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ABSTRACT

This paper presents the highlights of a national survey of governing boards and board members of Canadian universities. A total of 45 of the country's 59 provincially-supported university boards responded to the survey, which was followed up by a survey of the individual board members of the 45 responding institutions, which received 583 responses (49% response rate). The survey found that 39 of the responding institutions possessed a bicameral governance structure, with a governing board and a faculty senate. Various demographic characteristics of board members are reported. Board members reported, on average, that they worked on board matters 10.3 hours per month. Compared to governing boards at state-supported universities in the United States, the boards of provincially-supported Canadian universities included more student and faculty members and more females. While 77 percent of American boards were appointed by the state government, Canadian boards were appointed by a variety of methods, with the three most common, each accounting for about a quarter of the total, being appointment by provincial governments, by the board itself, and by constituency groups. (Contains 14 references.) (MDM)

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Governing Boards in Canadian Universities: Characteristics, Role, Function, Accountability, and Representativeness

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This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Higher Education held at the Marriott Hotel, Orlando, Florida, November 2-5, 1995. This paper was reviewed by ASHE and was judged to be of high quality and of interest to others concerned with the research of higher education. It has therefore been selected to be included in the ERIC collection of ASHE conference papers.

Governing Boards in Canadian Universities: Characteristics, Role, Function, Accountability, and Representativeness

**Glen A. Jones
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Introduction

University governing boards occupy a central place in the governance of higher education systems. Situated at the interface between academe and society at large, they provide a means for the external society to exert some influence over the university, but in a way that respects the peculiar conventions, norms, and values of the academy. In jurisdictions such as Canada and the United States, where universities enjoy considerable autonomy from direct government oversight of and intervention into their affairs, the institutional governing board may play a crucial role in fostering public confidence in the operation of universities. Yet, in spite of the central role that boards play in American higher education, Kerr and Gade (1989) reported that they could find "little useful literature" (p. 2) on such bodies, and this observation would apply even more so to boards of Canadian universities.

In an effort to address some of the gaps in present knowledge of the nature and working of governing boards of Canadian universities, the authors undertook a national survey of boards and board members of Canadian universities in 1994-95. In this paper, the first report from our study, we present some of the highlights from the survey.

The paper is organized into six sections. We begin by establishing the context for the study and briefly reviewing a number of the themes which underscored our interest in

this research project. We then describe the survey objectives, procedures, response rates, and limitations. The following sections present findings about the characteristics of boards and board members, the work of board members, the role of boards and board members, and major differences between university governing boards in Canada and the United States.

The composition, method of appointment of members, and powers and responsibilities of Canadian university governing boards are stipulated in acts of provincial legislatures which are effectively the chartering documents for these universities. In some provinces, such as Ontario, there is a distinct act for each university, and there are considerable differences in the composition of boards among the universities. In other provinces, such as Alberta, there is a single university act which prescribes the same or quite similar make-up for the boards of all (or most) universities in the province. In all except a few Canadian universities, there is a bicameral governance structure, with the governing board, which is most commonly called a board of governors, responsible for corporate administrative and financial matters, and an academic senate responsible for academic matters. The powers of the senate and division of responsibilities between the board and the senate are usually spelled out in the universities acts. The bicameral structure was widely in place by the early twentieth century, and there was not a lot of interest in modification of institutional governance arrangements, and hence in research related to such initiatives, until the 1960s.

In the 1960s, interest in democratizing higher education resulted in the expansion of the practice of including faculty and students on governing boards, and accordingly,

tracking this development was one of the main preoccupations in published literature on university governance in the 1960s and 1970s. Cameron (1991) cites studies which show that the proportion of boards which had faculty members increased from 9 % in 1955, to 32 % in 1965, to 92 % in 1975, and the corresponding changes for student members were from 0 % to 47 %, to 78 % in 1975 (p. 314). On average, faculty and students together comprised 2 % of total membership in 1955, compared to 20 % in 1975 (p. 315). In our survey, we attempted to update and broaden existing information on the characteristics of boards and board members.

A major focus of attention in our survey was the role of boards and board members. This interest is related to some of the key themes in higher education policy discussions: concerns about institutional performance; reconciling autonomy and accountability; and the tension between constituency and community. It is not yet clear just where institutional governing boards fit in the accountability movement which is sweeping North America. Insofar as this movement reflects a real and widespread concern among the lay public about the performance of universities, then a body which includes so many from the lay public and which is formally situated at the top of the organizational pyramid would seem to be an obvious candidate for a major assignment in the area of accountability. Arguing along these lines, a task force which was established to advise the provincial government of Ontario on how to enhance accountability for universities, recommended that institutional governing boards be given the major responsibility for ensuring public accountability (Task Force, 1993). Cameron (1992a) also emphasizes the need for boards to play a major role in program and personnel

evaluation. He further argues that the combination of institutional autonomy and academic self-government has left institutions rudderless, and that boards should fill this vacuum and take initiative in providing institutional leadership, particularly in making difficult choices among programs.

On the other hand, some may feel that boards are too close to the institutions which they oversee to be trusted with these responsibilities, or that it may not combine well with the boards' developmental and advocacy roles. Engel and Achola (1983) observed that the shared authority model can become so bogged down in bureaucratization and routinization that lay trustees may "lose sight of their role as public or constituent spokesperson" (p. 61). Engel and Achola noted that while there is much prescription, there is a paucity of empirical study of how boards deal with these issues. Hatton (1991) reported on one aspect of the accountability issue from a study in which he interviewed a sample of members of governing boards of Ontario universities who had also served on boards of directors in the profit sector. They confided that while asking "tough, demanding, or potentially embarrassing" questions of management at board meetings is not common in the private sector, it is common in some universities and not in others. It was not common in universities with self-renovating boards, but was more common in boards where many appointments were made from specific constituency groups (p. 27). However, little is known more generally about the extent to which boards attempt to play an accountability role and how they feel about that role, and so we sought members' perceptions on these matters.

Another of the developments which both motivated and guided the shape of our study is the continued movement toward constituency representation. This is a general trend in North American society which is manifested in, among other forums, governing boards of colleges and universities. In our own province, the government recently published guidelines for broadening and making more explicit the constituency identification of board members (Allen, 1992). In a recent review essay on governing boards and trustees, Floyd (1995) begins her list of future directions for research with the observation that "further attention should be given to the conflicts between guarding broad and specific interests - the concept of guardianship and the concept of constituency representation" (p. 104). Certain of the items in our questionnaire were designed to obtain data on whether these conflicts exist in Canada.

Research Method

The study involved two components. In August of 1994 a questionnaire was sent to the secretary of the governing board of every provincially-supported Canadian university. We used Cameron's (1992b) list of institutions as a base but updated the list to include new institutions in British Columbia and Ontario. Excluding federally-supported (military) institutions and private universities, the questionnaire was sent to 59 institutions. The secretary questionnaire focused on the composition, structure, policies and orientation practices of university governing boards. We also asked board secretaries to provide us with mailing addresses for all board members. A total of 45 institutions responded to the first component of the study for a response rate of 76%.

The second component of the study focused on obtaining information from individual board members. The board member questionnaire included a demographic component as well as questions on the role of individual board members and the role of governing boards. The questionnaire was sent to every board member of the 45 institutions participating in the study in February of 1995. Almost all secretaries provided us with a complete list of board members, but several indicated that board policies prevented the release of members names and in these situations board secretaries were provided with sealed questionnaire packages for distribution to all board members. A total of 1212 board members were identified in the first component of the study, but board membership vacancies, recent resignations, and incomplete or inadequate address information meant an adjusted population of 1191. We received 583 responses for a response rate of 49%.

While there was a high rate of response to both components of the study, several limitations of these data and of our analyses in this paper should be noted. While over three-quarters of provincially-supported Canadian universities participated in the study, there are considerable variations in the structure and composition of governing boards by institution and we have no way of knowing whether the data provided by board secretaries in the first component of the study is representative of those institutions that did not participate. This is especially true in considering the province of Saskatchewan where neither of the two universities participated in the study. In terms of limitations associated with the board member data, it should be noted that there were large variations in the rate of response by institution (from 27% to 68%). In this paper we have limited

our analysis of both components of the study to focus on university governance in Canada from a national perspective. Differences in both the rate and nature of responses by board members by institution will be the subject of a future paper.

Characteristics of Boards and Board Members

The governance structure of most Canadian universities can be described as bicameral in that the corporate charter delegates authority over institutional decision making to two legislative bodies, a governing board which usually appoints the president and is responsible for the administrative and financial elements of the university, and an academic senate with responsibility (in some cases of a purely advisory nature but often with specific duties assigned under the charter) for academic matters. Of the 45 universities participating in this study, 39 described their governance structure as bicameral. Five indicated that they have a unicameral governance structure with a single governing body responsible for both administrative and academic matters¹.

Most Canadian universities have their own unique charter and were incorporated at different times, and not surprisingly, there is considerable diversity in the precise composition and methods of appointment of boards. Overall, the three most common ways of being selected to a board, each accounting for about a quarter of the total nationwide, are appointment by the provincial government, appointment by the board itself, and election by a constituency. Other members are ex-officio (11 %), appointed by

¹ One board indicated that it has a "tricameral" governance structure. For a more detailed discussion of the evolution of the structure of Canadian university governing boards see Cameron (1991) or Jones (in press).

the academic senate (5 %), or appointed by some other organization such as an alumni association (8 %).

As shown in Table 1, the largest category of board members is lay members, with faculty, students, and alumni being the next largest categories. Besides lay members, the university president and students are the only categories common to all boards, although faculty and alumni are present on the vast majority of boards. About a third of board members are "insiders".²

About three-quarters of boards reported that they provide an orientation program or workshop for new board members. Only two universities reported that they provide honoraria to members, in one of these just to student members (\$75 per meeting). The average number of board meetings per year is eight. The fewest is two, at a small institution where apparently most work is done at the committee level. The most is 21, in the central board of the University of Quebec, the only broad multi-campus university in Canada (not counting the ones which have a few satellite campuses in their own locale). Two-thirds of boards reported that their meetings are open to the general public though certain items of business are conducted in closed sessions. In the remaining universities, meetings are not open to the general public, except for one case in which all meetings are open to the public.

²The total for faculty, students, support staff, and administrators, including the president, in Table 1 is 38.4 %. These figures were obtained from the board secretaries. The proportion of respondents to the members' survey who indicated their "primary occupation inside (i.e. student, faculty, or staff)" was 32.5 %. Since the data reported here on demographic characteristics and attitudes and perceptions of board members is from the member survey, the breakdown of 32.5 % inside, 67.5 % outside will be used.

In regard to age, only four per cent of members are 25 or under, all of them inside members, probably students. Two-thirds are between 46 and 65, and seven per cent are over age 65. The five year age group with the greatest percentage of members is age 51-55, which accounts for almost a quarter of members. The gender breakdown is 64 % male, 36 % female, with virtually no difference between inside and outside members. Over 90 % of board members have at least a baccalaureate or professional degree, almost all the remainder have some postsecondary education. Just under a quarter list a doctorate as their highest degree and slightly over a quarter list a master's degree. There was almost no difference in the proportions of inside and outside members who have at least a baccalaureate or professional degree. However a much higher percentage of inside members (53 %) than outside members (10%) had a doctorate, but 31 % of outside members indicated a master's degree as their highest level of education, compared to 20 % for inside members. Not only are board members highly educated, but the majority (59 %) have been a student at the university in which they are now a member of the board. A higher proportion of outside (64 %) than of inside members (49 %) had been students at the same institution. Ten per cent have been a member of the board of another university.

The distribution of membership by occupational sector¹ is as follows: business, mainly executives, 26 %; education, mainly faculty, administration, and students, 37 %; professions, of which law, accounting, and medicine are most prevalent, 13 %; retired, 11 %; and other, of which non-profit enterprise and government are the largest

¹The occupational categorization used in the survey was the same as used by the Association of Governing Boards so that we could compare our results to theirs (Association of Governing Boards, 1986).

subcategories, 11 %. Naturally there are substantial differences in occupation between inside and outside members. All the members in the business and retired categories are from outside. Not surprisingly, a large majority of those in the education category are from inside, although nearly a fifth are from outside, including faculty and administrators from other universities and a number of elementary and secondary school teachers.

The Work of Board Members

Respondents were asked several questions related to their work as board members. When asked if they were "active" members, the great majority agreed strongly (56 %) or moderately (30 %), the two highest response categories on a five point scale. There were slight differences in these responses between inside and outside members. About four per cent of outside members, but no inside members, disagreed strongly with the statement that they were active members, and about seven per cent more of inside (60 %) than of outside members (53 %) agreed strongly with the statement.

Board members were asked how many hours per month they spend preparing for and attending meetings of the board and board committees. The mean hours per month worked by board members was 10.3, with 20 % working fewer than five hours, and just over 20 % working 15 or more hours. Just over ten per cent worked 20 hours or more. Mean hours were slightly higher for outside members (10.5) than for inside members (9.9). A slightly higher proportion of outside than inside members worked under five hours or over fifteen hours. There was a clear tendency for members who described themselves as active to indicate more hours worked. Among those who agreed strongly with the statement that they were active members the mean hours worked was 12.2 per

month, compared to 8.2 for those who agreed moderately and 6.6 for those who disagreed strongly.

Using the same five point scale from disagree strongly to agree strongly, a majority (65 %) agreed moderately or strongly that they were able to "influence" board decisions, with 26 % of outside members as opposed to 19% of inside members agreeing strongly. About three-quarters of members agreed that they receive the information that they need in order to make decisions. A moderately higher proportion of outside than inside members agreed, perhaps because inside members are more demanding of information. In fact, about 21 % of outside members indicated that they received "too much" information, compared to 9 % of inside members. On the other hand, almost 80 % of inside members agreed strongly with the statement that they "know the organizational structure of the university", twice the proportion for outside members (40 %).

Comparisons between Canada and the United States

Most of the comparable data from the United States is from 1985 and 1986 surveys by the Association of Governing Boards (Association of Governing Boards, 1986; Association of Governing Boards, 1988), although Ingram (1993) provides some data for 1991. In contrast, as noted earlier, our survey was conducted in 1995. In addition, the Association of Governing Board (AGB) data is from a survey of universities, whereas our data is from both a survey of universities and from a survey of individual board members⁴. Since all but two degree granting institutions in Canada, and

⁴Kerr and Gade (1989) surveyed board chairs along with presidents and heads of faculty regarding board performance.

all the ones in our survey data, are public, in our comparisons we focus on public universities in the United States, and four year ones where possible. The major differences and similarities are as follows:

1. The multicampus board dominates the public university sector in the United States, whereas it is a rarity in Canada. Close to 70 % of students at public colleges and universities in the U.S. are on campuses within multicampus systems that do not have their own local governing boards (Ingram, 1993, p. 7). There is only one multicampus system in Canada, the University of Quebec, and it accounts for a minority of enrolment in Quebec universities.
2. A large majority of board members in 4 year public universities in the United States are appointed by the government - 77 % by the governor with approval of the legislature (AGB, 1988, p. 4). In Canada less than a quarter are appointed by the government, normally by the provincial cabinet minister responsible for universities under the authority of the lieutenant-governor-in-council. Corresponding to the other major methods of selection of board members in Canada, about a quarter each for appointment or election by constituent groups and self-perpetuation by the board, in the U.S. only nine per cent are selected by constituent group and only two per cent by self-perpetuation.

3. Faculty and students comprise more than a quarter of the board members of Canadian universities, and about one-third of members are from inside the university. By contrast, faculty and students account for less than three per cent of board members in the U.S. (AGB, 1986, p. 11). AGB reports do not show any breakdowns of membership characteristics between inside and outside members.
4. The representation of females is greater in Canada, 36 %, than in the United States, 26 % in 1991 (Ingram, 1993, p. 386).
5. The age distribution of outside members of Canadian boards is comparable to that of members of U.S. boards, in the order of one-third under 50 years of age, one-third over 60, and one-third aged 50-59. However, for Canadian boards as whole, the age distribution is more skewed toward the younger categories, reflecting the ages of inside members.
6. The proportions of board members who have at least a baccalaureate degree is about the same in the two countries, though a higher proportion of outside members of Canadian boards (41 %) have a postgraduate degree than of members of boards in the U.S. (25 %).
7. Boards in the United States have a much smaller proportion of members from the education sector (10 %) than in Canada (37 %), and correspondingly higher

proportions from business (36 %) and professions (23 %), compared to Canada (26 % for business, 13 % for professions). However, when focusing upon just the outside members of Canadian boards, many of these differences disappear. The proportions of outside members from education (10 %) and business (39 %) are virtually identical to the figures for the U.S. The main differences are that outside members on Canadian boards include a higher proportion of retired members (17 % to 12 %) and a smaller proportion in the "other" category (15 % vs. 19 %). Two groups within the "other" category, homemakers and farmers/ranchers comprise over ten per cent of the total membership of public university boards in the U.S., but less than two per cent of outside members of Canadian boards.

Role of Boards and Board Members

One of the ways in which we tried to address the subject of board and board member role was through a series of paired items with which respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement. One item of each pair involved a statement about how respondents felt boards should behave, and the other item asked for perceptions of how the board actually behaves in regard to the same matter. The full distributions of responses on the five point scale is shown in aggregate in Table 2, and the totals for the two highest response categories (strongly agree and moderately agree) are shown for internal and external members in Table 3.

Table 2 shows that the statements with which the highest proportions agreed strongly were the normative statements about the board's role in monitoring performance. More than 70 % agreed strongly that the board should ask "tough questions" of senior administration and periodically review the performance of the president and the board. However, in all three areas there was a wide discrepancy between what respondents felt should happen and what they perceived to be happening, as only 25 % or less agreed strongly that the board was actually doing these things. The greatest discrepancy was in regard to the board failing to review its own performance. The next largest discrepancy between the desired and observed was in regard to the board role in lobbying for change in government policy, something a majority felt that boards should do but which only less than a fifth of respondents agreed strongly that boards actually did. In contrast, there was almost no discrepancy between perceptions of what should be and what is in regard to how the board should relate to academic and administrative matters.

Table 3 shows that where the discrepancies between the paired statements are substantial, the discrepancies are greater for internal than for external members. This would suggest that internal members are more critical (or less forgiving) of board behaviour than are external members. The two sets of items for which the difference in these discrepancies between the internal and external members are greatest are those pertaining to asking tough questions of senior administration and lobbying for change in government policy. Internal members seem to be less deferential of authority in both arenas. An area where internal and external members seem to share almost equally in their disappointments is in the perceived failure to review the board's performance.

Perhaps the two groups could be regarded as equally responsible for perceived shortcomings in this respect. Table 3 suggests also that there tends to be closer agreement between internal and external members in regard to how boards should behave than in regard to how boards do behave. The exceptions to this generalization pertain to the board role in academic matters, where a little higher proportion of external than of internal members believe that the board should exert influence, but the two groups agree on what the board actually does.

While in aggregate there is little difference of opinion between internal and external members as to how much influence boards exert over academic matters, there are substantial differences between members of bicameral and unicameral boards in regard to this issue, as shown in Table 4. Three-fifths of bicameral board respondents agreed strongly that the board confines itself to financial and administrative matters and does not make decisions on academic matters, while corresponding proportion of unicameral board members who felt the same was in the order of one-third. On all four of the items in Table 4 which deal with the board's role in academic matters, there are differences between respondents from bicameral and unicameral boards in the direction which one would expect based upon differences in the formal responsibilities of the two types of boards. On the other four items, which pertain to more general oversight responsibilities of boards, there are virtually no differences between responses from the two types of boards.

Turning to perceptions of the role of the individual board member, as shown in Table 5, there is a strong consensus that the member's role is to make decisions that are in

the best interest of the university as a whole - perhaps the surprising part of this response is the five or six per cent who don't agree with the statement. However, some question might arise as to how the 41 % of internal and 22 % of external members who believe that their role is to represent the interests of a specific constituency reconcile these two role statements. The difference in percentage of members of the two groups who feel that they have a constituency representation role is perhaps not surprising when one considers that most of the internal members are selected by constituencies, while this is the case for only a minority of external members. Though other differences in Table 5 are modest, it is of interest that external members are more sensitive than internal members to the conflict that internal members might experience between constituency and university interests; and internal members are more sensitive to the analogous conflicts that external members might experience. Of course, in either case there is no way of telling if one group is exaggerating the conflicts which they feel others might face, or underplaying their own conflicts. Those who are critical of the idea of placing so much authority for public institutions in the hands of boards might point to the stronger agreement about a board's role in serving the interests of the university (over 90 %) than about its role in serving the interests of society (just over 70 %). However, the fact that only about half the respondents felt that normally it was clear what course of action was best anyway suggests caution in making interpretations as to whose interests board members feel they are serving.

Concluding Observations:

Most Canadian universities have a bicameral governance structure with both a governing board and an academic senate, though roughly 10% of institutions in our study reported the existence of a single governing board with responsibility for both academic and administrative matters. Given these different structural arrangements, it is not surprising to learn that board members of bicameral boards appear to be somewhat more reluctant to become involved in academic decision making than their peers at unicameral institutions. Aside from this difference, however, board members from both types of structures have remarkably similar characteristics and attitudes.

The composition of Canadian university boards includes representation from constituent groups within the university (especially faculty and students) as well as from the broader society as appointed by government, the board, alumni, and, in some cases, specific interests. Whether the current composition of boards represents an appropriate balance is impossible to determine, but it is clear that Canadian universities have placed a high value on attempting to ensure that both internal and external interests are taken into consideration. Both internal and external members appear to share similar perceptions concerning the role that governing boards should play, though internal board members appear to be somewhat more critical in that they believe that the board has farther to go in terms of reaching the ideal. Both groups agree that the role of the board member is to make decisions that are in the best interests of the university as a whole, though internal members also have a stronger tendency to view at least part of their role in terms of representing the interests of a specific constituency. The existence of an internal cohort

of members represents one of the importance differences between Canadian and American boards.

The findings presented in this paper represent a first step in our analysis of the national data. Over the next year we hope to prepare reports for each participating institution that will compare the data we obtained from that board and its members with the national, aggregate data. We also plan to prepare a thorough technical report that will include a much broader, and more detailed, presentation of data.

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Table 1
Board Membership By Category of Appointment¹

| Category | % of All Board Members | % of Boards Reporting Members in This Category |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|--|
| Lay-Members and Others ² | 50.0 | 100 |
| Faculty | 17.2 | 93 |
| Students | 9.2 | 100 |
| Alumni | 8.6 | 90 |
| Senior University Administrators | 5.5 | 38 |
| University President | 3.3 | 100 |
| Support Staff | 3.2 | 52 |
| University Chancellor | 2.9 | 83 |

¹ Three incomplete responses were excluded from this analysis (n=42).

² The vast majority of members in this category are appointed by government or by the board, but this category also includes members appointed or elected by external organizations and a small number of individuals who are ex-officio board members because of a position they hold external to the university.

Table 2
Perceptions of What Board Role Should Be in Various Areas Contrasted With How Board Actually Behaves

| Statement | Percent Who | | Percent Neutral | | Percent Who Agree | | Percent Who Agree Strongly | |
|---|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|
| | Disagree Strongly | Disagree Moderately | Disagree Strongly | Disagree Moderately | Disagree Strongly | Disagree Moderately | Disagree Strongly | Disagree Moderately |
| A board should confine itself mainly to financial and administrative matters | 28 | 22 | 5 | 24 | 21 | | | |
| Our board does confine itself mainly to financial and administrative matters | 13 | 19 | 12 | 37 | 19 | | | |
| A board should not make decisions on academic matters | 17 | 23 | 15 | 22 | 24 | | | |
| Our board does not make decisions on academic matters | 11 | 19 | 13 | 30 | 26 | | | |
| A board should be the final authority for approving major academic policies | 16 | 12 | 9 | 27 | 36 | | | |
| Our board does act as the final authority for approving academic policies | 17 | 17 | 15 | 25 | 26 | | | |
| A board should regularly review the performance of the university in academic areas | 8 | 9 | 8 | 38 | 38 | | | |
| Our board does regularly review the performance of the university in academic areas | 18 | 26 | 22 | 27 | 8 | | | |
| A board should act as a "watchdog" on behalf of the public interest | 2 | 9 | 11 | 30 | 48 | | | |
| Our board does act as a "watchdog" on behalf of the public interest | 3 | 14 | 26 | 36 | 21 | | | |
| A board should ask "tough questions" of senior university administrators | 4 | 2 | 3 | 17 | 74 | | | |
| Our board does ask "tough questions" of senior university administrators | 10 | 15 | 16 | 35 | 25 | | | |
| A board should periodically review the performance of the university president | 2 | 2 | 2 | 16 | 79 | | | |
| Our board does periodically review the performance of the university president | 12 | 13 | 16 | 23 | 36 | | | |
| A board should periodically review its performance | 1 | 1 | 4 | 21 | 73 | | | |
| Our board does periodically review its performance | 16 | 26 | 26 | 20 | 13 | | | |
| A board should play an active role in lobbying for change in government policy | 2 | 4 | 11 | 30 | 53 | | | |
| Our board does play an active role in lobbying for change in government policy | 7 | 19 | 28 | 28 | 18 | | | |

Table 3
**Percentage of Internal and External Members Who Agree Moderately
of Strongly With Statements About Board Role**

| Statement | Internal Members | External Members |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| A board should confine itself mainly to financial and administrative matters | 49 | 43 |
| Our board does confine itself mainly to financial and administrative matters | 57 | 56 |
| A board should not make decisions on academic matters | 56 | 41 |
| Our board does not make decisions on academic matters | 55 | 58 |
| A board should be the final authority for approving major academic policies | 54 | 67 |
| Our board does act as the final authority for approving academic policies | 51 | 51 |
| A board should regularly review the performance of the university in academic areas. | 69 | 79 |
| Our board does regularly review the performance of the university in academic areas. | 25 | 39 |
| A board should act as a "watchdog" on behalf of the public interest. | 72 | 81 |
| Our board does act as a "watchdog" on behalf of the public interest. | 44 | 63 |
| A board should ask "tough questions" of senior university administrators. | 91 | 91 |
| Our board does ask "tough questions" of senior university administrators. | 45 | 67 |
| A board should periodically review the performance of the university president. | 94 | 95 |
| Our board does periodically review the performance of the university president. | 48 | 65 |
| A board should periodically review its performance. | 94 | 94 |
| Our board does periodically review its performance. | 27 | 36 |
| A board should play an active role in lobbying for change in government policy. | 81 | 84 |
| Our board does play an active role in lobbying for change in government policy. | 31 | 54 |

Table 4
Percentage of Internal and External Board Members Who Agree Moderately or Strongly
With Statements On the Role of Board Members

| Statement | Internal Members | External Members |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| I believe that my role on the board is to represent the interests of a specific constituency inside or outside the university. | 41 | 22 |
| I believe that my role on the board is to make decisions that are in the best interests of the broader society. | 71 | 76 |
| I believe that my role on the board is to make decisions that are in the best interest of the university as a whole. | 95 | 94 |
| With most issues it is clear what course of action is in the best interest of the university as a whole. | 51 | 59 |
| With regard to most issues, internal members of our board do not experience much conflict between supporting the interests of the university as a whole and supporting the interests of their constituency. | 56 | 43 |
| With regard to most issues, external members of our board do not experience much conflict between supporting the interests of the university and supporting the interests of their constituency. | 58 | 68 |

Table 5
Differences in Perceptions of Board Behaviour Between
Bicameral and Unicameral Board Members¹

| Statement | Percent Who Agree Moderately or Strongly | | Mean Rating ² | |
|--|--|------------|--------------------------|------------|
| | Bicameral | Unicameral | Bicameral | Unicameral |
| Our board does confine itself mainly to financial and administrative matters. | 60 | 38 | 3.4 | 2.8 |
| Our board does not make decisions on academic matters. | 60 | 33 | 3.5 | 2.7 |
| Our board does act as the final authority for approving academic policies. | 48 | 69 | 3.2 | 3.9 |
| Our board does regularly review the performance of the university in academic areas. | 33 | 47 | 2.8 | 3.2 |
| Our board does act as a "watchdog" on behalf of the public interest. | 57 | 59 | 3.6 | 3.6 |
| Our board does ask "tough questions" of senior university administrators. | 60 | 57 | 3.5 | 3.4 |
| Our board does periodically review the performance of the university president. | 60 | 65 | 3.6 | 3.7 |
| Our board does periodically review its performance. | 34 | 30 | 2.9 | 2.8 |

¹ This analysis excludes board members from the one institution with a "tricameral" governance structure.

² These questions employed a five-point scale where 1=disagree strongly; 2=disagree moderately; 3=neither agree or disagree; 4=agree moderately; and 5=agree strongly.