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Press Freedom in Asia: New Paradigm Needed in Building Theories

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An Abstract

Four theories of the press are well established in journalism education and research and arguably do a good job of describing media systems in the West. However, it is hard to fit Asian media systems into the existing theories. This paper does a review of the existing press theories and tries to identify the difficulties in using the theories as a guide to understand media systems in Asia. The purpose of this paper is to raise issue with the applicability of the theories in an Asian media context and call for a new paradigm in studying Asian media systems.

Introduction

Since the dictatorial Marcos government was overthrown in the Philippines in 1986, news media in Asia have undergone tremendous changes in the direction of more press freedom. Martial law ended in Taiwan in 1987; the military government in South Korea gave way to elected civilian government also in 1987. In Indonesia, military strongman, Suharto, was forced to forfeit power after mass demonstrations in the streets, in much of the same manner as Marcos did 12 years ago. Even in communist China and Vietnam, economic reforms inevitably lead to a more vibrant, commercialized and competitive press.

But much of the changes in the media systems in Asian countries seems to be overshadowed by the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe as the changes there were much more dramatic and in much larger scale. The transformation of the media systems in the region has become a focus of media research while studies of news media in Asia are mostly country based. A regional approach to Asian media studies may help reveal some insight otherwise ignored.

Asia is a politically and culturally diverse continent, where you can find reforming and developing communist countries next door to some of the most successful capitalist countries in the world. And no one or two religions dominate the continent. It is hard to lump sum Asia together in any kind of description and it is even harder to pigeonhole the vastly diverse Asian media systems into the existing press theories developed by Western media scholars and based on the analysis of Western media histories, operations and performances.

This paper attempts to call attention to the applicability of the existing press theories in the Asian media context and to the reliability of press freedom ratings of each country by the Freedom House. This paper starts with a review of the well-established press theories and continues with an introduction of media systems in Asia. Discussions will follow in comparing the theories with the media systems and in identifying the difficulties in trying to describe the media systems in Asia with the help of the existing press theories.

Review of dominant press theories

The seminal work, *Four Theories of the Press*, by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) established the dominant paradigm in analyzing global media systems and, in particular, in assessing levels of press freedom in countries and regions of the world. Other theories on press systems followed, such as developmental journalism popular in the Philippines and South Asia, revolutionary media (Hachten, 1999), and democratic-participant media (McQuail, 1994). The new theories are mostly complementary to the established four theories of the press.

Of the four theories, “the authoritarian system has been most pervasive both historically and geographically,” according to Siebert. The goal of the media under such a system is to support and advance the policies of the government so that it can achieve its objectives (Siebert, 1956, p. 18). The major problem in such a system is establishing and exercising effective control over the media, mostly privately owned. Control mechanisms include but are not limited to licensing system, government censorship, special taxes, laws in the name of preserving the nation, such as treason and sedition. According to Siebert, the authoritarians do not object to a discussion of political systems in broad

philosophical terms, but will not allow direct criticism of current political leaders and their projects or overt attempt to unseat the authorities themselves (p.26.)

Werner J. Severin and James W. Tankard, Jr (2001, p. 310) summarized the major characteristics of each of the four theories and believed that the authoritarian concept was based on the 16th and 17th century English history and philosophy of the absolute power of the monarch.

Contrary to the authoritarian theory, libertarian theory holds that man is rational and an end in himself. The happiness and well-being of the individual is the goal of society (Siebert, p.40). The “Enlightenment” gave an impetus to the concept with its call to free man from all outside restrictions to use his reason. Siebert listed John Milton, John Stuart Mill and Thomas Jefferson as the major philosophers behind this concept (pp. 44-47). The function of the libertarian media is to inform and entertain and to act as a watchdog over the government. Libertarian media are mostly private.

Control of the libertarian media is mostly exercised through the “self-righting” process and the courts even though licensing, censorship or seizure of offending material and injunctions against the publication of a newspaper are also used. Voluntary censorship is sometimes practiced while the right of access to government sources is avidly pursued.

The social responsibility theory was an outgrowth of the libertarian theory and was first developed in the 20th century United States by the Commission on Freedom of the Press, which emphasized social responsibility of the press. In addition to inform, entertain and sell, the press should also “raise conflict to the plane of discussion.” (Severin and Tankard, 2001, p. 310) Press control is mostly in the form of community

opinion, consumer action and professional ethics. The main difference between the libertarian theory and the social responsibility theory is that the latter suggests that someone must see that media perform responsibly if they do not do so voluntarily.

The last of the four theories is the Soviet communist theory, which was based on Marxist ideology and value of unity – unity of the working class and unity of the Party. For the sake of unity, there is only one right position and only one truth, the absolute truth. The role of the press is to interpret the doctrine and to carry out the policies of the Party. Schramm saw the Soviet political system as “one of the most complete dictatorships in modern history” (p. 114). Media in communist societies are state-owned and should be a “collective propagandist, collective agitator... and collective organizer.” (p. 116) The Soviet system defined the function of mass communications positively and removed the profit motive from publishing and broadcasting.

Under the Soviet system, the government had a division of censorship. Other means of control included the appointment of editors, a large number of directives regarding press content and press reviews and criticisms.

Criticism of the theories

Dominant as the four theories are, there is no lack of criticism of them, especially criticism of the social responsibility theory. Journalism scholar, John C. Merrill, who strongly argued for the independence of individual journalists in his writings, asked his students: Who should be the authority in defining what responsible journalism is? Shouldn't journalists themselves be allowed to make that judgment?

More systematic criticism of the four theories came almost 40 years after the seminal book was published. “Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press,”

published in 1995 and written by a group of media scholars from the same school where the four theories originated, found the overall theoretical framework of the four theories flawed. The book, edited by John C. Nerone, pointed out that the four theories were not value free despite its value-free appearance (p.7). The theories were based on a pro-capitalism bias, and were the products of capitalism and of the Cold War era. Because of such bias, the book contended that while the four theories were very critical of the Soviet communist media, they ignored the concerns of the libertarian media, especially the concentration of media ownership. The book also argued that the theories focused only on the political control of the media, state power, while silent on other kinds of power and restraint on the media. For example, the theories only discussed media's political freedom, not economic freedom from the market forces and ownership ties. Another problem with the theories, the book argued, was that it allowed only two media environments – libertarian and authoritarian, the other two being only the derivatives of the free and the controlled media environments. And the black and white media systems were only discussed in the dichotomy of media versus state. The book also listed “internal inconsistencies and inadequacies” among the four theories.

Supplemental press theories

As media systems evolve and develop to meet the changing needs of societies, new press theories emerged, including developmental journalism, revolutionary media (Hachten, 1999) and democratic-participant media (Downing, 2002). Developmental journalism is the better-known theoretical concept of the three even though it is still a controversial concept and “an amorphous and curious mixture of ideas, rhetoric, influences, and grievances.” (Hachten, p.31) Wilbur Schramm and Daniel Lerner argued

for the role of communication in the achievement of national integration and economic development. And developmental journalism is mostly popular in developing countries, where higher living standards and an end to poverty, disease and illiteracy are considered the most urgent goal. Under the developmental journalism concept, media are primarily used for the purpose of nation building. The most controversial part about the theory is the government control of the media in the name of nation building.

The revolutionary media, considered a temporary and transitional condition like developmental journalism, describes illegal or subversive communication, which aims to rally people to overthrow a repressive government (Hachten, p.29) while democratic-participant media present an alternative to mainstream and commercial media and provide an opportunity for connecting with the local communities (Downing, p. 22).

Western press theories and Eastern press systems

The “libertarian press” in Asia The press theories that have been discussed above, especially the four theories of the press, have been widely used to categorize media systems across the world, east or west, north or south. But we encounter major difficulties or misfits when trying to pigeonhole Asian media systems according to the press theories, which were developed by Western media scholars and were based on Western philosophies and the analysis of Western history, politics and culture. As such, these dominant press theories cannot satisfactorily describe the realities of media in Asia.

Japan is widely regarded as having one of the most liberal presses in Asia, the prototype of libertarian press on the content. The Freedom House rated the Japanese press the freest in Asia in 2002. The political system in Japan, a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy, is one of the most democratic, if not the most democratic,

systems in Asia. The multi-party system in Japan is real and opposition candidates pose real challenges for the ruling party in political elections, unlike elsewhere in Asia where opposition parties can be cosmetic. In Japan, censorship is banned in the constitution and freedom of the press is generally accepted as a fact of life. Overt government interference in the media is rare and often frowned upon. The approval by Koizumi's cabinet of a bill aimed at outlawing "excessive reporting activities" and "violations of privacy" by reporters prompted protests from newspapers and broadcasters ("Japan" 2002). When Malaysia and Singapore are promoting "Asian values," Japan stands as living proof that Western democracy, as introduced by the United States, works in Asia. The Freedom House, widely regarded as the most authoritative institution in assessing global press freedom, rated Japan 17 (0-30=free) out of a total of 100 (61-100=not free), the best score of press freedom in Asia. Reporters Without Borders, an international organization devoted to press freedom, gave Japan the second highest ranking in Asia in press freedom after Hong Kong. ("Reporters" 2003) The Japanese press was considered the liveliest in East Asia ("Japan" 2002). To understand the nature of Japanese press system, we can examine the economic system in Japan first.

Democracy describes Japan's political system, but freewheeling capitalism is out of the question in Japan although theoretically speaking, Japan practices free market capitalism. Japanese economy has thrived and become a dominant force in global economy under state-guided capitalism ("Inside" 1992). Instead of regulating the industry, the government helps the industry to grow and compete on the global market. Government and big corporations in Japan are partners in nation building. Political

freedom and rights do not translate into economic liberalism in Japan and that has much to do with the Japanese culture, or the Asian culture.

In Oriental societies, especially those under the influence of Confucian philosophies, the strength of the country is supposed to be more important than the profitability of a company, and the well being of a family is more important than individual rights and freedom. For a country like Japan with limited arable land and scarce resources, the survival and prosperity of the nation are supposed to have taken priority in national life. The government and the royal family are the symbols of the nation and they command respect.

Such cultural tradition contradicts the Western concept of media as a watchdog. In Japan, media keep cozy relations with the government and the big industries through the press club system, or “information cartels,” which comprise press clubs, industry associations and media conglomerates (Kingston, 2000). The press clubs channel information from government offices to media organizations, which discourages independent reporting and thoroughness in journalism and results in “uniformity of content” and “pro-establishment style of journalism.” (Saito, 2000, p.569) The information cartels ensure no competition among media and no scoops (Kingston). In Oriental societies, the motto is not Darwin’s “survival of the fittest,” but the survival of all, which explains why in many Asian countries, such as Japan, China and Singapore, comparative advertisements are banned.

In Japan, all the high-profile political scandals that emerged in the first half of 2002 were not uncovered by the vernacular dailies, but by the non-mainstream weeklies (Brasor, 2002). Because of its less than rigorous reporting, the Japanese press fails to act

as a watchdog over the government and is called a lap dog (Kingston, 2000), which was blamed for failing to keep the public informed of the irregularities within the financial industry and the corruption within the government. When the Asian financial crash hit in 1997, the magnitude of the crisis took the public by surprise.

When we make an in-depth analysis of the Japanese press, it is clear that the ideas available at the “marketplace of ideas” are rather limited. Free competition that is at the very core of the libertarian theory is stifled under the Japanese press club system. While government control of the press in Japan is much less flagrant than elsewhere in Asia, control by the professional associations and the media organizations themselves is still very effective and produces the same result of a less informed public. The fact that the Freedom House rated the Japanese press as the freest in Asia may be because of the fact that the Japanese government seldom takes direct actions against the press. In Japan, there is rarely such need as the press polices itself rather diligently.

South Korea, also rated “free” with a score of 30 by the Freedom House, is in a similar situation with Japan. After decades of fighting for democracy, South Koreans started to enjoy their political rights in 1987 when a civilian government was sworn in after a general election. Influenced by the Confucian values and their common economic interest, the government and the big business in South Korea, including the media, are of one big happy family. South Korean industries are also guided and supported by the government. Media in South Korea ally themselves with the government and big businesses and are mostly seen as “pro-business,” “pro-government” and “conservative.” (Heo et al, 2000, p.619) It has become traditional practice between government and media in South Korea not to report critical and important information, such as

information leading to the Asian financial crash in 1997, which hit the South Korean economy hard (Neumann, 1998). The free and libertarian press in Asia is obviously of a very different brand.

Self-censorship is not unique to Japan or South Korea. It is a widespread practice in the newsrooms in Asia, such as Hong Kong and Thailand. Thailand was also rated “free” by the Freedom House in 2002. The media in Thailand and Hong Kong are in a category of their own, difficult to be fit into any of the existing press theories. They are among the freest in Asia when they resort to sensationalism and the lowest common denominator to survive the increasingly intense competition in the wake of the 1997 financial crash and the ensuing economic slowdown. Practice of yellow journalism in Hong Kong including price wars and hiring talents from competitors reached its climax in 1995 and again in 1997 (China Journalism Yearbook, 1998, p.720). In both Hong Kong and Thailand, the press exercises maximum freedom when it is dealing with non-political topics, but starts to censor itself when news stories concern the government or the royal family.

Before Hong Kong was returned to China in 1997, many of the newspapers in the former British colony were pro-British. Since the sovereignty changed hands, more papers are now pro-Beijing. Self-censorship is considered a major concern and the main threat to an independent and free press in Hong Kong despite a great deal of aggressive reporting. (Kubiske, 2000) In Thailand, even though the press criticizes government policies and publicizes human rights abuses, journalists censor themselves regarding the military, the judiciary and other sensitive subjects. (Ekachai, 2000, p.437) It is hard to find the rigorous watchdog in Hong Kong and Thailand.

The most appropriate term to describe the press in Taiwan, rated a 21 (free) out of 100 by the Freedom House, the press in the Philippines, rated 30 (free), and the press in Indonesia, 53 (partly free), should be anarchist press rather than the libertarian press. Given the newly acquired political freedom after military strongmen were overthrown or the martial law was lifted, the press has proliferated. The immense market pressure of competition to accommodate this explosive growth combining with the new press freedom has driven the press to “freakdom” of the press (Luwarso, 2002). Excesses and abuses of press freedom have ironically prompted calls from the public for the governments to restore some control of the press.

In Indonesia, more and more journalists are violating the most sacred principle of the profession: tell the truth (“Press” 2000). Journalists today are accountable to no one but themselves because of the sweeping deregulation of the media. Professional ethics are at an all-time low. In Taiwan, the *Scoop Weekly*, a tabloid magazine, enclosed a VCD of an alleged sexual encounter of a female legislative candidate in one of its issues (“Editorial” 2001). And some reporters sacrifice accuracy in the race to be the first in crime reporting. In the Philippines, media are being criticized for irresponsible and sloppy reporting, checkbook journalism and commercially exploiting the public’s taste for the sensational (Coronel, 2000).

The “authoritarian press” in Asia The press in Singapore, Malaysia and the lesser-known Brunei is often regarded as the prototype of authoritarian press in Asia (Luwarso, 2000). In these countries, the means to control the press are very similar to those used in 16th or 17th century England, including government censorship, suspension of license, legal actions against the press and even shutdown of the offending

publications. But that is where similarities stop. The authoritarian press theory was based on the history of the 16th and 17th century England (Severin, 2001, p. 310) while the press in the three Asian nations is shaped more by the Asian cultural tradition and the practical needs of the countries' geo-political realities.

While government authority came more from the absolute power of the monarchy in 16th and 17th century England (Severin), in Asian societies, especially in Singapore that is under the heavy influence of Confucius' teachings, governments regard themselves more as parents than as rulers, which helps explain why gum chewing and flushing toilets are regulated. Also, according to the Confucian hierarchical order of political system, government is the absolute authority of the land. "The ruler is the wind. People are the grass. When the wind blows, the grass is sure to bend," Confucius said ("Big Business" 1992). But Confucius was also a philosopher. He said, "Authority springs from morality, not force." (Big Business) He believed that people should accept authority, but authority must be just. Confucius asked: "When government leads by the right example, who dares to go astray?"

Singapore is a typical Confucian society with a no-nonsense government. The Singaporean government is one of the very few in Asia, where corruption is completely eliminated. The government is as clean as the streets in Singapore, which is widely considered as the cleanest city in the world ("Singapore" 1997). The government in Singapore prides itself on its system of meritocracy and efficiency. Different views are tolerated to a certain extent, but if the press publishes articles the government takes offense to, the government pursues the press relentlessly all the way to the court (Juan, 2000), which often has a chilling effect on the press.

Confucius also extolled cooperative and harmonious relations, which are what the Singaporean government hopes to cultivate both at home and abroad. The government keeps a watchful eye on the press for any stories that address race relations, religion or problems in foreign countries. Such stories are banned in the Singaporean press because of the mixed racial and religious makeup of its population and its often-sensitive relations with its neighbors. Violence and chaos caused by racial and religious differences elsewhere in Asia put the Singapore government on high alert. Former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, said that any journalist who did not support Singapore-Malaysia relations would be thrown in jail (Juan, 2000). The same is true of Malaysia, a nation with different ethnicities, religions and languages. Both Singapore and Malaysia raise loud voices in promoting “Asian values,” which set them far apart from the kind of authoritarianism originated in 16th and 17th century England.

The “communist press” in Asia Today’s Asia hosts the majority of the world’s remaining communist countries – China, Vietnam, Laos and North Korea. But trying to understand the press systems in these countries by using the Soviet communist press theory would be very misleading. The communist press theory was based on the model of the Soviet press system, which can’t satisfactorily describe the divergent press systems in these remaining communist countries, especially the Chinese press system today after more than 20 years of economic liberalizations and opening to the outside world. But guided by the label of communism, the Freedom House rated China 7,6, NF for 2000-01 (on a scale of 1-7 with 1 being most free and 5.5+ being not free) and 7,7, NF for 1972-73, grossly under-rated the overwhelming changes in the Chinese press during the last two decades.

The Soviet press model removes the profit motive from publishing and broadcasting. But China's economic reforms started in 1978 changed all that. Economic reform of the media in China began almost as early as the overall economic reform (Zhao, 1998, p.53). And media commercialization becomes an important part of the development of the market economy as the government has adopted a policy of gradually cutting subsidies and encouraging commercialized financing. Advertising, the capitalist genie, has finally returned to the world of communist media. To meet the new challenge, the press, including the ones directly under the control of the party, not only has to publicize the party's policies, but also keep an eye on the bottom line as the press has been assuming increasing responsibilities in covering the cost and balancing the sheet. Even the official Xinhua news agency and the party paper, People's Daily, are trying to turn out more profitable publications. Editors in China are made aware that newspapers are not only political tools, but they have to be moneymakers as well. To be competitive on the market, newspapers in China have to appeal to the readers, not just the party officials. The biggest challenge facing Chinese editors today is to strike the right balance between being politically correct and commercially viable.

Also the Soviet model mostly prescribes a positive role for the press – the press should be an agitator, an organizer and promoter for the socialist cause. In the Chinese press today, readers can find more negative news, which is a taboo in the rigid communist media model as bad news are seen as demoralizers. Given the rampant corruption among government officials in China, some high-level government officials encourage the press to engage in more investigations ("Giving" 2002). *Caijing*, a financial magazine, made a name for itself for its investigative reporting of the financial

sector (Kurtenbach, 2002). And some provincial governments have made new laws banning their officials from refusing interviews with the press ("Reporters" 2001). Such laws were unimaginable before the reforms or under the Soviet media model.

Under the communist media system, all media are owned by the state and no foreign media are allowed. The majority of the media in China today are still owned by the state. But there are some joint ventures already with foreign investment, including a joint-venture Internet service in technology information between the *People's Daily* and the News Corp owned by Australian media tycoon, Rupert Murdoch ("Media" 1998). Now as a member of the World Trade Organization, China will face more and more foreign capital in its media industries whether it likes it or not.

China is also working on an international media center with a total floor space of 130,000 square meters, which will serve as an office building for more than 100 foreign media organizations in Beijing ("China 2002). The center is planned to be equipped with state-of-the-art satellite communication and fiber optical devices for fast transmission of data, texts and pictures. And in 2001, Reuters' Qing Niao website, a site for trade information and e-business, made a low-key entry into China ("Reuters" 2001). The Soviet communist media model is a closed system. But China has opened up. It is China's national policy to reintegrate itself into the world community.

One of the major problems concerning the Chinese press today is the low ethical standard held by some local papers. It is no longer rare news that newspapers are sued for their inaccurate and sensational stories, which seldom occurs under an orthodox communist media system. The Soviet communist media theory would be an inaccurate summary of the lively and messy, and yet controlled press in China today.

The press in Vietnam, which has followed China's example in implementing economic reforms, is undergoing changes as well. The government has relaxed regulations of the media and allowed more negative news and criticisms in the papers. "In terms of freedom, the press here in Vietnam has been getting better and more aggressive." ("News", 2001) In the pursuit of profits, newspapers in Vietnam also face criticisms about their low ethical standards. Journalists in Vietnam now claim that they are having more debates on "responsibilities and morals of journalists" than on free press. ("News")

North Korea may be the only country with a press that could be fit into the Soviet media model. There has been very little change inside the hermit country despite the fact that most of the remaining communist countries are undergoing major reforms to revive and stimulate their economies. The media in North Korea perform the role of "official cheerleaders," distorting reports in the authority's favor and never questioning the states policies or performance. ("IPI", 2000) But the media in North Korea certainly do not represent the trend of the communist media today.

The "development media" in Asia Press in South Asia, such as India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, can loosely fit into the category of developmental journalism as South Asia is the least economically developed region of Asia and the press in the region plays a big role in its economic and social development. Newspapers, especially small-scale community media, devote space and time to the coverage of education, science and technology and discussions about solutions to social or health problems. In India, people expect newspapers to go far beyond mere reporting of news, and don a steering mantle when the need may arise. (Goenka, 1996) Newspapers are supposed to be more than

passive disseminators of news. They have to reflect diversity of opinion and encourage debate, with an objective to serve society and uplift falling societal values. (Goenka)

As the degree of freedom enjoyed by the press in the region varies a lot from country to country, it is difficult to categorize it otherwise. But that is where the controversy with the theoretical concept lies. In the concept of developmental journalism, there is no clear description of the rights and freedom of the press, and no clear description of the ties between the government and media. While one scholar describes it as “the pursuit of cultural and informational autonomy” and “support for democracy” among other goals (Downing, 2002, p. 22), another scholar criticizes it as “a rationale for autocratic press control” and “guided press” (Hachten, 1999, p.32). Given “an amorphous and curious mixture of ideas, rhetoric, influences, and grievances” (Hachten, p.31), press systems as divergent as those in the Philippines, India and China can all be put under this category as all of the three countries are still third-world, developing countries, where national development on all fronts is top priority. And that is the problem. When press systems of different nature can be categorized under one theoretical concept, that concept fails as an effective guide to the understanding of the systems it tries to describe.

Toward A New Paradigm of Theories

When theories have major difficulties in providing a guide to the understanding of the realities they are supposed to describe, new paradigms or improvements on the existing theories are needed, so are the criteria of the Freedom House for assessing global press freedom when their rankings can be misleading. Obviously, more factors have to be taken into consideration than each country’s laws and administration, the degree of political and economic influence on the content of journalism and actual cases of press-

freedom violations, which now determine the score (Sussman, 1999) and which fail to reflect the sweeping changes on the Chinese press scene.

In the *Last Rights*, the authors concluded that the four theories were a “durable” but now “questionable” map and that a “more adequate” map is needed (Nerone, 1995, p.181). The book presented inspiring criticism of the four theories but stopped short of proposing a new paradigm in creating new theories. But such efforts are urgently needed if we want to draw up a “more adequate” guide to the world’s myriad changing press systems.

It may be suggested that one major factor to consider in building a new paradigm is the optimal balance between specification and universality. The four theories of the press have the beauty and elegance of a very simple but clear structure – four categories under a dichotomy, which aimed to cover all the press systems in the world. Conveniently general as they are, the four or five theories have difficulties in providing a reliable guide to the global press systems. The universality of the theories is limited. However, if we try too hard at being specific and accurate in describing press systems, we may end up with as many press theories as the number of press systems that exist.

Another important factor in building a more reliable theoretical guide may be that more dynamics need to be built into the theories so that they can accommodate the changes in the press systems around the world. Obviously, press systems in new democracies in Eastern Europe are very different from the press systems in the West even though they all operate under democratic systems now. The press systems in new democracies in Asia, such as Indonesia, Cambodia, the Philippines, Taiwan and South Korea, vary from those in Eastern Europe despite the fact that they are all new

democracies. And the communist press system in China today cannot be compared with the Chinese press system two decades ago, let alone the original Soviet communist model. It would defeat the purpose of having theories if every time changes occur, new theories have to be created.

The last but not the least important factor to consider is that the press theories that are supposed to describe world press systems have to have a wider base to reflect a broader, more balanced global view. Given adequate attention to factors, such as Oriental history and culture, African and South American perspectives and economic pressure, the imperfections of the established theories caused by the authors' Western bias and their sole focus on political or governmental influence may be corrected.

In building a new paradigm for press theories, new ways of thinking should be adopted as press control comes in many ways and forms, including social and professional institutions. And press theories do not have to be limited to address the issue of press freedom and government control alone, they can describe stages of press development and the level of public involvement as well. The possibilities of the new paradigm are limitless as well as challenges. But one thing is certain. The task is made much easier given the high starting point of the four theories of the press. The task is daunting but also exciting. This paper hopes to inspire wider interest in the topic.

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Entertainment East and West: A Comparison of Prime-Time U.S. and Asian TV Content Using the Methodology of the National Television Violence Study

Abstract

The three most TV-saturated countries in the world all have advertising-based, entertainment-heavy TV content: China (370 million receivers); the United States (233 million); and Japan (91 million). This paper compares U.S./China/Japan domestic programming, as well as pan-Asia satellite services, by replicating in Asia the National Television Violence Study. The Hofstede (2001) research on cultural dimensions can elucidate differences in nations' tolerance for violent TV content. For example, only about 15% of China/Japan prime-time, non-news TV shows contain some violence, compared to 67% on U.S. broadcast networks.

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TOP THREE FACULTY PAPER

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Entertainment East and West: A Comparison of Prime-Time U.S. and Asian TV Content Using the Methodology of the National Television Violence Study

INTRODUCTION

The world's #1 (United States) and #2 (Japan) economies¹, and China, whose economy enjoys an 8% annual growth rate², are also the three most TV-saturated countries in the world. China, the world's most populous nation³, boasts 370 million TV receiver sets; the United States, 233 million receivers; and Japan, 91 million receivers (1999 figures from the International Telecommunications Union, quoted in Bannerjee 2002, p. 108). In 1990, China ranked second to the United States in number of receivers, but it has since catapulted to first place. Chinese viewers can number as many as 1 billion people, the largest audience on the planet (Chang 2002).

Today all three nations have advertising-based, entertainment-heavy TV content. In 1979 Shanghai TV made history by airing China's first commercial, a 90-second spot for a medicinal wine. While all three nations have educational channels, by and large these audiences watch ratings-driven programming. The U.S. and Japanese ratings systems are well-entrenched. After a pioneering venture in China in 1986 by the Nielsen Co, the audience measurement market grew "competitive" (Weber 2003, p. 280); Nielsen now has branches in 10 major cities. Moreover, China Central TV (CCTV) relies on its own surveys; the "shows that do not score a high rating are degraded to other slots or risk to be cancelled" (Chang 2002, p. 20).

¹As of December 2002, the U.S. GDP was \$1,784 .5 trillion and Japan's, \$1,109.9 trillion.

²From the base year 1978 to 12/31/00.

³China's population was 1.273 billion (India's was 1.029 billion) [all information retrieved from Bloomberg terminal 3/12/03].

Television in China

When Chinese television first went on the air in 1958, only about 30 television sets, all belonging to high-ranking party officials, existed in Beijing. For most of “the first 20 years of Chinese television, television viewing was extremely limited and was mostly collective activity at work units” (Chang 2002, p.16).

In 1976, the year that Mao Tse-tung died and the Cultural Revolution ended, one TV set existed for every 1,600 people. By 1970, more than 200 million viewers were able to watch programs transmitted from 52 stations. In 1985, the audience had doubled to 400 million. By 1986, about half of Chinese households owned TV sets. Today, with a population of 1.2 billion, one in every three Chinese owns a set. Television now reaches more than 90% of the Chinese population.

Beginning in the 1980s, a shift occurred “from the engineering model. . . to an ‘arm’s length’ approach to cultural management” (Weber 2003, p. 278), such that entertainment programs proliferated; the “monotonous and ideologically laden shows produced during the Cultural Revolution” (Chang 2002, p. 16) were replaced by comedies, dramas and musical variety shows. Despite “its firm control on the political orientation of the media, the Chinese government now espouses the policy of managing media outlets as business units” (Chang 2002, pp. 20-21).

In 1992, when the government took the first steps to encourage competition, television began “generating revenue through advertising and encouraging foreign investment. . .in preparation for WTO membership” (Weber 2003, p. 278). Audience measurement expanded after J. Walter Thompson in 1997 had “questions [about the] reliability and accuracy of advertising industry data” (Weber 2003, p. 280). China’s 2001

agreement for entry into the World Trade Organization membership “includes telecommunications and motion pictures, but not the news media” (Weber 2003, p. 280).

On average, viewers in rural areas have access to eight channels and urban viewers, 15. CCTV, the only national network, operates 11 channels. CCTV1 emphasizes current affairs; channel 2, economics; 3, music and variety shows; 4, shows in English; 5, sports; 6, movies; 7, children; and 8, dramas. Channels 9-11 were added recently, but were not included in the present research.

Television in Japan

Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK), Japan’s sole pre-war radio service (unabashedly modelled on the BBC when it was established in 1926), became a military propaganda tool during World War II. After the war, in 1950, the Occupation forces approved the licensing of the first private, commercial radio stations, giving Japan the mixed commercial/ non-commercial system it has today.

Television, which began in 1953 after the Occupation ended, surpassed newspapers in 1975 as the mass medium with the largest amount of advertising revenues. By 1989, television was taking 28.8 percent of ad expenditures, while newspapers took 25.1 percent. As for the future, already existing TV saturation (one set per 1.8 people) means limited increased revenues from new customers.

In 1971, Japan began to export more TV shows (primarily animated cartoons) than it imported (primarily movies), marking a shift in its status that persists to this day (Ito 1990). In 1999, Japan received \$579 million from the United States alone in payments for films and TV programs, whereas it paid out only \$16 million for U.S. imports, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce (cited in Jin 2002, p. 224). Thus Japan must shoulder its

production burden alone (about 150 hours a week for most stations).

In 1995, the average person watched television for 3.5 hours per day, an increase of 30 minutes from 1990. The champion watchers, who view more than five hours a day, are aged 70 and older. The peak viewing time is 8-9 p.m. (Public Opinion 1999).

Today, a typical viewer has a choice of two NHK networks (educational and entertainment) and five commercial channels (Nihon TV, TBS, Fuji TV, TV Asahi and TV Tokyo); these seven terrestrial TV networks with their "huge audiences," (Yamashita 2002, p. 35) are the subject of this study. In addition to terrestrial channels, there are two NHK satellite channels (requiring purchase of a small dish); two pay services with Japanese subtitles, Wowow and STAR movies; and two English pay services, CNN and BBC.

In Japan, the popularization of pay-TV by communication satellites, broadcast satellites and cable TV lags far behind that of the United States. In 2000, satellite (BS) television was digitized.

Satellite Television in Asia

STAR TV, the first regional satellite TV service in Asia, launched its initial five channels in August 1991, using the powerful AsiaSat 1. Established by a Hong Kong business tycoon, Li Ka-shing, STAR TV's original strategy was to target the top 5% of the Asian elite who spoke English and had buying power by offering mainly pan-Asian English programming (Tanzer 1991).

Rupert Murdoch, who wanted his News Corp. empire to break into Asia, in 1993 purchased from Li Ka-shing 63.6% of STAR TV for \$525 million (Karp 1993) and in 1995 boughtt out the remaining 36.4%. Working with local cable operators to retransmit its programming, STAR soon learned that a single pan-Asian strategy "did not work"

(Chang 2000, p. 66). STAR TV subsequently split its signal into a northern beam for the Chinese-speaking population in Taiwan, China, and Hong Kong, and a southern beam for the Hindi-speaking population in India.

In 53 Asian and Middle Eastern countries 120 million people watch STAR every week (www.startv.com/eng), The STAR TV channels have expanded from the original four in English and one in Mandarin to more than 40 in eight languages as of 2003. One of these, STAR World in English is included in this study.

In early 1996, STAR TV formed a three-party joint venture called Phoenix Satellite Television Company, which included the flagship general entertainment channel, Phoenix Chinese Channel (also a subject of this study). The Mandarin-language Phoenix channel, already available in southern China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, will be available in 2003 in three- and four-star hotels throughout the mainland.

Where available in China, the flagship Phoenix Chinese channel ranks second in popularity to CCTV 1. In 2002, its seventh year of operation, Phoenix earned \$88 million in revenues (Weber 2003, p. 289).

Purpose of study

Global, local, “glocal”: Understanding the cultural similarities and differences between the United States, China and Japan can have implications for business, educational and cultural relations, as well as specific applications for TV imports and exports. As a net exporter, Japan, for example, earned 100 times more for TV/film exports than it paid for imports in 1998 (Jin 2003, p. 229). U.S. movie/ TV producers, the world’s top purveyors of content, earn 50-60% of their revenues in non-U.S. markets (McChesney 2000).

This paper will elucidate cultural differences by studying the tolerance for, and nature of, representations of violence. Rather than joining in the debate about effects of violence (Potter 2002), this paper will use violence research for cross-cultural comparisons by replicating in Asia the most extensive TV study ever done in the West, the National Television Violence Study.

RELATED STUDIES

The passionate public and research debate about large vs. limited effects of TV violence underscores the importance of content studies of violence. It's easy to "point an accusing finger at the entertainment media as the primary reason for mayhem in our midst" (Heins 2001, p. v). For example, a full-page ad in the New York Times on Nov. 9, 1997, paid for by Accuracy in Media, screamed "**WE ARE OUTRAGED**" by media portrayals of "**violence and killings**" that "**encourage crime.**" However, any "censorship-based policy to prevent crime would be a complicated issue" because of the First Amendment protections (Heins 2001, p. 30)

Academic effects studies can be criticized for the lack of a control group of TV non-watchers. Moreover, studies may overlook "whether in fact some 'common third variable' [such as poverty and availability of guns] was the causative factor that accounts for the linkage" of viewing and violence (Heins 2001, p. 7). Even if media are "probably a peripheral cause" (Heins 2001, p. 31), social science research over the last 40 years has accumulated evidence of effects of TV violence.

Effects

Fear. George Gerbner, via his Cultural Indicators Project, posits that TV

violence invokes in viewers a skewed view of the real world as a more scary place than it really is. Violence increases insecurity and the public's willingness to accept an overbearing police force (Gerbner 1994).

Learned aggression. Bandura's (1986) social cognitive theory and his body of studies (e.g. Bandura, Underwood and Fromson 1975) set forth four subprocesses that govern observational learning: attention, retention, behavioral reproduction and motivation. Contextual features shown to be associated with learned aggression include attractive perpetrator, justified violence, conventional weapons, extensive/ graphic violence, realistic violence, rewards, and humor. Factors shown to decrease the learning of aggression include unjustified violence, punishments and pain/harm cues.

Desensitization. Graphic violence and humor are further associated with desensitization. Humor can dampen a potential aggressor's empathy, decreasing his/her inhibitions (Bandura 1990). Violence must escalate to retain its power to affect jaded, desensitized viewers. For example, "Death Wish" pictured nine corpses, but "Death Wish II" pictured 62 corpses (Gerbner 1994).

The NTVS project

The analysis of violence has moved beyond simply counting corpses to an emphasis on context and meaning. Supported by a three-year grant from the National Cable Television Association, the NTVS project analyzed non-news content from October to June for three years, 1994-97. It involved nearly 23 channels, 10,000 hours of videotaping and more than 300 researchers. Violence was defined as "any overt depiction of a credible threat of physical force or the actual use of such force intended to harm an animate being or group. Violence "also includes certain depictions of physically harmful

consequences against an animate being/ s that result from unseen violent means” (Smith, Nathanson and Wilson 2002, p. 90).

Violence was measured at three levels: incident, violent scene, and violent program. A violent PAT incident involves a unique perpetrator (P), engaging in a specific type of act (A), against a unique target (T). Every time the perpetrator, act type, or target changed, coders began a new PAT line. A violent scene was a series of interrelated violent acts occurring without a significant, meaningful break in the unfolding narrative. The last unit of analysis was the entire violent program. By looking at violence across these levels, researchers could assess features of violence in a context rather than in isolation.

Overall, the study found that, for the entire day, 58% (year 1), 61% (year 2) and 61% (year 3) of TV programs contained at least one violent incident. Premium cable channels had the most violence and PBS the least. Networks had more realistic violence with guns.

Violence on U.S. prime-time television

Even with 24-hour programming available, the evening hours of 8-11 pm continue to attract the most viewers; the average adult in 2000 watched more than 8 hours of 8-11 pm programming a week, according to Nielsen. To study prime time, Smith, Nathanson and Wilson (2002) used the most recent NTVS year, the October 1996-June 1997 database. For the most part, results for prime time and non prime time shows did not differ (Smith, Nathanson and Wilson 2002, pp. 93-97), with one exception being the increased realism of prime-time violence. For prime time only, no significant difference emerged in programs’ violence levels; 61% of the 418 programs airing between 8 and 11

p.m. had some violence. Thus research time can be more economically used by studying prime time (466.5 hours in the U.S. study) rather than non prime time (2,139.5 hours).

The researchers “considered a program to be ‘saturated’ with violence when nine or more interactions were featured in the show. No significant difference emerged between prime time and all other times of day; a “full 32% of all shows on television contained nine or more violent interactions” (Smith, Nathanson and Wilson 2002, p. 93).

Regarding genres, prime-time movies were the most violent (more than 90% had some violence) and featured graphic violence more than other genres. Perpetrators in network prime time (and basic cable prime time) were 68% (77%) white and 76% (72%) male, but only 5% (8%) heroic. (A hero protects and helps others at risk to self above and beyond the call of his/ her normal job without expecting a reward.)

Researchers found these results for variables dealing with the violence itself: (a) the reason or motivation for violence--protection of life, 33% (21%) of PATs; anger, 18% (30%); personal gain, 30% (26%); (b) the means used—natural means (i.e., use of own body), 31% (42%); gun; 51% (23%). Lethal violence was present in 56% (51%) of PATs. Blood/gore was present in 15% (13%) of violent scenes. Humor, defined as the use of speech, actions, and/or behaviors that any character engages in to amuse the self, another character, or the viewer, was present in 22% (36%) of violent scenes.

A number of variables required the coder to take the entire program into account. Only 4% of network (and basic cable) programs were coded as featuring an antiviolence theme—one that emphasized strongly that violence is morally or socially wrong.

Smith, Nathanson and Wilson (2002, p. 106) conclude that “primetime violence is especially likely to provoke observational learning among children. However, because

prime-time violence is not likely to encourage disinhibition, it may pose less risk to older children and adults, who have already learned nonviolent scripts.”

Cultural Variability

Cultural differences, to which any traveler can attest, have been verified by research. Culture can, for practical purposes, be defined as nation (Hofstede 2001). Hofstede originally developed four dimensions of cultural variability through analysis of a survey of 116,000 IBM employees in 40 countries, 1968 and 1972. Unfortunately, China per se did not appear in Hofstede’s original 1968/ 1972 surveys, but China is included in the 2001 second edition of *Culture’s Consequences*.

The newest (fifth) dimension, **long-vs. short-term orientation (LTO)** refers to “the fostering of virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular, perseverance and thrift” vs. “virtues related to the past and present” (Hofstede, 2001, p.359). Japan scored 80 on LTO, while the U.S. score was a much lower 29. China scored 118, highest in the world—even topping the 100 mark, because “the data for China came in after the scale had been fixed” (Hofstede, 2001, p.355).

The Hofstede (2001) dimensions on which Japan and the United States diverge most strikingly are **individualism** (Japan, 46; United States, 91) and **uncertainty avoidance** (Japan, 92; United States, 46). For China, the 1987 Chinese Value Survey (CVS) showed **collectivism** to be a strong cultural value, although “none of the CVS factors correlated with uncertainty avoidance” (Hofstede, 2001, p.353).

The clear U.S.-China-Japan cultural differences imply that TV audiences’ tastes could differ as well. However, few cross-cultural studies of entertainment TV content exist. Gunter, Harrison and Wykes (2003), who conducted a U.K. study similar to the NTVS,

include one U.S.-U.K. comparative chapter in their book. They found pay TV services and late-night programs to be the most graphically violent. Cooper-Chen (1994), who studied game shows, found cultural variation (four “cultural continents”) in that specific, locally produced genre.

Anecdotally, Weber (2003) credits the early (1980s) success of Hong Kong’s CETV in selling entertainment TV shows in China to the firm’s cultural and political sensitivities. CETV president Robert Chua understood that sex and violence “run counter to traditional family values and the spiritual civilization” of China (Weber 2003, p. 283). Further, Weber (2003, p. 287) credits CETV’s success to “negative references to the ‘other’ (western portrayals of sex and violence)”; the view of China as modern, not western, is “cogent with contemporary government thinking on Chinese values and social development.”

An important but dated Japan-U.S. study looked specifically at TV violence. Iwao, Pool and Hagiwara (1981) compared domestic and imported fare, but because they used a wide definition of prime time (5-11 p.m.), the sample, which included children’s shows, was 37% cartoons. Iwao, Pool and Hagiwara (1981), using Gerbner et al’s (1979) methodology and U.S. results, found nearly the same Japan and U.S. minutes of violence per hour.

Imported programs had more (8.1) incidents of violence per hour than domestic shows (6.8). Cartoons had 14.3 violent incidents per hour, while samurai dramas had fewer-- 8.7; the average for all programs was 7.0. Blood appears about as often in domestic (37%) and imported shows (35%), but the context differs. Aside from cartoons, “the net tone of Japanese programs is more that of a morality story. . . violence. . . is something that arouses distress and sympathy”—different from U.S. shows (Iwao, Pool and Hagiwara 1981, p. 36). The inclusion of shows imported by an Asian country foreshadows the present study.

Hypotheses and research questions

To explore Hofstede's finding of national cultural differences, the study looked at 14 micro-level research questions related to Asian TV violence. At a macro level, three hypotheses assume an East-West TV difference, based on the game show study of Cooper-Chen (1994), the Japan-U.S. research of Iwao, Pool and Hagiwara (1981) and Weber's (2003) China-West comparisons.

H1. Wherever Japanese and Chinese TV content is similar on various dimensions of violence, U.S. content will differ.

H2. Imported programs from the West will differ from domestically produced programs on various dimensions of violence.

H3. Satellite Mandarin-language programming will differ from programming on U.S. cable channels on various dimensions of violence; satellite STAR World will not differ.

* * * *

RQ1. How do the overall violence levels of China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs compare?

RQ2. How do violence levels of China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian movies compare?

RQ3. How do violence levels of China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian historical "costume" dramas compare?

RQ4. How do extremely violent ("saturated") China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs compare?

RQ5. How prevalent in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs is an anti-violence theme?

RQ6. How prevalent is humor in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs?

RQ7. How prevalent is sexual assault in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs?

RQ8. How often do heroes appear in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs?

RQ9. Are males or females more often involved in violence in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs?

RQ10. What races are involved in violence in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs?

RQ11. What reasons for characters' committing violence are most prevalent in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs?

RQ12. What weapons are most commonly used in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs?

RQ13. What level of harm is most prevalent in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs?

RQ14. How prevalent are graphic depictions of blood and gore in China vs. Japan vs. pan-Asian programs?

METHOD

During a faculty fellowship leave, the author conducted research in Asia using the 83-page NTVS codebook, reprinted in *The National TV Violence Study* (1997). She taped non-news/sports content --during October to June, 2000-2001 (the same non-summer months as the NTVS). For one week per month, she chose randomly the channel/network to tape on each day. Limiting the study to prime time (8-11 p.m.), she taped 7 days x 3 hours x 9 months, or 189 hours of content (minus news and sports programs). Like Smith, Nathanson and Wilson (2002), one year of content was studied.

Prime time in other countries does not necessarily duplicate the 8-11 pm period of the United States, but this study used those hours to create equivalence. For example, the "golden hours" in Japan are 7:30 to 10 p.m., while in China, the main evening programming typically starts at 7:40 pm. Moreover, some news programs occur during prime time rather than in the pre-prime time slots of US television. Such news programs were not taped (e.g., "News Station" with Hiroshi Kume on Japan's Asahi network or the prime-time news on CCTV 1, both 10-11 pm). A total of six hours, 45 minutes of news appeared in three months in China and seven hours, 15 minutes in Japan; no news appeared on the pan-Asian satellite services.

The names of the channels were written on paper and drawn from a box. If a channel were drawn and newspaper listings indicated a baseball game or other night sports event, the channel was replaced and another was drawn. If a movie continued past 11 pm, it was watched to its conclusion (usually no later than 11:20 p.m.); since news and sports programs were omitted to achieve equivalence with the U.S. study, this procedure did not result in excess taping and enabled the coding of program-level variables.

After noting the presence of no violent shows on China's educational CCTV-2 and only one show in three months on Japan's non-commercial NHK and NHK-e networks, they were dropped from the contextual analysis to remain parallel with the NTVS. Smith, Nathanson and Wilson (2002, p. 98) state that "because of its low levels of violence, public broadcasting was dropped from analysis involving context." (The educational shows *are* counted in "total shows" on Table 1.)

A difference between U.S. and Asian programming is the presence of U.S. imports on non-US screens—about one third of programming worldwide (Bannerjee 2002). Thus this project added the category "imports" to study the difference between domestic and foreign violence. This project also added the category "costume drama," which was defined as a domestic narrative program with a pre-World War II setting. Finally, Asian game shows have varied formats, can in fact be violent and do commonly appear in prime time. Thus, unlike the NTVS, game shows were included.

Seven China Central TV (CCTV) channels were taped in Beijing in October, November and December of 2000 (the sports channel was omitted). Seven channels were taped in Japan April-June—two non-commercial (NHK and NHK —educational) and five commercial: Fuji, NTV, TV Tokyo, Asahi, and TBS. Seven local and satellite channels

were taped in Hong Kong January-March, but only the pan-Asian Phoenix and STAR World channels will be analyzed for this paper. The author coded the CCTV and Phoenix programs with the help of a speaker of Mandarin and the Japanese programs with a speaker of Japanese. A graduate student assistant from China coded one English-language and five Mandarin programs. The NTVS coding sheets were used.

This study adopted the Smith, Nathanson and Wilson (2002, p. 94) “practical” criterion of difference--divergence by 10% or more. Their U.S. “broadcast network” channels were judged as equivalent to the NHK/ commercial channels nationally available in Japan and the CCTV channels nationally available in China.. Their U.S. “basic cable” channels were judged equivalent to Phoenix and STAR World channels.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

RQ1. Overall violence levels

Table 1 reveals extremely low levels of violence in Japan (13.3%) and China (16.3%) compared to the 47.1% of shows on Asian satellite services that contain some violence.

RQ2. Violence levels of movies

Table 2a shows that movies accounted for 38.5% of violent programs in China, while Table 2b shows that movies accounted for 37.5% of violent programs in Japan. The satellite channels aired no movies on the randomly selected days taped. (Pay movie channels are available in Asia, but were not included in this study.)

RQ3. Violence levels of “costume” dramas

Table 2a shows that “costume” dramas accounted for 15.4% of violent programs in China, while Table 2b shows that they accounted for a much higher 37.5% of violent

programs in Japan. Table 2c shows that “costume” dramas accounted for 25.0% of violent programs on the Mandarin-language Phoenix channel, but that no such shows aired on the English-language satellite channel.

RQ4. Extremely violent (“saturated”) programs

Table 2a shows that only 23.1% of violent programs in China were extremely violent, while Table 2b shows a figure of 87% for Japan (but we should keep in mind the numerically low number of violent shows in Japan). Table 2c shows that the saturated type was only 12.5% of violent programs on both satellite services.

RQ5. Programs with an anti-violence theme

Table 3 shows that, at the program level, China (3a) and Japan (3b) each aired one domestic program with an anti-violence theme. No such themes characterized programs on the satellite services (3c). In China’s “Story of Bitter Spring,” characters condemn a gambling addict after he attacks his father; when the man, a Muslim, shows remorse, those about to beat him with sticks refrain. Japan’s “Did You Know That?” portrayed battles of 1860-66 and ended by showing a leader who broke the cycle of revenge.

RQ6. Humor in programs

Table 3 shows that one imported (French) show in China (3a) and one in Japan (3b) featured some violent humor, but none of the satellite programs did (3c). The French import “Strawberry and Vanilla” injected farce into many of the confrontations between the (flawed) good guys and a group of thugs; for example, during a fight in a scuba shop, the scene switches to a gladiator contest at which an emperor gives a thumbs down, so the good guy smiles and stabs one thug with a harpoon. Two detectives in a Japanese mystery acted violently, but were also Keystone Cops-like in their bumbling.

RQ7. Sexual assault in programs

Table 3 shows that one foreign show in China (3a) and one in Japan (3b), as well as one domestic show in Japan, featured at least one sexual assault, but none of the satellite services' programs did (3c).

RQ8. Heroes appearing in programs

Each of Tables 4 a-c shows one domestic and one foreign hero. On Japanese television, Mark in "The Client" and Lord Mito in "Mito Komon" acted selflessly, even at risk to themselves. In China, a Chinese soldier in the World War II drama "God Dragon Car" and Terry Lambert in "The Bedroom Window" likewise acted selflessly. On Phoenix, a princess, who went out of her way to help a commoner, suffered injuries herself; on STAR World, in a "Chicago Hope" episode, a patron of a bank almost died after he reentered (during a Sarin gas attack) to save a woman and her grandson.

RQ9. Males/ females involved in violence

The totals on Tables 4a-c show that about 70% of characters involved in violence are male: China, 76.1%; Japan, 76.7%; satellite services, 69.2%. Thus by and large, both perpetrators and victims of violence are male.

RQ10. Races involved in violence

Table 4a shows that China had fewer --50.7% -- majority-race (Asian) characters than Japan (4b-- 70%). Phoenix (4c) had all majority (Asian) characters, while English-language STAR had mostly (81.3%) Caucasian characters. No blacks at all appear in Japanese programs in violent interactions, while a few appear in China and the satellites.

RQ11. Reasons for characters' committing violence

Table 5 shows that China (5a) Japan (5b) differ on the most prevalent reasons: personal gain and anger in China, versus retaliation in Japan. Anger is the most prevalent reason

on Phoenix, versus retaliation on STAR World.

RQ12. Weapons most commonly used

Table 5 shows China's (5a) heavy (40.8%) "reliance" on slapping, pushing and choking (natural means) and Japan's (5b) heavier (30.2%) "reliance" on swords than China (15.8%); both Japan and China show low use of guns. The Chinese-language Phoenix (5c), like mainland China, "relies" (46.7%) on natural means, while the English-language STAR relies heavily (40%) on guns.

RQ13. Level of harm

Table 5a shows in China the near absence (12.8%) of PATs with lethal violence (death, corpses) vs. 37.5% for Japan (5b), 30.4% for STAR and only 3.4% for Phoenix (5c). At the other end of the spectrum, "no harm" is 38.6% for China, 27.5% for Japan, 37.9% for Phoenix and 56.5% for STAR.

RQ14. Graphic depictions of blood and gore

Table 5 shows that more blood and gore is shown in Japan (5b- 50% of violent scenes) than China (5a- 36.8%) or STAR (5c- 32%) or, especially, Phoenix (5c- 5%).

Table 1. Violence Levels of TV Programs by Month: China, Japan and Satellite Services

	Month	# shows	# w/ violence	% violent
China	Oct. 2000	26	3	
	Nov. 2000	25	5	
	Dec. 2000	29	5	
	Total	80	13	16.3%
Satellite	Jan. 2001	3	3	
	Feb. 2001	7	2	
	Mar. 2001	7	3	
	Total	17	8	47.1%
Japan	Apr. 2001	19	3	
	May 2001	21	1	
	June 2001	20	4	
	Total	60	8	13.3%

Table 2a. Amount of Violence in Prime Time by Genre: China

# of Programs = 13	Import	Costume	Other	Total
# / % of programs w/ violence	5 (38.5%)	2 (15.4%)	6 (46.2%)	13(100%)
# / % of saturated violent programs	2 (15.4%)	0	1 (7.7%)	3 (23.1%)
# / % of violent movies	3 (23.1%)	0	2 (15.4%)	5 (38.5%)
# / % of saturated violent movies	2 (15.4%)	0	1 (7.7%)	3 (23.1%)

Table 2b. Amount of Violence in Prime Time by Genre: Japan

# of Programs = 8	Import	Costume	Other	Total
# / % of programs w/ violence	4 (50.0%)	3 (37.5%)	1 (12.5%)	8 (100%)
# / % of saturated violent programs	3 (37.5%)	3 (37.5%)	1 (12.5%)	7 (87.5%)
# / % of violent movies	2 (25.0%)	0	1 (12.5%)	3 (37.5%)
# / % of saturated violent movies	2 (25.0%)	0	1 (12.5%)	3 (37.5%)

Table 2c. Amount of Violence in Prime Time by Genre: Satellite Services*

# of Programs = 8	Costume	Other	Total
Phoenix: # / % of programs w/ violence	2 (25.0%)	2 (25.0%)	4 (50.0%)
Phoenix: # / % of saturated violent programs	1 (12.5%)	0	1 (12.5%)
STAR: # / % of programs w/ violence	0	4 (50.0%)	4 (50.0%)
STAR: # / % of saturated violent programs	0	1 (12.5%)	1 (12.5%)

* "Import" and "movie" categories not applicable

Note: "Saturated" means 9 or more violent interactions / program.

Table 3a. Characteristics of Violent TV Programs: China

# of Programs = 13	Import	Domestic	Total
Antiviolence theme	0	1 (7.7%)	1 (7.7%)
Humor	1 (7.7%)	0	1 (7.7%)
Sexual assault	1 (7.7%)	0	1 (7.7%)

Table 3b. Characteristics of Violent TV Programs: Japan

# of Programs = 8	Import	Domestic	Total
Antiviolence theme	0	1 (12.5%)	1 (12.5%)
Humor	0	1 (12.5%)	1 (12.5%)
Sexual assault	1 (12.5%)	1 (12.5%)	2 (25.0%)

Table 3c. Characteristics of Violent TV Programs: Satellite Services

# of Programs = 8	Phoenix	STAR	Total
Antiviolence theme	0	0	0
Humor	1 (12.5%)	0	1 (12.5%)
Sexual assault	0	0	0

Table 4a. Character Variables of Foreign vs. Domestic Violent TV Programs: China*

Persons involved in violence	Import N = 35	Domestic N= 36	Total N = 71
# / % who are White	26 (74.3%)	1 (2.8%)	27 (38.0%)
# / % who are Asian	1 (2.9%)	35 (97.2%)	36 (50.7%)
# / % who are Black	5 (14.3%)	0	5 (7.0%)
# / % who are male	26 (74.3%)	28 (77.8%)	54 (76.1%)
# / % who are heroic	1 (2.9%)	1 (2.9 %)	1 (1.4%)

Table 4b. Character Variables of Foreign vs. Domestic Violent TV Programs: Japan**

Persons involved in violence	Import N = 18	Domestic N= 42	Total N = 60
# / % who are White	18 (100%)	0	18 (30.0%)
# / % who are Asian	0	42 (100%)	42 (70.0%)
# / % who are Black	0	0	0
# / % who are male	13 (72.2%)	33 (78.6%)	46 (76.7%)
# / % who are heroic	1 (5.6%)	1 (2.4%)	2 (3.3%)

Table 4c. Character Variables of Mandarin vs. English Violent TV Programs: Satellite Services

Persons involved in violence	Phoenix N = 23 (Mandarin)	STAR N = 16 (English)	Total N = 39
# / % who are White	0	13 (81.3%)	13 (33.3%)
# / % who are Asian	23 (100%)	1 (6.3%)	24 (61.5%)
# / % who are Black	0	2 (12.5%)	2 (5.1%)
# / % who are male	14 (60.9%)	13 (81.3%)	27 (69.2%)
# / % who are heroic	1 (4.3%)	1 (6.3%)	2 (5.1%)

* does not include CCTV2 (educational)

** does not include NHK or NHK-e (educational)

Table 5a. Contextual Variables of Foreign vs. Domestic Violent TV Programs: China *

	Import	Domestic	Total
Reason for Violence ° N = 82			
# / % PATs involving personal gain	20 (35.1%)	0	20 (24.4%)
# / % PATs involving protection of life	12 (21.1%)	3 (12.0%)	15 (18.3%)
# / % PATs involving anger	8 (14.0%)	12 (48.0%)	20 (24.4%)
# / % PATs involving retaliation	5 (8.8%)	5 (20.0%)	10 (12.2%)
# / % PATs other	12 (21.1%)	5 (20.0%)	17 (20.7%)
Weapons used ‡ N = 120			
# / % PATs w/ natural means	27 (40.3%)	22 (41.5%)	49 (40.8%)
# / % PATs w/ guns	10 (14.9%)	7 (13.2%)	17 (14.2%)
# / % PATs w/ swords, knives	7 (10.4%)	12 (22.6%)	19 (15.8%)
# / % PATs other	23 (34.3%)	12 (22.6%)	35 (29.2%)
Graphic depictions + N = 101			
# / % PATs w/ no harm	29 (45.3%)	10 (27.0%)	39 (38.6%)
# / % PATs w/ mild/ moderate harm	26 (40.6%)	21 (56.8%)	47 (46.5%)
# / % PATs w/ lethal violence	9 (14.1%)	4 (10.8%)	13 (12.8%)
# / % PATs other/ not shown	0	2 (5.4%)	2 (2.0%)
# / % scenes w/ any blood or gore	21 (37.5%)	14 (35.9%)	35 (36.8%)

* does not include CCTV-2.

Table 5b. Contextual Variables of Foreign vs. Domestic Violent TV Programs: Japan **

	Import	Domestic	Total
Reason for Violence ° N = 74			
# / % PATs involving personal gain	8 (25.0%)	9 (21.4%)	17 (23.0%)
# / % PATs involving protection of life	2 (6.3%)	6 (14.3%)	8 (10.8%)
# / % PATs involving anger	10 (31.3%)	0	10 (13.5%)
# / % PATs involving retaliation	4 (12.5%)	17 (40.5%)	21 (28.4%)
# / % PATs other	8 (25.0%)	10 (23.8%)	18 (24.3%)
Weapons used ‡ N = 86			
# / % PATs w/ natural means	10 (27.8%)	16 (32.0%)	26 (30.2%)
# / % PATs w/ guns	14 (38.9%)	0	14 (16.3%)
# / % PATs w/ swords, knives	6 (16.7%)	20 (40.0%)	26 (30.2%)
# / % PATs other	6 (16.7%)	14 (28.0%)	20 (23.3%)
Graphic depictions + N = 80			
# / % PATs w/ no harm	12 (36.4%)	10 (21.3%)	22 (27.5%)
# / % PATs w/ mild/ moderate harm	9 (27.3%)	11 (23.4%)	20 (25.0%)
# / % PATs w/ lethal violence	6 (18.2%)	24 (51.1%)	30 (37.5%)
# / % PATs other/ not shown	6 (18.2%)	2 (4.3%)	8 (10.0%)
# / % scenes w/ any blood or gore	21 (61.8%)	26 (55.3%)	47 (50.0%)

** does not include NHK or NHK-e.

Table 5c. Contextual Variables of Mandarin vs. English Violent TV Programs: Satellite Services

	Phoenix (Mandarin)	STAR (English)	Total
Reason for Violence ° N = 47			
# / % PATs involving personal gain	1 (4.3%)	0	1 (2.1%)
# / % PATs involving protection of life	6 (26.1%)	1 (4.2%)	7 (14.9%)
# / % PATs involving anger	9 (39.1%)	5 (20.8%)	14 (29.8%)
# / % PATs involving retaliation	3 (13.0%)	6 (25.0%)	9 (19.1%)
# / % PATs other	4 (17.4%)	12 (50.0%)	16 (34.0%)
Weapons used ‡ N = 70			
# / % PATs w/ natural means	21 (46.7%)	6 (24.0%)	27 (38.6%)
# / % PATs w/ guns	5 (11.1%)	10 (40.0%)	15 (21.4%)
# / % PATs w/ swords, knives	12 (26.7%)	1 (4.0%)	13 (18.6%)
# / % PATs other	7 (15.6%)	8 (32.0%)	15 (21.4%)
Graphic depictions + N = 52			
# / % PATs w/ no harm	11 (37.9)	13 (56.5%)	24 (46.2%)
# / % PATs w/ mild/ moderate harm	17 (58.6%)	2 (8.7%)	19 (36.5%)
# / % PATs w/ lethal violence	1 (3.4%)	7 (30.4%)	8 (15.4%)
# / % PATs other/ not shown	0	1 (4.3%)	1 (1.9%)
# / % scenes w/ any blood or gore	2 (5.0%)	8 (32.0%)	10 (15.4%)

° Smallest N = “reason” because neither decontextualized depictions nor use of second weapon included a “reason.”

‡ Largest N = “weapons” because decontextualized depictions include weapons but not “reason” or “harm” and because two weapons could be used in one PAT.

+ Second largest N = “graphic depictions” because “harm” was coded twice if two weapons were used in one PAT.

Note1: P = Perpetrator, A = Action, T = Target (of a violent incident)

Note2: Examples of decontextualized depictions include movie clips shown during a Golden Globe awards program, quickly changing scenes during the opening theme song of “Princess Huai Yu” and scenes during the closing credits of any dramatic program.

* * * * *

H1 and H3 compare U.S. data from Smith, Nathanson and Wilson (2002), as noted on pages 8-10 above, with this study's Asian data.

H1. Wherever Japanese and Chinese network TV content is similar on various dimensions of violence, U.S. content will differ. **PARTLY SUPPORTED.**

The most basic dimension, overall TV violence, provides the most striking **support** for H1. The low violence levels in China (13.3% of programs) and Japan (16.3%) stand in stark contrast to the high U.S. figure of 67%. Moreover, when considering just the film genre, nearly all (93%) of U.S. movies were violent, vs. just over one-third for China and Japan (Table 2).

On three other variables where China and Japan are similar, the U.S. broadcast networks diverged by the “practical” criterion of 10%. Humor was used far more in U.S. violent shows (22%) than in China or Japan (Table 3). The U.S. “love affair” with guns (51% of weapons) contrasts with low gun use in China and Japan (Table 5). Finally, regarding reasons, U.S. shows portrayed protection of life (33%) more often than Chinese or Japanese shows (Table 5). (Race differences—more whites on U.S. than on Asian television—were not considered relevant to H1.)

Cultural similarities in all three countries do **not support** H1. East or West, violence is a “guy thing”; China and Japan (Table 4) matched almost exactly the U.S. figure of 76%. Also,; a viewer finds few heroes, whether in Chinese, Japanese (Table 4) or U.S. (5%) fare—and few anti-violence themes. Finally, personal gain was portrayed similarly on U.S. (30%) and Asian violent shows (Table 5).

H2. Imported programs from the West will differ from domestically produced programs on various dimensions of violence. **PARTLY SUPPORTED.**

One dimension that **supports** an East-West difference is movie violence (Table 2). Four Western movies imported into China (2a) and Japan (2b) were saturated with violence: for Japan, “The Client” with Susan Sarandon and “Eye for an Eye” with Sally Field; for China, the U.S. film “The Bedroom Window” and the French film “Strawberry and Vanilla.” Only one domestic movie each was saturated. Overall, however, imports did not represent the majority of violent programs.

Anti-violence themes appeared only in domestic programs, **supporting** H2, although the cell sizes are small (Table 3). The only sexual assault in China (3a) was an import, but for Japan (3b), one domestic show as well as one import portrayed a sexual assault, **contrary** to H2. (This hypothesis referred only to characteristics of programs, not the details of PAT interactions.)

H3. Satellite Mandarin-language programming will differ from programming on U.S. cable channels on various dimensions of violence; satellite STAR World will not differ. **PARTLY SUPPORTED.**

In **support** of H3, STAR World (in English, using mainly U.S. reruns) showed some similarity with U.S. cable. Similar dimensions include (Table 2c) saturated violence (U.S.-21%); presence (Table 3c) of an anti-violence theme (U.S.-4%); types of characters (Table 4): male (U.S.-72%), white (U.S.-77%) and heroic (U.S.-8%); and PATs (Table 5) involving anger (U.S.-30%).

Contrary to H3, STAR and U.S. shows differed on nine dimensions. Also **contrary** to H3, U.S. cable and the Mandarin-language Phoenix channel showed similarity on eight dimensions, including use of natural means (U.S.-42%). Overall, U.S. cable had more shows with violence (65%) than Phoenix or STAR.

CONCLUSIONS

This research on Asia studied violent TV content, 2000-2001, on three levels:

Intra- regional: China vs. Japan

Pan-regional: English vs. Mandarin

Selective cross-regional: Western imports into Asia

The use of the NTVS methodology enabled comparison on a fourth level, although

Smith, Nathanson and Wilson (2002) used an earlier time frame, 1996-97:

Inter-regional: East vs. West.

The discussion below will concentrate on content differences, level by level. It aims to explain results at a more macro level than the research questions and hypotheses.

Inter-regional: East vs. West.

The Hofstede (2001) cultural dimensions can elucidate this study's most striking finding--that only about 15% of China/Japan prime-time entertainment TV programs contain some violence, compared to 67% on U.S. broadcast networks. On individualism, the United States—ranked highest in the world (91)—stands apart from Japan- low/ moderate (46) and China- low (i.e. collectivist). Collectivist cultures would favor TV content that carries the least harm for the most people. Given the perception that violent content may be related to behavioral violence, viewers and programmers may reason, “For the sake of the common good, let’s keep violence off our TV screens.”

Moreover, China and Japan scored high on long-term orientation—a dimension on which the United States scored low (29). Thus the short-term thrills (a U.S. value) that graphic violence can arouse pales in the face of long-term benefits that (presumably) more uplifting content can provide; at the very least, Japanese and Chinese musical variety shows’ innocuous content can avoid negative consequences, if there are any.

Intra-regional: Japan vs. China

Among striking differences are Japan's higher percentages of shows with saturated violence, lethal violence, blood/gore and extensive use of swords. Japan's free media system (www.freedomhouse.org) contrasts with the controlled media system of China, where the "cultural sensitivity of Chinese regulators to sex and violence" (Weber 2003, p. 282) translates into censorship of content. Government policy in concert with culture can account for the Japan-China differences.

Pan-regional: English vs. Mandarin

Aimed at two different language groups, Phoenix and STAR satellite services could be expected to diverge in violent content. Indeed, Phoenix, which showed no Caucasian characters, featured costume dramas from Chinese history, such as "Princess Huai Yu." By contrast, the STAR lineup included "Sabrina," "Everybody Loves Raymond," "Dharma and Greg" and "Frasier" (all non-violent), as well as "Chicago Hope" and "Nash Bridges" (some violence).

While the U.S.- heavy STAR differed from Phoenix, it also differed from U.S. cable (H3). STAR could not succeed by replicating U.S. programming; its shows are selected for STAR's "glocal," pan-regional audience (Chang 2000, Weber 2003).

Selective cross-regional: Western imports into China and Japan

Since national audiences differ from pan-regional audiences, so do the reasons for the selection of Western shows. Both China and Japan seem to consider themselves modern but not (negatively) Western. The importing of extremely violent Western movies confirms Weber's (2003, p. 287) idea of the West as the "negative . . . 'other'." As Robert Chua, who successfully imports family fare into China, commented:

Sex for sex sake, violence for the sake of violence! We don't want that. Violence in the movies is just take a gun and shoot...bang, bang, bang. Shooting for the sake of shooting. This kind of thing, without a plot, we don't want this to be part of our culture (Weber 2003, p. 283).

Japan likewise locates saturated violence far away-- chronologically as well as geographically. Only one saturated program, "The Mystery of the Cursed Rubies," had a contemporary setting in Japan; the others took place in the past or came from the United States.

As noted above, the United States provides about one-third of TV programs worldwide (Bannerjee 2002). Thus TV entertainment studies of any country (e.g. developing commercial networks in Eastern Europe) should consider how selective cross-regional patterns operate in that country.

Limitations of study/ future research

Smith, Nathanson and Wilson (2002) did not report every variable by every channel type. With access to their raw data, the author could compare such dimensions as the percentage of blacks involved in violence and the percentage of violence involving sexual assaults. Each segment of the Asian study occupied only three months, not an entire year as in the Smith, Nathanson and Wilson (2002) U.S. research. The shorter time frame led to small cell sizes in some categories. The author hopes to replicate the study in a few years, perhaps with collaborators in Asia.

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Policing Press Freedom in Post-Soviet Central Asia: The Monitoring Role of Press Rights Activists and Their Web Sites

A paper prepared for the International Communication Division of AEJMC, for presentation at the annual convention in Kansas City, Missouri, July 31, 2003.

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Abstract

Twelve years after the Soviet Union collapsed and their independent national governments were established, Central Asian journalists face complex political, economic, resource, security and cultural challenges that affect their survival, safety, influence, credibility and informational mission. This paper examines the monitoring role of press rights activists in policing press restraints and in using Web sites and reports to publicize their findings and pressure governments to expand press freedom. It also discusses limitations of those strategies.

Introduction

Since the Soviet Union imploded in 1991, the five Central Asian republics have proclaimed a commitment to democratic values, press freedom and free speech. They enshrine those principles in their constitutions,¹ and their presidents reiterate those principles in speeches, meetings with Western leaders and official proclamations. The governments also point to those principles when criticized by domestic and international press rights activists.

However, there is a disconnect what they profess and reality: Journalists in all five countries face a daunting, sometimes deadly, mix of censorship, self-censorship, harassment, threatened and actual violence, job loss, financial barriers, tax audits, bribery, license revocation, imprisonment, exile and even assassination.

There has been little research on the impact of press rights activism on the laws and public policies that regulate and restrict the mass media in the region, although advocacy groups have grown more numerous and their means – including the Internet – of disseminating critical findings have grown more expansive. Press freedom and professionalization of journalism in Central Asia also remain under-researched by Western academics, as does the extent of Web site censorship. Since 1991, far more research has focused on press rights and journalistic standards in Russia, the now-independent former western USSR republics such as the Baltic states and former Warsaw Pact nations such as Hungary and Poland. Reasons for that disparity include the comparative geographic isolation of Central Asia, the countries' comparatively limited access to Western media influences, the traditional Moscow-centric focus of U.S. political and social research, weaker ethnic and family links between the United States and Central Asia and language barriers.

Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and continuing through the onset of the Iraqi war, Central Asia has been in the international spotlight because of its proximity to Afghanistan. U.S. and allied military forces are stationed in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, for example. Foreign aid from the West is flooding the region, and Western NGOs are spending heavily on humanitarian and economic development programs. Top U.S. officials have ventured there for the first time.

This paper examines how Western press rights activists – journalism-related NGOs, government agencies, international agencies and human rights groups – are focusing more attention on press repression. These activists issue reports, visit the region, interview journalists and government officials, underwrite independent media and publicize abuses. For instance, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) annually evaluates and reports on press freedom around the world, conducts site visits, writes to national leaders about specific problems and issues press releases to draw media coverage. In spring 2002, a three-member CPJ delegation spent more than a week in Uzbekistan, meeting local and foreign journalists, government officials, diplomats and NGO representatives. At the end of the visit, the delegation held a crowded news conference in Tashkent and sharply criticized the regime: “The government’s harsh policies have succeeded in creating a culture of self-censorship. Local journalists rarely cover official corruption, human rights abuses or the activities of opposition political parties and Islamic organizations.” CPJ posted its statement on its Web site.

Collectively, press rights activists include NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and CPJ; governmental agencies such as the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; and international agencies such as the Representative on Freedom of the Media of the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. These monitoring or

watchdog groups have several avenues for disseminating their reports and statements, including their own Web sites. They also seek coverage on the Web sites of nongovernmental news services such as the Institute for War and Peace Reporting and Eurasianet, as well as from mainstream media outside Central Asia. In Kyrgyzstan, a domestic NGO, Media Center Monitoring, uses weekly electronic newsletters to disseminate information about press freedom and restrictions in that country.

As Internet access and e-mail availability expand in the region, the public in the region should have more information about their own mass media that is not available through domestic newspapers, magazines, radio and television. However, Internet access remains limited, there is a dearth of training available on Internet skills and, for most people, computers and cybercafes are unaffordable. Even so, these Web sites do serve to inform the outside world, including humanitarian and human rights NGOs, foreign governments, journalism professionals, outside media and multinational organizations. At least in theory, some of those outside recipients of information are in a position to exert political and moral pressure and to use economic incentives or disincentives, such as grants and foreign aid, to push the five regimes toward allowing a more open press.

This paper also addresses why prospects for Western-style press freedom remain shaky due to a complex mix of structural-institutional, functional and social-political factors. It is uncertain to what degree most Central Asians even support Western-style journalism and the negative impact they perceive that press freedom may have on developing statehood, individual rights, cultural and religious values, nationalism and ethnic identity. That uncertainty reflects a global paradigm shift that the University of Missouri's John Merrill described this way: "The shift is basically from *the press* to *the people* (or to national rulers) – from press libertarianism

to press responsibility” (Merrill, 2002). This creates a dilemma for Western advocates of press freedom when their professional practices and values come under fire for arrogance, cultural unsuitability, economic nonviability and ethnocentrism, among other flaws.

The Historical Context of Press Restraints

To understand Central Asian attitudes toward press freedom, it is necessary to consider the context of the region’s history. Since ancient times, Central Asia has been repeatedly conquered and ruled by outsiders including the Arabs and the Mongols. Throughout the 19th century, the region the Russians called Turkestan was an amalgam of independent khanates and competing Russian, Persian and British spheres of control and influence. In what became known as the Great Game, superpowers Russia and Great Britain treated this remote, exotic area of deserts, mountains, nomads and the Silk Road as a field of intrigues, espionage, military expeditions, political machinations and potential market for exports. It also was a geographic buffer between Mother Russia to the north, the British colony of India to the south and an unpredictable China to the east. Finally, it provided a surrogate battlefield for the two European Christian powers to test arms, soldiers and strategies. As journalist-turned-historian Peter Hopkirk observed, “For those were the days of supreme imperial confidence, unashamed patriotism and an unswerving belief in the superiority of Christian civilization over all others.” (Hopkirk, 1990, p. 523).

By the early 20th century, Turkestan was under the direct and indirect control of St. Petersburg. Parts were absorbed as Russian territories, while puppet khans and emirs nominally ruled the rest. Russian emigrants arrived to farm, trade, manufacture, run the government and serve in the army. When the Bolshevik Revolution swept Russia, it swept Turkestan as well. In

the 1920s, Joseph Stalin carved Turkestan into five socialist republics, deliberately ignoring ethnic and cultural groupings. Those divisions made it easier for Moscow to govern but planted the seeds of ethnic rivalries and tensions that have erupted before and since 1991, sometimes bloodily so

Vladimir Lenin made his views clear in a 1920 speech: "Why should freedom of speech and freedom of the press be allowed? Why should a government which is doing what it believes is right allow itself to be criticized? It would not allow opposition by lethal weapons. Ideas are much more fatal things than guns." (Mencken, 1966, p. 966).

From the start, the role of the press in post-Revolution Turkestan was the same as elsewhere in the Soviet Union. In his memoir of Turkestan under the Bolsheviks in 1918-1919, British secret agent Frederick Bailey described local newspaper writers as "ignorant men with little knowledge of history or geography. The writer would take a few facts from an out-of-date book of reference, cut out what did not suit his argument, distort the rest so that it did, and add a few rhetorical expressions and slogans." News about World War I was "usually relegated to a small paragraph in an obscure corner and headed 'imperialists' War,'" and the peace conference was labeled the "Black Paris International." What filled the pages of *Nasha (Our) Gazette*, *Isvestia*, *Krasni (Red) Front* and *Turkestanski Komunist* instead? "The important events were the progress of revolutionary movements in other countries and speeches of various komissars." Bailey wrote of one newspaper, *Anarchist*, that dared criticize the new commissars: "It was immediately repressed and possession of a copy was severely punished. Needless to say the paper which optimistically had been numbered 'one' never got beyond this first copy" (Bailey, 1946, pp. 64-65).

Bailey described (p. 65) what would happen throughout the Soviet era and beyond: Foreign papers were occasionally smuggled in containing what he called “more unbiased news.” That observation also foretold efforts by post-independence regimes to block access to Web sites posting anti-government articles.

In Soviet days, Central Asia’s press operated as propagandist, collective agitator, arm of the state and platform for the rulers to build the Communist Party and further Marxist-Leninist ideology. Media subservience to the Party was demanded because the Party was the single voice and agent of the working class. Although the press did not advocate or push for free expression, it did push for a positive role for itself in society and acted as an agent of international propaganda for the Soviet system. (Shafer & Freedman, 2003) In Tajikistan, for example, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union controlled the media, and “newspapers could not change the editor-in-chief without permission from the CPSU Central Committee. The CPSU would interview new editors-in-chief about their ideology, which ensured that Lenin’s slogan ‘the media is a collective organizer and advocate’ determined the form, methods and contents of journalism during the whole Soviet period.” (Khamadov, 2002, p. 1).

On a practical level, journalists were educated and trained toward those ends. Many senior journalism professors in Central Asia have advanced degrees from Soviet universities or worked for the press under the Soviet system.³ *A Guide to Newspaper English*, a Cold War-era journalism textbook published in Moscow took its examples from the *Daily World*, *World Marxist Review* and other English-language communist papers. A representative lead: “The October Revolution and the country born out of it – the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics – played an important role in the revolutionary struggles of the Bulgarian people and in the building of socialism in Bulgaria. The centuries-old friendship between the Bulgarian and

Russian people found expression in all stages of their development.” (Potalueva & Seidova, p. 24). A typical exercise question: “When were the Palestinians driven from their ancestral lands by Israeli terrorists and reactionaries?” (p. 62).

After independence, exactly the same leaders stayed in power although they no longer called themselves communist: Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan; Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan; Asker Akayev of Kyrgyzstan; Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan; and Emomali Rakhmonov of Tajikistan. They now head regimes run by autocrats, kleptocrats and nepocrats, regimes marked by wholesale corruption, self-dealing, favoritism, egotism, repression, arbitrary behavior, rigged elections and stifling of dissent, including the voices of independent news media. The majority of the population is Muslim but their governments actively discourage religious observation and promote secularism. That approach to religion reflects both a 70-year Soviet history of atheism and the leaders’ fear that Islamism will be used to mobilize opposition to their rule. Religiously oriented news media are outlawed or restrained.

Press Repression and Press Rights Activism

Journalism is a high-risk profession in Central Asia, and self-censorship is common. That situation has not changed significantly since independence, and there is a troubling similarity from country to country. As press rights watchdogs repeatedly report, governmental agencies, ruling parties or their lapdogs control the vast majority of newspapers, magazines, TV and radio stations, as well as printing houses and Internet service providers. Only limited distribution of foreign publications is allowed. Only a tiny proportion of the population has access to or can afford to use the Internet – less than 1 percent of the Uzbek population use the Internet (Pannier, 2003) – although by November 2002 the U.S.-funded NGO International

Research and Exchanges Board had opened 50 free Internet access centers in the region, with training for journalists, community NGO leaders and other individuals who want to use them. (Mikosz, 2003).

Internet access and the skills to navigate the Web are not always sufficient to ensure access to information about press restraints. For example, it has been reported that the Uzbek government has blocked some non-Uzbek sites after articles were posted alleging official corruption (Pannier, 2003) and that the Kazakh government altered the content of CNN.com when material critical of the president was posted. One Western expert has cautioned that increased U.S. aid could further impair Internet freedom by allowing the Uzbek government's Internet Service Provider to consolidate its monopoly (Stubbs, 2002). Also, the content of Western-based Web sites may not be in Russian or any of the region's ethnic languages, reducing their usefulness and practical accessibility to the local populace as information sources and as credible alternatives to the mainstream media in their countries.

Although they share common problems and confront similar government-imposed obstacles, the five press systems aren't identical. Since 1991, "the paths of the regional mass media have gone their separate ways," according to an analysis by an independent Uzbek journalist (Juraev, 2002, p. 130), who divides them into three models: The first, "authoritarian-democratic," exists in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan: "Despite the fact that the Asian method of production and a despotic administration predominate in these states, signs of freedom of the press are nevertheless evident in them. The press plays the role of a 'fourth power,' and even the most virulent adversaries of freedom and democratic reforms have to reckon with it." (p. 130). Juraev labels the second "post-conflict" as it exists in Tajikistan, which underwent a civil war in the mid-1990s. "Here the press very deliberately, and not under pressure from the

government, restricts certain statements and opinions, fearing that the mass media could instigate a new conflict." Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan reflect his third model, "total control," with the head of state considered the founder of the press and with the government maintaining full control of print and broadcast. (p. 131)

The attitude of each government includes a proprietary interest in controlling information, both out of a sense of history and out of determination to maintain power. The concept of "public information" remains alien. Instead, information belongs to the government.

Here are representative findings from several press rights activist groups and the U.S. State Department (2002):

Kazakhstan

The Human Rights Watch (HRW) *World Report* (2003) notes that "Kazakhstan is a particularly egregious example of a country where we have observed a worrisome trend of intensified crackdown against journalists who have dared to write critically of government policies. It documented assaults and other abuses against journalists (HRW, 2002, p. 1). Its 2003 *World Report* is even more alarming: "Kazakh government repression of independent media reached crisis proportions, as journalists were attacked and beaten, threatened with death and jailed. Media outlets connected to President Nursultan Nazarbaev's political rivals, and journalists who attempted to expose official corruption, were particular targets of the crackdown." Press laws facilitate repression. Despite constitutional provisions prohibiting censorship, the law is ambiguous, resulting in restrictions on media content. For instance, it prohibits the press from "undermining state security" and prohibits supporting "class, social, race, national or religious superiority." Editors, owners of mass media, distributors, and journalists are subject to these laws, according to HRW.

Media are subject to laws on national security, giving the Prosecutor General authority to suspend media activity deemed to undermine state security. A 1999 law proscribes what state secrets are off-limits, including aspects of foreign policy. The list of potentially prohibited information includes everything about the health, financial and private life of the president and his family. The Constitution mandates that the president's dignity be protected, and it is illegal to insult him or other officials. Also prohibited is dissemination of information, such as the scientific characteristics of national mineral reserves and details about foreign debt.

All media including Internet sites must register with the government. Libel laws have been expanded, and foreign programming and content from international news agencies are subject to Kazakh libel laws. The State Department reports that media laws are selectively enforced: Some outlets were allowed to broadcast reports highly critical of the government; others were punished for doing so. A recent libel provision holds owners, editors, distributors and journalists responsible for media content, promoting self-censorship at each level. High fines are said to have bankrupted some small media outlets. Publishing houses fearing fines and other repercussions are said to hesitate to publish material that might contain "undesirable" stories. Libel suits are used to close down opposition media outlets and silence opposition leaders.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan has generally been credited with the highest degree of press freedom among the five republics. Yet CPJ ranks it among the world's 10 worst places to be a journalist, along with the West Bank, Zimbabwe and Colombia. (CPJ, 3 May 2002). HRW (2003) asserts that the government has abandoned human rights commitments by using violence to break up demonstrations and attempting to dismantle press freedoms. Its report further contends that the

government's closer relationship with the United States reduces the diplomatic consequences of repression.

Since a 1998 referendum amended the Constitution, Parliament is precluded from passing laws infringing on free speech. However, the mass media law "prohibits the dissemination of government and commercial secrets; material advocating war, violence, or intolerance toward ethnic or religious groups; desecration of national norms, ethics, symbols, such as the national seal, flag, or anthem; pornography; and encroachment on the honor and dignity of a person," according to the State Department (2002). Through compliant courts, the government uses the prohibition against material that encroaches on the honor and dignity of a person to harass and pressure independent media. Media must register with the Ministry of Justice and await approval before operating. In March 2001, citing an excess of outdated registrations, the ministry required all media outlets to re-register, which took eight months to complete.

Government influence over state television, radio and government newspapers is maintained because they receive subsidies. Private news organizations are hurt by unfair competition for the extremely limited advertising revenue, according to the State Department. Still, there are approximately 25 to 30 newspapers and magazines with varying degrees of independence. Ulchkun, the state printing house, remains the primary newspaper publisher in the country and has sometimes refused to print or distribute selected independent and opposition newspapers.

Tajikistan

As Tajikistan has become more central in the "War Against Terrorism," President Rakhmonov has strengthened his virtual one-party rule, with anti-terrorism as an excuse for

controlling press content. Opposition movements are tightly controlled although there has been some easing in the areas of broadcast licensing and slander prosecutions. The 2003 HRW report states that "despite these changes, the majority of severe media restrictions remain firmly in place." HRW notes that the state-owned publishing house conducted pre-publication censorship and that authorities threatened and harassed journalists following publication of material critical of the government or officials. Media licensing procedures remain difficult

Constitutional free speech and free press rights are severely restricted in practice, according to the State Department (2002). Controls are exercised overtly through legislation and through indirect methods such as "friendly advice" to reporters about what they should and should not cover. Journalists who disagree with the government are discouraged from speaking out. The government is said to exert pressure on newspapers with the courage to criticize it. One moderate Islamic newspaper was censored for publishing a serialized translation of a critical foreign human rights report. The government controls printing presses and newsprint supplies.

Virtually all publications and broadcasting are subsidized, encouraging a high degree of self-censorship by journalists who fear government reprisals. Despite an increasing number of local and independent media, only a small number of newspapers attempt to cover serious news or provide analysis. Other newspapers are organs of political organizations.

The one government-run television network and affiliated stations cover regional and local issues from an official viewpoint, with little access for opposition politicians. Only a few of the 36 non-government television stations are truly independent, although they do sponsor political debates. The State Department reports that independent broadcasters experience administrative and legal harassment, particularly over licensing. The licensing process is said to

be complex and corrupt, and can take months to years to accomplish; there is no appeals process if a license is denied.

Turkmenistan

The 2003 HRW *World Report* begins: "Turkmen authorities continued to violate basic rights, crush all dissent and further isolate the country from the rest of the world. President-for-life Sapamurat Niazov did not relent in his total control over politics and society." The report presents a long list of active repression of civil freedoms, including press curbs. Those related to mass media and information access included limits on local access to Russian-language Web sites and tightened control over access to oppositionist Web sites.

In 2002, customs agents in the capital reportedly began confiscating copies of the Russian newspaper *Komsomolskaia Pravda* because it contained an unfavorable travel feature on Turkmenistan. They also attempted to question subscribers who already had access to that issue. Cable television providers were scrutinized after airing a Russian program critical of the government. In May 2002, it was reported that a newspaper correspondent lost her employment contract after the government found she planned to attend a seminar in Sweden on democracy and journalism. Even harsher measures were taken against the media after a November 2002 assassination attempt against Niyazov. (Eurasianet, 25 November 2002).

Uzbekistan

The 2003 HRW report cites continuing human rights abuses on a massive scale, despite closer diplomatic relations with the United States. The report says that the government "systematically violated the rights of freedom of religion, expression, association and assembly." As for censorship, the report states that on 13 May 2002, pre-publication censorship was officially lifted after the chief censor was fired and the State Inspectorate for the Protection

of State Secrets disbanded. The same week, however, the government ordered Tashkent newspaper editors to assume responsibility for self-censorship.

There have been some recent articles on sensitive topics such as unemployment and poverty that previously would have been censored, yet one editor was summoned by the president's office and pressured not to publish such material under threat of prosecution. Despite the ostensible easing of press restrictions, the State Department remained harsh in its analysis of human rights in Uzbekistan. Its 2002 report called Uzbekistan "an authoritarian state with limited civil rights," a poor human rights record and continued engagement in serious abuses.

The report notes that while the Constitution provides for freedom of thought, speech and personal convictions, the government severely restricts these rights and tolerates little criticism. The government actively prevents dissemination of oppositionist literature, particularly religious literature, and the mass media law prohibits stories that "incite religious confrontation and ethnic discord or advocate subverting or overthrowing the constitutional order."

There are no private publishing houses, and virtually all newspapers are organs of government ministries. Private individuals and journalist collectives are prohibited from establishing newspapers unless they meet government standards for private newspapers. General distribution of foreign newspapers is not permitted. Some foreign papers and magazines are available in Tashkent's major hotels, and authorized groups can apply to obtain foreign publications. Scattered kiosks sell foreign newspapers, probably obtained from the hotels after they are a few days old.

There is strict licensing of broadcast outlets. Four state-run channels fully endorse the government and its policies in most of their programming. Access to cable television is unaffordable for most Uzbeks. The State Department (2002) estimates there are 30 to 40

privately owned local television stations and seven privately owned radio stations. Since the registration committee meets irregularly, up to one half of independent television stations have been forced to operate with expired licenses, leaving them vulnerable to closure.

The State Department further reports that journalists have been subject to threats, harassment and mistreatment by authorities. It lists cases where journalists were threatened with arrest, particularly for covering stories critical of the government, including a television station owner who was arrested and tortured after criticizing Karimov for repressing of dissent.

Who Watches out for the Media?

In addition to the Committee to Protect Journalists (www.cpj.org) and Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org), other Western NGOs monitor and report about press restraints based in North America or Western and Central Europe. They include Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org); the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (www.osce.org/fom); Canadian Journalists for Free Expression (www.cjfe.org); International Press Institute (www.freemedia.at); and Reporters Sans Frontieres/ Reporters without Borders (www.rsf.org). Their means of disseminating findings and complaints include Web sites, press releases, formal reports and direct meetings and correspondence with officials in the region.

Their sites typically include reports from their own groups and similar organizations about abuses of the press; links to news accounts about press freedom issues and events; press releases, speeches and correspondence; and announcements of training programs and conferences. Language remains a major limitation on their effectiveness since some sites have little content in Russian, let alone the ethnic languages of the region where many people do not know Russian. Human Rights Watch has a Russian-language version of its site, but CPJ does

not. In 2002, for instance, two of the CPJ alerts and protests about press restraints in Uzbekistan were posted in both Russian and English on www.cpj.org, but about a dozen others dealing with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan were posted only in English.

It is more difficult for local press rights advocacy-oriented NGOs to organize in Central Asia. Not until March 2003 did Uzbek authorities register, Zhurnalist, the first grassroots journalists' NGO in the country. Its leader said the group called intends to defend and consolidate journalists' rights (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2003). The Central Asia and Southern Caucasus Freedom of Expression Network (www.cascfen.com), based in Azerbaijan, was created in 2001 and has eight member-organizations of journalists from six countries, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Elsewhere, Media-Center's "Monitoring of Conflicts and Violations of Journalist's and Mass Media Rights in Kyrgyzstan" is a weekly electronic newsletter about media-related politics, finances, training and governmental policies in that country. A representative issue (22-28 January 2003). included items on how Radio Salam has broadened its coverage zone; the inaccessibility of a governmental Web site; the launch of a Ministry of Interior Affairs newspaper for militia members; the launch of a medically oriented newspaper; the training of Kyrgyz journalists in the United States; the delayed opening of a regional information center; the start of Web site for opposition parties; and the beating of a journalist from the independent newspaper *Moya Stolitsa*.

Some Western-based NGOs and governmental programs engage in press rights activism by providing or funding professional training for Central Asian journalists. For example, the State Department's Fulbright program (www.cies.org) sends journalism educators to teach at universities and to provide lectures, seminars and workshops for professionals. The Soros

Foundation's Open Society Institute (www.soros.org) provides media support and training, and operates the Eurasianet.org Web site for independent reporting from Central Asia and the Caucasus. The International Committee for Journalists (www.icfj.org) receives State Department funding to train journalists and media managers. With State Department funding, the International Research and Exchanges Board (www.irex.org) provides grants, training and legal support for independent media and for free-access Internet centers. Internews (www.internews.org) gets State Department funding to train independent broadcast journalists. Under the State Department's Freedom Support Educational Partnerships Program (<http://exchange.state.gov>), U.S. journalism programs can develop partnerships with Central Asian universities, such as one between Northeastern University and Uzbek State World Languages University.

Apart from periodic reports from mainstream Western news organizations such as the British Broadcasting Corp., some Western Web sites actively cover press freedom and human rights issues in the region. They include Free Europe/Radio Liberty (www.rferl.org); the International Freedom of Expression Exchange (www.ifex.org); Transitions Online (www.tol.cz); Eurasianet (www.eurasianet.org); and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting (www.iwpr.net). For independent journalists, these Web sites may also provide an outlet for their reports, sometimes written under pseudonyms to avoid retaliation. Also importantly, a single assignment for some Web sites may pay more than two months' salary from a state-controlled news organization.

As for the influence or clout of the foreign press, Western journalists have had only limited impact on press restrictions there. In general, at best they draw attention to a situation, but any substantive, long-term changes will be up to the people of each republic.

In what may be a rare cause-and-effect situation, a IWPR Web-published article about the expulsion of a journalism student at the Uzbek State World Languages University apparently did help bring about his reinstatement. The student was expelled in Fall 2002, officially for poor grades and high absenteeism. However, IWPR reported the widespread belief that he was punished for criticizing government policies in a “wall newspaper” – a poster on a university wall. (Vasiliev, 2002). In reaction to that critical coverage, university officials agreed to let him take make-up exams and be readmitted.

International politics remain an impediment to the effectiveness of press rights activism. Western dignitaries sound the rhetoric of respect for press freedom. For example, on a 2002 visit to Tashkent, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Lorne Craner said his trip would “emphasize the importance of human rights and democracy in U.S. foreign policy.” Craner, who oversees the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, said, “You cannot have a foreign policy without a moral dimension” and “that a part of the answer to terrorism is human rights and democracy.” (Eurasianet, 2 February 2002). Later that year, British Ambassador Craig Murray created a stir when he publicly criticized Uzbekistan for holding 7,000 to 10,000 political or religious prisoners. Murray made his comments with diplomats and Uzbek officials present and may have caused friction with the United States, whose ambassador’s remarks that day were more diplomatic. One journalist wrote, “The main question ... is whether criticism of abhorrent policies in Uzbekistan spur the government to reform or instead cause it to circle its wagons and become more defensive?” (Stern, 2003.)

However, in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks and military intervention in Iraq, many U.S. officials are loathe to pressure their newfound friends too heavily, and the five

regimes realized that it is enough to respond merely by mouthing platitudes and promising to ease restraints. They then do little to reform. (Shafer & Freedman, 2003).

Attitudes toward Western Media and Media Values and Acceptance of Authoritarianism

The policing work of press rights activists rests on an assumption that the freer and more independent media outlets are and the less restrained that individual journalists are, the better for any nation. That assumption canonizes not only traditional Western journalism values such as fairness and balance, but also a belief that Western press systems are superior to authoritarian or other models. That belief is best reflected in the 1956 classic *Four Theories of the Press* (Siebert et al.), although that book has come under fire as overly simplistic, ethnocentric, stereotyped, capitalism-driven and tainted by nationalistic Cold War values (Merrill & Nerone, 2002).

In fact, many Central Asian journalists – even some victims of press restraints – regard themselves as builders of the state, recognizing no inherent conflict of interest. One who made that point is Shodiv Mardiev, a journalist from the state-run radio station in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, who was imprisoned for his satirical broadcast about corruption in local government. In January 2002, Mardiev was released after four years. He later described the experience at a World Press Freedom Day ceremony: “All my life I worked for my country. I’m so sorry my country abandoned their son and a reporter.” Interestingly, he distinguished between Karimov, whom Mardiev insisted is doing his best to build Uzbekistan, and lower officials whom he insists thwarted Karimov’s policies. “Journalists are doing their best to go in line with the president’s programs. I’m so surprised that some authorities try to twist the

president's policies and put slander on journalists. I was the victim of such a slander" (Freedman, May 2002, p. 11A; Freedman, 6 May 2002).

Since the abandonment of communism as their ideology, the leaders of the republics have "opted for the resurrection of the nation idea" (Muminova, 2002, p. 133), with the press regarded as an instrument of unification within each country's borders, as journalism Professor Fatima Muminova of the National University of Uzbekistan put it. "The newly created national identity was based on a heightened appreciation of national dignity rather than on the idea that the nation was part of the world community. There is no doubt that the CIS media have done a lot to firmly plant this idea." Thus journalists have become instruments to build national identity. Instead of proselytizing for the Communist Party, they proselytize for a national mentality. Regardless of medium, the goal is the same, she wrote, adding, "In this respect, any press, either truthful or lying, is a very efficient method of creating identities." (p. 135) Equally troubling, self-censorship remains a potent force for suppressing news and information. Tajik journalist Sulton Khamadov observed that "the instinct of self-preservation has become the journalists' main censor." (2002, p.2). Another Tajik journalist observed that even those working for foreign media, including the BBC, avoid overt criticism of official policies. (Zakirova, 2002).

Governments treat journalists as key players in the state-building process, not as independent watchdogs serving a broader public purpose. An example: In March 2002, Tajik President Rakhmonov sent a Press Day message to a gathering of journalists: "We are grateful to you for your high sense of responsibility and worthy contribution in building civil society." (Khamadov, 2002, p. 1).

Unhappy as it makes many Western press rights activists feel, many Central Asians resist following Western press models. They may trust government more than the media, and they may believe the press should be a booster for nationalism. Survey research, such as a study of ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Russians in Kazakhstan, found strong support for the proposition that public order comes ahead of freedom (Javeline, 1999). And Merrill noted what the authors observed as Fulbright lecturers and as trainers of professional journalists, journalism educators and journalism students in Central Asia:

Western – especially American – academics and practicing journalists travel increasingly to the Third World, preaching the benefits of capitalistic and pluralistic media structures, insisting that every country’s media system should conform to such media structures. This perspective is, of course, not only an arrogant and ethnocentric one but also betrays a stultified intellectual view of reality. (Merrill, 2002, p. 18)

Merrill detects a changing paradigm “from press libertarianism to press responsibility:

They see Western libertarian journalists as harmful to social stability and national development. And they see the Western journalism model as arrogant and based too solidly on economic or profit-making motivations. They want more control of the media for their country, not less. They want order, not chaos. They want more of a monolithic press, not a pluralistic one. They believe that government should have more power over communication. (p. 22).

Those attitudes have serious implications for the potential influence of press rights activists in building regional support for media independence. While physical assaults and assassinations of journalists are indefensible, many citizens defend the concept of suppressing articles and broadcasts they fear may weaken respect for their government and its leaders,

impair diplomatic or international economic initiatives and lower national self-esteem. Thus an activist group that excoriates the latest official attack on a writer or photographer may find its Web-based report appreciated in the West but ignored or critiqued within Central Asia.

Also, Western professional journalists tell each other that the best future for press freedom in Central Asia may rest with the next generation of journalists, who didn't work under the Soviet system or under the immediate post-Soviet regimes. Yet there is evidence that even journalism students misunderstand or distrust the Western models or both. Oklahoma State University Professors Stanley Ketterer and Maureen Nemecek surveyed Kazakh journalism students' attitudes toward democracy and found similar beliefs. Among the results: Almost 61 percent agreed or strongly agreed that a "leader with a strong hand to preserve law and order" is normal in a democracy, and 36 percent agreed or strongly agreed that it's normal in a democracy for a leader to "control the flow of information." Eighty-three percent agreed or strongly agreed that free speech and assembly are essential to democracy, and more than 56 percent agreed or strongly agreed that Kazakhstan follows those principles.

Other Obstacles to Effective Press Rights Activism

There are other significant barriers to a free press in Central Asia, barriers that also impair the ability of press rights activists to facilitate changes in policies, laws and attitudes.

Financial Barriers

Independent media in Central Asia constantly face crippling financial problems. In Kyrgyzstan, Media Center Monitoring reported that in Fall 2002 alone, the newspapers *Pyatnitsna* and *Kok-Art Nuru* closed due to financial problems; the newspapers *Fergana* and *Akyikat* were heavily in debt to their printing houses; and the newspaper *Osh Shamy* had to cut

back from twice a week to once a week. There are other serious fiscal challenges. Ernys Mamyrganov, director of the Osh Media Regional Center, cites the financial threat of litigation and the fact that the “advertisement market and financial position of consumers are not enough developed” outside the capital. Those nongovernmental media that do survive, at least temporarily, often depend on grants from foreign NGOs. “In the case of independent media grant discontinuance, it is the possibility that only the governmental editions will survive because of the state subsidy” (Mamyrganov, 2002). The publisher of the independent English-language weekly *Times of Central Asia* said:

There is no market solution to the present financial problem. The market is too small. Companies do not advertise on a regular basis and consequently the only source of income for independent media is very limited. A possible solution may be contribution from public funding based on distribution and other parameters but given the red budget of the various countries of Central Asia this does not seem realistic. A support from foreign organizations may help with training and equipment but this will not be enough (Fiacconi, 2002.).

Media economics are complicated on micro and macro levels, as recent developments show in Tajikistan, where newsprint and typesetting rates have risen. The state-owned printing plant, which produces 80 percent of the country’s publications, imposed a 40-percent increase in January 2003. One local reporter wrote that readers now find cheaper ways to get information including “borrowing” papers from vendors for two or three hours at a fraction of the cover price or “clubbing together with friends and neighbors to buy one” (Abdullaev, 2003).

Journalism Education

It's uncertain to what degree Western-style journalism education is an effective way to promote and proselytize for press freedom in Central Asia. While the introduction of "democratic journalism" with its emphasis on professionalism, fairness, balance, accuracy and ethics is essential, there are serious questions about much impact it will have and how soon any impact will be evident. Students know that style of journalism is not practiced or allowed.

The authors taught through the Fulbright program at the International Journalism Faculty of State World Languages University, the most prestigious and competitive journalism program in Uzbekistan. By the time the authors completed their stays, many students could recognize a good news story and could find and interview multiple sources. They could understand ethical issues regarding publishing or withholding information, write good leads and possibly incorporate strong quotes and color. However, they had no student publications, on-campus Internet access, photography lab or television equipment. The student-run radio station broadcast only within the building. The library was poorly stocked.

More significant was the lack of systematic, practical training in interviewing skills, meeting deadlines, editing and fact-checking. Journalism education remains theory-dominated. Perida Bostonova, the journalism chair at Kyrgyz Technical University, explained, "Our students know very well the theory of how to conduct an interview but have very little experience in conducting an interview." (Bostonova, 5 February 2003). The curriculum is rigid and compulsory, with only a handful of electives offered. (Bostonova, 10 February 2003).

The exception is the American University in Central Asia^{*}, whose teaching methods and academic standards are the closest to a U.S. university of any in Central Asia. Its journalism curriculum, much of it taught in English, emphasizes practical skills. Students must "complete a

^{*} Formerly named American University in Kyrgyzstan.

hands-on internship with one of the national media that will enhance their practical skills.” In contrast to journalism programs elsewhere, there are required courses in math, history, literature, computer science, sociology, economics and research methods. The curriculum includes required courses in media management, law and ethics, reporting and editing, computer layout and design, and photojournalism. Electives include TV criticism; fundamentals of public relations and advertising; public affairs and international reporting; advertising and public relations techniques; documentary production; investigative journalism; and political communication. (American University in Kyrgyzstan, 2002.)

Co-optation of the Media as Part of the Power Structure

Until 1991, Central Asian journalists proudly saw themselves as Soviet citizens. As such, they were members of the intelligentsia with a leadership role in society and were aware that their “stories were read and carried influence” (Wu et al., 1996, p. 541). Today, the Central Asian media, particularly those controlled or owned by government and the political parties in power, are regarded as part of the power structure and as an essential tool in nation-building processes. As much as the power elite tries to suppress independent media, they foster their own controlled media.

Not surprisingly, government leaders clearly show favoritism that undermines editorial independence. Example: In 2002, Kyrgyz President Akayev awarded prizes for contributions “into the development of journalism and objective covering of the socio-economic life of the country.” One winner was vice president of the National TV and Radio Corp. The Kyrgyz parliament offered its own awards in a competition among the mass media on “different and objective covering of the work of this chamber.”

Areas for Future Research

Given the dearth of published academic research, Central Asia media issues remain ripe for exploration. Topics relevant to the future of independent journalism include the operating methods and effectiveness of press rights activists and a framing analysis of their Web sites. Other fertile areas of research include journalism students' attitudes in countries other than Kazakhstan and the scope and effectiveness of NGO-sponsored training programs for professionals. Another area involves present and prospective uses of the Internet as a medium to disseminate independent reporting. On the economics front, there are important unanswered questions about the financing and financial viability of independent media and about the ways that underpaid journalists support themselves, whether through legal activities such as translating or freelancing or through unethical activities such as accepting bribes to publish or not publish stories.

Conclusions

The press in Central Asia faces a complex set of challenges that affect their economic survival, the physical and financial safety of their journalists, their influence on public affairs, their nations' international image and the ability of their readers and audiences to be informed participants in democratization. Press rights activists must vigilantly carry out their inquiries and reporting, but with a recognition that historical, cultural, religious, economic and political realities will shape the evolution of the five countries' press systems into forms that are apt to conflict with Western models. Activists must do more than criticize. They must consider whether a go-slow approach to opening these press systems may be more successful than aggressive demands and must carefully avoid ethnocentrism and arrogance. They must also

continue to use technology, such as the Internet and e-mail, to disseminate their findings both within the region and internationally. At the same time, they must be alert to problems with censorship of the Internet, both existing and prospective, lest the impact of their watchdog endeavors be impaired.

¹ Tajikistan, Article 30. “Every person is guaranteed freedom of speech, publishing, and the right to use means of mass information. State censorship and prosecution for criticism is prohibited. The list of information constituting a state secret is specified by law.”

Uzbekistan, Article 29: “Each person has the right of freedom of thought, speech, and belief. Each person has the right to seek, receive, and disseminate any information, with the exception of information directed against the existing constitutional order and other limitations established by law. Freedom of opinion and the expression of opinion may be limited by law for reasons of state or other secret.”

Kyrgyzstan, Article 16: “Every person in the Kyrgyz Republic shall enjoy the right ... to free expression and dissemination of one's thoughts, ideas, opinions, freedom of literary, artistic, scientific and technical creative work, freedom of the press, transmission and dissemination of information.”

Kazakhstan, Article 20 “The freedom of speech and creative activities shall be guaranteed. Censorship shall be prohibited.

Everyone shall have the right to freely receive and disseminate information by any means not prohibited by law. The list of items constituting state secrets of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be determined by law.”

Turkmenistan, Article 26: “Citizens of Turkmenistan have the right to freedom of conviction and the free expression of those convictions. They also have the right to receive information unless such information is a governmental, official, or commercial secret.”

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Online Journalists in Germany 2002

The first representative survey on German online journalists

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Paper submitted to the **International Communication Division**

Abstract

This paper presents the key findings of the first representative survey of online journalists in Germany. It focuses on the most important aspects of online journalism, such as the basic demographics of online journalists, their working conditions, job satisfaction and structural factors (e.g. business models). The findings support the conjecture that online journalists are facing economic and professional pressure. Nevertheless most of the respondents still show some fascination in online journalism.

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Online Journalists in Germany 2002

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1. Introduction

A “revolution” (Boldt 1996), “the future of journalism” (Tonnemacher 1998) or “a whole new journalism” (Quittner 1995) – these are some of the headlines referring to journalism on the World Wide Web when online journalism seemed to be one of the biggest hopes for the media, in the US as well as in Europe. While the traditional media like newspapers and TV were facing stagnation or even a recession in their business, the Internet promised a new market with a huge potential. The new economy flourished, and a lot of media organizations were investing in online newsrooms and editorships.

After the burst of the new economy bubble, quite a few media companies now show less interest in the Internet, with decreasing investments due to the lack of sufficient profits. Others turn to journalism studies and ask for solutions in these troubled times – unfortunately, journalism researchers can not give them a simple answer. In some countries, the situation is even worse: Here, journalism researchers cannot provide any answer at all as they do not have enough information on the field.

Germany is one of these countries: Most of the academic articles on the subject were focusing on speculation rather than facts. Only a few empirical studies have been undertaken and most of them are based on a very small number of respondents. To put it in simple terms: There are no representative surveys on the work of online journalists in Germany.

This was the starting point of the present study: It is the first representative survey of German online journalists based on a random sample of professional communicators working for online publications. It includes people from ‘start ups’ as well as editors from traditional media with online publications and it covers the journalists from straightforward news sites as well as more exotic sites. Furthermore, it has been planned in co-operation with the team behind the American Journalist study so that its results are comparable to their latest findings on journalism in the United States.

In this paper, we would like to present some of the key findings of this study, such as the basic demographics of online journalists, their working conditions, job satisfaction, the journalists’ ideas about their professional role and some structural factors (e.g. business models).

To give the reader an impression of where we started we will summarize the status quo of the current academic debate on online journalism in Germany (section 2). From this starting point, we will develop the objectives of the study (section 3), explain the methodology (section 4) and present some key findings (section 5). Finally, we will give a summary of the study and its findings (section 6).

2. Status quo of research

As mentioned above the debate on online journalism in Germany consists of many theoretical articles and speculations. In many cases the authors do not differ from previous views already expressed in American articles such as Quittner (1995) or Singer (1998). The main focus is on the potential rather than the reality of online journalism. Still there are some empirical studies as well: Some researchers are concentrating on the content and its perception by the user – in particular the credibility of online sources (Roessler and Wirth 1999); others are interested in the use of hypertext and multimedia content as well as the overall usability (Bucher 1998, 2001; Storrer 2001).

Studies on the work of online journalists are scarce, probably due to the overall concentration of communication studies on the Internet's interactivity, community building and other 'new' aspects. The work on classical 'communicators' was not a major interest when turning to the new medium. Still there are a few studies worth mentioning.

The first exploration studies in online publications' newsrooms go back to 1997/98 (Mast, Popp and Theilmann 1997; Schmitt 1998). Most of their information on the work in newsrooms is outdated. Wilke/Joho sketch the work of the journalists in one (particular) case that is not typical in any respect. Much more information could be gained through the studies of Neuberger (2000a, b, 2002a, b) who carried out a representative survey on the (project) managers of online newspapers. From his studies we have a rough idea of how big the phenomenon should be (he mentions less than 2000 online journalists in Germany), and some impressions of what online journalists do. From Neuberger's point of view, online journalists do not successfully use the potential of the medium as in their work they are still very much 'print' centered. On the other hand, Neuberger's survey relies on interviews with the managers of online publications and thus just offers their particular view on their subordinates' work.

A detailed picture of the work of online journalists has been drawn by Quandt's observation study in five online newspapers (Quandt 2003). In his 10-week observation, he coded more than 11.000 actions of the observed journalists which allowed him to analyze the rules and structures that shape their workday. In his study he describes online journalism as being close to print journalism as well, but with the speed of news agencies. Therefore, there is a constant pressure to write the next news. Due to this pressure and the lack of economic and human resources, online journalists seem to rely heavily on the material provided by news agencies.

While both Neuberger's and Quandt's studies provide us with detailed views on online journalism and possible trends, their results still have to be tested in a larger, representative study. Such a survey is also needed due to the lack of solid statistical data on the work of journalists.

3. Objectives of the study

The primary objective of the survey was to draw a representative picture of German online journalists, their work and their attitudes related to their job and online journalism on the whole. Therefore, we put our focus (1) on several “traditional” aspects stressed in many surveys of journalists around the globe and (2) on some important questions referring to the specific quality of online journalism.

The first aim was to explore the basic characteristics of online journalists and to draw a first socio-demographic profile of the field. Besides, we put our attention on the organizational environment and occupational activities of online journalists. Another important goal was to find out how they differ from journalists working for “traditional” media. Moreover, we aimed to explore the working conditions and the level of job satisfaction of online journalists, in particular if compared to their colleagues working for print and broadcasting media. Another objective was to examine how online journalists perceive their professional role in a pluralistic society. Finally, our research put a particular focus on business models in online journalism and the journalists’ view on the future of their field.

4. Methodology

The findings of this study are based on a nationwide and representative telephone survey of 461 journalists working for online media in Germany, conducted in November/December, 2002. The research has been carried out in cooperation with the third wave of the “American Journalist” study in the United States (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996) so that some of the items and findings are comparable to this study.¹

One of the most complicated issues was the definition of the term “journalist” in relation to online publications. Most empirical studies on journalists look on their object of research from an individualistic perspective. They define journalism by the typical (traditional) work patterns in journalism – in this approach journalism is what journalists do. Weaver and Wilhoit (1986: 168), for example, define journalists as those “who have editorial responsibility for the preparation or transmission of news stories or other information” (editorial responsibility) by working in news media (organizational affiliation). Unfortunately, this poses some problems when it comes to online publications: First of all, we do not have reliable information what people calling themselves “online journalists” are really doing. Quandt’s study (2003) gives us some hints that there might be a much stronger bias towards selection and re-writing processes, while research and original writing seems to be less prominent. A second problem lies in the differentiation of journalists and other groups that have similar work patterns. The definition by editorial responsibilities makes it difficult to differentiate between journalists and people working in the field of public relations (PR). Quite often they simply do the same: A PR officer is likely to do similar jobs like writing and editing news stories. This problem of blurring borderlines is not specific to the Internet, but the integration of

¹ The cooperation was funded by the German Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation. We would like to thank the foundation for its support.

publications from diverse sources on one technological platform – the WWW – makes it much harder to draw a dividing line.

To avoid such confusion, we made use of a more complex approach to identify journalism and journalists. The definition consists of three steps:

1. In a first step, journalism has been distinguished from other areas of public communication such as PR (PR being defined as self-centered communication serving the presentation of the communicator itself), arts (fictional in character) as well as non-professional and non-periodic media.
2. In a second step, journalism was differentiated by the organizations providing content for print, broadcasting and online media.
3. In a final step, we identified professional roles that are related to the “core” of journalism. This traditional role concept of core journalism is defined by work patterns such as investigating, selecting, writing and editing of news. The concept of “news”, however, has been used in a broader sense including hybrid formats such as ‘infotainment’ or ‘edutainment’, lifestyle magazines and special interest publications.

As consequence, we did not limit our sample to traditional news journalists only. The population of this study is therefore broader than those examined by other journalism studies such as Donsbach (1993), Patterson (1998) or Weaver and Wilhoit (1998). Nevertheless, we can extract information on both the “core” journalism (i.e. the more traditional news journalism on the web) as well as the more exotic hybrid formats that are typical for the Internet. Due to the inclusion of core journalism tight comparisons are still possible.

The practical application of such a complicated approach poses some challenges to the researcher. As in most other democratic countries a complete list of all journalists who might apply to the definition above was not available in Germany. We developed a stratified sampling procedure to overcome this problem:

- (1) In a first step we compiled a complete list of all German news organizations possibly publishing online. This compilation was based on various sources such as the media directories by *Stamm*, *Zimpel* and the *IVW*.² From this list (consisting of more than 10.000 media) we excluded organizations mainly promoting enterprises, associations, federations, clubs and public administration since those were defined as PR. We also removed non-professional websites such as college and school sites and personal homepages. The remaining list consists of 3644 media.
- (2) From this list, we drew a sample consisting of 2000 media by using a random procedure. This sample has been screened again for websites not primarily practicing online journalism by a content analysis procedure: Websites clearly indicating PR and non-professional communication in their content have been removed from the sample. From the remaining 1208 items, we have completed interviews in 332 news organizations.

² Stamm and Zimpel are media directories compiled on a professional basis. They are used by the media themselves, by politicians and PR departments. The IVW is an institution offering the German standard in measuring online usage (PIs and visits).

- (3) We selected the respondents within the news organizations by using an alphabetical criterion. In order to avoid oversampling of journalists in small-sized organizations, we used a quota scheme developed through an independent pre-survey in 132 online organizations: The goal was to interview one journalist in small-sized organizations, two journalists in middle-sized organizations and five journalists in large-sized organizations. To make a projection from the sample to the population, the data has been weighted according to the results from the independent pre-survey.

The main survey has been carried out in November/December, 2002, in parallel to the third wave of the "American Journalist" study in the United States that, for the first time, included a minority sample of US-American online journalists for direct comparison with the German survey. Finally, a total of 461 online journalists have been interviewed successfully, representing a response rate of 71% of the journalists we directly approached.

The telephone interviews were supported by a CATI-system (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing). To some degree, our questionnaire followed the major surveys of journalists in the United States (Weaver and Wilhoit 1996) and in Germany (Weischenberg, Loeffelholz and Scholl 1998), while exploring specific issues related to online journalism. In total, our questionnaire consisted of 68 questions. The average interview time was between 30 and 40 minutes.

5. Key findings

In this section, we would like to give some answers to the following questions (derived from the main objectives of the study):

1. Who are the online journalists?
2. a) What are they doing...
b) ... in which (organizational) environments?

The first question can be answered by the description of the basic characteristics (sex, personal/marital status, age, general and journalistic education). The second question refers to data on working conditions (type of parent medium, full time vs. free lancer contracts, editorial positions, editorial departments, frequency of news updates/work pressure, job satisfaction) and the professionalization level (understanding of professional roles). Last but not least, we will give an overview of the preferred business models for online journalism in Germany and an outlook on the future of online journalism.

5.1 Basic characteristics of online journalists

The average German online journalist at the beginning of the 21st century is male, has a university degree and is 35 years old (cf. table 1). These characteristics agree with what we know from other surveys on journalists in traditional media (radio, TV, newspaper). There are two notable differences, though: the first one is the personal/marital status. Online journalists in the majority are single (65 percent vs. 54 percent in the German journalists survey 1993; Weischenberg, Loeffelholz and Scholl 1998: 237). The second deviation from the traditional journalist is the average net income. Online journalists earn \$28.087 a year, which is about \$3.113 less than the income of the traditional journalists.

Table 1: Basic Characteristics of German Online Journalists

Characteristics	N*	
Female	461	38.2 %
Single	460	65.0 %
University Degree	461	59.0 %
Age (median)	459	35 years
Average Income	240	\$28.087 (p.a.)

* Varying N is due to refused answers.

5.2 Organizational environment and working conditions

The Internet and in particular the World Wide Web has blurred the borderlines between the media in a particular way. Before the beginning of the Internet age, it was clear what we mean when we speak about newspapers, magazines, TV and radio stations. However, all of these media are present on the Internet, and there are even some new players (like 'pure' online start ups), too. To get a clearer picture of the overall distribution between the media with different background, we asked the journalists to name their company's organizational type. They could choose between traditional media organization (various types of newspapers and magazines, public and private broadcast companies, news agencies) and other organizations (online 'start ups' und other companies unrelated to the media).

Table 2: Type of Parent Medium

Parent Medium	Frequency	Percentage
Magazine	114	39.7
Daily Newspaper	63	22.0
No Parent Medium Company ("Online only")	21	7.3
Private Broadcasting	20	7.0
Daily/Sunday Newspaper	19	6.6
Public Broadcasting	15	5.2
News Agency	7	2.4
Freesheet	5	1.7
Others	18	6.3
Don't know	5	1.7
Total	287	100

According to our findings, most of the online journalists work for the news sites of magazines (39.7 percent) (cf. table 2), followed by the daily newspapers (22.0 percent). The other media – weekly and Sunday newspapers, public and private broadcast – only represent about five to seven percent of the employers. Original start-ups with no roots in traditional media are a very small

segment of online journalism: 7.3 percent of the journalists work for organizations that could be labeled “online only”.

This could lead to the assumption that online journalism is nothing more than just an addition to traditional journalism, and appendage. So one could expect a very bad ratio between full time professional editors and free lancers, with free lancers being an important group. The reasons are obvious: Online journalism is under pressure. Economic constraints due to a lack of advertising, more competition through the new players in the online business, an economic recession with decreasing revenues have led to a reduction of staff even in the editorial offices. So one would expect freelancers as a cheap alternative to full time editors. In traditional German journalism the relation between these two groups is two (full time) to one (free lancer) (Weischenberg, Loeffelholz and Scholl 1998: 237). Indeed this ratio is different in the field of online journalism – but surprisingly, free lancers are a much smaller group than expected. Only 14 percent of all online journalists are working as free lancers (cf. Table 3). This finding can be explained by the amount of work force that goes into the online publications: We have estimated that roughly 6200 full time editors (83.2 percent) just work part time for the online publications – the rest of their time is spent on the conventional publications of their organizations. So online journalism is just an addition to their other work. Using part time online editors is probably the cheapest approach to online journalism because the organizations do not have to invest in new departments and work force. We have found that only about 1250 online journalists (16.8 percent) are working fulltime in the online department.

While some of the journalists split their time between traditional and online media, many of them also split their attention to several news areas: Working in particular departments (such as politics, economy, culture, sport) is the rule for traditional German journalists, but not so for online journalists. More than half of them (52.5 percent) are not working for any specialized department. Obviously, online journalism is a field with wide spread tasks that are not divided into individual departments. This is a sign of the economic weakness, too, since it reflects the huge number of online journalists working in very small online units (76.2 percent) that do not allow for specialization.

Small online units are also visible through the hierarchical position of online journalists: About fifty percent of all online journalists are working as ordinary reporters (cf. Table 3). But many online journalists are working in a ‘higher’ position: Each fifth online journalist (20 percent) is working as an editor-in-chief, 29.9 percent of online journalists are working in the middle management as senior and desk editor. While many online journalists have an editorial management position, this does not mean that they earn a lot of money (as we have seen above) – it just means that the total number of workforce is comparably small, so that the ratio between people in the leading positions and the subordinates is different from traditional media. As expected, online journalism as a ‘young’ profession is not a field of education and training. Only three percent of the online journalists are trainees.

Table 3: Organizational Environment

	Frequency	Percentage
Position in the Hierarchy		
Editor-in-Chief	91	20.0
Senior/Desk Editor	137	29.9
Reporter	215	47.1
Trainee	14	3.0
Total	457	100
Working in Particular Departments		
Yes	219	47.5
No	242	52.5
Total	461	100
Editorial Work Force		
Fulltime	392	85.9
Freelancer	65	14.1
Total	457	100

5.3 Areas of work/tasks

This outline of the working conditions still does not give us a clear impression of what online journalists do. There are some expectations, though: Quite a few of journalism researchers believe that online journalists do not work in the traditional way. Some authors mention the label 'content manager' when talking about online journalists: They expect them to organize news by re-writing and re-packaging already existing material. To find out whether this is true, we asked the online journalists about their usual jobs during one average week.

The findings support the assumptions to a certain extent, but give us a more complete picture: Online journalists spend the most part of their average 45 hours work time a week on writing, online investigations, news selection and the editing of news material from agencies and public relations (cf. table 4). This kind of work pattern is performed by more than 80 percent of online journalists.

Some of the tasks performed by online journalists seem to reflect the traditional 'role model' of the journalist (Weischenberg, Loeffelholz and Scholl 1998: 239). However there are some notable deviations from conventional ideas about journalism: First, we notice a peak in online investigation, a tribute to the conditions of online media. Second we find new tasks such as programming, and finally we have to point out the comparably high amount of time spent on management and the notably frequent user contacts. The time spent on user contacts seems to be low, but we have to stress the fact that in traditional journalism user contacts are almost negligible.

Table 4: Tasks of the Online Journalists

Tasks	N*	Percentage performing this task	average duration per workday (minutes)
Online Investigation	451	96.6	73
Writing	454	91.2	107
News Selection	449	84.7	84
Editing News Material from Agencies and PR	446	81.4	78
Copying/Transferring Text onto the Online Web Page	451	77.5	62
Management	451	74.4	55
Offline Investigation	453	76.9	35
Editing Material from Colleagues	453	80.5	54
User Contact	450	60.8	21
Production	451	64.1	32
Programming	446	21.8	15

* Varying N is due to refused answers.

The exceptions obviously can be traced back to the technological challenges of online media. On the one hand a higher level of user contacts is due to the interactive potential of online media – the option for user feedback is much more direct through e-Mail and the respective feedback functions on the web pages. On the other hand, editorial ‘content management systems’ (integrated software packages for news production and distribution) are necessarily changing work patterns because they bundle numerous tasks through one software interface. Digital media content is not bound to the restrictions of space or time; journalists can work with it anywhere and any time. But the content also needs to be managed and organized. This requires much of the journalists’ working time, so it means a shift from the content production to the content packaging and distribution.

A fact which has to be pointed out in this context is the frequency of updates of the web site content, as it has a strong impact on the work pressure and speed in online journalism. Updates are necessary due to a simple but notable fact: A central difference from conventional journalism is the lack of production deadlines – content can be produced, distributed and updated continuously. Therefore we asked for the update rhythm of online publications (cf. table 5). The findings show that most of the web sites are updated several times an hour or at least several times a day (altogether 61.7 percent), 15.6 percent of the media update their content once a day, 12.9 percent weekly or with even lower frequency. This means that most online journalists have the pressure of permanently updating the content. This implies that they spend time for this that is not available for other jobs. In addition, it also means that quite a notable amount of their text production merely is re-writing already existing material – a finding that also underlines the assumptions mentioned above (and the findings of Neuberger’s and Quandt’s earlier studies).

Table 5: Updating Online Publications

	Frequency ³	Percentage
Several Times an Hour	98	30.1
Several Times a Day	103	31.6
Once a Day	51	15.6
Several Times a Week	32	9.8
Weekly	27	8.3
Less frequent	15	4.6
Total	326	100

These results lead to the question of job satisfaction: Given the pressure of constant news updates, a relatively low net income and a bad market situation, we expected a low job satisfaction. However, we found the results to be very surprising: More than ninety percent of the online journalists are fairly or very satisfied with their job and only a minority of 1.2 percent is very dissatisfied (cf. table 6). This could probably be explained by an overall fascination with the new field of online journalism, a relatively short period of time spent with this job as online journalist, small units and some other factors – but this is largely speculation. (A closer look at the findings with multivariate analysis is in preparation, so this might answer some of the open questions.)

Table 6: Job Satisfaction of Online Journalists

Job Satisfaction	Percentage
Very satisfied	15.3
Fairly satisfied	75.5
Fairly dissatisfied	8.1
Very dissatisfied	1.2

(N=455)

5.4 Professionalism

The most prominent questions on journalism are based on professional roles: How do the journalists perceive themselves, how do they describe themselves and to what extent do their views support the political function of mass media visible in all larger journalism surveys in Western countries (Donsbach 1993; Patterson 1998; Weaver and Wilhoit 1996)? Due to the complexity of self-descriptions and perceptions, several statements are needed in order to operationalize these concepts. From these items, we can build a 'profile' of online journalists' perceptions and their understanding of the professional work in journalism. Most of the journalists approved of items describing their

³ Only organizations counted.

role perception as a neutral news journalist, such as ‘get information to the public quickly’, ‘get information to the public neutrally’, ‘explain and transport complex issues’ (cf. table 7). Items that describe a political and critical role of journalists are accepted in a much lower frequency, such as ‘control politics, economy and society’, ‘present my opinions to the public’, ‘put myself out for the disadvantaged ones’.

Table 7: Professional Roles

Professional Role Items	N*	Percentage saying “fully and completely agree “	Percentage saying “fairly agree”
Get information to the public quickly	460	62.4	26.2
Get information to the public neutrally	461	59.3	31.0
Explain and transport complex issues	460	52.6	32.5
Concentration on messages that are interesting for the largest possible audience	460	22.9	31.2
Offer entertainment and relaxation to the people	461	15.6	27.9
Offer life assistance to the public	461	11.6	27.6
Give the normal people a chance to express their opinion on topics of public interest	461	8.6	18.4
Control politics, economy and society	460	5.1	13.1
Present my opinions to the public	455	4.7	13.4
Put myself out for the disadvantaged ones	461	3.7	20.9
Setting Agenda	461	1.6	10.5

* Varying N is due to refused answers.

5.5 Business models

The advertising revenues of nearly all media are decreasing. Many German media companies had to cut their staff including journalists. New projects like new media titles and web publications are the first victims of such a reduction.

The economic environment of online journalism is therefore one of the most interesting fields of research. Hollifield, Alexander and Owers (2003: 159) suspect a difficult situation for online journalism: "(...) digital technologies have made it possible to capitalize on market synergies to a much greater extent by creating wholly new distribution channels while simultaneously reducing the cost of translating content from one media platform to another. But emerging technologies, and most specifically the World Wide Web, also have significantly increased the economic instability and uncertainty of media markets. Media corporations have found American audiences to be generally unwilling to pay subscription fees for Web-delivered information. And while the total volume of advertising dollars spent on the Web has risen steadily, few media corporations have found that their Web sites attract enough advertiser – or command high-enough advertising rates – to generate profits. Consequently, a strong economic model for Web-delivered news and information has yet to emerge."

There are some questions arising from this analysis:

1. What kind of business model is preferred by the media organizations?
2. What are the criteria for a successful online journalism?

We asked the online journalists for their estimation on these topics. It is hardly surprising that most of the media organizations do not limit their options to one way of gaining revenues – they prefer combinations of several business models. The existing business models can be divided into three groups: The first comprises forms of advertising: 80 percent of the media organizations are using online advertising in order to finance their web sites (cf. table 8). The second group consists of different business models with a quota share of 35 to 55 percent each: cooperation with other organizations/industries (55.4 percent), content syndication (46.4 percent), subscription of certain parts of the content (34.6 percent). 12 percent of the organizations are using specialized business models not mentioned above. In this third group of business models we find business forms that are not very common and only used by a few online media: subscription of the whole content (9.3 percent), cross-financing by the parent companies (5.1 percent), sponsoring (1.8 percent) and public fees (0.9 percent).

Table 8: Business Models

Business Model	Frequency (multiple answers)	Percentage
Online Advertising	267	80.4
Cooperation with other Organizations/Industries	184	55.4
Content Syndication	154	46.4
Subscription of Certain Parts of the Content	115	34.6
Subscription of the Whole Content	31	9.3
Others	40	12.0

(N=332)

So we can clearly say that there is not one business model dominating online journalism. Mixed business models seem to be the most common solution for the generation of revenues in online journalism today.

5.6 The future of online journalism

We assumed that the future of online journalism depends on several criteria of success. We identified nine criteria and asked the journalists to estimate the importance of these criteria for a successful online journalism.

The most successful criterion for the future of online journalism is 'speed of news updates': 97 percent of the journalists found this criterion very or fairly important (cf. table 9), followed by 'offering service to the user' (87.4 percent). Third is 'cost consciousness' (83.2 percent). Other criteria that were mentioned quite often are 'original content (created by the media themselves)' (80.5 percent) and 'interactivity' (79.5 percent). Somewhat less important seem to be 'multiple utilization (of content)' (69 percent) and 'user contact' (69 percent), 'entertainment contents' (65.9 percent). 'use of multi media possibilities (audio/video etc.)' comes last (60 percent).

In total the findings show that the future of online journalism is depending on a bundle of criteria that represent a mix of standards of news reporting, economic influence and technological potentials. Some of the most prominent ideas about online journalism from its beginnings in the mid 90s have a lower ranking than expected, though: specifically 'interactivity' and 'multi media'.

Table 9: Criteria of Success for the Future of Online Journalism

Criteria of Success	N*	Percentage saying “very important”/“fairly important”
Speed of News Update	461	97.0
Offering Service to the User	458	87.4
Cost Consciousness	457	83.2
Original Content	460	80.5
Interactivity	458	79.5
Multiple Utilization	456	69.0
User Contact	460	69.0
Entertainment	458	65.9
Multi Media	461	60.0

* Varying N is due to refused answers.

The fact that cost consciousness and the speed of news updates are so important leads us (and other critical observers) to the conclusion that online journalism might be prone to economic influence.

6. Summary

The present paper gives an overview of online journalism in Germany based on the first representative survey of German online journalists. In November/December 2002, we interviewed 461 online journalists from all kinds of online media – start ups as well as traditional media organizations with an online news site.

The average German online journalist at the beginning of the 21st century is male, has a university degree and is 35 years old. In comparison to journalists in traditional media (radio, TV, newspaper) there are two notable differences: Online journalists in the majority are single and their average net income (\$28.087 a year) is about \$3.113 lower than the income of their colleagues in the traditional media.

According to our findings, most of the online journalists work for the news sites of magazines, followed by daily newspapers. The other media – weekly and Sunday newspapers, public and private broadcast – only represent about five to seven percent of the employers. Original start-ups with no roots in traditional media are a very small segment of online journalism.

The findings give us a more complete picture of what online journalists are doing: the most part of their average 45 hours work time they spend on writing, online investigations, news selection and the editing of news material from agencies and public relations. This kind of work pattern is performed by more than 80 percent of online journalists.

The lack of production deadlines marks a central difference from conventional journalism. We found indeed that most of the web sites (61.7 percent) are

updated several times an hour or at least several times a day which puts a considerable amount of work pressure on the online journalists. Speed is one of the most important factors for the work of online journalists. Nevertheless, there are some others that shape this new field of journalism as well. One of them is the lack of considerable revenues.

With the economic problems of online media in mind it is hardly surprising that most of the media organizations do not limit their options to one way of gaining revenues – they prefer combinations of several business models. Most of the only media still rely on advertising as a basic source of income: 80 percent of the media organizations are using online advertising in order to finance their web sites. Other business models with a notable quote share include the cooperation with other organizations/industries, content syndication and the subscription of certain parts of the content. Only 12 percent of the organizations are using specialized business models not mentioned above like subscription of the whole content, cross-financing by the parent companies, sponsoring and public fees.

The destiny of online journalism is surely bound to economic question, but there are also other factors that influence its future. We asked the journalists for the most successful criteria for the future of online journalism. Most of them named 'speed of news updates', followed by 'offering service to the user' and 'cost consciousness'. Other criteria that were mentioned quite often are 'original content (created by the media themselves)' and 'interactivity'.

Online journalism in Germany can be seen as a new field of journalism that shares some characteristics with traditional journalism – although it seems to develop its own characteristics. The fact that cost consciousness and the speed of news updates are so important leads us (and other critical observers) to the conclusion that online journalism still might be prone to economic influence in the foreseeable future. So the future of online journalism depends on the combination of journalistic criteria as well as its economic acceptance.

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Nepalese Journalists: Idealists, Optimists, and Realists

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Abstract

This paper studies Nepalese journalists using a convenience sample from the major cities of Kathmandu and Pokhara, representing all the major newspapers, radio stations and the government television station. Despite reports of the dismal condition of the press in Nepal, journalists in Nepal appear optimistic about their freedoms and idealistic in the reasons for which they join the profession. At the same time, they are realistic about the pressures they face and, to some extent, even about the traits and roles they ascribe to private and government media. And while differences exist, particularly by whether they work for government or private media, in how they view all of these—ratings, roles and reasons--the similarity of their responses overrides their differences.

Presented to the International Communication Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, at its annual meeting in Kansas City, MO, July-August 2003. This paper is based on a data set from which another paper was presented at a conference and has been published.

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Nepalese Journalists: Idealists, Optimists, and Realists

Introduction

Nepal is now emerging from decades of control and isolation by rulers (a monarchy followed by an oligarchy followed in turn by a restored monarchy) who kept its people from development, by denying educational and political opportunity, as a means to consolidate and continue their own positions of power. As a result, multiparty democracy and a non-government controlled media in Nepal are barely a decade old, though periods of free political structure and free press have existed in Nepal's less immediate history. Within the framework of these recently renewed freedoms and their spawning of a private press to accompany the already existing government press in Nepal, this study assesses Nepalese journalists' opinions about the controls and freedoms they experience as they report as well as about the comparative strengths and weaknesses of private and government media in terms of their roles and journalistic traits. The study also assesses the reasons these journalists join the profession.

Nepal's checkered political and press history apart, its under researched status provides another reason for this study. This study will establish benchmarks for future comparisons. In addition, Nepal's current political situation--a Maoist rebellion and a recent change in guard from King Birendra to King Gyanendra due to the assassination of the former monarch--have had implications for the press and may continue to do so, making the study of Nepal timely. There is considerable potential for the profession to continue to assist in building democracy in Nepal if it is not thwarted again by the political circumstances.

Nepal's Politics and its Press: A Brief History

With a per capita income of US\$220 per annum, Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world (World Bank, 2002). It is a developing country with agriculture as one of its mainstays accounting for 41% of the GDP (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002). Ninety percent of Nepal's population lives in

rural areas. Literacy is at 57.6%, with female literacy at 44.9% (“Curbing Population for Prosperity,” 2001).

Nepal’s politics and press have had histories that have run on a somewhat parallel course from the time of formation of the country in 1768 by King Prithvi Narayan Shah who united several independent hill states and began the rule of the Shah monarchy (Pokhrel and Koirala, 1995). In 1846, however, the Rana family took control of the kingdom from the Shah’s, instituting a system of hereditary prime ministerships and making the Shahs mere figureheads. The Ranas’ century-long rule was marked by isolation and a deliberate effort by the monarchy to stifle education of the people (Gunewardena, 1993).

Things changed temporarily when the Shahs were restored to political power in 1951. They legalized political parties and began to institute democratic reforms, but only to reverse their position a decade later and declare in 1960 that democracy had failed and direct rule from the palace would take its place. Following this reversal, the King established a partyless panchayat system (a pyramid system of local governments) which banned all political parties. Public agitation by urban intellectuals, by students dissatisfied with this system (Sharma, 1973, as cited in Sharma, 1985), and by banned political parties in temporary self-exile in India (Pokhrel and Koirala, 1995) led King Birendra to call for a national referendum on Nepal’s system of government. In 1980, Nepalese citizens voted in support of the partyless panchayat system, giving the king a victory but only by a slim margin (nine percent) that demonstrated the division in the country on the issue. Conflict between adherents of the panchayat system and those in favor of multi-partyism thus continued.

A Pro-Democracy Movement gained momentum in 1990 (Pokhrel and Koirala, 1995) and forced King Birendra to abolish the panchayat system, reintroduce multi-party democracy, and promulgate a new constitution in November 1990 empowering the people with sovereignty (Khadka, 1993). Since then, nine governments have come and gone (Mishra, 2001) and today Nepal is plagued by a Maoist insurgency creating fears again that King Gyanendra, who assumed the monarchy upon the violent death of King Birendra in a palace killing, will revert to palace rule (Dugger, 2002).

The Nepalese press has seen its fortunes parallel the rise, fall, and rise again of democracy in Nepal. During the decade-long democracy of the 1950s,¹ Nepal witnessed a growth in weekly newspapers, and the government established Radio Nepal, a radio station with signals reaching much of Nepal. The first two decades of panchayat rule however witnessed considerable tightening of control over the press including the promulgation of two restrictive Press and Publication Acts, one in 1962 and the other in 1976 (Aditya, 1996). Many newspapers were shut down² and those that were still in operation either supported the system or practiced self-censorship (Savada, 1993). A national news agency, Rastriya Samachar Samiti, was formed at this time (Pokhrel and Koirala, 1995; Savada, 1993). In fact, the period between 1960 and 1982 is called "the black laws" period (Gunewardena, 1993, p. 39). In the last decade of panchayat rule however, following the vote in support of the panchayat system in 1980, King Birendra relaxed media restrictions. The number of newspapers grew dramatically again and, in 1982, a liberal Press and Publications Act was established (Pokhrel and Koirala, 1995). In 1985, a government controlled national television station, Nepal Television, was established.

In 1990, with the success of the Pro-Democracy Movement, a new constitution was formulated with guarantees against cancellation of newspaper registrations, censorship, and newspaper closures (Aditya, 1996, p. 41). But recent political developments including the Maoist rebellion have resulted in the imposition of a national emergency in November 2001 with direct and indirect implications for the media. The king has suspended articles of the constitution guaranteeing press freedom (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2002), journalists sympathetic to the Maoist cause have been detained or gone underground, and self-censorship is practiced (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Nepal, 2002).

Still the post-1990 period has seen considerable growth in private print and broadcast media spurred by the new National Communication Policy of 1992 (Aditya, 1996). Private newspapers began to flourish and private radio stations, albeit with restrictions on news broadcasts and the reach of their

¹The Nepal Constitutional Act of 1947, promulgated just prior to this, provided for freedom of press and expression as a fundamental right of the people.

signals, were established. While private radio stations exist in number, television broadcasting continues to be largely under government control but two private networks operate now and distribute international programs. Two daily newspapers with relatively large circulation are government owned-- *Gorkapatra* (in Nepali) and *Rising Nepal* (in English), but the largest circulation newspapers in the country are two private papers, *Kantipur* (in Nepali) and *The Kathmandu Post* (in English).

Nepalese Media

The Nepalese press at large, because of its roots in government ownership, had a clearly defined role to play in the country's national development, in enhancing the country's prestige, and in unifying the country (Verma, 1988). Government controlled *Gorkhapatra* and Radio Nepal played a central role in implementing this policy (Pokhrel and Koirala, 1995), but even among the private press and even today there is consciousness of the role of the media in the country's social development. For example, the official media provide a considerable amount of development news and quite a few development reports (Pokhrel and Koirala, 1995). And, Radio Sagarmatha, private and non-commercial, provides educational and development messages ("Unprecedented Media Coverage on Sanitation," May-August 2000).

While this historically defined role might be well ingrained in the mindset of Nepalese journalists, the practices of a free press, by virtue of the recent introduction of press freedom, might be less so. The private media are criticized for lack of credibility, lack of distinction between opinion and news, and a single-minded focus on politics resulting in little content diversity (Rijal and Paudyal, 1995; Verma, 1988; Aditya, 1996). The government media are considered simple mouthpieces of the official point of view.

Conditions in the profession and in the institution of press do not make the transition easy however. At the personal level, a journalist's job is characterized by low pay, little job security, and inadequate training (Pokhrel, 1995). At the societal level, the institution of media is marked by a lack of investment

²For example, party newspapers were banned.

(Subba, 1995) and therefore of funding, resulting in high dependence on foreign programming and foreign news agencies. Aditya (1996) sums it up well: "As a career, journalism remains socially ignored, professionally weak, economically insecure, and politically vulnerable" (no page number). At the national level, in terms of the development of communication and its infrastructure, print, radio, and television journalism is concentrated in Kathmandu, the capital city, and there are about a quarter of a million telephones (2000 estimate), about 850,000 radios and about 130,000 television sets (1997 estimate) (CIA, 2002) in Nepal.

Research Questions

This study of journalists in Nepal is largely descriptive deriving from the tradition of The American Journalist series (for example, Weaver and Wilhoit, 1996). This series has generated considerable replication in different parts of the world and contributed to the collection of journalist profiles from several countries (Weaver, 1998). Research in this tradition generally assesses journalists' demographics and their opinions about their functions, their freedom, their benefits and such. Using Ramaprasad's (2001; 2003)³ questionnaire, this study adheres to some of these questions--freedom rating and job benefits for example, but departs in two significant ways. It 1) assesses journalists' opinions about the importance of certain influences on the content of their reporting and 2) uses the simultaneous presence of government and private media in Nepal to examine journalists' views of each others' traits and roles.

While the examination of government and private media views about each others' roles is also largely descriptive, the assessment of journalists' opinions about the importance of certain influences on their reporting is derived from the underpinnings of content theory, i.e., the literature on the concentric layers of influence on reporting that Shoemaker and Reese (1996) have tied together in their theory of news content. From individual level personal values to societal level ideology, the making of news is subject to a range of pressures documented repeatedly across time and across media philosophies (with

³Ramaprasad's questionnaire borrowed/modified items/ideas from (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1996), Weaver (1998), Pauli (1999) and Osswiler (1997), and added some new items/ideas.

even “free” media unable to escape these influences). News, it has been determined by this research, is no longer a reflection of reality but instead a construction of reality because of the forces that come into play in determining content. As Shoemaker and Reese (1996) commented, “Although the stimulus for a story might be a real world event or problem, measurable through other sources of social information, there are many factors that determine what will be transmitted and how it will be treated” (pp. 261-262).

Specific research questions that address the descriptive and theory based foci of the study are:

1. To what extent do Nepalese journalists consider various influencing factors—personal values or government position, for example--in their reporting?
2. What is Nepalese journalists’ rating of Nepal’s press freedom as well as of their own freedom to report?
3. What journalistic roles and traits do Nepalese journalists ascribe to private and government media? Is this influenced by ownership—private or government--of their place of work?
4. Why do Nepalese journalists join the profession?

Method

A cross-sectional survey of Nepalese journalists was conducted in November 1999. Over a four-day period, two journalists, who were also educators, assisted in the distribution of blank questionnaires to every newsroom in Kathmandu⁴ and in the collection of completed questionnaires. Questionnaires were also distributed to journalists attending a conference in a regional media center, Pokhara, 100 miles west of Kathmandu. This convenience sample of 132 journalists represented 28 media outlets (i.e., newspapers, radio stations, the television station, and corporations) and one freelance journalist.

The questionnaire duplicated for the most part Ramaprasad’s questionnaire for Tanzanian journalists (Ramaprasad, 2001; Ramaprasad, 2003) because of similar political and press dynamics--recent establishment of a multiparty and free press system, recent proliferation of media and media personnel, role for the media in national development, and simultaneous presence of government and private media. Iterative translation and subsequent finalization of the Nepali version of Ramaprasad's English

questionnaire was done with the assistance of several Nepalese fluent in both languages, some of whom also helped with translating the Nepali responses on the completed questionnaires back to English.⁵

Findings

The profile of Nepalese journalists that emerged from the 132 respondents to this study was as follows. Respondents were overwhelmingly male (88%). Their mean age was about 33 years, and most had completed some college (Table 1). An overwhelming majority (90%) was Hindus. About 61% indicated no affiliation with any political party. Of the other 39%, 20% were associated with the Nepali Congress, nine percent with the Democratic party, five percent with communist/leftist parties, and the remainder with other, smaller parties and independent groups. A majority (75%) had worked for ten years or less in journalism (mean = 8.2 years). Mean monthly income of respondents was 7496 Nepali rupees (about US\$ 113.58).

A majority of respondents worked for private media (58%) and for the print media (71%). In fact, a majority of private media respondents (89%) worked for print media, and a majority (albeit a small one) of government media respondents (54%) worked for broadcast media. This is a reflection of the still dominant control of television by government.

What Influences?

Respondents were asked to rate six factors, ranging from personal values to government position, for influence on their reporting in terms of topic selection, story emphasis, story angle, etc. Specifically, the question asked how much respondents considered these factors in their reporting. Responses were factor analyzed using principal components analysis with varimax rotation. Two very clear and cohesive factors emerged affirming the separation of personal from institutional influences as pointed out by Shoemaker and Reese (1996) (Table 2). The first factor dealt with institutional influences (journalist's

⁴The author thanks Chiranjibi Khanal and Rabin Sakhya of the Nepal Press Institute and of Tribhuvan University respectively, in Kathmandu, for their contribution.

⁵The author thanks Devendra Upadhyaya of Kathmandu, and Rekha Sharma and Dr. Ashlysha Sharma of _____ University for their translation assistance.

organization and government) and the second factor dealt with personal influences (personal values and opinions, political orientation, and ethnic affiliation). Together the factors explained 63.7% of the variance, with the first one explaining 36.1% and the second explaining 27.6%.

Factor means indicate a higher influence of external, institutional (mean = 2.24) factors than personal (mean = 3.38) factors (lower numbers indicate higher importance) again confirming previous findings (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). But were these two factors rated differently by print and broadcast journalists? By private and government media respondents? The only difference was found in the rating of the institutional factor by print versus broadcast journalists. Broadcast journalists considered this factor more important than did print journalists ($t = 2.59$; $p < .05$). It is interesting that as compared with private media, government media respondents did not rate the institutional factor more important. The institutional factor however comprised both organization level influences as well as government position. While organization level influences were not differently rated, government position was, with government media respondents considering it more in their reporting than private media respondents ($t = 2.09$; $p < .05$). Similar results were found for broadcast and print with broadcast media considering government position more important.

For individual item means, the picture was slightly mixed. While news organization policy/management guidelines were rated as the most influential and ethnic affiliation as the least, not all institutional influences were considered greater than personal influences. In fact, government position was rated less influential than personal values. Further analysis revealed that private and government media respondents differed in the importance they attached to personal values and government position. As compared with private media respondents, government media respondents rated personal values as less important ($t = -2.25$; $p < .05$) and government position as more important (results already presented above).

How Free?

The institutional influences that respondents consider as they report, while important, are only an indirect measure of freedom. To address the question of freedom more directly, respondents were asked to rate overall freedom of the press in Nepal, their own freedom to select stories and their freedom to emphasize aspects of stories. Two open-ended questions--indicate the most significant limits on the respondent's freedom as a journalist and define freedom of the press—were also asked.

Among answers to the open-ended question about limits to press freedom were mentions of external (government, courts, media organizations, publishers, corporations, etc.) constraints; several respondents used the word “pressure” to describe the nature of these constraints. These journalists also referred to politics, politicians and politicization of the media as other constraints, particularly with reference to lack of access to information and lack of transparency in government. These sentiments more or less reflected the institutional constraints included in the question above. Some journalists however commented that societal attitudes not only those regarding journalists but more so in terms of societal mores and values, traditional beliefs, patriarchal norms, religion and culture, and general lack of education were also limits on press freedom. Interestingly, the limits on freedom that were mentioned did not reflect personal values, ethnic affiliation or political orientation. Instead, at the individual journalist level, they included lack of training, lack of confidence, self-censorship, and even age and gender. Respondents also included lack of professionalism and ethical lapses/lack of ethics in this listing of limits to freedom of the press.

In defining press freedom, the other open ended question, respondents used interesting similes: freedom is necessary like “water to fish” or like a “plant needs soil,” or freedom currently is like a “leopard without teeth and claws,” or having freedom is the equivalent of the press having “a soul.”

Despite some of these answers that indicated a powerless media in the grip of government and its institutions and officials, or media caught within a time warp in which society lagged behind and weighted it down, respondents rated press freedom in Nepal on the positive end of a freedom scale. The

mean for overall freedom, rated on a 10-point scale, was 4.14 indicating that respondents rated Nepal's overall press freedom as greater than average (lower numbers indicate higher freedom). At the personal level, they similarly rated their freedom to select stories (mean = 1.79) and to decide what to emphasize in stories (mean = 1.79) as greater than average on a five-point scale.

Nepalese journalists did not differ in their rating of the country's press freedom but they differed in how they rated their own freedom to select and emphasize. Print media journalists indicated greater freedoms in selecting stories (mean = 1.66 versus 2.14; $t = -2.80$, $p < .01$) and emphasizing aspects of stories (mean = 1.60 versus 2.22; $t = -3.51$, $p < .01$) than broadcast media journalists. Similarly, private media journalists indicated greater freedom in selecting stories (mean = 1.53 versus 2.13; $t = -3.94$, $p < .001$) and emphasizing aspects of stories (mean = 1.51 versus 2.16; $t = -4.07$, $p < .001$) than government media journalists. As noted earlier, most print media journalists worked for private media. Findings related to the differences in freedom ratings and in the pressure from government position (above section) between government and print media journalists are not unexpected.

Was the overall freedom rating of Nepalese media by respondents explained by their rating of their own personal freedom to emphasize and select, by their consideration of personal and institutional influences, as well as by their gender and age? A multiple regression revealed a significant overall F ($F = 10.97$; $p < .001$), but freedom to emphasize aspects of stories and age were the only significant predictor of the overall freedom rating. The greater freedom Nepalese journalists had to emphasize certain aspects of a story and the older they were, the more free they considered Nepal's press to be. The lack of importance of freedom to select stories in explaining overall rating is explained by the very high and significant correlation between this variable and freedom to emphasize ($r = .80$; $p < .01$). The inverse relationship of age to freedom rating is explained by the fact that older journalists, having served under tighter press controls, possibly had a comparative perspective in mind as they rated press freedom. The lack of relationship between overall rating and the influences reporters may consider is interesting and possibly points to the subtle nature of these influences.

Whose Traits?

While both private and government media rated their personal freedom to select and emphasize on the positive end of freedom, they still differed in how much freedom they believed they had, with government media admitting smaller freedom. How did private and government media rate themselves and each other on other journalistic traits and roles? This study assessed which traits were attributed overall to government and private media. It also assessed whether workplace ownership was related to journalists' views about traits of private and government media. Ownership was divided into government and private, and the traits studied included credibility, accuracy, and competence and such media roles as unify the country and contribute to country's development.

Results of overall trait ascription were as follows:

Credibility, professional competence, accuracy, analysis, focus on cultural and intellectual issues, vocal critic of government policy, support political pluralism, reflect views of common people: In the overall analysis, a greater percent of the respondents considered private media to have these traits, traits that are considered the hallmark of journalistic excellence in its role of building democratic society (Table 3).

Reflect views of the wealthy, stir up ethnic and religious separatist conflict, focus on sensational news: The private media did not however escape branding with what are considered negative traits of journalism. Sensationalism, conflict and elitism were traits attributed to the private media in the overall analysis.

Help unify country, positive coverage in general, contribute to country's development: Government media, not surprisingly, were handed traits and roles that exemplify their government determined role in the development of the nation. Within the context of the national development imperative that faced many countries that emerged from colonialism or isolationism, media, often through direct government control, were called upon to lend a hand to the government in closing the development gap. Nepal was no exception and the ascription of these traits to government media testifies to this.

Balanced political coverage was the only trait that was not ascribed in significantly large measure to either one of the media types.

Results of trait ascription by ownership of the organization for which respondents worked were as follows:

Credibility, accuracy, focus on cultural and intellectual issues, balanced political coverage, contribute to country's development: These generally positive traits were claimed by both sides for the most part; those who worked for private media claimed these for themselves and those who worked for government media claimed these for themselves (Table 4).

Significant chi-squares indicating an association between ownership and ascription were found for several other traits too. Private media overwhelmingly claimed traits associated with journalistic freedom: *professional competence, support political pluralism, reflect views of common people and analysis.* While a considerable percent of government media respondents gave these traits to private media, a reasonable percent also claimed the traits for themselves (in the case of the trait *analysis*,⁶ this percent was not very large however). For example, for professional competence, 92% of the private media respondents claimed this trait and while 63% of the government media gave this trait to them, 37% still claimed it for themselves. For support political pluralism, 84% of the private media gave this trait to themselves and while 56% of the government media also ascribed it to the private media, 44% still claimed it for themselves. For reflect views of common people, private media overwhelmingly claimed the trait (99%), while 33% of the government media gave it to themselves. For the national development traits, *positive coverage in general* and *help unify country*, the reverse was true. Government media overwhelmingly claimed these traits, but significant numbers of private media respondents claimed them too. For example, for positive coverage (a national development role), 91% of the government media claimed the trait and while 74% of the private media gave this trait to them, 26% still claimed it for themselves. For help unify the country, also a national development role, the split was

about fifty-fifty among private media respondents in ascribing the trait to themselves and to government media. For *reflect views of the wealthy*, a negative trait, 90% of the government media felt the private media had this trait, and while 65% of the private media acknowledged this trait, 35% ascribed it to government media.

For three of the traits--*stir up ethnic and religious separatist conflict*, *focus on sensational news*, *vocal critic of government policy* --the results of the chi-square analysis were non-significant.⁷ All three traits were largely ascribed to private media.

Why Journalism?

It is evident that certain traits are coveted by journalists. These traits might portray the idealism of journalists and their passion to change and improve society, and might very well be the reasons they choose journalism as a profession. How do some of these reasons stack up against more mundane reasons? Among the answers to an open-ended question about why respondents became journalists were a range of sentiments from the idealistic to the routine. The idealistic reasons were, for example, promote gender equality, make people aware of their rights, and develop people's support for individual freedoms. Interest in the profession (one respondent said, "I *had* to write.") and the challenging nature and dynamism of journalism attracted others. More mundane reasons included not finding anything else to do and even not wanting to be a businessman or administrator.

Two other questions were used to get a fuller understanding of why respondents had chosen journalism as a career. One was a measure made up of two other statements about what a journalistic job means to respondents--"To me, being a journalist is only a job" and "I sought a journalistic job because I believe that the news media play an important role in people's lives"—and the other was a list of job benefits and aspects, each of which was rated by respondents. The means on the two statements were 2.56 and 1.42 respectively, indicating that journalism is not only a job to respondents and that they

⁶For this trait, expected frequency was less than five, so Fisher's exact test of significance was used.

⁷For these traits, expected frequency was less than five, so Fisher's exact test of significance was used.

sought the job because of the role they can play in people's lives. Interestingly, Nepalese journalists did not differ in how much importance they ascribed to these statements by type of organization (print or broadcast) and nature of the organization (private or government) they worked for indicating the universality of this position.

Once they had picked the profession, what aspects of their jobs did the journalists consider important? A list of itemized job aspects was factor analyzed using principal components analysis with varimax rotation. Four factors with eigenvalues greater than one emerged. These factors were benefits, national development, public affairs and freedom, and together explained 63.4% of the variance (Table 5). If a variable loaded on more than one factor, it was grouped with the factor on which it had the highest loading.

The first factor generated by the analysis was a "Benefits" factor with six of twelve items loading on it. Material benefits such as pay, training opportunities, job security and chance to advance cohered here with less tangible but more professionally relevant benefits such as opportunity to meet people and expose corruption. This factor captured 32% of the variance and accounted for nearly 51% of the common variance among all of the items.

The second factor was a "National Development" factor with only two items loading on it, chance to help ordinary people and to develop the country. However, chance to expose corruption and meet people (both from the Benefits factor) also had loadings above .4 on this factor. Exposing corruption could be considered part of national development but the considerable loading of the item, meeting people, on this factor is somewhat difficult to explain.

The third factor, "Public Affairs," captured the public affairs role of the journalist and included the following two items--opportunity to inform the public and influence public affairs. The fourth factor, "Freedom" is puzzling because it included autonomy as well as fringe benefits.

The Public Affairs factor had the lowest mean score indicating the highest importance. Benefits and National Development followed, with the same mean, and Freedom was the least important but this

lowest rating was largely influenced by the mean for fringe benefits. Still, all factors had means below the midpoint of three indicating that they were all important. And, these respondents did not differ in their rating of these job aspects by whether they worked for private or government media or broadcast or print media.

This universality was also mirrored in job satisfaction ratings. Mean job satisfaction was 1.98, higher than midpoint. Nepalese journalists did not differ in job satisfaction by type of organization (print or broadcast) and nature of the organization (private or government) they worked for.

Summary and Discussion

Despite reports of the dismal condition of the press in Nepal and confirmation in this study of the low pay journalists receive and the barriers they face, journalists in Nepal seem to be optimistic about their freedoms, satisfied with their jobs, and idealistic in the reasons for which they join the profession. At the same time, they are realistic about the pressures and influences they take into consideration as they report; about the importance of material benefits in their jobs; and, to some extent, even about the traits and roles they ascribe to private and government media. And while differences exist, particularly by whether they work for government or private media, in how they view all of these—ratings, roles and reasons--the similarity of their responses overrides their differences.

Nepalese journalists joined the profession because they wanted to be journalists and play a role in democracy building. They rated the public affairs factor highest among the benefits of a journalistic job. They believed that journalism was relatively free as a profession as well as in its day-to-day practice. And they were satisfied with their jobs. Another somewhat recent study had findings similar to this study's in several areas. Aditya's (1996) study pointed out that 38% of the respondents felt moderately free to speak and write on political issues, 35% felt very free, and 14% felt very safe to speak and write about these issues. This study also pointed out that that 53% of the respondents were satisfied with their jobs and 29% were not. Finally, more than a third of the respondents of Aditya's study indicated media-related work as their job preference.

Nepalese journalists recognized however that while their profession and its practice were relatively free, it was not devoid of influences. These journalists rated institutional level influences as more critical in their reporting than personal values. Much of the body of research deriving from content theory has found that factors external to the journalist such as government pressure and the political and economic, even the cultural and ideological, orientation of the societies into which journalists have been socialized are prime influences and that personal level factors such as values and beliefs are not as consistently or dominantly predictive of news content (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p. 60).

The importance attached to organization level influences points to the critical importance of social control in the newsroom through policy, first brought to our attention by Breed (1955) in his classic study. In Nepalese newsrooms too, this social control must operate as evident from the mean rating of 2.24 on a 5-point scale for this institutional influence. Within this institutional level influence too, comprising policy, guidelines and government position, the evidence suggests the dominance of policy. News organization policy emerged as the major means of social control (mean = 1.95), with government position as least important (mean= 2.58). And while government media respondents did heed government position more than did private media respondents, they still rated news organization policy (mean = 1.84) and management guidelines (mean = 2.13) as more critical than government position (mean = 2.33). It appears then that organization policy and related social control outweigh government influence even in government owned media. Still, this does not rule out the possibility that government position is conveyed through news organization policy and management guidelines. This would be an interesting area to explore in future research.

Also, worth developing in future studies is the measure of influences. To date, most studies of influences on news reporting have been case studies of newsrooms using observation methods. This study presents a new way of assessing the relative importance of several factors in the making of news. The fact that this method corroborates the findings of case studies lends validity to it. The list of influences is however rather brief; a more comprehensive list is needed.

Most institutional level influences, other than say direct government control, are not seen as related to press freedom. And that seems to be borne out by this study. Nepalese journalists rating of press freedom in their country was not explained by the influences they felt from the news organization and government. Could this be because the forces that influence content are often subtle, and therefore unseen, unnoticed and unacknowledged possibly as having anything to do with freedom? This is yet another area where future studies could make a contribution by assessing journalists' perception of the relationship between influences they consider in their reporting and how free they believe they are. A future researcher may also study the list of job benefits and develop that conceptually and operationally; the results of the factor analysis in this study particularly in the case of the Freedom factor were puzzling.

The realism of Nepalese journalists was also apparent in the ascription of various traits and roles to government and private media. Results of this analysis show that respondents seemed quite certain about which traits belonged to the private and which to the government media. In the overall analysis, traits that represented the hallmarks of free journalism were ascribed to private media but so were the negative traits of a free press. On the other hand, hallmarks of a press socialized to assist the country in national development went to the government media.

But this realism was tempered by idealism or possibly by pride in their own practice of journalism. Analysis of ascription by respondents' place of work (private or government) showed that type of ownership of the workplace was a factor in this ascription of traits to government and private media at least for the positive traits. The negative traits continued to be more or less ascribed to the private media even by private media respondents, but both sides claimed to some measurable extent the positive traits including those associated with national development.

Limitations and Contribution

While this study suffers from the limitation of a convenience sample largely because of the difficulty of conducting a random survey in Nepal, one of its objectives is to put Nepalese journalists, their

conditions and their constraints, their idealism and their realism, their optimism and pessimism, on the map. This is particularly critical at a time when the hard won freedoms may be at risk again given Nepal's current political situation with regard to the Maoist rebellion and its implications for the press within the context of government attempts to squash the rebellion. The study also provides future researchers benchmarks on which to build. It also provides several suggestions for future researchers to improve the questionnaire that is used in surveys of journalists. This is particularly necessary when the questionnaire is for countries that are not similar to the United States where the journalist survey questionnaire was first developed.

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Table 1
Distribution of Respondents by Demographic and Work Related Variables

	N	(%)
Gender		
Female	15	(11.7)
Male	113	(88.3)
Religion		
None	2	(1.6)
Hindu	112	(90.3)
Buddhist	7	(5.6)
Muslim	1	(.8)
Other	8	(1.6)
Education		
School	1	(.8)
College (including diplomas)	128	(99.2)
Party Affiliation		
Nepali Congress	22	(20.0)
Democratic	10	(9.1)
Social Democratic	1	(.9)
Communist/Leftist/Ma	5	(4.5)
None	67	(60.9)
Democratic Front	1	(.9)
Hariyali Green Party	1	(.9)
Independent	3	(2.7)
Organization Nature		
Private	76	(57.6)
Government	56	(42.4)
Media Type		
Print	92	(70.8)
Broadcast	38	(29.2)
Mean Age (years)		32.30
Mean Years Worked in Journalism		8.16
Mean Monthly Income (Nepalese Rupees)		7496.17
Mean Monthly Income (Dollars)		113.58

Table 2
Factor Analysis of Influences on Reporting

	Mean*	Factors		h ²
		I	II	
INSTITUTIONAL	2.24			
News organization policy	1.95	0.83		0.70
Management guidelines	2.15	0.82		0.67
Government position	2.58	0.69		0.56
PERSONAL	3.38			
Personal values and opinions	2.29		0.53	0.38
Political orientation	3.78		0.87	0.77
Ethnic affiliation	4.06		0.84	0.74
Percent of Variance		36.1	27.6	63.7

*Lower scores equal greater importance. Scale ranges from 1=very important to 5=not at all important.

Table 3
Distribution of Respondents by Media to Which They Ascribed Traits

	N	%
Analysis*		
Private	114	(94.2)
Government	7	(5.8)
Vocal Critic of Government Policy*		
Private	127	(99.2)
Government	1	(0.8)
Support Political Pluralism*		
Private	79	(72.5)
Government	30	(27.5)
Provide Balanced Political Coverage		
Private	61	(55.5)
Government	49	(44.5)
Reflect Views of Common People*		
Private	102	(85.7)
Government	17	(14.3)
Reflect Views of Wealthy*		
Private	71	(75.5)
Government	23	(24.5)
Focus on Sensational News*		
Private	122	(99.2)
Government	1	(0.8)
Stir Ethnic, Religious, Separatist Conflict*		
Private	94	(92.2)
Government	8	(7.8)
Help Unify Country*		
Private	33	(30.8)
Government	74	(69.2)
Contribute to Country's Development		
Private	52	(52.5)
Government	47	(47.5)
Focus on Cultural and Intellectual Issues*		
Private	74	(66.1)
Government	38	(33.9)
Credibility*		
Private	74	(62.2)
Government	45	(37.8)
Professional Competence*		
Private	98	(80.3)
Government	24	(19.7)
Accuracy*		
Private	73	(60.8)
Government	47	(39.2)
Provide Positive Coverage in General*		
Private	23	(18.7)
Government	100	(81.3)

*Significant chi-square values, $p < .05$.

Table 4
Distribution of Respondents by Where Employed and Media to Which They Ascribed Traits

	Organization Nature (Where Employed)			
	Private		Government	
	N	%	N	%
Vocal Critic of Government Policy				
Private	74	(100)	53	(98)
Government	0	(0)	1	(2)
Reflect Views of Wealthy*				
Private	35	(65)	36	(90)
Government	19	(35)	4	(10)
Support Political Pluralism*				
Private	54	(84)	25	(56)
Government	10	(16)	20	(44)
Stir Ethnic, Religious, Separatist Conflict				
Private	51	(89)	43	(96)
Government	6	(11)	2	(4)
Focus on Sensational News				
Private	72	(100)	50	(98)
Government	0	(0)	1	(2)
Credibility*				
Private	62	(91)	12	(24)
Government	6	(9)	39	(76)
Professional Competence*				
Private	68	(92)	30	(63)
Government	6	(8)	18	(37)
Accuracy*				
Private	60	(86)	13	(26)
Government	10	(14)	37	(74)
Provide Positive Coverage in General*				
Private	18	(26)	5	(9)
Government	52	(74)	48	(91)
Help Unify Country*				
Private	28	(48)	5	(10)
Government	30	(52)	44	(90)
Contribute to Country's Development*				
Private	45	(83)	7	(16)
Government	9	(17)	38	(84)

Table 4: Continued

	Organization Nature (Where Employed)			
	Private		Government	
	N	%	N	%
Focus on Cultural and Intellectual Issues*				
Private	57	(86)	17	(37)
Government	9	(14)	29	(63)
Analysis*				
Private	70	(99)	44	(88)
Government	1	(1)	6	(12)
Provide Balanced Political Coverage*				
Private	50	(79)	11	(23)
Government	13	(21)	36	(77)
Reflect Views of Common People*				
Private	69	(99)	33	(67)
Government	1	(1)	16	(33)

*Significant chi-square values, $p < .05$.

**Table 5
Factor Analysis of Job Aspects**

	Mean*	Factors				h ²
		I	II	III	IV	
BENEFITS	1.73					
Pay	1.78	0.71				0.62
Chance to advance in organization	1.71	0.64				0.52
Training opportunities	1.63	0.87				0.79
Chance to expose corruption	1.51	0.52	0.47			0.64
Chance to meet important people	1.96	0.51	0.40			0.49
Job security	1.77	0.70				0.58
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT	1.73					
Chance to develop country	1.73		0.85			0.77
Chance to help ordinary people	1.71		0.78			0.71
PUBLIC AFFAIRS	1.52					
Chance to influence public affairs	1.77			0.86		0.74
Chance to inform and educate public	1.27			0.52		0.48
FREEDOM	2.02					
Autonomy	1.30				0.60	0.60
Fringe benefits	2.75				0.78	0.68
Percent of Variance		32.0	14.3	8.7	8.5	63.4

*Lower scores equal greater importance. Scale ranges from 1=very important to 5=not at all important.

The demise of Nicaragua's *Barricada* newspaper: Slipshod journalism or political sabotage?

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Abstract

Barricada, a daily newspaper in Nicaragua, closed suddenly and without warning in 1998. The editor said his newspaper was a victim of a government policy to pull state advertising from *Barricada*, which was the official newspaper of the opposition Sandinista political party and had been highly critical of the government. This study examines the role of state advertising as a means of governmental control of the news media in Nicaragua. The study finds evidence to support the claim that *Barricada* was the victim of a partisan campaign to withhold advertising. But it also finds that the Sandinistas had done the same thing when they were in power in the 1980s. The new president of Nicaragua who took office in 2002 has promised to discontinue the practice of "awards and punishments" in awarding government advertising, instead basing it on readership and circulation.

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The demise of Nicaragua's *Barricada* newspaper: Slipshod journalism or political sabotage?

In July 2001, the candidates for president of Nicaragua met in the home of former President Violeta Chamorro and signed a proclamation supporting freedom of the press (Kodrich, 2001).

Noticeably absent from that meeting was the Nicaraguan president at the time, Arnaldo Alemán, who had been criticized for favoring the pro-government newspaper, *La Noticia*, over other newspapers in the awarding of state advertising. A little more than a week later, the Inter American Press Association issued a statement criticizing the president for a “systematic policy of discrimination in the placement of official advertising aimed at punishing news media” (IAPA, 2001a). Editors of the *El Nuevo Diario* charged that the government was punishing their daily newspaper for its support of the opposition Sandinista Party.

This accusation was reminiscent of a charge made by the editors of another opposition newspaper a few years earlier. The editors of *Barricada* accused Alemán's government of punishing *Barricada* for its support of the Sandinistas (Meléndez, 1997) (*La Tribuna* 1998: 1). After 19 years of being the official voice of the Sandinistas, *Barricada* closed without warning on 30 January 1998. Tomás Borge, the editor, called the newspaper workers together behind closed doors early that Friday evening as they were preparing the next day's paper and told them not to bother, blaming the “temporary closing” on the rightist government's economic blackmail of the leftist newspaper.

This study will revisit the past to help determine whether a pattern exists that might hold consequences for surviving newspapers. First, to provide necessary context, it will examine freedom of the press issues in Latin America, including the role of state advertising. It will review the literature concerning state control of the news media through economic means. Second, it will discuss Nicaraguan journalism and the role it plays in the country. The author spent considerable time in Nicaragua in the latter half of the 1990s and early part of the 2000s observing journalists and collecting data. Third, the study will examine the history of *Barricada*, which was born of the 1979 Sandinista revolution that overthrew the Somoza dictatorship. The author relied on accounts published both in Nicaragua and in the United States. Fourth, the study will examine possible reasons for the closing of that newspaper. Many observers said the newspaper had poor editorial content – biased information that couldn't be trusted. Others, however, said it was the result of a targeted effort by the government to silence the opposition. The author interviewed observers of

the journalistic scene in Nicaragua and examined journalistic accounts, commentary and published interviews from the time of the closing.

Fifth, this study will take a closer look at the official state advertising in the daily newspapers during three vital periods to help determine if there is any validity to the claim of government repression against the opposition media in Nicaragua. The author analyzed government advertising in all the Nicaraguan daily newspapers from three distinct periods – the Sandinista era, the Chamorro era and the Alemán era. Finally, this study will speculate on how the use of government advertising in Nicaragua has been used as a weapon of state control in the past and whether press freedom will gain momentum with the inauguration in 2002 of a new president, Enrique Bolaños. Bolaños has promised that his government will place advertising in newspapers based on readership and circulation, not on a system of awards and punishment.

Challenges facing the Latin American press

The media in Latin America generally operate under a Western mass communication model, with its emphasis on private enterprise and ownership — along with advertising as a means of financial support. “As more stable democratic governments become the norm in Latin America, the media are also adopting a more professional approach to their role as the Fourth Estate in the political system” (Cole, et al., 1996).

Many observers were optimistic about the path of Latin American mass media at the start of the 21st century. They saw the trend toward private ownership and advertising as the prime means of revenue as a positive step. They saw journalists also becoming more professional and taking their role as a watchdog over government more seriously.

Yet despite the positive trends, Latin American media also were confronting a dismal economic situation and pressures from corporate, criminal and government elements.

On the economic front, Latin American economies were growing at a rate of less than 3 percent a year, with per capita income in 2000 nearly the same as 10 years earlier (Hakim, 1999-2000). Latin Americans were nearly as poor in 2000 as they were in 1980, with inequalities of income and wealth even larger. The richest 20 percent of Latin Americans earned 12 times what the poorest 20 percent earned, making it the worst income disparity in the world (Hakim, 1999-2000). Many Latin American countries were facing recession. “Unless political stability and fiscal responsibility suddenly make their way to center stage, the outlook for the region will continue to worsen” (Evans, 1999).

The media were affected in two major ways by the region’s poor economy. The first was that people couldn’t afford to buy newspapers, magazines or Internet connections. The second

was that businesses had little money to advertise, and much of the audience was too poor to buy the advertised products anyway. Media companies that were economically weak were more susceptible to outside pressures. Economically independent newspapers were better able to confront attacks and pressures (Kraiselburd and Muñoz, 1996).

As private media had expanded in the past few decades, there was growing concern over the influence of large corporations. Media empires, such as Globo in Brazil and Televisa in Mexico, wielded tremendous power. At the same time, media owners protested any state interference. So with little state regulation and the growing concentration of ownership of the media, alternative views had fewer opportunities to get expressed. Some community members might have been left without a voice in the media (Fox, 1988).

The news media also were affected by violence and intimidation. Many threats, kidnappings and assassinations faced by journalists in the region were a result of criminal elements. The Inter American Press Association, an organization that challenges violations of press freedom in the Western Hemisphere, said in October 2000 that 15 journalists were murdered in the region in the prior 12 months for practicing their profession. "Journalists were assaulted, kidnapped, intimidated and exiled by paramilitary forces, guerilla groups, drug- and people-trafficking gangs, local political bosses and even civilian and military authorities" (IAPA, 2000). At the IAPA's midyear meeting in 2002, the organization said the two main sources of violence against journalists were drug traffickers and authoritarian governments. It said two journalists were killed in Colombia, one in Mexico and one in Haiti in the previous six months. "The death count of journalists cast a shadow on the hemisphere and the murder of journalists has become almost routine" (IAPA, 2002b).

Journalists in Latin America have long faced the threats. "It is a fact of life in Latin America that atrocities against journalists are a daily occurrence" (Ulibarri and Trotti, 1996: 192).

Politically, the region had seen a major shift from authoritarian, military-run governments to democratic, elected governments. Democracies had taken hold in Ecuador in 1978, Peru in 1980, Bolivia, El Salvador and Honduras in 1982, Paraguay and Panama in 1989, and Chile in 1990. With newly elected governments in Nicaragua and Haiti in the 1990s, Cuba was the most notable holdout in the shift to democratic rule. "This new wave of democracy in Latin America closely paralleled that in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the 1980s, and it ushered in with it the hope for expanded freedom of expression and of the press. Like toppling dominoes, military dictatorships yielded to free elections and constitutional civil rule" (Buckman, 1996: 4). The changes impacted all political and economic institutions, including the press.

Nevertheless, a 1998 study by the Inter American Press Association found the majority of countries in the Western Hemisphere restricted press freedom. While nearly all constitutions in the Americas guaranteed free speech and freedom of the press, they also allowed for limiting the freedoms under states of emergency or through privacy laws and other legislation. Other methods of controlling the press included: access to information, prior censorship, slander, libel and defamation laws, the requirement of a university degree to practice journalism, obligatory membership in journalist *colégios*, arbitrary imposition of information, lack of safeguards for confidentiality of news sources, and various legislative actions (IAPA, 1998a).

Latin American governments have long tried to control content of the media. Most governments in Latin America with authoritarian leanings had closed media operations – stopping the publication of newspapers, seizing copies of papers, closing radio stations or jamming their signals. Many had instituted prior constraint, limiting what could be said or published. “The means of control at a government’s disposal are as diverse as the weaponry of war, ranging from permanent or temporary padlocking to restrictions on what can be said in an advertisement” (Pierce, 1979: 181).

Governments also tried to control the press through finances. This could range from tax rebates, and control of newsprint to outright bribes. Governments still had control over broadcasting licenses, and could use it to silence certain groups. “Violating freedom of expression isn’t just about killing journalists,” says Ignacio Lopez Vigil, Latin American coordinator of the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC). “It’s also done more silently when a local community, a women’s group or an indigenous group repeatedly requests a radio license and is repeatedly turned down” (Lanchin, 1998:8).

The changes in Latin American media structures had implications for future national communication policies. Many sectors of society were left unprotected and open to exploitation because of the turn to the private sector. Some argued that social communication must have a democratic and public-service commitment (Fox, 1988). They saw democracy threatened by conservative and exploitative interests from inside and outside the country that had built private and commercial communication systems.

The use of state advertising as a means of control

One of the ways to control the media is the use of official government advertising to support media favorable to the government. Official advertising is important in Latin America – used to reward to punish the news media based on their editorial policies (Arbilla 1996: 27). Often, this meant the government used tax money to benefit personal interests, family, friends, or

political cronies. Or a government could punish all the media indiscriminately. Guatemala President Alvaro Arzu's government in 1997 and 1998 drastically cut its advertising in the media, affecting dozens of radio stations that depend on that ad revenue. The government blamed the press for playing up the negative side of stories. "President Arzu has declared himself an enemy of the press," said Julio Mendizaba, head of the Association of Guatemalan Journalists (Lanchin, 1998: 8). Media joined together to protest the boycott. Government advertising cutbacks also have been denounced in Argentina, Puerto Rico and elsewhere.

The IAPA found regulations on advertising was one of the more common methods in Latin America to wield economic power (IAPA, 1998a). The association's annual reports on freedom of the press in Latin America continue to cite state advertising as a problem in several countries throughout the region.

In 2002, the IAPA condemned the discrimination by the government of the Mexican state of Baja California for withholding government advertising from a newspaper that had published investigations on irregularities in public administration. The state had cancelled all government advertising in *La Crónica* after it published reports on erratic purchase of vehicles, nepotism within the government and salary increases for employees. The IAPA said, "The concession or suppression of government advertising cannot be used as a tool to reward or punish the media or journalists, since it is a form of indirect censorship that hinders the people's right to information" (IAPA, 2002c).

The government is the biggest advertiser in many Central American countries (Rockwell and Janus, 2001). Strong central governments have developed information policies to help keep the media in line. In El Salvador, for instance, the government maintained a government boycott of an independent TV station in the late 1980s. In Guatemala in the 1990s, the state used advertising as one of the means to control the press. Media outlets that were too critical of the government stopped getting government advertising.

John Keane (1992) writes that states often are equipped with mechanisms to regulate and distort the exchange of information among their citizens. "The flow of opinions among citizens is hindered by the executive use of old-fashioned prerogative powers and new techniques of official information management" (16). Keane argues that the state interferes in the process of publicly defining and circulating opinions in at least five ways: restricting or censoring the publication of material; secrecy; lying; corporatism, or the shifting more power to private groups or organizations; and the use of state advertising. A revised theory of freedom and equality of communication needs to address the role of these five interlocking types of political censorship, he argues.

Government advertising has become a sophisticated and regular feature of all Western democratic governments (Keane, 1992). Most independent newspapers, radio and television stations rely heavily on advertising revenue, so any threat to withdraw such funding can create pressures on the news media to comply with government demands. "The steady growth of state advertising gives all democratically elected governments enormous powers of blackmail" (20).

The use of state advertising came about because rulers of the modern state sought to protect and legitimate themselves by pushing their own opinion. The London Gazette, which started in 1665 as the Oxford Gazette, was an influential early organ of government advertising (Keane, 1992).

Silvio Waisbord (2000) says the rise of market forces in Latin America has not eliminated the role of the government in the media. The news media's commercial success is still tied to the state as well as the market. The state retained control over important resources that greatly affected press finances. Governments in Latin America still expect to receive favorable news coverage in exchange for economic considerations. Critical reporting is limited due to the intertwined government-media relations. "Today's governments do not directly control the media as in the past, but they aren't empty-handed in dealing with media groups. They concentrate economic resources and policy decisions that are vital for media companies and manipulate information that is highly prized in journalistic cultures closely tuned to official news" (60).

Nicaraguan journalism

Nicaragua, an impoverished country of 5 million people in Central America, is dotted with forests, mountains and volcanoes. Earthquakes are not uncommon, and thousands of people lost their lives when an earthquake struck the capital city of Managua in 1972. Hurricane Mitch killed thousands in 1998. The political scene also can be volatile.

By the late 1970s, the Nicaraguan people were fed up with the corruption and repression of the Somoza regime – three Somozas, Anastasio followed by his two sons, Luis and Anastasio Jr., had ruled Nicaragua since the 1930s. After years of war, the Sandinistas marched triumphantly into Managua on July 19, 1979, after Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza fled the country. The war of liberation had cost 50,000 lives, or about 2 percent of Nicaragua's population at the time (Walker, 1991).

Journalists, like the rest of the population, were dramatically affected by these upheavals in Nicaraguan society. With the success of the revolution, the Somoza-backed *Novedades* was closed and in its place the Sandinistas started *Barricada. La Prensa*, which had been highly critical of the Somoza regime, became the leading opposition newspaper to the Sandinistas. *El*

Nuevo Diario was started after pro-Sandinista elements of *La Prensa* broke off from that paper as it became more critical of the Sandinistas (Kodrich, 2002a).

For journalists, the Sandinista victory didn't mean an end to repression. For decades under the Somozas, journalists were routinely subjected to censorship and threats. The Sandinistas continued to censor and close the news media in the 1980s, often justifying it as necessary during wartime. The United States government had backed the Contras and the so-called Contra War for much of the 1980s in an attempt to remove the socialist-leaning Sandinistas and President Daniel Ortega from office.

In 1990, however, Nicaraguans elected as their president Violeta Barrios de Chamorro and the defeated Ortega and the Sandinistas peacefully turned over power. Violeta is the widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Cardenal, the martyred editor of Nicaragua's *La Prensa* who was slain in 1978 while leading much of the opposition to the Somoza regime. Under Violeta Chamorro, most press restrictions were lifted. In fact, Nicaragua's press system was one of the freest in all of Latin America (Buckman, 1996). President Arnoldo Alemán was elected in 1996, with Ortega again finishing second. Enrique Bolaños defeated Ortega in 2001.

Nicaragua's newspaper scene in the 1990s changed rapidly. *La Prensa*, *El Nuevo Diario* and *Barricada* were joined by *La Tribuna* in 1993. *Barricada* closed in 1998. *La Noticia* in opened in 1999. *La Tribuna* closed in 2000. The newspapers varied dramatically in content, appearance and politics. But circulations in the 1990s were dismal.

The nation's desperate economy played a prominent role in the circulation decline. "Nicaraguans would prefer to buy milk or beans," Alfonso Malespín, a professor in communication sciences at the Universidad Centroamericana (UCA) in Managua, told the author in 1998.

In the Western hemisphere, Nicaragua and Haiti generally perform the worst on a variety of social and economic indicators (United Nations Development Program, 1998). The World Bank reported per-capita annual income in Nicaragua at U.S.\$420 in the year 2000, compared with \$480 for Haiti (World Bank, 2001). Also a factor is Nicaragua's literacy rate, which had been as high as 88 percent during the 1980s but in 1995 was reported at 66 percent. (World Bank, 2001) (NicaNet, 2000).

Daily newspapers did not release circulation figures, but most observers the author talked with in 1998 agreed *El Nuevo Diario* had the most readers, followed closely by *La Prensa* and then, far behind, *La Tribuna*. Malespín told the author in 1998 that circulation directors at the three newspapers gave him the following numbers: *El Nuevo Diario* sold 15,000 copies a day, *La Prensa* sold 13,000 and *La Tribuna* sold 3,500. More recently, however, Nicaraguan newspapers

were gaining circulation. In October 2001, a few weeks before the presidential election, Malespín said the circulations were 38,000 for *La Prensa*, 35,000 for *El Nuevo Diario* and 2,500 for *La Noticia*

Nicaraguans had no problem vigorously exercising their freedom of speech. Diverse viewpoints were freely and openly discussed in the media, in academia and on street corners. There was no state censorship in Nicaragua. The privately owned print media, the broadcast media, and academic circles freely discussed diverse viewpoints in public discourse without government interference (U.S. Department of State, 1998).

Freedom of the press could potentially be restricted, however, by several constitutional provisions. The 1987 Constitution stipulated that citizens had the right to “accurate information,” thereby providing an exception by which the freedom to publish information that the Government deems inaccurate could be abridged. (U.S. Department of State, 1998).

Although the National Assembly passed a bill in September 1996 that would have established a professional journalists' guild, it was never signed into law. The executive's reluctance was due in part to the journalistic community's sharp division over whether such a law would improve the quality of journalism or merely restrict the freedom of speech. There was no movement in the National Assembly to revive the proposal (U.S. Department of State, 1998).

The IAPA said freedom of the press had improved dramatically since the days of the Somozas and the Sandinistas. Since 1990, Nicaragua had not had serious cases of press freedom violations. Nevertheless, the IAPA has noted several problem areas in recent years, including the continuing high unemployment for journalists and the governmental approval of a law requiring licensing of journalists. That law had not yet been implemented as of 2002 because of disagreement between the two main journalism organizations (IAPA, 2002a). The IAPA also continued to be critical of the use of state advertising as a way of penalizing or rewarding the media. This will be elaborated upon later.

Despite the problems with media-press relations, President Arnoldo Alemán, continued to praise journalists publicly. “You represent the voices of the national conscience and the irreducible bulwark of liberty, democracy and human rights,” he said. “What would a country be without the tenacious, noble and, at times, heroic work of yourselves” (Alemán, 1998: 10A).

La Tribuna columnist Wilfredo Montalvan said freedom of expression was a fundamental right. “In a democratic system such as the one we are trying to consolidate in Nicaragua, freedom of expression is considered a cornerstone or backbone of democracy. This is true, for without freedom of expression there can be no democracy” (Montalvan, 1998: 7A).

The life and death of *Barricada*

Barricada was founded shortly after the Sandinistas ousted the dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle in July 1979. The new daily documented the radical social changes pushed by the Sandinistas and the battle against the U.S.-backed Contras throughout the 1980s. When the Sandinistas lost the 1990 elections, *Barricada* became an opposition newspaper and kept close watch on the two subsequent administrations of President Violeta Chamorro and President Arnaldo Alemán (Kodrich, 2002a).

Barricada first published July 25, 1979, shortly after the revolutionaries took power. The newspaper used the equipment and supplies of the confiscated Somoza paper, *Novedades*. *Barricada*'s name referred to the barricades set up in many communities during the revolution to prevent the National Guard from entering. It was edited by Carlos Fernando Chamorro, one of four children of Pedro Joaquín and Violeta Chamorro. The newspaper was the official organ of the Sandinista Front and enjoyed a wide circulation in the 1980s, when it was considered useful for the "party line" (Woodward, 1983). *Barricada* was a vital tool of the Sandinistas as they tried to rebuild Nicaragua in the years following the revolution.

One of the founders was Sofia Montenegro, who was asked to join the paper by FSLN member Leonel Espinoza because he knew she was a journalism student and FSLN member. But because her brother was a captured National Guard member, some people didn't trust her. "I'd had two years of journalism by then, and I hoped at some point I'd be able to continue studying. Not everyone on the new paper trusted me, but Leonel's word and Carlos Fernando Chamorro's saved me" (Randall, 1994: 297). Montenegro handled the newspaper's editorial pages until 1989.

After the Sandinistas lost power in 1990, *Barricada* began declining in influence, circulation and advertising. On January 30, 1991, its official slogan on the front page changed from "The official organ of the FSLN" to "For the national interests." Also gone from the front were the red and black FSLN flag and the guerrilla fighter with his rifle in a combat position behind a brick barricade. The design was replaced with the Nicaraguan flag, with Sandino's hat in the middle. A few days later the hat and flag were separated. As part of its modernization efforts, it also added more graphics and went from a format of seven columns to six columns (*Barricada International*, 1991).

The newspaper continued to maintain a quality staff, accurate information and good investigative journalism. Some observers said it was the most serious forum of public discussion in Nicaragua (Catholic Institute, 1993). The newspaper seemed to be operating professional and had a significant degree of day-to-day autonomy from the Sandinista political party (Jones, 2001).

Carlos Chamorro said the new version of the newspaper had to satisfy both Sandinistas and non-Sandinistas. “We’re also trying to practice balanced journalism, which seeks out different viewpoints about the elements in a news item, so that the reader can draw his or her own conclusions. This doesn’t mean we’re renouncing our political intention – we don’t believe in neutral journalism, but the concept of balance is extremely important to us” (*Barricada International*, 1991).

But in 1994 that experiment ended when the party replaced Chamorro with Tomás Borge, the former Nicaraguan interior minister. About 80 percent of the journalists left and credibility with the readers dropped (Chamorro, 1998). *Barricada* lost about 75 percent of its circulation in the first three years under Borge and saw a 75 percent reduction in advertising as well (Chamorro, 1998).

Barricada continued to struggle and searched for new ways to regain readers and advertisers. Its circulation was estimated to be about 5,000 in its last months (Jones, 2001). In its final years, there were numerous attempts to save it. In January 1997, *Barricada* editors wrote that the newspaper was dealing with a difficult financial situation. “We have confronted with courage the inherited insolvency, the disorder and the fatal prognosis.” At the same time they announced a makeover of the newspaper, highlighted by a revamped magazine-like Sunday edition, a daily entertainment page and a new page called, “A little bit about everything,” which was to provide a lighter look at the news. The newspaper also expanded its economics section.

While the newspaper editorialized that it would continue to be loyal to the Sandinistas, it also stressed that the pages would be open to all, especially business people. “The pages of *Barricada* are open to producers, industries, transport services, businesses, small businesses and workers” (*Barricada*, 1997:1). The message didn’t try to disguise the appeal to advertisers, saying the economics page would be a link between business people and advertisers.

The editor worked with the reporters, photographers, designers, copy editors and assigning editors to develop the new design and “colorful and fertile content,” which would help “fill the needs of modern journalism.” The *Barricada* staff also considered the needs of the readers, whose “repeated demands were expressed in surveys and letters” (*Barricada*, 1997:1).

Other efforts to save the newspaper were tried. On April 9, 1997, *Barricada* featured on article on page 1 about *Barricada*’s new offer for free classified ads for readers. The story opened, “‘Free?!’ exclaimed the genuinely surprised Ronald Lopez when, after asking how much he had to pay for publishing his classified ad, he was told the cost of putting a classified in *Barricada* is nothing.”

Barricada editors said they were working to solve the problems of weak circulation and “anemic” advertising. “We have confronted with courage the inherited insolvency, the disorder and the fatal prognosis,” a newspaper editorial said. The changes would ensure *Barricada*’s success. “We can assure you, with all responsibility, *Barricada* will be around for a long time” (*Barricada*, 1997).

Its last issue as a daily was No. 6571 on January 30, 1998.

The January 30 issue carried no hint that it would be its last. Its main story was about a new survey that showed Nicaraguans support democratic values. The paper’s 12 pages – normal for that time period – carried the usual mix of news of politics, crime, sports and the economy as well as opinion pieces. The journalists didn’t find out until a 6 p.m. announcement that day. They were finishing stories and designing pages for the next day’s paper when Tomás Borge, the editor, made the announcement, saying the shutdown was temporary and was being implemented for economic reasons (Mairena, 1998).

When the angry workers demanded further explanation as well as back pay, Borge stormed out of the meeting and sought refuge in his office, saying other journalists had infiltrated the meeting. “I left because this was a private meeting and you were interfering,” he bellowed toward the journalists as he sought refuge in his office (Garcia Canales, 1998).

Two years after the daily *Barricada* abruptly stopped publishing, it resurfaced briefly as a weekly newspaper in March 2000 with no pretensions to be anything other than a biased political organ of the Sandinistas. “In this new stage of *Barricada*, we are there to spread Sandinista propaganda,” Editor Pablo Emilio Barreto told the author in July 2000. Barreto said he and his staff were journalists, but also proud of their political work. “I’m a member of the Sandinistas first,” he said.

In some ways, *Barricada* hadn’t changed much over the course of its 19 years of existence as a daily newspaper. From the start, *Barricada* appealed to Nicaraguans to support it. When the newspaper started charging one cordoba on August 19, 1979, an article said the one cordoba was “to maintain and spread our revolutionary truth...Sandinistas should support *Barricada*, the newspaper of the FSLN.”

At both the beginning and end of the era, it was primarily a political newspaper, closely identified with the Sandinistas. Its first issue had few pages and had no advertisements; its final issue had few pages with few advertisements. Both were black and white – although the first issue had its title in red and black – the colors of the Sandinista flag.

The newspaper, nevertheless, had seen many changes – sometimes quite dramatic ones. During the Sandinista era, it was a vital source of information about the country and the ruling

government. After the Sandinista loss, it continued to be a credible newspaper. But in later years, it turned to sensationalism more and more, and also returned to political sloganeering.

Was *Barricada* any different from other newspapers in Nicaragua?

A content analysis of *Barricada*, *La Prensa*, *El Nuevo Diario* and *La Tribuna* found that *Barricada* shared some traits but also differed from the other newspapers in 1997. The study looked at two constructed weeks of the four newspapers (Kodrich, 2002b). All except *El Nuevo Diario* used color photographs. *Barricada* had the fewest number of pages – an average of 16.9 day compared to the largest, 36 pages a day at *La Prensa*. Looking at Page 1, *Barricada* had the largest photos of any of the papers and also had the largest headlines. All four newspapers relied heavily on government coverage. *Barricada* placed more emphasis on political news than did the others, with the stories tending to praise the Sandinistas and criticize the government (Kodrich, 2002b).

María Elsa Suárez García, an observer of the newspaper scene and general editor of *Bolsa de Noticias*, a daily newsletter, agreed that *Barricada* wasn't a very professional or balanced newspaper when the Sandinista militants controlled it. When a newspaper was merely spreading the party line, she said, it had no credibility and people will not buy it. "It's difficult to survive." Yet, she said, few news media in Nicaragua were truly independent. "They have an ideological approach and the population knows it," she told the author in 1998.

Nicaraguan newspaper editors have long acknowledged that their newspapers were biased. Xavier Chamorro, editor of *El Nuevo Diario*, said, "We're combative and politicized. Do you want newspapers here to be like in San Salvador? That don't say anything? Why should we be like the *Washington Post*?" *Barricada* editorial chief Sofia Montenegro said, "Nicaragua is a polarized society and the media reflect this. So long as the war exists, combative journalism will exist." And *La Prensa* editor Pablo Antonio Cuadra said, "It's very difficult to ask, after 10 years of dictatorship and censorship, that there will be equilibrium, that circumstances be angelic. I don't believe U.S. newspapers have been less devoted to their own candidates" (Kattenburg, 1990: 48).

The pro-revolutionary Nicaraguan Journalists Union made some attempts to professionalize the media during the 1980s, but they would often end in bitter feuds (Norsworthy and Barry, 1989). The concept of fairness and objectivity just didn't exist in Nicaragua. Instead, passion and partisanship were the norm.

Following the defeat of the Sandinistas in 1990, more efforts were made to become more professional and objective. *Barricada* editor Carlos Fernando Chamorro and *La Prensa* editor

Javier Aguerra told the annual convention of the Society of Professional Journalists that, more than anything, their two papers must learn to become more objective and professional. Chamorro said journalism in Nicaragua is polarized because of the polarization of the country. Aguerra said newspapers are divided by the political views of their owners. "Even though we have a free press, we do not have independent newspapers in Nicaragua" (Fitzgerald, 1991: 22).

Malespín, the UCA journalism professor, said Nicaragua has a long tradition of biased reporting. "It was accepted in the Somoza era and continued in the Sandinista era." But with the arrival of democracy, he said, changes were needed. "If it's correct that a strong democracy is desired in Nicaragua, it needs a strong journalism to help work for democracy. It needs another type of journalism."

The media themselves also were acknowledging the need to be an independent press. "A free and democratic society can exist only where the news media are independent and the journalists have the freedom, the capability and the responsibility for exercising the sacred right to inform," a *La Prensa* editorial said on the Day of the Journalist (*La Prensa*, 1997: 10A). "The function of *La Prensa* is to inform objectively and responsibly, spreading the democratic thought of Nicaraguans, reporting the good acts of the government when they occur but also criticizing its errors and denouncing its abuses, keeping watch for the respect of human rights and justice, and effectively fighting anti-democratic forces of the past that continue to exist in the present."

Was advertising boycott to blame for *Barricada's* demise, or just poor journalism?

Barricada's closing sparked a flurry of charges and rebuttals over the reasons. In a written statement addressed to the Nicaraguan public that circulated in the *Barricada* newsroom on the newspaper's final day, editor Borge blamed the government and the private business sector for the closing. "The economic sabotage of the government and the oppressive sectors of private business resulted in a growing gap between revenue and expenses. During the final period the government subjected us to financial and political torture" (*La Tribuna* 1998: 1). The lack of state advertising, combined with the high cost of paper and other expenses, forced the closing, he said.

Daniel Ortega, the secretary general of the Sandinistas and former president of Nicaragua, also criticized the government for seeking revenge on the news media. Ortega stated that the Sandinistas had proposed legislation that would prevent government advertising to be used as an instrument of political blackmail and "establish methods of protection so that the news media are not silenced, closed or reprimanded" (Ortega, 1998: 1C).

Mario Tapia, a member of the national board of the Union of Nicaraguan Journalists, said the advertising blockade of *Barricada* was an obstacle to freedom of the press in Nicaragua (Gonzalez, 1998).

But others, including, denied the government was to blame for the closing. They said incompetent management and unprofessional journalism were to blame. *Barricada* had become biased and sensational, they argued.

Nicaraguan President Arnoldo Alemán was among those who said the closing was due to poor newspaper management. Alemán's communication secretary, Jaime Morales Corazo, said *Barricada*'s editors kept it a partisan newspaper and didn't adapt to the new times (IPI, 1999).

Former *Barricada* editor Carlos Fernando Chamorro also said the damage to *Barricada* was self-inflicted. The newspaper had once been respected source of news but that had given way to sensationalism and partisan coverage under Borge. Chamorro, who arrived at *Barricada* two months after its founding, said the newspaper needed to become more independent of the party in order for it to survive after the Sandinista electoral loss in 1990 (Chamorro, 1998).

In a column in *El Nuevo Diario* on February 9, 1998, media observer Francisco Bravo Lacayo put partial blame on the Sandinistas because they used *Barricada* for partisan reasons. Good guerrillas don't necessarily make good journalists, he said. "It's not the same to handle an AK machine gun as it is a typewriter," Bravo Lacayo said. Nevertheless, Bravo Lacayo said a governmental vendetta did play a role in the closing. The ruling Liberal Constitutional Party took revenge on the Sandinistas and pulled back state advertising in an attempt to pressure *Barricada*.

In an interview with the author in 1998, Roberto Fonseca, who worked at *Barricada* from 1985 to 1994, said people didn't buy the newspaper because it was an official newspaper with no credibility. "It wasn't a newspaper, it was a political pamphlet and pamphlets don't sell."

Nevertheless, Fonseca said he was sad to see *Barricada* close. "Whenever a mass media closes, it's a reason to worry. It was part of the reality of the country – 30 percent of the society was leftist. *Barricada* gave those people the opportunity for reflection and thought," he said. "I lament the closing of *Barricada*. I didn't like the newspaper but it's sad that it closed. This isn't healthy for democracy."

A closer look at state advertising in Nicaragua

To help determine whether the claim of political sabotage through the use of state advertising is plausible, this study now will examine the amount of state advertising in the newspapers. First, it will look at what *Barricada* itself and other media offered as evidence for discrimination. Then it will consider what media watchdog groups have said regarding the use of

state advertising in Nicaragua. Finally, this study will take an independent look at the amount of advertising in the daily newspapers in Nicaragua through a content analysis.

Much of the background for this study was gathered from 1997 to 2001 while the author was conducting fieldwork in Nicaraguan newsrooms. Between observing and interviewing of journalists for another research project, the author read issues of *Barricada* from throughout its nearly two decades of existence. He also noted other journalistic and scholarly accounts of the troubles *Barricada* was undergoing. The author conducted the content analysis in 1998 and 1999.¹

On 6 June 1997, *Barricada* had a front-page story about how the government was cutting its advertising in *Barricada* in favor of the two pro-government newspapers. The headline read, "Discrimination against the opposition media," and the story also featured a logo that read, "Government: Finished with *Barricada*" that pictured a cleaver cutting through the word, *Barricada*.

"Since it assumed power, the Liberal government has eliminated its advertising in some mass media with the clear objective of giving them economic difficulties," opened the story (Meléndez, 1997). "Between Jan. 10 and June 6, while the two pro-government newspapers received a total of 37,990 paid columns of advertising from the government, *Barricada* received only 2,376 paid columns, not even 5 percent of the paid government advertising in the country's dailies" (1). *Barricada* was the least favored newspaper for government advertising. *La Tribuna* received more state advertising even though it was the least-sold newspaper. *La Prensa* received 38.46 percent and *La Tribuna* received 32.05 percent. *El Nuevo Diario* received 25.17 percent of state advertising while *Barricada* received 4.41 percent.

In early 1997, *El Nuevo Diario* likewise had accused the new Alemán government of "concentrating official advertising in one place to drown out the voice of critical media and to silence them." The government denied the accusation and said it would distribute official advertising in accordance with the circulation or ratings of the media.

Borge, the *Barricada* editor, said in October 1997 that *Barricada* received 7 percent of the total of the government's advertising in the four newspapers. A Communications Ministry official said that since *Barricada* is owned by the Sandinista political party, it is an official mouthpiece of the party and not committed to true and objective information. He added that the Sandinistas had publicly proposed on several occasions the overthrow of the Alemán government (IAPA, 1998b).

Media watchdog groups had long criticized the use of state advertising as a way to control the media. They found plenty to criticize in Nicaragua. The Inter American Press

Association noted that the Sandinista media had received a very reduced portion of official advertising since Alemán took office. *Barricada's* advertising was reduced in 1997 and Channel 4 television indicated it did not receive even a minute of governmental advertising. Other pro-Sandinista media, including the news program "*Extravision*," also had difficulty in getting state advertising (IAPA, 1998b).

The following year, IAPA again criticized the Nicaraguan government. The media had voiced concern at continued discrimination against pro-Sandinista publications in the placement of official advertising by President Arnoldo Alemán's administration. Also, the tax and customs agencies had suspended their advertising in the daily *La Prensa* but kept advertising in two other newspapers. After *La Prensa* protested this discrimination in a letter to the presidential press secretary, the situation had improved (IAPA, 1999).

The International Press Institute, a global network of editors, media executives and journalists that examines freedom of the press issues, likewise criticized the Alemán administration. It said journalists in 1998 complained of constant violations, mistreatment, threats of imprisonment and verbal repression (IPI, 1998). In its discussion of the closing of *Barricada*, IPI reiterated that Borge had accused Alemán of instituting a government advertising embargo against the newspaper that had slowly strangled it. Alemán and Morales Carazo, press secretary of the government, said the paper was poorly managed and did not adapt to changing times. Carazo promised the government would not engage in embargoes or monopolies in the placement of official advertisements.

The Committee to Protect Journalists, an organization dedicated to the global defense of press freedom, said the Alemán government often used political criteria to decide which publications received state advertising revenues. In 1999, the new newspaper *La Noticia*, which was closely aligned with the Alemán government, received nearly 25 percent of the government's advertisements, even though it accounted for less than 2 percent of the country's total print media circulation (CPJ, 1999).

To help determine if Nicaraguan governments did indeed discriminate against newspapers, this study examined newspaper advertising under three different presidents, Daniel Ortega, Violeta Chamorro and Arnoldo Alemán. Government advertisements were counted and measured in a constructed week for each of the three time periods – 1986, during the Ortega era; 1994, during the Chamorro era; and 1997, during the Alemán era. Because the state of the economy and other factors could affect the total amount of advertising, the study will focus only on government advertising and then consider what percentage of the total column inches of government advertising appeared in each of the newspapers. Any display advertisement

sponsored by the national government or a governmental agency aligned with the national government was counted and measured in inches – the total inch count of an ad was determined by multiplying the vertical by horizontal measurements for each ad.

The constructed week consisted of editions from the same date from all the newspapers. A Monday was chosen from January, a Tuesday from February, a Wednesday from March, a Thursday from May, a Friday from June, a Saturday from September and a Sunday in December, for each of the three years. When *La Prensa* did not publish due to government restrictions for certain periods in 1986, dates were when all three newspapers had published were selected. The results show that *Barricada* received the least amount of government advertising under Alemán's government in 1997. It had about 8 percent of the advertising inches, compared with 22.3 percent for *El Nuevo Diario*, 28.2 percent for *La Tribuna*, and 41.5 percent for *La Prensa*. (See Table 1.)

On Monday, January 13, 1997, for example, *La Prensa* had two governmental ads that were a total of 75 square inches. *La Tribuna* had one governmental ad that measured 59 square inches. But neither of the opposition papers, *Barricada* or *El Nuevo Diario*, had any governmental ads. On Thursday, 22 May, *La Prensa* had five ads for a total of 603 square inches and *La Tribuna* had a total of two governmental ads for a total of 109 inches. *El Nuevo Diario* had two ads for 313 square inches while *Barricada* just had one ad of 52 square inches that day.

The types of advertising placed by the government ranged widely. For instance, the National Bank had a two-page advertisement promoting the fact that the government helped finance growers of corn and beans, with several photos of bank officials with farmers. An advertisement from the Nicaraguan Institute of Telecommunication and Mail informed readers that only it can use the word "correos," or mail, for promotion or advertising purposes. The office of the First Lady, the president's daughter at the time, promoted Nicaraguan Children's Week and the right of children to live in homes free of violence.

Examples of advertisements from 1994 included a notice of the names of people who had mail waiting for them that couldn't be delivered, a notice providing the rates for installation of telephones, and a promotion for a workshop on education. In 1986, advertisements included a promotion from the Sandinista Army stating "We are the people fighting for our country," instructions on how to obtain a national identity card and a notice of the rules and regulations of the Central Bank.

The Sandinista government in 1986 appeared to be no fairer than the Alemán government was in 1997 in the placement of advertisements. The opposition newspaper *La Prensa* had just 6.6 percent of the advertising inches, compared to 38.5 percent in the Sandinistas' own *Barricada* and 54.9 percent in the pro-Sandinista *El Nuevo Diario*. (See Table 3.) For example, on Friday, 6

June 1986, *El Nuevo Diario* had four governmental ads with a total of 108 square inches and *Barricada* had two with a total of 243 inches, while the opposition *La Prensa* had just one ad of 37 square inches.

This is in line with earlier findings regarding the Sandinistas and state advertising. In 1982, under the Sandinistas, the pro-revolutionary media received the most advertising from the government, with *El Nuevo Diario* at the top of the list (Läpple-Wagenhals, 1984).

The era when the advertising was most evenly split came in 1994 under Violeta Chamorro. *La Prensa* had 32.3 percent of the advertising inches, *Barricada* had 25.7 percent, *El Nuevo Diario* had 22.1 percent and *La Tribuna* had 20 percent. (See Table 2.) On Friday, June 17, 1994, for example, *La Prensa* had one governmental advertisement of 60 square inches, *El Nuevo Diario* had four with a total of 328 square inches, *La Tribuna* had one of 142 square inches and *Barricada* had five for a total of 576 square inches. On Saturday, 24 September, *La Prensa* had four advertisements for a total of 228 square inches, *El Nuevo Diario* had two for a total of 109 square inches, *La Tribuna* had two for a total of 102 square inches and *Barricada* had one ad of 65 inches.

The findings support the idea that both the Sandinista government and the Alemán government discriminated against the newspapers that were most in opposition to their governments. It also supports the idea that the Chamorro government was the fairest – which was in line with the goals of the Chamorro government for national reconciliation, following the bitter years of the war between the Sandinistas and the Contras.

Perhaps another reason that could explain the even-handedness of the Chamorro administration is the fact that Violeta Chamorro had family connections at all three newspapers – *La Prensa* was her late husband's newspaper and she still maintained a share of the ownership, *El Nuevo Diario* was started by her brother-in-law, and her son, Carlos Chamorro, was still running things at *Barricada*.

After the demise of *Barricada*, the Alemán government continued to use state advertising as a political weapon, according to the Inter American Press Association, the International Press Institute and the Committee to Protect Journalists. The IAPA, in its 2001 annual report, said President Alemán had promised that “in the future there will be no discrimination in the placement of government advertising for political reasons.” But the situation didn't change, and Alemán's government continued to favor *La Noticia*, which was closely aligned with Alemán. Even though a survey by the National Organization of Advertising Agencies showed *La Prensa* and *El Nuevo Diario* with a combined 98 percent of the readership, leaving just 2 percent for *La*

Noticia, another study by an independent research firm, Servicios Publicitarios Computarizados, found that *La Noticia* received 31 percent of the government advertising. *La Prensa* received 33 percent and *El Nuevo Diario* 47 percent. For broadcast media, the results were similar – radio and TV stations with ties to the government or that support the government received the most government advertising (IAPA, 2001b).

According to the International Press Institute, *El Nuevo Diario* saw a drastic reduction in the allocation of government advertising in its pages starting in June 2001. Officials also allegedly instructed government agencies to cancel their subscriptions. Journalists suspected the action was taken because of the newspaper's reporting on corruption and its critical opinions. According to Francisco Chamorro, the editor of *El Nuevo Diario*, President Alemán accused the newspaper of "a hateful smear campaign against the president and his government" and was intent on "having the newspaper disappear from the stands" (IPI, 2001). The main beneficiary appeared to be the pro-government *La Noticia*, which received a disproportionate share of state advertising considering its low circulation (CPI, 2001).

The year before, the IPI said the government was continuing to pursue a carrot and stick policy with the media through the allocation of government advertising. "In view of this, it would appear that the government is still attempting to introduce self-censorship among the media in Nicaragua by awarding advertising contracts to those media organizations which follow the government's line" (IPI, 2000). To counteract these developments, the IAPA Board passed a strongly worded resolution that condemned the government's policy of punishing its critics by denying them access to official advertising. (IPI 2000).

The IAPA again told President Alemán of its concerns in a letter sent in July 2001. "The Inter American Press Association hereby reiterates its deepest concern over complaints received from news media in your country about governmental discrimination in the placement of official advertising, an action that we fear the government may use as a means of putting pressure to silence and punish news reporting that it regards not being favorable to it" (IAPA, 2001a). The note reminded the president that the IAPA had already brought the matter to his attention in previous years when the same policy was applied to the detriment of other newspapers, including *Barricada*.

Discussion

This study supports the claim that the Nicaraguan government headed by President Alemán did discriminate against *Barricada*. The charges made by journalists and international

media watch groups were supported by an analysis of advertising in each paper. Government advertising in *Barricada* was being shut off and that certainly contributed to the financial crisis at *Barricada*. While the findings are from a constructed week, they do support earlier evidence provided by the newspapers themselves and the press watchdog groups regarding the government's use of advertising to punish or reward the press.

But this study cannot cast all the blame on the Alemán administration. Certainly *Barricada* editors alienated readers, advertisers and the government when it reemerged as a biased political organ in the mid-1990s. Why would any advertiser, including the government, want to pay for ads that aren't being read? If *Barricada* editors had maintained the newspaper's higher level of professionalism that it had in the early 1990s, it likely would not have lost the credibility and readership it had worked hard to gain.

Also, for the Sandinistas to complain about the lack of government advertising now seems to reek of hypocrisy. When the Sandinistas were in charge in the 1980s, this study showed they did the same thing to the opposition press – *La Prensa*, at the time..

Nevertheless, the use of state advertising as a way to control the media is still an insidious method of political censorship, no matter who is controlling the purse strings. As discussed earlier, a revised theory of freedom and equality must take into account varying forms of state interference in the communication of ideas (Keane, 1992). One of those types of political censorship is the use of state advertising to influence the media – a form of political blackmail.

The trends to exert political censorship are troubling and lead to a growing sense of lawlessness in Western democracies. “They indicate the growing quantity of political power which is normally accountable neither to citizens or to the mass media nor subject to the rule of law” (Keane: 22).

As Waisbord (2000) points out, governments still wield power over the press despite the ascendancy of market forces. And aside from government and market forces, no other powerful voices have emerged to provide a counterbalance. That antidemocratic tendency reflects a legacy of power inequalities in Latin America.

The use of state advertising is one of the ways governments have continued to keep the press in line. As Rockwell and Janus (2001) indicated, strong central governments in Central America have developed information politics to keep an economic leash on the media.

With the inauguration of a new president in Nicaragua in 2002, there was hope that things would somehow be different. As mentioned at the start of this study, Enrique Bolaños, as a candidate for president, agreed to support freedom of the press when he signed the Declaration of Chapultepec, a document based on the concept that no law or act of government may limit

freedom of expression or the press. President Bolaños, after taking office on January 10, 2002, announced that his policies on the media and placement of government advertising would be fair and nothing like those of Alemán. The new government said state advertising would be placed in the media based on readership surveys and circulation, not as "awards and punishments" as had been the case in the past (IAPA, 2002b).

It remains to be seen if the days of coercion of the news media through economic intimidation are over. But the fact remains that Nicaragua has one fewer outlet for facts, analysis and opinion as a result of the closing of *Barricada*.

The loss of a newspaper is a tragedy for many reasons, including the loss of jobs and economic stimulus desperately needed in a struggling economy. It also means one fewer voice, alternative view or check and balance. The loss hinders the right of Nicaraguans to have access to information in a free system. In a country like Nicaragua, where politics saturates every aspect of the culture, the impact is immeasurable. Democracy is still young in Nicaragua. And in order to thrive – sometimes even to survive – democracy needs a free press.

Note

1 The author thanks Andrea Mayorga, a journalism student at Universidad Centroamericana in Managua, for her help in the analysis of the advertising.

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Table 1: State advertising in Nicaraguan daily newspapers for a constructed week in 1997:

1997	Average # of pages	Average # of ads	Average size of ads	Average ad inches per day
<i>La Prensa</i>	37.7	3.2	83.8	275.3
<i>El Nuevo Diario</i>	19.4	1.7	86.4	148.1
<i>Barricada</i>	17.1	0.7	74.1	52.9
<i>La Tribuna</i>	21.4	2.4	77.0	187.1

1997	Total ad inches in week	Percentage of advertising inches
<i>La Prensa</i>	1926.8	41.5
<i>El Nuevo Diario</i>	1036.5	22.3
<i>Barricada</i>	370.4	8.0
<i>La Tribuna</i>	1309.6	28.2

Table 2: State advertising in Nicaraguan daily newspapers for a constructed week in 1994:

1994	Average # of pages	Average # of ads	Average size of ads	Average ad inches per day
<i>La Prensa</i>	22.9	2.6	82.0	210.8
<i>El Nuevo Diario</i>	15.4	2.1	67.3	144.2
<i>Barricada</i>	17.1	1.4	117.1	167.3
<i>La Tribuna</i>	20.6	1.5	82.8	130.2

1994	Total ad inches in week	Percentage of advertising inches
<i>La Prensa</i>	1475.9	32.2
<i>El Nuevo Diario</i>	1009.5	22.1
<i>Barricada</i>	1171.1	25.7
<i>La Tribuna</i>	911.1	20.0

Table 3: Advertising in Nicaraguan daily newspapers for a constructed week in 1986:

1986	Average # of pages	Average # of ads	Average size of ads	Average ad inches per day
<i>La Prensa</i>	9.1	0.9	30.3	26
<i>El Nuevo Diario</i>	11.1	4.9	45.0	218.5
<i>Barricada</i>	8.0	2.9	53.6	153.0

1986	Total ad inches in week	Percentage of advertising inches
<i>La Prensa</i>	182.2	6.6
<i>El Nuevo Diario</i>	1529.2	54.9
<i>Barricada</i>	1072.2	38.5

**Comparative critical analysis of advertorials and articles in
Nigeria's Fourth Republic Mass Media**

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**Comparative critical analysis of advertorials and articles in
Nigeria's Fourth Republic Mass Media**

Abstract

This study uses textual analysis to explore the messages embedded in Nigerian mass media advertorials to determine if their contents agree or contrast with articles dealing with the prevailing economic, social and political conditions in Nigeria.

The themes in the selected articles contradict those in the selected advertorials. While the advertorials extol the achievements of the civilian administrators, the articles dispute those claims and blame politicians for their failure to improve the welfare of Nigerians.

Comparative critical analysis of advertorials and articles in Nigeria's Fourth Republic Mass Media

Introduction

Since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria has experienced just over a dozen years of democratic administration. Major-General Ishola Williams (rtd.), former commander of the Training and Doctrine Command, blamed the pitfalls of Nigerian socioeconomic conditions, politics and the democratization process on a lack of integrity, accountability, transparency, contractocracy, and the militarized mindset of civil society (Aja, 1998).

For the more than forty years of Nigerian nationhood, mainly Northern military officers have ruled the nation. Corruption, tribalism, political conflicts and poor administration have been blamed for the failure of this natural resources-rich nation to achieve its economic promise. Ethnic and religious differences, combined with economic woes, create instability in the country (Akinterinwa, 2001).

Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999 marking the nation's Fourth Republic. Under this Fourth Republic, three political parties govern Nigeria: The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) controls the national assembly, federal government, and dominates state legislatures and the executive branch in 21 of 36 states. The Alliance for Democracy (AD), and

the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) have members in the national assembly. The AD controls the executive and legislative branches in six states, while the ANPP controls the legislative and executive arms in nine states.

During the 1999 election campaign, PDP presidential candidate Olusegun Obasanjo told Nigerians that if elected, he would strive to improve their socio-economic and political conditions by improving communications (road, telephone, air travel), building hospitals, creating jobs, encouraging the establishment of new industries, making education affordable, and promoting unity among the various Nigerian ethnic groups. Obasanjo was Nigeria's military head of state from 1976-1979. Obasanjo declared that his mission was to relieve the socioeconomic stagnation that had plagued Nigeria for more than fifteen years. He also promised to eradicate corruption. Politicians running for governorships, state and federal legislatures, as well as local government offices, offered similar declarations as they embarked on the 1999 election campaign.

Other politicians had their opinions about how to end Nigeria's problems and foster a renaissance. One of them, Chief Ernest Shonekan, who was installed briefly by the military as head of state after the annulment of the 1993 elections of Chief M.K.O. Abiola said Nigeria must engage in good governance. He said good governance called for the establishment of political parties cutting across ethnic, religious and social

lines, and a free and responsible media. He said that good governance required a professional military under the control of civil authorities, a generally accepted constitution that defines the modus operandi of the citizens as well as honest, hardworking politicians who believe in and will go to any length to defend the corporate existence of the country (Anyigor, 1998).

Nigeria earns more than 90 percent of its revenue from oil. Considering the vexing problems of inter-communal strife in Nigeria, one might adopt Taylor's formulation that says promotional strategies such as public relations and advertising techniques could be used to lower ethnic tensions through campaigns, programs, and policies that aim at nation building (Taylor, 2000).

Furthermore, one notes the argument that mass communications could potentially serve as effective mobilization tools, what others have called development communication. Ngugi (1995) points out that the concept was conceived as a means of facilitating development by "systematic utilization of appropriate communication channels and techniques to increase people's participation in development and to inform, motivate and train rural populations mainly at the grassroots levels" (p. 7).

This paper focuses on the use of strategies of advertising and public relations to promote national development. National development, refers

to efforts to enhance human, cultural, socioeconomic and political conditions of the individual and society (Moemeka, 1994).

Purpose, Significance and Questions

Many of the studies dealing with public relations, advertising, and national development have dealt with the traditional roles of public relations and advertising in a business environment. However, few studies deal with advocacy advertising, also known as advertorials, as a tool for national development. This study is an attempt to do so. The purpose of the study is to analyze the contents of advertorials in Nigerian newspapers and magazines between June 1999 and December 2001 and compare them with the press accounts of socio-economic and political developments. This period marks the first two years of Nigeria's return to democratic rule.

This analysis intends to determine if the information contained in advertorials are consistent with press accounts of the socioeconomic and political developments in Nigeria. Furthermore, the objective of the study is to discern if advertorials achieve their aim of relaying information to the public about the activities of politicians and the three tiers of government in the Fourth Republic. Thus, the study will be guided by the following research questions:

- (1) What is the dominant content of political-oriented advertorials in Nigerian newspapers and magazines?
- (2) Are the contents of advertorials consistent with press accounts of socio-economic and political developments in Nigeria?
- (3) Who and/or what entities sponsor advertorials?

Advertorials: A Special Communication Genre?

To understand the role of advertorial, it is important to distinguish it from editorial programming and traditional public relations and advertising. Sandler and Secunda (1993) defined editorial material as “news stories and feature articles in newspapers and magazine,” and programming such as “news, sports and entertainment shows distributed via electronic media” (p. 73). They describe advertising as sponsored promotional messages paid for and carried out in the mass media to influence a person’s decision-making process.

On the other hand, advertorials refer to efforts by advertisers to combine promotional messages with other mass media genre in an attempt to blur the boundaries between editorial content, advertising and promotions. This is intended to blur the distinction between news and promotional messages in the minds of people (Kim, 1995), which is being used inconspicuously as a public relations vehicle. Among ads using these blurring techniques are infomercials and advocacy advertising.

Advertorials began more than fifty years ago when advertisers sought ways to overcome increased advertising clutter in the mass media. These advertisements were chiefly used as nonproduct advertising, not related directly to products or commercial services. At one time, the term advertorial was considered to be synonymous with advocacy advertising, which is intended to promote the belief and stance of a corporation's views or its position on controversial issues (Salmon, Reid & Willet, 1985; Kim, 1995). More recently, however, the definition of advocacy advertising has been limited to the content of the advertisement, i.e., primarily issue-oriented messages. Also, advertorial advertising refers to its editorial-like form of presentation (Kim, 1995).

Using Public Relations in Nation-Building:

As a general rule, public relations aims at building, maintaining and changing relationships in order to promote mutual understanding between organizations and their audience (Seitel, 1995). Studies on public relations and practice focus on relationship-building processes (Taylor, 2000; Broom, Casey, & Ritchey, 1997). Although perceived primarily as a business function, some scholars say public relations may be more effectively used as a tool to negotiate relationships between previously unrelated social systems or as a tool to modify existing relationships between organizations and publics (Taylor, 2000; Botan, 1992).

As Pratt (1985) notes, the Nigerian government and others in the developing world rely on public relations as a vehicle for nation-building and public-issue oriented communication (Taylor, 2000). Their public relations campaigns are aimed at creating awareness, generating acceptance of government programs and policies and mobilizing public support for development programs (Alanazi, 1996). To realize these goals, Third World governments have adopted the concept of development communication.

Oliveira (1993) defined development communication as a means of instilling awareness among a target group. As currently practiced, development communication involves systematic utilization of interpersonal and mass communication channels to motivate, stimulate and promote social development programs and developmental habits among Third World masses.

Nation-building campaigns, then serve as strategic efforts to achieve specific effects on a large group of people in a pre-determined time period. However, some studies indicate that development communication often fails because campaigns are plagued with problems such as promoting value-laden messages, disregarding traditional values. They are often used for the political benefits of leader, instead of solving society's social problems (Boafo, 1985; Taylor, 2000). A single campaign is often used to reach diverse groups and to achieve multiple purposes. This

might account for the difficulty most Nigerian-government sponsored communication and public relations efforts that aimed at promoting social development programs have encountered. In a country as diverse as Nigeria, this is a challenge. It is difficult to reach Nigerian masses and achieve the goals of any single campaign within a brief period because of the inherent problems that breed distrust of the message such as ethnic division, economic inequality, corruption, and political instability.

Method and Analysis:

This study uses as samples, an available collection of Nigeria's regional and national newspapers and magazines and their Online versions that were published between June 1999 and December 2001 – the first thirty-months of the Fourth Republic. Some Online news outlets were also used.

Advertorials and articles selected for the study came from Nigeria's popular newspapers and magazines often considered to the largest circulating print outlets. These include *Tell, Newswatch, The Guardian, The Punch, Vanguard, ThisDay, Post Express* and *The Tribune*. The issues containing interesting advertorials and/or in-depth articles (news, editorials, commentaries and letters to the editor) dealing the socio-economic and political conditions were retained for additional study and analysis. Because this is a base-line study, no a priori content categories

were used. Rather, the study combines a variety of critical and textual approaches including cultural analysis, metaphoric analysis and discourse to explore the content of selected advertorials and articles in leading Nigerian newspapers and magazines.

Vande Berg, Wenner and Gronbeck (1998) state that discourse analysis allows scholars to examine the relationship between texts and their social and institutional contexts. They say that metaphorical analysis employs rhetorical and narrative orientations to explore the culture, meanings, and position taken in a text. It allows an analyst to explain how a text questions, reinforces or criticizes the dominant culture. Metaphoric analysis explores the ideological conflict, issues and perspectives conveyed in a text (Aden, 1995). Metaphoric analysis and other forms of textual analysis allow writers to explore the social construction presented in a text and to discern if alternative ideologies were presented. The perusal of the selected advertorials produced the following interpretations.

Analysis of Selected Advertorials in Nigerian Newspapers and Magazines

At the commencement of the 1999 general elections, politicians vying for federal, state and local offices told Nigerians that they have had more than their fair share of internal strife, natural and man-made

disasters, violence, poverty, diseases, hunger, corruption, unemployment, political instability and inadequate provisions of social services and amenities. If voted into office, they promised that they would work for utilizing Nigeria's abundant resources to improve the welfare of Nigerians. For example, Obasanjo said during the campaign that he was on a mission to improve the socioeconomic welfare of Nigerians. He promised to run a transparent government and work tirelessly to bring the nation together, promote harmony and restore the international image of Nigeria.

A year after returning to civilian rule, advertorials in Nigerian newspapers and magazines proclaimed that the civilian administrators were fulfilling their campaign promises. For example, during a state visit to Ondo State, the state's 18 local governments used an advertorial to tell President Obasanjo of their support and praise him for improving the social welfare of Nigerians. The advertorial asserted that Obasanjo should count on the "unalloyed support in our state and throughout Nigeria and indeed, the whole of Africa in the onerous task of taking our nation Nigeria to greater heights" (*Saturday Punch*, 2000, Oct. 14, p. 10).

The advertorial, featuring the pictures of the president and the state governor Chief Adebayo Adefarati (AD), thanked the president for his "promises to the people of the state because we know that being a man of his words, you will never fail us" (*Saturday Punch*, 2000, Oct. 14, p. 10). It

adds: "Our people will now enjoy more goodies from the federal government for the general well being of our people" (*Saturday Punch*, 2000, Oct. 14, p. 10). The advertorial's message said that in Obasanjo's one-year tenure, Ondo and the country were reaping the benefits of good governance. The advertorial praised the state governor Adefarati, calling him an "indefatigable visionary" for the contributions of his administration and for hosting the president (*Saturday Punch*, 2000, Oct. 14, p. 10).

In August of 2000 when When Alhaji Ghali Umar Na'Abba, the speaker of the House of Representatives, turned 42, several groups used advertorials to praise his leadership. Na'Abba marked the milestone just under one year after assuming the speaker's office. He succeeded the first speaker of the Fourth Republic, Salisu Buhari, who was forced out disgracefully for falsifying his age. Of the numerous advertorials that praised his leadership, house members of the ruling party, (PDP), sponsored one advertorial (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 5), while ANPP house members, one of two opposition parties in the House of Representatives, sponsored the other advertorial (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 42). Na'Abba is a member of the ruling party.

Both of these party-sponsored advertorials congratulated the speaker and extolled his leadership. The advertorials featured the Nigerian emblem. The emblem was placed in the center of the page above

photos of Mohammed Wakil, House Majority leader, and Mohammed Kumalia, ANPP house leader. The APP-sponsored advertorial described the house speaker as one who has “piloted the affairs of House with zeal and dedication to duty, conscious of the need to protect the independence of your arm of government, the National Assembly” (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 5). The PDP-sponsored advertorial described him as a leader with “vision, energy and wealth of experience” (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 42). The advertorial added the speaker’s leadership “has assisted in building bridges across the country” (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 42).

Without his courageous leadership, both advertisements imply, the legislature could not have adequately monitored the activities of the federal executive, to ensure Nigeria’s resources are used to provide the masses with employment, social services and amenities in order to improve their welfare. Since assuming office, the speaker had been in several policy conflicts with the executive branch with critics accusing of him of corruption and of promoting divisiveness (Ajani, 2000). Critics contend that the relationship between the national assembly and the executive branch was crisis-prone, uncooperative and unproductive (Uzoemena & Agande, 2000).

In 2000, Dr. Sam Egwu (PDP), governor of Ebonyi State, received an award as the “Best Governor in Southeast” from the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ). Following the award, the state’s PDP youth wing took a

full-page advertorial to congratulate the governor. In its description of Egwu as “a source of inspiration to the younger generation of politicians,” the advertorial states “we thank God for using you to restore the dignity, faith and hope in your people” (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 9, p. 44). The advertorial did not outline the achievements of the governor. However, an advertorial sponsored by James Nweke, chairman of Ivo Local Government Area in Ebonyi State, outlines Egwu’s achievements. The advertorial thanks the governor’s “developmental strides in revolunising agriculture, offering compulsory free educations, and qualitative education, grass root mobilization within one year of his leadership” (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 41).

Another advertorial by the state’s Ministry of Information also highlights the governor’s achievements in housing, water supply, rural development, finance, commerce, information, tourism, justice, sports, environmental protection, general administration (*The Guardian*, 2000, March 2001, p. 34). With regard to rural development, the advertorial paid gratitude to the governor for progress made in providing electricity to 20 communities. The advertorial said after the discovery of the existence of crude oil and bitumen in the state, the governor had worked effortlessly to tap the state’s resources. The advertorial also claimed that the governor’s efforts are paying off because steps are being “made to get the

appropriate agencies to explore and exploit it to enable to enjoy the status of oil producing state" (*The Guardian*, 2001, March 15, p. 34).

To recognize Egwu's award, Franklin Edem, chairman of Izzi Local Government Area in Ebonyi used an advertorial to congratulate him for recording a lot of "infrastructural developments" during his first year (*The Punch*, 2000, Oct. 4, p. 28). The advertorial extends appreciation to Egwu's deputy, the speaker and members of the state House of Assembly for working in harmony in the development of state.

As Nigeria observed its 40th anniversary, Edem also used the same advertorial to commend Obasanjo's federal administration for "making the people of the nation reap the benefit of democracy as well as repairing the battered image of the nation and confidence of the masses in government (*The Punch*, 2000, Oct. 4, p. 28).

In another example, Prince Segun Adesegun, commissioner for Works and Housing in Ogun State, used an advertorial to convey the people's gratitude to his boss, Chief Olusegun Osoba, governor of Ogun State for Osoba's sense of "good governance and exemplary leadership in the selfless service to the people" (*The Punch*, 2000, Sept. 1, p. 27). The full-page advertorial featuring a photo of the governor with his military bodyguard in the background, states the ministry and staff are grateful for the opportunity given to them to serve the state under the governor's direction.

Like his counterparts in Ebonyi and Ondo, Gov. Otunba Adebayo (AD) of Ekiti State received praises for exemplary leadership. The advertorial, sponsored by his deputy, thanked the governor for the successful commission of the Fountain Court at No. 1 in Victoria Island, Lagos, and for fulfilling other campaign promises (*The Punch*, 2001, Jan. 1, p. 32). It should be noted Victoria Island is in Lagos State, not Ekiti. The construction of a fountain in another state could be viewed as wasteful, criticism many level at the current civilian administrators (*The Guardian Online*, 2001, Dec. 18; Anele, 2001).

On the other hand, the fountain may be situated at the statehouse in Lagos, the nation's commercial capital. Used to conduct business, guard state interests, attract investment and monitor the welfare of state indigenes, most states in the nation maintain state houses in Lagos and Abuja, the new national capital.

Nigeria has about 772 local governments, created "to bring government closer to the grassroots people to in order to accelerate their socio-economic and political development" (*Sunday Tribune*, 2000, July 16, p. 24). During the 1999 elections, Francis O. Fajuke (AD) won the chairmanship of Ilesa West Local Government of Osun State. To mark his first year in office, the government took a full-page advertorial to inform the 1.5 million residents of the local government democracy is paying dividends. The advertorial featured a headshot of a smiling chairman who

enumerated his achievements in health, works, education, agriculture, and staff welfare. The advertorial heaped praises on the chairman for helping Ilesa West Local Government indigenes who were said to be victims of ethnic and religious conflicts that have plagued Nigeria since the return to civilian rule in 1999.

The advertorial said Fajuke's administration had conducted workshops on immunization, and breastfeeding and had opened two health clinics. The advertorial also said the local government had completed five open sheds at a local market, renovated slaughter slabs, repaired an existing generating plant and established a computer center. The advertorial identified the construction of a shopping complex, the re-surfacing of major roads and construction of four health centers in some wards as planned activities for the second year (*Sunday Tribune*, 2000, July 16, p. 24).

Sports is often viewed as a unifying factor in the nation. For example, when the national football team is engaged, Nigerians tend to proclaim their unity. Most administrators realize that one way of endearing themselves to Nigerians is to embark on projects and programs that promote sports. Within one year of taking office, the Obasanjo administration awarded a multi-million dollar contract to build the National Stadium Complex at Abuja, the new national capital.

If completed on schedule, the arena will be used to host major events including the Pan African Games in 2003. At the occasion of laying the foundation for the complex, China Civil Engineering Corporation (CCEC) took a full-page advertorial to thank and congratulate the president and the vice president of Nigeria. The advertorial featured two color pictures of both men. It states Nigerian Nation and the Nigerian people would in the nearest future derive from The Complex maximum benefits that will uplift and enhance sports in Nigeria (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 23)

The advertorial promised the company's commitment to completing its portion of the contract within the specified period. This promise is significant in a nation where government contracts are usually completed late, if not abandoned. By making this promise, this advertorial was telling Nigerians that the Obasanjo administration was holding everyone to higher standards as he promised. Ironically, the same company, CCEC, was accused by the senate committee on transportation of doing a shoddy work when it received a \$450 million contract from a past military administration to rehabilitate the Nigerian railway system. The committee stopped an installment payment of \$66 million to the company pending investigations (Andoor, 2000).

Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited also used an advertorial to praise the government when the Nigerian Liquefied

Gas Company commissioned a plant in Bonny in Rivers State. In one of two advertorials, Shell signified its importance to the project by noting it was the largest shareholder of the company, technical adviser to the project and major supplier to the plant. One of the advertorials featured an ocean-going cargo ship with a text explaining that the plant “constitutes a major highlight in the diversification of Nigeria’s economy, while marking significant growth in the nation’s oil and gas overall income” (*Tell*, 2000, Oct. 2, p. 68). In the other advertorial, Shell portrayed the picture of the plant and stated that the company would use its “worldwide experience and capability in gas plant technology” to contribute to the economic growth of Nigeria (*Tell*, 2000, Oct. 2, p. 69). Shell and other oil companies in Nigeria have often been accused of not contributing to the economic development of the country and of neglecting oil producing areas and polluting the environment (George & Ogbondah, 1999; Agbo, 2001).

Advertorials also serve as a vehicle for groups to make demands from government as well as vent concerns. While the people of Ondo State used a presidential visit to the state to thank President Obasanjo for his contributions, Izon-Ebi Club, a Lagos-based pressure group of indigenes of Bayelsa State, also published an advertorial during his visit to Bayelsa to ask the president to contribute to its socioeconomic development. The

advertorial outlines the needs of one of Nigeria's newest states. Bayelsa was created in 1996 under a military administration. Nigeria has 36 states.

The advertorial featured a shoulder shot of the president and the state governor, both sporting traditional Ijaw garbs and hats. The president pointed to the sky with his right hand as if he was reacting to the demands the Izon-Ebi Club. The club solicited road construction, provision of electricity, pipe-borne water and effective telephony. The advertorial also asked the Obasanjo administration to build a naval dockyard, a federal secretariat, an institution of higher learning and a refinery as well as a liquefied natural gas plant in the state (*The Guardian*, 2001, March 15, p. 35). Bayelsa is an oil producing state that has been grossly neglected by successive federal administrations (*ThisDay*, 2000, Aug. 20a; Fagbemi, 2001).

During Obasanjo's first year, federal troops killed many residents and destroyed Odi, a town in Bayelsa State when they ceased the facilities of an oil company to call to attention to their plight (*The Guardian*, 2000, Jan. 11; Alubo, 2001). The killing was viewed as a set back in the efforts to promote harmony and build democracy in the country. Since then federal troops have been involved in questionable killings in the guise of quelling riots in other areas (Alubo, 2001).

In an advertorial, captioned "Kwara State Own Dividend of Democracy," the Kwara Progressive Movement used a full-page

advertorial to call to attention to what it described as the “wicked, irresponsible and selfish” actions of Gov. Mohammed Lawal’s (APP) administration (*The Punch*, 2001, Aug. 14, p. 32). The advertorial, signed by Hon. Abdulsalmi Ajeigbe Imam, had two pictures. One photo featured a destroyed building (a former computer center), while the other featured a newly completed building (new ANPP secretariat).

The advertorial said the ill-fated building, known as Ola Olu Computer Center, Illorin (state capital) belonged to Stephen Oladipo and had stood for eight years. It added that the building was constructed with appropriate government permits. The advertorial said that Oladipo’s misfortune began as a result of the political crisis that gripped the state when the governor launched a bid to secure a second term ticket at the opposition of some party members.

According to the advertorial, the computer center was destroyed at the instruction and supervision of state government officials because the structure was considered a “nuisance’ by the virtue of its placement in front of another building now bought by the High and Might’ (*The Punch*, 2001, Aug. 14, p. 32). The advertorial claimed the center was destroyed to make space for a car garage for a new secretariat of the ruling party. The advertorial said the party’s new secretariat was built as a result of the crisis in order to make the existing one in another section of town irrelevant.

The advertorial asked if Kwara State's dividend of democracy was the destruction of the building holding the computer center. The destruction of the computer center, it said had rendered 30 people jobless, turned the center's equipment, and its well-furnished offices and air-conditioners into debris (*The Punch*, 2001, Aug. 14, p. 32). The advertorial called on Nigerian journalists to investigate and report the problem objectively by hearing both sides of the divide or even consult wider sources to get to the root of matters(*The Punch*, 2001, Aug. 14, p. 32).

Analysis of Articles in Nigerian Newspapers and Magazines

Nigeria returned to civilian administration in 1999 hoping for administrators that would "usher in an era of purposeful leadership" as an advertorial claimed (*Sunday Tribune*, 2000, July 16, p. 24). On the eve of return to civilian rule, politicians promised to alleviate the suffering of their constituencies, and to provide selfless service (*Sunday Tribune*, 2000, July 16, p. 24).

To discern whether the claims made in the aforementioned advertorial and others selected analysis are being fulfilled, a textual analysis of selected articles in Nigerian newspapers and magazines was also undertaken. Based on the perusal of these selected articles, the following posteriori themes characterized their contents: poor leadership, mismanagement, corruption, ethnic conflict, and political instability. Also

problematic were questions of lack of social amenities, economic stagnation, and unemployment. Although these themes contradict the claims made in the advertorials, some themes described as “achievement-oriented” emerged in the selected articles. “Achievement-oriented” are themes that agree with claims in the advertorials.

Poor Leadership and Mismanagement: Blaming their failures to lift Nigerians from their poor socioeconomic conditions, some articles accused the current civilian local, state and federal administrators of indecision, ineptitude, and mal-administration (Anele, 2001). Politicians were also accused of mismanaging and squandering the nation’s resources. The average Nigerian survives on less than one naira a day (\$1 is about N130), while each state governor earns about one million as basic salary per annum (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 8). Considering these failures, and the involvement of the political class in ethnic and religion conflicts, some critics argue the current administrators are providing the military a rationale to cease power, thus derailing Nigeria nascent democratic experiment (Akhaine, 2001b).

Corruption: Coupled with allegations of poor leadership and mismanagement, the current civilian administrators were also accused of corruption. Critics attacked the political class of siphoning money from government to private coffers, taking bribes from government contractors and rewarding their friends, relatives and cronies with huge contracts

(Chigbo, 2001). For example, since May of 1999, the office of the Senate President and that of the Speaker of the House of Representatives have changed hands multiple times because of political infighting and accusations of corruption (Anele, 2001). Efforts have been made to probe the speaker of the house (*ThisDay*, 2000, Aug. 20b), and many politicians are charged of embezzlement (Anele, 2001). It has been alleged the current leaders are stage-managing the privatization exercise to enrich themselves and select a core investors (*The Guardian Online*, 2000, May 30). Just a year into the current political dispensation, 86% of Nigerians in an opinion poll called for a probe of the federal government and the House of Representatives (*The Guardian*, 2000, Sept. 15).

Ethnic Conflict/Political Instability: Addressing a conference at the University of Ibadan, Gov. Luck Igbineion of Edo State blamed the rising ethnic conflicts in the country on economic and political injustice (*ThisDay*, 2000, Aug. 20a). Critics claim that Nigeria's ethnic conflict and political instability could be attributed to obvious inequality in the polity resulting from unfair revenue allocation, unfair distributions of political appointments and government projects as well as neglect of oil producing and rural communities (*ThisDay*, 2000, Aug. 20a; Fagbemi, 2001). Since the return of civilian Nigeria, the number of ethnic conflicts has risen. These conflicts have claimed thousands of lives (Ehusani, 2001). The federal

government is often accused of being unable to handle these conflicts and when it does it uses excessive force (Alubo, 2001).

Political rivalry remains common making it difficult for administrators to articulate and execute policies (*The Comet*, 2000). Ethnic and political conflicts occur at federal, state and local levels as well within parties and ethnic groups (Ehusani, 2001). These crises have claimed many lives including both commoners and prominent citizens. For example, Bola Ige, the federal minister of justice had been assassinated. Although Ige's assassination is being investigated, it is speculated the cause is political rivalry (Ojewale, 2001). Some local authorities and states have set their own paramilitary forces for protection (Osuagwu, 2001)

Lack of Social Services and Amenities: The federal, state and local governments are blamed often in press accounts for their inability to provide to basic social services in health, education and pensions (Ibharunefe, 2001). Seventy percent of Nigerians reside in rural areas where electricity pipe-borne water, communication facilities do not exist (*The Guardian*, 2000, Jan. 11; Phido, 2000). The nation's communication systems including transportation and telecommunication sectors remain in a poor state (Aihe, 2000). Schools, hospitals and other social facilities are dilapidated (*The Guardian Online*, 2001, Nov. 21). Strikes among teachers, doctors and government workers occur frequently (Akinyemi, 2000)

Economic Stagnation and Unemployment: The staggering rate of unemployment in Nigeria has ignited critics to call on the civilian administration to re-think, re-examine, re-direct and re-focus their activities. Critics claim the nation's economic stagnation is a reflection of the failures of the civilian administrators. Although accurate estimates are hard to obtain, the 1996 edition of CIA World Factbook estimated the rate of unemployment to be about 30 percent. When Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) advertised 200 jobs for indigenes of Ondo State, 82,000 applied. In 2001, the nation's attention was drawn to a scene at the Nigerian Prison Service in Abuja, where the department was conducting interviews for doctors, pharmacists and nurses to be posted to its medical services in various states. At the interview, hundreds of applicants not invited for interviews stormed the scene of the interview, creating a riot (*Vanguard*, 2001).

Poverty and sufferings of the masses: In the year 2000, a year after democracy returned to Nigeria, the World Development Report ranked Nigeria 179th out of 206 nations with an average of per capita income of \$310 (Onyero, 2000). This ranking demonstrates the scourge of poverty in a natural resources rich country.

The current administrators are accused of failing to provide Nigerian with the basic human needs of food (Obidibo, 2001), clothing and shelter (Oyefoso, 2000; Obayuwana, 2000).

Access to health care and education remain a privilege (Phido, 2000, Sept. 3,). Although Nigeria has enormous mineral resources and abundant fertile agricultural land, the country has neglected agriculture since the discovery of oil. About 70 percent of Nigerians engage in subsistence agriculture. Nigeria imports some of her staple foods such as rice (Odion, 2000). The current civilian government and the past administrations have been blamed for not implementing programs that tackle common-use problems like erosion, desertification, and soil and water pollution, thereby hindering agricultural productivity. Administrators and financial institutions are also blamed for failing to encourage agriculture in order to diversify the economy and raise food productivity (Adela, 2001).

Achievement-oriented themes: Some articles state the current civilian administrators have been working hard to fulfill their promises and identify these achievements. For example, the federal government is often credited with improving Nigeria's image abroad (Aneziokoro, 2001), improving human rights (Akhaine, 2001a), correcting past inequities (Ebiri, 2001), allowing a greater degree of freedom of expression (Okoroma, 2000), fighting corruption (Aneziokoro, 2001), liberalizing the economy to attract foreign investment (Ademiluyi, 2000), and embarking on privatization (Fiakpa, 2000). Some states and local governments are credited with improving the social welfare of their people by encouraging

industrialization (Umanah, O., 2000), embarking on agricultural projects (*Sunday Vanguard*, 2001, March 26), and providing social amenities (Aluko, 2000). Such articles contend that two to three years is a short time to repair the damage years of military rule inflicted on Nigerian (Amaize, 2001). They add that democracy should be given time to yield more dividends and the masses should work hard and contribute (Aneziokoro, 2001).

Conclusion and Discussion

The selected advertorials analyzed for this study highlighted the achievements of Nigerian politicians. The contents of the selected advertorials produces the notion that Nigeria has become a land of promise – where the politicians have become virtuous: dignified, hardworking, confident, courageous, compassionate, trustworthy and uncorrupt. As virtuous politicians controlling the levers of powers, the advertorials described the Nigerian political class as productive, crediting them with fulfilling their campaign promises of improving the socioeconomic welfare of Nigeria by creating jobs and delivering adequate social services and amenities during their short tenures in office. Politicians were praised for correcting the damages inflicted by past military administrations. The contents were self-serving.

The advertorials imply that politicians are achieving these goals by providing the masses access to education, health, social services and

security through law enforcement. Advertorials praise politicians for constructing roads, building schools and providing social amenities like electricity, pipe-borne water and telecommunications (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 41). They also cultivate the idea that Nigerian politicians are working hard in peace and harmony to unite the diverse people of Nigeria and build a nation where all the citizens are prospering (*Saturday Punch*, 2000, Oct. 14, p. 10).

However, the results of selected articles in the Nigerian print media contradict these claims. The articles imply that the return to civilian rule has hardly yielded any dividends. Rather politicians were accused of being selfish, corrupt, inept and uncaring (Anele, 2001). Politicians are blamed for worsening the socioeconomic conditions of Nigerians. An article, by Onajite Phido, a 13-year-old-student at Lagoon Secondary School, Lagos, captures the public perception of the current civilian administrator. It states:

In ten years time, I will be twenty-three. By that time, I would like to be a doctor in a hospital that can provide world-class facilities and would pay for the healthcare of the needy and provide them basic amenities needed by man. I would like to be in a society that recognizes equal rights for men and women, in a society where all women have the courage to go to work, or go into politics and even

run for president. Right now, in my country Nigeria, not all children are privileged like I am, to go to school and get good education. In ten years, I should like to be in a country where all children get equal chances in life, where the status and wealth of parents do not matter; where all children are equal. I would like to see teachers respected and rewarded for their efforts and the government encouraging them by paying good salaries and giving them benefits, because they are the reason for development at all. Also, I would like to see democracy settled permanently and rooted deep within all of us, with people free to express their thoughts and feelings openly and be heard by the government without persecution. I should like to be in a society where all respect each other's rights and where the government is honest and caring for its people and country. I would like to see a government that does not hesitate to provide every member of the country with basic amenities— food, clothing, and shelter. I should like to see people in rural areas possessing 'luxurious ' amenities like electricity, running water. I would like to see more employment possibilities for everyone and the level of unemployment legible. (Phido, 2000, p. 27)

It should be noted friends of politicians, political parties, political opponents, pressure groups and companies doing business with governments sponsor most of the advertorials. While advertorials sponsored by friendly and business entities tend to praise administrators (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 23), those sponsored by political opponents underscore their failures and shortcomings (*The Punch*, 2001, Aug. 14, p. 32). Advertorials sponsored by groups are often used to make demands (*Saturday Punch*, 2000, Oct. 14, p. 10). By allowing such critical advertorials to appear in the mass media, it could be argued that basic human right including freedom of expression has began to gain roots in the country (Okoroma, 2000).

Private corporations also use advertorials to explain their contributions to the economic development of Nigeria. As in the case of the Shell and China Civil Engineering Corporation, company-sponsored advertorials are used to praise the government, thus currying favor (*ThisDay*, 2000, Sept. 7, p. 23; *Tell*, 2000, Oct. 2, p. 68; *Tell*, 2000, Oct. 2, p. 69).

Considering the role of the advertorial as a public relations vehicle to relay information to the public in the process of nation-building, it becomes important to discern if those in Nigerian mass media achieved this goal. The results of this study implied that the reliance on advertorials as a tool for public relations has been unsuccessful. The themes in the

selected articles contradict those in the selected advertorials. While the advertorials extol the achievements of the civilian administrators, the articles dispute those claims. Thus, it could be argued the advertorials are not convincing the public the current civilian administrators since assuming office are fulfilling the promises they made when they ran for office.

This failure may be attributed to the fact, as a public relations vehicle, Nigerian administrators and their supporters use advertorials as a forum where information flows from the communicator to the public — one-way-communication, from top to bottom. Advertorials tend to depend most heavily on practices favored by press agents and public information officials that rely on one-way, purposive communication models. Traditionally, these models do not function in a manner that promotes the exchange of information between the communicator and the public, thus feedbacks are hardly received. Rather, they are used as a propaganda vehicle to persuade people to accept what are being communicated.

Advertorials are also used as tools to attempt to convince Nigerians to accept claims administrators make regarding their stated noble intentions and acts: hard work and fruitful progress in improving their welfare in the face of the harsh realities Nigerians deal with in their daily lives. Even if some the claims made in the advertorials are true, the failure

to promote dialogue remains a serious shortcoming of using advertorials as a primary public relations model (Culbertson, 1996; Hunt & Grunig, 1994) to communicate the efforts and achievement of the current civilian administrations. This is in view of the complex socioeconomic challenges Nigerians contend with that include unemployment, corruption, political violence and poor provision of social services and amenities. These dire problems cannot be overcome in two and half years of democratic rule. However, without concrete government efforts to tackle them, no form of sophisticated public relations campaigns could help.

Private corporations such as Shell that rely on advertorials may be able to convince government officials, but they remain unable to convert the masses as many articles remain critical of their activities (Agbo, 2001).

Nonetheless, public relations campaigns remain an important tool in nation building and maintaining civilian rule in Nigeria. As the tiers of Nigerian governments make strides to address these problems, they should engage in public relations campaigns that allow two-way symmetrical communication models in order to promote dialogue between the governors and the governed (Grunig, 1989). Despite its perceived shortcoming (Rakaw, 1989), this will be in keeping in with oral media, a traditional form of oral communication in most Africa societies that promotes dialogue between two people and among groups (Nwosu, 1990). Any campaign must be accompanied with achievements that

demonstrate administrators are honestly striving to alleviate poverty in order to improve the social welfare of Nigerians.

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Media and the crisis of democracy in Venezuela

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Abstract

The mass media have been integral players in the conflict dividing Venezuela since Hugo Chávez took power in 1998. This paper explores how the public sphere is shaped by Chávez's use of the mass media, the government-owned and alternative media, and the increasing politicization of the private media. The paper also highlights the status of press freedom and the challenges facing media organizations with the implications this has for democracy.

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Abstract

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As the Venezuelan crisis intensified during 2002 and 2003, the mass media were at the center of the struggle—transmitting information, actively taking sides, and mobilizing support for the different factions in society. President Hugo Chávez Frías repeatedly came before the television cameras to explain his vision of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution and to denounce the opposition media, calling the television stations “terrorists” and the “Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse.” Opposition media provided their versions of events, criticized Chávez and the government’s “acts of terrorism,” and ran hundreds of advertisements calling people to join in protests against the government. Online debates and chat sites in the country were filled with references to the media coverage; participants posted images from news organizations and local television stations to prove their points. Web sites were created to promote the various groups and facilitate communication with supporters around the world. In the streets, offices, homes, and online, people debated politics and the media’s coverage of current events. However, the conflict was not limited to verbal and written debates. It moved beyond words and resulted in physical and legal attacks on media outlets, journalists, and editors.

This paper explores how the mass media, more than just reflecting the problems and issues of the day, are important political actors in Venezuelan society. In fact, to ignore the role of private and state media businesses in an analysis of interest groups and political conflict, would limit our understanding and analysis of recent events. The analysis is based on the idea that freedom of expression and press freedom are essential for democracy and that the media play an essential role in facilitating debates in the public sphere. The public sphere is that arena of society where citizens can talk, form public opinions, and ultimately shape and guide the actions of a democratic government.¹ Actions by groups and individuals in society, structural

¹ Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, trans. by Thomas Burger (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989).

limitations, and even the discourse can inhibit or destroy the public sphere; thus these variables have implications for the quality of democracy in society. The research is important because it will increase our understanding of the roles media play in shaping the public sphere during times of political conflict and polarization. The data for the project was collected through a variety of qualitative methods, including historical and legal research, as well as a series of interviews with media practitioners and government officials in Caracas, Venezuela, during February 2003.

In this paper, will first provide some background on the Venezuelan mass media and relevant literature. Then I will look at how Chávez's use of the media, the state and alternative media, and the private media each shape the public sphere. Finally, I will discuss the implications these factors have for the public sphere and democracy in Venezuela.

Setting the stage: Background and literature

Venezuela has long been known for its vibrant, competitive, commercial media dominated by several large family-owned groups. These groups include Phelps/Granier (broadcasting: Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV)), Cisneros (broadcasting: Venevisión and Televen), Armas (publishing: *El Universal*, *Meridiano*, and *Diario 2001*), Otero (publishing: *El Nacional*), and Capriles (publishing: *El Mundo* and *Últimas Noticias*). The two largest television stations, RCTV and Venevisión, each had more than 30 percent market share in 2001. The government is also active in the media with state-owned television, radio, and publishing outlets, though the reach of these outlets is much smaller—about 2 percent market share for Venezolana de TV in 2001.²

² AGB Venezuela, "Hábitos y tendencias televisivas, 2000-2001," AGB Panamericana de Venezuela Medición [www.agb.com.ve/libro2001/].

A series of surveys conducted since 1998 revealed that Venezuelans generally have a positive image of the mass media. When asked if the media are working to resolve the problems in the country, a majority said "yes." This positive assessment is compared with other social institutions such as the national government, the armed forces, the Catholic Church, and the local government in Figure 1. Also, in the past two years as Chávez's popularity has declined, the mass media have generally continued to maintain their positive image.³ (See figures 1 and 2.)

[Figures 1 and 2 about here.]

The English-language scholarly literature devoted to Venezuelan media is quite limited. A few articles and book chapters address the issues facing Venezuelan media and changes in media structure. For example, in a 1988 study of Venezuelan media, Richard L. Allen and Fausto Izcaray looked at media exposure and "agenda diversity" or the number of problems or issues citizens can identify. They found that a person's socioeconomic status had a positive relation with newspaper exposure, high agenda diversity, and high television exposure.⁴ In the mid-1990s, the Freedom Forum Media Studies Center included a chapter on Venezuelan media in their book *Changing Patterns: Latin America's Vital Media*. The authors argued that the media owners were quite powerful and used their clout in the many political struggles, though generally the owners saw themselves as politically unallied with major parties. The authors also reviewed the different media companies and the press freedom issues journalists were facing at the time.⁵

³ Survey data from Consultores 21, Caracas, Venezuela, February 2003. The results are based on 1,500 face-to-face surveys conducted in homes throughout Venezuela in cities of more than 20,000 people.

⁴ Richard L. Allen and Fausto Izcaray, "Nominal Agenda Diversity in a Media-Rich, Less-Developed Society," *Communication Research* 15, no. 1 (February 1988): 29-50.

⁵ Jon Vanden Heuvel and Everette E. Dennis, *Changing Patterns: Latin America's Vital Media* (New York: The Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, 1995).

A more recent book included a chapter on Venezuelan media by José Antonio Mayobre who discussed the history of mass media businesses since the 1970s and criticized process of telecommunications privatization in the country. He blamed the media and the politicians for many of the problems the country was experiencing since the election of Chávez.⁶ Several other books on Latin American media mention the high levels of media development in Venezuela and some of the press freedom debates in the country.⁷

The majority of information on Venezuelan media available to English-language audiences is found in newspaper and magazine articles or in the archives of international press organizations and networks. Such organizations include the Inter American Press Association, the Committee to Protect Journalists, the International Freedom of Expression Exchange, Reporters without Borders, the International Journalists' Network, and the International Federation of Journalists.⁸

Works in Spanish are much more extensive, but not readily available outside Venezuela. These books include works such as an extensive outline of the mass communication businesses in the 1980s and a critique of the Venezuelan communication industry and the lack of progressive government policies.⁹ An analysis of journalism and the April 2002 demonstrations and coup found that the media became increasingly politicized and radicalized as the crisis

⁶ José Antonio Mayobre, "Venezuela and the Media: The New Paradigm," in *Latin Politics, Global Media*, edited by Elizabeth Fox and Silvio Waisbord (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002: 176-195).

⁷ See, for example, pages 20-21 in Richard R. Cole, ed., *Communication in Latin America: Journalism, Mass Media, and Society* (Jaguar Books on Latin America, No 14. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996).

⁸ See Committee to Protect Journalists [www.cpj.org]; Inter American Press Association [www.sipiapa.com]; International Federation of Journalists [www.ifj.org]; International Freedom of Expression Exchange [www.ifex.org]; International Journalists' Network [www.ijn.net]; Reporters without Borders [www.rsf.fr].

⁹ Lulú Giménez Saldivia and Angela Hernández Algara, *Estructura de los medios de difusión en Venezuela* (Caracas, Venezuela: Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, 1988); Antonio Pasquali, *La comunicación cercenada: El caso Venezuela* (Caracas, Venezuela: Monte Avila Editores, 1990).

intensified.¹⁰ The Venezuela media produce an incredible amount of information on their role in the political crisis. Rarely a day passes without the media publishing reports about themselves and their situation. Some of the information is available outside Venezuela through Web sites.

The media in Venezuela have seen their legal framework change since President Hugo Chávez Frías, a former paratrooper and leader of a failed 1992 coup, swept to power in 1998 with 57 percent of the popular vote, promising to create a “New Democracy” and rid the country of corruption. Within a year, Chávez and his Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento V República or MVR) had ended the 40-year-old “Punto Fijo” democracy and drafted a new constitution, which was approved by 72 percent of the voters. Under the new constitution, Chávez was elected again as president for a six-year term. Chávez and his supporters (often known as Chavistas) see the Constitution as a quasi-sacred text that provides the blueprint for a complete restructuring of Venezuelan society. In fact, during his television broadcasts, Chávez is rarely seen without a copy of the Constitution in his hand. Two of the articles, Articles 57 and 58, of the new constitution specifically address freedom of expression:

Article 57. Every person has the right to freely express his thoughts, his ideas or opinions in person, in written form, or through any other form of expression, and to use any medium of communication and diffusion for this purpose, without censorship. Whosoever exercises this right assumes full responsibility for all his expressions. Anonymity, war propaganda, discriminatory messages, or messages that promote religious intolerance are not permitted. Censorship of or by public functionaries as they give information about their work responsibilities is prohibited.¹¹

Article 58. Communication is free and plural, and brings with it the rights and responsibilities that are indicated by law. Every person has the right to timely, truthful, and impartial information, without censorship, in accordance with the principles of this

¹⁰ Caroline Bosc-Bieme de Oteyza and Leopoldo Tablante, “La Línea editorial de los periódicos *El Universal* y *El Nacional* entre el 7 y el 15 de abril,” Anuario ININCO, Universidad Central de Venezuela, *Investigaciones de la Comunicación* 14 (June 2002): 61-108.

¹¹ Spanish version: “Artículo 57. Toda persona tiene derecho a expresar libremente sus pensamientos, sus ideas u opiniones de viva voz, por escrito o mediante cualquier otra forma de expresión, y de hacer uso para ello de cualquier medio de comunicación y difusión, sin que pueda establecerse censura. Quien haga uso de este derecho asume plena responsabilidad por todo lo expresado. No se permite el anonimato, ni la propaganda de guerra, ni los mensajes discriminatorios, ni los que promuevan la intolerancia religiosa. Se prohíbe la censura a los funcionarios públicos o funcionarias públicas para dar cuenta de los asuntos bajo sus responsabilidades.”

Constitution, as well as the right of reply and correction when he is directly affected by incorrect or insulting information. Children and adolescents have the right to receive information appropriate for their comprehensive development.¹²

The media and press freedom groups strongly opposed the clause establishing the right to “timely, truthful, and impartial information” since such language could be used as a pretext for government censorship if the government becomes the institution to determine what is “truthful” or “impartial.” Venezuelan journalists continue to function under the 1994 Law of the Exercise of Journalism that modified and strengthened the original requirements of a 1972 law. This law requires all journalists who work in Venezuela to have a journalism degree and to belong to the Colegio, or national journalist organization.¹³ This law was opposed by editors’ and owners’ groups, including the Bloque de Prensa Venezolano and the Inter American Press Association, who argued that such requirements would threaten freedom of expression.¹⁴ Many journalists saw the law as a way to further professionalize their work, raise the standards of journalism in the country, and provide a way to counterbalance the power of media owners. This law continues to stand even though the Inter-American court ruled as early as 1985 that mandatory colegio membership laws violate the freedom of expression ideas of Article 13 in the American Convention on Human Rights.¹⁵ The colegio and other professional organizations uphold ethical

¹² Spanish version: “Artículo 58. La comunicación es libre y plural, y comporta los deberes y responsabilidades que indique la ley. Toda persona tiene derecho a la información oportuna, veraz e imparcial, sin censura, de acuerdo con los principios de esta Constitución, así como el derecho de réplica y rectificación cuando se vean afectados directamente por informaciones inexactas o agraviantes. Los niños, niñas y adolescentes tienen derecho a recibir información adecuada para su desarrollo integral.”

¹³ “Ley de ejercicio del periodismo.” *Gaceta Oficial* 4,819, 22 December 1994.

¹⁴ “La SIP condena ley de periodismo,” *El Universal*, 10 October 1996 [www.el-universal.com]; Bruce Garrison and James Nelson Goodsell, “Professional News Organizations in Latin America,” in *Communication in Latin America: Journalism, Mass Media, and Society*, ed. by Richard R. Cole (Jaguar Books on Latin America, No 14. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996); Ricardo Trotti and Bill Williamson, “Should Journalists Be Required to Belong to Colegios and Have University Degrees?” in *Communication in Latin America: Journalism, Mass Media, and Society*, ed. by Richard R. Cole (Jaguar Books on Latin America, No 14. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996)

¹⁵ Colegio laws have been extensively discussed in the literature. See, for example, Jerry W. Knudson, “Licensing journalists in Latin America: An appraisal,” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 73, no. 4 (Winter 1996):

codes for all their members, though there may be somewhat of a gap between the actual code and the day-to-day practice of journalism. The legal framework may continue to change as a new law regulating broadcasters is now under debate in the National Assembly.

The parameters in which the media function are established by the laws and market as outlined in this brief overview. With this foundation, I will now discuss three key individuals or media groups in Venezuela, starting with Chávez and his powerful influence in society.

Aló, Presidente: Chávez and the media

Chávez is extremely skilled in his use of the media. His national popularity can be traced to a brief television appearance made in February 1992 as he called off his troops during a failed coup.¹⁶ His skill in using language and the media have grown since this first appearance. The style and rhetoric are reminiscent of early populist leaders in Latin America. An official with the MVR noted that Chávez has cultivated a specific rhetorical mannerism inspired by Jorge Gaitán, but with a military edge and a lot of “yelling.”¹⁷ Soon after he took office, a commentator wrote that Chávez uses a “mixture of impassioned populist rhetoric and ... rough, unconventional style, off-the-wall expressions and colorful anecdotes.”¹⁸ He will use common language—including swear words and vulgar expressions—as well as specific images chosen to appeal to the poorer classes in Venezuela.

878-899 or Michael Perkins, “Violence against the Press in Latin America: Protections and Remedies in International Law,” *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 78, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 275-290.

¹⁶ Moises Naim, *Paper Tigers and Minotaurs: The Politics of Venezuela's Economic Reforms* (New York: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), 101-102.

¹⁷ Willian Lara, interview by Kirk A. Hawkins, Caracas, Venezuela, 20 February 2003.

¹⁸ Tony Bianchi, “Venezuela: Press Freedom and More,” *Pulso del Periodismo*, 8 June 1999. [www.pulso.org/English/Archives/Venezuela%20Press%20Freedom.htm].

Chávez uses the media in a number of ways. First, as a number of scholars and observers have commented, he uses the media to broaden his charismatic, populist appeal.¹⁹ To help facilitate this appeal, after he was elected Chávez created a weekly newspaper, *El Correo del Presidente*, and started weekly radio and television talk shows now called “Aló, Presidente” or “Hello, President.”²⁰ The newspaper and a subsequent weekly newsletter turned out to be short-lived projects, but the broadcast call-in show continued.²¹ The weekly radio and television broadcasts, which may last four or five hours, let him to speak directly to the Venezuelan people and also allow citizens to call in and talk about their concerns.²² The shows have enchanted certain segments of the population (especially those that Chávez sees as his base of support), changed the presidential image, and “brought them [the people] closer to the president”.²³ Transcripts and reports of all these shows as well as other speeches are available on the presidential web site, www.venezuela.gov.ve. He builds a base of support among the people by having people identify directly with him, not with some intervening party organization or movement, including his own party, MVR.

Second, he uses his broadcasts to set the political agenda in the country. “The program Aló, Presidente was marvelous for him,” said the news director at RCTV, “because he realized that in Aló, Presidente when he offers his interpretations, gives his opinions ... he is generating

¹⁹ José Antonio Mayobre, “Venezuela and the Media: The New Paradigm,” in *Latin Politics, Global Media*, edited by Elizabeth Fox and Silvio Waisbord (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002: 176-195).

²⁰ Michael Kudlak, “Face to Face with the President,” *IPI Watch List*, September 2001 [www.freemedia.at/wl_venezuela.htm].

²¹ Christina Hoag, “Venezuelan Journalists Under Siege by Chavez/Incendiary Attacks Stir Up Followers,” *Houston Chronicle*, 24 March 2002 [www.houstonchronicle.com].

²² Marylene Smeets, “Radio Chavez: the Press and the President In Venezuela,” *Quill* 89, no. 3 (April 2001): 48-50; Marylene Smeets, “Venezuela Radio Chávez: Populism Meets the Press as Venezuela’s Brash New President Takes to the Airwaves,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 2001 [www.cpj.org/Briefings/2001/Ven_feb01.html].

²³ Eduardo Sapene, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

the agenda of [public] opinion for the following week.”²⁴ For the rest of the week, all the media will address the topics covered in his speech.

Third, Chávez uses the broadcasts as a political tool to politically mobilize his supporters. Originally he did this directly by campaigning for his party until the National Electoral Council (CNE) censured him in July 1999.²⁵ More recently, Chávez will address a certain issue and then within a few days or weeks, someone will attempt to carry out the president’s wishes. Depending on the event, Chávez and his supporters will praise the action as arising spontaneously from the people or will disavow any connection with it. Opponents see these communication patterns as ingenious techniques Chávez uses to mobilize supporters without having to become directly involved in the actions. For example, on 16 February 2003 during his weekly broadcast, Chávez, in speaking with a lawyer from Maracay, said that the “Judicial Power is still in the hands of a bunch of bandits.... It can’t possibly be that there isn’t a judge here that will put the golpistas in jail, nor a judge that will put the terrorists in prison. Where are the judges in Venezuela?” After a long speech about judicial problems, he finished by saying that the Judicial Power “cannot be in the hands of corrupt bandits or cowards. We need republican constitutional judges that enforce the law.”²⁶ That week, a judge sympathetic to Chávez ordered the arrest of the president of Fedecámaras, Carlos Fernández, one of the main leaders of the nation-wide strike. Chávez was extremely pleased and extensively praised the judge for her actions during the following days.²⁷

²⁴ Eduardo Sapene, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

²⁵ Committee to Protect Journalists, “The Americas 1999: Venezuela,” Committee to Protect Journalists [www.cpj.org/attacks99/americas99/Venezuela.html].

²⁶ Hugo Chávez Frías, “Aló Presidente” Number 139, Radio Nacional, Broadcast from Campo Muscar, Venezuela, 16 February 2003. [www.venezuela.gov.ve].

²⁷ Hugo Chávez Frías, Speech from la carrera 19 con calle 25, Barquisimeto, Edo. Lara, Venezuela, Venezolana de Televisión, Programa Especial, 20 February 2003 [www.venezuela.gov.ve]; Hugo Chávez Frías, Speech at the “Juramentación de la Corporación Venezolana Agraria,” Venezolana de Televisión, Programa Especial, 21 February 2003 [www.venezuela.gov.ve].

In yet another example, Chávez gave a speech in which he criticized the United States, Colombia, and Spain for interfering in the country's internal affairs. Within days, on 25 February 2003, both the Colombian and Spanish embassies were extensively damaged by bombs. Although it wasn't known who was responsible, the newspaper *Tal Cual* criticized Chávez for fanning the conflict with his language, and wrote, "It is evident that at this time there are armed groups, very well armed, that drink in Chávez's language and take inspiration from his primitive politics and from these, draw out programs for direct action."²⁸

Along with mobilizing supporters or inflaming opponents, Chávez uses his speeches to announce policies, some which may be still in the idea stage. The importance of this strategy cannot be underestimated since Chávez has created a system in which all information and decisions are concentrated in the figure of the president. Ministers and other government officials have little or no power to act or speak independently.²⁹ For example, he called for the establishment of "Círculos Bolivarianos," or Bolivarian Circles, that would be a form of grassroots social organization. "The president, without saying what it [the circles] would be (because it was unknown), proposed to the country that the Bolivarian Circles be created. ... In April 2001 ... in a talk, he said, 'Well, let's create a movement that will be a social organization, the Bolivarian Circles.' But it wasn't known what type of organization it was, how it would be, nothing, only that it would be." Chávez's proposal ignited a discussion among people in the government, who then came up with a plan that "would fulfill what is written in this constitution," said the general coordinator of the Bolivarian Circles.³⁰ Other times, Chávez will use the weekly addresses to enact specific policies, such as the famous (or infamous) firing of the management of the of the state-owned oil company, *Petróleos de Venezuela* or PDVSA, in April

²⁸ "Verbobomba." *Tal Cual*, 25 February 2003 [www.talcualdigital.com].

²⁹ Eduardo Sapene, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

³⁰ Rodrigo Chaves, interview by Kirk A. Hawkins, Caracas, Venezuela, 17 February 2003.

2002. In cases such as these, he does not restrict himself to his weekly program and will use “cadenas,” which are broadcasts during which all the radio and television stations must link to the government signal and carry the speech by the president or other government officials. In the first part of 2003, Chávez used cadenas to announce the price controls and the fixed exchange rates. Chávez sees these talks as ways for him to combat the misinformation and lies spread by the opposition media. The director of *Tal Cual* summed up the feelings of many in Venezuela that Chávez’s words are “verbal bombs,” or they have the potential to inspire many different kinds of actions among his supporters, as well as reactions from opponents.³¹

Although the Constitution contains two articles dealing with freedom of expression, Chávez and his government’s view of this right contrasts sharply with the views held by human rights groups and press freedom organizations. In an exchange during *Aló, Presidente* between Chávez and the minister of the interior, Diosdado Cabello, Cabello read article 2 of the Constitution, which lists the values on which Venezuela is founded—life, liberty, justice, equality, solidarity, democracy, social responsibility, and in general, human rights, ethics, and political pluralism—and then pointed out, “Freedom of expression is not included in these fundamental values of the Constitution. What this means is that those rights that we have as citizens are above freedom of expression, just like is established by our Constitution.”³² Cabello continued to reason, with Chávez agreeing, that is if this is the case, laws that may restrict freedom of expression are constitutional since they will be supporting these “higher values” enshrined in the Constitution.

Through his extensive use of the media and political discourse, Chávez hopes to continue and deepen his Bolivarian project and transform Venezuelan society. In contrast with previous

³¹ “Verbobomba.” *Tal Cual*, 25 February 2003 [www.talcualdigital.com].

³² Hugo Chávez Frías, “Aló Presidente” Number 139, Radio Nacional, Broadcast from Campo Muscar, Venezuela, 16 February 2003. [www.venezuela.gov.ve].

presidents, “this man occupies full pages in the newspapers and entire hours on television. In other words, the center of the world, the axis of the world, in Venezuela is called ‘Hugo Chávez Frías.’”³³

Taking on a political role: State and alternative media

The government has several media outlets including the television station Venezolana de TV, Radio Nacional de Venezuela, which includes FM, AM, and shortwave radio stations, the news agency Venpres, and a monthly newspaper published by Venpres. Since 1999, the function of the government broadcast stations has changed from a broad public service, educational role to a political role designed to support the government and Chávez. The idea of “public service” is now seen as transmitting the information from and about the government, with the ultimate goal being to support the Constitution and the Bolivarian Revolution of Venezuelan society. This means that the station provides much more information and news than it ever did before, explained a consultant to the president of Venezolana de TV. The information programs are dedicated to combating the lies and rumors broadcast by the private television stations. As a result, the station’s content is very politicized.³⁴ As part of this project, the state media have increased their “participatory” programming in that broadcast stations sometimes invite common folk to participate on talk shows.

Some of the government’s journalists see ethical conflicts in this shift to an overtly political role, since they feel that they have become Chávez’s private media outlets. One journalist at Venpres said, “I’ve always argued that we have to cover both sides, but that’s not

³³ Eduardo Sapene, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

³⁴ Rubén Hernández, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 20 February 2003.

our communications policy.”³⁵ This political, informative role has become more important since many of the government officials have stopped talking with reporters from the opposition media and the government rarely sends out any press releases or information about government projects. Reporters from various media outlets are forced to monitor the state media and repeat what is officially broadcast or published.³⁶

Many Venezuelan community media have also joined the state media in supporting Chávez and his government. Some alternative media outlets predate Chávez’s presidency and TV Rubio and Televisora Cultural de Michelena were among the first community media in Venezuela. Radio Catia Libre 93.5 FM started broadcasting in 1996 and Radio Alternativa, Radio Perola, and Radio Activa de La Vega began broadcasts in 1998. Besides radio and television broadcasting, a few community media have also established Web pages.³⁷

The community television station in Rubio (TVCR), Táchira state, started in 1995 when a group of young people, many of them artists, decided a broadcasting station could support and publicize the social-cultural activities of various non-governmental organizations, including choral, dance, and theater productions. Some of the founders had been working with these cultural NGOs since the late 1980s. They were able to put together the equipment and the first broadcast went on the air 26 August 1995, reaching almost all of the city. The main goal was to create programming in which the people participated, “extending the dialog and discussing collective social and popular norms, complaints and proposals that will receive timely responses.” The station consists of two video cameras and some other simple equipment located in the upper floor of a house. Despite the lack of resources, the station has continued to broadcast

³⁵ Sauro González Rodríguez, “Cannon Fodder,” Committee to Protect Journalists: Special Reports, 8 August 2002.

³⁶ Valentina Lares, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

³⁷ ANMCLA, “Somos expresión de la multitude,” Asociación Nacional de Medios Comunitarios, Libres y Alternativos, Venezuela [www.medioscomunitarios.org].

since that time and generated a following among the people of the city who will gather to watch the local news and other programs when they go on the air.³⁸

Many of the community or alternative media have as their goal to “transform the profound social inequalities in each community and attain their full development.” To do this, they see their function as helping increase the democratization of the access to the information media and expanding the right to information and the freedom of expression.³⁹ During 2002, several networks of community media have formed, including the Red Venezolana de Medios Comunitarios (RVMC) and the Asociación Nacional de Medios Comunitarios, Libres y Alternativos (ANMCLA). The purpose of these networks is to support local community media. RVMC declares their mission is to “promote the exercise of freedom and the consequent democratization of communication, in order to support freedom of expression, information, opinion and contribute to the equitable and sustainable development of the Venezuelan society.”⁴⁰ ANMCLA sees as its goal to help community broadcasting “democratize communication in order to democratize society.”⁴¹

The legal framework for the community broadcast stations is established in Presidential Decree 1,521 of 3 November 2001 and the Ley Orgánica de Telecomunicaciones.⁴² According to Conatel, the National Telecommunication Commission, Venezuela is one of the few countries in Latin America (along with Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador) where legislation specifically addresses and supports community broadcast stations. The government is actively involved

³⁸ “Televisora Comunitaria de Rubio,” presentation in the first Foro Internacional y Encuentro Nacional de Medios de Comunicación Comunitaria, CONATEL, Caracas, August 2002. [www.conatel.gov.ve].

³⁹ ANMCLA, “Somos expresión de la multitude,” Asociación Nacional de Medios Comunitarios, Libres y Alternativos, Venezuela [www.medioscomunitarios.org/].

⁴⁰ “Red Venezolana de Medios Comunitarios, RVMC,” presentation in the first Foro Internacional y Encuentro Nacional de Medios de Comunicación Comunitaria, CONATEL, Caracas, August 2002. [www.conatel.gov.ve].

⁴¹ ANMCLA, “Somos expresión de la multitude,” Asociación Nacional de Medios Comunitarios, Libres y Alternativos, Venezuela [www.medioscomunitarios.org/].

⁴² Reglamento de radio difusión sonora y televisión abierta comunitarias de servicio público, sin fines de lucro, presidential decree 1,521, Venezuela, 3 November 2001. [www.conatel.gov.ve].

through Conatel in developing not-for-profit community radio and television stations that meet the needs of their communities. Presidential decree 1,522 exempted operators of community media from paying the taxes specified in the telecommunications law.⁴³ With this government support, the number of alternative radio and television stations has increased in the past year.

Although there are a few religious, apolitical stations, most of the community media have specific political projects. During the time Pedro Carmona Estanga briefly assumed power in the April 2002 coup, some of the community media centers were attacked and Nicolás Rivera, an announcer for Radio Perola, was arrested. Personnel from Catia TV helped the government television station get back on the air as Chávez returned to power.⁴⁴ Despite the claims that the stations are “independent community voices,” a growing number of them are joining the political debates and taking an active role in supporting Chávez and the government. As they do so, the stations are facing a number of challenges. A number of community radio stations report they are receiving opposition from the commercial radio businesses and poor coverage in the private media.⁴⁵ The people at Radio Fe y Alegría, El Pedregal, Mérida State, (a station sponsored by the Catholic Church) mentioned that in their first year of operation, they faced economic difficulties, political problems with unionization, a lack of knowledge about the importance of community radio, technical difficulties (they didn’t have a mobile unit or a computer), and some social

⁴³ José Brett Mundo, “Marco legal de estaciones comunitarias en el mundo y Venezuela,” Presentation in the first Foro Internacional y Encuentro Nacional de Medios de Comunicación Comunitaria, CONATEL, Caracas, August 2002. [www.conatel.gov.ve]; Reglamento de radio difusión sonora y televisión abierta comunitarias de servicio público, sin fines de lucro, presidential decree 1,521, Venezuela, 3 November 2001. [www.conatel.gov.ve].

⁴⁴ Al Giordano, “Community Media, the Voice of the Venezuelan People, Under Siege,” Narco News, 29 July 2002 [www.narconews.com/communitymedia1.html].

⁴⁵ José Brett Mundo, “Marco legal de estaciones comunitarias en el mundo y Venezuela,” presentation in the first Foro Internacional y Encuentro Nacional de Medios de Comunicación Comunitaria, CONATEL, Caracas, August 2002. [www.conatel.gov.ve].

challenges with individualism and apathy.⁴⁶ As the political conflict continues in Venezuela, it will be interesting to see if the alternative media maintain a separate identity and voice from the state-owned media, or if they become united with the government in their goal of defending the Chávez project.

From ardent supporters to bitter opponents: the private media

People within the media, academics, and even media critics all agree on one thing: since the 1989 riots, the Venezuelan mass media have assumed a political (but not always partisan) opposition role to the government, and stepped into the void left by unrepresentative political parties. They have become a window on society, showing social problems and allowing people to directly call on the government to resolve the issues. However, the extent to which these media outlets represent all of the sectors in society is debated.

Venezuela has a history of conflictual relationships between the media and the government. In the early and mid-1990s, although the media owners generally saw themselves as unallied with specific political parties, they would cultivate close relationships with those in power and use their influence to make business deals and, more rarely, to even run for political office. Much debate and rumor surrounds the opening of the media system that started near the end of Jaime Lusinchi's presidency in 1988. Over the next ten years, successive presidents awarded radio, television, satellite, and cable franchises to political supporters.⁴⁷ Various writers have documented the media owners' system of rewarding or punishing politicians, including the

⁴⁶ "Radio Fe y Alegría 105.7 FM, El Pedregal: Tu frecuencia comunitaria," presentation in the first Foro Internacional y Encuentro Nacional de Medios de Comunicación Comunitaria, CONATEL, Caracas, August 2002. [www.conatel.gov.ve].

⁴⁷ José Antonio Mayobre, "Venezuela and the Media: The New Paradigm" in *Latin Politics, Global Media*, edited by Elizabeth Fox and Silvio Waisbord (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002: 176-195).

president, in the television and print coverage. Presidents Lusinchi, Carlos Andrés Pérez, and Rafael Caldera fought with media owners, jailed editors, withdrew government advertising, and even attempted censorship.⁴⁸ Despite the government attempts to shape coverage, “the media, in particular broadcast media, frequently and virulently denounced the faults and sins of politicians and the last forty years of democratic administrations.”⁴⁹ In so doing, they contributed to the general dissatisfaction with the political system, which eventually led to the election of Chávez. Almost all of the media owners supported Chávez in 1998 and several contributed large amounts of money to the electoral campaign.⁵⁰

Within about a year, this had changed. And by 2003, a majority of reporters, editors, and media owners opposed Chávez and feared for the state of press freedom. Some, including prominent newspaper and television reporters, feared for their lives. Reporters could no longer go into the streets wearing their press credentials for fear of being attacked.⁵¹ The television station RCTV had purchased bulletproof jackets for all their employees who went out to cover stories and press groups were documenting hundreds of attacks on the media.⁵² The media were also facing legal issues as the National Assembly debated a media “Content Law” with an official purpose of “protecting children,” but whose thinly-veiled intent was to silence the private broadcast media in the country.

These changes can be traced to several key changes or events. First, the “honeymoon” between Chávez and the media effectively ended by December 1999 as the media returned to their former opposition role with the news coverage of the mudslides in Vargas state and the

⁴⁸ Jon Vanden Heuvel and Everette E. Dennis, *Changing Patterns: Latin America's Vital Media* (New York: The Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, 1995).

⁴⁹ José Antonio Mayobre, “Venezuela and the Media: The New Paradigm” in *Latin Politics, Global Media*, edited by Elizabeth Fox and Silvio Waisbord (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2002: 176-195), 176.

⁵⁰ Patricia Poleo, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 20 February 2003; David Adams and Phil Gunson, “Media Accused in Failed Coup,” *St. Petersburg Times*, 18 April 2002.

⁵¹ Valentina Lares, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

⁵² Daniela Bergami, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

debate over the new Constitution. Severe rainstorms in December 1999 led to massive mudslides in the coastal state of Vargas. Estimates place the number of deaths between 15,000 to 30,000 people. The Venezuelan media extensively covered the problems and criticized the government for inaction.⁵³ As the media began to criticize Chávez and broadcast the views of others who opposed him, Chávez saw it as his right to lash back. He singled out media owners, journalists, publications, and broadcasts for criticism on his weekly broadcast programs. As a populist leader, his discourse privileged the poor classes and he identified anyone who attempted to find fault with his project as an enemy to Venezuela and the Bolivarian ideals. The problem was compounded since the government was not able to quickly resolve many of the economic problems, which alienated more of the middle class, or to completely do away with problems of corruption. “Chávez argued that the critiques of the disenchanted were unfounded and he confronted them, increasing even more the social breakdown and the class conflict,” wrote Venezuelan communication scholars Caroline Bosc-Bierne de Oteyza and Leopoldo Tablante.⁵⁴

During 2000 and 2001, the relationship between the media and Chávez slowly deteriorated as his rhetoric became more and more harsh and the media continued to criticize him and his government. The rhetoric began to result in physical attacks on journalists and the media outlets. Chávez and his supporters called the media and journalists “traitors” and “terrorists.” He said journalists “cannot say they are innocent. No, here there are no innocents; everyone must assume their responsibility before history and the people. People are tired of the lies, of the manipulation, of the deception.... 2002 will be the year of the offensive.”⁵⁵ The media

⁵³ Eduardo Sapene, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

⁵⁴ Caroline Bosc-Bierne de Oteyza and Leopoldo Tablante, “La Línea editorial de los periódicos *El Universal* y *El Nacional* entre el 7 y el 15 de abril,” Anuario ININCO, Universidad Central de Venezuela, *Investigaciones de la Comunicación* 14 (June 2002): 66.

⁵⁵ T. Christian Miller, “The World; Media Under Siege in Much of Latin America,” *The Los Angeles Times*, 24 March 2002.

reported that attacks against journalists rose after this speech; by early 2002, journalists reported more assaults, death threats, and the destruction of their equipment. On 7 January 2002, after Chávez criticized *El Nacional* during *Aló, Presidente*, a group of his supporters surrounded the paper offices, smashed windows, and prevented about 400 employees from leaving the building. Incidents such as these raised fears that the president's speeches were now resulting in actions by his supporters.⁵⁶

A second major turning point in the relations between Chávez and the media occurred in April 2002. As mentioned earlier, the massive opposition protests of 11 April 2002 in Caracas—the largest in recent Venezuelan history—were sparked by Chávez's Sunday *Aló presidente* broadcast where he fired the directors PDVSA. Confrontations between armed groups, police, and the protesters resulted in shootings that left 15 dead, including Jorge Tórtola, a photographer for the newspaper *Diario 2001*, and about 300 wounded. Video images repeatedly broadcast on television for the next year showed an armed man firing a pistol at the demonstrators; participants in the demonstration talk about sharpshooters placed on the nearby rooftops also firing into the crowd. What happened in the next two days has been extensively debated. Sectors of the military reacted negatively to the deaths and staged a military coup or a "rebellion of military disobedience." Chávez resigned and was flown out of the Caracas while Carmona as the leader of Fedecámaras, the country's largest business organization, was installed as head of an interim government on 12 April. Carmona quickly alienated his supporters as he tried to take on dictatorial powers, dissolving the National Assembly, removing from office all elected officials, and suspending other rights. Chávez's supporters began to gather in Caracas and protest the coup, calling for his return. Upset with the disastrous actions of Carmona and

⁵⁶ Mark Fitzgerald, "Under Siege in Caracas," *Editor & Publisher* 135, no. 5 (April 2002): 28.

seeing the support, factions in the military brought back Chávez, who reassumed power early in the morning of 14 April. The protests continued throughout the weekend, leaving more wounded and dead.⁵⁷

The media played a crucial role during this week in April. The opposition media extensively covered the protests against Chávez. In an effort to combat this coverage, Chávez began proclaiming “cadenas,” where all the television and radio stations (not including cable or satellite) must carry the government signal. He repeatedly called cadenas in an effort to prevent the media from showing the opposition marches and demonstrations. Finally, frustrated with the situation, the main television stations spilt the screens, showing the demonstration on one side and Chávez talking on the other. In a last effort to seize control, Chávez forced all the opposition stations off the air; those with satellite (such as RCTV) continued to broadcast and later the others came back on. However, by 13 April, the television stations stopped transmitting information and broadcast cartoons and films; the day Chávez returned to power, opposition newspapers did not circulate. Chávez supporters called this a “media blackout” and a “media coup.”

Journalists and television producers say that it wasn't a “media coup,” but that armed mobs of Chavistas were threatening the employees and the offices or studios. According to

⁵⁷ There are many accounts of these events and the media coverage (or lack thereof) from a number of political perspectives. See, for example, David Adams and Phil Gunson, “Media Accused in Failed Coup,” *St. Petersburg Times*, 18 April 2002; David Adams, “Embarrassed Pro-Coup Media Silent as Chavez Returns,” *The Times*, 15 April 2002; Jon Beasley-Murray, “Venezuela: The Revolution will not be Televised, Pro-Chavez Multitudes Challenge Media Blackout,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 36 (July/August 2002): 16-20; Caroline Bosc-Bierme de Oteyza and Leopoldo Tablante, “La Línea editorial de los periódicos *El Universal* y *El Nacional* entre el 7 y el 15 de abril,” Anuario ININCO, Universidad Central de Venezuela, *Investigaciones de la Comunicación* 14 (June 2002): 61-108; Campbell Duncan, “Media: It's a coup: your sets will adjust accordingly,” *The Guardian* (London), 29 April 2002; Juan Forero, “Venezuelan Press Sidestepped Leader's Return,” *New York Times*, 23 April 2002; International Federation of Journalists, *Missing Link in Venezuela's Political Crisis: How Media and Government Failed a Test of Journalism and Democracy*, International Federation of Journalists, International Press Centre, 10-12 June 2002; and Maurice Lemoine, “How Hate Media Incited the Coup Against the President: Venezuela's Press Power,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, August 2002.

reports from the journalists in the buildings at the time, it was “absolute panic” as the groups outside threatened to kill the journalists. Eduardo Sapene, news director at RCTV said that with all the rumors and the quick-paced events, they reached a point where he made a decision and said, “I will not broadcast any Chavista news until I have some confirmation from a Chavista source.”⁵⁸ *El Universal* started to prepare the paper, but was unable to print it because the printers couldn’t come in to work. However, they were able to put up information on their Web page even though a printed version did not circulate. Afterwards, many of the media owners came on television to apologize for not getting out information as they should have done. The owners denied that they were directly involved in planning the coup or carrying it out.

The event served to radicalize and further politicize the media in Venezuela, especially with the death of the photographer Tortoza. Despite Chávez’s initial talk of moderation, his verbal attacks on the press soon resumed, as did the physical attacks by his supporters and other armed groups. Windows were smashed, bombs were placed at the media offices, journalists were assaulted, and individuals received death threats. Before the April coup, journalists generally weren’t the objects of attacks. One reporter even said that in previous years, when the media went to cover demonstrations or riots, the police would even give them advance warning before they used tear gas so the journalists could get out of the way.⁵⁹ Now, the journalists are targets of physical aggression.⁶⁰

Third, the media see a series of legal changes and court rulings as threatening to them and press freedom. The media were critical of the new Constitution’s Article 58 that required the media publish information that is “timely, truthful, and impartial.” Press groups had managed to keep this article out of various press laws in the past, and once again mobilized to denounce the

⁵⁸ Eduardo Sapene, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

⁵⁹ Patricia Poleo, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 20 February 2003.

⁶⁰ Daniela Bergami, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

requirement. International freedom of expression organizations sent in protest letters saying that such a provision opened the way for the government to restrict whatever information it deemed to be “untruthful” or “partisan.” Specifically, the media groups argued that giving the government this power violates the Universal Declaration of Human rights (Article 19) and the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 13).⁶¹ A ruling by the Supreme Court on 12 June 2001 created a set of criteria for what constitutes “timely, truthful, and impartial information.” This ruling said that journalists can only express opinions if they do not contain insults that are “out of context, disconnected, or unnecessary for the topic; or offensive, insidious, or degrading.” Also, if an “independent” publication could be in violation of these standards if a majority of the columnists have the same belief or political ideas. In some cases, the government is justified in using prior restraint, the court also said.⁶² The Bloque de Prensa Venezolano, the largest newspaper association, protested the ruling and appealed to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.

The most severe legal challenge facing broadcasters is the proposed “Content Law” or the “Ley sobre la responsabilidad social en radio y televisión.” This law was introduced in the National Assembly on 23 January 2003 after being under discussion during the previous year. The stated purpose of this law is to guarantee the comprehensive social development of children by regulating sexual, health, and violent content in the broadcast media. The law divides the day into three parts: protected hours (6 a.m. to 8 p.m.), supervised hours (5 a.m.- 6 a.m., and 8 p.m.- 11 p.m.), and adult hours (11 p.m.-5 a.m.) and specifies the types of materials that cannot be broadcast. For example, during the protected and supervised hours “violencia fuertes,” which is defined as content “that presents physical, psychological, sexual, or verbal violence by an

⁶¹ Committee to Protect Journalists, “Protest letter: Venezuela: New constitution would restrict press freedom,” Committee to Protect Journalists, 12 November 1999 [www.cpj.org].

⁶² Committee to Protect Journalists, “Attacks on the Press 2001: Venezuela” [www.cpj.org].

individual or group against one or more people, objects, or animals,” cannot be broadcast.⁶³ The law was approved on its first discussion in the National Assembly and will be debated during the spring of 2003. Supporters of the law see this as a “beautiful” project that doesn’t impose restrictions, but safeguards the television audience, especially the children and youth.⁶⁴ Chávez sees the law as part of his legal, political, and moral “offensive” against the media and the opposition, an offensive he began after the strike ended.⁶⁵ Lawyers and scholars supporting the opposition and the media criticized the law as being unconstitutional, and detail many concerns with various aspects of it.⁶⁶

However, as Chávez indicates in his speeches, the law appears to have a much broader intent. In one address, Chávez argued that broadcasting scenes of protests against his government violates privacy standards and should thus be banned.⁶⁷ Broadcasters, journalists, academics, and press freedom organizations fear that the law will provide a legal way for Chávez’s government to legally censor the media. During the first debate over the proposed law, the newspaper *Tal Cual* reported, “When Carlos Tablante stepped up to criticize the law saying that what it really

⁶³ “Proyecto de Ley Sobre la Responsabilidad Social en Radio y Televisión,” Venezuela National Assembly, 23 January 2003.

⁶⁴ Porfirio Torres, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 20 February 2003.

⁶⁵ Hugo Chávez Frías, “Cadena nacional: Aniversario del Congreso de Angostura,” Caracas, Venezuela, 15 February 2003. [www.venezuela.gov.ve]; Hugo Chávez Frías, “Aló Presidente” Number 139, Radio Nacional, Broadcast from Campo Muscar, Venezuela, 16 February 2003. [www.venezuela.gov.ve].

⁶⁶ “Especialistas rechazan Ley de Contenidos porque deriva de un precepto inconstitucional,” *Diario 2001*, 7 February 2002 [www.2001.com.ve]; Max Römer Pieretti, conversation with author, Caracas, Venezuela, 18 February 2003.

⁶⁷ Hugo Chávez Frías, “Aló Presidente” Number 139, Radio Nacional, Broadcast from Campo Muscar, Venezuela, 16 February 2003. [www.venezuela.gov.ve]. In this speech, Chávez argues, “Y esto sobre todo para proteger a los niños y a las niñas y a los adolescentes que están siendo atropellados por los canales de televisión privados los están atropellando nos están atropellando, y ellos pretenden que no se les regule nada. ... Respetar los derechos y garantías de todas personas derivado de la Constitución, las leyes, los reglamentos y demás normativa aplicable y en particular el derecho que toda persona tiene a la protección de su honor, de su vida privada, de su intimidad, de su propia imagen, de su confidencialidad y de su reputación. Esto es lo que no quieren respetar los “cuatro jinetes del apocalipsis”, para ellos no hay respeto ninguna confidencialidad, ni de vida privada. Ustedes creen que por ejemplo esa expresión del fascismo de ir a tocarle cacerolas a la casa de una familia y que eso lo transmitan en vivo por los canales de televisión o diferido como sea, eso es violatorio ¿a la qué?, a la vida privada; eso no se puede estar transmitiendo así libre y directamente incitando a que sigan haciéndolo contra funcionarios del estado del gobierno o contra cualquier persona eso no puede ser.”

was about was censoring the media, he finished his speech by asking, 'You, who speak so highly of China and Cuba ... they have only one newspaper, only one radio, only one broadcaster, is this what you want?' ... to this all of the [deputies belonging to the] MVR responded, 'Yeeees.' That was a good joke they played on Desirée [Santos Amaral], who had spent so much time trying to convince the night owls [deputies who were debating the law all night long] of the pluralistic and democratic character of the law."⁶⁸

In other legal maneuvering, the government has extensively investigated the media for financial and tax irregularities, threatening to fine them and revoke their broadcasting licenses. For example, Venevisión TV was informed in February 2003 that it would be investigated and possibly fined for its coverage of the national strike.⁶⁹ RCTV reported that they constantly have government officials conducting investigations and reviewing all their accounts.⁷⁰

The media are also facing economic difficulties. As businesses, they suffer along with others during the recessions and the recent general strike. During the 2002-2003 general strike, advertising almost completely dried up as many of the larger companies joined the opposition. Some of the papers even stopped circulation on some days during the strike as a sign of solidarity with the opposition. However, by mid-February 2003, the newspapers reported that their advertising revenues were starting to pick up again.⁷¹ The media also face another economic challenge with the government's policy of controlling the exchange rate and prices, a policy put into effect in February 2003 to try and deal with the country's economic problems. In the address to the nation in which he read Presidential Decree 2,302, Chávez proclaimed, "Not one dollar for

⁶⁸ Maye Primera Garcés, "Crónica de medianoche: Censura anunciada," *Tal Cual*, 7 February 2003 [www.talcualdigital.com].

⁶⁹ Associated Press, "Chávez supporters put heat on media: many news organizations face investigations as strike fades," 7 February 2003.

⁷⁰ Daniela Bergami, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

⁷¹ Valentina Lares, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

the golpistas! Not one dollar for the destabilizers!”⁷² Included in the category of “golpistas” are the media and they are taking this threat seriously. Newspapers import their paper and ink and pay for it in dollars. Broadcast stations purchase equipment, movies, and other items in dollars. People in the media see this as yet another attempt to silence them or censor them through the control of materials.⁷³ Article 13 of the American Convention on Human Rights or the “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,” states, “The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.”⁷⁴ Venezuela ratified this convention in 1977.

The broadcast media also see the cadenas as a way the government can try to censor the media and punish it financially. When the government calls a cadena, which originally was designed for special circumstances or national emergencies, all the television and radio stations must link up to the official signal. The private stations lose money during this time as the regular programming and advertisements are replaced with the government’s television signal. In the first two and a half months of 2003 there were 41 cadenas for a total of 41 hours and 43 minutes. They ranged from about five minutes to almost three hours in length and the speakers included various cabinet ministers and, of course, Chávez.⁷⁵

⁷² Hugo Chávez Frías, “Cadena nacional: control cambiario, control de precios,” Caracas, Venezuela, 5 February 2003. [www.venezuela.gov.ve].

⁷³ Daniela Bergami, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003; Patricia Poleo, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 20 February 2003; Luisa Mercedes Chiossone, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 18 February 2003.

⁷⁴ Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” [www.oas.org].

⁷⁵ The broadcast media keep tallies of the cadenas (see www.globovision.com for example) and the actual texts can be found on the presidential web site, www.venezuela.gov.ve.

Overall, the journalists working in the private media have a sense that they have moved beyond their normal role as an opposition voice to the government and are now fighting for their profession, their businesses, and sometimes even their lives. Previous divisions between journalists and the editors or the media owners have softened considerably over the past year as they feel threatened by Chávez and his social revolution. Some academics have even stopped criticizing the profession and joined in defending the media from what they see as an attack on freedom of expression in the country. When asked what his greatest worry as a television news director was, Sapene said, “Survive each 24 hours. This is the great challenge.”⁷⁶

Democracy in Venezuela: Conclusions

As mentioned in the beginning, this paper is based on the ideas that freedom of expression is essential for democracy and the media can play a vital role in shaping the discourse in the public sphere. The public sphere, especially the political discourse, in Venezuela is being strongly shaped by Chávez, by the state-owned and alternative media, and by the opposition private media. Chávez has been able to effectively use the media to set the political agenda and many of the terms of the debate. When Venezuelan reporters look at both the pro-government and opposition media, they find several problems that damage or reduce the effectiveness of political discourse in their country.⁷⁷

First, they cite several reporting problems: the reporters and editors may leave out information and only reflect their side of the issue; sources, both government officials and

⁷⁶ Eduardo Sapene, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

⁷⁷ Rubén Hernández, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 20 February 2003; Valentina Lares, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003; Patricia Poleo, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 20 February 2003; Eduardo Sapene, interview by author, Caracas, Venezuela, 21 February 2003.

opposition leaders, will only speak to the media that support them, which limits the information available to the public; and there is very little investigative reporting, which means reporters tend to repeat the declarations from their sources. As each side reports only its view of the situation, audiences watch or read only those things that reaffirm their beliefs, causing deeper divisions in society and preventing constructive dialog.

Second, language and presentation problems also decrease the effectiveness of debate in the public sphere. Actors on all sides of the issue use inflammatory and derogatory language for their opponents and information and opinion may be mixed together.

Third, the overt attacks, physical aggression, legal sanctions, and economic pressure create a climate where civil, democratic dialog is not valued. The media and Chávez, through their actions and content, reinforce the political divide in the country. Observers fear that as the country continues to be polarized and public debate seems to be ineffective, extreme factions may seek violent “solutions” to the problems facing Venezuela.

Fourth, and possibly most fundamentally, the interpretation and view of press freedom by Chávez and the opposition are fundamentally different. This puts the division between the two views of Venezuelan society in sharp relief and makes effective communication ever so much more difficult.

Petkoff, in a front-page editorial in *Tal Cual*, emphasized the importance that all the Venezuelan institutions have in relaying messages that support democratic values, peace, and tolerance if the country is going to overcome the present political divisions and find solutions to the problems facing the people. He singled out Chávez for specific criticism since, as president of the country bears a greater responsibility for setting the political agenda. “His language has been a decisive factor in the triggering of this crisis because since the election campaign the


aggressiveness of his discourse and the violent metaphors that he usually employed were characteristic of a rhetorical style that in the following years has not left a wholesome mark [in society]. This damaging, aggravating, offensive, intolerant, threatening, violent, and opposed to coexistence language has had consequences for both his supporters and his adversaries. In both, it stimulates confrontation. ... The search for a negotiated solution demands a distinct verbal climate."⁷⁸

Without a change in the verbal climate, as well as the attendant actions that result from the public discourse, Venezuelans will have a difficult time reaching compromises and solutions to this crisis. The media, as always, will continue to play a central role in the process.

⁷⁸ Teodoro Petkoff, "Por la boca muere el pez," *Tal Cual*, 26 February 2003 [www.talcualdigital.com].

Figure 1.


Venezuelan institutions, 1998-2002



Source: Consultores 21, Caracas, Venezuela, February 2003.

Figure 2.

Media and Chávez, 1998-2002



Source: Consultores 21, Caracas, Venezuela, February 2003.

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New News for a new South Africa? The possibilities of public journalism
and development journalism as interventionist news models

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Abstract:

As post-Apartheid South Africa is going through immense change, a necessary debate about the role of the press is taking place. Should the press be completely free or should some limitations be in place in terms of its responsibility to nation building and reconciliation? The aim of this paper is to inform this debate from a theoretical perspective and to discuss the possibilities of the interventionist models of public and development journalism in this context.

New News for a new South Africa? The possibilities of public journalism
and development journalism as interventionist news models

Introduction

From a functionalist perspective, news informs citizens about what is going on in the world so that they can make informed decisions in a democracy. Not only does it inform, news also entertains and educates. In the Western model of journalism, the news media typically serve as a watchdog of the government.

However, the Western model of journalism has been under attack for some years. In the United States, scholars and journalists claim that the news media have become disconnected from their readers (Carey, 1999; Rosen, 1999). These scholars are saying journalism has failed in its aim of serving the public interest and instead recommend the practice of public journalism in a major shift away from the way journalism had traditionally been practiced in the West. In Third World countries, scholars have argued that the American model does not fit the developmental needs of these countries and that a development model of journalism should be devised to address these issues (Aggarwala, 1978; Edeani, 1993).

South Africa, which is a combination of First World and Third World, is one of the countries in which the Western model of journalism is now questioned (De Beer, 2002; Mathaha, 2002). In South Africa, especially the English-language press has followed the Western model of journalism closely, however, in a time of major social changes South Africans are rethinking the role of the press. There is increasing pressure on the media to support the government's plans for national development and nation building, but some South African editors argue that they serve the public interest best by not necessarily

serving the national interest (Anon., 2001). In a continuing situation of mistrust between the press and the government, officials often claim their activities are not receiving fair and balanced treatment from the press (De Beer, 2002).

The aim of this paper is firstly to provide an overview of the current debate about the role of the press in South Africa. Then, theoretical perspectives will be utilized to inform this debate, and the possibilities of the interventionist models of public and development journalism in this context will be discussed more specifically.

The current debate over the role of the press in South Africa

South Africa is facing enormous challenges and change. Until 1994, the white minority ruled through the Apartheid government while black resistance groups fought for justice and democracy. In the first democratic election in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) won almost two-thirds of votes, making it the first black government in the history of South Africa. In the midst of the democratic euphoria, the new government had to face tremendous social problems, including unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, AIDS, crime, violence and racial tension. The ANC successfully proposed its Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) as an election platform to address these issues, but frustrations are running high as change occurs slowly.

In the preamble to the new South Africa constitution (Act 108 of 1996), the government outlined four national goals, namely to:

1. heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights;
 2. lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law;
 3. improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and
 4. build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations
- (www.concourt.gov.za/constitution/index/html)

With regard to the press, it is stated in section 16 of the Bill of Rights that "everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes freedom of the press and other media" (www.concourt.gov.za/constitution/index/html).

In this context, questions are raised as to exactly how the news media should contribute to nation building and national development. For example, Eddings (2001) asks: "Should journalists investigate and report government missteps and abuses, or should they play a supportive role to enhance the chances of democratic success?" (p. 86).

Some are arguing for a model of journalism that would contribute to reconciliation and nation building. One proponent of development journalism is Mathatha Tsedu, former deputy editor of *The Star* newspaper and now deputy head of the South African Broadcasting Corporation's (SABC) television (Mathaha Mathaha, 2002). In an online article Mathaha quotes Tsedu: "Out of the 30 minutes bulletin, advertising, weather and other non-news take up about 12 minutes. Of the remaining 18 minutes, there are stories on robberies, hijackings and international news. Is there news about the ordinary South African struggling to better him or herself? None."

(www.rjr.ru.ac.za/young_and_fresh/necessary_know_how/development_journalism_a_rethink_for_our_times.html). Tsedu continues:

I don't think journalism is necessarily about covering court cases or how many bank robberies or hijackings there have been. It is about highlighting what people are doing to help transform their lives. Whether they do this alongside government or on their own is immaterial. The premise that development journalism is necessarily government oriented is faulty. It is not about what Thabo (President Mbeki) is doing

Similarly, Blankenberg (2000) argues that the African philosophy of ubuntu (a term used to refer to African traditions) can be used to inform a type of liberation journalism that

would combine elements of development journalism, participatory communication and other theories to create a journalism that would best serve the needs of African communities.

While some in the news media adopted a committed style of journalism to support the country in its transition, others are taken aback by the government's apparent expectations of favorable treatment. According to Matloff (1996), some senior government officials have made public appeals to journalists to write positive accounts of policies to promote national unity. In one instance, former President Nelson Mandela lashed out against black journalists for criticizing government efforts to promote reconciliation. This situation can be particularly difficult for black journalists, who might be accused of acting against the national interest if they expose wrongdoing by the government (Steyn, 1994; Tsedu, 2000).

Some have expressed concern about this perceived threat to press freedom in South Africa (for example see De Beer, 2002). Lara Kantor, director of the Independent Media Monitoring Project in Johannesburg, argues that where the SABC once was used to promote white supremacy and Apartheid, it now promotes national reconciliation and the Reconstruction and Development Program. According to Kantor, one ideology just replaced another (Lansner, 1995).

In terms of journalism education in South Africa, Megwa (2001) argues that in a time of soul searching, journalists should not be trained as objective observers, but as "active participants in the process of news production" (p. 283). News organizations, Megwa points out, will have to deal with issues of diversity in both the newsroom and in its content. He says:

... good journalism is not just journalism that relentlessly pursues the truth and holds government accountable and transparent. It is also journalism that promotes and encourages the participation of all South African citizens in public debate about governance, reconciliation, and reconstruction of lives broken by a hideous system of exclusion and deprivation (p. 284).

In the next section, three theories of the press and their implications for journalism in South Africa will be discussed.

A theoretical framework for journalism in South Africa: the free press theory, social responsibility theory and development media theory

Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) introduced four theories of the press in what De Beer (1998) calls an "application of the idea that the political philosophy of a state has a direct bearing on the structure and functioning of the media system" (p. 18). The four theories identified by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (1956) were the authoritarian theory, the libertarian theory, the Soviet media theory and the social-responsibility theory, the latter largely based on the work of the Hutchins Commission on the Freedom of the Press (1942-1947). Altschull (1995) pairs these theories together in two categories based on their ideologies, namely authoritarian and Soviet , and libertarian and social-responsibility. McQuail (1987) expands on the four theories, which he calls inapplicable to developing countries, by adding two theories: the development media theory and the democratic-participant theory.

In considering what a future South African press system might look like, Jackson (1993) argues that one "could quickly eliminate" the libertarian and Soviet media theories because they have minimal prospects of being adopted in South Africa (p. 217). Indeed, in the 1980s South Africa pretty much followed the authoritarian theory when numerous restrictions applied to the freedom of the press. Instead of looking at what the South

Africa media system "might" look like, this author is taking a more optimistic approach in discussing what the system "should" look like. As such, the authoritarian theory is not desirable because of its obvious limitations, neither is the Soviet media theory in which media cannot be privately owned. It will be argued here that that the desired possibilities for South Africa range from the free press theory to the social responsibility theory and the development media theory. Public journalism and development journalism as interventionist models of the news might be particularly suitable for South Africa rather than the conventional free press-style journalism.

The free press theory

The American or Western model of journalism is based on the free press theory as set out by McQuail (1987), a theory that he calls a relabeled version of Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's libertarian theory (1956). According to McQuail, the libertarian theory is "widely regarded as the main legitimating principle for print media in liberal democracies" (p. 112).

In this regard, Kovach and Rosenstiel (2001) provide a useful summary of the essential elements of journalism, including a search for the truth, loyalty to citizens, independence, verification of news, comprehensible and proportional news, and monitoring of those in power. Curiously though, Kovach and Rosenstiel do not include objectivity as one of these elements. They argue that objectivity has lost its meaning.

Objectivity, however, has been a major element of American journalism since the 19th century. The shift from a partisan press to an objective press in the United States was induced mainly by economic interests: The Associated Press needed to construct and objective version of news to distribute news stories to as many as possible subscribers

(Campbell, 1998). Standard journalism textbooks in the United States still emphasize objectivity and detachment as key values of journalism (see Fedler, 1997).

In this model, newsworthiness of stories is based on timeliness, importance, prominence, proximity and oddities/unusualness (Fedler, 1997; Rich, 2003). In addition, Rich identifies qualities of news stories as celebrities, human interest, conflict, impact, helpfulness, entertainment, trends, and issues or problems in the community. Hard news, which is the basic ingredient of the daily news media, is defined as "serious and timely stories about important topics," while soft news is described as "feature or human-interest stories" (Fedler, 1997, p. 95). For hard news, the emphasis is mostly on events rather on issues or processes.

This model of journalism has achieved a hegemonic status not only in the United States where mainstream news organizations follow this model, but also in developing countries (Golding, 1979). In South Africa, for example, these exact news values are taught in tertiary institutions, where journalism professors often use American or British textbooks. Similarly, in Nigeria, the Western model of journalism is reinforced through on-the-job training, training abroad, experts from industrialized nations who are sent to work there, university programs, professional training institutes and foreign media role models (Jimada, 1992). It is important to realize, however, that this model of journalism has developed in a specific time and place, and that it may not necessarily be the best one for all countries at all times. Hard news, conflict, timeliness and a focus on events do not necessarily meet the informational needs of developing countries. In this regard, Jimada (1992) says, "we [Nigerians] still have to search for our own news values within the African world culture." This, I believe, might be true for South Africans too.

The conventional model of journalism does not have social change as a goal. However, social change might occur as a result of using this approach. Viswanath and Demers (1999) argue that traditional journalism could bring about social change as an institution when it promotes democracy and acts as a watchdog of the government and big business. Similarly, it could act to maintain the status quo, just as other social institutions like churches, schools and families could act to support the status quo. Therefore, Viswanath and Demers argue the mass media could be both agents of social control and social change and this could happen simultaneously.

Social responsibility theory

According to Altschull (1995) the social responsibility theory "remains the unofficial doctrine of the press," even though it is not well defined and largely ignored in practice (p. 144). Similarly, De Beer (1998) argues that the social responsibility system is "preferred in Anglo-American countries, and is also propounded by many as the ideal for South Africa" (p. 19). For example, Jackson (1993) states that the socially responsible system is likely to dominate, even though it would not flourish like in Western democracies. Jackson states that English-language papers in South Africa typically aspired to this standard, and that lately Afrikaans editors as well as alternative media editors are looking toward this approach. Jackson concludes that South Africa will probably end up with a hybrid model based on the social responsibility model and the development model.

Among the conditions identified by De Beer (1998) for the social responsibility system to work effectively, are a tradition of a free press and "a relatively homogeneous population" (p. 19). It can be argued that neither of these is present in South Africa based

on the heavy media restrictions during the Apartheid era and the heterogeneity of the population. However, it might be worthwhile to at least investigate what model of journalism would be practiced in line with the social responsibility theory.

Offering a rather bleak outlook for public journalism in the future, Blevins (1997) provides the connection between the Hutchins Commission's recommendations, Peterson's social responsibility theory of the press and the practice of public journalism in the 1990s. A valid criticism from Blevins is that people do not necessarily want to be guided by newspapers into problem solving and that public journalism as such can be seen as a form of paternalism toward readers. The work of Christians, Ferre and Fackler (1993) on communitarian journalism is also related to the social responsibility theory. Christians et. al. argue that a press devoted to civic transformation aims to "liberate the citizenry, inspire acts of conscience, pierce the political fog, and enable the consciousness raising that is essential for constructing a social order through dialogue, mutually, in concert with out universal humanity (p. 14).

Public journalism, also called civic journalism, community journalism or conversational journalism, aims to reconnect the news media with the community and to provide solutions for community problems (Charity, 1995; Glasser, 1991; Rosen, 1999; and Sirianni & Friedland, 2001). The public journalism movement's roots can be traced to John Dewey (1927), who in contrast to Walter Lippmann (1930), believed in the power of the public. Dewey argues that the public consists of a group of people who are affected in some way or the other and who then organize to protect themselves. Initially, Dewey argues, people took care of their own interests in a private way, but in the modern state officials such as judges and legislators hold this responsibility. Still, one would expect

people to be engaged and involved in what is in their best interest. Another influence on the development of public journalism was the work of Jurgen Habermas on the public sphere (1989)

Since the 1990s, discussions of public journalism have dominated the field of journalism in the United States, and as many as 200 newspapers started implementing principles of public journalism in newsrooms across the country. The public journalism movement also attracted fierce criticism from more traditional media practitioners. Many argued that public journalism was exactly what they have been doing for many years without giving it a new label. Others contended that public journalism was breaking all rules of impartiality and should therefore be avoided.

Examples of public journalism projects included yearlong series, a redesign of pages to include more voices of citizens, focus-groups, town-hall meetings, call-in lines, letters from readers, surveys regarding pressing political issues and approaching controversial issues from different perspectives so improve readers' understanding of the topic (Rosen, 1999).

It could be argued that a type of public journalism has been practiced in South Africa for many years through alternative media (Jackson, 1993; Seekings, 2000; and Van Kessel, 2000). Jackson puts it as follows:

Ridiculing the established papers' claim that they practice an "objective" approach to gathering and reporting news, the newer publications embrace a "committed" or "advocacy" journalism. Far from regarding themselves as neutral observers of the scene these papers openly embrace a viewpoint. They say that journalistic neutrality or objectivity is a myth under any circumstances; to claim to practice such journalism in South Africa is naïve self-deception at best and outright dishonesty at worst (p 9).

A good case in point is the community newspaper *Grassroots*, where staff members were known as community organizers, not as journalists, as can be seen in this quote from Van Kessel (2000):

As an organizing tool, *Grassroots* set itself the long-term goal of engaging local organizations in the struggle against the South African state. Bread-and-butter issues were a means to an end, stepping-stones in a process of mobilization against racial and class oppression. The *Grassroots* staff did not perceive themselves primarily as journalists. Notions like objectivity and separation of news and comment belong to the realm of the 'bourgeois' liberal press, which served the interest of the ruling class ... *Grassroots* defined its constituency as the oppressed and exploited majority ... (p. 285).

Development media theory

There exists an apparent relationship between development media theory and the development goals of a country like South Africa in that this theory supports economic development, social change and nation building (De Beer, 1998; McQuail, 1987). Some of the key aspects of development media theory (or developmental theory as De Beer calls it), are that the media should accept responsibility for development tasks and prioritize national language and culture in its content (McQuail, 1987). De Beer (1998) adds: "The overriding implication of the developmental system is that there should be a basic mass media devotion to economic, political, cultural and social development as a primary national task. All institutions (including the media system) should be committed to this end" (p. 18). In terms of limitations, McQuail (1987) points out that media freedom can be restricted based on economic priorities and development needs. This restriction might include state intervention, censorship, subsidy or even direct control.

Jackson (1993) contends that South Africa is unlikely to adopt the development theory because of the existing traditions of the mainstream press. He argues: "The strong orientation to the social responsibility approach held by the most powerful papers will make it difficult for any government to promote developmental journalism beyond modest levels" (p. 219). He does contend though that elements of development journalism should be incorporated into the future press of South Africa.

Even though development media theory is dissimilar to Marxist-Leninist theory and authoritarian theory, the philosophy of the development media theory can be traced back to Marxist theorizing about the role of the press. Marx regarded the media as part of the superstructure that the ruling class used to maintain power, together with other ideological institutions such as churches, schools and the government. As such, Marx argued that the task of the press was to overthrow the capitalist system (Altschull, 1995). Marx was against journalists as objective reporters, because objectivity "was denying the possibility of change" (Altschull, 1995, p. 205). Instead, journalists have to work for social change.

In the following section, it will become clear that journalists working in the development media theory model are not passive reporters but active organizers for a political cause.

In contrast to the traditional free press model of journalism, development journalism and public journalism are both interventionist models (Shafer, 1998). This means both these models are deliberately aimed at bringing about social change, in contrast with the traditional detached Western model of journalism.

In explicating the meaning of development journalism, it might be useful to first take a closer look at the concept of development. It should be acknowledged up front that the term "development" is highly controversial, as many development projects have had detrimental outcomes in developing countries. Instead of "developing" these countries, development policies have often led to an increase in poverty and unemployment. Esteva (1992) draws development discourse back to the inauguration of President Truman on January 20, 1949, when two billion people became "underdeveloped" as Truman announced plans for a program of development. Development discourse told two-thirds of the people in the world of "*what they are not*. It is a reminder of an undesirable, undignified condition. To escape from it, they need to be enslaved to others' experiences and dreams" (cursive in original, Esteva, 1992, p. 10). As such, development is typically frowned upon today as neo-colonialism, even if more participatory models are implemented. A more egalitarian vision of development is offered by Shah and Gayatri (1994) in the following definition: Development is "an ongoing participatory process within a society through which the society achieves a fulfillment of its basic needs and/or improvement of its quality of life according to its own destiny" (p. 412).

While keeping the contested nature of development in account, the usefulness of development journalism and development communication should still be considered. These two terms are sometimes used as synonyms (for example Ogan, 1982), however, they have separate origins and definitions. Development communication, according to Wilkins (2000), is "the strategic application of communication technologies and processes to promote social change" (p. 197). Development communication in the United States originated around the 1940s through the studies of Lerner (1962) and Schramm

(1963), who argued that mass media could help bring about development in developing countries. Development communication can take place through a variety of forms of communication, including interpersonal communication, theatre, and mass communication, and in this way development journalism is a smaller part of development communication.

In contrast, development journalism had its roots in Asia in the 1960s (Gunaratne & Hasim, 1996; McKay, 1993; Ogan, 1982; Shafer, 1998; Shah, 1992; and Sussman, 1978). Journalists associated with the Press Foundation of Asia in Manila and communication scholars started using the catch phrase "developmental journalism" (Gunaratne & Hasim, 1996) or "development journalism/communication" (Ogan, 1982). These scholars and practitioners organized courses and workshops on development journalism in Manila, Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and other cities.

Defining development journalism, however, is difficult. In a meta-research case study of development journalism, Fair (1988) found that there was no consensus in terms of conceptualizing development journalism among the 20 studies analyzed. In three cases, development journalism was conceptualized as "any news that relates to the primary, secondary or tertiary needs of a country's population" (p. 168). In another three cases, it was seen as "news that satisfies the needs of a country's population and contributes to self-reliance" (p. 168). In yet another two studies, development journalism was conceptualized as "news that related to development or to social, economic or political problems" (p. 169). In two instances, development journalism was described as "positive or good news" and in one case it was defined as "news for neo-literates" (p. 169). Fair found that in nine cases, no conceptual definition was given. However, in 18 studies

operational definitions were presented. Most often, development journalism was operationalized by "topics or categories of news that were considered to be development journalism" (p. 169).

The description of development news that is most often used is that of Aggarwala (1979, p. 181):

It is not identical with "positive" news. In its treatment, development news is not different from regular news or investigative reporting. It can deal with development issues at macro and micro levels and can take different forms at national and international levels. In covering the development newsbeat, a journalist should critically examine, evaluate, and report the relevance of a development project to national and local needs, the difference between a planned scheme and its actual implementation, and the differences between its impact on people as claimed by government officials and as it actually is.

Shah (1992) discusses advocacy, people orientation and a holistic approach as characteristics of development news based on Aggarwala's description.

Similar to criticisms of early development communication models as being top-down, traditional Western journalism has also been criticized for its focus on government officials and other elites. In describing development news as people oriented, Shah (1992) includes people who are affected by development as news sources in a bottom-up style of reporting. Development journalism, it might be argued, is setting out to follow the dialogical approach of Freire (1983), where the journalist (sender) becomes the listener (receiver) and the receiver (those affected most by development) becomes the sender. An example of empowering the voiceless in society is the work of Indian journalist Palagummi Sainath, who sees it as his task to write stories of the poorest and most downtrodden people of India (Hardie, 2002). Likewise, in South Africa, Mathatha Tsedu believes journalists should focus on the poor and the weak (Mathaha, 2002).

Unfortunately, as can be seen in a study Shah (1990), typical news sources in development news "were men in government positions who belong to the party in power. Few of these sources were critical of development plans, projects, policies, problems or issues" (p. 1037). Ogan, Fair and Shah (1984) recommended a greater use of critical sources and less dependence on the government as the only source of information.

In another study, Shah and Gayatri (1994) operationalized development news according to the criteria from Basic Outline, an Indonesian document that outlines the role for the country's mass media in the development process. According to this outline, the mass media have a duty to:

Arouse the spirit of dedication to national aspiration; strengthen national unity and integration; fortify the sense of responsibility and national discipline; increase awareness of rights and duties of citizens; consolidate national cultural values to reinforce Indonesian identity; educate the people; develop social communication as well as social aspiration, and stimulate social participation in national development (p. 413).

These values are clearly different from those of traditional detached Western journalism and could be applicable to the South African situation.

It is important to distinguish development journalism as conceptualized here from developmental journalism and development support communication (DSC) (or developmental writing as Jamias, 1986, calls it). According to Sussman (1978), developmental journalism is the idea that governments have to control the media to achieve national development. This is in contrast with the idea of development communication, which was "nongovernmental in origin and practice" (Sussman, 1978, p. 77). Literature on development journalism is somewhat confusing on this point, because the terms "development journalism" and "developmental journalism" are sometimes used interchangeably when the authors, in my opinion, really have the other term in mind (for

example above when Gunaratne and Hasim, 1996, used the term "developmental journalism," also see Anon, 2001; Fitzgerald, 1990, Domatob & Hall, 1983; and Murthy, 2001). This might be an indication of conceptual confusion or simply of the highly contested nature of this form of journalism.

Perhaps the harshest criticism of what Sussman (1978) calls developmental journalism comes from Domatob and Hall (1983), who say in "development journalism" the "state fashions and tailors the news to conform to the needs and public policy of the day" (p. 14). As a result, African politicians end up controlling the media for their own political goals. For example, Domatob and Hall point out that in several francophone African states, it is impossible to even "criticize the President, his family and the military" (p.19). Similarly, Fitzgerald (1990) describes "'development' journalism" as "the idea that the press should be cheerleaders for developing Third World nations" (p. 49).

On the other hand, DSC is a term used to replace "development communication" as based on the earlier dominant paradigm. According to Melkote and Steeves (2001), practitioners started using DSC to indicate a change in focus from a top-down, authoritarian way of communicating development to a horizontal relationship of sharing information between participants. Whereas development communication took place on the international and national level, DSC is taking place on local and grassroots levels. Big media, such as radio, television and newspapers, were employed in development communication, whereas smaller media, traditional media and interpersonal communication are used in DSC. In contrast with development journalism, which is practiced by either independent news media that willingly buy into the government's plans or government-controlled news media that are forced to practice development

journalism, DSC typically originates from national development programs initiated by governments or development agencies.

The problem, with developmental journalism or DSC, is that it can be seen as a form of "government say-so journalism" (Ogan, 1982, p. 7). To differentiate between developmental journalism (and DSC) and development journalism, Ogan argues that the latter could be categorized under the social responsibility theory of the press and the former under the authoritarian theory of the press.

In a relatively recent article on development journalism, Shah (1996) argues that "emancipatory journalism" should replace the outdated and contested term "development journalism" (p. 143). Shah's argument is that in the dominant paradigm of development communication, the assumption was that people would become modern once they understood a sense of nation-ness (space) and change their focus to the future, punctuality and long-term planning (time). However, the actual effects of the introduction of modernization in developing communities were that people lost their sense of space and time, resulting in existential anxiety and feelings of emptiness. Thus emancipatory journalism should be introduced to re-establish this sense of time and space and to empower people to transform social structures. Shah seems to propose yet another position for journalism, one that can be seen as a blend between development journalism (top-down) and DSC (bottom-up).

From the above, it is clear that there are several differences and similarities between public journalism and development journalism as interventionist news models. In contrast with development journalism, which is used for journalism in Third World countries, its younger cousin, public journalism (Gunaratne & Hasim), is a form of journalism that

originated in the United States. Whereas the focus of development journalism is on national development and macrostructural change, public journalism is micro-oriented and focuses on local problems in communities, for example neighborhood crime, racial tension, or unemployment (Shafer, 1998).

Gunaratne and Hasim (1996) identified several similarities between development journalism and public journalism. Both these forms of journalism emerged out of the realization that conventional Western journalism does not contribute to nation building or community building. Similarly, both forms want to emphasize the civic successes of the country or community, which in some cases led to charges against both as feel-good journalism. Development journalism is aimed at nation building and the promotion of democracy just as public journalism aims to improve civic life and democracy.

Development journalism wants to give voice to the underprivileged in developing countries, while public journalism wants to involve ordinary citizens in public debate. In both development journalism and public journalism, the journalist assumes an active role in encouraging citizens to work together to solve urban or rural problems. Finally, in both forms of journalism the journalist becomes a participant in public life instead of a detached observer. On the downside, Shafer (1998) argues that in both development journalism and public journalism, journalists do not have sufficient resources or time to address the structural roots of problems.

Although there is no evidence of public journalism being used for development in Third World countries, Shah (1992) has considered using development journalism in rural areas of the United States. He concludes that there is "great potential for rural newspapers to contribute in a positive way to humane development in the rural United

States" despite some problems (p. 15). It can be argued that public journalism could also contribute to problem solving in Third World countries.

Discussion

In this paper, it has been argued that that both public journalism and development journalism as interventionist press models could be implemented in South Africa to help with community connectedness and nation building. The traditional Western press model does not offer a constructive framework for change and reconciliation because journalists remain detached, skeptical and disinterested. To heal the wounds of South Africa, journalists need to step outside of their comfort zones and become activists for social change. Public journalism, with its focus on local problems, could bring citizens in communities together to consider solutions in neighborhoods. Development journalism, with its focus on national development, could give voice to the poorest of the poor in the country while emphasizing cultural unity and political participation. A combination of development journalism and public journalism could strengthen the fabric of society and give direction in the transformation process.

Having proposed these two forms of journalism for South Africa, this paper is not recommending developmental journalism. To only emphasize the positive aspects of a society, while ignoring burning issues, could only lead to disaster. It is crucial for the press to remain independent from government control and to operate freely and fearlessly.

Since newspapers are privately owned in South Africa, it is doubtful whether editors and managers would be interested in public journalism or development journalism unless there would be a financial incentive. The case is different with the South African

Broadcasting Corporation, which might be able to implement some of these strategies as part of its public responsibility to license payers.

Sadly, these alternative forms of journalism might at best be wishful thinking and at worst idealistic naivete, as journalists in South Africa are struggling with much more basic issues. In a recent study conducted on behalf of the South African National Editors Forum, De Beer (2002) found that news editors thought reporters lacked basic journalistic skills. Future training, De Beer recommends, should focus on the "very basic elements of news writing, such as getting the 5 Ws and the H right; getting to grips with the elements of news values; correct use of names and titles; and reporting correctly on the basic facts of a story (<http://www.mediatenor.co.za/mtsaq7/audit.htm>). Similarly, Jackson (1993) points out that except for issues of press freedom, journalists are ill equipped for their tasks and there is a general lack of careful thinking about journalism in South Africa.

In addition, in a country where illiteracy varies between 27 percent in metropolitan areas and 50 percent in rural areas (Underwood, 2002), one might question the impact of news media, especially of newspapers. Radio and television news perhaps has a better change of making a difference. Another factor to keep in mind is that South Africa currently has 11 official languages, a situation that makes it extremely difficult to provide news to every citizen in his or her home language.

At the end of the day, South African editors will probably argue that conventional journalism standards offer the best solution for South Africa's problems. It was the aim of this paper, however, to at least consider and highlight some of the possibilities of a more activist approach to journalism.

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WOMEN IN ADVERTISEMENTS ACROSS CULTURES

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ABSTRACT

There are few cross-cultural studies that investigate women's representation in advertisements. As a powerful force, advertising influences women's identity and relations with others. Cross-cultural comparisons can help identify factors determining depictions of women. Using content analysis, this study reviews magazine advertisements over 24 different countries for the presence of women. It focuses on the visual and on bodies within advertising space. Findings link social system dimensions of individual countries to the presence of women in advertising.

Paper submitted to AEJMC Convention, July 30 to August 2, 2003, in Kansas city, MO, to the International Communication Division's Markham Competition for Student Papers: Catherine Cassara, Department of Journalism, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, Telephone: 419/372-2372, Fax: 419/372-0202, E-mail: ccassar@bgnet.bgsu.edu.

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INTRODUCTION

The average person is exposed to 3,000 messages daily (Stole, 2001) and over \$321 billion is spent on advertising worldwide (White, 2002) making advertising a major force and economic base. As a socializing agent, advertising creates sensations, and particularly cogent are ideal or less than ideal portrayals of women. How are images of women in ads influenced by social systems in various countries?

Globalization is a paradox; it necessitates an understanding of cultural differences like never before. Experts generally agree that consumers respond more favorably to messages that are congruent with their cultures (Zhang & Gelb, 1996). Others suggest that advertisers must conform to the cultural values and norms of a target market in order to communicate successfully with its audience (Al-Olayan & Karande, 2000).

Gender roles are a key aspect of culture. Cheng (1997) asserts that they are the “most important indicators of codified behavior in all societies” (pp. 295–296). Roles result from different dimensions of a country, including religious beliefs, political philosophy, sanctions, values, social norms, and other traditions.

Portrayals of women are often depicted in stereotypical roles, that are “potentially debilitating and demeaning, and are also inaccurate” (Lazier & Kendrick, 1993, pp. 200-201). “Representation has always been an important battle ground for contemporary feminism” (van Zoonen, 1994, p. 12). Feminist critics believe that portrayals in ads are partly responsible for creating and maintaining limited social opportunities for women (Busby & Leichty, 1993).

Advertising is often called a “type of distorted mirror regarding its ability to reflect and transmit cultural values” (Pollay & Gallagher, 1990, p. 360). Messages need to convey meaning quickly, in limited time and space, and “therefore exploit symbols that are relevant and salient to society” (van Zoonen, 1994, p. 67). Such attributes make ads particularly good vehicles to examine gender role portrayals in different countries.

Although there are many studies of gender role images, they fail to quantify or link possible social system influence with content. They avoid answering the question: What dimensions of a country’s social system effect advertising content, if at all? Rather the findings yield only detailed, descriptive evidence of role portrayal differences in various countries.

A meta-analysis of advertising content research found that 40 of 59 investigations were concerned solely with the United States (Abernethy & Franke, 1996). In a world that is increasingly

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losing borders, it is startling that more research has not tackled analysis of advertising across cultures. Perhaps this is a natural reflection of America's disinterest in the rest of the world, or its sheer dominance. The time is right for understanding people in other nations. A study of worldwide advertising is needed.

Using a quantitative content analysis method, this project addresses social and cultural dimensions of countries and their relationship on women's presence in advertising. Advertisements from a purposive, convenience sample of consumer general interest publications are the sampling unit. As the level of analysis, social systems are quantified using data from published reports of industry and government statistics including gross domestic product, civil rights, literacy rate of women, and percentage of women in the labor force.

Culture and social literature are underpinnings of the research. Classic writing by Tönnies and Mead provide the basis for contemporary theory. Social/behavioral and cultural/critical mass communication paradigms offer models that best relate communications to social systems. Feminist and advertising studies are also used. The feminist perspective comprises a bundle of issues that criticize social system barriers that prohibit women's opportunities. Advertising is argued to perpetuate everyday knowledge of culture and society and provide an ideal vehicle to study gender roles.

THEORY

As the study is based on cultural and social differences, historical references and definitions are reviewed to provide a platform for understanding social processes within societies and the possible effects on communication.

Culture

Culture can be defined as a standard for a particular group with "special social values clustering around traditions" (Sapir, 1994, p. 23). In German, there are two relevant meanings, one describes the activities of the elite; and, the other "the geist of a people, the underlying soul or spirit" (Sapir, 1994, p. 30). It can be described as a complex set of ideas of the larger value of life that belong to a group.

In a major cross-cultural project, Hofstede (1984) defines culture as "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another... the interactive aggregate of common characteristics that influence a human group's response to its

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environment” (p. 31). Countries are comprised of unique homogeneous characteristics and communications function within these boundaries. Advertising, as a cultural form, “displays a preoccupation with gender that is hardly matched in any genre” (van Zoonen, 1994, p. 67).

Social systems

Social systems are in tandem with culture. Tönnies believes that group life is only possible through regular behavior. People’s thinking and experiences result directly from social life to create a logical system he considers social entities. He proposes this as a requirement to understand social phenomena (Tönnies, 1957).

Similarly, Mead (1934) suggests “general social attitudes” make an organized self possible (p. 260). He describes “common response” as specific ways of acting under situations that are essential within a group (p. 261). Organized sets of responses are related to each other, which Mead calls the “generalized other” (p. 261). Feminist scholar van Zoonen (1994) asserts that gender is a deeply felt element of the social structure in providing effective symbols (p. 67).

Tönnies considers three groups of social values: economic, political, and intellectual or spiritual. These provide commonality and points of reference for social interaction. This study addresses those that are most relevant for representation of women in the media: gross domestic product, civil rights, percent literacy for women, and percent of women in the labor force.

Transmissional and ritual perspectives

The transmissional and ritual perspectives are contemporary theories that provide a cultural basis for analysis of mass communication. The models emphasize the importance of people’s everyday rituals in interpreting experiences and suggest that they rely on messages in order to construct their daily routines. Messages provide and reinforce common beliefs that are unique to individual cultures.

Content is described as having monolithic “meaning” embedded with “dominant” messages (Newcomb & Hirsch, 1983, p. 40). It assumes that the audience shares, or perceives, the same meaning from messages. James Carey, a supporter of the paradigm, approaches the concept in two parts. He emphasizes the transmission aspect of communication as a “process of transmitting messages at a distance for the purpose of control. The archetypal case of communication then is

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persuasion, attitude change, behavior modification, socialization through the transmission of information, influence, or conditioning” (Carey, 1975, p. 177).

The other aspect focuses on the ritual of communication that “maintains society in the representation of shared beliefs. Common messages, symbols, and ideas are maintained continually and reinforced through conscious or unconscious efforts” (Carey, 1975, p. 177). Similarly, Tönnies (1957) considers social entities “conditioned by the wills of others directly involved” (p. 7).

Carey eloquently summarizes the paradigm: “Communication is a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired, and transformed” (Carey, 1975, p. 177). Relevant to this study, it suggests that women’s presence in advertising helps maintain them in mainstream society. Conversely, their absence helps to keep them invisible.

Symbolic interaction

Symbolic interaction, part of the social behaviorism view of sociology, is concerned with how culture influences people’s learning and considers where learning takes place. The notion is that symbolic behavior occurs in shared meaning and values between social actors. George Herbert Mead (1934) asserts that mutual conditioning occurs in our environment. He uses an analogy of players at a baseball game where each player learns his respective position through playing, observing, and interacting with other team members. In society, people are conditioned by others for their role within the group.

Contemporary critics suggest that people’s interpretation of the environment is based on communications, including advertising. What people know of the world is based on their prior experience, including indirect experiences from communications. These communications guide people in their everyday lives in their concept of self, their roles, situations, and expectations. Portrayals of men and women in mass media help create and maintain images of each gender.

Social construction of reality

Social construction of reality proposes that communication provides symbols and common experiences that people share to form meanings in the world. The paradigm is based on differing of knowledge in specific social contexts. Through the dynamic, ever evolving process of society, knowledge comes to be established as reality. “Whatever passes for ‘knowledge’ in society, regardless

of the ultimate validity, ... is developed, transmitted, and maintained in social situations” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 3).

Reality is also that which we take for granted in our everyday lives. It allows people to exist in society through “an ongoing reality between *my* meaning and *their* meaning in this world.... We share a common sense about its reality” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 23). The authors argue that one “cannot exist in everyday reality without continually interacting and communicating with others” (p. 23). Mass communications help create mutual symbols that have shared meaning. Advertisers design messages that include, or do not include, women to *best* communicate with their target audience.

Roles are created in common knowledge, based on the “fundamental process of habitualization and objectivation” (Berger & Luckmann, 1967, p. 74). Roles are necessary to maintain order, including institutional order (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). Portrayals of women in advertisements are based on common social reality. The lack of women present in ads contributes to the masculine dominance of most societies.

Feminist theory

Feminist sociologist DeVault defines feminism as “a movement, set of beliefs, that problematize gender inequality... and work to improve women’s status” (Eaton, 2001, p. 17; DeVault, 1996, p. 31). Most scholars suggest three typologies of feminist thought, although distinctions are blurred. Radical feminists seek major social changes, and that equality with men in a male-defined world is not enough (Dyer, 1993). Focusing on pornography, they argue that women are objectified for men’s pleasures, perpetuating the “patriarchal ideology of women as available objectives” (van Zoonen, 1994, p. 19). Socialist feminists “claim that gender is a crucial component of ideology” (van Zoonen, 1994, p. 21) and are interested in the interaction between gender, class, and ideology. Liberal feminism is concerned with stereotypes and gender socialization. The latter two are most relevant to this study.

Social feminists link “the capital mode of production to the oppression of women” (van Zoonen, 1994, p. 21). From Marxism, they use the political economic analysis of capitalism and the “conception of human nature as constituted in society” (van Zoonen, 1994, p. 22). Media, including ad messages, are viewed as hegemonic agents that help maintain a capitalist and patriarchal order.

The lack of representation of women in the media, such as on television, tells the audience that “women don’t matter much in American society” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 11). Discrimination, prejudice,

and annihilation of women create a void, resulting in absence of women images. Cultural conditioning has created a “role crisis” for women (Friedan, 1983, p. 75). Lack of women images in advertisements maintain women in their traditional place and out of the mainstream.

The liberal feminist agenda acknowledges societal barriers that prevent women from succeeding and work to improve conditions within the existing system. They argue that women need to be treated equally and allowed into the mainstream to reach their full human potential (Friedan, 1983). The focus is on individual autonomy and equal opportunity for women to exercise free will and share in social decisions (Dyer, 1993). Liberal feminists believe that providing role models for adult women and girls is an important issue (Eaton, 2001).

Economics and education are two key issues that can empower women. The opportunity for employment is not only a way to gain economic independence, but it provides training, skills, and an identity (Friedan, 1983). Earning a living can be an emotional benefit while providing for material necessities. Education is also crucial for intellectual and spiritual growth. It provides for a wider range of job opportunities to greater ability to be active in society.

Advertising

A considerable amount of literature suggests advertising is an important indicator of socialization. Sociologists and other theorists use messages embedded in advertising to understand the values and motives of individuals (Busby & Leichty, 1993). Several studies consider that “cultural values are the core value of advertising messages” (Cho, *et al.*, 1999, p. 59). Others have called it “the most potent influence in adapting and changing habits and modes of life, affecting what we eat, what we wear and the work and play of the whole nation” (Fox, 1984, p. 87; Lazier & Kendrick, 1993, pp. 199-200).

As a social barometer, advertising can be explicated into two: social actor and cultural artifact (Cheng, 1997; Dyer, 1982; Frith, 1995; Leiss, 1990). The former considers that advertising is powerful in transforming symbols, images, and ideas between products and individuals. Similarly, psychologists argue that advertising is a source of learning or conditioning (Lazier & Kendrick, 1993, p. 200). As a cultural artifact, ad messages are thought to reflect a shared understanding in society.

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Hypotheses

Four hypotheses comprise the study. In each case, the independent variable is a different dimension of a country's social system, while in all cases, the dependent variable is the average number of women per advertisement. Table 1 provides data for all independent variables.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

Gross national product

Advertising helps create demand for new products and purchase frequency for existing ones. Theories support the notion that advertising messages are defined according to parameters of the social system. Women's role in society can be found in their portrayals or, more generally, their mere presence in advertisements. A study of 353 television commercials found that men still dominate prominent roles (Lazier & Kendrick, 1993, p. 202). Advertising as a condition must exist before women can be present in ads and the more commercially oriented the country; the more ads and the more women are seen.

The first hypothesis tests this relationship: The larger the country's gross domestic product, the more women are shown in that country's magazine advertisements. Gross domestic product (GDP) of each country is the independent variable, measured in billions of U.S. dollars as found in *The Economist*. The dependent variable, used for all hypotheses, is the average number of women present per advertisement for each country.

Theoretically, it suggests that the presence of women in advertising is linked to the commercial orientation of a country. Because advertising may act like a distorted mirror in reflecting society, the bigger the economy, the more advertising, and the more opportunity for appearances of women per ad.

Civil rights

In a study of television advertising in the United States and China, Cheng (1997) found that television commercials portrayed men more often than women and men dominate voice-overs in more than 82% of cases for both countries, but more so for China (pp. 309-310). This suggests that the more freedoms and rights a country offers; the more women are represented in advertisements. Civil rights, defined in terms of guaranteed freedom for individuals, are a social system dimension that effect

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women. Liberal feminist theory argues “women are rationally and politically the same..., entitled to share equally in all rights and privileges” (Dyer, 1993, p. 323).

It is expected that the more freedom provided by the social system, the more rights women will have, and the more they are able to participate in society. Entering the mainstream makes women’s images more common. The second hypothesis captures the expected relationship: The more civil rights offered by a country, the more women are shown in that country’s magazine advertisements. As the independent variable, civil rights is defined as constitutional public law that guarantees “legal protection of all individuals to live freely, be housed, work, have income support in cases of need, be educated, and to have access to legal advice and medical care” (Kurian, 1991, p. 51). A civil rights score, ranging from 1 for the most rights to 7 for the least rights, is compiled for each country.

The hypothesis implies that the more freedom every individual has in a country, the more women will enjoy those freedoms. The condition allows people, including women, the opportunity to participate in society. Women’s increase in social activities make it more likely that they will be depicted in media, specifically in ads.

Literacy

Liberal feminists argue that education is one vehicle that can empower women to become full participants in society by increasing their opportunities. Countries with tightly controlled social systems discriminate or discourage education for women and thereby keep women in traditional roles. Countries that forbid the education of women have low female literacy rates, such as 1% in South Yemen and 6% in Afghanistan (Kurian, 1991, p. 244).

The third hypothesis is: The greater a country’s percent of literate women, the more women are shown in that country’s magazine advertisements. It predicts a positive relationship between literacy rates of women, implying discrimination against education for women, and their portrayal in advertisements. Percent of literate women is the independent variable. Literacy is defined as the ability to read short and simple passages and to answer questions about it. It assumes that literacy is gained from education, and the more education, the more literate the individual.

The theoretical linkage is based on the liberal feminist argument that education is a primary path for women to gain independence. The knowledge and skills acquired through education help women into the mainstream. As women participate in society, their image will become a common occurrence.

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Employment

Liberal feminist theory argues that employment is a key method for women to gain independence. The proportion of women in the labor force is a key indicator of culture. If women become employed, they have more autonomy and ability to participate in society. The more active they are, the more they will be represented in advertising. The fourth hypothesis reflects this relationship: The greater a country's percent of women in the labor force, the more women are shown in that country's magazine advertisements. The independent variable is the percentage of women in the labor force, or those working outside the home and making an income.

Theoretically, employment not only provides an economic base but also training and skills that can help women become independent. Countries that allow women to be employed also allow them to be in the mainstream. The more women participate in society, the more likely they will appear in advertisements.

METHOD

A quantitative content analysis is the method used to understand the effects of countries' social systems on women's appearances in advertising. The level of analysis is social system, and the unit of analysis is the country. The sampling unit is printed publication, and ads are the recording and contextual units.

Country selection

The research investigates broad aspects of social system influence on the absence or presence of women in ads. Countries are selected on a purposive basis to gain the widest variation of social system dimensions of gross domestic product, civil rights, literacy of women, and women in the labor force. To achieve this, countries sampled represent capitalistic, socialistic, Middle East, developing, and those recently free from communist controls. A total of 24 countries are reviewed, comprising about 10% of all world nations recognized by the United Nations.

Publication selection

The design uses a convenience sample of publications. Besides a few common European magazines from Germany and France, foreign publications are not easily obtainable. Those found at libraries are primarily edited for distribution outside the country of origin. These vehicles are assumed

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to be different from those that are used within the country, in both content and advertising. The premise is that advertisers strategically design ads (therefore the absence or presence of women) and place ads in specific publications for potential customers. Media budgets alone represent 80% to 90% of total advertising expenditures, emphasizing the importance of placement. Foreign editions are not for the local audience and are therefore excluded.

The availability limitations required that publications be requested from foreign embassies from as far away as London. Multiple e-mail and phone calls were necessary to secure any kind of printed material. Securing appropriate material was a challenge given the definition and parameters established.

Publication definition

The concept of magazines is chosen for the medium's ability to provide an embellished picture of a country's social system. Magazines are typically color and include more imagery, important for advertisers. In addition, magazines demand a longer lead-time for production and printing, as compared to newspapers. Advertisers are required to strategically develop ad messages well in advance. It assumes that the design, including the option of including women, is rational and objective.

The preferred vehicles are monthly color magazines. However, black-and-white and daily publications are also used, if necessary, to increase the number of countries. The intention is to review general mass interest magazines, similar to *Time*, *Newsweek*, or *People*. The definition of print publication is broadly defined to allow flexibility of obtaining appropriate vehicles throughout different cultures, with these parameters:

- Vehicles from the category defined as consumer publications.
- Editorial content comprised of mixed topics including general interest, political, or popular culture.
- Mainstream printed material that is read by people within the country.
- Read by both men and women (women's magazines are excluded).
- Written in the country's common or native language, or English if appropriate.
- Format could be magazine, tabloid, or broadsheet size. The terms newspaper, magazine, or tabloid are avoided in order to secure the best print vehicle.
- No color restrictions, could be black-and-white or four-color.

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- Must include advertisements.

Publication sampling

The project demands that vehicles be examined in their entirety. When possible, more than one publication from each country is reviewed to ensure validity. However, due to limitations and time restrictions, this is not always the case.

A combination of publications from country embassies, newsstands, and the library are used.

Sampling design considers the complexities and limitations in two major categories:

- All appropriate publications obtained, based on the definition and parameters above are included in the study.
- Publications from the library, when offered, provide a rich source of multiple editions. The sampling design considers frequency of issue:
 - Monthly: Select 6 random issues from the 12 most current.
 - Weekly: Select 6 random samples from within the last year.
 - Daily: Construct a 7-day week random sample from within the last year.

Information about the sampling plan is available from the author.

Intercoder reliability

The author is the coder for the entire sample. To assess intercoder reliability, a second coder reviewed 19% of the titles, 8% of the sample, purposively selected for a wide variation of countries. The second coder, a master's student in communications, was trained specifically for the project. She performed the coding, using the same material (date, title) as the original coder and completed a separate coding sheet.

Scores of the six most relevant variables are compared from both coders. Correlation coefficients are calculated as the test of intercoder agreement. There was complete agreement between coders on all variables coded ($r = 1.00$).

RESULTS

A total of 163 publications from 24 countries are reviewed for the presence of women in advertisements and the relationship with social system dimensions. The study encompasses 4,494 ads from 10,863 pages. Publications, from 48 different titles, range in size, with a fairly equal split of

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magazine, and a combination of tabloid and broadsheet sizes. Color reflects a similar ratio, four-color 53%, and black-and-white only or with some color, 47%. Women appear in only 24% of all ads (Table 2).

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

For all countries, as shown in Table 3, the average publication is 81 pages long and includes 29 ads. Italian magazines yield the most ads per publication with an average of 70, while China has the least, 6. The average number of women present in ads is about 10 per publication. Italy boasts the most, 38 women per publication, while there were no women in the Libyan materials. The average number of women per ad is .32, Australia ranked the highest, .80, and Libya the lowest with none (data not shown in table form).

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

Table 4 presents summary statistics for country social system dimensions. The mean GDP is \$890 billion (U.S. dollars). Lebanon ranks the lowest, \$16 billion, while the highest is the United States, \$7,903 billion. The mean civil rights score is 3.8. Four countries, Australia, Japan, Sweden, and the United States, achieve 1, the best score. China has the worst score for civil rights, 6.7, although the Czech Republic and Libya are close, 6.4 and 6.3 respectively. The average proportion of literate women is 82%. Four countries boast 100% female literacy rate: Finland, Germany, Japan, and Sweden. Countries with the lowest percent of female literacy are India, 25.7%, and Nigeria, 31.5%. The mean of women in the labor force is 44%. Ex-soviet countries topped the list with the most women in the labor force: Russia, 71%, Poland, 70%, and the Czech Republic, 69%. Libya and Saudi Arabia each yield 5%, ranking last.


[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]

Hypothesis 1, proposing an association of a country's GDP with the average number of women in advertisements, is not supported. As seen in Table 5, using Pearson correlation coefficients, $r = .28$.

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[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]


GDP could be an explanatory variable as it is related to the number of women in ads through civil rights. GDP is statistically significant with civil rights, $r = -.46, p < .05$. The negative relationship is expected because an *increase* in GDP is accompanied by a *lower* civil rights score, meaning *more* freedom. The civil rights score is also significantly correlated with the number of women per ad, $r = -.63, p < .01$. The path is suggested:



The relationship in hypothesis 2, the more civil rights offered by a country, the more women appear in advertisements, is supported. It achieves the strongest correlation in the study, $r = -.63, p < .01$. The negative relationship is expected as every unit *decrease* in the civil rights score represents *more* freedom, and more freedom is associated with more women found in advertisements.

The percent literacy of women and the number of women per ad is also significantly correlated, $r = .50, p < .05$, supporting hypothesis 3. It suggests that an increase in the proportion of literate women is associated with an increase in the number of women per advertisement.

The last hypothesis, the greater the percent of women in the labor force, the more women appear in ads, is not supported. This is the weakest relationship in the study, resulting in $r = .09$. However, the data suggest that the percent of women in the labor force is an explanatory variable for women's appearance in ads through the percent of literate women. Women in the labor force is significantly correlated with the percent of literate women, $r = .41, p < .05$. And, as just explained, literacy rate is significant with the average number of women per ad, $r = .50, p < .05$. The proposed relationship:



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To further examine the data, a hierarchical regression analysis is constructed on the number of women in ads with the four independent variables, GDP, civil rights score, the percent of literate women, and women in the labor force. Variables are added to the model on a theoretical basis, in order of least to most important.

The first variable, the percent of women in the labor force is considered to have the weakest relationship with the number of women per ad. This considers that high proportion of women in the labor force may result from other variables that are detrimental to women's freedoms and participation in society. These factors can prohibit women's appearances in ads rather than support them, clouding the hypothesized relationship.

Percent of literate women is entered as the second variable in the model. The feminists, particularly the liberal feminists, argue that education is an important vehicle for women to gain access to society. Although it is proposed to have a stronger relationship than the percentage of women in the labor force, the variables have similar problems. Education of women may be a consequence of alternative factors in a restrictive social system that result in marginalizing women and yield a low incidence of images in ads.

Civil rights are considered the next important variable. Freedoms allow for other social system dimensions, including employment, education, speech, and commercial endeavors. Its connection to other factors should result in a strong relationship with the appearance of women in ads.

GDP is proposed as the most important variable as economic conditions affect nations in all dimensions. Wealth is a precursor for technology, education, communication, and social mobility. Advertising is a commercial activity, linked to economics, suggesting that GDP is closely associated with the number of women per ads.

Table 6 presents results of the hierarchical regression. The total model achieves $R^2 = .53, p < .01$, as the combination of variables explain 53% of the number of women in advertisements. Percent of women in the labor force achieves a $-.11$ standardized beta in the total model. The other three variables pull the association negative, from the direct relationship of $r = .09$. This likely reflects the influence of the eastern block countries, comprising a high number of women in the labor force but a relatively low average number of women per ad. The percent of literate women achieves $.42$ standardized beta, contributing $.26$ to R^2 , for $R^2 = .27, p < .05$. Civil rights deliver $-.55$ standardized beta coefficient, $p < .01$, the strongest relationship with the number of women per ad. The variable contributes $.26$ to R^2 , resulting in $R^2 = .53, p < .01$. GDP results in a small standardized beta

coefficient, -.04. It shows that other variables have stronger relationships with the number of women in ads.

[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]

DISCUSSION

How can you explain that across almost 11,000 pages of printed publications from around the world women are included in less than 25% of all ads? Women's absence is seen in the data, their under representation in mass media documented. What is surprising is the lack of studies or empirical evidence suggesting an explanation. What social system dimension is responsible for determining the appearance of women in ads? Unlike others, this research links social system dimensions to the presence of women in advertising.

Several studies conclude that women are under represented or depicted in stereotypical roles. Cheng (1997) asserts that "stereotyping in gender role portrayals is a cross-country and cross-cultural problem in advertising, so it deserves serious attention from advertising professionals and researchers" (1997, p. 314). A 1988 study of the social status of women in magazine ads found that images did not reflect women's strides in the last 20 years (Lazier-Smith, 1988; Lazier & Kendrick, 1993). From this, Busby & Leichty (1993) conclude "advertising was not 'market driven.' Indeed advertising seems to be driven by factors greater than market demands – cultural myths, and attitudinal inertia" (p. 261).

Social feminist scholar Eaton (2001) argues that advertising is linked with economics and politics, and acts as a hegemonic agent that maintains patriarchy. Advertising is a profit-driven, rich, and powerful business armed with sophisticated market research techniques dedicated to creating seductive messages. The process is a strategic, conscious effort; images are planned and women are left out for rational, objective considerations.

Using Marxist philosophy, the "dominant ideology becomes invisible because it is translated into 'common sense'" (van Zoonen, 1994, p. 24). This suggests that in everyday life, people are not likely aware of women's absence in ads. More moderate theories also support this notion. The social construction of reality paradigm proposes that we become so accustomed to what we see, we accept reality, without question (Bergman & Luckmann, 1967). The transmissional model theorizes that messages help control and maintain society "through conscious or unconscious efforts" (Carey, 1975, p. 177). The ritual model postulates that people rely on messages to construct their daily routine,

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thereby maintaining social meaning. Women remain unconsciously absent from the public's perspective.

The symbolic interaction theory (Mead, 1934) suggests that gender roles are formed through mutual conditioning of shared beliefs and behaviors. Implications for women are attitudes beyond simple mass media messages and into other social dimensions, such as education and job opportunities. As the findings show, images of women in ads are associated with particular dimensions. Advertising is a communication that works for the dominant ideology and is closely linked to social systems.

Results of this investigation need to be interpreted considering the limitations. Although it comprises a well-rounded group of countries, future research should incorporate more nations from Asia, the Middle East, ex-Soviet, and South America and from Africa and Latin America. Changes will increase validity and provide a base for examining country type.

Additional studies should be augmented with a qualitative analysis of readership habits within each country to ascertain the best material to review. A practical solution is in depth interviews with counsel generals or cultural officials, who are natives, current with their citizens, and located in the United States. A summary of international reading habits could be of great value.

More issues of each publication need to be included to ensure validity and reliability. For this study, many available publications at the library were exhausted. Additional time will allow for securing multiple issues from other libraries, embassies, or alternative sources.

The research takes a holistic approach to women in advertisements by aggregating the number of ads and occurrences of women. It is meant as a snapshot of what average citizens are likely to see everyday and its implications for women. It is beyond the scope of the project to address specific details, such as differences in gender role portrayals, rather it offers significant findings by addressing the broad picture: ads and images of women, and their associations with social system dimensions.

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WOMEN IN ADVERTISEMENTS ACROSS CULTURES

Table 1. List of countries with gross domestic product, civil rights score, percent literacy, and percent in the labor force.

Country	Gross Domestic Product \$bn*	Civil Rights Mean Score**	Percent Literacy of Women***	Percent Women in Labor Force****
Argentina	290	4.1	94.4	31
Australia	387	1.0	99.0	44
Chile	74	4.6	93.0	26
China	924	6.7	61.2	55
Czech Republic	53	6.4 ^A	99.5 ^D	69 ^F
Finland	125	2.0	100.0	60
France	1,465	1.7	98.7	48
Germany	2,180	4.0 ^B	100.0 ^E	61.5 ^G
Greece	123	3.0	90.6	40
Hungary	46	5.7	98.6	61
India	427	3.3	25.7	41
Italy	1,157	1.7	96.3	32
Japan	4,089	1.0	100.0	59
Korea (South)	426	5.6	87.9	40
Lebanon	16	3.1	64.2	18
Libya	39	6.3	62.0	5
Nigeria	35	4.0	31.5	53
Poland	151	5.7	99.0	70
Russia	332	6.0 ^C	99.0	71 ^H
Saudi Arabia	143	6.0	34.6	5
Spain	555	4.3	89.9	23
Sweden	227	1.0	100.0	52
Turkey	201	3.3	50.0	51
United States	7,903	1.0	95.3	51

*GDP in billions of U.S. dollars, calculated by multiplying gross domestic product per capita and total population. Source: *The Economist*, 2001, p. 22.

**Civil rights score compiled by indexing individual, constitutional, civil, and social rights such as housing, employment, education, and medical care. Scores range from 1 = best, to 7 = worst. Source: Civil rights index (Kurian, 1991, p. 51). ^ACzech Republic data uses Czechoslovakia figures; ^BGermany data averaged from East Germany, 6.9, and West Germany, 1.1 mean scores; ^CRussia data uses Soviet Union figures.

***Coded using percent female literacy for each country, ranging from 25% to 100%, except Australia, Poland, and Russia that uses total adult literacy each yielding over 99%. Sources: All countries from Kurian, 1991, p. 244 except Australia from *The Economist*, 2001, p. 102; Poland and Russia from Turner, 2002, pp. 1302, 1340). ^DCzech Republic data uses Czechoslovakia figures; ^EGermany data calculated by averaging East Germany and West Germany, both with 100% female literacy rate.

****Source: Women in the labor force (Kurian, 1991, p. 178). ^FCzech Republic data uses Czechoslovakia; ^GGermany data averaged from East Germany, 72%, and West Germany, 51% women in the labor force. Figures; ^HRussia data uses Soviet Union figures.

WOMEN IN ADVERTISEMENTS ACROSS CULTURES

Table 2. Percentages for publication characteristics including size and color, and advertisement characteristics of the presence or absence of women.

Variables	%
Size of publication	
Magazine size*	53.99
Tabloid size**	13.50
Newspaper size***	<u>32.51</u>
	100.00%
	(N = 163)
Color	
4-color	52.76
Black and white only or with some color	<u>47.24</u>
	100.00%
	(N = 163)
Advertisements	
With women	23.74
Without women	<u>76.26</u>
	100.00%
	(N = 4,494)

*Magazine size is considered 7" x 10" to 10" x 12".

**Tabloid size is considered 10.25" x 12.25" to 14" x 16".

***Newspaper size is publications *larger* than 14" x 16".

WOMEN IN ADVERTISEMENTS ACROSS CULTURES

Table 3. Means and standard deviations for characteristics of publications including average number of pages, number of ads, and number of women in ads, and number of women per ad.

Variables	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Average number of pages per publication	80.65	47.14	24
Average number of ads per publication	29.42	17.43	24
Average number of women in ads per publication	10.42	10.65	24
Average number of women per ad	.32	.20	24

WOMEN IN ADVERTISEMENTS ACROSS CULTURES

Table 4. Means and standard deviations of social system variables: GDP, civil rights score, percent of literacy of women, percent of women in the labor force.

Variables	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
GDP*	\$890.33	\$1,750.02	24
Civil rights score**	3.81	1.95	24
Percent of women who are literate***	82.13	24.68	24
Percent of women in the labor force****	44.44	19.02	24

*Coded in billions of U.S. dollars, for each country, calculated by multiplying gross domestic product per capita and total population (*The Economist*, 2001, p. 22).

**Coded using civil rights index scores for each country, ranging from 1 = most rights to 7 = least rights (Kurian, 1991, p. 51).

***Coded using percent female literacy for each country, ranging from 25% to 100% (All countries from Kurian, 1991, p. 244 except Australia from *The Economist*, 2001, p. 102; Poland and Russia from Turner, 2002, pp. 1302, 1340).

****Coded using percent of women in the labor force, ranging from 5% to 71% (Kurian, 1991, p. 178).

WOMEN IN ADVERTISEMENTS ACROSS CULTURES

Table 5. Pearson correlation coefficients for social system dimensions of GDP, civil rights score, percent of literacy of women, percent of women in the labor force, and average number of women per advertisement variables.

Variables	2.	3.	4.	5.
1. GDP*	-.46 ^a (24)	.23 (24)	.18 (24)	.28 (24)
2. Civil rights score**	—	-.25 (24)	-.06 (24)	-.63 ^b (24)
3. Percent literacy of women***		—	.41 ^a (24)	.50 ^a (24)
4. Percent of women in the labor force****			—	.09 (24)
5. Average number of women per advertisement*****				—

*Coded in billions of U.S. dollars, for each country, calculated by multiplying gross domestic product per capita and total population (*The Economist*, 2001, p. 22).

**Coded using the civil rights index scores for each country, ranging from 1 = most rights to 7 = least rights (Kurian, 1991, p. 51).

***Coded using percent female literacy for each country, ranging from 25% to 100% (All countries from Kurian, 1991, p. 244 except Australia from *The Economist*, 2001, p. 102; Poland and Russia from Turner, 2002, pp. 1302, 1340).

****Coded using percent of women in the labor force, ranging from 5% to 71% (Kurian, 1991, p. 178).

*****Coded using average number of women per advertisement per country.

^ap < .05

^bp < .01

^cp < .001

WOMEN IN ADVERTISEMENTS ACROSS CULTURES

Table 6. Hierarchical regression analysis for social system dimensions of women in the labor force, literacy of women, civil rights, and GDP, on average number of women per advertisement.

Blocks of independent variables	Std. beta	R-square change	Total R-square	Adjusted R-square
1. Percent of women in the labor force*	-.11	.01	.01	-.04
2. Percent literacy of women**	.42 ^a	.26 ^a	.27 ^a	.20 ^a
3. Civil rights score***	-.55 ^b	.26 ^b	.53 ^b	.46 ^b
4. GDP****	-.04	.01	.53 ^b	.43

*Coded using percent of women in the labor force, ranging from 5% to 71% (Kurian, 1991, p. 178).

**Coded using percent female literacy for each country, ranging from 25% to 100% (All countries from Kurian, 1991, p. 244 except Australia from *The Economist*, 2001, p. 102; Poland and Russia from Turner, 2002, pp. 1302, 1340).

***Coded using civil rights index scores for each country, ranging from 1 = most rights to 7 = least rights (Kurian, 1991, p. 51).

****Coded in billions of U.S. dollars, for each country, calculated by multiplying gross domestic product per capita and total population (*The Economist*, 2001, p. 22).

^ap < .05

^bp < .01

^cp < .001

German and American Students' Perceptions of Social Values as Depicted in Magazine Advertisements: A Copy Testing Approach

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Abstract:

This study explores, through a copy-testing procedure, American and German consumers' recognition of social values as depicted in print advertisements. Respondents' identification with situations depicted in the advertisement with different value content were also explored. Results indicate that both German and American respondents did recognize the social values as depicted in the advertisements, but their identification with the situations shown in the advertisements was complex, indicating both similarities and differences between the two groups. Preferences for the advertisements depicting different social values showed the most marked differences between the groups.

American corporations increasingly participate in the international marketplace, facing growing competition from foreign multinational corporations. This study focuses on a comparison of German and American consumers and the way they perceive social values depicted in magazine advertising.

While more than \$130 billion is spent annually on advertising in the United States, advertising expenditures in non-U.S. markets have increased dramatically during the last decade and now exceed \$170 billion. Procter & Gamble, for example, generates 40 percent of its business from outside the United States (Aaker, Batra, and Myers, 1992).

Many U.S. companies, accounting for nearly a 50 percent share of global advertising expenditures, focus on international markets for numerous reasons (Levin & Lafayette, 1990). The saturated U.S. market offers limited opportunity for growth and expansion because of slow population growth, intense competition, and an unfavorable marketing environment. Less competition may exist in non-U.S. markets, where products have not yet reached the maturity stage of their life cycle. Also, market size and the population are growing more rapidly outside the U.S., and the effect of advertising sales is greater in foreign markets (Aaker, Batra, and Myers, 1992). U.S.-based companies have entered joint ventures or formed strategic alliances with foreign companies in developing and implementing advertising and promotion programs for international markets.

In general, academic researchers recognize that advertising practices and results differ between cultures (Sheth and Smiljanic, 1973). In addition to the obvious language barriers, marketers need to target consumers in international markets with different sets of values, customs, consumption patterns and habits, as well as different purchasing motives and abilities. As the world moves toward a global economy, understanding these cultural differences becomes

increasingly important. They demand distinct creative and media strategies, which have to be targeted directly to the consumer as competition increases. Studies suggest that additional research is needed in order to explore the realm of international advertising, focusing on similarities as well as differences in non-U.S. cultures (Zinkhan, 1994).

Advertising was the first component of international marketing to be examined for standardization (Jain, 1989; Samiee and Roth, 1992), which means keeping one or more of the three basic components of a multinational campaign – strategy, execution, language – the same (Duncan and Ramaprasad, 1995). Standardization of advertising campaigns is complex, because the goal is to determine the degree to which the campaign can be standardized, if at all.

Whereas advertising may contribute to economic development of nations at the early stages of industrialization, it might have a different effect in post-industrialized countries. Consumers living in post-industrial or postmodern economies may feel that advertising is not essential for continued economic development and might therefore concentrate on the negative social consequences of advertising (Zinkhan, 1994).

Various international advertising studies compare advertising in the United States to non-Western cultures. However, little research has compared the U.S. to a similar Western nation. Germany and the United States are considered to be sufficiently similar in several respects to make a comparison feasible. Both cultures have a Western orientation, founded in the Judeo-Christian ethic and tradition (Thorelli, Becker, and Engledow, 1975). They have comparable political and economic systems, believe in an open-market philosophy, and the standard of living in both cultures is reasonably similar.

At the same time, Germany and the United States also differ in many aspects. This makes the comparison more challenging and revealing. The obvious differences in size, population and

population density could have an enormous significance of the way advertising is perceived and information is processed. A crucial occurrence in Germany changed world politics forever: the reunification of West and East Germany in October 1990. The reunification is likely to have had a dramatic influence on the German value system and the way Germany is now perceived by international marketers.

The reunification fulfilled a societal goal of equality between the west and the east. Article 106 of the old West German Basic Law requires "uniformity of living standards in the federal territory [to be] ensured." The western Germans took this principle for granted, while the eastern Germans had to get used to it (The Economist, 1996). In general, as societal goals change, individuals' values will sometimes lead and sometimes reflect this change (Kahle, Poulos, and Sukhdial, 1988). Therefore, this paper will examine Germany after the reunification as an advertising and marketing target, and compare reunified Germans' values to those held by Americans.

Research indicates that values are closely linked to attitudes and behavior (Triandis, 1980). People adapt to various roles in part through value fulfillment. They develop values based on their heritage and life experiences, which, in turn, affect their behavior (Kahle, Poulos, and Sukhdial, 1988). Comparative analyses of advertising in a multinational environment allow practitioners to capitalize on shared attitudes, beliefs, motivations, and values, while avoiding aspects of culture that might lessen the impact of advertising investment (Samiee and Jeong, 1994). Therefore, it is essential to understand the values of the audience toward whom the advertising message is directed. At the same time, marketing theorists generally accept culture as one of the underlying determinants of consumer behavior (Henry, 1976). Hence, the determination of cultural differences through values is an important element in international

advertising strategy. If values can be adequately measured, they could be used as a basis for segmenting international markets within different cultures (Munson and McIntyre, 1976).

Human values and value systems have increasingly been used by social scientists to explain a variety of behaviors, including mass media usage (Becker and Connor, 1981; Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach, 1989) and consumer behavior (Henry, 1976; Pitts and Woodside, 1983; Vinson and Munson, 1976). This use is based on the view that values are more closely related to behavior than are personality traits because values are less numerous, more central, and more immediately related to motivations than are attitudes (Valette-Florence, 1988). Culturally learned values are used as standards "to determine whether we are as moral and competent as others, to guide our presentations to others, and to help us rationalize beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that would otherwise be personally or socially unacceptable" (Rokeach, 1973). Once a value is learned, it becomes part of a value system in which each value has some kind of rank order. Most decisions in life are based on one's value system, and because more than one value is involved when coming to a conclusion, the value system as a whole needs to be investigated rather than just a single value (Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987).

The most commonly used instrument to measure values is the Rokeach Value Survey (RVS), in which respondents are asked to rank-order 18 instrumental values (ideal modes of behavior) and 18 terminal values (ideal end states of existence) in order of importance as guiding principles in their lives. One problem with the RVS is that it is difficult for respondents to rank-order 18 different values (Rokeach, 1983). The List of Values (LOV) is an abbreviated measurement instrument that only includes terminal values, which considerably simplifies the ranking task (Kahle, 1983). In comparison to the well known Values and Life Styles (VALS)

segmentation, which is widely used in commercial applications, LOV predicts consumer behavior trends significantly more often (Kahle, Beatty and Homer, 1986).

For this study, LOV represents the ideal measurement instrument, not only because it can capture the nature of terminal values at a more abstract level, but also because a German counterpart to the instrument exists. The German List of Values (GLOV) was developed by Grunert and Scherhorn (1990) by translating the nine values of LOV into German and adapting the terminology to the German way of life, while bearing in mind the connotations of the terms known to exist in the U.S. LOV and GLOV helped find the underlying value patterns in the German and American culture.

The most recent study comparing social values in Germany and the U.S. was conducted in 1990 (Grunter and Scherhorn). However, the study compared only West Germany to the U.S. in terms of social values. With German reunification now a reality, a study is needed to identify the new German value system in comparison to the American one. Also, Grunert and Scherhorn did not tie social values to advertising, but identified social values in general.

It is clear that significant cross-national differences exist in advertising strategy, even among nations of similar heritage and economic development. With a comparable economic and political background, Germany is a major market for many U.S. companies. However, additional research is needed to pinpoint crucial differences of the German value system because values are the most influential factor determining consumer behavior (Kahle, Poulus and Sukhdial, 1988). An effective way to investigate is to use copy testing as a methodology.

This study focuses on social values as depicted in print advertisement in Germany and the United States, and determining what influences different value systems have on an individual's attitude toward advertisements.

Research Questions

1. Did the German and American respondents recognize social values in print advertisements?
2. What are the differences and similarities between German and American respondents and their identification of social values in print advertisements?
3. What are the respondents' differences and similarities in their preferences for social values in print advertisements?

Sample

The sample for this study consisted of 10 American students at a major U.S. midwestern university, and 10 German students, from both west and east Germany, studying in a major German city. Given that the study was exploratory in nature and involved a lengthy procedure, 20 subjects appeared to be adequate. An equal number of males and females were included in the German and American samples.

Methodology

Cross-cultural similarities and differences in advertising can be detected by examining the extent to which media and advertising copy represent marketing environments and promotional patterns in the cultures under investigation (Samiee and Jeong, 1994). Copy research is frequently used for evaluating the communication and persuasion quality of domestic campaigns, but international marketers have not attempted to try this approach with multinational campaigns. Many researchers assume that copy testing identifies advertisements that will work well in the marketplace (Wimmer and Dominick, 1994). It has been shown that advertisements that copy tested well and advertisements that performed well in the marketplace

were highly correlated (Haley and Baldinger, 1991). The copy testing procedure as developed by William Stephenson (Johnson 1990) provides a logical and valuable approach on which this research design was based. According to Stephenson, qualitative studies explore the differences of meanings in messages among different reference groups as well as cultural artifacts. This copy testing approach consists of five steps: (1) Five-Second Exposure, (2) Unlimited Exposure, (3) Comparative Exposure, (4) Thematic Apperception, and (5) Special Copy or Artwork Tests.

Before gathering data from the German and American respondents, a coding system was designed to identify the nine values of the LOV and GLOV as depicted in current print advertisements in Germany and the United States. The focus of the coding procedure was to find print advertisements in German and American magazines reflecting the following values:

Table 1: Nine Values Comprising LOV and GLOV

<u>LOV</u>	<u>GLOV</u>
Sense of Belonging	Zugehörigkeit, Geborgenheit
Security	Sichere Lebensumstände
Self-respect	Selbstachtung, Selbstvertrauen
Warm relationships with others	Enge Beziehung zu anderen Menschen
Fun and Enjoyment in Life	Die Welt und das Leben Genießen
Being Well Respected	Anerkannt und respektiert werden
Sense of Accomplishment	Leistungsfähig sein, etwas erreichen
Self-Fulfillment	Selbstentfaltung, Weiterentwicklung
Excitement	Ein aufregendes, abwechslungsreiches Leben führen

Many cross-cultural advertising studies have been criticized because their findings were dependent on sample of advertisements that were selected (Douglas and Craig 1992). To avoid this problem, several different kinds of ads were collected to represent each of the nine values, and the ads included a wide variety of products and services.

Usually in cross-cultural studies, it is important to choose a representative media and advertising sample of the specific country. In this study, the main objective was to find similarities and differences in previously established patterns. As long as these values were represented in the advertisements, the sample of media was less important. For the purpose of this study print media were found to be more appropriate than broadcast media because participants were asked to explore their attitudes and feelings about the illustrated value. This procedure often involves a longer time period for studying the ad than a television commercial could provide.

The researcher selected four advertisements for each of the nine values, totaling 36. The advertisements were found in both German and American news and consumer magazines, and had strong visual appeal. All advertisements were full-color and appeared in news and consumer magazines such as *Newsweek*, *time*, *U.S. News & World Report*, *Modern Maturity*, *Focus*, *Der Spiegel*, *Der Stern* and *Cosmopolitan*. The audiences of the magazines were representative of the residents in the two nations under investigation. The copy test was kept to a minimum to avoid language barriers. Only the headlines were translated in both languages to avoid misunderstanding and misinterpretation. If the ads contained body copy, it was blocked and could not be seen or read by the respondent.

One major concern in cross-cultural studies is to be able to generalize findings to a certain extent. The researcher can attempt to establish equivalence by translating measures very

carefully (Berry 1980). Therefore, this study used back translations and bilingual translators, as proposed by Samiee and Jeong (1994). To eliminate bias, three neutral bilingual coders were chosen as participants for selecting the ads, after the primary investigator selected the 36 advertisements.

After the three bilingual coders were introduced to the meaning of LOV and GLOV and definitions of the values, they were asked to classify the 36 advertisements according to the most obvious social value depicted. The coder agreement was 67 percent. At least two coders had to agree about the value being depicted in the advertisement before it was selected for the study. Once the values were identified, the same neutral coders were subjects of a preliminary copy testing study in order to establish the copy testing questions for the final study.

Copy Test

Stephenson's framework was slightly altered to create the best possible research design to pinpoint differences in social values between the two nations. After the five second exposure the respondents were asked to describe in their own words those social values that they live by on a daily basis. This question was not originally part of Stephenson's copy testing framework.

The subjects were presented with nine magazine advertisements, and were asked to give their immediate response to each ad without judging the advertisement. They were then asked which ad was most appealing and which the least appealing to them. Next, the subjects were asked to describe the social values that they live by in their daily life, and to rank the nine values from most important to least important. The subjects were then given the advertisements to look at for as long as they wished, and to tell the researcher the basic appeal of each ad, how they would describe any value they perceived in the ad, and whether the ad appealed to them

personally and why. After doing this for all nine ads, they were then asked to look at all of the ads once more and again state which ad was most and least appealing to them and why, and to order the ads by personal preference. After this, the respondents were instructed to tell a story about the ad that they preferred most. Finally, the subjects were given definitions of the social values and asked to indicate which of the nine ads depicted the value.


The study involved observing, recording and transcribing responses made by German and American students when exposed to the selected print advertisements. Depending on the preference of the respondent the interviews were conducted in either English or German. All of the respondents chose to answer in the language of their country. The interviews were then analyzed to find patterns in responses. The method of analytic and comparative analysis was used (Glase and Strauss 1967) to find common patterns among the responses. The transcripts were scanned and searched for themes or categories leading to underlying value patterns (analytic induction). Analytic categories were constructed after all responses were translated into English. The interviews were categorized by ad to compare the differences in German and American responses.

Results


Respondents' interview transcripts were analyzed to explore the question of whether there are differences and/or similarities between German and American respondents' identification with the values depicted in the nine advertisements. At given times, the respondents identified with the appeal and the value, but not as depicted in the advertisements. Other times, they had not been in a similar situation, but someone else they knew had been.

For ad #1 (Sense of belonging), eight German and eight American respondents said they identified with the appeal in the ad. Two German respondents identified with the appeal and the value, but could not relate to the situation shown in the ad. These two respondents mentioned that the ad looked posed and unreal. However, they still identified with the value "Sense of belonging."

Two American respondents could not identify with the ad all because starting a family was not one of their priorities in life yet. This analysis indicates that almost all respondents identified with the ad that had been



Ad #1: Sense of Belonging
Motherly Love
(Mutterliebe)



Ad#2: Security

They say the more you have, the more you worry. They obviously aren't insured with Chubb.

(Man sagt, je mehr man besitzt, desto mehr Sorgen hat man. Allerdings nur, wenn man nicht mit Chubb versichert ist.)

selected by the coders to represent "sense of belonging."

Both German and American respondents could relate to the ad one way or another, except two Americans.

Four German and six American respondents could identify with the value in ad #2 (security), three of whom did not agree with the way it was depicted in the ad. Of those respondents who could not identify with the ad, six were German and four were American, and these respondents said that the ad did not appeal to them because they were not yet in that kind of income range.

Also, one respondent mentioned that she did not like the

way the people were depicted in the ad because they seemed to be distant from each other.

Another reason why so many respondents did not identify with the ad was that financial security in general did not appeal to them.

For ad #3 (self-respect), three Germans and four Americans could not identify with the ad, while five Germans and six Americans could. Three Germans and one American identified with the value itself, but not the way it was depicted in the ad. The data indicate that more German respondents associated success with "Self-respect" instead of appearance. One German respondent indicated, "To me, self-respect has to do with performance. It doesn't really have anything to do with the way you look, but with your goal-setting and success."

On the other hand, several Americans indicated that appearance was very important to build one's self-esteem. One American respondent said, "I'm a firm believer in taking care of yourself. I believe that if I don't do that, I will be perceived and looked upon differently, probably in a negative way." Ad #3 caused German and American respondents to reveal different opinions about self-respect. It seems that to the American respondents self-respect depended on what others think of the person, while the German respondents thought performance and achievement generated self-respect.



Ad #3: Self-Respect
A Healthy Appearance Doesn't Know Age.
(Gesundes Aussehen kennt kein Alter.)



Ad #4: Warm relationships with others
Come Together
(Zusammen sein.)

Only two respondents could not identify with ad #4 (warm relationships with others). Of the remaining 18 respondents, four could identify with the value (warm relationships with others," but not with the product. Three of them (two Americans and one German) said that although the situation was appealing to them, they could not tie the advertised product (cigarette) to the stated value "warm relationships with others." One remaining German respondent indicated that the situation itself was too trivial to classify as friendship. Overall, the fact that 18 of the respondents identified with the value and the ad, shows that this approach reached both cultures successfully.

For ad #5 (fun and enjoyment), seventeen respondents identified with the ad, nine of whom were American. Four of the remaining Germans identified with the value, but not the way it was depicted in the ad. All of these respondents were female, and all of them identified the social value "fun and enjoyment" correctly. However, they could not see themselves in the situation as depicted in ad #5 and actually enjoy the situation. To them, a bar


Only two respondents could not identify with ad #4 (warm relationships with others). Of the remaining 18 respondents, four could identify with the value (warm relationships with others," but not with the product. Three of them (two Americans and one German) said that although the situation was appealing to them, they could not tie the advertised



Ad #5: Fun and Enjoyment
Feel the Night.
(Nachtleben.)

scene like the one depicted in the ad was a male domain. They said they did not need to be in this situation to have fun, instead they preferred to meet up with friends and talk, no matter where. In general, the ad seemed to show a typical male bonding situation cross-culturally. Only two Germans and one American respondents did not identify with the ad at all.

Twelve of the respondents (six Germans and six Americans) identified with ad #6 (being



Ad #6: Being well-respected
The Power of Now.
(Power von heute.)

well-respected), four saying they could identify with the value, but not with the situation depicted in the ad. To them it seemed like they had to prove themselves in order to be respected, and they disagreed with that message. For example, the German respondent said it was very important to her to be well-respected. Another German respondent posed the question of why people “always equalize power with respect.” Instead she indicated that respect cannot be gained physically, it has to be gained intellectually.” Eight respondents (four Germans and four Americans) said they did not identify with the ad at all, most often because the situation seemed “unreal” to them. One German respondent said, “I don’t respect women who are trying to be tough, yet they’re smoking while doing that.” Other respondents could not identify with the ad because they had never been in a similar situation. One of the main reasons twelve respondents identified with the ad was because both male and female respondents thought it was important for women to show their equality to men.

well-respected), four saying they could identify with the value, but not with the situation depicted in the ad. To them it seemed like they had to prove themselves in order to be respected, and they disagreed with that message. For example, the German respondent said it was very important to her to be well-respected. Another German respondent posed the question of why people “always equalize power with respect.” Instead she indicated that respect cannot be gained physically, it has to be gained intellectually.” Eight respondents (four Germans and four Americans) said they did not identify

For ad #7 (sense of accomplishment), five Germans and six Americans indicated they could identify with the ad. Most of these respondents said they would like to be in a similar situation once they get out of college or that the ad seemed like a career goal to them. One American respondent said "this ad looks like a goal or dream of how you want your work place to be." Only one of the respondents (German) of those who could identify with the ad said that although she could picture herself in the depicted situation, the ad was st men in a typical office situation. The remaining respondent they either had not been in this kind of situation or did not want to be in one.



Ad #7: Sense of Accomplishment
At the beginning was "Rottring."
(Am Anfang war ein Rottring.)




Ad #8: Self-fulfillment

Sixteen respondents identified with ad #8 (self-fulfillment), nine Germans and seven Americans, because most respondents liked to be in the outdoors with either their families or friends and share quality time. These people identified with the ad because they had been in a similar situation before and were positively reminded of it by the ad. Two of these respondents could identify with the value "self-fulfillment," but not the way it was depicted in the ad. One of these respondents

considered the ad more of a goal, but had never been in a

situation like that. The other one said she would not need to go up to a cabin to fulfill herself, but the value itself was very important to her.

For ad #9 (excitement), eight German and six American respondents identified with the ad, and described it as enjoying nature, freedom and adventure. They liked to be in a peaceful environment without having to worry about daily problems. Some of the respondents were reminded of their travels and being together with good friends. One of the eight Germans could identify with the value, but had never been in a situation like the one depicted in the ad. She said the ad represented her dream of being free though. Another German respondent said he could identify with the ad, but didn't think that "excitement" was very well reflected in the ad because "it's too beautiful to be true." Another German respondent identified with the value, but said he would already get his excitement at work. Two Germans and three Americans did not identify with the ad at all. One German respondent mentioned that the situation depicted in the ad involved too much risk to enjoy the situation. The two American respondents on the other had, said they did not identify with the ad because they did not like the product, or because the Marlboro theme was so overused that it had no appeal anymore.



Ad #9: Excitement
Come to where the flavor is.
(Komm' auf den Geschmack.)

Respondents were also asked to rank their preferences for the ads. Table 2 presents a comparison of the rankings of the ads for both American and German respondents.

Table 2: Ranking of Nine Advertisements by Nationality		
Rank	<u>German Respondents</u>	<u>American Respondents</u>
1	Ad #4: Warm relationships with others	Ad #1: Sense of Belonging
2	Ad #9: Excitement	Ad #5: Fun and enjoyment
3	Ad #1: Sense of Belonging	Ad #8: Self-fulfillment
4	Ad #6: Being well-respected	Ad #4: Warm relationships with others
5	Ad #8: Self-fulfillment	Ad #9: Excitement
6	Ad #5: Fun and enjoyment	Ad #2: Security
7	Ad #7: Sense of Accomplishment	Ad #6: Being well-respected
8	Ad #2: Security	Ad #7: Sense of Accomplishment
9	Ad #3: Self-respect	Ad #3: Self-respect

Only ad #1 (sense of belonging) ranks among the first three in both German and American respondents' rankings. The German respondents also rank ad #4 (warm relationships with others) and ad #9 (excitement) in their top three list. The American respondents, on the other hand, ranked ad #5 (fun and enjoyment) and ad #8 (self-fulfillment) among their first three. Ad #3 (self-respect) ranks last among both the German and American respondents. They both also ranked ad #7 (sense of accomplishment) among the three least preferred ads. The German respondents also ranked ad #2 (security) low, while the American respondents ranked ad #6 (being well-respected) among the least preferred ads.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to explore whether respondents from two different nations recognized social values as depicted in print advertisements, and to identify and explain what communications implications these findings have for advertisers who want to market their products in those nations. Another outcome of this study was to give specific suggestions to multinational advertisers and marketers to target their multinational campaigns more effectively.

This study showed that both American and German respondents selectively identified with the ad because they either had been in a similar situation or they knew someone who had been. For example, almost all of the respondents could identify with ad #1 (sense of belonging) in one way or another. They stated that they often were reminded of the situation they were in when they were children and the way their mothers held them. Ad #4 (warm relationships with others) is another example of strong self-identification. All but two respondents had been in a similar situation and therefore could identify with the ad. However, respondents often said they recognized and identified with the particular stated value, but not the way it was depicted in the ad. Ad #2 was a case in which half of the respondents could not identify with the situation the way it was shown. One American respondent mentioned that the ad only catered to upscale people, not the average consumer.

The results of this study also reveal that although German and American respondents gave similar responses, they also differed in many ways because of different value structures. Furthermore, this study indicates that a communicator first has to know the audience so that the message can be successfully encoded, and the receiver can easily decode and evaluate it. It appears from the results that the audiences' underlying value system is related to whether a message may or may not have an effect on the receiver.

This study also shows that Bauer's (1958) "active audience" theory applies to multinational advertising campaigns. He suggests that, instead of being passive receivers of information, the audience should participate in the communication process through selective perception, selective retention, and selective recall. As Bauer contends, an individual's behavior is based on his/her value system. By asking respondents in this study to comment on each ad, they were able to participate in the communication process. The copy testing procedure structure of the study presented a forum for discussion that led to further understanding of the implications of individuals' value systems for advertisers.

Understanding different cultures becomes increasingly important as the world moves toward a truly global economy. Germany is a major market for many U.S.-based companies, but after the reunification of 1990, the German market has become larger and more diverse. By studying cultural differences based on social values reflected in magazine advertisement we have added to our knowledge how these values influence individuals' consumer behavior. The research design and results are especially useful to practitioners because results of the copy test provide specific data with important conclusions for the German-American advertising process. Copy testing is an effective way to develop themes because consumers define in their own words what is important to them, what implications a particular ad might have, and what appeals to them most and why. Additionally, this study provides researchers with a workable, inexpensive, yet time-consuming research design incorporating a widely accepted social value system within a copy testing framework.

Limitations

The most obvious limitation is the small sample size. The results of this study can, of course, not be generalized to a larger population. This study is also limited to print advertising, and future research should include various media. Finally, the sample of products depicted in the ad may have affected the results. Future research could be conducted using ads for the same product/service and targeting the same demographic, in order to factor in the response to the product itself.

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THANK YOU NEWTON, WELCOME PRIGOGINE

'Unthinking' old paradigms and embracing new directions

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THANK YOU NEWTON, WELCOME PRIGOGINE

'Unthinking' old paradigms and embracing new directions

Abstract / The premises and propositions of the Newtonian-Cartesian model associated with classical science—determinism, linearity, reversibility, timelessness, equilibrium, etc.—are applicable primarily to closed systems. Prigogine's theory of dissipative structures has affirmed that nonlinearity, irreversibility, unpredictability, chaos and *far-from-equilibrium* conditions characterize interdependent open systems. Because closed systems are rare in nature, the linear findings of empirical studies tied to the presumptions of classical science face potential challenge. The challenge to reductionism is dismantling the hierarchical order of natural science, social science, and humanities, thereby paving the way for a common epistemology. The field of communication stands to gain by emphasizing post-Parsonsian systems thinking to explore the nonlinear dynamics of dissipative structures.

Keywords / classical science / dissipative structures / Eastern philosophy / Newton / Prigogine / systems thinking

[14,400 words]

Lately, a new language for the understanding of complexity of life (organism, ecosystem, and social system) has been developed. Chaos, fractals, dissipative structures, self-organization, and complex adaptive systems are some of the key concepts. On this view, reality is not the deterministic structure that Newton envisaged, but rather, a partially unknown or at least unpredictable world of multiple possibilities. As the horizon of our knowledge of natural realities expands, the emergent comprehensive perspective requires a radical reconstruction of both the concrete structure upon which human life is materially built and the symbolic structure that reason has schemed. (Kwiatkowska, 2001, p.96)

Chaos theory was the intellectual darling of the pop-science writers of the late 1980s. In their eyes, it would provide a new paradigm by which to describe the world, one that liberated scientists from clockwork determinism—or alternatively, from incomprehensible randomness. . . . [A] significant portion of the material on chaos and literature concerns Ilya Prigogine's and Isabelle Stengers's work on the philosophical implications of entropy in general and self-organizing systems in particular. . . . [M]ost, if not all, applications of chaos theory to literature are flawed. (Matheson & Kirchhoff, 1997, pp. 28, 32, 42)

Nietzsche . . . is closer to Prigogine's contention that "a new formulation of the laws of nature is now possible . . . , a more acceptable description in which there is room for both the laws of nature and novelty and creativity" [Prigogine, 1997, p. 17] . . . Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont [1998, p. 15] . . . say, [Prigogine and Stengers] "give the educated public a distorted view of the topics they treat"—even though "their abuses do not even come close" to those of literary "postmodernists" who distort science for partisan political purposes. Sokal places himself above partisanship when it comes to the political uses of science, even though he perpetrated a famous hoax to expose the shallowness of postmodern engagements with it. (Bennett & Connolly, 2002, pp. 152, 155-156)

I. Introduction

1. *The Purpose*

As the above quotes show, the subject matter of this essay has its strong proponents and opponents. I believe that the proponents have the stronger case. Therefore, the purpose of this essay is to document the thesis that communication theory and research can make vast strides by paying more attention to “new” systems thinking and nonlinear dynamics—variously identified as dissipative-structures theory, chaos theory, catastrophe theory, self-organized criticality, new science, new systems approach, and complexity studies¹ (Mathews, White & Long, (1999)—than by continued allegiance to the positivism of classical science alone. Communication, including journalism and mass communication, should recognize the new challenges that have emerged from the evidence against Newtonian presumptions, as well as from the emergence of new approaches variously identified as cultural studies ↔ critical methodologies, postmodernism, postcolonial studies, and feminist studies.

Thermodynamically, all living systems or dissipative structures—including *homo sapiens*, communities, and nation states—thrive in open environments exchanging energy (and matter) with outside sources. These living systems are capable of maintaining their

¹ Early investigators of *chaos*—irregular, unpredictable behavior of natural structures—included physicist Mitchell Feigenbaum, fractal inventor Benoit Mandelbrot, and mathematician Edward Lorenz. *Complexity* theory, which presumes that all things tend to organize themselves into patterns, had its beginnings with Norbert Wiener’s cybernetics, Ludwig von Bertalanffy’s general systems theory, and John H. Holland’s computerized artificial life simulation.

identity only by remaining open to the flux and flow of their environment.² Such open systems normally produce dynamic nonlinear relations that the covering laws of classical science, which presume linear relations as normal, cannot predict.³ Kauffman (1980)

² Dissipative systems have the ability (a) to increase and store information in the form of increasing levels of internal structuration, and (b) to export disorganization or entropy to their immediate environment. Harvey and Reed (1994) say dissipative systems, grounded in the dynamics of deterministic chaos, are inherently historical, far-from-equilibrium, boundary-testing, ontologically layered, and thermodynamically constituted configurations that evolve through mechanisms of assisted bifurcations and symmetry-breaking processes. Social systems are a special class of naturally constituted dissipative systems. For further elaboration, see Nicolis & Prigogine (1989).

³ Linearity reflects the situation where an effect is proportional to an incremental change in the cause, and the resulting ratio is independent of any previous change. Nonlinearity, which can be functional or longitudinal, reflects the situation where effects are not invariantly proportional to their causes. Iteration over time represents longitudinal linearity. The relationship of variables in the model, machine, or system shows functional linearity. Stroup (1997) says, "Functional nonlinearity appears in many guises, for example, (1) simple interaction between two terms; (2) cubic, quadratic, or logarithmic terms; (3) or thresholding" (p. 127). Dynamic systems exhibit three necessary conditions: iteration, nonlinearity, and sensitivity to initial conditions. Iteration or recursion refers to feedback (resulting from repetitive application of linear and/or nonlinear rules) under which system process becomes structure. Sensitivity to initial conditions means that the system's asymptotic behavior varies when the initial conditions are changed by even a small amount. Although some may argue that most equations of the classical model, including Newton's second law of motion $F = ma$ [Force = mass \times acceleration], are not linear, such equations exclude the realities of the "butterfly" effect or asymptotic behavior because of their *ceteris paribus* presumptions. Thus, linear thinking permeates the classical model. As D.L. Harvey (personal communication, January 17, 2003) further explains, Newtonian mechanics, as well as the differential calculus from which it is generated and in which it is expressed, prohibits the interaction of system components. Newtonian modeling is always *additive*, that is, a complex system's global dynamics is

describes a system as “a collection of parts which interact with each other to function as whole” (p. 1). Such interaction produces both negative and positive feedback. *Negative* feedback negates changes or disturbances in the system thereby bringing about a degree of stability. On the other hand, *positive* feedback, a process that amplifies any disturbance in the system, can be so powerful that it can bring about vast changes within a short period. Complex systems are both nonlinear and adaptive. Their asymptotic behavior pattern is often unpredictable (e.g., weather, public opinion, epidemics, stock market) although short-term prediction may be possible.

This essay will unfold the “new” science—“new” in a relative sense to “old” science—and explain how the communication field can accommodate itself to meet the reality of open systems. However, at the very outset, it is pertinent to dispel some myths about the “new” science. Referring to these widespread myths, Eve (1997) clarifies that chaos does not mean complete randomness, that systems can be both chaotic and stable—not either or—depending on when one observes it, that the new science does not rule out the applicability of empirical social science, and that the new paradigm is not intended to replace existing paradigms in the social sciences. Moreover, there is much order in chaotic systems, and “the old causal modeling techniques are probably useful *much* of the time” (p. 278). What the new paradigm demonstrates is that “knowledge gained under the old paradigm is true *under specific boundary conditions*” (p. 275).

Thus, this essay is not an attempt to point out the failure of any old paradigms that seem to govern communication scholarship, but rather an attempt to show new directions

presumed to be the *sum* of the trajectories of the individual components of the system. It excludes the possibility of emergent behavior.

that could provide a means of understanding and researching the uncertainties, nonlinearities, and unpredictable aspects of social systems. Moreover, as Eve (1997) puts it:

[In] our search to create elegant and parsimonious models, typically in the form of path diagrams and the sets of simultaneous equations, we found it necessary to make simplifying assumptions. If we didn't, the coefficients that resulted from "solving" these sets of equations were of a very small magnitude. So we tended to impose linearity on the universe (or at least nonlinearity that was easily mimicked by log transformations and similar data tweakings). Perhaps worst of all, we tenaciously clung to the belief that a stable coefficient was the natural outcome of our computations. . . . What chaos theory implies, of course, and what makes it anathema to many of us, is that the whole business of trying to describe the world with summary digits is likely to often be quite impossible. (p. 277)

2. The Background

Presenting some background is pertinent even though students of systems theory may consider it redundant. Western science arose in the 17th century "in opposition to the biological model of a spontaneous and autonomous organization of natural beings" (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 291). With the onset of the so-called Industrial Revolution during the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the intellectual elites of the West compartmentalized knowledge into three hierarchies—natural/physical science, social science, and philosophy/ humanities in descending order of prestige. Natural/physical sciences followed the "universal laws" and rationality associated with the Newtonian-

Cartesian model.⁴ What used to be historical social science split into three nomothetic fields—sociology/ anthropology, economics, and political science—and the idiographic field of history. (In 1838, Auguste Comte coined the term *sociology* to describe the field that would discover the laws of human society.) The three nomothetic fields vied for prestige by doing their utmost to follow the path of reductionist classical science. History, together with philosophy, became part of the third hierarchy called the humanities (Wallerstein, 1999, 2000, 2001).

The supremacy of the Newtonian-Cartesian model remained for more than three centuries despite two main challenges. One was the second law of thermodynamics—the law of entropy,⁵ which Clausius advanced in 1865 (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 117). This law “presented the first challenge to a concept of nature that would explain away the complex and reduce it to the simplicity of some hidden world” (p. 8). The other was quantum physics that, in the early 20th century, gave a theoretical frame to describe the incessant transformation of particles into one another. Nevertheless, quantum theory “retained a number of conceptual positions of classical dynamics, particularly as far as

⁴ Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) formulated the laws of universal gravitation and motion, which he used to explain a wide range of natural phenomena. René Descartes (1596-1650), also known as Cartesius, held that one could discover certain universal, self-evident truths by means of reason alone; and that one could derive deductively from those truths the remaining content of philosophy and the sciences.

⁵ This law states that the entropy—that is, the disorder—of a closed system can never decrease. Thus, when the system reaches maximum entropy, it is in equilibrium and can no longer undergo change. In general, entropy represents the degradation of matter and energy. Penrose (1989) explains that, in rough terms, “the entropy of a system is a measure of its manifest *disorder*” (p. 308).

time and process are concerned” (p. 11). It is pertinent to note that the incorporation of the law of relativity had little bearing on these conceptual positions.

The nomothetic social sciences, which showed remarkable growth until the mid-20th century, have predominantly followed the path of the Newtonian-Cartesian model in their research agenda even though some researchers addressed the issues of dynamics, complexity and nonlinearity as random deviations from the normal. The “complexity studies” associated with the Brussels school of the natural sciences (e.g., Prigogine, 1980) pointed out that it was the Newtonian paradigm that suffered from questionable presumptions.⁶ Beginning late 20th century, ideas reflecting Prigogine’s theory of dissipative structures have infiltrated most of the natural/physical and social sciences (Straussfogel, 2000). However, scholars in the communication field, including those in journalism and mass communication, have been slow in embracing the “new” science of complexity although systems theory, in its various forms, did attract a few steadfast adherents (Fisher, 1975, 1982; MacLean, 1967; Monge, 1973, 1977; Watzlawick, Beavin, & Jackson, 1967).

New systems approaches replaced the old systems approaches of the structural-functional Parsonsian school from about the middle of the last century, when the cybernetic systems perspective, followed by “chaos” theory in the 1960s, generated much interest and debate within the social and behavioral sciences (Berrien, 1968), including communication (Benson & Pearce, 1977; Ruben & Kim, 1975), psychology and social

⁶ Harvey and Reed (1994) point out that, at the turn of the 20th century, French mathematician Henri Poincaré was “one of the first to recognize the intractable limits that non-linear systems placed on conventional science” (p. 376). For the next seven decades, however, Newtonian scientists relegated the nonlinear domain to that of random disorder and, therefore, of little scientific interest.

psychology (Latané & Fink, 1996; Streufert, 1997), anthropology (Rodin, Michaelson, & Britan, 1978), and archeology (Plog, 1975). Thayer (1968) says that from 1948 to about 1951, four important "tributaries" influenced the communication field: information theory, cybernetics, general systems theory, and the tradition of communication "nets" studies (p. 327).

Baran and Davis (1995) have devoted a chapter of their mass communication theory text to systems theories of communication processes. However, they failed to identify any communication scholar who has applied the complexity theory, and they devoted most of the chapter to a discussion of quasi-systems theories such as the knowledge gap model, social-political marketing theory, and information processing theory. They overlooked the work of Kincaid (1979, 1987) and Krippendorff (1987), two of the early communication scholars who saw merit in the Prigoginian model. Kincaid developed the convergence model of communication using the basic concepts of information theory, cybernetics, and general systems theory. He used Prigogine's work on nonequilibrium thermodynamics and self-organization to develop a conceptual framework integrating the micro- and macro levels of analysis. Barnett and Kincaid (1983) have pointed out that this model called for a change in the nature of the research questions asked, for new research designs, for new instruments of observation and measurement, and for new methods of data analysis and inference. However, not many communication researchers have taken up this challenge except for Barnett and his colleagues (Barnett & Houston, in press) and a few others (e.g., Hammond, 1997; Houston, 1996).

It seems that communication scholars have generally avoided or slighted (see Contractor, 1994) studies related to nonlinear trajectories in complex porous systems even though nonlinearity represents much of reality. For example, no researcher has applied the chaos theory to study the *far-from-equilibrium* state within the world system of communication-outlets over space and time. Such a study could examine the kind of “energy and matter” the system absorbed from outside and dissipated to its environment; the type of positive feedback that pushed the system to the threshold of bifurcation, and the singular perturbation (or the so-called butterfly effect) that sparked the bifurcation toward either more complex disorder or reorganization. By studying chaotic occurrences, a researcher can create more accurate probability models. Chaos theory also offers a more realistic framework to study the organization and operation of wire services, newsrooms, and other mass media environments.

More recently, a few specialists in psychology have drawn the attention of communication scholars to the connection between communication and chaos principles embedded in their Dynamic Social Impact Theory, which relates cognitive, cultural, and social processes (Latané & Fink, 1996). DSIT allows examination of the linkages of concepts and their nonlinear effect on attitude change and attitude structure. It employs a neural network model in discussing attitude structure and change, and it considers important attitudes to exhibit catastrophes. The model takes into account the characteristics of chaos, complexity, nonlinear dynamics, and reorganization.

3. The Outline

First, in this essay, I shall elucidate the differences between the “old” and the “new” sciences by providing a brief outline of the premises and propositions of the Newtonian-

Cartesian classical model that have come under the microscope, and then by sketching out the new scientific findings associated with Prigogine's theory of dissipative structures. Second, I shall discuss how communication theory and methodology—including journalism and mass communication—can accommodate the new scientific environment, which is deconstructing the old three-tiered hierarchy of fields of study, through systems thinking and exploration of nonlinear dynamics. Third, I shall discuss the pragmatic applications of “new” science pointing out how communication researchers can promptly benefit from the projects initiated by other disciplines, and how they can implant nonlinear dynamics into the world-system framework to analyze global communication. Finally, I shall conclude with a suggestion to move toward a common East-West epistemology befitting our global commons.

II. Comparison of 'Old' and 'New'

1. *Classical (Newtonian) Model*

The Newtonian-Cartesian model, the spread of which coincided with the rise of a factory civilization associated with the so-called Industrial Revolution, presented a mechanistic view of the world (universe) in which chance played only a peripheral part. Its presumptions included the following (Wallerstein, 1999, 2000; Wiseman, 2002):

- That precisely *determinable* initial conditions determined every element in natural processes.
- That trajectories of most natural phenomena are *linear* and that such trajectories always tend to return to *equilibrium* conditions.

- That *time* is not relevant to the understanding of natural processes because all laws are mathematically “*reversible*” as the fundamental relations of those processes never evolve. As Penrose (1989) explains: “The deterministic equations of classical physics (or the operation of U in quantum physics, for that matter) have no preference for evolving in the future direction. They can be used equally well to evolve into the past. The future determines the past just the same way that the past determines the future” (p. 306).
- That knowledge is universal and can ultimately be expressed in simple covering laws.

Thus, “Newtonianism” presumed the ability of science to predict outcomes with the knowledge of the initial conditions and the relevant universal law. [But in 1931, mathematical logician Kurt Gödel produced a startling theorem that cast doubt on the infallibility of mathematical schemes deemed to make such prediction possible (Penrose, 1989). Gödel’s complicated theorem showed that one could not prove the propositions on which the mathematical system is in part based because it is possible, in any logical system using symbols, to construct an axiom that is neither provable nor disprovable within the same system. One had to use methods of proof from outside the system to prove the self-consistency of the system (*Encarta Encyclopedia* 2002).]

As Wallerstein (1999) explains, the classical model asserts that the function of science is to uncover the universal natural laws that govern everything in the real material universe. The model also asserts that empirical investigation involving precise measurement, which is possible through perfectible measuring instruments, is the only reliable, or useful, method of uncovering these universal laws. Additionally, the model

presumes that most natural processes are closed systems, and that one can isolate the complex interactions among natural processes in the universe through the *ceteris paribus* (other things being equal) ploy. Napinen (2001) asserts that the “futurological predictive studies [based on the Newtonian model] . . . are not only misleading but even dangerous [because it is] not correct to reduce all the acts of people to the achievement of predictable events” (p. 161).

2. *Complexity-Studies Model*

The Brussels school (e.g., Prigogine, 1980; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984)) jolted the scientific community with Prigogine’s theory of dissipative structures. This landmark theory, which helped Prigogine earn the 1977 Nobel Prize in chemistry, unified dynamics (the physics of being) and thermodynamics (the physics of becoming) to prove that irreversibility emerges from instability. Prigogine demonstrated the limitations of the applicability of Newtonian mechanics, as well as its extensions known as Boltzmann’s⁷ statistical mechanics.

[T]here exists in nature systems that behave reversibly and that may be fully described by the laws of classical or quantum mechanics. But most systems of interest to us, including all chemical systems and therefore all biological systems, are time-oriented on the macroscopic level. Far from being an “illusion,” this expresses a broken time-symmetry on the microscopic level. Irreversibility is either true on *all* levels or on none. (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 285)

⁷ Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906) claimed that one could explain the second law of thermodynamics by statistically analyzing the motions of atoms.

Prigogine and Stengers (1984) used the concept of *entropy* (see Footnote 5) to distinguish between reversible and irreversible processes. Entropy increases only because of the irreversible movement of thermodynamic processes. Newtonian mechanics, by contrast, presumes a static (reversible) frame of analysis when studying dynamic systems whereas Prigogine's paradigm takes the dynamic (irreversible or evolutionary) view.

There can be no doubt that irreversibility exists on the macroscopic level and has an important constructive role Therefore there must be something in the microscopic world of which macroscopic irreversibility is the manifestation. (p. 258)

Time flows in a single direction, from past to future. We cannot manipulate time, we cannot travel back to the past. (p. 277)

Prigogine derived his theory of dissipative structures by focusing on the second law of thermodynamics—the law of entropy, which introduced time and history into a universe that Newtonian physicists “had pictured as eternal” (Briggs & Peat, 1989, p. 135). The second law says that in a closed system, disorder increases relentlessly until the system reaches *equilibrium* (or random dispersal of particles). Thus, the law implied that all the matter and energy in the universe would ultimately degrade to a state of tepid, inert uniformity (*equilibrium*) or heat death. Prigogine turned away from this negative view by identifying the universe as an open system where the disorder associated with a state of *far from equilibrium* would bring about order through spontaneous reorganization.

At all levels, be it the level of macroscopic physics, the level of fluctuations, or the microscopic level, *nonequilibrium is the source of order. Nonequilibrium brings "order out of chaos."* (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 287)

Prigogine made this intuitive leap from his observation of a phenomenon known as the Benard Instability.⁸ Chemical processes known as the Zhabotinsky Reactions (named after a Russian biophysicist who discovered them) confirmed Prigogine's theory. Thermodynamically, Prigogine (1997) affirmed, "All arrows of time in nature have the same orientation: They all produce entropy in the same direction of time, which is by definition the future" (p. 102).

Prigogine's comprehensive theory of change, as outlined in Prigogine and Stengers (1984), contains the following salient points:

- Although some parts of the universe may operate like machines, these are closed systems, which form only a small part of the physical universe.⁹ Most are open

⁸ Tucker (1983) explains that Benard Instability "occurs when a liquid is heated from below. As heating intensifies, the mixture suddenly begins to 'self-organize,' taking on a striking spatial structure sometimes resembling miniature stained-glass cathedral windows, with ovals of brilliant colors arranging themselves in kaleidoscopic patterns. [These] ... patterns resembled living cells, [and] within each cell, ordered molecular motion occurs. Prigogine reasoned that if this was possible in fluid dynamics, it would also be possible in chemistry and biology. This self-organization of matter represented to him a critical link between animate and inanimate matter. It could even provide a clue to the spontaneous eruption of life's beginnings."

⁹ Prigogine and his collaborators, who make a distinction between free energy and bound energy, see three forms of thermodynamic systems: *isolated*, *near-to-equilibrium*, and *dissipative*. Equilibrated, steady state systems such as crystals, minerals, and mechanical systems that cannot evolve internally belong to the *isolated* category. Systems that are organized around the principle of minimum entropy production and

systems, exchanging energy or matter (as well as information) with their environment. Because biological and social systems are open, it is not possible to understand them in mechanistic terms. Most of reality is seething and bubbling with change, disorder and process—not orderly, stable and equilibrated.

- Fluctuations occur in an open dissipative structure when energy flows become too complex for the system to absorb. When a single such fluctuation or a combination of them musters enough power through positive feedback, a *singular moment* or *bifurcation point* arises that forces the system to reorganize. Each reorganization produces greater complexity and greater likelihood of random fluctuations, viz., evolution. It is impossible to determine in advance the direction of the system change: whether it will disintegrate into “chaos” or give rise to a new, more differentiated, higher level of “order.”
- Nonlinear relationships¹⁰ prevail when a system is in a *far-from-equilibrium* state, whereupon it becomes inordinately sensitive to external influences. A small perturbation or fluctuation can bring about startling, structure-breaking waves that

therefore cannot evolve internally, such as chemical clocks, belong to the *near-to-equilibrium* category.

Evolving systems found in enriched, free-energy environments, and whose far-from-equilibrium configurations are non-replicable over time belong to the *dissipative* category (Harvey & Reed, 1994). This paper identifies the first two categories as closed systems.

¹⁰ Briggs and Peat (1989) explain that in a nonlinear equation, “a small change in one variable can have a disproportional, even catastrophic impact on other variables.” A nonlinear solution tends “to be stubbornly individual and peculiar.” Plots of nonlinear equations “show breaks, loops, recursions—all kinds of turbulence.” Nonlinear equations have terms that “are repeatedly multiplied by themselves” to allow for feedback (p. 24). Gleick (1987) says that nonlinear systems “generally cannot be solved and cannot be added together” (pp. 23-24). Also see Endnote 3 above.

replace the old with a new system (thereby bringing order out of chaos)—a finding that has analogical significance for the social sciences. In contrast, a system in *equilibrium* may have reached maximum entropy where molecules are paralyzed or move around at random—the state toward which the universe is heading, according to the second law of thermodynamics. Nothing much happens in a *near-to-equilibrium* system as well because it is comparable to an energy well in which the system loses heat as fast as it gains heat.

Thus, as Wallerstein (1999) puts it, the science of complexity “sees instability, evolution, and fluctuation everywhere” (p. 165). It sees a “narrative” (rather than a “geometrical”) universe, in which the problem of time is the central problem. Probability is the only scientific truth there is. “Probability derives from the fact that there are always new statistical solutions of dynamic equations. Interactions within systems are continual, and this communication constitutes the irreversibility of the process, creating ever more numerous correlations” (p. 166). The holistic view of the dissipative structure is its *macroscale*. All its internal subsystems are known as the *microscale*. The interaction of macro-and microscales is fundamental to the dynamics of dissipative structures (Straussfogel, 2000).

III. Accommodating “New” Science

Accommodating the “new” science requires adopting “new” systems thinking to explore nonlinear dynamics in communication systems, which are dissipative structures.

Communication can certainly emulate the field of social psychology, which has already adopted some of the ideas of nonlinear dynamics (Streufert, 1997). This does not mean

the wholesale abandoning of the Newtonian model, which, as we shall see below, is applicable to phenomena that are linear (e.g., low-energy equilibrium systems) and to those constituting the lower ontological levels of dissipative structures. At the higher, more abstract, ontological levels, historical and philosophical narratives become the more appropriate method of analysis. The iconological method, associated with nonlinear dynamics, is most suitable at the middle ontological levels.

1. Adopting "New" Systems Thinking

"New" systems thinking, which involves the recognition of nonlinear dynamics, is vital to grapple with theoretical paradigms associated with the science of complexity. Systems thinking in its traditional sense focused on *part-whole* interdetermination. "New" systems thinking shifted the focus to *system-environment* openness. More recently, systems thinking has also focused on self-referential autopoietic systems.

Luhmann (1984/1995) points out "profound changes in general systems theory and associated interdisciplinary efforts" (p. 1). He distinguishes between three levels of analysis: systems in general at the first level; systems subdivided into machines, organisms, social systems, and psychic systems at the second level; and social systems subdivided into interactions, organizations, and societies at the third level. He points out that comparisons among different types of systems must restrict themselves to one level.

Luhmann (1984/1995) reminds us that the tradition of speaking about wholes that are composed of parts stems from antiquity. The problem with this tradition was that "the whole had to be understood in a double sense: as the unity and as the totality of its parts" (p. 5). To resolve the problem, the first move was to replace the difference between *whole and part* with that of *system and environment*, which enabled one to interrelate the theory

of the organism, thermodynamics, and evolutionary theory. Although theoretical concerns also focused on the difference between open and closed systems, Luhmann says, now “the open-systems paradigm has been asserted and accepted within systems theory” (p. 8). Luhmann claims his *theory of self-referential systems* to be “a universal sociological theory” (p. 15). It conceptualizes society as a composite of operationally closed but cognitively open autopoietic subsystems. Each subsystem—economy, politics, mass media, law, politics, and so on—undergoes self-referential reproduction through recursive meaning production of communication related to its own binary code. For example, the mass media operate through reproduction of communication confined to the information/non-information binary code whereas the economy operates similarly within the payment/nonpayment binary code. The lifeworld and psychic systems provide the environment for each of the social systems. Luhmann’s (post-1984) systems theory is built upon Husserl’s phenomenological concept of communication, not individual action. [Whitaker (1995) provides an overview of autopoietic theory. Luhmann borrowed the term *autopoiesis* from Maturana and Varela (1980) and applied it to social systems of communicative events resulting from the consummation of *information*, *utterance*, and *understanding*. Mingers (2002) has criticized Luhmann for paying little attention to the relationship between communicative events and the people who generate those events whom Luhmann places in each social system’s environment.]

In the field of communication, scholars (e.g., Benson & Pearce, 1977; Cronen & Davis, 1978) had been debating the relative merits of three theoretical approaches to research—covering laws, systems, and rules—just about the time that Prigogine broached his theory of dissipative structures, a system-environment paradigm. The covering laws

approach, championed by Berger (1977), represented the logical empiricism of the Newtonian-Cartesian school of thought. The rules approach (Shimanoff, 1980) represented the qualitative movement that emerged in reaction to the cold, lawful, quantitative empiricism of the Newtonian-Cartesian model. The systems approach, championed by Fisher (1975), questioned the linear understandings of time. Shimanoff points out the Ellis and Fisher (1975) study on the phases of conflict in small group development as a good example of systems research.

Elaborating on the explanatory potential of laws, rules, and systems approaches, Shimanoff (1980) concluded that “systems theory is the only one that offers all four types of explanation” (p. 230)—what, mental concept, reason giving, and causal. The laws approach was deficient in reason giving, whereas the rules approach was deficient in causal explanation. Furthermore, Shimanoff asserted, “If systems theory includes both law-and rule-related phenomena, then it will be able to predict both mechanistic and prescriptive relationships” (p. 233). However, Shimanoff’s discussion failed to distinguish between linear versus nonlinear approaches to systems thinking. (Nonlinear statistics merely estimates the probabilities of outcomes resulting from nonlinear dynamics in far-from-equilibrium dissipative systems whereas linear statistics associated with the classical model presumes the ability to predict relationships among variables.)

Monge (1973) advocated the adoption of a systems paradigm for communication research because the criteria associated with the covering law model (particularly, universal generalization) were too stringent. However, what Monge had in mind was a *closed* system that enabled the researcher to subject linear equations to regression analysis. Subsequently, Monge (1977) explained systems theory in terms of “at least

three and perhaps four alternative logical paradigms” (p. 21)—general systems theory (open systems), general systems theory (closed systems), cybernetics, and structural-functionalism. He argued that the systems perspective had the “ability to incorporate important aspects of the alternative positions” (p. 29). (Prigogine, however, asserted that most systems of interest to social scientists were open and historical, not closed ones.) Fisher (1982) outlined the following elements of system theory: holism and nonsummativity, openness, hierarchical organization, organized complexity, and self-regulation.¹¹ Neither Monge nor Fisher appears to have been familiar with Prigogine’s work

Reed and Harvey (1992) make a distinction between the “earlier systems approaches,” such as the Parsonsian systems theory, as well as its extension by Luhmann (1982) before Luhmann embraced autopoiesis, and the “new family of systems theories” (p. 353) grounded in chaos theory. Primarily referring to the latter, Straussfogel (2000) says the study of systems—which includes the subfields dealing with chaos theory, dissipative structures, organizational cybernetics, and soft system science¹²—offers enormous challenges to uncover social processes.

¹¹ Lilienfeld (1978) placed six separate disciplines under the general heading of “systems thinking”: biological philosophy (von Bertalanffy), cybernetics (Weiner, Ashby), information and communication theory (Shannon, Weaver, Cherry), operations research (Williams), games theory (von Neumann, Morgenstern), and techniques for simulating social and environmental processes by computers (Forrester). Lilienfeld, however, condemns system theory as “the latest attempt to create a world myth based on the prestige of science” (p. 249).

¹² Checkland (1999) illustrates the application of soft system methodology. His study of structural change in a publishing company (pp. 183-189) may be of particular interest to communication researchers.

When Ludwig von Bertalanffy began developing his general systems theory in the mid-20th century, systems notions got the attention of several communication researchers. Among those were Westley and MacLean (1957) who proposed a new model of communication processes with feedback loops. MacLean (1967) points out several mass communication studies that applied the principles of early sociological systems analysis: Rosten's (1937) study of Washington correspondents, White's (1950) wire-news "gatekeeper" study, Swanson's (1949) research on the news staff of a mid-city daily, Gieber's (1956) study of 16 wire editors on Wisconsin dailies, McNelly's (1959) study of the international flow of news, and the Rileys' (1959) model of mass communication that emphasized the influence of social context, primary groups, and reference groups on the actions and interpretations of communicator and receiver alike.

Later, Ruben and Kim (1975) produced an edited book connecting human communication and general systems theory. These systems thinkers borrowed their concepts from information theory and cybernetics. However, their models were not robust enough to analyze *far-from-equilibrium* open systems, which spontaneously produced bifurcation points associated with nonlinear reactions of immense magnitude. Kincaid's (1987) convergence model of communication, which used Prigogine's concepts, represented a *ceteris paribus* "idealization"—a partially closed, open-ended system (p. 215). Krippendorff's (1987) models applying second-order cybernetics to understand the role of communication in societies undergoing planned and unplanned change still require greater refinement. Krippendorff identified the network-convergence paradigm (Rogers & Kincaid, 1981) as rooted in first-order cybernetics and systems theory, and he traced the paradigm of autopoiesis to theoretical biology.

What the paradigm of autopoiesis does is relate information to processes of organization of production (in the ecosphere), encourage the conception of changes in the domain of information (noosphere) in terms of certain generative processes, and promote the view that communication is also a major stabilizing force, marking a social organization, a culture, or a society as a distinct identity and, being a constitutive part of that organization, producing its organization at the same time (Krippendorff, 1987, p. 207).

In more recent work, the old structural-functionalist systems thinking is reflected in Spitzberg's (2000) model of inter-cultural communication competence, Kim's (1995) cross-cultural adaptation theory, and Jia's (2001) social constructionist model of *lian/mian* transformation. In mass communication, Hendrickson and Tankard (1997) suggested the application of a systems perspective to reporting, as well as to refine news beats and routines. However, the application of the "sciences of complexity" in communication research is rare although some may claim that the use of path analysis incorporates the possibility that two variables each exert causal force on the other,¹³ and that the introduction of stochastic mathematical models has offered an alternative to simple causality. Other defenders may claim that even the traditional social sciences have addressed some of the complexity issues through the application of modeling interactions

¹³ Eve (1997), however, points out that path diagrams and the sets of simultaneous equations that describe them are attempts to create elegant and parsimonious models based on simplifying assumptions, which impose linearity on the universe.

using the elaboration paradigm¹⁴ (see Babbie, 2001), simultaneous system changes using structural equation modeling¹⁵ (see Hoyle, 1995), and nonlinear regression (see McClave & Sincich, 2002). They may further claim that social sciences have been largely influenced by the probability theory and they have histories and principles of their own. However, as pointed out earlier, traditional social science has operated under the presumption that nonlinear dynamics were random exceptions to the normal.

In France, members of the Lyon-Grenoble team have applied the principles of the general systems theory to journalism historiography even though, according to Dooley (1990), the team's work has so far had little impact. Edgar Morin (1969/1971) was the first theorist to do so with the 1960s student rebellion furnishing his ideal case. Morin (1977, 1980, and 1987) has since produced a three-volume *summa* of systems theory in relation to communications. The theory suggests that societies undergo a dynamic and continuous process of development, wherein all elements are interconnected. Thus, it has discouraged looking at journalistic reporting as a closed system. Consequently, it has dismantled the distinction between the upmarket (elite) and downmarket (popular) journalistic outlets.

Because of the broadening and deepening of systems theories, analyses and methodologies over the last three or four decades, communication scholars now have access to a rich literature to use systems thinking more creatively (e.g., Adams, 1988;

¹⁴ Also known as the interpretation method or the Lazarsfeld method, researchers use the elaboration model to understand the relationship between two variables through the simultaneous introduction of additional variables.

¹⁵ SEM is a comprehensive statistical approach to testing hypotheses about relations among observed and latent variables. SEM requires formal specification of a model to be estimated and tested.

Briggs & Peat, 1989; Dawkins, 1986; Gleick, 1987; Kauffman, 1995; Salthe, 1985; Waldrop, 1985). "New" systems thinking is vital for *unthinking* the "old" paradigm (Wallerstein, 2001). Systems thinking has become much more relevant with rapid globalization, which requires adopting a very holistic approach to problems and issues.

It [systems thinking] takes a 'big picture' approach, with the clear understanding that human issues are very complex, integrated, and unpredictable in the long term; that they contain both quantifiable and non-quantifiable elements; that interdependence is a key feature of the survival of human systems; and that to separate out subsystems to be studied in isolation changes the very nature of the system and the problem. (Straussfogel, 2000, p. 171)

Thus, the systems approach need not be the exclusive domain of the quantitatively oriented scholars. In fact, Fisher (1975) has argued that qualitative analysis is essential to future communication research. Fisher says, "[T]he difference between qualitative and non-qualitative analysis is the difference in emphasis upon linear causality and predictability" (p. 202). He points out that whereas non-qualitative analysis addresses causes and effects, qualitative analysis addresses forms, variations, structures, classifications, etc., of the phenomenon under investigation. One does not have to be adept in quantitative analysis and modeling to look into linkages and interactions between variables at the higher ontological levels of dissipative systems. For instance, world-system theory emerged from the application of historical social science, not from nomothetic empiricism. Moreover, systems thinking is the hallmark of Buddhist philosophy. Siddhartha Gautama did not use quantitative modeling to explain the

functional dynamics of the tangible and intangible constructs of the *samsaric* (chain of rebirth) system.

2. *Exploration of Nonlinear Dynamics*

Exploration of nonlinear dynamics must go hand-in-hand with “new” systems thinking. It is fair to say that communication researchers have yet to follow other social sciences in applying the theory of dissipative structures—an intellectual model that “has profound implications for modeling social systems” (Kiel, 1991, p. 431). In contrast to the homeostatic structural-functionalism of the Parsonsian systems approach, this model emphasizes nonlinearity, instability, and uncertainty associated with social systems.

Kiel (1991) says that even though the tools of nonlinear models show relative weaknesses, they help incrementally “toward greater understanding of the behavior of complex social systems” (p. 440). He adds, “Perhaps, most importantly, the nonlinear paradigm and the theory of dissipative structures demand consideration of a unification of the natural and social sciences” because the nonlinear paradigm represents “a significant link between system dynamics in both the natural and human realms” (p. 441). Napinen (2001) says that natural science has already acquired some features of humanities because it has begun to recognize creativity, “which is based on chance and irreversibility of nature” (p. 163). Thus, natural science has acknowledged “the fundamental indeterminacy of the whole history of nature and human society” (p. 163).

Dissipative structures in physical and chemical systems evolve over time. In one phase, they behave deterministically according to average values involved; and in the other, they allow a fluctuation to amplify until it changes the entire structure. If we presume that human and societal systems behave similarly, we can surmise that they are

open systems prone to be in *far-from-equilibrium* states during various spatial-temporal conjunctures. As emphasized earlier, open systems are dynamic and complex structures invariably linked to their environment. Thus, theories and methodologies developed within the confines of a single academic discipline (say, communication) may fail to track nonlinear relations associated with open systems. For instance, the measurement of press freedom in the world (Gunaratne, 2002a) requires a thorough analysis of the interaction between the part (the nation-state as a subsystem) and the whole (the world system, which is more than the sum of its parts) just as in the case of assessing development. Subsystem-specific press-freedom measures that exclude the system effects may reflect the bias of Newtonian mechanics.

The expertise required for complex mathematical modeling of nonlinear relations often proved a disincentive for social scientists to adopt the open-system approach. The mathematization of human issues also was a drawback. Nicolis (1995) points out:

The fundamental laws of microscopic physics such as Newton's equations or Schrödinger's equation, or of macroscopic physics such as Navier-Stokes equations or the law of mass action, are inadequate for understanding or even for formulating the complexity induced by the evolution of nonlinear systems. In contrast, attractors, fractals, multifractals, normal forms, Lyapunov exponents, entropies, invariant measures and correlation functions are part of the new scientific vocabulary proposed by modern nonlinear science. (pp. xiii-xiv)

However, the situation is brighter today. Straussfogel (2000) says that advances in nonlinear mathematics and, especially, the development of computer software that allow scholars to produce and run simulations of system models have facilitated the adoption of

system methods. Turner (1997) adds that computer technology has enabled us not only do nonlinear dynamic modeling but also to “create an accurate facsimile of reality by successive tweakings of the variables and the connections among them” thereby reversing “the top-down, theory-to-phenomena approach of classical science” (pp. xxv-xxvi). Kiel (1998) says that these new mathematical methods provide “novel means” (p. 246) for determining the relative complexity of the behavior of a variety of social systems as evident from the works of Brock, Hsieh and LeBaron (1991), and Guastello (1995). A useful statistical tool is the BDS statistic, which tests the null hypothesis that observations of a variable at particular points in time cannot be predicted from observations of the same variable at previous points in time. Kiel (1998) says that in the highly nonlinear world of the social realm, researchers now may have a rigorous means for determining the amount of nonlinearity, uncertainty, and thus complexity. Recent research has used the General Algebraic Modeling System to formulate and solve nonlinear integrated ecological-economic models; and ordinary/partial differential equations to calculate the long-term asymptotic response of nonlinear processes.

Thus, the systems approach, despite its complexity, can provide a beneficial environment to both quantitatively oriented scholars and those who are idiographically or philosophically oriented to explore the new science of complexity. Scholars have begun to use systems thinking in creative ways (Kiel & Elliott, 1996). For example, Verschraegen's (2002) has used Luhmann's earlier structural-functional systems perspective to analyze human rights and modern society while amplifying the analysis with Luhmann's later work (e.g., Luhmann, 1984/1995, 1996/2000) that seeks to integrate the open and closed system perspectives through the theory of self-referential,

“autopoietic” systems. Verschraegen argues that by giving inalienable and equal rights to all human beings, society ensures the maintenance of differentiation among its functional subsystems while at the same time institutionalizing specific mechanisms to increase stability and protect the individual.

Wallerstein (2001) has called on social scientists to unthink *collectively* their intellectual fetters because two fundamental concepts of the social sciences—development and the categories of time and space—have misdirected their attention and their analyses. The functionalist modernization paradigm presumes mathematically reversible linear relationships associated with a closed system. If we agree on the existence of a capitalist world system made up of a few core states, a large number of periphery states, and possibly some semiperipheral states, then the concept of development applies to the whole system at a specific conjuncture of time and space. A nation-state is not a closed system but a subsystem of the whole world system. A subsystem cannot, for long, develop on its own outside the context of the whole system. As is the case with any open system, the world system is in a *far from equilibrium* state. That is, it is seething and bubbling with change, disorder and dynamic processes as reflected, for example, in its uneven development and its dynamic three-fold stratification. This always leaves open the possibility that a *singular moment* or *bifurcation point* can arise so that a single fluctuation or a combination of them (say, a movement of the civil society) might muster enough power to shatter the preexisting organization because of *positive* feedback. Under such a regimen, a new dissipative structure might assemble itself in place of the old. The study of systemic configurations

where chaos, fluctuation, bifurcation, nonlinearity, probability, and unpredictability are the norms invites the narrative skills of all scholars.

Although communication scholars have done qualitative, as well as quantitative, analyses of the international news flow, they have yet to fit their findings to a world-system of dissipative structures that show part-whole interdetermination, complexity, nonlinearity, and chaos. Researchers have yet to use iconological modeling in this regard.

III. Pragmatic Applications of "New" Science

1. Lessons from Other Disciplines

Some communication scholars have argued that the "new" systems approach, including the Prigoginian model, has failed to generate research results even though it has provided a good way to explain processes.¹⁶ This argument implies that scholars should stick to the classical model because grappling with the reality of open social systems is too difficult. Despite such negativism, a few scholars in organizational communication and public relations (Contractor et al, 1997; Cottone, 1993; Murphy, 1996; Perrow, 1972, 1984; Seeger, 2002; Stroh & Jaatinen, 2001) and health communication (Witte et al., 1996) have recognized the appropriateness of the chaos paradigm for communication research. Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (1998) have pointed out the suitability of chaos theory for "macroscopic investigation of organizational crisis" (p. 269). They cite Murphy's view that crisis prediction is problematic because crisis is a force of systemic change that inserts randomness, disorder, and chaos into an organization's stability and order.

¹⁶ A reviewer wrote, "Significantly, the main problem usually attributed to systems theory is that it makes a nice story ... but doesn't seem to generate any research results."

Tetenbaum (1998) says that the shift from an industrial to information age has created a new, nonlinear world of work where complexity theory has been and can be applied successfully to operational problems.

Social scientists have applied nonlinear dynamics to a wide variety of social phenomena related to economics (Arthur, 1990; Baumol & Benhabib, 1989; Grandmont, 1985), environmental studies (Kakonge, 2002), political science (Brown, 1995; Huckfeldt, 1990; Kiel & Elliott, 1992, Saperstein & Mayer-Kress, 1988), and sociology (Eve, Horsfall, & Lee, 1997). In sociology, however, the application of nonlinear dynamics has tended toward metaphorical and postmodernist or poststructuralist usages (Young, 1991, 1992). Attempts to apply nonlinear dynamics include the organizational change study of Gemmill and Smith (1985) and Smith (1986), and the political revolutions study of Artigiani (1987a, 1987b). Kiel's (1994) paradigm for managing chaos and complexity in government provides insights applicable to communication systems as well.

Kiel (1991) cites several examples of social science research projects that applied the Prigogine model. Urban geography is the first social science field to have used a fully developed dissipative-structure model. The urban spatial evolution studies of Allen and Sanglier (1978, 1979a, 1979b, 1981), Allen (1982a, 1982b), Allen, Sanglier, Engelen, and Boon (1985), and Engelen (1988) looked at urban areas as nonlinear and dissipative systems that attracted human and economic energy—capital and business—for system maintenance and growth through economic activity and supply-and-demand generation. The models incorporated both the typical and unexpected interactions and behaviors of a variety of actors and variables, including population size, number of available jobs,

transportational linkages, and business decisions. The researchers used nonlinear differential equations to generate the indeterminism in the resulting spatial configuration. By feeding back into the equation the transformation of each iteration of the equation, they generated a fluid and continuous model of the urban area's spatial evolution.

The two volumes on chaos theory in the social sciences edited by Kiel and Elliott (1996) and Elliott and Kiel (1999) could provide fresh insights for communication researchers to shift their focus from linear to nonlinear investigations of communication phenomena. Those interested in public opinion research, for example, could benefit from McBurnett's (1996) application of nonlinear dynamics to analyze the 1984 race for the Democratic presidential nomination. McBurnett used three methods—the phase portrait, the correlation integral, and Lyapunov exponent¹⁷—to analyze complex dynamical time series. He concluded that linear models based on simple dynamic models of the primary electoral process could not “capture the rich dynamics observed in electoral outcomes” (p. 193). He found the presence of a positive Lyapunov exponent that provided “convincing evidence for chaos in this and any other time series” (p. 193). In time series, the underlying governing equations are nonlinear.

Those interested in the implications of the Global Information Infrastructure will find ideas for new avenues of research in Koehler's (1999) paradigm grounded on nonlinear dynamics. Koehler says a new “time-ecology” has evolved through the integration of natural, social, and individual elements of the globe across various time scales. A historically unprecedented “time-compact” globe has come into being through

¹⁷The Lyapunov exponent measures the extent to which “small” changes in initial conditions produce divergence in a system over time.

the interaction between time-ecology and heterocrony—the ordered process from which structures emerge. Koehler explains:

The time-compact globe involves an accelerating feedback loop between the digitized commodification of all that information technology touches and the concomitant acceleration of investment in particular technologies which disrupts the global time-ecology via the Internet and other global communication structures. These communication structures globally link elements of local communities. Community heterocrony is distorted. The results appear to be a “complex or chaotic foresight horizon” making it difficult to project a meaningful future. ... Further, the simultaneous access to all values via digitization and information technology without order produces the techno-primitive “Nothing is forbidden” making everything banal. (p. 153)

Of particular interest to communication researchers would be the paradigm developed by Harvey and Reed (1996) to guide social scientists to determine appropriate modeling strategies for studying chaotic social systems. Their matrix (Figure 1) matches six levels of modeling abstraction—predictive, statistical, iconological, structural, ideal type, and historical narratives—with 14 hierarchies of ontological complexity in social systems. Predictive models are those associated with Newtonian mechanics or covering law. Statistical models are those commonly used in the social sciences. Iconological models are those recently developed by mathematical chaos theoreticians. Structural models are those popular in contemporary anthropology and sociology. Ideal type models are those used in comparative economics and sociology. Historiographical models are those that concentrate on the idiographic description of temporally ordered concrete

events. Harvey and Reed used Boulding's (1968) work on hierarchies of complexity and Smelser's (1963) reading of Parsonsian systems theory (Parsons, 1961) to develop their 14 layers of ontological complexity in social systems.

Harvey and Reed's (1996) modeling/ontology matrix or paradigm shows that predictive modeling can still play a useful role in studying the bottom six levels of dissipative structures whereas statistical modeling can work with two additional levels of ontological complexity. At the extreme end of modeling abstraction, historiographical modeling becomes more appropriate for dealing with the top seven levels of ontological complexity with the other three models occupying positions in between. Harvey and Reed provide the following guidelines: 1. Researchers should restrict predictive, statistical, and iconological models to those ontological levels in which they can legitimately treat collective social phenomena as statistically aggregates. 2. They can deploy structural, ideal typical or historiographical models with maximum effectiveness in those areas where predictive, statistical, and iconological patterns are least suited. 3. If researchers use predictive, statistical or iconological models to study norms, values, and idiographic or historical phenomena, they run the risk of reifying the social and cultural phenomena under investigation. 4. To the extent that chaos researchers exclusively employ structural, ideal typical or historiographical models to explain natural, biological, and ecological phenomena, they run the risk of committing a mythopoetic fallacy.¹⁸

Additionally, researchers who want to apply the critical social history approach to communication phenomena may find Harvey's (2002) sociological reading of critical-

¹⁸ Mythopoesis refers to the "tendency in humanist research to mistakenly treat obdurate facts of nature as though they were purely discretionary human constructions" (Harvey & Reed, 1996, p. 315).

realist philosopher Roy Bhaskar's Transformation Model of Social Action appealing. Harvey has transformed the TMSA (see Archer, Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson & Norrie, 1998) to fit critical sociological inquiry by incorporating George Simmel's social psychological model of self-cultivation and chaos/complexity theory. From the perspective of nonlinear dynamics, Harvey sees the self-as-process as "an evolving flow of dispositional energies, feeding back on itself and its [irreversible] productions, and being realized over time in a set of concrete historical acts" (p. 186). The dialectics of social reproduction and the dialectics of self-cultivation are but two sides of the same coin.

2. Potential of World-Systems Approach

Only a few communication scholars have used the world system approach for analyzing communication phenomena (e.g., Gunaratne, 2002b; McPhail, 2002). Some have found fault with the world-systems approach because it presumably took "for granted the immorality of capitalism and the need to move toward a world socialism—political assumptions that required reasoned support in academic discourse."¹⁹ However, such criticism ignores the different schools of thought that inhabit the world-systems approach. One school of thought asserts that capitalism, far from being an ideological or political concept, represents the method in which the world economy has operated for at least the last 5,000 years (Frank & Gills, 1993).

So (1990) has done an exhaustive analysis of the modernization, dependency, and world-system approaches while So and Chiu (1995) have used the world-system approach to explain the rise of East Asia. So (1990) says the world-system school has

¹⁹ Quote from an anonymous reviewer.

made a significant contribution by starting a new direction of research toward the study of cyclical movements of the world economy, the long waves of colonialism, and world labor movements although it has been criticized for reification, for neglect of historically specific development, and for stratification analysis. The world-system approach has also “offered a new orientation to the interpretation of major events in the 1970s, such as East Asian industrialization, the crisis of the socialist states, and the decline of the capitalist world-economy” (So, 1990, p. 262).

Communication researchers stand to benefit more by examining the fit of the world-systems approach to the theory of dissipative structures, and the associated characteristics of system openness, complexity, nonlinearity, and chaos. For a better understanding of how scholars can use systems thinking for conceptual clarity, we can turn to Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) who used the world-system approach (even though they lapse into linear thinking in open-system analysis).²⁰ They perceived the current world-system in terms of three structural constants: the capitalist world economy, the interstate system and the world order, and a core-periphery hierarchy. (Other researchers may look at the world-system from a different perspective. The use of the

²⁰ Linear relationships, however, are appropriate to analyze deterministic processes between bifurcations. Probabilistic processes are involved in the choice of the branches at bifurcation (see Wallerstein, 1999, p. 237). Mori and Kuramoto (1998) further clarify that dynamical system chaos displays two fundamentally different types of behavior: Deterministic, predictable motion characterizes short time scales whereas random, unpredictable motion characterizes long time scales (pp. vii-viii).

work of Boswell and Chase-Dunn in this essay does not necessarily signify endorsement.)

Elaborating on the *capitalist world economy*, Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) defined capitalism as "the accumulation of resources by means of exploitation in the production and sale of commodities for profit" (p. 20). They explained that "capitalist exploitation is an unequal exchange wherein capitalists extract income from economic exchanges solely because they hold legal title to productive assets" (p. 20). *Primary exploitation*, they said, took the form of profit—an unequal exchange with labor wherein the capitalists appropriated all the "value added" in production, net of wages. *Secondary exploitation* took the form of rent and interest.

Describing the second constant, *the interstate system and the world order*, Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) asserted that "a system of sovereign states is ... fundamental to the origins and reproduction of the capitalist world economy," and that "capital accumulation has always involved political power and coercion" (p. 24). They asserted that *world order* was encoded in treaties and international organizations whereas *world polity* operated more at the cognitive level [because] the latter implied shared values as in the case of those who adhered to the major world religions. *World order* had a greater realist emphasis on formal agreements based on geopolitical power interests. However, transforming the world system, rather than just reforming it, would mean a change in the *world polity* (meaning, in terms of Prigogine's theory, the emergence of a new dissipative structure).

Referring to the third constant, *a hierarchy of core and periphery*, Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) said this hierarchy reflected three dimensions of inequality: *power*,

dependency, and *productivity*. Former empires made up the core zone. Former colonies of the core powers mostly made up the periphery. States that were more stable and economically more developed than those in the periphery constituted the semiperiphery. Transnational corporations' investment produced less economic growth than domestic capital because TNCs had fewer links to domestic suppliers or customers. Because the core countries completely dominated the world economy, they argued, discussions of radically changing the system or of building socialism without core participation was pointless. (Although the authors have used this reasoning to illustrate part-whole interdetermination, they have overlooked the vital characteristic of a nonlinear, open system: the probability of a small perturbation or fluctuation at a bifurcation point that could produce startling structure-breaking effects.)

Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) explained that world-systemic *trends* and *cycles* constituted two other structural features in addition to the three definitional constants. They found five long-term *trends* that denoted "development": commodification, proletarianization, state formation, increased size of economic enterprises, and capitalization. They emphasized two systemic *cycles*—Kondratieff long wave and hegemonic sequence—while also drawing attention to political cycles and cycles related to economic globalization and the transnationalization of capital. Each K-wave of expansion built upon and superseded the previous period. Hegemonic phases were followed by multicentric periods.

Within the theoretical framework summarized above, Boswell and Chase-Dunn (2000) went on to analyze world revolutions and the political economy of socialism, the revolutions of 1989, the spiral of capitalism and socialism, and the future of the world

system. In terms of Harvey and Reed's modeling/ontology matrix, the authors were focusing on the upper hierarchy of ontological complexity coupled with more abstract levels of modeling. Although they used quantitative analyses to document their "narrative," they avoided iconological modeling. Their approach demonstrates how qualitatively inclined scholars can productively contribute to the study of complex systems.

Baker (1993) combined the elements of nonlinear dynamics with those of the world-system paradigm to construct a provocative sociological theory. World-system theorists presumed competitive capital accumulation to be the motor force of the world system that engendered centers and peripheries. Baker presumed the "continuous exchange of energy and information between the elements of different spheres of reality" (p. 136) to be the motor force that produced centers and peripheries. By conceptualizing individuals and human collectivities, including cultures and nations, as *autopoietic* (self-maintaining) *dissipative* (environmentally dependent) structures whose essential features involved transformation of *energy* and release of *entropy*, Baker elevated elements of the world-system paradigm to encompass nonlinear dynamics. Baker used the term *centering* to describe the various centripetal strategies that humans, individually and collectively, used "to bring the world into their orbit of control" (p. 139). Centering was an "attractor" that created order by funneling energy—material goods, services, personnel—and information toward itself and disorder by peripheralizing its environment. However, the accumulated entropic effect would, "at some point or other, lead to sudden change" (p. 141). Researchers can use Baker's innovative framework to investigate communication systems.

IV. Conclusions

1. Communication field should accommodate the move toward establishing a common East-West (humanocentric) epistemology befitting our global commons.

Nature has confounded Newtonian science, which, over the last three centuries, tried to reduce all natural and social processes to a neat set of universal laws. Prigogine and Stengers (1984) assert that the physical sciences “are moving from deterministic, reversible processes to stochastic and irreversible ones” (p. 177). Thus, “We are probably only at the beginning of new directions of research” (p. 179). The new science recognizes some fundamental elements of Eastern philosophy that rationalist science set aside as myths, e.g., that (a) the components of dissipative systems are interdependent, (b) the whole is more than the sum of the parts, and (c) order emerges out of chaos spontaneously. Shimizu (1990) says the principle of self-organization enables the connection of Oriental thoughts to Western thoughts. Referring specifically to Chinese philosophy, Jones and Culliney (1998) assert that the roots of the essential ideas of the science of complexity are found within the social ordering principle of *li* (rites/decorum) in Confucius’s *Analects*.

Prigogine and Stengers refer to a fascinating dialogue between Einstein and Tagore, the Indian poet, in 1931. When Einstein emphasized that science had to be independent of the existence of any observer (thereby denying the reality of time as irreversibility), Tagore countered that even if absolute truth could exist, it would be inaccessible to the human mind. Prigogine and Stengers observe, “Curiously enough, the present evolution of science is running in the direction stated by the great Indian poet” (p.

293). They go on to speculate on the possibility of a synthesis of Western and Eastern epistemology:

We believe that we are heading toward a new synthesis, a new naturalism.

Perhaps we will eventually be able to combine the Western tradition, with its emphasis on experimentation and quantitative formulations, with a tradition as the Chinese one, with its view of a spontaneous, self-organizing world. (Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, p. 22)

Thus, a common East-West epistemology means the combination of Western and Eastern traditions to explain how the universe and its component elements operate.

Western science arose in the 17th century “in opposition to the biological model of a spontaneous and autonomous organization of natural beings”—a model that is consistent with Eastern thought. Prigogine’s work has established that the “new” thermodynamic model can add to the earlier biological model through focusing on a system’s asymptotic behavior and explain how positive feedback can produce unpredictable massive changes at a bifurcation point. As explained in the introduction, this essay points out the need for co-existence between the “old” and the “new” sciences, as much as between hard science and social science.

2. The study of complex systems places the hard sciences, the soft sciences, and humanities (including philosophy) on the same plane.

Wallerstein (1999) says that Prigogine “has reunited social science and natural science ... on the inverted basis that physical activity can be seen as a process of creativity and innovation” (p. 237). Wallerstein adds that the science of complexity has erased “the distinction between nomothetic and idiographic epistemologies” (p. 166).

Prigogine and Stengers (1984) clearly explain that the ideas of instability, of fluctuation, diffuse into the social science. They say that

Societies are immensely complex systems involving a potentially enormous number of bifurcations exemplified by the variety of cultures that have evolved in the relatively short span of human history. We know that such systems are highly sensitive to fluctuations. This leads to both hope and a threat: hope, since even small fluctuations may grow and change the overall structure. As a result, individual activity is not doomed. On the other hand, this is also a threat, since in our universe the security of stable, permanent rules seems gone forever.

(Prigogine & Stengers, 1984, pp. 312-313)

Skeptics may argue that although the notion of open systems associated with the theory of dissipative structures appears to reflect a transfer of thinking from the natural to the social sciences, the new approach once again paints the study of the social on the model of the physical. Hence, they may say, there is little difference between a "hard positivism" from the Vienna Circle in the 1920s and the "new" systems theory. This view, however, fails to comprehend the interdependence of the two approaches as much as all other elements in dissipative systems. Perceptive theorizing from the historical, philosophical, and behavioral approaches can produce models that "hard" science could put to test at the appropriate ontological level without running the risks of reification or mythopoesis.

3. The field of communication, including journalism and mass communication, should recognize the new challenges that have emerged because of the shortcomings of the nomothetic Newtonian model

The emergence of cultural studies ↔ critical methodologies, postmodernism, postcolonial studies, and feminist studies has posed another challenge to nomothetic empiricism. Wallerstein (1999) says that these challenges have placed the “study of social reality within an integrated view of the study of all material reality” pointing toward “social scientization” of all knowledge (pp. 190-91). If that were so, the soft sciences (with which the field of communication mostly identifies itself) have the potential to even lead the hard sciences. Critics may argue that post-modern thought is in no way supportive of the kind of systems theory reflected in the Prigogine model, not just the classical model. However, the higher ontological levels of dissipative systems, which defy empirical measurement, call for speculative thinking from all—post-modernist or otherwise. Post-modernists have posed no challenge to the “new” science of complexity because both approaches are relatively new. The emerging equality of the humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences should help build a common epistemology. Because social sciences originated in Europe during the so-called Enlightenment, their concepts and theories showed a natural Eurocentric bias. Communication scholars can take a leading role in transforming Eurocentrism to humanocentrism by incorporating the epistemology, ontology, and history of all civilizations. The implications arising from the work of the Brussels school, Wallerstein (1999) asserts, raise “questions about the very objective of precision and about the presumed correlation between precision and validity (or even reliability)” (p. 166). That’s a matter scholars should think

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
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Figure 1: Modeling/Ontology Matrix

Modeling Strategies for Studying Chaotic Social Systems:
 Arrayed by Decreasing Determinist Presuppositions (horizontal axis) and by Levels of System Specificity (vertical axis)

Hierarchy of Ontological Complexity in Social System

- Process II: Societal evolution via historical modes of production
- Process I: Class struggle. Conflict over cultural hegemony
- 12. Values II: Hegemonic culture & subcultural bases of resistance
- 11. Values I: Struggle for hegemonic vs. subterranean world views
- 10. Norms II: Allocation of relative power among social institutions
- 9. Norms I: Personal conformity to general hegemonic standards
- 8. Roles II: Intraorganization allocation of roles & resources
- 7. Roles I: Distribution of material rewards & esteem
- 6. Facilities II: Technical division of labor in productive sphere
- 5. Facilities I: Sociotechnical infrastructure of organization
- 4. Ecological organization of institutional time & space
- 3. Ecological organization of local biotic community
- 2. Biological organization as a series of assisted bifurcations
- 1. Determinant regularities of the physical universe



Source: Harvey and Reed (1996)
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Acculturation and Media Usage

Among the Chinese Students In the US

Abstract: The purpose of this study is to extend the Uses-and-Gratifications approach to a cross-cultural context, focusing on the relationship between need for acculturation, the acculturative motives and the media use among Chinese students in the US. Eight-four Chinese students have been chosen as the subjects. The data show that need for acculturation is correlated to motives of acculturation in both TV watching and Internet use. The acculturative motive is correlated to watching TV news program and using American news websites and BBS.

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**Submitted to the International Communication Division
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Introduction

Approximately 500,000 international students attend US universities and the number has grown steadily over the past decade (Institute of International Education, 1996). The emergence and increase of this special group have attracted the attention of the academic. One of the focuses of studies on this group is how and to what extent international students are adapting to the new cross-cultural environment (e.g., Defleur & Cho, 1957; Dato-on, 2000; Fathi, A, 1973; Katona-Apte & Apte, 1980; Kim, 1980; Lee & Fse, 1994; Mohan, 1980; Saran & Leonhard-Spark, 1980; Sethi & Giglio, 1988). The purpose of this study is to extend the understanding of Uses-and-gratifications approach to a cross-cultural social context, focusing on the relationship between need for acculturation, the pattern of media uses among the Chinese students in the US.

Acculturation and Media Usage

Many scholars in various academic disciplines have examined the complex process of acculturation. The conceptualization can be traced back to the turn of last century (Padilla, 1980). The process of adapting or adjusting to a new cultural environment can be termed as acculturation (e.g., Dato-on, 2000; Lee, 1994), cross-cultural adaptation (e.g., A., 2001; Shah, 1991), cross-cultural adjustment (e.g., Jou & Fukada, 1996; Takeuchi, et al., 2002), etc.. The multi-disciplinary and cross-disciplinary characteristics of the study of acculturation have made the definition of the concept diverse and inconsistent, which results in difficulty to apply the concept in further research.

The most often cited definition of acculturation is constructed by Kim. According to Kim (1988: 37-38), acculturation “refers to the process of change over time that takes places within individuals who have completed their primacy socialization process in one culture and then come

into continuous, prolonged, first-hand contact with a new and unfamiliar culture.” In this definition, acculturation is treated as a process instead of a stagnant status, and the contact with a new and unfamiliar culture is the primary stimulus of the process.

Individuals’ own cultural identity and their relationship with the new cultural context are two important issues in the process of acculturation. Berry (1991) argues that these two important factors will decide whether or not one’s own cultural identity and customs should be preserved, and whether relations with other groups in the larger society should be sought. Based on the different acculturation strategies toward these two issues, Berry constructs a four-fold model: “(a) Integration: valuing one’s cultural identity as well as relations with others, (b) Assimilation: valuing relations with others while devaluing one’s cultural identity, (c) Separation: valuing one’s cultural identity while devaluing relations with others, and (d) Marginalization: devaluing one’s cultural identity as well as relations with others.” (Berry, 1991:25). According to Berry, in these four strategies, assimilation and integration require the highest need for acculturation and result in the least acculturative stress.

Learning to live with the unfamiliarity and uncertainty of the new social/cultural context has become one of the central challenges for the newcomers. Taft (1977:134) argues that “there are certain universal human needs and modes of functioning that must be satisfied in all culture.” Therefore, in this research, “the need for acculturation” is defined as, in the cross-cultural context, in order to reduce the cross-cultural stress and to function properly in the new society, the newcomers have a need to adjust to the new society.

Laroche et al.’s (1997:37) divided the process of acculturation into four dimensions of: “(1) host language fluency and usage, (2) host society interaction frequency and depth vis a vis home society interaction, (3) culturally linked habits and customs, and (4) host media utilization

and preference.” According to these four dimensions, individuals’ difference in language ability, level of host-social interaction, and host media usage are vital in deciding their needs of acculturation.

Newcomers’ participation in the new society is closely related with their communication behavior. “The extent to which members of a minority group become acculturated to the way of life of the dominant group depends upon the extent of their participation in the communication channels of their rules” (Shibutani & Kwan, 1965: 573). Exploring the complex process of communication between newcomers and the host cultural environment, Ruben’s (1975) parameter of human communication provides a useful and comprehensive framework. In this parameter, each person’s social communication activity is conceptualized in two closely interrelated, inseparable communication process—interpersonal communication and mass communication.

Mass communication theorists have contributed a number of theories and propositions that bear significant implications for the relationship between mass communication and acculturation. Gordon (1974:13) conceptualized the function of mass communication in socialization: “the media’s major socialization influence is on (1) the images and stereotypes we possess of our environments, our social system; (2) the long-term value systems we possess; and (3) what we view as priority concern—by way of the media’s agenda-setting function”. Also, Lasswell’s (1964: 51) famous formulation of the mass communication process recognizes three major functions: “(1) surveillance of the environment, (2) correlation of the components of society in making response to the environment, and (3) transmission of the social inheritance.” Both Gordon’s and Laswell’s views point that mass media have a acculturative function “by

transmitting not only topical events but also societal values, norms of behavior, and traditional perspectives for interpreting the environment.” (Kim, 1988:114).

Mass communication activities (particularly the use of mass media) have been observed to promote the acculturation process of newcomers in many studies (e.g., Gordon, 1974; Kim, 1988; Lee & Tse, 1994; Shah, 1991; Subervi-Velez, 1986). Mass media have been proven to play an important role, especially “in the initial stage of acculturation” (Kim, 1979). During this stage, when newcomers still have not enough host communication competence to be functional in their interpersonal communication in the host cultures. The frustration and stress in the initial direct contact with the natives, especially the direct negative feedback might be too overwhelming to the newcomers. It is more likely that the newcomers will resort to less direct, less personal and virtually less pressure mass communication, in which the newcomers have more freedom and could get more sources about the host culture. Ryu’s (1976) study found that the international students relied on the mass media as important sources of acculturation and the host media has been greatly used especially among the new arrivals.

This research will focus on the sojourners, especially Chinese students, the biggest group of international students in the US. The primary research question is:

What is the relationship between the Chinese students’ need of acculturation and their media usage in the US?

Uses-And-Gratifications Perspective

Reece & Palmgreen (2000) states that the strength of a sojourner’s motivation to acquire the information is an important mediating variable between the need for acculturation and media

usage. Thus, the study of the relationship between acculturation and media uses can fall into the theoretical framework of uses and gratifications (U&G).

U&G is one of the most useful theories for the explanation of media uses patterns. According to Katz, et al. (1974), the use-and-gratification approach emerged because of the discovered inadequacy of the older traditional, simple, direct effect, and the stimulus-response models of the communication process. The new approach sought to explain how people use media to gratify their needs, understand motives for media behavior and identify functions and consequences that follow from needs, motives, and behavior (Rubin, 2002: 526).

The main theoretical contribution it provided is an assumption that the context of social condition is essential for a comprehension of the behavior of audience and individuals. Social-structure variables influence the matrix of values, need, belief, and social circumstance that models media behavior. At the same time, the audience is conceived as very “active”, and an important part of mass media use is assumed to be “goal directed” (Rubin, 2002).

Katz et all (1974: 20) provides a useful framework of U&G which including several principal elements: “(1) the psychological and social origin of (2) needs, which generate (3) expectations (4) of the mass media or other sources, which lead to (5) differential patterns of media exposure (or engagement in other activities), resulting in (6) need gratifications and (7) other consequences perhaps mostly unintended ones”.

As mentioned above, in the cross-cultural context, the newcomers manifest the need for acculturation. Based on the literature review, it is unclear, however, whether general acculturation needs are related to newcomers’ more specific motives for using host mass media. “The acculturative motive in media usage” is another important variable in this research.

Two concepts in the U&G approach, gratification sought and gratification obtained, need clarification first. A number of media scholars stressed the need to distinguish the motives for media usage or gratification sought (GS) and the gratification perceived to be obtained (GO) (Greenberg, 1974; Katz et al. 1973). In this research, the focus is on what kind of expectations the Chinese students have in their media usage; that means the gratification sought is the concentration. According to the definition of gratification sought—"a particular gratification will be sought from a medium if this medium is perceived to have some expected attributes or if the medium is very positive evaluated" (Palmgreen & Rayburn 1985: 27), "the acculturative motive in media usage" is conceptualized as the expectation of getting a broad range of the host culture elements including its economics, social, political and aesthetic from the media usage.

Not only the media types, but also the media content are observed in this research. Though many studies have "controlled" for types of medium by investigating the relationship for gratifications to content choice within a single medium (e.g. Rubin & Rubin, 1982), Lometti et al. (1977) have noted the difference in medium type and content characteristics. Both television and Internet, which could be accessible by the Chinese students both in the US and in China, are of the interest here. In the cross-cultural context, because of its dominant host cultural content, television has been regarded as one important mass media in the process of acculturation (Alman, 1993; Palmgreen & Reece, 2000; Rizk, 1986). In this research, given the increasing influence of Internet on society, especially its easy accessibility and important role in Chinese students daily life, Internet uses are also taken into the consideration of the function of media in the process of acculturation. On the other hand, the no-boundary attribute of Internet gives media users more freedom to gratify specific their need, especially to gratify different need of acculturation in the cross-cultural context. The specific media content, such as news program,

entertainment program, is also emphasized in this research. Based on the Laroche et al.'s (1997) conceptualization of the dimensions of acculturation as mentioned before, the language used and the primary cultural content in media are applied as the criteria to classify the media into American-based media (i.e., American-based TV and American-based Internet) and Chinese-based media (i.e., Chinese-based TV and Chinese-based Internet).

Hypotheses

Drawing from literature review and the research questions, the following hypotheses emerge:

1. The higher the acculturation need of the Chinese students in the US, the higher their acculturative motives in media usage.
2. The higher the acculturation motives in the Chinese students' media usage in the US, the more frequently they use America-based media.
 - 2a. The higher acculturation motives in the Chinese students' media usage in the US, the more frequent they watch American TV.
 - 2b. The higher the acculturation motives in the Chinese students' media usage in the US, the more frequent they use American-based Internet.
3. The higher the acculturation need of the Chinese students in the US, the more frequent they use America-based media.
 - 3a. The higher the acculturation need of the Chinese students in the US, the more frequent they watch American TV.
 - 3b. The higher the acculturation need of the Chinese students in the US, the more frequent they use America-based Internet.

Research Method

A cross-sectional survey was conducted in the sample of 84 Chinese students currently attending a midwest university. The sample was a convenience sample selected from more than 1,000 Chinese students and scholars on campus.

A pretest of the inventory was conducted among three Chinese graduate students on campus. Revision of the wording and structure of the questionnaire were performed. The final revised questionnaire was delivered to the Chinese student population through four major methods, as follows: 1) in person distribution at several Chinese student social events; 2) in person distribution through interpersonal networks; 3) email distribution using personal email lists; and 4) email distribution using the email list of the Friendship Association of Chinese Students and Scholars of the University.

The questionnaire was conducted by applying a common procedure in Uses & Gratifications research. It included the questions of: media use before and after Chinese students came to the US, need for acculturation, likelihood of going back to China, motives for viewing American television, motives for using the Internet, content of television watching, content of Internet use and demographic information.

Media use in China and the US were measured by a Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often). Questions covered the use of short wave and local radio, music, videos, movies, books, magazines, broadcast TV, cable TV, and the Internet.

Need for acculturation was measured by a 3-question index developed by Rizk (1986). The three questions were: 1) How interested are you in learning about the current political, economic, and social situations and issues within the United States? 2) How interested are you in

learning and understanding the ways American people behave and think? 3) How interested are you in making American friends? Responses were structured on the Likert scale.

Motives in media usage (see Table a) was measured by Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Motives of Television viewing were tested by a revised version of Rubin's (1983) Television Viewing Motives Scale (TVMS) by Reece and Palmgreen (2000), including acculturation, diversion, pass time, and escape. Motives of Internet use were measured by a revised version of Papacharissi and Rubin's (2000) Internet Motives Scale (IMS), including acculturation, diversion, pass time, escape, interpersonal utility, information seeking, and convenience.

Program preference was also measured by Likert scale, indicating how often the Chinese students watched a particular type of TV programs, including local news, international news, comedy, Chinese language program, MTV, entertainment program, sports program, and movies. The preference content of Internet use was also measured, by classified into American news website, Chinese news website, American BBS and Chinese BBS.

Data Analysis

The study utilized the following statistical analyses: descriptive statistics, paired sample t-test, principal components analysis, and Pearson correlations. All the analyses of this study utilized the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

Results

Survey Sample Characteristics

Among the 84 respondents, there are 47 female students (56.0%) and 35 (41.7%) male students. The majority of the subjects came to the US in the last 1-3 years: eighteen (21.4%) of them are first year students, twenty-five (29.8%) of them are second year students, twenty-three (27.4%) are third year students, and sixteen (19%) subjects had been in the US for more than 3 years. Most of them are graduate level students with age ranging from 23-30. Among them there are 5 (6.0%) students in the range of 15-22-year-old, thirty-seven (44.0%) students are in the range of 23-26, twenty-nine (34.5%) students are in the range of 26-30, and eight (9.5%) students are in the range of 31-40. Twenty-seven subjects (32.1%) are currently seeking a master's degree. Forty subjects (47.6 %) are currently seeking a doctoral degree.

The Change of Media Usage by Type

The result of previous media use in China and current media use in the US showed change in the types of media the Chinese students used before and after they came to the US.

(Insert Table 1 about here)

Table 1 lists the mean of media use in China and in the US as well as the mean differences, t-values, degree of freedom and probability of significance. With an alpha of 0.05, the means differed significantly on all media types, except for the use of American music, American videos, online multimedia and online literature.

The media that significantly decreased are short wave radio, local radio, Chinese music, Chinese videos, Chinese movies, Chinese books, Chinese magazines, and Chinese newspapers. It is noticeable that the usage of both broadcast TV and cable TV are decreased significantly,

indicating that Chinese students are exposed to television less after they came to the US. The use of classrooms is also decreased significantly.

The types of media usage that significantly increased are American movies, American books, American magazines, and American newspapers. There is another significant increase email, instant messenger, online news and online literature.

Motives of Media Use

Motives for TV watching and Internet use were explained via principal components factor analysis (PCA), with varimax rotation, of the 10 TV viewing motive items and 16 Internet use motive items.

(Insert Table 2 & 3 about here)

The results of factor analysis showed that acculturative motives for both TV watching and Internet use are consistent. For both TV watching and Internet use, “I want to learn more about American culture”, “It helps me adjust to American society”, and “I want to improve my English” are three core items of acculturative motives (loading value > .78).

(Insert Table 4 about here)

According to paired t-test result in Table 4, all three of the core acculturative motives had a mean score significantly higher in TV watching than Internet use, including “I want to learn more about American culture.” (Δ Mean = .85, $p = .000$), “It helps me adjust to American society.” (Δ Mean = .78, $p = .000$), and “I want to improve my English.” (Δ Mean = 1.41, $p = .000$). This means that acculturative motives are stronger in TV watching.

The Chinese students watch TV more for finding out “what’s going on in America” (mean = 3.68) than finding out “what’s going on in China” (mean = 1.77), (Δ Mean = 1.89, p

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=.000; two-tailed); they use Internet more for finding out “what’s going on in China” (mean = 4.31) than for finding out “what’s going on in the US” (mean =3.61), (Δ Mean = .70, p = .000; two-tailed). The seeking of information of China and US are significantly important motives in Internet use.

(Insert Table 5& 6 about here)

The above result is further supported by one-sample t-test result in Table 5 and 6. According to Table 5, all acculturative motive items are identified as “strong motives” for TV watching. In Table 6, only “I want to find out what’s going on in US” is identified as “strong motives” in Internet use, and none of the core acculturative motive items are identified as strong.

From Table 6, it also shows that the Chinese students use Internet to connect with family and friends in China (mean = 4.08, p =.000), and find out what’s going on in China (mean = 4.31, p =.000).

Hypotheses Testing

Hypotheses 1: The higher the acculturation need of the Chinese students in the US, the higher acculturative motives of them in media usage.

Significant positive relationship was found between need for acculturation and acculturative motives for TV watching (r =.357, p = .001, one-tailed); there was also significant positive relationship between need for acculturation and acculturative motives for Internet use (r =.337, p =.001, one-tailed). Hypotheses 1 was supported, which means that when the acculturation need is higher, both acculturative motive for TV watching and Internet use were higher. There was also significantly positive relationship between acculturative motives for TV watching and Internet use (r = .305, p = .009, two-tailed).

Hypotheses 2: The higher acculturative motives in the Chinese students' media usage in the US, the more frequent they use American-based media.

Sub-hypothesis 2a: The higher acculturation motives in the Chinese student' media usage in the US, the more frequent they watch American TV.

Significant positive relationship was found between the frequency of watching local news and acculturative motives for TV watching ($r = .211$, $p = .039$, one-tailed); between international news and acculturative motives for TV watching ($r = .262$, $p = .013$, one-tailed); between comedy and acculturative motives for TV watching ($r = .195$, $p = .049$, one-tailed). No significant relationship was found between other types of TV program and the motives. The hypothesis was partially supported and need more exploration.

Sub-hypothesis 2b: The higher acculturation motives in the Chinese students' media usage in the US, the more frequent they use American-based Internet.

In general, the use of Chinese-based Internet was higher than the use of American-based Internet among the Chinese students. Their use of Chinese news web page is significantly more than their use of American news website ($\Delta \text{Mean} = 1.46$, $t = 8.689$, $p = .000$, two-tailed); the use Chinese BBS is significantly more than the use of American BBS ($\Delta \text{Mean} = 2.00$, $t = 11.142$, $p = .000$, two-tailed)

Significant positive relationship was found between using American News Website and acculturative motives for Internet use ($r = .263$, $p = .016$, two-tailed); also significant positive relationship between using American BBS and acculturative motives for Internet use ($r = .326$, $p = .003$, two-tailed). The hypothesis was supported by the above results, which means that the higher acculturation motives, the more frequent Chinese student use American-based Internet.

Hypotheses 3: The higher acculturation need of the Chinese students in the US, the more frequent they use American-based media.

Sub-hypothesis 3a: The higher acculturation need of the Chinese student in the US, the more frequent they watch American TV.

(Insert Table 7 about here)

There is no significance between acculturation need and the frequency of watching all types of TV program, and the hypotheses is not supported.

Sub-hypothesis 3b: The higher acculturation need of Chinese student in the US, the more frequent they use American-based Internet.

(Insert Table 8 about here)

Significant positive relationship was found using between American new website use and need for acculturation ($r = .225$, $p = .041$, two-tailed).

Discussion

This study introduces the perspective of Uses-and-Gratification to the process of acculturation. The results of study provide a detailed explanation of the relationship between need for acculturation, acculturative motives and the media usage among the Chinese students in the US.

First, the result of data analysis shows that the media use has changed in media type, after the Chinese students came to the US. Generally speaking, the use of traditional media (e.g., radio and television) and Chinese-based media has significantly decreased, and the use of Internet and American-based media has significantly increased. The change of media availability might be one important reason. While it is still possible for Chinese students to get some Chinese books,

magazines, music, or movies from library or from friends, the amount of these media is relative small. This difficulty of accessing Chinese media in the United States restricts the use of Chinese media. In contrast to the decrease of Chinese media, the availability of American media and Internet has highly increased. It is much easier for Chinese students to access Internet both at school and at home in the United States. The change of the language context (from China to the US) and the decrease of individuals' language competency (Chinese vs. English) may explain the decrease of the use of TV. "Strangers must be both motivated to receive messages (in mass media) and capable of understanding them." (Kim, 1988: 117). The English education in China leads to the Chinese students more skilled in reading and writing English, in stead of spoken and listening comprehension. It might be more comfortable and more understandable for the Chinese students to get information from Internet than from television.

Second, the testing of hypothesis 1 shows that there is a significant relationship between the need of acculturation and the motive of acculturation in media use. "The media uses can be conceived as goal directed." (Palmgreen et al., 1985: 14). This means that the stress from being in a new social context and the need for adaptation to the new society may result in Chinese students' motive of acculturation in media use, and "The newcomers are keenly aware of the vital role that mass media play in their overall function in the host society." (Shibuyani, 1965: 537).

Third, acculturative motives have been found stronger in TV watching than Internet use, and significant relationship has been found in acculturative motive and TV watching. TV watching has been treated as better way to get information of American culture, to adjust to the American society and to improve English, than Internet use. Almost totally host-cultural content, along with its requirement in higher competence in language, TV watching needs the Chinese

students should be acculturatively motivated enough to extensively consume it with American culture.

On the other hand, data show that the Chinese students use Internet to connect with family and friends in China by email. Comparing to TV watching, Internet use is a way “to find what’s going on in China” rather than “to find what’s going on in America.” Significant positive relationship also has been found between both American news website and American BBS use, and acculturative motives for Internet use and need for acculturation. Given its nature as a global media, Internet can transform the geographic boundaries and gives a virtual place where people could be engaged in social interaction.. In the cross-cultural context, Internet with different languages and cultural content could provide more flexibility to the newcomers, who could keep in touch with the home culture, or have high interaction with the host culture, based on their different need for acculturation.

Finally, the usage of the television news and Internet news have significant relationship with the Chinese students’ acculturative motives and need for acculturation. It confirms with some other research’s finding that “exposure to the content of information-oriented media such as newspapers, magazines and television news has been observed to be particularly with adaptation when compared to other media that are primarily entertainment oriented.” (Kim, 1988: 117). The underlying reason might be that, the information-oriented media content is far more associated with all aspects of the host culture including its economic, social, political and aesthetic dimensions, which is the necessity for the acculturation process.

The major limitation of this study is that the relatively small sample was restricted to Chinese students at one university in the US. It is clearly acknowledged that such a sample is not representative of the population of the large, or diverse group of Chinese student in the US.

Acculturation and Media Usage among the Chinese students in the US

In this research, more attention has been paid to host media than home-cultural media. In the future study, the relationship between the acculturation and use of host media while still use home-cultural media could be an interesting concentration in the future study. Future study also could focus on the antecedent of gratification sought (GS), such as personality and psychological characteristics in the cross-cultural context. What's more, the influence from the interaction between interpersonal communication and mass communication is also a very interesting topic. Combining this with gratification obtained (GO), what kind of perceived gratification the newcomers could get from their media usage and whether it could help them adapt properly in their interpersonal communication, will provide a dynamic system of acculturation.

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Table A. Motives for TV watching and Internet use

TV Watching Motives	Internet Use Motives
<i>Acculturation</i>	<i>Acculturation</i>
I want to learn more about American Culture	I want to learn more about American Culture
It helps me adjust to American society	It helps me adjust to American society
I want to improve my English	I want to improve my English
<i>Diversion</i>	<i>Diversion</i>
It relaxes me	It relaxes me
It entertains me	It entertains me
<i>Escape</i>	<i>Escape</i>
I want to forget about school, work, or other things	I want to forget about school, work, or other things
<i>Companionship</i>	<i>Companionship</i>
There is no one else to talk to	There is no one else to talk to
<i>Surveillance</i>	<i>Surveillance</i>
I want to find out what is going on in US	I want to find out what is going on in US
I want to find out what is going on in China	I want to find out what is going on in China
<i>Escape</i>	<i>Escape</i>
I have nothing better to do	I have nothing better to do
	<i>Interpersonal Utility</i>
	I want to communicate with friends, family in China
	I want to belong to a group
	I want to participate in discussion
	It's convenient to communicate with others
	<i>Information Seeking</i>
	It is a new way to do research
	<i>Convenience</i>
	It is cheaper

Table 1: Means values of media usage in China and the US and paired t-tests

	China	US	ΔX	t	df	P value
Short-wave radio	2.43	1.47	0.96	6.796	82	0.000
Local radio	3.55	3.13	0.42	2.915	83	0.005
Chinese music	3.83	3.05	0.79	6.195	83	0.000
American music	3.06	3.32	-0.27	-1.917	80	0.059
Chinese video	3.71	2.52	1.22	8.422	82	0.000
American video	3.35	3.39	-0.00	-0.224	81	0.823
American movies	2.3	2.77	-0.47	-3.039	82	0.003
Chinese movies	2.88	1.36	1.53	12.581	82	0.000
Chinese books	4.37	2.43	1.94	16.146	83	0.000
American books	3.1	3.96	-0.87	-5.738	82	0.000
Chinese magazines	4.3	1.71	2.58	19.083	82	0.000
American magazines	2.62	3.36	-0.7	-4.278	81	0.000
Chinese newspapers	4.33	2.21	2.12	15.47	83	0.000
American newspapers	2.41	3.51	-1.1	-7.721	82	0.000
Broad cast TV	3.76	3.21	0.55	3.422	82	0.001
Cable TV	3.74	3.14	0.58	2.542	82	0.013
Email	4.41	4.82	-0.43	-3.378	81	0.001
Instant messenger	2.52	3.11	-0.58	-3.166	80	0.002
Chat room	2.01	1.7	0.31	2.488	82	0.015
Online forum	2.23	2.43	-0.17	-1.329	82	0.188
Online news	3.56	4.19	-0.7	-4.166	80	0.000
Online multimedia	2.6	2.88	-0.28	-1.888	82	0.063
Online literature	2.9	3.35	-0.44	-2.596	80	0.011

Table 2: Factor analysis on TV viewing motives

Questionnaire format: "In the US, how important is each of the following reasons in your TV watching?"			
	Mean	Reliability	Loading
Factor 1 Acculturation		0.80	
I want to learn more about American culture	3.55		.867
It helps me adjust to American society	3.31		.876
I want to improve my English	4.01		.791
I want to find out what is going on in US	3.68		.610
Factor 2 Diversion		0.66	
There is no one else to talk to	1.81		.845
I have nothing better to do	2.05		.840
Factor 3 Entertainment		0.22	
It entertains me	4.44		.675
I can find out what is going on in China	1.77		.751
Factor 4 Relaxation		0.14	
It relaxes me	3.97		.876
I want to forget about school, work, or other things	2.21		.537

Table 3: Factor analysis on Internet use motives

Questionnaire format: "In the US, how important is each of the following reasons in your Internet use?"			
	Mean	Reliability	Loading
Factor 1 Acculturation		0.80	
I want to learn more about American culture	2.75		.809
It helps me adjust to American society	2.54		.867
I want to improve my English	2.67		.788
I want to find out what is going on in US	3.61		.592
I want to participate in discussion	2.28		.542
Factor 2 Diversion		0.73	
I want to forget about school, work or other things	2.17		.868
I have nothing better to do	1.98		.763
I want to belong to a group	1.94		.660
Factor 3 Communication		0.41	
I want to communicate with friends and family in China	4.08		.757
I want to find out what is going on in China	4.31		.702
It relaxes me	3.55		.556
It is convenient to communicate with others	4.09		.607
Factor 4 Convenience		0.51	
It is cheaper	3.59		.727
It is a new way to do research	3.81		.816
Factor 5 Entertainment		0.12	
It entertains me	3.76		.490
There is no one else to talk to	2.57		

Table 4: Difference in acculturation motives between TV and Internet use Paired sample t-test

Acculturation motive items	Mean TV	Mean Internet	Δ Mean	t-value	p
I want to learn more about American culture	3.55	2.75	.85	5.826	.000
It helps me adjust to American society	3.31	2.54	.78	5.479	.000
I want to improve my English	4.01	2.67	1.41	8.613	.000
I want to find out what is going on in US	3.68	3.61	6.67E-02	.413	.681

Table 5: Strong TV watching motives using One-sample T-test

Motive items	Mean	Δ Mean	t-value	P (two-tailed)
Acculturation				
I want to learn more about American culture	3.55	.55	4.384	.000
It helps me adjust to American society	3.31	.31	2.556	.013
I want to improve my English	4.01	1.01	8.490	.000
I want to find out what is going on in US	3.68	.68	5.453	.000
Other				
It entertains me	4.44	1.44	3.502	.001
It relaxes me	3.97	.97	8.797	.000

Table 6: Strong Internet use motives using One-sample T-test

Motive items	Mean	Δ Mean	t-value	P (two-tailed)
Acculturation				
I want to find out what's going on in US	3.61	.61	4.516	.000
Other				
It entertains me	3.76	.76	6.261	.000
It relaxes me	3.55	.55	4.554	.000
I want to communicate with friend, family in China	4.08	1.08	9.027	.000
I want to find our what is going on in China	4.31	1.31	14.363	.000
It is convenient to communicate with others	4.09	1.09	9.516	.000
It is cheaper	3.59	.59	4.238	.000
It is a new way to do research	3.81	.81	6.107	.000

Table 7: Correlation Matrix of need for acculturation, TV watching motives and usage

	Year in US	Need for Acculturation	Acculturation motives for TV watching	Local News	National News	Comedy	Chinese Program	MTV	Entertainment	Sports
Year in US										
Need for Acculturation	.020									
Acculturation Motive TV	-.146	.357**								
Local news	.120	.013	.211*							
National news	.224*	.106	.262*	.107						
Comedy	.128	.123	.195*	.363**	-.002					
Chinese TV	-.017	.138	.051	-.150	.226*	-.292**				
MTV	-.069	.114	.076	-.094	.090	.056	.198*			
Entertainment	-.029	-.122	.049	.222*	-.108	.306**	-.073	.120		
Sports	.072	-.004	.046	.079	.070	-.002	.064	.095	.106	
Movies	.095	.032	.123	-.089	.317**	.129	.126	.312**	.269*	.071

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed)

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed)

Table 8: Correlation Matrix of need for acculturation, Internet use motives and content

	Years in US	Need for Acculturation	Acculturation Motives Internet	American News website	Chinese News website	American BBS
Year in US						
Need for Acculturation	.020					
Accul. Motives Internet	.012	.337**				
American News website	-.087	.225*	.263*			
Chinese News website	-.081	.065	.090	.342**		
American BBS	-.142	.069	.326**	.402**	.149	
Chinese BBS	-.096	.085	-.189	-.056	.265*	.108

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Tnt'l

**Images of Islam:
Exemplification as Elegance in the Post-9/11 Works
of Thomas Friedman**

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There is therefore in perception the charm of an infinity of images . . .

--Jean-Paul Sartre

On March 26, six days after the war in Iraq began, Thomas Friedman's Searching for the Roots of 9/11 aired on the Discovery channel. One of the most remarkable things about this documentary was its varied portraits of Muslims expressing opinions and giving voice to emotions elicited by the September 11 attack on New York's Twin Towers and the Pentagon, as well as by the general plight of the Arab peoples and the troubled relationship between America and the Arab world. Of the many penetrating interviews and profiles, three Muslims in particular linger in one's memory: Dyab Abou Jahjah, a young political leader in Belgium; Ali Salem, a playwright in Cairo; and Wisam Rochalina, an eighteen-year-old female boarding-school student in Jakarta. The power of these images—their faces, garb, words, and gestures—haunts us at least in part because of the urgency of Friedman's mission, but also, undeniably, because of their vivid nature and personal drama.

Each speaks in slightly broken English, simply and compellingly. Says Dyab, whose youthful face bears an incongruously cool, detached expression:

“We all wanted to forget these scenes—we didn’t want to see people jumping out of windows. . . . That was very, very disturbing. We kind of wanted to focus on the fact that America got a punch in the nose.” And Wisam, her bright eyes full of hope: “America is like on the top of the world right now. So if I go to the best universities, then I will get the best education.” And Salem, speaking with extreme care and deliberation: “We are partners in the future of this planet, of this village. We have to teach these people that to our family on this one planet, there is no he and she and you and me. There is we. . . . We have to live with others. We can’t live alone—we can’t . . .”

These are the final words of the film—and the viewer is left with a sense not only of Friedman’s anger and bewilderment, but of his compassion and his desire to understand. Mostly, though, we are left with a sense of the complex and varied nature of the Muslim worldview.

These same individuals appear in Thomas Friedman’s op-ed columns published in the New York Times since 9/11, among many other figures from the Arab world whom Friedman variously describes as friends, acquaintances, professionals, authorities, leaders, and outlaws. The force of their presence, in both the documentary and the writings of this three-time Pulitzer-prize-winning journalist, is undeniable. Friedman’s works since 9/11 speak volumes about the Arab world and our relationship to it and very probably come closer than any other single source to probing the complex heart of the causes that led to the attack.

Although others have argued that the New York Times' portrayal of the Islamic world since 9/11 has been slanted (e.g., Brennen and Duffy 2003), and though many consider Friedman's stance on the Iraqi war controversial (he has long endorsed the war, with allied support), his columns nevertheless exhibit a deep understanding of, and respect for, the Arab world.

His works, however, at least for the purposes of this paper, also speak to a different, if more modest, problem—as do all journalistic works that use vivid, well-wrought images to such powerful effect. The aim of this analysis is not to evaluate the truth behind Friedman's images—they speak for themselves—but to evaluate a mass-communications theory based on the premise that such portraits and examples are by their nature flawed and deceptive. It is a question that many who are familiar with exemplification theory and some of its more worthwhile conclusions cannot help but find troubling.

One of the basic premises of exemplification theory is that examples are, by their nature, distorted versions of “truth.” The initial articulation of the theory by Dolf Zillmann in 1999 compares examples unfavorably to information that is example-free—that is, “base-rate information,” otherwise defined as “reliable, quantitative information” (70). The implication is that examples are necessarily unreliable: they are “bound to be less than perfect,” and because a “certain degree of imprecision is unavoidable” (74), and the “emotionality” that accompanies vivid or dramatic imagery is to be expected, examples are more often than not

“qualitatively distorted” (70). Because examples are products of a writer’s choices—or “idiosyncrasies,” as Zillmann chooses to describe them (Zillmann 2002, 21)—an example can only be “adequate” at best: “Exemplar samples,” he argues, “are, at best, somewhat representative of their population and, at worst, entirely nonrepresentative. The projection of the exemplified issue accordingly varies from adequate to inadequate” (21). Base-rate information, on the other hand, because it “convey[s] data that are collected in adherence to the principles of science” is “less partial and hence more veridical”—more truthful—and, in an ideal world, has the “power to put exemplars in their place as mere illustrations” (22).

This undisguised bias in favor of “quantitative,” or “science-based,” data seems more than strange in a postmodern world long divested of the notion that objectivity is possible in any realizable sense. Interestingly, Zillmann himself hints at this problem in one of his earlier articles, in which he defines “base-rate” slightly differently: “Base-rate information,” he explains in 1996, “refers to general descriptions of the number of people or things involved in a given social phenomenon” and “may vary substantially in precision of quantification, ranging from ratio-measurements involving minimal error to intuitive appraisals expressed in ordinal comparisons” (Zillmann et al. 1996, 427). In other words, presumably, there are lies, damned lies, and statistics. Example-free information is not necessarily simply numbers, he tells us, and, once you begin imagining what it

might in fact include in the practicable terms he offers, could mean any number of things—including (perhaps) examples of some kind.

Neither does Zillmann always seem so certain of the inherently negative nature of examples, admitting at one point that even sound bites can “add insight about possible causal circumstances” (Aust and Zillmann 1996, 788), and that examples can in fact be used to “elucidate a broader concept or issue” (Zillmann 1999, 72)—presumably, that is, to aid in ascertaining truth. He himself uses many examples in an attempt to elucidate his own abstract arguments. I will analyze a few of these later in this paper.

More than merely flawed by design, however, examples are often used for nefarious purposes, Zillmann argues: “Some media institutions . . . claim poetic license and refuse to accept any responsibility for distorted perceptions” (Zillmann 2002, 21). “The news is laden with exemplars,” he explains, “and often enough their selection seems more inspired by dramatic and ideological slants than a commitment to impartial, balanced reporting” (21).

In this paper I will argue that, far from distorting truth, exemplars can be, and have been, used for precisely the opposite purpose: to provide balance, credibility, and depth to stories otherwise in danger of bias and distortion. Thomas Friedman in fact uses them purposefully to strive for the “impartial, balanced reporting” that Zillmann so esteems—and he does so masterfully, precisely because of the images he uses. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that

Friedman achieves this effect through contrast—a concept that is central to the understanding of the way exemplars do, in fact, work. The theoretical importance of this idea will become clear when I return, in the conclusion of my paper, to a brief and final discussion of some of the more basic philosophical arguments of Zillmann's work.

In the meantime, I turn to the remarkable talent of a man whose deep understanding of the Arab peoples is even more extraordinarily evident in the troubled aftermath of the tragedy of 9/11.

* * *

Thomas Friedman's documentary is an excellent starting point in the analysis of his images of Islam (Friedman 2003b). Because the images in the film are iconic, they are all the more compelling and predominant, and so, perhaps, more immediately indicative of Friedman's intentions than are the examples in his writings. Furthermore, they fill the content of the work in a way that imagery in his op-ed columns simply does not. On television, of course, images confront the eye from start to finish, and in this documentary, examples of Muslims probably account for at least 99 percent of the pictures, profiles, and interviews that we see.

No clearer case than this film can be made that exemplars can be used in powerful ways to invest highly emotional topics—topics easily prone to stereotypes and predisposition—with nuance, balance, subtlety, and depth. Friedman's portraits of Muslims are sympathetic, complex, and highly educative.

He accomplishes this effect principally with the use of contrasting elements and ideas. The documentary is ingeniously constructed around three notorious players in the 9/11 attack: Osama bin Laden; Mohammed Atta, the leader of the attack on the Twin Towers; and Dr. Iman Zawahari, described in the film as the ideological mastermind behind bin Laden. Friedman opens the film with a narrative that asks the central question, How did 9/11 happen? This narrative is followed by images of Americans pursuing everyday activities, accompanied by the voice of bin Laden—his words, translated, superimposed on the screen:

Why is it fear, killing, destruction continue to be our lot while security, stability, and happiness continue to be your lot? This is unfair. It's time we get even. The Islamic nation has started to attack you at the hands of its beloved sons. You will be killed just as you kill and will be bombed just as you bomb. And expect more that will distress you. Praise be to almighty God.

Virtually every antithesis within the film is centralized in these opening frames: East/West, evil/innocence, power/impotence, war/peace, piety/iniquity. Between the images of these three men—bin Laden at the beginning of the film (though we don't see his face until later in the documentary), Atta halfway through the film (his ordinary middle-class background emphasized), and Zawahari at the end of the film (again, with voiceover and superimposed text)—we see ordinary Muslims, most of them middle-class, many expressing ideas familiar to us all:

hope for their own futures, compassion for the suffering, concern about the future of the world. Some express hatred for America, some admiration, some both.

Dyab Abou Jahjah, the young political leader, says he detests the logic that demands killing innocents for any reason, yet describes the horror of 9/11 with cool detachment.

Suhaim al-Thani, a sixteen-year-old high school student in Qatar, looks and acts a great deal older, and complains to Friedman with bitterness:

You see the blood of Arab people being spilled as if we're sheep. . . .

You think that your blood is expensive and that we're just animals. .

. . . Palestinian blood isn't any cheaper than any other kind of blood.

I've heard of an Arab empire, and I have never really heard of a

Jewish empire, and America is only 300 years old. So how is our

blood cheaper? In what sense?

Dr. Aloush, whom Friedman debates on the Al-Jazeera television station, lived and studied in the United States for fourteen years, yet speaks with fiery glee about the day that America will be vanquished. When Friedman asks him how he could bring himself to live in a country he hates so fiercely for so many years, he simply answers, "Know thine enemy."

Rami Khouri is editor in chief of Qatar's Daily Star. He, too, lived in America for a number of years and is one of Friedman's many Arab friends. He is chief umpire of his son's little league baseball team, calling it the "most difficult

job” he’s ever had. He tells Friedman that the day the United States relinquishes its double standard concerning the Arab/Israeli conflict will be the first step toward that country’s reconciliation with the Islamic world.

Ali Salem, the Arab playwright in Cairo, is the most impressive voice of wisdom and peace in the film. He expresses his love for all humanity in most eloquent and moving terms and seems to harbor no prejudices or anger. Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, he published an essay in Newsweek magazine entitled “An Apology from an Arab.” In this piece he describes the 9/11 terrorists as “dwarfs” who, out of “pathological jealousy,” seek to bring down towers.

Fauzaya Talhaoui is the sole Arab member of the Belgian parliament. Belgium, which has a large immigrant Arab population, is troubled with sporadic racial violence. She speaks with compassion of how difficult it is for Arab men to live among Europeans who look upon them with such contempt.

Nordin Maloujhmoun is president of the National Organization of Belgian Muslims. He says Muslims worldwide suffer from a perceived loss of dignity.

Wisam Rochalina is the young boarding-school student who dreams of attending university in America. She is filled with “facts” that she gleans from television, the Internet, and Arab newspapers and magazines, many of them false—Al Gore lost the presidency because he was Jewish, she explains—but all of which she accepts without question.

Yousuf al-Shirawi is a dignified, witty man, former Minister of Development and Industry in Bahrain. Friedman accompanies him to Bahrain's first national election, trading jokes with him about Friedman's desire to vote in the election, too, simply because he enjoys elections so much.

Basil El Baz, a young and upcoming businessman in Egypt, complains that the United States has put up a wall to keep Muslims out, now that 9/11 has had its shattering effect on American immigration practices. How can we build a Harvard of our own, he asks Friedman, if we can't go to Harvard?

With these vivid portraits, Friedman demonstrates the complexity of the Arab people: young, old, bitter, loving, educated, naïve, rich, poor, weak, powerful. Friedman demonstrates in all his works that truly artful images contrast with one another to provide balance and texture to a story, but the most powerful images of all are inwardly ambiguous, as well. The single most remarkable thing about the Arab people today, Friedman has told Chris Matthews, is the great struggle that is going on within each of them (Friedman 2003a). He calls it "the Conversation," and suggests that it is a result of a deep ambivalence over Arab resentment toward America and shame over what Islam has become. We see in Dyab regret tinged with satisfaction; in Wisam ignorance alleviated by an intense desire for knowledge; in Aloush a Western background coupled with a great hate for America. Perhaps the most compelling contrast of all in the documentary, however, is Friedman's image of the Al-Asar Mosque. He was given permission

to attend the mosque on a Friday, during noon prayer, and describes, as we watch, the strange and unsettling experience of seeing the mosque taken over by angry, militant young men when the last words of the sermon are heard. “In an instant we went from prayer to politics,” he says. “For me it was a real window on the struggle for the soul of Islam.”

Friedman’s editorials—and his symbolic images—are highly reminiscent of the kind of approach we see in this film. His columns are sprinkled with Arab villains, Arab rulers both good and bad, Arab scholars and professionals and pundits—but mostly his writings are filled with portraits of his Arab friends, of which he has many.

On September 25, 2001, we read of his Lebanese friend, Diala, who jokes darkly about how she carries a bomb in her luggage when she flies—because “the odds against two people carrying a bomb on the same plane are so much higher.”

In his November 13 column he asks a sweet-faced eleven-year-old madrasa student what his reaction was to the 9/11 attacks and is told, “I am pleased that America has had to face pain, because the rest of the world has tasted its pain.” When the boy’s teacher is asked why Americans are so good at selling Coke all over the world but can’t sell their policies, the answer is “Because their policies are poisonous and their Coke is sweet.”

On November 16, 2001, Friedman quotes a Pakistani writer’s address to bin Laden: “The last thing Muslims need is the growing darkness in your caves. . . .

Holy Prophet Muhammad, on returning from a battle, said: ‘We return from little Jihad to greater Jihad.’ True Jihad today is not in the hijacking of planes, but in the manufacturing of them.”

He quotes an Arab friend on November 23, who tells him “My 11-year-old son thinks bin Laden is a good man.”

On February 10, 2002, he describes how an Arab editor in London asked him this startling question: “I hope you will not be insulted. . . . Are Jews in the media behind the campaign to smear Saudia Arabia and Islam?”

And on May 5, 2002, Friedman describes his most classic image of all: an Indonesian boy, spotted by a U.S. diplomat in Jakarta, wearing an Osama bin Laden T-shirt and a New York Yankees cap. “We must make sure that he grows into the hat, not the T-shirt,” is Friedman’s simple comment.

It would seem that exemplars, far from being weak and inadequate purveyors of truth, are perhaps the most powerful tools of all when communicating the most profound ideas—at least in the hands of a skilled journalist.

* * *

The richness of Friedman’s exemplars, as we see, lies in their variety—in the contrasts among them, within them, and against the context in which they are embedded. Within this complexity, we sense, lies something approaching truth—because, in some way, we are moved. This fact belies Zillmann’s insistence on

the precision of “sameness”—as if truth can be found only in redundant iteration of some formula or equation: “The highest degree of similarity is demanded,” he argues. “Exemplars are to be considered instances of whatever kind that are capable of representing other instances only to the extent that they share with them all defining features” (1999, 72).

It is difficult to understand the philosophical or theoretical foundation upon which this argument is grounded. Other than the implicit premise that “scientific” or “quantitative” data are superior in their ability to reflect “truth,” he seems to rely on dictionary definitions of “exemplar” to justify his claim: “lexical definitions,” he explains, “focus on this similarity by stipulating that the exemplar be typical or characteristic of exemplified entities” (72). Elsewhere he simply refers to this premise as if it is self-evident: “Tacit understanding of exemplification . . . entails recognition of shared features between an example . . . and the exemplified, as well as between all possible examples of the exemplified” (72).

Following this logic, it seems that the ideal example would simply be a verbatim repetition of the exemplified, because a precise restatement is never possible, as Zillmann himself admits: “A certain degree of imprecision is unavoidable,” he writes, “because no two events are truly alike” (74). This statement, ironically, penetrates to the heart of the problem of objectivity: even an identical example, restated with the highest possible precision, would not be an

identical event in that the first reading would differ in some way from the second in the reader's perception. The problems are legion here and are further compounded by Zillmann's insistence that ideal exemplification would not merely involve the highest possible precision once, but many times over: "Only the use of large numbers of exemplars would insure the inclusion of infrequently occurring but nonetheless relevant events." He seems to realize, however, the basic instability of the argument: "Although the employment of such large numbers of exemplars accomplishes great representational precision, it is often or mostly unworkable because it entails a forbidding amount of redundant information about the typical case" (76).

In fact, a large number of exemplars can only involve continued imprecision, or contrasts, or shades of meaning. The skilled user of language, of course, understands this reality and, in search of truth, exploits it. The peculiarity of exemplification theory lies in the fact that it does not see this, despite the philosophical era from which it springs. In a postmodern, poststructural world, exemplification theory seems to be immune from the influence of structural linguistics, for instance, and from Ferdinand de Saussure's famous comment, "There are only differences." All words have associative relationships with other words, and have no meaning that is not influenced by these differences (Saussure 1974). Poststructuralism goes even further by refusing any objective concepts of truth (or law) at all, grounding itself in the imprecision of language and in the

fateful way that it informs all human thought. That exemplification theory should therefore exist in this philosophical milieu is a puzzle—except for the fact that its emphasis on the power relationships that lie behind an individual’s journalistic choices—as well as on the effects of those choices—is decidedly postmodern, and, in my opinion, is the single most valuable element of the theory.

We can see in Zillmann’s own writings his fondness for examples, and indeed, his skill at using them. His initial presentation of the theory (Zillmann 1999) is sprinkled with images of beastly little chow chows, Amazon headhunters, inquisitive Neanderthals, unruly Punk-rock fans, and rabid geese. What is most useful about these examples, however, is not their similarity to the abstract concepts he wishes to elucidate, but precisely their differences. That there are similarities is inarguable, but the differences are what illuminate Zillmann’s ideas. Skillful use of imagery brings the abstract idea into relief and (we intuitively understand) contains a kernel of truth that example-free language cannot hope to attain, even at its most incisive. The following is a telling example:

So may the match between intent and performance [be exemplified], or between precept, action choice, the expectation of consequences, and actual consequences. For instance, children who consume a fair amount of fairy tales readily appreciate that elderly women with deformity of the back and screechy voice harbor hostile intentions and, given the opportunity, act on them. (73)

The joining of these two sentences—their balance, contrast, and complementarity—puts to rest, I believe, the idea of the value of redundancy.

Examples in academic literature often consist of such documented quotations as the one I just used. A string of such examples is usually meant to illustrate subtle, or not so subtle, distinctions in the way various scholars discuss the same idea. Zillmann does this, too, of course, and the following is one such instance:

The inclusion of qualitatively distorted, atypical cases in news reports proved to be . . . powerful and persistent—the effect manifesting itself even in the presence of incompatible base-rate information (Gibson and Zillman 1994). The emotionality of exhibited cases emerged as yet another potent factor in creating lasting effect on impressions, beliefs, and associated dispositions (Aust and Zillmann 1996). The use of emotion-evoking imagery was found to create perceptions and dispositions that, over time, actually gained strength (Zillman and Gan 1996).

Taken together, the effects of such case presentations have been interpreted as showing that recipients give disproportional attention to concrete, often vividly displayed events. (Zillmann 1999, 70)

Each quotation adds another layer to the essence of the exemplified; each corresponds to the other and contrasts with the other in quintessentially defining ways. Zillmann's idea would be incomplete with the absence of any one example—yet none mirrors the other perfectly.

Others of Zillmann's examples contain intriguing internal contrasts and ambiguities that he himself recognizes and uses to good effect: "We may smile or cringe," he offers, "when a child, apparently as the result of frequent witch exemplification in Grimm-style fairy tales, points to a lady in the street and utters, 'A witch, a witch!'" That such an instance can elicit either amusement or dismay—or both—is an especially telling characteristic of an exemplar designed to reflect an abstract truth about "the etiology of our own beliefs" (73). Zillmann's own "gentle leopards" and "ferocious rabbits" (88) seem particularly relevant here.

All of these examples are the product of a fine writer and remind us that the best that exemplification theory has to offer is indeed worthy of considerable attention. That the paucity of minority roles in prime-time television is a disgrace is hard to dispute; that last summer was dubbed the "Summer of the Kidnapped Child" is good reason for concern, when it means that adults nationwide are planting microchips in their kids and generally falling victim, in the worst possible way, to the "mean-world" syndrome of Gerbner et al. (2002). Zillmann is right to be concerned about these things, and journalists, if they are honest with

themselves, can certainly benefit from his insights. But such superior observations deserve to be built on rock, not sand. In my eyes, the best that exemplification theory has to offer needs sounder philosophical grounding.

Theories that fail to recognize the most masterful works of journalism, focusing instead on those that are most flawed, cannot possibly claim to describe a universal truism. That some people use examples badly indicates nothing about the innate nature of examples. In Thomas Friedman's works we see language open up, flowering to its greatest potential, whereas exemplification theory would have language shrink to near extinction. The supreme irony is that Zillmann's finest writing is his own greatest self-contradiction.

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**Audience Involvement and Its Antecedents: An Analysis of the
Electronic Bulletin Board Messages about an Entertainment-
Education Drama on Divorce in Korea**

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**Audience Involvement and Its Antecedents in Entertainment-Education: An Analysis of
Bulletin Board Messages and Drama Episodes on Divorce in Korea**

Abstract

This study, analyzing an entertainment-education drama's episodes and bulletin board messages about the episodes, explored the relationship between audience involvement and its antecedents. Episode topic and issue controversy were associated with parasocial interaction and reflection as well as behavioral responses (poll participation and message contribution). This study also found the possibility that entertainment-education interventions could be effectively executed by combining old media's entertainment and education function and cyber media's information and discussion forum providing function.

Audience Involvement and Its Antecedents in Entertainment-Education: An Analysis of Bulletin Board Messages and Drama Episodes on Divorce in Korea

It is about 30 years ago that Meyer (1973), reviewing the technical reports to the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Television and Social Behavior, argued that more programs needed to be developed that are entertaining and informative while not being tied to violence as an attention-getting theme. Additionally, he indicated that if prosocial programs were developed in place of many violent shows that would amass child audience, then there would be no need to continually emphasize violence in television programs. As is implicit in Meyer's message, actually, there is no reason why television should be able to teach "prosocial" behavior, if it teaches "antisocial" behavior (Baran et al., 1979).

Recently, communication scholars and media practitioners around the world began to be interested in and recognize the effect of prosocial content of entertainment or entertainment-education (EE) on individuals' behavioral change and social change. In his recent book, Albert Bandura (1997) also shows his interests in EE, expecting fictional dramatic presentation in the broadcast media to provide a means of enabling people to achieve changes having widespread social impact. Why? First, entertainment programs, especially the serial dramas, are an extraordinarily effective tool for reaching huge numbers of people over a prolonged period. Second, audience members get deeply involved in the lives of the televised models (Bandura, 1997).

Entertainment-education, simply defined as "the intentional placement of educational content in entertaining messages," uses the universal appeal of entertainment to show people how they can live happier, healthier, and safer lives (Singhal & Rogers, 2002, p. 117). The basic assumption of EE efforts is that audiences will benefit because they learned something, thought

differently about something, or will behave differently as a result of their exposure, especially because the message was embedded in an entertaining context (Greenberg et al., in press).

Contributing to social change is the general purpose of EE programs (Singhal & Rogers, 1999).

Since the 1990s, EE scholars have produced some fruitful performances. With their efforts, whether EE has an effect is not a question any more (Singhal & Rogers, 1999, 2002). Most previous research on EE programs, however, did not turn their attention to how and why EE has its effects on the knowledge, attitude, and behavior of both individuals and communities (Papa et al., 2000; Singhal & Rogers, 2002). Very recently, a few studies on EE in developing countries have found that audience involvement with an EE message often influences viewers' efficacy beliefs, which, in turn, enhances behavioral change. Sood and Rogers (2000) explored the dimensions of audience involvement. Papa et al. (2000) investigated the processes of social change initiated by an EE media program. Later, Sood (2002) found that audience involvement appeared to be a precursor for increasing efficacy beliefs, and in promoting interpersonal communication among audience individuals.

However, very little research has showed the relationship between audience involvement and its antecedents in the perspective of entertainment-education. In addition, most past studies of EE programs have been executed in developing countries in South Asia and Africa, and have focused mainly on development issues such as adult literacy, family planning, or gender equality. EE research should be extended to non-developmental issues in non-developing countries.

This study investigates the association between audience involvement and its antecedent variables. The EE program analyzed in this study focuses on the issue of "divorce" in Korea which, the authors believe, is somewhere between developing and developed countries. This study also analyzes electronic bulletin board messages contributed by viewers of the EE program. The electronic bulletin board is widely used as a new vehicle of feedback from viewers in Korea.

Thus, this study will make an interesting case in EE research.

Audience Involvement and Entertainment-Education

Antecedents of Audience Involvement

Predictors of audience involvement can be grouped into the three categories: media, individual, and situational. The media factor includes media type (e.g., radio, TV, etc.), genre, topic and storyline, characters (e.g., well-known star, frequency of appearance, etc.), and camera technique (e.g., close-up shots, movement and angle, etc.). Nordlund's study (1978) shows that heavy viewers tend to interact with quiz programs, entertainment shows, and television serials rather than magazine serials, and that the more people are exposed to a given medium, with the exception of daily newspapers, the more they interact with that medium. Television game show hosts conversationally address viewers (Rubin & Step, 2000), and involvement in soap operas is achieved through storyline and depiction of interpersonal relationships (Rubin, 1985).

Rubin and McHugh (1987) found that parasocial interaction was predicted not by sheer exposure duration to the television character, but by the social and task attraction of the character. When television characters use a controversial style, inviting responses from viewers, parasocial interaction is more likely to occur (Rubin et al., 1985). Frequent appearances of a television character also facilitate parasocial interaction (Levy, 1979). The character's behaviors become more predictable to viewers (Sood & Rogers, 2000). This perceived predictability, in turn, enhances intimacy with the media character (Nordlund, 1978; Rubin et al., 1985). And closer camera shots of television characters give the illusion of face-to-face communication with audience members, promoting a perceived sense of intimacy (Meyrowitz, 1982; Nordlund, 1978; Rubin, 1985; Rubin & Step, 2000).

Additionally, individual factors such as social affiliation, motivation, and personality trait

influence audience involvement. Brunner et al. (1981) and Cegala (1981) found that personality dispositions were associated with audience involvement in conversation. Finally, situational factors such as single viewing or group exposure will also influence the degree of audience involvement. In a group viewing situation, the probability of behavioral parasocial interaction will be higher.

Audience Involvement: Parasocial Interaction, Reflection, and Behavioral Participation

Unlike the definition derived from persuasion and marketing research, in the interpersonal and mass communication field, audience involvement is defined as “direct personal experience” during message reception (Krugman, 1966, p. 583) or the degree to which audience members perceive a connection between themselves and mass media content and the degree to which the members interact psychologically with a medium or its messages (Levy & Windahl, 1984). Rubin and Perse (1987) defined involvement as including parasocial interaction, postviewing thinking, and postviewing discussion about media messages. Meanwhile, Sood (2002), arguing that audience involvement has two main elements of parasocial interaction and reflection, defined involvement as the degree to which audience members engage in parasocial interaction with, and reflection upon, certain media programs, thus resulting in overt behavioral change. Considering that reflection is a mental process which challenges learners to use critical thinking to examine presented media messages (In Time, 2002), the concept of postviewing thinking derived from Rubin and Perse (1987) is very similar to the concept of reflection derived from Sood (2002).

Parasocial interaction originally meant quasi-relationships which audience members develop with media performers or the characters they portray, similar to that with the audience’s peer group (Horton & Wohl, 1956). After exposure to the program, the viewer will analyze the

role in order to accept, reject, or further interpret the proposition of parasocial relationships with the media persona (Horton & Wohl, 1956). Caughey (1984) suggested that viewers may continue to engage in parasocial interaction when the set is turned off, just as people continue in interpersonal relationships when the other is absent.

Levy (1979) found that television news viewers parasocially interact with the media personae both affectively and cognitively. Affective parasocial interaction is the degree to which audience members identify with a particular media character or with other salient characteristics of a media program (Burke, 1945; Sood, 2000). Cognitive parasocial interaction means the degree to which an audience member pays careful attention to the characters in a media message and thinks about its educational content (after their exposure) (Papa et al., 2000; Sood & Rogers, 2000).

Reflection occurs when audience members evaluate a media message during and after media exposure (Papa et al., 2000; "Combining," 2000), and can be prompted by parasocial interaction (Katz et al., 1992). Reflection is a means for critical analysis, problem-solving, synthesis of opposing ideas, evaluation, identifying patterns, and creating meaning ("Action," 2000). Reflection is defined as the degree to which audience individuals consider a media message and integrate it in their own life and it has two different dimensions, referential and critical (Sood, 2002).

Referential reflection is the degree to which an audience member relates a media program to his/her personal experiences. Audience members engage in referential reflection by discussing a media message or program with others in terms of their own lives and problems. Critical involvement is the degree to which audience individuals distance themselves from, and engage in, aesthetic construction of a media program. The media consumers engage in critical reflection by suggesting plot changes or reconstructing a media program (Sood, 2002). Liebes and Katz

(1986), differentiating the referential from critical involvement, stated that a major indicator of involvement is the extent to which a viewer invokes the critical rather than the referential in responding to the program.

While audiences interact with media personalities and messages parasocially, they also participate in media content behaviorally. Rubin and Perse (1987) considered talking about media messages to be behavioral involvement. Besides discussing media messages, viewers can write a letter or place a call to media personae, post messages on the electronic bulletin board, and participate in postviewing opinion polls about media content. They can also participate in media content behaviorally during viewing as well as after viewing. So, instead of the terms of postviewing discussion, the term of “behavioral participation” is used in this study to represent the behavioral dimension of audience involvement.

Those who are involved with media messages behaviorally are the most active viewers. Bechtel et al. (1972) and Lemish (1985) found that those who spoke to others about program content were the most involved viewers. Stanford (1984) found that the most involved were those who had a personal guidance orientation to television, discussing characters and plots and talking back to the television.

Speech during discussion can shift humans from a state of unawareness to deliberate, self-conscious action, helping them internalize and link reflection to experiences, and writing is an effective way of prompting learner reflection (“Action,” 2000; “Combining,” 2000). Thus, behavioral participation such as peer discussion and writing a letter or message is an effective means of prompting viewer reflection, which allows them to reach a stage of deep learning. And methodologically, the content of writing and conversation can be used as a footprint or evidence of parasocial interaction and reflection evoked by audience members during and/or after media exposure.

Several studies found that the perceptual level of parasocial interaction lead to actual behavioral participation. Audience members with a high degree of parasocial interaction often seek personal contact with a media character (Horton & Wohl, 1956) or else by letter, telephone, or some other means (Sood & Rogers, 2000). Perse (1998) found that when viewers were not mentally engaged with the program, and were experiencing negative affective reactions to the content, they changed channels more frequently. Katz et al. (1992) argued that parasocial interaction can prompt referential reflection on the part of media consumers.

Therefore, this study delineates audience involvement into three sub-concepts--parasocial interaction, reflection, and behavioral participation--and it occurs both during and after media exposure. As parasocial interaction has two dimensions, affective and cognitive, reflection also has two dimensions, referential and critical. Behavioral participation includes discussing characters and plots and talking back to the television by letter, phone, or electronic bulletin board, etc. While parasocial interaction and reflection are in the conceptual (affective-cognitive) dimension, behavioral participation is in the behavioral dimension in this study. The two dimensions influence each other.

Research Questions

To explore the proposed association between audience involvement and its antecedent variables, the following research questions were raised:

RQ 1-1: How is episode topic related to viewers' behavioral participation?

RQ 1-2: How is issue controversy associated with viewers' behavioral participation?

RQ 1-3: Are both types of behavioral participation (bulletin board contribution and phone poll participation) positively correlated?

RQ 2-1: How is issue controversy associated with viewers' parasocial interaction?

RQ 2-2: How is issue controversy associated with viewers' reflection?

RQ 3-1: How is episode topic related to parasocial interaction?

RQ 3-2: How is episode topic related to reflection?

Increasing Divorce Rate and An Entertainment-Education Drama on Divorce in Korea

Traditionally, in Korea, divorce was taboo, and blind obedience to a husband was a virtue that a wife had to have. In such a male-dominant society, divorcing was not a better and even doable choice to women despite their spouses' immoral misconduct. Recently, however, this kind of marital notion has dramatically changed, with great impact on the paternalistic society. Women are not likely to tolerate and endure their spouses' immoral and illegal behavior any more, and do not hesitate to consider divorce as a better choice for themselves. This may produce disputes between spouses, and increase divorce rates. Actually, divorce rates continue to go up steeply in Korea. During the last decade, the divorce rate in Korea soared by well over 200 percent from a rate of 1.1 per 1000 people in 1990 to a rate of 2.5 per 1000 in 2000, and three out of ten married couples divorce (Cho, 2001).

Although a low divorce rate does not necessarily mean that couples are happily married, the failure of marriages in Korean society has emerged as a profound social problem. High divorce rates will result in several social problems such as one-parent homes, parentless children and juvenile delinquency. So, high divorce rates have emerged as a critical social issue in Korea.

"Bu-bu Clinic: Sa-rang-gua Jun-jaeng" (which literally means "Conjugal Clinic: Love and War) is a television drama based on the understanding of that the above situation in Korea. Scheduled on every Friday on the second channel of Korean Broadcasting Services (KBS) since October, 1999, *"Bu-bu Clinic"* focuses on a variety of marital discord, and shows a moderating

process between the two parties by moderators. The production team of this series revealed their intention of introducing the show on the website¹ of the program as follows:

Three couples out of ten married ones come to the end. Under such a circumstance, our drama intends to find the true meaning and morality of “marriage,” to lead to social discourse about it, to help recovery of sexual identity, and to propose the rule of coexistence for rediscovery of conjugal relationship and healthiness of families, showing all kinds of small and big problems between husband and wife and the clinical process of moderating and settling the problem. (in Korean)

Thus, this soap opera can be considered as an EE. This drama is composed of a series of one-act plays. Each episode has completely different stories featuring different characters. In each episode, a chief moderator (acted as a judge) and a male (acted as a psychiatrist) and female (acted as a feminist) assistant moderator hear the case of a couple trying to file a divorce suit, give some advice, and mediate between two parties to solve the conjugal problem. All episodes end with the chief moderator’s concluding remarks advising reconsideration of divorce until next meeting on the scene of divorce court. Some episodes, however, add short epilogues showing the efforts of the spouses to recover marital harmony, which provides the examples of problem-solving.

The EE soap opera is based on real divorce arbitration cases. With the format of docudrama (documentary-drama), it mixes reality and fantasy, which will increase the educational effects on the audiences (Singhal & Rogers, 1999). The program has been running its own homepage since July 1, 2000, and included an electronic bulletin board on November 16, 2001, inviting audiences to post their responses on the bulletin board. The program also

encourages audience members to participate in the postviewing phone poll, which asks participants if they agree or disagree that the couples in each episode should divorce.

Since its inception, the drama has produced unprecedented audience participation and feedback in the history of Korean broadcasting. According to the earlier version of the program's website,² in the early days of the program, more than 5,000 people per episode participated in the postviewing poll via the automatic-response pay phone service, and around 100 letters per episode were sent to the broadcaster. So far, since the bulletin board was opened on November 16, 2001, around 570 messages per episode and about 80 messages per day were posted.

The EE drama has also recorded high audience ratings. The drama rated on top in the first week of August, 2002, and its rating was 29.1 percent (Park, 2002). If we make the assumption that some people watch the program through the Internet, the audience numbers will be more than that represented by the rating. Actually, the number of hits on the video on the web shows that a substantial number of people watch the program via Internet. And data shows that almost all age groups are very interested in the EE drama and the issue of divorce. About 60 percent of postviewing poll responders are in their twenties and thirties, around 15 percent are either teens or in their forties, and about 10 percent are in their fifties (Kim, 2001).

Method

This study quantitatively and qualitatively content-analyzed the episodes of the EE drama and messages posted on the electronic bulletin board of the program website by viewers. To explore the association between behavioral participation and its antecedents, a total of 21 episodes broadcast during last five months (from September 27, 2002 to February 21, 2003)³ and a total of 8,970 bulletin board messages were content-analyzed.

The episodes were categorized in terms of episode topic and issue controversy. Episode

topics were qualitatively analyzed in terms of the main cause of marital discord. Adultery, domestic violence, premarital love affair and lie, wife's maiden family's poverty, age difference, sexual interest difference, divorce in the twilight years, fraud marriage, etc. were the main causes of divorce suits.

Issue controversy considers whether the issue of marital discord depicted in each episode is controversial or not and is operationally defined as the absolute value of the difference between the ratios of pros and cons of divorcing in the phone poll. So, the larger the value is, the less controversial the issue is. Behavioral participation was measured by counting both the number of messages posted on the bulletin board and the number of the poll participants.

To find the relationship between parasocial interaction and its antecedents and between reflection and its antecedents, respectively, four episodes were conveniently selected, and all bulletin board messages about the four episodes were analyzed. The four episodes were: the 152nd (October 4, 2002), the 153rd (October 11, 2002), the 157th (November 8), and the 158th episode (November 15, 2002).

In terms of issue controversy, each episode was categorized into "controversial" and "non-controversial." The absolute value of 30 is the standard to decide whether the issue of an episode is controversial or not. If it is within 30, it is controversial, and if it is over 30, it is "non-controversial." The 152nd (pros, 9.4% v cons, 90.6%) and 158th (93.2% v 6.8%) episodes were categorized as non-controversial; the 153rd (58.7% v 41.3%) and 157th (40.1% v 59.9%) episodes were classified as controversial.

The 152nd episode was about a wife's financial assistance to her maiden family who was in extreme difficulty due to her father's inability, and the husband had requested a divorce for that reason. The episode was classified as "financial assistance to maiden family." The main cause of the 153rd episode was about a husband's adultery with his teaching assistant and the

wife's counter adultery, and the husband claimed divorcing. The episode was coded as "mutual adultery." The 157th episode was about an older wife's doubt about her younger husband's behavior. The episode was categorized as "older wife's doubt." The main cause of the 158th was a husband's domestic violence against his wife, and the wife demanded a divorce. So the episode was classified as "domestic violence."

For classification of bulletin board messages, first, the messages were categorized into affective and cognitive parasocial interaction. Affective parasocial interaction is referred to as the degree to which audience members identify with a particular media character or with other salient characteristics of a media program (Burke, 1945; Sood, 2002). Cognitive parasocial interaction is referred to as the degree to which an audience member pays attention to the educational content of a media program and thinks about its meaning and importance (Papa et al., 2000; Sood & Rogers, 2000). Affective and cognitive parasocial interactions were distinct but not necessarily exclusive (Sood & Rogers, 2000). If only one type of parasocial interaction was exhibited, the messages were categorized into "affective" or "cognitive." If more than one type of parasocial interaction were exhibited, the messages were categorized into "affective-dominant" or "cognitive-dominant" on the basis of which one was stronger and more clearly represented in the message. When deciding which one was stronger and more clearly represented, the titles of the bulletin board messages were considered essential. When neither of the two types was included, it was coded as "none."

Next, the messages were classified in terms of reflection. Referential reflection is the degree to which audience individuals relate a media message to their personal experiences (Papa et al., 2000; Sood & Rogers, 2000). Critical reflection is the degree to which an audience individual engages in aesthetic construction of media messages (Sood & Rogers, 2000), reflecting the program's educational meaning and importance. Some messages were impossible

to assign into one of the two categories. So, they were coded as possessing both “referential and critical” reflection. When neither of the two types was included, it was coded as “none.” Not all messages included both parasocial interaction and reflection; in some messages, only parasocial interaction or reflection was exhibited.

As letters illustrated their involvement with media characters and circumstances and represented one important measure in assessing the effects of EE programs (Rogers et al., 1999; Singhal & Rogers, 1999), messages on the bulletin board did too. In addition, analyzing bulletin board messages is a truly unobtrusive way of observing audiences’ involvement in the EE program. Thus, the content of the writings on the board will show which dimension of involvement was evoked in a natural setting of watching. As the letter writers are usually atypical but they are active audiences (Gans, 1977; McGuire & LeRoy, 1977), bulletin board contributors also noted that they were happy to be on the boards just to give information or solve problems for those with questions (James et al., 1995).

Intercoder reliability was checked by employing Scott’s *pi*, and the coefficients for both parasocial interaction (.863) and reflection (.903) were well above the minimum reliability coefficient (.75) when using *pi*.

Results

Behavioral Participation

Table 1 shows that the less controversial the issue was, the more viewers were behaviorally involved in both the postviewing phone poll ($r = .659, p < .01$) and bulletin board contribution ($r = .467, p < .05$). The two types of behavioral participation, poll participation and message contribution, were highly correlated ($r = .851, p < .01$).

Table 1 about here

A qualitative content analysis of episode topic shows that extremely immoral, unusual and taboo cases evoked higher behavioral responses (e.g., for her husband's promotion, a wife's love affair with her husband's boss; a husband's extreme domestic violence, a wife's families' white lie to her husband before marriage). Also viewers showed relatively high behavioral response to the episodes in which one party requested a divorce, questioning the other's non-immoral behavior (e.g., a wife's financial support to her parents, a husband's financial inability and his dedicated housework; conflict between a wife and her husband's brother's wife). With those cases, viewers tended to oppose the couples divorcing. In contrast, cases which are relatively usual (e.g., spouse's simple love affair, personality and sexual interest difference) and are considered somewhat remote from one's own self (e.g., divorce in the twilight years) produced relatively low behavioral involvement.

Parasocial Interaction and Reflection

Among a total of 1,360 messages, 64.4 percent of the bulletin board messages included only parasocial interaction, 1.5 percent exhibited only reflection, 31.2 percent possessed both parasocial interaction and reflection, and 2.9 percent had none ($\chi^2 = 1,431.623$, $df = 3$, $p < .0001$). All the messages categorized as "none" were "replies" to prior messages.

The last column of Table 2 shows that 41.9 percent included affection-oriented (affective + affective-dominant) parasocial interaction and 53.7 percent exhibited cognitive-oriented (cognitive + cognitive-dominant) interaction. 44.9 percent included both affective and cognitive interaction, and 95.6 percent possessed at least one type of parasocial interaction ($\chi^2 = 761.566$, $df = 4$, $p < .0001$). 18.9 percent included referential reflection and 11.4 percent exhibited critical reflection. 2.4 percent included both referential and critical reflection and 67.4 percent possessed none ($\chi^2 = 1,375.740$, $df = 3$, $p < .0001$).

Table 2 shows that while non-controversial episodes included more affection-oriented parasocial interaction (57.9% v 37.5%), controversial episodes exhibited more cognition-oriented parasocial interaction (22.9% v 73.0%) ($\chi^2 = 183.752$, $df = 4$, $p < .0001$). Cramer's V (.368) represents moderate association between issue controversy and parasocial interaction. On the other hand, in terms of reflection, no significant difference was found between controversial and non-controversial episodes ($\chi^2 = 6.208$, $df = 3$, non-significant).

Table 2 about here

Table 3 shows that while the 152nd (“financial assistance”) and 158th (“domestic violence”) episodes had more affective-oriented interaction from viewers (58.5% and 57.2%, respectively), the 153rd (“mutual adultery”) and 157th (“older wife’s doubt”) episodes received more cognitive-oriented interaction (61.4% and 84.3%, respectively) ($\chi^2 = 227.888$, $df = 12$, $p < .0001$). Cramer's V (.236) represents some association between episode topic and parasocial interaction. In terms of reflection, the 153rd and 158th episodes had less reflective responses (26.0% [100% – 74.0%] and 19.6% [100% - 80.4%], respectively); the 152nd and 157th episodes received more reflective responses from audience members (45.7% [100% - 54.3%] and 35.5% [100% - 64.5%], respectively). Especially, the 152nd and 157th episodes had more referential reflection than critical reflection (30.9% and 23.6%, respectively), while the 153rd and 158th episodes possessed more critical reflection (14.5% and 10.2%, respectively) ($\chi^2 = 100.312$, $df = 9$, $p < .0001$). Cramer's V (.157) shows weak association between episode topic and reflection.

Table 3 about here

Discussion

This study, using content analysis, was designed to examine the association between

audience involvement with media content and its antecedents. This study found that the two antecedent variables (episode topic and issue controversy) were associated with the conceptual dimension of audience involvement (parasocial interaction and reflection) as well as the behavioral dimension of involvement (behavioral participation).

Less controversial issues produced more behavioral participation. When the issue was less controversial, viewers seemed to express their opinions more clearly and actively by participating in the poll or posting their messages on the board. Episodes triggering more poll participation also yielded more bulletin board contribution. A qualitative analysis also found that more viewers involved behaviorally with unusual, extreme and highly sympathetic topics such as extreme domestic violence and a wife's financial assistance to her maiden family rather than usual and remote topics such as a simple love affair and a divorce in the twilight years.

Most messages included at least one type of parasocial interaction, and nearly half of the messages possessed both affective and cognitive parasocial interaction. On the whole, bulletin board messages included much more parasocial interaction rather than reflection. This may have resulted from two factors: one is a research method used in this study; and the other is the nature of the bulletin board itself. Despite the advantage of analyzing completely self-reported messages by bulletin board contributors, it may be very difficult to measure what researchers try to measure, contrary to a semi-compulsory method such as survey interview. Additionally, because message contributors tended to write briefly, with the exception of a few longer messages, it may be difficult for them to express enough what they try to say.

Issue controversy of an episode was associated with parasocial interaction. When an issue was controversial, viewers tended to respond rationally through cognitive parasocial interaction. Conversely, when an issue was non-controversial, viewers tended to respond emotionally through affective parasocial interaction. Episode topic was related with both parasocial

interaction and reflection. Many message contributors expressed strong sympathy for the weak side for the 152nd episode (a wife's financial assistance to her maiden family) and 158th episodes (a husband's domestic violence against his wife) and compared the fictional cases with their own personal experiences. Sympathy and comparison as such seemed to provoke more affective parasocial interaction and more referential reflection. Kincaid (2002), developing a theory to explain what makes a drama effective and how an effective drama affects audience behavior, hypothesized that stronger emotional sympathy would produce a greater impact on audience members of a drama. Slater and Rouner (2002) expected that a persuasive effect of the narrative, to the extent of the recipient's sympathetic response to the character's own development and experiences, may lead to at least temporary acceptance of values and beliefs that represent a shift from the audience individual's existing beliefs.

These findings provide some important implications on EE research and the production of EE interventions, because this study shows the design and production of an EE program will affect the type and degree of audience involvement with the program content. Actually, a further qualitative analysis of the bulletin board messages shows that the EE program really impacted on the viewers. A female contributor wrote that "I am a new bride who married in an earlier age. I watch every episode of your program because it provides real examples that married couples may encounter in their life and it will help me a lot solve possible marital discord." A male viewer posted that "While watching this program, I experience indirectly how married couples live together. Your program is deeply moving, and makes me to look back my marital life." And a student contributor wrote that "Although I don't know about marriage very well, this program give me a lesson that I should make a careful decision about marriage."

However, high behavioral responses to somewhat unusual, extreme cases may reflect the symptom that this over-three-year long program is struggling to find new subject matters. The

data in the early days of this program shows that this long-running program has continually lost its (active) viewers and behavioral responses from them, and this might lead the program to commercialism or sensationalism. Actually, a male contributor, questioning the intention of the EE program, wrote that the program depicted some extreme cases of marital discord and might encourage viewers to divorce so easily. Thus, EE producers should be very careful to maintain a balance between commercial profits and social responsibility (Singhal & Rogers, 1999). EE planners also should be cautious about the side-effects of the program such as indirect cultivation effect on the frequency estimates of divorce and marital discord by heavy viewers. Heavy viewers may think that there are too many couples who have marital discord and finally end with divorcing.

Effective communication strategies are needed in EE to maximize its educational effects. The high number of electronic bulletin board messages shows the possibility of the bulletin board as a way of boosting postviewing activity. Although the number of replies was low among the bulletin board messages, replying to prior messages led contributors to discuss the issues presented in the episodes. Posted messages were also read by at a minimum dozens of and at a maximum hundreds of online visitors. This will allow electronic bulletin boards to be used as a virtual space for peer group interpersonal communication after viewing. This kind of peer group discussion prompts viewer reflection and helps them to reach deeper learning. Behavioral involvement such as peer discussions can also create a social learning environment where participants consider options for change (Singhal & Rogers, 1999). Furthermore, the bulletin board's mass media function will lead to broader, society-wide discussion about the issues placed on the entertainment-education programs. With public message posting, millions of people with similar interests can post, read, and provide immediate feedback (James et al., 1995).

Fourteen mass communication researchers at the conference convened by the Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention in May, 2000 suggested that EE effectiveness can be enhanced through a multi-media approach, with EE programs accompanied by offering viewers a phone number to talk with someone, or a web site for additional information, or a chat room and the Internet be a major candidate for future EE efforts, since the Internet requires more involvement from its users, and may give it greater attention and credence (Salmon, 2001). This study found the possibility that entertainment-education interventions could be effectively executed by combining old media's entertainment and education function and cyber media's information and discussion forum providing function.

Finally, this study has some limitations. The behavioral response indicators used in this study may be associated with the ratings of the program, and parasocial interaction and reflection exhibited in the messages may be influenced by other variables such as actors and their acting skill. Future research should control the effect of such variables on audience involvement. In addition, besides the media antecedents dealt with in this study, other media antecedents such as format of program (e.g., soap opera versus talk show) and frequency of broadcast (e.g., weekly versus daily) can affect audience involvement. Future studies should account for these factors. This study also highly recommends that future research should shed light on how differently each type of audience involvement influences viewers' learning experience and/or efficacy beliefs. And many studies on the effects of mass communication in communication-based campaigns predate the Internet, over 100 channel television systems, and other new technologies. Although these developments are of little concern in the implementation of EE in many other parts of the world, they are very important in understanding the context of EE efforts in the U.S. and other developed countries (Greenberg et al., in press). Thus, more EE research should be done in a media-saturated environment.

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Table 1: Correlation between Issue Controversy and Behavioral Participation

	Issue Controversy ^a	# of Poll Participants
# of Poll Participants	.659**	
# of Board Messages	.467*	.851**

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed); ** $p < .01$ (two-tailed).

^a The larger the value is, the less controversial the issue is.

Table 2: Issue Controversy and Parasocial Interaction and Reflection

	Controversial	Non-controversial	Totals (<i>N</i>)
Affective	6.1% (38)	10.5% (77)	8.5% (115)
Affective-dominant	16.8% (105)	47.4% (349)	33.4% (454)
Cognitive-dominant	14.3% (89)	9.2% (68)	11.5% (157)
Cognitive	58.7% (366)	28.3% (208)	42.2% (574)
None	4.2% (26)	4.6% (34)	4.4% (60)
Totals (<i>N</i>)	100% (624)	100% (736)	100% (1,360)
Referential	17.0% (106)	20.5% (151)	18.9% (257)
Critical	12.2% (76)	10.7% (79)	11.4% (155)
Referential + Critical	1.6% (10)	3.0% (22)	2.4% (32)
None	69.2% (432)	65.8% (484)	67.4% (916)
Totals (<i>N</i>)	100% (624)	100% (736)	100% (1,360)

Note: For parasocial interaction, $\chi^2 = 183.752$ ($df = 4$), $p < .0001$, Cramer's $V = .368$; for reflection, $\chi^2 = 6.208$ ($df = 3$), non-significant.

Table 3: Episode Topic and Parasocial Interaction and Reflection

	Domestic Violence	Financial Assistance	Mutual Adultery	Older Wife's Doubt	Totals (<i>N</i>)
Affective	10.6% (34)	10.4% (43)	10.3% (32)	1.9% (6)	8.5% (115)
Affective-dominant	46.6% (150)	48.1% (199)	23.5% (73)	10.2% (32)	33.4% (454)
Cognitive-dominant	9.9% (32)	8.7% (36)	14.8% (46)	13.7% (43)	11.5% (157)
Cognitive	27.6% (89)	28.7% (119)	46.6% (145)	70.6% (221)	42.2% (574)
None	5.3% (17)	4.1% (17)	4.8% (15)	3.5% (11)	4.4% (60)
Totals (<i>N</i>)	100% (322)	100% (414)	100% (311)	100% (313)	100% (1,360)
Referential	7.1% (23)	30.9% (128)	10.3% (32)	23.6% (74)	18.9% (257)
Critical	10.2% (33)	11.1% (46)	14.5% (45)	9.9% (31)	11.4% (155)
Referential + Critical	2.2% (7)	3.6% (15)	1.3% (4)	1.9% (6)	2.4% (32)
None	80.4% (259)	54.3% (225)	74.0% (230)	64.5% (202)	67.4% (916)
Totals (<i>N</i>)	100% (322)	100% (414)	100% (311)	100% (313)	100% (1,360)

Note: For parasocial interaction, $\chi^2 = 227.888$ ($df = 12$), $p < .0001$, Cramer's $V = .236$; for reflection,

$\chi^2 = 100.312$ ($df = 9$), $p < .0001$, Cramer's $V = .157$.

Notes

¹ <http://lovewar.kbs.co.kr/plan.html>

² <http://www.kbs.co.kr/2tv/lovewar/index.htm>

³ The episodes and the poll results are available by online through the program's website. The 169th episode that broadcast during the lunar new-year holidays was excluded.

**PUNCH AND COUNTERPUNCH:
JURISDICTION OVER INTERNATIONAL
LIBEL SUITS
IN THE INTERNET AGE**

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In his native Australia Joseph Gutnick is known as Diamond Joe. He became one of Australia's richest men through speculation in stocks and discovery of gold and diamond mines. His reputation as business mogul, political power broker, and philanthropist reaches from his hometown of Melbourne to the United States and Israel. Gutnick is an ordained rabbi of the New York-based ultra-Orthodox Chabad Hassidic movement. He credits the guidance of Menahem Schneerson, the late Lubavitcher rebbe, who headed Chabad, for his business success. Now 51 and father of 11 children, unlike many Hassidim, Gutnick moves freely in the non-Orthodox world. He rescued Melbourne's beloved Demons football club and became its major shareholder. His bearded face and yarmulke became hallmarks of a successful team. He has a penchant for Rolls Royces and Bentleys and owns a yacht and jet airplane. He is a major contributor to Australia's two principal political parties. Gutnick's lifestyle has been labeled "modern ultra-Orthodoxy." His Chaban faith focuses on reaching out to more secular Jews and persuading them to return to Orthodox Judaism. Yet the movement has a political side in its espousal of a Greater Israel and its support for West Bank settlements. Contributions by Gutnick and other Lubavitchers are widely credited for helping Benjamin Netanyahu become prime minister of Israel in 1996. During the campaign, to which Gutnick contributed \$A10 million,¹ Israel was flooded with the slogan: "Netanyahu is good for Jews." Gutnick spends about one week in Israeli each year and acts as Chabad's representative to the Israeli government. There has been dissension among Chabad Hassidim since Rabbi Schneerson's death. Gutnick's role in the movement has drawn criticism from other rabbis. Gutnick is a global figure. He is known for his business and charitable activities in both the United States and Israel. He also has interests in mining in other countries and in the Australian biotechnology industry. Despite the collapse of some of his mining ventures since 1997, Gutnick remains a rich man.²

Barrons, the United States business weekly published by Dow Jones & Co., in its Oct. 30, 2000, issue printed an article³ that focused on Gutnick while chronicling the freewheeling investment activities of Jewish charities in the United States. The article described how the charities purchased shares in Gutnick-controlled companies and reaped substantial profits by

¹ An Australian dollar is worth about US 60 cents.

² For background on Gutnick, see Efraim Zuroff, *Where No Ultra-Orthodox Jew Has Gone Before*, The Jerusalem Report, June 18, 2001; *Millionaire Rabbi's Empire Totters*, Ha'aretz, May 15, 2001; Abraham Rabinovich, *The Rough Diamond Is Bibi's Right Hand*, The Australian, May 12, 1999.

³ Bill Alpert, *Unholy Gains: When stock promoters cross paths with religious charities, investors had best be on guard*, *Barrons*, Oct. 30, 2000, 24-32.

selling before the shares collapsed in value. The article did not accuse Gutnick of wrongdoing, but it did say Australian authorities “wondered if that trading (by charities) was intended to push up the price of Gutnick shares in a classic stock scam, where outsiders are lured into a stock at rising prices, allowing those in the know to cash in before the price collapses.”⁴ *Barrons* reported that American and Australian securities regulators believed some Jewish charities were used to launder money through banks in Israel. The article recounted the conviction of Nachum Goldberg in Australia for tax evasion that involved money laundering through a religious charity. It included a statement that “(v)oluminous evidence from wiretaps included a boast by Nachum Goldberg that Australian prosecutors took to mean that Gutnick was his biggest money-laundering customer.”⁵

Claiming the article defamed him by stating that he was a money launderer, Gutnick sued Dow Jones & Co. for libel in the Supreme Court of Victoria, the state in which Melbourne is located.⁶ Dow Jones challenged the jurisdiction of the Australian court and maintained the lawsuit should be heard in New Jersey. Dow Jones noted that only a *de minimus* number of the 305,563 copies of the print edition of *Barrons* that contained the 7,000-word article were sold in Victoria. The article also was published in *Barrons Online*, which was uploaded onto the *wsj.com* webserver in New Jersey. The website has about 550,000 subscribers, of whom about 1,700 are in Australia. Dow Jones conceded that some of the Australian subscribers were in Victoria and had downloaded the article. The Victorian court held that it could exercise *in personam* jurisdiction and decide the case. The Victoria Court of Appeal summarily dismissed Dow Jones’ appeal.⁷ In a decision of importance to all common law countries, the High Court of Australia upheld the decision of the Victorian courts and ruled Gutnick could seek vindication for harm to his reputation in Australia.⁸

Boris Berezovsky is a billionaire. Once he boasted that he was one of a crop of oligarchs who gained control of half of the Russian economy following the shattering of the Soviet Union. His growth in wealth paralleled the rise of Boris Yeltsin to the presidency of Russia. Berezovsky fell from

⁴ Id, 26.

⁵ Id, 30.

⁶ Gutnick v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc. (2001) VSC 305. Available on Academic Universe, LEXIS, Legal Research, International Legal Research, Australian Cases.

⁷ Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2001) VSCA 249. Available on Academic Universe, LEXIS, Legal Research, International Legal Research, Australian Cases.

⁸ Dow Jones & Co., Inc. v. Gutnick, (2002) HCA 56. Available on Academic Universe, LEXIS, Legal Research, International Legal Research, Australian Cases. Bill Alpert, writer of the article, has filed an action against Australia before the United Nations under the International Covenant on Human Rights. Wall Street Journal, April 16, 2003.

power with the ascension of Russian President Vladimir Putin, but he remains a rich man and seeks to influence Russian politics from abroad. Holder of a doctorate in applied mathematics, his rise to wealth started in 1989 when he founded an auto dealership with Autovaz, a state-owned auto manufacturer. Largely with financing from Autovaz, he became Russia's largest car dealer, reputedly selling 10 percent of all autos in the country. He followed by gaining effective control of a television network and of an oil company at low prices during the privatization of state-owned enterprises. In 1994 Berezovsky escaped serious injury when a bomb demolished his Mercedes and decapitated his driver. In 1996 he led a group of oligarchs that funded Yeltsin's reelection campaign. Yeltsin appointed Berezovsky deputy chief of the National Security Council and later executive secretary of the Commonwealth of Independent States. His television network championed the election of Putin. More recently Berezovsky lost the support of Putin. Threatened with prosecution for corruption, he went into self-imposed exile in the United Kingdom.⁹

In its Dec. 30, 1996, issue, the American business magazine *Forbes* published an article¹⁰ that claimed Berezovsky and other Russian business titans were allied with gangsters. *Forbes* said Moscow police disclosed that Berezovsky "started his auto dealership in close collaboration with powerful Chechen criminal gangs."¹¹ The article asserted:

What is undeniable is that in addition to his auto dealership, Berezovsky controls Russia's biggest national TV network. His control was solidified shortly after the first chairman of the network was assassinated gangland-style. Berezovsky was immediately fingered by police as a key suspect, but the murder remains unsolved two years later. Why did the police fail to follow up? Possibly because they feared where the trail would lead if they followed too closely.¹²

The article also raised the possibility that Berezovsky was a participant in a scheme to loot Aeroflot, the Russian national airline.¹³ In a separate story

⁹ For background on Berezovsky, see Susan B. Glasser, *Russian Party Ousting Its Founder*, Washington Post, Oct. 8, 2002; Simon Saradzhyan, *Berezovsky Spared in Aeroflot Case*, Moscow Times, March 15, 2001; Paul Starobin and Catherine Belton, *Tycoon Under Siege*, Business Week, July 24, 2000; Paul Hoffman, *Russian Mogul Epitomizes New Power of Capitalism*, Washington Post, Jan. 10, 1997; Bill Powell, *The Capitalist Czars*, Newsweek, March 17, 1997.

¹⁰ *Godfather of the Kremlin? Boris Berezovsky, not Boris Yeltsin, may be the most powerful man in Russia*, *Forbes*, Dec. 30, 1996.

¹¹ *Id.*

¹² *Id.*

¹³ *Id.*

explaining *Forbes* probe, the magazine accused Berezovsky of standing “tall as one of the most powerful men in Russia. Behind him lies a trail of corpses, uncollectible debts and competitors terrified for their lives.”¹⁴

The *Forbes* stories undeniably were defamatory. Berezovsky sued for libel in the High Court in London. The magazine challenged the jurisdiction of English courts. It noted that information for the stories was gathered in Russia and editing was done in the United States. The magazine was printed and the Internet edition was uploaded in New York. Of the total printed, 785,710 copies were circulated in the United States and Canada. Only 1,915 copies were distributed in England and Wales. Circulation in Russia was 13 copies. The number of readers of the Internet edition in England and Wales could not be determined. The High Court agreed with *Forbes* and rejected *in personam* jurisdiction. It suggested that Russia was the best venue for the lawsuit. Finding that Berezovsky had a significant reputation in England, the Court of Appeal reversed.¹⁵ The House of Lords affirmed.¹⁶

After the House of Lords decision, Berezovsky and *Forbes* settled the suit without any payment of damages. The magazine said in High Court that it did not intend to say Berezovsky murdered anyone and “in light of the Court ruling, they accept it was wrong to characterize Mr. Berezovsky as a mafia boss.”¹⁷ More recently British police arrested Berezovsky on Russian charges that he looted \$1.9 billion in public funds. He is fighting extradition to Russia and seeking political asylum in the United Kingdom.¹⁸

Gutnick and *Berezovsky* are the leading decisions on jurisdiction of national courts in defamation suits in the common law countries outside the United States. They are of exceptional significance in an age when media are increasing globalized and when information placed on the Internet is instantly available anywhere in the world. They are particularly important to American media because the First Amendment that protects them in United States courts is not recognized elsewhere. This paper analyses *Gutnick* and *Berezovsky* against the background of the common law of libel jurisprudence of United Kingdom and Australian courts and of the American constitutional law of libel. It notes the differences in jurisprudence on where transnational libel suits should be heard. It concludes by discussing what seem to be

¹⁴ Id.

¹⁵ *Berezovsky v. Forbes, Inc.*, (1999) EMLR 278.

¹⁶ *Berezovsky v. Michael*, (2000) 2 All ER 986.

¹⁷ *Berezovsky v. Michael*, Statement in Open Court, Queen’s Bench, March 6, 2003, accessible at www.forbes.com.

¹⁸ International Herald Tribune, March 26, 2003.

irreconcilable differences between the United States and the rest of the common law world.

Common Law Of Defamation

General principles of the law of defamation in the United Kingdom and Australia are similar and are rooted in the common law. Libel is not only a strict liability tort at common law. It is a tort that a noted jurist called “artificial and archaic” and “beyond redemption by the Courts.”¹⁹ Libel law places on the alleged libeler the burden of proving the truth of statements. Some statements, labeled *per se* libel, are presumed to be false. Defamation must be proved only if it flows from context. Damages are presumed. The main defenses in libel cases are justification and fair comment. Justification is proved by showing the alleged libel is true or substantially true. Alleged libels are presumed to be factual. The defense of fair comment permits the alleged libeler to prove the statements are comment. For the defense to prevail, the comment must be reasonable and not be motivated by ill will. English common law generally requires the loser in a libel case to pay the legal costs of the winner. Frequently, in the United Kingdom, these costs have been hundreds of thousands of pounds in high-profile cases.²⁰

The plaintiff-friendly nature encourages the rich---often also the famous and powerful---to use libel laws to squelch criticism of them. Mere threats to sue can deter journalists. One of the rich and powerful who has wielded the libel cudgel is Mohamed Al-Fayed,²¹ who controls the Harrods, the upscale London department store, and the Ritz hotel in Paris. When acquiring the House of Fraser (HOF), the retail giant that owns Harrods, Al-Fayed falsified his family and financial background. Then he successfully fended off most news media investigative stories by threatening libel suits. A report of the British Department of Trade and Industry concluded:

On one hand Mohamed Fayed was telling lies about himself and his family . . . to representatives of the Press, and once those stories were on a cutting file or in a press cuttings library they grew and multiplied without much inquiry into their accuracy. On the other hand he gave instructions to his very able lawyers to take legal action against any who sought to challenge his claim that he and his brothers beneficially

¹⁹ *Slim v. Daily Telegraph*, (1968) 2 QB 157, 179 (Lord Diplock).

²⁰ Elements of libel law summarized from *Gatley on Libel and Slander* (9th ed. 1998).

²¹ Mohamed Al-Fayed is the father of Dodi Al-Fayed, the companion of Princess Diana of Wales on the night that she died in an auto crash in Paris.

owned the money with which they bought HOF. To a great extent he succeeded in his aims. Most newspapers and magazines considered that discretion was the better part of valour and preferred to write about other things than get involved in an expensive libel suit with a rich man. As a result of what happened, the lies of Mohamed Fayed and his success in “gagging” the Press created . . . new fact: that lies were the truth and that the truth was a lie.²²

Others have pursued defamation suits in efforts to intimidate critics. These have included McDonald’s Corporation over allegations about nutrition and rain forest destruction²³ and Upjohn Company over criticism of the drug Halcion.²⁴ The late media and business tycoon Robert Maxwell successfully covered up his looting of companies by wielding the threat of libel suits.²⁵

The common law also encourages perjury by public figures who file libel suits over truthful stories and are confident news media cannot prove truth. The most prominent example is Lord Jeffrey Archer, the international best selling author and prominent British Conservative Party leader. In 1987 Archer won 500,000 pounds in libel damages and 700,000 pounds in legal costs from the *Star*, a popular tabloid, which had accused him of paying a prostitute 2,000 pounds for sex and lying about it.²⁶ Fourteen years later Archer received a four-year jail sentence for lying about the prostitute²⁷ and had to pay the *Star* 2.7 million pounds.²⁸ He has occupied his time in prison

²² Department of Trade and Industry, *House of Fraser Holdings plc*, Report by Henry Brooke, QC, and Hugh Graham Cazalet Aldous, FCA, London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1988, at 752.

²³ McDonald’s Corporation v. Steel, (1997) EWHC QB 366; Marlene Arnold Nicholson, *McLibel: A Case Study in English Defamation Law*, 18 Wis. Int’l L.J. 1 (2000); *McDonald’s to Abandon Action*, Financial Times (London), July 19, 1997. McDonald’s sued two unemployed activists. The suit resulted in a 313-day trial, the longest in English history. The corporation won a 60,000 pounds award (reduced to 40,000 pounds on appeal), but it incurred more than 10 million pounds in legal costs. It decided not to try to collect the damages or legal costs from the judgment-proof activists. The suit proved to be an unwise venture. It resulted in McSpotlight, an Internet site that has an archive of the case and of material critical of the corporation.

²⁴ Upjohn Company v. Oswald, Queen’s Bench (Transcript: Beverly Nunnery), 1994; Clare Dyer, *Halcion Firm In Pounds 85,000 Libel Victory*, Guardian, May 28, 1994; Steven R. Reed, *Sleep Merchants*, Houston Chronicle, Sept. 11-15, 1994 (Investigative Series).

²⁵ Catherine Bennett and Clare Dyer, *Maxwell’s Legal Hammer*, Guardian, Nov. 7, 1991; Richard Siklos, *The Maxwell Legacy*, Financial Post (Toronto), Nov. 11, 1991; Maxwell Communication v. Newspaper Publishing, Association Transcript, C.A., 1991; Maxwell v. Felton, Association Transcript, C.A., 1989; Maxwell v. Pressdram Ltd., (1987) 1 All ER 656 (C.A.).

²⁶ Andrew Rawnsley, *Archer wins record 500,000 pounds damages*, Guardian, July 25, 1987. A British pound is worth about \$1.57.

²⁷ *The Fall of Jeffrey Archer: Peer, Perjurer, Prisoner*, Independent, July 20, 2001.

²⁸ *Law: Sex, Lies and Damages*, Independent, Oct. 8, 2002. The amount included interest on monies the tabloid had paid Archer.

by writing another best-selling novel.²⁹ Former Cabinet minister Jonathan Aiken served a prison term for lying in a libel suit against the *Guardian* and Granada Television.³⁰ In Australia Jim Cairns, former state treasurer, has been exposed for perjury in a libel action.³¹

The High Court in London has been a favorite venue for residents of both the United States and European Union countries to seek libel damages. The standing of European Union residents to sue in England was affirmed by the European Court of Justice in *Shevill v. Presse Alliance*.³² The court held that European Union residents could sue for libel where an alleged defamation was published, where the resident lived, or where the allegation was circulated. In *Shevill* the European court allowed *France Soir*, a French language newspaper with a circulation of only 250 copies in England and Wales, to sue in London.³³ American publications and authors are frequently sued in London.³⁴ It is a particularly attractive venue for intimidation suits. When Steve Weinberg, an American investigative reporter, wrote a biography of Armand Hammer, the late chairman of Occidental Petroleum Corp., Hammer sued in London.³⁵ After Hammer died, it was discovered that he laundered money for the KGB, used corporate funds to amass an art collection, employed his mistress as art museum director, and bribed government officials.³⁶

After a string of exceptionally high damage awards in the 1980s, the English courts checked the trend. The highest award was 1.5 million pounds to Lord Aldington whom Count Nikolai Tolstoy accused of war crimes.³⁷ The European Court of Human Rights found the Aldington award so

²⁹ Archer promoting his latest novel from jail, *Herald* (Glasgow), Feb. 7, 2003. The novel is *Sons of Fortune*.

³⁰ Kim Sengupta, *The Aiken Affair: The Tory high-flyer impaled on the sword of truth*, *Independent*, Jan. 20, 1999.

³¹ Louise Milligan, *Cairns tell-all could be costly*, *Weekend Australian*, Sept. 21, 2002; Cairns v. John Fairfax & Sons, 1982 NSW LEXIS 25 (Sup. Ct.); Cairns v. John Fairfax & Sons, 1983 NSW LEXIS 38 (C.A.).

³² (1995) All ER 289 (EC).

³³ *Id.* The House of Lords found personal jurisdiction in *Shevill v. Presse Alliance*, (1996) 3 All ER 929.

³⁴ Sarah Lyall, *Where Suing for Libel Is a National Specialty: Britain's Plaintiff-Friendly Laws have Become a Magnet for Litigators*, *New York Times*, July 22, 2000; Don J. DeBenedictis, *Moving Abroad: Libel Plaintiffs Say Its Easier Suing U.S. Media Elsewhere*, 75 A.B.A.J. 39 (1989). See *Berezovsky*; *Irving v. Penguin Books*, (2000) E.E.H.C. OB 115; *Dow Jones & Company, Inc. v. Harrods, Limited*, 237 F.Supp.2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); *Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications*, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup.Ct. 1992).

³⁵ Alexander Beam, *Hammer's nonsense suit*, *Boston Globe*, Feb. 21, 1990.

³⁶ Brian Pendreigh, *Hammer blows*, *The Scotsman*, Sept. 26, 1996.

³⁷ *The Aldington Libel Case*, *Guardian*, Dec. 1, 1989. See *Tolstoy-Miloslavsky v. Lord Aldington*, (1996) 2 All ER 556 (C.A.), and *Tolstoy Pays Up As 1.5M Pounds Libel Peer Dies*, *The Scotsman*, Dec. 9, 2000. Among the other winners were Jeffrey Archer (500,000 pounds); Koo Stark, Prince Andrew's former girlfriend (more than one million pounds); Sonia Sutcliffe, wife of "The Yorkshire Ripper" (more than 600,000 pounds).

disproportionate to what is necessary in a democratic society that it violated the free expression provision of the European human rights treaty.³⁸ Meanwhile, in *Ratzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers*, involving the false allegation that a television personality had shielded a child abuser, the Court of Appeal had upheld the right of a judge to reduce a jury's award of damages if he believed it was excessive.³⁹ The trial court had reduced the award from 250,000 to 110,000 pounds.⁴⁰ Then, in *John v. MGN Ltd.*, the Court of Appeal held that judges could guide juries in awarding damages by informing them of awards in libel and other personal injury cases.⁴¹ The court slashed damages awarded to singer Elton John for a story about his alleged eating disorders, from 350,000 to 75,000 pounds.⁴² Despite the regime of reduced damages, awards by English courts remain substantial.

The House of Lords adopted in *Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd.* a qualified privilege against libel damages where the press has acted responsibly in publishing information of serious public concern.⁴³ In *Reynolds* Irish Prime Minister Albert Reynolds sued the *Sunday Times* over a story that claimed he had misled the Irish Parliament over an issue involving a priest accused of sexual abuse. In deciding whether the privilege applies, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said courts should consider 10 factors: (1) seriousness of the allegation; (2) nature of the information and the extent to which it is a matter of public concern; (3) sources of the information; (4) steps taken to verify the information; (5) status of the information; (6) urgency of the matter; (7) whether comment was sought from the plaintiff; (8) whether the article contains the gist of the plaintiff's comments; (9) tone of the article; and (10) circumstances, including the timing, of publication.⁴⁴ The burden of proving the privilege applies rests with the press. Raising the privilege requires a court to review the editorial judgment and practices of the press. The High Court of Australia has adopted a similar privilege, but it applies only to reporting on government and politics.⁴⁵

Once libel law in the United States was similar to that of the United Kingdom and other common law countries.⁴⁶ The United States veered from the common law of libel in 1964 when the Supreme Court decided that the

³⁸ *Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. United Kingdom*, 20 E.H.H.R. 442 (1995).

³⁹ (1993) 4 All ER 975, 975-976.

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 997.

⁴¹ (1996) 2 All ER 35, 36.

⁴² *Id.* at 46-50.

⁴³ (1999) 4 All ER 609.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 626.

⁴⁵ *Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, (1997) 145 ALR 96.

⁴⁶ *Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire*, 315 U.S. 568, 576 (1942) (libelous speech not protected by the First Amendment).

First Amendment required that libel be a fault tort.⁴⁷ The Court ruled that a public official could collect damages for a libelous statement about his official conduct only if he proved by clear and convincing evidence that “the statement was made with ‘actual malice’---that is, with knowledge it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”⁴⁸ Later, the actual malice standard was applied to public figures⁴⁹ and reckless disregard was deemed to be statements “made with the high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.”⁵⁰ Any speech of public concern---not just political speech---is protected.⁵¹ For private figures the Court has ruled “so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability.”⁵² Most states have chosen negligence.⁵³ As a result of libel becoming a fault tort, plaintiffs must prove falsity⁵⁴ and damages.⁵⁵ Even private figures must prove actual malice to collect punitive damages.⁵⁶

Even after the House of Lords decision in *Reynolds*, libel law in the United States is much more protective of the press. The press in the United Kingdom must prove it acted responsibly.⁵⁷ In the United States a public official or public figure must prove the press knew what it published was false or was aware it was probably false. *Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts*, a case consolidated with *Walker v. Associated Press*,⁵⁸ illustrates the greater protection the news media receives in libel suits in the United States. In *Curtis* magazine journalists engaged in a severe departure from accepted journalistic standards. That was sufficient for the Court to uphold a verdict against the *Saturday Evening Post*.⁵⁹ In *Walker*, even though a mistaken story was put on the wire, the Associated Press followed ordinary newsgathering practices in covering a riot. The Court said the lack of any

⁴⁷ *New York Times v. Sullivan*, 376 U.S. 254.

⁴⁸ *Id.* at 279-280.

⁴⁹ *Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts*, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

⁵⁰ *Garrison v. Louisiana*, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).

⁵¹ *Hill v. Time, Inc.*, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).

⁵² *Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.*, 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).

⁵³ Marc A. Franklin et al, *MASS MEDIA LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS*, 6th ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2000), 351. Negligence is defined as the tortfeasor did not act as a prudent person would under similar circumstances.

⁵⁴ *Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps*, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).

⁵⁵ *Gertz* at 349-350.

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ *Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers, Ltd.*, (2002) QB 783.

⁵⁸ 388 U.S. 130 (1967).

⁵⁹ *Id.* at 158.

departure from ordinary practices barred a court from finding actual malice.⁶⁰

The First Amendment protection in American libel law has prevented the press from falling victim to the high-profile libel verdicts common in the United Kingdom. One example is the effort of Ariel Sharon, current Israeli prime minister, who sued *Time* magazine in 1983 over his alleged responsibility for massacres by Christian militias of Palestinians in refugee camps in Lebanon.⁶¹ A federal district court jury believed *Time* libeled Sharon by publishing a false story, but it found no actual malice.⁶² After losing in the United States, Sharon filed suit in Israel where libel law resembles that of the United Kingdom. *Time* settled the Israel suit.⁶³ Generally, public figures now are turning to suits over newsgathering practices of journalists due to the difficulty of winning libel suits.⁶⁴

Studies by Russell L. Weaver and Geoffrey Bennett conclude that libel law has a chilling effect on the United Kingdom news media.⁶⁵ Their interviews with British journalists found that many stories are not pursued and others are not published due to fears of libel actions. The editors cited the Robert Maxwell saga as an example of how the threat of libel suits deter journalists. The British newsmen said that press investigations such as that of Watergate would not occur in the United Kingdom. Moreover, they noted, that lawyers are a key part of the editing process.⁶⁶ Their conclusions on chilling effect are backed up by a study by British social scientists.⁶⁷ Libel law plays a role in the coverage by British newspapers of the royal family, which has a policy of not suing for defamation.⁶⁸ By contrast Weaver and Bennett found no similar chilling effect among United States media. When

⁶⁰ Id at 158-159.

⁶¹ See, *inter alia*, Sharon v. Time, Inc., 575 F.Supp.1162 (1983), 103 F.R.D. 86, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24885, 599 F.Supp. 538 (1984), 609 F.Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

⁶² John Riley, *Sharon Case: A Pyrrhic Victory for Time*, National L.J., Feb. 4, 1985. See also accounts of cases filed by Gen. William Westmoreland, American commander in Vietnam, against CBS; by William Tavoulaareas, president of Mobil Oil Co., against the Washington Post; by entertainer Wayne Newton against NBC.

⁶³ Thomas L. Friedman, *Time Magazine and Sharon Settle the Libel Suit He Filed in Israel*, New York Times, Jan. 23, 1986.

⁶⁴ See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999); Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 233 F.3d 514 (7th Cir. 2000); Deteresa v. American Broadcasting Companies, 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997).

⁶⁵ *Is the New York Times "Actual Malice" Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective*, 53 La. L.Rev. 1153 (1993), and *New York Times v. Sullivan: the "Actual Malice"-standard and editorial decisionmaking*, 14 J. Med. L. & Practice 1 (1993).

⁶⁶ Id. See Alex Wade, *What papers can say-it's all down to the lawyer*, The Times (London), Feb. 4, 2003.

⁶⁷ Eric Barendt et al, LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

⁶⁸ Duncan Lamont, *Media Law: Royally ticked off*, Guardian, Dec. 2, 2002.

interviewed journalists and media lawyers said libel laws seldom if ever deterred pursuit or publication of stories. Lawyers are not part of the editing process.⁶⁹ Statistics disclose that most libel suits in the United States are dismissed before trial. The media win most actions at trial and prevail in about 80 percent of the cases on appeal.⁷⁰

Courts in the United States can take personal jurisdiction where out-of-state or foreign publishers have significant circulation or other business activities in their states⁷¹ or where they print stories that target a person's activities in their states.⁷² Where publications, including Internet publications, have minimal contacts with a state and do not target a person's activities in that state, mere residency of a plaintiff is not enough to permit a state's court to take jurisdiction.⁷³

THE *BEREZOVSKY* DECISION

The decision by the House of Lords to permit Boris Berezovsky to sue in London is worrisome to free press advocates because it may signal a turn in United Kingdom judicial policy. Since 1986 when the House of Lords decided *Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex*⁷⁴ the English courts appeared to be less open to libel suits by foreign plaintiffs.⁷⁵ At issue is how the English courts interpret the doctrine of *forum non conveniens*. *Spiliada* dictated that an English court would refuse to hear a case if it were not the natural and appropriate forum and if substantial justice could be achieved in a foreign court. In judging where the natural and appropriate forum lay, the court would examine how the parties' interests and the ends of justice could best be served.⁷⁶ Decisions on jurisdiction in the wake of *Spilada* were mixed. While House of Lords in the *France Soir* case legitimized the trend for more libel suits to be filed in English courts by residents of other European Union countries,⁷⁷ fewer actions against for United States

⁶⁹ *Weaver and Bennett*.

⁷⁰ Donald M. Gillmor, *POWER, PUBLICITY, AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). See also annual reports of Libel Defense Resource Center.

⁷¹ *Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.*, 465 U.S. 770 (1984).

⁷² *Calder v. Jones*, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). *Calder* was applied to the Internet in *Wagner v. Miskin*, 660 N.W.2d 593 (N.D. 2003).

⁷³ *Revell v. Lidov*, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002); *Young v. New Haven Advocate*, 315 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2002); *Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries*, 11 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir. 1993).

⁷⁴ (1986) 3 All ER 843.

⁷⁵ Kevin W. Goering, *Shopping for an English Forum: Shifts in Law Making It Harder for Media Plaintiffs*, New York L.J., Sept. 11, 2000.

⁷⁶ *Spiliada*, 846

⁷⁷ *Shevill v. Presse Alliance*, (1999) 3 All ER 929, implementing decision of European Court of Justice.

media went forward. In 1999 the Court of Appeal upheld a decision not to permit the chief executive of a California company to sue *Barrons* magazine in London. Only 1,257 copies out of a total of 283,520 copies of the issue containing the alleged libelous article were circulated in the United Kingdom.⁷⁸ Two years earlier the High Court refused to hear the libel action of Texas billionaire Oscar Wyatt against *Forbes* magazine.⁷⁹ In the *Barrons* and *Forbes* cases the plaintiffs were Americans. Where the plaintiff is a resident of the United Kingdom, the trend was less evident. In *Schapira v. Ahronson*, a London resident sued the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz for libel. The Court of Appeal upheld jurisdiction even though Haaretz is published in Hebrew and had fewer than 150 copies circulated in the United Kingdom.⁸⁰

Berezovsky was a 3-to-2 decision by the House of Lords. At its core is the continued survival of a libel doctrine laid down in *Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer* in 1849.⁸¹ To sustain a defamation suit the Duke of Brunswick sent his servant to a bookstore to purchase a copy of a book published many years earlier. The court in *Duke of Brunswick* held that each publication is a separate libel.⁸² Another key doctrine is that the harm from a libel occurs in the jurisdiction in which the alleged libel is read.⁸³ An outgrowth of the doctrines is that a person can sue in each jurisdiction in which a publication containing an alleged libel is circulated. That circulation of an allegedly libelous story is minimal is not an impediment to bringing a common law libel action because damages are presumed. Writing the lead opinion in *Berezovsky*, Lord Steyn applied the common law doctrines:

The present case is a relatively simple one. It is not a multi-party case; it is, however, a multi-jurisdictional case. It is also a case in which all constituent elements of the torts occurred in England. The distribution of the defamatory material in England was significant. And the plaintiffs have reputations in England to protect. In such cases it is not unfair that the foreign publisher should be sued here.⁸⁴

⁷⁸ *Chandra v. Dow Jones & Co.*, (1999) EMLR 724.

⁷⁹ *Wyatt v. Forbes* (unreported 1997); Michael Streeter, *Libel 'tourists' come to sue*, Independent, Dec. 7, 1997.

⁸⁰ *Schapira v. Ahronson*, (1999) EMLR 735. One of the plaintiffs in *Shevill* also was an England resident.

⁸¹ 14 QB 185.

⁸² *Id.*

⁸³ *Bata v. Bata*, (1948) W.N. 366.

⁸⁴ *Berezovsky*, 994. The reference to plaintiffs reflects the fact that a business associate of Berezovsky also sued.

Lord Steyn took an objective view on the magnitude of *Forbes* circulation in the United Kingdom. Some 1,915 copies of a total circulation of 785,710 plus Internet posting was significant in the jurist's view. In relative terms it clearly was not. Under the *Duke of Brunswick* doctrine Berezovsky could collect damages only for harm done by the libel in England and Wales. That would be significant for most torts, but it is not for libel because of presumed damages. The effect of presumed damages is illustrated by the case of Martin Packard, a Royal Navy intelligence officer, who was awarded 450,000 pounds for a libel in a Greek language newspaper with a circulation of less than 100 copies in the United Kingdom.⁸⁵

Another effect of *Duke of Brunswick* is to avoid choice of law. Normally in a transnational lawsuit a court will apply the law of the nation with the most connections with the case. Thus, if a libel case had a larger connection with the United States, the court would decide the dispute by applying American law. By confining the plea for damages to those incurred in England and Wales, *Duke of Brunswick* dictates that the court will apply English law.

Forbes argued that in cases of transnational libels the lords should adopt a version of the uniform single publication rule that is part of United States libel law. That rule requires that the first court that takes jurisdiction over a libel suit decide issues of liability and damages for all jurisdictions.⁸⁶ *Forbes* said the United Kingdom should consider the entire publication, including its transnational print, broadcast and Internet editions, as giving rise to one cause of action and to then decide whether that action is best tried in England. Lord Steyn claimed that "such a principle, if adopted, will usually be to favour a trial in the home courts of the foreign publisher because the bulk of the publication will have taken place there."⁸⁷ In any event, the jurist said, adoption would be contrary to well established libel law.⁸⁸

The *Forbes* stories focused on Berezovsky's activities in Russia. The story did not mention the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, Lord Steyn said, two factors ruled out Russia as the best forum. First, only 13 copies of the *Forbes* issue were distributed in Russia.⁸⁹ Second and most important, the jurist asserted, the judicial system in Russia would not redress Berezovsky for damage to his reputation in England. Why the Russian system would not

⁸⁵ Peter Murtagh, *450,000 pounds for defamed Navy officer*, *Guardian*, June 4, 1987.

⁸⁶ Restatement (Second) of Torts, sect. 577A(4); *Keeton v. Hustler*, 465 U.S. 770 (1984).

⁸⁷ *Berezovsky* at 993.

⁸⁸ *Id.* at 994.

⁸⁹ *Id.* at 995.

provide redress was not explained. When the statement is juxtaposed with his view of the American judicial system, it appears the jurist concluded the Russian system is either too corrupt or too incompetent to render justice. In any event, Lord Steyn stated, Russia cannot “realistically be treated as an appropriate forum where the ends of justice can be achieved.”⁹⁰ Lord Steyn said the United States “is a jurisdiction where libel actions can be effectively and justly tried,”⁹¹ but Berezovsky’s connections with America are minimal and there is no realistic claim that his reputation needs protection in the United States. Thus, the United States is not an appropriate forum.⁹²

It becomes clear that the *Duke of Brunswick* rule weights the judicial scale in favor of England as a forum when the plaintiff is a United Kingdom resident or has enough connections with the country to have a reputation there. Both Lord Steyn and Lord Nolan stressed Berezovsky’s dealings with London financiers.⁹³ Berezovsky’s wife lived in London and his daughters attended Cambridge University. Lord Nolan commented:

The essence of. . . plaintiffs’ claims is that their reputations in this country have been severely damaged by the article complained of, and that it is vital for the successful continuation of their personal, business and, in the case of Mr. Berezovsky, official activities in this country that they should be able to defend and vindicate their integrity in an English court. The claims are confined to damage sustained within this jurisdiction. * * * *

. . . But in the international business and political world it is by no means unknown for scoundrels, and even major criminals, to survive, to be accepted, and to prosper. Standards of conduct and tolerance in such matters vary widely from country to country. This case is solely concerned with the plaintiffs’ reputations in England. They seek to have their reputations judged by English standards.⁹⁴

By making Berezovsky’s reputation in the United Kingdom the lodestar of the decision, the reasoning of the lords ignores the difficulties of the burden of proof placed on the media under English libel law. The sources of the *Forbes* stories mostly were in Russia. None were in England.

⁹⁰ Id at 995-996.

⁹¹ Id at 996.

⁹² Id.

⁹³ Id at 989, 997-998.

⁹⁴ Id at 997-998.

The notion that the magazine could have successfully proven the truth of its allegations in an English court boggles the mind.

More convincing is the reasoning of Lord Hoffman, who declared in his minority opinion an “English court should not be an international libel tribunal for a dispute between foreigners which had no connection with this country.”⁹⁵ Lord Hoffman said any reputation Berezovsky had in England was derived from his activities in Russia. The jurist said Berezovsky’s purpose was not compensation for damages to his reputation in England. Rather, he commented, the Berezovsky’s purpose was to demonstrate that he was defamed in respect to his Russian activities.

The plaintiffs are forum shoppers in the most literal sense. They have weighed up the advantages to them of the various jurisdictions that might be available and decided that England is the best place in which to vindicate their international reputations. They want English law, English judicial integrity and the international publicity which would attend success in an English libel action. *

. . . I would not deny that in some respects an English court would be admirably suitable for this purpose. But that does not mean that we should always put ourselves forward as the most appropriate forum in which any foreign publisher who has distributed copies in this country, or whose publications have been downloaded here from the internet, can be required to answer the complaint of any public figure with an international reputation, however little the dispute has to do with England.⁹⁶

Particularly noteworthy is Lord Hoffman’s insight that in an age of globalization, including global media, a public figure in one country is likely to have a reputation in many other countries. Thus, where the *Duke of Brunswick* rule prevails and reputation does not exclude that derived from activities elsewhere, forum choice is dictated by the plaintiff.

Lord Hoffman provided a trenchant analysis of Berezovsky’s motive for suing in the United Kingdom. He did not sue in Russia “for the unusual reason that other people might think it too likely that he would win. He says success in Russia would not be adequate to vindicate his reputation because it might be attributed to his corrupt influence over the Russian judiciary.”⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Id at 1005.

⁹⁶ Id.

⁹⁷ Id.

He avoided suing in the United States because the actual malice rule of *New York Times v. Sullivan* “makes it too likely that he would lose.”⁹⁸ Under Lord Hoffman’s analysis, Berezovsky’s purpose was enhancement of reputation rather than compensation for harm.

THE *GUTNICK* DECISION

Berezovsky involved publication of stories in both a magazine and on the Internet. There was no special focus on the Internet. *Gutnick* also involved both print and the Internet, but the focus was on the Internet. Yet, the decision by the High Court of Australia adhered to traditional common law. The court refused to consider the Internet as a unique international media that required new legal principles.

(P)ointing to the breath or depth of reach of particular forms of communication may tend to obscure one basic fact. However broad may be the reach of any particular means of communication, those who make information accessible by a particular method do so knowing of the reach that their information may have. In particular, those who post information on the World Wide Web do so knowing that the information they make available is available to all and sundry without any geographic restriction.⁹⁹

The court said the essence of defamation law is the location of the tort. It rejected the contention of *Barrons* that the site of the alleged libel was New Jersey where the story about Gutnick was uploaded onto wsj.com. Ordinarily, said the court, libel happens “where the damage to reputation occurs. Ordinarily that will be where the material which is alleged to be defamatory is available in comprehensible form assuming, of course, that the person defamed has in that place a reputation which is thereby damaged.”¹⁰⁰ Thus:

In the case of the World Wide Web, it is not available in comprehensible form until downloaded on to the computer of a person who has used a web browser to pull the material from the web server. It is where that person downloads the material that damage to

⁹⁸ Id at 1005-1006.

⁹⁹ *Gutnick* at para 39.

¹⁰⁰ Id at para 44.

reputation is done. Ordinarily then, that will be the place where the tort of defamation is committed.¹⁰¹

Given the common law principles, the court said, it was appropriate that Gutnick's libel action be tried in Melbourne. The court noted that Gutnick's suit sought damages only for harm to his reputation in the State of Victoria. Since the locus of the harm, as limited by the plea for damages, was Victoria, then the common law of libel of that state would govern the action.¹⁰²

The court reaffirmed that Australia adhered to the *Duke of Brunswick* rule.¹⁰³ Due to the rule, *Barrons* argued, conferring jurisdiction on a court other than where information is uploaded on the Internet would force publishers to face libel suits around the world. The court dismissed the "spectre which Dow Jones sought to conjure up. . .of a publisher forced to consider every article it publishes on the World Wide Web against the defamation laws of every country from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe."¹⁰⁴ The court said two factors make the spectre unreal. The first is that a person is likely to sue only in forums where he has a reputation that would warrant a substantial award. Second, a person is likely to sue only if a defendant has assets that can be reached.¹⁰⁵ In fact, as Lord Hoffman noted in *Berezovsky*,¹⁰⁶ reality belies the court's comments. In an age of global media people such as Gutnick have reputations in practically all developed nations. Where the common law with its presumption of damages prevails, substantial awards are possible in many nations. The media often have no substantial assets in countries in which they are sued. Indeed, in a concurring opinion, Justice Mary Gaudron wrote:

The objections that (Dow Jones) is not present in this country, has no office or assets here. . .has only minimal commercial interest in the sale of *Barron's* magazine or online services in Victoria or to Australians; and publishes them principally for the benefit of, and sale to, United States readers, are considerations irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction. . .¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ Id.

¹⁰² Id at para 48.

¹⁰³ Id at para 27.

¹⁰⁴ Id at para 54.

¹⁰⁵ Id at para 52.

¹⁰⁶ *Berezovsky* at 1005.

¹⁰⁷ *Gutnick* at para 103.

Justice Gaudron conceded that the *Duke of Brunswick* rule may need revision in an Internet age, but she maintained *Gutnick* was not where it should be done.

Intuition suggests that the remarkable features of the Internet (which is still changing and expanding) make it more than a simply another medium of human expression. It is indeed a revolutionary leap in the distribution of information, including about the reputation of individuals. It is a medium that overwhelmingly benefits humanity, advancing as it does the human right of access to information and to free expression. But the human right to protection by law for the reputation and honour of individuals must also be defended to the extent that the law provides.¹⁰⁸

However, Justice Gaudron said, there are “limits on the extent to which national courts can provide radical solutions that would oblige a major overhaul of longstanding doctrine in the field of defamation law.”¹⁰⁹

Justice Ian Callinan, a jurist known for his enmity to the news media, in a concurring opinion, rejected *Barrons*’ argument that the United States is a more appropriate forum. In doing so, he expressed a heavy dislike for United States First Amendment law.

Australian defamation law, and, for that matter, English defamation law also, and the policy underlying them, are different from the United States. There is no doubt that the latter leans heavily, some might say far too heavily, in favour of defendants.¹¹⁰

Quite deliberately, and in my opinion rightly so, Australian law places real value on reputation and views with scepticism claims that it unduly inhibits freedom of discourse.¹¹¹

Justice Callinan claimed that to hold that jurisdiction in Internet libel actions should be where stories are uploaded

¹⁰⁸ Id at para 164.

¹⁰⁹ Id at para 166.

¹¹⁰ Id at para 188.

¹¹¹ Id at para 190.

is to impose upon Australian residents for the purposes of this and many other cases an American legal hegemony in relation to Internet publications. The consequence. . . would be to confer upon one country, and one notably more benevolent to the commercial and other media than this one, an effective domain over the law of defamation, to the financial advantage of publishers in the United States, and the serious disadvantage of those unfortunate enough to be reputationally damaged outside the United States. A further consequence might be to place commercial publishers in this country at a disadvantage to commercial publishers in the United States.¹¹²

Such *dicta* is nonsense. The consequence of more liberal laws on free expression is to encourage publishers to move to the United States. American courts will not enforce judgments handed down by foreign courts where First Amendment protections are not provided.¹¹³ Nevertheless, it points up a substantial difficulty for transnational publishers. Foreign courts are not friendly to American libel law.¹¹⁴

CONCLUSIONS

The United Kingdom and Australian courts take a different view on the essence of jurisdiction than do courts in the United States. *Forbes* had only minimal circulation in the United Kingdom of its print and Internet editions. The same was true of *Barrons* in Australia. *Forbes'* stories were about Berezovsky's activities in Russia. His activities in England were not mentioned. *Barrons'* stories about Gutnick are more ambiguous. Some of his activities in Australia were detailed. Nevertheless, the focus was on his dealings with religious charities in the United States. The target audiences for both the *Forbes* and *Barrons* stories were in the United States. If United States law had been applied, neither the United Kingdom nor Australia could have taken jurisdiction.

The results in *Berezovsky* and *Gutnick* flowed from libel as a multi-jurisdiction tort at common law. Berezovsky and Gutnick have reputations in the United Kingdom and Australia, but as related to the essence of the stories in the magazines, the reputations derive from activities elsewhere.

¹¹² Id at para 200.

¹¹³ *Telnikoff v. Matusevitch*, 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1996); *Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.*, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (Sup.Ct. 1992).

¹¹⁴ See, e.g., Susanna Frederick Fischer, *Rethinking Sullivan: New Approaches in Australia, New Zealand, and England*, 34 Geo. Wash. Int'l L.Rev. 101 (2002).

Nevertheless, application of the *Duke of Brunswick* rule and of limiting damages to harm in the United Kingdom and Australia, provides the legal underpinning for jurisdiction. That libel law presumes that the plaintiff suffered harm makes the geographical limitation on damages meaningless doesn't enter the legal equation.

A new twist may be added to *Gutnick*. Bill Alpert, author of the article, has appealed the decision to the Geneva-based United Nations Commissioner on Human Rights.¹¹⁵ The UN office can only issue non-binding opinions, but those opinions can have persuasive authority with courts.

Freedom of expression stems from societal and legal traditions. Due to the differing values placed on that freedom by various societies, global publishers are bound to be increasingly caught in conflicts among those values. At present the conflicts over jurisdiction in libel cases appear irreconcilable. Muddling through is likely to be the norm for global publishers until societies can rally around a freedom of expression consensus.

¹¹⁵ Miranda Mclachlan, *Legal Firsts in Gutnick Defamation Case*, Australian Financial Review, April 29, 2003; Nikki Tait, *US journalist challenges Internet libel ruling*, Financial Times (London), April 17, 2003.

Cultural Profiles of Global and Local Advertising on Primetime Chinese Television: A Comparative Content Analysis

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Abstract

A comparative content analysis explores the cultural profiles of global and local advertising on primetime Chinese television by examining manifest cultural values in advertising themes and cultural symbols and icons in advertising executions. The purpose is to test the explanatory power of three theoretical perspectives on the outcomes of global cultural interactions: globalization, localization, and glocalization. The results support the glocalization argument, showing that the outcomes of cultural interaction represented in global and local advertising in China exemplify the dialectical synthesis of globalization and localization.

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Since the second half of the 20th century, many multinational corporations have come to see the world as an increasingly homogeneous market and have pushed products and services across national borders in search of market expansion, market domination and economies of scale (Kotler & Armstrong, 2001). Major advertising agencies have followed their clients to business frontiers around the world, making advertising a global industry (Jones, 2000).

The global expansion of the advertising industry has raised concerns about its social and cultural effects in local markets. Many believe that it entails a wholesale transfer of Western consumerist values into local cultures, potentially transforming local diversity into a “bland reproduction of the industrial capitalist West” (Hogan 1999; also see Anderson, 1984; Barnet & Cavanagh, 1994; Tomlinson, 1991). This argument is an extension of the cultural imperialism thesis begun in the 1970s (Mattelart, 1979; Schiller, 1972; Wallerstein, 1974).

Others, in contrast, contend that globalization provokes indigenizing forces in local cultures. As the local audience meets global culture, they bring their own interpretative frameworks, resisting, reinterpreting, and reinventing foreign cultural products (Ang, 1985; Fiske, 1987; Liebes & Katz, 1990; Morley, 1983). By encountering other ways of life and appropriating the cultural repertoires of others, local identities and traditions can be revitalized and reinvigorated (Friedman, 1990; Thompson, 1995).

At the core of these debates are questions about the processes and outcomes of today’s ever-intensifying global-local interactions. How does the global affect and negotiate with the local? How does the local respond to the global? What are the cultural characteristics of the outcomes of such interaction and negotiation? Do they exemplify globalization and cultural Westernization, or localization and cultural heterogenization, or a combination of these tendencies?

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A possible entry point for answering these questions is an examination of the output of today's international commercial and cultural circulations, namely, the content of global and local advertising. Global advertising is defined here as advertising for products and services of multinational corporations, whereas local advertising is defined as advertising for products and services of locally owned businesses. The present study attempts to explore and compare the cultural profiles of global and local advertising by examining cultural values, symbols and icons used in advertising themes and executions.

This study focuses on China, the world's largest potential consumer market craved by multinational advertisers. As an ancient Eastern culture with distinct characteristics vis-à-vis the Western culture, and as a developing economy with a booming advertising industry, China makes an ideal case for studying the processes and outcomes of global-local interaction and negotiation.

The study focuses on television advertising because television is China's most popular and influential mass medium, and the leading advertising medium in terms of business volume (Tian, 1995; Weber, 2000). Targeted toward the mass rather than niche audience, television advertising is a more accurate reflection of the Chinese society and culture as a whole.

This study is designed to empirically test the explanatory power of three contrasting theoretical models of global cultural formations. The globalization argument predicts a convergence in the direction of the global, and foresees cultural homogenization and Westernization (Ritzer, 1996; Sklair, 1995). The localization hypothesis, in contrast, argues for the reassertion and revitalization of local traditions and identification as a backlash against escalating globalism (Friedman, 1994; Waters, 1995). A third alternative called "glocalization" argues for a dialectical synthesis of globalization and localization, a Janus-faced process

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This study is one of the first to focus on a comparison of global and local advertising in the same cultural context and the first such study done in the Chinese context. Apart from its theoretical significance for international communication, it yields practical knowledge about social and cultural tendencies in today's complex marketing environment that is both culturally diversified and globally connected. Such knowledge is crucial for achieving better consumer insight and more effective marketing communication.

The next section reviews research in the cultural characteristics of advertising content, particularly those of global advertising in the local context. The analytical instruments adopted in this study are also reviewed. To put the study in context, this section includes a brief overview of the past and present of Chinese advertising.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Cultural globalization, localization and glocalization tendencies reflected in advertising

Many studies have attested to the tendencies of cultural homogenization and globalization reflected in advertising. Studies in Latin America have shown that global advertising depicts Western lifestyles and excessive consumption, and promotes Western values of *materialism*, *hedonism*, and *intense competitiveness* (Janus, 1986; Santoro, 1975; Tapia, 1973).

In Asia, research concluded that global advertising was spreading "Un-Asian" attitudes that can be linked to the rapid growth of consumerism (Consumer Association of Penang 1986; Frith 1990; Goonasekera 1987). An analysis of foreign ads in Chinese newspapers found that they echoed the global capitalist emphasis on the values of *materialism* and *modernity* (Wang, 1996). A longitudinal study of Chinese ads from 1979 to 1995 found that ads promoting

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Western values such as *competition, individualism, modernity* and *sex* have increased in frequency (McIntyre & Wei, 1998). Studies of advertising in Hong Kong and Taiwan show the predominance of Western values, such as *materialism and consumption*, and the gradual displacement of traditional values, such as *frugality* (Chan, 1999; Pasadeos & Chi, 1992; Wong, 2000).

On the other hand, studies comparing advertising content in Eastern cultures with advertising in the West have documented localization tendencies. Comparative studies of U.S. and Japanese advertising have found that despite increasing Western influence expressed as the use of Western cultural values, symbols and icons, deep-rooted Japanese values, such as *reverence for the elderly and tradition, emphasis on non-verbal communication* and *social harmony*, remain strong (Belk & Bryce 1986; Belk & Pollay 1985; Belk et al., 1985). In fact, researchers believe that advertising in Japan is becoming increasingly Japanese; its national culture and identity are being reasserted in response to the pressures of globalization (Hogan, 1999; Mueller, 1987, 1992).

Researchers have also found that advertising in Eastern cultures such as Korea and India differs significantly from advertising in the West by displaying distinctive Eastern cultural characteristics such as *collectivism, past time orientation, oneness with nature*, and *high contextuality* (Cho et al., 1999; Frith & Sengupta, 1991; Han & Shavitt, 1994). Chinese advertisers have also been found to use more typical Eastern cultural values than their American counterparts (Cheng & Schweitzer, 1996).

Recent studies have begun to show an increasing tendency toward glocalization, a combination of globalization and localization tendencies. Researchers have observed the phenomenon of “a melting pot” of Eastern and Western cultural values in Chinese advertising

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(Cheng, 1994, 1997; Cheng & Schweitzer, 1996). Others noted the reassertion of Chinese cultural traditions, juxtaposed with evidence of Western cultural influence (Ji & McNeal, 2001; Lin, 2001). In India, a study found the presence of Western cultural values in both global and local advertising. However the authors argued that the Western elements were appropriated as useful “otherness” capable of contributing to India’s modernization and development process (Sengupta & Frith, 1997).

In sum, existing literature has documented globalization, localization and glocalization tendencies reflected in advertising content, but with no conclusive evidence about which tendency is more predominant and if there’s a predominant tendency, in what kind of advertising it manifests. Most studies either compared advertising across cultures, or examined advertising content in one culture without separating the global from the local. To disentangle the complexities and nuance of cultural transactions between the global and the local, it is necessary to examine and compare global and local advertising in the same cultural context.

Instruments used in previous research

This study investigates the cultural profile of Chinese advertising on two dimensions: cultural values in advertising themes and cultural symbols and icons in advertising executions. Both dimensions have been examined by previous research, though in most cases studied separately.

Scholars have long recognized that advertising is “a carrier of cultural values” (Pollay, 1983, p 73). It aims to achieve a “transfer of values” by establishing a nexus between the advertised commodity and what a culture views as desirable, e.g., *beauty*, *health*, etc. In fact, no sophisticated advertiser fails to study and determine consumer values before they craft advertising messages and appeals (Donnelly, 1996). Certain cultural values are perceived as

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instrumental in helping to move merchandize and are therefore frequently endorsed, glamorized and reinforced at the core of advertising messages. Critics argue that over time, advertising's persistent highlighting and neglecting of particular cultural values can have a cumulative effect on social and cultural transformations (Pollay & Gallagher, 1990).

Synthesizing previous research on human values, Pollay (1983) developed a coding framework that measured manifest cultural values in advertising themes. This framework has been widely adopted in subsequent research. Reliability coefficients of the framework and its modified versions applied to multiple historical, cultural and media contexts consistently fall within the acceptable range of .85 and more. A modified version of the framework is used in this study.

Previous research on advertising's cultural content mainly focused on advertising themes, or the gist of the message in terms of what is communicated. A few looked at creative executions, or the presentation of the message in terms of how it is communicated. Cultural characteristics may be apparent in not only what is said, but also in how it is said. Therefore both advertising themes and executions should be examined to capture the full picture.

Hall (1992, p 293) defined national and cultural narrative as "a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and rituals which stand for or represent the shared experiences...which give meaning to the nation." As a reflection of the culture in which it exists, advertising typically articulates these cultural narratives in creative executions.

Previous research in international advertising used cultural symbols and icons such as arts and artifacts, settings, and models in terms of their age, ethnicity and number (appearing individually vs. in a group) to examine how national and cultural identities and preferences are represented in advertising content. For example, researchers have treated the number of models

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used in an ad as a symbolic representation of the degree of *individualism* in any given culture (Frith & Sengupta, 1991; Han & Shavitt, 1994). The degree of Westernization in advertising content has been measured by the use of Western models and celebrities, languages, artifacts, settings, music, and fashion (Mueller, 1992). Model age has been used as an indicator of a culture's time orientation and its attitude toward tradition and elderly people (Cho et al., 1999). These cultural symbols and icons are modified and adopted in this study.

Advertising in China

Advertising as a tool to promote a product or service to the public appeared in China as early as five thousand years ago (Xu, 1990). Its modern version as an institution of commercial information and persuasion that depends on the mass media emerged only at the turn of the 19th-to-20th century as a product of Western colonial influence (Williams, 1980). In the 1920s to 1930s, the industry experienced its first boom, in which foreign advertising played a pivotal role (Xu, 1990).

After the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in 1949, commercial advertising gradually disappeared as a result of the revolutionary transformation in the country's political, ideological, and economic environment (Hong, 1994). In the late 1970s, commercial advertising was resurrected by the government's economic reform and open-door policy that precipitated almost another revolution in China's economic and cultural environment. The dramatic economic development, enhanced consumer purchasing power and a proliferation of the mass media are just a few factors that contributed to a stunning growth of the advertising industry. Between 1987 and 1997, advertising spending increased by 1000%, making China the world's fastest growing advertising market (Weber, 2000).

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Multinational corporations (MNC) and transnational ad agencies (TNAA) play an important role in the growth of advertising in China. In 1992 the International Monetary Fund rated China the third largest economy in the world. Within just a few years, almost all the major MNCs have set up production bases and marketing outlets in China. Compared with other developing nations, China attracts the largest amount of direct foreign investment, with an average annual increase of over 15% during the 1990s ([Knowledge@Wharton](#) 2001). The world's leading TNAAs have followed their clients to the newly discovered consumer wonderland. By 1997 the number of TNAA branches in China had grown to 433 (China Advertising, 1998). They have been instrumental in introducing and cultivating foreign consumer products and images in the minds of Chinese consumers (Li and Gallup, 1995).

Research questions

To estimate the cultural tendencies of globalization, localization and glocalization reflected in primetime Chinese television advertising, these research questions were asked:

RQ1: What are the most frequently used cultural elements, including values, symbols, and icons, in global and local advertising themes and executions?

RQ2: What are the differences in the use of cultural elements, including values, symbols, and icons, between global and local advertising in themes and executions?

RQ3: based on answers to RQ1 and RQ2, which of the three theoretical models has stronger explanatory power, globalization, localization, or glocalization?

Table 1 summarizes all possible outcomes predicted by the three different theoretical models that were tested in this study.

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Table 1
Predicted outcomes from three theoretical models

Theoretical models	Predicted outcomes in global advertising	Predicted outcomes in local advertising	Predicted outcomes comparing global and local
Globalization	More Western than Eastern cultural elements	More Western than Eastern cultural elements	More Western cultural elements in global than in local ads
Localization	More Eastern than Western cultural elements	More Eastern than Western cultural elements	More Eastern cultural elements in local than in global ads
Glocalization	Similar proportion of Eastern and Western cultural elements More universal than culture-specific elements	Similar proportion of Eastern and Western cultural elements More universal than culture-specific elements	Similar proportion of Eastern and Western cultural elements

METHOD

Sampling

China Central Television Channel One (CCTV 1) and Beijing Television Channel One (BTV 1) were selected as the sampling frame. CCTV reached 600 million to 1 billion viewers in 2000 (Media 2000). CCTV 1 is the network's primary news and entertainment channel. BTV 1 reaches 10 million viewers in Beijing and its suburban areas. This population represents urban Chinese who are the primary target consumers of global advertisers. The two channels combined yield a representative sample of advertising on today's national and regional Chinese television.

Two weeks of programming were recorded during the prime time period of 6:30-8:30 p.m. in February 2001 when there was no holiday or festival to influence the generalizability of

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the data. The recording was conducted in a rotating manner between the two channels. This procedure yielded 28 hours of programming that included 1293 complete commercials, 1183 of them local ads and 110 of them global ads. The unequal sample size between the two groups reflects current marketing situation in China, where a majority of television commercials are put on air by local Chinese advertisers. The entire sample size is large enough to yield valid results from statistical analyses (Howell, 2002). Duplicated ads were retained following the practice of previous research, based on the rationale that each broadcast of a commercial has an impact on the viewers and the repetition of commercial broadcasts constitutes an aggregate effect (Belk & Pollay, 1985).

Coding scheme

Drawing on research from cross-cultural psychology and international advertising, two coding schemes were developed, one measuring manifest cultural values in advertising themes and the other, cultural symbols and icons in advertising executions (see appendix). A pretest on 10% of the sample ($N=130$) was conducted for the cultural values scheme and items that rarely appeared in the sample were identified. They were either discarded or collapsed with others, resulting in a modified list of 26 cultural values.

Coding procedure

The unit of analysis is one complete television commercial. The predictor variable is the origin of the advertised product or service, namely, global and local advertising. Global ads are defined as commercials for products and services of multinational corporations (MNC) and joint ventures. Local ads are defined as commercials for products and services of Chinese owned businesses (COB) and joint ventures. In cases of joint ventures, company websites are consulted to determine whether they are MNC or COB ads based on the relative proportions of foreign and

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Chinese investments. The criterion variables are: (1) cultural values manifest in advertising themes; and (2) cultural symbols and icons used in advertising creative executions, including (a) arts and artifacts, (b) settings, (c) age of models/celebrities, (d) ethnicity of models/celebrities, and (e) number of models/celebrities.

Cultural values tend to manifest in the video footage, voice-over, and copy of a television commercial (Cheng, 1996). All three components were taken into consideration in the coding process. Since more than one value could be used in any given ad (Pollay, 1983), the coder identified the most dominant one, which was determined by the overall impression or “gestalt” conveyed by the commercial, that is, the end result or total message possibly received by the viewer (Goffman, 1979). This is because ads are polysemic with complex interrelations between the signs employed. Since no one-to-one correspondence between signs and their intended meanings can be established, one possible approach is to discern overall effects, or “gestalts,” of the ads.

After the initial coding, the author categorized cultural values into three groups, (1) Eastern values, (2) Western values, and (3) universal values, based on theories from cross-cultural psychology (see Cho et al., 1999, for a review of cross-cultural theories distinguishing Eastern and Western cultural dimensions; see Table 2 for categorization of cultural values). This categorization was discussed and validated in interviews with four individuals from China and the United States representing Eastern and Western cultures (A. Lee, C. Hall, G. W. Scott, & X. Zhao, personal communication, 2001).

Reliability tests

A graduate student, proficient in English and Chinese but with no knowledge of the research questions, coded the data after receiving a two-hour training session. Eight weeks later,

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15% ($N=215$) of the sample ($N = 1293$) were randomly selected and coded independently by the author and the student coder. The two-step coding procedure yielded two sets of reliability scores. The intra-coder reliability (also called stability test) coefficient measures the internal consistency of the student coder using the ratio of coding agreements to the total number of coding decisions made under a test-retest condition (Muller, 1987). For all the criterion variables, intra-coder reliability coefficients ranged from 93.5% to 100%. The inter-coder reliability (also called reproducibility test) coefficient measures the commonality of perception and judgment between two coders using the ratio of coding agreements to the total number of coding decisions each coder had to make under the same test condition (Kassarjian, 1977). For all the criterion variables, inter-coder reliability coefficients ranged from 86% to 100%. Both sets of reliability coefficients compared favorably with Kassarjian's (1977) acceptability criterion of 85% agreement. With the combination of stability and reproducibility tests, the coding schemes are believed to be sufficiently reliable (Mueller, 1987; Pollay, 1983).

RESULTS

Cultural values in advertising themes

RQ1 asked about the most frequently used cultural elements, including values, in global and local advertising themes. As shown in Table 2, both global and local advertising used the value of *practicality* most frequently (21.9% in local advertising and 39.1% in global advertising). The second most frequently used value was *modernity* (7.6%) in local advertising and *individualism* (10.9%) in global advertising.

RQ2 asked about the difference in the use of cultural elements, including values, between global and local advertising themes. As shown in Table 2, global ads used the values of

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practicality, individualism, economy, and extravagance more frequently than local ads. Local ads used the values of *modernity* and *status* more frequently than global ads. Another difference was that more local ads (8.1%) than global ads (1.8%) did not use any values at all.

To assess the tendencies of globalization, localization, and glocalization reflected in advertising, the 26 values were recoded into three summary categories of Eastern, Western, and universal values. As shown in Table 3, both global and local advertisers preferred universal to culture-specific values. 66% of the global ads and 55% of the local ads used universal values. When using culture-specific values, local advertisers used more Western (20.7%) than Eastern values (16.5%), supporting the globalization argument (see Table 1 on p. 10). In contrast, global advertising used similar proportions of Western (15.4%) and Eastern (16.4%) values, supporting the glocalization argument.

Between-group comparison shows that global advertising used more universal values than local advertising, but there was no difference in the use of Eastern and Western values, again supporting the glocalization argument: 16.5% of the local ads and 16.4% of the global ads used Eastern values; 20.7% of the local ads and 15.4% of the global ads used Western values; neither difference of proportion was statistically significant.

Cultural symbols and icons in advertising executions

RQ1 also asked about the most frequently used cultural elements, including cultural symbols and icons, in global and local advertising executions. As shown in Table 4, in both global and local advertising, a majority of the ads opted for non-culture-specific tactics in the use of *arts and artifacts* and *settings*: in the use of *arts and artifacts*, 83.3% in local ads and 83.6% in global ads were not culture-specific; in the use of *settings*, 90.2% in local ads and 88.2% in global ads were not culture-specific. Between-group comparison shows that more global ads

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(10%) used *Western arts and artifacts* than local ads (4.1%). There was no difference in the use of Eastern and Western settings between global and local advertising. In the use of models, almost half of the local ads (49.6%) did not use models, whereas the majority of the global ads used models (90.9%).

To get a clearer picture of the use of cultural symbols and icons in global and local advertising, an advertising execution index was built by combining the five execution variables, each measured on a 0- to- 3 scale and recoded into a -1-to-1 scale, with -1 standing for presence of Eastern cultural symbols and icons, 0 for absence or mixture of Eastern and Western symbols and icons, and 1 for presence of Western symbols and icons. An independent-samples *t* test was conducted to evaluate the difference in the mean scores of global and local advertising on the execution index with a score range of -5 to 5. Global advertising ($M = -.24$, $SD = 1.995$) obtained a higher score than local advertising ($M = -.89$, $SD = 1.630$), $t(123) = 3.352$, $p = 0.001$, representing a higher level of Westernization in creative executions. This also means that local advertising has a higher level of localization than global advertising in creative executions. However, both global and local advertising scored close to but lower than 0, the midpoint on the execution index representing a mixture or absence of Eastern and Western cultural characteristics. Therefore, both global and local advertising displayed a stronger tendency for neutral or mixed cultural characteristics in creative execution. This evidence lent support to the glocalization argument.

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Table 2
Frequencies of cultural values in global and local advertising themes^a

Cultural Values	Local advertising		Global advertising		X ² Values ^b (df = 1)	Cramer's V
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%		
<i>No value</i>	96	8.1	2	1.8	5.70*	.066*
<i>Eastern values</i>						
Naturalness	73	6.2	11	10	2.43	ns
Courtesy	34	2.9	0	0	3.25	ns
Tradition	32	2.7	0	0	3.05	ns
Collectivism	25	2.1	0	0	2.37	ns
Economy	17	1.4	7	6.4	13.41***	.102***
Maturity	14	1.2	0	0	1.32	ns
<i>Western values</i>						
Modernity	90	7.6	2	1.8	5.10*	.063*
Technology	50	4.2	2	1.8	1.51	ns
Competition	34	2.9	0	0	3.25	ns
Uniqueness	22	1.9	0	0	2.08	ns
Individualism	16	1.4	12	10.9	43.38***	.183***
Sex & romance	16	1.4	1	.9	.15	ns
Youth	15	1.3	0	0	1.41	ns
<i>Universal values</i>						
Practicality	259	21.9	43	39.1	16.63***	.113***
Enjoyment	61	5.2	6	5.5	.02	ns
Health	56	4.7	3	2.7	.93	ns
Work	54	4.6	3	2.7	.81	ns
Status	45	3.8	0	0	4.34*	.058*
Beauty	41	3.5	5	4.5	.34	ns
Extravagance	37	3.1	10	9.1	10.22**	.089**
Wisdom	28	2.4	0	0	2.66	ns
Popularity	26	2.2	0	0	2.47	ns
Safety	24	2	1	.9	.67	ns
Neatness	10	.8	0	0	.94	ns
Magic	8	.7	0	0	.75	ns
Ornamentality	0	0	2	1.8	NA ^c	NA
<i>Total</i>	<i>1183</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>99.9</i>		

^a Percentages may not total 100% because of rounding; values are listed in three groups, within each in descending order of frequency distribution in local advertising.

^b X² values test differences in the use of cultural values between global and local advertising.

^c More than 20% of the cells have expected count of less than 5; therefore the test cannot yield a valid chi-square.

p* < .05. *p* < .01. ****p* < .001.

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Table 3
Frequencies of Eastern, Western, and universal cultural values in global and local advertising^a

Summary categories	Global advertising		Local advertising		X ² Values ^b (df=1)
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	
No values	2	1.8	96	8.1	5.70*
Eastern values	18	16.4	195	16.5	.001
Western values	17	15.4	243	20.7	1.62
Universal values	73	66.3	649	54.7	5.40*
<i>Total</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>99.9</i>	<i>1183</i>	<i>100</i>	
X ² (df=1) ^c		.03		5.26*	

^a Percentages may not total 100% because of rounding.

^b Between-group X² values test differences in the use of Eastern, Western, and universal cultural values between global and local advertising.

^c Within-groups X² values test differences in the use of Eastern and Western cultural values within global and local advertising respectively.

* $P < .05$

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Table 4
Frequencies of cultural symbols and icons in global and local advertising executions^a

Cultural symbols/icons	Local advertising		Global advertising		X ² values ^b (df= 1)
	Freq.	%	Freq.	%	
<i>Arts and Artifacts</i>					
Eastern	149	12.6	7	6.4	3.68
Western	48	4.1	11	10	8.16**
No distinctive	986	83.3	92	83.6	.006
<i>Total</i>	<i>1183</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>100</i>	
<i>Age of models</i>					
Older	59	5	6	5.5	.05
Younger	456	38.5	82	74.5	53.68***
All ages	81	6.8	12	10.9	2.49
No models	587	49.6	10	9.1	66.52***
<i>Total</i>	<i>1183</i>	<i>99.9</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>100</i>	
<i>Ethnicity of models</i>					
Eastern	496	41.9	84	76.4	48.25***
Western	43	3.6	13	11.8	16.27***
Mixed-race	57	4.8	3	2.7	.99
No models	587	49.6	10	9.1	66.52***
<i>Total</i>	<i>1183</i>	<i>99.9</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>100</i>	
<i>Number of models</i>					
Group	389	32.9	65	59.1	30.34***
Individual	207	17.5	35	31.8	13.57***
No models	587	49.6	10	9.1	66.52***
<i>Total</i>	<i>1183</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>100</i>	
<i>Settings</i>					
Eastern	64	5.4	5	4.5	.15
Western	52	4.4	8	7.3	1.88
No distinctive	1067	90.2	97	88.2	.45
<i>Total</i>	<i>1183</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>110</i>	<i>100</i>	

^a Percentages may not total 100% because of rounding.

^b X² values test differences in the use of cultural symbols and icons between global and local advertising.

p* < .05. *p* < .01. ****p* < .001.

Discussion and conclusion

Findings

This research explores the cultural profiles of global and local advertising in China on two dimensions: cultural values in advertising themes and cultural symbols and icons in advertising executions. The purpose was to estimate cultural tendencies reflected in advertising so as to empirically test the explanatory power of three different theoretical arguments for the processes and outcomes of global-local interaction. The main findings supporting each argument are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5
Evidence supporting each of the theoretical models

Theoretical models	Empirical evidence in global advertising	Empirical evidence in local advertising	Empirical evidence comparing global and local advertising
Globalization		More Western than Eastern cultural values in advertising themes	
Localization			
Glocalization	<p>More universal than culture-specific values in advertising themes</p> <p>Similar proportion of Eastern and Western cultural values in advertising themes</p> <p>More neutral or mixed than culture-specific symbols and icons in advertising executions</p>	<p>More universal than culture-specific values in advertising themes</p> <p>More neutral or mixed than culture-specific symbols and icons in advertising executions</p>	<p>More universal cultural values in global than in local advertising themes</p> <p>Similar proportion of Eastern and Western cultural values between global and local advertising themes</p>

Discussion and conclusions

The cultural profile of global advertising in China. As shown in Table 5, the most frequently used cultural elements in global advertising, including cultural values in themes and cultural symbols and icons in executions, are universal, neutral, and mixed ones. Moreover, the proportions of Eastern and Western values in global advertising themes are similar. When compared with local advertising, global advertising does not demonstrate more Western cultural values. This finding is contrary to earlier research that found more Western values in global advertising (Cheng, 1997; Wang, 1996). In addition, global advertising is even more likely than local advertising to emphasize universal rather than culture-specific values. These findings suggest that at least in the case of global advertising on primetime Chinese television, there is little evidence for the predominant tendency of cultural Westernization and globalization. Instead, the simultaneity and hybridization of global and local elements in global advertising content may be results of cultural negotiation and adaptation between global and local forces. This constitutes a synthesis of globalization and localization tendencies, thus lending support to the glocalization argument.

There are a number of possible explanations for this finding. First, many of today's media and cultural products, including advertising, are manufactured and marketed for a global audience (Robertson, 1995). Part of the outcomes of economic globalization is the international allocation of resources, production, management and even ownership. In the case of global advertising, productions by MNCs' affiliated local branches and talents may be able to alleviate the degree of cultural transmission from Western standardized advertising. In China for example, many MNC ads are modified and in some cases, produced by local affiliates and personnel

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whose values resonate with and reflect the local Chinese culture (D. M. Haygood, former Group Account Director, DMB&B Beijing office, personal communication, 2001).

Second, recent research found that global advertisers doing business in China increasingly acknowledge the unique cultural preferences of the Chinese consumers when crafting advertising messages (Yin, 1999). Advertising by nature only highlight cultural elements that will help move merchandize, making it a “distorted mirror” of the culture in which it exists (Mueller, 1987; Pollay, 1983). Western cultural elements that oppose and have not been incorporated into the Chinese culture are therefore unlikely to be adopted in global advertising content.

Third, the Chinese media are owned by the government, who has always been vigilant about possible “spiritual pollution” of the Chinese people by Western culture. Advertising regulations aimed at screening Western cultural influence have been in place since 1995 (Weber, 2000). Consequently, Western cultural elements that are considered incompatible with and a threat to the purity of traditional Chinese culture are unlikely to pass through regulatory hurdles set by dominant political institutions.

Last but not least, advertising on primetime television is generally geared toward the mass audience regardless of age, gender, income, education, and other key demographic variables. On one hand, this could subject advertising on TV, especially global advertising, to stricter government regulations. On the other hand, global advertisers who choose the medium of television may be engaged in heightened self-censorship in order to appeal to the mass TV audience who is less responsive to Western cultural elements than certain demographic groups such as 18-35 year-olds (Zhang and Shavitt, 2003).

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In sum, the cultural profile of global advertising in China represents the complexity of the outcomes of global cultural interaction. A whole spectrum of factors, in this case the diversification of global media production, the resistant reading of local audience, the political and regulatory peculiarity of the local environment, and advertising media characteristics, work together to mediate the effect of cultural globalization, making the end result a dialectical synthesis of globalization and localization.

The cultural profile of local advertising in China. In local advertising, the most frequently used cultural elements are also universal, neutral, and mixed ones, again lending support to the glocalization argument which predicts hybridization as a result of cultural interaction. However, local Chinese advertising does use more Western than Eastern cultural values in advertising themes, providing evidence for the argument of cultural globalization and Westernization. This finding is consistent with some previous research (Cheng, 1997; McIntyre & Wei, 1998), although it should be interpreted in conjunction with the finding that local Chinese advertising tends to use more universal than culture-specific values, which means that the globalization model receives only limited support from this study.

To understand why there are more Western than Eastern values in local Chinese advertising, an examination of the frequency distribution of culture-specific values is in order. The results indicate that the relatively frequent use of two Western values contributes to this finding. They are *modernity* and *technology*. Interestingly *modernity* is also used more frequently in local than in global advertising. This finding must be interpreted in context. The presence of *modernity* as a recurring theme in Chinese advertising is partly due to advertising's defining characteristic of promoting newness and encouraging change in consumer behavior. More importantly, this reflects a long-held cultural complex for national empowerment that can be

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traced back to the early 1900s as a response to more than a century's oppression and exploitation from the West. This national complex was reawakened in the late 1970s when China was opened after decades of isolation to a much more modernized outside world. For the subsequent three decades, *modernity* has become an overriding and defining theme in the Chinese political, economic, and social experience, both at the societal and the individual level. The adoption of this Western value in Chinese advertising, instead of being considered as the dominance and imposition of the global over the local, should be viewed at a situational level as a historical and contemporary reaction of the local to pressures from the global, and as an assimilation of the global into the local's "own realm of practiced meaning" (Friedman, 1995, p78). An argument can be made that the value of *modernity* in China has been historically hybridized. It represents a recombination of the global code to form a re-articulation from the local voice.

Another cultural value that contributes to the higher frequency of Western than Eastern values in Chinese advertising is *technology*. Along with *modernity*, it is part and parcel of the whole notion of useful "otherness" that are perceived to be instrumental for national development and empowerment. Thus the value of *technology* constitutes another hybridized value being incorporated into the local culture for the same historical reasons as *modernity*.

It is important to note that the use of Western values such as *modernity* and *technology* does not replace conflicting local values such as *tradition* and *naturalness*. Although the value of *naturalness* has always maintained a presence in Chinese advertising, this is the first time that it is documented as one of the most frequently used. This new development suggests that there is some indication of the rediscovery and reassertion of Chinese cultural traditions reflected in advertising at the beginning of the 21st century.

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In sum, the cultural profile of local Chinese advertising exemplifies the dialectical moment of globalization and localization. On one hand, local cultural elements are maintaining a strong hold and arguably asserting an increasing influence, demonstrating a localization tendency; on the other, Western cultural elements make their inroads, but this presence, instead of suggesting the dominance of global culture, indicates that cultural formations are the results of historical hybridization. Again, outcomes of cultural interaction reflected in local Chinese advertising exemplify the practice of glocalization.

Implications and future research

This study tested three theoretical models of cultural formations using empirical evidence from global and local advertising in China. Although both the globalization and the glocalization arguments capture some aspects of the cultural phenomena of global and local advertising in China, the glocalization argument seems to explain and predict more in this case, and thus exhibits more explanatory power. Overall, the cultural profiles of global and local television advertising in China exemplify a glocalization tendency. These profiles are hybridization of the global and the local, with elements from both represented at varying degrees, and therefore should be positioned in the middle of the globalization-localization continuum.

One implication of this finding is that cultural formations must be examined within specific temporal and spatial contexts. They are not fixed but fluid, as cultural negotiations and interactions produce a spectrum of possibilities between the unilateral opposites of dominance/globalization and opposition/localization. Our results show that globalization and localization tendencies are not only bound together, but also mutually implicative of the creation of cultural hybrids. Such tendencies of glocalization and hybridization, whether reflected in media and cultural products or in the population, deserve constant monitoring and studying.

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This study is limited in scope in that it only captures outcomes of a particular kind of cultural interaction, in this case that occurring in the advertising arena, in a particular moment, at a particular location. But it is indicative of current cultural tendencies in the developing world under conditions of economic globalization. Future studies could examine other media and cultural products, in different media environments, and under different social and cultural conditions to obtain more empirical evidence for the outcomes of cultural interactions. Finally, longitudinal studies can help unravel the processes and directions of potential cultural change as a result of global-local interaction.

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Appendix

Coding schemes for global and local advertising on primetime Chinese television

I. Cultural values manifest in advertising themes

View the ad (video footage image, voice-over, text) and identify the dominant cultural value; enter the corresponding number of that cultural value into coding sheet; if no cultural value can be identified, code as 0; review list of values for final checking.

1. Beauty

--Emphasis on the product's ability to improve the physical appearance of its user; to help achieve a socially desirable appearance; to become fashionable, graceful, glamorous and handsome.

2. Collectivism

--Emphasis on the value of being accepted or becoming an integral part of family or social group; stressing benefits to the family or social group as a whole; emphasis on family or group integrity, group welfare, goals, choices, and achievements.

--Focusing on interdependence, harmony, conformity, solidarity, and consensus; to join, unite, or bond in friendship, fellowship, and companionship; to conform to social norms.

--Stressing relation to communities, ethnic groups, or national publics; public spiritedness; social awareness; consideration for other people's viewpoints and happiness; nurturance of the weak, disabled, young and elderly; patriotism.

3. Individualism

--Emphasis on the value of being or becoming self-sufficient, independent, confident, secure, proud, and autonomous; stressing benefits to the individual; emphasis on individual well being, self improvement, self-fulfillment, self-development, self-

realization, feelings of self-worth, personal choices, goals, ambitions, and achievements.

--Focusing on the individual being distinct, unique, unconventional, nonconformist and standing out from the crowd.

4. Courtesy

--Emphasis on showing politeness, friendliness, and sincerity toward the consumer by using polished and affable language.

5. Competition

--Focusing on distinguishing the product from its counterparts by explicit or implicit comparisons; may mention competition's name, or use such terms as "number one", "leader", "outstanding", and "the best".

6. Economy

--Emphasizing the attributes of being inexpensive, affordable, discounted, and cost saving; being a good value.

7. Extravagance

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- Emphasizing the attributes of being expensive, highly valuable, highly regarded, high quality, exorbitant, luxurious, and priceless.
- Emphasizing the value of being rich, affluent and prosperous; focusing on the product's ability to bring wealth, a higher material living standard, and a better material life to the consumer.

8. Enjoyment

- Emphasis on the product's ability to bring fun, enjoyment, and happiness and good fortune to the user; this may be achieved by showing consumers enjoying, having fun with and/or celebrating the consumption experience.

9. Health

- Stressing the importance of being physically fit, strong, active, athletic, and free from disease, infection or addiction.
- Emphasis on the product's ability to enhance or improve physical vitality, strength and robustness of its consumers.

10. Magic

- Emphasizing the attributes of being miraculous, mysterious; resulting from witchcraft, superstition, and occult sciences; emphasis on the product's ability to mesmerize, astonish, bewitch, and fill the consumer with wonder, e.g., "cleans like magic".

11. Wisdom

- Stressing the importance of being knowledgeable, intelligent, informed; focusing on the product's attributes as being resulted from education, expertise, judgment, and experience, e.g. "experts agree..."
- Emphasis on the product's educational and informational function, e.g. "enrich your knowledge".
- Highlighting detailed product information, instruction, or recipe.

12. Maturity

- Emphasizing the value of being grown-up, elderly, senior, having age-related insight, wisdom and mellowness; highlighting elderly people being asked for opinion because of these age-related qualities.

13. Youth

- Focusing on the deification of the young generation; emphasis on the youthful and rejuvenating benefits of the product, e.g. "feel young again".

14. Neatness

- Emphasizing the value of being orderly, tidy, clean, spotless, and free from dirt, refuse, pests, vermin, stains and smells.

15. Naturalness

- Stressing the attributes of being unadulterated, un-processed, pure, organic, and natural by making reference to the elements, animals, vegetations, and minerals; emphasis is on the beauty of nature, the product as a means of becoming one with nature and back to

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nature, the harmonic interaction and affinity between man and nature, and/or preservation and protection of the natural environment.

16. Technology

--Stressing the attributes of being engineered, manufactured, resulting from science, invention, discovery and research; emphasis is on the advanced and sophisticated technologies used in the product and man's manipulation of and superiority over nature through the use of technology.

17. Popularity

--Stressing the attributes of being commonplace, customary, conventional, regular, usual, ordinary, normal, typical, everyday, as well as being universally recognized and accepted, e.g., "largest seller", "well known nationwide/worldwide".

18. Uniqueness

--Stressing the attributes of being rare, distinctive, unusual, unrivaled, and incomparable, e.g., "the only..." emphasizing a unique selling proposition.

19. Practicality

--Focusing on the attributes of being effective, workable, useful, pragmatic, functional, efficient, helpful, comfortable (clothes), tasty (food), and capable of achieving certain ends.

--Being durable, long lasting, permanent, stable, strong, powerful, and tough.

--Being convenient, handy, easy to use, timesaving, accessible, and versatile.

--Emphasis on variety.

20. Ornamentality

--Focusing on the attributes of being beautiful, decorative, adorned, embellished, detailed, designed, and stylish.

21. Tradition

--Emphasis on the attributes of being classic, historical, antique, legendary, time-honored, long-standing, venerable, and nostalgic; having accumulated experience and wisdom, e.g. "a hundred years' experience in..."

22. Modernity

--Focusing on the attributes of being contemporary, new, up-to-date, ahead of time, advanced, improved, progressive, relating to the future, e.g. "introducing..." "new ...".

--Highlighting reference to whatever is foreign, e.g. "international leader".

23. Safety

--Emphasis on the attributes of being reliable, stable, trustworthy, absent from potential hazard, harmful ingredients, injury or other risks; having guarantees, reassurances, and warranties.

24. Sex and romance

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- Emphasizing erotic and romantic relations by highlighting scenes of couples holding hands, gazing at each other, kissing, embracing and dating.
- Emphasizing the product's ability to enhance the sexual attractiveness of its users; this may be achieved by using glamorous models with attractiveness of clearly sexual nature.

25. Status

- Emphasizing the value of being socially competitive, powerful, successful, and dominant.
- Associating the use of the product with the experience or benefits of seeking compliments from others, setting trends, and elevating one's position or rank in the eyes of others.

26. Work

- Emphasis on the value of being occupationally ambitious, proficient, competent, accomplished, and successful; the importance of being diligent, persistent, and dedicated to one's career.
- Stressing the product's ability to help consumers obtain these qualities and achieve these goals.
- Highlighting occupational settings and behaviors.

II. Cultural symbols and icons used in advertising executions

1. Arts and artifacts

- Code as 0 if there is no arts and artifacts used in the commercial or if it's hard to tell their cultural nature.
- Code as 1 if the ad uses only distinctive Chinese artistic forms such as music, opera, dance, and mythical and fictional figures; distinctive Chinese artifacts such as costumes, national currency, national flag, and festive decorations; and historical and contemporary Chinese figures.
- Code as 2 if both Chinese and Western arts and artifacts are used.
- Code as 3 if the ad uses only distinctive Western artistic forms such as English language pop songs, ballet, and legendary, fictional and mythical characters; distinctive Western artifacts such as costumes, national currency, national flag, and festive decorations; and historical and contemporary Western figures.

2. Models' age

- Code as 0 if the ad doesn't use human models or if it's hard to tell the model's age.
- Code as 1 if the model (s) appear to be above middle age.
- Code as 2 if there are both below and above middle-aged model(s).
- Code as 3 if the model (s) appear to be below middle age.

3. Models' ethnicity

- Code as 0 if the ad doesn't use human models or if it's hard to tell the model's ethnicity.
- Code as 1 if the ad uses only Chinese celebrities and models.
- Code as 2 if it uses both Chinese and Western models and celebrities.
- Code as 3 if it uses only Western models or celebrities

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4. Models' numbers

- Code as 0 if the ad doesn't use human models.
- Code as 1 if the ad uses a group of models (more than 2) interacting with one another.
- Code as 2 if the ad uses both individual and group models.
- Code as 3 if the ad uses one model, or if more than one, appearing in different frames and having no interaction with one another.

5. Settings

- Code as 0 if there is no settings used in the ad or if it's hard to tell the setting's cultural nature.
- Code as 1 if the ad is set in distinctive Chinese traditional occupations, leisure activities, landmarks, and landscapes.
- Code as 2 if there is a mixture of Chinese and Western settings.
- Code as 3 if the ad is set in distinctive Western occupations, leisure activities, landmarks, and landscapes.

Running head: Global Brands

Globalization through Global Brands:
Purely an American-Made Phenomenon?

AEJMC 2003 - International Communication Division

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Globalization through Global Brands:
Purely an American-Made Phenomenon?

Abstract

Globalization is a highly controversial issue among many in academia, business, and government. It has been faulted for a number of problems afflicting societies and credited for the benefits it bestows upon others. Those opposing globalization usually place blame on America as the primary force behind the phenomenon. This paper looks at global brands, a potent symbol of globalization representing a country's economic and cultural might, to determine if America is the driving force behind globalization.

Paper submitted to the International Communication Division of AEJMC

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Globalization through Global Brands:

Purely an American-Made Phenomenon?

On Sunday, August 12, 2002, José Bové, a French farmer, returned to the Millau, France McDonald's, the site and origin of his recent fame, to lead several thousand of his supporters, mostly members of the Small Farmers' Union (Confédération paysanne), in a protest of unchecked, rampant globalization and assert their demand for support from the French government for French farmers. The impetus of this particular protest was the surcharge employed by the United States on Roquefort cheese. But, it was just three years ago, in 1999, when Bové and his supporters dismantled that same McDonald's restaurant, while in construction, in this small village in southern France instantly gaining affection among those uneasy with the steady growth of foreign companies and influence on French soil. Since then, Bové has become a symbol and almost mythical figure for the forces from around the world aligned against any form of globalization. Indeed, he is the anti-globalization movement's folk hero, even garnering the nickname of "Asterix," the Gallic comic hero who fights against the Roman army occupiers of more than 2000 years ago (Keaten, 2002).

For these anti-globalization forces in Millau both in 1999 and in 2002, their complaints were perhaps misdirected. In fact, the irony in the case of the French farmers using McDonald's as a symbol for their protests is that the 850 plus McDonald's restaurants in France purchase 80% of their products in the French market providing economic assistance to the approximately 45,000 French beef producers. European countries provide the other 20% (Keaten, 2002). Thus, the overwhelming majority of the

food served at the French McDonald's originates in France. In addition, all the local McDonald's jobs are filled by the local French workers. Most of the actual McDonald's restaurants are owned by the French. And the head of McDonald's in France is a Frenchman (Keaton, 2002). So, what exactly were the farmers protesting?

Perhaps one no was really sure. But then again, the anti-globalization crowd is not particularly known for the depth and thoroughness of their thinking. The Millau protests and the protests at the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle several years ago were really about globalization. For many, this broad concept, against which these protesting forces are mobilized, means the spreading of American or western values through the exportation of western style capitalism to other countries. But globalization can be hard to pin down. For various groups, it can take on different meanings. For some, it is the instantaneous electronic transfer of capital to any part of the world. It means a multinational corporate feeding frenzy on small, local unprotected markets. It means the imposition of strict, market-opening trade rules in return for "unfair" western debt restructuring on vulnerable countries that have no choice but to accept. For others, it means the wiring of the world so that a select few media conglomerates have the ability to reach billions with a western spin on news, information, and entertainment. And for most, there is a big American component to globalization.

For those French farmers in Millau, McDonald's was simply the most convenient and most conspicuous symbol of globalization. But it could have been Coca-Cola, Starbucks, or CNN, all vivid and highly visible symbols of globalization. McDonald's, the iconic American fast food brand, and its fellow global brands provide fresh fodder for the legendary complaining so popular among the Europeans, cozily camped out in their

cafes and bistros. McDonald's represents to many Europeans, particularly for the increasingly frustrated French, what they resent about America and its overwhelming influential cultural, economic, and military position in the world.

Actually, brands may provide an intriguing measure of globalization. This is because they represent not only economic power but cultural influence and a form of cross border communication as well. Specifically, brands are an extension of country's economic reach across its borders into the marketplace of another. Regarding cultural influence, brands are usually reflective of the beliefs and values of the country of origin. In fact, some would argue that brands are simply another form of United States economic and cultural hegemony. Plus, there is a strong communication element to brands. Brands are supported by millions of dollars of advertising that are communicated over the local country's airways, printed in its local newspapers and magazines, and plastered on billboards and its transit systems.

This paper will attempt to determine the key driving forces behind globalization by looking at global brands and their country of origin. Is the United States really the driving force of globalization?

Literature Review – Branding and Globalization

This literature review section will review the key literature on both branding and globalization. First, brands and the concept of branding have become highly prevalent in business and society. In fact, over the past several decades, branding has emerged as a specialized field in marketing and advertising, and the literature has mirrored this dramatic growth. Specifically, business leaders and scholars have contributed to a

growing body of work around the brand-building concept. Almost all of the existing work centers on the fundamental concepts involved in branding such as brand definition, evaluation, and the tools used in building brands. Plus, there is a growing body of work that extends the concept to other areas. For example, there are books and research regarding building Internet brands and the necessary skills required to develop and maintain brands using the Internet. However, there has been no research that attempts to understand globalization through the measurement of global brands. Yet, we can begin to understand the importance and value of branding and its role in the global economy by tracing the broad outline of the existing work on brands from its early stages in defining the branding concept to current published work that features more refined techniques such as how to heighten consumers' "brand experience" on the Internet.

One of the earliest and most important publications on brand-related issues was from Ries and Trout (1981). The book, *Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind*, deals with the fundamental issue of creating a basic position for a brand and communicating that position in advertising in a single-minded way. Additionally, this book recognizes the power of a strong, clearly positioned brand in creating extensions and flanker products, which feed off the strength of the base brand.

Perhaps the key publication signaling the growing importance of brands is Aaker's *Managing Brand Equity* (1991). In this work, Aaker (1991) helps to define brand equity beyond the broadly accepted definitions of "brand heritage" or "general collection of brand images" in consumers' minds. Aaker breaks down the brand to five, key components: brand loyalty, brand awareness, perceived quality, brand associations, and proprietary brand assets.

Feeding off Aaker's thinking, books and articles about "managing" brands for long-term health emerged. *Strategic Brand Management's* (Kapferer, 1992) focus is on successfully managing a brand over time by avoiding common obvious mistakes, maintaining a contemporary image, introducing extensions, and optimizing the brand portfolio.

Additionally, much of the early thinking on branding was centered on "brand personality" whether communicated by television ads or other forms of communication (Durgee, 1988; Aaker, Stayman, & Hagerty, 1986). The personality represents the "voice" or "attitude" of the brand and is a major differentiation point versus competitors.

Plus, brand personality is recognized as a key component of brand goodwill with consumers (Batra, Lehmann, & Singh, 1993) and a crucial element in developing a "relationship" with consumers (Blackston, 1993). Refining the idea further, Aaker (1997) identifies five distinctive, personality dimensions of brands and within those dimensions, a set of numerous personality traits with which consumers identify brands through advertising.

The discourse on branding eventually evolved to how to measure the success of brands, particularly brand equity. Keller (1993) refines the definition of brand equity as "consumer-based" brand equity or consumer knowledge about the brand over and above that of a generic product in the category. Thus, it is a definition of brand equity based on the outcomes or effects of the marketing efforts of a particular brand. Keller further outlines this definition in *Strategic Brand Management* (1998), which incorporates techniques for building, measuring, and managing brand equity.

Recently, the literature has focused on the broader issue of building strong brands. In *Building Strong Brands*, Aaker (1996) presents a complete process for creating a strong brand. The process begins with a strategic brand analysis, developing the brand identity, implementing the identity via positioning and advertising execution, and finally tracking the brand health through research. Aaker recommends the “Brand Equity Ten,” ten measures designed for measuring the success of advertising in creating a strong brand. Keller (2000) offers an alternative outline for the creation of strong brands. This is a set of ten characteristics that strong global brands have in common such as delivering solidly against consumer wants, staying relevant, maintaining a proper position, and receiving proper support consistently over a long period of time.

Finally, a broad range of new work is emerging regarding branding in the age of the Internet, reinforcing the need for brand building skills in the high-speed economy. *Deep Branding on the Internet* outlines ways in which the Internet can help build brands through a consumer’s meaningful and productive experience on a brand’s Web site (Braunstein & Levine, 2000). *The 11 Immutable Laws of Internet Branding* reviews the necessary elements in building Internet brands (Ries & Ries, 2000). And *Warp Speed Branding* reveals how technology and speed of business places even more importance on using the Internet to build brand relationships with consumers (Winkler, 1999).

Regarding the literature on globalization, it is common to see globalization defined in a number of ways, often based on the writer’s agenda. Perhaps Thomas Friedman (1999) captures it best when explaining that it is a post-Cold War system in which capital, technology, and information are integrated across traditional national

borders. The result is the formation, to some extent, of a much closer and connected world or a “global village” (Friedman, 1999).

In similar fashion, Joseph Stiglitz (2002) defines globalization as “the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world which has been brought about by the enormous reductions of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and (to a lesser extent) people across borders” (Stiglitz, 2002).

Friedman and Stiglitz reflect a sober, reasoned approach to globalization. However, there are other views, much more negative in tone and content, that are best represented by Naomi Klein (2000). Clearly, Klein disdains the forces of globalization and its consequences. She claims that the ills of society are largely due to the incessant greed of multinational corporations. In Klein’s full-fledged assault on brands, *No Logo*, she is one of the first authors to make the connection with globalization and global brands (Klein, 2000).

And yes, for the most part, she points her finger right at American corporations. Most all of the references and examples in her book are about American corporations. One wonders if Miss Klein travels much or if she can even recognize foreign-made brands. Her bottom line is that we are all consumed by this American-led, soul-sapping movement embodied by brands.

So, do other authors portray globalization as being a product primarily of America? Stiglitz (2002), like many scholars and writers, acknowledge that many place the blame of globalization’s failures at the United States. However, Stiglitz presents an analysis of the successes and failures of globalization and proposes a number of actions

to remedy what has gone wrong. He avoids the convenient and popular reaction of decrying the United States. Rather, he writes that the International Monetary Fund is the primary culprit for the disappointments of globalization (Stiglitz, 2002).

Friedman (1999) as well notes that most view this “system” as American-made, therefore they blame America. “For some people, Americanization-globalization feels more than ever like a highly attractive, empowering, incredibly tempting pathway to rising living standards. For many others, though, this Americanization-globalization can breed a deep sense of envy and resentment toward the United States – envy because America seems so much better at riding this tiger and resentment because Americanization-globalization so often feels like the United States whipping everyone else to speed up, Web up, downsize, standardize and march to America’s cultural tunes into the Fast World....It is about the other backlash against globalization – the rising resentment of the United States that has been triggered as we move into a globalization system that is so heavily influenced today by American icons, markets, and military might. (Friedman, 1999).

The research progression reviewed above indicates that there are several gaps in the existing research. First, with the exception of Klein, little has been written about global brands and their connection to globalization. And second, there has not been an analysis of global brands, their home country, and the extent to which brands are marketed internationally. Which country is creating all these brands and distributing them around the world? Could it really be the United States, the country often derided in international business circles as being stunningly incompetent outside its own borders?

Theoretical Framework

The theory on which this paper is based is “framing.” Robert Entman (1993) defines framing as involving the selection and salience of a message that is intended for communication. Branding is essentially all about framing. It is the selection of a message, or what the brand stands for in the context of the competitive brand environment, and communicating that message in all forms of brand communications. This includes advertising, packaging, public relations, product delivery, service, all consumer contacts, etc. Regarding framing, effective communication involves selecting or highlighting a frame, or a word or number of words, that communicates the essential message (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). By simple selection or highlighting of an item, this elevates the item’s salience. Communicating with a salient message enhances the chances for successful communication with a target audience (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). But just as important as choosing what to highlight is choosing what to omit. Inclusion and omission of elements in a message are both important in communicating a message (Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991). Essentially, framing and branding are very much the same.

Overall, this paper is an effort to study globalization through the presence of global brands. Is the United States the primary driver of globalization? If so, then would it not be true that US brands dominate other countries’ brands in markets all over the globe? Or are brands from other countries just as powerful in their presence and strength as the brands from the United States?

Research Questions

Overall, this research will determine if globalization, defined through global brands, is an American driven phenomenon or whether it is a force driven by a number of countries from different regions.

The specific research questions are as follows:

RQ1: Is globalization, in terms of global brands, largely an American phenomenon?

RQ2: What is the country composition of this phenomenon?

RQ3: Has the country composition changed over time?

Method

The primary method for this study will be to quantitatively analyze a database of strong brands. The data used for this study is from Interbrand's "World's Most Valuable Brands." It is a ranking of the top 100 global brands, brands with a value of at least \$1 billion. The year, 2002, marks Interbrand's fourth consecutive year of creating a "Most Valuable Brands" list.

Interbrand, a well-known branding consultancy, developed a technique for assessing the monetary value of brands. In fact, Interbrand was one of the pioneers in establishing a formula for brand valuation. This Interbrand formula has become the standard for companies from around the globe and is accepted by marketing and financial entities such as management consultancies, academics, accounting firms, auditors, banks, advertising agencies, and other professionals. Over the past thirteen years, the firm has

worked with over 2500 global brands in providing branding valuation services (Khermouch, 2002).

There are two primary criteria for inclusion in Interbrand's survey: (1) brands must be global with significant revenue coming from the primary global markets, and (2) sufficient marketing and financial data must be available to the public in order for a proper valuation of brand value. This last criterion is extremely important. Depending largely on public available data, Interbrand works with Citigroup in developing the financial forecasts involved in the valuation. Thus, companies that provide inadequate data publicly are not included in the research; companies such as Mars, BBC, CNN, and VISA (Khermouch, 2002).

The specific model used to determine brand value calculates the net present value of the earnings the brand is expected to generate in the unspecified future. This is brand value. Below is a very broad and brief explanation of the model and its three key elements developed from *BusinessWeek*, publisher of the list, and Interbrand sources. It should be noted that the specific details of the model are proprietary information of Interbrand's and not released for public consumption.

(1) *Financial Forecasting* – This element is the projected revenue the brand is expected to pull into the business in the future minus all operating costs, taxation, and capital used to run the brand business. This leaves earnings created by the “intangibles” of the business. In other words, this figure tries to capture the “value added” by the brand deducted from the functional assets of the business.

(2) *Role of Branding* – This is the analysis that calculates brand earnings as a portion of intangible earnings. These are the earnings that are identified as being *brand generated only*. This is done by a study of the primary drivers and motivations of consumer demand in the specified product category.

(3) *Brand Risk* – This part of the analysis reduces or discounts the brand earnings variable to a present value for the brand. It assesses the “risk profile” of the projected earnings in conjunction with a measure of brand strength, which includes market characteristics, stability, leadership, support, trends, geography, etc.

The final calculation involving the above three components ultimately leads to the *total brand value* of a specific brand (Khermouch, 2002).

The research for this paper uses data from Interbrand’s four rankings from 1999 through to 2002. This writer located the country of origin and region for each brand and then constructed a database from this information. This writer also created additional variables such as the brands’ industry segments and whether or not a brand was considered a “consumer” brand that is largely used everyday versus an industrial brand.

Results

RQ1: Is globalization, in terms of global brands, largely an American phenomenon?

American brands dominate the list of Interbrand's "World's Most Valuable Brands" accounting for a full 65% of the brands on the list. In contrast, non-US brands make-up 35% of the brands on the list. Demonstrating the extent to which American brands dominate is the fact that the countries with the second most brands on the list are Germany and Japan, both with only six brands each or 6% of the total brands.

Table 1 About Here

These 65 US brands represent the pearls of the United States business brand portfolio; brands such as Coca-Cola, Microsoft, Disney, McDonald's, Nike, Harley Davidson, Budweiser, and an array of other premier US brands.

The dominance of American brands is further reinforced when looking just at the top ten brands and the prominence of American brands in that listing. Coca-Cola, Microsoft, IBM, GE, and Intel, all US brands, are the top five brands on the list. Only two of the top ten brands are non-US brands, Nokia from Finland and Mercedes from Germany.

Another way to look at the extent of American presence in the top 100 list is to review brand value as determined by InterBrand. The total brand value of the top 100 global brands is \$971,618,000,000. Of that amount, American brands represent 74% of the total brand value.

Table 2 About Here

Looking at the top ten but in terms of brand value, America dominates again. The total brand value of the top ten global brands is \$387,850,000,000. Of that amount, the brand value of the American brands is \$336,870,000,000 or 87% of the total. Thus, the United States presence in terms of brand value is even greater than that of the number of brands.

Not only are brands from America prominent in sheer number and value, but also the US brands represent a very broad cross section of industries. The Interbrand list has eighteen different industry groupings or segments, and US brands are represented in seventeen of the eighteen. The only exception is the “electronics” segment where the United States has no brands.

Table 3 About Here

The non-US brands are included in thirteen of the eighteen industry segments. However, non-US brands are not represented in the following industry segments: financial services, industrial, pharmaceutical, technology, and travel & leisure segments. Regarding specific countries, the countries that have brands in the next highest number of industry segments are Germany, Japan, and France with brands in four different industry groupings each.

RQ2: What is the country composition of this phenomenon?

Non-US brands comprise 35% of all the brands in the top 100 global brand list. But what regions and countries define this portion of the list? Are there regions of the globe or countries that dominate other regions or countries? Where do the brand power bases lie outside the United States?

The composition of the non-US portion of the list includes 11 different countries from three regions of the globe: Europe, Asia, and North America. Europe claims the majority of non-US brands with 27 of total 35 or 77% of the non-US brands from eight different countries. There are seven brands from two different Asian countries and one non-US brand from North America in the top 100 global brand list. That one brand is Barcardi from Bermuda. Clearly, Europe and more specifically, western Europe is the power base region for global brands behind the United States.

Table 4 About Here

Regarding brands per country, the list is led by Germany and Japan with six brands each. Six brands are 17% of the total non-US brands, thus combined, Germany and Japan have just over a third of the non-US brands on the list. Britain and France have five brands each, or 14% each, followed by Italy and Switzerland, both with three brands in the list. There are two brands from both Sweden and the Netherlands and one brand each from Bermuda, Finland, and South Korea.

Table 5 About Here

Regarding brand value, even though Germany and Japan have 34% of the number of non-US brands, the brand value of those brands represents an even larger share of the non-US brand value. Together, the brand value of the brands from Germany and Japan is 49%, approximately half of the total non-US brand value.

Table 6 About Here

RQ3: Has the country composition changed over time?

There are inherent limitations in showing change from just four years ago, but it can at least show some directional movement. So, the question becomes have brands from the United States always dominated the top 100 global brand list? Have changes occurred in the composition of the list since the list's debut in 1999? There have been four top 100 global brand lists issued since 1999 and the question is whether or not the US brands maintained their lead during those years.

Looking at total number of brands in the list, from 1999 to 2002, the United States increased from 61 to 65 brands, a percentage increase of 7% over the four years. The non-US brands decreased 10% from 39 total brands in 1999 to 35 in 2002.

Table 7 About Here

However, in terms of brand value, the brands from the United States remained flat versus 1999. And in a dramatic contrast, the brand value of the non-US brands increased 10%. So, even though the number of non-US brands decreased, the value of the remaining brands grew enough to overcompensate for the loss in number.

Table 8 About Here

The composition of countries in the non-US segment is largely consistent from 1999 to 2002. There are a few exceptions. In 1999, both Ireland and Denmark had brands in the top 100 list, Guinness and Carlsberg beers respectively, but not in the 2002 list. Also, there were changes in the number of brands for the following countries: *The Financial Times* from Britain fell out of the 1999 list leaving Britain with five brands in 2002. Germany lost two brands, Merck and Siemens. And Sweden's Absolut brand also dropped out of the list in 2002.

The only country other than the United States that increased its number of brands during the four year period is France which added two additional brands, Danone and L'Oreal, in 2002 for an increase of 67% over 1999.

Table 9 About Here

In dramatic contrast to the decline in number of brands for most countries, many of the non-US countries increased the total brand value of their brands. Most notably is France with its brand value increasing 129%. Other big gainers during the four-year period include South Korea increasing at 59%, Sweden at 37%, and Finland at 49%. Only three countries' brand portfolios decreased in brand value, and those countries are Britain (3%), Germany (5%), and the Netherlands (9%).

Table 10 About Here

Discussion

The following are the key discussion points from the results:

(1) *In terms of global brands, America is the clear driver of globalization.* Based on Interbrand's survey of the top 100 global brands, America's presence is nothing less than dominant. And this leadership position is held both in terms of number of brands in the list and the total brand value of all the US brands. No other country even begins to approach the position America holds, 65% of the total number of brands, on the list of the top global brands. As referenced earlier, both Germany and Japan follow America in a very distant second place in number of brands with 6% each. Regarding brand value, the gap is even wider with Germany and Japan.

Clearly, within the bounds of this particular study, globalization is an American phenomenon.

Not only that, but based on the findings of this research, globalization certainly can be considered a Western movement. Asian brands only comprise 7% of the total number of brands. Thus, the critics of globalization can find comfort that their assertion that globalization is a product of the West is largely true, at least according to this study.

(2) However, at least directionally, the US brands are not maintaining their large lead in total brand value. Granted, the brands from the United States have 74% of the total brand value in the 2002 list. But, the figures show that growth has been flat over the past four years with US brands not exhibiting any increase in total brand value. Yet, the non-US brands increased 10% in brand value since 1999.

(3) Despite the flat growth of US brands in brand value, the United States remains in a strong position to continue its dominance in the list. The survey revealed that there were eighteen different industry segments represented. The United States had at least one brand in each of the segments with the exception of electronics. Thus, the United States' position on the list is solid even if several industries begin to decline for some larger economic reason.

Further, looking at the high growth industries, the United States has an even stronger dominant position. Industries connected with the knowledge economy and information technology are thoroughly dominated by brands from the United States. These industries are business services, financial services, media, software, technology, and telecoms. Of these industry segments, there are 32 total brands, and the United States has 27 brands or 84% of the total. Thus, the United States is dominating the

industries expected to experience the highest growth rates in the new millennium, and it can be expected that US brands will therefore continue to make a strong showing in the top global brands list.

(4) *The wide range of countries with brands in the survey show that many countries are taking advantage of the benefits of a global capitalist system and relatively open markets.* This fact counters some critics that open markets and free trade only benefit the largest countries. The figures reveal that a number of countries have brands that cross borders.

Perhaps the surprising figure is that Asian countries are not more prominent in the list. However, the list depends on data presented publicly, and Asian businesses are historically protective of their data with a legacy of being slightly less than transparent and honest with their business figures. Without that open and transparent presentation of data, many Asian brands might not be included in the survey.

(5) *It must be recognized that the Interbrand list of the "World's Most Valuable Brands" has a built in bias toward the US brands.* Brands from the United States have a gigantic home market thus giving these brands an enormous advantage over brands from other countries. The Interbrand criteria only require that at least 20% of sales come from outside the home country. This means that a brand that has sales that are primarily based in the United States and has a minimal overseas presence, 20% at least, is included in the list. Is this truly a global brand? Granted, Interbrand requires that the brands do business in the "major global markets," but it just seems that 20% is too low a standard for "global brand" status. When thinking about European brands, their home markets are merely a slice of the giant United States market in comparison. Is that fair?

Of course, in the future, as both China and the European Union develop further, it is easy to envision a list of top global brands with a very different composition. In fact, how might United States companies respond when the 1.2 to 1.3 billion population of the Chinese market begin to support their local brands? Do we see a top global brands list featuring a majority of Chinese brands?

It should be noted that requests were made to Interbrand for data that subtracted the US brands' figures for the American market. This would show the true presence of American brands overseas thus being a better indicator of America's role in globalization. This request was refused. Interbrand's data is mostly proprietary and therefore not obtainable unless the requesting party is an Interbrand client.

(6) The published list from Interbrand reveals an additional reason why many perceive brands from the United States as being the primary driver of globalization. Among "consumer" or "everyday usage" brands, the United States again dominates. It is only logical that if consumers use or are exposed to American brands on a fairly frequent basis, then those consumers would be more likely to perceive a domineering United States presence. Looking at the brands that consumers are most likely to interact with during an average day, the United States again has a very strong presence. These industry segments would be food & beverage, leisure goods, media, personal care, and retail. Of the 38 total brands in these segments, the United States accounts for 76% of them.

Conclusions

Of course, it is all too convenient to measure globalization by just the value of a nation's brands. Many other factors are obviously at work, but global brands are a unique and creative way to gauge the steady and stealthy encroachment of globalization. Citizens in various countries probably perceive the impact or presence of global brands to be much stronger than it is. An invasion of global products on the local community's shelves or the addition of another Starbucks or McDonald's on the corner can have quite an impact on perception. Just ask the French about their McDonald's experiences. How about the omnipresent Japanese electronic neon boards perched atop many building in the capitals and business centers of the world's most prominent cities? Perception is a powerful and emotional tool, often superseding reason and logic. To be able to incorporate perception into a study of global brands and globalization would be quite revealing.

But clearly, in order to truly gauge the presence of global brands in various countries, a redefinition of global brands must be developed. While Interbrand's definition is widely accepted by many accounting firms, management consultancies, advertising agencies, and others from around the globe, there is no denying that Interbrand's definition of "global brand" is a bit narrow. Can a brand really be considered "global" when it only has to garner 20% of sales from overseas markets? Is this really global? Plus, the large home market advantage for US brands automatically allows for inclusion of some brands that have a minimal presence overseas to be included in the list.

Thus, to gain a better understanding of the US brands' presence, future research should attempt to eliminate the American home market advantage. Unfortunately, Interbrand's list is the only one of its kind and the only one so widely accepted.

Another thought for future research would be to measure how global brands are crowding out local brands in local markets. This sort of approach would indicate a real effect of globalization on a local country or region. The loss of jobs and the loss of emerging capital from the impact of global brands would demonstrate the real world consequences of globalization. But aside from the direct losses, there is also a loss of local pride and a loss of local heritage when a local brand is squeezed out or simply purchased by a large multinational.

So, in conclusion, is the exercise of creating and analyzing such a list as the "World's Most Valuable Brands" a futile exercise in simpleminded scorekeeping? Is there really any value in this? Perhaps there is a very good reason. There is a movement that has begun which is promoting the idea that intangibles such as brands and other intellectual property should be assigned dollar values for recording as assets on company balance sheets. This would give potential investors a sharper look at the company's future prospects, and it would also add billions of dollars to the balance sheets of global companies giving these companies further leverage with which to extend their brands across borders (Alston, 2002).

The idea is gaining broad support among the business community for a number of reasons but particularly when one considers that these intangible properties are what drive growth in a knowledge and information economy. Baruch Lev, a New York University professor estimates that companies pour in approximately \$1 trillion annually

in intangibles. Further, he estimates that intangibles could make-up over half of the market value of public companies (Alston, 2002).

Of course, there is a substantial risk in estimating the value of intangibles. Companies are well aware of the consequences for harsh investor reaction toward inaccurate measurements of intangibles or a sudden write down of such assets. Investors would either flee the stock or bring suit against the company or both.

However, there is increased acceptance of such a move in the accounting and business communities. In fact, approximately twelve nations already allow companies to designate brand value as assets on the balance sheet. Two of these countries are Britain and France. Can the United States be far behind?

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Table 1

Top 100 Global Brands - 2002

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Brand</u>	<u>Country</u>
1	Coca-Cola	US
2	Microsoft	US
3	IBM	US
4	GE	US
5	Intel	US
6	Nokia	Finland
7	Disney	US
8	McDonald's	US
9	Marlboro	US
10	Mercedes	Germany

11	Ford	US
12	Toyota	Japan
13	Citibank	US
14	Hewlett-Packard	US
15	American Express	US
16	Cisco	US
17	AT&T	US
18	Honda	Japan
19	Gillette	US
20	BMW	Germany
21	Sony	Japan
22	Nescafe	Switzerland
23	Oracle	US
24	Budweiser	US
25	Merrill Lynch	US
26	Morgan Stanley	US
27	Compaq	US
28	Pfizer	US
29	JP Morgan	US
30	Kodak	US
31	Dell	US
32	Nintendo	Japan
33	Merck	US
34	Samsung	South Korea
35	Nike	US
36	Gap	US
37	Heinz	US
38	Volkswagen	Germany
39	Goldman Sachs	US
40	Kellogg's	US
41	Louis Vuitton	France
42	Sap	Germany
43	Canon	Japan
44	IKEA	Sweden
45	Pepsi	US
46	Harley Davidson	US
47	MTV	US
48	Pizza Hut	US
49	KFC	US
50	Apple	US
51	Xerox	US
52	Gucci	Italy
53	Accenture	US

54	L'Oreal	France
55	Kleenex	US
56	Sun	US
57	Wrigley's	US
58	Reuters	Britain
59	Colgate	US
60	Philips	Netherlands
61	Nestle	Switzerland
62	Avon	US
63	AOL	US
64	Chanel	France
65	Kraft	US
66	Danone	France
67	Yahoo!	US
68	adidas	Germany
69	Rolex	Switzerland
70	Time	US
71	Ericsson	Sweden
72	Tiffany	US
73	Levi's	US
74	Motorola	US
75	Duracell	US
76	BP	Britain
77	Hertz	US
78	Bacardi	Bermuda
79	Caterpillar	US
80	Amazon.com	US
81	Panasonic	Japan
82	Boeing	US
83	Shell	Britain
84	Smimoff	Britain
85	Johnson & Johnson	US
86	Prada	Italy
87	Moet & Chandon	France
88	Heineken	Netherlands
89	Mobil	US
90	Burger King	US
91	Nivea	Germany
92	Wall Street Journal	US
93	Starbucks	US
94	Barbie	US
95	Polo Ralph Lauren	US
96	FedEx	US
97	Johnnie Walker	Britain
98	Jack Daniels	US
99	3M	US
100	Armani	Italy

Total Number of US Brands - 65

Total Number of Non-US Brands - 35

Total Number of US Brands in Top Ten - 8

Total Number of Non-US Brands in Top Ten - 2

Table 2

Top 100 Global Brands – Brand Value - 2002

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Brand</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Brand Value</u> <u>(\$Mil)</u>
1	Coca-Cola	US	69,637
2	Microsoft	US	64,091
3	IBM	US	51,188
4	GE	US	41,311
5	Intel	US	30,861
6	Nokia	Finland	29,970
7	Disney	US	29,256
8	McDonald's	US	26,375
9	Marlboro	US	24,151
10	Mercedes	Germany	21,010

11	Ford	US	20,403
12	Toyota	Japan	19,448
13	Citibank	US	18,066
14	Hewlett-Packard	US	16,776
15	American Express	US	16,287
16	Cisco	US	16,222
17	AT&T	US	16,059
18	Honda	Japan	15,064
19	Gillette	US	14,959
20	BMW	Germany	14,425
21	Sony	Japan	13,899
22	Nescafe	Switzerland	12,843
23	Oracle	US	11,510
24	Budweiser	US	11,349
25	Merrill Lynch	US	11,230
26	Morgan Stanley	US	11,205
27	Compaq	US	9,803
28	Pfizer	US	9,770
29	JP Morgan	US	9,693
30	Kodak	US	9,671
31	Dell	US	9,237
32	Nintendo	Japan	9,219
33	Merck	US	9,138
34	Samsung	South Korea	8,310
35	Nike	US	7,724
36	Gap	US	7,406
37	Heinz	US	7,347
38	Volkswagen	Germany	7,209
39	Goldman Sachs	US	7,194
40	Kellogg's	US	7,191
41	Louis Vuitton	France	7,054
42	Sap	Germany	6,775
43	Canon	Japan	6,721
44	IKEA	Sweden	6,545
45	Pepsi	US	6,394
46	Harley Davidson	US	6,266
47	MTV	US	6,078
48	Pizza Hut	US	6,046
49	KFC	US	5,346
50	Apple	US	5,316

51	Xerox	US	5,308
52	Gucci	Italy	5,304
53	Accenture	US	5,182
54	L'Oreal	France	5,079
55	Kleenex	US	5,039
56	Sun	US	4,773
57	Wrigley's	US	4,747
58	Reuters	Britain	4,611
59	Colgate	US	4,602
60	Philips	Netherlands	4,561
61	Nestle	Switzerland	4,430
62	Avon	US	4,399
63	AOL	US	4,326
64	Chanel	France	4,272
65	Kraft	US	4,079
66	Danone	France	4,054
67	Yahoo!	US	3,855
68	adidas	Germany	3,690
69	Rolex	Switzerland	3,686
70	Time	US	3,682
71	Ericsson	Sweden	3,589
72	Tiffany	US	3,482
73	Levi's	US	3,454
74	Motorola	US	3,416
75	Duracell	US	3,409
76	BP	Britain	3,390
77	Hertz	US	3,362
78	Bacardi	Bermuda	3,341
79	Caterpillar	US	3,218
80	Amazon.com	US	3,175
81	Panasonic	Japan	3,141
82	Boeing	US	2,973
83	Shell	Britain	2,810
84	Smirnoff	Britain	2,723
85	Johnson & Johnson	US	2,509
86	Prada	Italy	2,489
87	Moet & Chandon	France	2,445
88	Heineken	Netherlands	2,396
89	Mobil	US	2,358
90	Burger King	US	2,163
91	Nivea	Germany	2,059
92	Wall Street Journal	US	1,961
93	Starbucks	US	1,961
94	Barbie	US	1,937
95	Polo Ralph Lauren	US	1,928
96	FedEx	US	1,919
97	Johnnie Walker	Britain	1,654
98	Jack Daniels	US	1,580
99	3M	US	1,579
100	Armani	Italy	1,509
			\$971,618

Total Brand Value of Top 100 Global Brands - \$971,618

Total Brand Value of American Brands - \$721,893 (74%)

Total Brand Value of Non-US Brands - \$249,725 (26%)

Total Brand Value of Top Ten Global Brands - \$387,850

Total Brand Value of American Brands - \$336,870 (87%)

Total Brand Value of Non-US Brands - \$50,980 (13%)

Table 3

Number of Brands per Industry Segment – US Brands versus Non-US Brands - 2002

<u>Business Segment</u>	<u>Number of US Brands</u>	<u>Number of Non-US Brands</u>
Alcohol	2	5
Automotive	2	5
Business Services	3	1
Electronics	---	4
Financial Services	6	---
Food & Beverage	6	3
Industrial	4	---
Leisure Goods	6	2
Luxury	2	6
Media	6	1
Oil	1	2
Personal Care	5	2
Pharmaceutical	2	---
Retail	6	1
Software	3	1
Technology	7	---
Telecoms	2	2
<u>Travel & Leisure</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>---</u>
Total	65	35

Table 4

Region Composition of Non-US Brands - 2002

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number of Brands</u>	<u>% of Non-US Brands</u>	<u>% of Total Brands</u>
Europe	27	77%	27%
Asia	7	20%	7%
<u>North America</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3%</u>	<u>1%</u>
Total	35	100%	

Table 5

Country Composition of Non-US Brands - 2002

<u>Country</u>	<u>Number of Brands</u>	<u>% of Non-US Brands</u>	<u>% of Total Brands</u>
Bermuda	1	3%	1%
Britain	5	14%	5%
Finland	1	3%	1%
France	5	14%	5%
Netherlands	2	6%	2%
Germany	6	17%	6%
Italy	3	9%	3%
Japan	6	17%	6%
South Korea	1	3%	1%
Sweden	2	6%	2%
<u>Switzerland</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>9%</u>	<u>3%</u>
Total	35	100%	35%

Table 6

Top Non-US Global Brands – Brand Value by Country - 2002

<u>Country</u>	<u>Brand Value (\$ Mil)</u>	<u>% Brand Value Non-US Brands</u>	<u>% Brand Value All Brands</u>
Bermuda	3,341	1%	---
Britain	15,188	6%	2%
Finland	29,970	12%	3%
France	22,904	9%	2%
Netherlands	6,957	3%	1%
Germany	55,168	22%	6%
Italy	9,302	4%	1%
Japan	67,492	27%	7%
South Korea	8,310	3%	1%
Sweden	10,134	4%	1%
<u>Switzerland</u>	<u>20,959</u>	<u>9%</u>	<u>2%</u>
Total	\$249,725	100%	26%

Total Brand Value of Non-US Brands - \$249,725 (26%)

556

Table 7

Change in Number of US and Non-US Global Brands – 1999 to 2002

	<u>1999</u>	<u>2002</u>	<u>% Change</u>
US Brands	61	65	7%
<u>Non-US Brands</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>35</u>	<u>(10%)</u>
Total	100	100	

Table 8

Change in Brand Value of US and Non-US Global Brands – 1999 to 2002

	<u>1999 (%)</u> <u>(\$Mil)</u>	<u>2002 (%)</u> <u>(\$Mil)</u>	<u>% Change</u>
US Brands	719,516 (76%)	721,893 (74%)	---
<u>Non-US Brands</u>	<u>226,671 (24%)</u>	<u>249,725 (26%)</u>	<u>10%</u>
Total	\$946,187 (100%)	\$971,618	

Table 9**Change in Number of Brands per Country – 1999 to 2002**

<u>Country</u>	<u>1999</u>	<u>2002</u>	<u>% Change</u>
	<u>Number of Brands</u>	<u>Number of Brands</u>	
Bermuda	1	1	----
Britain	6	5	(17%)
Denmark	1	0	(100%)
Finland	1	1	----
France	3	5	67%
Ireland	1	0	(100%)
Netherlands	2	2	----
Germany	8	6	(25%)
Italy	3	3	----
Japan	6	6	----
South Korea	1	1	----
Sweden	3	2	(33%)
<u>Switzerland</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	----
Totals	39	35	(10%)

Table 10

Change in Brand Value per Country – 1999 to 2002

<u>Country</u>	<u>1999 Brand Value (\$Mil)</u>	<u>2002 Brand Value (\$Mil)</u>	<u>% Change</u>
Bermuda	2,895	3,341	15%
Britain	15,639	15,188	(3%)
Denmark	1,075	---	--
Finland	20,694	29,970	49%
France	10,023	22,904	129%
Netherlands	7,666	6,957	(9%)
Germany	57,880	55,168	(5%)
Ireland	1,262	---	--
Italy	7,614	9,302	22%
Japan	57,416	67,492	18%
South Korea	5,223	8,310	59%
Sweden	22,176	10,134	37%
<u>Switzerland</u>	<u>17,108</u>	<u>21,959</u>	<u>28%</u>
	\$226,671	\$249,725	10%



*U.S. Department of Education
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


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