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AUTHOR Goldman, Paul; Conley, David T.  
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## ABSTRACT

Is it possible for state legislation designed to initiate systemic school reform to influence curriculum, instruction, and assessment at the classroom and building level? This paper presents findings of a longitudinal study of Oregon educators' reactions to school-reform legislation since it was passed in 1991. The Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century required elementary and secondary schools to develop and use a set of performance-based benchmarks that document educational progress from early adolescence to adulthood. Surveys of Oregon educators were conducted in 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. One of the most interesting findings was that large differences existed between school districts and individual schools, both within and across school districts, that were not explained by demographic factors. The paper uses concepts from social-compliance theory and institutionalism to develop hypotheses about school restructuring at the building level. A working hypothesis is that social compliance, as operationalized in the form of normative behavior, is important to explain the differences in school-level responses to educational reform legislation. The institutional approach looks at how interorganizational relationships reinforce institutionalized organizational behavior. One table is included. Appendices contain the questionnaire scale items and statistical tables showing the reactions to school reform at the individual, school district, and building levels. (Contains 26 references.) (LMI)

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Paul Goldman & David T. Conley  
University of Oregon

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Address correspondence to Paul Goldman, Educational Leadership, Technology & Administration, 5267 University of Oregon, Eugene OR 97403-5267, Ph. (541) 346-5065, Fax (541) 346-5174, PGoldman@Oregon.UOregon.Edu

FA 028-086

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# Why Do Schools Respond Differentially to State School Reform Legislation?

## Introduction

Is it possible for state legislation designed to initiate systemic school reform that work's its way into curriculum, instruction, and assessment at the classroom and building level? This question has been of interest to educational policy researchers during much of the past decade as state after state has attempted to mandate fundamental restructuring. Interestingly, no clear answer has emerged, although states continue major educational reform legislation under an implicit assumption that the result will be dramatic changes in classrooms and the public school system generally.

Many researchers have established the school building as the proper unit of analysis for educational change (Fullan, 1991; Louis and Miles 1990; Teddlie and Stringfield 1993). However, schools are not independent governmental agencies with control over their policies. Instead, they are "captive" institutions, controlled by school boards which are, in turn, creations of the state legislature. This governance model is different, for example, from city and county governments, most of which operate under some sort of charter or legal status in the state constitution. Legislatures cannot easily eliminate cities and counties, but school districts can be eliminated or consolidated by state - level agencies such as state boards of education, or by simple acts of a legislature. Individual schools can be funded, defunded, inspected, tested, and regulated by state departments of education in the normal course of events.

If schools are, then, "creatures" of the legislature, why do they not act in a way that reflects this direct link to legislature and why do they seemingly not acknowledge the great power legislatures or state executive agencies hold over them? A number of factors come to mind, including the deliberate attempt by legislatures (and often the demand by educators and local boards of education) to foster a sense of local autonomy in most states. The tradition of funding schools from locally-derived property taxes is very strong, and patrons expect to have some control over how "their" money is spent on education. Changes in education finance systems in more than 35 states over the past 25 years have tended to reduce local funding in an attempt to foster equity, and have replaced it

with state equalized funding formulae (Odden and Wohlstetter 1992). This change in the locus of control over funding, in combination with other forces, has bolstered the tendency of state legislatures to launch bolder initiatives to change education systemically. Although the plans for such changes have been sweeping in many cases, effects have been varied. In fact, several programs, for example British Columbia 's Year 2000 Program (Sullivan 1988; Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Education 1992), or Minnesota's Essential Learner Outcomes (Minnesota Department of Education 1991), have been abandoned or drastically reshaped before full implementation.

We explore in this paper two somewhat separate but closely related topics. First, we present Oregon educator reactions to school reform legislation in the four years since it was passed in 1991. We surveyed and interviewed teachers and administrators yearly from 1992 through 1995, charting their reactions and analyzing their responses. We present here the results, but resist the temptation simply to offer a series of "findings," "interpretations," and "recommendations." Instead, in the second part of this paper, we want to apply two theoretical models to our findings and reflect on the processes that may be occurring in schools as they react to state-level educational reform legislation. We do so not to answer this question, but to pose it more precisely. We hope in this paper to generate additional hypotheses for investigation. We request your assistance in this process of exploration and examination, which is perhaps a bit different than the typical paper geared to presenting data and conclusions. We invite you to help us consider which theoretical frameworks help explain our findings and which might serve as the basis for generating additional hypotheses. Ultimately, we will develop our own theoretical framework for understanding the ways in which schools process state-level mandates. This is an interim step toward that goal.

### **What are the limits of legislative power?**

Is it possible for state legislation designed to initiate systemic school reform to influence and shape curriculum, instruction, and assessment at the classroom and building level? This question has been examined in educational policy research during much of the past decade as state after state has attempted to mandate fundamental restructuring. Research on individual schools, and occasionally on school districts, suggests that some buildings, usually those with

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strong leadership, a clear, shared vision, and a critical mass of dedicated staff, can transform teaching and learning (Fullan and Miles 1992; Murphy and Hallinger 1993; Stockard and Mayberry 1992).

At the same time, most schools don't initiate fundamental changes, and of those that do, only a modest proportion sustain their efforts long enough to achieve genuine restructuring and improvement in student learning. State policy initiatives, especially those that propose major changes, can jump-start the restructuring process in schools and districts that have resisted change as well as provide a nurturing environment for schools that want to change. But even with dramatic measures, strong symbolic impact, and substantive consequences or rewards, state policy makers have had mixed success pushing reform into most schools and into the majority of classrooms in those schools. But some reforms have effects closer to those intended, when they are given time to work, and when educators and the public believe they won't just go away. Kentucky is an example of high-stakes reform that has had some success going to scale; Oregon is an example of more equivocal results.

We studied Oregon educators reactions to reforms in a series of four surveys conducted during October and November of 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. Although we gave survey instruments to individuals, our basic sampling unit was the school, allowing us to track collective changes over time on a school-by-school basis. In this paper, we summarize the results of these surveys. However, rather than emphasize the broad policy issues noted in the previous paragraph or offer clear recommendations, we have chosen to explore the meaning of our findings in light of two disciplinary approaches in organizational science: (1) social compliance, rooted in social psychology and (2) institutionalism, which derives from a long-standing tradition in sociology. This discipline-based theoretical focus allows us to think about school reform in a different fashion, to understand the more universal process that may be operating here, and, more important from our perspective, to help us grapple with a critical unresolved issue: can we identify those factors or combinations of factors that help explain why some schools embrace and implement reform while others struggle unsuccessfully to change, and still others resist all efforts to change them.

The paper progresses as follows. First, we attempt to provide a brief overview of Oregon's reform legislation as it has developed between 1991 and 1996. Second, we describe our research methodology, data collection, and data strategies. Third, we present and discuss general findings, especially trends that have emerged from our data over the past five years. And fourth, we try to use concepts from social compliance theory and institutionalism to develop useful hypotheses about school restructuring at the building level. In this discussion we present some additional data, but mainly have focused on raising questions for future research —ours and others— rather than suggesting a correspondence between the hypotheses and data from the present study.

### The Oregon Context

In 1991 the Oregon Legislature passed House Bill 3565, the *Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century*, laying out a new vision of schooling for the state's 1,200 public elementary and secondary schools. The Act presents a complex framework for systemic redesign of education, preschool through post-secondary. Influenced by *America's Choice: High Skills or Low Wages* and other calls for reform, its intention was to create a “restructured educational system...to achieve the state's goals of the best educated citizens in the nation by the year 2000 and a work force equal to any in the world by the year 2010.” Specifically, the 1991 Act contained provisions regarding students readiness to learn by kindergarten entry, non-graded developmental education that included multi-age primary classrooms, the Certificate of Initial Mastery (CIM) at age 16, the Certificate of Advanced Mastery (CAM) to replace a high school diploma and link with community college studies and the world of work, integration of social services with schools, alternative learning centers for youths not succeeding in secondary school, and site-based decision making. These provisions were to be fully phased in by 1999.

With no additional changes by the 1993 Legislature, the Act remained a fixed, if fuzzy, target for educators and the state education agency between 1991 and 1995. A State Superintendent of Instruction who was a career politician rather than an educator was a vigorous proponent of the reform effort and pushed her staff to form task forces and travel the state to explain and "sell" the legislation to

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administrators, teachers, and parents. However, it proved to be more difficult to sketch in the details that to construct the vision. Efforts to translate the Act's broad goals into clear frameworks and procedures for schools to follow fell short, and initial attempts to create pilot projects at schools met with opposition, ended in confusion, or were not built upon systematically.

In 1995 the Legislature reacted to concerns of parents and others, especially those opposed to "outcomes-based" education. The biennial session re-examined the legislation and made several significant changes in a piece of legislation entitled H.B. 2991. Most notably, the CIM and CAM were sharpened to focus on "rigorous academic content standards," timelines for implementing the CIM and CAM were moved back two years (to 1998-99 and 2000-01 respectively), the Department of Education was required to report more regularly to the Legislature on plans and progress for the CIM and CAM, and schools/districts were required to offer programs for the CIM and CAM, but not at the expense of grades or the high school diploma. Guidelines for school site councils were changed as well: rather than mandating a teacher majority on the committee, H.B. 2991 prohibited teacher majorities.

Educators have had a five-year period in which to contemplate these looming changes, not knowing for sure what their ultimate shape would be, or even whether they would be sustained. Our surveys and interviews captured educator reactions to this dynamic, fluid situation during this period of time.

### **Research Methods**

Research data come from a series of self-administered questionnaires distributed and returned during Fall 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995. A total of 92 schools were included in the 1992 sample, 64 from a state sample and 28 from two mid-sized "case study districts" in which we surveyed every school in the district. The 1993 sample of 24 schools (25 actually since one original school was divided after a new facility was opened) was drawn from among schools surveyed the previous year. For the 1994 sample, all schools in the 1993 sub-sample were re-surveyed, 24 more schools were randomly selected from the remaining schools in

the original sample and an additional 24 schools, not previously surveyed, were selected by a random process and added to the sample. Analysis of demographic data and response patterns indicated that the newly added schools were similar to those in the original sample. The 1995 sample contained the same school sample as 1994. However, a smaller proportion of schools returned surveys than in previous years. In each school, questionnaires were distributed to all certified staff. Table 1 summarizes sample parameters and return rates. More detailed descriptions of procedures are provided in Goldman and Conley (1994) and Conley and Goldman (1995).

Table 1. Sample characteristics

	1992	1993	1994	1995
Number of schools	92	25	67	62
School return rate (percent)	99	100	94	86
Number of returned surveys	2,260	602	1,247	1,093
Individual return rate (percent)	66	65	67	59

The survey instrument contained 99 "agree-disagree" questions in 1992 and 1993. The number of questions was cut to 50 for 1994 and 1995. In addition to forced-choice items, there were demographic questions, open ended questions, and a "comments" section. Over half the respondents added hand-written comments of some kind. (Specific questionnaire items for each scale are listed in Appendix A.) As data analysis evolved over the four year period, we were able to create three distinct additive scales measuring general attitudes towards change (we call this "change" in the text), expectation that educational practices would change as a result of the legislation ("practices"), and anticipated outcomes of the statewide reform effort ("outcomes"). We standardized scales so that individual scores, school means, and sample means reflect the average percentage of respondents who "agreed" with each set of statements.

### First Order Findings: Or What Do We "Know" So Far

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Four years of survey data analysis, presented in a series of conference presentations, reports, and journal articles (e.g. Goldman and Conley, 1994, 1996 and Conley and Goldman, 1995) suggest a series of findings about Oregon educators' responses to school reform. These are presented and discussed briefly in the remainder of this section. Summary tables are attached as Appendices B, C, and D.

From the outset, educators believed the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century was largely well-intentioned and that it was directed to the big issues of fundamental school restructuring and to improving student academic performance. A majority believed school reform was necessary and were at least cautiously positive towards the basic thrust of the reform legislation. Educators have become slightly less positive over time, with the largest drop occurring in the past year. Educators believed (and still believe) that implementation of the reform legislation would change teaching practices, for example teachers would use more integrated curriculum, change ways they group students, and employ a wider range of instructional strategies. They believed that if the reforms were fully implemented, educational outcomes would improve for most students. While a majority still think so, this optimistic view has attenuated over the past four years. Again the drop was most noticeable in the most recent survey.

Survey responses indicate that many individual demographic factors such as age and experience, and school/district demographic factors such as average student SES and number of students had little or no effect on attitudes. Schools furthest from Salem, the state capital, were least enthusiastic about the legislation. The first survey (1992), showed little difference between men and women and elementary and secondary teachers. However, in each year, larger and larger differences appeared: elementary teachers and women stayed the same, but secondary educators and men were less positive, less optimistic.

The most interesting finding to us was that in each of the four years, there were very large differences between school districts and individual schools, both within and across school districts. Demographic factors did not explain these differences, and we have been particularly interested in understanding why teachers in some schools have been so much more responsive to the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century than others. There is no "obvious" pattern to

those schools that have supported reform and those that have not. Some schools have remained constant in their attitude, either supportive or unsupportive, while others have changed dramatically in one direction or the other.

Why is this occurring? The obvious answer, that schools are complex organizations where a multitude of variables affect the way in which any external (or internal) force is processed, is unsatisfying. Which theories potentially explain and predict this variance? Psychological theories offers some possible insight, but require an insight into each individual that is beyond the scope of our ability to process and comprehend. Furthermore, it may not be necessary to understand the total psychological makeup of the individual, but instead, how she or he operates in a specific social context. At the same time, many sociological models may generalize too far beyond the idiosyncratic human interaction that must be accommodated if the behavior of schools as institutions are to be understood. If this is the case, social psychology may offer a better starting point. From among the available theories, we selected social compliance as the starting point for our investigation of the phenomenon of schools' varied reaction to state educational reform legislation. We then applied a sociological perspective through the theoretical lens of institutionalism to complement and augment the social psychological perspective.

### **Social Compliance in Schools**

The concept of social compliance provides one possible way to explore differences in school engagement in statewide educational restructuring. We can view reform legislation as a change in the conditions of socially appropriate behavior for teachers as prescribed by the Legislature, the theoretical source of legitimacy. In Oregon, those demands required elementary and secondary schools to develop and use a set of performance-based benchmarks that document educational progress from early adolescence to adulthood and to ensure students reach these benchmark performance levels successfully. Regardless of whether they favor or oppose the changes, educators and policy-makers generally agree that the Oregon Educational Act for the 21st Century will result in profound changes for the state's schools if it is implemented in its entirety. They also know that the changes require educators to contribute significant time, energy, and commitment. Bear in mind that the sanctions and

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rewards for compliance are not strong, at least at this point. The major motivation to comply early is that the law supports practices already in place. But how much power does the Legislature have in this arena? To what degree will teachers comply with legislation simply because it is legislation? Do they demand other conditions before they change their behavior?

The dynamics here are interesting, since teachers are perhaps more socially compliant than the general population. The education profession tends to drive out non-conformists, and the basic purpose of education is the transmission of established, endorsed cultural values, hardly an institution that can tolerate for long individuals who disown the legitimate authority of the state. Teachers are in some senses role models for social compliance, and almost every school preaches this philosophy to students; students should do what they are told because it is the “right” thing to do, not because of fear of sanction or pursuit of reward. How do teachers rationalize their questioning, conditional acceptance, or rejection of a clear directive from their legitimate supervisor, the Legislature? Could it be that there are competing systems of compliance operating?

Gary Yukl (1991), an organizational psychologist, describes compliance in a fashion that seems to catch the flavor of many educators’ response to reform legislation:

Compliance means that the target is willing to do what the agent asks but is apathetic rather than enthusiastic about it and will make only a minimal effort. The agent has influenced the target person’s behavior but not the person’s attitudes. The target person is not convinced that the decision or action is the best thing to do, or even that it will be effective for accomplishing its purpose (p. 13).

Yukl contrasts compliance with resistance. Resistance signifies active opposition, rather than indifference, to a proposal or request, and implies active efforts to avoid or block mandate. Specific examples of resistant behavior include (1) making excuses why it can’t work, (2) trying to get the request withdrawn, (3) delaying, hoping that whoever made the request will stop caring, (4) pretending to comply but actually sabotaging the task, (5) and refusing outright. All of these are common educator responses to new policy initiatives, programs, or school restructuring mandates whether they initiate from the state, district, or building

level. But even compliance is often not enough: token engagement with educational reform doesn't provide the commitment and energy necessary for school restructuring. As Yukl points out, compliance is satisfactory for simple tasks, not for those that are complex. The problem of compliance is exacerbated in state-level school reform because the issuing authorities (usually legislators or the state education agency) are distant and rarely command personal affection or respect.

Aronson (1988) suggests that social psychology's approach to compliance treats it as being closely linked to both conformity and to social influence. In general, individuals will comply when they identify in some fashion with those who issue directives or requests. For example, they may personally like or respect their superiors, or they may share the same values or visions with them. In the literature on educational reform, this view is reflected by the attention given to the functions of leadership and the importance of a shared sense of goals or mission.

Values and beliefs are important components of motivation and performance at work. But they don't operate abstractly; perceived connections between cause-and-effect are also important. It may not be enough for educators to value school reform abstractly, or even to agree with policies and practices that result from legislative changes. They have to believe that their choices to invest time and energy--individually and collectively--will have payoffs in better outcomes for students and/or a better quality of working life for them and their colleagues. This relationship is the central feature of "valence-instrumentality-expectancy theory" about work motivation (Pinder, 1991), and also manifests itself in discussions of the importance of perceived teacher efficacy (Rosenholtz, 1989 for one).

The following questions, which flow from our data, seem to follow more-or-less logically from the social compliance approach. Note that we are trying to pose possible differences in schools rather than in individuals even though we mention individuals at times. Given our research and the literature on teacher and school responses to statewide reform, we start with the assumption that most people (and schools) would just as soon not make major changes. However, some do, and it is useful to try to understand the conditions under which

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collective compliance is stronger. We offer the following questions as the source for further investigation in this area:

1. Are individuals more likely to accept, initiate, and sustain restructuring activities if they personally support the reforms in theory? How important are attitudes and values? Are they the most important factor, or does the strength of the attitude and value have to cross some critical threshold before it becomes activated?
2. Are individuals and schools more likely to accept, initiate, and sustain restructuring activities if their colleagues support the reforms in theory? How important is social support? Is state policy implemented to a greater degree in schools that have mechanisms for processing information and external mandates than in schools that rely on following informal and formal leaders?
3. Is a school more likely to initiate and sustain restructuring activities if it has had *successful* experience in the past (and a consequent belief that there is a reasonable balance between costs and benefits)? How does success relate to the costs, such as burn-out of key participants? This hypothesis does not speak to *unsuccessful* previous experience.
4. Are schools most likely to initiate and sustain restructuring activities if teachers perceive the costs of *not* doing so to be high, for example loss of funding, status, or local support, or the reward of doing so are proportionate to the risk? Where are the "trigger mechanisms" on both ends of the spectrum?
5. What is the principal's relative power to enhance social compliance within a school through means other than formal authority? How does this power affect a school's response to externally-mandated reforms?

Our research is suggesting to us a set of interactive factors, including those contained in the questions above, that combine to affect the ways in which a school processes external reforms. Our working hypothesis is that social compliance, as operationalized in the form of normative behavior, is important to explain the differences in school-level responses to educational reform

legislation. The important variables that bear on social compliance may include the following:

1. Inherent tendency toward compliance of each individual faculty member.
2. Strength of the bonds among faculty members (social cohesion).
3. Norms of the school as they affect communication and exchange of information (culture).
4. Strength of the enticements and sanctions applied by the state.
5. The school's history with previous reforms or programs of improvement.
6. Values of teachers and of the community in which the school is located.

#### **Institutionalism: The "Big Picture"?**

Schools exhibit a profound inertia. Educators', and the public's, shared experience of self-contained classrooms, schedules that vary little from day-to-day or even month to month, textbooks that structure teaching and learning, clear grade level differentiation, and, in secondary schools, strict differentiation of subjects and academic disciplines. Hence, educators and the public often find it hard to imagine that schools could be very different, and even those who say they favor change may be visualizing marginal rather than profound change. Day-to-day living tends to create and maintain a set of repetitive patterns and expectations that can only be reinforced when they are shared across a cultural landscape. Sociologists call this process "institutionalism" or "institutionalization." Broom and Selznick (1955, p. 238) define Institutionalism as "the emergence of orderly, stable, socially integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely organized, or narrowly technical activities." Four decades later, Selznick (1996) elaborates on institutionalism in an organizational context:

[Institutionalism focuses] on legitimation as a sustained and driving force among organizational actors. Legitimacy is seen as an organizational 'imperative' that is both a source of inertia and a summons to justify particular forms and practices (p. 272).

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Recent research on inter-organizational relationships and networks reinforces the maintenance of institutionalized organizational behavior. As DiMaggio and Powell (1991, p. 70) note, "organizations tend to model themselves after similar organizations...they perceive to be more legitimate or successful." While imitation allows schools and other organizations to borrow or expropriate good ideas, it also reinforces organizational conservatism because shared expectations of what schools, even good schools, should be like, often encourages schools to conform to educator and public expectations of what schools are supposed to be like. As Meyer and Rowan (1976) point out, the "complexity of networks and social organization and exchange" generates and reinforces rigid organizational structure and behavior.

The institutional approach, while emphasizing the difficulties of systemic change, also suggests a number of questions researchers on systemic or even school-based educational change appear not to have addressed.

1. What is the role of imitation in state school restructuring? This is a macro-question and a micro-question. At the state level, to what extent does the growth of reform legislation reflect political cross-pollination from state-to-state. Are such institutions as the Education Commission of the States creating new vision of schooling? If this is the case, are schools that attempt to break the mold those that have been able to attune themselves to national trends, national networks, national sources of funds? Or are such visions the composite of numerous schools, each having changed only one aspect or another of their program? Perhaps the aggregate vision is fundamentally unattainable.
2. In a similar vein, has the gradual but steady growth of new ideas and break-the-mold schools created a set of accessible models for additional numbers of schools to imitate? Certainly, the current conception of a "lighthouse" school is not one that only projects achievement of high standards. Rather, it is the school that is doing something new and different in technology, curriculum, timetables, decision making; Is there a tipping point where the number and variety of new and different models make it easier for educators to visit, observe, and imitate? Are schools and districts in more sparsely populated areas slower to change

not because they are further from state control, but because they have less contact with changing schools? How will the emergence of convenient electronic dissemination of new programs and models affect the phenomenon of lighthouses and diffusion of innovation?

3. To what extent is the current school reform movement creating a new set of institutions and institutional expectations? Recent school leadership literature suggests that principals more than ever are expected to be "change agents" or "change managers," not managers or defenders of the status quo (Murphy, 1992). Is this true for teachers well? For schools in the sense that a whole school might be an organizational "actor"? While schools may not wish to be "early movers" in which individual personal investment in restructuring will be high, they may also not want to "late movers" who miss out opportunities or status associated with successful restructuring. Is it possible that the alternative, magnet, or charter school movements may be understood from an institutionalist framework?
4. What happens if a school or school district makes such substantial changes that they cannot (easily) return to the status quo ante? In other words, is there a "point of no return" in educational change and restructuring? What happens if, as in Oregon, financial constraints require such major changes that retreat becomes more difficult than advance? Can states create an environment where that is possible? Are some schools viewing to standards-based education directed at satisfying CIM and CAM requirements as an invitation to create a new set of institutions? At the building level, for example, many secondary schools are creating new structures: alternative schools and schools-within-schools, project-based learning and integrated curriculum, and block scheduling. At some point it may become more difficult to turn back than to push forward.

## Conclusion

There may be other important variables, as well. Those identified in the previous section, may, offer a jumping-off point for a systematic investigation of the relationship of the forces acting to process externally-mandated reform that

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intervene into the daily functioning of the school as social community, changes that cause teachers to examine or alter their practices in relationship to one another, not to educational change generically. We are well aware that others have pointed out the importance of these dimensions to the change process more generally (Fullan, 1991). Our goal is to develop instruments that capture and test the relative strength of these variables as moderators for external policy initiatives.

Such an understanding is important given the current trend by policy makers to abandon public schools as the locus for change in favor of such innovations as charter schools or voucher programs. If state legislatures cannot effect policy changes in individual school buildings with some reliability via legislatively-mandated reform programs, the alternatives seem clear: they will begin to work outside the existing system of schooling. Our proposed line of investigation will seek to explain, then predict, the ways in which external mandates are processed. Our goal is to enable states to identify a priori the conditions that will facilitate implementation at each school site. This may allow educational reform programs to contain the right combination of methods and mechanisms to support the desired goals of the reform.

Simultaneously, it may be advantageous for the state to understand when it has developed policies that are unacceptable to schools, that fall outside the bounds of socially compliant behavior for teachers. Not all policy is good policy. Not all policy is acceptable policy. If the state is able to anticipate how a policy is likely to be processed by schools, it becomes more capable of modifying policies that are unworkable or patently bad ideas. Ultimately, the policy-making process itself might become more rational and coherent. Schools as institutions crave rationality and coherence in policy.

Of course, this approach implies that the goal of policy making logical and consistent over time is a good goal. Other models of policy development are less concerned with such values. However, these seem like reasonable targets toward which to shape the policy process, since a system that acts like it is rational and consistent will come over time to reinforce such behavior in socially-compliant individuals within the system. In the end a reinforcing loop may be created that

leads both to greater policy coherence in education and to more ready acceptance by educators of policy initiatives that are well-conceived and consistent.

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Appendix A. Scale Items

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Attitude towards change ("Change"):

- H.B. 3565 was passed because time for fundamental change
- H.B. 3565 was passed because schools are already doing 3565
- H.B. 3565 was passed because ideas make sense
- H.B. 3565 was passed because system isn't working for many kids
- H.B. 3565 was passed because unrealistic (reverse coded)
- H.B. 3565 was passed because not good educational ideas (reverse coded)
- H.B. 3565 was passed because unfair to some students (reverse coded)
- H.B. 3565 was passed because too much change too fast (reverse coded)
- I am skeptical (reverse coded)
- I have opportunity to do things I've wanted
- I will take seriously when funded (reverse coded)
- I don't see implications for me (reverse coded)
- I have too much else to do (reverse coded)

Anticipated Changes in Practices ("Practices"):

- Effect-promote developmentally appropriate practice
- Effect-increase teacher control
- Effect-increase no of instructional strategies
- Effect-greater integration of social services
- Effect-greater curriculum integration
- Effect-diverse ways to group students
- Effect-more teacher decision-making
- Effect-increased teacher collegiality

Expected Outcomes ("Outcomes")

- Effect-benefit all students
  - Effect-benefit college-bound
  - Effect-kids enter kindergarten better prepared
  - Effect-CIM will decrease dropouts
  - Effect-ALCs will decrease dropouts
  - Site councils will lead to learning
  - Increased accountability will lead to learning
  - Funding for preschool will lead to learning
  - Extended school year will lead to learning
  - CIM will lead to learning
  - CAM will lead to learning
  - Alternative learning centers will lead to learning
  - Mixed age classrooms will lead to learning
  - Philosophy of individual development will lead to learning
-

## Appendix B. Oregon Individual Educator Reactions to School Reform

Legislation, 1992 to 1995 (scale means, selected demographic categories)

	attitude				changes				outcomes			
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1992	1993	1994	1995	1992	1993	1994	1995
Mean	54	54	54	51	61	65	66	57	63	60	56	53
Position												
teacher	52	52	52	49	58	62	63	55	62	57	54	51
other certified	56	59	57	56	64	71	73	65	66	62	62	60
administrator	67	72	75	63	77	84	84	72	73	77	70	67
School type												
high school	57	54	54	50	65	61	65	55	64	57	53	51
middle school	53	55	53	51	54	66	66	58	63	59	57	53
elementary	51	52	54	51	61	67	66	59	62	57	59	58
Age												
20-29	50	56	51	49	60	67	67	61	62	64	57	57
30-39	53	57	56	49	62	68	65	56	63	61	58	53
40-49	55	53	52	51	62	65	65	56	64	59	54	52
50-59	54	54	55	52	59	61	68	58	63	57	58	53
60+	53	62	57	48	49	84	68	56	53	79	67	57
Gender												
female	54	56	57	54	62	67	69	61	65	61	61	57
male	54	53	50	47	59	62	62	51	61	57	50	48

# Why Do Schools Respond Differentially to State School Reform Legislation?

Appendix C. Oregon district reactions to school reform legislation,  
1992 to 1995 (scale means, selected districts)

District	ADM	attitude				changes				outcomes			
		1992	1993	1994	1995	1992	1993	1994	1995	1992	1993	1994	1995
Mean	54	54	54	50	61	65	56	57	63	59	54	53	
1	15,000+	49	49	58	51	53	50	63	55	59	55	58	60
2	15,000+	57	56	67	56	69	61	64	70	70	57	67	56
3	15,000+	49	42	48	44	49	54	53	45	60	50	48	47
4	10,000+	54	57	50	50	59	64	53	58	65	63	50	53
5	10,000+			60	52			65	65			60	58
6	5,000+	54	57	56	50	61	65	53	56	62	59	56	47
7	5,000+	59	64	55	56	69	77	56	63	66	72	55	58
8	5,000+			48	44			53	50			48	49
9	2,500+	61	55	51	45	73	68	51	50	69	57	51	47
10	2,500+	54	50	52	53	62	66	50	61	59	58	52	52
11	2,500+	48	48	56	47	58	64	53	56	57	58	56	50
12	2,500+	58	57	46	47	68	70	44	51	65	62	46	49
13	500+	58		58	39	52		64	49	61		58	45
14	1,000+	54		53	50	56		56	40	61		53	45
15	2,500+			61	59			71	67			61	63
16	2,500+			54	51			61	59			54	57
17	1,000+	52	63	73	56	60	79	81	58	66	69	73	64
18	5,000+			51	55			57	63			51	57
19	500+			51	40			44	40			51	39
20	500+			60	56			63	62			60	64

Appendix D. Oregon school building reactions to school reform legislation,  
1992 to 1995 (scale means, selected districts & schools)

District	attitude				changes				outcomes			
	1992	1993	1994	1995	1992	1993	1994	1995	1992	1993	1994	1995
1 HS	62		62		71		76		56		63	
1 MS	47		57		45		100		61		75	
1 MS	46	46		60	42	47		75	58	46		78
1 El	42	52	56	44	35	58	56	42	52	50	54	51
1 El	51	49	39	29	62	46	54	32	70	60	59	46
1 El	43		69	49	59		72	62	57		72	62
2 HS	57	54	64	59	65	56	68	73	69	56	63	56
2 MS	60	60	74	47	75	71	82	53	75	60	66	49
3 HS	53	42	49	42	56	53	59	43	61	49	54	48
3 MS	52		47	48	47		57	38	64		66	53
3 El	44	42	47		46	57	53		54	55	54	
3 El	39		47	41	43		56	37	47		40	44
4 HS	56	59	51	56	52	60	60	60	63	63	53	54
4 JH	53			46	53			62	64			54
4 JH	60		48	44	64		70	59	68		50	49
4 El	54		61		71		68		64		66	
4 El	50	48	49	51	63	80	51	67	68	61	56	62
5 HS	58		61	58	66		75	67	67		56	62
5 MS	50	51	43	43	45	61	59	49	49	54	45	37
5 El	50		52	65	66		66	76	63		53	65
5 El	66	50	44		69	75	68		65	62	41	
6 MS	51	48	53	45	59	61	65	56	58	53	52	44
6 El	52				70				52			
6 El	60	48	63	55	81	75	75	59	81	70	57	72
7 HS	53		48	44	60		54	55	61		49	47
7 MS	64		57		73		64		81		54	
7 El	52	55	49	55	59	65	55	64	58	66	52	60
7 El	72	80	87	88	87	94	93	99	74	85	91	91
7 El	59		49		81		82		62		51	
8 HS	62	60	60	54	71	65	71	56	65	60	53	45
8 MS	55	52	53	47	67	70	65	53	63	62	53	46
8 El	51		62	51	53		72	70	59		68	54
8 El	45	50	41	45	44	62	41	48	46	57	42	45



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