EDUCATION STIMULUS WATCH

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

SPECIAL REPORT 4

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Secretary of Education Arne Duncan

Briefing to education associations at the Department of Education, April 3, 2009

Politics and the Scoring of Race to the Top Applications

By Daniel H. Bowen | September 2010

This is the fourth in a series of special reports on the K–12 education implications of the federal government's economic stimulus package, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

The Obama administration's education legacy could hinge on the success of the Race to the Top (RTT) program. Now more than ever, with the Department of Education's recent announcement of the round-two winners, RTT has received its share of praise and criticism. The praise stems from RTT's success in fostering policy discussions about the education-reform environment—like the legislative battles on charter schools in New York[1] and Alabama[2]—that can lead to low-cost reforms.[3] Critics have attacked the application process for its subjective criteria and anonymous scoring and have questioned its ability to yield meaningful outcomes.[4] RTT presents something of a Catch-22, as the application guidelines stipulate that state proposals ought to include the support of the same teachers unions that are deeply concerned about many of the required changes.[5] However, while the impact of these efforts on student outcomes will remain unmeasureable for some time, the application and grant-making process is now ripe for scrutiny.

While conditional federal aid is nothing new in K–12 education, RTT is unusual in that it incorporates rigorous competition into the application process with a substantial amount of money at stake. This competition can prove beneficial in two ways. First, it discourages the "compliance" mindset, in which grantees do the bare minimum necessary to seek funds.[6] Second, it may propel states into an irrational escalation of commitment,[7] creating a greater cost-benefit ratio than a traditional grant program.[8]

Research by William Peterson and Richard Rothstein of the Economic Policy Institute has raised questions about whether RTT possesses the objectivity required of an impartial evaluation process.[9] While this research has dissected the shortcomings of the RTT application process, the *extent* of RTT's subjectivity remains unaddressed.[10] This *Education Stimulus Watch* report uses independent studies of states' education-reform track records on certain RTT criteria to examine disparities between projected and actual scores for the first round of RTT. I find a disparity between these scores that raises red flags about the objectivity of the process.

Of particular concern, given how much the impact of RTT relies on the assumption of a level playing field,

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are suspicions that scoring may have been driven by political influences. To explore such concerns, I employed regression analysis to examine the first-round scores of the forty-one states that applied. The regression model incorporates a state's political circumstances (that is, the contentiousness of its upcoming elections) and an education-reform index that reflects a state's demonstrated reform efforts, making it possible to identify the degree to which political considerations appeared to influence a state's first-round score. The hypothesis guiding this analysis is that states of greater interest to the White House received preferential grades on their RTT applications. Through regression analysis, it is possible to measure such a preference by inserting political factors (for example, whether a state has a heated gubernatorial or Senate race) into the equation.

A state with a seat that the **Democrats could lose or take** away from the Republicans **scored up to seventy-seven extra points** on its first-round application.

This model suggests that political forces influenced how states fared in the first round. Having a track record of education reform also mattered, but, even after controlling for such considerations, the status of a state's Senate and gubernatorial races for the 2010 election explained up to a seventy-seven-point increase (out of five hundred) on its final score. In other words, a state with a seat that the Democrats could lose or take away from the Republicans, based on the CQ Politics handicapping of election races, scored up to seventy-seven extra points on its first-round application. This would have been enough to vault Washington, D.C., from last place among the round-one finalists to first place, given the right political context—allowing it to pocket a cool couple hundred million courtesy of the secretary of education.

These political influences are mainly possible because of RTT's ambiguous rubric. Effective rubrics explicitly state the criteria of the evaluation, specify the weights given to them, and establish methods for measuring the extent to which they are met. For the most part, the RTT rubric fails to provide objective methods for measuring the extent to which states meet criteria, leaving significant discretion in the evaluation.

Unquestionably, some RTT criteria require qualitative grading; however, such subjectivity does not have the precision required for a fair evaluation. Some of the rubric's components depend solely on a state's promises rather than data.[11] Even a well-designed rubric would fail to evaluate precisely how well a state "set[s] forth a comprehensive and coherent reform agenda" or "build[s] strong statewide capacity to implement, scale up, and sustain proposed plans."[13]

In some cases, the RTT rubric provides specific instructions for determining a state's exact point total.[14] More often than not, however, reviewers only receive instructions for determining whether a state receives "high," "medium," or "low" points, giving them wide discretion.[15] For example, a criterion with a maximum point value of twenty-eight provides the reviewer with a minimum of seven discretionary points;[16] a state may qualify for a "high" point value, but the reviewer decides whether "high" means twenty-one or twenty-eight points.

Assessing States on RTT's Objective Criteria

For this study, a criterion's objectivity depends on whether it is quantifiable and whether an independent source has provided a means for quantitatively assessing it. Seven of the thirty criteria fail to meet such a standard: articulating a comprehensive, coherent reform agenda (A)(1)(i); translating Local Education Agency participation into statewide impact (A)(1)(iii); building strong statewide capacity to implement, scale up, and sustain proposed plans: ensuring the capacity to implement (A)(2)(i) and using broad stakeholder support (A)(2)(ii); providing effective support to teachers and principals (D)(5); demonstrating other significant reform conditions (F)(3); and emphasis on science, technology, engineering, and math (Competitive Preference Priority). These criteria account for 18 percent of the available points under the RTT rubric. While 18 percent may seem small, keep in mind that it translates into ninety points, the difference between finishing in first Delaware) or twenty-second (Hawaii, not even a finalist for round

one). Also, keep in mind that Georgia (third place) finished only 6.4 points outside of qualifying for grant money.

The remaining 82 percent of the rubric more objectively measures a state's education-reform track record under the RTT criteria. Using independent evaluations of states' education policies such as *Leaders and Laggards*, Quality Counts, and the Data Quality Campaign,[17] an objective-based score prediction can be generated for these remaining criteria. Because these evaluations are independent, their assessments provide greater dependability. Presumably, a state would score higher than other states on these evaluations only due to stronger performance on the given criterion. For example, the Data Quality Campaign has no ulterior motive for giving Louisiana high marks for its education data systems other than the fact that it wants "to encourage and support state policymakers to improve the availability and use of high-quality education data to improve student achievement."[18] These independent evaluations are more likely to reflect states' progress on RTT criteria.

Based on the data from these independent evaluations and the RTT weights, South Carolina and Florida actually finish first and second, respectively, while round-one winners Delaware and Tennessee finish eighth and fourth, respectively (for the results of the sixteen round-one finalists, see the table). Projected scores also dictate that Illinois, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Washington, D.C., have no business being first-round finalists (that is, the top sixteen).

In the aggregate, the actual scores are significantly higher than the projected scores, but, more important, they have only a modest correlation (0.53) with projected numbers. The ranking disparities show the impact of applying a different technique to the RTT evaluation and call into question whether the subjective elements influence the grading process. Therefore, it becomes imperative to determine what other factors may better explain a state's first-round score.

Actual versus Projected RTT Round-One Scores for Finalists

State (Listed by Actual Round-One Rank)	RTT Round-One Score	RTT Projected Score*	Rank Based on Projected Score
1. Delaware	454.6	341.3	8
2. Tennessee	444.2	359.4	4
3. Georgia	433.6	352.4	7
4. Florida	431.4	372.9	2
5. Illinois	423.8	239.7	29
6. South Carolina	423.2	380.6	1
7. Pennsylvania	420.0	304.1	17
8. Rhode Island	419.0	199.6	34
9. Kentucky	418.8	324.7	10
10. Ohio	418.6	317.1	12
11. Louisiana	418.2	335.0	9
12. North Carolina	414.0	357.1	5
13. Massachusetts	411.4	292.6	18
14. Colorado	409.6	272.6	24
15. New York	408.6	356.8	6
16. D.C.	402.4	196.8	35

SOURCE: Author's calculations. See appendix 1.
*Projections, on average, were approximately 83 points lower than actual scores (even after adjusting projections to a point scale of 500, rather than 410).

Testing the Influence of a State's Political Climate

With midterm elections on the horizon, the Obama administration has serious concerns about whether the Democratic Party will hold on to political power.[19] Even though the president has two years before reelection, the results of the midterm elections could set his agenda back substantially during those two years. Therefore, a state's political climate could plausibly induce favoritism, especially in some of the more subjective aspects of the grading process.

A state with a tightly contested Senate race, governor's race, or 2008 presidential race (bellwethers) could be a candidate for preferential grading—similar to the way politicians seek federal grants (earmarks) for constituents when facing a difficult election.[20] The acquisition of pork tends to increase in the presence of electoral vulnerability, especially when the election is of great concern to the majority.[21] Although states acquire RTT funds via a federal grant competition rather than a

standard legislative earmark, the same principle could affect the distribution of funds.

The inclusion of **a state's political circumstances**, along with its **education-reform record**, improves the model's capacity to **explain and predict round-one RTT scores**.

Through regression analysis, it is possible to determine the extent to which a state's political climate relates to its actual first-round RTT score. This study employs four different explanatory variables to help predict states' scores. Formulaically, the model looks like this:

$$RTT_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PROJRTT_i + \beta_2 PRES_i + \beta_3 SEN_i + \beta_4 GOV_i + \varepsilon_i$$

RTT_i is a state's actual first-round final score.[22] $PROJRTT_i$ is a state's projected first-round score (that is, previously demonstrated reform record based on the independent evaluations described above). $PRES_i$ is a measure of the state's competitiveness in the 2008 presidential election.[23] SEN_i is whether a state has a Senate seat in play for the 2010 election.[24] GOV_i is whether a state has a governor seat in play for the 2010 election.[25] (ε_i is the error term.) This study is based on the state of the elections just prior to the announcement of first-round RTT winners in March 2010.

The regression shows that three of the four components were statistically significant in explaining a state's first-round score: projected score based on education-reform track record (p-value of 0.00)[26]; having a Senate seat in play (p-value of 0.08); and having a state governor seat in play (p-value of 0.02). The contentiousness of the 2008 presidential election did not produce statistically significant results (p-value of 0.54). The coefficients of each component show that each point a state acquired on its projected first-round score ($PROJRTT_i$) added 0.62 points to its actual first-round score (that is, scoring one hundred points on the projected score adds sixty-two points to a state's actual score). A state having a close senatorial race added thirty-five points, and a close gubernatorial race added forty-two points.

Discussion of Results

The regression analysis produces two central findings. First, having a contested seat for the 2010 election increases round-one RTT scores by at least thirty-five points, and up to seventy-seven points (15 percent of the total available points) if a state has contested races for both governor and Senate. Second, the inclusion of a state's political circumstances, along with its education-reform record, improves the model's capacity to explain and predict round-one RTT scores.[27] The lack of statistically significant effects from states' contentiousness in the 2008 presidential election could be explained by the 2012 presidential election being relatively far away.

These findings help explain the higher-than-projected final rankings for states such as Delaware, Tennessee, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Colorado, where tightly contested elections were on the horizon. It also helps explain the disappointing final scores for states that had high projected scores but lacked contested political races, such as Louisiana, North Carolina, Arizona, and South Carolina.

Florida poses a bit of an anomaly. Despite its strong track record of reform and its hotly contested governor's race, Florida still failed to win RTT funds in the first round—perhaps because the state has had heated conflicts with unions over its application. While lack of union support is included in the measurement of a state's projected first-round score, critics have voiced concerns that union support is actually a necessary condition for winning RTT funds.[28]

Despite the correlation between first-round scores and states' political circumstances, determining causation remains problematic. Do states with contested 2010 elections receive preferential treatment, or are politicians in politically contentious states working harder to secure grant money (and possibly gaining the approval of constituents)? Regardless of causation, these findings could prove that the RTT competitive grant process is subject to influences beyond states' education-reform records.

Recommendations

The great weakness of RTT as a competitive grant program is its ambiguous rubric. If the federal government wishes to create a successful grant competition, it needs to formulate a more systematic, objective, and transparent approach to the award process. While subjective criteria account for at least 18 percent of the RTT application assessment, many criteria in the remaining 82 percent lack firm guidelines for evaluation. To provide greater transparency and consistency, the Department of Education, at a minimum, needs to develop a stricter methodology for evaluating RTT criteria. A more systematic evaluation process would eliminate outside influences that could compromise the competition's neutrality.

Weighting more of the grading on outside, independent data—rather than the statements made in an application—is another essential change. States with stronger histories of education reform should earn points, giving states incentives to actually implement reforms rather than simply make promises. This way, states that have found new and innovative methods to improve their education systems could use grant money to explore other groundbreaking approaches. In addition, the evaluation process would not be compromised by fictitious claims, which have already unraveled in the first round of applications.[29]

Despite its shortcomings, RTT still has positive elements. First, RTT continues to facilitate the discussion of education reform at the state and local levels, among policymakers, educators, and interest groups. Second, RTT stimulates meaningful reforms at the state level at relatively low costs to taxpayers. Tennessee, for example, received the biggest prize from round one in the amount of $500 million, which is a relatively minute amount of federal spending. In fact, the $4.35 billion dedicated to RTT accounts for only 9.3 percent of the Department of Education's 2010 discretionary appropriations.[30]

Finally, RTT may have an advantage over President George W. Bush's No Child Left Behind Act in that it allows greater flexibility for ad hoc adjustments. Since RTT has not been a major financial investment, fine-tuning and reevaluation remain viable options. Public criticism and the call for objectivity may ultimately facilitate more effective and meaningful reforms for states' education systems. The mistakes of the first round of RTT are forgivable if they lead to the necessary changes either in future iterations of Race to the Top or in other forthcoming competitive grant programs. Otherwise, RTT will remain a program of questionable integrity with little hope of spurring meaningful change.

Notes

1. Sam Dillon, "New York Is Among Finalists for U.S. School Grants," *New York Times*, March 4, 2010.
2. Jim Cook, "Gov. Bob Riley Seeks to Legalize Charter Schools," *Dothan Eagle*, January 11, 2010.
3. David Brooks, "The Quiet Revolution," *New York Times*, October 22, 2009.
4. "Race to the Middle?" *Wall Street Journal*, January 21, 2010.
5. "Unions v. Race to the Top," *Wall Street Journal*, January 7, 2010.
6. Frederick M. Hess, "Stroll to the Top," *National Review* 62, no. 8 (May 2010): 26–28, available at www.aei.org/article/101943.
7. With RTT, the Department of Education plays the role of the auctioneer offering a dollar to the highest "bidder." The states adopt or promise to adopt reforms as a means of outbidding competitors. The "auction" becomes problematic from a state's perspective (but beneficial from a reform advocate's view) when it recognizes that it has to keep increasing investments in reforms to receive the reward and not incur a financial loss that results from a mediocre bid without a real chance of winning. However, this requires competitors to view the assessment as one that maintains fairness and integrity. Without a fair and transparent evaluation, states will lack the incentives to "up their bids."
8. Martin Shubik, "The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15, no. 1 (1971): 109–111.
9. William Peterson and Richard Rothstein, *Let's Do the Numbers: Department of Education's 'Race to the Top' Program Offers Only a Muddled Path to the Finish Line* (Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, April 20, 2010), available at http://epi.3cdn.net/4835aafd6e80385004_5nm6bn6id.pdf (accessed September 3, 2010).
10. Andy Smarick, "The Full Story on Race to the Top," AEI *Education Stimulus Watch*, Special Report 3 (March 2010), available at www.aei.org/paper/100095.
11. Bruce S. Cooper and Anne Gargan, "Rubrics in Education: Old Terms, New Meanings," *Phi Delta Kappan* 91, no. 1 (September 2009): 54–55.
12. Center for Education Reform, *Race to the Top: Reality Check* (Washington, DC, 2010), available at http://edreform.com/_upload/CER_R2TT_RealityCheck.pdf (accessed September 3, 2010).
13. U.S. Department of Education, *Race to the Top Program Executive Summary* (Washington, DC, November 2009), 6, available at www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf (accessed September 1, 2010).
14. See, for example, (C)(1), under Data Systems to Support Instruction, which stipulates that reviewers must give two points for every element the state has out of twelve.
15. William Peterson and Richard Rothstein, *Let's Do the Numbers: Department of Education's 'Race to the Top' Program Offers Only a Muddled Path to the Finish Line.*
16. U.S. Department of Education, *Race to the Top—Scoring Rubric* (*Appendix B*) (Washington, DC, January 2010), available at www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/scoringrubric.pdf (accessed September 3, 2010).
17. See, for example, Frederick M. Hess, *Leaders and Laggards* (Washington, DC: Center for American Progress and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 2009), available at www.aei.org/paper/100062; Amy M. Towers, "State of the States: Holding All States to High Standards," *Education Week*, January 14, 2010, available at www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/01/14/17stateofstates.h29.html (accessed September 3, 2010); and Data Quality Campaign, "10 Essential Elements of a State Longitudinal Data System," available at www.dataquality campaign.org/survey/elements (accessed September 3, 2010).
18. Data Quality Campaign, "About DQC," available at www.dataquality campaign.org/about (accessed September 3, 2010).
19. Mark Preston, "Obama Says Now Is Time for Dems to Get Focused Midterms," CNN.com, April 26, 2010, available at http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2010/04/26/in-new-video-obama-calls-on-democrats-to-focus-on-midterm-elections/?fbid=-nPgULuNYKX (accessed September 3, 2010).
20. Patrick J. Sellers, "Fiscal Consistency and Federal District Spending in Congressional Elections," *American Journal of Political Science* 41, no. 3 (1997): 1024–41.
21. Jeffrey Lazarus, "Party, Electoral Vulnerability, and Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives," *Journal of Politics* 71, no. 3 (July 2009): 1050–61.
22. Because Washington, D.C., could have neither a senatorial nor a gubernatorial race, it was excluded from the analysis. It is not an accurate representation to treat D.C. as a state that lacks a contentious governor and Senate race (that is, inserting a

"0" for both dummy variables). However, even when treating D.C. as a state without a contentious governor or Senate race, the Senate and governor race variables still maintain their levels of statistical significance. The only real difference is that the combination of these variables would now combine for seventy-four (14.8 percent), as opposed to seventy-seven (15.4 percent), points.

23. Calculated by taking the absolute value of the percentage-point difference between Obama and McCain in the 2008 election (for example, for Florida, this number is 1 - [0.51 - 0.48] = 0.97).

24. Dummy variable on whether CQ Politics deemed the seat a "potential gain" (for either party) or "tossup" for the 2010 election. Note that state status is based on status at the beginning of March, the time just prior to and during the announcement of round-one winners. The statuses of these races may have changed since this time. See "Senate Races in 2010," CQ Politics, available at http://innovation.cq.com/senate2010_map (accessed September 3, 2010).

25. Ibid.

26. P-values indicate the likelihood that effects are merely due to chance. The Senate seat 0.08 p-value means that there is only an 8 percent likelihood that the influence of a Senate seat on an RTT score is simply due to chance.

27. I ran a regression without the political components ($RTT_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PROJRTT_i + \varepsilon_i$) to determine how well they help explain a state's RTT score. The model with political components proved to have greater explanatory power than the model without them. The inclusion of political factors improves the model from having an adjusted-R2 of 0.26 to 0.41.

28. Neil King Jr., "Only Two States Win Race to Top," *Wall Street Journal*, March 29, 2010.

29. Center for Education Reform, "Race to the Top: Reality Check."

30. U.S. Department of Education, "Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Summary—May 7, 2009," available at www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget10/summary/edlite-section1.html (accessed September 3, 2010).

Appendix 1

Methods for Calculating a State's Projected RTT Score

Variable	Resource	Calculation Procedure
Securing Local Education Agency (LEA) commitment	Data reported on state's RTT application	Calculated by multiplying percentage of support by the percentage of union support (for example, Alabama had a 0.85 LEA support and a 0.95 union support, so its measure is 0.8075).[1] This number was then multiplied by 45 points.
Demonstrating progress in raising achievement	National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) value-added scores, 2003–2009	Summed the state's overall NAEP net score gains from 2003 to 2009 in fourth- and eighth-grade reading, curved the scores 7.56 points to make all scores positive (West Virginia had a net loss of 7.56 points), and then indexed each state on a scale of 0 to 1 in relation to D.C.'s gains over this period. This number and the number for "demonstrating progress in closing achievement gaps" were averaged, scaled according to the highest overall scorer (Florida), and then multiplied by 30 points.
Demonstrating progress in closing achievement gaps	NAEP changes in gap between white and black student scores, 2003–2009[2]	Measured the pre-2003 score gaps for fourth- and eighth-grade math and reading and calculated the growth or reduction of the gap from 2003 to 2009, then summed these numbers and multiplied by –1 (in order to make closing the gap a positive indicator), curved the scores 11.48 points to make all scores positive (Oregon had its net achievement gap increase by 11.48), and indexed each state on a scale of 0 to 1 in relation to Florida's gains over this period. This number and the number for "demonstrating progress in raising achievement" were averaged, scaled to the highest overall scorer (Florida), and then multiplied by 30 points.[3]

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Variable	Resource	Calculation Procedure
Developing and adopting common standards	*Leaders and Laggards* (2009)	If *Leaders and Laggards* indicated that the state supports the adoption of common standards, then the state received 40 points.
Developing and implementing common, high-quality assessments	*Leaders and Laggards* (2009)	If *Leaders and Laggards* indicated that the state has high school exams that gauge college and career readiness, then the state received 10 points.
Supporting the transition to enhanced standards and high-quality assessments	*Leaders and Laggards* (2009)	If *Leaders and Laggards* indicated that the state requires a college- and career-ready diploma for high school graduation, then the state received 20 points.
Data systems to support transition	Data Quality Campaign (2010)	Data Quality Campaign has identified ten essential elements for effective data systems. For each component a state had, it received 4.7 points since there are 47 total points available for the data-system portion of the rubric.[4]
Providing high-quality pathways for aspiring teachers and principals	*Leaders and Laggards* (2009)	*Leaders and Laggards* gave grades for each state's alternative certification programs. The highest grade for the states that applied was a B (three out of four), so I took each state's grade, divided it by three, and then multiplied by 21 points.
Improving teacher and principal effectiveness based on performance: measuring student growth	*Education Week*'s Quality Counts (2010)	If Quality Counts indicated that teacher evaluations included student achievement, then the state received five points.
Improving teacher and principal effectiveness based on performance: developing evaluation systems	*Leaders and Laggards* (2009)	*Leaders and Laggards* gave grades for the strength of each state's teacher-evaluation system. The grades A–F were translated to a 4–0 scale. Then the state's score was divided by four and multiplied by 15 points.
Improving teacher and principal effectiveness based on performance: conducting annual evaluations	*Education Week*'s Quality Counts (2010)	If Quality Counts indicated that a state has evaluations conducted on an annual basis, then the state received 10 points.
Improving teacher and principal effectiveness based on performance: using evaluations to inform key decisions	*Leaders and Laggards* (2009) and *Education Week*'s Quality Counts (2010)	*Leaders and Laggards* graded each state on its ability to remove ineffective teachers. The grades A–F were translated to a 4–0 scale. Then each state's score was divided by four. This number was then increased by one if Quality Counts indicated that a state has a pay-for-performance program. This new number was divided by two and multiplied by 28 points. The highest any applicant scored was a 24.5, so all states' scores were divided by 24.5 and then multiplied by 28 to properly adjust scores.

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(appendix 1 continued)

Variable	Resource	Calculation Procedure
Ensuring equitable distribution of effective teachers and principals: ensuring equitable distribution in high-poverty or high-minority schools	*Education Week*'s Quality Counts (2010)	If Quality Counts indicated that the state provides incentives for national-board-certified teachers to work in targeted schools, then the state received 7.5 points. If Quality Counts indicated that states provide incentives for principals to work in targeted schools, then the state received 7.5 points.
Ensuring equitable distribution of effective teachers and principals: ensuring equitable distribution in hard-to-staff subjects and specialty areas	*Education Week*'s Quality Counts (2010)	If Quality Counts indicated that the state provides incentives for teachers who work in hard-to-staff teaching assignments, then the state received 10 points.
Improving the effectiveness of teacher and principal preparation programs	*Education Week*'s Quality Counts (2010)	If Quality Counts indicated that teacher education programs are accountable for graduates' performance in the classroom setting, then the state received 14 points.
Turning around the lowest-achieving schools: intervening in the lowest-achieving schools and LEAs	*Leaders and Laggards* (2009)	If *Leaders and Laggards* indicated that a state sanctions and intervenes in its low-performing schools, then the state received 10 points.
Turning around the lowest-achieving schools: identifying the persistently lowest-achieving schools	*Education Week*'s Quality Counts (2010)	If Quality Counts indicated that the state assigns ratings to all of its schools, then the state received 5 points.
Turning around the lowest-achieving schools: turning around the persistently lowest-achieving schools	*Education Week*'s Quality Counts (2010)	If Quality Counts indicated that the state provides assistance to its low-performing schools, then the state received 35 points.
Making education funding a priority	*Education Week*'s Quality Counts (2010)	Measured by taking the state's percentage of total taxable resources spent on education. New Jersey at 5 percent was the highest, so all states were graded based on this (for example, Arizona spends 3.5 percent of its total taxable resources on education, so it received a score of 0.70). I took each state's number and multiplied it by 10 points.
Ensuring successful conditions for high-performing charter schools and other innovative schools	*Leaders and Laggards* (2009)	*Leaders and Laggards* graded each state on the strength of its charter-school laws. The grades A–F were translated to a 4–0 score. Then each state's score was divided by four and multiplied by 40 points.

NOTES:

1. I chose to multiply these numbers to serve as an interaction to more accurately reflect the percentage of districts that have both LEA and union support.
2. Even though there could be an argument for examining different minority groups for different states, I decided to remain consistent for all states and use this relationship as a proxy for each state's achievement gap.
3. Some of the more racially homogenous states do not have substantial data on students broken down by race (Idaho, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming). For these four states, only their indexed score for raising overall state scores was multiplied by 30 points.
4. These core components are whether a state has a statewide student identifier, student-level enrollment data, student-level test data, information on untested students, a statewide teacher identifier with a teacher-student match, student-level course completion (transcript) data, student-level SAT, ACT, and AP exam data, student-level graduation and dropout data, ability to match student-level P–12 and higher-education data, and a state data audit system. I chose simply to count the number of components and treat this portion of the rubric in aggregate since so many of these components overlap with the criteria on the RTT rubric.

Appendix 2

Political Factors

State	CNN 2008 Election Center: 2008 State Contention, Presidential Election (100 Percent Difference between Obama and McCain)	CQ Politics 2010 Senate Seat: Potential Gain/Tossup	CQ Politics 2010 Governor Seat: Potential Gain/Tossup
Alabama	78	0	0
Arizona	91	0	0
Arkansas	80	1	0
California	76	0	1
Colorado	91	1	1
Connecticut	77	0	1
D.C.	14	N/A	N/A
Delaware	75	1	0
Florida	97	0	1
Georgia	95	0	0
Hawaii	55	0	1
Idaho	75	0	0
Illinois	75	1	1
Indiana	99	1	0
Iowa	91	0	1
Kansas	85	0	1
Kentucky	83	1	0
Louisiana	81	0	0
Massachusetts	74	0	1
Michigan	84	0	1
Minnesota	90	0	1
Missouri	99	1	0
Nebraska	85	0	0
New Hampshire	91	1	0
New Jersey	85	0	0
New Mexico	85	0	0
New York	73	0	0
North Carolina	99	0	0
Ohio	95	1	1
Oklahoma	68	0	1
Oregon	84	0	0
Pennsylvania	89	1	1
Rhode Island	72	0	1
South Carolina	91	0	0
South Dakota	92	0	0
Tennessee	85	0	1
Utah	71	0	0
Virginia	94	0	0
West Virginia	87	0	0
Wisconsin	87	0	1
Wyoming	68	0	1

Appendix 3

RTT Data

State	% LEA Support	% Local Teachers Union Leader Support of Participating LEAs	A1ii: Securing LEA Commitment	Overall NAEP Score Gains, Fourth-Grade Math, 2003–2009	Overall NAEP Score Gains, Fourth-Grade Reading, 2003–2009	Overall NAEP Score Gains, Eighth-Grade Math, 2003–2009	Overall NAEP Score Gains, Eighth-Grade Reading, 2003–2009
Alabama	0.85	0.95	36.34	4.62	9.19	6.59	1.72
Arizona	0.59	0.13	3.45	1.08	1.12	6.15	2.28
Arkansas	0.96	0.61	26.35	8.53	2.54	10.23	0.05
California	0.47	0.26	5.50	4.22	4.13	3.40	1.62
Colorado	0.74	0.41	13.65	7.94	2.04	3.97	-2.08
Connecticut	0.62	0.55	15.35	4.10	0.63	4.88	4.59
D.C.	0.5	0	0.00	14.34	13.61	10.54	3.79
Delaware	1	1	45.00	3.63	1.58	6.67	0.47
Florida	0.89	0.08	3.20	8.22	7.66	7.96	7.06
Georgia	0.13	N/A	5.85	5.77	4.25	7.88	2.53
Hawaii	1	1	45.00	8.85	2.36	8.03	3.45
Idaho	0.56	1	25.20	6.10	2.76	7.37	0.40
Illinois	0.38	0.32	5.47	5.43	2.86	5.27	-1.89
Indiana	0.92	0.62	25.67	4.65	2.25	5.59	0.86
Iowa	0.61	0.79	21.69	4.12	-1.85	0.22	-2.62
Kansas	0.91	0.94	38.49	3.56	3.78	4.41	0.79
Kentucky	1	1	45.00	10.11	6.56	5.01	0.66
Louisiana	0.67	0.78	23.52	3.18	2.76	6.05	-0.12
Massachusetts	0.65	1	29.25	10.59	6.15	12.33	0.68
Michigan	0.89	0.08	3.20	0.59	-0.55	1.83	-2.48
Minnesota	0.8	0.12	4.32	7.54	0.73	3.76	2.03
Missouri	0.91	1	40.95	5.85	1.58	7.04	-0.49
Nebraska	0.86	0.64	24.77	2.49	1.91	2.07	0.75
New Hampshire	0.21	0.49	4.63	7.96	1.36	6.12	0.01
New Jersey	0.59	0.06	1.59	7.75	4.32	11.25	5.02
New Mexico	0.68	0.32	9.79	7.51	4.46	6.43	2.53
New York	0.73	0.58	19.05	4.71	2.18	2.83	-1.04
North Carolina	1	0.99	44.55	1.74	-1.92	3.09	-2.18
Ohio	0.65	1	29.25	5.91	2.67	3.98	2.11
Oklahoma	0.61	0.2	5.49	7.68	3.61	3.81	-2.22
Oregon	0.47	0.39	8.25	1.73	0.53	4.14	1.06
Pennsylvania	0.28	1	12.60	7.64	4.98	9.77	6.43
Rhode Island	0.92	0.05	2.07	8.47	6.21	5.93	-0.99
South Carolina	0.95	N/A	42.75	-0.12	1.13	3.08	-0.81
South Dakota	0.09	0.14	0.57	4.83	-0.11	5.74	0.09
Tennessee	1	0.93	41.85	4.07	4.79	6.59	2.84
Utah	0.95	0.88	37.62	5.54	-0.07	3.42	1.29
Virginia	0.89	N/A	40.05	3.87	3.19	4.39	-2.36
West Virginia	1	N/A	45.00	2.22	-4.66	-0.35	-4.76
Wisconsin	0.98	0.12	5.29	6.83	-0.70	4.22	-0.66
Wyoming	1	1	45.00	0.92	0.58	2.60	1.16
Maximum Possible	1	1	45.00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Notes: LEA = Local Education Agency. NAEP = National Assessment of Educational Progress.

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(appendix 3 continued)

State	Change in White-Black NAEP Score Differences, Fourth-Grade Average of Math, 2003–2009	Change in White-Black NAEP Score Differences, Fourth-Grade Average of Reading, 2003–2009	Change in White-Black NAEP Score Differences, Eighth-Grade Average of Math, 2003–2009	Change in White-Black NAEP Score Differences, Eighth-Grade Average of Math, 2003–2009	Net Gains for Overall Scores	"Gain" Index*	Net Closure of Achievement Gap	"Closure" Index**	"Gain" and "Closure" Index Average***
Alabama	1.65	-6.30	-1.83	1.11	22.12	0.60	5.38	0.36	0.479
Arizona	-4.43	-8.09	-4.69	-2.71	10.63	0.36	19.92	0.68	0.520
Arkansas	-2.91	-7.59	-2.14	-0.79	21.35	0.58	13.43	0.54	0.558
California	-0.25	-3.76	1.83	0.74	13.37	0.42	1.44	0.28	0.349
Colorado	0.77	0.14	-1.21	-2.26	11.87	0.39	2.57	0.30	0.346
Connecticut	-1.43	-8.18	-1.75	3.54	14.20	0.44	7.82	0.42	0.426
D.C.	-2.64	-9.65	N/A	N/A	42.28	1.00	12.29	0.51	0.756
Delaware	1.13	-0.67	0.49	-4.90	12.35	0.40	3.95	0.33	0.366
Florida	-6.01	-9.20	-11.77	-8.05	30.90	0.77	35.03	1.00	0.886
Georgia	1.35	-2.30	-6.73	-5.34	20.44	0.56	13.03	0.53	0.544
Hawaii	-1.68	12.20	N/A	N/A	22.69	0.61	-10.52	0.02	0.314
Idaho	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	16.63	0.49	N/A	N/A	0.485
Illinois	-1.28	-0.56	-0.71	1.68	11.67	0.39	0.86	0.27	0.326
Indiana	-2.35	-6.32	-10.16	-4.80	13.35	0.42	23.63	0.75	0.587
Iowa	-6.76	-9.18	-2.32	2.33	-0.13	0.15	15.93	0.59	0.369
Kansas	-2.32	-8.95	-8.45	-3.36	12.54	0.40	23.09	0.74	0.573
Kentucky	5.03	4.83	-2.50	-4.51	22.34	0.60	-2.84	0.19	0.393
Louisiana	-5.73	-12.12	-4.69	-6.35	11.87	0.39	28.89	0.87	0.629
Massachusetts	-4.16	-2.25	0.37	0.96	29.75	0.75	5.08	0.36	0.552
Michigan	-3.01	-9.02	-0.89	-1.08	-0.61	0.14	14.00	0.55	0.344
Minnesota	0.47	0.55	-7.38	1.26	14.06	0.43	5.09	0.36	0.395
Missouri	0.00	0.48	-3.65	-3.76	13.98	0.43	6.93	0.40	0.414
Nebraska	1.53	3.87	-2.11	-1.36	7.23	0.30	-1.94	0.21	0.251
New Hampshire	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	15.45	0.46	0.00	0.25	0.354
New Jersey	-3.36	-10.93	-4.29	2.19	28.34	0.72	16.38	0.60	0.660
New Mexico	-0.13	-1.01	0.91	3.96	20.93	0.57	-3.73	0.17	0.369
New York	-4.01	-9.03	-5.18	-2.93	8.68	0.33	21.15	0.70	0.514
North Carolina	1.24	-2.59	0.62	3.29	0.72	0.17	-2.57	0.19	0.179
Ohio	0.74	2.90	1.64	4.29	14.66	0.45	-9.57	0.04	0.243
Oklahoma	-4.45	1.09	-7.73	-9.18	12.88	0.41	20.27	0.68	0.546
Oregon	2.75	2.31	6.42	N/A	7.46	0.30	-11.48	0.00	0.151
Pennsylvania	-4.61	-6.13	-3.95	0.99	28.82	0.73	13.70	0.54	0.636
Rhode Island	-2.62	-4.34	-6.15	2.53	19.61	0.55	10.58	0.47	0.510
South Carolina	1.76	-0.68	-3.61	-1.58	3.28	0.22	4.10	0.34	0.276
South Dakota	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	10.55	0.36	N/A	N/A	0.363
Tennessee	-1.50	-4.64	-6.94	-1.47	18.29	0.52	14.56	0.56	0.539
Utah	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	10.18	0.36	N/A	N/A	0.356
Virginia	2.72	-1.27	-2.56	-1.73	9.09	0.33	2.84	0.31	0.321
West Virginia	-1.51	-5.20	-10.94	-6.79	-7.56	0.00	24.44	0.77	0.386
Wisconsin	-1.52	9.99	-7.89	-4.39	9.70	0.35	3.81	0.33	0.338
Wyoming	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	5.26	0.26	N/A	N/A	0.257
Maximum Possible	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	1.00	N/A	1.00	1.00

Notes: NAEP = National Assessment of Educational Progress.

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*. 7.56 added to each state's number to make all numbers positive. See WV's Net Gains for Overall Score.
**. 11.48 added to each state's number to make all numbers positive. See OR's Net Closure of Achievement Gap.
***. For states that do not have a "closure" index due to lack of diversity, just use "gain" index.

(appendix 3 continued)

State	A3: Demonstrating Significant Progress in Raising Achievement and Closing Gaps	State Supports Common Standards (LL)	HS Exams Gauging College and Career Readiness (LL)	State Requires College- and Career-Ready Diploma (LL)	B: Standards and Assessments	Data Quality Campaign, Number of Criteria Met
Alabama	16.22	40	0	20	60	10
Arizona	17.61	40	0	20	60	7
Arkansas	18.89	40	0	20	60	10
California	11.81	40	10	0	50	8
Colorado	11.71	40	10	0	50	7
Connecticut	14.42	40	0	0	40	7
D.C.	25.58	40	0	20	60	4
Delaware	12.38	40	0	20	60	10
Florida	30.00	40	0	0	40	10
Georgia	18.43	40	10	20	70	10
Hawaii	10.62	40	0	0	40	8
Idaho	16.43	40	0	0	40	3
Illinois	11.02	40	10	0	50	8
Indiana	19.88	40	0	20	60	8
Iowa	12.50	40	0	0	40	7
Kansas	19.41	40	0	0	40	8
Kentucky	13.30	40	10	20	70	10
Louisiana	21.30	40	0	0	40	10
Massachusetts	18.70	40	0	0	40	8
Michigan	11.63	40	10	20	70	8
Minnesota	13.38	40	0	20	60	8
Missouri	14.02	40	0	0	40	8
Nebraska	8.50	40	0	0	40	8
New Hampshire	12.00	40	0	0	40	6
New Jersey	22.34	40	0	0	40	8
New Mexico	12.50	40	0	20	60	9
New York	17.39	40	10	20	70	6
North Carolina	6.06	40	0	20	60	8
Ohio	8.24	40	0	20	60	9
Oklahoma	18.50	40	0	20	60	8
Oregon	5.10	40	0	0	40	7
Pennsylvania	21.52	40	0	0	40	8
Rhode Island	17.26	40	0	0	40	7
South Carolina	9.35	40	0	0	40	8
South Dakota	12.31	40	0	20	60	7
Tennessee	18.26	40	10	20	70	10
Utah	12.05	40	0	0	40	10
Virginia	10.87	40	0	0	40	8
West Virginia	13.08	40	0	0	40	9
Wisconsin	11.43	40	0	0	40	7
Wyoming	8.71	40	0	0	40	10
Maximum Possible	30.00	40	10	20	70	10

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(appendix 3 continued)

State	C: Data Systems to Support Instruction	Alternative Certification Programs (LL)	D1: High-Quality Pathways for Aspiring Teachers	Teacher Evaluation Tied to Student Achievement (QC)	Strength of Teacher Evaluation Systems (LL)	Evaluations on Annual Basis (QC)
Alabama	47.0	2	14	0	2	0
Arizona	32.9	2	14	0	1	10
Arkansas	47.0	3	21	0	0	10
California	37.6	2	14	0	1	0
Colorado	32.9	2	14	0	1	0
Connecticut	32.9	2	14	0	2	0
D.C.	18.8	1	7	0	0	0
Delaware	47.0	2	14	5	2	0
Florida	47.0	2	14	5	4	10
Georgia	47.0	3	21	5	2	10
Hawaii	37.6	0	0	0	1	0
Idaho	14.1	1	7	0	0	10
Illinois	37.6	1	7	0	1	0
Indiana	37.6	1	7	0	0	0
Iowa	32.9	0	0	5	2	0
Kansas	37.6	1	7	0	1	0
Kentucky	47.0	3	21	0	1	0
Louisiana	47.0	2	14	0	1	0
Massachusetts	37.6	2	14	0	1	0
Michigan	37.6	1	7	0	1	0
Minnesota	37.6	0	0	0	1	0
Missouri	37.6	2	14	0	2	0
Nebraska	37.6	0	0	0	1	0
New Hampshire	28.2	2	14	0	0	0
New Jersey	37.6	3	21	0	2	10
New Mexico	42.3	1	7	0	2	0
New York	28.2	1	7	5	0	10
North Carolina	37.6	1	7	5	2	10
Ohio	42.3	1	7	5	1	0
Oklahoma	37.6	2	14	5	2	10
Oregon	32.9	0	0	0	0	0
Pennsylvania	37.6	1	7	0	1	10
Rhode Island	32.9	0	0	0	0	0
South Carolina	37.6	1	7	5	4	10
South Dakota	32.9	1	7	0	0	0
Tennessee	47.0	2	14	5	4	0
Utah	47.0	1	7	5	1	0
Virginia	37.6	2	14	5	1	0
West Virginia	42.3	1	7	0	1	0
Wisconsin	32.9	0	0	0	1	0
Wyoming	47.0	0	0	0	0	10
Maximum Possible	47.0	3	21	5	4	10

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(appendix 3 continued)

State	D2i-iii: Improving Teacher and Principal Effectiveness	Pay-for-Performance Program (QC)	Removing Ineffective Teachers Grade (LL)	D2iv: Evaluations to Inform Decisions	Managing Allocation of Talent (QC)	Incentives to Principals (QC)	Incentives to Teacher, Subject-Area Combat Pay (QC)
Alabama	7.5	0	1	4	0	0	0
Arizona	13.75	1	3	28	0	0	0
Arkansas	10	1	1	20	7.5	7.5	10
California	3.75	0	0	0	7.5	0	10
Colorado	3.75	0	1	4	7.5	0	0
Connecticut	7.5	0	2	8	0	0	0
D.C.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Delaware	12.5	0	1	4	0	0	0
Florida	30	1	0	16	7.5	7.5	10
Georgia	22.5	0	4	16	7.5	7.5	0
Hawaii	3.75	0	0	0	7.5	7.5	10
Idaho	10	0	2	8	0	0	0
Illinois	3.75	0	3	12	7.5	0	0
Indiana	0	0	1	4	0	0	0
Iowa	12.5	0	2	8	7.5	0	10
Kansas	3.75	0	2	8	0	0	0
Kentucky	3.75	0	0	0	0	0	0
Louisiana	3.75	1	3	28	0	7.5	0
Massachusetts	3.75	0	1	4	7.5	7.5	0
Michigan	3.75	0	2	8	0	0	0
Minnesota	3.75	1	3	28	0	0	0
Missouri	7.5	0	3	12	0	0	0
Nebraska	3.75	0	4	16	7.5	0	10
New Hampshire	0	0	2	8	0	0	0
New Jersey	17.5	0	4	16	0	0	0
New Mexico	7.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
New York	15	0	4	16	7.5	0	10
North Carolina	22.5	1	3	28	7.5	0	0
Ohio	8.75	0	1	4	7.5	0	0
Oklahoma	22.5	1	3	28	0	0	10
Oregon	0	0	2	8	0	0	0
Pennsylvania	13.75	0	4	16	7.5	0	10
Rhode Island	0	0	2	8	0	0	0
South Carolina	30	1	3	28	7.5	7.5	10
South Dakota	0	0	3	12	7.5	7.5	0
Tennessee	20	0	1	4	0	0	0
Utah	8.75	1	1	20	7.5	0	10
Virginia	8.75	0	4	16	7.5	0	10
West Virginia	3.75	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wisconsin	3.75	0	0	0	7.5	0	0
Wyoming	10	0	3	12	0	0	10
Maximum Possible	30	1	4	28	7.5	7.5	10

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(appendix 3 continued)

State	D3: Ensuring Equitable Distribution of Effective Teachers and Principals	Accountability for Effectiveness of Teacher Education Programs (QC)	D4: Improving Effectiveness of Prep Programs	State Sanctions Low-Performing Schools (LL)	Accountability: State Assigns Ratings to All Schools (QC)	State Provides Assistance to Low-Performing Schools (QC)
Alabama	0	14	14	10	0	35
Arizona	0	0	0	10	5	35
Arkansas	25	0	0	10	5	35
California	17.5	0	0	10	5	35
Colorado	7.5	0	0	10	5	35
Connecticut	0	0	0	0	0	0
D.C.	0	0	0	0	0	0
Delaware	0	0	0	10	5	35
Florida	25	14	14	10	5	35
Georgia	15	0	0	10	0	35
Hawaii	25	0	0	10	0	35
Idaho	0	0	0	10	0	35
Illinois	7.5	0	0	10	0	35
Indiana	0	14	14	10	5	35
Iowa	17.5	0	0	0	0	0
Kansas	0	0	0	0	5	35
Kentucky	0	14	14	10	0	35
Louisiana	7.5	14	14	10	5	35
Massachusetts	15	0	0	10	5	35
Michigan	0	0	0	10	5	35
Minnesota	0	0	0	0	0	0
Missouri	0	14	14	0	0	0
Nebraska	17.5	0	0	0	0	0
New Hampshire	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Jersey	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Mexico	0	0	0	10	0	35
New York	17.5	14	14	10	5	35
North Carolina	7.5	14	14	10	5	35
Ohio	7.5	14	14	10	5	35
Oklahoma	10	0	0	10	5	35
Oregon	0	0	0	0	5	0
Pennsylvania	17.5	0	0	10	0	35
Rhode Island	0	0	0	10	0	35
South Carolina	25	14	14	10	5	35
South Dakota	15	0	0	0	0	0
Tennessee	0	14	14	10	5	35
Utah	17.5	0	0	0	5	0
Virginia	17.5	14	14	10	5	35
West Virginia	0	0	0	10	5	35
Wisconsin	7.5	14	14	0	0	35
Wyoming	10	0	0	10	0	35
Maximum Possible	25	14	14	10	5	35

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(appendix 3 continued)

State	E: Turning Around Lowest-Achieving Schools	Percent of Total Taxable Resources Spent on Education (QC)	"Spending" Index	F1: Making Education Funding a Priority (NJ Is Benchmark)	Charter-School Law Strength (LL)	F2: Successful Conditions for High-Performing Charter Schools	Total (Out of 410; Not Inflated)	Total (Inflated to out of 500)
Alabama	45	0.039	0.78	7.8	0	0	251.85	307.14
Arizona	50	0.035	0.70	7.0	3	30	256.71	313.06
Arkansas	50	0.042	0.84	8.4	1	10	296.64	361.76
California	50	0.035	0.70	7.0	4	40	237.16	289.22
Colorado	50	0.03	0.60	6.0	3	30	223.52	272.58
Connecticut	0	0.041	0.82	8.2	1	10	150.36	183.37
D.C.	0	N/A	N/A	10.0	4	40	161.38	196.81
Delaware	50	0.025	0.50	5.0	3	30	279.88	341.32
Florida	50	0.033	0.66	6.6	3	30	305.80	372.93
Georgia	45	0.041	0.82	8.2	2	20	288.98	352.42
Hawaii	45	0.043	0.86	8.6	1	10	225.57	275.09
Idaho	45	0.035	0.70	7.0	2	20	192.73	235.04
Illinois	45	0.036	0.72	7.2	1	10	196.55	239.69
Indiana	50	0.037	0.74	7.4	3	30	255.55	311.65
Iowa	0	0.035	0.70	7.0	0	0	152.09	185.47
Kansas	40	0.041	0.82	8.2	0	0	202.45	246.89
Kentucky	45	0.036	0.72	7.2	0	0	266.25	324.70
Louisiana	50	0.028	0.56	5.6	2	20	274.66	334.96
Massachusetts	50	0.038	0.76	7.6	2	20	239.90	292.56
Michigan	50	0.047	0.94	9.4	3	30	230.59	281.20
Minnesota	0	0.036	0.72	7.2	4	40	194.25	236.89
Missouri	0	0.037	0.74	7.4	3	30	217.47	265.21
Nebraska	0	0.035	0.70	7.0	0	0	155.11	189.16
New Hampshire	0	0.041	0.82	8.2	1	10	125.03	152.47
New Jersey	0	0.05	1.00	10.0	2	20	186.03	226.87
New Mexico	45	0.038	0.76	7.6	3	30	221.69	270.36
New York	50	0.042	0.84	8.4	3	30	292.55	356.76
North Carolina	50	0.028	0.56	5.6	1	10	292.81	357.08
Ohio	50	0.045	0.90	9.0	2	20	260.04	317.13
Oklahoma	50	0.034	0.68	6.8	1	10	262.89	320.60
Oregon	5	0.032	0.64	6.4	2	20	125.65	153.23
Pennsylvania	45	0.042	0.84	8.4	3	30	249.37	304.11
Rhode Island	45	0.042	0.84	8.4	1	10	163.63	199.55
South Carolina	50	0.042	0.84	8.4	2	20	312.10	380.61
South Dakota	0	0.027	0.54	5.4	0	0	145.17	177.04
Tennessee	50	0.028	0.56	5.6	1	10	294.71	359.40
Utah	5	0.033	0.66	6.6	3	30	231.52	282.34
Virginia	50	0.034	0.68	6.8	0	0	255.57	311.67
West Virginia	50	0.046	0.92	9.2	0	0	210.33	256.49
Wisconsin	35	0.041	0.82	8.2	2	20	178.07	217.16
Wyoming	45	0.043	0.86	8.6	1	10	236.31	288.18
Maximum Possible	50	0.05	1.00	10.0	4	40	410.00	500.00

Appendix 4

Aggregates

State	Projected RTT Score (Out of 410 Points)	Projected Score (Inflated to 500 Points)	Projected Rank	Actual RTT Round 1 Score	Actual RTT Round 1 Rank	2008 Presidential Contention Race (CNN)	Senate Seat Up for Grabs (CQ)	Governor Seat Up for Grabs (CQ)
Alabama	251.85	307.14	16	291.20	37	78	0	0
Arizona	256.71	313.06	13	240.20	40	91	0	0
Arkansas	296.64	361.76	3	394.40	17	80	1	0
California	237.16	289.22	19	336.80	27	76	0	1
Colorado	223.52	272.58	24	409.60	14	91	1	1
Connecticut	150.36	183.37	38	344.60	25	77	0	1
D.C.	161.38	196.81	35	402.40	16	14	N/A	N/A
Delaware	279.88	341.32	8	454.60	1	75	1	0
Florida	305.80	372.93	2	431.40	4	97	0	1
Georgia	288.98	352.42	7	433.60	3	95	0	0
Hawaii	225.57	275.09	23	364.60	22	55	0	1
Idaho	192.73	235.04	31	331.00	28	75	0	0
Illinois	196.55	239.69	29	423.80	5	75	1	1
Indiana	255.55	311.65	15	355.60	23	99	1	0
Iowa	152.09	185.47	37	346.00	24	91	0	1
Kansas	202.45	246.89	28	329.60	29	85	0	1
Kentucky	266.25	324.70	10	418.80	9	83	1	0
Louisiana	274.66	334.96	9	418.20	11	81	0	0
Massachusetts	239.90	292.56	18	411.40	13	74	0	1
Michigan	230.59	281.20	22	366.20	21	84	0	1
Minnesota	194.25	236.89	30	375.00	20	90	0	1
Missouri	217.47	265.21	26	301.40	33	99	1	0
Nebraska	155.11	189.16	36	247.40	39	85	0	0
New Hampshire	125.03	152.47	41	271.20	38	91	1	0
New Jersey	186.03	226.87	32	387.00	18	85	0	0
New Mexico	221.69	270.36	25	325.20	30	85	0	0
New York	292.55	356.76	6	408.60	15	73	0	0
North Carolina	292.81	357.08	5	414.00	12	99	0	0
Ohio	260.04	317.13	12	418.60	10	95	1	1
Oklahoma	262.89	320.60	11	294.60	34	68	0	1
Oregon	125.65	153.23	40	292.60	35	84	0	0
Pennsylvania	249.37	304.11	17	420.00	7	89	1	1
Rhode Island	163.63	199.55	34	419.00	8	72	0	1
South Carolina	312.10	380.61	1	423.20	6	91	0	0
South Dakota	145.17	177.04	39	135.80	41	92	0	0
Tennessee	294.71	359.40	4	444.20	2	85	0	1
Utah	231.52	282.34	21	379.40	19	71	0	0
Virginia	255.57	311.67	14	324.80	31	94	0	0
West Virginia	210.33	256.49	27	292.40	36	87	0	0
Wisconsin	178.07	217.16	33	341.20	26	87	0	1
Wyoming	236.31	288.18	20	318.60	32	68	0	1