

Modern Democratic Theories and Political Education in Japan

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This paper examines the “subjectification” function of political education in democracy, considering the present situation of political education in Japan. In particular, from the point of view of political science, it focuses on the relationship between democratic theories and political education and considers whether the possibility of the self-transformation of human beings is included in such theories.

In Japan, the political education provided at school is aimed at conferring information and knowledge of the existing political system as a sovereign citizen, and at fostering attitudes toward and motivation for participating in politics. Political education in Japanese high schools tends to be biased towards the functions of “qualification” and “socialization” in order to maintain political neutrality, as stipulated by the Basic Education Act of Japan. More fundamentally, what kind of political system people understand democracy and how people understand a citizen in the political system seem to contribute to the tendency as well. In order to consider the future direction of political education in Japan, we need discussion from a wider perspective through the theoretical reexamination of democracy.

In the aggregative democracy model, a citizen’s preferences are treated as given. It is not concerned with how the citizen’s preferences were formed or how their values and preferences were changed as a result of interactions with others through participation in the political process. The deliberative democracy model, in contrast, takes the view that human beings can be transformed, and therefore there is an opportunity for political education. However, it has been pointed out that the deliberative democracy model restricts citizens from participating in deliberation because the model requires rational deliberation. Iris Young calls this internal exclusion and suggests communicative democracy as a democratic model to overcome it. Young’s communicative democracy advocates the importance of political education that opens up the possibility of self-transformation through interactions with others with different views.

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Introduction

After World War II, it was decided that education and politics would be kept separate in Japanese education. The argument that education should be separate from politics has been widely deployed not only in educational fields but also in pedagogy. In schools, education on political culture and citizenship tended to be avoided under the name of the political neutrality of education. The mainstream faction of pedagogy strategically defined education in an adversarial relation with the state and excluded politics from it (Kodama et al., 2016, p. 49).

However, in recent years, political education in schools has become an important educational subject in Japan, since the minimum age of suffrage was reduced from 20 to 18. Political education in schools is mainly sovereign education. In other words, it is aimed at conferring information and knowledge on the existing political system as a sovereign citizen and fostering attitudes toward and motivation for participating in politics (Kuwabara ed., 2017; Shindo, 2016; Miyashita, 2016; Hirota ed., 2015).

According to Gert Biesta, education performs the three functions of “qualification”, “socialization”, and “subjectification” (Biesta, 2010, p. 19). The qualification function provides students with “the knowledge, skills and understandings and often also with the dispositions and forms of judgment that allow them to ‘do something’” (Biesta, 2010, p. 19). The socialization function helps students develop into “part of particular social, cultural and political ‘orders’” (Biesta, 2010, p. 19). The subjectification function is “not about the insertion of ‘newcomers’ into existing orders, but about ways of being that hint at independence from such orders, ways of being in which the individual is not simply a ‘specimen’ of a more encompassing order” (Biesta, 2010, p. 20).

This paper examines the subjectification function of political education in democracy, considering the present situation of political education in Japan. In particular, it focuses on the relationship between democratic theories and political education and considers whether the possibility of the self-transformation of human beings is included in such theories from the point of view of political science. In order for political education to perform its subjectification function, it is vital that individuals keep an open mind and be able to see and understand other people’s views, maintain a posture in which they affect their own and others’ positions, encourage mutual transformation with other people and constantly examine their own political life. This paper discusses whether such opportunities can be found in democratic theories.

The first section presents an overview of political education in Japan. The current political education in high schools in Japan tends to be driven by what Biesta calls qualification and socialization. This tendency is a consequence of the requirement for political education in Japan to maintain political neutrality, as stipulated by the Basic Education Act of Japan. However, we need to reexamine more fundamental questions on what kind of political system democracy is understood and how a citizen in democracy is understood in order to con-

sider the future direction of political education in Japan. For this purpose, the second section through the fifth section attempt to clarify how a citizen in democracy is understood through historically looking at democratic theories.

The second section reviews Athenian democracy in ancient Greece. In theory, free and rational citizens supported democracy while at the same time such citizens were thought to mature under democracy, which is to say advocates for democracy then assumed that citizens obtained political education through political participation.

The third section looks at modern democratic theory. After World War II, the “aggregative democracy model” became prominent in both theory and practice. In aggregative democracy, a citizen’s preferences were a given, and it was not considered that the citizen’s values and preferences could be changed by interactions with others. Therefore, in this democracy model, we did not have the opportunity for subjectification in political education.

The fourth section points out that modern democracy has reached an impasse. It has been suggested that if the preferences of individuals and groups were expressed, those preferences would be aggregated and adjusted so redistribution could be realized in aggregative decision-making. Presently, this form of decision-making is having trouble meeting the needs of the people and no longer satisfies them.

The fifth section argues that there has been increasing concern about the “deliberative democracy model” as the aggregative democracy model reached an impasse. The deliberative democracy model, in contrast to the aggregative democracy model, provides the view that human beings can be transformed through deliberation, and in this respect, offers an opportunity for subjectification in political education. On the other hand, the problem of internal exclusion is recognized in deliberative democracy. Iris Young suggests “communicative democracy” as a model to overcome internal exclusion (Young, 2000). In communicative democracy, people may be torn away from their desire to persist in selfish discussion, realize their narrow and limited viewpoint, and have their prejudices corrected. It seems that Young’s argument opens the door for people’s attitudes and language itself to change, and for people’s points of view to be affected.

1. Political Education in High Schools in Japan

In March 2015, a bill to revise the Public Offices Election Act, which would lower the voting age, was presented to the Diet. The bill was passed at the plenary session of the Lower House on June 4, then passed by the Upper House on June 17. The revision to the Public Offices Election Act was promulgated on June 19th and enforced one year later. Two national elections have taken place since the voting age was lowered; the Upper House election on July 10 2016 and the Lower House election on 22 October 2017.

In the deliberation process of this amendment to the Public Offices Election Act, lawmakers discussed various issues, one of which was political education in high school classes. With the change of the minimum voting age to 18, some third-year high school students would become new eligible voters. Although all political parties recognized the need of political education in high schools, there was a major discrepancy of opinions on directions and contents between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan, the leading opposition party.

The Liberal Democratic Party, a conservative party, was willing to enhance education on political participation, but emphasized thoroughly ensuring political neutrality at schools. They contended in particular that teachers should be legally punishable if they deviated from political neutrality. The Democratic Party of Japan, a liberal party, took a stance to encourage young people to actively and autonomously participate in politics and insisted that it was necessary for students to learn about actual political issues at schools through discussion. They clearly opposed the penalties for violators requested by the LDP.

After World War II, it was decided that education and politics would be kept separate in Japanese education. The Basic Act on Education, enacted in 1947, stipulates that “the political literacy necessary for sensible citizenship must be valued in education”, and at the same time “schools prescribed by law shall refrain from political education in favor of or against any specific political party, and from other political activities” concerning political education. We see here that political neutrality in school education was called for. As a result, education on political culture and citizenship in schools tended to be avoided under the name of the political neutrality of education.

In line with the lowering of the voting age, political education has been called for in high school classes. Teachers are now facing the difficulty in maintaining political neutrality. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) issued on October 29 2015 a notice concerning political activities of students, in order to avoid confusion in high schools, stating that out-of-school activities of students on holidays or after school are “according to the judgment of students”, and relaxed the previous standards. However, political activities during class, student council activities or club activities are still banned as before. Political activities in schools during holiday or after school are restricted or prohibited so as not to interfere with other students. Regarding political activities outside school, those highly likely to violate the law may need to be restricted or prohibited. Although MEXT provided rough criteria by issuing this notice, there are many situations where teachers need to judge political neutrality in actual classes. “It makes us nervous,” “It’s easily said. But in reality, it’s hard to maintain that neutrality,” said a social studies teacher at a high school in Tokyo (Japan Times, July 8, 2016).

MEXT basically aims at promoting political education. They made and disclosed supplementary teaching materials in September 2015 which include how to cast a vote, the system of election and how to hold a mock election. On the other hand, MEXT guidelines for teachers concerning the use of the materials, produced at the same time, repeatedly stress that teachers are required to keep a neutral stance, such as by refraining from expressing their personal opinions about particular political issues.

Thus, it is required to maintain political neutrality in Japanese school education, which has put greater emphasis on sovereign education. For example, according to a poll conducted by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute after the Upper House election in 2016, asking 18- and 19-year-olds what they had learned about the election at school, the biggest percentage of 73% answered “the structure of the Diet and the electoral system”, followed by 47% “the importance of the election” and 37% “how to cast a vote” (NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, 2017: 23-24). The political education provided at school is aimed at conferring information and knowledge on the existing political system as a sovereign citizen and at fostering attitudes toward and motivation for participating in politics. Therefore, the current political education in high schools in Japan is being driven by what Biesta calls

“qualification” and “socialization.”

Political education in Japanese high schools tends to be biased towards the functions of qualification and socialization in order to maintain political neutrality, as stipulated by the Basic Education Act of Japan. More fundamentally, what kind of political system democracy is understood and how a citizen in the political system is understood seem to contribute to the tendency as well. In the following sections, I will describe the relationship between democracy and citizens through an overview of democratic theories.

2. Athenian Democracy and Political Education

It was in ancient Athens around the 5th century BC when democracy appeared as political thought and a practical government system. The term democracy is a compound of “*dem-os*” meaning people or majority, and “*kratos*” meaning rule or power. As this etymology shows, the essence of democracy is that people who are the majority hold political power (Crick, 2002; Arblaster, 1987).

In Athenian democracy, to create a government by majority, ‘the principle of self-government’ was invented. Government by majority means that a governing majority and a governed majority simultaneously exist. To achieve this situation, the principle of self-government is necessary in order for the governed to govern themselves. Under majority rule based on the principle of self-government, decisions are made by a majority of people, and the results of the decision-making apply to the majority. In the case of Athenian democracy, the logic in which the governed govern themselves was formally accomplished by implementing direct democracy through the assembly, or “*ekklesia*”, where all citizens took part (Dahl, 1998, pp. 11-13).

Those who advocated democracy in ancient Athens assumed an optimistic worldview of trusting the reason and judgment of citizens when thinking that government by majority was desirable. However, they did not necessarily think that the majority’s understanding was right. What they insisted was that the majority would consider something right if that was right, and that if the majority did not know it was right at that time, they would find it right in the future (Shiratori, 1984, pp.214-215).

Supporting the idea was the concept of political education for citizens through democracy. Implementing a democratic government system, citizens could obtain political education through political participation, and enhance their political understanding and judgment. Democrats in Athens claimed that free and rational citizens supported democracy, while at the same time maturing under democracy. They thought that the political development of citizens was inseparable from the government system of direct democracy.

3. Modern Democracy and Political Education

Democracy never appeared as a practical government system from the 4th century BC, when Athenian democracy collapsed, to the 18th century. There was also persistent criticism of democracy, to the effect that it was an irrational unstable political system used by uncultured citizens. Plato considered democracy the domination of ignorant citizens, leading the

state to degeneration, and a “philosopher king” who genuinely and adequately philosophized to be the only worthy ruler who could accurately observe and understand the status of the state and society (Plato, Book VI, 1974).

When democracy was adopted again as a practical government system in the 18th century, it was not direct democracy but representative democracy (Dahl & Tufte, 1973). If we justified government by the majority as a “decision made by the majority” based on the principle of self-government, we would have to expect the restoration of direct democracy. Nevertheless, in a modern state, it is physically impossible and representative democracy must be opted for instead.

There was an issue of how to justify government by the majority in representative democracy. In representative democracy, it is clear that the number of governed people is greater than that of governing people. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, grasping this political reality, said “it is free only during the election of members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it, and it is nothing” under representative democracy (Rousseau, Chapter XV, 1968).

Joseph Schumpeter, an American economist, proposed a solution to the problem of justifying government by the majority. Schumpeter defines contemporary democracy as follows: “The democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, 1942, p. 269). In other words, he interpreted government by the majority not as a “decision made by the majority” but a “decision on who will be the decision-maker made by the majority,” accepting the fact that a smaller number of people rule. In modern democracy, the role of citizens is not to decide “what to do” through discussion, but to decide “who will rule” by competitive elections. It is exclusively the role of politicians and government to decide “what to do” in politics.

Modern democracy is understood as a mechanism for selecting a better ruler, and its theoretical interest is directed toward institutionalization of that mechanism. Robert Dahl states that the following eight institutional conditions must be fulfilled to enable modern democracy to work (Dahl, 1971, Chapter 1): “(1) Freedom to form and join organizations, (2) Freedom of expression, (3) Right to vote, (4) Right of political leaders to compete for support, (5) Right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, (6) Alternative sources of information, (7) Free and fair elections, (8) Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference”. These eight institutional conditions can be summarized into the following two dimensions. The first is public contestation, meaning the plurality of political leaders and the freedom of political activities. The second is inclusiveness, meaning how much of the population is included in the political system.

For political decision-making in modern democracy, the “aggregative democracy model” has become prominent both in theory and practice (Fishkin, 2009, pp. 66-69; Young, 2000, pp.18-21). In the aggregative democracy model, preferences of individuals and groups are expressed in the political process, in a competitive relationship. Political parties and politicians offer policies attempted to satisfy possibly the largest number of people’s preferences, and compete in the election. They then finally decide on a policy based on the principle of majority rule. In the aggregative model, a citizen’s preferences are treated as a given (Shapiro, 2003, pp.2-3). This model is not concerned with how the citizen’s preferences were formed or how their values and preferences were changed as a result of interactions with others

through participation in the political process.

In contemporary democratic theory, discussion on political socialization has developed, rather than political education for citizens. Political socialization refers to a mode of transmitting political culture from one generation to the next in society, a process which helps maintain traditional or existing political norms and institutions. On the other hand, when socialization agents such as families, peer groups, schools and mass media teach different political values from those of the past, or when children have different political and social expectations from those of their ancestors, the socialization process can bring about political and social changes (Langton, 1969). In discussion of political socialization, there was a keen interest in the mechanism of maintenance and stability of political culture, and little focus on the mechanism of creating or transforming political culture (Dawson & Prewitt, 1969).

4. Impasse of Modern Democracy

The aggregative democracy model seems to have functioned generally well after World War II. First, democracies were able to practice politics on the premise of maintaining their own system, as they had an ideological enemy, which was communism, due to the outbreak of the Cold War.

Secondly, dispersive redistribution was effective by preventing specific groups and sectors from monopolizing interests through aggregative decision-making. After World War II, democracies achieved economic growth to redistribute interests to more groups and sectors.

Thirdly, developed democracies could benefit people not organized in any social groups or sectors, because they could realize a welfare state to greater or lesser degrees. This contributed to hindering potential public contestation from surfacing. Those who were unorganized could take part in the political redistribution, even though considering only their own lives, which meant they did not need to discuss political decision-making with others.

In the 1990s, the aggregative democracy model reached an impasse. The first factor was that communist countries, the ideological enemies of democracies, became democratized, and political contestation to their political system emerged in existing democracies.

Second, governmental resources and welfare shrank as the economic growth that followed World War II slowed down and more burden fell on welfare states. As a result, the competition among interest groups and sectors intensified, and those left out of the redistribution became dissatisfied.

Third, as national finance was consolidating and welfare states were retrogressing, it became difficult to redistribute interests to people who were not organized in or did not have connections to any specific groups. This led these people to demand that governments or political representatives allocate benefits and resources for them.

Fourth, multiculturalism came into vogue, arising from globalization and diversification of identity. Multiculturalism visualized the existence of minorities in democracies that could not receive political redistribution through aggregative decision-making processes. In multiculturalism, citizens are required to change their own identity and preferences to coexist with others with different views (Gutman, 1994).

It was suggested that if expressed, the preferences of individuals and groups would be aggregated and adjusted so redistribution could be realized in aggregative decision-making.

Presently, this form of decision-making is having trouble meeting the needs of the people and no longer satisfies them.

In modern democracy, if their demands are not realized, it means that political rulers are not responding to their mandate. In that case, citizens then aim to realize their own preferences by means of changing the governing party/parties or dismissing politicians from their seats in parliament. However, even if we change the governing party/parties or change the power relations of politicians and political parties, it will not be beneficial to all the citizens who are dissatisfied with political decision-making, because the range of the change is highly limited as well as taking time and money to change the existing systems and policies. In fact, such dissatisfied citizens were disappointed at the government and political representatives, and notably felt more powerless.

5. Upgrade of Modern Democracy

In this impasse of the aggregative democracy model, an alternative way of political decision-making has been sought. In one model, the role of citizens aims for active participation in decision-making on “what to do”, in addition to “who will rule” by competitive elections, after accepting the fact that a smaller number of people rule as in the aggregative democracy model.

This is the frequently debated “deliberative democracy model” that has been practiced in the past 20 years (Fishkin, 2009; Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004; Dryzek, 2000). The deliberative democracy model holds that decision-making has to be preceded by “consideration of reasons”, not implemented by force of numbers or the adjustment of interests. In other words, citizens should state reasons that other people may accept when expressing an opinion, and then examine its validity.

In deliberative decision-making, “participants arrive at a decision not by determining what preferences have the greatest numerical support, but by determining which proposals the collective agrees are supported by the best reasons” (Young, 2000, p. 23). The deliberative democracy model, in contrast to the aggregative democracy model, takes the view that human beings can be transformed, and therefore there is an opportunity for political education. In other words, people deliberate in order to expedite the quest for common good, and urge others to change their preferences and demands.

According to James Fishkin, citizens become better when they gain experience in deliberation. “Better citizens” means “those who have developed civic capacities for dealing with public problems--information, efficacy, public spiritedness, and participation” (Fishkin, 2009, p. 143).

An important criticism of the deliberative democracy model is that deliberative democracy has problems with inclusiveness and exclusion (Tamura, 2017, pp. 25-26). Chantal Mouffe points out that the deliberative democracy model does not grasp the nature of “the political” (Mouffe 2000). “The political” here is defined as hostile relations that cannot be reconciled. In deliberative democracy, although deliberation aims at consensus, those who are unable to reach consensus and are irreconcilable are necessarily excluded in the first place. In deliberation, can we include people with opinions based on irrational communication or people who are in a hostile relationship and are irreconcilable?

We are currently facing the rise of populism as a pressing issue (Mizushima, 2016). Populism precisely poses a problem in inclusiveness. If a large number of people whose political orientation is “exclusionary” suddenly take charge of the political process, they would be representing the interests of all the people, claiming that their actions are truly democratic. Can we include people with such exclusionary tendencies in the political process?

Populism has an aspect of dissatisfaction with representative democracy, that is public contestation with the government and political representatives not responding to people’s opinions and demands. In Tzvetan Todorov’s expression, populism cannot be classified into the traditional right wing and left wing, but is rather a movement belonging to what he calls “below” (Todorov 2012). The people who belong to what he calls “below” are people who support populism and are normally identified by such terms as “people as a whole”, “common people”, and “ordinary people” (Canovan, 2004). “People as a whole” here appear as representatives of interest for the whole people on the supposition that people become one beyond partisan confrontation and partial interests. “Common people” implies a structure of confrontation between “we” and “they” and signifies the tendency to exclude foreigners, ethnic and religious minorities as “others”.

Populism is a movement in which a large number of people whose political orientation is “exclusionary” suddenly take charge of the political process representing the interests of all the people. This may lead to a conflict with deliberative democracy.

Iris Young identifies two forms of exclusion as “external exclusion” and “internal exclusion”. “External exclusion” recognizes the dominative control of some individuals or groups, while others are excluded from debating and decision-making (Young, 2000, pp. 51-52). “Internal exclusion” recognizes a lack of serious consideration for some people’s claims and unequally disrespectful treatment toward them, even though they are formally included in debates and decision-making processes (Young, 2000, p. 52). In these debates or decision-making processes, their opinions and demands are considered “silly or simple, and not worthy of consideration”, and therefore are “ignored, dismissed or patronized” by other individuals or groups (Young, 2000, pp. 55-56).

Young points out that deliberative democracy tends toward “internal exclusion,” meaning that deliberative democracy tends to limit political communication concerning discussion on claims and proposals. According to Young, people are required to show reasons that can be accepted by others when they claim or propose something. Furthermore, debates in deliberative democracy tend to involve the “internal exclusion of style and idiom” (Young, 2000, p. 56). The value of claims and reasons of some people is seen as lower based on a norm of “articulateness” when they are logically unclear (Young, 2000, p. 56). “Embodied forms of expression, emotion, and figurative expressions” are dismissed based on a norm of “dispassionateness” without valuing such forms (Young, 2000, p. 56). In other words, the claims and proposals of some people may be dismissed based on the way they speak, not the content of their speech. Straightforward or emotional way of speaking may be excluded from discussion based on a norm of “orderliness”, even if it can draw people’s attention or work well to express important points (Young, 2000, p. 56).

Young offers a remedy for internal exclusion, as its tendency is recognized in deliberative democracy. She suggests “communicative democracy”, introducing the three communication forms of “greeting”, “rhetoric” and “narrative” (Young, 2000, pp. 52-80).

“Greeting” is the most daily and nonpolitical communication or gesture, defined as shak-

ing hands, hugging, or making small talk before going into an actual discussion. Greeting is effective to some extent to overcome internal exclusion as follows (Young, 2000, pp. 57-62): (a) We can tell our interlocutors that we are ready to listen and take responsibility for our relationship to them. (b) “Those who have conflicts aim to solve problems, recognize others as included in the discussion, especially those with whom they differ in opinion, interest, or social location”. (c) We are obligated to “be responsive..., listen seriously..., even though we may perceive that our interests conflict fundamentally or we may come from different ways of life with little mutual understanding”.

“Rhetoric” refers to a way of persuasive speaking in which one or more of the following rhetorical devices are used (Young, 2000, pp. 62-70): “(a) the emotional tone of the discourse, whether its content is uttered with fear, hope, anger, joy, and other expressions of passion that move through discourse”. “(b) The use in discourse of figures of speech, such as simile, metaphor, puns, synecdoche, etc., along with the styles or attitudes such figures produce ---that is, to be playful, humorous, ironic, deadpan, mocking, grave, or majestic”. “(c) Forms of making a point that do not only involve speech, such as visual media, signs and banners, street demonstration, guerrilla theatre, and the use of symbols in all these contexts”. Using these rhetorical devices in political communication contributes to three positive consequences. First, it makes it easier to get matters on the agenda for deliberation. Secondly, it enables the people included in deliberation to claim and debate in an “appropriate way”. Thirdly, it motivates people to move past the thinking phase and on to actual decision-making.

The notion of Young’s “narrative” can be distinguished from the general meaning of narrative in its objective or its audience context. Narrative in political communication is to make claims, not to amuse people or talk about ourselves. Narrative gives political deliberation more clarification, description, or justification. The political communication called narrative encourages “understanding among members of a polity with very different experience or assumptions about what is important” and provides further discussion beyond the differences (Young, 2000, pp. 70-77).

Young emphasises, in her argument about communicative democracy as a remedy for internal exclusion, that the claims and proposals of more people can be heard and that people may transform themselves by participating in the decision-making process. The significant roles of communicative democracy are to equally respect people with deference and to offer opportunities for interests and opinions that were excluded in deliberative democracy to be expressed and heard in the political arena, and in addition, to stimulate people to make just and wise decisions (Young, 2000, pp. 114-120). First, having to be accountable to people from diverse social positions with different needs, interests, and experience helps transform discourse from self-regard to appeals to justice. Secondly, encountering people from diverse social positions in the fora of debate contributes to “correcting biases” of participants and discussing their own partial perspectives. Participants then will come to realize the partiality and unilaterality of their perspectives and at the same time to gain objective social understanding through diverse experience and mutual interactions.

Young points out in her argument for communicative democracy the importance of forms of communication that can be dismissed as irrational and unintellectual in deliberative democracy, and suggests that we should positively introduce such forms. The communication forms of “greeting”, “rhetoric” and “narrative” prevent internal exclusion, enable people with

diverse backgrounds to equally respect one another with deference, and offer opportunities for interests and opinions that were excluded in deliberative democracy to be expressed and heard in the political arena. In the decision-making process in communicative democracy, people may be torn away from their desire to persist in selfish discussion, realize their narrow and limited viewpoints, and have their prejudice corrected. It seems that Young's argument opens the door for people's attitudes and their language itself to change, and for people's points of view to be affected.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the relationship between politics and education, focusing on the relationship between democratic theories and political education. Political education is not limited to acquiring political information and knowledge or to producing citizens conforming to the existing political systems. What is more important about political education is the function of subjectification (Biesta, 2010) and the possibility of self-transformation.

The issue posed by the rise of populism in recent years is whether citizens can affect one another with different views and accept the possibility of self-transformation. When we consider the relationship between politics and education of today, it is necessary to focus on the subjectification of political education. Thus, whether the possibility of self-transformation is included in democratic theories is an important point.

In the aggregative model, a citizen's preferences are treated as a given, and the role of politics is to aggregate the preferences of citizens. The system of aggregating the preferences of citizens has drawn the most concern in the aggregative model.

When the aggregative democracy model reached an impasse, the deliberative democracy model appeared. The deliberative democracy model takes the stand that human beings can be transformed and introduces a political education model for citizens through deliberation. However, it has been pointed out that the deliberative democracy model restricts citizens from participating in deliberation because it requires rational deliberation.

Young called this internal exclusion and suggested communicative democracy as a democratic model to overcome it. In communicative democracy, the three communication forms of greeting, rhetoric, and narrative are introduced to maximize the inclusion of citizens to take part in deliberation, and at the same time open the door for citizens' attitudes and language itself to change, and for people's points of view to be affected. In this sense, it can be considered that Young's communicative democracy advocates the importance of political education that opens up the possibility of self-transformation through interactions with others with different views.

In order to consider the future direction of political education in Japan, we need discussion from a wider perspective through the theoretical reexamination of democracy, as has been argued in this paper, in addition to opinions of politicians, policies of political parties, requirements of the Basic Education Act of Japan, and practice by teachers. It is necessary to reexamine what role a political citizen living in democratic society should perform and to consider political education as education that nurtures such political citizens, in order to break the spell of the neutrality of political education in Japan.

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