

Viewing Pancasila in the Eyes of Nationalists in Indonesian New Order Era

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Abstract

Indonesian political thinking is divided in two: political Islam and secular politics. Soekarno and Mohammad Natsir were dominant political figures in Indonesia, with the former being a secular nationalist, and the latter being an Islamist. Both these leaders inherited ideological disparities, and these distinctions separate political Islam from secular nationalism. This presents an academic opportunity, because such a phenomenon can act as material for research to invent and develop new ideas. This study took a qualitative approach and used both primary and secondary data sources, and a collection of publications and documents were examined to inform this research. The primary and secondary data were therefore analyzed qualitatively to construct a theory. Due to the national arguments during the early years of independence, both Islamic and secular nationalist ideologies emerged. Soekarno and Muhammad Yamin's version of Pancasila (the Five Basic Principles) was advocated as the national principle by the nationalist circle. This ideological issue has been debated since the presidential decree legalized the Jakarta Charter, which established an ideal constitutional vision for the country and state. As a result, the Jakarta Charter was implemented in law as part of the 1945 Constitution.

Keywords: *Thought identity, Secular politics, Islamic politics, Pancasila, Religion*

Introduction

In terms of demographics, the Indonesian nation is an amalgamation of several ethnic groups. The distinctiveness of Indonesian political philosophy is framed by a political and cultural divide into two camps, namely the Islamists and nationalists, with the latter having little regard for religious beliefs (Anshari, 1986), and this national issue that has not been resolved to date. For various reasons, Islam, as the most-common faith, appears to have been hampered in implementing a political structure based on Islamic doctrine. At the very least, multiculturalism, on the one hand, and the strong history of Islam on the archipelago, on the other hand, mark the meeting point of political thoughts, giving rise to Islamist and secular nationalist movements (i.e., Islamic ideology versus Pancasila) (Aswar, 2021).

Political Islam and secular politics are the two main aspects that have emerged in Indonesian political thinking (Jamilah, 2021). Soekarno and Muhammad Natsir emerged as pivotal figures in Indonesian political philosophy. Soekarno represented secular nationalism, while Natsir

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represented political Islamism. These ideological differences have been passed down to subsequent generations, thus dividing political thought into two camps. On March 1, 1945, the BPUPKI committee, presided over by Mr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat, was created to address this ideological dispute (Christenson, 1971; Natsir, 2004). This committee's primary responsibility was to develop a constitution, and their discussions were flavored by arguments about national ideas. It was unable to establish a national principle, so a small committee was established called the PPKI (the Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence). Its mission was to find a proper solution to the national principle. As a result, on June 22, 1945, a compromise was struck in agreeing the "Preamble" wording of the Constitution, which became known as the Jakarta Charter (Anshari, 1986; Platzdasch, 2009). The Jakarta Charter was therefore a political settlement between secular and Islamic nationalists.

The meeting of the Indonesian Constitutional Assembly on November 12, 1957 was a high point in the political discussion over the national principle. Natsir spoke on behalf of the Islamic group (Manik et al., 2021) and rejected Pancasila as the national philosophy because it is secular, so he kept supporting Islam as the national principle. Two Islamic political groups, Masyumi (the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) and NU (the Ulema Council), both rejected Pancasila at the meeting. Kyai Wahab Abdullah, a prominent NU figure, was a little more moderate in stating that Islam provided ideals that bolstered the nation's principles.

Research Questions

Taking into consideration the general development of political thought in Indonesia, and particularly since Indonesia gained independence, the pertinent question about the politics of Islamists and nationalists can be defined into the main research questions: "What are the positions of Islam and Pancasila as national principles in the views of political Islam and secular nationalism, and how can these ideological differences be addressed?"

Sub-research Questions

To explore the research into in-depth study, the main research questions were elaborated into the following five sub-research questions below:

- 1) What is the political perspective of Islam in Indonesia is a wise to Pancasila as the state ideology?
- 2) How is the implementation of Islamic politics during the Indonesian revolution period?
- 3) How is the perception of political Islamic ideology with regards to Pancasila as the state ideology of Indonesia?
- 4) How is Pancasila vis a vis Islamic thoughts about state ideology is applied in the state practices in Indonesia?
- 5) How is the polemic between Natsir and Soekarno during the process of self-dependence?

Literature Review

Some books closely related to the current study were reviewed to reveal how Islamic political thinking and secular nationalism tend to contradict each other. These books served as the foundation for reviewing literature about Islamic political thought in Indonesia and how it fits with secular philosophy (Ka'bah, 2005).

The book *Pemikiran Politik Islam Tematik* was published in 2013 and dedicated to issues such as the rule of law, justice, human rights, freedom, democracy, violence, and corruption. A work this like cannot capture the entirety of Islamic political thinking, but this theme is prevalent throughout political science (Mahfud, 1998). In addition, it does not provide precise opinions about Islamic sharia, so it is not considered authoritative (Black, 2006; Khomeini, 2002). Abdullah (1987) wrote a book titled *Pemikiran Politik Islam Indonesia* that focuses on two major subjects, namely the political challenges in Indonesia and the nexus of the state, the caliphate, civil society, and democracy (*Pemikiran Politik Islam Indonesia*). The themes presented pertain to political movements that shed some light on historical features of Islamic political movements in Indonesia, with little emphasis being placed on the formation of political beliefs. However, the focus of its arguments seems to be based on the conflict between symbolic and substantive politics.

The various debates about the national principle, which led to the Jakarta Charter, were described in depth by Anshari (1986) in his book *Piagam Indonesia 22 Juni 1945*. Here, Pancasila was first

presented by the PPKI as the national principle, with this being a compromise between the Islamist and secular nationalist advocates.

Indonesian political thinking can be explained through ideology, because this best describes how notions of political thought have developed in the country, especially within the purview of Islamic political institutions (Khaled, 2004). There are different schools of Islamic political thought, such as the formal ideas that advocate the concept of an Islamic state or *Islam Din ad Daulah*. There is another school of thought that sees a symbiotic relationship between Islam and politics, resulting in the birth of an Islamic society. The theory of ideology first manifested in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Destutt de Tracy was the first to apply this phrase in a specific context, namely for the science of ideas (Mandan, 2009). In another sense, ideologies can be defined as a collection of perspectives and ideals, and such fundamental values and beliefs serve as normative guidelines in the social life of a state or nation, as well as the system that governs it (Abidin, 2012; Mahyuddin, 2009).

The ideology of Islamic political and social movements reflects Islam's religious teachings. The concept of struggle is common among Islamic movements like Egypt's *Ikhwanul Muslimin*, Pakistan's *Jamaat el-Islami*, and Indonesia's *Masyumi* (Al-Chaidar, 2002; Maududi, 1990). Therefore, all Islamic groups, whether they are social or semi-political like Hizb ut Tahrir or highly political like Hamas and Hezbollah, adopt ideology as a form of self-identification. Due to the Quran and hadiths being the major pillars of Islamic philosophy, the phrase "Islamic ideology" has come to be accepted in everyday language (Efriza, 2008; Firmanzah, 2008).

Methods

This study applied a historical research as the research design (Brundage, 2014), a method for studying historical facts with the stages of heuristics, source criticism, interpretation, and historiography (Brundage, 2014; McCaffrey et al., 2012). Historical research was carried out through 5 stages, namely: topic selection, heuristics (source collection), verification (source criticism), interpretation, and historiography (writing) (Brundage, 2014; Gunn & Faire, 2016; McCaffrey et al., 2012;). This study was qualitative because it has data in the form of words, sentences, arguments, narrative logic and researchers express meaning based on the intent of the source (Creswell et al., 2011). This study examines the historical aspect of the role of Islam in developing Pancasila in the political dynamic of Indonesia during the independence (Garcia, et al.,

2009). Qualitative research aims to investigate or describe an unquantifiable event or social manifestation. Such research focuses on theory development, whereby the data gathered about a phenomenon are used by researchers to identify and generate new hypotheses (Satori & Komariah, 2010).

Data were collected from documents in the form of books, journals, papers, theses, dissertations, and research reports that were systematized as references to increase this research's pool of available data. Qualitatively, data were collected in the form of selected themes from historical documents, published articles and dissertations. After that, the data were analyzed using five stages of historical research, namely: choosing a topic, collecting sources (heuristics), verification, interpretation and historical rewriting (historiography) (Brundage, 2014; Gunn & Faire, 2016; McCaffrey et al., 2012).

Results and Discussion

Political Perspective of Islam in Indonesia

It is important to note that three powerful elements played roles in the history of the Indonesian people, namely colonialism, the *ummah* of Islam (the Islamic community), and the Majapahit empire. Islam existed in Indonesia before the colonial occupations of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, Japanese, and their allies, such that it was the dominant religion in the archipelago. Indeed, the history of the Indonesian Muslim community dates back to the beginning of the 14th century, somewhat before the arrival of the Portuguese and Dutch in 1596 (Anshari, 1986).

The formation of several Islamic kingdoms across the archipelago sparked the Indonesian national political movement. According to Anshari, after the decline of Majapahit and the development of Malaka (1389–1950), Islamic kingdoms emerged beginning with Perlak and Samudera Pasai, followed by governance under Sultan Alauddin Syah (1477–1488), the Demak Sultanate (1500–1546), Sultan Baab Ulah's Ternate (1570–1587), and the kingdom of Aceh (Ansari, 2004).

Since the decline of Hinduism, Islam has grown into the national religion of Indonesia. Slamet Muljana wrote in his book *Runtuhnya Kerajaan Hindu—Jawa dan Timbulnya Negara-Negara Islam di Nusantara* that Islamic power was demonstrated by the kingdom of Perlak, which was the first Islamic kingdom to exist in 1186 A.D., and later by the kingdom of Samudera Pasai, which was established in 1297 A.D. As far as Islamic political institutions or Islamic governments are concerned, these two kingdoms can be considered as examples of them. They acted as forerunners

to the establishment of other Islamic kingdoms throughout the archipelago, which in turn served as the foundation for developing modern Indonesian nationalism (Santoso, 2004; Taimiyah, 1999). Islam spread, leading to more Islamic government institutions being built throughout the archipelago, including on Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Irian. In terms of geopolitics, the conversion of this archipelago into the nation of Indonesia represents the most visible manifestation of Islam's role in Indonesia's inception (Rahardjo, 2001; Ritzer, 1992).

Islam continued to grow on Java until it eventually became strong enough to overthrow the Majapahit empire. The Demak Sultanate was Java's first Islamic political institution. King Raden Patah ruled from 1500 to 1518 B.C.E. His son Pati Unus launched an attack against the Portuguese colony in Malaka during his reign (Anshari, 1986). Pati Unus later took Raden Patah's place following his death. The Demak Sultanate (1500–1550), Banten (1524–1813), Cirebon (1552–1677), Pajang (1568–1618), and Mataram (1568–1618) were among the Islamic states that controlled Java, having inherited the greatness of the Majapahit empire, while resisting imperialism and colonialism (1596–1755).

Some Islamic kingdoms existed on Sulawesi, such as in South and Southeast Sulawesi, including the Sultanate of Gowa (1593–1669), Bone (17th century), the Kingdom of Banggai (16th century), and the Sultanate of Buton (1332–1911). In Sulawesi, the strategic position of these Islamic kingdoms played a significant role in the expansion of Islam into the eastern section of the archipelago.

Karaeng Matoaya, the King of Gowa, was the first king of Makassar to convert to Islam, and he was helped by Daeng Manrabia, the King of Tallo, as well as the *Mangkubumi* (high administrator) with the title of Sultan Abdullah. Around 1593–1639 A.D., he controlled Makassar, and this kingdom quickly grew into a maritime power under the reign of King Malekul Said (1639–1653). Small and large Islamic kingdoms in Kalimantan, including the Sultanates of Pasir (1516) and Banjar (1526–1905); Korawaringin with the Kingdom of Pagatan (1750); and the Sultanates of Sambas (1671), Kutai Kartanegara (1400), Sambaliung (1810), Gunung Tabur (1820), Pontianak (1771), and Bulungan (1771) spread across the entire Kalimantan region (731), making Kalimantan an Islamic stronghold. The smaller kingdoms in Kalimantan paid homage to Banjar, which was the most powerful of the island's Islamic kingdoms, which in turn gave Kalimantan enormous influence.

From 1526 to 1905 A.D., the kingdom of South Kalimantan existed. The Hindu kingdom of Negara Daha was an ancestor of the Banjar dynasty. Sultan Samudera, commonly known as Sunan Batu Habang, was the Sultanate of Banjar's first ruler. He was also the grandson of Maharaja Sukarama of the Hindu Negara Daha dynasty. Sultan Samudera converted to Islam and received the title *Suryanullah* or *Suriansyah*. The Sultanate of Demak had charge of this procedure for Islamizing the Sultanate of Banjar (Lapidus, 2000).

Islam ruled Maluku and Irian from Sabang to Merauke, with sultanates being established in Tidore, Jailolo, Bacan, and the Kingdom of Tanah Hitu in Ambon, as well as the kingdoms of Misol and Patipi in Irian. Ternate's kingdom had a significant impact on Maluku and Irian, as well as the entire archipelago. According to Nanulaitta's writings, Ternate was one of the archipelago's four major kingdoms, along with Aceh, Mataram, and Makassar (Nashir, 2007). Sultan Hairun and his son Sultan Babullah reigned in Ternate, ushering in a golden age for the sultanate.

The establishment of Islamic kingdoms in the archipelago, as well as the wars led by the *ulema*, such as the Diponegara and Paderi wars, were precursors to the notion of the nationalism that would ultimately lead to the Republic of Indonesia in the 20th century. According to Shobron (2003), the engagement of the *ulema* in politics can be traced back to the beginnings of Islamic civilization itself. In the context of Indonesia, the *ulema*'s participation in the politics of the Islamic kingdoms, most notably as advisors to rulers, was strategic enough to warrant their inclusion in this section.

The *ulema* later stepped in to fill the void left when the Islamic kingdoms collapsed in the face of European colonialism, rallying the Muslim community to stand firm against the invaders. To reaffirm the *ummah*'s commitment to fighting the interlopers, the fatwa of jihad and martyrdom gained power. This political lesson was noted in the Diponegoro War (1825–1830) and the later Kiai Mojo War (1873–1904), where the mobilization of Islam stoked nationalist and anti-colonial sentiments. The *ulema*'s jihad fatwa and the Sabil War laid the groundwork for building a powerful *ummah* for fighting the colonizers until Indonesian sovereignty could be achieved (Lapidus, 2000).

Islamic Politics during the Indonesian Revolution Period

The Colonial Period before Independence

Before and after independence, during colonial and foreign assaults and domestic rebellions, the Indonesian revolution can be divided into two periods as follows: The first phase of the revolution was a revolt in response to the oppression from colonizing powers (the Portuguese, Dutch, and

Japanese). It was carried out using the strength of the Islamic kingdoms throughout the archipelago, and it subsequently evolved into a spirit of national revolution, which ultimately culminated in independence for the Republic of Indonesia.

In order to deal with the power of the Islamic sultanates in the archipelago from Sabang to Merauke, the Dutch began to use imperial tactics by establishing a commercial organization called the East India Company (Dutch: Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC) on March 20, 1620. It was the first trade organization in the world (Nanulaitta, 1966). The Islamic kingdoms in the archipelago, together with the *ummah*, began to rise in opposition to the Dutch due to the VOC's trade monopoly and desire for territorial expansion through the use of military force (Ricklefs, 2005).

The preponderance of the Islamic *ummah* in the archipelago, according to Aqib Suminto, is something the Dutch encountered. The conflicts against the Dutch—particularly the Paderi (1821–1827), Diponegoro (1825–1830), and Aceh (1873–1903) wars—were another hindrance according to Suminto (1996). Anshari went on to describe the aforementioned reality in further detail while disputing Clifford Geertz's assertion that the Paderi and Diponegoro conflicts, the fight in the Java Sea, and the battle in Aceh were all essentially just student insurgencies against Dutch imperialism. As a result, Geertz accidentally, or even intentionally, politically localized these conflicts by claiming that they were sectarian actions carried out by a few Muslims who felt antipathy to the Dutch monopoly, a crusade of sorts, so they lacked national legitimacy.

Anshari asserted that the first war in West Sumatra (1821–1828), which Geertz referred to as a “student revolt,” was in fact the Paderi War rather than a student insurrection. The war came to a conclusion in 1837. The second conflict took place in Central Java (1826–1830). Geertz simply stated that Mahdi's movement was responsible for the student revolt, because it was fighting the war against infidel Dutch imperialism and its allies at the time. This fight, which was led by Pangeran Diponegoro, is unquestionably referred to as the Diponegoro war. A third conflict took place in northwest Java (1840 and 1880). Geertz did not clarify the location or the figures involved in the rebellion, but it was carried out by the *ummah* in Banten, who burned European homes and civil administration buildings. Aceh was the site of the fourth conflict (1837–1903). Geertz again did not identify any of the leading figures of the insurrection, instead just stating that the movement was successful in beating Dutch imperialism, which had been in control in Aceh for thirty years at the time.

Various points of view are offered to support the justification of the Islamic kingdoms' resistance against the colonizers and Islam's status as a symbol of national unity in the archipelago. For example, in his book *Islam and the Rise of Nationalism in Indonesia*, Fred R. Von der Mehden asserted:

Whether it is to foster a sense of national unity or to distinguish the Indonesian people from the Dutch colonialists, Islam is the most obvious means of accomplishing these goals. The islands, which included the Dutch East Indies, did not exist as a linguistic, cultural, or historical entity until very recently. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, the final places under the control of Dutch power were never completely surrendered. As a result, because it is made up of a diverse range of traditions, histories, languages, cultures, and geographical shapes, Islam is the only global tie that can be found outside of the colonial power structure (Effendy, 1998).

Islam, according to Madjid (1987) and Amir (2003), is one of the most prominent symbols of national unity. In the fight against the colonialists, Islam became a symbol of the nation's awakening. In their fight against the Dutch, the Indonesians positioned Islam as their shared identity and ideology for struggle. Throughout history, Islam has always intersected with power. Even at the time, the Dutch government attempted to separate Islam from politics through Hurgronje's teaching. His doctrine divided Islam into two categories, namely "worship Islam" and "political Islam." The goal was to limit this arena for the Muslim *ummah*, so that it could never evolve a political institution. However, Islam came to serve as a political concept for national identity (Effendy, 1998; Suminto, 1996).

It served as a thesis upon which to build a movement for the *ummah*, led by the archipelago's kingdoms, to resist colonialism. Thus, a sense of Indonesian nationality among the archipelago was created, with a view toward achieving Indonesian independence. We discuss below some of the hypotheses that are debated:

As a religion capable of freeing people from slavery, Islamic teachings are inherently autonomous. As such, Islam was a politically independent religion free from colonial control and its political institutions. Initially, the Islamic sultanate that had ruled Indonesia for centuries acted as a historical basis for the current unitary state of Indonesia.

Moreover, it also served as a starting point for building the foundations upon which to develop the Indonesian state, because the Islamic kingdoms wielded considerable power in the archipelago. According to Kahin (1996), the Diponegoro War was the catalyst for Indonesian nationalism, not the other way around.

Revolution after Independence

The second stage was the revolution that occurred after independence. It could be said that this occurred due to the military aggression carried out by the Dutch and NICA, as well as domestic uprisings. As an example, consider the following explanation for the second stage of revolution.

The Military Aggression of the NICA. Indonesia was not immediately acknowledged by the international community following its proclamation of independence on August 17, 1945, particularly by Western countries and especially the Dutch. “The State of Indonesia is a Unitary State in the Form of a Republic, and its territory is the entire former Dutch Indies region,” stated Article 1, Verse 1 of the 1945 Constitution (Halim, 2005). The Dutch, however, did not respect the boundaries established in the 1945 Constitution because they still wanted to retain some territory in the east. The Dutch then invaded Indonesia with the help of the Allies.

On September 29, 1945, the NICA and its allies attacked Indonesia under the command of Admiral Peterson. The Dutch occupied most of Indonesia from 1945 to 1949 and totally dominated eastern Indonesia. On July 15, 1946, in Ujung Pandang, the Allied army commander handed over responsibility for Kalimantan, Timur Besar, Bangka, and Belitung to H. J. Van Mook, a Dutch government agent (Halim, 2005). On December 19, 1948, the Dutch and KNIL took control of Yogyakarta and detained some revolutionary leaders. Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, Mr. Assaat, Mr. Abdul Gafar Pringgogdogdo, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Air Commodore Suriadarma were held up on Bangka Island. On December 19, 1948, at 10:00 a.m., Soekarno and Hatta met with their cabinet, and Syafruddin Prawiranegara was chosen to form an emergency administration for the Republic of Indonesia. Syafruddin fulfilled this objective by relocating the Indonesian capital to Sumatera, along with ministers of finance and social affairs including Colonel Hidayat, Colonel Kawilarang, Lieutenant Commander Oetarjo, Colonel Soejono, and Colonel Subiakto (Hilmy, 2010).

Guerrilla warfare tactics and strategies finally compelled the Dutch to engage in negotiations. In this case, the Islamic leaders who chaired the negotiations played significant roles. KH. Agus

Salim led the Indonesian delegation in the round table conference in The Hague, and the name Muhammad Roem is immortalized in the name of one of the Dutch–Indonesian negotiations, namely the *Roem-Royen* negotiation.

Linggarjati, *Renville*, and *Roem-Royen* were just two of the Netherlands–Indonesia agreements. By implementing a federal government system that divided Indonesia into states, the Dutch employed divide-and-conquer politics. The Dutch, however, acknowledged the Republic of Indonesia’s full sovereignty as a united country, with the exception of West Irian, as a result of the round table conference in The Hague on August 23 to November 2, 1949. The Netherlands therefore formed the Republic of Indonesia as comprising East Indonesia Country, Pasundan (including Jakarta), East Java, Madura, East Sumatera, and Autonomous State Units, such as Central Java, Bangka Belitung, Riau, West Kalimantan, Bayak, Banjar, Central Kalimantan, and East Kalimantan (Hilmi, 2010).

On October 22, 1945, in response to the Dutch invasion, the *ulemma* of NU gathered in Surabaya to pass the “Djihad fi Sabilillah” resolution, which declared a state of war against both the Dutch and Allied forces. Kyai Hasyim Asy’ari was a direct contributor to the financing of the Hizbullah and Sabillilah forces (Feillard, 1999). To demonstrate to the nation that they were not waiting for a call from Indonesian leaders or any other group to defend the state from colonialism, Islamic figures marched in the streets of Jakarta. In the first or maybe the second year following independence, Soekarno issued what was essentially an official statement of his intention to fight the Dutch and the Allies. His address at the celebrations of the first and second years of independence reflected the call he made in the previous year. He stated the following:

“What a huge challenge we're up against!” After we wrested power from Japan’s hands, the challenge will not reduce, but rather intensify. Allied forces have landed thousands of troops, including Dutch troops...Our entire nation—rich, poor, old, young, men, women, educated, illiterate—rises, moves, and struggles to justify and materialize the proclamation of August 17 with one steely desire to become one (Soekarno, 1965 in Soyomukti 2012).

Domestic Rebellions. The internal uprisings were instigated by various factions in national society. The problem was unusually intricate, and it came dangerously close to bringing down the newly independent government body. Indonesia’s government was confronted with international

power in the form of the Dutch/NICA and the Allies, domestic political tensions in terms of ideology and geography, and other obstacles. Three domestic revolts took place in Indonesia during the leadership of Soekarno and Hatta. Two of these were ideological revolutions by the DI (*Darul Islam*)/TII (Indonesian Islamic Army) and the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), while the third was a pragmatic regional revolution, also involving the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party). These are explained below.

The first was the DI/TII ideological revolution, which was the most significant conflict in Indonesia's sociopolitical field and government system throughout the history of the *ummah's* struggle for independence, both before and after independence. It was also the most persistent ideological conflict. The armed classes associated with the DI/TII due to this ideological war. Kartosoewirjo proclaimed the foundation of the Indonesian Islamic State by reading the "NII Proclamation Text" on August 7, 1949 after Soekarno and Hatta had proclaimed Indonesia's independence (Kartosoewirjo, 1949 in Al-Chaidar, 2002). Central Java, South Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Aceh were among the places where the DI/TII movement was strongest. Kartosoewirjo, a native of West Java, was a pivotal figure in the DI/TII movement (Rahawarin, 2003).

The intellectual fight between secular nationalists, Islamists, and Marxists that occurred prior to the Japanese and Dutch occupations had a great influence on Kartosoewirjo's determination to build an Islamic state. His Islamic political thinking was both radical and coherent, which made him a formidable opponent. He was unaware of any political compromise between the ideology of a secular state and the ideology of a religious state (e.g., Pancasila). The following are some pieces that were originally published by *Fajar Asia*, a publication where he served as editor, as well as vice president and general manager:

Darmo Kondo thinks we're strange because of our nationality. Don't believe that since we are Muslims, we don't want Indonesia to be independent. In Darmo Kondo, our colleagues do not have a monopoly on the ideal. Also, don't assume that as Muslims, we don't strive to achieve our vision, so that we can have control over our own country. But the difference between our colleagues in Darmo Kondo and us is that for nationalists, the Indonesian national independence of the Indonesian people, as stated by Darmo Kondo's editor, is the highest peak, whereas for us, the independence of our homeland is merely one condition, one bridge that we must

cross. Instead of enacting Islam in its true and broadest sense in our birthplace Indonesia, we must achieve independence to achieve our greater and nobler ideal. "For us, there is only one criteria," says the editor of Darmo Kondo. "For the editor of Darmo Kondo, it is the lofty purpose and objective" (Al-Chaidar, 2002).

This scathing condemnation was aimed at the secular nationalists and intended to be taken literally. Kartosoewirjo developed a dislike for secular nationalists due to their reactions to his actions. The concept of Darul Islam, on the other hand, was still being fought over. The following shows how the concept of Darul Islam was expressed:

....the Indonesian national community directs its movements and acts toward the big Indonesia in order to commit to its country, to its mother-Indonesia, but Muslims in the Islamic community, or Daroel-Islam, "do not desire to devote to Indonesia or anyone, but only to Almighty God." Their goal is to create the most perfect Daroel-Islam, where every Muslim can experience Allah's laws (Islam) as widely as possible, whether they are dealing with sjahsiah or idjtima'iyah (Al-Chaidar, 2002).

The second revolt was the PKI's ideological revolution, which took place in 1989. This political group had a Marxist-socialist ideology, and its name translates as the Indonesian Communist Party. It was initially founded in May 1914 under the name ISDV (*Indische Sosial Demokratische Vereniging*) by three Dutchmen, namely Sneevelit, Bransterder, and Bergsma. It transformed into the PKI on May 23, 1920. Semaun, Darsono, Alimin, Muso, and D.N. Aidit were some of the most notable PKI members. As the left-wing communist Tan Malaka was not included in this organization, he was disqualified from participating in it. The PKI progressed rapidly and successfully in a short period of time.

The PKI brought a political ideological mission to the table as a Marxist organization. Its constitutional purpose was to construct a communist-dominated Indonesian state. There were at least four major examples of the PKI's efforts to accomplish this aim. The first was the Madiun Affair, which took place on September 18, 1948. The G.30.S/PKI revolt of 1965 was the second. The third was the general election of 1955, and their manifesto of political ideology was the fourth. The PKI, with the support of the Soviet Union, staged a coup against the Indonesian Government and established Madiun as its state capital. The political rivalry between Musso and Soekarno over

the Madiun Affair was reflected in their respective speeches on the subject. On September 19, Soekarno delivered the following address, which was broadcast on radio at 10 p.m.:

His Communist Party took over Madiun yesterday morning and installed a Soviet-style administration led by Musso. They see this as a prelude to seizing power throughout the Republic of Indonesia. From this, it is apparent that the events in Solo (Surakarta) and Madiun are interconnected and are part of a larger plan to overthrow the Indonesian government. To do this, the rebels used units of the 29th Brigade, led by Lieutenant Colonel Dahlan. Dahlan has betrayed the state and the soldier's oath, so I dismiss Dahlan from the army. Ladies and gentlemen, Musso's Communist Party is seeking to capture the Republic of Indonesia, which we adore. In the name of the Indonesian independence struggle, I visit you at a critical time, when you and I must choose between joining Musso and his Communist Party, who will hinder the establishment of an independent Indonesia, or Soekarno–Hatta, who will, with Allah SWT's help, make the Republic of Indonesia an independent Indonesian nation free from foreign colonization...Support your government, help the government battle the rebels and restore the rightful government in the troubled regions. Madiun should be returned to our hands immediately (Kahin, 1966).

Musso responded to Soekarno's speech at 11.30 p.m. with the following speech:

When the citizens of Madiun regained control of the city on September 18, 1948, they did so fast and with their own hands. As a result, they have completed their mission in the national revolution, which should be led by the people rather than by any other groups or individuals.

Our revolution has lasted three years under the leadership of a national bourgeois class full of misgivings and ambiguous attitudes toward imperialist countries, particularly the United States of America. It is one of the reasons why the Republic's political and economic situation continues to deteriorate. This is why the general public, particularly the labor movement, has been unable to distinguish between the current situation and that which existed under the Dutch or Japanese regimes. In fact, people in power have enriched themselves by taking advantage of our movement. People became quislings, traitors, romusha (forced labor) dealers, and

heiho (working body) propagandists during the Japanese occupation. Since their spouses were forced to join romusha, there are more than two million widows. Now, the same people will sell Indonesia and its people to imperialist America once more. Soekarno accused FDR and Musso's PKI of being rebels, and he backed up his claims with bogus evidence. Are the traitors and disciples of Trotsky, which he employed in Solo (Surakarta) to terrorize and kidnap all communists, something Soekarno seems to have completely forgotten? He seems to have forgotten about the fact that he increased and supported the crimes committed by the Siliwangi division and by the terrorists in the area. Is it really his intention, as a former ramusha merchant, to free Tan Malaka, a criminal who is plotting to oust him from his position as President? Clearly, three years ago, Soekarno-Hatta and two ramusha businessmen, the vile traitors, engaged in a capitulation policy with the Dutch and English, knowing well that they were about to sell Indonesia and its people to imperialist America, as evidenced by their actions. Is it possible for people of this caliber to claim that they have legitimate rights to run our Republic? Indonesians are not deaf or blind. They see that these romusha dealers are unfit to be in charge of this country's affairs. It is the people of Madiun and other areas who are attempting to break away from their ties with the imperialist satellite states.

It is not Soekarno or Hatta who is against the Netherlands, England, and now America but the Indonesian people themselves. Therefore, the incidents in Madiun, and in other places, are the sign for all Indonesian people to seize the state's power with their own hands. It is one of the guarantees that the Republic will be sovereign and able to face all attacks in the domestic region and free themselves from the satellites of the imperialist.

The Indonesian people are being asked by Soekarno to choose "Soekarno or Musso!" The people should answer "Soekarno-Hatta, the slaves of Japan and America! The traitors should die!"

We are sure that the people will say: "Musso is always devoted to the Indonesian people!"

According to a radio report in Moscow, which was triggered by Musso's announcement and supported the Madiun regime, a people's government had been

established in Madiun and People's Commissions were being formed in other prominent cities. It was the people's rebellion against the quisling (betrayers) of the government of Japanese fascists, Soekarno and Hatta (Kahin, 1966).

Musso's speech was aimed at Soekarno and Hatta, claiming the two were romusha traders and the traitorous minions of Japan and America. Musso tried to use his words to convince the Indonesian people, especially the residents of Madiun, as much as possible to support the PKI's revolution (Soekarno, 1965). The Madiun Affair was ultimately unsuccessful, but it was not buried. A more systematic revolutionary movement was orchestrated by the PKI in the form of a generals' coup known as the G.30.S/PKI incident. Before this incident broke out, the nation was in a precarious situation. According to the PKI, "The motherland is in an old pregnant state." The PKI tried to oust Soekarno and Hatta by presenting a negative political image of them to the Indonesian National Army, pointing to how the nation was a state of chaos (Maa'rif, 1988; Suhelmi, 1999). The National Indonesian Army was suspected of plotting to hold a coup against the government and form a military junta. The army's generals were accused by the PKI of forming a "General Council" with the mission of deposing the president. According to the PKI's interpretation of the Gilchrist document (named after a British ambassador in Indonesia), it related to a confrontation with Malaysia, but it was really about limited attacks on Indonesia by our "local army partners" orchestrated by America and England. The PKI interpreted "local army friends" as referring to the "General Council." The General Council's principal goal, however, was to remove the PKI from the political scene. The PKI formed a Revolutionary Council in response with the goal of sabotaging the Council's agenda.

The second type of revolution was politically motivated rioting. Through a variety of incitements and provocations, the PKI was able to break the peace of the Indonesian people during these political protests. The PKI attempted to recruit farmers to its ranks in addition to its already large base of supporters. Its initiative to free and distribute land to farmers was referred to as the land reform movement, and the goal of this was to delegitimize Islam and its adherents, because Islam and the army were the PKI's primary adversaries. The PKI launched an open attack on the Islamic *ummah*, referring to Muslim landowners as "village evils" or "bourgeois" in order to denigrate them. The PKI's revolution triggered widespread mobilization of the Muslim community to wage jihad against the organization, however. Islamist youths set fire to the PKI's headquarters in

Jakarta on October 8 and demanded that the organization be dismantled throughout Java and the rest of Indonesia (Feillard, 1999).

Political Islamic Ideology with regards to Pancasila

Islam and Pancasila as the State Ideology

In terms of politics, Islam and Pancasila represent two distinct ideas. It is not uncommon for these two to be at odds, yet some people manage to bring them together. At the very least, the two come from different sources: Pancasila is based on logic, while Islam is based on revelation. Since the 1920s, there have been ideological and political clashes between Indonesia's Islamic and secular elites. In the arguments about ideology, the national principle, and the 1945 Constitution that resulted from the PPKI (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence), particularly the Jakarta Charter, history would repeatedly replicate the Indonesian situation. Below, we explain how the historical cycle occurred for the debate in question.

First and foremost, Islam is a political ideology. As defined by Qardhawiy (2008), *Siyasah Islamiyah* is a political entity that is descended from sharia, such that the concepts, aims, and methods of implementation are all dictated by sharia law. Qardhawiy held the viewpoint described above, and this was used to explain a political point of view held in Indonesian Islamic circles around the time of independence. Such people wanted Islam to become the national principle of Indonesia. This was reflected in two debates about the national principle, namely the negotiations conducted by the PPKI following the failure of the BPUPKI (Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Independence) session in 1945 and the session of the Constitutional Assembly held following the 1955 general election.

Pancasila, which had been continuously debated as a national principle prior to the Islamic faction's efforts to make Islam the state ideology, was legitimized by the Islamic circle at two significant events, namely the work of the PPKI resulting in the Jakarta Charter and the debates in the Constitutional Assembly following the election results of 1955, which gave rise to Presidential Decree No. 5 of July 5, 1959.

Pancasila could be accepted by both parties because it is consistent with a typical understanding of Islam's teachings and objectives. However, this does not mean that Pancasila supplanted Islam as a political doctrine. Pancasila is an ideology that was created within the context of Islamic thought, so it just possesses a symbiotic relationship with Islam. It accords with Amien Rais's

point of view about when an assumption is made about the relationship between democracy and Islam.

Pancasila and Islam could be compared in terms of democracy and Islam. Amien Rais said in this regard, “I believe in democracy 100 percent.” Indeed, democracy and fundamental Islamic teachings are inextricably linked. This statement does not legitimize *Siyasah Islamiyah*, but it does demonstrate the symbiotic link that exists between democracy and Islam, as evidenced by Pancasila’s position in *Siyasah Islamiyah* (Afandi, 1999). Islamic ideology—which was proposed as a national concept in the BPUPKI and PPKI meetings, the Constitutional Assembly, and other forums throughout Indonesia’s history—will never ignore the substance of Islam and politics. Due to geopolitical and diversity constraints, the Islamic circle’s adoption of Pancasila is conditional on political considerations. Furthermore, Pancasila is not a final and binding state ideology, both legally and historically, but rather a result of two formulations in the 1945 Constitution that are still in effect.

Although the 1945 Constitution was a temporary political compromise, it was a necessary one because the country’s situation was precarious due to domestic unrest and the ideological struggle between the Islamists and the secular nationalists. As a result, the debates on the national principle were temporarily put on hold. In light of the provisional nature of the 1945 Constitution, from a legal and legislative perspective, should it no longer be consistent with spirit of the Jakarta Charter, Pancasila as the national principle would become naive and vulnerable.

What follows are Natsir’s and Soepomo’s reactions to the Presidential Decree. According to Soepomo, its views and dicta could be viewed as lofty aspirations and the moral foundation of Islam (Anshari, 1986). Meanwhile, according to Natsir, the Jakarta Charter ensouls the 1945 Constitution, implying that Pancasila, as formulated by the PPKI, can be adopted as long as its interpretation does not contradict Islamic principles, notably *tawhid*. Although Pancasila incorporates Islamic ideals, this does not mean that it is equal or superior to Islamic doctrine. Indeed, its five principles were constructed so as to not contradict Quranic doctrine (Natsir, 2008b). Pancasila was established as a state concept only after a long and difficult process of discussion and argument. History notes that the outcomes of these debates, which included Islamists and secular nationalists, about Indonesia’s national principle resulted in Pancasila being revised and reinterpreted as a result. When considering the various reinterpretations that Pancasila has undergone throughout its history, there are five kinds of official formulations for Pancasila that

may be identified in Indonesian history. These five official formulations were developed by government agencies rather than proposed individually.

Only one of the five formulations will be presented in this article, however, namely the Pancasila of the 1945 Constitution, which was legitimized by Presidential Decree on July 5, 1959, thus recognizing the Jakarta Charter as an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, both legally and constitutionally.

The results of the debate in the Constitutional Assembly after the 1955 general election are reflected in the fifth formulation. The argument raged between the Islamists, who wanted Islam to be the national principle, and the secular nationalists, who wanted Pancasila to be the national principle. As a result, the Constitutional Assembly was at an impasse, so a Presidential Decree was issued on July 5, 1959 to end the process. The decree's text mandated, among other things, the dissolution of the Constitutional Assembly and the reinstatement of the 1945 Constitution as "ensouled by the Jakarta Charter."

The following five goals were based on the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959 and specified in the 1945 Constitution:

- One and only God
- A just and civilized humanity
- The unity of Indonesia
- A democratic life guided by wisdom in deliberation and representation,
- Social justice for all the people of Indonesia

(Ensouled by the Jakarta Charter on June 22, 1945) (Text of Decrit)

According to the Decree, which includes the words "ensouled by the Jakarta Charter on June 22, 1945," it served as a compromise of legal legitimacy that was acceptable to the entire Indonesian people, including both the Islamists and secular nationalists. It essentially restored the Jakarta Charter's legal status, and political activities received official state approval once again. According to Endang Syaifuddin Ansyhari, as referenced by Haedar Nashir:

Why could the "Jakarta Charter" formulations, which had been hotly debated and consumed much intellect and power for days by significant representatives of our nation, be revised in minutes at the "PPKI" conference on August 18, 1945? Why, why, why?

What power pushed from behind to make the change? The author is unsure if the question can still be answered correctly. Why did Ir. Soekarno, who was present at the BPUPKI meetings, call the committee to amend the Jakarta Charter? The author is unsure (Nashir, 2008b).

Thoughts about State Ideology

Soekarno's Thoughts

State ideology in the form of Pancasila is officially enforced, and it is thought to be a mirror of Pancasila as presented by Soekarno and Muhammad Yamin, as stated in the section on Islam and Pancasila. However, to separate Muhammad Natsir's thesis of state political thought from Soekarno's, the following text discusses the notions behind each's thoughts and arguments.

In terms of characteristics and identities, Soekarno's beliefs on state politics can be explored through three pillars of ideological politics: Pancasila, Marhaenism, and Nasakom.

Soekarno's Pancasila was a basic formulation of the state, and it differs from the one officially used as the national principle now, as mentioned above. Pancasila proposed by Soekarno goes as follows: "Indonesian nationality, Internationalism and humanity, Consensus and democracy, Social welfare, and Divinity" (Down, 1957; Thomson, 2003).

To paraphrase Soekarno, the five pillars of Indonesian culture are manifestations of the country's individuality. It follows that the five pillars were derived from the high levels of trust and confidence that were held by the Indonesian people for a long period of time. If these five pillars are a manifestation of the Three Pillars—namely divinity, sociationalism, and sociodemocracy—and the Three Pillars are a manifestation of the One Pillar, namely mutual cooperation, then the Five Pillars must also be a manifestation of the One Pillar (Soekarno, 1965). Thus, on June 1, 1945, Soekarno delivered his version of Pancasila, and this day is regarded as Pancasila's birthday and celebrated as Pancasila Day. The question of who was the real creator of Pancasila, Soekarno or Yamin, continues to be debated, however. A disagreement arose, because on May 29, 1944, before Soekarno delivered his address on June 1, 1945, Yamin proposed the concept of five pillars of national principles to the BPUPKI, thus sparking a debate. According to the text, nationality, humanity, divinity, democracy, and the welfare of the people are all important (Anshari, 1986). According to Roem, the five principles offered by Yamin and Soekarno are essentially no different. Boland (1971) stated that the similarities between the two lead to the conclusion that "the Pancasila

was in fact a product of Yamin and not Soekarno.” It is entirely possible that Yamin’s philosophy inspired the five national principles, and Soekarno created Pancasila by altering the language.

Soekarno's next line of thinking was Marhaenism. Marhaenism is a political ideology that he found, being motivated by a farmer’s beliefs. Soekarno took the name Marhaen from a farmer named Marhaen in the 1920s, and he used it from that point on. Another variant of the word “Marhaen” derives from the name of a farmer from Bandung, West Java, who went by the given name “Aen.” The political turmoil resulting from ideological and political conflicts—particularly among the Islamists, nationalists, and communists—prompted the birth of a political ideology. This came in the form of Nasakom, with the goal of accommodating and consolidating the various ideological differences (Ranuwiharja, 2001).

Nasakom, as a political ideology, combines religion, nationalism-secularism, and communism in a single package. Religious figures that saw communism subjectively reacted strongly to Nasakom and opposed it. What is more, Soekarno undoubtedly argued against the anti-communist stance, as demonstrated below:

Those whose soul is negative will suffer from a disease “being afraid of being called left,” namely communist. Left- and communist-phobias make them become conservative and reactionary in matters of politics and socioeconomic development (Soekarno, 1965).

When one considers the political philosophies of Pancasila, Marhaenism, and Nasakom, it does not seem inappropriate to label him a genuine secularist-nationalist, based on his respective philosophy. This idea is based on Soekarno himself, who referred to the Divine circle in the Nasakom as a “religious group,” something that is synonymous with Islamists, regardless of whether they were nationalists or communists at the time. Soekarno also referred to the Divine circle as those who adhered to Islamic doctrine, a statement that hints at his status as someone who did not adhere to Islamic ideology (Sadzali, 1993).

The notions of Pancasila, Marhaenism, and Nasakom are considered to be very problematic as an ideology, because they blend a wide range of ideas and thoughts, life experiences, and opinions in a highly controversial manner. Soekarno presented the Nasakom ideology in his autobiography *Penyambung Lidah Rakyat*. This was reported by Nurani Soyomukti in her book *Soekarno dan Nasakom* as follows:

My politics is not the same as others. It is because my background is not the same as any others. My grandfather gave Javanese culture and mysticism. From my Father, theosophism and Islamism came. From my mother, Hinduism and Buddhism. Sarinah gave me humanism. From Pak Cokro, socialism came. From my friends, nationalism.

I add reflections from Karl Marx and Thomas Jefferson. I learn economy from Sun Yat Sen. I learn goodness from Gandhi. I can synthesize education in a modern way with ancient animist culture, and I take from its product to make messages of life hope that may be inhaled in line with the understanding of the villagers. The results of all these are called "Soekarnoism" by ordinary people (Soyomukti, 2012).

Muhammad Natsir's Thought

Some of Natsir's political thoughts can be traced back to "Agama dan Negara," "Islam dan Demokrasi," "Agama dan Politik," "Qur'an dan Negara," and "Ideologi Islam." Below are some possible explanations for Natsir's thoughts on various topics: Religion and Government.

Each religion, including Islam and Christianity, has a philosophy for life and an ideology. According to Natsir, Islamic philosophy is defined by the surah Addzariyat, verse 56 of the Quran: "I created the jinn and humanity solely for the purpose of worshipping Me" (Departemen Agama RI, 1995). The verse therefore cannot be taken to mean that the goal of a Muslim's life on earth is to achieve happiness in both the present and the hereafter (Natsir, 2008a).

Islam cannot be explained in terms of the one and only hereafter because it is based on devotion. *Muamalat* (social society) is covered by Islam, including all applicable norms and *hududs* (legal punishments). The Quran and hadiths largely outline such rules, but because they contain orders and prohibitions, it is difficult for these two major works to be used as references. Consequently, an entity with authority is needed to carry out such functions, namely the state (Natsir, 2008b; Noer, 1988).

Islam and ideology are two terms that often come to mind. To initiate the conversation in *Islam dan Ideologi*, Natsir offered the following statement from H. A. R. Gibb, an orientalist:

"Islam is much more than a religious system. It is a complete civilization" (Natsir, 2008a).

According to Natsir, Islam is a single life philosophy, ideology, and way of life for humanity in this world and the next. Politics was part of his life as a Muslim, and Islamic philosophy presents a democratic theistic ideology that is neither secular nor theocratic. Islam is not understood in the same way that democracy is understood, however, because Islam is Islam with its own nature (Natsir, 2008b). As a result, preserving Islam is something that is inextricably linked to the state. Natsir remained committed to his political position, namely to fight to establish Islam as the national principle, as expressed in the following statement:

It is no use for us to spend time with angry and annoyed feelings when we meet resistance in terms of ideology. With a cool head and big soul, a Muslim should always be able to place oneself with definite stances and attitudes. Qul i'malu 'ala makanatikum inni 'amil—“work according to your position; [for] indeed, I am working” (The Qur'an Surah Al-An'am verse 135).

Several counterarguments were raised in response to Natsir's viewpoint, thus calling into question the link between Islam and state. For example, one person asked, “How can Islam dominate the country when there are so many intricate issues?” Natsir responded to the hesitancy by stating that Islam had established fundamental ideals for the state, and anything that seems outdated can be modified to meet the needs and advancements of modern times.

The Polemic between Natsir and Soekarno

Natsir and Soekarno were Indonesian nationalist theorists with opposing views on nationalism. Due to their differences, they were forced to confront each other, not just in terms of ideas and practical politics but also in terms of physical intimidation, which ultimately led to Natsir being jailed. The collapse of the Masyumi Party and the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party), together with the arrest of Islamic officials, marked the height of political animosity between Natsir and Soekarno. This inevitably affected political Islam, because Soekarno viewed it as a dangerous ideology (Soekarno, 1965).

To distinguish Muhammad Natsir's Islam from Soekarno's secular Pancasila, the following arguments are offered. Natsir positioned Islam as a set of principles and an ideology and opposed Pancasila as a national principle (Santosa, 2004). The first commission put forward three national principles: Pancasila, Islam, and the social-economy. When Natsir and his friends were asked to address the plenary session, Natsir claimed that history provided a definitive conclusion for a state

ideology, namely that there were only two options for a state's base: secularism (la-diniyah) and religiosity (diniyah). He questioned what Pancasila's position was in la-diniyah and diniyah and labelled it secularism. This presumption came from Soekarno's explanation of Pancasila's first pillar (One and only one God). On June 17, 1954, before the Pancasila Defenders Movement, Soekarno said:

The Divinity (Divinity I use here means religiosity) has lived in the Indonesian nation's heart for tens, hundreds, and even thousands of years. I dug it from the land of the Indonesian people, and the first thing I saw is religiosity. Why? It is because Indonesian people are a nation that lives above the agrarian level, the agricultural level. All nations live above the agrarian level, certainly, because they are religious. I have not used One and only one God, but I just use the word religiosity, or a belief in something unseen that rules all of our lives...People who are still farming feel that all of their efforts to look for something to eat is greatly dependent upon something magical...Such a nation that still lives above the agrarian level must be religious. On the other hand, in a nation that is hard to live in, industrialism mostly leaves religiosity...but why? Since it faces a lot of certainty. It needs electricity, not, "Oh supernatural! Oh supernatural!" Press the button, and...bright light!

According to Natsir, Soekarno's point of view was unsuitable, because it is inappropriate to speak about the hearts of believers in Allah SWT, regardless of whether they are farmers or industrialists. Natsir's sole intention was to demonstrate that his speech was merely a manifestation of the secularism that had been created. The existence of God had been relativized in accordance with the development of a community from one level to another. Santosa (2004) defined this formally. Natsir came to the conclusion that according to secularism, a person who lives at the agrarian level requires God, but if he rises to become an industrialist, he will no longer require Him. Thus, what is the role of revelation as a source of belief and faith in God, and where does it fit in? A secularist believes that the existence of One and Only One God has nothing to do with revelation; instead, he believes that divinity is constructed by humans and subject to change (Mahendra, 1999; Haq, 2001).

Second, Pancasila is agnostic. Religion is a manner of living that moves the soul. Most Indonesians follow Islam, so Natsir believed Islam must become the national principle rather than an ideology. Soekarno's idea of Pancasila is plainly secular, because the other pillars do not allude to the one and only God. Indeed, it can be interpreted according to the reader's inclinations. It is therefore regarded as a compromise or *gemene-deler* (lowest common denominator), borrowing words after considerable engineering. Soekarno, the founder of Pancasila, defined it as five pillars that covered many Indonesian factions, including the communists (Ranuwiharja et al., 2001). Natsir criticized Pancasila as follows:

In addition, because Pancasila is neutral and will not stray from its neutral posture, it will not be willing to absorb any of the positive ingredients. It will not be considered a "pure concept" in and of itself. As a "pure concept," it is not a reality in the positive sense, and as a result, it has no effect on anything. The tragedy of the secular (la-diniyah) and neutral Pancasila can be summarized as follows: Thus, it is possible to apply Pancasila as a national principle in this manner. So Pancasila as the state philosophy for us is hazy and can say nothing about the spirit of Islam's ummah, which has always had a clear and comprehensive ideology that exists in the minds of Indonesian people as their life guide and the source of inner and outer strength, namely Islam. For the ummah of Islam, the transition from Islamic doctrine to Pancasila is analogous to jumping from the ground on which they are standing to a vacuum, an empty space devoid of air. That is the story told in the parable (Natsir, 2008b).

Conclusion

In summary, debates about the national principle, from the BPUPKI meetings through to the Constitutional Assembly, gave rise to two main schools of thought: Islamism and secular nationalism. Soekarno's, or Muhammad Yamin's, version of Pancasila and its five basic principles were not accepted as the national principle by the Islamists. As a result of a political compromise, the PPKI made the following decision: Soekarno or Yamin may have offered Pancasila as a national principle, but the meanings and substance should be applicable to Islam. In addition, the PPKI version of Pancasila is contained in the Jakarta Charter, which incorporates the Islamic

worldview into the constitutional framework, especially with the Seven Words: “with the commitment to implement Islamic sharia for its believers.

Its purpose was to respond to how ideological matters had been polemicized up to that point, particularly following the decree that legalized the Jakarta Charter, in order to build an ideal constitutional vision of the country and state. It provided a constitutional settlement for the implementation of the Jakarta Charter as part of the 1945 Constitution, because it was a key demand of many Indonesians who believed in Islam.

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