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The Century of Education

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<http://www.pse.ens.fr/data/>

1 Introduction

Global economic transformations have never been as dramatic as in the twentieth century. Most countries have experienced radical changes in the standards of income per capita, technology, fertility, mortality, income inequality and the extent of democracy in the course of the past century. It is the goal of many disciplines - economics, history, demography, sociology, political science - to comment these transformations, assess their causes and describe their consequences. But one major obstacle hinders the analysis of such long term processes: the lack of data. In particular, there does not exist any data spanning over the whole century that describes one fundamental aspect of economic development: education, the knowledge of nations.

In this paper, we make a contribution by building consistent series of average years of schooling in 74 countries for the period 1870-2010. This has never been achieved before probably because of the huge amount of data that needed to be treated adequately to ensure comparability across countries and time. This involves about 30 000 figures.

Our series derive from two data sets. The first one spans over 1870-1960 and is original, the second describes the period 1960-2010 and has been constructed by Cohen and Soto (2007), quoted hereafter as Cohen-Soto. This source has been chosen because it provides the most reliable estimates of average years of schooling as they take into account differential mortality across age groups, and as most of their figures rely on national censuses. For the pre-1960 period, the main source is Mitchell (2003 a-b-c), who provides, among much other information, long series of total enrolment in primary, secondary and higher education as well as age pyramids. These two sets of variables are combined to derive an estimate of average years of schooling for each cohort of age from 1870. This perpetual inventory method enables us to estimate average schooling in the population aged 15-64 years or that older than 15 years. As average years of schooling depend on past enrolment in school, one needs series of enrolment

going back as far as the eve of the nineteenth century in order to start our series in 1870.

Early enrolment data were taken from Lindert (2004) for many European countries.

Several assumptions were needed to complete a consistent data set describing educational attainment over such a long period. Thus, it is important to gauge to what extent our series are influenced by these assumptions. A large part of this paper is devoted to a discussion of this issue. In particular, we find that missing data can generate sizeable measurement errors at the beginning of the period, especially for less advanced countries. We show that in most European countries schooling is estimated accurately as soon as 1870, and that 1900 constitutes a good start date for other countries. Also, comparing our figures with Cohen-Soto in 1960, we find a high correlation of 0.96. As the two methodologies are completely different, one relying on perpetual inventory of enrolment at school, the other mainly on surveys, this proves to be an excellent result.

Besides, the comparison between the two databases in 1960 motivates a statistical framework that corrects time-persistent measurement errors in our historical data set, as well as systematic ones in Cohen-Soto. Indeed, a third of their data relies on surveys conducted in the 1990s, which were used to infer average schooling in 1960. However, the latter authors neglected differential mortality across educational groups. As a result, they *overestimated* average schooling in 1960, or equivalently, *underestimated* the growth of schooling between 1960 and 1970.

As a result, the data reflects an unprecedented global development of education that has accelerated after the Second World War. From that perspective, the twentieth century has clearly been the “Century of Education”. Importantly, we show that our global distribution of years of schooling has widened since 1870. We also find that the two globalization periods have witnessed a convergence in average years of schooling for all countries with average schooling above a minimal threshold of 2 years - about 30% of literate people. This convergence has been rapid during the former globalization era and much more modest since 1980.

Section 2 explains the building of the historical database, while section 3 describes the data. A robustness analysis follows, then we explain how we merged the two data sets in section 5. Section 6 provides elementary descriptive results and the last section concludes.

2 The Building of a Historical Data Set 1870-1960

In this section, we explain why we focus on average schooling rather than on enrolment rates. This is because the data we observe offers robust estimates of the former, but none of the latter. Then we expose the assumptions used in the perpetual inventory procedure.

2.1 A Statistical Trade-off Between Quantity and Quality of Pupils

The fundamental challenge is the following. One is interested into the knowledge of the distribution of education, namely a vector

$$n = (n_0, n_1, \dots, n_P, \dots, n_S, \dots, n_H) \quad (1)$$

describing the number of people in the population having completed respectively

$$e = (0, 1, \dots, P, \dots, S, \dots, H) \quad (2)$$

years of schooling, where P represents the last year of primary schooling, S the last year of secondary and H that of higher education. Often the available data sum up this information into a reduced number of educational groups: for instance, Cohen-Soto consider 7 groups, people without schooling, people with incomplete and completed primary schooling, and similarly for secondary and tertiary. In Mitchell's data, we have access to a vector of total enrolments in the three stages of education, but not to their

distribution within each stage. For instance, we observe the total number of pupils in primary $n_1 + \dots + n_P$, but not their distribution (n_1, \dots, n_P) . The fundamental challenge stems from the impossibility of inferring the share of pupils that have given up school at some point, in other words, to derive the distributional vector n . If one had some historical information on the durations P , S and H as well as on the dropout rates in any country, then it would be possible to recover the latter distribution. Such information is obviously not available on the long term.

However, there exists a way to exploit the information given by Mitchell's data. If the distribution of schooling cannot be identified, stocks of schooling can. The intuition is as follows: there is a trade-off between average duration at school and enrolment in the first year of schooling, given total observed enrolment. The lower the average duration the higher the initial enrolment rate, given that a total number of pupils has to be matched in the data. In particular, two unknown factors affect average duration at school: the maximal durations P , S and H , as well as the dropout rates. When these factors vary, average duration and initial enrolment rate vary inversely to each other. Their product, roughly equal to the stock of average years of schooling, is likely to vary little with maximal duration and the dropout rate. At least, this is an empirical question that can be addressed.

2.2 Are Average Years of Schooling a Robust Statistics?

The computations of stocks of schooling are similar to those completed in Cohen-Soto. We take here the example of primary schooling. Let $P_{i,t}$ be the population of age i at time t , N_t be the number of intakes - those attending their first year of school in year t . Given a cohort of age i at time t , the probability to have been an intake at the age of 6 is simply

$$pr = \frac{N_{t-i+6}}{P_{6,t-i+6}} \quad (3)$$

Similarly to Cohen-Soto, a pupil can repeat a maximum of three years during primary schooling, which lasts P years. Let d and r be the dropout and repeating rates, and g the growth rate of intakes. The expression linking total enrollment E_t to first-year enrollment N_t and a factor capturing the relative proportion of intakes¹ $\mu(d, r, g, P)$ is

$$E_t = N_t \mu(d, r, g, P) \quad (4)$$

This formula simply decomposes each grade at school between students who have repeated 0, 1, 2 or 3 times before. Besides, a cohort i at time t has an average number of years of schooling equal to

$$H_{i,t} = \frac{N_{t-i+6}}{P_{6,t-i+6}} \lambda(d, P) \quad (5)$$

In this equation $\lambda(d, P)$ is the mean duration of primary², held constant over time, and not taking into account repeated years. From (4) and (5), the average stock of years of schooling $H_{i,t}$ for cohort i at time t is given by

$$H_{i,t} = \frac{E_{t-i+6}}{P_{6,t-i+6}} \frac{\lambda(d, P)}{\mu(d, r, g, P)} \quad (6)$$

In the case where $d = r = g = 0$, one simply has $H_{i,t} = E_{t-i+6}/P_{6,t-i+6}$ since $\lambda(d, P) = \mu(d, r, g, P) = P$. In that case, the stock of schooling does not depend on P , and there is a perfect trade-off between average duration (λ) and initial enrolment rates (E/μ) given the observed total number of pupils E .

In other cases, stocks will have to be adjusted by the factor λ/μ that depends on the underlying parameters (d, r, g, P) . Figure (1) displays the value of the adjustment factor λ/μ for $g = 0$, as well as $g = 7\%$ corresponding to a doubling of enrolment

¹as in Cohen-Soto one has formally:

$$\mu(d, r, g, P) = \sum_{j=0}^{P-1} (1-d-r)^j \left[\frac{1}{(1+g)^j} + \frac{r \binom{j+1}{1}}{(1+g)^{j+1}} + \frac{r^2 \binom{j+1}{2}}{(1+g)^{j+2}} + \frac{r^3 \binom{j+1}{3}}{(1+g)^{j+3}} \right]$$

²equal to $\sum_{j=1}^{P-1} j(1-d)^j .d + P(1-d)^P$

rate every 10 years - the most rapid growth historically observed. It calculates the ratio λ/μ for different values of r and for $P = 6$ - it has been checked that other values of P were changing results only marginally. As expected, over periods of constant flows of intakes - upper graph -, the dropout and repeating rates have a reasonably low influence on stocks of schooling. Let us stress that an annual dropout rate of 20% is enormous: it means that only 25% of enrolled pupils have completed 6 years of primary schooling, a situation only experienced by some African countries according to Cohen-Soto statistics in 1960³. As an illustration, a dropout rate around 3% could suit to Western countries, meaning that about 83% of a cohort will complete 6 years of primary school, while intermediate countries might be around 5-7.5%. In those cases, the estimated stocks of average years of schooling will not differ by more than 10% as shown by Figure (1). During phases of fast enrolment growth - lower graph -, the adjustment factor is smaller than one as intake cohorts are relatively more numerous to a situation without growth in intakes. Overall, stocks of average schooling do not vary by more than 15% when the dropout rate varies from 0 to 0.10. In contrast, average enrolment rates will be dramatically affected by the dropout rate. For instance, a 10% (respectively 0.15) annual dropout rate during 6 years will have the average enrolment rate established at 70% (resp. 59%) of its initial value.

As a sum, Mitchell's data offers access to the quantity of years of schooling, a statistics in which economists have been much interested in. However, the distribution of schooling itself remains unidentified. The use of other data such as illiteracy rates could partly alleviate this constraint, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. We explain hereafter how we derived statistics of average schooling for the whole population.

³According to Unesco (2007), the minimal world survival rate in primary has been around 60% in 2000.

2.3 A Perpetual Inventory Method

First, we derived stocks of schooling for each cohort of age in each country at each point in time since 1870. Dropout and repetition rates were chosen from Unesco data (2007). The annual repeating rate was comprised between 2% and 5% in Europe and North America all over the period, and between 5% and 10% elsewhere. The annual dropout rate was calibrated so that the share of pupils completing primary school was equal to 90% in most advanced Western countries, was comprised between 70% and 85% in less advanced Western, South American and Asian countries, and 50% in the least advanced countries⁴. As underlined above, these figures do not entail a distribution of schooling that can be trusted, but do entail stocks of schooling in which one can have confidence.

Then, we average all stocks of schooling across the relevant cohorts of age at each point in time. This provides us with average years of schooling among the people aged between 15 and 64 since 1870 and among people older than 15. One can also split the latter statistics across stages of education, and derive the average years of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling among the population older than 15, given by

$$H_t = \frac{\sum_i H_{i,t} P_{i,t}}{\sum_i P_{i,t}} \quad (7)$$

As the stock of education depends on previous enrolment rates in the population, some problems are likely to arise from this perpetual inventory method. In particular, the population structure in year t is not necessarily the outcome of year $t - T$ given a mortality rule between those two periods, because migrations can affect a substantial proportion of the population. Between the 19th and the 20th century, countries from the Commonwealth, Latin America, North-America, and some of Europe have had intense periods of migrations. Depending on the relative amount of human capital of migrants and natives, the net impact of migration can be positive or negative. In particular, the

⁴Detailed assumptions for each country are available in a separate appendix.

US have absorbed about 60% of total migrations from Europe to the Americas between 1820 and 1920. The impact of mass migrations on US average schooling is examined in Murtin and Viarengo (2009), and we retain their original series in the historical database.

3 Data Description

We present hereafter the data available in Mitchell: series of total enrolment from which enrolment rates can be derived for illustrative purposes, as well as age pyramids. We introduce the problem of missing data for those two sets of variables.

3.1 Implicit Series of Enrolment Rates

A difficulty arises with the definition of primary and secondary schooling in Mitchell's data. It is not clear which grades primary and secondary respectively encompass, and occasionally some breaks in the series have been mentioned with the report of some secondary schools to primary and vice-versa⁵. Similarly, definition for primary may vary across countries. In order to ensure comparability across countries and across time, it is necessary to provide a unique definition for primary schooling: let it be the stage of education composed of the first six years of schooling. Hence, statistics from a country displaying 8 years of primary schooling have to be adapted to this definition, and the last two years of primary in this country are reclassified as secondary schooling.

In the data, the number of grades that primary and secondary encompass in each country is unknown, and can hardly be recovered from other sources. Even if it could, it would not reveal what definition Mitchell has adopted when building his series. So we have to guess from the data itself the number of years of schooling that primary schooling encompasses in Mitchell's statistics. This can be done relatively easily for

⁵Most of the time those reports have been corrected in our final sample in order to preserve homogeneity of data - see Annex on enrolment series.

the most advanced countries. Indeed, for countries that have reached full enrolment in primary school before 1960, the enrolment rate profile flattens at some point in time and remains constant. This constant is logically equal to one when full enrolment is completed in the country. Hence, for each country we test several assumptions on the maximal duration of primary and select those ensuring an enrolment close to one at the end of the period⁶.

For less developed countries, this procedure is limited since enrolment rates never reach 100%. So we had to make ad-hoc assumptions, typically that primary was lasting 6, 7 or 8 years in those countries. As stressed above, enrolment rates are sensitive to the latter assumptions, so that those enrolment profiles might not be taken at their face value for those countries. In contrast, average schooling is only marginally modified by assumptions made on maximal duration of primary - see below. These series of enrolment also have the advantage of revealing for each country and for each stage of education the relative proportion of observed and interpolated data. They make transparent the treatment of series linked to border changes⁷.

3.2 Missing Data on Schooling Enrolment

A major difficulty is missing data on total enrolment. Series start often but not systematically before 1870 for European countries, US, Canada and Australia. In Latin America, Eastern Europe and in some Asian countries, series often begin around 1870 or 1880. Moreover, for African countries and other Asian countries, Mitchell gives no data before 1930 or even 1950.

In order to treat this problem, we used data given by Lindert (2004) on total enrolments in primary and secondary for most advanced countries before 1850. The latter

⁶More precisely, notice E_t^P total enrolment in primary, P its unknown duration that has to be guessed, and $P_{[6,6+P]}$ the size of the cohort aged between 6 and $6 + P$. Then we make P vary and select the value for which the ratio $E_t^P / P_{[6,6+P]}$ will flatten around 1 at some point.

⁷It is also important to stress that enrolment rates can differ from those depicted in the literature because of a comparability issue: the literature has usually reported enrolment rates relative to cohorts of pupils aged between 5 and 14 (see Lindert (2004)), which is a larger reference population than ours.

author uses specific historical studies and has also corrected unplaussible series of total enrolment in Mitchell (2003a-b-c), most notably that of England and Wales. For other countries, we assumed ad-hoc and very low values for enrolment rates in primary schools in 1820 - 0.01% in Asia, South America, Africa - and a constant rate of increase between 1820 and the first observed year in Mitchell's series. As the first observed enrolment rate is typically low, the entailed measurement error is expected to be low. Figure 2 plots the first observed average years of schooling in primary by year of first observation. Countries with initial average schooling greater than 4 years are the most problematic because unobserved enrolment of some cohorts can be very high, potentially entailing large measurement errors in the data. This will be investigated in the robustness analysis section.

3.3 Age Pyramids

The demographic data depict the structure of the population by age group. The number of countries for which age pyramids are available in 1820 is scarce. For other countries, we postulate that the distribution of mortality F is Weibull (a, b) , with parameters calibrated on life expectancy of the corresponding population - available from Bourguignon-Morrisson (2002) - and on the survival rate after 60 taken equal to 10% in 1820. Life expectancy is corrected for child mortality, taken equal to $m_0 = 20\%$ at birth and to $m_1 = 7\%$ the following 4 years. Formally, life expectancy LE is given by

$$\begin{aligned}
 LE &= m_0 + m_1(2 + 3 + 4 + 5) + (1 - m_0)(1 - m_1)^4 \sum_{k \geq 6} p_k k, \quad p_k \rightsquigarrow \text{Weibull}(a, b) \\
 &= \nu(m_0, m_1, a, b)
 \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

Once calibrated, the survival function $1 - F$ provides the relative weight of each cohort of age inside each age group

$$\frac{p(Age = i)}{p(Age = j)} = \frac{1 - F(Death \leq i)}{1 - F(Death \leq j)} \quad (9)$$

For early years, age pyramids are interpolated with the first observation for the country. Also, for a significant proportion of countries - 20 in total - no age pyramid was reported in Mitchell. These countries were imputed a rescaled age pyramid derived from a neighbour country. In the robustness analysis section, we show that this imputation has little impact. The reason is simple: age pyramids have not been very different across countries over that period, at least in comparison to how different they are by now.

Let us give a quick overview of the data on age pyramids over the last two centuries. In order to illustrate the demographic transition, we computed the share of population aged 6-20 in total population for each available age pyramid. Figure 3 reports the distribution of these shares by continent⁸. It is striking to see that except for Europe, all median shares of young people are close to 0.35 at any date in any continent. Europe is an exception but age pyramids are available very early for all European countries.

Some historical facts on the world demographic transition are summarized in the companion appendix. They shed light upon the variations of the latter distributions. Shares of 6-20 years-old remain approximatively constant until 1870 in Europe, increase until 1900 due to a generalized fall in infant mortality, then experience a dramatic decrease with fertility reduction. The group “Americas and Oceania” gathers quite heterogeneous countries. The fall in the median shares between 1810 and 1870 mainly picks up the US fertility decrease. The decrease in the lower quartile from 1890 still corresponds to the fall in fertility in the US, Canada, Australia and New-Zealand. The median shares stay quite constant, then increase around 1920-1960. This reflects partly compositional effects as statistics become available for Latin and South-

⁸Boxes have lines at the lower quartile, median, and upper quartile values. The whiskers are lines extending from each end of the boxes to show the extent of the rest of the data.

ern America, but also the same phenomenon taking place in Europe 50 years before: the peak in the natural increase of population, which is the difference between death and birth rates⁹.

4 Robustness Analysis

In this section we test whether missing data and unobserved distributions of schooling can affect substantially the schooling estimates.

4.1 Missing Data on Schooling Enrolment

Assumptions made to supplement missing enrolment data might bias schooling estimates in early years. In order to gauge this measurement problem, we run the following counterfactual experiment: in one simulation, all past unobserved enrolment rates are equal to the first observed enrolment rates in primary, secondary and higher education - this clearly *overestimates* the actual stocks of schooling since an increase in average enrolment has been a common rule for all countries at any time with only a few exceptions occurring during World Wars and the Great Depression. In a second simulation, past enrolment rates are reconstructed backward by assuming a fast enrolment process starting in the immediate past of the first observation. The pace of such a process is calibrated as an increase in 20% percentage points of enrolment every 10 years before the first observation. For primary schooling, this has been observed historically in only a few countries such as Finland after its 1917 independence or African countries after the Second World War. This scenario is clearly an underestimation of stocks of schooling, as older generations receive less education than they might have had in reality.

The two latter simulations provide us with upper and lower bounds for average

⁹In order to give an approximate perspective, this peak has been observed in Europe between 1870 and 1920 - excluding the Baby-Boom variations -, and in Latin and South America between 1940 and 1970. The same phenomenon was at stake in Asia, and had barely started in Africa at that time. The fall in median shares in the early twentieth century corresponds to that happening in Algeria and Egypt.

years of schooling. We are almost certain that for any country at any time, the true value of schooling lies within this interval. Hence, we can build a dispersion statistics, a pseudo-standard error equal to the width of this interval divided by (2×1.96) . This echoes the well-known fact that regression estimates have an asymptotic normal distribution with a confidence interval width equal to (2×1.96) times the standard error. As we will see below, assuming a normal distribution for the measurement error affecting average schooling is empirically supported.

The distribution of this pseudo-standard error is reported on Figure 4 for 1870, 1900, 1930 and 1960. In 1870, missing data can generate sizeable but still reasonable measurement errors, as the average pseudo-standard error equals 0.23. This is equivalent to 4 percentage points of enrolment rate in primary assuming 6 completed years. There are twelve outliers for which this standard error is over 0.5¹⁰. Thirty years later, pseudo-standard errors have been reduced. Their average value is 0.14, or 2.3 percentage points of enrolment rate. There are only seven countries above 0.5¹¹. In 1930, the measurement error linked to missing initial data has almost completely shrunk as it averages 0.06 - 1 percentage point of enrolment rate - and is greater than 0.5 only in Czechoslovakia and Poland with identical value 0.6.

A complementary analysis focuses on the *relative* size of measurement error and schooling attainment. In less developed countries, it could be that even small measurement errors are comparable in size with average schooling. In fact, it is the case for a large number of countries in 1870. Figure 5 depicts a pseudo-coefficient of variation - the pseudo-standard error divided by the estimated level of schooling - with respect to average years of schooling. Exactly half of the countries have a coefficient of variation greater than 0.5, which means that “true” average schooling is comprised between 0

¹⁰These countries and the corresponding standard error into parenthesis are respectively: Honduras (0.50), Costa-Rica (0.56), Panama (0.62), Lebanon (0.70), Canada (0.72), Sweden (0.72), Greece (0.78), Bulgaria (0.79), New-Zeland (0.82), Poland (1.09), Czechoslovakia (1.44), Denmark (1.46). Not surprisingly, these countries constitute the “external envelop” of countries scattered by average schooling and by year of first observation on Figure 2.

¹¹Lebanon (0.69), Bulgaria (0.54), Denmark (0.66), Greece (0.64), Czechoslovakia (1.30), Poland (1.17), Panama (0.60).

and twice the estimated value. All of these countries are obviously among the less developed ones, with average schooling smaller than 2 years. However, only 4 countries fall in this category in 1900: Cambodia, Benin, Ethiopia and Senegal. The average coefficient of variation has been dramatically reduced from 0.48 in 1870 to 0.22 in 1900.

Summing up, missing data generate measurement errors that are significant in 1870, both in absolute and relative terms. In particular cross-country comparisons are not appropriate for less developed countries at the beginning of the period as measurement errors are large compared to estimates. However, 1900 appears to be a satisfying start date for the whole sample.

4.2 Dropouts

The second robustness experiment addresses the sensitivity of data with respect to the underlying distribution, in other words, to the unobserved dropout rate. We adopt the same strategy as before and compute average schooling for two opposite counterfactuals: one stating that the dropout rate is equal to 0 in any country at any time, while the other assumes that only half of initially enrolled children complete 6 years of primary schooling. Although the latter scenario might well be realistic in some African and Asian countries - unfortunately even today -, it clearly constitutes a lower bound of achievement in other countries. The pseudo-standard error is reported in Figure 6. It turns out that the underlying distribution has a negligible impact on average schooling in 1870. However, its influence increases with educational development. The average pseudo-standard error amounts to 0.09 in 1960 - 1.5 percentage points of enrolment rate with the former convention. This remains a somewhat modest influence, that will anyhow be tackled by the comparison with survey-based figures in a subsequent section.

4.3 Maximal Duration of Primary and Unknown Age Pyramids

A further source of mis-measurement is the maximal duration¹² of primary schooling that had to be chosen on an ad-hoc basis for developing countries, in which the enrolment rate never attained 100% before 1960. We simulate average years of schooling while selecting either $P = 6$ or 8 and compute the corresponding pseudo-standard error. For the sake of caution, we include all countries in this experiment. As before a pseudo-standard error is computed and reported in Figure 7. Measurement errors linked to unknown duration turn out to be negligible for any country at any date.

Last, we tackle the issue of age pyramids, which were unobserved for 33 countries. We consider the following two extreme age pyramids: the United States in 1950 and Kenya at the same date. The shares of people aged 6-20 years in total population are respectively 0.27 and 0.39. The former is ranked among the smallest share ever observed over the period 1870-1960 - excluding developed European countries -, the latter is the highest share ever measured in Africa before 1960. It is almost certain that shares of young people in any country will be comprised between those two bounds. Then we make the radical assumption that age pyramids are constant over time in the two counterfactual simulations in order to keep a constant “confidence interval”. We rule out most advanced countries¹³ from the analysis as we have a good knowledge of age pyramids for all of these countries in the nineteenth century. Figure 8 reports the distribution of pseudo-standard errors, which are found to be low in 1900 with an average of 0.06, or about 1 percentage points of enrolment rate in primary school. Measurement errors increase with educational development to reach an average of 0.24 in 1960, or 4 percentage points¹⁴. But mismeasurements at the end of the period are

¹²Another issue related to duration is the possible extension of the schooling term of an academic year. No data is available on this issue except for a few countries.

¹³European countries plus Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan, New-Zeland, the United States and Uruguay which were mainly populated by Europeans.

¹⁴This is still reasonable, even if we have to bear in mind that a handful of countries can be significantly affected in 1960: these are Costa-Rica, Cuba, Guyana, Jamaica, Lebanon, Paraguay, for which the pseudo-standard error exceeds 0.5.

unlikely to be large because age pyramids have been often available for decades prior to 1960.

Overall, this counterfactual simulation shows that unknown age pyramids are not likely to affect our estimates in a significant way. The main reason for this is that observed age pyramids were much more similar from one country to another than they are now. In 2000 the share of the 5-19 population was still around 0.39 in Kenya, but it was equal to 0.15 in Italy and it fell to 0.22 in the United States (US Census online statistics). So differences are much sharper today than they used to be before 1960.

As a sum, missing data on initial enrolment affect schooling estimates at the beginning of the period, while unknown distribution of dropouts within each degree, as well as unknown age pyramids, may have an impact around 1960. All effects remain somewhat modest in absolute terms. In *relative* terms, they can definitely be viewed as large for less developed countries. Typically, estimates of schooling below 2 average years might be subject to much caution when used for comparative purposes.

5 A Unified Database 1870-2010

In this section, we explain how we merged the former historical data set with Cohen-Soto data in order to build unified series for the period 1870-2010. Once again, we relied on Cohen-Soto rather than extending our permanent-inventory methods beyond 1960 because we believe that Cohen-Soto data set, drawing heavily on surveys, does perform a better job than any inventory procedure weakened for instance by migration phenomenons that have prevailed from 1960.

5.1 Comparison with Cohen-Soto in 1960

We consider average years of schooling among the population aged between 15 and 64, as well as among the population older than 15. The latter stock can be decomposed by degree: Cohen-Soto also provide average years of primary, secondary and tertiary

schooling among the population older than 15, which also includes pupils¹⁵. So far, this leaves us with 5 series for 82 countries common to our data set and Cohen-Soto.

The comparison is meaningful because the way the data were constructed was fundamentally different. As depicted above, our figures are built with an inventory method, while Cohen-Soto base a large majority of their data upon surveys. In fact, they use surveys for 62 countries over 82 and similar inventory methods for the remaining 20.

Figures (9) to (12) scatter each set of data for those 82 countries versus the corresponding one in Cohen-Soto. It turns out that total stock of average years of schooling are remarkably well correlated. For instance, including (resp. excluding) countries built with inventory methods in Cohen-Soto, the correlation amounts to 0.961 (resp. 0.956) for the 15-64 population. Stocks of schooling by grades in the population aged over 15 turn out to be somewhat noisier: for primary schooling, the correlation equals to 0.954 (resp. 0.945) when the 20 non-surveyed countries are included (resp. excluded); for secondary, to 0.838 (resp. 0.827); for higher education, to 0.853 (resp. 0.837).

Although most countries have comparable stocks of schooling, some of them are outliers. We temporarily exclude 5 countries that are clear outliers in Figures (9) to (12): France, Switzerland, Australia, Canada, New-Zealand. As mentioned before, the United States is a particular case treated in detail in Murtin-Viarengo (2009). Also, we excluded definitively Singapore and the following 7 less advanced countries for which the gap was much too high: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Korea, Romania, Tanzania and Zambia.

As a sum, our final sample has $82 - 7 - 1 = 74$ countries; among those, we have a sample of $74 - 5 - 1 = 68$ countries for which inventory methods ran throughout the XXth

¹⁵In order to maintain comparability with our data set, we had to redefine “primary” and “secondary” schooling in Cohen-Soto accordingly to our own definition, which is the first six years of schooling for the former and the following years for the latter. In practice, some years of primary schooling were attributed to secondary when primary duration exceeded 6 years, and vice-versa when primary duration was strictly smaller than 6 years. For instance, Germany has only 4 years of primary schooling. Then $6 - 4 = 2$ years of schooling must be counted as primary schooling and not as secondary schooling for individuals with incomplete or completed secondary or tertiary education.

century and surveys have lead to close results in 1960. However, canonical correlations can sometimes hide important structural differences in the data. For instance, Cohen-Soto (2007) data are highly correlated with those of De la Fuente-Domenech (2001) and Barro-Lee (2001) when data are taken in levels, but much less when they are taken in differences. So there is a need for a closer investigation of the differences between both samples, in order to see whether systematic - though modest in magnitude - differences emerge in one or another data set. This is the purpose of what follows.

5.2 A Measurement Problem: Differential Mortality Across Educational Groups

Sources of mistakes are likely to differ across the two samples, and we aim at exploiting this difference¹⁶.

What are the problems likely to occur with the Cohen-Soto data set? Among the 68 remaining countries, 11 were surveyed in the 60s, 10 in the 70s, 7 in the 80s, 22 in the 90s and inventory methods were used for the remaining 18. As an example, Germany was surveyed in 1991; the percentage of German people with primary schooling aged between 60 and 65 in 1960 is estimated as the percentage of German people with primary schooling aged between $60+31=91$ and 96 in 1991, and similarly for secondary and tertiary Education. A large majority of the data uses this backward computation.

Two problems are likely to happen: one is linked to migrations. Whether low-skilled or high-skilled migrants have entered or left Germany between 1960 and 1991, the 1991 figure will imperfectly reflect the 1960 reality. The magnitude of the bias will depend on both the intensity of migration flows and the skill composition of these flows¹⁷.

¹⁶For a use of a comparable measurement-error framework that corrects educational statistics, see Portela et al. (2004).

¹⁷Distortions due to migrations are likely to affect high-immigration OECD countries; in fact, it turns out that OECD countries that have a foreign-born population exceeding 15% of the total population are Australia, Canada, New-Zealand and Switzerland, which have been excluded from the sample and will be examined individually in a subsequent subsection.

The second problem is linked to differential mortality across educational groups. If education has an effect on life expectancy, then the education distributions in 1960 and 1991 will not be similar because highly educated people will have a higher probability of survival than people with lower education over the 1960-1991 period. If this differential effect is not likely to be sizeable over a 10 year time span, it could be significant over a 30 year time span. We expect that educational attainment in 1960 will be *overestimated* when inferred from 1990s surveys.

A simple model rationalizes that. Without loss of generality consider two groups of population, one with education level h in proportion λ , the other with zero education. At initial time, the first group has a survival function $S_h(t)$ that determines the probability that its members survive t years. The second group has survival function $S_0(t)$. Then the average education in the population is initially $h(0) = h\lambda$. After t years, it becomes

$$\begin{aligned} h(t) &= \frac{h\lambda S_h(t)}{\lambda S_h(t) + (1-\lambda)S_0(t)} \\ &= h(0) + \underbrace{h\lambda(1-\lambda) \frac{S_h(t) - S_0(t)}{\lambda S_h(t) + (1-\lambda)S_0(t)}}_{\alpha(t)} \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

It is easy to show that for $\alpha(t)$ to be increasing with time, the hazard rate of the educated population must be smaller than that of the non-educated population¹⁸. This overestimation of educational attainment has to be taken into account in Cohen-Soto data.

Regarding the historical data set, the former robustness analysis section mentions several sources of bias: missing enrolment data, unobserved dropouts, and unknown age pyramids. They turned out to be of modest magnitude, albeit not negligible. Importantly, we tend to think that measurement errors in a given country are highly correlated across time. This is because of the nature of data we are examining, stocks.

¹⁸i.e. $-\frac{S'_h(t)}{S_h(t)} < -\frac{S'_0(t)}{S_0(t)}$

As data spans over 10-year intervals, the population at stake in two subsequent observations will likely be the same to a large extent: the population aged over 15 in 1900 will be that over 25 in 1910, that over 35 in 1920 and so on. If measurement errors affect the estimation in 1900, they will automatically contaminate the estimates for subsequent years. This serial correlation is likely to be very high and has to be taken into account.

5.3 A Measurement Error Framework

Denote by h_i^{cs} , the estimate of years of schooling for country i in 1960 taken from Cohen-Soto, h_i^{mm} that deriving from the historical data set, and h_i^0 the true value. From what precedes a natural measurement error framework arises:

$$\begin{aligned} h_i^{cs} &= h_i^0 + \alpha_{i(t)} \\ h_i^{mm} &= \frac{1}{\gamma} h_i^0 + \mu + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

where $\alpha_{i(t)}$ are dummies for the time period t in which the survey was conducted in country i , γ and μ two constant terms capturing systematic structural biases in the historical data set and ϵ_i idiosyncratic measurement errors with zero-mean. Three time dummies capture the fact that in Cohen-Soto database, surveys have been run between 1970 and 1979, 1980 and 1989, or after 1990. The coefficient in front of these time dummies are expected to be positive and increasing with the time period as described in the former subsection. We introduced two constant terms γ and μ as there could be systematic measurement errors in our historical data. In constrast, Cohen-Soto data are assumed to be exact estimates of the true data once taken into account the differential mortality effect. Then one has

$$h_i^{cs} = \gamma h_i^{mm} + \alpha_{i(t)} - \gamma\mu - \gamma\epsilon_i \quad (12)$$

This equation is estimated for the following variables: average schooling among 15-64 and among 15+; average primary, secondary and tertiary schooling among 15+. It provides us with the bias in Cohen-Soto linked to differential mortality, with measurement errors in the historical sample due to data construction, as well as with a direct test of whether the two data sets are consistent through testing the null hypothesis $\gamma = 1$ and $\mu = 0$ ¹⁹.

Table 1 presents the results for total years of schooling among 15-64 and 15+. Two major conclusions arise: historical data and Cohen-Soto are most of the time consistent with each other; the differential mortality effect is significant for countries surveyed after 1990, but not for those surveyed before. The first conclusion comes from the fact that after including all regressors in the equations (columns II), the estimated coefficient γ is very close to 1 and the intercept is not significant. In other words, no systematic distortion affects the historical sample, although the intercept is significant in column I for the population 15+.

On the other hand, in all cases we find that the dummy for countries surveyed after 1990 has a large and significant coefficient roughly equal to 0.5. The following simplified example shows that the order of magnitude is reasonable: indeed, take a country - approximately the UK in 1960 - where half of the population has some primary schooling (5 years) and the other half has secondary schooling (10 years). Then average years of schooling is $0.5 \times 5 + 0.5 \times 10 = 7.5$ years. Three decades later, it is realistic to assume that 50% of the population with primary schooling has passed away, versus 20% for the population with secondary schooling. This is equivalent to assuming that 5 extra years of schooling decreases the mortality rate by $50 - 20 = 30\%$ percentage points over 3 decades, or equivalently that one additional year of schooling decrease the mortality rate by 2% per decade. This is realistic because Lleras-Muney (2005) assesses this effect of education on decennial mortality and finds OLS estimates equal

¹⁹Empirically, other models have been tested. We have tested models with multiplicative measurement errors, which did not provide any robust finding and had a smaller explanatory power. We also introduced some interactions between survey dummies and h^{mm} , and found them to be not significant.

to 1.7% and IV estimates of 3.6% in the US. Hence, three decades later, the population is composed of $0.5 \times 0.5 / (0.5 \times 0.5 + 0.8 \times 0.5) = 40\%$ of people with primary schooling and 60% with secondary schooling. This translates into average years of schooling equal to $0.4 \times 5 + 0.6 \times 10 = 8$ years of schooling in 1990, namely an over-estimation of 0.5 years of schooling. This is exactly what Table 1 suggests.

Of course, one could not assess the validity of the former measurement-error framework simply on the basis of the two variables that this framework is intended to link, as several different framework structures could lead to the same equation (12). So we need to rely on an external source of information to ensure identification of the latter framework. We use another suggestive evidence, independant from our data, that supports our view. Unesco (1957) reports worldwide illiteracy rates in the first half of the twentieth century, and most particularly in 1950. Similarly Cohen-Soto reports the percentage of individuals who have not attended school in 1960. There is no equivalence between being illiterate and not attending school, as literacy could be acquired outside school and pupils with few years of schooling could be classified as illiterate. However, there is plausibly a high correlation between those two variables, even with a 10-year time span. Regressing Ill^{cs} the percentage of individuals without schooling given by Cohen-Soto on Unesco illiteracy rates Ill^0 and dummies for dates of surveys in 51 countries,²⁰ one has

$$Ill^{cs} = 0.07 + 0.89^{**} Ill^0 - 0.11^{**} \alpha_{i(1990)} - 0.09^{**} \alpha_{i(1980)} - 0.05 \alpha_{i(1970)} + u_i$$

(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)

The significant and negative coefficient in front of the 1990s survey dummy suggests the same conclusion: differential mortality has lead to an under-estimation of true illiteracy levels in 1960 in the Cohen-Soto data set, conversely, to an overestimation²¹ of

²⁰Countries having achieved mass education for a long time (illiteracy rates smaller than 5%) are excluded from the sample - hence, we avoid the oversampling of low illiteracy levels. The sample of illiteracy rates has therefore 5% as a minimum, 99% as a maximum, and 62% as an average. 39% (respectively 9% and 13%) of included countries are surveyed in the 1990s (resp. the 1980s and the 1970s).

²¹This also means that computing reliability ratios between our historical schooling variable and the one from Cohen-Soto in 1960 would not make sense, as the above results show that measurement-errors affecting

average schooling in 1960²².

One step beyond, we decompose total years of schooling into years of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. Columns II of Table 2 show that the differential mortality effect can be further decomposed: the stock of primary years of schooling appear to be the most overestimated, probably because of lower mortality among people with secondary and tertiary education relatively to those with only primary schooling. A further effect takes place within the tertiary group, plausibly reflecting disparities of educational attainment within this group. Moreover, the historical data turn out to be sometimes biased at this disaggregated level: there is a systematic mean difference of 0.22 for primary (column II), and some over-estimation of tertiary schooling for most developed countries as reflected by $\gamma = 0.77$ on column II. However, tertiary schooling plays a negligible role in total stocks of education as shown, for instance, by Figure 12. So we will neglect this anomaly in the building of series²³.

5.4 Building Long Term Series

The last step consists in merging the two data sets while taking into account the former problems. We impose a coefficient equal to 1 for h^{mm} in all regressions of Tables 1 and 2. Then, we make the following two assumptions: first, Cohen-Soto provide exact estimates from 1970; second, the measurement error affecting our sample in 1960 has been the same before that date. The first assumption stems directly from the estimates of Tables 1 and 2, as none of the dummies for 1970-1979 and 1980-1989 surveys are significant. The second assumption is a simplifying one.

In order to formalize this clearly, we notice $\tilde{h}_{i,t}^{cs}$ and $\tilde{h}_{i,t}^{mm}$ the average years of schooling in country i at time t given respectively by Cohen-Soto and the historical

Cohen-Soto data are not idiosyncratic, hampering the validity of reliability ratios computation.

²²Lutz et al. (2007) construct a database on education 1970-2000 with backward projection methods. They do take into account differential mortality across educational groups and find that this effect is significant. However, they do not use all of the information available in postwar surveys as Cohen-Soto do, which potentially magnifies measurement errors affecting their base-year survey (2000).

²³As explained above 18 countries use constructed data in Cohen-Soto sample. Whether we include or exclude them from the analysis the estimates of γ remain almost the same.

sample after the statistical corrections described above have been applied. They constitute the final data set. Modifications are thus the following

$$\begin{aligned}
\tilde{h}_{i,1960}^{cs} &= h_{i,1960}^{cs} - \hat{\alpha}_{i(1990)} \\
\tilde{h}_{i,t}^{cs} &= h_{i,t}^{cs} \text{ for } t \geq 1970 \\
\tilde{h}_{i,t}^{mm} &= h_{i,t}^{mm} - \hat{\mu} - \hat{\epsilon}_i \text{ for } t \leq 1960
\end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

where $\hat{\alpha}_{i(1990)}$ are the estimated coefficients of 1990 surveys dummies, $\hat{\mu}$ and $\hat{\epsilon}_i$ respectively the significant intercepts and error terms in columns (IV) of above regressions. Hence, by construction $\tilde{h}_{i,1960}^{mm} = \tilde{h}_{i,1960}^{cs} = h_{i,1960}^0$, so that the corrected samples match in 1960.

We applied this procedure using the constrained estimation (IV) in Table 1 for population aged 15-64, and the constrained estimations in columns (IV) of Table 2 for primary, secondary and tertiary schooling of population older than 15. The largest modification concerns Cohen-Soto OECD countries in 1960, in which primary schooling has been lowered by 0.36 average years - about 6 percentage points of average enrolment rate²⁴.

It is interesting to look at the distribution of measurement errors, as Krueger-Lindhal (2001) have identified them as a cause of non-significance of education in growth equations. We consider for instance total years of schooling among 15-64 and we report a qq-plot of the measurement error distribution against normal quantiles. It turns out that the measurement error is well approximated by a normal distribution in Figure 13. The standard error of measurement errors amounts to 0.51, while 80% of the observations (54 countries out of 68) lie in the interval $[-0.6, 0.6]$. A maximum

²⁴The historical data have been corrected backwards. In order to avoid some negative stocks of schooling at some point in time due to the statistical correction, we imposed minimum levels of stocks: 0.02, 0.01 and 0.01 for respectively primary, secondary and tertiary years of schooling, which all correspond to a 0.25% enrolment rate in a 8-4-4 system. A small proportion of the total observations, around 6.5%, were consequently left-censored at these thresholds. These countries are India until 1900, Iraq until 1940, Myanmar until 1880, Paraguay until 1890, Philippines until 1910, Thailand until 1890, Tunisia until 1910, Turkey in 1870, Zimbabwe until 1920.

gap of 0.6 represents 10% of enrolment rate in primary.

Those latter 54 countries constitute the “core” data set, the final sample for which we have a reasonably high level of confidence in the series at any date. Other countries are called the “outliers” and are treated individually - see below. For the core sample, the measurement error has a standard error of 0.32, which represents 5 percentage points of enrolment rate in primary on a 6 years basis. This ensures high accuracy in usual OLS estimates. Indeed, given that in 1960 the standard error of average years of schooling is equal to 2.66 for this sample, this can potentially lead to an underestimation of the schooling impact on growth by a factor equal to $1/(1 + 0.32^2/2.66^2) = 0.986$. In other words, measurement errors may not have any sizeable influence in this sample, and growth regressions derived from this unified sample are likely to offer robust estimates.

5.5 Treating the Outliers

Among the final sample of 74 countries, there are $74-54=20$ countries excluded from the core sample that we would like to discuss briefly. Details of the manipulations are given in the appendix. The first and most important case is the United States, taken from Murtin-Viarengo (2009). US schooling estimates rely on IPUMS census surveys after 1940. For the 1870-1930 period, they estimate average years of schooling of US natives and US immigrants, using both our historical data on education in European countries, and a perpetual inventory of US immigrants by age and by country of origin. Their serie for 1870-1930 is perfectly consistent with the first national estimate in 1940. The US can then integrate the core sample, which brings its size to a final sample of 55 countries.

Then, France is the only country for which our estimate (8.61 average years in 1960) is more reliable than that of Cohen-Soto (6.73). This fact is confirmed by the examination of other data sources. Perhaps the latter authors have not taken into account

the fact that primary schooling was lasting 8 years and not 5 until the 1960s. So we keep our estimate for 1960 and use different sources for 1960-2010 - see appendix.

Four advanced countries were excluded from the statistical framework because they were clearly outliers: these are Australia, Canada, New-Zealand and Switzerland. For those countries, the discrepancy in 1960 comes from an ill-measured enrolment in secondary schools. It is well known that the “high school movement” happened in the 1920s in the most advanced country, the United States. So we make the assumption that estimates taken from the historical data set are all correct until 1930²⁵. Then, we interpolate²⁶ to reach the 1960 levels of Cohen-Soto, corrected for the differential mortality bias. This is a tentative solution and one recommends to pay some caution when using these four series.

Fourteen countries have been excluded from the core sample because they had a measurement error larger than 0.6 in absolute value. These countries and the corresponding measurement error are: Belgium (-0.61), Bulgaria (+0.83), Denmark (-0.71), Finland (+0.89), Greece (-1.17), Hungary (+1.16), Ireland (-1.19), Italy (+1.18), Norway (-1.00), Costa Rica (-0.71), Egypt (-1.18), Paraguay (-1.12), Philippines (-0.71) and Sudan (+0.61). Nine of these countries are European, so that the bulk of the 1960 statistical error may again come from mis-measurement of average years of secondary schooling. Hence, we apply the same rule and select the figures from the historical data set until 1930 and interpolate between 1930 and 1960. This procedure avoids unplausible results for 1870 figures if large measurement errors were applied to the 1870-1960 series, leading to sizeable over-estimation or under-estimation of initial levels. Similarly, we tend to think that measurement errors affecting the remaining 5 developing countries may have occurred in the immediate postwar period, when schooling enrolment accelerates. So we keep the historical series until 1940²⁷ and interpolate them

²⁵until 1910 for Canada, as the end of the first globalization period marks the end of fast educational expansion in this country.

²⁶The interpolation started from 1920 in Canada and New-Zealand. Interpolation was not assumed to be linear as postwar growth has been more intense - see appendix.

²⁷Until 1930 for Egypt.

with the corrected figures of Cohen-Soto in 1960.

6 Results

6.1 A Global Overview

In this section we describe the global evolution of education since 1870. For the sake of completeness, we have added two large countries in our sample, China and Russia. Although there does not exist any satisfactory historical statistics for the latter countries, we have relied on historical studies. However the data for the latter two countries serves only an illustrative purpose specific to this section and shall be taken with caution.

Figure 14 provides an overview of education in 9 large geographical areas²⁸ covering between 80 and 87% of the world population all over the period. It is the first comprehensive overview over 130 years, as the attempt by Baier et al. (2006) to estimate similar curves spans over a much shorter period: for several regions information is provided only from 1940 or later.

In 1870, world education seems to be a quasi-monopoly of high-income countries in which educational attainment reaches more than 4.5 years, versus 2 years or less in all other regions. However, there is a significant gap between South-East Asia, India, MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa with less than 0.5 years on the one hand, and on the other hand Southern Europe, Latin America, Japan and China²⁹ where average years of schooling vary between 1 and 2. In Southern European countries as well as in Latin America, this is because a minority of persons was educated as in Western Europe. In China and Japan, the context for literacy is different as reading requires the knowledge

²⁸Western countries (Western Europe, Australia, Canada, New-Zealand and US), Southern-Europe (Italy, Portugal, Spain plus Chile and Argentina of which population had Spanish and Italian origins and similar educational attainments as in these countries), Latin America, Russia, India, Japan, Eastern Asia (China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand), MENA (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey) and Sub-Saharan Africa.

²⁹In 1870 China had an edge over South-East Asia. The educational gap between the two areas closed around 1950 and remained close to 0 afterwards. This is why we have gathered them in the group of Eastern Asia.

of thousands of characters. In order to read or write a simple text, people must know around 2000-3000 characters. In those two countries, historians estimate that in 1870 more than 40% of men and more than 10% of women had reached this level after 3 or 4 years of schooling.

Educational attainment rapidly increased in Western countries until the First World War, but slightly slowed down in the interwar period, and dramatically accelerated in the postwar period as a consequence of the Baby-Boom and mass enrolment in secondary schooling and at university to a lesser extent. In 2000, Western countries remained on top of the world education distribution. But the situation of other countries has changed dramatically: Japan has caught up with Western countries with average schooling exceeding 12 years; in many Southern European countries as well as in Russia, schooling has reached 10 years; in all other regions, average education exceeds 6 years, except in India and in Sub-Saharan Africa, which are characterized by an important gap with the rest of the world as schooling is around 4 years on average.

The performances of Russia - Eastern Europe in general - are partially linked to the progress of education during the communist era. Until 1920, education has increased slowly in Russia and was equal to 2 years, whereas it was about 3 or 4 years in Italy and Spain. But thanks to a steady growth after 1920, Russia is slightly ahead of Southern Europe (comprising Chile and Argentina) in 2000.

It is clear that the most successful story has been that of Japan, a consequence of the priority granted to education since the Meiji revolution. But the performances of other East Asia countries are also satisfactory. In South-East Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand), schooling has exceeded 7 years in 2000 whereas these countries were ranked at the bottom of the distribution in 1870. China is slightly below this level at the same date. MENA is also a success story. This region was ranked at the bottom distribution in 1870 and little progress has been made until 1960, but then average education has been multiplied by 6.

As a sum, only Sub-Saharan Africa and India are now lagging behind other countries, a result which is partly linked to the discrimination against women in these societies, and to the large gap between enrolment rates of boys and girls in primary schools. On the contrary, the educational take-off within other Asian and African countries has closed the gender gap, with some notable exceptions.

Finally, it is clear from Figure 14 that the polarization of education between Western countries and the rest of the world has been largely reduced since 1870. But it is also worth stressing that the absolute differences in years of education between the most and the least educated countries increased over the last 130 years. We let the reader refer to Morrisson-Murtin (2008), who use a preliminar version of this database, for a full description of global education inequality.

With some more detailed information given by country-level statistics, we can complement the former overview. As it will be assessed in the next section, there is a convergence process taking place among Western countries since 1870, making this group much more homogeneous by now. In 1870, differences among the latter group of countries were relatively large: average education equalled only 2.1 years in Australia, 4.2 years in Belgium and in France, 6.2 years in Switzerland and 5.7 years in Norway. These differences were linked to heterogeneous educational policies since the 18th century, with a school set up in each village of most advanced countries at that time, whereas in other countries this obligation appeared much later, as in France around 1840. But we observe that the United States, Canada and Switzerland took rapidly the lead among Western countries.

As for South America in 1900, Argentina and Chile are more comparable with Southern European countries. There is a large gap between these two countries and the other Latin American countries: in 1930 as in 1960, average schooling in Argentina or Chile was double of that in Brazil and Mexico. The evolution of the latter two large countries was comparable but a few other countries such as Guatemala or Nicaragua

were far below.

Among MENA countries, only Morocco is clearly lagging behind others with 3.6 average years of schooling in 2000 instead of 6 on average. This is a consequence of a very low enrolment rate for girls in rural zones before 1980-1990. At last, in Sub-Saharan Africa, we observe some contrast stemming from the two main colonial policies of UK and France, which explain the gap between French-speaking and English-speaking countries. In 1960, average years of schooling were much higher in Ghana and Kenya than in Côte-d'Ivoire and Senegal (1.9 versus 0.4 years) and in 2000 they are twice as large. Among French-speaking countries, Cameroon is the only relatively advanced country (1.3 years in 1960), as it was a German colony before 1918. Differences in educational policies account for these results: in English or German colonies, primary school was often taken over by Christian missionaries, whereas in French colonies preference was given to state schools which displayed a much higher financial burden for the ruling power.

6.2 On Convergence in Education

Let us now focus on countries rather than on geographical areas, and look at particular sub-periods. It makes sense to investigate whether countries have converged or diverged in terms of average education. Indeed, convergence in education might trigger that of income as education enters directly the production function via labor, and possibly indirectly via the growth rate of technological change, the demographic structure of the labor force, the participation rate of females and so on.

Figure 15 depicts the variation in average schooling among the 15-64 population with respect to initial schooling over two periods: 1870-1910 and 1910-1960. One is a period of marked integration of goods, financial and labor markets, while the other has witnessed two world wars and a dramatic “deglobalization” process. The evidence is striking: there is a convergence process at work during the globalization of the late

nineteenth century, but only for the most advanced countries; there is no particular trend during the following period.

The convergence in schooling during the globalization period concerns all developed countries with average years of schooling roughly greater than 2 in 1870³⁰, in other words, the group of Western countries. Among those, the less advanced countries in 1870 such as Australia, Ireland or New-Zealand have clearly caught up with others. The average increase in schooling in this convergence club has been of 2.2 years of schooling. This contrasts with countries with initial years of schooling lower than 2, which acknowledged marginal increases in schooling of 0.5 years on average.

On the other hand, the following “deglobalization” period has not witnessed any particular trend. Except maybe for the less advanced countries, the increase in education between 1910 and 1960 was seemingly unrelated to the initial level in 1910. Indeed, for countries initially between 1 and 3 years (respectively 3 and 6 years and above 6 years), the average increase in schooling was 2.1 years (respectively 2.3 and 1.9 years). Countries below 1 year in 1910 had an average increase of 0.9 years. Hence, education was increasing overall, but without any specific pattern.

Figure 16 focuses on the contemporary period 1960-2000 and the recent period of intense globalization (1980-2010). At first sight, it is not clear whether an absolute convergence process holds for countries with initial schooling above 2 years in 1960 or in 1980. If it does, it is certainly moderate. Indeed, countries initially comprised between 2 and 6 years of schooling in 1960 reduced the gap with countries initially above 6 years by a modest 0.5 years; over the period 1980-2010, the reduction of the latter gap is equal to one year.

Table 3 presents simple OLS estimations of absolute convergence: the difference in average schooling is regressed on initial schooling and a constant, and the implied annual convergence rate³¹ is calculated. This confirms former graphical evidences: in

³⁰ Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.

³¹ equal to $-\frac{1}{T} \log(1 + \hat{\rho})$ where $\hat{\rho}$ is the estimated coefficient.

any period the group of low-education countries follows a divergence process where education grows proportionally to its initial level. On the other hand, middle-education countries - initially more than two years of schooling - have acknowledged a convergence process during the former globalization era with a high annual convergence rate of 3.7%. This process has vanished during the following deglobalization period, and has barely started to regain strength after 1980 as shown by the low 0.7% annual convergence rate over that period.

Certainly, these descriptive evidences have to be refined with the help of an extended database comprising other determinants of educational attainment. Conditional convergence has to be tested. It might well be the case that conditional convergence in education has been intense after 1960 for those countries displaying similar characteristics. Also, panel data should be used rather than cross-section regressions³².

What are the historical and current determinants triggering convergence in schooling? Is globalization an important driver of educational investments and a major force acting for the catch-up with more advanced countries? Why are some countries left aside in the process? These issues are complicated as education is the outcome of many forces: economic factors such as the net return to education, institutional factors such as the constraint of attending compulsory years of schooling, the existence of church schools or pro-literacy political ideology. Disentangling these factors is difficult. It is the task of economic history to address the facts and historical motives sustaining the development of education, and in the appendix we review briefly those facts for a handful of countries. In a more quantitative way, Murtin-Viarengo (2008) show that one particular determinant of education - compulsory years of schooling - has been converging in fifteen Western European countries over the postwar period. They argue that decreasing returns to education at the aggregate level can explain this convergence process. They also find that openness is a significant determinant of com-

³²With panel data the dependent variable should be a flow variable such as average schooling of the 20-30 years old rather than a stock variable as it is here. A stock variable creates mechanical correlation across time that contaminates the estimation of the economic phenomenon at stake.

pulsory schooling. Hence, these results are consistent with the view that globalization has fostered investments in education but that decreasing aggregate returns to education have limited its expansion³³.

6.3 Education, Inequality, Demography and Democracy Across the XXth Century

Beyond the issue of explaining the dynamics of education, we believe that this database will make many empirical investigations possible. One is the relation between income and education. Cohen-Soto (2007), among others, provide a very clear proof of the relevance of data quality for growth regressions. Cohen-Soto show that significant results for education are obtained with their data, whereas regressions using other data sets provide non-significant results. However their regressions start only in 1960. With our data set, growth regressions could be estimated for the first time over the whole twentieth century, provided that data on physical capital become available.

Second, economic historians have analyzed in detail how education has allowed technological accumulation in a few countries. This process is critical for growth as it has a positive impact on total factor productivity and on exports of manufactured goods. With a large education database, scholars can now compare and explain successes and failures of many countries in such a process. The relative advance in years of education of some Asian countries in 1870 and the lag of Sub-Saharan Africa at the same date is interesting from that perspective. This database will certainly allow a revised and enlarged analysis of the relationships between education, technological diffusion/innovation and growth.

A third issue would be the link between education and the demographic transition. At first glance, one observes that fertility started decreasing a century ago only in some

³³However, more research is certainly needed, as the latter authors consider a limited sample and sub-period. Other determinants such as the political regime, the demographic structure, ethnic fractionalization or religion may interfere. Besides, the relationships between actual and compulsory schooling has to be investigated, as the direction of the causality between them is not necessarily identical across countries.

Western European countries where illiteracy had nearly disappeared. Today, we observe high fertility rates in Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, the only regions in the world where the number of years of education is still low, and where strong discrimination prevails against women who often have no access to primary school (Morrisson and Jutting, 2005). Over the long run, a rich literature has sought to explain the global observed decrease in fertility in the course of economic development, and competing theories have emphasized for instance the role of the demand for human capital, the effects of child and adult mortality, or the impact of income standards. In practice, this education database, which starts in 1870 and pertains to a large sample of countries, allows for an empirical test of the latter theories. In that respect, Murtin (2009) reveals that the most robust explanation for the global decline in fertility is the rise in education³⁴. Other potential determinants, such as income, infant mortality or total mortality, lack of statistical robustness across the various econometric procedures (pooled OLS regressions, panel fixed-effects, SYS-GMM.). In contrast, even after controlling for persistence in fertility across time and including lagged fertility in the right-hand side of the regression, average schooling appears to be highly significant and its coefficient unchanged.

Fourth, this database can shed light on the interactions between education and inequality. Education certainly plays a direct role in the variations in income inequality, which is partially determined by inequality in human capital (as defined by the Mincerian approach). Furthermore, education entails externalities which could reduce income inequality. Indeed, Bourguignon-Verdier (2001) suggests that political participation of poor people increases with their educational level and that consequently redistributive policies arise with educational development. In practice, Morrisson-Murtin (2008) use Bourguignon-Morrisson (2002) global data on income distributions and find that mass education has indeed triggered a dramatic decline in income inequality from 1870,

³⁴Similarly, Ehrlich-Kim (2007) and Murtin (2009) suggest that inequality in fertility within countries is directly linked to the distribution of human capital.

aside from any variations linked to GDP per capita or human capital inequality.

Fifth, education is likely to interact with institutions, which are a key factor of long-term growth. For instance, there is an abundant literature on the interaction between economic development and the extent of democracy. This literature is dominated by the “modernization hypothesis”, which has been originally developed by Lipset (1960) and has attracted some attention in the recent literature. Examining the empirical evidence over the XXth century, Murtin-Wacziarg (2009) reveal that schooling, and more precisely primary education, has been a significant and robust determinant of democracy over the long run. Again, this finding is robust to econometric methods, as well as to the inclusion of lagged GDP per capita in the set of explanatory variables. It holds for any time period starting from 1870, even if the evidence is more fragile over the contemporary period as many countries have already achieved high standards of democracy in 1960, and therefore make less progress relatively to former periods.

To sum up, recent evidence tend to show that education is key to economic development, as it has triggered a decline in fertility, a rise in democracy, and most likely an associated decline in income inequality. There are several other economic relationships that this database could enlight. We truly hope it will help building original answers to pervasive and crucial issues of social sciences.

7 Conclusion

This paper has presented a new database on average years of schooling in 74 countries over the period 1870-2010. We have assessed measurement errors potentially due to missing data on total enrolment, age pyramids, dropout rates or duration of primary schooling. Simulations indicate that the quality of estimates reaches a satisfactory level for all countries around 1900. Besides, a comparison with Cohen-Soto database in 1960 enabled us to infer those measurement errors explicitly, and to correct simultaneously Cohen-Soto data from a bias linked to differential mortality across educational

groups. We have derived a core group of 54 countries for which the standard error of measurement errors equals 0.32, or 5 percentage points of enrolment in primary. Basic descriptive results suggest that global achievements in education have accelerated in the 1960s, but that our global distribution of schooling has widened since 1870. For a sub-sample of countries, we find evidence of fast absolute convergence in years of schooling during the former globalization period and of modest convergence during the current one. In each case less advanced countries have been excluded from the convergence club.

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8 Annex

Table 1 - Average Years of Schooling Among 15-64 and 15+ from Cohen-Soto

	Population Aged Between 15 and 64				Population Aged 15 and Over			
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
$h^{mm,(1)}$	1.08 ** (0.03)	1.03 ** (0.03)	1 ⁽²⁾	1 ⁽²⁾	1.06 ** (0.02)	1.01 ** (0.03)	1 ⁽²⁾	1 ⁽²⁾
Survey in 1970-1979	-	0.08 (0.20)	0.09 (0.20)	-	-	0.10 (0.18)	0.11 (0.18)	-
Survey in 1980-1989	-	-0.11 (0.23)	-0.07 (0.22)	-	-	-0.01 (0.21)	0.01 (0.21)	-
Survey post-1990	-	0.49 ** (0.20)	0.59 ** (0.15)	0.59 ** (0.14)	-	0.42 ** (0.18)	0.48 ** (0.14)	0.45 ** (0.13)
Constant	0.08 (0.11)	0.10 (0.12)	0.15 (0.10)	0.16 ** (0.08)	0.17 * (0.10)	0.17 (0.11)	0.19 ** (0.09)	0.22 ** (0.07)
Adj. R^2	0.96	0.97	0.19 ⁽³⁾	0.21 ⁽³⁾	0.97	0.97	0.13 ⁽³⁾	0.15 ⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ Average years of schooling taken from historical data for corresponding populations.

⁽²⁾ Constrained.

⁽³⁾ Adjusted R^2 of the difference between dependant variable and h^{mm} .

Table 2 - Average Years of Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Schooling in Cohen-Soto

	primary				secondary				tertiary			
	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)	(I)	(II)	(III)	(IV)
$h^{mm,(1)}$	1.05** (0.04)	0.98** (0.05)	1 ⁽²⁾	1 ⁽²⁾	0.98** (0.06)	0.94** (0.08)	1 ⁽²⁾	1 ⁽²⁾	1.00** (0.09)	0.77** (0.09)	1 ⁽²⁾	1 ⁽²⁾
Survey in 1970-1979	-	-0.02 (0.20)	0.10 (0.22)	-	-	0.13 (0.14)	0.13 (0.14)	-	-	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	-
Survey in 1980-1989	-	0.12 (0.23)	0.10 (0.23)	-	-	-0.08 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.16)	-	-	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	-
Survey post 1990	-	0.42** (0.19)	0.37** (0.15)	0.36** (0.13)	-	0.13 (0.14)	0.07 (0.11)	0.05 (0.10)	-	0.05** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Constant	0.21* (0.11)	0.22* (0.12)	0.20** (0.10)	0.21** (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)	0.01 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.00 (0.06)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Adj. R^2	0.92	0.93	0.06 ⁽³⁾	0.09 ⁽³⁾	0.80	0.81	-0.02 ⁽³⁾	-0.01 ⁽³⁾	0.66	0.74	0.15 ⁽³⁾	0.16 ⁽³⁾

⁽¹⁾ Average years of schooling taken from historical data for corresponding populations.

⁽²⁾ Constrained.

⁽³⁾ Adjusted R^2 of the difference between dependant variable and h^{mm} .

Table 3 - OLS Estimation of Absolute Convergence in Average Schooling For Low-Education and Middle-Education Countries

Dependent Variable: Difference in Average Schooling								
	1870-1910		1910-1960		1960-2000		1980-2010	
	L	M	L	M	L	M	L	M
Initial Schooling	0.96*** (0.13)	-0.77*** (0.17)	0.89*** (0.30)	-0.16 (0.10)	0.97** (0.40)	-0.09* (0.40)	0.91** (0.38)	-0.19*** (0.03)
Convergence rate in percents	-1.7	3.7	-1.3	0.3	-1.7	0.2	-2.2	0.7
N	58	16	46	28	28	46	11	63
R^2	0.48	0.56	0.15	0.05	0.15	0.05	0.32	0.33

notes: L stands for countries with initial average schooling lower than 2 years, M for other countries. *** (respectively ** and *) means significant at 1% (resp. 5% and 10%)




Figure 1: Sensibility Analysis - Adjustment Factor of Average Years of Schooling




Figure 2: Average primary Schooling of First Observed Cohort




Figure 3: Share of Population Aged 6-20 in Total Population by Geographical Area




Figure 4: Pseudo-Standard Error of Average Schooling Generated by Missing Data




Figure 5: Pseudo-Coefficient of Variation of Average Schooling Generated by Missing Data




Figure 6: Pseudo-Standard Error of Average Schooling Generated by Unknown Dropout Rates




Figure 7: Pseudo-Standard Error of Average Schooling Generated by Unknown Duration of Primary




Figure 8: Pseudo-Standard Error of Average Schooling Generated by Unknown Age Pyramid




Figure 9: Comparison of Average Years of Schooling in 1960




Figure 10: Comparison of Average Years of Primary Schooling in 1960




Figure 11: Comparison of Average Years of Secondary Schooling in 1960




Figure 12: Comparison of Average Years of Higher Education in 1960




Figure 13: Quantiles of Measurement Error versus Quantiles of a Standard Normal Distribution




Figure 14: Weighted-Average of Educational Attainment by Geographical Area




Figure 15: Schooling Variations 1870-1960




Figure 16: Schooling Variations 1960-2010

Annex to the Century of Education

Christian Morrisson - Fabrice Murtin

This annex presents some complementary historical information on the world demographic transition and facts that have marked the history of education in a handful of countries. Then we present underlying assumptions used in the building of the data as well as complementary information on the data - first observations, assumed enrolment in 1820, first observed enrolment and so on. Then we explicit the corrections made to Mitchell's data on schooling enrolment and present the implicit enrolment rate series in Primary schools since 1820. Observed data are in circles while simulated data (extrapolated or interpolated) are in dots, which makes transparent the relative weight of observed and simulated data.

1 Historical Background

1.1 The world demographic transition

The modifications of age pyramids over time are exhaustively described by Chesnais (1992), and we refer to his work in the following. The two phases of the demographic transition are generally consisting in the decline in mortality followed by that in fertility. The decline in overall mortality first happened around 1800 in France, Czech and Scandinavian countries. The contemporary discovery of smallpox vaccine by Jenner in 1796 probably contributed to it. The decline in mortality was slow along the nineteenth century but accelerated after 1870 and involved most of European countries. For large developping countries such as India, Turkey, Mexico and probably China, there

has been a sudden decline in mortality in the interwar period, that generalized to other developing countries in the postwar period. Variations in infant mortality are consistent with those of overall mortality. Infant mortality has decreased steadily in Northern Europe since 1800, then in North-Western and Southern Europe since 1870. This decline accelerated around 1900 and slowed down after 1950. This “health transition” propagated quickly to Latin and Southern America in the first quarter of the twentieth century, and to Eastern Asia in the second quarter.

In parallel, fertility started to decrease early in France, Czech countries and the United States, in the period 1750-1800. Scandinavian countries, North-Western and Central Europe experienced the same trend from 1875, followed by North-Eastern Europe - Poland, Russia -, South and Eastern Europe - Spain, Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia - and some South American countries - Argentina, Chile, Uruguay - in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Many developing countries started to experience a decline in fertility in the 1960s or the 1970s, with the notable exceptions of the Middle-East and Sub-Saharan Africa.

1.2 Some historical facts on education

We give some historical references for a handful of countries, which largely draw on World Education Encyclopedia (2002).

1.3 Europe

Figure 15 depicts four large countries: France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Italy. The first three countries have had very close levels of education throughout the period, while Italy has slowly reduced the gap with them. Primary education reformed in the mid-nineteenth century and was made free, non-clerical and mandatory in France in 1882 under the impulsion of Jules Ferry. As a result enrolment increased and illiteracy fell from 20% in 1870 to 4% in 1912. First World War severely hit enrolment

in the interwar period, as young male teachers, who often served as lieutenant during the war - the most exposed rank in infantry -, were almost wiped out as a class. The 1975 Loi Haby reformed Secondary in order to enforce attendance of at least 3 years of high school before specific education might eventually be undertaken. Mass enrolment in Secondary has increased from the 1950s and led to a sharp increase in average schooling from the 1970s.

Education has a long history in Germany, which comes back to Frederick the Great who mandated school attendance between 5 and 13 in 1763. As a result, Prussia and Germany as a whole achieved high levels of enrolment early in the nineteenth century, equaled only by Norway in 1830 according to Lindert (2004). In 1920 school attendance became compulsory until 18. However, in the 1950s only 6% of any age cohort had completed full-time schooling, while two thirds had undertaken mandatory part-time education. Major reforms of the educational system occurred in the 1970s.

In the United Kingdom, Queen Victoria eliminated the practice of child labor in 1833 and introduced compulsory elementary schooling in the Education Act of 1870. The English system has been classified as being elitist by most historians, combining some church schools for the poor and expensive private schools reserved to the well-off. As the “National Society for the Education of the Poor in the Principles of the Established Church” became powerful, the government envisaged educational reforms by the early 1850s to take some power from church societies. The same competition between the State and the Church for the monopoly of public education prevailed in most Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in France. Also, it is often emphasized that industrial capitalists lobbied the government to promote mass education, which was complementary to the fast technological change of industrialization. In addition to the Education Act, the 1902 Balfour Act established secondary school for all, with tax revenues as a source of funding. In the postwar period, high school and college education exploded after 1970.

Though it has the oldest university in Europe, Italy had very low educational level in the nineteenth century, mainly because of the weakness, if not the absence, of central government. Indeed, Italy has experienced political disunity from the fifth to the nineteenth century, and was only reunified in 1871 at the end of the Franco-Prussian War. The birth of Italian public education can be traced to 1859 when four years of free and compulsory schooling were implemented. They were extended to 6 in 1904, and the 1923 Gentile reform added 2 years of compulsory schooling. As for other European countries, radical reforms were implemented in the postwar period.

1.4 Three Former European Offshoots

Figure 16 describes Australia, Argentina and the United States. The first country is a fascinating case. Education level was originally at a very low level, and was probably of poor quality as female convicts tended to be the first teachers in local schools, indeed a nice start for public education. But the “Big Four” Christian Churches - Anglicanism, Catholicism, Methodism and Presbyterianism - were major contributors to the provision of education, especially in remote rural areas. The central administration implemented a non-denominational schooling system in 1848 but still continued to found denominational schools. These competing forces led to an astonishing catch-up with Canada and the United States at the eve of the twentieth century.

The counter-example of Australia is Argentina. Starting at approximately the same level of 2 average years in 1870, educational level grew very slowly. A reform was implemented in 1874 enacting 8 years of free and compulsory schooling, but the corresponding level of average schooling in the population was not attained until the 1950s. Apparently, the political economy mechanism described by Galor et al. (2006), where a small and powerful oligarchy of landowners vetoes public investments in education, offers a plausible explanation.

The colonial times in the United States were dominated by different religious move-

ments or sects who used education as a means to reproduce over time, similarly to what happened in Australia. In the early nineteenth century, the idea of a public free school emerged, championed by visionaries such as Thomas Jefferson or Horace Mann. However, the federal state did not play a major role in the educational process, excepted for the foundation of military academies. The high level of literacy achieved at the eve of the twentieth century was quickly followed by the “high school movement” that accelerated in the 1920s. The 1950s marked the end of segregation in schools, which was legal since the 1896 “Plessy vs Ferguson” Supreme Court ruling. Then in the Elementary and Secondary Act of 1965, federal aid increased and the high school graduation rate peaked at about 80% in 1970 (US Department of Education (1993)). Overall, the growth of education has been notably constant over the whole period.

1.5 Three Other Countries

Last Figure depicts Japan, Algeria and India. The 1868 Meiji Revolution ended two centuries of isolation and low educational levels in Japan. A modern schooling system under Western influence was quickly implemented, and attendance in Primary was over 90% in the 1900s. Compulsory years of schooling were increased from three to six in 1907. The educational system was transformed in 1947 following the end of World War II and compulsory schooling was augmented to nine years. Consequently, Japan caught up with the most advanced countries in the 1960s, a conclusion shared by Godo and Hayami (2002).

Last, Algeria and India illustrate the low educational investments that European powers have achieved in their colonies. By 1892 in Algeria, more than five times the money was spent educating Europeans - French but also Spanish and Italian people - as was spent on Muslims, who had five times as many children of school age. It is the same Jules Ferry who made Primary schooling mandatory in France in 1882, who declared one year later: “the superior races have a right because they have a duty: it is

their duty to civilize the inferior races”. The following years proved that this statement was not only racist but also untrue. Schooling achievement was by no means better in India before the 1947 Independence. India has gradually increased average schooling up to 4 years in 2000, but constitutes one of the most unequalitarian schooling system in the world: in 2000, 5% of the Indian population has attended college and 50% has not attended school at all.




Figure 1: Educational Attainment of some European Countries 1870-2010




Figure 2: Educational Attainment of some European Offshoots 1870-2010




Figure 3: Educational Attainment of some European Offshoots 1870-2010

2 Underlying Assumptions

We describe in the following table the final sample of countries (74 countries) and the following informations: maximal durations of Primary P , Secondary S and Higher education H , annual repeating rate r and dropout rate d (in percents), enrolment rate in primary in 1820 X_{1820} (in percents), year of first observed age pyramid Y_0^{Pyr} or country that supplements missing age pyramids, year of first observed total enrolment in Primary Y_0 , first observed enrolment rate in primary X_0 , a dummy *core* equal to one when the country belongs to the core data set. As stressed in the paper, those enrolment rates are *not* comparable with those taken from the literature that are based on total enrolment divided by the 5-14 years old cohort (10 annual cohorts) rather than by the scholarized population (P annual cohorts).

Table 1 - Underlying Assumptions by Country

	P	S	H	r	d	X_{1820}	Y_0^{Pyr}	Y_0	X_0	$core$
Algeria	6	6	4	5	2,7	0,1	1911	1860	4,9	1
Angola	6	6	4	10	10,9	0,1	1940	1929	0,6	1
Argentina	8	4	4	5	2,7	10	1869	1882	17,1	1
Australia	9	3	4	5	2,8	1	1861	1840	13,8	0
Austria	8	4	4	2	1,7	35	1869	1842	40,8	1
Belgium	8	4	4	2	1,7	25	1846	1830	46,5	0
Benin	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	Nigeria	1936	6,6	1
Brazil	8	4	4	5	2,7	1	1872	1871	7,6	1
Bulgaria	8	4	4	5	2,7	10	1881	1895	44,4	0
Cameroon	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	Nigeria	1911	0,1	1
Canada	7	5	4	5	2,7	20	1851	1868	97,6	0
Chile	8	4	4	5	2,7	1	1895	1880	15,0	1
Costa Rica	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	1	Mexico	1885	42,0	0
Cote d'Ivoire	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	Ghana	1910	0,3	1
Cuba	6	6	4	5	2,7	1	Mexico	1899	33,1	1
Denmark	7	5	4	2	1,7	60	1801	1893	95,7	0
Dominican Republic	6	6	4	5	2,7	1	Mexico	1933	34,9	1
Egypt	6	6	4	10	10,9	0,1	1917	1898	0,6	0
El Salvador	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	1	Mexico	1887	27,0	1
Ethiopia	6	6	4	10	10,9	0,1	Kenya	1948	0,3	1
Finland	7	5	4	5	2,7	5	1800	1880	9,1	0
France	9	3	4	2	1,7	25	1851	1830	39,3	0
Germany	8	4	4	2	1,7	65	1871	1830	66,1	1
Ghana	6	6	4	5	2,7	0,1	1960	1882	1,6	1
Greece	7	5	4	7,5	2,7	10	1861	1901	48,5	0
Guatemala	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	1	Mexico	1883	22,0	1
Guyana	8	4	4	5	2,7	1	Surinam	1891	24,0	1
Honduras	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	1	Mexico	1902	36,9	1
Hungary	8	4	4	5	2,7	10	1869	1854	32,7	0
India	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	1881	1852	0,1	1
Indonesia	8	4	4	5	2,7	1	1961	1875	0,3	1
Iran	6	6	4	5	2,7	1	1956	1920	1,3	1
Iraq	6	6	4	5	2,7	1	1957	1927	4,6	1

	P	S	H	r	d	X_{1820}	Y_0^{Pyr}	Y_0	X_0	$core$
Ireland	8	4	4	5	2,7	10	1861	1852	40,0	0
Italy	6	6	4	5	2,7	5	1861	1830	4,0	0
Jamaica	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	1	Mexico	1868	26,2	1
Japan	6	6	4	2	1,7	10	1884	1873	29,4	1
Kenya	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	1960	1926	17,3	1
Madagascar	6	6	4	10	10,9	0,1	1960	1906	9,8	1
Malawi	6	6	4	10	10,9	0,1	Tanzania	1903	26,0	1
Malaysia	8	4	4	5	2,7	1	1931	1864	1,7	1
Mali	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	Senegal	1936	3,2	1
Mexico	7	5	4	5	2,7	1	1895	1895	24,2	1
Morocco	6	6	4	5	2,7	0,1	1951	1913	0,6	1
Mozambique	6	6	4	10	10,9	0,1	1940	1926	4,9	1
Myanmar	6	6	4	5	2,7	0,1	1881	1857	0,4	1
Netherlands	7	5	4	2	1,7	70	1840	1851	83,4	1
New-Zealand	9	3	4	5	2,8	1	1864	1875	71,5	0
Nicaragua	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	1	Mexico	1883	24,5	1
Niger	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	Nigeria	1936	0,5	1
Nigeria	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	1960	1879	0,1	1
Norway	8	4	4	2	1,7	80	1801	1837	78,6	0
Panama	7	5	4	5	2,7	1	Mexico	1922	38,7	1
Paraguay	8	4	4	7,5	5,8	1	Argentina	1891	21,5	0
Peru	8	4	4	5	2,7	1	1940	1889	7,8	1
Philippines	7	5	4	7,5	5,8	1	1939	1898	4,9	0
Portugal	6	6	4	5	2,7	5	1864	1848	6,5	1
Senegal	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	1960	1936	5,1	1
Sierra Leone	6	6	4	10	10,9	0,1	Ghana	1850	4,8	1
South Africa	6	6	4	2	1,7	0,1	1936	1871	12,4	1
Spain	7	5	4	5	2,7	10	1857	1855	39,0	1
Sudan	6	6	4	10	10,9	0,1	1900	1940	4,8	0
Sweden	8	4	4	2	1,7	50	1800	1865	64,0	1
Switzerland	7	5	4	2	1,7	90	1860	1830	91,4	0
Syria	8	4	4	5	2,7	1	1960	1927	13,2	1
Thailand	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	1	1929	1913	9,2	1
Tunisia	6	6	4	5	2,7	0,1	1960	1896	5,9	1
Turkey	8	4	4	5	2,7	1	1935	1923	11,6	1
Uganda	6	6	4	10	10,9	0,1	1960	1927	3,0	1
United Kingdom	7	5	4	2	1,7	25	1841	1830	42,1	1
United States	9	3	4	5	2,7	60	1820	1830	60,5	1
Uruguay	8	4	4	5	2,7	10	1900	1876	19,6	1
Venezuela	8	4	4	5	2,7	1	1920	1926	16,0	1
Zimbabwe	6	6	4	7,5	5,8	0,1	Tanzania	1902	0,6	1

3 Series of enrolment

We give hereafter some informations on data sources if different from Mitchell, and mention the corrections that were applied to Mitchell's data.

- Argentina: undocumented break in the Primary and Secondary series in 1938. The series for 1939-1960 are adjusted to their 1938 level.
- Australia: only the total enrolment in Primary and Secondary is available. The share of Secondary was taken equal to 1% in 1840 and 25% in 1960 with a linear increase over the period. Higher education is censored between 1940 and 1952
- Austria: censoring of 1914-1922 figures.
- Belgium: 1881, 1883 and 1884 figures are deleted as outliers.
- Bulgaria: censoring of 1914. The huge increase in Primary enrolment in 1939 is explained by a transfer of Progymnasia from Secondary to Primary, hence is compensated by an equal decrease in Secondary enrolment.
- Canada: only the total enrolment in Primary and Secondary is available. The share of Secondary was calibrated on the US and taken equal to 1% in 1850 and 25% in 1960 with a linear increase over the period. Higher education is censored between 1940 and 1952.
- Chile: undocumented break in the Primary and Secondary series in 1926. The series for 1927-1960 are adjusted to their 1926 level.
- Denmark: Primary and Secondary series before 1905 are adjusted to their 1905 levels. The Higher education before 1924 is adjusted to its 1924 level. Interpolation between 1940 and 1950.
- Egypt: 1935-1945 Primary figures are censored because of large unplausible variations due to the effect of WW II on 1940 age pyramid.

- France: P: 1830-1850 in Lindert (2004). 1914-1922: some counties are missing due to the war hence this period is censored. 1970-1990 are based on De la Fuente-Domenech who provide the distribution of schooling, partly based on national surveys, for the population 25+. We compute the ratio of schooling for the population 15+ divided by schooling for population 25+ in Cohen-Soto for the same period and apply it to De la Fuente-Domenech. Then we compute the increase in average years of schooling in Cohen-Soto over the period 1990-2010 and apply it to our 1990 figure. The corrected figure from De la Fuente-Domenech is 8.79 average years for the population 15+ in 1960, while we find 8.56 in the historical data set. The two series are therefore fully compatible. For the population 15-64, we compute the ratio of schooling for population 15-64 divided by schooling for population 25+ in Cohen-Soto and apply it to De la Fuente-Domenech serie. Then we apply the increase of average schooling given by Cohen-Soto for the period 1990-2010.
- Germany: P: 1840-1890 Diebolt (1997), 1830 : Prussia variations in Lindert (2004) applied to 1840 Diebolt (1990) figure. Large variations in the 1950s stem from the political turbulences after the separation of Germany and from the reorganization process of the educational system in West Germany. S: Prussia variations in Diebolt (1997) applied to Mitchell (2003) 1910 figure.
- Guatemala: Large variations censored around 1890 and 1930.
- Hungary: the Trianon Treaty dismantles the kingdom of Hungary. Enrolment and age pyramids are consistent except for the 1914-1921 period that is censored.
- Italy: P: 1830-1850 in Lindert (2004).
- Malawi: Primary serie goes up and down unplausibly. 1905-1947 is censored.
- Malaysia: 1940-1950 is censored due to WW II.



- Myanmar: Primary and Secondary series are adjusted to the 1920 level after this date.
- Netherlands: the 1854 outlier is maintained in the data.
- Norway: P: 1830 Lindert (2004). Between 1881 and 1890 pupils in “ambulant schools” are excluded. Large variations between 1890 and 1900. Hence 1880-1900 is censored.
- Panama: Primary serie is censored between 1940 and 1950.
- Paraguay: undocumented break in the Secondary serie in 1945. The serie 1946-1956 is adjusted to its 1957 level.
- South Africa: Primary serie was smoothed with 5 years censoring around 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940 and 1950.
- Sweden: break in 1914 due to a change in the basis of Primary statistics. Post-1914 serie is adjusted to the 1914 level.
- Switzerland: P-S: 1830-1880 Lindert (2004). After 1931 only Primary middle schools in Mitchell data. Post-1931 figures are adjusted to the 1931 level.
- Thailand: 1939-1953 are censored due to WW II.
- UK (England and Wales): P: 1830-1890 Lindert (2004). S: 1900 figure in Lindert (2004). Reorganization process following World War II in 1944: 1944-1949 are censored in Primary and Secondary.
- USA: P: 1830-1840 in Lindert (2004). Data post 1940 are based on IPUMS surveys. After 1990 only a degree variable is available, so we use the following scale of equivalence: Grade 1-4=3 years; Grades 5-8=8 years ; Grades 13-15=14 years; Grades 16+=17 years. This scale is chosen accordingly to 1980 equivalence. For 2010 we used the absolute increase in years of schooling given by



Cohen-Soto and applied it to the actual 2000 figures: +0.00 for P, +0.12 for S and +0.44 for H.



- Zimbabwe: 1930-1943 are censored as well as 1947-1955.



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

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








































































































































DATA

country	year	s15_64	s15_plus	s15_plus_p	s15_plus_s	s15_plus_h
Algeria	1870	0.13	0.15	0.03	0.10	0.01
Algeria	1880	0.24	0.25	0.12	0.12	0.01
Algeria	1890	0.37	0.37	0.23	0.13	0.01
Algeria	1900	0.49	0.48	0.33	0.13	0.01
Algeria	1910	0.61	0.59	0.44	0.14	0.01
Algeria	1920	0.72	0.69	0.53	0.15	0.01
Algeria	1930	0.79	0.77	0.60	0.16	0.01
Algeria	1940	0.86	0.84	0.67	0.17	0.01
Algeria	1950	1.04	1.02	0.83	0.18	0.01
Algeria	1960	1.21	1.19	0.96	0.21	0.01
Algeria	1970	1.74	1.67	1.35	0.30	0.02
Algeria	1980	3.15	3.05	2.50	0.52	0.04
Algeria	1990	4.86	4.73	3.39	1.25	0.09
Algeria	2000	6.36	6.12	4.07	1.87	0.18
Algeria	2010	7.23	6.93	4.47	2.21	0.25
Angola	1870	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.01
Angola	1880	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.01
Angola	1890	0.06	0.07	0.04	0.02	0.01
Angola	1900	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.01
Angola	1910	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.01
Angola	1920	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.01
Angola	1930	0.07	0.08	0.05	0.02	0.01
Angola	1940	0.08	0.08	0.06	0.02	0.01
Angola	1950	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.02	0.01
Angola	1960	0.10	0.11	0.07	0.03	0.01
Angola	1970	0.26	0.29	0.23	0.05	0.01
Angola	1980	0.93	0.92	0.79	0.12	0.01
Angola	1990	1.90	1.84	1.57	0.26	0.01
Angola	2000	2.38	2.28	1.95	0.32	0.01
Angola	2010	2.92	2.79	2.43	0.35	0.01
Argentina	1870	1.28	1.35	1.17	0.17	0.01
Argentina	1880	1.35	1.42	1.22	0.19	0.01
Argentina	1890	1.41	1.48	1.27	0.21	0.01
Argentina	1900	1.74	1.80	1.50	0.28	0.01
Argentina	1910	2.23	2.26	1.84	0.40	0.01
Argentina	1920	2.94	2.92	2.34	0.58	0.01
Argentina	1930	3.75	3.68	2.89	0.78	0.01
Argentina	1940	4.51	4.38	3.40	0.97	0.01
Argentina	1950	5.39	5.22	3.97	1.20	0.05
Argentina	1960	6.13	5.88	4.36	1.40	0.12
Argentina	1970	6.76	6.61	4.68	1.76	0.17
Argentina	1980	7.52	7.38	4.94	2.14	0.30
Argentina	1990	7.69	7.55	5.15	2.17	0.23
Argentina	2000	8.30	8.10	5.34	2.50	0.26
Argentina	2010	8.80	8.52	5.50	2.73	0.30
Australia	1870	2.12	2.07	1.39	0.66	0.01
Australia	1880	3.47	3.35	2.22	1.11	0.02
Australia	1890	5.51	5.28	3.50	1.77	0.01
Australia	1900	6.59	6.25	4.10	2.13	0.02
Australia	1910	7.41	7.06	4.57	2.47	0.02
Australia	1920	8.00	7.71	4.90	2.78	0.03
Australia	1930	8.69	8.39	5.21	3.13	0.04
Australia	1940	8.83	8.57	5.29	3.17	0.11
Australia	1950	8.96	8.75	5.36	3.20	0.18
Australia	1960	9.24	9.10	5.51	3.27	0.32
Australia	1970	11.04	10.67	5.93	4.15	0.59
Australia	1980	12.20	11.59	5.96	4.81	0.82
Australia	1990	12.76	12.23	5.98	5.24	1.01

Australia	2000	13.09	12.71	6.00	5.88	0.83
Australia	2010	13.25	13.03	6.00	6.13	0.91
Austria	1870	3.48	3.41	2.09	1.31	0.01
Austria	1880	3.71	3.63	2.23	1.38	0.01
Austria	1890	4.23	4.10	2.58	1.51	0.01
Austria	1900	4.90	4.73	3.04	1.68	0.01
Austria	1910	5.58	5.36	3.50	1.85	0.01
Austria	1920	6.21	5.93	3.92	2.00	0.01
Austria	1930	6.15	5.85	3.83	2.01	0.01
Austria	1940	6.60	6.29	4.11	2.16	0.01
Austria	1950	7.26	6.94	4.55	2.34	0.05
Austria	1960	7.70	7.43	4.79	2.54	0.11
Austria	1970	9.28	8.66	5.42	3.08	0.17
Austria	1980	10.31	9.45	5.66	3.59	0.20
Austria	1990	10.94	10.16	5.82	4.13	0.21
Austria	2000	11.43	10.81	5.93	4.45	0.43
Austria	2010	11.70	11.26	6.00	4.77	0.49
Belgium	1870	4.45	4.26	3.18	1.07	0.02
Belgium	1880	5.03	4.78	3.54	1.22	0.03
Belgium	1890	5.41	5.18	3.81	1.34	0.02
Belgium	1900	5.24	5.17	3.78	1.36	0.03
Belgium	1910	5.39	5.33	3.88	1.41	0.04
Belgium	1920	5.59	5.56	4.04	1.48	0.05
Belgium	1930	5.92	5.90	4.26	1.58	0.05
Belgium	1940	6.15	6.08	4.50	1.51	0.07
Belgium	1950	6.37	6.26	4.73	1.44	0.09
Belgium	1960	6.81	6.63	5.21	1.29	0.13
Belgium	1970	8.29	7.87	5.75	1.84	0.28
Belgium	1980	9.24	8.68	5.87	2.39	0.43
Belgium	1990	10.03	9.45	5.93	2.91	0.60
Belgium	2000	10.84	10.11	5.98	3.38	0.76
Belgium	2010	11.42	10.69	6.00	3.78	0.91
Benin	1870	0.07	0.09	0.06	0.02	0.01
Benin	1880	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.02	0.01
Benin	1890	0.13	0.15	0.12	0.02	0.01
Benin	1900	0.16	0.18	0.15	0.02	0.01
Benin	1910	0.19	0.21	0.17	0.02	0.01
Benin	1920	0.22	0.24	0.20	0.02	0.01
Benin	1930	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.02	0.01
Benin	1940	0.29	0.30	0.27	0.03	0.01
Benin	1950	0.33	0.34	0.31	0.03	0.01
Benin	1960	0.41	0.42	0.38	0.03	0.01
Benin	1970	0.54	0.55	0.48	0.06	0.01
Benin	1980	0.91	0.92	0.75	0.16	0.01
Benin	1990	1.78	1.70	1.21	0.46	0.04
Benin	2000	2.30	2.26	1.64	0.56	0.05
Benin	2010	2.73	2.66	2.02	0.59	0.06
Brazil	1870	0.99	1.26	1.19	0.01	0.05
Brazil	1880	1.10	1.33	1.27	0.01	0.06
Brazil	1890	1.20	1.41	1.34	0.01	0.05
Brazil	1900	1.30	1.49	1.42	0.01	0.06
Brazil	1910	1.42	1.57	1.50	0.01	0.06
Brazil	1920	1.58	1.69	1.62	0.01	0.06
Brazil	1930	1.78	1.84	1.77	0.01	0.06
Brazil	1940	2.11	2.13	2.00	0.07	0.06
Brazil	1950	2.56	2.56	2.29	0.20	0.07
Brazil	1960	3.07	3.05	2.59	0.39	0.08
Brazil	1970	3.69	3.65	2.98	0.55	0.11
Brazil	1980	4.27	4.13	3.29	0.66	0.17

Brazil	1990	6.53	6.35	4.35	1.78	0.22
Brazil	2000	7.50	7.20	4.83	2.17	0.21
Brazil	2010	8.19	7.83	5.08	2.40	0.35
Bulgaria	1870	1.70	1.64	1.12	0.53	0.00
Bulgaria	1880	2.02	1.92	1.29	0.62	0.00
Bulgaria	1890	2.37	2.22	1.49	0.73	0.00
Bulgaria	1900	2.86	2.72	1.81	0.91	0.00
Bulgaria	1910	3.17	3.04	2.04	0.99	0.01
Bulgaria	1920	3.71	3.56	2.33	1.22	0.01
Bulgaria	1930	4.32	4.16	2.62	1.52	0.02
Bulgaria	1940	5.06	4.87	3.00	1.82	0.05
Bulgaria	1950	5.81	5.57	3.38	2.12	0.07
Bulgaria	1960	7.30	6.98	4.15	2.72	0.12
Bulgaria	1970	8.04	7.65	4.52	2.94	0.19
Bulgaria	1980	8.97	8.55	4.91	3.35	0.29
Bulgaria	1990	9.55	9.25	5.24	3.62	0.39
Bulgaria	2000	10.59	10.11	5.52	3.99	0.60
Bulgaria	2010	11.48	10.86	5.68	4.27	0.90
Cameroon	1870	0.58	0.60	0.43	0.17	0.01
Cameroon	1880	0.58	0.60	0.43	0.17	0.01
Cameroon	1890	0.58	0.60	0.43	0.17	0.01
Cameroon	1900	0.58	0.60	0.43	0.17	0.01
Cameroon	1910	0.58	0.60	0.43	0.17	0.01
Cameroon	1920	0.58	0.60	0.43	0.17	0.01
Cameroon	1930	0.63	0.65	0.48	0.17	0.01
Cameroon	1940	0.84	0.85	0.68	0.17	0.01
Cameroon	1950	1.15	1.16	0.98	0.17	0.01
Cameroon	1960	1.33	1.33	1.14	0.18	0.01
Cameroon	1970	1.88	1.80	1.50	0.30	0.01
Cameroon	1980	3.04	2.88	2.37	0.51	0.01
Cameroon	1990	4.07	3.89	3.19	0.68	0.03
Cameroon	2000	4.65	4.47	3.50	0.92	0.04
Cameroon	2010	4.92	4.74	3.62	1.07	0.06
Canada	1870	5.82	5.72	4.65	1.02	0.04
Canada	1880	6.35	6.21	4.96	1.19	0.05
Canada	1890	6.86	6.69	5.24	1.40	0.04
Canada	1900	7.26	7.10	5.39	1.63	0.08
Canada	1910	7.76	7.62	5.61	1.93	0.09
Canada	1920	8.17	8.04	5.71	2.23	0.10
Canada	1930	8.29	8.16	5.68	2.26	0.22
Canada	1940	8.35	8.21	5.67	2.27	0.27
Canada	1950	8.41	8.27	5.66	2.29	0.32
Canada	1960	8.53	8.39	5.64	2.32	0.44
Canada	1970	10.37	9.90	6.00	3.18	0.72
Canada	1980	11.59	10.87	6.00	3.88	0.99
Canada	1990	12.36	11.64	6.00	4.37	1.27
Canada	2000	13.07	12.42	6.00	4.96	1.46
Canada	2010	13.30	12.88	6.00	5.26	1.62
Chile	1870	0.63	0.93	0.91	0.01	0.01
Chile	1880	0.80	1.08	1.03	0.04	0.01
Chile	1890	0.98	1.24	1.15	0.09	0.01
Chile	1900	1.25	1.49	1.32	0.16	0.01
Chile	1910	1.57	1.79	1.53	0.25	0.01
Chile	1920	2.45	2.64	2.08	0.54	0.01
Chile	1930	3.51	3.63	2.74	0.88	0.01
Chile	1940	4.40	4.47	3.33	1.13	0.01
Chile	1950	4.88	4.92	3.62	1.29	0.01
Chile	1960	5.61	5.58	3.96	1.59	0.02
Chile	1970	7.05	6.99	4.72	2.17	0.10

Chile	1980	8.18	8.07	5.09	2.82	0.17
Chile	1990	9.14	8.91	5.33	3.35	0.23
Chile	2000	9.94	9.52	5.50	3.76	0.27
Chile	2010	10.77	10.27	5.62	4.13	0.52
Costa Rica	1870	0.92	0.90	0.86	0.02	0.02
Costa Rica	1880	1.25	1.21	1.16	0.03	0.02
Costa Rica	1890	1.58	1.52	1.47	0.03	0.02
Costa Rica	1900	1.75	1.69	1.62	0.04	0.03
Costa Rica	1910	2.05	2.01	1.93	0.04	0.04
Costa Rica	1920	2.19	2.13	2.04	0.05	0.04
Costa Rica	1930	2.45	2.38	2.27	0.06	0.05
Costa Rica	1940	2.86	2.81	2.68	0.08	0.05
Costa Rica	1950	2.99	3.00	2.77	0.18	0.06
Costa Rica	1960	3.26	3.39	2.94	0.37	0.08
Costa Rica	1970	3.91	3.92	3.32	0.50	0.11
Costa Rica	1980	4.68	4.80	3.84	0.75	0.20
Costa Rica	1990	5.91	5.82	4.33	1.04	0.45
Costa Rica	2000	6.72	6.62	4.65	1.30	0.67
Costa Rica	2010	7.65	7.39	4.96	1.55	0.88
Cote d'Ivoire	1870	0.10	0.12	0.08	0.04	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1880	0.10	0.13	0.08	0.04	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1890	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.04	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1900	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.04	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1910	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.04	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1920	0.11	0.13	0.08	0.04	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1930	0.13	0.15	0.10	0.04	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1940	0.16	0.18	0.13	0.04	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1950	0.20	0.21	0.16	0.04	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1960	0.27	0.28	0.22	0.05	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1970	0.54	0.58	0.39	0.17	0.01
Cote d'Ivoire	1980	1.48	1.46	1.06	0.38	0.02
Cote d'Ivoire	1990	2.48	2.43	1.70	0.69	0.04
Cote d'Ivoire	2000	3.18	3.10	2.15	0.89	0.06
Cote d'Ivoire	2010	3.74	3.63	2.52	1.02	0.08
Cuba	1870	0.35	0.45	0.32	0.12	0.01
Cuba	1880	0.57	0.65	0.52	0.12	0.01
Cuba	1890	0.76	0.84	0.71	0.12	0.01
Cuba	1900	0.98	1.03	0.90	0.12	0.01
Cuba	1910	1.26	1.31	1.17	0.13	0.02
Cuba	1920	1.63	1.65	1.49	0.14	0.02
Cuba	1930	2.48	2.45	2.28	0.14	0.03
Cuba	1940	3.00	2.99	2.80	0.15	0.04
Cuba	1950	3.38	3.34	3.13	0.16	0.05
Cuba	1960	3.52	3.50	3.22	0.21	0.07
Cuba	1970	4.30	4.17	3.62	0.46	0.08
Cuba	1980	5.48	5.37	4.20	1.04	0.13
Cuba	1990	7.47	7.08	4.62	2.24	0.23
Cuba	2000	8.93	8.31	4.98	2.94	0.38
Cuba	2010	9.88	8.99	5.26	3.34	0.40
Denmark	1870	4.74	4.69	4.00	0.68	0.01
Denmark	1880	5.02	4.94	4.21	0.72	0.01
Denmark	1890	5.36	5.25	4.46	0.78	0.01
Denmark	1900	5.74	5.61	4.76	0.84	0.01
Denmark	1910	6.08	5.96	5.03	0.92	0.01
Denmark	1920	6.47	6.33	5.27	1.05	0.01
Denmark	1930	6.76	6.63	5.41	1.19	0.02
Denmark	1940	7.20	7.03	5.47	1.51	0.05
Denmark	1950	7.63	7.43	5.52	1.82	0.08
Denmark	1960	8.50	8.23	5.64	2.46	0.13

Denmark	1970	10.08	9.49	6.00	3.20	0.30
Denmark	1980	11.03	10.22	6.00	3.78	0.44
Denmark	1990	11.54	10.84	6.00	4.32	0.52
Denmark	2000	12.20	11.56	6.00	4.80	0.75
Denmark	2010	12.32	11.89	6.00	5.07	0.82
Dominican	1870	0.34	0.40	0.09	0.28	0.02
Dominican	1880	0.51	0.55	0.24	0.29	0.02
Dominican	1890	0.67	0.71	0.39	0.29	0.02
Dominican	1900	0.83	0.86	0.54	0.30	0.02
Dominican	1910	0.98	1.02	0.69	0.30	0.02
Dominican	1920	1.15	1.17	0.84	0.30	0.02
Dominican	1930	1.32	1.33	1.00	0.31	0.02
Dominican	1940	1.49	1.51	1.18	0.31	0.02
Dominican	1950	1.89	1.90	1.54	0.32	0.03
Dominican	1960	2.52	2.50	2.10	0.36	0.05
Dominican	1970	3.54	3.54	2.74	0.73	0.08
Dominican	1980	4.04	4.00	3.06	0.85	0.10
Dominican	1990	4.90	4.91	3.55	1.19	0.17
Dominican	2000	5.88	5.72	3.86	1.46	0.40
Dominican	2010	6.43	6.26	4.05	1.63	0.59
Egypt	1870	0.09	0.09	0.01	0.07	0.00
Egypt	1880	0.12	0.11	0.02	0.10	0.00
Egypt	1890	0.15	0.14	0.02	0.12	0.00
Egypt	1900	0.18	0.17	0.02	0.14	0.00
Egypt	1910	0.21	0.19	0.03	0.17	0.00
Egypt	1920	0.40	0.37	0.15	0.22	0.00
Egypt	1930	0.74	0.69	0.35	0.33	0.01
Egypt	1940	0.80	0.78	0.42	0.34	0.02
Egypt	1950	0.87	0.87	0.48	0.35	0.03
Egypt	1960	1.01	1.05	0.61	0.37	0.06
Egypt	1970	1.64	1.68	0.97	0.62	0.10
Egypt	1980	2.92	2.92	1.69	1.12	0.11
Egypt	1990	4.96	4.95	2.98	1.78	0.19
Egypt	2000	6.76	6.56	3.66	2.61	0.29
Egypt	2010	8.04	7.75	4.25	3.15	0.35
El Salvado	1870	0.78	0.78	0.61	0.15	0.01
El Salvado	1880	0.99	0.97	0.80	0.17	0.01
El Salvado	1890	1.20	1.16	0.98	0.18	0.01
El Salvado	1900	1.38	1.34	1.14	0.18	0.01
El Salvado	1910	1.46	1.44	1.24	0.19	0.01
El Salvado	1920	1.46	1.44	1.23	0.19	0.02
El Salvado	1930	1.55	1.53	1.33	0.19	0.02
El Salvado	1940	1.51	1.51	1.31	0.18	0.02
El Salvado	1950	1.69	1.69	1.50	0.17	0.02
El Salvado	1960	2.01	1.99	1.75	0.21	0.02
El Salvado	1970	2.55	2.51	2.16	0.31	0.04
El Salvado	1980	3.59	3.53	2.91	0.51	0.11
El Salvado	1990	4.54	4.63	3.53	0.87	0.23
El Salvado	2000	5.10	4.98	3.75	0.89	0.33
El Salvado	2010	5.53	5.33	3.97	0.97	0.39
Ethiopia	1870	0.07	0.09	0.07	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	1880	0.08	0.09	0.07	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	1890	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	1900	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	1910	0.09	0.11	0.09	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	1920	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	1930	0.10	0.12	0.10	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	1940	0.11	0.12	0.10	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	1950	0.11	0.13	0.11	0.01	0.01

Ethiopia	1960	0.12	0.13	0.11	0.01	0.01
Ethiopia	1970	0.21	0.23	0.19	0.03	0.01
Ethiopia	1980	0.51	0.51	0.38	0.12	0.01
Ethiopia	1990	1.25	1.21	0.92	0.28	0.01
Ethiopia	2000	1.93	1.84	1.49	0.33	0.01
Ethiopia	2010	2.60	2.48	2.11	0.35	0.01
Finland	1870	0.51	0.50	0.35	0.14	0.01
Finland	1880	0.58	0.56	0.38	0.17	0.01
Finland	1890	0.65	0.63	0.41	0.21	0.01
Finland	1900	0.80	0.77	0.50	0.25	0.03
Finland	1910	1.12	1.07	0.73	0.31	0.03
Finland	1920	1.44	1.36	0.96	0.37	0.03
Finland	1930	1.99	1.87	1.31	0.52	0.04
Finland	1940	3.20	3.12	2.45	0.61	0.07
Finland	1950	4.42	4.37	3.59	0.69	0.09
Finland	1960	6.85	6.88	5.88	0.86	0.14
Finland	1970	7.96	7.87	5.91	1.74	0.22
Finland	1980	9.49	9.11	5.93	2.75	0.43
Finland	1990	10.73	10.20	6.00	3.67	0.53
Finland	2000	11.68	10.95	6.00	4.07	0.88
Finland	2010	12.28	11.50	6.00	4.49	1.01
France	1870	4.04	3.86	2.59	1.26	0.01
France	1880	4.93	4.63	3.10	1.52	0.01
France	1890	5.76	5.43	3.64	1.78	0.01
France	1900	6.63	6.31	4.22	2.07	0.02
France	1910	7.35	6.99	4.67	2.29	0.03
France	1920	7.86	7.54	5.02	2.48	0.03
France	1930	8.01	7.73	5.10	2.57	0.05
France	1940	8.15	8.00	5.21	2.73	0.06
France	1950	8.27	8.22	5.24	2.89	0.09
France	1960	8.61	8.56	5.27	3.15	0.13
France	1970	10.37	9.93	5.91	4.07	0.31
France	1980	11.30	10.69	6.01	4.38	0.43
France	1990	11.61	10.67	5.88	4.35	0.47
France	2000	11.98	11.06	5.83	4.59	0.67
France	2010	12.60	11.68	5.90	4.98	0.83
Germany	1870	5.25	5.07	2.63	2.32	0.12
Germany	1880	5.55	5.35	2.78	2.44	0.13
Germany	1890	5.96	5.74	3.05	2.57	0.12
Germany	1900	6.36	6.11	3.29	2.69	0.14
Germany	1910	6.92	6.62	3.61	2.87	0.15
Germany	1920	7.42	7.09	3.88	3.06	0.16
Germany	1930	7.68	7.38	4.03	3.18	0.17
Germany	1940	8.22	7.90	4.38	3.34	0.18
Germany	1950	8.54	8.17	4.56	3.42	0.19
Germany	1960	8.94	8.63	4.85	3.55	0.22
Germany	1970	11.14	10.23	5.45	4.37	0.41
Germany	1980	12.65	11.31	5.66	5.10	0.54
Germany	1990	13.21	12.25	5.83	5.77	0.65
Germany	2000	12.95	12.53	5.85	5.88	0.80
Germany	2010	12.74	12.68	5.86	5.97	0.85
Ghana	1870	0.78	0.80	0.49	0.31	0.01
Ghana	1880	0.79	0.81	0.50	0.31	0.01
Ghana	1890	0.81	0.83	0.51	0.31	0.01
Ghana	1900	0.81	0.84	0.52	0.31	0.01
Ghana	1910	0.86	0.88	0.56	0.31	0.01
Ghana	1920	0.92	0.94	0.61	0.31	0.01
Ghana	1930	1.04	1.06	0.73	0.32	0.01
Ghana	1940	1.18	1.19	0.86	0.32	0.01

Ghana	1950	1.31	1.31	0.92	0.38	0.01
Ghana	1960	1.89	1.85	1.20	0.64	0.01
Ghana	1970	3.18	3.21	2.04	1.16	0.01
Ghana	1980	4.36	4.12	2.70	1.40	0.02
Ghana	1990	4.82	4.65	3.13	1.49	0.02
Ghana	2000	5.26	5.08	3.52	1.54	0.02
Ghana	2010	5.64	5.49	3.91	1.57	0.02
Greece	1870	1.45	1.40	1.14	0.26	0.01
Greece	1880	1.82	1.75	1.42	0.33	0.01
Greece	1890	2.14	2.07	1.66	0.40	0.01
Greece	1900	2.44	2.37	1.89	0.47	0.01
Greece	1910	2.79	2.70	2.15	0.55	0.01
Greece	1920	3.18	3.06	2.43	0.63	0.01
Greece	1930	4.06	3.89	3.11	0.77	0.02
Greece	1940	4.38	4.25	3.46	0.76	0.03
Greece	1950	4.71	4.60	3.82	0.75	0.03
Greece	1960	5.36	5.32	4.52	0.74	0.05
Greece	1970	6.74	6.40	5.17	1.09	0.14
Greece	1980	7.72	7.31	5.47	1.58	0.25
Greece	1990	8.71	8.27	5.69	2.20	0.39
Greece	2000	9.90	9.18	5.82	2.84	0.52
Greece	2010	10.73	9.84	5.86	3.32	0.66
Guatemala	1870	0.23	0.35	0.22	0.12	0.01
Guatemala	1880	0.40	0.51	0.38	0.12	0.01
Guatemala	1890	0.57	0.67	0.53	0.13	0.01
Guatemala	1900	0.71	0.81	0.66	0.14	0.01
Guatemala	1910	0.82	0.92	0.77	0.14	0.01
Guatemala	1920	0.88	0.97	0.81	0.15	0.01
Guatemala	1930	0.94	1.03	0.87	0.15	0.01
Guatemala	1940	1.15	1.25	1.07	0.16	0.01
Guatemala	1950	1.43	1.52	1.32	0.18	0.01
Guatemala	1960	1.64	1.72	1.47	0.23	0.02
Guatemala	1970	1.92	2.03	1.74	0.26	0.03
Guatemala	1980	2.65	2.73	2.25	0.43	0.05
Guatemala	1990	3.92	3.85	3.09	0.66	0.09
Guatemala	2000	4.84	4.70	3.70	0.87	0.13
Guatemala	2010	5.32	5.15	3.98	1.01	0.16
Guyana	1870	0.51	1.46	1.44	0.01	0.01
Guyana	1880	1.06	1.88	1.85	0.01	0.01
Guyana	1890	1.78	2.43	2.40	0.01	0.01
Guyana	1900	2.22	2.75	2.72	0.01	0.02
Guyana	1910	2.71	3.12	3.09	0.01	0.02
Guyana	1920	3.13	3.43	3.41	0.01	0.02
Guyana	1930	3.43	3.69	3.66	0.01	0.02
Guyana	1940	3.90	4.06	4.04	0.01	0.02
Guyana	1950	4.42	4.44	4.42	0.01	0.02
Guyana	1960	5.10	5.07	4.89	0.16	0.02
Guyana	1970	5.68	5.63	5.21	0.41	0.02
Guyana	1980	6.68	6.58	5.33	1.22	0.03
Guyana	1990	7.54	7.40	5.28	2.07	0.05
Guyana	2000	8.51	8.31	5.52	2.68	0.11
Guyana	2010	9.21	8.94	5.65	3.11	0.18
Honduras	1870	0.88	0.87	0.71	0.15	0.01
Honduras	1880	1.10	1.07	0.91	0.15	0.01
Honduras	1890	1.31	1.27	1.10	0.16	0.01
Honduras	1900	1.52	1.47	1.30	0.16	0.01
Honduras	1910	1.72	1.68	1.51	0.17	0.01
Honduras	1920	1.79	1.73	1.56	0.16	0.01
Honduras	1930	1.85	1.80	1.64	0.15	0.01

Honduras	1940	1.82	1.79	1.63	0.16	0.01
Honduras	1950	1.71	1.70	1.53	0.16	0.01
Honduras	1960	1.90	1.89	1.67	0.20	0.02
Honduras	1970	3.39	3.42	2.75	0.59	0.08
Honduras	1980	4.10	4.10	3.18	0.80	0.12
Honduras	1990	4.64	4.68	3.61	0.91	0.16
Honduras	2000	5.32	5.26	3.94	1.10	0.22
Honduras	2010	5.71	5.65	4.15	1.23	0.27
Hungary	1870	1.86	1.81	1.34	0.47	0.00
Hungary	1880	2.21	2.14	1.58	0.56	0.01
Hungary	1890	2.81	2.70	2.00	0.69	0.00
Hungary	1900	3.44	3.31	2.46	0.84	0.01
Hungary	1910	3.98	3.82	2.84	0.97	0.02
Hungary	1920	4.33	4.18	3.09	1.06	0.03
Hungary	1930	4.19	4.06	2.95	1.07	0.04
Hungary	1940	4.89	4.79	3.41	1.33	0.06
Hungary	1950	5.59	5.52	3.86	1.59	0.07
Hungary	1960	6.99	6.98	4.77	2.10	0.11
Hungary	1970	8.33	8.05	5.36	2.49	0.21
Hungary	1980	9.32	8.83	5.53	3.00	0.30
Hungary	1990	10.10	9.50	5.68	3.46	0.35
Hungary	2000	10.87	10.16	5.79	3.96	0.40
Hungary	2010	11.27	10.63	5.86	4.32	0.45
India	1870	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
India	1880	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
India	1890	0.04	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01
India	1900	0.04	0.17	0.15	0.01	0.01
India	1910	0.04	0.28	0.26	0.01	0.01
India	1920	0.19	0.38	0.36	0.01	0.01
India	1930	0.38	0.53	0.51	0.01	0.01
India	1940	0.62	0.69	0.67	0.01	0.01
India	1950	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.02	0.01
India	1960	1.17	1.17	1.02	0.13	0.02
India	1970	1.95	1.94	1.36	0.50	0.08
India	1980	2.61	2.58	1.70	0.78	0.09
India	1990	3.15	3.23	2.27	0.84	0.11
India	2000	4.34	4.36	3.03	1.15	0.18
India	2010	5.32	5.22	3.58	1.40	0.23
Indonesia	1870	0.58	0.75	0.73	0.01	0.01
Indonesia	1880	0.57	0.74	0.72	0.01	0.01
Indonesia	1890	0.57	0.74	0.72	0.01	0.01
Indonesia	1900	0.58	0.75	0.73	0.01	0.01
Indonesia	1910	0.61	0.77	0.75	0.01	0.01
Indonesia	1920	0.66	0.81	0.79	0.01	0.01
Indonesia	1930	0.78	0.90	0.88	0.01	0.01
Indonesia	1940	1.00	1.05	1.03	0.01	0.01
Indonesia	1950	1.22	1.21	1.19	0.01	0.01
Indonesia	1960	1.60	1.55	1.42	0.13	0.01
Indonesia	1970	2.89	2.88	2.45	0.41	0.02
Indonesia	1980	3.80	3.69	3.10	0.57	0.02
Indonesia	1990	5.98	5.85	4.37	1.38	0.10
Indonesia	2000	7.25	6.98	4.95	1.89	0.14
Indonesia	2010	7.99	7.68	5.25	2.21	0.22
Iran	1870	0.25	0.25	0.16	0.07	0.01
Iran	1880	0.26	0.26	0.16	0.08	0.01
Iran	1890	0.27	0.27	0.17	0.09	0.01
Iran	1900	0.28	0.29	0.17	0.10	0.01
Iran	1910	0.29	0.30	0.17	0.11	0.01
Iran	1920	0.31	0.31	0.17	0.12	0.01

Iran	1930	0.30	0.31	0.17	0.12	0.02
Iran	1940	0.33	0.33	0.21	0.11	0.02
Iran	1950	0.45	0.45	0.32	0.11	0.02
Iran	1960	0.71	0.69	0.50	0.17	0.02
Iran	1970	1.33	1.28	0.91	0.34	0.03
Iran	1980	2.28	2.34	1.66	0.63	0.06
Iran	1990	3.84	3.68	2.59	1.02	0.08
Iran	2000	5.34	5.17	3.48	1.57	0.12
Iran	2010	6.66	6.35	4.11	2.04	0.19
Iraq	1870	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
Iraq	1880	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
Iraq	1890	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
Iraq	1900	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
Iraq	1910	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
Iraq	1920	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
Iraq	1930	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
Iraq	1940	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.01	0.01
Iraq	1950	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.01
Iraq	1960	0.37	0.35	0.21	0.12	0.02
Iraq	1970	1.25	1.28	0.87	0.37	0.04
Iraq	1980	2.66	2.65	1.88	0.65	0.13
Iraq	1990	4.87	4.72	3.15	1.34	0.23
Iraq	2000	6.11	5.87	3.89	1.65	0.33
Iraq	2010	6.60	6.38	4.18	1.78	0.42
Ireland	1870	2.15	2.04	1.49	0.54	0.01
Ireland	1880	2.79	2.62	1.91	0.69	0.02
Ireland	1890	3.55	3.33	2.43	0.88	0.01
Ireland	1900	4.46	4.22	3.08	1.11	0.02
Ireland	1910	5.50	5.07	3.72	1.33	0.03
Ireland	1920	6.35	5.88	4.31	1.54	0.03
Ireland	1930	6.46	6.14	4.70	1.38	0.06
Ireland	1940	6.51	6.27	4.89	1.31	0.08
Ireland	1950	6.56	6.40	5.07	1.23	0.09
Ireland	1960	6.67	6.66	5.47	1.08	0.12
Ireland	1970	8.01	7.75	5.90	1.60	0.25
Ireland	1980	8.94	8.55	5.96	2.22	0.37
Ireland	1990	9.53	9.14	5.99	2.65	0.49
Ireland	2000	10.17	9.71	5.96	3.08	0.68
Ireland	2010	10.59	10.15	5.96	3.37	0.82
Italy	1870	0.88	0.84	0.81	0.02	0.01
Italy	1880	1.40	1.33	1.29	0.03	0.01
Italy	1890	2.00	1.87	1.81	0.04	0.01
Italy	1900	2.58	2.38	2.30	0.06	0.02
Italy	1910	3.06	2.84	2.72	0.09	0.03
Italy	1920	3.57	3.36	3.17	0.16	0.03
Italy	1930	4.13	3.94	3.67	0.23	0.04
Italy	1940	4.40	4.24	3.83	0.37	0.04
Italy	1950	4.68	4.55	4.00	0.51	0.04
Italy	1960	5.24	5.16	4.33	0.79	0.04
Italy	1970	6.78	6.46	4.98	1.37	0.11
Italy	1980	7.96	7.46	5.26	2.05	0.15
Italy	1990	9.10	8.35	5.48	2.70	0.17
Italy	2000	10.33	9.37	5.60	3.44	0.33
Italy	2010	11.02	10.08	5.75	3.95	0.37
Jamaica	1870	0.95	0.92	0.63	0.28	0.01
Jamaica	1880	1.24	1.19	0.89	0.29	0.01
Jamaica	1890	1.97	1.89	1.58	0.30	0.01
Jamaica	1900	2.66	2.55	2.23	0.31	0.01
Jamaica	1910	3.49	3.37	3.05	0.32	0.01

Jamaica	1920	3.94	3.75	3.41	0.33	0.01
Jamaica	1930	4.02	3.82	3.47	0.34	0.01
Jamaica	1940	4.42	4.31	3.95	0.35	0.01
Jamaica	1950	4.71	4.62	4.25	0.37	0.01
Jamaica	1960	4.82	4.77	4.34	0.42	0.01
Jamaica	1970	5.77	5.70	5.01	0.65	0.05
Jamaica	1980	7.24	7.02	5.22	1.73	0.06
Jamaica	1990	8.09	7.83	5.27	2.50	0.06
Jamaica	2000	8.66	8.37	5.37	2.91	0.09
Jamaica	2010	9.05	8.76	5.42	3.22	0.13
Japan	1870	1.67	1.78	0.98	0.78	0.01
Japan	1880	1.86	1.94	1.14	0.79	0.01
Japan	1890	2.30	2.35	1.55	0.80	0.01
Japan	1900	2.98	2.98	2.17	0.80	0.01
Japan	1910	3.72	3.66	2.80	0.85	0.01
Japan	1920	4.77	4.63	3.57	1.06	0.01
Japan	1930	5.90	5.70	4.27	1.41	0.02
Japan	1940	6.79	6.58	4.75	1.80	0.04
Japan	1950	7.72	7.51	5.15	2.28	0.09
Japan	1960	8.90	8.64	5.37	3.13	0.14
Japan	1970	10.37	9.95	5.87	3.79	0.30
Japan	1980	11.20	10.66	5.93	4.24	0.48
Japan	1990	11.93	11.35	5.97	4.70	0.69
Japan	2000	12.61	12.10	5.98	5.07	1.05
Japan	2010	13.11	12.58	6.00	5.36	1.23
Kenya	1870	0.82	0.82	0.52	0.29	0.01
Kenya	1880	0.90	0.90	0.60	0.29	0.01
Kenya	1890	0.98	0.98	0.68	0.29	0.01
Kenya	1900	1.07	1.06	0.76	0.29	0.01
Kenya	1910	1.15	1.14	0.84	0.29	0.01
Kenya	1920	1.23	1.22	0.92	0.29	0.01
Kenya	1930	1.30	1.29	0.99	0.29	0.01
Kenya	1940	1.39	1.38	1.07	0.30	0.01
Kenya	1950	1.52	1.50	1.19	0.30	0.01
Kenya	1960	1.86	1.82	1.50	0.31	0.01
Kenya	1970	2.80	2.70	2.15	0.54	0.01
Kenya	1980	3.99	3.87	3.01	0.84	0.02
Kenya	1990	5.24	4.98	3.94	1.02	0.01
Kenya	2000	6.06	5.86	4.64	1.19	0.03
Kenya	2010	6.52	6.33	5.00	1.28	0.04
Madagascar	1870	0.40	0.46	0.40	0.05	0.01
Madagascar	1880	0.46	0.51	0.45	0.05	0.01
Madagascar	1890	0.51	0.56	0.50	0.05	0.01
Madagascar	1900	0.56	0.61	0.55	0.05	0.01
Madagascar	1910	0.62	0.67	0.60	0.05	0.01
Madagascar	1920	0.68	0.73	0.67	0.06	0.01
Madagascar	1930	0.82	0.87	0.79	0.07	0.01
Madagascar	1940	1.02	1.06	0.96	0.08	0.01
Madagascar	1950	1.24	1.27	1.17	0.09	0.01
Madagascar	1960	1.43	1.44	1.32	0.10	0.01
Madagascar	1970	1.52	1.55	1.41	0.13	0.01
Madagascar	1980	2.06	2.07	1.83	0.22	0.02
Madagascar	1990	2.96	2.94	2.48	0.42	0.04
Madagascar	2000	3.71	3.61	2.99	0.57	0.05
Madagascar	2010	4.07	3.96	3.23	0.68	0.05
Malawi	1870	0.20	0.32	0.02	0.29	0.01
Malawi	1880	0.35	0.40	0.10	0.29	0.01
Malawi	1890	0.50	0.54	0.24	0.29	0.01
Malawi	1900	0.64	0.69	0.39	0.29	0.01

Malawi	1910	0.79	0.83	0.53	0.29	0.01
Malawi	1920	1.10	1.14	0.84	0.29	0.01
Malawi	1930	1.46	1.49	1.19	0.29	0.01
Malawi	1940	1.71	1.74	1.44	0.29	0.01
Malawi	1950	1.91	1.94	1.64	0.29	0.01
Malawi	1960	2.13	2.15	1.85	0.29	0.01
Malawi	1970	2.20	2.22	1.88	0.33	0.01
Malawi	1980	2.32	2.32	1.91	0.40	0.01
Malawi	1990	3.32	3.28	2.65	0.62	0.01
Malawi	2000	4.28	4.24	3.37	0.85	0.01
Malawi	2010	5.31	5.16	4.07	1.08	0.01
Malaysia	1870	0.38	0.78	0.76	0.01	0.01
Malaysia	1880	0.39	0.79	0.77	0.01	0.01
Malaysia	1890	0.41	0.80	0.78	0.01	0.01
Malaysia	1900	0.47	0.85	0.83	0.01	0.01
Malaysia	1910	0.52	0.88	0.86	0.01	0.01
Malaysia	1920	0.65	0.97	0.95	0.01	0.01
Malaysia	1930	0.85	1.10	1.08	0.01	0.01
Malaysia	1940	1.23	1.40	1.33	0.06	0.01
Malaysia	1950	1.86	1.98	1.73	0.25	0.01
Malaysia	1960	2.64	2.70	2.19	0.50	0.01
Malaysia	1970	4.60	4.42	3.29	1.09	0.03
Malaysia	1980	6.22	5.95	4.06	1.84	0.06
Malaysia	1990	7.98	7.65	4.84	2.64	0.17
Malaysia	2000	9.31	9.01	5.27	3.42	0.32
Malaysia	2010	10.22	9.86	5.54	3.95	0.38
Mali	1870	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.02	0.01
Mali	1880	0.10	0.12	0.08	0.02	0.01
Mali	1890	0.12	0.13	0.10	0.02	0.01
Mali	1900	0.13	0.14	0.11	0.02	0.01
Mali	1910	0.14	0.16	0.12	0.02	0.01
Mali	1920	0.16	0.17	0.13	0.02	0.01
Mali	1930	0.17	0.18	0.15	0.03	0.01
Mali	1940	0.18	0.19	0.16	0.03	0.01
Mali	1950	0.19	0.20	0.17	0.03	0.01
Mali	1960	0.21	0.22	0.19	0.03	0.01
Mali	1970	0.30	0.32	0.24	0.07	0.01
Mali	1980	0.69	0.69	0.49	0.19	0.01
Mali	1990	0.95	0.91	0.65	0.25	0.01
Mali	2000	1.14	1.12	0.80	0.31	0.01
Mali	2010	1.60	1.54	1.16	0.37	0.02
Mexico	1870	0.83	1.17	1.15	0.01	0.01
Mexico	1880	1.02	1.32	1.30	0.01	0.01
Mexico	1890	1.21	1.47	1.45	0.01	0.01
Mexico	1900	1.39	1.62	1.60	0.01	0.01
Mexico	1910	1.54	1.76	1.74	0.01	0.01
Mexico	1920	1.66	1.85	1.82	0.01	0.01
Mexico	1930	1.83	1.99	1.96	0.01	0.01
Mexico	1940	2.22	2.33	2.29	0.03	0.02
Mexico	1950	2.87	2.95	2.80	0.13	0.02
Mexico	1960	3.40	3.46	3.17	0.27	0.02
Mexico	1970	4.90	4.79	4.09	0.60	0.11
Mexico	1980	5.90	5.83	4.64	1.00	0.19
Mexico	1990	7.06	6.96	5.11	1.53	0.31
Mexico	2000	7.95	7.76	5.38	1.91	0.47
Mexico	2010	8.43	8.21	5.55	2.13	0.52
Morocco	1870	0.20	0.25	0.23	0.01	0.01
Morocco	1880	0.21	0.26	0.23	0.01	0.01
Morocco	1890	0.21	0.26	0.23	0.01	0.01

Morocco	1900	0.21	0.26	0.24	0.02	0.01
Morocco	1910	0.22	0.27	0.24	0.02	0.01
Morocco	1920	0.22	0.27	0.24	0.02	0.01
Morocco	1930	0.25	0.30	0.26	0.02	0.01
Morocco	1940	0.32	0.36	0.31	0.04	0.01
Morocco	1950	0.44	0.47	0.40	0.05	0.01
Morocco	1960	0.61	0.62	0.54	0.08	0.01
Morocco	1970	0.95	0.99	0.77	0.20	0.02
Morocco	1980	1.51	1.51	1.19	0.29	0.03
Morocco	1990	2.41	2.42	1.77	0.57	0.07
Morocco	2000	3.58	3.48	2.44	0.88	0.16
Morocco	2010	4.50	4.28	2.98	1.08	0.22
Mozambique	1870	0.08	0.10	0.03	0.05	0.01
Mozambique	1880	0.10	0.12	0.05	0.05	0.01
Mozambique	1890	0.12	0.14	0.07	0.05	0.01
Mozambique	1900	0.14	0.15	0.09	0.05	0.01
Mozambique	1910	0.16	0.17	0.11	0.05	0.01
Mozambique	1920	0.17	0.19	0.13	0.05	0.01
Mozambique	1930	0.19	0.21	0.14	0.05	0.01
Mozambique	1940	0.21	0.23	0.16	0.05	0.01
Mozambique	1950	0.27	0.28	0.21	0.05	0.01
Mozambique	1960	0.45	0.46	0.39	0.06	0.01
Mozambique	1970	0.78	0.79	0.70	0.07	0.01
Mozambique	1980	1.05	1.02	0.92	0.09	0.01
Mozambique	1990	2.02	1.95	1.76	0.18	0.01
Mozambique	2000	2.39	2.30	2.09	0.19	0.01
Mozambique	2010	2.45	2.35	2.15	0.20	0.01
Myanmar	1870	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.03	0.01
Myanmar	1880	0.04	0.09	0.05	0.03	0.01
Myanmar	1890	0.07	0.22	0.17	0.03	0.01
Myanmar	1900	0.27	0.40	0.36	0.04	0.01
Myanmar	1910	0.46	0.59	0.54	0.04	0.01
Myanmar	1920	0.63	0.75	0.69	0.06	0.01
Myanmar	1930	0.80	0.91	0.82	0.08	0.01
Myanmar	1940	0.94	1.07	0.94	0.12	0.01
Myanmar	1950	1.05	1.17	1.04	0.12	0.01
Myanmar	1960	1.03	1.17	0.98	0.18	0.01
Myanmar	1970	1.64	1.74	1.41	0.32	0.01
Myanmar	1980	2.79	2.75	2.22	0.51	0.03
Myanmar	1990	3.62	3.58	2.84	0.66	0.07
Myanmar	2000	4.42	4.32	3.38	0.83	0.11
Myanmar	2010	5.01	4.78	3.69	0.95	0.14
Netherland	1870	5.33	5.29	4.35	0.85	0.09
Netherland	1880	5.50	5.45	4.48	0.88	0.09
Netherland	1890	5.69	5.62	4.61	0.92	0.09
Netherland	1900	5.88	5.81	4.75	0.96	0.09
Netherland	1910	6.07	6.01	4.91	1.01	0.10
Netherland	1920	6.38	6.29	5.13	1.07	0.10
Netherland	1930	6.68	6.58	5.32	1.14	0.11
Netherland	1940	7.09	6.97	5.50	1.34	0.12
Netherland	1950	7.45	7.30	5.61	1.55	0.14
Netherland	1960	7.76	7.66	5.64	1.85	0.17
Netherland	1970	9.35	8.91	6.00	2.57	0.33
Netherland	1980	10.28	9.67	6.00	3.19	0.48
Netherland	1990	10.72	10.22	6.00	3.64	0.58
Netherland	2000	11.34	10.90	6.00	4.12	0.78
Netherland	2010	11.50	11.17	6.00	4.31	0.86
New Zeala	1870	2.95	2.91	1.97	0.92	0.02
New Zeala	1880	3.96	3.86	2.62	1.22	0.02

New Zeala	1890	5.42	5.23	3.55	1.66	0.02
New Zeala	1900	6.54	6.26	4.24	1.98	0.03
New Zeala	1910	7.49	7.17	4.84	2.29	0.05
New Zeala	1920	8.16	7.86	5.23	2.56	0.06
New Zeala	1930	8.24	7.99	5.37	2.47	0.15
New Zeala	1940	8.28	8.05	5.44	2.43	0.19
New Zeala	1950	8.32	8.11	5.50	2.39	0.23
New Zeala	1960	8.40	8.25	5.64	2.30	0.31
New Zeala	1970	9.87	9.53	6.00	3.07	0.46
New Zeala	1980	10.72	10.27	6.00	3.66	0.60
New Zeala	1990	11.02	10.70	6.00	3.99	0.71
New Zeala	2000	12.09	11.68	6.00	4.71	0.97
New Zeala	2010	12.48	12.17	6.00	4.91	1.26
Nicaragua	1870	0.58	0.61	0.42	0.17	0.02
Nicaragua	1880	0.77	0.78	0.59	0.17	0.02
Nicaragua	1890	0.95	0.95	0.77	0.17	0.02
Nicaragua	1900	1.04	1.04	0.85	0.18	0.02
Nicaragua	1910	1.12	1.13	0.93	0.18	0.02
Nicaragua	1920	1.17	1.17	0.97	0.18	0.03
Nicaragua	1930	1.37	1.37	1.16	0.18	0.03
Nicaragua	1940	1.51	1.52	1.30	0.19	0.03
Nicaragua	1950	1.87	1.86	1.62	0.21	0.03
Nicaragua	1960	2.30	2.27	2.00	0.24	0.03
Nicaragua	1970	2.61	2.56	2.24	0.28	0.04
Nicaragua	1980	3.85	3.90	3.06	0.72	0.12
Nicaragua	1990	5.31	5.21	3.75	1.23	0.23
Nicaragua	2000	6.31	6.25	4.29	1.66	0.30
Nicaragua	2010	7.08	6.92	4.58	1.97	0.37
Niger	1870	0.05	0.06	0.04	0.01	0.01
Niger	1880	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01
Niger	1890	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01
Niger	1900	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01
Niger	1910	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01
Niger	1920	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01
Niger	1930	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.01	0.01
Niger	1940	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.01
Niger	1950	0.06	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.01
Niger	1960	0.07	0.08	0.06	0.01	0.01
Niger	1970	0.13	0.15	0.10	0.03	0.01
Niger	1980	0.37	0.39	0.26	0.12	0.01
Niger	1990	0.76	0.73	0.50	0.23	0.01
Niger	2000	1.02	0.98	0.66	0.31	0.01
Niger	2010	1.25	1.20	0.83	0.36	0.01
Nigeria	1870	0.68	0.70	0.67	0.02	0.01
Nigeria	1880	0.68	0.70	0.67	0.02	0.01
Nigeria	1890	0.68	0.70	0.67	0.02	0.01
Nigeria	1900	0.68	0.70	0.67	0.02	0.01
Nigeria	1910	0.68	0.70	0.67	0.02	0.01
Nigeria	1920	0.69	0.71	0.68	0.02	0.01
Nigeria	1930	0.72	0.74	0.71	0.02	0.01
Nigeria	1940	0.79	0.81	0.78	0.03	0.01
Nigeria	1950	0.87	0.89	0.85	0.03	0.01
Nigeria	1960	1.05	1.06	1.01	0.04	0.01
Nigeria	1970	1.28	1.29	1.20	0.08	0.01
Nigeria	1980	1.41	1.44	1.28	0.15	0.01
Nigeria	1990	2.61	2.63	2.07	0.52	0.03
Nigeria	2000	3.89	3.84	3.09	0.69	0.07
Nigeria	2010	4.37	4.25	3.33	0.83	0.09
Norway	1870	5.67	5.68	4.28	1.38	0.02

Norway	1880	5.73	5.66	4.25	1.39	0.02
Norway	1890	5.78	5.71	4.27	1.42	0.02
Norway	1900	5.86	5.77	4.28	1.46	0.03
Norway	1910	6.06	5.98	4.42	1.53	0.03
Norway	1920	6.35	6.26	4.58	1.65	0.03
Norway	1930	6.58	6.47	4.70	1.74	0.04
Norway	1940	7.22	7.06	5.01	1.97	0.08
Norway	1950	7.52	7.34	5.16	2.08	0.10
Norway	1960	8.47	8.22	5.63	2.42	0.16
Norway	1970	10.30	9.60	6.00	3.26	0.35
Norway	1980	11.56	10.52	6.00	3.98	0.54
Norway	1990	12.32	11.34	6.00	4.63	0.71
Norway	2000	12.48	11.91	6.00	5.09	0.82
Norway	2010	12.71	12.37	6.00	5.44	0.93
Panama	1870	1.16	1.29	1.18	0.02	0.09
Panama	1880	1.42	1.54	1.36	0.09	0.09
Panama	1890	1.68	1.78	1.54	0.16	0.09
Panama	1900	1.93	2.03	1.71	0.22	0.09
Panama	1910	2.18	2.29	1.89	0.30	0.10
Panama	1920	2.47	2.55	2.07	0.37	0.10
Panama	1930	2.81	2.87	2.33	0.44	0.10
Panama	1940	3.33	3.41	2.75	0.55	0.11
Panama	1950	3.87	3.92	3.15	0.66	0.11
Panama	1960	4.60	4.65	3.57	0.94	0.14
Panama	1970	5.22	5.26	3.89	1.17	0.19
Panama	1980	6.86	6.80	4.55	1.94	0.31
Panama	1990	7.87	7.71	4.95	2.32	0.44
Panama	2000	8.56	8.32	5.17	2.55	0.60
Panama	2010	9.12	8.83	5.31	2.75	0.77
Paraguay	1870	0.63	0.62	0.48	0.14	0.01
Paraguay	1880	0.80	0.78	0.59	0.18	0.01
Paraguay	1890	0.95	0.93	0.71	0.21	0.01
Paraguay	1900	1.13	1.10	0.84	0.25	0.01
Paraguay	1910	1.40	1.37	1.05	0.31	0.01
Paraguay	1920	1.86	1.81	1.40	0.40	0.01
Paraguay	1930	2.64	2.56	1.98	0.56	0.01
Paraguay	1940	3.26	3.15	2.44	0.69	0.02
Paraguay	1950	3.52	3.45	2.74	0.68	0.03
Paraguay	1960	4.03	4.04	3.33	0.65	0.05
Paraguay	1970	4.55	4.53	3.62	0.84	0.07
Paraguay	1980	5.21	5.16	3.95	1.09	0.12
Paraguay	1990	5.96	5.92	4.48	1.24	0.20
Paraguay	2000	6.59	6.46	4.73	1.46	0.27
Paraguay	2010	7.03	6.88	4.97	1.62	0.30
Peru	1870	0.84	1.08	1.00	0.07	0.01
Peru	1880	0.91	1.15	1.05	0.09	0.01
Peru	1890	0.98	1.21	1.10	0.10	0.01
Peru	1900	1.06	1.29	1.15	0.12	0.01
Peru	1910	1.21	1.43	1.26	0.16	0.01
Peru	1920	1.47	1.67	1.44	0.22	0.01
Peru	1930	1.69	1.87	1.59	0.28	0.01
Peru	1940	2.05	2.21	1.83	0.37	0.01
Peru	1950	2.67	2.78	2.22	0.54	0.02
Peru	1960	3.69	3.75	2.85	0.85	0.05
Peru	1970	5.23	5.16	3.77	1.21	0.18
Peru	1980	6.39	6.30	4.35	1.65	0.30
Peru	1990	7.47	7.31	4.80	2.10	0.40
Peru	2000	8.32	8.04	5.13	2.45	0.46
Peru	2010	9.01	8.69	5.37	2.68	0.63

Philippines	1870	0.14	0.14	0.12	0.02	0.00
Philippines	1880	0.17	0.17	0.15	0.02	0.00
Philippines	1890	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.02	0.00
Philippines	1900	0.23	0.23	0.20	0.03	0.00
Philippines	1910	0.29	0.29	0.25	0.04	0.00
Philippines	1920	0.90	0.85	0.74	0.11	0.00
Philippines	1930	1.43	1.36	1.13	0.22	0.01
Philippines	1940	2.14	2.02	1.63	0.36	0.03
Philippines	1950	2.73	2.72	2.19	0.46	0.07
Philippines	1960	3.87	4.07	3.27	0.65	0.15
Philippines	1970	5.28	5.30	4.10	0.98	0.22
Philippines	1980	6.26	6.21	4.59	1.35	0.27
Philippines	1990	7.17	7.04	4.97	1.74	0.33
Philippines	2000	7.94	7.73	5.26	2.10	0.37
Philippines	2010	8.62	8.40	5.42	2.36	0.62
Portugal	1870	0.79	0.75	0.67	0.07	0.01
Portugal	1880	1.07	1.01	0.93	0.07	0.01
Portugal	1890	1.41	1.31	1.23	0.07	0.01
Portugal	1900	1.79	1.67	1.58	0.08	0.01
Portugal	1910	2.03	1.88	1.79	0.09	0.01
Portugal	1920	2.21	2.08	1.97	0.10	0.01
Portugal	1930	2.33	2.22	2.10	0.12	0.01
Portugal	1940	2.49	2.40	2.25	0.14	0.01
Portugal	1950	2.76	2.66	2.47	0.19	0.01
Portugal	1960	3.15	3.03	2.73	0.26	0.04
Portugal	1970	4.11	3.86	3.31	0.50	0.06
Portugal	1980	5.57	5.19	4.16	0.88	0.14
Portugal	1990	5.91	5.51	4.52	0.83	0.16
Portugal	2000	7.28	6.69	4.94	1.49	0.27
Portugal	2010	7.89	7.33	5.19	1.81	0.33
Senegal	1870	0.14	0.17	0.11	0.05	0.01
Senegal	1880	0.17	0.19	0.13	0.05	0.01
Senegal	1890	0.19	0.21	0.15	0.05	0.01
Senegal	1900	0.21	0.23	0.17	0.05	0.01
Senegal	1910	0.23	0.25	0.19	0.05	0.01
Senegal	1920	0.25	0.27	0.21	0.05	0.01
Senegal	1930	0.27	0.29	0.23	0.05	0.01
Senegal	1940	0.29	0.31	0.25	0.05	0.01
Senegal	1950	0.31	0.33	0.28	0.05	0.01
Senegal	1960	0.39	0.40	0.33	0.06	0.01
Senegal	1970	0.56	0.61	0.44	0.16	0.01
Senegal	1980	1.25	1.20	0.87	0.31	0.02
Senegal	1990	1.90	1.84	1.33	0.48	0.03
Senegal	2000	2.56	2.45	1.77	0.64	0.04
Senegal	2010	2.96	2.85	2.10	0.71	0.05
Sierra Leor	1870	0.07	0.27	0.07	0.18	0.01
Sierra Leor	1880	0.10	0.30	0.10	0.18	0.01
Sierra Leor	1890	0.11	0.30	0.11	0.18	0.01
Sierra Leor	1900	0.14	0.33	0.13	0.19	0.01
Sierra Leor	1910	0.14	0.33	0.14	0.19	0.01
Sierra Leor	1920	0.13	0.32	0.13	0.19	0.01
Sierra Leor	1930	0.12	0.32	0.11	0.19	0.01
Sierra Leor	1940	0.12	0.32	0.11	0.20	0.01
Sierra Leor	1950	0.14	0.34	0.12	0.20	0.01
Sierra Leor	1960	0.18	0.37	0.15	0.21	0.01
Sierra Leor	1970	1.05	1.11	0.66	0.44	0.02
Sierra Leor	1980	1.95	1.89	1.11	0.76	0.02
Sierra Leor	1990	2.83	2.76	1.57	1.17	0.02
Sierra Leor	2000	3.61	3.47	2.11	1.33	0.03

Sierra Leor	2010	4.00	3.83	2.38	1.42	0.03
South Afric	1870	0.98	1.17	0.02	1.09	0.06
South Afric	1880	1.12	1.31	0.16	1.09	0.06
South Afric	1890	1.30	1.48	0.32	1.10	0.06
South Afric	1900	1.52	1.69	0.52	1.10	0.06
South Afric	1910	1.75	1.92	0.75	1.10	0.06
South Afric	1920	2.11	2.25	1.06	1.12	0.07
South Afric	1930	2.61	2.73	1.48	1.17	0.08
South Afric	1940	3.13	3.22	1.90	1.23	0.09
South Afric	1950	3.64	3.71	2.32	1.29	0.10
South Afric	1960	4.32	4.36	2.89	1.36	0.12
South Afric	1970	4.80	4.76	3.22	1.43	0.12
South Afric	1980	5.13	5.13	3.56	1.46	0.11
South Afric	1990	5.66	5.68	4.04	1.55	0.09
South Afric	2000	7.35	7.22	4.70	2.33	0.19
South Afric	2010	8.83	8.52	5.16	2.99	0.38
Spain	1870	2.43	2.52	2.50	0.01	0.01
Spain	1880	3.11	3.05	3.03	0.01	0.01
Spain	1890	3.90	3.68	3.66	0.01	0.01
Spain	1900	4.51	4.21	4.13	0.05	0.02
Spain	1910	4.93	4.63	4.49	0.11	0.03
Spain	1920	5.14	4.88	4.70	0.15	0.03
Spain	1930	5.17	4.99	4.78	0.17	0.04
Spain	1940	5.14	5.03	4.79	0.20	0.04
Spain	1950	5.16	5.08	4.78	0.25	0.05
Spain	1960	5.21	5.16	4.73	0.36	0.06
Spain	1970	6.52	6.21	5.38	0.69	0.14
Spain	1980	7.45	7.05	5.63	1.21	0.21
Spain	1990	8.44	7.94	5.82	1.80	0.32
Spain	2000	9.50	8.77	5.78	2.35	0.64
Spain	2010	10.27	9.44	5.86	2.76	0.82
Sudan	1870	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.01	0.00
Sudan	1880	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.01	0.00
Sudan	1890	0.10	0.10	0.09	0.01	0.00
Sudan	1900	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.01	0.00
Sudan	1910	0.14	0.14	0.12	0.01	0.00
Sudan	1920	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.02	0.00
Sudan	1930	0.18	0.18	0.16	0.02	0.00
Sudan	1940	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.02	0.00
Sudan	1950	0.49	0.49	0.44	0.04	0.00
Sudan	1960	1.06	1.06	0.96	0.09	0.01
Sudan	1970	1.38	1.39	1.20	0.18	0.02
Sudan	1980	2.10	2.03	1.70	0.31	0.02
Sudan	1990	2.39	2.42	1.93	0.46	0.04
Sudan	2000	2.87	2.80	2.16	0.59	0.05
Sudan	2010	3.02	3.00	2.36	0.58	0.06
Sweden	1870	4.86	4.67	3.70	0.87	0.10
Sweden	1880	5.28	5.05	3.97	0.97	0.10
Sweden	1890	5.75	5.46	4.28	1.09	0.10
Sweden	1900	6.26	5.92	4.60	1.21	0.11
Sweden	1910	6.70	6.33	4.89	1.32	0.12
Sweden	1920	7.06	6.68	5.13	1.42	0.12
Sweden	1930	7.32	6.98	5.33	1.52	0.13
Sweden	1940	7.55	7.28	5.50	1.64	0.14
Sweden	1950	7.79	7.53	5.60	1.77	0.15
Sweden	1960	8.10	7.90	5.63	2.07	0.20
Sweden	1970	9.97	9.30	6.00	2.91	0.40
Sweden	1980	11.26	10.15	6.00	3.58	0.57
Sweden	1990	12.04	10.98	6.00	4.26	0.72

Sweden	2000	11.72	11.12	6.00	4.49	0.63
Sweden	2010	12.11	11.49	6.00	4.80	0.69
Switzerland	1870	6.17	6.07	5.07	0.98	0.02
Switzerland	1880	6.73	6.59	5.46	1.11	0.02
Switzerland	1890	7.04	6.91	5.67	1.22	0.02
Switzerland	1900	7.41	7.30	5.90	1.36	0.03
Switzerland	1910	7.65	7.54	5.99	1.51	0.05
Switzerland	1920	7.79	7.71	6.01	1.64	0.06
Switzerland	1930	7.88	7.84	6.02	1.75	0.07
Switzerland	1940	8.73	8.60	5.89	2.59	0.12
Switzerland	1950	9.13	8.96	5.83	2.99	0.14
Switzerland	1960	10.38	10.08	5.64	4.23	0.22
Switzerland	1970	11.81	11.27	6.00	4.87	0.40
Switzerland	1980	12.48	11.79	6.00	5.29	0.49
Switzerland	1990	12.96	12.32	6.00	5.72	0.61
Switzerland	2000	12.73	12.33	6.00	5.62	0.71
Switzerland	2010	12.57	12.41	6.00	5.66	0.75
Syria	1870	0.75	0.94	0.92	0.01	0.01
Syria	1880	0.83	1.00	0.98	0.01	0.01
Syria	1890	0.92	1.05	1.03	0.01	0.01
Syria	1900	1.00	1.11	1.09	0.01	0.01
Syria	1910	1.08	1.16	1.14	0.01	0.01
Syria	1920	1.16	1.22	1.20	0.01	0.01
Syria	1930	1.24	1.27	1.25	0.01	0.01
Syria	1940	1.35	1.35	1.33	0.01	0.01
Syria	1950	1.60	1.55	1.47	0.07	0.01
Syria	1960	2.09	2.00	1.68	0.29	0.03
Syria	1970	2.99	2.80	2.24	0.52	0.04
Syria	1980	4.17	4.12	2.97	1.01	0.13
Syria	1990	5.67	5.51	3.73	1.54	0.25
Syria	2000	7.09	6.90	4.61	1.90	0.38
Syria	2010	7.59	7.41	4.96	1.99	0.45
Thailand	1870	0.04	0.06	0.02	0.03	0.01
Thailand	1880	0.04	0.10	0.05	0.03	0.01
Thailand	1890	0.04	0.14	0.10	0.04	0.01
Thailand	1900	0.05	0.19	0.14	0.04	0.01
Thailand	1910	0.10	0.23	0.18	0.04	0.01
Thailand	1920	0.15	0.28	0.23	0.05	0.01
Thailand	1930	0.23	0.36	0.30	0.06	0.01
Thailand	1940	0.76	0.87	0.78	0.08	0.01
Thailand	1950	1.62	1.69	1.51	0.16	0.02
Thailand	1960	2.60	2.62	2.32	0.27	0.04
Thailand	1970	3.15	3.17	2.71	0.41	0.06
Thailand	1980	3.87	3.95	3.15	0.68	0.12
Thailand	1990	6.50	6.30	5.07	1.01	0.22
Thailand	2000	7.51	7.16	5.39	1.45	0.31
Thailand	2010	8.50	8.09	5.60	1.85	0.63
Tunisia	1870	0.04	0.13	0.02	0.10	0.01
Tunisia	1880	0.04	0.13	0.02	0.10	0.01
Tunisia	1890	0.04	0.13	0.02	0.10	0.01
Tunisia	1900	0.04	0.16	0.05	0.10	0.01
Tunisia	1910	0.04	0.20	0.09	0.10	0.01
Tunisia	1920	0.12	0.28	0.17	0.11	0.01
Tunisia	1930	0.25	0.41	0.28	0.11	0.01
Tunisia	1940	0.44	0.59	0.44	0.13	0.01
Tunisia	1950	0.63	0.76	0.59	0.15	0.01
Tunisia	1960	0.83	0.94	0.71	0.22	0.02
Tunisia	1970	1.58	1.72	1.26	0.43	0.04
Tunisia	1980	2.73	2.66	1.93	0.66	0.07

Tunisia	1990	3.32	3.25	2.38	0.77	0.10
Tunisia	2000	4.44	4.14	2.99	1.00	0.15
Tunisia	2010	5.20	4.83	3.40	1.19	0.24
Turkey	1870	0.04	0.34	0.32	0.01	0.01
Turkey	1880	0.06	0.39	0.37	0.01	0.01
Turkey	1890	0.12	0.44	0.42	0.01	0.01
Turkey	1900	0.20	0.49	0.47	0.01	0.01
Turkey	1910	0.26	0.54	0.52	0.01	0.01
Turkey	1920	0.32	0.58	0.56	0.01	0.01
Turkey	1930	0.39	0.62	0.60	0.01	0.01
Turkey	1940	0.56	0.71	0.69	0.02	0.01
Turkey	1950	0.96	1.09	0.92	0.15	0.02
Turkey	1960	1.56	1.65	1.30	0.32	0.03
Turkey	1970	3.07	2.98	2.32	0.57	0.09
Turkey	1980	4.16	3.97	3.03	0.82	0.12
Turkey	1990	5.22	5.04	3.77	1.11	0.16
Turkey	2000	6.25	5.96	4.26	1.50	0.19
Turkey	2010	6.89	6.55	4.57	1.75	0.22
Uganda	1870	0.76	0.75	0.67	0.07	0.01
Uganda	1880	0.78	0.76	0.68	0.07	0.01
Uganda	1890	0.79	0.78	0.70	0.07	0.01
Uganda	1900	0.80	0.79	0.71	0.07	0.01
Uganda	1910	0.81	0.80	0.72	0.07	0.01
Uganda	1920	0.83	0.82	0.73	0.07	0.01
Uganda	1930	0.84	0.83	0.75	0.07	0.01
Uganda	1940	0.85	0.84	0.76	0.07	0.01
Uganda	1950	0.92	0.91	0.82	0.08	0.01
Uganda	1960	1.20	1.18	1.07	0.10	0.01
Uganda	1970	1.80	1.71	1.50	0.20	0.01
Uganda	1980	2.16	2.10	1.87	0.23	0.01
Uganda	1990	2.54	2.52	2.20	0.30	0.01
Uganda	2000	3.31	3.22	2.77	0.43	0.02
Uganda	2010	4.71	4.61	3.74	0.84	0.02
United King	1870	4.13	3.76	2.97	0.73	0.06
United King	1880	4.97	4.55	3.64	0.84	0.07
United King	1890	5.40	5.01	4.04	0.91	0.06
United King	1900	5.84	5.50	4.44	0.98	0.08
United King	1910	6.35	6.04	4.88	1.07	0.09
United King	1920	6.76	6.49	5.21	1.18	0.10
United King	1930	7.15	6.87	5.44	1.33	0.10
United King	1940	7.56	7.19	5.62	1.46	0.11
United King	1950	8.05	7.62	5.74	1.76	0.12
United King	1960	8.53	8.25	5.64	2.46	0.15
United King	1970	10.32	9.64	6.00	3.36	0.27
United King	1980	11.57	10.61	6.00	4.23	0.38
United King	1990	12.28	11.46	6.00	4.98	0.48
United King	2000	13.12	12.66	6.00	5.90	0.76
United King	2010	13.34	13.11	6.00	6.26	0.85
United Stat	1870	5.57	5.42	4.05	1.36	0.02
United Stat	1880	6.02	5.92	4.32	1.54	0.06
United Stat	1890	6.60	6.51	4.69	1.76	0.07
United Stat	1900	7.09	7.00	4.93	1.97	0.11
United Stat	1910	7.45	7.32	4.95	2.21	0.16
United Stat	1920	7.84	7.69	5.05	2.45	0.19
United Stat	1930	8.46	8.31	5.31	2.77	0.24
United Stat	1940	8.85	8.69	5.52	2.90	0.27
United Stat	1950	9.61	9.35	5.61	3.37	0.37
United Stat	1960	10.29	9.93	5.70	3.76	0.47
United Stat	1970	11.11	10.76	5.81	4.32	0.63

United Stat	1980	11.97	11.64	5.88	4.80	0.96
United Stat	1990	12.76	12.49	5.90	5.25	1.34
United Stat	2000	13.01	12.81	5.90	5.38	1.53
United Stat	2010	13.62	13.37	5.90	5.50	1.97
Uruguay	1870	1.51	2.02	1.99	0.01	0.02
Uruguay	1880	1.67	2.14	2.11	0.01	0.02
Uruguay	1890	1.88	2.29	2.26	0.01	0.02
Uruguay	1900	2.09	2.44	2.41	0.01	0.02
Uruguay	1910	2.30	2.59	2.55	0.01	0.03
Uruguay	1920	2.64	2.82	2.77	0.01	0.04
Uruguay	1930	3.26	3.27	3.17	0.05	0.05
Uruguay	1940	3.86	3.83	3.54	0.23	0.06
Uruguay	1950	4.52	4.42	3.87	0.44	0.11
Uruguay	1960	5.32	5.13	4.22	0.74	0.16
Uruguay	1970	6.04	5.81	4.57	1.03	0.20
Uruguay	1980	6.85	6.53	4.92	1.38	0.24
Uruguay	1990	7.67	7.27	5.22	1.77	0.28
Uruguay	2000	8.36	7.85	5.47	2.10	0.28
Uruguay	2010	8.98	8.52	5.64	2.40	0.47
Venezuela	1870	0.93	1.18	1.16	0.01	0.01
Venezuela	1880	1.03	1.25	1.23	0.01	0.01
Venezuela	1890	1.15	1.33	1.31	0.01	0.01
Venezuela	1900	1.27	1.42	1.39	0.01	0.02
Venezuela	1910	1.39	1.51	1.48	0.01	0.02
Venezuela	1920	1.52	1.59	1.57	0.01	0.02
Venezuela	1930	1.62	1.68	1.66	0.01	0.02
Venezuela	1940	1.79	1.82	1.79	0.01	0.02
Venezuela	1950	2.25	2.24	2.10	0.11	0.03
Venezuela	1960	2.93	2.89	2.52	0.32	0.05
Venezuela	1970	5.28	5.19	3.89	1.15	0.15
Venezuela	1980	6.28	6.17	4.38	1.54	0.26
Venezuela	1990	5.35	5.29	3.89	0.98	0.42
Venezuela	2000	6.26	6.20	4.30	1.32	0.58
Venezuela	2010	7.25	7.08	4.59	1.68	0.80
Zimbabwe	1870	0.04	0.62	0.02	0.52	0.08
Zimbabwe	1880	0.04	0.62	0.02	0.52	0.08
Zimbabwe	1890	0.04	0.62	0.02	0.52	0.08
Zimbabwe	1900	0.04	0.62	0.02	0.52	0.08
Zimbabwe	1910	0.04	0.62	0.02	0.52	0.08
Zimbabwe	1920	0.04	0.63	0.02	0.53	0.08
Zimbabwe	1930	0.41	0.67	0.05	0.54	0.08
Zimbabwe	1940	1.46	1.66	1.02	0.56	0.08
Zimbabwe	1950	2.21	2.36	1.71	0.57	0.08
Zimbabwe	1960	2.98	3.06	2.37	0.61	0.08
Zimbabwe	1970	4.28	4.24	3.20	0.90	0.14
Zimbabwe	1980	5.27	5.18	3.69	1.31	0.18
Zimbabwe	1990	7.09	6.97	4.35	2.39	0.23
Zimbabwe	2000	8.29	8.04	4.85	2.90	0.30
Zimbabwe	2010	8.82	8.52	5.14	3.15	0.22

Please refer to Christian Morrisson and Fabrice Murtin, 2009, "The Century of Education", forthcoming Journal of Human Capital.

s15_64: average years of schooling among the population aged between 15 and 64 years

s15_plus: average years of schooling among the population older than 15

s15_plus_p: average years of primary schooling among the population older than 15
(maximum is 6 years)

s15_plus_s: average years of secondary schooling among the population older than 15
(maximum is 6 years)

s15_plus_h: average years of higher education among the population older than 15
(maximum is 4 years)