point—unable to translate his anger into a set of political propositions — we decided to move directly into a discussion of "the theory and practice of socialism." It lasted a month. Tony began it with a description and analysis of our assorted social ills that roused little opposition. Since many Lehman students come from low-income families and are also members of minority groups, they're well aware of the vast disparities of income and opportunity that Tony pointed to, and even those students from more privileged backgrounds expressed dismay and discomfort over those disparities. Nor was a large majority in the seminar slow to buy Tony's argument that the blame for our assorted ills should be placed directly on the interlocking alliance of hereditary wealth, federal officialdom. Pentagon brass, and multinational corporations. They were only a little slower in agreeing that the whole package could accurately be labeled "capitalism."

It was when we tried to sharpen and extend Tony's initial indictment that the seminar consensus broke down. Some of the students (preeminently Tony) argued that capitalism's defects were functional: the direct result of private ownership of the means of production. Others thought the defects incidental: the failure of the government to curb the "excesses" of big business. The few conservative students preferred to cite the cosmos: "the poor always ye have with you."

Tony's insistence that only socialism offered the needed vision and tactics for change led to a prolonged squabble over definitions that fragmented opinion still further. Was the chief identifying feature of "socialism" public ownership of the means of production and distribution? If so, wouldn't that make the Soviet Union the epitome of socialism— though it suppresses those basic freedoms of speech et al., which everyone agreed (no defenders here of the view that such freedoms are mere window dressing) were essential aspects of any society worth inhabiting? Besides: public ownership by exactly whom and of precisely what? Should the "public" be defined as on-the-job worker collectives, or as local communities, or as state and federal political assemblies? Should "ownership" be of basic industries and utilities only, of small businesses as well, or of all private property?

Trying to cut through the thickening knot, someone suggested socialism might best be defined not in terms of outright ownership of production but as "increased social planning." That opened up a different, but no less difficult set of questions. Who would do the planning? And to whom would they be accountable? Wasn't there a danger of concentrating power—and the potential for its abuse—still further? Of inflating an already swollen bureaucracy? Of multiplying regulatory agencies that had long since proved their susceptibility to cooptation by the very special-interest groups they were meant to control? But perhaps it was possible, someone said, to accomplish planning on a local level, to decentralize decision-making. Objections arose to that, too. Many felt that such problems of national scope as racism, poverty and gender discrimination could not safely be left to local initiative, resources—and prejudice.

Yet another shift followed: perhaps socialism should be defined in terms of ends not means: that is, by its focus on the plight of the unfortunate, by its insistence that highest priority be given to the needs of the least privileged. That seemed to bring us back full circle: how to devise a strategy for achieving those goals? Even if we succeeded, someone asked, what made us think that those in power would voluntarily relinquish it? And if they didn't, what then? Should we rely on a process of reeducation? Attempt violent overthrow? Pursue the "long march through the institutions"? Most thought the first tactic naive, the second immoral, the third impractical. Discussion of the last unearthed additional complexities—and a further babble of discord. Given the ethnic and racial divisions in the country and the average American's distrust of collective action, how could we hope to get the needed marchers? And even if we somehow managed, what would prevent outright government repression?

As conundrums multiplied, spirits sagged. Having run into my own roadblocks on these questions for a decade, I wasn't of much help. I told them that we'd recapitulated in a month the essence of a debate that has been in process for a hundred years and (putting the best face on it) that we had to accept the frustration of realizing that no easy answers were available. "You mean *no* answers," someone shot back—to a general, melancholy nodding of heads.

"Typical American impatience!" Tony yelled impatiently. "If we can't get instant results, the hell with it! The revolution happens Wednesday at 5:00, or it's down to the disco!"

"Yeah, keep on dancing! Smoke more, think less!"

"Very funny," Tony said morosely. "You're dancing on your own graves."

"And what are you gonna do, Karl Marx?"

"Build a bomb shelter in the backyard."

That bit of gallows humor wound up the month-long discussion, give or take a few pep-talk platitudes I felt impelled to throw in (mostly because Tony looked so miserable) about this being "a creative period of dissolution . . . have to expect conflict over strategy . . . clarification emerges during the process of struggle . . . " I think I even said, "where there's a will there's a way," blanching less at the cliché than at the knowledge that when all ways seem blocked, the will atrophies. Janet picked up the beat. There was a way, she said, but we'd been looking in the wrong places. "With typical male fanaticism, you've poured energy into a hyper-rational analysis of who has power and how to get it. Even if you managed to come up with some blueprint for a brave new world, I wouldn't want to live in it."

Tony (angry): "Meaning?"

Janet: "Meaning you'd shift rulers, not values. Any lasting social transformation has to be preceded by *self*-renovation."

Tony (angrier): "Meaning?"

Janet: "As radical feminists have been saying for years, we have to reclaim the world of the senses and emotions. Men—some women too—have to rediscover their capacity for tenderness and intimacy, a capacity now submerged under the patriarchal imperatives: tabulate, accumulate, dominate—imperatives perpetuated by the institutions of marriage and the nuclear family."

An elegant summary, I thought to myself. Before I could say so, Tony jumped in: "More bourgeois subjectivism!"

Janet: "And what's your anger — *objective*?"

Tony: "You bet your sweet—!"

Janet (and ten others): "—sexist pig!"

Tony (and two others): "—self-indulgent child!"

We got beyond the name-calling pretty fast. Apologies were offered all around, and some ideological ground—but only some—given. Tony declared his agreement with the feminist demand for "equal pay for equal work" and also his support for ERA—despite his feeling that "most women lacked the stamina and aggressiveness needed to perform well in certain fields." ("We're not interested in becoming professional football players," one of the women snapped back.) On her side, Janet acknowledged that the classic socialist goal of ending material want should be high on everyone's list of social priorities. Somewhat less readily, she conceded that where material deprivation was severe, it might be premature to talk of the need for a psychosexual revolution.

These concessions aside, Janet and Tony remained fervently at odds. Tony continued to insist that the radical feminist call for an end to traditional marriage and the nuclear family and its insistence that there were no innate biological (and thus psychological) differences between the sexes was "simply foolish." Janet quoted Marcuse in support of her view that the sexual liberation movements (feminist and gay) were the potential cutting edge of revolutionary change. Tony blanched briefly at one of his heroes being used against him, but rapidly rebounded. With millions starving, he said, it was "irresponsible" to put primary emphasis on destroying sex-role stereotypes and downright "moronic" to think (Janet had also quoted Norman O. Brown and Wilhelm Reich) that "resurrection of the body," "polymorphous perversity" or any of that "bisexuality/androgyny junk" could be a matter of even remote importance to *serious* people (Duberman, 2002c, pp. 239-244).

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The debate between Tony and Janet, ending as it did in minimal concessions or sympathy, exemplifies the obstacles to coalescence. Like many male Marxists I know, Tony is a cultural conservative. He'll fight the establishment tooth and nail (yes, tooth and nail: the male style) on economic issues, but otherwise tends to share the reigning patriarchal values. Tony believes in the importance of hierarchy, reason, authority (in his case, Marx),

leadership, order, discipline. He tends to over-rationalize experience, is impatient with personal idiosyncrasy ("subjectivism"), inattentive to realities (like intimacy) that cannot be precisely measured. He wants to expand access to material goods, but not definitions of humanness. He wants to destroy distinctions between the classes, but is wary of challenging those that separate the sexes. Reverse all the above, and we see the alternate strengths—and limitations—of Janet's vision.

Most of the young in my seminars (and throughout the country) are not absorbed by Tony's or Janet's concerns. They don't raise (let alone dwell on) issues posed by socialist or feminist analysis. Yet it would be inaccurate to say (as many have) that they're indifferent to them. During our discussions, Janet and Tony hardly had the floor to themselves. Almost everyone joined in at some point, a nerve struck, an old allegiance challenged, a new option clarified. What surprised me wasn't the amount of passion (of which this generation is supposedly devoid) that got invested in the debate, but the extent to which opinion clustered on Janet's side. I hadn't expected students from working class families that tend to stress traditional values to be drawn to an "extreme" feminist position. Well, I thought, that's New York City—it is different. But then I read some surveys of campus attitudes elsewhere, and Lehman didn't seem so atypical after all (Duberman, 2002c, pp. 246-247).

This long fragment illuminates Duberman's "theory-in-action" (Argyris & Schön, 1978) of his ontological dialogism. Duberman's ontological dialogue does not seek agreement at its "end" – production or reproduction of knowledge. It is not a Habermasian, consensus-seeking dialogue (Habermas, 1984; Latour, 1987). Rather, Duberman's classroom dialogue is a critical examination of deeply-hold, deeply-committed, deeply-cherished personal truths ("pravda" in Russian[16]) (cf. the concept of "person-idea" in Bakhtin, 1999) – Janet's feminism versus Tony's socialism – through bringing evidence and counterevidence (e.g., about unemployment), alternative ideas, testing ideas, engaging in the Big Dialogue with ideas outside of the class (e.g., Janet's quotes of Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, Wilhelm Reich), and so on. This dialogue is unfinalizable (Bakhtin, 1999; Nikulin, 2010), involving a heated drama of the ideas and of the people. This is "the final dialogue at the threshold" about "damn questions" (Bakhtin, 1999) about the most desired and just society as well as the ways of approaching it. The dialogue focuses on finding the boundaries of the pravda-truths – their strengths and limitations. Of course, knowledge also often emerges from this dialogic process, but it is by-productive, emergent, and almost accidental (Matusov, 2009; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019; Nikulin, 2010).

In short, Duberman's theory-in-action of ontological dialogism in education is surprisingly Bakhtinian[17], which is my bias as well. In the educational dialogue, Duberman assumed a dialogic teacher orientation by facilitating, provoking, and deepening the dialogue, addressing the issue at hand from his own pravda-truth. Finally, in his reflection on the dialogue, Duberman engaged in a *dialogic analysis* of the classroom discourse by engaging his heart and mind in the discussed ideas and the emergent dramatic events. This contrasts with a typical discourse analysis when an educator or an educational researcher focuses mostly on structural-functional patterns of the classroom discourse (Matusov, 2020a; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, Kullenberg, & Curtis, 2019).

In contrast, when the Princeton students' discussions or contributions were losing their charge with the students' ontology, Duberman felt that those discussions became empty, shallow, and superficial, just an intellectual game without any stakes for the students: "I began to worry that people weren't being very direct and personal at this point, they were talking abstractly…" (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 9, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive). The students were not "presencing their self" to open it for addressing by others in such exchanges, using David Sabey's term (Sabey, 2021).

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[16] Pravda-truth contrasts with istina-truth in Russian. Istina-truth is the objective truth, existing independently of the human consciousness (cf. truth in positivism).
[17] Martin told me he never read Bakhtin (personal communication, 2019-09-02).

At the same time, I see several limitations of Duberman's ontological dialogic educational paradigm. First, like many educational dialogists (e.g., Burbules, 1993), apparently, he confused the form of an instructional genre with its spirit. Thus, throughout his writing, he rejected an instructional genre of the lecture as being too monologically passive for students and narcissistic for professors. He argued that even good lectures are problematic:

> In a 'dazzling' lecture, what turns on the listener is the theatricality, and that is usually at the expense of both truth and dialogue. It's a performance. I'm a good lecturer. I'm theatrical. I often lecture without notes. But it's bad for the students—I knew that all along. Only belatedly did I realize it's also bad for me. It feeds my narcissism [Duberman added that Princeton students often applaud at the end of a lecture they like] (interview with Herbert Livesey, 1974, Tape 02785, Series VIII, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

However, as I argued elsewhere (Matusov, 2009), lectures can be externally and/or internally dialogic. A lecture can be externally dialogic by being a long dialogic turn by the teacher in reply to students' explicit or implicit inquiry, tension, question, or idea. It can be internally dialogic by including diverse voices, diverse ideas, diverse paradigms, and diverse approaches and inviting students to test them. Nevertheless, I agree with Duberman that the domination of lectures in education, especially monologic lecturing, is problematic and troublesome.

Another limitation was Duberman's struggle to find his role in ontological classroom dialogue. He seemed to alternate between: 1) withdrawing himself from the students' discussions, concerns about "contaminating discussions" with his thinking, even not coming to the class meeting, and 2) jumping into a classroom dialogue as an interested learner and a passionate scholar equal to the students. The former was driven by a combination of Duberman's democratic education paradigm (see above) with his ontological dialogic paradigm. The democratic education paradigm often sees a teacher's role as creating conditions, ecologies, and rich environments for students' own self-studies to prevent impositions of the teacher's ideas on the students. As to the latter, Duberman's desire to be equal to the students, in my view, can be rooted in Duberman's commitment to a strong version of ontological dialogism articulated by Mikhail Bakhtin: "*a plurality of consciousnesses, with equal rights and each with its own world*, [that] combine but are not merged in the unity of the event*" (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6). Alternatively, or in addition to the ontological dialogic paradigm, it might come from the hippie organic and the communitarian ecological educational paradigms (see below), rooted in political anarchism and egalitarianism, to which Duberman was (and, in my observation, still is) attracted.

Duberman perceived ontological dialogue as participants' exchanges that are verbal, passionate, intellectually deep, dramatic, no-nonsense, highly emotional, loud, openly judgmental, full of self-doubts, pushing ideas to the extremes, frank – even vulgar – brutally honest – even at the expense of hurting feelings at times (while not crossing a boundary of humiliation and betrayal). His vision and perception of the ontological dialogue were arguably very cultural[18]. Raised in an Eastern-European Jewish[19] environment in Brooklyn in the 1930-1950s (Duberman, 2002a), he was apparently socialized in Jewish cultural discourse, sensibilities, and values, which reminds me of my own cultural Jewish upbringing in the USSR[20]. Non-verbality, indirectness, peripheral participation, dancing around the bush, listening rather than talking, intellectual calmness and emotional detachment, prolonged silence, and so on were apparently un- or under -appreciated, -valued, and -recognized by Duberman (and by a particular Eastern-European Jewish culture that I am familiar with). It seems that Duberman was rarely aware of these cultural differences

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[18] I thank Bob Hampel for alerting me to this cultural sensibility of dialogue by Martin Duberman.
[19] I use this term here and below as an ethnic rather than a religious term.
[20] I grew up in the Soviet Union and immigrated to the USA in 1988 when I was 28.

between him and his students in defining ontological dialogue and pushed these ethnocentric sensibilities on his students, who were not urban Jews. On one of such rare occasions, he said to Peter Janney, "It's very hard for me, terribly hard for me to sit back and not talk. Because I am a big verbalizer and I really get very uncomfortable myself when I feel I should sit there and not say anything. Probably more uncomfortable than anyone in the room" (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 10, Box 73, Folder 5, NYPL archives).

At times, in my view, Duberman overlooked the link between the students' ontology and the academic subject of his class, judging their conversation as off-topic, which he tolerated and even valued: "…when the group did wander off into a discussion of some peripheral matter which had come up-taking drugs, say – the lack of immediate relevance to the overall topic at hand was more than compensated for by its broader relevance to the lives of those involved" (Duberman, 1969, p. 281). In the context of our era of gradual legalization of recreational marijuana and the political struggles around it (Hari, 2015), it feels strange that Martin Duberman did not recognize the legalization of illicit drugs as a part of American Radicalism, especially because he wrote a letter to the editor in the Daily Princetonian[21] saying that most illegal drugs were harmless. However, a non-recognition of such curricular relations and missing some emerging teaching-learning opportunities are common to and expected from the ontological dialogic pedagogy (Hammer & van Zee, 2006; Matusov, 2009).

In addition, in my judgment, Duberman struggled with how to define students' ontology in education. What does it mean for students' hearts and minds in the here-and-now to make their education relevant, meaningful, and deep? In my observation, Duberman was attracted to three distinctive possible ontologies: 1) therapeutic, 2) political (social justice), and 3) academic. Therapeutic student ontology is based on students' psychological, personal, and interpersonal challenges. Political student ontology is rooted in students' passion for the politics of social justice and their embetterment of society (usually from leftist political positions). Academic student ontology is rooted in students' curiosities relevant to the academic material. Although Duberman embraced all these student ontologies, he seemed to prioritize the therapeutic one (see my description of the therapeutic paradigm below). Here I sense the struggle between Duberman's ontological dialogic educational paradigm and his therapeutic group dynamic paradigm (see below). At times, Duberman moved from defining education as an ontological academic dialogue to group therapy or, at least, group therapy leading the educational process (cf., Kresge College at the University of California, Santa Cruz, in Grant & Riesman, 1978).

Finally, I think that Duberman's overall democratic dialogic educational project had severe limitations that probably were invisible to him. He firmly controlled the overall design of the class. Although Duberman encouraged and welcomed the students' initiatives – his students could and did make proposals (e.g., considering radical reforms for Princeton as a part of the class curriculum, where to meet, and bring beer in class); – at the end of the day, these changes often had to be compatible with Duberman's philosophical views to be allowed by him. Apparently, he often dominated students whose initiatives often had to be sanctioned by the teacher (see a discussion of the issue of domination in Pettit, 2014). When students' educational goals or demands for change challenged Duberman's educational philosophies (e.g., asking for the teacher's assignments or grades, see Duberman, 1969)[22], these requests were criticized and, what is more important, often blocked by Duberman. Bruffee characterized Duberman's lack of educational pluralism in the following way, "[Duberman] gave [his students] 'complete freedom.' What this meant [in his practice] was that what the teacher refused to do, he refused to let the students do either" (Bruffee, 1972, p. 463). There was no process for democratic decision-making to change the class design, its educational goals, and its educational philosophies, especially when the teacher might disagree with

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[21] Thanks to Bob Hampel for directing me to this source.
[22] By 1968, Princeton gave students in ungraded experimental courses the option of requesting a grade – Duberman could not say no to those requests or did not decide to sabotage them (I thank Bob Hampel for this point).

these design ideas, goals, and philosophies. In my own pedagogical experience, I have realized that accepting decisions democratically made by my students, with which I personally and professionally disagree (e.g., cutting the class time, the reintroduction of grades and assignments for students who want that), is the final test of my commitment to democratic education and radical pluralism (Kelly, 1978) it is based on. My initial class design, mostly developed in my collaboration with previous students, can always be altered if my current students agree to do so.

Progressive Education

In my interpretation of the history of education, a progressive education paradigm emerged in the Enlightenment and was first articulated by the French philosopher and writer Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712- 1772), the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and further developed and publicized by the American philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952) and his disciples. In my judgment, the progressive education paradigm is based on three major tenets (Matusov, 2021a). The first tenet was articulated by Rousseau in his pedagogical novel Emile: a progressive teacher wants the student to want what the teacher wants the student to want without the student noticing that. Rousseau wrote,

> Take the opposite course with your pupil [in child-centered, proto-Progressive, education that Rousseau advocated in contrast to a conventional authoritarian teacher-centered education – EM]; *let him always think he is master while you are really master*. There is no subjection so completed as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that the will [of the child] itself is taken captive [by the teacher's hidden manipulation]. Is not this poor child, without knowledge, strength, or wisdom, entirely at your mercy? Are you not master of his whole environment so far as it affects him? Cannot you make of him what you please? His work and play, his pleasure and pain, are they not, unknown to him, under your control? No doubt he ought only to do what he wants, but he ought to want to do nothing but what you want him to do. He should never take a step you have not foreseen, nor utter a word you could not foretell (Rousseau, 1979, p. 120, the italics are mine).

The second tenet of Progressive Education was articulated by Kant, who argued that in order to promote human destiny, which is autonomy, the irrational, ignorant, and immature students must be forced to engage in education designed by rational, reasonable, and mature people (Kant, 1784). This is the principle of educational paternalism, when others decide what good education is for the student and have the right to impose this "good education" on the student (Matusov, 2020c, 2020d, 2021b).

American psychologist and educator Jerome Bruner developed the third tenet of Progressive Education: "...any subject could be taught to any child at any age in some form that was honest" (Bruner, 1986, p. 129). Bruner gives educators hope that it is possible to find an "honest" way of teaching any curriculum for any student at any time, which my colleagues and I called the Holy Grail of the Progressive Education (Matusov, 2021a; Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019).

The democratic education paradigm rejects the three tenets of progressive education not only because they are unachievable (especially the third tenet) but also because they are pedagogically undesirable. As a founder of the first American democratic school, Sudbury Valley School, Dan Greenberg wrote about the main difference between progressive and democratic education: progressive education wants to make students like what they are supposed to do and to learn in school, but in the democratic school movement, students do and learn what they like to do and learn (Greenberg, 1991, p. 101).

I could not find any explicit statements by Duberman embracing progressive education. However, I can infer Duberman's progressivism from his deep pedagogical desires, revealed in his frustrations, disappointments, and resentments when his students' behavior unmet these tacit progressive desires.

Duberman's progressivism was also articulated in the "self-criticism" practice of blaming students for dependency and docility. Duberman had progressive expectations that when his students selected a topic for the next class, each student would come well-prepared to the class and actively and passionately participate in class meetings. Anything less than that was unacceptable and irritating for Duberman. The Progressive teacher orientation often creates irritation and burnout in progressive teachers. Thus, professor of sociology of education David Labaree notices that one of the most common reasons for (progressive) professors' retirement is being tired of trying to be a good teacher:

> When professors decide to retire, they frequently give teaching as a key reason for the choice (another is faculty meetings). I know that was true in my case. It's not that they dislike teaching; many talk about teaching as one of the most satisfying parts of the job. It's that the stress of struggling to be a good teacher gets to them over time. The emotional wear and tear is considerable, hovering on the precipice of disaster in class after class. Time to give it a rest. You can keep doing research in retirement; combined with release from the stress of teaching, this makes retirement a win-win situation (Labaree, 2021).

In my judgment, the source of this teacher stress and burnout of (progressive) professors interested in their good teaching comes from the nature of *foisted* institutionalized education. In foisted education, a teacher becomes a teacher only because the institution assigns them to teach a particular class and NOT because freely assembled students interested in studying something ask the person to help them with their studies. Recently, I have been experimenting with "higher ed in the wild" (Shugurova, Matusov, & Marjanovic-Shane, 2022). As a result, I stopped feeling the type of stress and burnout that David Labaree is talking about. In my view, the nature of the teaching stress is in failed progressive hope to find a Holy Grail of teaching that can successfully address the foisted nature of the institutionalized education (Matusov, 2021a).

The idea that students might have different interests, different intensities of participation, different modes of participation, different priorities, and so on troubled Duberman-the-progressivist. It was almost a split of pedagogical personality in Duberman: his democratic pedagogical mind told him that it was OK when students had diverse interests, and their non-participation was legitimate, but his progressive pedagogical heart told him that if students were responsible for their education and life, surely, they won't want to miss the wonderful learning opportunities in his seminar. Duberman's progressive heart might be telling him, "Yes, students have the freedom not to read, not to talk, not to write, and to have different goals for their education; but they better read, talk, and write, and have my vision of education, if they are responsible learners and people." It was a bit of a schizophrenic "double bind" (Bateson, 1987), sending the students two opposite messages at once. In progressive education, the academic freedom given to the students by the teacher reminds me of the famous statement by Henry Ford about his model-T car's color, "Any customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black." But "let him always think he is master while you are really master" (Rousseau, see above).

<<**Martin Duberman**: You're right: I can now see that I was in control of the overall design of the class, though I wasn't conscious of that at the time. But [here], I think you overstate the "double message" I sent the students.>>

Another problem seemed to push Duberman into the progressive education paradigm: the ontological dialogue, which Duberman apparently craved, required a critical mass of students who were genuinely interested in, prepared for, and actively engaged with their minds and hearts in the curricular topic of the day. However, at times, "They just won't participate, commit themselves. And that left a vacuum. That's a point at which the group almost broke down" (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 118, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive). Without a critical mass, the class discussions were boring for

Duberman and probably for other students, which even gave Duberman a temptation to switch back to the "structured education" that progressive education requires.

Similarly, on September 7, 1970, Duberman wrote to a former student in response to his comments on the 1969 seminar, "The very thing you suggested for this coming year has been much on my mind lately – that is, stressing <u>early</u> the necessity of commitment to the group. I'm toying with the idea of making attendance a requirement – though I hate to put it in those terms. Ideally, each person would internalize this responsibility [NB! wanting what the teacher wants for them – progressivism!]. At the least I'll emphasize how urgent continuity is; or, alternatively, how important <u>not</u> to run away when the going gets tough" (Martin Duberman to Roger Arrington, September 9, 1970, Box 16, "A-B" folder, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive). I think the problem of having a critical mass of engaged students for a quality dialogue is real. Still, it should be addressed through a democratic process with the students and an initial class design (Matusov, 2021c). Fortunately, Duberman did not require attendance in his year-long innovative seminar in 1971 at Lehman College at CUNY. His syllabus said, "The format, as well as the content of the seminar, will be 'radical.' The group members will decide what topics will be discussed, as well as all policies relating to the course procedures. There will be no requirements of any kind other than a commitment to the subject matter and to the group and a willingness to use one's own experience and feelings in an effort to interact with the material and with the other members of the seminar as fully as possible" (Box 74, Folder 1, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

In my analysis, Duberman's concept of unstructured education[23] was driven by the democratic education paradigm and the hippie organic educational paradigm in opposition to his hidden progressive education paradigm. As far as I know, during his 1966-1971 Princeton-Hunter experiment, Duberman never wavered from the former, despite his strong doubts and apparent temptations to do so. Instead, he blamed his students for their educational passivity, immaturity, and irresponsibility, with the acknowledgment that conventional elementary and secondary education rewarded these deficits in students long before they came to college.

Unfortunately, as far as I know, Duberman never critically reflected on his progressive pedagogical desires. Apparently, Progressivism was Duberman's pedagogical blind spot. Unfortunately, having a pedagogical blind spot of being colonized by pedagogical values that remain invisible to and unexamined by educators is very common to many, if not all, educators, except those who are actively involved in democratic education. That is why a professional forum for authorial educators is so important to reveal and examine these blind spots as much as possible.

I feel that Duberman's attraction to the progressive education paradigm was invisible to him, occupying more his heart rather than his mind. This pervasiveness and invisibility of the progressive educational paradigm are not that surprising. In my view, the progressive education paradigm has been hegemonic in the education world for a long time, not because progressive educational practices are widespread –far from that—but because the progressive education paradigm makes conventional education bearable (Matusov, 2021a). It inspires educators with a promise of the Holy Grail dream: searching for an "honest" way of teaching any required curriculum for any student at any time. Paraphrasing Karl Marx's famous statement about religion, the *Progressive Education paradigm is the opium of*

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[23] I suspect that the notion of "structured education" refers to the Kantian educational paternalism (Kant, 1784; Matusov, 2020c, 2020d, 2021a, 2021b), according to which non-rational, uninformed, immature people must be forced to study what the rational and informed society chose for them to study. Only informed rational mature people deserve their autonomy to be respected by society. Although an ignorant student might complain and even resist foisted education, later they will be thankful for being forced to study the important curriculum.

educators[24]. Progressive education is a major enabler of conventional education, keeping progressive teachers from burnout longer by promising them hope of meaningful education without abandoning the conventional authoritarian pedagogical regime. It imposes the preset curriculum and education itself, so valued by the progressive teachers, on their students by exploiting the students' subjectivities. Like Martin Duberman, I have also been colonized by the progressive education paradigm so deeply that now I consider myself a progressive teacher who poignantly tries not to practice progressivism to avoid a possible paralysis and a feeling of betrayal of myself, as a democratic dialogic educator when occasionally I relapse to progressivism[25] (Matusov, 2021a).

However, reading his book on Black Mountain College (BMC), I found Duberman's indirect disagreement with the progressive education paradigm. He ingeniously inserted his 1971 voice in the transcript of a 1936 BMC faculty meeting. On September 28, 1936, BMC faculty discussed the nature of teaching. The issue was whether the primary teaching role must be to excite, inspire, fascinate, and "infect" BMC students with the taught curriculum. Elsewhere, my colleagues, Bakhtinian educators, and I discussed this progressive pedagogical desire as creating an educational vortex that would "suck" all the students into a taught subject (Matusov, Marjanovic-Shane, & Gradovski, 2019). The vocal majority at the meeting replied positively to this question, while Duberman took an issue with it.

> ALBERS [BMC professor, 1936]: A teacher has to have a definite point of view if he wants to infect. The democratic teacher is no teacher. He admits every point of view. …
> DUBERMAN [1971 insertion]: I'd agree that personally a man should know what he stands for. But the climate in a classroom should be such that others are free to express what they stand for (Duberman, 2009a, p. 104)

This is where Duberman came close to a critique of the progressive education paradigm – at least in his texts that I read. In my judgment, his above critique of Progressivism is a bit too vague and undeveloped as he did not directly challenge Albers' notion of the teacher's role to "infect" the students with interest and strong intrinsic motivation to study the taught subject. Personally, I feel that the teacher should not go beyond the exposure of a subject and provide a rich learning environment for the students. In my view, the progressive education dream of the "pedagogical infection" of the students with an interest in the taught subject is illegitimate (Matusov, 2021a).

Hippie organic paradigm

In the zeitgeist of the 1960s, there was an unprecedented struggle against authority in the US and elsewhere in Western Europe. The historical emergence of a new choice- and identity- based middle class (Matusov & Smith, 2012), the civil rights and civil disobedience movements against pervasive racism, sexism, and homophobia, and the antiwar movement propelled a rebellion against the establishment, its authority, and its suffocating order. Those insurrections (probably, along with other things) gave birth to what I call the hippie organic, laissez-faire educational paradigm. According to this paradigm, students' self-actualization, learning activism, sovereignty, and responsibility for their own education blossom when the oppressive societal and institutional authority is simply removed. At the same time, the absence of authority and rejection of soulless institutions naturally promotes the emergence of an organic, humane community. The trust in informality and the natural emergence of good human relationships are the birthmarks of a political anarchist movement that arose in the first half of the nineteenth century, initially in the Russian

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[24] "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the sentiment of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people" Karl Marx, Introduction to *Contribution to the critique of Hegel's philosophy of right* (1845).
[25] I borrowed this approach from the Alcoholic Anonymous (cf. "a dry alcoholic"). I also feel being deeply colonized by conventional education, considering myself to be a conventional teacher who tries to break with conventional teaching. In contrast, I could not find any traces of Duberman being colonized by conventional education in his innovative seminar, although his "structured education" lecture courses were apparently conventional based on his syllabi.

Empire. Duberman was very familiar with anarchist political ideas and credited them, in part, as responsible for his innovative pedagogy,

> I had also [i.e., in addition to pedagogical literature on democratic education that I discussed above], within the past two years, read a great deal about Anarchism, in line with a play I was then writing on Emma Goldman. I strongly identified with Anarchism's anti-authoritarian basis; it was the closest I had come to feeling at home in a philosophical tradition. (I'm aware that this effort – that all such efforts – at charting "influences" is a little foolish. For all I know, the true cause of my developing interest in unstructured education may have been familial – an unresolved authority problem? – or even metabolic) (Duberman, 1969, p. 260).

> Anarchists … had always stressed (as I argued in an article for Partisan Review entitled "The Relevance of Anarchy") that human aggression and cruelty were the products of imposed constraints, of authoritarian family structures, social curbs on nonconformity and a capitalist ethic that encouraged competitive zeal and greed, institutionalizing the warfare of each against all. According to the anarchist creed, I wrote, if people could be "economically freed from the struggle for existence, intellectually freed from the tyranny of custom, emotionally freed from the need to revenge their own mutilation by harming others," then quite different, no less "natural" human feelings of cooperation, fraternity, and mutual assistance would have a chance to emerge (Duberman, 2002a, e-version).

Whatever its origin, Duberman's notion of unstructured education was driven by the hippie organic educational paradigm. Duberman believed that the removal of teacher authority by itself would bring about the students' organic, productive, free, and enjoyable learning culture, full of learning initiatives, and a healthy community, addressing personal and interpersonal yearnings. Miracles of education happen not because of institutional arrangements, structures, and pedagogical techniques, but despite them – people's natural and unrestrained virtues are the keys (Duberman, 2002a). Duberman believed that things are best in education when they happen naturally and spontaneously (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 64, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

In line with the hippie organic paradigm, Duberman had faith in the naturalness that would automatically trigger the organic processes of self-organization and unleash students' self-actualization, curiosity, self-discovery, and agency. A. S. Neill, the founder of Summerhill democratic school in the UK, even thought that freedom would cure most (but not all) children from all their neuroses: "More and more I come to the conclusion that therapy is not necessary when children can live out their complexes in freedom" (Neill, 1960, p. 40) – although Duberman might not go that far. This faith in naturalness was probably first articulated by Rousseau and other romantic philosophers of the nineteenth century: "Tolstoy[26] repeats the lessons of Rousseau's *Emile*. Nature: only nature will save us. We must seek to understand what is 'natural,' spontaneous, uncorrupt, sound, in harmony with itself and other objects in the world, and clear paths for development on these lines; not seek to alter, to force into a mould. We must listen to the dictates of our stifled original nature, not look on it as mere raw stuff upon which to impose our unique personalities and powerful wills" (Berlin, Hardy, & Kelly, 1978, p. 255). If the teacher and the students relax and let things go their natural course, many problems would be solved in a beautiful way: "If Joe really wanted to talk about the cultural aspects of the New Left, it doesn't mean that he would have to interrupt, or shift the whole group's gear suddenly. It would come in -- if he were a participant, what was on his mind would come out *in a very natural way*" (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 64, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive; italics mine). The hippie organic paradigm's cult of naturalness reminds me of an old Soviet joke

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[26] Leo Tolstoy – a famous Russian writer and innovative educator of the nineteen century (see Tolstoy's writings on education that might resonate with Duberman's pedagogy, Tolstoy, 1967; Tolstoy & Blaisdell, 2000).

about Communist dreamers of the Soviet economy, "As soon as we place the train on the tracks, it will go by itself."

> <<**Martin Duberman**: You're right about my underlying assumption that with restraints removed people are revealed as naturally "good." I still think so, and can argue the point from an anthropological point of view.>>

To achieve this naturalness, Duberman tried many things. He tried to create an "authority void" at the beginning of the semester to help an organic class structure to emerge through students' own self-organization. He tried to stay away from the students' discussions, however uncomfortable it was for him. "Probably I should have just kept my goddammed mouth shut, and let it go on for a half hour or whatever. And next time I'm going to try but I get so uncomfortable. It's my problem, I should just you know shut up. And be uncomfortable" (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 57, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive). He tried to promote egalitarian relations with and among his students. At times, he even tried to avoid coming to the classes to eliminate his authority:

> Peter Janney: …I think it'd be hard for any of us to approach you on the same egalitarian position, that we'd feel we approach other students. This type of thing. I mean, there is this barrier, no matter how … you can't get over it.
> Martin Duberman: That's why -- you know in some ways my not being there is better. Really this group would probably function better if I wasn't there at all. I'm convinced that that's true of most learning situations. Because I remain something of an authority figure, no matter how I try not to be. It's just built into the situation. I'm the guy with the credentials and the status and all the – older, and all that stuff. I'm teacher, no matter what I do about it. And that really does impede the process of learning and discussing, controversy, give and take (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, pp. 38-39, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

In his 1969 article, he distinguished authoritarianism from authority and institutional authority from what can be called epistemological authority. Duberman accepted authority over authoritarianism and epistemological teacher authority over institutional teacher authority. Duberman wrote, "authoritarianism is forced to demand the respect that authority draws naturally to itself. The former, like all demands, is likely to meet with hostility; the latter, like all authenticity, with emulation. Our universities – our schools at every level are rife with authoritarianism, all but devoid of authority" (Duberman, 1969, p. 264). Duberman recognized the teacher's epistemological authority when the teacher's knowledge, expertise, and experience helped the students' own studies and learning. For him, the ideal teacher authority is one who masters the taught subject matter and himself, who is ready to be surprised by his students, and who knows his students' experiences, needs, and interests relevant to the taught subject matter. For him, the goal of education is for his students to develop their own authority in education and life: "Ultimately each man can, must, become his own authority. This is the one path to adulthood and democracy" (p.265). However, in his conversations with Peter Janney in fall 1969, again and again, he rejected the teacher authority as such (see the indented quote above)[27]. Duberman worried that authoritarianism and unwanted authority would be there even if the teacher tried to avoid them. His mere presence could be a serious problem for the emergence of an organic egalitarian community.

Duberman's attempts to eliminate formal teacher authority apparently created "pervasive informality" (Rietmulder, 2019) – vicious social dynamics that generated its own unchecked and, at times, oppressive authority and "horizontal violence" (Matusov & Sullivan, 2020). At times, his students seemed

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[27] As Martin Duberman reported, the big issue for him in therapy was his resentment of and challenge to many people in positions of authority (including his own therapist) (Duberman, 2002a).

to engage in a power struggle, domination, backstabbing, suppressing oppositional voices, silencing, scapegoating, ostracism, and so on. Peter Janney provided the following snapshot of this process in his senior thesis,

> …"Nate" appointed himself as leader and began to dominate the discussion, steering the focus away from the topic by talking about himself. Though never expressed openly; there was resentment of this tactic. It was expressed by other members to allow the discussion to dwindle. But "Brad" appeared an hour later, apologizing for his lateness. Asking the group about where the discussion was headed, he began to stimulate it with his own thoughts. Nate immediately became quiet when Brad returned and in fact said nothing until Duberman raised the question that there might be something in the climate that was making the group generally unrelaxed.
>
> Nate took this chance to reject and defame the seminar, stating that "there had been no connectedness of thought. I don't feel as if I've been challenged." His rejection of the group was, of course, a manifestation of the group's rejection of him. This was too uncomfortable an issue for the group to face at this time. There was no attempt to discuss it. At the next class, no one mentioned Nate's absence (Janney, "History 308 revisited," 1970, p. 66-67, Box 73, Folder 4, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

In my view, the main problem here is not that the students' relations were disrupted by Nate – this has to be expected in any community – but, in fact, there was no deliberate communal process to deal with situations like that. Without any formal, well-thought, and communally approved process of deliberation to deal with public disruptions and personal grievances, the community was destined to deal with emerging tensions via "pervasive informality" (Rietmulder, 2019). Instead of a tyranny of the teacher's hierarchical authority, pervasive informality predictably creates a tyranny of peer pressure, peer politics, and peer authority, which was not thought of and approved by the classroom society. I argue that the phenomenon of pervasive informality and its negative consequences is a consequence of the hippie organic paradigm. Jim Rietmulder, a founder of The Circle School, a democratic school, describes this phenomenon in the following way:

> Reflecting [on] the social movement [of the 1960s], many free schools sought to eliminate power, structure, and authority generally, sometimes tending not to distinguish the real targets of the revolution: abusive power, oppressive structure, and illegitimate authority. The result was not usually anarchy, but instead *pervasive informality*: informal power, informal structure, and informal authority. Some free schoolers tended to gloss over or "not see" the presence of power, structure, and authority in their schools. In contrast, the democratic schools in this book are about formal structure and formal authority — meaning structure and authority are visible, valued, acknowledged, and documented (Rietmulder, 2019, p. 15, the italics is mine).

<<**Martin Duberman**: I've never heard of Jim Rietmulder but your quotes from his book greatly impress me. I must read it.>>

The hippie organic paradigm resurrects the Enlightenment assumption of the child as a noble savage who is later traumatized and distorted by oppressive civilization. At some point in his pedagogical experiment, Duberman questioned this assumption, noticing that by itself, the removal of teacher authority and giving students freedom did not automatically result in students' learning activism and self-actualization: "When the coercive power of the grading system is eliminated, can we rely on any alternative stimulus to motivate students to learn? Quite a few seminar members felt that 'natural curiosity' was a sufficient motivating force for learning, but a number of rebuttals were and can be made to this assumption" (Duberman, 1969, p. 285). However, at the end of the day, he still remained faithful to the hippie organic educational paradigm, explaining the observed failures by the system ingraining passivity in the students:

"All of which raises the pessimistic possibility that curriculum reform on the college level may be an enterprise of marginal value only. By age eighteen, it could be said, it is too late to salvage curiosity" (p. 286).

Moreover, the hippie organic paradigm apparently contributed to Duberman's blame-and-shame chronotope and his "self-criticism" pedagogical practice. Each time students asked Duberman to deviate from the hippie organic paradigm by bringing more or different guidance and leadership in the class, he blamed these students for lack of activism and not taking responsibility for solving the problems they observed,

> There are always people – too many people [i.e., his students] – who just sit on the outskirts of the discussion and they won't participate. And then they come up with various rationales for why they won't participate. Sometimes they say it's boring. Or, I don't have the information to participate. Or, somebody's monopolizing the conversation all the time. There are endless variations on this, but I think – and always the excuse that they give has some realistic merit to it. There's always enough truth [unclear] as an excuse, you know. But I think basically what's behind it almost every time is that they really prefer to be passive and not get involved. They latch onto any excuse to allow them to stay passive (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 16, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

In his considering problems emerging from his commitment to the unstructured education, the Hippie Organic paradigm, with all his doubts and temptations to go back to his structured education, he rarely critically analyzed the paradigm itself but rather tried to go for some other explanations or another pedagogical twist "to prove the worth of my own experiment":

> My level of expectation is also sometimes unrealistically high. I mean, Roger [a student in Duberman's class] was asking -- really what I was asking, in a way. Or which I latched onto, anyway. What should you realistically expect from a group of 12 comparative strangers, in some cases total strangers, artificially gathered together to talk about topics of varying appeal to the 12 people. I mean, maybe that first hour of discussion was all you should realistically expect. But what happens to me in that kind of setting – I then start to get anxious about whether this whole thing is a good idea. Because I can remember classroom discussions ten years ago, in a much more structured situation, which were far livelier and more impassioned than what we were going through. So I start to think, Well maybe it's all a crock of shit. God, we had better discussions about radicalism at Yale, when people were there for grades, and writing papers and taking exams, and you know, what the hell am I up to in this whole unstructured thing. Maybe it is a crock of shit. That makes me very anxious. So then I feel the need to Do Something, to prove the worth of my own experiment. And so I become excessively provocative. You know, I'm determined to get this goddammed group going (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, pp. 32-33, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

However, on a rare occasion, analyzing problems in students' discussion, Duberman considered himself too withdrawn from the academic discussion and considered a more active guiding role for himself instead of discussing curricular meta-issues: "I think the better way to have done it would have been for me to join the discussion in regard to the subject matter. To raise a provocative question about the Wobblies, instead of 'Why are we studying the Wobblies?'" (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 35, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

Rejection of Teacher Orientation paradigm

I define the notion of "teacher orientation" as a teacher's desire to develop a particular design of a role (usually in advance of the teacher's practice) that shapes the teacher's relationships with students. Teacher orientation is more than setting a particular teacher role per se because this concept also includes the justifications of this role. A good example of a perceived teacher orientation is when people notice "a professorial tone" in a person who tries to instill certain dogmas in their audience. Of course, this is an example of the conventional teacher orientation of transmission of knowledge. Progressive, dialogic, and other educators often have their own distinguished teacher orientations.

In my view, there are two big pedagogical issues with the notion of teacher orientation. First is what kind of role the teacher may want to assume deliberately (and/or emerge) in their practice and why to assume that particular teacher role. A teacher role can be conventionally monologic, dialogic, progressive, constructivist, and so on (Matusov & Brobst, 2013).

Second is whether an educator wants to have any teacher orientation at all. Rejection of teacher orientation means the teacher addresses the students and responds to emergent situations, issues, and questions at hand as a whole person without assuming any special role in the classroom (Matusov & Brobst, 2013). One of Martin Duberman's strongest pedagogical desires was to drop his teacher orientation. He viewed it as a phony performance – he apparently wanted to be with his students as their peer rather than to perform on a classroom stage.

> The unnaturalness of having to talk about a given topic at a particular time of each week – that alone is so constrictive and so phony. To gather in a room, and to pretend that we are all interested in that moment in discussing the American Right – it's just horseshit; we're not. We feel the pressure to, and that in itself is really fatal to any kind of naturalness. And exchange. Not to any kind, but god knows it inhibits. [Peter Janney: Oh yes. Terrible.] To a terrible degree. Plus – "teacher." Everybody has been brought up to regard the teacher in such a way that, no matter what you do, by getting rid of grades and authoritarianism, you can't get around the fact there's going to be a certain amount, and probably a large amount, of deference/paid to you as teacher (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 66, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

There could be many sources for his desire to reject teacher orientation. Arguably the most important source is his commitment to the hippie organic paradigm with its obsession with naturalness – deeply down this anarchist paradigm is suspicious not only of any authority but also any role, which undermines the authenticity of unique people and unique situations.

This second source, and this is my speculation, could be rooted in the fact that Martin Duberman was a gay man whose sexuality the society tried to "cure," suppress, and destroy for most of his life but especially in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s (Martin described the societal "cures" and his "gay man's odyssey" in his book with the same title, Duberman, 2002a). The fight for his publicly accepted authenticity and integrity as a gay man – to be out of the closet, out of any underground – might spill out in his pedagogical desire to be free of traditional and narrow expectations.

The third source of his desire to drop teacher orientation might be rooted in his therapeutic group dynamic educational paradigm (see below), which might see any roles that people play in life as their personal, interpersonal, and societal dysfunctionality and, thus, illegitimate (of course, this a rough non-nuanced position). People should be equal and frank in healthy relationships with peers, friends, and comrades.

> …so many of the students in History 308 came away from the seminar feeling, as one put it, that "no course I have ever had in this university has challenged and changed my attitudes and views as much as this 'bull session.'" The term bull session is instructive; it was used by a number of the students to connote the sense of a discussion among friends, one more free of formality and constraint than most, one in which more of the person gets exposed and involved than it does in a seminar discussion narrowly confined to a selected topic or issue. To my mind, the frequent use of the term bull session to describe our meetings is a testimony to their success (Duberman, 1969, p. 290).

The fourth possible source of his rejection of teacher orientation could be rooted in Martin's Jewish upbringing in the rather anti-Semitic USA. I do not know how much pressure he felt being a Jew in his childhood or later and whether he felt like an outsider. In his book Cures, Duberman described an anti-Semitic attack on him as an adult but commented that he was not vulnerable: "I told the bartender he would have to leave. He refused, yelling that I was 'a dirty Jew.' (How bizarre, I thought with relief, he's attacking me where I don't feel vulnerable)" (Duberman, 2002a, p. 114).

Finally, as I mentioned already, there is a particular cultural theme of frankness involving rejecting any role in Jewish culture. Thus, Israeli social linguist Tamar Katriel described Israeli sabra brutally straight and frank way of talking that is called *dugri* (Katriel, 1986). Of course, *dugri* has its own cultural specificity, and it is not identical to Eastern-European Jewish cultural ways of talking or sensitivities. Still, in my judgment, there are certain common cultural themes there, including an interest in frankness and dropping any roles, including politeness or even concerns about other people's feelings.

Innovative MIT educator Peter Elbow rejected the teacher orientation because genuine learning starts and is rooted in the student and not in the teacher. Until some kind of question or inquiry emerges in a student, teaching is impossible.

> Nothing seemed worth saying in a classroom till a student had [his own] question he took seriously. … I refused to coax [the students'] interest. I also felt it as a refusal to pedal alone. If they won't pedal, neither will I. No source of energy seemed bearable except their motivation. And not only motivation but experience. If they are not talking from the experience of the text. read-even the felt experience of getting no experience from it-then count me out.
> These were troublesome feelings. Giving in to them seemed to mean abdicating my role as a teacher. … So with respect to most of the leadership activities of teachers, I'd become by Christmas a kind of drop-out, a conscientious objector, a giver-in to repugnance (Elbow, 1971, pp. 743-744).

I suspect that Martin Duberman might share many of Elbow's sentiments.

My own pedagogical attraction to rejection of teacher orientation per se has been rooted in my interest in dialogic egalitarianism of treating my students "as consciousnesses with equal rights" (Bakhtin, 1999, p. 6), my distaste of patronizing students, rejection of the Kantian educational paternalism, and deep distrust of any hierarchy and institutions that I view as a human mechanism – i.e., humans working as reliable smart machines controlled by rules, techniques, and procedures, often subordinated to a hierarchy (i.e., institutions). Another source for my rejection of teacher orientation was a bit selfish – I wanted to be a full-time scholar, learner, and intellectual in the classroom with my students. I did not want to prepare for my classes but just be there. I suspect that Martin Duberman might share this selfish, if not a bit lazy, the temptation with me. At the same time, I have never been attracted to the hippie organic paradigm because, while loving improvisation, I do not believe in naturalness as the source of goodness. Rather, I believe in sense-making and taking responsibility, which may involve rules and roles at times (above, which is still

critical dialogue among real people). That is why I am still rather ambivalent about the desirability of rejection of teacher orientation, leaning toward accepting rather than rejecting it (Matusov & Brobst, 2013). At the same time, in contrast to my colleague Ana Marjanovic-Shane, I believe that rejection of teacher orientation is achievable.

Observing this tendency among different educators, including myself, I have noticed two major types of dropping teacher orientation: angry vs. calm. Calm rejection of teacher orientation occurs in some democratic schools: "Traditional and modern [i.e., innovative schools like Montessori and Progressive schools] models are mostly silent about structure-governance-rights-limits, and assume the familiar hierarchical school structure of administration, teachers, and students. In contrast, the democratic model is mostly silent about teaching-learning-curriculum-activities and assumes the familiar civil structure of democratic society" (Rietmulder, 2019, p. 35). In Jim Rietmulder's democratic school, The Circle School[28], adults are referred to as "school staff" and not as "teachers," which apparently reflects the absence of the teacher orientation[29]. However, when their students ask them for teaching, the school staff can happily accept this teacher role, which does not totalize their relationship with their students in their school, where "kids practice life in a scaled-down society" (Rietmulder, 2019, p. 222).

Duberman (1969) and Matusov (2013) are examples of "angry" rejection, which emerges when students demand a teacher orientation from their professor. When such demands occur, reluctant teachers often blame those students for being immature, passive, dependent, and irresponsible for their own education. The teacher's expectation is that the problems have to be solved together among equals. When students break this expectation, so cherished by the egalitarian teacher, by appealing to the teacher, it makes the teacher feel angry – betrayed by the students who the teacher tries to liberate from oppressive authority:

> …chief complaint [about the classroom discussions] centered on what was called 'formlessness,' or 'lack of direction.' Only a minority viewed this as a deficiency, and no two people who did shared the same reasons for thinking it so. The most extreme statement came from a student who claimed to be "basically happy" with his seminar experience, but felt that he could have got still more out of it had the sessions been tightly organized. He suggested – and this, I feel, is yet another example of an endemic unwillingness or inability to exercise individual responsibility –that since 'it would have been very difficult for any of us to impose this kind of discipline successfully,' the solution was for me to impose it on them. He did not suggest how I could do this without inhibiting spontaneity and destroying "the relationship of complete equality between professor and student" that he himself felt had "contributed so much to making our discussions worthwhile (Duberman, 1969, p. 288).

Yet, Duberman's rejection of teacher orientation was rather limited. He still controlled the overall class design: he tacitly imposed his progressive expectations on his students, he rejected students' demands and proposals that did not match his philosophical values, and so on. Also, at times, Martin Duberman seemed to feel that he had a special responsibility for challenging his students intellectually by providing alternative ideas, calling for critical examination of their ideas, engaging them in investigating their desires and responsibilities, and bringing ontological dialogic provocations in the class. In other words, at times, Duberman assumed a particular teacher role of mixing dialogism and progressivism.

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[28] https://circleschool.org/
[29] Interestingly, the Greek original word "pedagogue" described a slave who was responsible for accompanying the free child to and from school and for making the free child's learning at school possible. The Greek pedagogue was not a teacher.

Finally, he clearly tried to break with the totality of teaching as the basis of his relationship with his students. The latter leads us to another educational paradigm that guided Duberman, namely, the communitarian ecological paradigm.

Communitarian ecological paradigm

According to this paradigm, teachers and students, living together in a small community and sharing food, chores, and space, promote the human relations necessary for personal growth and open-minded conversation. "Classes" – a relatively intense discussion focused on a particular topic of shared interest and concern, facilitated by a trusted and knowledgeable person or people – should not be scheduled but should naturally occur in a natural environment, naturally emerge and naturally dissolve in a community in and around the participants' need for education (cf. the Black Mountain College – a book, on which Duberman worked in parallel to his experiment in education, Duberman, 2009a). I wonder if Socratic teaching in Athenian Agora (i.e., marketplace and civic place), Aristotle's Peripatetics in the olive gardens of Athens, and/or Plato's Academia were also inspirational models for Martin Duberman. People constituting a community should come from diverse walks of life to bring very diverse ideas, values, and ontologies into discussions (cf. "Socrates cafe," Phillips, 2002). Curricular topics are ontologically embedded in the communal and broader societal life, in which the participants are deeply engaged as activists. Education and teaching must be entrenched in communal life, so "students" might know their "teachers" as whole persons rather than through a prism of one activity.

> Martin Duberman: If you live with the guy in the house, and you see what he's like and you see that he's just, you know, the usual human being with the usual … hangups and problems, then when you get to talking about an intellectual subject, you don't have to defer to him. You know he's just like you and everybody else. But in the university you don't know that, because you only see this guy in that setting. That's why I think education in universities is just…
>
> Peter Janney: Dennison[30] brings that out really well, too. That the teacher in the public schools relating on the teacher/student plane – he really doesn't relate to his students as people. But as "students." Just in that little enclave of that role. And you know, he says that's just – it would be more educational for the kid not to go to school at all. Just wander about the city by himself.
>
> Martin Duberman: Literally. That's where kids really learn things. They sure as hell don't learn much in the schools, except how to be frightened, and how to kill their curiosity, and how to be dutiful, and all the things that you don't want them, at least theoretically, to learn. That's what they're learning in the schools. Nothing else. How to be competitive, how to defer, -- and it's not very different in the universities, except there's an overlay of permissiveness here. And there's the rhetoric of equality. But when you strip all that away, there's still the goddam deference pattern. And the dutifulness and the passivity. And no matter how much you struggle, you can do something to diminish those qualities, but you can't do a hell of a lot. I'm more and more

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[30] "George Dennison (1925–1987) was an American educator and author best known for *The Lives of Children*, his account of the *First Street School*. He also wrote fiction, plays, and critical essays, most notably his novel *Luisa Domic* and a collection of shorter works, *Pierrot and Other Stories*. Although Dennison devoted himself primarily to his art, he also taught school for a number of years, at all levels from preschool to high school. He trained at the New York Institute for Gestalt Therapy with Paul Goodman and later worked with severely disturbed children as a lay therapist and teacher. He believed that relationships, not instruction, promoted real learning. As such, schools needed to be places where freedom of choice created the trust that allows for a full relationship between teachers and students. These ideas were considered radical because they questioned compulsory attendance and the focus on external student behavior to enhance student management. Since the focus on controlling student behavior interferes with relationship, his work suggests a preference for small schools and an implied criticism of large schools, especially in their ability to be effective with high risk students. He believed teaching was an art, not a science and, as such, it was never technique that caused learning to occur, but rather the full complexity of individual relationships between students and teachers that were not reducible to the predictability of technique. Further, he felt that much of significant learning occurs strictly within the student's individual motivation and between students, when the teachers are wise enough to stand aside and allow it to occur" https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Dennison.

convinced of it. It's just too damn late (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 67, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

Of course, at Princeton, Martin Duberman could not practice this dream. He tried to add food, informal meeting rooms, and other amenities to bring a bit of communal, ecological life to his classes. Still, he often felt defeated by the machinery of his institution, colonizing his life and the lives of his students, "At some meetings only six or seven students showed up, and now and then a meeting would be called off entirely 'because of midterm exams' or the like" (Duberman, 1969, p. 282).

Studying Black Mountain College (BMC), Duberman (2009a) observed the occasional but pervasive, oppressive nature of a neatly aligned community based on informal "communal agreements" and "the community spirit." "The community" – i.e., its most powerful and vocal members – often suppressed discussions about BMC students having sex, letting traveling Black students stay on the campus, or accepting transvestite or homosexual students, or limiting these discussions to what punitive response must be applied to transgressors. Duberman suspected – correctly, in my view – that often the primary concern was not only the issue of survival of the college in the hostile conservative Southern environment of North Carolina but also personal bigotry and prejudice of the "community" itself, especially its most powerful members. Still, I could not find Duberman's reflection on that at the level of a direct critique of his cherished paradigm of communitarianism.

Reading between the lines (especially, reading the critique of the BMC for its "laissez-faire climate" promoting faculty authoritarianism by John Wallen, a BMC faculty, to which Duberman seemed to be both apprehensive and sympathetic, see Duberman, 2009a, pp. 244-245), I suspect that Martin Duberman was leaning to accept that some aspects of a rule-based *society* – a place of systematic meetings of strangers (*Gesellschaft*, in German) are needed to curb the corruptions and provincialism of an organic *community* – a collective of kin (*Gemeinschaft*, in German) (see my discussion of "community" vs. "society" as a model of educational sociality, Matusov, 2023, in press). Alternatively, that might be my own bias projected on Duberman.

Finally, despite his embrace of the Communitarian Ecological paradigm, Duberman seemed to like communitarianism as an idea for others but not as a practice for himself. He remarked on his personal unfitness for a communal life because its excessive "calls on my time and energy far beyond my actual interest," – a sentiment which might be viewed as "irresponsible" by the community, "which is one reason I've never joined a community" (p. 248). He also seemed to be somewhat sympathetic to John Wallen's critique of communitarianism that "life in a community can be 'too total, with escape very difficult" (Duberman, 2009a, p. 239). Does this suggest a bit of his hypocrisy in promoting community at Princeton?

Therapeutic group dynamic paradigm

According to this educational paradigm, to be relevant and deeply meaningful for the students, good education must be rooted in and shaped by problems and tensions that the students have faced in their lives, especially problems and tensions resulting from the participants' interpersonal and deep psychological dysfunctionalities (existing and emergent) and personal unhappiness[31]. Thus, a good education must be therapeutic (Neill, 1960). Of course, individual and group psychotherapy was another

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[31] "The only curing that should be practiced [by teachers] is the curing of unhappiness. The difficult child is the child who is unhappy. He is at war with himself; and in consequence, he is at war with the world. The difficult adult is in the same boat. No happy man ever disturbed a meeting or preached a war, or lynched a Negro. No happy woman ever nagged her husband or her children. No happy man ever committed a murder or a theft. No happy employer ever frightened his employees. … this book is the story of a place-- Summerhill – where children's unhappiness is cured and, more important, where children are reared in happiness" (Neill, 1960, p. xxiii).

strong zeitgeist in the 1960s in the United States, and Duberman actively participated in this zeitgeist for several reasons, one of which was his strenuous attempt to "cure" his homosexuality (Duberman, 2002a).

> I cannot fully demonstrate why, but I feel that membership in a therapy group for the past three years may have been the most profound of the influences prompting me to re-evaluate my role as an educator. In the therapy group, I became aware of how many levels of the person can be "educated" simultaneously when a group is functioning well-that is, when an atmosphere of mutual trust and forbearance prevails. The willingness to suspend judgment of one another in the name of understanding, the tolerance of mistakes, the opportunity to reveal and examine one's inner self without fear of penalty-all encourage growth (Duberman, 1969, pp. 260-261).

<<Martin Duberman: You raise a largely ignored question: the relationship of my homosexuality to my professed anarchism. To be more precise: I grew up gay during the 1950s, the single most repressive decade of the 20th century in regard to homosexuality. The reigning "authority" was psychiatry: homosexuality was labelled an illness, arrested development. There's much to talk about here.>>

Reading Martin Duberman's self-reflective texts on his innovative pedagogy, I found three versions that he considered and articulated along with his struggle with these versions. In its "soft" version, this paradigm calls teachers' attention to the class participants' emotional and relational dynamics and atmosphere to facilitate effective (traditional or dialogic) academic teaching: "Mutual respect and trust were established among people of widely different viewpoints; this made it possible to expose feelings and to engage in debate without excessive fear of 'being made a fool of'" (Duberman, 1969, p. 269). In its "hard" version, this paradigm diverts the purpose of education from its academic subject to one of the Delphic maxims "know thyself" or even entirely replaces intellectual education with straightforward psychotherapy. In Summerhill school, education involved this hard version of freeing the child from neuroses: "Curing a neurosis in a child is a matter of the release of emotion, and the cure will not be furthered in any way by expounding psychiatric theories to the child and telling him that he has a complex" (Neill, 1960, p. 38). In its middle-ground version, this paradigm organically integrates the existing academic curriculum at hand with therapy, like in some versions of the "community of learners"[32] pedagogical approach (Matusov, von Duyke, & Han, 2012). For example, Duberman was searching for a middle ground,

> What I'm aiming for is a way to bring *ourselves* to a topic; I don't think we should make ourselves the topic. I'd like to create a climate when in talking, say, about the Anarchist movement, we would feel able to explore – and express – how our own reactions to authority influence our evaluation of those who have historically resisted all forms of authority. What I don't think is desirable is to concentrate *exclusively*, say, on our individual reactions to parental authority while growing up. *That* would be purely a therapy session (Duberman, 2009a, p. 269, italics original).

As to what kind of psychotherapy Duberman had in mind and tried to practice in his innovative seminar, in his senior thesis Peter Janney mentioned: "sensitivity training/group," "T-group," and "encounter group"[33] aiming at "the formation of trust and acceptance of self and others, the reduction of fear of self and

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[32] I am thankful to Ana Marjanovic-Shane for applying this concept to characterize Martin Duberman's middle-ground version of therapeutic education.

[33] "A T-group or training group (sometimes also referred to as sensitivity-training group, human relations training group or encounter group) is a form of group training where participants (typically between eight and fifteen people) learn about themselves (and about small group processes in general) through their interaction with each other. … A T-group meeting does not have an explicit agenda, structure, or expressed goal. Under the guidance of a facilitator, the participants are encouraged to share emotional reactions (for example, anger, fear, warmth, or envy) that arise in response to their fellow participants' actions and statements. The emphasis is on sharing emotions, as opposed to judgments or conclusions. In this way, T-group participants can learn how their words and actions trigger emotional responses in the people they communicate with." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T-groups

of others, and the consequent growth of confidence" (Janney, "History 308 revisited," 1970, p. 50, Box 73, Folder 4, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive). An atmosphere of openness and honesty, brutal at times, through sharing participants' positive and negative feelings about themselves and each other, was encouraged throughout sensitivity training therapy; and the participants' authenticity and self-actualization were prominent goals (Gregory & Zangwill, 1987; Schutz, 1973). "Usually by the end of the seminar we're feeling comfortable and close enough to take some risks with each other, to open ourselves up to possible challenge, acceptance, hurt, concern – to be vulnerable with each other" (Duberman, 2009a, p. 269). In his 1970 diary entry, Duberman characterized encounter group that he was interested in for his innovative seminar as "confrontational" (Duberman, 2009a, p. 268). Janney made a good point that Duberman's "History 308 was not a T-group or encounter group enterprise (although at times it moved to this level). It was an academic course with a goal – the focus of American Radicalism, past and present. Yet, after this point, there was very little external structure; so Gibb's[34] modal [psychological] concerns eventually manifested themselves in one form or another" (Janney, "History 308 revisited," 1970, p. 51, Box 73, Folder 4, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

To get a flavor of this encounter group practice, let's consider the following exchange between Peter Janney and Martin Duberman reflecting on their October 30, 1969 class session,

> Duberman: …I had the feeling that Brian – during the self-criticism part Brian let himself feel momentarily his hostility to Matt, – consciously or not, it crossed his mind that what was bugging him was Matt. He never said it, but I think he got frightened by the realization, so when we shifted to the topic I think it was on his mind unconsciously to make it up to Matt. [Janney: Yes]. I think he was so afraid of his hostility that he did what we all do. You do the opposite. You get especially friendly. You get so afraid of your hostility. And I think that he was so cordial to Matt during the discussion that it was quite unreal. Because Matt in fact was being his most difficult self, I felt. More difficult than he had been in any other session.
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> Janney: He was totally against the self-criticism. He kept saying, "Shall we begin? Shall we begin?" in between reading the paper.
>
> Duberman: Yeah, he just was having none of it. He wanted to talk about Marxism again. It may have been material basis of life. Well I think part of it hasn't been – there for a few weeks (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 81, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

From my reading of the Janney-Duberman reflections on the class meetings, I feel that the seminar involved alternations between discussions of the broadly defined academic material chosen by the students for the day and informal encounter groups orchestrated by Duberman. The informal encounter groups seemed to include self-disclosure, sharing positive and negative feelings about the self and others in class, evaluation and critique of the class and Duberman, and occasionally Duberman's critique of his students for their immaturity, passivity, and irresponsibility.

As the quote above reflects, there were tensions between the academic and therapeutic parts of the class. These tensions were motivational and conceptual. Motivational tensions were coming from the fact that some participants of the seminar were mostly (or entirely) interested in the academic part of the class – namely, the history of the past and present of American Radicalism in a broader sense and its derivative topics (like, apparently, Brian). Other students were mostly (or entirely) interested in T-group therapy, while some were in-between (like Peter Janney, according to his own account). Duberman was often (but not always!) ready to scarify the academics for the therapy or for discussions of the students' life issues and existential crises. In the conversations with Janney, Duberman revealed that he was in the

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[34] Jack R. Gibb was a pioneer in humanistic psychology and the originator of Trust Level theory
http://www.healthy.net/Biography/Jack_Gibb_PhD_Biography/233.

middle of this professional crossover crisis, losing his interest in the study of history and doubting its value while gaining more interest in theater and therapy: "That in part my interest in unstructured education is a result of my disinterest in the subject matter [i.e., history] that I'm teaching. That's not the only reason I'm interested in it. But I increasingly distrust the study of history, for myself or anybody else" (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 35, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive). Also, for successful therapy, participation in it seems to be voluntary and desired by the participants, "Therapy for both adolescents and adults must be desired by the patient" (Neill, 1960, p. 289). It was clear that some of the students were not interested in any therapy or discussions of their lives in Duberman's seminars. As Duberman's former student, Eric, recalled, "I preferred to discuss personal matters with friends in the dorm rather than with (mostly) strangers in a seminar. Since my senior thesis was 'Political Ideology of the New Left,' I'm sure I chose the seminar for what I thought would be its substance."[35]

The second type of tension was conceptual and pedagogical. Duberman was aware that pedagogically and conceptually, the academic curricula and the therapeutic agenda also collided in his class, creating troublesome discontinuities and interruptions in the focus, goal, and meaning of the class meetings,

> The problem is still, for me – I can see, when the subject matter itself [in the classes, which academic curriculum is focused on] Group Process, or [on] Organizational Dynamics, how the subject matter and the group's own processes would so naturally tie together. But when group process is really not connected with the subject matter – like, American Radicalism – the problem is, how do you then make the connection or the shift. Because I find that more and more, that the group becomes so fascinated by the dynamics – by the encounter aspects -- that they don't want to shift to something else. If you shift to the subject matter of group process you're not shifting to – something else. [Janney: Right.] If you shift to American Radicalism, you're shifting from the very area that the group finds interesting. To something it doesn't find interesting. … "Imagine people revealing things about themselves! ... [at] university! Wow!" – that they just don't want to leave it alone. It's so intriguing and new. And to go back to that boring old stuff, talking about history!... the good question is [that] maybe we shouldn't go back to [the academics] (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, pp. 126-127, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

It is interesting that in this quote, Duberman assumed that all students like him were interested mostly or entirely in therapy and not in American Radicalism, which was not true based on many of his students' accounts. However, the tension between the class's focus on academics versus personal revelations is apparently common for the therapeutic group dynamic educational paradigm (see a description of this problem in the Kresge college at the UCSC in Grant & Riesman, 1978).

Conclusion: Martin Duberman's therapeutic unstructured education

In conclusion, I want to characterize Martin Duberman as an innovative educator holistically – dialogically finalize him – as he appeared in his innovative pedagogical work at Princeton University, Hunter College, and (to a lesser extent because the evidence is less abundant) Lehman College after 1971. Also, I will summarize the professional lessons that I draw from studying Martin Duberman's innovative pedagogy.

After abstracting several educational paradigms in Duberman's pedagogy, I was challenging myself to characterize Martin Duberman's overall pedagogy. In my judgment and formulation, it was *therapeutic unstructured education*, where the therapy dominated the academics. Duberman was clearly struggling with

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[35] Email to Bob Hampel, May 29, 2019.

the issue of the relationship between therapy and academics in his innovative pedagogy[36]. Thus, in his account of his first pedagogical experiment, he said that group dynamics must serve the goal of teaching academics, implying the supremacy of academics over therapy. Also, this formulation might have helped ensure his experiment would continue to be approved by his conservative department.

In contrast, in his conversations with Peter Janney in the fall of 1969, Duberman strongly wanted to give primacy to the therapy (in a broader sense, including discussions of students' self-awareness of their lives)[37], expressing his doubts about the academic. However, in the fall of 1970, Martin characterized his 1969 pedagogical desire as a mistake – in his diary, he argued for organic integration of the therapy with the academics,

> September 17, 1970: At the first session of the seminar the members decided to stress form over content. It's the stress I prefer, but I'm worried that they see it as an either/or proposition – and have opted headlong for a full-blooded encounter group. I think I learned with last year's seminar that it's a mistake simply to convert an academic format into a therapeutic one; it's the combined form I'm searching for – not the straight informational nor straight confrontational. But like last year, I'm uncertain enough about what I'm heading toward so that when the ball is carried clearly into one court or the other, I have trouble clarifying what I sense is my justifiable resistance (Duberman, 2009a, p. 268).

Nevertheless, taking into account the totality of his writings, I perceive the primacy of therapy over the academics in his 1966-1971 innovative pedagogy. My conclusion is based on the fact that in all his writing, the therapeutic drama in his seminars took much more space and much more emphasis than the drama of ideas about the history of American radicalism.

Besides, students rarely surprised, puzzled, or impressed him intellectually, at least in the 1966-1971 period. One memorable exception was his annoyance with some of SDS[38] students, apparently versed in Marxism, who viewed history as unfolding the objective laws revealed by Marx in the historical materialism framework. In contrast, Martin Duberman viewed history as unique events highly shaped by and rooted in the participants' subjectivities that are often inaccessible by historians. At the time of his pedagogical experiments, he also doubted the value of history for the present and the future, which, apparently, he rarely shared his professional doubts with his students. Yet, most of Martin Duberman's reflections with Peter Janney were full of psychologizing his students and himself. The most striking psychologizing was his claim that for one of his students, the student's desire to marry was a mistake affecting his life, education, and relationship with his peers. Duberman overwhelmingly defined his students' ontology in therapeutic and psychological terms.

The second important aspect of Duberman's innovative pedagogy was "unstructured education," rejecting the Kantian educational paternalism where the teacher and educational institution knows better than the students what the students must study and how and for what purpose. Martin Duberman's "unstructured education" was rooted in several educational paradigms: the Hippie organic paradigm, the

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[36] Martin Duberman was not alone in this struggle back at the end of 1960s, the beginning of the 1970. Thus, an innovative educator Howard Wolf, then an Assistant Professor of English at the State University of New York at Buffalo, wrote, "I see my position as one committed to *synthesis*, not *compromise*. It is one kind of experience and does not take its value from the rejection of other experiences. Under certain conditions I would like to participate in encounter experiences (as in fact I have over the past two years), but without an effort to be literary: without having to impose the role of teacher upon the role of encounter participant or leader" (Wolf, 1971, p. 265, italics is original).

[37] I wonder if Martin Duberman ever considered limitations of therapy as Neill, the founder of Summerhill, saw it: "No amount of personal therapy can abolish the evil of a bad home, a slum street, a poverty-stricken family" (Neill, 1960, p. 280).

[38] "Students for Democratic Society", https://rhamapush.wordpress.com/2019/05/31/students-for-democratic-society/ Martin added, "SDS was not to any extent 'Marxist'" (personal communication, 2019-09-02).

Democratic Education paradigm, the Ecological Communitarian paradigm, and the Rejection of Teacher Orientation paradigm[39]. The Ontological Dialogic paradigm might also contribute to his notion of "unstructured education" because both human ontology and genuine dialogue are often wild and messy. Duberman's interest in unstructured education was also rooted in his political views leaning toward Anarchism.

The strong countercurrent to his unstructured education was his hidden attraction to Progressive Education, revealed in his frustrations resulting in his blame for his students' passivity, immaturity, and irresponsibility. The paradigm of Progressive Education powerfully called him back to structured education. However, so far as I know, to Duberman's credit, he seemed to resist this call, remaining faithful to his idea of unstructured education. In my judgment, the paradigm of progressive education colonized him without much of his knowledge or awareness. I was surprised that I could not find any traces of conventional pedagogy colonizing him. I am surprised because both progressive education and conventional pedagogy have strong grips on me as an innovative educator who tries to break with both of them. It can be said about many educators, including me, "I may be through with progressive education and conventional pedagogy, but progressive education and conventional pedagogy are not through with me." When I feel time pressure in my class meetings, I often slip to rush to cover the lesson's curriculum rather than continue the ongoing classroom dialogue. Similarly, when I see a disengaged student, I feel immediately guilty for failing this student and wanting the student to want to learn the academic subject that we are discussing in the class at this moment, in accord with the progressive education paradigm. I wonder if Duberman had similar guilt caused by progressivism.

In a conversation with Martin at the noisy Empire Diner in New York City on a hot day in August 2019, we, Ana Marjanovic-Shane, Bob Hampel, and I learned that he seemed to achieve his teaching nirvana when he started teaching gay and lesbian history in spring 1991 (after a prolonged fight with the administration at the CUNY who initially did not consider studies of sexuality as a legitimate academic subject) (Duberman, 2009b, pp. 87-99). The seminar attracted LGBTQ+ undergraduate youth. The students and Martin created a natural community of learners with shared responsibility for their own learning and guidance, where the academic content of the seminar was inherently ontological for its participants. Academics, ontology, and therapy coincided in those classes. According to Martin, the class discussions were very lovely and dramatic. The students were deeply engaged. He continued using encounter group therapeutic techniques in his seminars on sexuality. At times, the discussions were even confrontational, but Duberman loved it, "It was brutal! It was brutal! I'm not exaggerating!" (Duberman, interview, 2019-08-22) where some students challenged him and their peers of slighting new queer theories and sadomasochist practices: "Their scorn for my 'knee-jerk humanism' had me grinding my teeth ... like all good students, they have to test whether I'm smart enough, progressive enough, tough enough, to warrant their trust and respect" (Duberman, 2009b, p. 90). When Martin told us this story, his eyes were shining with excitement. It seemed to me that Martin finally found an academic subject and a type of students that perfectly fit his teaching approach, which suggests that his teaching approach is content and students specific, with the academic content being ontologically central, crucial, and urgent for both the teacher and the students.

One lesson that I have learned from studying Martin Duberman's journey into his therapeutic unstructured education is the importance of critical reflection on my own pedagogical desires that often reveal themselves in my pedagogical frustrations. Are these desires and their underlying values really

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[39] It is interesting that for Neill, the founder of Summerhill, the relationship between therapy and unstructured education seemed to be reverse despite the fact that Neill might be a pioneer of therapeutic education: "I gradually learned that my territory was [therapeutic] prophylaxis – not curing. It took me years to discover the full significance of this, to learn that it was freedom that was helping Summerhill problem children, not therapy. I find that my chief job is to sit still and approve of all the things that a child disapproves of in himself – that is, I try to break down the child's superimposed conscience, his self-hatred" (Neill, 1960, p. 294).

mine? Are they good? Do I really want them? Am I colonized by oppressive values? What are alternative values? It is not the case that I had not thought about these questions before – I did, but in studying Martin Duberman's *journey*, I have realized them more acutely. Only once, I noticed that Martin Duberman came close to examining his own pedagogical desires, "I've thrashed about the last three years trying to make the classroom a more satisfying experience for other people and for me. But I'm not at all optimistic about the results. And some of that may be because of the confusing way in which I've set about trying to make it more satisfying."

> <<**Bob Hampel**: Eugene, your claim to "only once" see MD examine his own pedagogical desires seems too harsh. Isn't the conversation with Peter full of examination of his own pedagogical desires? [Or perhaps the phrase pedagogical desires isn't as clear as it might be]>>

> <<**Eugene Matusov**: Yes, Martin's conversations with Peter were reflective and critical, but they did not rise to the point of critical examination of Martin's own pedagogical desires and their underlining philosophical values – not in my judgment.>>

And then Martin Duberman immediately blamed the institution, providing his "alibi-in-being"[40] for himself, "But I think some of the confusion is built into the structure of the university. In other words, there's just so much you can do, clearly…" (PJ-MD conversations, 1969, p. 128, Box 73, Folder 5, Duberman Papers, NYPL archive).

> <<**Bob Hampel**: Unlike you, Eugene, Martin had no colleagues with whom he discussed his concerns. There was no Center for Teaching Effectiveness at Princeton. As I mentioned in my book, he could have discussed instruction with several colleagues, but he was on campus only twice each week. Thus the candor with Janney—it must have been a thrill to reflect on his teaching, at length, after 3 years of going at it alone.>>

> <<**Eugene Matusov**: I live in Philadelphia and come to the UD campus also, usually twice a week. My colleagues at UD are mostly graduate students, except you. I do not see our Center for Teaching Effectiveness as very helpful for me. In other words, I do not see much difference in our conditions.>>

Writing the word "journey" in the paragraph above, I realized that I was correcting Martin's own description of his experience. He consistently described it as an "experiment," while I described it as a "journey." Was it the most important thing that Martin, like Ancient Greeks, did not know about himself? Or am I wrong? I view Martin's pedagogy as authorial rather than technological (Matusov, 2011). Authorial pedagogy involves constant transcendence of the given – the cultural, institutional, pedagogical, biographical, and psychological given – recognized by others and/or the author themselves. In contrast, technological pedagogy involves a sum of the proven instructional techniques ("research-based," "evidence-based," "best practice") that more or less predictably secure desired learning outcomes. Of course, authorial pedagogy might involve technological aspects, while technological pedagogy might include some creative mastery. However, in the former, the pedagogical technology is subordinated to the pedagogical authorship, while in the latter, it is the reverse: the pedagogical authorship is subordinated to the pedagogical technology. Was Martin Duberman a traditional educational scientist who designed a pedagogical intervention as an experiment to see if it worked or not in order to spread it among all educators? Did he try to abstract teacher-free pedagogical techniques that other educators, with the right training, could use to gain the same desired educational outcomes?

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[40] Bakhtin's term (Bakhtin, 1993).

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My immediate answer is "yes," judging the technological language Martin Duberman often used to describe his practice as an experiment. In part, his use of the technological language might be political, aimed at winning his institutional approval – the technological paradigm of education has not been just hegemonic but also monopolistic in higher education.

My further and more weighted answer is "no," judging the spirit of Martin's pedagogical practice full of doubts and unexpected twists. If it was an experiment, it was a never-ending experiment – it was a journey without a destination, which rejects a technological approach to education. I sense that Martin Duberman viewed pedagogy and education more as an authorial art rather than as objective teacher-proof science and technology. Also, educators he read and respected, such as Holt, Rogers, and Dennison, clearly viewed teaching as an authorial art. But still, I am not completely sure.

<<**Bob Hampel**: Moreover, he turned down many invitations to "spread it among all educators" by speaking at other campuses. The Duberman Papers at NYPL have dozens of his No Thanks to both paid and unpaid invitations to lecture (and write) about his pedagogy. John Holt urged him to be more vocal and visible, as JH was. MD hated flying, so that was one reason he declined, but I also think he did not want to be seen as Telling Others The Secret of Good Pedagogy.>>

Of course, Martin Duberman was an educational visionary, a pioneer of Democratic Anarchist Education in higher education, who passionately argued not only for his ideas but for his overall pedagogical journey while strongly criticizing the omnipresent conventional education. But was he also a missionary who wanted to impose his educational truth on others? Was he an _authorial visionary_ or a _missionary visionary_ (or a bit both, or entirely something else)? An authorial visionary inspires other pedagogical authors and induces critical responses from them while seeing their own authorship as unique. Missionary visionary tries to scale up their pedagogical truth, proven by experience or research, to standardize their proven ideas by cleaning their innovative practice from their subjectivity as much as possible and implementing standardization across the entire sphere of institutionalized education. An authorial visionary is often an educational pluralist supporting other authorial pedagogies, even ones with which the authorial visionary disagrees.

I did not find any evidence of Martin Duberman supporting a fellow pedagogical author or arguing for academic freedoms for pedagogical authorship in his institution. In contrast, he seemed to think a collective approval of his pedagogical innovations legitimate (although his proposed pedagogy indeed disrupted the institutional structures, he could have tried his innovations without the institutional approval, in the spirit of a good anarchist who does not recognize the institutional monopolist legitimacy, like me). A missionary visionary is always an educational monopolist, trying to impose their vision on the entire sphere of education (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2016).

Was Martin Duberman an educational pluralist or an educational monopolist? I found a letter from Martin Duberman's colleague from Temple University, who raised this issue with him. On October 27, 1970, Howard Kirschenbaum charged Duberman with a missionary approach in a presentation about his innovative teaching:

> I had one major concern. Although you said near the beginning you weren't trying to decide the right teaching style for everyone, I thought you often tended in that direction. I sensed this is an unresolved issue for you – one part of intellectually believing there are several valid teaching styles, another part emotionally believing that your experiences point to some pretty definite directions for all teachers (There may be a lot of projection in that attribution.). I think this could get you in trouble in two ways: First, I've seen too many examples of traditional

teachers being very successful teachers in given situations to believe that student centered teaching is the only way to facilitate significant learnings. Secondly, by trying to by trying to suggest one best methods, you can easily miss the possibilities for organizing university education so that it allows for diversity – good lectures, good learn-by-discussion leaders, good encounter groups, formal and informal learning groups, etc. (Howard Kirschenbaum to MD, October 27, 1970, in Box 16, "K-L" folder, Duberman Papers NYPL, archive).

Based on the spirit of his entire educational enterprise, I am leaning toward accepting that Martin was an educational pluralist, despite some of his occasional slippages into missionary rhetoric.

Martin Duberman was clearly a radical educational revolutionary and not a gradualist educational reformer. His authorial educational vision could not be tried piecemeal or gradually. It was all or nothing. Of course, Martin Duberman was forced to compromise, especially about his ecological communitarian vision of education, where students and teachers must live together and unescapably experience each other in everyday communal life. But his core of the unstructured education – no grades, no mandatory attendance, no mandatory assignments, small class size[41] – must be enacted fully and simultaneously, in his view. The uncompromised adoption of his innovation was a part of his vision for education.

How do I feel about this uncompromised educational radicalism? Ambivalent. I agree with Martin that education is defined by values and goals that require a radical rethinking of the entire practice of education. However, in contrast to Martin, I currently believe that the primary authorship of education belongs to the student and not to the teacher. Students author their education by engaging in a critical examination of their own educational desires and lack of them. The teacher's pedagogical authorship is secondary, aiming at helping the student during the student's educational journey if and when it is needed for the student. In other words, Martin designed an educational journey primarily for himself, "I had set up the seminar on an experimental basis… chiefly for my own sake" (Duberman, 1969, p. 279), although I am sure a lot of exciting and deep learning occurred for his students. His ontological life project sought a good, meaningful, and fulfilling life for himself (cf. the notion of "taking care of the self as a practice of freedom," Foucault, 1988) while overcoming dramatic events of "me-in-crisis" (Duberman, 2009b, p. 207). His good life includes other people's and his own concerns about their personal and collective well-being. It involves political, social, educational, and artistic activism. In education, he tried to discover how to build his own good life with his students.

However, as to his students, Martin rarely set up and legitimized students' asserting their own ideas about their own education, ideas which might challenge Duberman's views of a good education. Rather he discouraged this testing through criticism of encounter groups or expected that the students' strong academic authorship, educational activism, and responsibility for their own education would naturally emerge when he gave them freedoms. And yet, letters from his former students testify how the History 308 seminar significantly changed their views of education and life – at least, some of them. Again, the issue for me is how *critically* examined these transformations were by the students. Recently, I tried to achieve students' testing their own education by designing multiple pedagogical regimes[42] that my students can try, modify, and choose for themselves (Matusov, 2020a, 2021c).

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[41] Small class size was achieved by splitting a class into two sections – by doing that, Martin Duberman actually doubled his teaching load.

[42] Here is a brief outline of the four pedagogical regimes: First, "Open Syllabus for self-responsible learners and lurkers" – students design their own syllabus (curriculum, learning activities, instruction, assessment) with or without my help and help of other students (this seems somewhat similar to what Martin's student Sherm proposed in his first unstructured seminar in 1966). Second, "Opening Syllabus for other-responsible learners" – my initial class design that involves curricular choices and my requirements that gradually open for the students' revisions. Third, "Non-traditional Closed Syllabus for credential students" – a set of tests and exams with preparation materials for students to pass (similar to getting a driving license, where students are prepared for mastery, judged by an

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One of the recurring themes in Martin's self-reflective writing was his impatience. I think impatience is not just a part of his psychological temperament or even pedagogical one (see the progressive education paradigm above) but also a part of his life philosophy. In my view, Martin is impatient with the machinery of human life (Matusov, 2020b). By the machinery of human life, I mean attendance to basic human necessities – income, shelter, social status, safety, survival, health, self-esteem, and so on for the person themselves and loved ones (cf. the pyramid of needs, Maslow, 1943) – that has consumed a lot of human attention and effort since the dawn of the humanity. Aristotle argued that a truly free person is one whose life is not dominated by his (sic!) attendance to necessities but rather dedicated to the pursuit of virtues and noble causes (Arendt, 1958). It is not by chance that Ancient Greeks invented the notion of "school," which in Greek means "leisure." However, education as a form of leisure is aimed at self-actualization, self-growth, creativity, and critical deconstruction[43] – educational goals dear to Martin's heart – was only possible in Ancient Greece because of slavery, exploitation of Greek peasants, artisans, women, and exclusion of foreigners. In other words, there was a special machinery of human life that made possible the Ancient Greeks' ideal of education as leisure (for some). I sense that Martin wanted to minimize the machinery of life – he often disregards it (and frequently feels ambivalent or even guilty when he does not). I can hear/imagine him saying, "Damn this machinery! I don't accept the machinery of life! I don't want to be a part of this machinery! I don't want my life, anybody's life, to be shaped by this monster! Machinery is oppressive! It's conservative! It is suffocating! I don't want to see it!" Instead, he seems to view the main cause of the oppressiveness of conventional education in deeply-rooted tradition of authoritarianism – "this conservative, conformist country" (Duberman, 1996, p. 70) – that can only be overruled by a strong collective will of the people. I sense voluntarism in his approach, which may come from his attraction to anarchism and rejection of the Marxist sociological analysis.

In my view, Martin is definitely right that his vision of education is incompatible with the mainstream instrumental education aimed at serving this machinery of life (Matusov, 2020b). I think he is right that intrinsic education (Matusov & Marjanovic-Shane, 2019), as an existential human need (Matusov, Baker, Fan, Choi, & Hampel, 2017), cannot be institutionalized or "structured," using Martin's own words. Rejection of the given, "being not from this world," helps to envision a radically new possibility and shake yourselves from colonization by naturalized oppression (i.e., an oppression that is masquerading as being "natural" and thus unavoidable in principle). However, I think that in his years of teaching and even currently, our society is not ready to liberate itself from the yoke of the machinery of human life; a large majority of people must attend to their necessities. Maybe with the emergence of global technological unemployment (Keynes, 1963), when the economy starts requiring fewer and fewer people for its successful functioning, economic, cultural, political, and social conditions, backed by dignified universal basic income, for intrinsic education may emerge. Until then, I believe that intrinsic education, to which Martin has been so devoted, can be possible only in some temporary oases, here and there, on a very limited and compromised scale (Matusov, 2020b).

But Martin was (is?) very impatient with this idea. I suspect that he might call my patience conservative, too much accepting the oppressive given. "The height of realism, I've often argued, is to recognize that what does not yet exist, what has never been tried, is nonetheless possible; to reject so-

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expert). Fourth, "Non-syllabus for Prisoner of Education" – unconditional giving a passing grade (B minus) for students who are forced to take my course by the institution, but they find it irrelevant and useless for themselves (to avoid education becoming "a cruel and unusual punishment" for those students). The students have 5 first weeks of the grace period to make a decision about their pedagogical regime.
[43] Cf. Socrates' motto in the Apology dialogue, "The unexamined life is not worth living."

called 'historical necessity' in the name of what is not yet known. In a real sense, that has been, and remains, the sum of my political philosophy" (Duberman, 1996, pp. 82-83)[44].

> <<**Martin Duberman**: Yes, I finally found "nirvana" when I was able to shift my academic subject to the LBGTQ world and to students for whom the material was essential to their being. Yes, too, to your recognition that I do all that I can to minimize "the machinery of life." I'm a born scholar-hermit, happiest when alone and absorbed in an engrossing project. You've definitely got my number!>>

I feel a huge affinity and kinship with Martin Duberman, the authorial educator of therapeutic unstructured education. First, I believe that Martin was an author of his unique pedagogy and is thus a part of my professional society of pedagogical authors. Second, I have been attracted to many of his educational paradigms (in the order of the significance for me): Ontological Dialogism, Democratic Education, attention to educational ecology, and Rejection of Teacher Orientation (as my own philosophically unresolved struggle). I do not have much interest in Therapeutic Group Dynamics, Hippie organic paradigm, and Communitarianism. And I reject Progressive Education. Third, we have somewhat similar struggles with the hegemony of Progressive Education and the monopoly of conventional education based on foisted education and its ideology of the Kantian educational paternalism (Matusov, 2020c, 2020d, 2021b).

Fourth, I highly respect and admire the brutal honesty of his critical reflections on his innovative educational practice with its, at times, undesired, frustrating, and disturbing outcomes (e.g., students' disengagement). Martin faced his deep doubts without becoming paralyzed or retreating into conventional pedagogy. If he did not write about some negative aspects or consequences of his innovative practice that I might notice, it is because I believe he simply was not aware of them (or disagreed with me) but rather tried to hide them from others and himself. Like him, I try to juggle my faith in humanistic pedagogy and my doubts about it. Martin Duberman is a huge inspiration and a source of professional learning for me and, I hope, for other authorial educators who might be interested in Martin's journey into his "therapeutic unstructured education."

> <<**Martin Duberman**: Reading your essay I felt in many instances that you understand the Martin Duberman of the late Sixties better than he understood himself! Sometimes I even felt that you still do have insights into my personality and perspectives on education deeper than my own. For all of which I thank you[45].>>

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[44] However, Martin also justifies educational oases by seizing "the chance of making at least some lives better now" (Duberman, 1996, p. 70). Thanks to Bob Hampel for directing me to these quotes.

[45] And yet, as he indicated in our latest email exchanges in spring 2020, Martin did not like some of my harsh judgments about him and his pedagogy. Unfortunately, he was uninterested and/or did not trust me enough to elaborate on his disagreements with me. He authorized me to publish his comments on my prior text, except for one I deleted at his request.

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