This paper assesses educational planning in Tanzania as moving from one of hope to despair as the country becomes more reliant upon foreign aid. As the country moved from colonialism, basic education was to be accessible to all children and adult illiteracy was to be eliminated. By the 1980s financial crisis and the conditions that accompanied foreign assistance had shifted priorities for education so that it was no longer a major long-term goal for the country. This study examines those initiatives and responses in the sagging economic conditions. Although nearly all young Tanzanians were enrolled in primary schools, serious shortages were found in the numbers of textbooks, training of teachers, maintenance of the physical plant, equipment for classroom use and overall educational quality. Analyses of the basic economic plans and foreign investment policies that have governed the country for the last two decades are included. The study contends that planning in the present must pay as much attention to the conception as to the implementation in recreating the schools upon which economic development hopes lie. (EH)
Financial Crisis, Structural Adjustment, and Education Policy in Tanzania

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For two decades Tanzania's leaders articulated a coherent and widely admired general orientation and set of priorities for education. All children were to have access to basic education and adult illiteracy was to be eliminated. Notwithstanding Tanzania's poverty—even during difficult times government spending on education was maintained—those goals were substantially achieved. By the mid 1980s, however, financial crisis and the conditions that accompanied foreign assistance had relocated the center of initiative. Planners no longer talked of implementing a philosophy of education or even of major long term goals. Rather, they sought to assess the aid market. What would interest the foreign assistance agency whose officials were currently in town? How could that be packaged and presented? Earlier, educators were charged with lighting a torch on Kilimanjaro as a beacon for all of Africa. In the 1990s, their task is to struggle for survival in a shantytown.

"To plan is to choose," Tanzania's former president Julius Nyerere insisted. Contemporary education planning in Tanzania, however, is more like marketing than either planning or choosing. Discerning foreigners' preferences and accommodating to their interests has replaced setting goals and developing strategies to achieve them. A study of education policy and planning in contemporary Tanzania is necessarily an exploration of the transition from the dependence of conquest to the dependence of foreign assistance, from the proud assertion of the philosophy of education for self-reliance to the swallowed pride of our goals are what foreign agencies will support.1

FINANCIAL CRISIS, STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, AND EDUCATION AND TRAINING

The principal focus here is on initiatives and responses in trying circumstances.2 The 1980s were a period of stress for Tanzania on many fronts. Most dramatically, after recurring economic crises a country still heavily dependent on imports had very little foreign exchange with which to purchase them. Problems erupted throughout the Tanzanian economy and society. With a shortage of replacement tires, buses and trucks were idled. Abundant in some areas, food could not be easily moved to other areas where supply was short. The infrastructure deteriorated. The potholes in the roads were matched by the leaking school and hospital roofs, crumbling bridges, and decaying telephone cables. Education and training programs—areas

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where there had earlier been striking successes—were also severely affected. Although by the 1980s nearly all young Tanzanians were enrolled in primary school, their classrooms had far more pupils than desks or books, many of their teachers had limited training and even less equipment, and education quality was widely perceived to be declining as rapidly as the physical plant.

Successive national economic reorganization strategies, roughly modeled on the programs of structural adjustment adopted elsewhere, seemed inadequate to the task. After a period of disagreement, confrontation, and acrimony, Tanzania and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed on a set of policies to be pursued in August, 1986. That reconciliation was followed by significantly increased foreign assistance and with it, forceful advice on what was to be done. Sometimes firmly attached to the external funding, that advice proved difficult to ignore or reject.

Most of the 1980s, then, were years of economic crisis and structural adjustment. My concern here is to explore policy making in education and training in that context. Like the other research undertaken within the research program initiated by the ILO-UNESCO Interagency Task Force on Austerity, Adjustment and Human Resources, this case study does not seek to distinguish between the impacts of economic crisis and the consequences of structural adjustment. Rather, it is concerned with their conjunction. Others have sought, more or less successfully, to assess the costs of that conjunction and especially of the structural adjustment policies adopted in particular countries. Here, I am primarily concerned with policies and policy making — and how they have been affected by economic crisis and structural adjustment.

Unfortunately, much of the conventional wisdom about African education and training rests on analytic foundations that have two major structural weaknesses: inadequate attention to the problems in the available data and oversimplification of the policy making process. Many of the data that are commonly used in studies of education and training in Tanzania are seriously flawed. At the same time, those problems are frequently unrecognized, unacknowledged, or underestimated in analyses of the Tanzanian experience. As will also become clear in the following discussion, the complexities and ambiguities of Tanzanian policy making have in general been a source of resilience and a manifestation of resourcefulness in a very trying setting. Oversimplifying the analysis, say by insisting on a definitive answer to the question, Who is in charge here?, makes it impossible to understand the locus of power and the shifting coalitions that characterize Tanzanian politics.

THE POLICY PROCESS

Tanzania fascinates. From the accolades of the Tanzaphilia of the early 1960s through the acerbic critiques and wistful laments of the Tanzaphobia two decades later, Tanzania has captured far more attention than its poverty and vulnerability would seem to warrant. For many observers, as it fascinates, so Tanzania disappoints. Exciting, indeed inspiring aspirations and occasional successes are easily obscured by the rest of the story. Three decades after its independence, Tanzania is not socialist, not prosperous, not clean, not even self reliant.

The analyst's challenge has been to comprehend this complex mixture of failure and success. Productivity remains low and marketed production apparently declines alongside the achievement of universal primary education, substantially reduced illiteracy, significantly
expanded access to clean water, increased life expectancy—accomplishments not matched by even the more affluent African countries.

A brief historical overview, with particular attention to education goals and finance, is useful here. The periodization is organized to highlight the shifting locus of initiative.

Strikingly successful in accelerating the pace of universalizing primary education but troubled by a sense of malaise and crisis in education at the beginning of the 1980s, Tanzania’s President Julius Nyerere appointed a national commission to provide assessment and guidance. Individuals with significant political offices or constituencies constituted its membership. Educators composed its professional staff. The commission was responsible to the President, and through him to the Cabinet and National Assembly on the one hand and to the party and its National Executive Committee (NEC) on the other. After an extensive national tour, numerous public and private hearings, and a mountain of commissioned and unsolicited documents over two years, the Presidential Commission on Education offered analyses, projections, and recommendations. Its vision, Education in Tanzania: Toward the Year 2000, publicly released and then abruptly withdrawn, initiated a national debate. Two more years of deliberation, especially within the NEC, were to pass before a new national education policy could be formally announced.

By the early 1990s, the situation had changed. A new national review of education policy was commissioned. But this time the initiative lay with the Ministry of Education and Culture, and the principal participants were academics, not politicians. Late in 1991 its chair, the Dean of the Faculty of Education at the University of Dar es Salaam, reported that while some preliminary reviews had been completed, the major work of the commission could not proceed until sufficient external funding had been secured. At the same time, led by the World Bank, some international agencies and their Tanzanian allies and clients were working energetically to seize the agenda-setting initiative and, indeed, to impose their own sense of what was to be done. I return to this striking juxtaposition of stalled activity sustained initiative below.

At the risk of oversimplifying, this transition—from a self-consciously political and national process for initiating a broad policy discussion to an apparently equally self-consciously apolitical reliance on the guidance of technical experts—both reflects and entrenches the recent trajectory of Tanzanian politics. Precisely because education is so central to the social order and to a very widely shared understanding of development, education policy is always fashioned on a contested terrain and always manifests the principal features of its political environment.

Policy, of course, is not a fixed target. The boundaries of education policy’s contested terrain are necessarily fluid, since a part of the contest has to do with specifying borders. While

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3It is important to note here that I do not use the term politicians pejoratively, but rather simply to refer to individuals who hold political office or whose concerns and activities revolve around the expression, confrontation, integration, and mediation of political interests. Nor do I assume that education policy ought to be set by professional educators or that decisions guided primarily by the findings of education researchers will necessarily produce better policy.

I shall be concerned primarily with what official authority does, the quality and utility of the analysis of its behavior is in significant part a function of attentiveness to other sources of policy initiative and to policy-in-practice as well as to policy-in-prose.

**EDUCATION REFORM INITIATIVES**

**Agendas**

The primary education concerns of the early years of independence were rooted in the creation of a nationalist leadership that was both a protege and a critic of the departing Europeans. Like their predecessors, the new leaders firmly believed that the lack of high level skills was a major obstacle to development goals. With a very small pool of adults who had completed secondary school and an even smaller number of university graduates, Tanganyika had, it seemed, to assign its highest education priority to human resource development, especially at the upper levels. For the new leadership, the political imperative to replace Europeans with Tanzanians reinforced that priority. At the same time, expanded access to school had been a central plank in the nationalist platform. Initial education policy in independent Tanganyika, therefore, emphasized high level skills and more schools (in that order).

In the tension between these two goals, education expansion had different meanings for citizens and leaders. The popular pressure was for access to primary schools, which in the earlier era promised upward social mobility. In the human resource orientation of the national leadership, however, the critical education task was to develop high level skills. Primary school expansion would come later. Hence, although many new schools were opened and the enrollment increased rapidly, after an initial spurt, school expansion roughly matched the growth of the population. By 1973, still fewer than half the school age children were attending school.

As the developmental nationalism of the early 1960s was succeeded by the radical populism of the late 1960s, education goals were modified. Education was no longer to be considered an elite privilege or even primarily an investment in human capital. Rather, education was to be a fundamental right of citizenship. These two themes—that education was a basic right of all citizens and that effective popular participation required literate citizens—reflected a revised education agenda. The development of high level skills remained important, but providing a basic education to all Tanzanian citizens and developing adult literacy were now also high priorities.

Education policy has reflected the tension between two pressures. On the one hand, understanding social transformation as the foundation for economic growth calls for schools that organize learning around principles of equality and participation, that reduce the gap between

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5 Unfortunately, there are many inconsistencies in the education statistics for Tanzania, even within the data provided by a single source (a problem of course not unique to Tanzania). As well, frequently data on schools and enrollments in Tanzania in fact pertain only to government (or government-assisted) schools and their students. For a more detailed discussion of the problems in these data, see Samoff, "The Facade of Precision."


the rewards attached to intellectual and manual work, and that develop close ties with their communities. On the other hand, the emphasis on academic mastery and individual achievement in the schools manifests the deeply embedded and persisting expectation that economic growth requires skills more than participation and equality. By the late 1960s and early 1970s there had also begun to emerge a more explicitly socialist agenda for education. In part, the socialists offered a critique: expanded access, community schools, and adult literacy would change little if the reward structure continued to favor academic achievement and individual success. To achieve equality and democracy required not only universal education but also specific attention to the role of education in reaching the educationally (and politically) most disadvantaged parts of the population. Education, therefore, had to become a vehicle for mobilization, for class organization, and for constraining elites.

By the end of the 1970s the progress was impressive. Essentially all Tanzanian children could find a place in school. Literacy was widespread. That progress, however, had at best lukewarm support from many education administrators, who criticized spreading limited resources so thinly and who pointed to the apparently declining quality of education. The renewed assertiveness of the technical-managerial perspective on Tanzanian development of the early 1980s was accompanied, therefore, by an effort to re-focus the education agenda on academic achievement and vocational training. Human resource development, with some effort to respond to popular pressure by permitting school expansion and by assuring employment for at least some school graduates, had again become the order of the day. The education agenda of the bureaucratic governing class and its allies seemed, at least for the moment, to have swamped the socialist initiative.

Trajectory

Since it is not possible here to discuss in detail each of the many education reforms in Tanzania over the two and a half decades of independence, it is useful here to outline their salient elements. Each of the major education policy initiatives was prompted by a sense that Tanzania’s schools were not serving adequately their development tasks, and, to varying degrees, all have been implemented. Thus, although burdened by the institutional legacies of European rule and operating in an external environment that was simultaneously hostile to major national policies and supportive of many education reforms, Tanzanians would conduct their revolution by education. In the view of President Nyerere, socialism—the declared national goal—was

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5 These comments refer primarily to school-based education activities. Thus far, the impressive successes in reducing adult illiteracy have not been integrated into a strategy for political mobilization or into a program for continuing education programs outside the schools. Although educators speak in terms of continuing education, their practice suggests that they, and perhaps the political leadership, regard adult education as a transitional program addressed to unschooled adults that is rendered unnecessary by its own success and by universal access to basic education.


a state of mind.\textsuperscript{11} To achieve the transformation of individual consciousness that socialist construction required and to prepare its architects and work crews, radical education reforms were essential. Hence, the reforms noted here were both responses to specific problems within the education system and at the same time basic elements of a broad strategy of socialist transition.

Schools in Tanzania are expected to accomplish the tasks assigned to schools everywhere: teaching young people to read, write, and manipulate numbers, instilling the discipline of social order and of work place routine, inculcating a sense of pride in the nation, the people, and their history, and for a select group of students, developing their imagination, creativity, and ingenuity as far as possible. Since Independence, however, developing skills has been considered schools' most important task, reflecting the initial focus on education for modernization.

By the mid 1960s, however, in both development strategy and education policy expectations had not been fulfilled. The flow of events highlighted the inadequacies of the modernization perspective. Among the 1967 policy papers that addressed these problems was Education for Self Reliance, which offered a broad indictment of Tanzanian education and announced several major reforms. The principal goal was to reduce dependence by promoting education for self reliance. Primary schooling was to become a basic education: a shift from emphasis on the preparation of those few students who would advance to post-primary institutions—an arrangement in which a majority of those enrolled failed—to a curriculum primarily intended to equip young Tanzanians for adult roles. School-based productive projects were to integrate each school more fully into its local community, to involve the educated elite in manual labor, and to provide some resources to support the school. Although major education resources were still be devoted to high level skills development, the school system as a whole was expected to upgrade the competencies of the entire populace, to promote a broader sense of community, to nurture attitudes of cooperation and patterns of collective effort, and to foster a sense of self-confidence. A second goal for schooling was to reduce inequality across society. Education was expected to contribute to this goal, most directly by reducing inherited inequalities in recruitment to high level positions. The education sector was also expected to reduce inequalities by affirmative action: special allocations to districts and regions deemed to be disadvantaged, preferential selection and promotion, increased rewards for manual labor and community service.

As the elaboration of Tanzanian socialism proceeded into the 1970s, the leadership recognized that an expanded skills pool, a literate citizenry, and reduced political dependence provided a necessary, but far from sufficient, base for creating and then managing the egalitarian, non-exploitive society that was envisioned. To overcome peripheral capitalist underdevelopment required socialist construction. Schooling was to become education for Tanzanian socialism. The task was to lay the foundation for expanded citizen participation and democratic practice. Citizens had to learn not only how to manage their local councils and

\textsuperscript{11}Although commentators on Tanzania frequently quote Nyerere's statements of the 1960s as evidence for his current thinking, it would be a serious error to fail to recognize changes in understanding that have emerged over the past two decades and an injustice to Nyerere himself to reject a priori the possibility that he has revised his own thinking. It is impossible within the confines of this paper to explore the understandings of socialism in Tanzania of the 1980s, but it is important to note that socialism is taken to involve contradiction and conflict in the society and not simply an attitude of mind.
cooperatives, but, beyond that, how to govern. If public institutions were to be accountable to the populace, people had to be taught to expect that accountability, to routinize it, and to protect it from both attack and erosion.

Of these three major education policy directions—modernization (skills development), self reliance, and Tanzanian socialism—the last has been the least well analyzed, articulated, and elaborated. In part, that is because among policy makers the three policy goals are presumed to be sequential. Greater self reliance depends on successfully meeting skills needs. Nurturing a mobilized citizenry and maintaining participatory political institutions in turn is assumed to depend on both generating needed skills and achieving significant self reliance. From this perspective, it was straightforward to conclude that assigning the highest priority to skills development required delaying attention to politicization and popular mobilization. In part, the priority assigned to skills development, and to schools as recruitment filters for most of the wage labor force, reflects the persistence of understanding development as modernization rather than social transformation, and of the political dominance of the modernizers over the socialists. Indeed, the tension between these orientations, and the regular reassertion of modernization as the dominant perspective, have been enduring features of Tanzanian education policy.

Issue Areas

As I have suggested, education reform in Tanzania has been frequent and extensive. The large number of reforms adopted, and for the most part implemented, delineate three major issue areas: expansion of schooling, revision of the curriculum, and transforming the relationship between schools and society.

Much of the resources and human energy allocated to education in Tanzania have been directed toward expansion. Expansion is considered critical to self reliant economic growth, to the political mobilization of the citizenry, to establishing and maintaining a democratic political order, and for individuals, to access to jobs, power, wealth, and prestige. As well, rapid expansion of schooling was commonly understood—by both leaders and the mass public—as a central element in the legitimation of the new government, and of the structure of the state itself. That has followed several paths. The elimination of the Standard IV examination permitted those who found primary school places to remain in school throughout the primary cycle. Similarly, the elimination of the Form 2 examination made secondary school a four-year program for those selected. The nationalization of all private primary schools at the end of the 1960s and then the achievement of universal primary education by the late 1970s have made basic education available to all young Tanzanians. Although the policy contours have been somewhat erratic, tolerance for and periodically encouragement of private (that is, non-governmental) secondary schools had by the mid-1980s doubled secondary enrollment. Adult literacy programs, whose emphases and forms have in part mirrored the changing priorities in education policy more generally, have reached widely across the society, reducing illiteracy from an estimated 67% in 1967 to 15% in 1993 to 9.6% in 1986.

Over the thirty years of Tanzanian independence there have been successive curricular reforms. Syllabi and texts have been nationalized, with continuing attention to studying
Tanzania, East Africa, Africa, and the Third World from a Tanzanian perspective. Kiswahili became the language of instruction in primary schools (with the indirect consequence of effectively eliminating expatriate teachers from those schools). Setting and marking national examinations is now done within Tanzania. Political education has been introduced at all levels. There have also been efforts to shape the curriculum to nurture the world view, values, orientation, and style deemed appropriate for the new Tanzanian: inquiring and self reliant, an active participant in community affairs with a preference for cooperative and collective activity and concerned more with public service than with individual rewards. Yet, teacher-student relationships, classroom organization, and approved patterns of student behavior continue reflect the focus on skills development (schools as places where knowledge is transmitted, students are processed, and graduates are produced) far more than they incorporate the practices of education for liberation (schools as sites of critical consciousness, learner-centered dialogues, and cooperative communal initiatives).13

Although there are now productive projects at all schools, initially intended to develop skills, to institutionalize the school-community links, and to offset some school operating costs, the results are mixed. There have been a few striking successes. But not infrequently, the children labor and the teachers supervise. Systematic attention to agricultural strategies is minimal; farming practices tend to be those of the surrounding community. Additions to the school treasury are modest, occasionally disappearing entirely before they can be spent on the school.

The relationships between school and society constitute the third issue area addressed by education reforms. A major challenge to the integration of schools into their communities has been the difficulty in combining rapid education expansion with the commitment to reducing inequalities, usually expressed in regional terms. The initiatives here have focused on reducing regional differentiation (for example, eliminating school fees14 and nationalizing private schools, both of which served to advantage affluent regions), challenging elitism in higher education by requiring university applications to have had successful work and community experience, rapid expansion of adult literacy programs, and the creation of village libraries and ruraly situated Folk Development Colleges (FDCs). Each of the reforms implemented within those initiatives has had moments of striking success, but other than literacy nearly all have slowed or stalled in the bog of entrenched resistance.

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14 Initially small and termed "contributions," school fees figured prominently in the deliberations of the Presidential Commission on Education, whose recommendations led to the establishment of the principle that parents should share directly in the costs of educating their children. In practice, school fees are probably less regressive than they might seem. Though not insignificant, required fees are not high enough, in themselves, to exclude many children from school. Since nearly all parents want their children to go to school, such fees are much more collectible than other sorts of taxes.
MAKING EDUCATION POLICY: MAPPING THE LANDSCAPE

Education policy making and implementation in Tanzania manifest conflicting, at times incompatible, policy styles.\(^{15}\) Efforts to plan, to accomplish major changes rapidly, to maintain central control, and to encourage local participation are all in tension with each other. Indeed, the attempt to fashion a non-capitalist state may have left Tanzania with some of the least desirable characteristics of each of the systems used as models.

Although decision making is often described in a clear schematic form with interconnected but distinct categories of responsibility, authority, and decision makers, actual practice is never so neat and tidy. Policy making is always a negotiation, or more commonly a set of related and overlapping negotiations, conducted on contested terrain. Decision makers in official positions set some, but clearly not all, public policies. It is useful, therefore, to characterize education policy making in Tanzania in terms of five poles of influence that are simultaneously independent and interdependent.

Alliances emerge and decay. As coalitions consolidate and crumble, the center of gravity may shift. In the thirty years of Tanzania's independence, the dynamic impulse for education policy has at different times been both international and national. Foreign advisors were the dominant voices in the early 1960s. The Arusha Declaration and Education for Self Reliance marked the assertion of a national initiative in the late 1960s. That effort to specify an education agenda and to organize a system of formal and nonformal education that were distinctly Tanzanian was consolidated and reinforced by the Musoma Resolutions of the mid 1970s and the Presidential Commission on Education in the early 1980s. By the late 1980s, however, the most influential voices were once again increasingly foreign, embedded in the resumed negotiations with international agencies and a series of structural adjustment programs. So pervasive and persistent is their influence, some senior Tanzanian educators argue, that Tanzania's education agenda has been "hijacked."

Formal Authority

At first glance, education policy making in Tanzania is quite straightforward. As in much of the world, a ministry of education (since 1990, two ministries: the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Higher Education, Science, and Technology) implements policies approved by the National Assembly. Associated parastatals, with varying degrees of autonomy, have related responsibilities: the Institute of Education (curriculum development), the Institute of Adult Education, the National Examination Council, the University of Dar es Salaam, the Tanzania Library Service, and Tanzania Elimu Supplies (procurement and distribution of equipment and materials). Since the early 1980s the administration of primary and adult education has been decentralized to the regions and through them to the districts and wards. Several other institutions in Tanzania operate education programs. The ministry of agriculture, for example, has primary responsibility for farmers training courses. The ministry responsible for community development (currently, the Ministry for Community Development, Women Affairs and Children) has always organized

community focused short courses and has recently assumed responsibility for the national network of Folk Development Colleges, originally conceived as the sites for the continuing education of adults who have completed the basic literacy course but increasingly serving those who have completed primary school. The ministry of labor and the national trade union organization undertake workers' education programs. The party operates a national college and its four zonal satellites. A study in 1988 identified 435 separate training institutions in Tanzania.

Although the rhetoric always distinguishes between making and implementing policy, nowhere does that asserted separation accurately characterize what actually occurs. At both large and small scale policies are defined in the process of implementation. It is widely assumed in Tanzania, by people across the political spectrum, that decision making ought to be centralized. That is expected to avoid the divisive demands of region, religion, and ethnicity, rationalize and maximize scarce resources, and facilitate redistribution to reduce regional inequalities. Consequently, notwithstanding the rhetoric of participation and bottom-up planning, policy in general, and especially in education, has been highly centralized. Precisely because expertise is scarce, however, and because communication channels are often circuitous and unreliable, the degree of centralization in policy making exceeds central capacities to make policies. Pronouncements proliferate, but follow-up, evaluation, and adjustment are weak, driven more by crises than by systematic monitoring.

At the same time, at least some leaders are seriously committed to popular participation. There have been several waves of institutional reform, all intended to increase the leverage of local citizens in specifying goals, programs, and practice. For example, every school is required to have an advisory board or committee composed largely of parents and community residents. More than in many other African countries, Tanzanians do speak out on policies that concern them and are able to influence both the policies and their implementation. Indeed, in important respects, centralization in Tanzania requires local participation. Although from 1965 to the 1990s there was legally only one political party, and despite occasional heavy-handed exercises of central authority, Tanzania is not a totalitarian state. To secure compliance with central directives, therefore, the Tanzanian government requires popular support. The existence and intensity of that popular support are in turn dependent on popular participation. Hence, effective centralization is necessarily a function of effective local participation which is in turn often hostile to central direction. This tension between central direction and local autonomy is neither avoidable nor ephemeral. Neither prevails definitively, and each limits the other. The formally centralized policy process adopted in Tanzania regularly collides with limited managerial and communication capabilities. At the same time, within a hierarchical and bureaucratic administrative structure, to encourage local participation by asserting that key decisions will be initiated and made locally must eventually generate frustration, opposition, and cynicism.

Put somewhat differently, institutional forms designed for a highly politicized setting where informed and politically conscious local citizens participate regularly in making policies and implementing decisions have regularly been overwhelmed in Tanzania by a deep-seated ethos of modernization. The guiding assumptions are that decisions require expertise, which means that the popular role must be severely constrained, and that energized local participation is more likely to be divisive than constructive, and therefore to be avoided rather than encouraged. Formal policy vacillates between reliance on mass support and distrust of mass participation. Ostensibly politicizing institutions become vehicles for depoliticization.
The point here is a simple one that is not unique to Tanzania. The institutions and individuals formally responsible for education policy do not in practice exercise unchallenged authority. Policy making through implementation, the dispersion and decentralization of responsibilities, and overlapping institutions all limit their autonomy, especially when alternative poles of influence provide fertile ground for developing and articulating competing interests and preferences.

Local Initiatives
Challenged at the center by individuals located in the party and other ministries and organizations, education officials must also regularly face locally based critiques and initiatives. The rapid expansion of schools in one of the most affluent areas of the country provides a particularly clear example. In Kilimanjaro in the 1960s a local coalition with support from the churches effectively subverted a national redistributive policy by creating and managing a parallel primary school system that came to enroll nearly as many students as the government schools. A similar process in the 1980s undermined the national policy of limiting secondary school expansion. As local community groups organized to create new private secondary schools they gradually assumed several of the principal functions of local government, including levying taxes.

Again the point is a simple one and not unique to Tanzania. Major policies may in practice be more the result of community action and popular initiative than of central decision making. In some circumstances, the formal authorities and central decision makers may see little alternative but to tolerate or even acquiesce in the new policy direction.

External Influences
Education policy making in Tanzania is not a solely Tanzanian activity. Like their colleagues elsewhere in Africa, Tanzanian education policy makers look to the North Atlantic for models, analyses and diagnoses, and approval. Often subtle, this deference to external authority conditions policies—from specifying what is problematic to designing intervention strategies to evaluating outcomes. Even more important, most new projects in education and even a portion of recurrent expenditures rely on externally-provided finance.

I am not suggesting here that there has been sustained deliberate concerted action among external assistance agencies (though there has been explicit cooperation) or between those agencies and Tanzanian leaders, or that the outsiders set education policy in Tanzania, or that Tanzanian educators do only what those agencies will support. Tanzanian educators have shown remarkable independence in a very constrained situation and surely will continue to do so. Expectations about what can be funded do, however, influence what is proposed and what is attempted, for example, Folk Development Colleges with a Swedish heritage, vocational schools in the Cuban style, functional adult literacy programs with UNESCO's underlying assumptions, among others.

This reliance on foreign finance has another indirect impact. Success in securing foreign assistance becomes itself a source of power and influence within Tanzania. The tendencies toward self-protection and self-aggrandizement that characterize administrative structures

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16For an overview of this assertion of local initiative, see Samoff, "School Expansion in Tanzania," and the references therein.
everywhere are in Tanzania in part played out within a web of international connections. Increasing the resources within one education sub-sector, for example, may depend as much on building an alliance with, say, Swedish education advisers as on constructing a supportive political coalition within Tanzania.

It seems clear that Tanzania’s dire economic situation and increasing debt have increased external influence at precisely the time when the World Bank is expanding its own direct role in the provision of advice and research as well as financial assistance. As I have argued elsewhere, over the long term the consolidation of this financial-intellectual complex is unlikely to lead to better education policies or projects. One manifestation of the troubling consequences of this arrangement is that with which this paper began: the specification of the Tanzanian education agenda for the 1990s and beyond apparently cannot proceed without foreign support.

Important Non-decisions

I have been concerned here with decisions about education policy in Tanzania. There have also been some very striking non-decisions. Although many of those involved in Tanzania’s highly regarded adult literacy program referred to and used the terminology of the Brazilian educator, Paulo Freire, there was little systematic discussion of Freire’s core conception of such programs: peasant mobilization and political empowerment. Functional literacy was assumed to be the appropriate strategy; the pedagogy of the oppressed, education for cultural consciousness, and liberatory learning never made it onto the agenda.

Although the effort to develop a curriculum relevant to Tanzania was energetic and the decision to adopt Swahili as the language of instruction in primary schools was widely applauded, there was little corresponding attention to transforming the pedagogy. Official statements proclaimed that Tanzania’s schools were to develop curious, self-reliant, and self-confident citizens who would participate actively in their society. Yet classrooms in Tanzania (as in most of Africa) remain authoritarian, hierarchical, and teacher centered, with relatively few student-initiated activities and even less tolerance for dissent and deviation. Most of the curriculum and much of the teaching is driven by the national examinations. Participation in the school projects that were to reduce the disdain for physical labor and the elitism of students is in fact often used to sanction unacceptable behavior. The maintenance of the authoritarian classroom and the dominating role of examinations are assumed, not widely debated.

There are of course many other issues that do not appear on the policy agenda in Tanzania. The point, once again, is straightforward: important policies are effectively made by excluding particular alternatives from consideration. To understand both the policies and the policy making process, therefore, requires exploring which issues, or rather, whose issues, have been excluded, how, and why.

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Technicians and Politicians

The thrust of recent education policy changes reflects the technical-administrative orientation that has come more visibly to dominate the national leadership and national policy in Tanzania. To employ a rough but convenient shorthand, in the struggles among the contenders for power in Tanzania, the experts have displaced the politicians. The relative dominance in the late 1960s and mid 1970s of a political perspective that regarded development as at its core a political process and that emphasized politicization, mobilization, and to some extent, socialism, was in the 1980s supplanted by a return to the view that development is principally a technical process. Again put crudely, in the popular perception the politicians had simply failed to produce, and as a consequence suffered an erosion of legitimacy. The need to import cereal grains in the mid-1970s weakened their base, though it was restored somewhat by the economic recovery and military victory of the late 1970s. The continuing difficulties in meeting the demand for both basic foods and consumer goods in this decade have further weakened that political base, or rather, have reinforced the political claims of the technocratic orientation.

Within education, the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on Education reflect a mid-point between the strong assertion of local initiative in the late 1960s and the localization of external advice in the 1990s. Those recommendations were developed and presented in terms of attention to the (academic) quality of education, its costs, and its training roles, rather than in terms of education for socialist construction, or redistribution, or equality. In large part, the policy thrust preferred by the professional educators—including fees for government secondary schools, doubling the number of those schools, and encouraging private education institutions—prevailed over the objections of those concerned that charging fees for admission to the key recruitment mechanism and leaving much of its development in private hands were inconsistent with basic egalitarianism, democratic participation, and socialism. As I have noted, strong opposition to some of the recommendations, apparently centered in the party's National Executive Committee, did delay for two years the adoption of the new policies, and some proposals were rejected. Ultimately, however, it was the party that acquiesced. The ministry responsible for education, which a decade earlier had been renamed the Ministry of National Education to assert the importance of the political role over the technical responsibilities of education, again became the Ministry of Education. At the same time, Colleges of National Education resumed their former name: Teachers' Colleges. Regarding education in primarily technical-administrative rather than political terms has been supported by most of the numerous external education advisers to Tanzania, especially the World Bank and UNESCO.

This is a striking transition indeed: from the proudly political to the aggressively apolitical, from self-consciously socialist to dispassionately neutral, from education-as-social-transformation to education-as-the-transmission-of-skills-and-attitudes. Yet, it would be quite erroneous to assume that what I have termed here the political orientation is unconcerned with issues of technique and administration or is indifferent to the academic quality of education institutions. It would be equally erroneous to assume that the current political configuration is either immutable or immortal. My point here is simply that recent education policies correspond to the current dominance of a more technical-administrative and less political perspective in national politics.
The Evolution of Education Finance

The principal focus in this case study is on policy responses to economic crisis and structural adjustment. It is timely, therefore, to explore changes in the ways education in Tanzania has been financed. To get ahead of the story a bit, I suggest that increased reliance on foreign funding in the context of crisis and adjustment has significantly relocated the center of gravity and even the source of initiatives in education policy making. Let us examine how that has occurred.

Like the rest of post-colonial Africa, Tanzania has faced a continuing tension between the pressure to expand education on the one hand and the absolute shortage of funds on the other. With a sorely limited legacy, the task was enormous. Access to basic education came to be regarded as a fundamental right of citizenship, requiring no further instrumental justification. Schooling, pulled by popular demand and pushed by the need for highly educated and skilled personnel, became an inexhaustible sink for capital. The lack of capital to invest in education reflects the historic underdevelopment of Africa, other claims on public funds, the vagaries of the global economy and declining terms of trade, and governments’ limited ability to manage an effective tax system. Convinced of its necessity but unable to fund the expansion of education, like other African countries Tanzania’s leaders turned to external agencies for assistance. Over time, it has come to seem not only obvious but unexceptional that new initiatives and reform programs require external support, and therefore responsiveness to the agenda and preferences of the funding agency(ies).

Initially, external funding for education was considered to be a transitional measure, support for overcoming the very limited pool of skilled personnel and the similarly limited number of schools and training institutions at the time of independence. Subsequently, foreign assistance to education came to be understood as a mechanism for funding desirable new initiatives or particular projects that could not be accommodated within the regular education budget, that is, within national resources. By the 1980s, however, foreign funding was providing essential sustenance for major elements of the education system. It is not an exaggeration to note that without Swedish support, for example, primary school students would not have even the limited number of notebooks and texts that are currently available. Nor would it have been possible to staff, equip, and maintain a network of more than fifty Folk Development Colleges. In short, not only the development (capital) budget but also recurrent spending required foreign support.

That has been the trajectory. Let us look at the details.

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15 I am not concerned directly here with the motivations of the external agencies, both national and transnational, that provided and provide support to African education. Although some individuals have sought to exploit the situation, I presume most people involved in the provision of that support to be genuinely committed to improving the standard of living and the quality of life in Africa. At the same time, it is also clear that investors in African education acquire a structural capability to influence both the content and the orientation not only of schooling in the present but also of fundamental values, world views, and ways of knowing far into the future.

16 Externally provided funds for African education are of several sorts, involving both national and transnational institutions. Although it clearly matters to the recipient country whether the funding received is a loan or a grant, for the present I group them together, using the terms funding and assistance interchangeably.
WHAT, EXACTLY, ARE EDUCATION EXPENDITURES?

As I have noted above, discrepancies in reported spending on education stem in part from different specifications of what, exactly, constitutes spending on education. Some authors are content to report the annual budget of the ministry of education, as Tanzania's spending on education. Others add the expenditures of the ministry responsible for local government. Some analysts go even further, including as well spending on education in the ministries responsible for community development, agriculture, labor, and more. Some sources seem to have pursued each of those approaches in different years. Were the consequences not so significant, the situation would be quite humorous.

Take, for example, the 1983 transfer of responsibility for funding primary education from the ministry of education to the ministry responsible for local government. Not surprisingly, the ministry of education budget declined. In some commentaries, that appears as a dramatic decline in overall education spending in the following year. As I shall suggest shortly, the evidence seems reasonably clear that the overall proportion of government funds allocated to education did not decline substantially in that year. Yet the official World Bank Public Expenditure Review for Tanzania, completed in 1989, reports a dramatic decrease in education's "Sectoral Composition of Public Expenditure as a Percentage of Total Public Expenditure," from 11.7% in 1983/84 to 7.3% in 1984/85. Table 1.4 shows how several different agencies reported

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.1 Discrepant Reports on Government Allocations to Education, 1980/81 - 1986/87</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980/81</td>
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<td>1981/82</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that period. Since that era, spending by the ministry of education has generally been less than half of the total spending on formal education (see Table 1.4).

There are two obvious lessons here. First, once again we must note that many of the standard sources for data on Tanzania—both primary and secondary—are wrong. Here, the error is very large. That points to the second lesson: large changes in education expenditures are simply not possible over short periods. At the primary level, most spending is on teachers' salaries. In the absence of a massive layoff, the spending on primary education cannot change dramatically from one year to the next. At the secondary level, the bulk of annual expenditures are on boarding and transport, followed by teachers' salaries. Again, in the absence of the expulsion of a large number of secondary school students, or a decision to terminate funding for boarding and transport, or the discharge of many teachers, spending on secondary education cannot show a major reduction from one year to the next. Quite simply, reports of large changes in recurrent spending over short times (including in this case that of the World Bank) are probably wrong.

What, then, has been the trajectory of spending on education in Tanzania? I shall review that from four vantage points. First, I shall examine the government's spending on education relative to other expenditures. Then, I shall explore the absolute level of education expenditures, foreign support to Tanzanian education, and the distribution within Tanzania of recurrent spending. To maintain our focus on the policy process, this overview will necessarily

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TABLE 1.2 Flow of Most Central Government Education Funding, 1983/84 (TSh '000,000 and %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON EDUCATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of National Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Councils</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Administration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

be brief. To avoid charging ahead of the precision permitted by the available data, we will need to resist interpreting as significant observed changes that are smaller than a reasonable margin of error.
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO EDUCATION

Since independence education has had a very high priority in the rhetoric of the national leadership. Has that rhetorical priority been reflected in government spending, particularly as the successive economic crises became more severe and adjustment programs seemed to emphasize investments in direct production rather than social services? For the most part, yes.

Notwithstanding a welter of conflicting claims about what had happened, the Tanzanian government allocated roughly the same proportion of its annual expenditures to education over the first two decades of independence. I have reviewed the most recent data from several sources, bringing my earlier report23 up to the end of the 1980s. Throughout, there are sharp disagreements among the different data sources. The consensus seems to be that there was a modest decline in the proportion of government spending allocated to education toward the end of the 1980s and a restoration to earlier levels since then (see Table 1.4). That apparent decline corresponds with the economic distress of the 1980s and the reconciliation with the IMF in 1986, an agreement that prescribed reductions in spending on social services. That was also the time of the shift from discouraging to encouraging the establishment of private schools. The more recent increase in the proportion of government funds allocated to education may reflect increased foreign assistance during the late 1980s. That is, what seems to have happened is a shift of a part of education financing from the public sector to a combination of private contributions and fees and foreign aid. One consequence of that shift, at least in the short term, has been an increase in regional differences in access to education.

In recent years, debt servicing has accounted for nearly a quarter of total budget allocations. If debt servicing is excluded, spending on education compares favorably with spending in the past when the debt servicing component was small (see Table 1.4). With that exclusion of debt servicing, the Tanzanian government is currently allocating nearly one-fifth of its recurrent spending to education.

Some commentators continue to report sharp decreases in government spending on education. All such reports that I have been able to examine carefully in fact reflect the use of different definitions and data at different times. Often, when funding responsibility for some education activities is transferred from the ministry of education to another institution, observers characterize a decrease in the ministry of education budget as a decline in spending on education. Indeed, that is occasionally a useful strategy for Tanzania's educators. In 1991, for example, the Minister of Education and Culture reported to the budget session of the National Assembly that his ministry had spent far less than had been budgeted for the previous year. Emphasizing that apparent preservation of public funds, he sought an increase in the new allocation to his ministry. That increase would provide to his ministry, he noted, a bit more money than it had spent in the previous year but still less than it had been allocated. His argument may well have been persuasive, though the budget presented by the government is normally approved by the National Assembly in any case. The press covering that budget session seemed not to have noticed the minister's sleight of hand. In fact, a new ministry for higher education, science, and technology had been created during the previous budget year, and its funding was transferred from the budget of the ministry of education. Thus, what was described as substantial underspending was nothing of the sort. Although the Ministry of

23"The Facade of Precision."
TABLE 1.3 Estimated Spending on Education and Debt Service, 1987/88-1990/91 (TSh '000,000 and %)

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Recurrent Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Fund Services (CFS)*</td>
<td>20,406</td>
<td>32,804</td>
<td>36,252</td>
<td>49,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministerial Supply</td>
<td>36,614</td>
<td>55,664</td>
<td>77,041</td>
<td>102,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regions</td>
<td>2,851</td>
<td>3,804</td>
<td>5,259</td>
<td>7,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50,071</td>
<td>92,272</td>
<td>118,552</td>
<td>160,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total recurrent excluding CFS</td>
<td>39,665</td>
<td>59,468</td>
<td>82,300</td>
<td>110,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Development Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Total Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>24,943</td>
<td>26,193</td>
<td>20,822</td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Recurrent Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education and Culture</td>
<td>3,092</td>
<td>4,762</td>
<td>7,567</td>
<td>10,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government ministry</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>5,519</td>
<td>7,631</td>
<td>10,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers Service Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Education Recurrent Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>6,942</td>
<td>10,401</td>
<td>15,375</td>
<td>21,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Rec Exp as % of Gvt Rec Exp</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Rec Exp as % of Gvt Rec Exp -CFS</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Development Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education and Culture</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>2,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government ministry</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers Service Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Education Development Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>3,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ed Dev Exp as % of Gvt Dev Exp</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education Total Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education and Culture</td>
<td>3,842</td>
<td>5,659</td>
<td>8,297</td>
<td>13,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister's Office</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Government ministry</td>
<td>3,904</td>
<td>5,739</td>
<td>7,881</td>
<td>10,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers Service Commission</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Education Expenditure</strong></td>
<td>7,957</td>
<td>11,542</td>
<td>16,365</td>
<td>24,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot Ed Exp as % of Gvt Tot Exp</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tot Ed Exp as % of Gvt Tot Exp -CFS</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* CFS = Consolidated Fund Services (debt repayment)

Note: Since these are estimated figures rather than actual expenditures, their margin of error may be large.


Education and Culture did spend less, overall government expenditures on education did not decline. And in practice, the Ministry of Education and Culture effectively spent more than had been allocated to it (after the funds for higher education and related activities had been...
Financial Crisis, Structural Adjustment, and Education Policy in Tanzania (Samoff) 19

removed from its budget). The 1991 allocation to the Ministry of Education and Culture was then used to make the case that spending on education had declined significantly.

Clearly, in their effort to secure an increase in government spending on education, ministry of education officials have a direct interest in understating the current allocation. In their discussions with external assistance agencies in 1991, ministry officials regularly reported that the government was allocating approximately 12% of total government spending to education. They agreed with the advice of foreign consultants that the proportion be raised to 20%. Again we find fast footwork with the figures. The reported 12% is a spurious figure, perhaps reflecting the creation of a ministry for higher education. An increase from 12%, or even 15%, to 20% in a short period is surely implausible. It is thus reasonable to conclude that although there have been occasional increases and decreases, the proportion of government expenditures allocated to education has remained about the same throughout Tanzania's independence. To put that finding somewhat differently, the Tanzanian government commitment to support education has been essentially unwavering, even through severe economic crises.

OVERALL EDUCATION FUNDING

In general, financing education has followed the national political philosophy. School fees provide a clear example. To expand access, immediately after the end of European rule, primary school fees were reduced. In 1963 the government abolished fees in all government-aided secondary schools, arguing that they discriminated against poor children. Following the nationalization of private primary schools, in 1973 primary school fees were abolished. To generate additional funding to support the acceleration of the achievement of universal primary education, however, a contribution—always characterized as a voluntary “development levy” but effectively required—of TSh 20 per primary school pupil was introduced in 1984. This was the beginning of reversing the policies that had been followed since the early 1960s. In 1984, in the context of the Economic Recovery Plan and on the advice of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, secondary school fees were reintroduced. Other policy changes also shifted more of the direct expenditures for education from the public sector to students and their families. Earlier discouraged but tolerated, establishing private secondary schools began to be encouraged after 1986, a watershed year in that regard. At the same time, the government decided to make its new secondary schools day, rather than boarding schools. Despite these shifts, the government remains the largest source of funds for education.

The most recent data also suggest that in real terms (controlling for inflation and the devaluation of the Tanzanian currency), expenditures on education have increased since 1987/88 not only relatively but absolutely. Real per capita spending on education rose by 50% from TSh 31 in 1987/88 to TSh 45 in 1990/91. (See Table 1.4) Notwithstanding these increases, spending on education in Tanzania remains inadequate to support adequately the current school system and to meet the pent-up demand for expanded access.

How so? Both SIDA and the World Bank concluded that overall expenditures on education in Tanzania declined significantly during the 1980s, with the result that by 1987 “real per capita expenditure on education [was] about two-thirds the level of the mid-seventies”.

Yet the share of government funds allocated to education had not decreased. The causes of the

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24World Bank, Tanzania: Public Expenditure Review II:149.

ERI C
TABLE 1.4  Estimated Real Spending on Education, 1987/88-1990/91 (TSh '000,000)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Education Expenditure</td>
<td>7,957</td>
<td>11,542</td>
<td>16,365</td>
<td>24,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price Index</td>
<td>1,134.0</td>
<td>1,453.6</td>
<td>1,800.0</td>
<td>2,142.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Education Expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurrent</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>1,134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>22,610,722</td>
<td>23,371,984</td>
<td>24,158,877</td>
<td>24,972,283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Education Expenditure</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Per Capita Education Expenditure</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSh / US$</td>
<td>83.72</td>
<td>125.00</td>
<td>192.30</td>
<td>195.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Edu Tot Expend (US$)</td>
<td>$4.20</td>
<td>$3.95</td>
<td>$3.52</td>
<td>$4.97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Since these are estimated figures rather than actual expenditures, their margin of error may be large.


This suggests that the underprovision experienced by the education sector must be attributed to other factors. The conclusion of the PER is that the funding difficulties of secondary and higher education are due mainly to the general deterioration in revenues, the pressure on sector allocations exerted by debt servicing, and rising enrollments.25 That conclusion is striking. The external agencies and their consultants insist that Tanzanian educators must find ways to reduce expenses. Privatization, reducing teacher:student ratios, and curtailing pre-service teacher training are among the recommendations regularly presented. Yet the World Bank itself concluded that the principal problem was not high expenses (though it did suggest reductions), but low revenues.26 Indeed, the World Bank's conclusion suggests that strategies for improving Tanzanian education must focus on increasing public revenues, reducing debt servicing, and slowing enrollment growth.

The challenge for Tanzania has been to balance the demand for expanded schooling with the need to fund other sectors and at the same time to reduce the inequalities (especially regional disparities) inherited from European rule. Several spending reduction policies have been adopted.

One strategy has been to reduce the expenditure per pupil. In practice, that requires reducing the expenditure on personnel, by far the major component of educational costs. There has been a good deal of success in this regard in adult education, through the use of volunteer teachers, educational radio programming, and by organizing some literacy programs to rely on recent literates for the bulk of the instruction. Much of the increased and rapid teacher training required to achieve universal primary education was conducted through distant learning approaches.

25World Bank, Tanzania: Public Expenditure Review 11:149 [emphasis added].

26The apparent tension between these perspectives—the one insisting on reducing expenditures, the other emphasizing inadequate revenues—warrants further exploration that is beyond the scope of this discussion. It may simply be that analysts of education expenditures and analysts of overall public finance do not read each other's reports.
and in-service programs. Opening new day secondary schools makes families responsible for the costs associated with housing and feeding their children and supervising their leisure time.

Another strategy for reducing education expenditures is to raise funds directly and indirectly from the citizenry. It has long been common in Tanzania to expect local residents to donate labor and materials for the construction of school buildings. As I have noted, schools at all levels now levy direct fees. Private secondary schools, which had earlier seemed a major threat to Tanzania's egalitarian goals, were by the late 1970s seen as a partial solution to the combination of insatiable demand for expanded access with available funds insufficient to finance that expansion. Now encouraged, private secondary schools, though required to be formally registered, are permitted to charge fees at officially approved rates. By the mid 1980s, private secondary schools and students outnumbered their government counterparts in Tanzania.

A third strategy for reducing public education expenditures—in practice if not promulgated as a formal policy decision—has been to provide lower cost alternative paths to secondary education. The Institute of Adult Education in some areas provides what is effectively a part-time secondary school program in evening hours. While they use the same syllabus as formally registered secondary schools and often recruit secondary school teachers to be their instructors, these programs generally have poor facilities and lack equipment and books. Even some of the teacher training courses have become, in practice, an alternate path to secondary school certification.

A fourth strategy has proved much less successful. School projects were expected to generate as much as one-fourth of a school's revenue. With few exceptions, however, the products and income derived from school self-help projects have not significantly reduced school expenditures. Although the average income generated per student has increased, its absolute magnitude remains far below the initial expectation of 25% of school operating costs.

Each of the cost-cutting measures adopted, however, has other, perhaps undesirable, consequences. For example, the day school arrangement is likely to favor urban children, since few rural areas are sufficiently densely populated to support many (or any) secondary schools and since such schools will in general recruit more heavily from their immediate areas. Day schools also make it more difficult to distribute secondary school students throughout the country, both equalizing the selection across the regions and giving students experiences in other than their home area. Similarly, although the evening secondary schools operated by the Institute of Adult Education do operate at a lower expenditure per pupil (essentially, the cost of training and maintaining their teachers is borne by the government school system, whose teachers moonlight in the evening schools), they, too, favor urban over rural residents and more affluent over less affluent areas.

Relying on parents' contributions of labor and materials and taxing families to educate their children have certainly permitted a more rapid educational expansion than would otherwise have been possible. As well, the creation of private schools reflects popular demand and local political initiatives, both of which seem quite consistent with a philosophy of self-reliance. At the same time, it is the most affluent areas that have been most able to take

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27In the political ethos of contemporary Tanzania, and in contrast to the situation elsewhere in Africa, private secondary schools must be owned and managed by approved voluntary agencies (including churches and the YMCA), community organizations; or local governments. Formal rules and community sentiment bar both schools intended to make a profit and schools run by individual private entrepreneurs.
advantage of this privatization, thus increasing regional disparities. For example, by 1984 one-fourth of all the secondary schools and fully 42% of all the private secondary schools in the country were in Kilimanjaro Region, whose residents were 5.3% of the total mainland Tanzanian population. Kilimanjaro students constituted 28.7% of all of the Form 5 students in Tanzania in 1982; in ethnic terms, the Chagga, 3.7% of the national population, provided 20.5% of those Form 5 students.

As high as they are, the tuition and fees of a private secondary education probably keep few children out of school. Since so few students are ultimately admitted, and since access is so highly valued, parents whose children are selected will make extraordinary efforts to find the necessary funds, drawing on relatives, friends, neighbors, and other networks.

While children from poorer families who are selected may manage to enter secondary school, it does seem likely that differences in parents' wealth manifest themselves long before secondary school selection: progress in school is related to parents' socioeconomic status. Affluent parents are less likely to require their children to devote many hours to tending the fields or herding animals. They can also purchase private instruction during the primary school years and provide a home environment that is more supportive of educational achievement. Children of affluent parents are likely to have traveled more and to have more frequent opportunities to hear and speak English (emphasized in the selection examinations and the secondary school language of instruction). Affluent parents are better able to establish residences elsewhere in the country where their children can repeat or have reduced competition. Finally, affluent parents are better situated—in terms of both available funds and political efficacy—to increase the number of private secondary schools in their community and improve their quality.

Thus, some of the apparent inefficiency in secondary and tertiary education is in fact indirect expenditure to reduce inequalities. What is called increased educational efficiency, therefore, is likely to have its own price: exacerbated inequalities. Each of the strategies pursued to secure additional resources for education—increasing internal efficiency (that is, reducing the expenditure per pupil), securing foreign assistance, requiring local contributions, and instituting school fees—puts other national policy goals at risk. In the tension between expansion and equality the current balance has shifted toward the former. In the contemporary alignment of political forces, school expansion has priority over reducing inequalities.

Studies of African education provide conflicting findings on the relationship between socioeconomic status and access to and success in school. It has often proved difficult to distinguish the independent significance of socioeconomic status from the impact of differences in ethnicity, race, gender, urban residence, and other factors. That is probably especially problematic in countries like Tanzania, where most students come from a peasant background and very few are selected to proceed: there is so little variation in both independent and dependent variables that the consequences of status differences are overwhelmed. The evidence in Tanzania does suggest, however, that the rate of school success is higher for elite children.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO EDUCATION

Chronically short of funds and always pressed to provide more schooling than they can effectively staff or equip, Tanzania's educators have increasingly looked to foreign assistance to close the gap between what is desirable and what is feasible. Once again the unreliability of the available data makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, to establish precisely the magnitude of the aid provided by the numerous agencies and organizations involved. In addition to the data problems already enumerated, the figures on foreign assistance present several further difficulties. First, both the providing agencies and the recipient institutions are generally unable to specify precisely the amounts of foreign funding actually expended or received. The mechanics of keeping track of those funds are themselves daunting. As well, both providers and recipients feel they have better ways to spend their time than accounting for funds that have just left or recently entered their domains of responsibility. Second, although foreign assistance is usually organized and administered by officials with functional responsibilities (for example, educators), it is usually negotiated and formally transferred through ministries of finance. Often, no individual or office knows exactly how much has been received for a specific purpose.

Third, a good deal of the foreign assistance that is provided does not appear in Tanzania's national accounts. For example, money allocated for products and personnel from the country providing the assistance may be paid directly to vendors and contractors. Similarly, funds may be used to purchase vehicles or other equipment, which is then delivered to Tanzania. Tanzanians who travel abroad for study or other purposes may have their costs paid directly, rather than through the Tanzanian government. Although in principle such assistance is to be reported to the Tanzanian Treasury and then recorded as a paper transfer, preparing and scrutinizing such reports is a high priority for no one. Indeed, both provider and recipient may prefer to exclude at least a portion of the foreign assistance from the national accounts. Structural adjustment programs may limit the amount of foreign funding that can be received. In Tanzania, the Treasury apportions those limits to operating ministries. If the ministry of education were to observe its limit scrupulously, it would have to refuse some of the assistance offered to it. Consequently, when both the providing country and the ministry officials conclude that the foreign assistance makes sense, they may tacitly agree to leave it outside the national accounts. Finally, there are clearly circumstances when both providers and recipients prefer to obscure the details of the aid relationship. A change of government in Europe, for example, may threaten particular assistance programs whose officials wish to maintain. Since there may be some competition within Tanzania for foreign funds, recipient institutions may find it useful to be less than candid about exactly what they have received and from whom. Consequently, it is simply not possible to determine the magnitude of foreign funding to education, notwithstanding the numerous reports—often with widely differing figures—that

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29For a review of systematic but ultimately frustrated and frustrating efforts to learn from the providing agencies the actual magnitude of their assistance, see Wim Biervliet, with Kenneth King, Trends in Agency Policy and Support to Basic Education in Tanzania (Hornbaek, Denmark: prepared for the NASEDEC/CDR Conference on Education and Training in the Third World: The Local Dimension, 3-5 October 1991).

30The efforts of other organizations to monitor the flows of foreign funding are similarly troubled. A UNDP compendium, for example, lists hundreds of projects supported by nearly as many organizations. But even with that mass of information, it is not possible to specify, with any degree of confidence, the amount of assistance provided by a particular country to Tanzanian education. UNDP, Development Co-operation Tanzania: 1989 Report (Dar es Salaam: UNDP, May 1991).
purport to do so. It is with great reluctance, therefore, that I attempt to quantify aid flows here. The margins of error are necessarily large and generally unknowable.

Beginning at its independence, external funds have provided most of Tanzania's education development budget. Since the beginning of the 1980s, the World Bank, SIDA, DANIDA, and NORAD have been the principal external supporters of Tanzanian education. In recent years, two trends have emerged in foreign aid to education in Tanzania.

First, the assistance agencies have increasingly tended toward sector rather than project support. Historically project-focused assistance has been and generally continues to be the principal form of external aid. Providing support to particular projects is not unproblematic. Often, it led to sharp differences within the education sector, with some activities much better funded and perhaps better managed than others. That differentiation is also visible within individual institutions. At the University of Dar es Salaam, for example, several departments receive substantial foreign funding. Those departments have modern equipment, adequate stationery and supplies, and opportunities for their students and staff to study and travel overseas. Departments that have proved to be less attractive to external agencies must operate within the university budget, which results in dramatically inadequate equipment and supplies and a far more limited ability to secure overseas education. These inequalities reflect the preferences of the external agencies, not necessarily university or even Tanzanian national priorities. Intense competition among university departments has resulted. Every department searches actively for link arrangements with overseas universities. Dependence on these foreign links has become endemic.

From the Tanzanian perspective, sector support seems preferable. External assistance to a broad array of activities—sectoral aid—might well not carry with it the attempt to exercise control that has often accompanied project support. Sector support could also offer to Tanzanian educators some autonomy of decision making, programmatic as well as financial. Unfortunately, with the possible exception of a portion of Swedish assistance, there is little evidence of general, broad-scale, and largely unconditional support to Tanzanian education.

Indeed, sector support may well simply broaden the arena in which outsiders seek to exercise control. The provision of support to specific sectors and even more so to the economy as a whole—generally characterized as structural adjustment—intensifies and compounds external influence. In this form, the external advice on which funding is dependent refers not to more narrowly defined projects but instead to the entire education enterprise or to the entire national economy. Effectively, having concluded that local decision makers have fundamentally mis-managed their responsibilities, the external agencies offer general and rapidly disbursed support in exchange for broad control. This broader form of external assistance impels a demand for broader expert knowledge. The expertise required goes well beyond, say, curriculum development and teacher training. The relevant experts are those who can understand and manage production, finance, international exchanges, and national planning as well as social services. This call for broader expertise comes at a moment of severe economic crisis, precisely the time when Tanzania, and African countries more generally, are little able to supply expertise and experts at the level and scale and with the credibility and legitimacy the external agencies demand.

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3Karim F. Hirji provides a particularly poignant and personal account of encounters with this Link: "Academic Pursuits under the Link," *Codesria Bulletin* 1(1990):9-14,16.
A second trend in foreign assistance to education is that emphasis has increasingly shifted to the rehabilitation of existing facilities rather than toward new projects. What that means in practice is that external agencies are increasingly involved in meeting the current costs of the education sector, for example building maintenance and renovation and printing exercise and text books.

**THE DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION SPENDING**

The proportion of both recurrent and development expenditure on primary education has declined somewhat over the last four years. (See Table 1.5 and Figure 1-a) In recurrent spending the decline was from 50% in 1987/88 to 46% in 1990/91, while in the development budget the decline was much more dramatic, from 28% in 1987/88 to 9% in 1990/91. Spending on adult education has also declined. At the same time, recurrent spending on technical education doubled, from 6.7% to 13.2%, during the same period. In 1990/91 almost half of the development budget was spent on education administration and the university.

While the government is the source of most funding for education in Tanzania, private spending on schooling has been increasing in recent years. Unfortunately, there are no reliable figures available on the magnitude of that spending or on how it has changed over time. At primary school level the private cost per pupil in 1991 was estimated to be TSh 3,000 per year,
TABLE 1.5 Education Expenditure by Level, 1982/83 - 1990/91 (Selected Years)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Recurrent Expenditures</th>
<th>Development Expenditures</th>
<th>Total Expenditures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>7.93%</td>
<td>7.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>53.20%</td>
<td>50.27%</td>
<td>49.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>13.20%</td>
<td>7.20%</td>
<td>8.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Education</td>
<td>5.70%</td>
<td>6.47%</td>
<td>6.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Education</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
<td>6.67%</td>
<td>8.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>12.60%</td>
<td>15.70%</td>
<td>14.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Education</td>
<td>7.50%</td>
<td>5.78%</td>
<td>5.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.1%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


including uniforms, exercise books, fees, and contributions to school funds. School fees at the secondary level have risen steadily in the past few years. Day students in government secondary schools in 1991 paid TSh 5,000 per year; boarders paid TSh 8,000. Fees for private secondary schools are approximately TSh 20,000 per year. Community and parent contributions to construct and maintain school buildings have not been reliably estimated.
VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Vocational education has a long history in Tanzania. Both German and English administrators intended the limited education they provided or permitted for Africans to be job training, including subaltern administrative posts. In the early years parents and students accepted the vocational orientation of schooling as a price to be paid for getting education. But the overall aim of education has been contentious. The state has seen education as a means to improve agriculture and keep young people in rural areas. But students and parents see education as the vehicle for escaping the harshness and vulnerability of rural life. Consequently, the vocational component of regular schooling, especially the focus on agriculture, has never been popular. In fact, one of the issues around which the nationalist movement mobilized popular support against European rule was the reintroduction of agricultural education in rural primary schools. The responses were similar when agricultural activities were introduced in primary schools in the late 1960s as part of education for self-reliance. Parents and students have correctly understood that there is little hope of economic and social advancement in the rural areas.

The conflict between the vocational and the academic curriculum has influenced the terminology used in Tanzania. Vocational education refers to training for skilled labor positions, while technical education is understood as more academic. This distinction is reflected in institutional responsibilities: vocational education is within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour, while technical education is lodged in the ministry of education. Vocational education, deemed appropriate for those who have not been selected to proceed beyond primary school, is aimed at jobs. Technical education leads its students toward further education, including the university. In this context, the increasing demand for vocational and technical education has encountered a large number of institutions and authorities with limited coordination. By the late 1980s in addition to Post Primary Training Centres (Ministry of Education and Culture) and the programs administered by the National Vocational Training Division (NVTD, Ministry of Labour and Manpower Development) Tanzania had more than 400 training institutions of various sorts.

Foreign assistance to vocational and technical education in Tanzania illustrates several of the problems of reliance on external funding and of the inability of the Tanzanian government to manage the coordination of the support it receives from different sources. Most of NVTD’s funding, for example, comes from foreign assistance, largely through project rather than sectoral support. From the perspective of the foreign agency, project support is advantageous because its direct results are more likely to be visible and measurable and because the agency is better able to maintain control over the resources provided. From the Tanzanian perspective, however, project assistance has a major disadvantage: it differentiates the centers. In general, assisted centers are substantially better equipped and staffed than other centers. Project support also makes it more difficult to develop a long-term strategic approach to addressing vocational training in its entirety. As a DANIDA report notes, “Rather than developing the system, most of the donors have been concerned with creating isolated ‘Islands of Efficiency.’”32 Foreign agencies also generally require the Tanzanian government to commit resources to supported projects, thereby reducing the funds and even the staff available to other centers. As well,

many foreign-funded projects have expatriate managers who maintain nearly complete control over acquisition and use of project materials and vehicles. While there may be some advantages to this direct role for foreign personnel, management-by-expatriates impedes capacity building within Tanzania. It is the antithesis of assisting Tanzanians to develop the skills and experience necessary to manage projects on their own. It undermines their authority and destroys their confidence. Often, it insures the collapse of projects once the supporting agency departs.

Dependence on external aid and agencies has increased considerably over the past decade. During the 1980s foreign funds provided 75% of the development budget for vocational education. In the 1990s foreign agencies are expected to fund nearly all development expenditures and half of the recurrent spending. Thus, currently the Tanzanian government and foreign agencies bear the major costs of vocational training. The employers that benefit from that training bear hardly any of its cost. That was perhaps less consequential when most enterprises were wholly or partially publicly owned. For the present, however, that is less defensible since the press to privatize has not included the privatization of a significantly increased portion of vocational training.

To have multiple sources of vocational training may well be desirable in a setting where labor market data are limited and unreliable, the demand for highly skilled managerial personnel exceeds the supply, and each individual program and even institution is vulnerable to the vagaries of its foreign patrons. But that plurality of providers is problematic in at least three respects. First, there is no longer in Tanzania a broadly accepted national approach to vocational education and training that can be used to guide and coordinate diverse initiatives and programs. Earlier, what was called manpower planning guided efforts in both education and vocational training. Education for self reliance effectively rejected that approach. Yet, though the new thinking of the late 1960s asserted the broader role of education (at neither the individual nor the community level was basic education to be focused primarily on job training), it retained an employment orientation toward post-primary schooling. That, in turn, was overthrown by the impossibility of establishing the tight link between schooling and employment that had been envisioned and by the rapidly expanding popular demand for secondary education in the 1980s. No common national approach has emerged to succeed manpower planning.

Second, the plurality of programs is in tension with what official statements, general expectations, and relevant legislation say about how vocational training should be organized. People who expect to function within a highly centralized and tightly coordinated system constantly bemoan the lack of clear authority, inconsistent agendas, and incompatible practices. In the current setting, however, it is far from clear that increased centralization will resolve these problems. Instead, it may be timely to reconceptualize both the organization and administration of vocational training as a series of overlapping spheres of action with more limited interaction and cooperation. Third, the multiplicity of providers combines with the supply assumption of human resource development (the expectation that a trained person will readily find employment) and the absence of reliable needs assessments to render it impossible to determine the success of the vocational training system in meeting the society's needs. Two major studies conclude that there is no unmet demand for craftspeople in Tanzania.33 Indeed,
one argues that the system needs “consolidation and quality improvement, not expansion of the scale of total provision.”

In short, crisis and adjustment have followed quite different paths in education and vocational training. In both there has been increased reliance on foreign funding for both development and recurrent expenditures. In education, that external assistance has had a generally unified voice. While different agencies have had their own priorities and preferences, they have generally supported a common agenda largely drafted and articulated by the World Bank. In vocational training, by contrast, the foreign funds have had not only multiple but often discordant voices. Rather than a centralized set of negotiations about expectations, terms, and conditions, each vocational training center or institution can become the subject a separate and largely independent discussion. In this profusion of vocational training programs it is difficult to discern which Tanzanian interests have been advantaged and which disadvantaged.

TEACHERS' PAY AND TEACHERS' WORK: THE FINANCIAL-INTELLECTUAL COMPLEX

Dependence is being modernized in Tanzania. Conquest by arms is ancient history to young Tanzanians. Conquest by advice, or rather by the powerful alliance of foreign funding and academically certified wisdom, is the theme of modern history. Let us explore how that works by reviewing briefly a much smaller set of events.

Convinced that teachers' low pay and their apparently declining morale were important factors in the deteriorating quality of instruction, the World Bank, the Ministry of Education, and SIDA commissioned a study of Tanzanian teachers. Managed by a consulting group located in Tanzania and undertaken largely by Tanzanians, that study explored the living and working conditions of primary and secondary school teachers in mainland Tanzania. In some respects, that study was imaginative, sensitive, and systematic in its conception and implementation. At the same time, several major weaknesses in the design and the conduct of the study render at least some of its conclusions untenable.

The major findings of the report of this study concerned teachers' satisfaction with the teaching profession in general and with their own positions in particular. To date, those findings seem to have received very little attention outside the study group and to have entered little, if at all, into policy discussions. Instead, the principal use of this study focuses on a point that is not central to the authors' conclusions and that in fact is not fully addressed in their report: that Tanzanian teachers are under-worked and Tanzanian schools are overstaffed. Although the report does provide some ground for reaching this conclusion, that ground is very shaky indeed. Since the use of this report, rather than the content of its findings, is my major concern here, I shall simply note several of the major problems in the study that render that conclusion unpersuasive. First, although the authors were aware that their sample was significantly more urban, and thus female, than the population of teachers as a whole, they did not adjust the sampled results to support their comments about teachers in general. One

34Lauglo, Vocational Training in Tanzania, p. 50.


36Note that my principal concern here is not with the details of that study or with the study's findings, but rather with the absence of any serious evaluation of the study and with its role in the policy process.
Financial Crisis, Structural Adjustment, and Education Policy in Tanzania (Samoff)

striking example of the consequences of that strategy concerns teachers' additional income. The final report of the study indicates that somewhat fewer female than male teachers earn additional income through private tutoring. This reported gender difference is not so large (2:3) that it warrants detailed discussion or analysis. Adjusting the sample of teachers to match the gender distribution of the entire teaching force, however, suggests that female teachers are substantially less likely to supplement their income by private lessons (a ratio of nearly 2:8). A gender difference of that magnitude surely requires further exploration. Second, the information on teachers' use of time was gathered through questionnaires rather than observation. Third, the discussion of how teachers used their time ignored the numerous small activities in which teachers are engaged. While those activities may each take little time, cumulatively they may account for a substantial portion of what teachers do each day. For example, rural Tanzanian teachers report that they spend some 5% of their time each month simply collecting their salaries. Fourth, the construction of the study's questionnaire yielded information on time spent in formal teaching and time spent on activities in which teachers were involved for more than four hours per week. Once again, the activities to which teachers allocate less than four hours per week (keeping in mind the likely margin of error in recalling such activities precisely) may well cumulatively take even more time than the major (four hours or more per week) activities. Fifth, in the absence of an explicit discussion of reasonable and usual time allocation, there is an implicit assumption that teachers ought to spend all or nearly all of their available time teaching classes. While educators disagree on the appropriate balance between in-class and out-of-class time, there is broad consensus that insufficient time for preparation and for consultation and collaboration among the school staff may well reduce the quality of learning. Thus, without a review of the context and philosophy of instruction, one cannot infer the reasonableness of the workload from the teachers' average number of classroom hours, an imprecise number in any case. Sixth, unanchored scales make it impossible to compare degrees of dissatisfaction across categories of teachers, or even the same teachers across time. Hence, while this study provides some useful insights into Tanzanian teachers' experiences and working conditions, it does not provide a solid foundation for assessing teachers' actual or potential workloads.

Three observations on this study and its role are worth underlining. First, its commissioning offers an example of an increasingly common practice: the World Bank as the lead agency, setting the direction for activities that are in fact financed by another agency (in this case SIDA). Second, despite its prominent role in the World Bank analysis of what needs

The World Bank is of course not a monolithic organization. Indeed, the divergence of perspectives and priorities of its personnel may be much broader and sharper than the policy and programmatic differences between funding agency and recipient country. At the same time, there do exist official World Bank policies that are influential if not determining in every situation. As well, notwithstanding the diversity of perspectives, there are within the World Bank widely, though of course not universally, shared understandings. Those share understandings include a conception of development and therefore of strategies of development, a sense of the nature of the obstacles to the changes that are deemed desirable and therefore tactics for addressing them, and a vision of the appropriate role of the World Bank itself. The broad agreement on basic premises and fundamental assumptions—though, it is worth stressing again, neither universal nor unchallenged—makes it both reasonable and necessary to treat particular World Bank ideas, roles, and practices in a relatively undifferentiated manner. That sharp critiques of World Bank policies have emerged from among its own personnel and that particular project managers pursue an agenda that diverges in some respect from that of the World Bank as a whole must not obscure the general orientation, trajectory, and consequences of World Bank funding. My argument here is structural, not personal. Its subject is the set of organizations and ideological imperatives and pressures that guide and constrain behavior, not the motivations, preferences, and sensibilities of particular individuals.
Financial Crisis, Structural Adjustment, and Education Policy in Tanzania (Samoff)

To be done in Tanzanian education, this study has had very limited circulation. And third, although the study was undertaken by academic researchers, it has had no effective peer review.

Following close on the completion of the study of the living and working conditions of Tanzania's teachers, in January 1992 a major World Bank led mission, with co-financing from SIDA and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA), addressed teachers and education finance. Its broad and detailed report began with both a description and an explanation of the present crisis in Tanzanian education and moved on to outline an agenda for overcoming it. Among the Tanzanians identified as part of the "main mission" were two of the authors of the study of teachers' conditions. Some sections of the World Bank report are carefully done and reflect an understanding of the relevant history and context and a healthy skepticism about the reliability of the available data. Much of this report, however, makes extensive and uncritical use of the study of teachers' conditions and of the available data on Tanzanian education. It is that link between the commissioned research and the policy recommendations (and policy making process) that is of particular interest in this discussion.

The first of the three major recommendations that appear in the World Bank report focused directly on teachers. Beginning with a flawed inference from a flawed study, the report arrived at an almost magical solution that seemed to solve simultaneously several hitherto intractable problems. The survey of teachers, the World Bank argues, revealed that on average Tanzanian teachers had a relatively light work load and that at least in urban areas there are too many of them. Accordingly,

Increases in teacher workloads could have important benefits. If teachers taught more hours a week, then a smaller number of them would be required; the resulting budgetary savings could then be used to increase teacher salaries. Also, class sizes could be made smaller, which would help in improving the quality of education provided; and more classes could be added, enabling more students to attend school and receive an education.

An apparently very simple solution to a whole series of seemingly intractable problems! If teachers worked more (which they could do without serious hardship, since their current workloads are light), they could be paid better and have smaller classes as well. To support this claim that Tanzanian teachers are underworked, the authors of the World Bank paper refer to the study of teachers' living and working conditions. As I have suggested above, the evidence presented there is both incomplete and far from compelling. A single study, with a seriously flawed approach to this question, is surely a weak foundation for such a sweeping conclusion. Even the authors of that study do not include this conclusion among their findings.

There are two immediate problems here. First, there is substantial evidence from other sources that Tanzanian teachers are more overwhelmed than underworked as they struggle to cope with extraordinarily adverse conditions: very large classes, too few desks, chairs, and books, too pressed to have much time for reflection or innovation, and salaries that cannot support their families. Second, even were one to accept the premise that Tanzanian teachers

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are under-worked and the assumption that they could be persuaded or coerced to work harder, it is not at all clear that their number could be reduced.

In short, the World Bank team used an unsupported inference from a defective study to lay its foundation, erected a structure that is surprisingly insensitive to what teachers really do and how schools actually operate, and behind the facade of that teetering edifice concocted a magic potion it claims will make things right. The mystique of research prevailed over the wisdom of common sense. Many in the development business, and a few Tanzanians, took this line of analysis seriously.

My concern here has been to trace the links between what happens at the very large scale (the global reach of finance capital, induced dependence, the World Bank as an international and internationalizing agency that has transformed its own orientation and focus as it works to retain its role in managing the integration of disparate national economies into a capitalist world economy) and events at the very small scale (professional and institutional pressures on well-meaning and generally liberal World Bank staff to lend money and impose their own vision, the effort to by-pass existing authority structures, the internalization and legitimization of foreign agencies' understandings and recommendations). What we have seen is the conjunction of funding and research, a veritable financial-intellectual complex (Samoff 1991b). Clearly, conquest and external control in the contemporary era do not imply and do not require the formal imposition of authority. The internalization of external norms is far more powerful and enduring.

**CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS**

**FROM LIGHTING THE TORCH ON KILIMANJARO TO SURVIVING IN A SHANTYTOWN**

The torch is an important symbol in Tanzania. As they approached the end of European rule in 1961 the national leadership promised to light the torch of freedom for other countries in Africa. At the moment of independence itself, a torch carried by an elite team was raised above the summit of Mt. Kilimanjaro, the highest peak in Africa. Periodically since then groups have carried a torch up Mt. Kilimanjaro to mark progress toward the liberation of humankind. Each year the Freedom Torch is carried through every region of the country to celebrate the anniversary of the founding of the party that led to the end of European rule.

In education, Tanzania has indeed lit the torch. One of the poorest countries of the world, it accelerated the pace of universal primary education long before the World Bank and then the countries of the world affirmed that was a high priority goal. Internationally recognized for its adult literacy programs, Tanzania has come far closer to eliminating illiteracy, and far more quickly, than most other countries in Africa. It remains one of the few countries in Africa with a very heterogeneous population where a traveler needs only one language, a local language, to converse with people in the most remote villages.

As the 1970s closed, all of that and more was increasingly in jeopardy. Throughout financial crisis and adjustment, indeed the reorganization of the global economy, the Tanzanian leadership sought to continue lighting the torch in education. The proportion of the national

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40I make the more general case in "Research, Knowledge, and Policy in Assistance to African Education: The Financial-Intellectual Complex."
budget allocated to education apparently remained relatively constant, though the absolute amount declined. Without strong support from several external agencies, especially SIDA, things would surely have been far worse. During the growing estrangement from foreign aid providers as the Tanzanian leadership sought to maintain a set of policies rejected by the organizations of international finance, the situation did get worse. As study after study reported, more and more pupils had neither chairs nor books, teachers had unmanageably large classes, and neither the schools nor the teachers’ houses kept out the rain.

Recourse to foreign funding had become a way of life for Tanzania’s educators. Planning came to be seen as marketing. Over time priorities were set less by government and party leaders and more by what foreign governments and their aid organizations were filling to finance. The power brokers in education had once been those who could put together coalitions of people influential in Tanzania’s public and private life. Now they were more likely to be those who were most successful in securing foreign funding, those who seemed to have the easiest access to embassies in Dar es Salaam and institutional headquarters in London, Washington, Stockholm, Paris, and elsewhere. The price for increased access to foreign funding was reconciliation with the IMF. It is not at all clear that Tanzania and Tanzanians will be better off when the current fascination of the foreigners wanes. In education at least, they will surely not be more self reliant.

By the mid 1980s lighting a torch to mark the path for others had become impossible. Simple survival was now the pressing concern. And survival required not the orientation of the long term planner with a stable resource base but rather skills of coping with ever changing rules, relationships, and circumstances. Tanzanians have proved quite adept at surviving in the shantytown of the global economy, whose dynamic engine remains beyond reach.

It may be, as some argue, that national policies in the first quarter century of Tanzania’s independence were fundamentally wrong. It may also be that the harsh experiences of economic crisis and the bitter brews of structural adjustment will eventually set things right. Perhaps Tanzanians’ standard of living will be significantly higher at the beginning of the 21st Century than it is at the end of the 20th. Getting there, however, will have further undermined their ability to determine what sort of society they wish to have and their capacity to govern and manage it.

The immediate consequence for education of the economic crisis was deterioration and demoralization. The principal impact on education of structural adjustment has been disempowerment.

**POLICIES AND PROCESS**

There is a striking tension between the mode of operation preferred by the external agencies and the operating patterns of Tanzania’s educators and administrators. The foreign agencies expect to deal with an institutional arrangement akin to a military general headquarters. They expect to find a sharply delineated hierarchy, clear lines of authority, functional divisions of responsibility, and reasonably direct paths of communication. They expect consistent responses to their queries and proposals and continuity in implementing the agreements that have been reached. For the Tanzanians, coping rather than centralized planning has become the order of the day. The institutional model is not the military general headquarters but the flea market where everything is negotiable. The prices, terms, and forms of exchange are always in flux. Even the goods to be exchanged are regularly revalued. No response is ever definitive. Alliances and partnerships are rarely permanent, more often quite
short lived. There is little point in rejecting an offer or proposal—except as a bargaining ploy—since one may always hope that the terms will improve. I exaggerate, of course. But caricatures are useful in highlighting underlying patterns.

Although foreigners spend a lot of time trying to figure out where power really lies in Tanzania, in fact since it became an independent country its political system has been characterized by overlapping spheres of influence. It is the shifting coalitions, not their institutional locations, that have mattered. That is even more so in the flea market spawned by economic crisis and structural adjustment. The negotiating mode may also be an effective strategy that the weaker and poorer party employs to improve its leverage and enhance its influence. When facing a stronger opponent, diplomacy may be preferable to an open clash.

This tension between modes of operation manifests itself in the relationship between the external funding agencies and Tanzania in yet another form. Regularly, efficiency has formally been assigned a high priority. Elaborate analytic models and strategies have been developed to determine what is the most efficient way to invest available resources, which are the most efficient programs, and how efficiency can be improved. Even school attrition is regularly addressed as an issue of efficiency. Yet in practice, maximizing reliability has been much more important than maximizing efficiency. Parallel transport arrangements, for example, permit vehicles to operate on the same routes and at less than their capacity. But decentralizing the responsibility for public transport to a combination of a public transit system, public and private employers, and private vans and taxis provides a degree of redundancy that localizes and limits the consequences of breakdowns. That may not work terribly smoothly, and it surely does not always work, but it seems to work more often than other schemes, and it enables people to survive.41 In the current Tanzanian circumstances, the largely unqualified insistence of the foreign agencies on maximizing efficiency, often at the expense of reliability, seems particularly insensitive to the local setting and fundamentally short-sighted. Deemphasizing reliability may well preclude efficiency.

Many of the external agencies’ proposed remedies involve reducing the role of the state in providing education. The clarion call is to privatize. Ironically, the external agencies in fact need the state. Nearly all of their programs envision a central point of authority and control accompanied by a strong measure of central planning, monitoring, and evaluation. Hence, it is useful to understand the current era as a transitional period. First, the state is to be marginalized and the power and authority of its officials reduced. Then, state organizations are to be dismembered and dismantled, with the parts recombined into new forms under the control of a different set of leaders. Once that has been accomplished, the state can be reconstituted. The reconstructed state will be less able to pursue national policies at odds with the international system. Superficially it will be more democratic, but in practice it is likely to be less responsive to the situation and needs of the least affluent and most disadvantaged. The

41It is striking that there were similar patterns in the small scale societies of the past. During a famine, it might be individually rational for a farmer with a reserve of grain to use that reserve as seeds for the next harvest. Planting that reserve might also seem rational for the village, since it might increase the size of the next harvest. But the communal norms of reciprocity and mutual aid require the farmer to share his reserve of grain with his neighbors who have exhausted their supply. What is maximized is not the individual or even the communal standard of living but rather the survival of the village members and therefore of the village itself.
dependent liberal capitalism that the Europeans envisioned when they ended direct rule will finally have been installed.42

Central to the insistence on reducing the role of the state has been the assertion of the failure of centralized planning. Yet the same international financial institutions that decry centralized planning in general, in their role as providers of assistance to African education, insist on a very high order of central planning and direction. It is not clear, however, that proceeding in that way makes the most sense for those responsible for education in Africa, where the demand for high level planning and managerial skills will exceed the supply for some time to come and where many of the critical contextual factors are beyond local control. Indeed, contemporary conditions in Tanzania and in much of Africa underline the importance of flexibility, responsiveness to changing circumstances, and the ability both to reorder priorities and to modify implementation at short notice. The appropriate decision making model may be more the apparent chaos of the stock market or the overlapping alliances of the flea market than order and fixed lines of authority of the military general headquarters. To put that point somewhat differently, for Tanzania and other African countries, the institution is likely to be more important than the plan. That is, an institutional apparatus sufficiently resilient to respond effectively as events require, to seize opportunities as they occur, to build on successful strategies, and to discard those that do not work will contribute more to improving the quality of life than a clearly articulated plan and authoritarian decision makers.

AGENDAS AND AGENDA SETTING

As I have noted above, planning education in Tanzania has come to be largely a process of negotiation with the agencies that provide foreign assistance. During the negotiations, anything and everything can be considered, and there is always time to revise ideas and even formal proposals in light of the reactions they encounter. There are also always visible agendas, hidden agendas, and even more obscure agendas, all with supporting alliances. While some coalitions endure for quite a long time, others coalesce, disintegrate, and re-form over much shorter time spans. In this setting, Tanzanian educators accepted some of the World Bank recommendations and acknowledged others. What was deemed undesirable was put under consideration, not rejected. From the Tanzanian perspective, this was a reasonable way to proceed, consistent with the position in which the country found itself. From the perspective of a senior official of the major external lending agency, the maneuvers of negotiation were simply a smokescreen to obscure temporizing and inaction.

In this setting, the World Bank seized the initiative, intervening both directly and indirectly in the agenda setting process. As the education ministry's futures commission seemed to be making little progress, the World Bank quietly seeded another site. With little fanfare, a new paper appeared, formally prepared by officials in the Planning Commission, the education ministry, and the ministry responsible for local government. More superficial than the World Bank report and clearly hurriedly written, this paper incorporated many, though not all, of the...
World Bank's recommendations. Here, the World Bank stressed, was a Tanzanian voice that said much of what the World Bank had been advocating. While acknowledging that they found this paper very useful and that they were pushing it very hard, some World Bank staff disclaimed knowledge of its origins. In fact, it was largely the work of an educator who had been part of the World Bank mission that prepared the report on Teachers and the Financing of Education. In this way the external perspective on what was to be done had been largely internalized and legitimized.

The principal external assistance agencies, especially the World Bank, ODA, and SIDA, successfully shifted attention from the agenda prepared by senior education officials—which in the negotiating mode was an array of projects with poorly defined connections and changing priorities—to the agenda of items deemed essential by the World Bank and now articulated in a paper that few had seen but that bore the legitimacy of the Planning Commission. In this way those agencies effectively exercised a powerful influence on the education agenda in Tanzania.

One sequel to this flurry of international agency activity in late 1991 was the rejuvenation of the internal agenda setting mechanism that had been established more than a year previously. The Ministry of Education and Culture had created a commission to examine and make recommendations on Tanzanian education into the 21st century, chaired by the Dean of the Faculty of Education at the University of Dar es Salaam. While the senior education ministry officials regard that commission as a counterweight to the pressure from the external agencies and the recommendations included in the Planning Commission paper, that commission's conclusions have not differed substantially from what the World Bank has been advocating. Its membership includes several of the Tanzanian scholars who were part of the January, 1991, World Bank mission. Informal discussions suggest that most, perhaps all, of the commission members understand the contemporary situation in essentially the same terms as does the World Bank. From a common perspective, general approach, and methodological orientation, they will reach similar, though probably not identical findings.

On the face of it, the policy making process seems to have produced a reasoned consensus. That appearance, however, is deceptive. First, of course, it is not the case that everyone agrees. Rather, those who disagree most forcefully (and their ideas) have been largely excluded from the decision making process. Second, what is problematic is not that there seems to be agreement, but rather how that agreement is achieved. Ideally, agreement on policy directions should flow from imaginative creation of alternative courses of action, systematic analysis of those alternatives and their theoretical and empirical bases, and spirited debate among people who have different interests and hold contrary views. Here, however, agreement emerged from common assumptions and perspectives, not from the contestation of ideas, the juxtaposition of alternatives, and the insights of critics. It is misleading to refer to "agreement" when several people take as given precisely what needs to be studied and debated.
THE FIXATION ON FINANCE

Resources are never unlimited. As Julius Nyerere of Tanzania emphasized a quarter century ago, to plan is to choose. Effective choices require knowledge about costs and sources of finance. It is appropriate, therefore, that studies of existing education systems and proposals for their development pay careful attention to the cost implications of what they propose. Unfortunately, the concern with costs and finance often becomes the central focus of studies of education.

When that occurs, schools as community based institutions, teaching as an interactive process, learning as something more than memorizing selected facts, and even the learners themselves disappear from view. Or rather, the recommendation to pursue or not pursue a particular course of action comes to be justified in terms of its costs and financing, with little attention to its overall contribution to education or to related national goals and aspirations.

When the stress on resources is particularly severe, as is the current situation for most of Africa, many education studies focus almost exclusively on the reduction of spending. In addition to relegating learning and teaching to a marginal role, that orientation also favors those objectives of education that can be quantified and explicitly valued and often ignores those that cannot. At the level of theory, nearly everyone agrees that education's value to society goes beyond preparation for employment. In practice, however, when the focus on finance becomes a fixation, the bulk of education's contribution is effectively devalued.

The point here is straightforward. To fail to consider costs and financing may promote inefficiencies and cripple promising initiatives. To focus single-mindedly on costs and financing may prove even more disastrous.

IMPROVING QUALITY AND INCREASING EFFICIENCY BY IGNORING LEARNING

Tanzania is committed to improving the quality of its education. In what might be termed the structural adjustment mode, where the emphasis is on reducing spending, improved quality is often understood to mean doing a better job at operating the sort of education system that was inherited from the period of European rule, now somewhat adapted to Tanzanian circumstances. But that is surely not enough. The older patterns and standards are even less appropriate in Tanzania than they are in the North Atlantic. Teacher centered instruction constrains rather than nurtures students' sense of curiosity and exploration. The excitement of learning that is so clearly visible in young children is effectively suppressed by years of memorization, drill, and recall. The discovery, observation, comparison, analysis, understanding that could be fueled by the intrinsic rewards of learning come in teacher centered and rigid systems to require external rewards and punishments for their management. Like curiosity, experimentation, and critique, innovation is devalued and discouraged. In addition to their negative consequences for learning, authoritarian classrooms contribute little to preparing young people to participate as adults in a democratic society. Bureaucratic administration stifles local initiative. The parents and other adults who could enrich the learning process become instead its passive observers. Where education planning and decision making could foster the development of the skills of community self management, instead communities become the objects rather than the subjects of the political process.

If schools are to be the beacons and engines of development, it is not sufficient to focus on the mastery of specified texts, even updated texts, and raising examination scores. If young people are to become self reliant, self confident innovators, it is not enough to increase the number of teachers who are expected to rely on mass memorization and to value authority and
obedience over learning and autonomy. If their graduates are to bear the responsibility for organizing and managing a democratic society, it is counterproductive to discourage participation in education decision making, both within and outside the classroom. If schools are to play a role in fostering national integration and a sense of national purpose, they must go beyond training farmers, technicians, and managers. They must as well enable young people to develop the competence and self confidence needed to rediscover their culture, rewrite their history, and revise their sense of self and society.

Here again we see the constraining consequences of the assumptions that accompany aid. Over the long term, a failure of conception will prove far more detrimental and costly than a failure of implementation. Too little attention to What is to be done? will eventually undermine all the effort directed toward How to do it? Or, to put that positively, planning in the present must pay as much attention to the conception as to the implementation.