

## DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 372 022

SO 024 307

AUTHOR Harris, James F., Ed.; Metcalf, Fay, Ed.  
 TITLE Germany and Europe Since World War II: Resources for Teachers.  
 INSTITUTION ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education, Bloomington, IN.  
 SPONS AGENCY Office of Educational Research and Improvement (ED), Washington, DC.  
 REPORT NO ISBN-0-941339-18-1  
 PUB DATE 94  
 CONTRACT RR93002014  
 NOTE 267p.  
 AVAILABLE FROM ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education, Indiana University, 2805 East Tenth Street, Suite 120, Bloomington, IN 47408-2698.  
 PUB TYPE Guides - Classroom Use - Teaching Guides (For Teacher) (052) -- Information Analyses - ERIC Clearinghouse Products (071)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC11 Plus Postage.  
 DESCRIPTORS Area Studies; Economics; \*European History; Foreign Countries; Government Role; Group Unity; High Schools; History Instruction; \*Instructional Materials; Nazism; Social Change; Social Studies; Teaching Guides; World War II  
 IDENTIFIERS \*East Germany; German History; \*West Germany

## ABSTRACT

Designed as a resource for teachers to help high school students understand the new Germany, six background papers and nine lessons provide information on the difficult transition from the Third Reich to defeat and military occupation, on the establishment of two successor states, and on revolution and reunification. The six background papers cover aspects of the history, government, economy, and society of Germany since World War II: (1) "From Third Reich to No Reich: Germany after 1945" (James F. Harris); (2) "The Re-Birth of Democracy in Germany" (Rebecca Boehling); (3) "Germany's Role in the European and World Economies" (Robert Mark); (4) "German Culture in a Modern World" (Peter Jelavich); (5) "From Revolution to Unification: Creating a New Germany" (Konrad H. Jarausch); and (6) "Europe in U.S. Social Studies Textbooks: A Case Study on Germany in the Textbooks" (Dagmar Kraemer; Manfred Stassen). The nine lessons for use with secondary students of social studies draw from the contents of the background papers, and each lesson includes a plan for teachers and materials to be copied and distributed to students. Following the lessons, a timeline offers an annotated chronology of events in postwar Germany and the European Community. The next sections list 47 annotations of papers found in the ERIC database on Germany and Europe since World War II and 80 annotations from journals in the ERIC database on the topic. A selected bibliography of 44 books that pertain to the history of Europe and Germany during the 20th century precede 35 curriculum materials on Germany and Europe since World War II. An extensive directory of resources and useful addresses concludes the reference guide. (CK)

# GERMANY

## And Europe Since World War II: Resources for Teachers



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION  
Office of Educational Research and Improvement  
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION  
CENTER (ERIC)

This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.

Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.


SO 024 307

James F. Harris and  
Fay Metcalf, Editors




**BEST COPY AVAILABLE**

ERIC Clearinghouse for  
Social Studies/ Social Science Education



# GERMANY

And Europe Since World War II:  
Resources for Teachers



James F. Harris and  
Fay Metcalf, Editors



4  
ERIC Clearinghouse for  
Social Studies/ Social Science Education

## Ordering Information

This publication is available from:

ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education  
Indiana University  
2805 East Tenth Street, Suite 120  
Bloomington, Indiana 47408-2698  
(812) 855-3838  
(800) 266-3815  
FAX: (812) 855-0455

ISBN: 0-941339-18-1

Published in 1994.



Funding for the development of this publication was provided by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education, under contract RR93002014. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of OERI or ED.

ERIC, Educational Resources Information Center, is an information system sponsored by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, within the U.S. Department of Education.

# CONTENTS

The Editors and Contributors .....	v
Acknowledgments .....	vii
Foreword .....	ix
Editor's Preface .....	xi
<b>Part I: Background Papers .....</b>	<b>1</b>
Paper 1: From Third Reich to No Reich: Germany After 1945 by JAMES F. HARRIS .....	3
Paper 2: The Re-Birth of Democracy in Germany by REBECCA BOEHLING .....	19
Appendix: Der Fragebogen .....	43
Paper 3: Germany's Role in the European and World Economies by ROBERT MARK SPAULDING, JR. ....	53
Paper 4: German Culture in a Modern World by PETER JELAVICH .....	69
Paper 5: From Revolution to Unification: Creating a New Germany by KONRAD H. JARAUSCH .....	85
Paper 6: Europe in U.S. Social Studies Textbooks: A Case Study on Germany in the Textbooks by DAGMAR KRAEMER AND MANFRED STASSEN .....	101
<b>Part II: Lessons on Germany and Europe Since World War II .....</b>	<b>109</b>
Lesson 1: How Did Germany Change from Dictatorship to Democracy? by ROSEMARIE KUNTZ .....	113
Lesson 2: Post-War Decision Making: What to Do with Germany? by ROSEMARIE KUNTZ .....	131

Lesson 3: A Comparison of the Two-Party and Multi-Party Political Systems by JAMES GARLAND .....	139
Lesson 4: Basic Rights in West Germany and the United States— A Comparison by PATRICIA GEYER .....	149
Lesson 5: Germany's Economy in the 20th Century by JAMES (ROCKY) HARRIS .....	167
Lesson 6: Factors of Economic Growth in Post-War Germany by PATRICIA STRICKLAND .....	171
Lesson 7: "Rubble Literature": German Writers After World War II by MARJORIE WALL BINGHAM .....	175
Lesson 8: Artistic Expression in Germany Since World War II by CLAUDIA SEITER AND DAVID SEITER .....	187
Lesson 9: Germans Face Unification: Four Simulations by JAMES DIEHL AND CARL SCHULKIN .....	191
<b>Part III: Time Line: An Annotated Chronology of Events in Postwar Germany and the European Community</b> by DAGMAR KRAEMER .....	203
<b>Part IV: Select Annotated Bibliography of ERIC Documents</b> by VICKIE J. SCHLENE .....	215
<b>Part V: Select Annotated Bibliography of Journal Articles in the ERIC Database</b> by VICKIE J. SCHLENE .....	229
<b>Part VI: Select Bibliography of Scholarly Works</b> by JAMES F. HARRIS .....	243
<b>Part VII: Curriculum Materials on Germany and Europe Since World War II</b> by FAY METCALF .....	247
<b>Part VIII: Germany and Europe Since World War II: Directory of Resources and Useful Addresses</b> by VICKIE J. SCHLENE .....	255

## THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

MARJORIE WALL BINGHAM teaches European and American history at St. Louis Park High School in Minnesota. She served on the Bradley Commission for History in the Schools.

REBECCA BOEHLING is a professor of history at the University of Maryland, Baltimore Co., Maryland.

JAMES DIEHL is a professor of history at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.

JAMES GARLAND teaches history at West Lafayette High School, West Lafayette, Indiana. He was a participant in the 1989 NCSS-German Marshall Plan Seminar in Germany.

PATRICIA GEYER teaches world history, government, and economics at the West Campus of Johnson High School in Sacramento, California. She served on the California History/Social Science Framework Committee.

JAMES F. HARRIS is a professor of history at the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.

ROCKY HARRIS teaches world history and economics at Hillsboro High School, Hillsboro, Oregon. He is a charter member of the Steering Committee of the Hillsboro International High School (a school within a school).

KONRAD H. JARAUSCH is a professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina.

PETER JELAVICH is a professor of history at the University of Texas, Austin, Texas.

DAGMAR KRAEMER is a consultant for German Studies in Washington, DC.

ROSEMARIE KUNTZ teaches at Perry Meridian High School, Indianapolis, Indiana.

FAY METCALF is a consultant for social studies education, Mesa, Arizona.

CARL R. SCHULKIN teaches at Pembroke High School, Kansas City, Missouri.

CLAUDIA SEITER is the chair of the Social Studies Department at Layton High School in Layton, Utah. She serves on the board of the Bill of Rights Education Collaborative.

DAVID SEITER is the chair of the Social Studies Department of Northridge High School in Layton, Utah. He currently serves as President of the Utah Council for the Social Studies.

ROBERT MARK SPAULDING, JR. is a professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Wilmington, North Carolina.

MANFRED STASSEN is a senior fellow at the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies in Washington, DC.

PATRICIA STRICKLAND teaches United States history and economics at El Dorado High School, El Dorado, Arkansas.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A few persons and organizations deserve special recognition for their contributions to the development and publication of this volume.

Dr. Manfred Stassen of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, merits special praise. He was prominent in the original conceptualization of the work. Further, he secured funds from German and American sources to pay a significant part of the cost of producing the book.

Dr. Volker Berghahn, John P. Birkelund Distinguished Professor of European history at Brown University, served as reviewer of the drafts of Part I, Background Papers of this volume. Dr. Konrad H. Jarausch, Lurcy professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, also served as a reviewer of Part I, Background Papers. The constructive criticism of Professors Berghahn and Jarausch contributed very much to the quality of the published papers in Part I.

Recognition is given to Pamela Hollar, Associate Editor of *Social Education*, the journal of the National Council for the Social Studies. On behalf of NCSS, she granted permission to reprint the map of Europe used on the inside front cover and the inside back cover of this book. She also gave us permission to reprint Part III, Timeline. Both of these were published originally in Volume 57, of *Social Education* (September 1993).

Finally, recognition goes to Mike McKinnon, coordinator for social studies and second language instruction at the Janesville School District, Janesville, Wisconsin. He granted us permission to reprint the page "Why Study Germany and Europe Now?" This page, at the beginning of Part II of this volume, appeared originally in *Common Ground* by Mike McKinnon, which was published by the American Association of Teachers of German.

## FOREWORD

In 1945, at the end of World War II, Europe was exhausted; and its long-standing imperial domination of the world was coming to an end. Some political leaders and scholars in various parts of the world predicted that Europeans would never again exercise strong influence on global developments.

In 1994, less than fifty years after the end of World War II, various peoples and cultures of Europe are potent factors in world affairs. And, if the imperial power of the leading European states has practically disappeared, their cultural power, represented by several transcendent ideas, (e.g., constitutional democracy, human rights, modern science, etc.), has remained strong. J. M. Roberts (1993, p. 917) in his acclaimed *History of the World* says, "[N]o other tradition has shown the same vigour and attractiveness in alien settings as the European: it has no competitors as a world shaper." Roberts, of course, includes North America as an extension and important part of the European tradition often labeled Western civilization.

Theodore H. Von Laue, the eminent historian from the University of Kansas, argues (*The World Revolution of Westernization: The Twentieth Century in Global Perspective*, 1987) that core ideas of Western culture have been the central ideas of our twentieth-century world. He writes (p. 3), "[T]he human condition in the present and the future can only be understood within the framework of the Westernized world."

If Roberts and Von Laue are accurate in their assessments of Europe's continued importance in global history and contemporary affairs, educators would be remiss to overlook or slight studies of European history and culture in their design of curricula and presentation of classroom lessons. In particular, Europe since the end of World War II, the theme of this volume, deserves a prominent place in the curricula of schools, if we would teach our students accurately and authentically about the forces that shape current global developments.

This volume was designed to help teachers provide their students with accurate, authentic, and ample treatments of contemporary Europe in their history and social studies courses. Much credit is due James Harris and Fay Metcalf, the editors of this volume, for their efforts in compiling and presenting fundamental knowledge and other important resources for teaching about "Germany and Europe Since World War II." And, Manfred Stassen deserves special recognition as the originator of this project and a driving force in its successful development. The ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education and the Editors wish to acknowledge with gratitude the material support received from our German colleagues, especially Dr. Stassen, which made this publication possible.

Dr. John J. Patrick, Director,  
ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/  
Social Science Education and  
Director, Social Studies Development Center,  
Indiana University

## EDITOR'S PREFACE

Whether measured by economic output, size of military establishment, or number of Olympic medals, the merger of the two Germanies, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), has become a major element in the European state system. Observers have noted, often fearfully, the dangers presented by a re-unified Germany with a population of eighty million in the heart of Europe. Germans too are fearful of the future. In part they worry about the burdens assumed and created by the merger of the democratic, prosperous, technologically advanced FRG with the dictatorial, poor, and backward GDR. But they also fear the outbreak of potential chaos in the east in the same Russia that, ironically, helped make it possible for the merger to occur. Large German monetary support for Russia and Poland, to name only two eastern states, testifies to its concern for the future of Russia and the east.

As the new Germany ages it will begin to deal with problems in Europe and the world in new ways. Indeed that has already begun over issues as diverse as Croatian and Slovenian independence, the Persian Gulf War, and the Somalian crisis. Internally, major crises face German statesmen, including acceptance of political refugees, immigration, the granting of citizenship to non-Germans, and, perhaps most poignantly, hate crimes against foreigners. Not all Germans agree on solutions to these problems, but all know they face hard choices in an unforgiving world.

The purpose of this book is not to predict the future. Historians are not particularly good at that: witness our total surprise at the 1989 revolution in the German Democratic Republic. The premise of the background papers and lesson plans that follow is that we will better understand the new Germany the more we know about the difficult transitions from the horror of the Third Reich to defeat and military occupation, to the establishment of two successor states, and, finally, to revolution and reunification. Education about Germany between the Nazis and 1990 ought to be

presented in as much depth as the curriculum permits before our daughters and sons leave high school. This book aims at beginning that process.

James F. Harris  
Department of History  
University of Maryland-College Park



## Background Papers

Part I includes background papers by scholars on various aspects of the history, government, economy, and society of Germany since World War II. These papers, while focusing on Germany, also discuss the larger context of European events to which Germany has been connected. In addition, there is one paper on textbook treatment of Europe in general and Germany in particular. These six papers provide ideas and information that teachers can use to enhance their lesson planning and classroom teaching about Germany and Europe during the second half of the twentieth century. The editor for Part I was James F. Harris, professor of history, University of Maryland, College Park.

The six background papers and their authors are listed below:

1. *From Third Reich to No Reich: Germany After 1945* by JAMES F. HARRIS, University of Maryland, College Park.
2. *The Re-Birth of Democracy in Germany* by REBECCA BOEHLING, University of Maryland, Baltimore County.
3. *Germany's Role in the European and World Economies* by ROBERT MARK SPAULDING, JR., University of North Carolina, Wilmington.
4. *German Culture in a Modern World* by PETER JELAVICH, University of Texas, Austin.
5. *From Revolution to Unification: Creating a New Germany* by KONRAD H. JARAUSCH, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
6. *Europe in U.S. Social Studies Textbooks: A Case Study on Germany in the Textbooks* by DAGMAR KRAEMER and MANFRED STASSEN, American Institute for Contemporary German Affairs, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC.



# From Third Reich to No Reich: Germany After 1945

by James F. Harris

What is Germany? The answer to this simple question is elusive. Established as a national state only in 1870-71, Germany changed both territorially and constitutionally in 1918-19 (following defeat in World War I and revolution), in 1933 (when the Third Reich began), in 1945-49 (following defeat, occupation, and division), and in 1989-90 (following collapse of the German Democratic Republic and "re-unification.") For much of the period 1945 to 1989, most observers thought of "Germany" and Germans in relation to the 1933 - 1945 Nazi experience. The two Germanies seemed to be rival epilogues to a "national" history that ended in 1945. The revolution of 1989 and unification of 1990 have transformed these two stages into preludes to a new national Germany. The origins of the states which united in 1990 lie in the defeat of Adolf Hitler's Third Reich in 1945.

A coalition of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France defeated National Socialist Germany in World War II. The defeat was total and derived from a combination of Adolf Hitler's fanatical determination to fight to the bitter end in pursuit of racial dreams and allied insistence that all Germans had to recognize clearly that they had lost before any thought could be given to an end to hostilities. There was to be no repeat of 1918 when an armistice began with German troops retreating, but still on foreign soil on all fronts. In World War II the allies doggedly fought their way across Germany from east and west, grinding to a stop only in shattered Berlin. In the wake of Hitler's suicide on 30 April 1945, hostilities soon ceased because no one was left willing or able to continue to resist.

The surrender on 23 May 1945 by Admiral Karl Doenitz, Hitler's designated successor, was anticlimactic as little was left of the Third Reich. The German army had already surrendered on 8 May. Out of a population of about eighty million in 1938, about ten million Germans died or were permanently missing in World War II. Destruction touched most civilians at home as the war destroyed 20% of all housing and severely damaged another 30%. More than ten million refugees, expellees, evacuees, and others competed with the surviving permanent population for scarce housing and food supplies. Manufacturing came to a near halt, largely because of lack of raw materials, fuel, and employees. Food rations, originally set at about 1,500 calories per day in the British zone, fell to between 950 and 1,150 by July 1945. In the U.S. zone, army authorities separated and clearly labeled their garbage "edible" and "inedible" out of concern for the many Germans reduced to scavenging. Larger cities, like Berlin, were rubble. Hans Speier, a former Berlin resident serving the United States occupation, not only could not find his home there—he could not find the block in which it had stood.<sup>1</sup>

Why did a country the size of Germany, heavily outnumbered even in Europe, attempt to conquer all of that continent, as well as to invade the Soviet Union and declare war on the United States? German aggression was the product of Nazism and Hitler's vision of the future. Many Germans who were relatively happy with Nazism in peacetime, had no taste for war. The decision to go to war, and especially the fateful invasion of Russia in 1941, was made by a dictatorial system controlled by ruthless leaders.

Waging war against large odds was not unusual, but World War II was radically new in a much more basic way than as a power struggle between states, however disproportionate. The horrible reality was that Hitler's Germany made war on people as well as states, and Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs became victims because of who they were without regard for what they did or thought. Mass extermination began with the invasion of Poland in 1939 and reached its peak in 1943-44 at about the same time that Germany's military fate hung in the balance. The beginning and end of the Second World War define the Holocaust as well as the military conflict. The two were inextricably linked.

The destruction visited upon Germany by allied forces must be seen in this perspective. Whatever damage occurred in Germany, the total number of

military and civilian casualties and damage to all types of property in allied countries was far greater. In Russia alone over twenty million people died. The population of Poland declined by 20%. Six million Jews perished in the death factories of the Holocaust, along with hundreds of thousands of Gypsies. Nearly all European countries had substantial numbers of killed and wounded, while suffering large-scale economic and physical destruction and damage. After the military hostilities finally ceased and the full picture of the horrors of death camps like Auschwitz and Treblinka was added to the guilt for a devastating war, world public opinion summarily indicted all Germans as Nazis.

As we will see, nearly all reconstructive measures taken by the victorious powers after 1945, as well as most of those taken by Germans, originated in concern for the pre-1945 past and, particularly, the National Socialist past. If we are to properly understand what happened *after* the war, we must begin with some appreciation of the extent to which Germany had become a Nazi society, as well as a Nazi state.

The fundamental stumbling block preventing even the most objective and careful historians from determining the guilt or innocence of Germans who were adults during the twelve-year history of the Third Reich lies in the dictatorial nature of that state. Modern dictatorships have no interest in providing for the open expression of opinion by their citizens. Even the term "citizen" seems out of place in a discussion of the Third Reich. Jews, Communists, Socialists, and Democrats were not considered citizens of Germany by the mid-1930s. Opposition to the state's policies in the normal form of simple dissent was an option in Hitler's Germany only for a brief time in early 1933. What happened then helps explain the ensuing decade.

A series of elections in 1932 revealed a fatal weakness in the Weimar Republic, namely the inability of the political parties to produce a firm governing coalition in parliament. Opposition to the state by both a powerful radical right in the form of the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP), the largest party, and a strong radical left in the form of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), the third largest party, made any coalition nearly impossible. The remaining parties of the "middle," the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Catholic Centre Party (Z), and several smaller bourgeois liberal, democratic, and conservative parties, could not or would not cooperate with each other. As a last resort, eighty-six year old General Paul von Hindenburg, President of the

Republic, appointed the head of the Nazi Party, Adolf Hitler, to the crucial position of Chancellor, or Prime Minister, of Germany on 30 January 1933. Hindenburg had defeated Hitler in a race for President in 1932 and had already refused to appoint him Chancellor; he clearly wanted to use and control Hitler.<sup>2</sup>

Seeking a political mandate under the mantle of the legitimacy conferred by his appointment to the most important political office in Germany, Hitler quickly called for elections. Despite the false Nazi accusation that the Communists were about to revolt, and the arrest of most Communists and some Social Democrats, and intimidations by the SA (the *Sturmabteilungen* or activist part of the Nazi party) and government, the elections of March 1933 gave the National Socialist German Workers' Party less than 44% of the popular vote cast. A thin Nazi parliamentary majority depended upon cooperation with the small (about 7%) German National People's Party. Socialists, Communists, Catholics, and the few Democrats remaining had denied the Nazis their mandate.

Angered at the outcome of the elections, Hitler immediately pressured the *Reichstag* (parliament) to confer dictatorial powers upon him. Only the Social Democrats (the Communists were in prison) courageously voted to reject this Nazi legislation, called the Enabling Act. After its passage, Hitler moved rapidly to abolish all other political parties, and all socialist and independent trade unions. The Nazi state imposed tough censorship on the press and subjected the churches to intrusive Nazi control and influence. By stages, the Third Reich first excluded Jews from the civil service, then in 1935 deprived them of their citizenship. Socialist and democratic state officials lost their governmental positions, often replaced by Nazis.

Nothing, it is said, succeeds like success. Membership in the Nazi party, which had begun to grow rapidly after the beginning of the Great Depression in 1929, exploded in 1933. After Hitler's appointment as Chancellor, millions of Germans, some of them probably opportunistically, joined the Nazi party. Before their numbers were reduced by death in war, Nazi party members accounted for approximately a quarter of the adult male population.

Membership in the Nazi party, we must assume, meant support for Nazism. At the other extreme, resistance in the form of illegal underground activity, espionage, and assassination provide us with a

measure of opposition to Nazism. Examples of heroic action against Hitler and the Nazi state existed, but in very small numbers. Yet, almost all segments of German society took part. Among the military, Claus von Stauffenberg gave his life in trying to take Hitler's in 1944. From a famous aristocratic and military family, Count Helmut James von Moltke gave his life in surreptitiously working against the regime. Within both the Evangelical Lutheran and Catholic churches, individual clergy spoke out against the regime. The Scholls, brother and sister, students at the University of Munich, did likewise. Communists, like those in a group nicknamed "Red Orchestra," spied on the Nazis. Some workers engaged in work slowdowns. Teenagers defied the ban on "degenerate music", like jazz. While still possible, thousands of the most convinced opponents fled the country. But there was no significant popular resistance to Nazism. If the Third Reich had not been defeated by the allies, it might have endured far beyond 1945.

Between the extremes of support and opposition to Nazism, existed a dimly-lit terrain inhabited by the great majority of Germans. When we ask what the German people thought and did during the years from 1933 to 1945, the results are disheartening. Traditional institutions, like the Catholic and Protestant churches, the civil service (especially the police, the judiciary, and the educational system), and the military, made no significant effort to oppose Nazism. Indeed, studies of both civil structures and elites present a uniformly depressing picture of the best and the brightest of German society serving the Hitlerian state, often with distinction. Support from almost all Germans enabled Germany to fight against the combined forces of the United States, the Soviet Union, England and, at one time or another, most of Europe. But it is still unclear how many Germans were supporting Nazism or merely defending their homes and country in 1945.

Certainly, military defeat came as no surprise. The invasion of Russia in 1941 ushered in a period in which a brief spurt of euphoria quickly turned into widespread pessimism and ultimately a palpable mood of defeat long before the final surrender in 1945.<sup>3</sup> Shortages of all kinds combined with large-scale loss of life led to growing dissatisfaction and even some popular resistance in isolated areas. Faced with military failure on the heels of years of sacrifice, many Germans undoubtedly yearned for an end to war as well as for an end to Nazism. Even many Nazis had second thoughts as the war wound down. Then and later German observers and

participants called the end of the war the *Stunde Null* or Zero Hour. Unlike its military or English meanings, Zero Hour did not indicate the hour of attack, but rather the end of one era and the beginning of another. The oft-used phrase indicated that Germans and Germany had hit bottom in 1945.<sup>4</sup>

Cessation of hostilities in April 1945 left Germany not only militarily prostrate and occupied by large foreign armies, but also economically devastated, overpopulated by millions of refugees, and lacking even the most basic of local governmental structures and services. Germany had become little more than an indeterminate land area in which ungoverned, starving, unemployed people spoke the same language. That they had brought this situation on themselves did not lessen the chaos, satisfy the hunger, or shed light on the future. In this climate the eminent philosopher Karl Jaspers wrote: "The 'German essence'—it is indeed the language and only the language...But that is no small thing, and it would be wonderful if German were still spoken and written somewhere in the world in future centuries. That is no longer a sure thing."<sup>5</sup>

In one sense, of course, there was never a Zero Hour in Germany. For the survivors, life went on under all of the occupying powers. Some Germans warmly greeted the conquering armies as the bearers of peace, others held their own peace and waited. But, in one very real, practical sense, Germany came to an end in 1945: for the next four years there was no German state. In the interim Germans lived under the military governments of four separate zones run by the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France.

In addition to attempting to secure at least a minimal subsistence level for the people within their jurisdiction, the allies undertook much of the burden of administering the daily affairs of German society. In varying degrees, and for different reasons, all four allies simultaneously began to organize the reconstruction of the German economy, the reestablishment of services, and the reintroduction of political life.

Because of the enormously destructive course of World War II, especially of the Holocaust, it was natural for the allies to seek to bring the perpetrators of military aggression and human extermination to trial. In part this occurred at the International Tribunal at Nuremberg, which began on 20 November 1945 and ended in September 1946, with the judgment of twenty-four major war criminals. In addition, the Tribunal convicted groups, particularly the SS (the *Schutzstaffeln*, essentially a

separate institution designed to protect and further Nazi goals) and the Gestapo (the *Geheime Staatspolizei* or security police), while acquitting others, among them the SA (the *Sturmabteilungen* or activist part of the Nazi party), the General Staff of the military, and the Cabinet. This was a judicial process in which the courts used traditional rules of law and evidence, indicting individuals who could be accused of specific crimes. The process continues even today because laws prohibiting prosecution of crimes after twenty years were lifted by law in 1969 for war crimes.

Trial in a court of law was the highest level of denazification, but one which affected the smallest number of people. Lesser action outside the courts in special tribunals was taken against a much larger number of people. As early as 7 July 1945 the allies ruled that officials of the Nazi party or state, and especially of the SS and SA, were to be excluded from a wide variety of civil and economic positions. Eventually, a questionnaire was distributed to all Germans over 18 years of age asking 131 questions about their participation in the Third Reich (see Appendix: *Der Fragebogen*). Respondents were then assigned to one of five categories: "major offender", "offender", "lesser offender", "followers", and "exonerated".

Processing the responses to the questionnaire proved to be a massive logistic problem, especially so as thirteen million people returned them in the United States zone alone by 1950. Of the six million cases then decided, 1,700 people were classified as major offenders, 23,000 as offenders, 150,000 as lesser offenders, one million as followers, and 1.2 million were exonerated. The majority of those who filled out questionnaires were never charged. In March 1946 the occupying powers turned over the task of judging the responses to the individual German states, like Bavaria, which were again operating. Thus denazification was a joint allied and German process: largely allied in conception, but both allied and German in execution.<sup>6</sup>

Exoneration often occurred because the occupying powers, themselves hard-pressed to pay the continuing costs of victory, needed to return the German economy and society to self-sustaining status. Excluding large numbers of skilled administrators, teachers, engineers, physicians and others, would have made it extremely difficult to achieve that goal. Even the Communists in the east in 1952 amnestied all ex-Nazis who were not war criminals. In the west, the entire process suffered from problems

ranging from corruption to ignorance. Denazification made it possible to protect society from the worst Nazis, but it stopped well short of excluding all former Nazis from influential positions.

Denazification evolved in varying ways in the four zones, reflecting the fact of military government by very different states. Territorially, "Germany" existed in several different pieces in 1945. Initially, the allies divided most of the country into three zones of occupation controlled by the United States, England, and the Soviet Union. Later, France claimed a role as occupier and was given a part of the U.S. zone. Berlin, the capital, surrounded by the Soviet zone, became a microcosm of the country as a whole, when it too was divided into four zones of occupation. Some of pre-1945 Germany lay outside these zones. Austria, forcibly annexed in 1938, returned to its pre-1938 independent status. Other territory was returned or given to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Russia. Allied planning for victory began during wartime and the idea of zones of occupation emerged as early as 1943 and was agreed to at the Yalta Conference in the Crimea in February 1945. These agreements established the principle of zones of military administration only of that part of Germany lying west of the Oder and Neisse rivers. Territory to the east of those rivers was to become part of a new Polish state, excepting only a small piece of land around the city of Königsberg, which became part of the USSR. Territory west of the Oder and Neisse was to be German, and was originally divided into three zones of occupation. Thus the post-war Polish and German states shared a joint rebirth (at Yalta), as well as a new common border (the Oder/Neisse rivers). Final decision depended on a peace settlement which only came to pass nearly a half century later.

While the allies reached agreement generally, if loosely, on the future size of Germany and on the borders between Poland and Germany, it proved impossible to find common ground on how the rest of Germany ought to be formed into a single country and with what sort of internal political arrangements. Initial choice of the borders of the zones of military occupation reflected western belief that the Russian military advance would be quicker than actually took place—giving the USSR a bigger territorial share than the British and Americans. Each country's military was to have jurisdiction in each zone. The Allied Control Commission was created as a forum in which the four states could meet, discuss issues, and agree on solutions. All decisions affecting more than one zone had to be unanimous. At various times all four zonal governments set and

implemented policies individually and all were, at one time or another, in conflict with the others. The most uncooperative zone was the eastern one under Soviet administration.

Even if the allies had worked together well, operation of the former German economy would have been difficult. Raw materials needed in the east lay in the west and much of the transportation infrastructure (railroads, roads, bridges) no longer existed, to say nothing of badly-needed trains, barges, and trucks or the fuel to power them. Food was in short supply everywhere and at first had to be provided by the allies. A very large portion of the personnel needed in hospitals, police stations, and schools, to name only three widely different examples, were dead, had fled, or were excluded because of their Nazi past. All four victors faced serious economic problems of their own at home. In addition to these problems, cooperation became nearly impossible because of growing conflict among the victors and especially between the western allies and the USSR in what came to be called the Cold War.

The Cold War refers to the nearly constant state of friction between the United States and her allies and the USSR and her allies in the decades after 1945. Peaks of antagonism over specific issues occurred in 1948 (in the form of western currency reform, the Soviet blockade of Berlin, and subsequent U.S. airlift), in 1953 (when Russian troops put down protests in the Soviet zone), in 1956 (when Russians crushed the Hungarian revolution), in 1961 (when the Soviets built a wall separating east and west Berlin), and in 1968 (when Russian troops crushed the Czech reformers). More simply, the Cold War was a non-military conflict between two military superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, each possessing nuclear weapons; the tension expressed itself in a war of ideologies pitting capitalism and democracy against socialized production and communism. The ideological conflict was not new, dating back to the successful Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Concrete differences also caused friction. Russian suffering in World War II was much greater than that of the United States (by a factor of about 25 to 1 in terms of deaths) and, at war's end, the Red Army controlled most of eastern Europe as well as part of Germany. Defeated and divided, Germany was an obvious bone of contention because it was the largest and potentially the strongest conquered state as well as because of its central location in Europe. Initially Germany was seen as a prize to be won by either west or east, and it became a participant in the struggle.

As early as 1945 it was clear that agreement between the superpowers on the creation of a new German state would not be easy. Meetings of the representatives of the four occupying powers in the Allied Control Commission moved from practical agreement on emergency measures to increasingly sterile exchanges between two sides who said less and less. This was the climate that led to Winston Churchill's famous speech of 5 March 1946 in Fulton, Missouri, in which he dubbed the border between east and west Germany an "iron curtain." But diplomatic stalemate alone did not create the problems that separated east and west in Germany. Implementation of policies and programs in all four zones had a major impact on popular attitudes toward what soon became two separate states, East and West Germany.

Political life emerged remarkably quickly, at least at the local level. Conservative, Liberal, Socialist, and Communist parties were soon to be found in all of the zones, including the Soviet. The SPD (Social Democratic Party) and the KPD (Communist Party) retained their original party names, while Liberals changed their party's name to the Free Democratic Party (FDP) in the west and to the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPD) in the east. Protestant and Catholic conservatives adopted a new name, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), and established an alliance with the largely Catholic Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU). In April 1946 in the Soviet zone, the Communists forced a reluctant SPD to merge with the KPD under a new name, the Socialist Unity party (SED). After failing to win a clear majority in the October 1946 elections, and under intense Soviet pressure, the SED became more and more communist and less and less social democratic. Simultaneously, the other parties, while tolerated, were limited to small and ineffective roles. The change from a relatively open to a closed political system in the Russian zone combined with relative prosperity in the western zones, caused many people to flee to the west.

The occupying powers allowed or encouraged particular types of expropriation to occur. In the Soviet zone the Russians desired reparations, agreed to at Yalta, much of which they extracted in kind. The Soviets shipped about 1,400 industrial concerns from their zone to Russia by the end of 1946 and converted another 200 into Soviet Joint Stock Companies. In the countryside, the Soviets expropriated some 2.5 million hectares (1 hectare = 2.5 acres) from 7,000 estate owners, many of them nobles, and confiscated about 600,000 additional hectares from prominent Nazis in

September of 1945. About two-thirds of this land was given to rural laborers, while the remainder was held by local authorities. Workers' committees seized some businesses. On 30 June 1946, seventy-five percent of voters in a plebiscite approved the nationalization of firms and enterprises which had profited from the war or were owned by war criminals.<sup>7</sup> As in politics, these economic measures also caused many more people to flee to the west.

In the west, political life under allied military government leaned to the right rather than the left. Results from late 1946 and early 1947 in the form of several state (*Länder*) elections showed that the conservative and religious CDU/CSU was the strongest single party, averaging about 38% of the vote, while the SPD was competitive at about 35%. The remaining major parties, the KPD (9.4%) and FDP (9.3%), trailed badly and the other small parties together accounted for about 8.7% of the total. In the western zones, non-meat food production reached 89% of pre-war levels by 1947. Industrial growth was slower, increasing only to about 70-75% of pre-war levels in late 1947. Food was in even shorter supply in the east than in the west and the USSR was less able and willing to provide supplies from its own stocks.

After more than a year of stalemate and slow progress toward reconstituting a Germany productive enough to relieve the allies of the cost of occupation, Britain and the United States decided in the summer of 1946 to create inter-zonal cooperation on economic matters. This decision conflicted with the agreement on unanimous quadripartite rule. Joint economic administration of the British and American zones began on 1 January 1947 as a pragmatic economic move which also reflected a fundamental re-thinking of the nature of the future Germany. In Cold War terms, an economically strong, democratic West Germany could be a potentially powerful addition to the western confrontation of the USSR. Plans for dismantling the German industrial structure, openly proposed in 1943 by the American Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, had already been shelved in 1944. On 12 March 1947, President Harry Truman laid down the essentials of the Truman Doctrine—a policy to “contain” the spread of Communism. On 5 June Secretary of State George C. Marshall told Harvard graduates that the United States should help finance European economic recovery. A “stable and prosperous” Germany was seen as vital to such a program. Russia, eastern Europe, and the Soviet zone rejected Marshall Plan aid, ostensibly because the United States

insisted on a market economy, but also out of fear that western aid might undermine Soviet authority. The Cold War was in full swing.

All of the reasons that led the British and American planners to cooperate, angered the Soviets. When, in June of 1948, the United States, England, and France decided to introduce joint currency reform in their zones in order to create a dependable money supply and to eliminate barter as well as to encourage a wider market economy, the Soviets responded. Following bi-zonal economic cooperation, the Marshall Plan, and the Truman Doctrine, the Soviets evidently saw creation of a stable and common currency excluding the Soviet zone, as coming too close to German unity in the west only. Four days after the currency reform of 20 June 1948, the Soviet Union began to limit all communication with the city of Berlin. The Soviets eventually established an effective blockade of all ground and water transit into and out of Berlin. The chance of war occurring as the result of an armed clash was great and increased sharply as air routes were threatened.

Yet, on 12 May 1949, after eleven months of tense stalemate, Russia lifted the blockade. In retrospect the Russian actions appear to have been part of a strategy designed to protest against the development of a west German state. If so, it failed. Berlin, released from blockade, was obviously not the issue. Nor could the allies have sustained the city at minimal levels much longer without losing a large part of the population. Yet in the process Berlin became a symbol of resistance and democracy, an ironic shift from its former image as the capital of Hitler's Third Reich.

The blockade of Berlin and subsequent military airlift to supply the western half of the city (277,000 flights) not only did not preclude further moves toward the establishment of a west German state—it seems to have ensured that such would occur. During the airlift, the SED became more Stalinist. And, in the west, a parliamentary council of representatives of the parliaments of the individual states (*Länder*) met to draw up a constitution, known as the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*). The western representatives voted approval of the new constitution on 8 May 1949 and four days later the Soviets ended the blockade of Berlin. The first national elections since 1933 were set for 14 August 1949 in the west.

Just over three-quarters of eligible voters in the three western zones cast ballots, the lowest turnout to date in the history of the West German state.

The combined conservative parties of the CDU/CSU won 31%, while voters gave the SPD 29.2%. The two smaller parties, the liberal FDP and communist KPD, received 11.9% and 5.7% respectively. A disturbingly large 22% of votes cast went to a wide array of splinter parties. In the resulting parliament, a majority could only be obtained through coalition and Konrad Adenauer (CDU) finally succeeded in negotiating, an alliance of the CDU/CSU, FDP, and several smaller right-wing parties; he became chancellor by a bare majority of one. Less than a month later, on 7 October 1949, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) became the de facto state in the east zone.

Like every major aspect of life after 1945, new constitutions in West and East Germany reflected their makers' sense of future needs as well as key lessons from the past.<sup>8</sup> At first glance, the Basic Law in the west resembled pre-1933 Germany: a president, a chancellor responsible to parliament, and two houses of parliament, one of which was to be elected by universal suffrage based on a system of proportional representation. But, cautious about the dangers of too much executive power after Hitler, Hindenburg, and Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Basic Law established a much weaker presidency: the president was to be elected by a federal assembly composed of the Bundestag and representatives of the parties in the member states rather than by national election. Moreover, the president did not possess the right to suspend the constitution in an emergency. Additionally, each of the member states (*Länder*) possessed substantial autonomy. Represented in the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*), the states have a part in the legislative process and, in a few areas, veto power.

Daily conduct of government again was vested in a chancellor, but that post was now surrounded by a series of protections against misuse. Citizens in the new state possessed rights, specifically laid out in the Basic Law, which could not be changed even by constitutional amendment. Moreover, the Basic Law created a Federal Constitutional Court to protect both the rights of the people and the document itself. Because it had been too easy for opponents to topple governments in the 1920s, the Basic Law limited a vote of "no confidence" to opponents who could present a replacement chancellor at the time of the vote. The electoral law of 1956 provided for a modified form of proportional representation (the De Hondt system); included was a specific proviso that parties could only sit in the federal parliament (*Bundestag*) if they obtained over 5% of the popular vote nationwide. Here, the drafters clearly remembered not only

the fragmented nature of politics in the twenties, but were alert to the existence of a myriad of small parties in 1947-48. The member states (*Länder*) received, both individually and collectively, jurisdiction to act separately from the national government.

In the Russian zone, planning for a new state evidently began in 1947 or even earlier, but always followed western actions in a reactive fashion. A draft constitution was approved on 19 March 1949 and submitted to the Peoples' Congress on 25 May. Delegates came from two sources: first, from elections in which the SED was assigned 25% of the seats, with 45% going to the other parties [15% each to the CDU and LDPD, 7.5% each to the NDPD (a nationalist party) and the Peasant party]; the remaining 30% were filled by delegates from the Trade Unions and the Free German youth, both of which had become so strongly controlled by communists that the CDU and LDPD withdrew from participation in January 1948. So the SED dominated and the elections were not free.

The constitution that emerged was in a few ways similar to the western document: a president was to be elected by parliament, which in turn was to be elected by universal suffrage. But there were basic differences both in theory and practice. Instead of two legislative houses, only one, a Peoples' Chamber (*Volkskammer*), existed in the German Democratic Republic. There was no representation of the states, no separate association of *Länder*, and, after 1952, no more *Länder* as they were abolished and became instead simple administrative districts. The prime minister, the equivalent of the chancellor, was to be drawn from the strongest party rather than from a majority in the parliament. In a system designed to give the SED dominance, the chancellorship was never competitive. Voting was not by secret ballot and the constitution contained no "human" rights, but only citizen rights. While these rights were guaranteed, they could be modified by legislation. In practice, unlike the west, no political party or segment of a party ever challenged the SED. But the popular uprising of 17 June 1953 and the flight of millions to the west testified to the existence of broad popular dissatisfaction with the GDR.

By 1949 all of the major elements of both the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic were in place. Few changes occurred after 1949 and there was no basic reform of either until 1989. None was expected. For four decades, from 1949 to 1989, two German states confronted each other where before there had been one. The Federal

Republic of Germany defined itself as both democratic and capitalistic, while recognizing the social needs of its citizens. Although clearly dictatorial, the German Democratic Republic insisted that it was also democratic, but socialistic in its economic organization. Each was strongly influenced by a superpower with sizable foreign armies in residence.

In 1949 the question "what to do with Germany?" had been answered, if only partially: Germany had been divided. But it remained unclear whether this territorial, economic, and ideological division was viable and would in the course of time produce separate cultures based on differing historical memories. The following essays deal with the development of the two Germanies and help us to understand the extent to which they grew apart or together.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Hans Speier, *From the Ashes of Disgrace. A Journal from Germany: 1945-1955* (Amherst, Mass., University of Massachusetts Press, 1981), 24ff.
- <sup>2</sup> Gordon A. Craig, *Germany: 1866-1945* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1978), 566-68.
- <sup>3</sup> Marlis G. Steinert, *Hitler's War and the Germans. Public Mood and Attitude During the Second World War* Trans. by The. E. J. DeWitt (Athens, Ohio, 1977), esp. chapters 3 and 4.
- <sup>4</sup> Mary Fulbrook, *The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918-1990* (New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), 1, 12, 357.
- <sup>5</sup> Karl Jaspers to Hannah Arendt, Heidelberg, January 1, 1947, in Lotte Kohler and Hans Sner, eds., *Hannah Arendt. Karl Jaspers. Correspondence: 1926-1969* (New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992), 71-72.
- <sup>6</sup> V. R. Berghahn, *Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, second edition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987), 185-87, and Fulbrook, *Divided Nation*, 141-50.
- <sup>7</sup> Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, 92-94.
- <sup>8</sup> H. W. Koch, *A Constitutional History of Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London, Longman, 1974), and C.C. Schweitzer, et al, eds., *Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Documents* (Leamington Spa, Berg, 1984).



# The Re-Birth of Democracy in Germany

by Rebecca Boehling

## Introduction

This essay will explore political developments in both East and West Germany from the Allied occupation until the (re)unification of Germany in 1990. Although its primary structure will be chronological, it will also use a thematic approach to examine the development of democracy in German political life. These themes will include the structural patterns set during the occupation period, development of the governing structures as set up in the constitutions, the political parties and their leading personalities, the dependence of the two German states on their former occupiers and erstwhile superpower allies, and the attempts by various German groups and social movements to promote change, sometimes for democratic purposes and sometimes not, as well as the government's responses to these attempts. These developments will be explored in the context of how they have either furthered or limited democratization at different stages in German postwar history. More emphasis will be placed on the Federal Republic of Germany than on the German Democratic Republic, due to the more complex levels of legal political interaction in the West.

The Yalta and Potsdam Agreements of 1945 divided Germany into four zones of occupation, each administered by one of the Big Three Allied victors and France. Decisions affecting more than one zone were to be quadripartite and unanimous, with an Allied Control Council sitting in Berlin, which was also to be divided into four sectors, although the city itself formed a Four-Power-controlled island in the midst of the Soviet

zone of occupation. The four principal policies to be pursued by all four Allied Military Governments were the so-called "Four D's" of denazification, demilitarization, decartelization, and democratization.

Each occupying power used its native national norms, to some extent, as the standard for the democratization of Germany. The British tended to approach their Military Government administration somewhat more from a perspective related to their imperial/colonial experiences and in a less interventionist way. The French did not try very hard to transfer French political institutions to German soil because they were more pessimistic about positively converting the "boche" than either the Americans, with their almost missionary zeal, or the Soviets. The Soviets were determined to reeducate Germans so as not to risk German aggression again nor to pass up this opportunity to include Germans in their sphere of influence for security and economic purposes. Ultimately, the United States' occupation policy prevailed on most matters in the three western zones, especially after the 1947 economic unification of the British and American zones. The Soviets often countered actions of the Western Allies, like the 1948 trizonal currency reform, which contradicted the agreement that all matters affecting more than one zone had to be unanimous, with strong reactions like the blockade of Berlin. Political decisions inside the zones were often responses by one zone to the actions of another.

The Germans themselves did have some influence upon their occupiers. Due to language difficulties, transfers and shortages of qualified Military Government personnel, and financial pressures to have the occupation costs reduced to a minimum, the allies in the western zones used Germans to implement occupation policies and to fulfill most of the tasks of reconstruction. Germans appointed to oversee reconstruction often had quite a bit of leeway in their implementation of Allied policies, and many Germans were able to maneuver around the orders of the occupation officers.

Career military men and the technical experts in the U.S. Military Government stressed alleviating material concerns and carrying out administrative tasks as expeditiously as possible, more than they focused on the more time-consuming and unfamiliar work of facilitating democratic structural reforms. This emphasis on getting things running again was understandable given the amount of destruction and chaos at the end of the war. It created, however, a predilection among Military

Government officers to value administrative experience and technical expertise in Germans rather than their democratic potential. Thus, the Germans who were likely to be selected for key posts were first and foremost those with experience and expertise in administration, even though that experience could only have been acquired either during the Third Reich or before 1933.

Intervention from occupation authorities in charge of implementing the denazification policy generally prevented Military Government officers from relying upon Germans with prominent Nazi pasts. But this does not mean that they appointed activist anti-fascists to key posts. Anti-Nazis rarely had acquired administrative experience during the Third Reich. Those who did were older Germans with pre-1933 administrative or political experience who had been marginalized during the Third Reich or even incarcerated, so that they were often neither physically nor emotionally energetic enough to play active roles in the postwar period. Younger anti-fascist Germans formed the core of the activists eagerly welcoming the Allies; but beyond the fact that there was a severe shortage of 20-50 year-old men, young anti-fascists often lacked administrative or technical expertise and experience. Such young anti-fascists expressed idealistic hopes for a so-called "Third Way" for postwar Germany, a kind of humanistic democratic socialism that would avoid both the dictatorial nature of Stalinist communism and the socio-economic inequalities of capitalism.<sup>1</sup>

Americans often preferred more pragmatic Germans over activist anti-Nazis who seemed to have their own explicit political agenda for change. The less overtly political Germans, who often had managed to retain administrative posts during the Third Reich, generally appeared more familiar to the American officers. As a result, the U.S. officers showed favoritism toward such pragmatic German experts. This favoritism was reinforced later by Cold War tensions because anti-Nazis were often connected to the political parties of the left, while these pragmatic experts were more often from centrist or right of center parties. The bias against anti-fascists and leftists in the early appointments of 1945 had more to do with perceptions of experience and efficiency in accomplishing material recovery, than with Cold War politics *per se*.<sup>2</sup>

The first appointed German officials in the U.S. zone were usually mayors, who more often than not were centrist or politically right of center.

Although political activities of all sorts were prohibited until August 1945, these mayors typically relied on the leading politicians of the former non-Nazi parties in their communities for advisory city councilors and even department heads. This gave an advantage to older and established politicians by recreating their parties from the top down and ultimately disadvantaging new political constellations which could not form until after the ban.

Occupation authorities required the licensing of political parties, privileging those parties already represented informally in the advisory city councils, who were able to get their lists together first. There was also a clear American bias towards the parties of the Weimar Republic, whether they retained the same names, such as the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the German Communist Party (KPD), or consolidated themselves from old parties. For example, the party of economic liberalism and individual rights, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), combined elements of the older liberal and middle-of-the-road parties. So, too, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) sought to include all Christians rather than just Catholics as the Center Party of the pre-1933 period had done. Germans in these restored and newly consolidated parties as well as occupation authorities were wary of completely new parties, especially if their members lacked political profiles prior to 1933. The British and U.S. occupation authorities were also leery of licensing too many parties, because they were accustomed to two and three party systems, as well as because of warnings about the destructive role played by the multi-party system in the collapse of the Weimar Republic. Postwar West German politics witnessed a large extent of continuity with the political party structures and personnel hierarchies of the Weimar Republic.<sup>3</sup>

Many Germans questioned the role of large-scale industry and capitalism in the Nazi regime. Initially the SPD, KPD, and even the CDU agreed about the need for some form of socialism in postwar Germany. In Frankfurt am Main in 1945, the newly founded Christian Democratic Union (CDU) all but swore off capitalism in its early program formulations, while as late as February 1947 the CDU's Ahlen Program in the British Zone represented a mixture of Catholic social teachings, some elements of a liberal market, and other elements of a socialized economy. The CDU's emerging leader, Konrad Adenauer, made sure that this Christian-Socialist influence would not last long; by 1949 the CDU's Düsseldorf Program stressed a more traditional free market economy with

some welfare state provisions.<sup>4</sup> The Marshall Plan, first announced in 1947, the economic consolidation of the British and U.S. zones that same year, and the 1948 trizonal currency reform signalled clearly the capitalist direction the western Allies expected the German economy to take.

In the early phase of the occupation period, frequent KPD-SPD working groups cooperated in trying to find common ground. However, forces within the SPD, in particular its rapidly emerging leader in the British zone, Kurt Schumacher, had clear-cut anti-Communist biases and discouraged cooperation with the KPD. In fact, under Schumacher's leadership, SPD members were threatened with exclusion from the party if they continued such cooperation.<sup>5</sup> The SPD leadership's behavior corresponded well with the increasingly anti-Soviet and anti-Communist attitudes of the western allies.

The combination of Cold War tensions, the western allies' anti-Communist policies, and increasingly explicit west German anti-Communism lent credence to the red-baiting policies of Social Democrats like Schumacher, but it also stifled opportunities for reform from below or for fresh new policies within the SPD, whether they were explicitly leftist or not. The SPD was more likely to use the particular weapon of accusations of "fellow-travelling" than other parties because of its position on the left and its vulnerability to charges that socialism was merely a step away from communism. Of course the CDU was always ready to exploit this vulnerability to its own advantage both with the occupation authorities and the German public.

In the Soviet zone of occupation authorities demonstrated a clear-cut political preference for the KPD (German Communist Party), which received more supplies and campaigning materials than the other parties in preparation for the first elections in 1945.<sup>6</sup> Within the KPD, the Soviets preferred those Communists who had been in exile in the Soviet Union and specifically trained for their postwar political roles over those who had been incarcerated by the Nazis or who had gone underground in Germany. Whereas the former had definite allegiances to Stalin and Stalinist Communism, the latter were more likely to promote a humanistic communism, independent of the Soviet Union.

When it became apparent in the late 1945 local elections that the KPD could not win mass electoral support in competition with an independent

SPD, the Soviets placed pressure on the SPD to merge with the KPD. A conservative CDU and an economically liberal LDPD, the counterpart to the Free Democratic Party in the western zones, also were founded in the Soviet zone, as were two Communist puppet parties used to attract peasants and right-wing nationalists. In April 1946 the Soviets forced the SPD to merge with the KPD, resulting in a number of leading Social Democrats opting to move to the western zones and in KPD control over the newly merged party, the Socialist Unity Party, or SED.

Despite the formal existence of a multi-party system in the east, the SED became more and more the political organ of the state. It initiated Soviet policies in the Soviet zone and later in the GDR. A fair amount of tolerance for other political views and for debate existed in the early SED, but by the late 1940s real political pluralism disappeared due to Soviet Cold War policies towards Eastern Europe and a tendency to smother democracy under a Marxist-Leninist-style democratic centralism.<sup>7</sup>

In both the British and the U.S. zones the occupational authorities showed a clear preference for the parties of the right. In states and localities with SPD majorities, attempts to introduce socialist-oriented aspects of a mixed economy encountered U.S. Military Government opposition. In Hessen the U.S. Military Governor prevented the implementation of a nationalization clause in the constitution. This took place despite a 71.9% referendum vote for the inclusion of a clause in the Hessian constitution providing for the nationalization of heavy industry and energy resources. The U.S. Military Governor had required this plebiscite hoping that the clause's inclusion would lose.<sup>8</sup> The American occupation authorities excused their prevention of the clause's implementation on the grounds that such policies would affect the entire country and should be postponed until the zones were united. When the western Allies wanted reforms that had little or ambivalent German support, as in the case of the reduction of the rights and privileges of the tenured civil service or in the case of denazification once its implementation was turned over to the Germans, elected German officials and administrators often bypassed the occupiers' wishes. Their most successful tactic was to postpone crucial binding decisions until after either the occupiers had become frustrated, as in the case of denazification in the U.S. zone, or until the Germans themselves had acquired enough autonomy to implement their own policies, as in the restoration of the professional civil service after 1949 in the Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>9</sup>

The occupiers in the western zones did have significant influence upon the political and economic structure of West Germany. The early preference shown for those Germans with the experience to implement the measures necessary for an expedient economic recovery and administrative efficiency gave them definite political advantages over those who had been unable to fall into the good graces of the Allies. This political advantage was not absolutely decisive in terms of holding political office once elections were restored; however, without at least the implicit support of the occupation authorities on issues that were of high priority to the Allies, such as economic recovery, groups or individuals were unlikely to be able to overcome the resistance from the occupation authorities.

East-West tensions and the increasingly different political and socio-economic developments in the western and Soviet zones culminated in the division of Germany. When the June 1948 currency reform was introduced in the three western zones, threatening to further weaken the currency in the Soviet zone, especially in Berlin, the Soviets responded with a blockade of all land routes into and out of that city. But Stalin's hopes of preventing the establishment of a sound German state under western auspices were thwarted when the British and Americans airlifted food, fuel, and medicines to Berlin for almost a year. Realizing that an attack on western aircraft would spell war, Stalin lifted the blockade in May 1949, just as the Basic Law<sup>10</sup>, establishing the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was ratified by all of the western German states except Bavaria. The western allies quickly approved it. Five months later the Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic. In 1949 two Germanies existed, although neither initially acknowledged the formal existence of the other.

## **Political Normalization and Conservatism in the Early Federal Republic**

The 1949 constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany consciously drew upon the Weimar constitution of 1919 while compensating for some of the latter's weaknesses.<sup>11</sup> Besides a list of civil rights, the Basic Law included a specific prohibition against the (mis-) use of rights of free expression by any individual or group advocating anti-Semitism, racism, or the overthrow of democratic government.<sup>12</sup> Whereas the constitution affirmed public support for institutions like the family and the church, it

did not include the list of socio-economic rights which the SPD had advocated, such as joint labor-management control of major corporations and the right to work. The Basic Law did possess a formal equal rights provision for men and women, although the civil code restricted women's rights in many ways. Abortion, except in very exceptional cases, remained outlawed. The states retained a number of specific powers, such as control of all public education and the control of the upper house of the legislative branch, the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*), whose members are selected by the state legislatures and which has certain powers to veto, amend, and delay legislation. A completely new Federal Constitutional Court, modeled largely after the U.S. Supreme Court, has complete jurisdiction over all issues of constitutionality of federal, state, and local laws as well as administrative acts and international treaties.<sup>13</sup>

Konrad Adenauer, who had chaired the Parliamentary Council that wrote the Basic Law, was elected the first chancellor of West Germany, by a one-vote majority. Adenauer had been the Center (Catholic) Party mayor of Cologne during the Weimar Republic and again during the early days of the occupation and had been incarcerated briefly twice for his opposition to the Nazis. The coalition of the CDU and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the FDP, which elected him, provided a ruling majority until 1957 and again from 1961 to 1966. From 1957 to 1961, the CDU/CSU enjoyed a four-year period of majority rule without the necessity of alliance with the FDP. Adenauer remained chancellor until 1963, when he retired at the ripe age of 87. His personality and political decisions shaped the contours of the CDU and the Federal Republic.

Adenauer and his Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, were responsible for the "social market economy," an economic policy combining a competitive capitalism with certain elements of a social net and a minimum standard of living for all citizens. Together with capital from the Marshall Plan, these are often seen as the primary causes behind the economic recovery of the mid- to late 1950s known as the "Economic Miracle." The 1952 Equalization of Burdens Law, which attempted to balance out some of the inequities caused by war-time losses to property,<sup>14</sup> and the 1953 Refugee Law, which provided for housing and job training for ethnic Germans expelled from Eastern Europe and for quotas for the distribution of refugees among the various states, reflected an attempt to redistribute war-related burdens, although not wealth as such. Additional economics-related policies which furthered postwar West German

democracy were the Co-determination Law of 1951 and the Works Constitution Law of 1952. Against considerable employer opposition and with minimal support from the ruling CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, all joint stock companies in the coal and steel industries with over 1,000 employees<sup>15</sup> were required to have workers' representatives on the boards of directors and all enterprises with more than twenty employees were supposed to have works councils. These provisions for workers' participation in firms' decisions have been credited by some observers for West Germany's relatively low strike record.

In terms of foreign policy, Adenauer, who felt convinced of the dangerous threat of an invasion from the Soviet Union, supported the Americans' plans to rearm Germany and to include West Germany in NATO, despite the fact that West German public opinion was strongly opposed to rearming. Adenauer prevented a plebiscite from being held on rearmament, actually labelling plebiscite supporters as Communists or Communist sympathizers. In the atmosphere of Cold War tensions during and following the Korean War, Adenauer worked closely with the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, John J. McCloy,<sup>16</sup> in negotiating a policy of German rearmament and integration into NATO as well as an amnesty policy for Nazi war criminals.

In 1952 the West Germans made provisions for financial compensations to Jews persecuted by the Nazi regime. By 1966 \$820 million had been paid out to Holocaust survivors and their heirs. In 1953 the FRG established a special office in Ludwigsburg to track down and prosecute Nazi war criminals and an Institute for Contemporary History in Munich to research the Third Reich.

The economic prosperity that was achieved by the late 1950s made many Germans more likely to accept the FRG's democratic parliamentary structure, although the slogan, "Prosperity makes you free," well describes the limited extent of the positive ideological commitment to democracy of many Germans in the 1950s and 1960s. The 1950s also saw more and more former Nazis returning to their old civil service positions and playing more active roles in the FDP and CDU/CSU, including even a cabinet member under Adenauer.<sup>17</sup>

Anti-communism, long prevalent among the German middle and upper classes, grew under Cold War stimulation and was used to help West

Germans grow accustomed to the division of their country. The decision in 1956 to outlaw the KPD on the basis of its hostility to the constitution did not hurt the popularity of the Adenauer government; in fact the CDU/CSU received its first and only absolute majority in the ensuing 1957 elections. The SED practice of Marxism in East Germany was used by the political right to discredit the SPD. After their losses in the 1957 elections, the SPD abandoned any semblance of Marxism, even its rhetoric. The SPD also moved away from its working-class identification in an attempt to become more of a people's party (*Volkspartei*).<sup>18</sup>

Adenauer's position within both the CDU and the country began to erode in the late 1950s. He wavered over stepping down from the chancellorship to take on the less demanding—and less powerful—position of president in 1959, ultimately deciding that there was no one of his calibre to replace him as chancellor. Three years later the so-called *Spiegel* Affair discredited the entire government. The weekly news magazine, *Der Spiegel*, published an article about the limited preparedness of West Germany's conventional forces in the event of a crisis. Adenauer's Defense Minister, the Christian Social Union leader, Franz-Josef Strauss, whose misconduct had long been a target of the liberal weekly, had the magazine's offices raided and eleven journalists arrested and charged with leaking defense secrets. After considerable pressure from its coalition partner, the FDP, and the public, Strauss was forced to resign, with Adenauer agreeing to retire in 1963.

Ludwig Erhard, Adenauer's Economics Minister, succeeded him as chancellor and promptly ran into serious difficulties in balancing the budget in the mid-1960s. Despite an electoral victory for the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in 1965, the FDP cabinet members resigned in October 1966 over Erhard's attempts to raise taxes. In the midst of the economic crisis, a neo-Nazi party, the NPD, increased its agitation and the left became more vocal in its criticism. In this atmosphere a "Grand Coalition" of the SPD and CDU/CSU was formed. The CDU's controversial Kurt Georg Kiesinger became chancellor, while the mayor of West Berlin, Willy Brandt (SPD), became Foreign Minister. Ironically, Kiesinger had been a Nazi party member from 1933 to 1945 while Brandt had engaged in the anti-Nazi resistance and fought against Germany while in exile in Scandinavia. In any case, the participation of the Social Democrats in the government signalled a new era in West German political history.<sup>19</sup>

## Stalinization, "Brain Drain" and Consolidation in the Early German Democratic Republic

The German Democratic Republic's first constitution embodied the principles of federalism and parliamentary democracy, and, like the FRG, borrowed entire sections directly from the Weimar constitution. But as SED party policy changed, the constitution was changed to conform to it—there were four separate constitutions during East Germany's forty-one year existence. The SED's Party congress, which met every four years and which was supposed to be elected by the membership-at-large, elected a Central Committee of between 150 and 200 members. The Central Committee, which made decisions when the Congress was not in session, also elected the *Politbüro*, whose members staffed posts which paralleled the major government ministries and offices. Ultimately, control rested in the hands of the *Politbüro*, which approved all the appointments in the leadership posts in the SED, the government, and the economy. For example, the *Politbüro* directly controlled the Ministry for State Security, known by its abbreviated German form as the *Stasi*.

The SED played a major role in almost all aspects of political, social, and economic life. In 1952 the five states of the GDR were replaced by fourteen districts, with all districts headed by an SED functionary. Major mass organizations, such as the labor unions, the youth organization, the women's organization, and the Association for German-Soviet Friendship, were crucial in spreading SED policy and by the early 1950s Stalinist ideology and membership in these organizations, as well as in the SED, was a stepping stone to any political career and most important jobs.

Walter Ulbricht, a KPD member of the Saxon legislature and the *Reichstag* during the Weimar Republic, who had spent the Third Reich period in exile in Prague, Brussels, Paris, Spain (in the Civil War), and Moscow, was the first General Secretary (later called the First Secretary) of the SED's Central Committee from 1950 until 1971.<sup>20</sup> Under Ulbricht's leadership, the SED fell more and more into line behind the Soviet Communist Party.<sup>21</sup> In 1950, for example, the SED membership was purged of advocates of a German path toward communism. These were often former KPD members, who had remained in Germany during the Third Reich and were more skeptical about following the Soviet line than those German Communists who had been in exile in Moscow.

The economy was quickly nationalized; the 200 industrial enterprises which had been taken over by the Soviets for reparations purposes became East German state companies in 1952. But the centralized economic system did not work well early on, partly due to the reparation losses. The result was that many GDR citizens, especially those with professions and technical expertise, left for the West. This population exodus, or brain drain, only worsened the economic situation.

The only significant social unrest prior to 1989 in the GDR were the demonstrations and strikes by construction workers which began as protests against workload increases in East Berlin on 17 June 1953. Soviet troops intervened the day after the unrest began after some East German police fraternized with the demonstrators. What had begun as an expression of economic discontent in East Berlin spread to numerous other East German cities and evolved into political demands for free parliamentary elections and, occasionally, for unification with West Germany.

Economic pressures eased after 1953, but any SED members suspected of supporting political reform like that attempted in Poland or Hungary in the mid-1950s were vulnerable to expulsion from the party or even arrest. As of December 1957 unauthorized trips outside of the GDR were considered a criminal offense. Khrushchev cooperated with the GDR leaders' attempts to stop the flow of refugees to the West by issuing an ultimatum to the western Big Three in late 1958, setting a six-months deadline for negotiations either to recognize West Berlin as a "free and independent political entity,"<sup>22</sup> or risk the Soviets turning the fate of West Berlin over to the GDR. The West did not demand the continuation of unrestricted travel between East and West Berlin, the Soviets were appeased, and Ulbricht prepared for his next move less fearful of Western intervention. In the wee hours of the morning of 13 August 1961 East Germany began constructing the Berlin Wall to prevent uncontrolled travel between East and West Berlin and to put a halt to the "brain drain." By the end of the year the GDR extended the barrier along the entire border between the two Germanies and reinforced it with electronic detection devices, land mines, and heavily armed guards. The flow of refugees stopped, except for those few risking daring escapes, and the GDR stabilized economically and politically as a result.<sup>23</sup>

The GDR began rearming at about the same time as the FRG, although conscription did not begin until 1962. The units of the East German

National People's Army were more integrated into the Warsaw Pact than the FRG's were into NATO. Like the FRG, the GDR did not have control over any nuclear weapons. The GDR was a strong advocate of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which reserved the right of the Soviet Union to intervene in "socialist" countries to protect "socialist" gains, both because of its disapproval of the 1968 Prague Spring and because of its hopes to get Soviet military support if East Germans revolted against the SED regime. Yet, when the West Germans under the Social Democrat, Willy Brandt, initiated a policy of understanding with the GDR and eastern Europe in 1969-70 and the Soviets were supportive, Ulbricht again threatened the status of West Berlin and demanded compensation from the BRD for "luring away its people."<sup>24</sup> Shortly thereafter a majority of the SED's *Politbüro* forced Ulbricht out of power. He continued to chair the State Council, a cabinet of sorts, until his death in August 1973, but his successor as First Secretary, Erich Honecker, made sure that the State Council no longer had any real power. Honecker's policy was a more subtle mix of cooperation and isolation.

## Political Transition: The First Postwar West German Generation Comes of Age

The late 1960s witnessed political changes in the FRG. A political shift to the left was due primarily to the SPD's successes under the leadership of Willy Brandt. The SPD's participation in cabinets from 1966 until 1982 signalled the realization of its plans to become a *Volkspartei*. Between 1960 and 1969 its party membership had changed from almost 56% to just under 40% blue-collar workers. A new, younger, more educated generation of SPD members and voters more than made up the difference and, especially after the collapse of the late 1960s student movement, a definite leftward ideological shift among younger members occurred as some of the disillusioned students moved into the party.

The younger generation, which had not lived through the Third Reich, challenged the compromises of expediency and the lack of confrontation with the Nazi past of their parent's generation. The lack of effective parliamentary opposition during the Grand Coalition (1966-1969) led to the development of an extra-parliamentary opposition (abbreviated APO) by the younger generation. After police in Berlin killed a student during a demonstration against the visit of the Shah of Iran, demonstrations spread

to almost all university towns to protest not only German police brutality, but also the authoritarian overcrowded educational system, bourgeois materialism, insufficient opportunities for democratic change, and the Vietnam War. While the largest mass circulation newspaper, *Bild Zeitung*, and the CDU/CSU called for even stronger measures to suppress student protests, political polarization deepened. When in April 1968 a near-successful assassination attempt was made upon the most popular leader of the extra-parliamentary opposition, a fringe student group firebombed a Frankfurt department store. The parliament responded with a series of emergency laws expanding the powers of the police to arrest demonstrators. Yet the APO was not completely isolated. The Justice Minister, Gustav Heinemann, a former Christian Democrat who joined the SPD after resigning from Adenauer's cabinet in 1950 to protest the rearmament plans, expressed understanding for the APO's concerns. When the time came to elect a new president in 1969, delegates from the SPD and the FDP joined together to elect Heinemann, signalling not only the SPD's dissatisfaction with the CDU/CSU's response to the students, but also the Free Democrats' opening to the left.

This SPD-FDP rapprochement culminated a few months later in the formation of a coalition government. The CDU/CSU responded to the 1968 events by stressing law and order in the unsuccessful election campaign of fall 1969, trying to capture the votes of the neo-Nazi NPD, which had grown in reaction to the student movement. This first SPD-FDP coalition stressed the need for judicial and educational reforms and civil rights as well as for new foreign policy initiatives, while playing down their significant economic policy differences.

Brandt headed the new cabinet and initiated reforms that worked toward creating a more open society and calmer relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1971 partly for this role in normalizing relations with Poland, including the formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the German-Polish border. This policy of *Ostpolitik* also opened up new opportunities for travel and exchanges with the GDR. The voters clearly appreciated these changes as reflected in the 1972 elections, when the SPD got almost as many votes as the CDU and, together with the small, but significant, FDP<sup>25</sup> had more than a 53% majority. Less than two years later, however, Brandt resigned in the midst of a spy scandal, which exposed one of his personal assistants as an East German agent.<sup>26</sup> A more conservative Social Democrat, Helmut

Schmidt, replaced him as chancellor. As Brandt's Minister of Defense and later his Finance Minister, and as Hamburg's Interior Minister, Schmidt was known as a tough administrator. His new Foreign Minister was the national chairperson of the FDP, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. The discontent expressed in the late 1960s student movement was not completely dispelled by an SPD-led government or by the educational and political reforms of the early 1970s. In 1972 the parliament passed a law aimed at radical students, requiring a political litmus test for civil servants, which in West Germany included all teachers. Although applied relatively infrequently, this examination of one's political conscience did little to convince APO members of the good intentions of the new SPD government and brought forth reminders of the Nazis' *Berufsverbot*, which had been used to exclude Jews and political opponents from public employment. It provoked serious concerns in the FRG and abroad about the spirit of democracy in West Germany.<sup>27</sup> Some APO members formed various Marxist splinter groups or joined the DKP, a new Communist party, which professed support of parliamentary democracy, but which had strong connections to the SED. An even smaller group formed a terrorist organization, the Red Army Faction (RAF), also called the Baader-Meinhof gang, after two of its leaders.

Initially focusing on the destruction of property to protest capitalist materialism, the RAF began to kidnap and murder prominent individuals in the economic and conservative political establishment. The tactics of the RAF were intended to provoke the state into reacting in ways that would make its criticism of the repressiveness of the system seem even more justified. In fact, the political situation did polarize as the state exercised new methods of search and seizure against suspected terrorists.

Police used repressive measures in cities like West Berlin as young demonstrators took to the streets to protest what they perceived as police state tactics. There was even a serious discussion of reintroducing the death penalty in the midst of the 1977 hijacking of a Lufthansa passenger plane intended to force the freeing of several RAF leaders from prison. Yet when an anti-terrorist unit liberated both the plane and all its passengers, the imprisoned RAF leaders, who had no access to each other or to outside news, mysteriously committed suicide simultaneously in their individual cells. Although 1977 marked the climax of the terrorist attacks, they did not completely cease, nor were they limited to the RAF, as witnessed by the neo-Nazi anti-foreigner-inspired bombing at Munich's *Oktoberfest*.

In the meantime, economic and political division grew between the coalition partners (SPD/FDP), within the SPD itself, and in West German politics as a whole. Schmidt's attempts to increase the use of nuclear power in the midst of an energy crisis caused by spiralling oil prices internationally in 1973/74 provoked resistance among more left-wing Social Democrats and the burgeoning anti-nuclear movement. Rifts developed within the SPD-FDP coalition over solutions to growing unemployment and inflation. Economic worries were accompanied by growing pressure to decrease the number of so-called "guest" (foreign) workers in the FRG. Foreign workers had been solicited into Germany ever since the economic boom of the late 1950s as a result of the labor shortage due to wartime casualties and the need for workers to rebuild postwar West Germany's economy. Especially after the end of the flow of refugees from the GDR in 1961, the economy recruited foreign workers from Southern Europe and Turkey. Now pressure grew to send these workers and their families "home." Many such workers had been born in Germany and had no intention of returning to the homelands of their ancestors. Although few of these "guest workers" had jobs that Germans actually wanted, there was a tendency to blame the Turks in particular for German unemployment problems. Expressions of xenophobia and racism increased and the right side of the political spectrum did not hesitate to exploit such attitudes in election campaigns.

The CDU/CSU gained a reputation for trying to hide Germany's Nazi past when it defended Hans Filbinger, one of the CDU state prime ministers, after he was exposed for having imposed unjustified death sentences in the final days of WWII as a *Wehrmacht* judge in Norway, and when it took an equivocal stance toward extending the statute of limitations for Nazi war crimes in 1979. That same year, the CDU/CSU decided to run the right-wing, Bavarian CSU leader, Franz-Josef Strauss, infamous for his role in the 1962 *Spiegel* affair, as its chancellor candidate, a move that assured its defeat in the 1980 national elections.

Partly as a reaction to Strauss's vociferously right-wing campaign and the Americans' 1979 decision to station nuclear missiles in West Germany, as well as to the growing awareness of acid rain and to the desire for more participatory democracy, a new party developed on the left of the political spectrum, the Greens. Founded in 1978 as a collection of grassroots local and regional organizations, which felt that the major parties were not addressing the pressing problems of the arms race and ecology, the Green

Party included former APO members, disillusioned Social Democrats, pacifists, feminists, anti-nuclear activists, and environmentalists. Although they did not make it into the *Bundestag* until the 1983 national elections, they did move quickly into a number of state and municipal legislatures beginning in 1980.

Meanwhile, in the early 1980s, the left-wing of the Social Democrats expressed opposition to nuclear power, weapons, and NATO, raising questions about the repercussions of continued economic growth and industrialization and undercut Schmidt politically. Schmidt and the right wing of the SPD along with the FDP supported precisely those things the left opposed. While appeasing the SPD right and the FDP by keeping down expenditures and inflation in the aftermath of the oil price shocks, Schmidt alienated the left by his inability to stop the rise in unemployment. The fragile nature of the FDP/SPD coalition was exposed in the fall of 1982 when the free-market FDP prevented an extension of welfare measures, an increase in the national debt, and an extension of the voice of labor beyond the co-determination practices in the large-scale industrial sector. The FDP resolved the obvious political deadlock by pursuing secret negotiations between some of its leaders and the CDU about a new coalition. Following a vote of constructive no-confidence in Schmidt, the *Wende*, or turnabout, in West German politics occurred in October 1982 with the formation of a CDU/CSU-FDP government under the head of the CDU, Helmut Kohl. The unsuccessful CDU/CSU chancellor candidate in 1976, Kohl began his chancellorship with a call for individual initiative and efficiency to replace state planning and tutelage. This economic stance, Kohl's ties to the Catholic Church's position on women and abortion in Germany, as well as his assertion that being born after 1945 exonerated his and younger generations from responsibility for the Nazi past, pointed the way toward a new era of conservatism in West Germany.

---

## East German Stability: The Honecker Era

Unlike the west, little changed in the east in the 1970s and 1980s. Erich Honecker, Ulbricht's successor, attended the Lenin School in Moscow in 1929-30, but spent the Third Reich period in Germany, incarcerated by the Nazis from 1935 to 1945. He was the head of the SED's youth organization from 1946 to 1955, and a member of the Central Committee from 1946 until

1989. Ulbricht had assigned him the task of constructing the Berlin Wall. Appointed First Secretary of the SED's Central Committee in 1971, he held the additional post of head of the State Council after 1976. In the 1974 constitution, Honecker strengthened the GDR's ties to the USSR and removed any reference to "the German nation." On the other hand, he responded positively to Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, but on the basis of autonomy and peaceful coexistence rather than as a move towards reunification. He was successful in having the GDR recognized internationally, although the FRG never acknowledged the GDR formally as a sovereign state.

The GDR was relatively stable in the 1970s and early 1980s under Honecker for a combination of reasons. A crucial factor was the international situation, in particular the atmosphere of political resignation in the Warsaw Pact countries.<sup>28</sup> Another reason was that the SED was more disciplined and united than most of the other Eastern Bloc Communist parties. Non-party elites, such as the technical intelligentsia, were often co-opted through privileges, while challenges to the system from the cultural intelligentsia were deflected in other ways. The dissident folksinger, Wolf Biermann, for example, was expelled to West Germany in 1976. Protests by fellow cultural elites were dealt with either by denying the individuals involved access to the public via publication or occasionally by house arrest or forced exile to West Germany, where East Germans received automatic citizenship and various forms of material aid. Even the unofficial peace initiatives of the early 1980s were defused by one of their sponsors, the Protestant Church, in an effort to contain oppositional activity within acceptable bounds and to prevent serious state repression. The final factor in East Germany's stability under Honecker was the relative satisfaction of material needs. Although East Germans were acutely aware of the greater affluence of West Germans, especially after West Germans were able to travel more freely in the GDR following the 1971 Four-Power Berlin Accords, the East German economy was the strongest in the Eastern Bloc. Honecker focused on improving the East German standard of living, initiating, for example, major housing construction. There was neither actual want nor severe food shortages, although the variety of foods was limited. As long as the USSR controlled its empire and the SED was able to dominate with confidence, material dissatisfaction alone was not sufficient to create a revolutionary situation.<sup>29</sup>

## The 1980s: Economic Concerns and Conservatism in Both German States

The 1982 *Wende* in West Germany was affirmed in the 1983 parliamentary elections. But whereas the CDU/CSU received almost 49% of the vote, the FDP's support was reduced by a third, apparently as punishment for having turned on the SPD. The SPD lost almost five percent of its votes as compared to the 1980 elections, but the Greens succeeded in getting 5.6%, as compared to their 1.5% in 1980, apparently managing to acquire many younger, disgruntled SPD voters. The Green Party became the first new party since 1953 to cross the five percent hurdle into the *Bundestag*.

West German economic growth slowed considerably in the early 1980s, while the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979 fueled inflation and the disruption of international trade patterns hurt Germany's export-oriented economy. The national debt had been increased to cover the reforms of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The number of strikes increased as management tried to tighten belts and labor tried to combat inflation rates and fears of unemployment. Although the Kohl government was able to cut the federal deficit in half and to reduce inflation to two percent annually within just a few years, the unemployment rates did not improve and the growth rates remained sluggish until close to the end of the decade. The economic problems of the 1980s were also reflected in the social arena. The "guest workers" were again in the spotlight. Attempts at paying them to return to their homelands were relatively unsuccessful and expressions of fears, often inflamed by the CDU/CSU, about Germans dying out due to their low population growth and the country being taken over by foreigners became more common. Beginning in 1987, the economy began to improve considerably, with increases in business profits, wages and salaries, as well as in exports. In 1988 unemployment figures finally also began to reflect the economic recovery. This recovery was, however, quite short-lived. Despite a brief post-unification boom in 1990, there was little preparation for the unexpected burdens of assimilating the five new states of the GDR. The unrealistic economic predictions about the costs involved in unification as well as the global recession of the early 1990s brought the brief recovery to a sudden halt.

In 1984 the mayor of West Berlin, Richard von Weizsäcker, a prominent Christian Democrat, who had been a leading figure in the German Lutheran Church and in the World Council of Churches, was elected

president of the FRG. Considerably more popular than Helmut Kohl, Weizsäcker gave moving speeches about Germany's historical legacy and responsibility which helped offset controversies at home and abroad surrounding the fortieth anniversary of the end of World War II. These controversies included President Reagan's visit to the Bitburg cemetery, where, among others, Waffen SS members had been buried, the 1986 so-called Historians' Controversy over relativizing the Nazi past and the Holocaust, as well as the problematic official speech given to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Reich Crystal Night in the *Bundestag*.

However, even Weizsäcker's contrite sincerity and diplomacy could not quell domestic and international concerns about the rise of a new party on the far right, the *Republikaner* (Republicans). The Republican Party emerged in 1988, one year after the elections which saw the worst showing of the CDU/CSU since 1949. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition held together in 1987, but there was a significant shift on the other end of the political spectrum. The Greens increased their popular vote to 8.3 percent while the SPD fell again, this time by just one percent, to 37%.<sup>30</sup>

The timing of the appearance of the *Republikaner* coincided with the death of the head of the CSU and the undisputed champion of the German right, Franz-Josef Strauss, and the, until then, nadir of Kohl's popularity. Led by a former soldier in the Waffen-SS, the sociological profile of the party's supporters mirrored those of similar Western European right-wing parties, such as LePen's *Front Nationale* in France: workers displaced or threatened by changes in the economic structure, farmers upset with the Common Market's agricultural policies, as well as anyone who felt alienated by the "postmodern" world and the presence of, especially, non-Western foreigners in their country.<sup>31</sup> In the West Berlin and European Parliament elections in the first half of 1989, the Republicans received 7.5 and 7.0% of the vote, respectively, mostly at the expense of the CDU/CSU. In the midst of the euphoric nationalist sentiment and the peak of Kohl's popularity surrounding the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and reunification in 1990, the momentum of the Republicans' support appeared to be halted almost overnight. Yet in the rude awakening of the "morning after" atmosphere of economic crisis and the expression of second thoughts about unification, the Republicans have once again begun to pick up support in local and state elections.

The 1980s were also a period of political conservatism in East Germany. The GDR was the last stronghold of Stalinism in the Eastern Bloc. Honecker refused to be swayed by the glasnost and perestroika policies of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev, and was in fact embarrassed by Gorbachev's advice to the SED leaders to make reforms and to Honecker to consider retiring, when Gorbachev attended the fortieth anniversary celebrations of the GDR on 7 October 1989.

The economies of almost all the Eastern European countries ran into problems in the 1980s; this had a significant effect on the GDR since most of its trade was with the Bloc.<sup>32</sup> Even before the drastic effects of mass emigration in 1989, which pushed the GDR economy to the verge of collapse, growth rates fell from 5.5 percent in 1984 to 2.8 percent in 1988. But the high level of East German discontent, which became apparent in the fall of 1989, was not based on the economic situation of the mid-1980s. East Germans may have grumbled, but as long as they were better off than their Eastern neighbors, they put up with their material situation. It was only when there was suddenly an opportunity to leave and a chance for significant reforms at home, thanks to Gorbachev and the developments in several other Warsaw Pact countries, that a revolutionary situation arose in East Germany. That this revolutionary situation would result in the unification of Germany was neither the intent of the activists involved nor a result expected by Germans in the fall of 1989.

## Conclusion

Democracy did return to Germany after the fall of the Third Reich, although its extent varied not only within the two German states, but also according to the level of economic stress and the willingness of the various governments to accept criticism and opposition, and to implement structural reforms that broke with institutional remnants of Germany's authoritarian past. In the West German case, parliamentary democracy was accepted initially more passively and only as it became clear that ties to the West brought with them economic and military security advantages. There it was not until the vocal emergence of the first post World War II adult generation that enough of a civil society and an actively democratic citizenry had developed to possess the political clout to compete with the traditional, less democratic voices in West German political life. This competition was a necessary prerequisite to the growth of a democratic consensus in the 1970s. But this consensus has been challenged in the last

decade by inflation and unemployment as well as by the difficulties involved in the formation of a new, post-Cold War national identity in a re-united Germany.

In the German Democratic Republic, the post-Nazi re-emergence of democratic elements was undercut by the Sovietization of the socio-economic system and the Stalinization of politics. Democratic reform efforts were suppressed by an authoritarian one-party state with the use of cooptation, material rewards, imprisonment, and forced emigration. With the initiation of reforms in the Soviet Union and other parts of Eastern Europe in the mid 1980s and the decline of the East German economy, the aging hardliner, Honecker, was unable to repress the growing opposition and the popular discontent. The opening up of Eastern European borders and the resulting exodus of many young East Germans provided the window of opportunity that allowed the democratic citizens' movements ultimately to bring down the East German regime.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> There is an ongoing historiographical debate about the implications of the U.S. Military Government's decision to disband the anti-fascist committees which formed spontaneously in the last days of the war and in the immediate postwar weeks. Given the fact that such committees were not allowed to form their own political parties or even directly influence the old Weimar parties which were re-emerging in various forms already in the summer of 1945 prior to the lifting of the ban on political activity by the Americans in August 1945, there is no way of actually knowing what their influence might have been. See Lutz Niethammer, et.al., *Arbeiterinitiative 1945: Antifaschistische Ausschüsse und Reorganisation der Arbeiterbewegung von Deutschland*, Wuppertal, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes announced the economic reconstruction of Germany along capitalist lines in Sept. 1946. As early as the summer of 1946 there was evidence of the U.S.'s political preferences in Germany, such as in a State Department document in preparation for the U.S. participation in a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, in which it was directly admitted that "The United States cannot tolerate a Communist dominated Germany." See Institut für Zeitgeschichte-Munich, RG 260, POLAD, 17/24-2/5, 1 of 2, State Dept. Policy Committee revised draft of July-August 1946, p.7. There was some debate within the U.S. State Department's Office of the Political Advisor for Germany that such a statement "would indicate that we are hypocritical in our profession of political neutrality," but such concerns were more with perceptions of hypocrisy than with real contradictions in the professed official policy of political neutrality. See *Ibid.*, RG 84, POLAD/746/8, 1 of 3, 4 Sept. 1946 Memo from Donald R. Heath to Mr. Galbrath and Mr. Mason.

<sup>3</sup> For example, Helga Grebing notes how the reconstruction of the SPD in the western zones was by the same functionaries and members that had shaped the party before 1933: more than 90% of the SPD members in the western zones in 1946 had been active in the SPD or SPD-affiliated associations and were therefore largely of working class background and born before 1910. See Helga Grebing, "Die Parteien," in *Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Ed. Wolfgang Benz, Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1983, Vol. I, p. 128.

- <sup>4</sup> Grebing, p. 137. See also Mary Fulbrook, *The Divided Nation: A History of Germany 1918-1990*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 138f. Cf. Hans Georg Wieck, *Christliche und Freie Demokraten in Hessen, Rheinland-Pfalz, Baden und Württemberg* (Düsseldorf, 1958) and Rudolf Billerbeck, *Die Abgeordneten der ersten Landtage (1946-51) und der Nationalsozialismus* (Düsseldorf, 1971), pp. 80f.
- <sup>5</sup> Günther Plum, "Versuche gesellschaftspolitischer Neuordnung. Ihr Scheitern im Kräftefeld deutscher und alliierter Politik," in *Westdeutschlands Weg zur Bundesrepublik 1945-1949*, Beiträge von Mitarbeitern des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte, Munich: C.H. Beck Verlag, 1976, pp. 97ff. Cf. Fulbrook, *Divided Nation*, p. 138.
- <sup>6</sup> Fulbrook, *Divided Nation*, p. 137.
- <sup>7</sup> Fulbrook, *Divided Nation*, p. 138.
- <sup>8</sup> Plum, pp. 112f. Cf. David W. Ellwood, *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, American and Postwar Reconstruction*, London, 1992, p. 146.
- <sup>9</sup> Activist anti-Nazi Germans had been the strongest early supporters of thorough denazification, yet they were often not politically affiliated with those groups which the western occupation authorities supported the most. Those groups with such support were often members of parties which soon vied for the votes of former Nazis. Whereas U.S. MG eventually supported the less stringent practices of the Germans after denazification had been turned over to them in the spring of 1946 because economic reconstruction could be expedited this way and Germans would have to take personal responsibility for denazification, it still hoped to democratize Germany through civil service reform. But U.S. plans for civil service reform included changes, like imposing their own model of the political neutrality of civil servants, that went beyond the democratization agenda that was shared by some Germans. See Billerbeck, p. 192. Cf. Hans Hattenhauer, *Geschichte des Beamtentums* (Cologne, 1980) and Wolfgang Benz, "Die Auseinandersetzungen um das Berufsbeamtentum 1945-1952," Unveröffentlichte Skripten der Sektion 9: "Deutsche Nachkriegsgeschichte nach 1945: Neuaufbau oder Restauration?" bei dem 33. deutschen Historikertag, 26. bis 30. März 1980 in Würzburg.
- <sup>10</sup> The West German constitution was called a Basic Law rather than a constitution in order to designate the provisional status of the document and thus to avoid giving any legal status to the division of Germany.
- <sup>11</sup> See Background Paper #1, "From Third Reich to No Reich: Germany after 1945" by James F. Harris for more details on this.
- <sup>12</sup> Dietrich Orlow, *A History of Modern Germany, 1871 to the Present*, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1991, 2nd ed., pp. 270 ff. Note that it is this provision which provides for the dissolution of "anti-constitution" parties and which was used to ban the KPD in 1956 and various neo-Nazi parties both in the early years of the Republic and most recently in the new wave of neo-Nazism in (re-) unified Germany.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 271. This is the court that has been deciding the issues of where Germany can send combat troops given the fact that the constitution prohibits deploying military forces except for defense within NATO territory. The Persian Gulf War and now the crisis in former Yugoslavia have forced re-examinations of these restrictions.
- <sup>14</sup> By 1986 \$68.4 billion had been paid to 57 million applicants.
- <sup>15</sup> In 1976, again despite significant employer opposition, co-determination was applied to all other joint stock companies with over 2000 employees.
- <sup>16</sup> Although technically the founding of the Federal Republic ended the military occupation, a more supervisory phase of Allied civilian presence, called the Allied High Commission, lasted until the formalization of the Occupation Statute in 1955, when the Germans received complete autonomy. However, until the "Two plus Four" talks in 1990 there was no formal post-WWII peace agreement between the Allies and Germany.

<sup>17</sup>See Fulbrook, *Divided Nation*, pp. 185ff. There was also a tendency to avoid any reminders of the Nazi past and either to pretend it had not happened or to note its allegedly positive features.

<sup>18</sup>To some extent this *Volkspartei*-approach was true of all the major postwar West German parties, the CDU/CSU, the SPD and the FDP.

<sup>19</sup>See Fulbrook, *Divided Nation*, pp. 197 ff.

<sup>20</sup>Ulbricht remained honorary party chief until his death in 1973.

<sup>21</sup>Almost no de-Stalinization took place in the GDR as compared to either the Soviet Union or its Eastern European neighbors. But here one must remember the geopolitically strategic location of the GDR as the most western country in the Soviet Bloc and, as a divided country, the one considered most vulnerable to Western propaganda.

<sup>22</sup>As cited in Orlow, p. 313.

<sup>23</sup>Both in terms of productivity and standard of living, the GDR far outstripped the rest of the Eastern Bloc, although it was substantially below the levels of West Germany, which had not suffered under significant dismantling for reparations and had the advantage of Marshall Plan capital investment.

<sup>24</sup>As cited in Orlow, p. 320.

<sup>25</sup>The FDP has had disproportionately large power in determining which of the two major parties formed a government with it. It has ranged from just getting over the five percent hurdle to reaching almost twelve percent, but except for the period of 1957-61, the only time any party (in this case the CDU/CSU) had an absolute majority, it has been a government coalition partner.

<sup>26</sup>The Right once again played up propaganda about Brandt's "traitorous" behavior in WWII and the fact that he had belonged to a left-wing splinter group made him even more vulnerable to charges that he too was implicated in spying for the GDR. Of course, there was nothing to this, but, not wanting to hurt his party politically, he felt compelled to resign.

<sup>27</sup>Cf. Orlow, p. 299.

<sup>28</sup>The exception to this was Poland in 1980-81, where Soviet intervention was, however, prevented by the declaration of martial law.

<sup>29</sup>See Mary Fulbrook, "Nation, State and Political Culture in Divided Germany 1945-90," in *The State of Germany*, Ed. John Breuilly, London, 1992, pp. 190f. It was precisely changes in these two situations, which were indeed interrelated, which changed the situation completely in 1989 and to a lesser extent even a few years before.

<sup>30</sup>In the December 1990 elections, which followed unification, the West German Greens were not even able to surpass the five percent hurdle, although their counterparts in the east gained representation, due to the special regulations for those elections. This seems to reflect the effects of the division within the Green Party between the more dogmatic fundamentalists and the realists, who were willing to enter into coalitions with the SPD, and the majority of the West German population's primary concern with economic problems, rather than environmental ones or war-related fears, especially after the end of the Cold War.

<sup>31</sup>Orlow, p. 302.

<sup>32</sup>These problems were nothing compared to those provoked by the 1990 currency reform, when the former GDR converted to the DM and thereby lost all of its Eastern European trading partners.



13. Identity card, type and number
14. Wehrpass No.
15. Passport No.
16. Nationality
17. If a naturalized citizen, give date and place of naturalization
18. List any titles of nobility ever held by you or your wife or by the parents or grandparents of either of you
19. Religion
20. With what church are you affiliated?
21. Have you ever severed your connection with any church, officially or unofficially?
22. If so, give particulars and reasons
23. What religious preference did you give in the census of 1933?
24. List any crimes of which you have been convicted, giving dates, location and nature of the crimes

#### B. SECONDARY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

Name and Type of School (If a special Nazi school or military academy, so specify)	Location	Dates of Attendance	Certificate, Diplomas or Degree	Did Abitur Permit University Matriculation?	Date

25. List any German University Student Corps to which you have ever belonged
26. List (giving locations and dates) any Adolf Hitler school, Nazi Leaders College or military academy in which you have ever been a teacher
27. Have any of your children ever attended any such schools? Which ones, where and when?
28. List (giving location and dates) any school in which you have ever been a Vertrauenslehrer (formerly Jugendwarter)

#### C. PROFESSIONAL OR TRADE EXAMINATIONS

Name of Examination	Place Taken	Result	Date

**D. CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF FULL  
TIME EMPLOYMENT AND MILITARY SERVICE**

29. Give a chronological history of your employment and military service beginning with 1st of January 1931, accounting for all promotions or demotions, transfers, periods of unemployment, attendance at educational institutions (other than those covered in Section B) or training schools and full-time service with para military organizations. (Part time employment is to be recorded in Section F.) Use a separate line for each change in your position or rank or to indicate periods of unemployment or attendance at training schools or transfer from one military or para military organisation to another

From	To	Employer and Address or Military Unit	Name and Title of Immediate Superior or C.O.	Position or Rank	Duties and Responsibilities
					Reason for change of Status or Cessation of Service

30. Were you deferred from Military Service?  
 31. If so, explain circumstances completely  
 32. Have you ever been a member of the General Staff Corps?  
 33. When?  
 34. Have you ever been a Nazi Military Leadership Officer?  
 35. When and in what unit?  
 36. Did you serve as part of the Military Government or Wehrkreis-administration in any country occupied by Germany including Austria and Sudetenland?  
 37. If so, give particulars of offices held, duties performed, location and period of service  
 38. Do you have any military orders or military honours?  
 39. If so, state what was awarded you, the date, reasons and occasions for its bestowal

**E. MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANISATIONS**

40. Indicate on the following chart whether or not you were a member of and any offices you have held in the organizations listed below. Use lines 96 to 98 to specify any other associations, society, fraternity, union, syndicate, chamber, institute, group, corporation, club or other organisation of any kind, whether social, political, professional, educational, cultural, industrial, commercial or honorary, with which you have ever been connected or associated.

Column 1: Insert either 'yes' or 'no' on each line to indicate whether or not you have ever been a member of the organization listed.  
If you were a candidate, disregard the columns and write in the word 'candidate' followed by the date of your application for membership.

Column 2: Insert date on which you joined.

Column 3: Insert date your membership ceased if you are no longer a member.  
Insert the word 'Date' if you are still a member.

Column 4: Insert your membership number in the organization.

Column 5: Insert the highest office rank or other post of authority which you have held at any time. If you have never held an office, rank or post of authority, insert the word 'none' in Columns 5 and 6.

Column 6: Insert date of your appointment to the office, rank or post of authority listed in Column 5.

	Yes or No	From	To	Number	Highest Office Rank Held	Date Appointed
41. National-Socialist						
42. General SS						
43. Armed SS						
44. SS Security Service						
45. SA						
46. Hitler Youth League German Maidens						
47. NSD St B						
48. NS Do B						
49. NS Women's Org.						
50. NS Motor Corps						
51. NS Flying Corps						
52. Off. German officials						
53. DAF						
54. Strength through Joy						
55. NS Welfare						
56. NS Nurses' League						
57. NSKOV						
58. NS Tech. League						
59. NS Med. League						

60. NS Reach. League						
61. NS Leg. League						
62. Germ. Women's Union						
63. Germ. Family League						
64. NS Phys. Cult. L.						
65. NS Vet. League						
66. Germ. Stud. Org.						
67. Germ. Parish Org.						
68. NS War Vet. League						
69. State Prof. Union						
70. State Culture Chamber						
71. Ch. Germ. Writing						
72. Ch. Germ. Press						
73. Ch. Germ. Radio						
74. Ch. Germ. Theatre						
75. Ch. Germ. Music						
76. Ch. Germ. Art						
77. Ch. Germ. Film						
78. American Inst.						
79. Germ. Acad. Munich						
80. Germ. Foreign Inst.						
81. Germ. Christ.						
82. Germ. Faith Movement						
83. Germ. Fichte League						
84. Germ. Hunters' League						
85. Germ. Red Cross						
86. Span. Amer. Inst.						
87. Inst. Jewish Question						
88. Comrades League USA						
89. East Eur. Inst.						
90. Nat. Lab Serv.						

91. Nat. Col. League						
92. Nat. Air Def. League						
93. State Acad. Racial and Health Service						
94. Union Germans Abroad						
95. Advis. Off. Germ. Econ.						

Others (specify)

96.

97.

98.

99. Have you ever sworn an oath of secrecy to any organization?

100. If so, list the organizations and give particulars

101. Have you any relatives who have held office, rank or post of authority in any of the organisations listed from 41 to 95 above?

102. If so, give their names and addresses, their relationship to you and a description of the position and organization

103. With the exception of minor contributions to the Winterhilfe and regular membership dues, list and give details of any contributions of money or property which you have made directly or indirectly to the NSDAP or any of the other organizations listed above, including any contributions made by any natural or juridical person or legal entity through your solicitation of influence

104. Have you ever been the recipient of any titles, ranks, medals, testimonials or other honours from any of the above organizations?

105. If so state the nature of the honour, the date conferred, and the reason and occasion for its bestowal

106. Were you a member of a political party before 1933?

107. If so, which one?

108. For what political party did you vote in the election of November 1932?

109. In March 1933?

110. Have you ever been a member of any anti-Nazi underground party or groups since 1933?

111. Which one?

112. Since when?

60

113. Have you ever been a member of any trade union or professional or business organization which was dissolved or forbidden since 1933?
114. Have you ever been dismissed from the civil service, the teaching profession or ecclesiastical positions or any other employment for active or passive resistance to the Nazis or their ideology?
115. Have you ever been imprisoned, or have restriction of movement, residence or freedom to practise your trade or profession been imposed on you for racial or religious reasons or because of active or passive resistance to the Nazis?
116. If you answered yes to any of the questions from 110 to 115, give particulars and the names and addresses of two persons who can confirm the truth of your statements
117. With the exception of those you have specially mentioned in Sections D and E above, list: (a) Any part time, unpaid or honorary position of authority or trust you have held as a representative of any Reich Ministry or the Office of the Four Year Plan or similar central control agency; (b) Any office, rank or post of authority you have held with any economic self-administration organization such as the Reich Food Estate, the Bauernschaften, the Central Marketing Associations, the Reichswirtschaftskammer, the Gauwirtschaftskammer, the Reichsgruppen, the Wirtschaftsgruppen, the Verkehrsgruppen, the Reichsvereinigung, the Hauptausschüsse, the Industrieringe and similar organizations, as well as their subordinate or affiliated organizations and field offices; (c) Any service of any kind you have rendered in any military, paramilitary, police, law enforcement, protection, intelligence or civil defence organizations such as Organization Todt, Technische Nothilfe, Stosstruppen, Werkscharen, Bahnschutz, Funkschutz, Werkschutz, Land-und-Stadtwacht, Abwehr, SD, Gestapo and similar organizations.

From	To	Name and Type of Organisation	Highest Office of Rank you Held	Date of Your Appointment	Duties
------	----	-------------------------------	---------------------------------	--------------------------	--------

#### G. WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

118. List in a separate sheet the titles and publishers of all publications from 1923 to the present which were written in whole or in part, or compiled or edited by you, and all public addresses made by you, giving subject, date and circulation or audience. If they were sponsored by any organization, give its name. If no speeches or publications, write 'none' in this space.

#### H. INCOME AND ASSETS

119. Show the sources and amount of your annual income from January 1 1931 to date. If records are not available, give approximate amounts.

Year	Source of Income	Amount
------	------------------	--------

120. List only land or buildings owned by you or any immediate members of your family, giving locations, dates of acquisition, from whom acquired, nature and description of buildings, the number of hectares and the use to which the property is commonly put.
121. Have you or any immediate members of your family ever acquired property which had been seized from others for political, religious or racial reasons or expropriated from others in the course of occupation of foreign countries or in furtherance of the settling of Germans or Volksdeutsche in countries occupied by Germany?
122. If so, give particulars, including dates and locations, and the names and whereabouts of the original title holders.
123. Have you ever acted as an administrator or trustee of Jewish property in furtherance of Aryanization decrees or of ordinances?
124. If so, give particulars

#### I. TRAVEL OR RESIDENCE ABROAD

125. List all journeys or residence outside of Germany including military campaigns
126. Was the journey made at your expense?
127. If not, at whose expense was the journey made?
128. Persons or organizations visited
129. Did you ever serve in any capacity as part of the civil administration of any territory annexed to or occupied by the Reich?
130. If so, give particulars of office held, duties performed, location and period of service.
131. List foreign languages you speak indicating degree of fluency

REMARKS

The statements on this form are true and I understand that any omission or false or incomplete statements are offences against Military Government and will subject me to prosecution and punishment.

Signed

Date

CERTIFICATION OF IMMEDIATE SUPERIOR

(Verify that the above is the true name and signature of the individual concerned and that, with the exceptions noted below, the answers made on the questionnaire are true to the best of my knowledge and belief and the information available to me. Exceptions—if not exceptions, write 'none')

Signed

Official Position

Date



# Germany's Role in the European and World Economies

by Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr.

## Economics and the German Identity

Perhaps no portion of the post-war German experience has been as crucial to the reconstruction of German identity in the world as the economic performance of the two German states. In the west, the "economic miracle" of recovery in the 1950s and continued growth through the end of the 1980s transformed the new Federal Republic from a pariah among West Europeans into a model for both economic and political management. As a result of their pre-1945 political liabilities and in light of their post-1945 economic capabilities, West Germans have preferred to reintroduce themselves to their neighbors in economic rather than political terms: as skilled workers, steady savers, effective managers, quality producers, and successful exporters. In the far more difficult circumstances of Eastern Europe, the new German Democratic Republic (GDR) performed better than its Soviet bloc neighbors in most critical categories and East Germans took an obvious pride in this. However, the strategies of a planned economy reached a dead-end in the 1980s; the East German standard of living began to fall, bringing the communist leadership down with it. Now that unification of the two post-war states has starkly revealed the GDR's economic performance as vastly inferior to that of the West, the East German self-image has suffered terribly. Since economic performance has been so central to rebuilding the German image in post-war Europe and the world, no understanding of post-war Germany is complete without some understanding of the German role in the European and world economy.

## The German Economy before the Second World War<sup>1</sup>

Already before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, Germany played a major role in both the European and world economies. By 1914 Germany had overtaken Britain to become the leading industrial producer in Europe and, behind the United States, second in the world.<sup>2</sup> The foundation of the German economy lay in basic industry: iron, steel, coal, and textiles. In addition, machine building had emerged as a pillar of the German economy and German firms such as BASF, Bayer, Zeiss, and AEG were dominant in the new turn-of-the-century technologies of chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and optical and electrical equipment.

Prior to 1914, Germany possessed adequate supplies of the most basic industrial raw materials: coal (in the Ruhr valley and in Silesia, with lower quality brown coal deposits spread across central Germany) and iron ore (in Silesia and especially in Lorraine—the area annexed from France in 1870-71). Yet because native resources were limited to a few basic minerals (coal, iron, potash, and zinc) and because German industrial capacity far exceeded domestic demand, Imperial Germany engaged in extensive foreign trade to acquire raw materials and markets for its growing manufacturing sectors. Agricultural imports increased as the German farm sector had trouble accommodating the rising tastes of the rapidly growing population (41 million in 1871, 65 million in 1910). More significantly, German farms could not compete with massive quantities of cheaper foodstuffs arriving from Russia, America, Canada, and Argentina.

Before 1914 Germany already occupied an important position in international trade as a leading exporter of advanced industrial equipment and specialty items and as a importer of raw materials in large quantities. For Germany, foreign trade was vital: at 20.8 billion marks, 1913 imports and exports equalled 39% of the net national product (NNP). Conversely, Europe and the world relied heavily on German exports which made up more than 20% of total world exports in 1913! But compared to exports valued at over 90 billion marks for the period 1900-1913, German foreign investment prior to 1914 was very modest at only 12 billion marks.<sup>3</sup> Germany's primary role in the world economy was as a trader rather than as a financier, as a merchandise exporter rather than as an investor.

Agricultural and raw material imports (grain, timber, copper, cotton, hides, and skins) came chiefly from the lands of Eastern Europe,

dominated before 1914 by the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and from the United States. German exports were also bought in Europe. The larger economies of Britain, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and France bought huge amounts of German industrial equipment: machinery of every type, pipes and fittings, pumps, dynamos, generators, industrial boilers, electrical cable, and gasoline engines. Smaller European countries like Holland, Belgium, and Sweden also relied on German exports. Significant markets were found outside of Europe in the United States and South America, but colonial markets in Africa and Asia lagged far behind.

After World War I the structure of the German economy changed little and dependence on international trade remained high. Interwar Germany maintained a strong industrial base in coal mining and steel production, even in the face of a general European overcapacity in these basic sectors. More important to its future, Germany continued to excel in the production of the most advanced and specialized industrial machinery, chemical and pharmaceutical products, and electrical equipment. Yet a number of changes worked to increase German dependence on foreign trade and intensify German economic contacts with the world economy. First, the Versailles settlement imposed at the end of World War I deprived Germany of 13% of its 1914 territory holding 68% of zinc reserves, 75% of iron ore reserves, and 26% of anthracite reserves. The most significant losses affecting raw materials were the transfer of part of Silesia to Poland in the east and the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France in the west. Consequently, interwar Germany needed to import large amounts of iron ore for steel production. Technological shifts in several manufacturing sectors required exotic raw materials such as oil and rubber, all of which had to be imported. German agriculture continued to lose ground to international competitors who could produce grain, livestock, poultry, and dairy products more cheaply than could German farmers. Finally, Germany had to export more since only export earnings could enable Germany to pay off the huge reparations burden (132 billion gold marks or \$30 billion in 1914 dollars) imposed by the Allies as payment of the cost of war damages.

In 1928, ten years after the war, German imports and exports together equalled 32% of the NNP, down from 39% in 1913, but still a major portion of German economic activity and indispensable for the rest of the economy.<sup>4</sup> Wartime events had shifted the German pattern of trade somewhat. Britain and France remained major markets for German

exports. The new successor states carved out of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Hungary, became major trade partners. Most unfortunately, the new Soviet Union never returned to the role occupied by Tsarist Russia before the war as a major German trade partner in both imports and exports. Despite the penalties imposed for the lost war, Weimar Germany maintained Germany's existing role in the world economy as a consumer of food and raw materials, and as a supplier of valuable industrial products to other developed countries, chiefly in Europe.

Even under Nazi control after 1933, the German economy retained its fundamental character as a raw materials consumer and as a producer of high-quality manufactured items. Although Hitler initially had hoped to use all of Germany's energy for rearmament in the shortest possible time, Nazi economic planners found that maintaining foreign trade was indispensable to the functioning of Germany's industrial economy. As late as 1937 foreign trade equalled 13% of German NNP and was vital to the rearmament drive.<sup>5</sup> Germany could not prepare for war without raw material imports and could not pay for these imports without maintaining some exports. For political and economic reasons, Hitler's Germany devoted special attention to expanding trade in Southeastern Europe among the Balkan countries. Even in the difficult international trade environment of global depression in the 1930s and despite the huge domestic demands of rearmament, Germany maintained an active role in European and world foreign trade up to the outbreak of war in 1939.

## **The Decisive Years for West and East, 1945-1948**

Beneath the rubble that covered Central Europe in 1945, Germany still possessed many of the productive resources that had long supported its sophisticated economy. Most importantly, Germany's tremendous resources in human capital were intact: labor skills, management experience, and production know-how. Wartime losses in civilian and military manpower were offset by the tide of German refugees streaming out of Eastern Europe and by the returning prisoners of war.

Surprisingly, Germany also retained a substantial portion of its industrial capacity. The Nazis had invested heavily in key German industries during their twelve year rule.<sup>6</sup> The resulting increase in production more than offset the damage of the Allied bombing campaign (which targeted

civilian housing over industrial facilities) and the additional damage caused by ground fighting in important German industrial areas. German wartime production fell sharply only in the autumn of 1944, primarily because of a lack of raw materials and because the Allies had begun to occupy significant portions of German territory.<sup>7</sup> Certainly the physical damage in Germany was tremendous, often appearing overwhelming to both the Germans and the Allied occupation forces.<sup>8</sup> Yet much of this was damage to the civilian population rather than to production facilities. Further, much of the damage was disruptive in nature rather than permanently destructive. For example, damage to the telephone system and the transportation network brought economic activity to a near standstill in 1945 although many production facilities were still intact. In short, a surprising amount of the industrial base remained operable, even if it was not operating when Allied forces arrived in the spring of 1945.

No one doubted the Germans' ability to rebuild an advanced industrial economy despite the tremendous problems that prevailed at the moment of defeat. For Allied planners pondering the economic future of post-war Germany, the question was not whether Germany *could* recover, but rather whether Germany should be *allowed* to fully recover. If Germany returned to the rank of first-rate industrial power, many assumed that would mean military power and they feared this consequence. At the close of the Second World War, the Allies were, understandably, considering the question of Germany's economic future primarily from a political-military standpoint.

Political and military considerations spoke loudly against allowing the Germans a full economic recovery: what had WWI and the interwar period demonstrated if not that the Germans could not be trusted to employ their industrial power in a way that did not threaten the rest of Europe? Initially, the politically motivated idea of severely limiting Germany's future economic role in Europe and the world dominated allied planning for post-war Germany. Indeed, in 1944 President Franklin Roosevelt seriously considered adopting Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau's plan to prevent any industrial recovery in post-war Germany with the ultimate aim of reconverting its advanced industrial economy back into a farm economy. Allied occupation forces in Germany had no use for such wild plans. They understood that unless Germany became strong again economically, its population would remain dependent on American hand-outs. The quickest path to economic

recovery was allowing the Germans to return to what they did well— design and produce high quality manufactured goods. Over the course of 1945 this realistic approach to the German situation triumphed over residual Morgenthau thinking. In March 1946 the Allies adopted a “Level of Industry Plan” for Germany that limited total industrial production to 65% of the 1936 level (55% of the 1938 level).

Not until 1947 did the Western allies re-orient their policies to allow West Germany to develop virtually all of its (non-military) industrial and economic potential. This crucially important shift in Western thinking originated in a concern for the post-war economic recovery of all of Western Europe and a growing realization that Western Germany would have to play an active role in that process. In order to overcome their wartime devastation and resume their own industrial production, the other countries of Western Europe needed substantial imports of machinery and equipment to re-equip facilities that had been damaged by combat or stripped by the Germans. Traditionally, the industrial areas of Western Germany had been major suppliers of these commodities to Western and Central Europe. If one hoped to simulate a general economic recovery in all of Europe, as the Americans desperately did, there was little alternative to promoting a full-scale industrial revival in Germany.<sup>9</sup>

The situation inside Germany reinforced this logic. With the loss of its major agricultural areas in the east, West Germany became even more dependent on industrial exports for its survival. American hopes for a self-sufficient Germany required that Germany begin to earn its living with industrial exports so that American aid, totaling \$1.8 billion, used to finance imports into West Germany in 1945-46, might eventually be withdrawn. Germany's traditional role in the European economy meant that economic recovery in Europe and economic recovery in Western Germany could not be separated. For these reasons, the Americans included the Western zones of Germany in the European Recovery Program (ERP) that Secretary of State George Marshall offered in June 1947.

As Marshall Plan aid began arriving in early 1948, the West German economy shifted into an accelerating economic recovery now generally referred to as the “Economic Miracle.” Marshall Plan aid helped secure the success of future Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard's June 1948 currency reform in Western Germany that set loose the full production potential of

the recovering West German economy.<sup>10</sup> Once the unwanted old currency had been replaced by the new Deutsche Marks, producers and merchants brought out their hoarded inventories for sale and West German consumer purchases rose dramatically. More importantly, West German foreign trade revived along traditional lines so that West Germany began to resume its role in the European economy as a supplier of advanced industrial equipment. Taken together, exports of metalwares, machinery, vehicles, chemicals, scientific equipment, and pharmaceuticals increased more than 600% in value from the beginning of 1948 to mid-1949, reaching \$72.5 million in the second quarter of 1949. By that time, these traditional German products accounted for just under one-quarter of West Germany's total exports.<sup>11</sup>

Although the story of West German economic recovery between 1945 and 1949 was largely one of returning to a long-standing German role in the European economy, there were significant new elements in the post-war experience. Chief among these was the organizational integration of the West German economy into a new, liberal international economic order sponsored by the Americans. The Americans and West Europeans used organizational links to tie West Germany to the larger European and world economies. By enmeshing West Germany as completely as possible in larger international structures, the West hoped to channel Germany's formidable economic energies into constructive pursuits. Integrating West Germany into the world economy became the primary means of controlling German economic power. In short, West Germany would be allowed to prosper and thrive while its economic options were politely yet firmly constrained by its new international obligations. This approach differed markedly from the policy of 1913 to 1924 when Europe excluded Germany from international economic structures after defeat in World War I.

Under the firm guidance of the Western allies as occupation authorities, Western Germany, and, after 1949, the new Federal Republic (FRG), moved step by step to join the most important international economic organizations of the post-war world. In Europe, West German representatives under allied supervision joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) that drafted a common European program for using Marshall Plan aid. The allies also insisted on West German participation in global organizations. In 1948, the allies brought Western Germany into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the international organization that sets the rules for fair

trade practices. In 1949 the new Federal Republic joined the world's most important international financial organizations: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

By the time a new West German state emerged as the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1949, the West German economy had already resumed many of its traditional functions in the European economy. The large volume of West German machinery, motor vehicles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and electrical equipment that was moving across Western Europe continued the path of German economic development begun at the turn of the century. Similarly, West German imports of oil, cotton, and other industrial raw materials were part of a familiar old picture. New, however, were the intimate organizational linkages that tied Germany to its West European neighbors and to the world economy, making it difficult and undesirable for Germany to embark on a potentially destructive separate economic path.

In East Germany, economic recovery proceeded much more slowly, for a combination of economic and political reasons. First, the Soviet zone lacked the quality coal resources and heavy industrial base that helped the western zones begin their recovery. Second, the July 1945 Potsdam Agreement among the allies authorized the Soviets to draw \$10 billion in reparations from Germany, 75% of this total to come directly from the Soviet zone of occupation. Between 1945 and 1953 the Soviets drew a still undetermined amount of reparations from Eastern Germany, largely from 1945 to 1947 in the unproductive practice of dismantling still operable plant and equipment and shipping it back to the USSR.<sup>12</sup> Finally, the disruptions that accompanied the forced transformation from a capitalist to a Soviet-style socialist economy through confiscation of large land holdings, nationalization of key industries, and purges of the civil service hampered economic recovery. By the time the new German Democratic Republic emerged in October 1949, its economy was already significantly behind that of the west, having regained only 79% of 1937 production levels, compared to a 90% recovery by that time in the west.<sup>13</sup> Yet in view of its poor natural resource base, the damaging Soviet reparation policies, and lack of anything like the Marshall Plan financial aid, the dogged economic improvement of East Germany might qualify as a "mini-miracle."

With the first signs of production recovery, the Soviets and the East German communist leadership of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) began

tying the East German economy to the larger economic bloc of Soviet occupied Eastern Europe. By the time the Soviet-sponsored Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, or more commonly, COMECON) had been founded in Eastern Europe in January 1949, the Soviet zone already conducted 75% of its foreign trade with Soviet bloc partners.<sup>14</sup> Analogous to the situation in Western Europe, the Soviet bloc countries looked to East Germany for the most sophisticated machinery, electrical, and optical equipment that they could not produce themselves.

## **Divergent Paths: Prosperity and Problems, 1949-1989**

For the West German economy, the forty years from 1949 to 1989 witnessed the further development of the important decisions made in 1947-48. Most fundamentally, the Federal Republic has continued to exploit its traditional strength as a world class producer and supplier of advanced industrial products. Exports surged in the 1950s, rising more than 20% annually as West Europeans eagerly bought German equipment to rebuild their economies. In 1960 foreign trade accounted for 30% of NNP; in 1970, 34%. By 1985 *exports alone* had reached 27% of total output!<sup>15</sup> Nothing can show more clearly West Germany's very high degree of involvement in the international economy. Rising exports have generally more than outpaced rising imports so that the Federal Republic has registered healthy trade surpluses for almost all of the post-war period. As recently as the three year period 1987-89, the FRG compiled a huge trade surplus of some \$130 billion.

Manufactured exports helped carry the FRG through twenty consecutive years of economic growth before a mild recession touched the economy in 1967. Since then, the FRG has experienced only two other recessionary periods, 1973-74 and 1981-82, each coming at a time of world-wide economic slowdown that limited export sales. Throughout this period, the fundamental domestic agreements that underlay West Germany's "social market economy" continued to prevail. The labor unions oversaw increases in worker productivity, practiced reasonable wage restraint, and refrained from damaging strikes. In exchange, workers benefitted from extensive social welfare benefits, the right to place labor representatives on the supervisory boards of heavy industrial firms, and government efforts to maintain full employment.

One important reason for the continued international success of West German products is that the FRG economy has continued to evolve. West German producers remain eager to adopt the newest production techniques and continue to shift their product lines by dropping low-end items that other countries might produce more cheaply and by pressing ahead to develop newer, more technologically advanced goods. This, too, is a traditional German strategy and the process reflects a new round of structural transformation underway in West Germany since 1960. Older industries that had once been important components of the German economy (textiles, basic iron and steel, coal mining) have been losing importance for the national economy while newer, technologically more advanced industries (chemicals, plastics, precision engineering, electrical engineering, pharmaceuticals, computer controlled machinery, optics) continue to expand. Although still far behind the United States and Japan, the FRG ranks third in exports of communications technology.

A second fundamental characteristic of West German economic development since 1949 has been the ever closer integration of the West German economy into the larger West European economy. By the early 1950s, the West Germans, under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's guidance, had become enthusiastic supporters of the West European integration begun by the Allies in 1947-48. In 1950 the FRG became a founding member of the European Payments Union that allowed multilateral accounting for foreign trade among the West European countries. A year later the FRG joined France, Italy, and the Benelux countries in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that regulated West European coal and steel production on a supra-national basis. The ECSC served as a stepping stone to the 1957 founding of the European Economic Community (EEC, later EC) of which the FRG was again an original member.

Subsequently, under Chancellors Helmut Schmidt (SPD, 1974-82) and Helmut Kohl (CDU, 1982-), the FRG has championed the cause of closer West European economic cooperation. Under Schmidt, the West German "Deutsche Mark" (DM or D-Mark) became the anchor of the 1978 European Monetary System (EMS), designed to stabilize European currencies by linking them to each other in a target range of acceptable fluctuation. Under Kohl, the FRG pushed hard for the 1987 Single European Act (SEA) that called for a single European market in goods and services by the end of 1992. The SEA re-launched Europe on a drive for

more complete economic and political unification as envisioned in the Maastricht Treaty of December 1991, which the FRG has done everything possible to advance, even in the face of widespread European skepticism. At the same time, the FRG continues to actively participate in other global international economic organizations such as GATT and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), while continuing to increase its financial support of international organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank.

The regional pattern of West German trade has displayed a number of important shifts in the post-war period. Most important has been the steady rise in the percentage of trade conducted with West European partners. Since the founding of the EEC in 1957, its share of West German exports has risen from roughly 35% to 50% (1985). No other market comes even close to the European Community in importance for the West German economy. Another fundamental shift in trade has been the sharp decline in the East European market for German exports. Prior to the Second World War, Eastern Europe absorbed 15% of all German exports. With the Cold War division of Europe, this figure fell to 1-2% in the 1950s. Exports to the East rebounded somewhat to 5-6% of the FRG's total exports in the late 1970s, then fell off again as the Soviet bloc entered its final phase of economic difficulty in the 1980s. In the future, geography, history, and technology will give Germany an advantageous position from which to increase its economic interaction with the slowly recovering economies of eastern Europe, particularly Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and the countries that emerged from the former Soviet Union. We should not be surprised to find Germany active as the principal western economic partner of these economies in the decades ahead.

In the 1970s the FRG began to assume a major financial as well as trading role in the European and world economies. Prior to that time, money earned through exports was invested primarily at home where the FRG had a capital shortage as a result of the ruined currency that had been withdrawn in 1948. Steady West German trade surpluses have allowed the accumulation of significant foreign exchange reserves, roughly \$70 billion in 1988. These reserves help sustain the stability of the D-Mark, allowing it to play the central role in the European Monetary System. Since the mid-1960s, West Germans have also begun to invest significant sums abroad (DM 74 billion by 1980, DM 120 billion 1985), primarily in Western Europe followed by North America, South America, Africa, and Asia.<sup>16</sup>

The growing importance of European trade and financial interactions for the continued health of the West German economy no doubt provided the material basis for genuine West German enthusiasm in participating in the international and supra-national organizations of the European economy. Both organizationally and materially, West Germany has helped to forge a unique set of ties that have inextricably bound the FRG and Europe. For both groups, this unprecedented development has been the most important new element in the post-war chapter of economic interaction between Germans and their neighbors.

In the east, industrial production grew rapidly in the early years of the GDR, doubling from 1950 levels by 1956 and doubling again by 1966.<sup>17</sup> Overall growth rates of industrial production were not significantly lower than those of the FRG. This was achieved as the governing Socialist Unity Party (SED) continued to squeeze private ownership out of the economy and move toward a fully planned economy, a process completed by the early 1970s. Standards of living remained low in the East, however, as high rates of industrial growth required massive investment in order to create an industrial base in heavy industry—something the GDR initially lacked. Proportionately less was invested in consumer goods industries.

Over time, the GDR became as closely enmeshed in the structures and patterns of the Soviet bloc economy as the FRG was in the EC. At the end of the 1950s, East German economic planning periods (5 and 7 Year Plans) were adjusted to run concurrently with Soviet planning periods so that coordination of the two economies could be intensified. East German-Soviet economic cooperation was formalized by long term bilateral trade agreements and by bilateral "Protocols on the Coordination of Macroeconomic Plans."

In the 1970s and 1980s the SED leadership unthinkingly continued down the path of investment in traditional heavy industries such as steel and coal.<sup>18</sup> Meanwhile, the advanced economies of the west had already abandoned these industries as vehicles to continued economic development. Ideological attachment to heavy industry, political attachment to the planned economy, and economic blindness to changes in the global economy all played some role in this decision by the communist planners.<sup>19</sup> As the West German economy began to reduce its stake in the older mining and metallurgical industries and to shift its efforts to more advanced industrial sectors, East Germany continued to invest in

increased coal and crude steel production.<sup>20</sup> By not reducing their commitment to heavy industry and shifting to new technologies, East Germany and the Soviet bloc fell even further behind the west. Increasingly, the East German industrial landscape took on the character of a gigantic rust-belt. Growing West German exports of sophisticated industrial technology to the Soviets in the 1970s testified to the widening gap between East German and West German economic abilities. Excessive government spending on subsidies for social services and basic commodities, such as food and rent, produced a large, though hidden national debt.

In addition to these structural problems, the 1980s brought new burdens. Early in the decade, a new arms race with the West restricted economic options. Later, the GDR, a major re-exporter of Soviet petroleum products, was hit hard by the collapse in world oil prices in 1985. Finally, the regime invested large sums in microelectronics and other high technology products in an unsuccessful attempt to emulate the glamorous technological breakthroughs of capitalist producers in the West. By the second half of the decade, the general public knew very well that standards of living in the GDR were falling. Little wonder that when Gorbachev suggested genuine economic and political restructuring, the citizens of the GDR seized the offer, sweeping away the older generation of communist leaders and opening the way for the German revolution of 1989-1990.

## Prospects for the Future<sup>21</sup>

In 1990 German unification was accompanied by a legion of newspaper and journal articles warning that the economic power of the new Germany would soon reach dangerous levels.<sup>22</sup> Since that time, however, the alarmist rhetoric has fallen off significantly. Two factors are largely responsible for the growing consensus that unified Germany does not pose an immediate threat to the European economic order. First and most immediately, the German economy has not been strengthened, but rather weakened, in the short run, by unification. In June 1992, then German Economics Minister Jürgen Möllemann estimated the costs of rebuilding the new Eastern Länder at DM 2,000 billion[!], with payments spread out over the next 10 to 15 years. Germany has also shouldered the bulk of the international financial burden in subsidizing economic reform in the

former Soviet Union, with payments of almost DM 80 billion to the former Soviets between 1990 and 1993 and another DM 87 billion granted to the new regimes in Eastern Europe.<sup>23</sup> Germany will be facing these continuing financial burdens for a decade or more; its financial dominance of Europe is not at hand.

The burdens of rebuilding eastern Germany eliminated the traditional west German trade surplus almost immediately in 1990 and slowly dragged the entire economy into severe recession by 1993. The recession, in turn, has sparked a debate on whether some of the long-standing practices of the post-war west German economy, such as providing generous benefits to workers, are still appropriate in times of domestic austerity and heightened international economic competition. The severity of the recession and the business conclusions drawn from it will determine how much of West Germany's old social market economy will be recognizable in the economic future of the united Germany.

Second and more enduringly, the newly enlarged Federal Republic remains genuinely committed to the structures and practices of international cooperation and integration that have governed the West European economy throughout the postwar period. Certainly the economic strains of rebuilding the former GDR make it more difficult for Germany to find economic and financial policies that satisfy both domestic and European demands. Recall that high German interest rates, necessary to forestall a domestic inflation brought on by massive reconstruction spending, were widely blamed for the international European currency turbulence of September 1992 and the need to restructure the EMS in August 1993. Yet no careful observer of German and European politics can doubt the German commitment to finding mutually satisfying policies. For the foreseeable future, Germany remains committed both to intensifying the degree of intra-European economic cooperation and to expanding the number of countries that participate in the integrating structures of the EC.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> The best English language introductions to the German economy are Hans-Joachim Braun, *The German Economy in the Twentieth Century* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990); Eric Owen Smith, *The West Germany Economy* (London: Croom Helm, 1983); and Henry C. Wallich's earlier study, *Mainsprings of German Revival* (New Haven, Yale UP, 1955). Invaluable as a data source is B.R. Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics 1750-1970*

(New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), also available in a paperback abridged edition (1978). Braun can be set in the context of larger economic developments traced in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), *The Fontana Economic History of Europe* (London: Collins/Fontana, 1972-), vol. 5, *The Twentieth Century*; vol. 6, *The Contemporary Economies*.

<sup>2</sup> In Europe, Germany's 1914 crude steel production of 17.6 million metric tons more than equalled the combined outputs of Britain (6.9 million), France (4.6 million), and Russia (4.5 million), Mitchell, *Historical Statistics* (abr. ed.), p. 224-225.

<sup>3</sup> Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics* (abr. ed.), p. 304, 411; Braun, *The German Economy*, p. 22.

<sup>4</sup> Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics* (abr. ed.), p. 304, 410.

<sup>5</sup> Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics* (abr. ed.), p. 304, 411.

<sup>6</sup> Investments in military-related industries totaled RM 16 billion for the pre-war period 1933-1938 alone, J. Noakes and G. Pridham (eds.) *Nazism 1919-1945*, vol. 2, *State, Economy, and Society* (Exeter: Exeter University Publications, 1984), p. 297. "RM" = "Reichsmark" the unit of currency in Germany 1923-1948. The Nazis severely devalued this currency by printing money recklessly to finance the war. In 1948, the nearly worthless Reichsmarks were withdrawn from the western (American, British, and French) zones of occupation and West Berlin, and replaced by a new currency unit, the "Deutsche Mark" (DM), which served as the legal tender in the Federal Republic from 1948 to 1989 and since 1990, for the united Germany.

<sup>7</sup> On German economic developments during the war, begin with Alan S. Milward, *War, Economy, and Society 1939-1945* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977). Milward cites data for the important German machine-tool industry showing 1945 equipment inventories 50% greater than those of 1938, p. 334.

<sup>8</sup> See, for example, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1950), the memoirs of Lucius D. Clay, the first American Military Governor in occupied Germany.

<sup>9</sup> Greatly simplified, this is the argument that runs through Alan Milward's *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984); see in particular pp. 36 ff., 465, 471-474.

<sup>10</sup> The importance of Marshall Plan aid for West Germany's economic revival has been questioned, most pointedly by German economic historian Werner Abelshauser. For an introduction to that and other debates surrounding the Marshall Plan in Germany, see Charles Maier and Gunter Bischof (eds.), *The Marshall Plan and Germany* (New York/Oxford: Berg, 1991).

<sup>11</sup> Calculated from Office of the Military Governor, United States (OMGUS), *Report of the Military Governor, No. 49 (July 1949)* Statistical Annex No XXIX, table 602.

<sup>12</sup> The Soviets subsequently claimed that reparations valued at \$4.2 billion had been collected from East Germany. Western estimates are considerably higher: \$10-12 billion in reparations and an additional \$3.5 billion in "occupation costs."

<sup>13</sup> Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics* (abr. ed.), pp. 180, 182. The GDR continued to ration some food items up to 1 June 1958. By comparison, all food rationing had ceased in the FRG in 1949.

<sup>14</sup> Cited in Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., *The German Democratic Republic* (Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968, (Table 8, p. 120.

<sup>15</sup> Braun, *The German Economy*, p. 237.

<sup>16</sup> Braun, *The German Economy*, p. 245.

<sup>17</sup> Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics* (abr. ed.), p. 182.

<sup>18</sup>The following interpretation of the crisis of the GDR economy draws heavily on an analysis advanced by Charles Maier in *Why Did Communism Collapse in 1989?*, Program on Central and Eastern Europe Working Paper Series #7 (Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1991).

<sup>19</sup>Roughly parallel decisions were made in every Soviet bloc economy at this time: in Edward Gierek's Poland, in Gustav Husak's Czechoslovakia, and in Leonid Brezhnev's Soviet Union. Only in Janos Kadar's Hungary, where the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) of 1969 allowed an unorthodox mixture of state and private enterprises, was there room for innovation and economic growth in new areas.

<sup>20</sup>West German coal production peaked in 1961 and declined some 45% by 1988. In that same period, East German coal output increased by 24%; Mitchell, *European Historical Statistics* (abr. ed.), p. 190; Maier, *Why Did Communism Collapse?*, p. 22.

<sup>21</sup>For more on the economy of the united Germany see Hans-Werner Sinn, *Jumpstart: The Economic Unification of Germany* (MIT Press, 1992); W. R. Smyser, *The Economy of United Germany: Colossus at the Crossroads* (St. Martin's, 1993).

<sup>22</sup>See, for example, William Jarosz and Roger Smith, "A New German Empire," *The Washington Post*, 12 November 1989; Andrei S. Markovits and Simon Reich, "Should Europe Fear the Germans?," *German Politics and Society*, vol. 23 (Summer 1991), pp. 1-20.

<sup>23</sup>"Möller: neue Länder nicht nur Absatzmarkt," *Deutschland Nachrichten*, 5 June 1992; "Deutschland finanziert GUS," *ibid.*, 30 October 1992; "Bisher 167 Milliarden Mark für die Reformstaaten," *ibid.*, 12 November 1993.



# German Culture in a Modern World

by Peter Jelavich

## Author's Note

*Postwar Germany can boast a cultural life as rich as that of any major nation, like England, France, Italy, or the United States. Yet its particular historical experiences in the twentieth century gave a distinctive imprint to its artistic output. The traumatic years of National Socialism had a lasting impact on the lives and memories of many Germans. More immediately, the division of the country between a capitalist West and Communist East led to the formation of two very distinct cultural realms. To be sure, the arts of all countries have been affected by political and social forces: one need only think of the influence of the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, or the women's movement on the culture of the United States. But in Germany, the arts were politicized to an unusually high degree.*

*Despite—or sometimes because of—these peculiarities, postwar German culture has attracted significant attention abroad, including the United States; thus many works are accessible to American readers and viewers. Any short discussion of Germany's complex artistic scene, such as this one, must be very selective and somewhat arbitrary. I have tended to highlight novels, plays, and films that have been translated into English (and thus should be available in larger libraries, bookstores, or video outlets). The only way to experience the richness—and the often problematic nature—of German culture is to confront such works directly.*

Before the twentieth century, Germany was known as a country devoted to ideas and the arts. It liked to see itself as a nation of “poets and thinkers” (*Dichter und Denker*). That designation was not inappropriate. The German-speaking states produced Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Friedrich Schiller, two of the finest writers of the eighteenth century, as well as the major philosophers of the nineteenth century: Georg W.F. Hegel, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Friedrich Nietzsche. German composers (such as Johann Sebastian Bach, Ludwig van Beethoven, Robert Schumann, Richard Wagner, and Johannes Brahms) dominated concert

programs throughout the western world. German universities were unsurpassed in fields like history, classics, and the natural sciences; indeed, the American university system, wherein scholars combine teaching and research, is based upon a model developed around 1810 in Berlin. Moreover, German creativity was geographically widespread. In France, Paris is the undisputed cultural center, as London is for England. By contrast, the fragmentation of Germany until 1871 meant that many cities and principalities vied for artistic prestige. Not only Berlin and Munich, but lesser cities like Düsseldorf and Darmstadt, and even small towns like Weimar made important contributions to German art and thought.

By the end of the nineteenth century the newly united nation was no longer, of course, simply a land of "poets and thinkers," but Europe's military and economic giant as well. Yet that did not detract from the quality of its cultural and intellectual life, which remained vibrant through the 1920s. Indeed, Weimar Germany produced many landmarks of modern culture: the expressionist painters, the Bauhaus architects and designers, and socially critical playwrights like Bertolt Brecht created works that continue to inspire or agitate viewers to this day.

This cultural vitality was shattered by the Nazis. All painters and writers who were Jewish or leftist, all producers of critical and innovative art, were branded as "degenerates." Scores of Germany's most famous artists, playwrights, novelists, actors and actresses, and film directors fled abroad, often to the United States. Modernist writers and artists who chose to stay in Germany were cowed into silence; some were exterminated in the final years of the war, when the concentration camps were working to full capacity. By then Germany had turned into a cultural wasteland. The state promoted artists who glorified Nazi political and racial ideals, but their works were mediocre to an embarrassing extent.

Consequently, after 1945 the Germans not only had to rebuild their cities and factories, and reshape their political system; they also had to revive their culture. It soon became clear that the division of Germany between west and east would have a profound impact on the arts. For that reason, developments in the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic will be treated separately.

## Developments in West Germany

Soon after Germany's capitulation in May 1945, the cities under American, English, and French occupation attempted to restore their cultural life. By the 1950s they had succeeded, at least on the surface: theaters, operas, concert halls, cinemas, museums, and galleries were being rebuilt, and were attracting sizeable attendance. But the mood was predominantly one of escapism, inasmuch as there was a clear desire to avoid thinking about the recent (Nazi) past. This tendency could be found in both elite and popular culture. Many writers, in particular poets, argued that the experiences in the Third Reich demonstrated that any conflation of art and politics was detrimental to culture; they contended that true artists should avoid dealing with contingent events (like politics or recent history) and focus instead on the "eternal verities" of nature and the human spirit. Whereas culturally pretentious writers withdrew into "high art," at the other extreme the mass media provided sappy or sensationalist forms of escapism. The revived German film industry cranked out scores of so-called *Heimat* (homeland) films, replete with sentimental love stories and cheerful scenes of peasant life set in the Black Forest or the Bavarian alps. Other successful genres were rather grisly crime films based on English detective stories; "Westerns" taken from the cowboy-and-Indian tales of Karl May, a popular German novelist of the nineteenth century; and nostalgic historical films set in the imperial (Prussian or Habsburg) past.

Not all writers succumbed to escapism. There were some who tried to face up to their wartime experiences. They also questioned the myth about National Socialism that prevailed during the 1950s: namely, that the German populace at large, far from being responsible for the war and the Holocaust, was itself a victim of the Nazis. According to this scenario, Hitler had been a "demonic" but somehow "mesmerizing" figure who had led the Germans astray, while his (supposedly small) band of brutal thugs had terrorized those who refused to follow his siren call. Some younger writers challenged this view by arguing that many "average" Germans were willing, indeed enthusiastic, followers of National Socialism and the very people who returned to political and economic prominence in the postwar years.

The best-known critic of German "victimization" was Heinrich Böll (1917-1985), who in 1949 began to publish short stories that recalled life in wartime Germany from a critical, Catholic humanist perspective. But soon

he began to question the postwar situation as well. Böll's first international success, the novel *Billiards at Half-Past Nine* (1959), argued that the same brutish types who had come to power in the Third Reich regained influence during the Adenauer years, while the "lambs" of society continued to be trodden underfoot. Another novel appeared in 1959 that made its author famous worldwide: *The Tin Drum*, by Günter Grass (born 1927). Told in a tone that is alternately horrific and grotesquely comic, it recounts the prewar, wartime, and postwar adventures of a boy who consciously chooses to stop growing at age three. The boy's amoral and impulsive nature causes several deaths, but he is no better or worse than the "normal" Germans around him, whom Grass depicted as more or less willing participants in the Nazi movement.

While critical writing was relatively rare in the 1950s, there was a veritable explosion of such works in the 1960s. To a certain extent, this paralleled developments elsewhere in Europe and the United States: youth movements and civic groups attacked the deployment of nuclear weapons, the "exploitation" of Third-World countries by the capitalist west, and the war in Vietnam. The 1960s were a watershed in the Federal Republic as well, but there the politicization of the arts displayed specifically German characteristics.

The trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1960 in Jerusalem was followed in Frankfurt am Main by drawn-out court cases against Auschwitz camp guards that lasted from 1962 to 1964; both trials received heavy media coverage. Moreover, in 1966 and 1967 the neo-Nazi NPD made large gains in certain regional and municipal elections. Playwrights took the lead in voicing their concerns. In 1963 Rolf Hochhuth (born 1931) achieved instant, international notoriety with *The Deputy*, the first of a series of historical, quasi-documentary dramas. Hochhuth accused Pope Pius XII of consciously having refrained from speaking out against the extermination of the Jews, even though a public condemnation might have saved many lives. The play was not explicitly anti-Catholic: its hero was a priest who chose to accompany Jews to their deaths in Auschwitz, while the true villain was a sadistic Nazi doctor at that camp. Nevertheless, *The Deputy* agitated public opinion because it raised the issue of Church silence during the Nazi years.

Although none of West Germany's major playwrights sought to downplay Nazi atrocities, by the 1960s they were suggesting that the horrors of

National Socialism were part of a larger pattern of military brutality in the modern world. Heinar Kipphardt wrote a documentary play about America's development of the atomic bomb (*The Case of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, 1964). Hochhuth even criticized Churchill for allowing unnecessary bombing of German civilians during World War II (*Soldiers*, 1967), but was careful to indicate that the Germans had initiated that practice, with the destruction of Coventry. Peter Weiss (1916-1982) was another major playwright who wrote a number of controversial documentary dramas about current events, such as the Auschwitz trials in Frankfurt (*The Investigation*, 1965) and the war in Southeast Asia (*Discourse on Vietnam*, 1968).

These radical plays could not help but alienate the majority of politicians and citizens who held moderate or conservative views. Between 1968 and 1979 critical writers and the political establishment traded bitter, often hysterical accusations. To a certain extent, that development was ironic: the electoral victory of the Social Democrats in 1969 should have cheered left-leaning intellectuals. Moderately leftist writers like Grass did in fact campaign actively for the Social Democrats, an experience he recounted in *From the Diary of a Snail* (1972). But many other prominent writers had become considerably more radicalized in the wake of the student antiwar movement. Massive protests erupted after the Berlin police killed a student (with a shot in the back) during demonstrations in June 1967. Political tensions reached a boiling point after 1972 when the leftist "Red Army Faction" (commonly known as the "Baader-Meinhof Gang") stepped up its bank robberies and began its assassinations of prominent industrialists and politicians. In response, the federal parliament and the executive passed increasingly punitive laws and decrees, and the police stepped up surveillance of the populace at large. This led critics to fear that the state was beginning to infringe on the very liberties it was sworn to defend.

Böll, whose international fame was at its height following his receipt of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1972, was drawn into the center of these debates. His questioning of police practices induced conservative politicians and the boulevard press, in particular the papers owned by Axel Springer, such as *Bild*, to launch a defamation campaign against him. He was accused of "sympathizing" with the terrorists, and the police searched his home several times. Böll responded by doing what he did best: he wrote a novel entitled *The Lost Honor of Katharina Blum, or, How*

*Violence Develops and Where It Can Lead* (1974). It tells the story of a woman who spends one night with a man who, unbeknownst to her, is a suspected terrorist. Subjected to a barrage of false accusations by the boulevard press, she eventually shoots the journalist who has been hounding her. Böll proceeded to write *Reports on the State of Mind of the Nation* (1975), acidly satirical tales about German anti-terrorist agents spying on each other, and *The Safety Net* (1979), a novel describing how paranoid businessmen become trapped in their own security systems.

By the 1970s critical filmmaking had advanced to the point where it too could enter the fray. The "New German Cinema" was born in 1962, when twenty-six young film directors issued the "Oberhausen Manifesto," named after the town where a festival of innovative short films was being held. Disgusted at the glut of *Heimat*, crime, and sentimental films that dominated the commercial market, they took their cue from the "New Wave" cinema that the French had started in the 1950s. The young Germans' gritty documentary style, and their avoidance of straightforward narrative in favor of more "realistic" fragmented tales, initially won praise from art-cinema aficionados at film festivals. By the 1970s the New German Cinema was attaining some commercial success as well. Rainer Werner Fassbinder (1946-1982), by far the most prolific of the younger filmmakers, gained attention with a series of unusually bleak, hard-hitting works about German society. He showed how petty cruelty and the lack of human warmth in everyday life cause despair and death among lower-middle-class men (*Why Does Mr. R. Run Amok?*, 1970; *The Merchant of Four Seasons*, 1971), bourgeois women (*The Bitter Tears of Petra von Kant*, 1972), and foreign "guest" workers (*Ali: Fear Eats Soul*, 1973). Soon the issue of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures caught the attention of filmmakers, and the 1976 cinematic version of Böll's *Katherina Blum* by Volker Schlöndorff (born 1939) and Margarethe von Trotta (born 1942) was a runaway success. In 1978 several major filmmakers, including Fassbinder and Schlöndorff, collaborated on *Germany in Autumn*.

The *Autumn* referred to in the title was that of 1977, when the terrorist wave and anti-terrorist hysteria reached its height. The kidnapping of Hanns-Martin Schleyer, a former SS officer who was then president of the major industrialists' and employers' association, provoked a massive manhunt by security forces. After several weeks his body was found; he had been murdered in response to the suicides of three imprisoned terrorist leaders, among them Andreas Baader. That marked the end of the

waves of terrorism and repressive counter-measures, but the period had a grotesque denouement. In 1978 Rolf Hochhuth discovered that Hans Filbinger, the Minister President of the state of Baden-Württemberg and a rabid critic of leftist "sympathizers," had been a military judge with Nazi forces in occupied Norway. In that capacity he had condemned to death a German sailor for attempting to desert in the very last days of the war. Hochhuth turned the story into another one of his docu-dramas, but even before *Jurists* was staged, he leaked the information. After weeks of furious denials, Filbinger was forced to resign.

The confrontational stance adopted by Böll and others was not typical of all West German writers in the 1970s. Indeed, during that decade many citizens turned away from conventional political concerns. Leftist artists who had looked favorably toward the Soviet Union were appalled by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. More moderate writers, whose hopes had been boosted by the Social Democrats' victory in 1969, became discouraged by their failure to promote significant changes. Many citizens felt disappointment or disgust with the established political parties, as well as the radical leftist movements. Frustrated, they formed neighborhood groups and grass-roots movements devoted to causes that affected them more immediately, like ecology and women's rights.

One major new genre to emerge from the ferment of the 1970s was women's literature and film, which was also developing in Europe, Latin America, and the United States. The privileging of males has been common in almost all societies, but Germany was "patriarchal" to an unusual degree at all points of the political spectrum. Women who joined the various ultra-leftist groups of the 1960s were horrified to discover that self-proclaimed radical men might lambast the exploitation of workers and Third-World peoples, but they invariably treated female "comrades" condescendingly—or worse.

The search for separate women's spaces, and a distinct female identity, soon became a topic of literary reflection. One of the first such works was *Class Love* (1973) by Karin Struck (born 1947), a novel about a working-class woman who receives an elite high school and college education only to discover that she is looked down upon not only because of her class background, but also because of her gender. The most famous of the women's novels was *Shedding* (1975) by Verena Stefan (born 1947). Through a very introspective first-person narrative, Stefan tells the story of

a woman who stops having affairs with men and turns to women for love. Most fundamentally, her work is a novel of self-discovery: the heroine struggles to find a language appropriate for describing her emotions, her sensations, her body.

The theme of women's social alienation and quest for self-expression was adopted by a new generation of women's filmmakers in the 1970s, whose works include *Redupers: The All-Around Reduced Personality* (1977) and *The Subjective Factor* (1980), both by Helke Sander (born 1937), and Margarethe von Trotta's *The Second Awakening of Christa Klages* (1977).

To the extent that women's film and literature focused on self-discovery, it belonged to a wider literary and artistic tendency of the 1970s, the "new subjectivity." Like the New German Cinema, it was produced by a younger generation that was born during or immediately after the war years, and thus had no recollection of the Nazi era. The "new subjectivity" was, however, hardly unified, and took many different forms. Women's literature, though concerned with personal feelings, was not individualistic, since it simultaneously proclaimed women's solidarity. But other forms of the "new subjectivity" were much more self-centered and skeptical about the possibility of any genuine form of interpersonal contact. That mood was found most prominently in the plays of Botho Strauss (born 1944), who took the German bourgeoisie to task for its self-satisfied materialism, which barely succeeded in masking a barrenness of human emotions and spiritual values. *Big and Little* (1978) dramatizes a woman's increasingly fruitless search for friendship; desperate to connect with someone, she even tries to place a phone call to God. In *The Park* (1983), based on Shakespeare's *Midsummer Night's Dream*, Titania and Oberon materialize in a city park, but their attempts to inspire the German burghers with a zest for life and love prove futile. Failing to find meaning and subjectivity in everyday life, Strauss adopted an increasingly mystical tone, and soon was criticized for undue pessimism and other-worldly escapism.

By the 1980s much of West German literature betrayed a sense of resignation. To be sure, some writers (like Grass) revived their political activism in the wake of the massive citizens' protests against the deployment of mid-range nuclear missiles in the early 1980s. But many creative individuals had come to question whether they had any impact on society at all. A particularly discouraging phenomenon occurred in

1979, when *Holocaust*, the melodramatic Hollywood miniseries, was broadcast on West German television. The show produced an outpouring of emotional soul-searching among citizens, particularly youths, who claimed that they had never been confronted with their nation's Nazi past. Since the crimes of Hitler's Germany had been one of the standard themes of writers and artists, it became clear that the public at large had not been listening to them. In fact, to cite just one statistic, only five percent of the population attended live theater. The majority turned to the commercial mass media, which were dominated by imports from the United States. Some 60% of films shown in Germany during the 1980s were American. Thus it was hardly surprising, though certainly ironic, that a Hollywood miniseries was needed to force the West German public to reflect on the Nazi past.

## Developments in East Germany

The German Democratic Republic, with its Communist regime, developed an entirely different cultural dynamic. In the Soviet zone of occupation, the arts were politicized from the very beginning. Authors were required to adopt the Stalinist dogma of "Socialist Realism," a type of art or literature which heralded social progress under the guidance of the Communist Party (known as the Socialist Unity party, or SED, in East Germany). Artists and writers were bound not only to Communist ideology, but also to a particular style: their works had to be straightforwardly "realistic," and avoid the type of formal experimentation that had characterized avant-garde arts since the late nineteenth century. In 1951 Otto Grotewohl, the GDR's Minister President, delineated the artists' role: "Literature and the visual arts are subordinate to politics. ... The ideas of art must follow the direction of march of the political struggle."

There actually were a number of highly respected writers and artists who concurred with Grotewohl's view. After 1945 many of the creative individuals who had fled Nazi Germany on account of their leftist politics chose to return to the Soviet zone of occupation, rather than to the western zones. Some writers, like Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956), did not have much choice: he was forced to leave the United States in 1948 after being summoned before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, and it was made clear to him that he would be unwelcome in the western

occupation zones. But beyond that, Brecht and others like him sincerely believed that a socialist society would provide the best hope for the future of humanity. In particular, they contended that Hitler's movement had been the product of a militaristic capitalist society, and that the Soviet Union had been most instrumental in defeating him.

Throughout the 1950s citizens of the GDR (unlike those of the Federal Republic) were given heavy doses of "anti-fascist" education. The Nazi experience became one of the major themes of East German literature, in works like *Naked Among Wolves* (1958), a novel about the Buchenwald concentration camp by a former inmate, Bruno Apitz (1900-1979). Works condemning the Nazi regime and commemorating its victims were, of course, morally and politically necessary. Nevertheless, they sometimes provided an exculpatory function for the Communist rulers. Many members of the new East German regime based their legitimacy upon the fact that they had been forced to flee the Nazi state: they never tired of reminding the East German citizens of their "anti-fascist" activities during the war. The economic difficulties of the immediate postwar era and the increasingly dictatorial practices of the Communist regime, were presented as inevitable policies for a state trying to dig itself out of the ashes of Nazism. Many prominent writers subscribed to this viewpoint, and at least during the early years of the GDR, they chose to overlook the repressive measures that were being implemented before their eyes.

Eventually, however, serious writers and artists—including many leftists who had voluntarily moved to the GDR—began to chafe at the strictures of Stalinist politics, and at the imposition of the Socialist Realist style. This was particularly galling for Brecht, who had made his reputation in the 1920s with a highly innovative mode of drama, which rejected the type of realism that the Soviets favored. Brecht was given his own theater and acting troupe, but SED circles criticized many of his plays and productions for their "formalist excesses." Brecht grew increasingly dispirited up to his death in 1956.

Even a figure as prominent as Brecht could be kept in line because, by the early 1950s, the GDR had developed an effective system of cultural domination. As in the Soviet Union, the state controlled all theaters, television and radio stations, publishing houses, bookstores, galleries, and cinemas. Every work published, every play staged, every film screened had to acquire prior approval from some state agency. Authors, for example, had to "discuss" their manuscripts with editors at the state-owned

publishing houses. The editors then had to acquire a "license" to print the work from the state publishing office, a subdivision of the Ministry of Culture. Needless to say, members of the SED occupied commanding posts in all of these agencies.

The East German state also required that all citizens involved in artistic professions belong to an appropriate "union"—for example, authors had to belong to the Writers' Union if they wanted their works published and distributed in the GDR. Of course, this system provided numerous perks to authors willing to conform. Unlike their western counterparts, authors and artists were not dependent upon the vicissitudes of the free market to earn their income: as members of the Writers' Union they received monthly stipends. The state could hand out further favors like nice apartments, cars (which normally required a ten-year wait), access to vacation homes, and freedom to visit western countries. Conversely, failure to conform could have harsh consequences. Dismissal from the Writers' Union amounted to a prohibition to publish. Moreover, the judicial system could be invoked in its full severity: the GDR imposed stiff jail sentences for "crimes" such as "agitation hostile to the state" and "defamation of the state." Through this system of carrots and sticks, the SED sought to impose total control over the arts. The only chink in the armor—but a very big one—was caused by the West German media: all citizens of the GDR could tune in to West German radio, and by the 1970s, most East Germans could receive western television as well.

East German writers, artists, and filmmakers who were willing to toe the Party line, to depict the successful consolidation of socialism in the face of evil capitalist machinations, were well-treated. More often than not, however, conformist works were mediocre, and had little credibility or success among the population at large. In 1959 the Writers' Union of the GDR tried to revive the flagging spirits of literature with the proclamation of the "Bitterfeld Path," named after the industrial city where their conference was held. Workers were encouraged to "grasp the pen," while authors were told to become better acquainted with factory life. The problem with that dictum was that too much honesty was not appreciated, as Heiner Müller had just learned. At that time a convinced leftist, Müller (born 1929) tried to provide accurate dramatizations of the difficulties of building a Communist society amid the ruins of Nazi Germany. For example, his play *The Scab* (1958) depicts an idealistic worker who voluntarily raises the work norms in order to speed the progress of

socialist construction. He is hindered, however, by fellow workers who are ex-Nazis, by formerly leftist "comrades" disillusioned with Stalinism, and even by Party members. After being performed for several months in various theaters, the play was yanked from the repertoires, because it was deemed to show too many "negative" characters. Müller subsequently fell into political disfavor until the 1970s, when he reemerged as the most innovative and internationally acclaimed playwright of the GDR. Many of his later dramas turned to mythological or literary figures to denounce the prevalence of violence in human history (*Philoktetes*, 1968; *The Hamletmachine*, 1979). This play allowed him to avoid taking a clear stance on contemporary issues, since either capitalists or socialists could be considered "war mongers", depending on the viewer's perspective.

The outstanding novelist of the GDR was clearly Christa Wolf (born 1929). True to the "Bitterfeld Path," she worked for a time in a railroad-car factory, and proceeded to write *The Divided Heaven* (1963). Set in the days just before the construction of the Berlin Wall, it tells the story of a working-class woman who chooses to remain in the GDR rather than join her lover in West Berlin. Official opinion turned against Wolf, however, with the appearance of *The Quest for Christa T* (1968). The narrator of the novel reflects about Christa, a young woman who has died of leukemia. Christa never was able to feel happy in the GDR, because that society did not encourage her to think of herself as an individual; her quest for self-expression continually foundered on "the difficulty of saying I." Moreover, the socialist state told its citizens to be patient, to make sacrifices in the present so that communism could be attained in the future. Christa, however, demanded more of her life, and repeatedly asked the haunting question: "When, if not now?" Wolf's novel was criticized severely by official circles in the GDR, and few copies were published. Yet it was reprinted in the Federal Republic and became something of a Bible for the nascent West German women's movement, since Christa's search for self corresponded with the concerns of women on the other side of the wall.

The fact that a writer like Christa Wolf could appeal to readers in both German states should not lead one to believe that literature performed the same function in the two societies. In the east, the search for subjectivity was invariably political, since it challenged—if only implicitly—an official ideology that proclaimed the superiority of the collective over the individual. The ability of the arts to raise such questions turned the GDR's cultural realm into a substitute public sphere. Issues and opinions that

could not be voiced in, say, newspapers or public debates were raised—often elliptically—in novels or plays. A cat-and-mouse game developed between the artists and censors, as creative individuals tested the limits of free expression, or sought to embed subversive ideas in seemingly innocuous language. This led, in turn, to the formation of an unusually sensitive public, which learned to “read between the lines.” The arts thus increasingly became a forum for contestatory ideas, which led to mounting conflicts with the state.

The late 1960s was a period of heightened tensions in the GDR, since many writers had been sympathetic to the “Prague Spring,” and were appalled when East German troops joined the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. After taking over the government in 1971, Erich Honecker tried to ease the atmosphere by proclaiming that there would be “no taboos” in the arts, as long as one proceeded from an honest belief in socialism. Soon various works tested the limits of that policy. *The New Sorrows of Young W* (1973), a play by Ulrich Plenzdorf (born 1934), was a smash hit in the GDR, since it brought to stage the youth subculture that had grown up in East as well as West Germany. A very loose updating of Goethe’s *Sorrows of the Young Werther* (1774), it portrayed a blue-jeans-wearing, rock-music-listening young man who repeatedly made irreverent remarks about Party slogans and authority figures. Once again, official circles grumbled, but since the character was shown to be a good member of his work brigade, the play was deemed to be within the bounds of socialism.

By 1973 Honecker had, however, come to regret his “no taboos” policy, and three years later another spokesman of youth culture paid the price. Wolf Biermann (born 1936), who had moved from West to East Germany, emerged in the 1960s as a songwriter who claimed to be a leftist and supporter of the GDR, but his witty songs often made fun of the absurdities of East German life and politics. By the 1970s he no longer could perform publicly in the GDR, but he was allowed to appear in the Federal Republic, where he sang anti-capitalist and anti-war songs. During a trip to the west in 1976, the GDR informed him that he would not be permitted to return. Shocked by that expulsion order, a hundred East German writers, including Christa Wolf and Heiner Müller, signed a letter of protest to their government. Many of them were subjected to disciplinary measures or harassment, and the relationship between critical writers and the regime never recovered. For the next decade—until the dissolution of the GDR—numerous prominent figures in the arts were

encouraged to leave, or forcibly expelled, to the west. It was no wonder that prominent authors were in the forefront of the citizens' movement that brought down the Honecker regime in the fall of 1989.

## After Reunification

Despite the hostility of many East German authors to the GDR's rulers, the reunification of Germany has been a traumatic event for many of them. Deprived of their guaranteed incomes, they now have to face the vagaries of the publishing market. More fundamentally, they are unsure of their role. As long as the GDR existed, they felt that they were the mouthpiece for a citizenry that was striving for more individuality and freedom. At a meeting of the Writers' Union in March 1990, Christa Wolf referred to the soon-to-be-defunct GDR as a nation "in which we were often expected to speak vicariously for others—because no other institution expressed the contradictions that tore ever deeper into this country, and because others would have paid a higher price had they spoken out."<sup>1</sup> With the demise of the repressive socialist state, that function vanished. Matters were exacerbated by the fact that after the Berlin Wall fell, prominent West German critics attacked Wolf and other East German writers for not having spoken out more vociferously in earlier years. Moreover, documents have come to light revealing that a few well-known writers and artists regularly reported on their colleagues to the GDR's secret police, the Stasi. With their function in doubt and their collective reputation tarnished, rightly or wrongly, many writers in Germany's eastern states have fallen silent.

It is interesting to note that writers and filmmakers had predicted that the integration of the two states would not be easy. Already in 1959 Uwe Johnson (1934-1984), who had just moved from East to West Germany, published *Speculations about Jacob*, a novel about a man's inability to feel at home in either country. One of the first successes of the New German Cinema, *Yesterday's Girl* (1966) by Alexander Kluge (born 1932), described the inability of a Jewish woman from East Germany to integrate herself into the society of the Federal Republic. *The Wall Jumper* (1980) by West German novelist and essayist Peter Schneider (born 1940) tells of one man's refusal to see himself in terms of either state's goals.

Reunification doubtlessly will usher in a new era of Germany's cultural history. In particular, those factors which contributed to the uniqueness of

German arts in the last half of the twentieth century—memories of National Socialism, and the postwar division—will no longer play such a commanding role. Although the Nazi regime and its lingering effects will continue to be a subject of reflection and criticism, one must assume that with the passing years, the issue will become less prevalent. As for the country's division, the political conditions that shaped and sustained the culture of the GDR are gone forever. Nevertheless, the continuing social and economic disparities between east and west, as well as differences in mentalities and life-experiences produced by forty years of separation, will certainly generate literary and artistic responses. Moreover, the appearance of new social problems—xenophobia, racism, unemployment—suggests that the politicization which characterized much of postwar German culture will continue into the next century. But we must wait to see whether the arts will be strident, as in the 1960s, or introspective, as in the 1970s—or express an altogether new sensibility.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Heine, die Zensur und wir" in: Christa Wolf, *Reden im Herbst* (Berlin and Weimar: Aufbau-Verlag, 1990), p. 166.

## REFERENCES

Bullivant, Keith, ed., *After the "Death" of Literature: West German Writing of the 1970s*. Oxford: Berg, 1989.

Corrigan, Timothy, *New German Film: The Displaced Image*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1983.

Demetz, Peter, *After the Fires: Recent Writing in the Germanies, Austria and Switzerland*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992.

———, *Postwar German Literature: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Pegasus, 1970.

Kaes, Anton, *From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

McCormick, Richard, *Politics of the Self: Feminism and the Postmodern in West German Literature and Film*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

For the culture of the German Democratic Republic, see the annual volumes of: *Studies in GDR Culture and Society* (Washington, DC: University Press of America), 1981—



# From Revolution to Unification: Creating a New Germany

by Konrad H. Jarausch

German unification came as a complete surprise. As late as 1989 politicians and pundits were convinced that the Germans had been divided for good. To be sure, western speeches on June 17, the holiday commemorating the 1953 uprising, had continued to invoke the goal of eventual reunification. Allied governments had professed to go along, certain that their bluff would never be called. But, in practice, almost everyone had accepted the division and tried to manage its consequences. Progressive opinion considered the existence of two German states to be the foundation for peace in Europe. Therefore the sudden East German awakening in the fall of 1989 caught virtually all actors and commentators unprepared.

The speed of the transformation proved shocking. Decades of immobility had created an expectation that the stalemate could only be overcome by incremental changes. But instead of moving like a glacier, events rushed forward like a flood. The overthrow of post-Stalinism did not stop with the democratization of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), but created an unstoppable rush to national unity. In spite of growing misgivings, one incredible year brought that reunification which had proven so elusive during the preceding four decades. From the mass exodus on, time horizons shortened from decades to years, from years to months, from months to days. No wonder that many participants felt giddy, as if they were riding on a runaway train.

The extent of the changes was equally stunning. All elaborate confederation scenarios of gradual reconciliation turned out to be wrong. The two countries did not meet somewhere in the middle through piecemeal reforms, but the GDR simply dissolved itself and its component

states joined the FRG. In the clash of ideologies, the "free democratic order" won out over "real existing socialism." In the military arena, the hostile blocs did not just disarm, but one key member of the Warsaw Pact actually switched to the NATO side. In economic competition socialist planning lost out to the superior performance of "the social market economy." As a result even the once superior teams of the East joined less talented athletes of the West to compete together for Olympic medals. Not only did the Iron Curtain lift at last, but a German national state began to reemerge.

The rapidity and depth of the upheaval have left many people incredulous. Inside and outside the new Germany, a heated debate has arisen about its causes, pattern, and consequences. With more emotion than information, old fears of German aggression and repression confront new hopes of democracy and prosperity. This cognitive lag has spawned powerful myths. Supporters of unity romanticize the East German rising as a heroic struggle and applaud popular preference for the west. Critics deprecate the implosion of the GDR experiment and denounce its annexation as a capitalist plot. The elation of self-liberation has turned into depression over the disastrous results of the merger. A whiff of nostalgia is in the air, making the GDR more alluring after its demise than during its lifetime. How can a contemporary observer resolve such contradictions and understand these unforeseen events?

## **Pictures of the Upheaval**

Since German unification was a media event, it left behind a kaleidoscope of confusing images. Astute commentators called the eastern rising "a television revolution" in order to denote the important role of radio, television, and the press in its course. With their sympathies for dissidents, western journalists accelerated the pace of change by offering to broadcast their views. Once the GDR media gained some independence, they suddenly blossomed with accurate and biting reports about the deficiencies of their own system. At the same time, western professionals began to manipulate eastern opinion by producing slickly packaged promises of a better life. In the babble of sound-bytes, former communists and regime opponents soon found themselves outclassed. To understand the upheaval, it is necessary to recall some of the bewildering pictures that still evoke the drama of the change.

86

The central symbol of the Cold War had been the Berlin Wall. The GDR had closed off its frontiers in August 1961 to halt the westward emigration of 3.5 million of its citizens. The East German communist party (SED) lamely justified the barrier as "anti-fascist protection" against West German revanchism. By stopping the population hemorrhage, East Germany managed to stabilize its state for almost three decades. The ugly edifice sent a clear message to its citizens and neighbors that the GDR was here to stay. But the Wall also came to symbolize repression, since it penned in an unwilling population and desperate attempts to cross it cost almost 500 lives. For western observers, its concrete and barbed wire served as visual proof of the inferiority of the communist regime.

Bonn's red-carpet reception of Erich Honecker in 1987 suggested that both German states tried to improve relations nonetheless. During the state visit chancellor Helmut Kohl received the East German leader with full honors in the West German capital. The Christian-Democratic host had continued the *Ostpolitik* of his Social-Democratic predecessors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt in order to improve human relations between East and West. With a de facto recognition of the GDR and crucial economic credits, these Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) leaders had sought "change through closeness." Their conciliatory stance made the border more permeable for East German citizens and allowed greater numbers to travel to the west. But in dealing with the East Berlin government, Bonn had to swallow its ethical objections to Communism. While both sides continued to try to undermine one another, they started to live with each other in a kind of abnormal normality.

In September 1989 news flashes of embassy occupations suggested the end of this intra-German stability. One snap-shot showed a desperate refugee straddling the fence of the Prague legation. While Czech police pulled on his legs to keep him out, GDR emigrants tugged on his arms to get him into safety. Polish reforms and Soviet perestroika made the Iron Curtain rust through in Hungary, when the improving climate allowed Budapest to remove the barbed-wire fence at the Austrian border. This unexpected chance for vacationers to escape created a mass exodus from the GDR during the summer and fall. SED vacillations between sealing off East German borders and allowing embassy refugees to escape only increased the flow. By voting with their feet, ordinary citizens began to undermine Honecker's post-Stalinist regime. In effect, the flight from the GDR was a kind of individual reunification with the west.

By October 1989 unprecedented images of mass demonstrations dominated the news. The media showed tens of thousands of East Germans marching peacefully with candles in their hands. Instead of shouting "We want to get out," they intoned "We are staying here." Led by small groups of dissidents advocating human rights, these growing crowds wanted to remain in order to reform the GDR. Since Mikhail Gorbachev refused to authorize the use of Soviet troops to support them, the old men of the politburo did not dare turn to force. When courageous Leipzig citizens and party reformers agreed to avoid bloodshed on October 9, the streets were free for protest. In order to preserve its power, the SED had no choice but to dismiss the aging Honecker and to appoint a more pragmatic successor, Egon Krenz. The civic courage of the slogan claim "We are the People" had forced the overthrow of the post-Stalinist regime.

During the evening of November 9, pictures of people dancing on the Wall flashed around the world. On the broad crown of the barrier in front of the Brandenburg gate, hundreds of happy Germans celebrated the opening of the frontier. In a desperate bid for popularity, the Krenz government had promised to ease travel restrictions. Since the SED was fracturing into competing factions of hard-liners, opportunists, and reformers, the party sought to regain the initiative by leading the movement toward change. When thousands of impatient East Berliners thronged to the border, the unprepared guards had little choice but to let them through. With the two halves of the divided city coming face to face, a tearful reunion ensued. The opening of more crossing points allowed many GDR citizens to see for themselves the glittering "social market economy" of the West. Ordinary easterners began to doubt the need for a separate state of their own. Intended to shore up a tottering system, the opening of the Wall eventually hastened its demise.

In early December wire-services ran photos of earnest discussions of the Round Table. The new prime-minister Hans Modrow had agreed to meet with the leaders of the opposition to discuss the future of the GDR. Nineteen members of the SED and the nomenklatura, in baggy suits, faced an equal number of men and women of the civic movement, in sweaters and jeans. Mediated by the churches, these debates sought to avoid violence between the embattled authorities and an aroused populace. Both sides were forced to compromise since the government had power without legitimacy and the opposition popular support without office. Inspired by

the Czech dream of a "socialism with a human face," the Round Table members sought to find a "Third Way" between discredited Stalinism and unrestrained capitalism. By joining forces, the party elite and the dissident challengers tried to democratize socialism in order to maintain the independence of the GDR.

On January 15, 1990 television showed dramatic footage of the storming of Stasi (secret police) headquarters at the Normannenstrasse. A peaceful demonstration against the East German secret police got out of hand when enraged crowds, led by inside provocateurs, rampaged through the compound. Desperately Prime Minister Modrow and opposition leader Ibrahim Böhme tried to restore order. In effect, the storming of the GDR bastille marked the collapse of socialist renewal. This popular revolt forced the government to broaden its base by including members of the opposition in the cabinet in order to speed up reforms. But a failing economy made popular demands for unification irresistible by early February. In a Moscow visit, Modrow obtained Soviet approval for developing a confederation which would eventually lead to national unity. During the middle of the month, the international community surprisingly agreed on a negotiation formula of "two-plus-four" that combined the World War II victors with the two German states.

By early March, the television screens were filled with pictures of Chancellor Kohl campaigning in the GDR. Waving banners and shouting "Helmut, Helmut!" hundreds of thousands enthusiastically welcomed his promises of western help. During their first free election, easterners were all too eager to believe that the big brother from Bonn could magically turn their shabby towns into "flourishing landscapes." After scraping by and making do for four decades, they no longer wanted to be second class citizens and demanded prosperity now. Dissident warnings that the eastern economy would collapse fell upon deaf ears and not even the gradual transition advocated by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) seemed to be rapid enough. On March 18 the East German electorate handed the centrist-conservative Alliance for Germany a stunning victory. Ignoring international fears, the unexpected outcome was a clear mandate for quick unity through accession of the GDR via paragraph 23 of the Basic Law.

At midnight on July 1, the spotlight shifted to the Deutsche Bank at Berlin Alexanderplatz. Reporters filmed hundreds of people pressing against the plate-glass doors in order to be the first to receive the long-awaited DM.

The next day, banks all over the GDR converted the Eastern "aluminum chips" and small bills into the heavier and harder money of the West. With the arrival of the currency and economic and social union with the FRG, the GDR in effect left the Eastern COMECON and joined the Western Economic Community (EC). Overnight it abandoned the egalitarian and secure poverty of socialist planning for the unequal and risky prosperity of capitalist competition. With salaries exchanged at 1:1 and savings converted at 1:1.5, consumers could finally buy many previously unobtainable goods. Little did they realize that their precipitous merger with a stronger economy would force the closing of inefficient factories and the merciless world market would throw many of them out of work!

During the middle of July network news showed Mikhail Gorbachev welcoming Helmut Kohl to his Caucasus retreat. In unaccustomed amity the Soviet President and German Chancellor strolled along scenic mountain streams. At the concluding press conference, reporters could hardly believe their ears when both leaders announced a bargain that settled the international issues of unification. With surprising largesse, the Soviet Union offered to withdraw its forces from its World War II prize in exchange for German disarmament and economic aid. Instead of insisting on neutrality, Moscow accepted the extension of NATO to East Germany as long as no Alliance troops were stationed there. In gratitude Bonn promised to recognize its eastern frontiers and help Russia rejoin Europe. The Caucasus breakthrough on the external terms of unity also hastened agreement in the complicated internal negotiations on a unification treaty that established numerous legal rules for the merger between East and West Germany.

On the evening of October 2, television cameras were trained on the unification ceremony in Berlin. Hundreds of thousands of citizens from East and West Germany crowded in front of the restored Reichstag building to celebrate the merger in quiet dignity. The strains of classical music gave way to cheers from the crowd when athletes unfolded a huge German flag. At the stroke of midnight, fireworks exploded into the sky to mark the reemergence of a united Germany. The holiday was a result of the decision of the de Maizière government to dissolve the separate East German state. When its economy failed after the currency union, the East German cabinet had to speed up unification in the hope of being rescued by the wealthier west. The haste to join was so great that the eastern states (*Länder*) could only be constituted two weeks after accession. In early December a hard-fought federal election ratified the consummation of

unity through a popular vote for its champions in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Free Democratic Party (FDP). After 41 years of independence the GDR had dissolved itself and its component states rejoined the FRG.

During the summer of 1992, Germany was once again in the news. This time, disturbing pictures showed youthful skinheads throwing rocks at foreigners and setting asylum homes ablaze. In towns like Rostock, Mölln, and Solingen regular citizens cheered them on while the police stood helplessly by. This outbreak of xenophobia showed that unification had not only solved old problems, like division, but created new ones in turn. The collapse of the eastern economy surpassed all predictions and created mass unemployment of around 50%. The purge of institutions spawned resentment against western colonization and the psychological strains of combining two such contradictory cultures were immense. While easterners complained of insufficient help, westerners got tired of having to foot the bill. But in the fall hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the streets for a different purpose, marching with candles in their hands to urge tolerance towards foreigners. At present it remains to be seen which of the crowds will ultimately prevail.

This glance at the picture album suggests that German unification was a contradictory process. Time and again, surprises confounded the experts. The development was so rapid that people felt they were losing control. One can hardly imagine a more drastic change than having one's country disappear under one's feet. Hence both the positive and negative images contain some kernels of truth. Compared to Bismarck's wars of unification, the restoration of German unity was remarkably peaceful and democratic. This time self-determination had the approval of the neighbors and the support of the majority of the electorate. But the merger was also more bureaucratic and destructive than campaign promises suggested. The privatization policy of the Trusteeship Agency destroyed eastern industry while the dictates of Bonn officials forced an alien system upon the new citizens. Hence the sudden and massive changes unleashed by unification brought both euphoria and despair.

## **Explaining the Inexplicable**

Understanding this German upheaval is a daunting intellectual challenge. The chief difficulty in explaining the events is the unanticipated

transformation of the democratic awakening into a push for national unification. While the former fits into the general East European repudiation of Communism, the latter constitutes once again a special German case. In several other countries, the revival of ethnic passions broke up larger states. Moreover, the renewal of socialism was propelled by different protagonists and programs than the reunification of the German successor regimes. Yet both processes were fundamentally linked, since the Communist collapse was an essential precondition for the recovery of national unity. How can one make sense of this unexpected and ambiguous relationship?

A further complication is the varying speed of the process. First, there was the very slow development of division and detente, which took more than forty years. In the post-war era, the hostile blocks seemed frozen and changes seemed virtually impossible. Second, there was the headlong rush from democratic awakening in the GDR in 1989 to the political unification of Germany in 1990. During this astounding year, events accelerated with breathtaking speed. Third, after unification the process once again slowed down markedly. Internal integration on the political, social, economic, and cultural level is taking much longer than expected. Predictions about the time-span for this task have changed from a few years to whole decades that reach well into the next century.

It should not be surprising that this precipitous process was accompanied by ever-changing explanations. Because they often turned out to be partisan myths rather than dispassionate analyses, unresolved questions abound: what were the special characteristics of the German upheaval in comparison to the general features of the transition from post-Stalinist socialism? While many aspects of the civic revolution seem similar, in other important respects East Berlin differed markedly from Warsaw or Prague. What shape is the newly emerging order taking? The notion of "post-Communism" seems to imply everything from "democracy" and "capitalism" to "civil war," "ethnic strife," "nationalism," or "fascism." Even less clear are the consequences for the future. What implications will the return of German unity have for that country's domestic stability and for European integration?

In German public discourse, two polarized legends compete as stylized accounts of the surprising events. In a celebratory narrative of the right, enshrined in the new national holiday, the East German people heroically

overthrew an alien dictatorship. As a kind of founding myth for the reunited state, this government-sponsored version emphasizes that for once Germans proved capable of achieving a revolution of their own. Because it fears that the new country might misbehave like the old, the left is instead inclined to take a catastrophic view. Intellectual members of the civic movement denounce the "unity wave" among the East German population and most West German politicians as a form of "annexation," thus recalling the blackmailing of Austria by the Nazis. Another myth that fits Marxist anti-capitalist sentiment is the charge that East German "social achievements" were "sold out" to greedy Western industrialists.

Much of the scholarly discussion focuses on the problem of revolution. Participants talk simply about a "turn" (*Wende*) to demarcate the change in their lives without actually assigning responsibility. People close to the "civic movement" tend to stress the notion of "civil society." From their own opposition experience, they argue that the East German upheaval was based on the demand of active citizens for the recovery of individual and collective rights against the control of a repressive state. More analytical observers emphasize post-totalitarian transitions from dictatorship to democracy, as they were observed during the 1970s in southern Europe and in Latin America. While illuminating some common features of collapsing authority, this approach has difficulties with the national turn of the East European transformations. Many social scientists who are uncomfortable with the notion that Germans could actually revolt prefer to speak of an "implosion" of the GDR. But this mechanistic metaphor begs the important question of agency.

Other explanations fasten upon the national dimension of the events. Especially conservative commentators like Thomas Nipperdey argue that unification was a quasi natural event that had to happen, once the obstacles against it were removed. In their understanding *any* nation strives to be unified, because ethnic groups want to obtain self-determination through a state of their own. Regarding the nation not as a political, social, or cultural construct but as an intrinsic entity, this approach views unification as a self-evident result of the overthrow of Communism. In contrast, liberal historians suggest that it might be more useful to refer to the turbulent events of 1848 as an example of the complicated connections between "revolution" and "nation." Only if such concepts are clearly defined and treated as historical creations can they offer any interpretation for the confusing events. The interpretative

challenge is to explain the actual linkage between the civic rising of 1989 and the national turn of 1990.

As they do not fit one over-arching concept, German developments should be analyzed in four different, but related arenas. First, there was the general *collapse of Communism* in Europe and Central Asia. The implosion of the political and economic systems of "actually existing socialism" linked several different dynamics. Economic production became less and less capable of mastering the transition to new technologies (with the exception of armaments). The widening gap between socialist rhetoric and reality made the population disillusioned in the performance of the system. The aspiration of socialist internationalism came increasingly into conflict with de facto Russian dominance and military occupation. Democratic centralism reached a legitimacy crisis as the goal of a communist future became ever more opaque. The accumulation of such problems inspired Gorbachev's perestroika and the lifting of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" that permitted intervention in socialist countries. These Soviet changes opened Poland's and Hungary's move toward democracy and de-legitimized Honecker's style of late-Stalinist rule.

Second, the speed of the Communist collapse led to a *civic revolution* in East Germany. This neologism is intended to mark the special quality of the civic movement's peaceful revolt that overthrew the post-Stalinist regime. The disparate developments of the mass exodus, the protest demonstrations for human rights, and the widespread reform debates within the Communist elite combined in an unstoppable dynamic. On the one hand, this revolt aimed at restoring those civil rights granted in the GDR Constitution that were never actually practiced. Dismantling the institutions of repression and establishing freedoms of opinion, association, and travel began to democratize the GDR system in the fall of 1989. On the other hand, instituting a "council democracy" in the Round Tables also tried to develop new forms of social participation, ecological reform, and gender relations appropriate for the 21st century. Even if it remained peaceful, the speed and extent of the transformation of East German politics was, indeed, revolutionary.

Third, in the German context the *national turn* of the post-Communist transition produced peculiar results. In the spring of 1990, the GDR population abandoned the quest for a "Third Way" and embraced the

slogan "we are **one** people" as the quickest path toward a better life. The provisions of the West German constitution that maintained an all-German citizenship and allowed for the accession of other parts of Germany created the legal preconditions for a merger. Instead of supporting the continued existence of an Austrian-style GDR, the Bonn cabinet was willing to offer economic help only if it led to the restoration of a joint national state. Invoking the experience of 19th-century unification, the FRG government argued that the mass exodus and economic collapse of the east could be solved only by a currency union. As a result of this offer, the majority of the East German population decided to integrate the reforming GDR into the Federal Republic during the first free elections in March 1990. Although West Germans were loathe to pay the costs, the public ratified this decision in the national ballot in December 1990 out of a lingering sense of national solidarity.

Ultimately, the unification of the German states was made possible by the *detente of the superpowers*. At the height of Cold War confrontation, it would have been unthinkable for the Soviet Union to relinquish its prized conquest of World War II. The lessening of East-West tensions, demonstrated by tangible progress in disarmament, changed Central Europe from a potential battle-ground to a pillar for peace. Moscow reformers could argue convincingly that Russian security would be enhanced by the creation of a united but friendly Germany that extended economic aid. Steadfast American support helped persuade France and Britain, the other Second World War victors, to allow the settlement of the "German question" in order to speed up the integration of Europe. Some neighbors were at first reluctant to countenance unification because they feared the reemergence of German dominance in the heart of the continent. But eventually they accepted the result of the "four plus two" negotiations which guaranteed European frontiers in exchange for granting full sovereignty to the united Germany.

German unification was, therefore, the product of a unique combination of internal and external developments. The failure of reunification attempts during the four post-war decades indicates that progress was impossible when just one of the major four factors was missing. In the international realm, Gorbachev's departure from the Brezhnev Doctrine and the growing detente between the superpowers made the reuniting of the Germans less problematic than before. Domestically, the overthrow of the post-Stalinist regime in the East and the continuation of national solidarity

in the West allowed the post-Communist transition to take the form of unification in the German case. Instead of being determined by a single overriding cause, the upheaval of 1989-1990 was the result of a constellation of forces that seemed highly unlikely before it actually occurred. This example suggests that just when everything looks immutable, history sometimes takes a surprising turn.

## Consequences of Unity

German unification has transformed the face of Central Europe. Most importantly, the fall of the Berlin Wall cleaned up the territorial debris of World War II and ended the Cold War on the continent. After four decades of division, a national state that existed only for three-quarters of a century has returned to Germany. Compared to previous incarnations, this latest version is a smaller and more homogeneous country. Hitler's and Stalin's ethnic cleansing have reduced German minorities so drastically that they no longer pose any irredentist threat in the East. Moreover, territorially the new Germany is only the third largest state in Europe after France and Spain. Nonetheless, its population of about 80 million and potent economy restore it to a position of latent hegemony. Too large to fit in easily, the FRG is nonetheless too small to dominate outright. Perhaps European integration and NATO membership will finally resolve this structural incompatibility.

The recovery of unity has also profoundly reoriented German politics. In the fall of 1989, the CDU looked unpopular and the SPD seemed on the verge of taking power in the upcoming election. By gambling on unification with a Protestant and socialist state, Chancellor Kohl nevertheless trounced his populist SPD rival Oskar Lafontaine. His success derailed the post-national and post-material agenda of 1968, advanced by leftist intellectuals. Instead of saving rain forests and helping the Third World, priorities have shifted to rebuilding the devastated Eastern European infrastructure. Though given grudgingly, the annual transfer of 150 billion DM from West Germany to East Germany is the largest peacetime redistribution of funds in German history. Now parties, interest groups, and organizations face the challenge of integrating the new citizens psychologically and politically. Older class divisions and religious animosities have been superseded by the new cleavages between East and West Germany.

In the short run, incorporating East Germany has proven more of an economic strain than a benefit. The GDR legacy of outdated equipment, polluted soil, and casual work habits was far worse than anyone had expected. In structural terms, eastern industry faced an impossible double transition from smoke-stack to high-tech production and from a planned economy to market competition. But neo-liberal illusions of the CDU/FDP coalition also complicated the transition unnecessarily. To spare Westerners from sacrifice, the government followed the myth that the market would unleash another economic miracle. The decision to return nationalized property to its erstwhile owners tied up many properties needed for rebuilding in endless litigation. Though improving consumption and services, the hasty privatization policy of the *Treuhandanstalt* produced massive deindustrialization and unemployment. After the unification boom fizzled in the West, the unparalleled social experiment of integrating East Germany has turned out to be an enormous liability.

By destroying old certainties unification also triggered a deep identity crisis among the citizens of the new states. The national turn of the Eastern electorate disappointed critical intellectuals who were hoping to find their own "Third Way" between the camps. Revelations of Stasi complicity added another painful layer to the confrontation with the already troubled Nazi past. To a shocking extent politicians like Lothar de Maisière and Manfred Stolpe or writers like Christa Wolf and Sascha Anderson had collaborated with the secret police. The sudden juxtaposition of once separate populations revealed deep differences between a cosmopolitan but consumer oriented West and a provincial but egalitarian East. The influx of half a million asylum seekers and a quarter million ethnic refugees into the united Germany posed new questions about what was German and what was foreign. By especially undercutting leftist intellectual positions, unification forced many Germans to redefine themselves.

The return of unity called Bonn's accustomed international role into question as well. The sudden increase in size and the lifting of post-war restrictions rendered the FRG's posture of being an economic giant and a political dwarf obsolete. The clash between new expectations of larger influence and old fears of hegemony placed the German government in a no-win situation. If it took the lead as in the recognition of Croatia, it was criticized as overbearing. If it held back as in the Gulf war, it was attacked

for shirking its responsibilities. East European neighbors expected economic help without accompanying control, even if resources were already overtaxed. Western friends paradoxically expected greater German leadership without having their own international importance diminished. The UN hoped to use German troops for peace-keeping missions in exchange for a vague prospect of a permanent Security Council seat. While the Right was only too willing to assume a larger role, the Left clung to a moralism that eschewed force. No wonder that a new consensus on transcending DM-diplomacy without excessive assertiveness has yet to emerge.

Finally, the German merger also complicated the process of European integration. Paris agreed to unification only if Bonn would be anchored more firmly in a united Europe. But an enlarged Germany, though preoccupied with absorbing its new states, deserved a greater voice in European institutions and asked for subsidies for the underdeveloped East. The collapse of Communism made the choice of "deepening" or "widening" the European Community harder, since poor Eastern cousins like the Czech Republic and Poland now joined attractive Western suitors like Austria and Sweden. As a solution, the Maastricht agreement committed the members to a currency union by the end of the century and authorized the inclusion of new countries. However, high Bundesbank interest rates, designed to fight inflation, forced Britain and Italy to abandon the European Monetary System and compelled a broadening of the exchange range. Though the treaty weathered several plebiscites, popular resentment against Brussels bureaucrats grew so strong that the goal of a European superstate seemed to recede into an indeterminate future.

Will the new Germany become a "normal" state like other West European countries? Most of the evidence shows that unification was not a revanchist effort to undo the defeat of World War II. While historic fears centering on another aggression or holocaust are likely to be misplaced, new problems created by unity arouse concern instead. The addition of seventeen million people who lived for 56 years under dictatorship is testing democratic stability. A prolonged economic recession is trying the assumption of continuing material prosperity. Bouts of xenophobia are straining the civility of a Westernized society. But there are also hopeful signs that the Germans have learned from their problematic history. The hundreds of thousands who demonstrated for tolerance during the winter of 1992 showed a deep commitment to human rights. No doubt, the

process of internal unification will be contested and painful. But the return of unity also offers the Germans another chance to combine nationality with liberty.

## REFERENCES

- Ash, Timothy Garton, *Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (New York, Random House, 1990).
- Beschloss, Michael and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston, Little Brown, 1993).
- Borneman, John, *After the Wall: East Meets West in the New Berlin* (New York, Basic Books, 1991).
- Darnton, Robert, *Berlin Journal, 1989-1990* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1991).
- James, Harold and Marla Stone, eds., *When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification* (New York, Routledge, 1992).
- Jarausch, Konrad H, *The Rush to German Unity* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993).
- Jarausch, Konrad H. and Volker Gransow, eds., *Uniting Germany. Documents and Debates* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).
- Merkel, Peter, *German Unification in the European Context* (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993).
- Philipsen, Dirk, ed., *"We Were the People:" Voices from East Germany's Revolutionary Autumn of 1989* (Durham, Duke University Press, 1992).
- Szabo, Stephen F, *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992).



# Europe in U.S. Social Studies Textbooks: A Case Study on Germany in the Textbooks

by Dagmar Kraemer and Manfred Stassen

In the 1983 report, *A Nation at Risk*, the National Commission on Excellence in Education assailed U.S. pupils' alleged lack of historical knowledge and singled out textbook quality as one of the culprits.<sup>1</sup> In this context, the educational publishing industry was faulted for producing books that make the study of history bland and uninspiring.<sup>2</sup>

Part of this textbook controversy was the charge of an unbalanced coverage of Europe: while some favored the establishment of a curriculum with a more non-European orientation, others had reason to criticize the lack of European coverage after 1945.<sup>3</sup>

This domestic debate coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the unification of the two Germanies. In 1989 Europe witnessed an extraordinary culmination of monumental events: history seemed to accelerate forward relentlessly. In light of these political changes and their likely consequences for social studies curricula in the United States, a comprehensive study was conducted in 1990, with the help of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), which looked at the representation of Europe, with a special emphasis on Germany, in U.S. social studies textbooks and teaching materials.<sup>4</sup>

## Rationale and Methodology

The textbook report derived its rationale from the assumption that Europe, because of the dramatic events in 1989 and 1990, will gain a renewed importance for United States foreign and economic policy in the next decade and, perhaps, the next century. One of the ways to take cognizance of this development is to impart, through the school curriculum, a profile of Europe commensurate with this importance in a form that is meaningful to an ever-changing American school population.

The relevant textbook literature of the past decade does not provide a presentation of the European heritage in American culture and society which reflects the current and probable future state of affairs and, therefore, does not prepare the American student adequately for dealing with this vital issue. The charge of Eurocentrism leveled against the American curriculum and the textbook literature in Social Studies, while justified to a large extent on the basis of the current content and scope of European material included in these textbooks, could perhaps be neutralized, to the benefit of all concerned, if a differentiated and socially as well as culturally more relevant and up-to-date picture of Europe, in its interaction with the U.S. and other parts of the world, were presented.

The analysis focused on the representation of Western Europe in four categories of social studies textbooks most widely used in U.S. classrooms: World History/Global History, World Geography, Western Civilization/European Civilization, and American History. Within this framework, Germany was chosen as an in-depth case study. The study contains both a quantitative and qualitative analysis which follows internationally accepted and tested models using a transparent set of criteria such as "mode of presentation," "coverage," "accuracy," "context," and "slants and biases." The study went beyond the traditional models of textbook analysis by applying these criteria to the entirety of the historical account of Europe and Germany, not only to some exemplary periods.

## Summary of Findings

In the Social Studies textbooks of the 1960s through the 1980s, Western European quantitative coverage until 1945 in world history or global history textbooks is significant, but it is almost invisible for the period after 1945. The "abundance" of information on Western Europe prior to

111

1945 strongly contrasts with the virtual absence of Western Europe (and Germany) after 1945—particularly in the world history textbooks. Apart from repercussions of World War II, such as the Marshall Plan and the Berlin Blockade, the reviewers noted a remarkable degree of underreporting from 1945 to the present. The significance of the European Community's emergence as an economic power and the implications of this development for the U.S. are not addressed in the textbook literature.

In spite of the virtual absence of coverage of Europe and Germany after 1945, the commitment and the cultural and ideological indebtedness of the U.S. to Western Europe is not questioned in the textbooks. Western Civilization textbooks, in particular, assert the ideological-cultural orientation of the U.S. as decidedly Western. For example, young American students are identified as representatives of the people of the European West. The majority of basic texts for the lower grades treat the uniqueness and superiority of the Western experience as self-evident. While the study of western civilization from a historical perspective is sanctified, the student is not provided with reasons to study the European Community, or the change of the Federal Republic of Germany from fierce adversary to loyal ally and key participant in the united Europe.

It may be true that in a particular understanding of U.S. foreign policy after the war, and because of the unprecedented success of the Marshall Plan and NATO, Europe may not have been a key area of U.S. concern. Particularly, Germany may have appeared as a dependent, rather than as an independent variable. The sudden recent resurgence of Europe as a key area in world politics seems to indicate, however, that the developments between 1945 and 1990 would have warranted closer attention.

Generally, Western Europe is not presented as a geographic or political region, but as an area composed of distinct nation states. Texts treat Britain, France, and Germany, while other, smaller states remain unmentioned. Throughout the texts, the successful development and creation of a nation state is presented as the measure of historical progress.

Few textbooks avoid the pitfall of the "model country" approach in which particular states are presented as stereotypes. The United Kingdom stands for the development of parliamentary democracy and the virtue of fairness, exemplified by its emphasis on sport. Ironically, France represents both elite culture as well as the development of human rights and other

broad social changes. In stark contrast, Germany appears as the champion of conflict and war. The texts fail to show converse influences and repercussions of national developments between European nations; instead, each national development is presented in isolation. This prevents the student from understanding internal and oppositional developments in a country, international links, and mutual dependencies among nations. In addition, the presentation of Europe's long and rich past suffers from a ubiquitous "presentist" perspective which denies the student the understanding of the contextuality of historical events.

Under the guise of spatial constraints, authors frequently revert to a "checklist approach". They present a catalogue of names, places, and events, often out of context, which fulfill the canon of "historical literacy" in dictionary form. In spite of their expressed respect for the findings of social history, most texts treat "great men" as the determining forces in history. The high degree of personalized history in the textbooks surveyed distorts the view of historical conditions and the influence of the physical and political environments.

The coverage of Germany shares in all the shortcomings of the treatment of Western Europe in general. The shortcomings here, however, are, at least in some cases, particularly consequential and give rise to a series of observations.

The eclipse of the period after 1945 tends to suggest that German history ended with the Holocaust and that there is an intrinsic teleology to German history, from the Teutoburger Wald (where barbaric German tribes defeated Roman legions) to Buchenwald (where equally barbaric Germans exterminated Jews). In that interpretation, the period after 1945 knows a Germany, or rather, two, that are both non-descript satellites of their respective superpowers.

On the basis of "statism," namely the progressive nature of normal national unity, the issue of the "belated" German unification assumes primary importance. If indeed, as the texts imply, early nation-state building is the best measure of historical progress, Germany, in the European context, failed by unifying so late. It is interesting to note that Germany is frequently grouped with Eastern Europe in the chapter division of the textbooks. This outsider position of Germany, in comparison to the nations who have shaped Western civilization, is also explicitly affirmed in a number of texts.

The predominance of the "model country" approach, which isolates Germany as the prime example for conflict and war, leaves no room for the delineation of the democratic and anti-authoritarian traditions in German history. Coupled with the failure to trace the development of post-war West Germany as the most stable democracy in Europe, the American student is entirely at a loss to understand why the Germans have been the most loyal allies of the U.S., and why a "velvet revolution" in the East led to the unification of Germany and the end of the Cold War. One of the most significant features of post-war German history has been the effort toward reconciliation. Yet, neither the German-Israeli relationship nor the Franco-German friendship treaty (nor the agreements with Poland and the former Czechoslovakia) are included in the historical accounts. While Germany's re-emergence as a major force in world politics cannot be discussed in isolation from these policies, Germany could also serve as a case study that no one people has a monopoly on evil or military adventure.

The significance accorded to "great men" as the shapers of national histories implies, to some extent, a German leadership problem. The emphasis on personalities is particularly pronounced in the case of Adolf Hitler who assumes center stage in the history of Germany. With the usual abundance of lurid descriptions of Hitler, an understanding of the period and the forces which were instrumental in his rise to power is difficult to gain (see also Recommendations). Frequently, the textbook authors have made a distinction between Hitler as the evil spirit on the one hand, and the Germans as the intoxicated prey on the other hand. While this distinction is not only an over-simplification, it is unhistorical. Hitler, vile as he was, did not rise to power in a vacuum, but was helped by structural connections and popular forces larger than himself. Only very few texts address both the uniqueness of Nazism and the Holocaust, and its connection to the larger phenomenon of European fascism in the twentieth century.

Particularly after the experience of the last hundred years, Germans will have to live with the fact that history matters. With that in mind, it comes as no surprise that more recent coverage of West Germany in the geography and the Western civilization texts contains a slightly menacing undercurrent: current German technological prowess appears threatening when coupled with reference to past German aggressiveness. The German work attitude, while praised, also appears suspect. In the eyes of the

foreign observer, there is a connection between the older German image of obedience and duty and the new (West) German image of economic success.

It must be emphasized, however, that not all texts analyzed were found lacking in all respects noted above. Some of the more recent textbooks have successfully incorporated the findings of social history. Furthermore, geography texts have used new approaches, such as the key-concept approach, with interesting implications for the teaching of geography.

## **Recommendations**

Overall Western European coverage, which is quantitatively sufficient, should be differently apportioned so as to allow for improved coverage of post-World War II Europe and its relationship to the United States. The EC and NATO each warrant a separate discussion. Because of the diversity of coverage, no general recommendation can be made as to what of the existing coverage ought to be omitted in order to make room for new materials. Within the enlarged coverage of the last four decades, emphasis should henceforth be on the specifically European developments in education, philosophy, and the arts, as well as of integration and reconciliation, including the attempts at a uniform foreign and economic policy.

Avoiding the "model-country" approach, greater consideration should be given to interdependencies in European history and links between historical developments. In depicting the dynamic quality of European society, the student will be encouraged to look across borders and explore international connections of the past and present.

Treatment of economic and technological aspects and the global linkages of these areas in present day politics should be strengthened, as the relationship in those arenas will become much more important than the confrontational stories of security and detente in the past, or the story of an individual nation state.

The inclusion of social history (everyday life, women, minorities, migration, etc., as evidenced in some of the textbooks studied) would help to render the texts more "relevant" (specifically to a demographically shifting school population in the U.S.), more readable, and more accessible

to students socialized on television and other media. It would, because of the intrinsic similarity of peoples' experiences around the world, help to avoid facile stereotypes and the perpetuation of bias.

With regard to the treatment of Germany, it would appear that four relatively simple measures would help to present a picture to the American students and teachers that they would find less contradictory than the one currently dominant:

- 1) Coverage of the last 45 years of German history, commensurate to the political, cultural, and economic importance of the country in the European context and in the Atlantic Alliance;
- 2) Greater emphasis, in the historical portions, on the social and political traditions in German history that explain its strong federalism and render plausible its commitment to democracy in the post-war era, and explain the specific features of a social market economy with its emphasis on social welfare, national health insurance, and a model system of free vocational and higher education. Such a picture would contribute to rendering Germany an interesting case study also for minority students in the United States;
- 3) The description of the country's technological prowess, linked to the dependence on export, and of social peace as a consequence of successful co-determination between labor and management, will, if correctly presented, suffice to offset the fairy-tale image of Germany as a romantic museum, on the one hand, or as a 1984-like society where everybody has "a passion for perfection," on the other; and
- 4) Incorporation of more recent and more differentiated research on the Third Reich and the Holocaust. In particular, a stronger consideration of the Jewish experience, Jewish life, and Jewish suffering, in the account of their destruction, is required. The vast majority of texts present the Jews and other victimized groups as passive objects rather than as active and living populations. The narrow and often one-sided (most texts are Hitler-centered) treatment of the Nazi Genocide suggests self-sacrifice and, at worst, gives the impression of silent complicity on the part of the victims.

## A Concluding Note

The present volume, *Germany and Europe since WWII: Resources for Teachers*, is a step in the right direction. It is the result of a collaborative effort, over several years, between American educators in the Social Sciences and their European counterparts. In its felicitous mixture of substantive essays with didactical material, it is intended to give Social Studies teachers a helpful tool for the preparation of their students in coming to terms with the ever increasing complexity of the social and political world they live in. It cannot and should not, to be sure, replace the social studies textbook, but it might serve as an accompanying instructional tool while the major textbooks are being revised. And it may serve as an indicator of what will need to be covered in future textbooks in order to render the students' exposure to world history and geography meaningful.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> National Commission on Excellence in Education. *A Nation at Risk* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing office, 1983). See also: Diane Ravitch and Chester E. Finn, Jr., *What Do Our 17-Year-Olds Know?* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1987).
- <sup>2</sup> Gilbert T. Sewall, *American History Textbooks* (New York: Educational Excellence Network, 1987).
- <sup>3</sup> Molefi K. Asante, "Afrocentric Education". In *Washington Post*, July 7, 1991.
- <sup>4</sup> The long version of the report is available on microfiche and in hard copy from the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). (See EDRS Ordering information in Part IV of this volume.) Dagmar Kraemer and Manfred Stassen, *Europe in U.S. Social Studies Textbooks and Teaching Materials. (Case Study: Germany)*. Washington, D.C., 1991. ED 354 207.



## Lessons

Part II includes nine lessons for use with secondary school students of social studies. The contents of these lessons are linked to the contents of the background papers in Part I. These background papers can be used as sources of ideas and information for teaching and learning these nine lessons. Each lesson includes a plan for teachers and materials to be copied and distributed to students. Fay Metcalf edited Part II of this volume.

The nine lessons are listed below:

1. *How Did Germany Change from Dictatorship to Democracy?* by ROSEMARIE KUNTZ, Perry Meridian High School, Indianapolis, Indiana.
2. *Post-War Decision Making: What to Do With Germany?* by ROSEMARIE KUNTZ, Perry Meridian High School, Indianapolis, Indiana.
3. *A Comparison of the Two-Party and Multi-Party Systems* by JAMES GARLAND, West Lafayette High School, West Lafayette, Indiana.
4. *Basic Rights in West Germany and the United States—A Comparison* by PATRICIA GEYER, Johnson High School, West Campus, Sacramento, California.
5. *Germany's Economy in the 20th Century* by JAMES (ROCKY) HARRIS, Hillsboro High School, Hillsboro, Oregon.
6. *Factors of Economic Growth in Post-War Germany* by PATRICIA STRICKLAND, El Dorado High School, El Dorado, Arkansas.
7. *"Rubble Literature": German Writers After World War II* by MARJORIE WALL BINGHAM, St. Louis Park High School, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

8. *Artistic Expression in Germany Since World War II* by CLAUDIA SEITER, Layton High School, and DAVID SEITER, Northridge High School, Layton, Utah.
9. *Germans Face Unification: Four Simulations* by JAMES DIEHL, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, and CARL SCHULKIN, Pembroke High School, Kansas City, Missouri.

## Why Study Germany and Europe Now?

by Michael McKinnon

1. Germany is a prime mover in European integration.
2. Germany is geographically located in the center of Europe with political, economic, and social windows that open *East and West*.
3. Germany is an industrial giant in Europe and one of the top three leading exporting nations in the world.
4. Germany can be studied as a model of post World War II reconstruction and a microcosm of "cold war" conflict.
5. Germany serves as a model for emerging nations and for Europe.
6. Germany has provided a legacy of literary and political thought that has impacted the evolution of Western Civilization.
7. Germany is the ancestral home for centuries of immigrants to America.
8. Germany, many years a "nonimmigration" country, now must learn to deal with rising problems of alien minorities.
9. The study of contemporary German society can dispel stereotypes of the Hausfrau in Dirndl and the ruddy-faced Bavarian accordion player in Lederhosen being characteristic of the German people.
10. Germany offers a case study rich in contrast and contradiction. It has freely offered the world its people and its artistic and scientific genius. It also has been at the source of devastating war and unparalleled genocide.



# How Did Germany Change From Dictatorship to Democracy?

by Rosemarie Kuntz

## OVERVIEW

In Background Paper 1, *From Third Reich to No Reich: Germany after 1945*, Dr. Harris poses the question asked after World War II, "What to do with Germany?" The resulting answer—the temporary division of Germany into two states—was not an immediate solution. To understand reconstruction by the Allied powers and by Germans is to understand the past Nazi state. This area provides the basis for the following lesson that can provide a model in comparative government.

## OBJECTIVES

Students will be able to:

- 1) define dictatorship and democracy.
- 2) compare the components of dictatorships to democracies.
- 3) assess the degree to which the Nazi state abused its power.
- 4) distinguish the types of resistance individuals may take within differing government structures.
- 5) analyze the factors needed to support individual rights for a democratic state.

## CENTRAL QUESTION

*What elements cause some governments to practice war and genocide and others to promote peace and human rights?*

Germany under Hitler stands in stark contrast to today's Federal Republic of Germany established by the Basic Law of May 23, 1949 and by the Unity Treaty for the constitutional and legal union of the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1990.

*What are the distinguishing characteristics that can be contrasted between a dictatorship and a democracy?*

## **PROCEDURES**

1. Predetermine a group, such as blonde-haired students, to place in a minority group. As students enter the classroom, collect all the blondes' visible possessions, notebooks and textbooks and instruct them to sit in the back of the room. Hand out a sheet of instructions to the dark-haired students as they enter. The instructions should inform the students they should not talk to or associate with the others in the back of the room. Suggest that they have been found to be the cause of some problems and must be treated differently. Conduct a short textbook lesson or discussion lesson giving the material to only the dark-haired students. At the end of the lesson, give a test only the brown haired students could pass.

Then, give all students a reflection paper and ask them to:

- 1) list your thoughts and feelings of the successfulness of your work today and of the classroom situation.
- 2) Why did you accept the new class set-up?
- 3) Did anyone speak up and object? Why/why not?
- 4) Why did you obey?

Return the students' possessions. Conduct a class discussion answering these questions to set the stage for the discussion on dictatorships versus democracies.

2. Have students choose two partners, creating triads. Distribute *Lesson 1, Handout 1*, a chronology of the rise of the Nazi state and excerpts from the Basic Law. Each triad will answer questions from the handout and each student must participate within their small group. (It would be advantageous to have a full chronology of development of the Nazi state and complete copies of the Basic Law.)
3. The triads will report their answers to the whole class. The general discussion should lead to a comparison of dictatorships to democracies with pertinent elements listed on the chalkboard/overhead and charted by students.

## Dictatorship

- 1) Power within the state, not with the people; one person or a small group possesses the power in the government.
- 2) Limitations or abandonment of individual liberties and rights, especially freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, and procedural due process rights.
- 3) Use of military force by the state against the people's individual rights.
- 4) No accountability to the people or to a higher authority.
- 5) Two factors can be added: the most extreme forms of governmental abuse:
  - a) totalitarianism—unlimited ruling power in all aspects of a person's life.
  - b) genocide—unjustified destruction of human lives to the extermination of a whole group of people.

## Democracy

- 1) Power lies with the people (popular sovereignty) by free elections and political participation; only by people's consent can government be changed.
- 2) Limited government by a set of laws or established customs (constitutionalism).
- 3) Insistence upon protection of human rights especially those respecting the dignity, worth, and equality of each individual.
- 4) Belief in majority rule and protection of minority rights.
- 5) Acceptance of the rule of law, that no one is above the law.

The Basic Law that was created in 1949 should be discussed in historic context by noting the preamble and highlighting the civil and social rights listed as well as the separation of powers to limit the government. What does the Basic Law represent in recognizing and rejecting the past and for adopting democratic goals for the future? The resulting Federal Republic of Germany today exemplifies a strong social democracy committed to cooperation and strengthening the economic and political security of nations.

4. The amount of power people possess within a government is key to whether it is a dictatorship or democracy. Brainstorm with students: What are the roles and responsibilities of individuals and institutions when government abuses its power and rights are violated? The range

of rights and options to secure these rights differ greatly between the two types of governments. The lack of power people possessed to change the Nazi state is in contrast to the empowerment of individuals to ensure post-war German democracy.

5. A question many times asked relating to the Third Reich is "Why was there no organized resistance?" Both victim and abuser, bystander and rescuer must be recognized to answer the question completely. The more appropriate question to ask is: "How did people facing such hopeless circumstances manage to resist at all?" (Resistance, 1993, p.1)
6. For students to answer this question two basic understandings should be discussed:
  - 1) the nature of the Nazi state; and
  - 2) the definition of resistance from a full range of unarmed to armed activities.

Distribute *Lesson 1, Handout 2: Obstacles to Resistance* that describe the restrictiveness of the Nazi state. Discuss the frustration and lack of power felt by individuals under such a rule. Discuss why the following statistic would likely be accurate: "At best, less than one-half of one percent of the total population (of non-Jews) under Nazi occupation helped to rescue Jews." (Oliner and Oliner, 1991, p.363)

Discuss what personality traits individuals would possess to be able to resist. What types of individuals would more likely resist? Have triads list ways to secretly resist such a government's power over political, educational, and religious life.

7. Distribute *Lesson 1, Handout 3: Forms of Unarmed and Armed Resistance*. Discuss new examples of resistance learned. Discuss when it is the duty of citizens to obey the law and when persons must take a stand against unjust laws. How can cultures survive and maintain traditions and institutions when faced with death? How should citizens act when confronted with unjust laws and limitations on others rights? What values, interests, and principles are represented in any resistance movement?

## CONCLUDING THE LESSON

Student reflections for a journal or notebook entry should analyze their thoughts, feelings, and what they have learned about dictatorships and the character of individuals living under such rule. Students should conclude by answering the central question first posed in the lesson. Students should write an essay answering:

What must citizens in a democracy do to protect their rights from government abuse(s)?

What beliefs must be upheld and what actions should be undertaken to maintain a democratic state?

What should be the role of democratic countries toward dictatorships in the world?

Discuss students' reflections.

## ADDITIONAL ENRICHMENT ACTIVITIES

1. Using the principles learned in this lesson, investigate similar situations in the world today. Report in written form findings of abuses by governments and recommendations for action by the United States, its citizens, and the U.N. or other multinational organizations. Or, develop a class newspaper or a News Report Show with information pieces, interviews with "experts" (as actual immigrants or representatives from human rights organizations in their community), and editorials expressing their beliefs and recommendations for actions by the society. The paper or show (video-taped) could be presented to other related discipline classes in the school, as well as be sent to individuals or groups in policy-making positions.
2. Investigate the creation of the United Nations and Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Compare it to Germany's Basic Law and the U.S. Constitution. Create your own Bill of Rights and Responsibilities that should be adopted by all nations today. Defend your specific articles.
3. Compare and contrast the world response of governments and non-governmental organizations to the Holocaust and compare it to responses to contemporary world-wide genocides, by such organizations like Amnesty International and the International Red Cross.

4. Explore the cultural backgrounds of people denied equal rights. Through an artistic work, present your feelings of their courage, heroism, and dignity versus the indifference, intolerance, and abuses of governments. Consider the status and roles of victim, oppressor, bystander, and rescuer.
5. Research the diaries, poetry, and plays in Holocaust literature. Students should reflect upon the evil capacity in human nature as well as the heroism and dignity of the human spirit in facing extreme adversity. Students may reflect upon similar social issues in contemporary society.
6. Research and map areas of the world faced with human rights violations as well as those areas upholding democratic principles. Students can create their own lesson for the class to answer the central question regarding abusive and non-abusive governments.
7. Study the use of symbols in dictatorships and in democracies. Create a visual comparison of such symbols for the class. What is the use of such symbols and how useful are they for a government to succeed in accomplishing its purposes?



## Chronology of the Rise of the Nazi State

1. Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor on January 30, 1933 occurred in a coalition cabinet in which the National Socialists had no majority. Hitler's assumption of increased power began the systematic destruction of the democratic state that had been based upon due process of law. On January 30, 1933 Hitler was being honored for his appointment. On this day, and on following days, his stormtroopers entered homes, brutalized political rivals, and, without reason, confined individuals affiliated with Social Democrats, Communists, and independent Social Democrat political parties. Use of mass arrests of Communist and Social Democratic party members and individual critics who spoke out demanding an end to such random activities promoted the terror and intimidation that caused nazification of the people.
2. February 2, 1933: Hermann Goering, then Prussian Minister of the Interior, sponsored a law making the secret state police (SS) and the Stormtroopers, (SA) an auxiliary police force. The SS would soon be placed directly under the Minister President.
3. February 28, 1933: The day after the burning of the Reichstag, Hitler persuades Paul von Hindenburg, Reich President, to sign the "Decree for the Protection of the People and the State". This emergency decree suspends indefinitely (until 1945) the following articles of the Weimar constitution:  
  
ARTICLE 114 - personal liberty  
115 - warrants for house searches  
116 - violations of privacy of postal, telegraphic, and telephonic communications

- 118 - right to free expression of opinion, including freedom of the press
- 124 - freedom of coalition
- 153 - protection of property

4. April 1, 1933: boycott of the Jews.
5. May 1933: the Secret State police, the Gestapo, built a secret State police office located at Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse 8 that held and used brutal torture in the interrogation of political prisoners. Mainly the victims were members of opposition parties, but they also included resistance organizations, such as the socialists, Jehovah's Witnesses, or individual Church representatives. The Gestapo could arrest anyone who they suspected to be an opponent of the state and without trial place the individual under the "protective custody" classification as an "enemy of State and People." This could mean being sent to a concentration camp as "a precaution." The SS were empowered to use any means against these enemies as they thought fit. By October 1939 a rule established that no one under this classification should be released for the remainder of the war. These "enemies" were sent to concentration camps which were organized by July 7, 1934, and culminated in the "extermination by labor" with hundreds of thousands imprisoned.
6. July 14, 1933: A law forbidding new political parties passed; only one-party—the National Socialist party—was recognized.
7. From 1933-1939: Through fear, intimidation, and propaganda, the political and ideological doctrine of Nazism was pressed upon the German people.
8. From 1933-1939: the state and National Socialist Party promoted anti-Semitic campaigns of hatred and slander, loss of citizenship, and the "Nuremberg laws" that eventually excluded Jews from economic opportunities, and forced many to emigration. In November of 1938 a program was established to exclude Jews from any economic life. In January 1939 the power over these campaigns was transferred to Reinhard Heydrich for the Secret State Police to be in charge of the "Solution of the Jewish Question." In October 1941 deportations of German Jews began, first to ghettos and then to the extermination camps. The chronology of deprivation of civil rights, persecution, deportation, and genocide reflected the most extreme forms of conflict

and destruction by creating a "racial-political" enemy. After 1939, such activities were expanded to Poland, Soviet Russian territories, and all areas occupied by German forces.

## **BASIC LAW OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (excerpts)**

### **Preamble**

The German People...conscious of their responsibility before God and men, animated by the resolve to preserve their national and political unity and to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe, desiring to give a new order to political life for a transitional period, have enacted by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. They have also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied. The entire German people are called on to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany.

### **Preamble (Unification Treaty of 1990)**

Conscious of their responsibility before God and men, animated by the resolve to serve world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe, the German people have adopted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law.

The Germans in the (17) Länder...have achieved the unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination. This Basic Law is thus valid for the entire German people.

### **I. Basic Rights**

#### **Article 1 [protection of human dignity]**

- (1) The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect shall be the duty of all state authority.
- (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.
- (3) The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law.

#### Article 2 [rights of liberty]

- (1) Everyone shall have the right of the free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code.
- (2) Everyone shall have the right to life and to inviolability of his person. The liberty of the individual shall be inviolable. These rights may only be encroached upon pursuant to a law.

#### Article 3 [equality before the law]

- (1) All persons shall be equal before the law.
- (2) Men and women shall have equal rights.
- (3) No one may be prejudiced or favoured because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions.

#### Article 4 [freedom of religion]

- (1) Freedom of faith, of conscience, and freedom of creed, religious or ideological (*weltanschaulich*) shall be inviolable.
- (2) The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed.
- (3) No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service involving the use of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.

#### Article 5 [freedom of expression]

- (1) Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.
- (2) These rights are limited by the provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law for the protection of youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal honour.
- (3) Art and science, research and teaching shall be free. Freedom of teaching does not absolve from loyalty to the constitution.

#### Article 8 [freedom of assembly]

- (1) All Germans shall have the right to assemble peaceably and unarmed without prior notification or permission.
- (2) With regard to open-air meetings this right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law.

Article 9 [freedom of association]

- (1) All Germans shall have the right to form associations and societies.
- (2) Associations, the purposes or activities of which conflict with criminal laws or which are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, are prohibited.
- (3) The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions is guaranteed to everyone and to all trades, occupations and professions. Agreements which restrict or seek to impair this right shall be null and void; measures directed to this end are illegal. ...

Article 13 [freedom from illegal searches]

- (1) The home shall be inviolable.
- (2) Searches may be ordered only by a judge or, in the event of danger in delay, by other organs as provided by law and may be carried out only in the form prescribed by law.

....

Article 18

Whoever abuses freedom of expression of opinion, in particular freedom of the press... , freedom of teaching... , freedom of assembly... , freedom of association... , the privacy of posts and telecommunications... , property... , or the rights of asylum in order to combat the free democratic basic order, shall forfeit these basic rights. Such forfeiture and the extent thereof shall be pronounced by the Federal Constitutional Court.

Article 20

- (1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social state.
- (2) All state authority emanates from the people. It shall be exercised by the people by means of elections and voting and by specific legislative, executive, and judicial organs.
- (3) Legislation shall be subject to the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary shall be bound by law and justice.

....

## Questions on Handout 1

1. List all the rights denied in the Nazi state.
2. From *Lesson 1, Handout 1, the Chronology of the Rise of the Nazi State*, formulate four major characteristics of dictatorships.
3. Define popular sovereignty, constitutionalism, and rule of law. Relate these to democratic forms of government. In what ways did the Nazi state eliminate these basic democratic principles?
4. What values and interests are weighed in a dictatorship over a democracy?
5. Explain what an individual could do in a nation such as the Nazi state if they were Jewish or non-Jewish? What were the alternatives that could be created to resist this type of regime? What emotional sentiments would have been felt in considering attempted resistance?
6. List the rights in the Basic Law.
7. From the Basic Law, develop four major characteristics of democracies.
8. What are the main values and interests upheld in the Basic Law? How is this constitution a reflection of the historic time period in which it was created? What are the principles that uphold these enduring human rights?



## Obstacles to Resistance

"Used in the context of the Holocaust, 'resistance' may be defined as any action contrary to the established ideology, policies, laws, or actions of National Socialism taken by individual or groups who were considered 'enemies of the state' and whose lives were in jeopardy."

(Resistance, 1993, p. 1)

### Obstacles to Resistance:

1. The superior Nazi armed forces overtook Poland in one month and France in six weeks. What could unarmed civilians do to counter such power?
2. "Collective responsibility" - Tactic that held that entire families and communities were held responsible for individual acts of resistance. For example, in Lidice, a Bohemian mining village with a population of seven hundred, Czech resistance fighters assassinated Nazi leader Reinhard Heydrich in 1942. Nazis "liquidated" Lidice. All men and older boys were shot and women and children were transferred to concentration camps. The village was razed and its name was removed from the map.
3. Family relationships - Anyone escaping from a closed ghetto knew their family would be executed. The entire ghetto population in Dolhyhnov, Lithuania, was killed after two young boys escaped and refused to return. Due to such enormous and immediate retaliation, youth waited to resist until other adults in their family were deported.
4. Terror in camps - Similar retaliations occurred in the prison camps, as well as continued starvation and physical deterioration which weakened their resolve.
5. Civilian population - If one escaped from a ghetto or camp, the next problems were of shelter, food, and assistance within the civilian

population. Civilians knew death would be the consequence of such aid.

6. Deportations secrecy - Under the guise of resettlement in unknown labor camps, millions were sent to death camps. (Holocaust, Resistance, 1993)

## Questions on Handout 2

1. "At best, less than one-half of one percent of the total population (of non-Jews) under Nazi occupation helped to rescue Jews." (Oliner and Oliner, 1991, p. 363.) Why would this statistic likely be true?
2. What personality traits would individuals need to resist. Why did so few resist? What types of individuals would be more likely to resist?
3. List ways to secretly resist such a government's power over political, educational, religious, and social aspects of life.
4. What can individuals do within a democracy to prevent such dictatorships from occurring?
5. Review *Lesson 1, Handout Three, Examples of Resistance*. What values and interests did individuals have to weigh before they decided to obey the laws or to resist?



## Examples of Resistance

In Berlin, a stone urn has been placed in front of the Plötzensee Memorial containing earth from the Nazi concentration camps. It was in the Plötzensee prison that some 2500 men, women, and adolescents of German, Dutch, French, Czech, or other nationalities were guillotined or hanged. The Berlin Senate in 1953 created a memorial dedicated to the members of the Resistance Movement, both German and non-German, with a scroll beneath the foundation stone that reads:

“During the years of the Hitler dictatorship, from 1933 to 1945, hundreds of human beings were put to death by judicial murder on this spot. They died because they chose to fight against the dictatorship for human rights and political freedom. They included people from every walk of life and nearly every country. Through this Memorial, Berlin honors those millions of victims of the Third Reich who because of their political convictions, their religious beliefs, or racial origins, were vilified, abused, and deprived of their freedom or murdered.” (Plötzensee Memorial pamphlet, 1989, p. 2)

### Unarmed Resistance

1. Underground press: Socialists, Communists, and trade unionists wrote, printed, and distributed anti-Nazi literature;

June 1942, Hans Scholl, a medical student at University of Munich, and Sophie and Christoph Probst, outraged that educated citizens would comply, mailed leaflets known as “White Rose Letters”; a network of students in Hamburg, Freiburg, Berlin, and Vienna urged students to rebel. A janitor reported them and all were executed on February 22, 1943. Hans Scholl before death repeated the words of Goethe: “Hold out in defiance of all despotism”.

2. Strikes and demonstrations: Holland 1940-41, students and professors protest against Jewish professors being dismissed.

In Amsterdam, the Dutch stopped work to protest deportations. Shipyards, then trolleys, trains, and factories were closed.

German Christian women in mixed marriages protested for nearly one week in February 1943, outside Berlin assembly centers. The Gestapo released their husbands, but most were later deported.

3. Smuggling: Ghettos had rationing cards for food and supplies.

Smuggling food into ghettos was looked upon as a defiant act and those caught were severely punished.

4. Spiritual resistance:

a) education: education became secretive as 40,000 students continued religious and/or secular education. Students hid books in coats or trousers. In Poland, Germans finally issued a decree for Jewish Councils to provide elementary and vocational education, yet secondary and higher education secretly continued.

b) religious rituals: prayer and all public religious observances prohibited. Jews prayed secretly and if caught were punished severely. Attitude was to build morale, reaffirm cultural and religious identity, and supply spiritual comfort.

c) ghetto documentation: *Oneg Shabbat* (Warsaw Ghetto) researched and stored reports, diaries, documented Nazi activities and daily life of ghetto. The philosophy was that knowledge and evidence constituted defiance.

d) cultural activities: creation of art, songs, theater, concerts, dances, lectures, jokes, pictures, poems, underground libraries.

e) underground communications system: couriers connected the ghettos with information, arms, escapee network.

f) gypsy resistance: nomadic style assisted refugees, arms transportation, and rationed food for resistance fighters.

g) sabotage: conscious effort to damage Nazi efforts by destruction of machinery, arson, damage munitions, forced labor detriment tactics.

## Armed Resistance

1. Eastern Europe ghetto uprisings, the most famous in Warsaw, April 19, 1943 - threatened by liquidation, 750 Jewish fighters fought 2,000-3,000 German troops. May 16, 1943, Germans recaptured and destroyed ghetto.
2. Revolts in killing centers: Treblinka, Sobibor, Birkenau
3. Eastern Europe and Western Europe Partisan Units (Much research can be studied to extend this area. This is only a minimal listing.)

(Holocaust, Resistance, 1993)

**NOTE:** The Constitution of Germany, The Basic Law, is printed in its entirety in *Lesson 4: Basic Rights in West Germany and the U.S.—A Comparison* by Patricia Geyer.

## REFERENCES

- Craig, Gordon A. *The Germans*. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
- Dinan, Desmond. "The Economic Development of Postwar Germany." *Social Education* 57 (April/May 1993): 176-191.
- Holt, Evelyn R. *Remember Our Faces - Teaching About the Holocaust*. ERIC Digest, Bloomington, IN, EDO-SO-92-1, February, 1992.
- Large, David Clay. "Germany in Europe 1945-92: A Historical Overview." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 232-236.
- Oliner, Pearl M., and Samuel P. Oliner. "Righteous People in the Holocaust." In *Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review*. Edited by Israel Charny. London and New York: Mansell Publishing and Facts on File, 1991.
- Roedel, Ralf. "A Constitution for a United Germany: the Basic Law." *Update on Law-Related Education* 16 (Fall 1992): 28-31, 49-50.
- Rürup, Reinhard, ed. *Topography of Terror*, translated by Werner T. Angress, Berlin: Verlag Wilmuth Arenhovel, 1989.
- Stassen, Manfred, and Dagmar Kraemer. "Europe's New Center." *Social Education* 57 (April/May 1993): 166-167.
- United States Holocaust Council. *Guidelines for Teaching about the Holocaust*. Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, April 1993.
- United States Holocaust Council. *Resistance*. Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, April 1993.
- Zipfel, Friedrich, Eberhard Aleff, et.al, *Plötzensee Memorial, Berlin Pamphlet*, translated by Margaret Cain. Berlin: Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 1989.



# Post War Decision Making: What to Do with Germany?

by Rosemarie Kuntz

## OBJECTIVES

Students will be able to:

- 1) identify and examine the viewpoints of the occupied powers toward Germany after WWII.
- 2) analyze the variety of forces upon the division of Germany.
- 3) compare the traditional means of conflict resolution to contemporary means of conflict management for international relations.
- 4) develop a problem-solving strategy for the outcome of Germany's division.
- 5) evaluate the effectiveness of nations' conflict resolution strategies.

## CENTRAL QUESTION

*What values and interests influence nations to accept resolutions for international conflict management?*

After WWII the decision for a divided Germany was not automatic. The Yalta Conference established the three occupational zones of Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. The Occupying powers wanted Germans to analyze their past and come to terms with the Nazi atrocities and the consequences of such behavior. The consequences for Germany due to the Holocaust, the recovery of the German and European economy, and the reestablishment of the German state were all issues to be dealt with in the immediate post-war era by the occupied powers. How did Germany "move from the position of an undemocratic or totalitarian

enemy... to the most loyally and foremost democratic country in Europe, with a forceful economy, stability at home, and peaceful coexistence with its neighbors?" (Stassen, Manfred, and Dagmar Kraemer. "Europe's New Center." *Social Education* 57 (April/May 1993): 166-167). The post-war decision-making process between the occupying powers illustrates a form of conflict resolution that began the era of the Cold War. Students should recognize that the division of Germany was influenced by circumstances, attitudes, and individuals who offered reconstruction proposals. For the Federal Republic of Germany to develop into its current unified democratic status was the result of these forces and the atonement and dedication of the German people.

## PROCEDURES

1. Place the following quote on the board or on a transparency, and present it to the class:

*Germany in 1945 was Stunde Null, Hour Zero. Willy Brandt described Germany as a "chaos of craters, caves, mountains of rubble, debris-covered fields, ruins that hardly allowed one to imagine that they had once been houses, cables, and water pipes projecting from the ground like the mangled bowels of antediluvian [at the time before the Biblical flood] monsters, no fuel, no light, every little garden a graveyard and above all this, like an immovable cloud, the stink of putrefaction [rotting decomposition]. In this no man's land lived human beings. Their life was a daily struggle for a handful of potatoes, a loaf of bread, a few lumps of coal."* (Craig, Gordon A. *The Germans*. New York: Penguin Books, 1991, p.35)

Have students reflect upon the quote: what visual images, feelings, observations, basic needs are expressed. Students should consider: What should have happened to Germany? To answer this question, students should analyze the various viewpoints regarding Germany.

2. Small group research: Divide students into small groups and assign each group a position from *Lesson 2, Handout 1*. Views offered in *Lesson 2, Handout 1* may be combined or omitted depending upon the size of the class. These positions are not exclusive of each other. Students should be given time for background research in their assigned section.
3. The Negotiators' group should meet with the teacher for instructions on negotiations and mediation techniques. Their goal is to arrive at a

reconstruction policy that serves the best interest of the future of Europe. They are to identify and weigh the values and interests of the competing groups and to establish those values and interests that would best meet the needs for the stability and progress of Europe.

4. Each group of students will then compose a position paper and make a strong argument for their stand. Each student will have his/her own paper. Students should identify the values and interests of their position and the consequences of their position for Europe and the world.

## **CULMINATING ACTIVITY/JIGSAW**

Create small groups by taking one member from each of the original research teams. Each new group will contain one position of what to do about Germany. Each will share their groups' side with the others. Then, the negotiator will attempt to develop a compromise to merge the positions and arrive at his/her view of the way to resolve the conflict. Each group should arrive at a conclusion to share with the class. Or, the whole class may take part in an Allied Hearing where representatives from the groups present their positions, and then the panel of negotiators weighs the needs of the global society and arrives at a solution to be presented to the class. What values and interests must be shared to arrive at a resolution?

## **CONCLUDING THE LESSON**

A discussion of the student negotiators' positions should be contrasted and then compared to the actual resulting division of Germany. What are the negatives and positives for the policy adopted? Other possible points to pursue: Students should discuss the forms of justice placed upon post-war Germany. If the goal had been retribution, hypothesize what the outcomes could have been for Germany today. If the Soviets had cooperated, would Germany have become the nation it is today? Why or why not? What does this activity show regarding foreign policy and global decision-making between various states? What role can independent neutral negotiators lend to the process?

## ADDITIONAL ENRICHMENT ACTIVITIES

1. The development of the Federal Republic of Germany as a democratic state can be shown by researching the following individuals and their resolve for a strong democratic government that would protect all individuals: Socialists Kurt Schumacher and Ernst Reuter; liberals Theodor Heuss, Ludwig Erhard, and Konrad Adenauer.
2. Research the Nuremberg Tribunals. Was a new strain of international morality introduced with the standards adopted for the procedural due process implemented in these trials?
3. Investigate a current peace plan involving a treaty between nations. Describe the background issues and compare the method of decision-making and negotiations used to arrive at the solution. Do the methods of neutral third party negotiations, mediation, and arbitration enter into today's conflict management and resolution?
4. Study why Germany is said to be representative of the Cold War. How did Germany symbolize the division of the world and Europe? How is Germany a model for reconstruction and Cold War management?
5. Chart the development of Germany to its unified state today. What social, political, and economic forces contributed to this democratic nation? Or, interview immigrants from Germany regarding economic, political, and social life, or individuals representing German interests in business, education, health, and legal issues.

## REFERENCES

- Craig, Gordon A. *The Germans*. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
- Dinan, Desmond. "The Economic Development of Postwar Germany." *Social Education* 57 (April/May 1993): 176-191.
- Holt, Evelyn R. *Remember Our Faces - Teaching About the Holocaust*. ERIC Digest, Bloomington, IN, EDO-SO-92-1, February, 1992.
- Large, David Clay. "Germany in Europe 1945-92: A Historical Overview." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 232-236.
- Oliner, Pearl M., and Samuel P. Oliner. "Righteous People in the Holocaust." In *Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review*. Edited by Israel Charny. London and New York: Mansell Publishing and Facts on File, 1991.
- Roedel, Ralf. "A Constitution for a United Germany: the Basic Law." *Update on Law-Related Education* 16 (Fall 1992): 28-31, 49-50.
- Rürup, Reinhard, ed. *Topography of Terror*, translated by Werner T. Angress, Berlin: Verlag Wilmuth Arenhovel, 1989.
- Stassen, Manfred, and Dagmar Kraemer. "Europe's New Center." *Social Education* 57 (April/May 1993): 166-167.
- United States Holocaust Council. *Guidelines for Teaching about the Holocaust*. Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, April 1993.
- United States Holocaust Council. *Resistance*. Washington, DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, April 1993.
- Zipfel, Friedrich, Eberhard Aleff, et.al, *Plötzensee Memorial, Berlin Pamphlet*, translated by Margaret Cain. Berlin: Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 1989.



## Lesson 2, Handout 1

# Post-War Decision Making: Positions on Germany

- 1) During the war, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. proposed a *pastoralization policy*. He argued that Germany's surviving factories should be scrapped and the country completely "pastoralized" to become a rural, nonindustrialized state. This sector of Americans blamed Germany for the cause of two world wars, for the mass destruction of Europe, and for the loss of millions of lives. This position supported European fears that a sovereign German nation could only lead to future problems. The Germans must recognize their transgressions and be made to settle their past accounts. For justice, a complete denazification and punishment of the German people was required.
- 2) After the war, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall called for a *recovery policy*. By studying the Versailles Treaty and the punitive actions taken against Germany as the aggressor after World War I, many policy-makers argued that such sanctions had encouraged the development of nationalism and militarism that resulted in Nazism and World War II. This position held that rebuilding Western Europe economically was primary regardless of past enmity. Thus, cooperation between nations and German involvement was necessary. The U.S. Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe was proposed.
3. In general, the United States position was for a *humanitarian policy*. The Nuremberg trials would establish justice and punish the proper war criminals. The German people's needs must be the present concern. The threat of mass starvation must be confronted. After the people's physical strength was assured, an economic program for a decent

standard of living should be addressed. There were many German ties with America. Germans needed to be recognized as a nation of people in an hour of need that must be answered by aid, not blame.

4. Great Britain's policy favored a strong German economy as a necessary support for a stable government friendly to the west. If Germany developed industrially and became a partner in trade, the occupation's cost of supplementing the German economy could be reduced and recovery for European nations would be more quickly realized. Each European country faced economic and human losses. To rapidly get these societies back in order would require less of a German burden. Realizing the Soviet refusal to cooperate and instead promoting worldwide communism, this position favored a strong Germany which could help Western democracies and undermine communist party movements. This position upheld the self-sufficiency of Germany. If denazification was completed, large numbers of skilled workers, administrators, educators, engineers, and physicians would be sacrificed making it difficult to have economic stability and progress in Germany.
5. France's position focused upon a policy of *self-interest*. France had suffered most of all the other concerned nations. Therefore, their own economic development was primary. With limited resources, Germany should not be allowed to develop economically at the same rate as France. Germany should be made to pay for its past actions. Fears of German dominance and resurgence must be considered. Germany should remain weak and as fragmented as possible to repress German nationalism and militarism.
6. French position best characterized by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman in his *Schuman Declaration*. Schuman proposed France and Germany should combine both countries' coal and steel sectors. Coal and steel were the two essential resources for reconstruction and future prosperity. German economic recovery and French national security could both be secured by such a move. By sharing sovereignty in this way, both countries would need and depend upon the other for cooperation, not conflict.
7. The Soviet Union's position promoted a *worldwide communist policy*, whose first concern was to use their German eastern zone's resources to build the Soviet Union. Their goal was to work for a unification of

Germany with a communist government in place. They were determined, at least, to sustain a Communist government in East Germany. Soviets ignored the requests for accountability for the policy of dismantlement with zone resources, production, and management. Soviets had lost much more from the war than Americans, with twenty-five to one the number of deaths. The Soviets ignored the view for an independent neutral German state and instead viewed Germany as a key to promotion of a communist state.

8. Negotiation team: Negotiators will study an overview of post-war Europe and review ways to negotiate a settlement for Germany. The goal should be the best interest for the future of Europe and the world. Review ways to resolve problems by negotiations, mediation, and arbitration. Negotiators should act with the following decision-making steps: (1) state the problem; (2) after research, clarify the values and interests of Germany, of Europe, and the United States; (3) compare the position statements that will be presented for the values and interests that best coincide with the best interests for the future European and global stability; (4) consider the consequences that would occur from each position being accepted; and (5) formulate a cooperative policy that best recognizes those values and interests for a stable and progressive future.



# A Comparison of the Two-Party and Multi-Party Political Systems—

A Case Study Using the United States and Germany

by James Garland

## OBJECTIVES

Students will be able to:

1. study how the multi-party system of government works in the Federal Republic of Germany.
2. compare the German system to the two-party system in the United States.
3. explore how the United States would operate, if this country used the German model, by use of a simulation.

## PROCEDURES

1. Provide students with copies of *Lesson 3, Handout 1, A Case Study Using the United States and Germany*. Allow time for students to read the case study.
2. Go over the case study with students making sure they understand the basics of the German system (If time is a limiting factor, the descriptions of the parties may be left out and the teacher can give a brief overview of each party).
3. Have students participate in the simulation using the following suggested format:
  - A. Tell students that you have magically converted the United States into a political system that resembles the one used in Germany. In this system the House of Representatives plays the key role in the

formation of government. After elections, the House will choose the President of the United States. To elect a President, a majority of votes in the House is necessary.

- B. In this hypothetical setting, a political party needs a minimum of 5% to be represented in the House. A system is used that guarantees any party with 5% or more of the vote representation, even if they do not win any districts. Because of this there has been a realignment of the political parties. In addition to the Republicans and the Democrats, Jesse Jackson has formed the ultra-liberal Rainbow Party, and the ultra-conservative wing of the Republican Party has been formed under the leadership of Pat Buchanan and Jesse Helms. Moderate Democrats and liberal Republicans have formed the Progressive party, which is led by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. Each of these parties has met the requirement of at least 5% of the vote. (Teachers may substitute any other parties and leaders they wish. For example, Ross Perot could be added.)
  - C. Divide the students into five groups representing each of the five parties. The parties are to meet to negotiate the formation of a government and the election of a President. The hypothetical make up of the House is contained on *Lesson 3, Handout 3, Graph 2*.
4. Give students a specific amount of time to form a coalition government. They should consider the following items to use in negotiations.
    - A. Agreement to hypothetical legislative proposals that will be supported by a majority of the House and the President. This legislation should include the areas or categories of social legislation, defense, and foreign affairs. It is not necessary to discuss specific legislative proposals. Rather, participants should try to agree to support or oppose strong government action in each of the three areas or categories of legislation.
    - B. Distribution of the President's Cabinet posts. (It is not necessary to make specific appointments by name, but rather list what offices go to each party.)
    - C. Parties are to act as a united group; they may not split votes.Teachers should prepare the students beforehand by specifying the goals of each party and by discussing the role of the Cabinet and of particular members of the Cabinet.
  5. Students announce the hypothetical "new" government of the United States and what was promised to form the government. This should include the agreed upon legislation and the members of the President's Cabinet.

The suggested time allowed for this case study and simulation is three to four class periods. By combining research projects into the exercise the time may be expanded.



## *Lesson 3, Handout 1*

# A Case Study Using the United States and Germany

The Wednesday following the presidential election in the United States, the public knows who will be the next President of the United States. Under our two-party system and the electoral college, a winner emerges from the election. The public also knows which party will control each house of Congress. In Germany, the system is very different. The country operates under a multi-party system and coalitions are necessary to form a government. The purpose of this case study will be to explain the German political system, to compare it to the one in the United States, to present a simulation exercise which presumes the United States becomes a multi-party system, and to give students the chance to see how a coalition would work in our country.

## **GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY**

The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (and now the unified Germany) was established in 1949. This document is the equivalent of the U.S. Constitution. In the German system, the Bundestag is the supreme democratic organ. For this case study, the role of the Bundestag is its right to elect the head of the government, the Federal Chancellor. To be elected to this post, a person must receive the votes of a majority of the members of the Bundestag.

Currently there is a multi-party system represented in the Bundestag. There are five parties represented: (1) the Christian Democratic Union and its sister party, the Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), (2) the Social Democratic Party (SPD), (3) the Free Democratic Party (FDP), (4) the East German Greens, and (5) the PDS, the party of the former East German Communists. (The CDU/CSU is normally treated as a unitary party, but in

reality is two separate political parties.) German law requires a party to receive at least five percent of the vote to be represented in the Bundestag. This five percent barrier is critical to the success of the system as it prevents numerous minor parties from being represented and making stable coalitions impossible.

There are 662 elected voting members in the Bundestag. Half the members are elected directly in the district. The other half enter the Bundestag after being elected from a state-wide party list in proportion to the votes their respective parties have gained in the election. Voters use a ballot on which they select from two separate lists. Each party receiving more than the required five percent will have seats equalling the percentage of votes received. This means that once the number of seats won by a party has been established, the first candidates to be considered are those who have been elected directly by their districts. The remaining seats are then distributed from the party lists, which set forth the names of the candidates in the order determined by the parties.

This is a difficult process for Americans to grasp. Assume a Bundestag has 100 seats. The CDU/CSU wins 48% of the votes on the second ballot and thus are entitled to 48 seats. They win 25 districts. The first 23 names on their party list are then elected to the 23 remaining seats. The FDP win 9% of the vote. They fail to win a single district. The first nine names on their party list are then selected.

The current make-up of the Bundestag can be seen on *Lesson 3, Handout 2, Graph 1*. In this situation, no party has more than 50% and thus no one party can choose the Chancellor. In this case, a coalition government must be formed. Today, the ruling coalition consists of the CDU/CSU and the FDP.

## THE FORMATION OF COALITIONS

The basic goal of political parties in the German system is to achieve a majority of the Bundestag and be able to control the government. The main objective of the parties being courted to make the coalitions is to maximize their chances of being re-elected. This is mainly accomplished by obtaining ministries that are visible to the public. Coalitions are formed by intense negotiations between the parties in the following areas: (1) policy, (2) ministries, and (3) job holding.

## COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND GERMAN GOVERNMENTS

In analyzing the differences between the governments of the two countries, the first thing that seems to be true is that the government of the United States is more efficient than that in Germany. As stated at the beginning of this case study, on election day, the public knows who will be in government. The electoral college's "winner take all" method assures that one candidate will usually win a majority of the electoral votes. In Congress, single member districts, which only require a plurality of the votes to win, assure that one party will be in the majority in each house. Third parties seldom have a chance to win a single district and thus have no representation in Congress. This makes the majority party responsible for the operation of each House.


In Germany, on the other hand, more views are represented in the Bundestag. Any party with a minimum of five percent of the vote is represented. With more than two parties in government, the voice of the smaller parties is heard. In some instances, these small parties are the ones who can make or break a government coalition, thus giving them power in a far greater proportion than the votes they receive. It is probably accurate to say that the German system encourages diversity in politics while the United States encourages its parties to move constantly toward the middle of the road.





*Lesson 3, Handout 2*  
*Graph 1*


**The German Bundestag**  
**Party Distribution (Hypothetical)**




*Lesson 3, Handout 3*  
*Graph 2*



**U.S. Today (Hypothetical)**



**U.S. as Multi-Party System  
(Hypothetical)**





# Basic Rights in West Germany and the United States—A Comparison

by Patricia Geyer

## OVERVIEW

After the surrender of Germany in May 1945, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States divided the country into four zones, each administered by one of the four powers. Because of the developing Cold War, cooperation among the four powers became difficult. On July 1, 1948, the three western countries (France, Great Britain, and the U. S.) decided to authorize representatives from the German states under their control to elect representatives to draw up a constitution. By May 1949, a Basic Law was adopted establishing the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany).

This lesson is designed to help students compare the basic rights included in the West German Constitution with the Bill of Rights appended to the U.S. Constitution. Using knowledge gained from their study of the history and governments of the U.S. and West Germany, students will discuss similarities and differences and posit reasons why they exist.

## OBJECTIVES

Students will be able to:

1. describe the rights found in both documents.
2. explain why some rights found in the Basic Law are not included in the U.S. Constitution, and why some rights listed in the Constitution are not found in the Basic Law.
3. work cooperatively in small groups.

4. Express their understandings through small group discussion, class presentations, and individual writings.

## **OPENING THE LESSON**

Explain to students that the purpose of this lesson is to help them understand how the history and conditions within the nations of the U.S. and West Germany at the time of the adoption of their constitutions led to similarities and differences in their respective Bill of Rights.

Divide the class into groups of four with each group working on one of five different assignments. Each student is required to take notes on the group's work and to prepare questions for further discussion. One student should be selected to present the group's work to the rest of the class. Students should receive group credit for cooperation and for each student being "on task."

## **DEVELOPING THE LESSON**

Provide students in each group with copies of the appropriate note-taking sheet. Have students complete the assigned work and help with the preparation of their presenter. As each presentation is made, students are to take notes and at the conclusion of each talk, time should be allowed for questions. The teacher may wish to add additional insights and comments. After all presentations are made, students should be given time to write reflective paragraphs summarizing what they have learned.

## **CONCLUDING THE LESSON**

As a final evaluation of the lesson have students write an essay on the topic of the Basic Rights of citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany and how those rights compare with or differ from the U.S. Bill of Rights.

## **NOTE-TAKING SHEETS**

Each group should be given a copy of the Basic Rights of the Federal Republic of Germany and individual copies of note-taking sheets. They should have available a copy of the amendments to the U.S. Constitution (See Handouts 1 and 2 for Lesson 4). Use a full sheet of paper for each group's work.

## GROUP 1

**Group 1.** Compare Articles 1-10 of the German Basic Rights with the U.S. Bill of Rights. In the space below, list those articles that are similar to the amendments to the Constitution.

---

German Article (Brief description)	U.S. Amendment (brief description)
------------------------------------	------------------------------------

---

Write your questions and observations here. Consider:

Why are their differences in similar amendments and why might they occur?

Why are these rights important to both countries?

Which right is most important to you or your family? Why?

How have these rights been violated? By Germany? By the U.S.?

Which right will be most important 200 years from now? Why?

## GROUP 2

**Group 2.** Compare Articles 11-19 of the German Basic Rights with the U.S. Bill of Rights. In the space below list those articles that are similar to the U.S. amendments to the Constitution.

---

German Article (brief description)	U.S. Amendment (brief description)
------------------------------------	------------------------------------

Write your questions and observations here. Consider:

Why are their differences in similar amendments and why might they occur?

Why are these rights important to both countries?

Which right is most important to you or your family? Why?

How have these rights been violated? By Germany? By the U.S.?

Which right will be most important 200 years from now? Why?

## GROUP 3

**Group 3.** Compare the German Basic Rights with the U.S. Bill of Rights. In the space below list those amendments found in the Bill of Rights that are not found in the German Basic Rights.

---

U.S. Amendment (brief description)

Write your questions and observations in this section. Some things to consider are:

Why might these amendments be important to the United States?

What happened during the U.S.-British conflict that influenced the writing of these amendments?

Which amendment is most important and why?

Which amendment is most important to you or your family? Why?

Which amendments are no longer needed in the United States?

Are there any of these amendments that Germany should have?

## GROUP 4

**Group 4.** Compare Articles 1-10 of the German Basic Rights with the U.S. Bill of Rights. In the space below list those articles that differ from the U.S. amendments.

---

German Article (brief description)

Write your questions and observations in this section. Some things to consider are:

Why were these articles important to West Germany?

What happened in Germany in the 20th century that influenced the writing of these articles?

Which article is the most important? Why?

Which article would be most important to a German student? Why?

Which articles are no longer needed by Germany? Why?

Are there any articles not included that Germany should have? Why?

## GROUP 5

**Group 5.** Compare Articles 11-19 of the German of the German Basic Rights with the U.S. Bill of Rights. In the space below list those articles that differ from the U.S. amendments.

---

German Article (brief description)

Write your questions and observations in this section. Some things to consider are:

Why were these articles important to West Germany?

What happened in Germany in the 20th century that influenced the writing of these articles?

Which article is the most important? Why?

Which article would be most important to a German student? Why?

Which articles are no longer needed by Germany? Why?

Are there any articles not included that Germany should have? Why?



## *Lesson 4, Handout 1*

# The United States Bill of Rights: Amendments I-X of the Constitution

### **[Amendment I]**

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

### **[Amendment II]**

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

### **[Amendment III]**

No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

### **[Amendment IV]**

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

### **[Amendment V]**

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in

cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

### **[Amendment VI]**

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.

### **[Amendment VII]**

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

### **[Amendment VIII]**

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

### **[Amendment IX]**

The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

### **[Amendment X]**

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.



## *Lesson 4, Handout 2*

# The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany

### **Preamble**

The German People. . . conscious of their responsibility before God and men, animated by the resolve to preserve their national and political unity and to serve the peace of the world as an equal partner in a united Europe, desiring to give a new order to political life for a transitional period, have enacted, by virtue of their constituent power, this Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. They have also acted on behalf of those Germans to who participation was denied. The entire German people are called on to achieve in free self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany.

### **I. BASIC RIGHTS**

#### **Article 1 [Protection of human dignity]**

- (1) The dignity of man shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.
- (2) The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.
- (3)\*The following basic rights shall bind the legislature, the executive and the judiciary as directly enforceable law.

#### **Article 2 [Rights of liberty]**

- (1) Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality in so far as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code.

---

\* As amended by federal law of 19 March 1956 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 111).

- (2) Everyone shall have the right to life and to inviolability of his person.  
The liberty of the individual shall be inviolable. These rights may only be encroached upon pursuant to a law.

### **Article 3 [Equality before the law]**

- (1) All persons shall be equal before the law.
- (2) Men and women shall have equal rights.
- (3) No one may be prejudiced or favoured because of his sex, his parentage, his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith, or his religious or political opinions.

### **Article 4 [Freedom of faith and creed]**

- (1) Freedom of faith, of conscience, and freedom of creed, religious or ideological (weltanschaulich), shall be inviolable.
- (2) The undisturbed practice of religion is guaranteed.
- (3) No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service involving the use of arms. Details shall be regulated by a federal law.

### **Article 5 [Freedom of expression]**

- (1) Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship.
- (2) These rights are limited by the provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law for the protection of youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal honour.
- (3) Art and science, research and teaching, shall be free. Freedom of teaching shall not absolve from loyalty to the constitution.

### **Article 6 [Marriage, Family, Illegitimate children]**

- (1) Marriage and family shall enjoy the special protection of the state.
- (2) The care and upbringing of children are a natural right of, and a duty primarily incumbent on, the parents. The national community shall watch over their endeavours in this respect.
- (3) Children may not be separated from their families against the will of the persons entitled to bring them up, except pursuant to a law, if those so entitled fail or the children are otherwise threatened with neglect.
- (4) Every mother shall be entitled to the protection and care of the community.

- (5) Illegitimate children shall be provided by legislation with the same opportunities for their physical and spiritual development and their place in society as are enjoyed by legitimate children.

#### **Article 7 [Education]**

- (1) The entire educational system shall be under the supervision of the state.
- (2) The persons entitled to bring up a child shall have the right to decide whether it shall receive religious instruction.
- (3) Religious instruction shall form part of the ordinary curriculum in state and municipal schools, except in secular (*bekennnisfrei*) schools. Without prejudice to the state's right of supervision, religious instruction shall be given in accordance with the tenets of the religious communities. No teacher may be obliged against his will to give religious instruction.
- (4) The right to establish private schools is guaranteed. Private schools, as a substitute for state or municipal schools, shall require the approval of the state and shall be subject to the laws of the Laender. Such approval must be given if private schools are not inferior to the state or municipal schools in their educational aims, their facilities and the professional training of their teaching staff, and if segregation of pupils according to the means of the parents is not promoted thereby. Approval must be withheld if the economic and legal position of the teaching staff is not sufficiently assured.
- (5) A private elementary school shall be permitted only if the education authority finds that it serves a special pedagogic interest, or if, on the application of persons entitled to bring up children, it is to be established as an inter-denominational or denominational or ideological school and a state or municipal elementary school of this type does not exist in the commune (*Gemeinde*).
- (6) Preparatory schools (*Vorschulen*) shall remain abolished.

#### **Article 8 [Freedom of assembly]**

- (1) All Germans shall have the right to assemble peaceably and unarmed without prior notification or permission.
- (2) With regard to open-air meetings this right may be restricted by or pursuant to a law.

#### **Article 9 [Freedom of association]**

- (1) All Germans shall have the right to form associations and societies.
- (2) Associations, the purposes or activities of which conflict with criminal

laws or which are directed against the constitutional order or the concept of international understanding, are prohibited.

- (3) The right to form associations to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions is guaranteed to everyone and to all trades, occupations and professions. Agreements which restrict or seek to impair this right shall be null and void; measures directed to this end shall be illegal. Measures taken pursuant to Article 12a, to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 35, to paragraph (4) of Article 87a, or to Article 91, may not be directed against any industrial conflicts engaged in by associations within the meaning of the first sentence of this paragraph in order to safeguard and improve working and economic conditions.\*

#### **Article 10\*\* [Privacy of posts and telecommunications]**

- (1) Privacy of posts and telecommunications shall be inviolable.
- (2) This right may be restricted only pursuant to a law. Such law may lay down that the person affected shall not be informed of any such restriction if it serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation or a Land, and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a review of the case by bodies and auxiliary bodies appointed by Parliament.

#### **Article 11 [Freedom of movement]**

- (1) All Germans shall enjoy freedom of movement throughout the federal territory.
- (2) \*\*\* This right may be restricted only by or pursuant to a law and only in cases in which an adequate basis of existence is lacking and special burdens would arise to the community as a result thereof, or in which such restriction is necessary to avert an imminent danger to the existence or the free democratic basic order of the Federation or a Land, to combat the danger of epidemics, to deal with natural disasters or particularly grave accidents, to protect young people from neglect or to prevent crime.

#### **Article 12\*\*\*\* [Right to choose trade, occupation or profession]**

- (1) All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their trade, occupation or profession, their place of work and their place of

---

\* Last sentence inserted by federal law of 24 June 1968 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 709).

\*\* As amended by federal law of 24 June 1968 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 709).

\*\*\* As amended by federal law of 24 June 1968 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 709).

\*\*\*\* As amended by federal laws of 19 March 1956 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 111) and 24 June 1968 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 709).

training. The practice of trades, occupations, and professions may be regulated by or pursuant to a law.

- (2) No specific occupation may be imposed on any person except within the framework of a traditional compulsory public service that applies generally and equally to all.
- (3) Forced labour may be imposed only on persons deprived of their liberty by court sentence.

**Article 12a\* [Liability to military and other service]**

- (1) Men who have attained the age of eighteen years may be required to serve in the Armed Forces, in the Federal Border Guard, or in a Civil Defence organization.
- (2) A person who refuses, on grounds of conscience, to render war service involving the use of arms may be required to render a substitute service. The duration of such substitute service shall not exceed the duration of military service. Details shall be regulated by a law which shall not interfere with the freedom of conscience and must also provide for the possibility of a substitute service not connected with units of the Armed Forces or of the Federal Border Guard.
- (3) Persons liable to military service who are not required to render service pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of this Article may, when a state of defence (Verteidigungsfall) exists, be assigned by or pursuant to a law to specific occupations involving civilian services for defence purposes, including the protection of the civilian population; it shall, however, not be permissible to assign persons to an occupation subject to public law except for the purpose of discharging police functions or such other functions of public administration as can only be discharged by persons employed under public law. Persons may be assigned to occupations—as referred to in the first sentence of this paragraph—with the Armed Forces, including the supplying and servicing of the latter, or with public administrative authorities; assignments to occupations connected with supplying and servicing the civilian population shall not be permissible except in order to meet their vital requirements or to guarantee their safety.
- (4) If, while a state of defence exists, civilian service requirements in the civilian public health and medical system or in the stationary military hospital organization cannot be met on a voluntary basis, women between eighteen and fifty-five years of age may be assigned to such

---

\* Inserted by federal law of 24 June 1968 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 710).

services by or pursuant to a law. They may on no account render service involving the use of arms.

- (5) During the time prior to the existence of any such state of defence, assignments under paragraph (3) of this Article may be effected only if the requirements of paragraph (1) of Article 80a are satisfied. It shall be admissible to require persons by or pursuant to a law to attend training courses in order to prepare them for the performance of such services in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article as presuppose special knowledge or skills. To this extent, the first sentence of this paragraph shall not apply.
- (6) If, while a state of defence exists, the labour requirements for the purposes referred to in the second sentence of paragraph (3) of this Article cannot be met on a voluntary basis, the right of a German to give up the practice of his trade or occupation or profession, or his place of work, may be restricted by or pursuant to a law in order to meet these requirements. The first sentence of paragraph (5) of this Article shall apply *mutatis mutandis* prior to the existence of a state of defence.

#### **Article 13 [Inviolability of the home]**

- (1) The home shall be inviolable.
- (2) Searches may be ordered only by a judge or, in the event of danger in delay, by other organs as provided by law and may be carried out only in the form prescribed by law.
- (3) In all other respects, this inviolability may not be encroached upon or restricted except to avert a common danger or a mortal danger to individuals, or, pursuant to a law, to prevent imminent danger to public safety and order, especially to alleviate the housing shortage, to combat the danger of epidemics or to protect endangered juveniles.

#### **Article 14 [Property, Right of inheritance, Expropriation]**

- (1) Property and the right of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be determined by the laws.
- (2) Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal.
- (3) Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It may be effected only by or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the nature and extent of the compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts.

### **Article 15 [Socialization]**

Land, natural resources and means of production may for the purpose of socialization be transferred to public ownership or other forms of publicly controlled economy by a law which shall provide for the nature and extent of compensation. In respect of such compensation the third and fourth sentences of paragraph (3) of Article 14 shall apply *mutatis mutandis*.

### **Article 16 [Deprivation of citizenship, Extradition, Right of asylum]**

- (1) No one may be deprived of his German citizenship. Loss of citizenship may arise only pursuant to a law, and against the will of the person affected only if such person does not thereby become stateless.
- (2) No German may be extradited to a foreign country. Persons persecuted on political grounds shall enjoy the right of asylum.

### **Article 17 [Right of petition]**

Everyone shall have the right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to the appropriate agencies and to parliamentary bodies.

### **Article 17a\* [Restriction of basic rights for members of the Armed Forces etc.]**

- (1) Laws concerning military service and substitute service may, by provisions applying to members of the Armed Forces and of substitute services during their period of military or substitute service, restrict the basic right freely to express and to disseminate opinions by speech, writing and pictures (first half-sentence of paragraph (1) of Article 5), the basic right of assembly (Article 8), and the right of petition (Article 17) in so far as this right permits the submission of requests or complaints jointly with others.
- (2) Laws for defence purposes including the protection of the civilian population may provide for the restriction of the basic rights of freedom of movement (Article 11) and inviolability of the home (Article 13).

---

\* Inserted by federal law of 19 March 1956 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 111).

### **Article 18 [Forfeiture of basic rights]**

Whoever abuses freedom of expression of opinion, in particular freedom of the press (paragraph (1) of Article 5), freedom of teaching [paragraph (3) of Article 5], freedom of assembly (Article 8), freedom of association (Article 9), privacy of posts and telecommunications (Article 10), property (Article 14), or the right of asylum (paragraph (2) of Article 16) in order to combat the free democratic basic order, shall forfeit these basic rights. Such forfeiture and the extent thereof shall be pronounced by the Federal Constitutional Court.

### **Article 19 (Restriction of basic rights)**

- (1) In so far as a basic right may, under this Basic Law, be restricted by or pursuant to a law, such law must apply generally and not solely to an individual case. Furthermore, such law must name the basic rights, indicating the Article concerned.
- (2) In no case may the essential content of a basic right be encroached upon.
- (3) The basic rights shall apply also to domestic juristic persons to the extent that the nature of such rights permits.
- (4) Should any person's right be violated by public authority, recourse to the court shall be open to him. If jurisdiction is not specified, recourse shall be to the ordinary courts. The second sentence of paragraph (2) of Article 10 shall not be affected by the provisions of this paragraph.\*\*

---

\*\* Last sentence inserted by federal law of 24 June 1968 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 710).



# Germany's Economy in the 20th Century

by James (Rocky) Harris

## OBJECTIVES

Students will be able to:

1. describe the major factors affecting the German economy in the 20th century.
2. interpret and discuss two graphs on employment and production in Germany.

## TEACHING THE LESSON

1. Have students read the Spaulding article and answer the attached questions.
2. Ask students to study the attached graphs and list possible interpretations.
3. Hold a teacher-led discussion that will elicit the major factors affecting Germany's economy in the 20th century.

## MATERIALS

1. Classroom set of copies of Background Paper 3 by Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., *Germany's Role in the European and World Economies*.
2. Copies of Lesson 5, Handouts 1 and 2.

## **DIRECTIONS**

1. Read the Spaulding article and respond to the tasks below.
2. Study the graphs and pose some conclusions, based on the data about employment and production in Germany.

## **TASKS** (based on the Spaulding article)



1. List the effects of geography on the German economy.
2. Describe the trends in (a) production planning, and (b) foreign trade from 1900 to the present.
3. Using Germany as an example, contrast exporter and investor nations.
4. Contrast the approaches of Secretary of Treasury Morgenthau and Secretary of State George Marshall to the post-World War II German economy.
5. Describe the strategy of western nations to rebuild the German economy and at the same time discourage the rise of German nationalism since World War II.

Lesson 5, Handout 1



Distribution of employment,  
Germany, 1950 and 1980


	Agriculture	Industry	Distribution & Services
1950	25	43	32
1980	6	44	50





## Lesson 5, Handout 2

### German Production



Source: Liesner, Thelma, *Economic Statistics, 1900-1983*, New York, 1985, page 89



# Factors of Economic Growth in Post-War Germany

by Patricia Strickland

## OVERVIEW

Economic growth is an important goal of most countries. It is the means of producing greater amounts of goods and services over a long period. For a society's people to raise their standard of living, they must produce more goods and services. The limit to economic growth is determined by the availability of productive resources, the efficiency with which the resources are used, and the economic, social, and political factors that encourage an increase in productive capacity.

This lesson asks students to research the several factors that contributed to the accelerated economic growth or the "Economic Miracle" of West Germany following World War II. Students working in small groups will investigate Germany's natural resources, population, capital, technology, the importance of governmental assistance, and organizational support. Under the direction of the Western Allies, West Germany utilized each of these economic factors, so that West Germany prospered even as the nation was integrated into a new international order.

## OBJECTIVES

Students will be able to:

1. list and describe the several factors that contribute to any nation's economic growth.
2. develop examples of these factors as they apply to post-World War II West Germany.
3. explain how these factors are interrelated and link Germany's economy to the rest of the world.

## STUDENT ACTIVITIES

Divide the class into six equal (or nearly equal) groups. Provide each group with a copy of Background Paper 3 by Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., "Germany's Role in the European and World Economies," and have handy maps of Germany and the world, and current articles relating to Germany's economy. Assign each group to conduct research on one of the following economic factors:

- A. *Natural Resources*: Raw materials used as a source of fuel or as components of finished products.
  - 1. Identify resources associated with the top five German industries.
  - 2. Locate the sources of these materials on maps of Germany and the world.
- B. *Population*: People who serve as laborers and as consumers.
  - 1. List and locate on a world map the sources of Germany's labor force.
  - 2. List and locate on a world map Germany's primary export markets.
- C. *Capital*: Monetary investments in industry.
  - 1. Describe the impact of the Marshall Plan on Germany's post-war economy.
  - 2. Develop three or four examples of both national and international investments of today.
- D. *Government Assistance*: Creates an environment for industrial growth.
  - 1. Explain how the Social Democratic state helped German industry.
  - 2. Provide three or four examples of legislative acts or reforms implemented by the German government (for example, Monetary Reform, 1948).
- E. *Technology*: Inventions that create new industries and/or increase the output per worker.
  - 1. Provide examples of new industries that have developed in Germany since World War II.
  - 2. Describe the technology associated with each example and describe its impact.

- F. *Organizational Support*: Groups that organize land, labor, and capital to assist economic growth.
1. Identify German organizations that have helped economic growth and describe their goals and contributions (for example, trade unions).
  2. Identify international organizations concerned with economic development and describe their goals and contributions to Germany's economic development (for example, EC, GATT).

## CONCLUDING THE LESSON

Call on each group to report their findings. They should indicate not only the information they found, but also the sources they used. As each report is given, allow classmates to ask questions. After all groups have presented their findings, discuss with the class the inter-connectedness of economic factors that assisted economic growth in West Germany, and how Europe and the rest of the world had an impact on German economic growth and vice versa.



# “Rubble Literature”: German Writers After World War II

by Marjorie Wall Bingham

## OVERVIEW

After World War II, German writers were faced with reconstructing their literature, much as the German people were reconstructing their war torn cities and a political system devastated by Nazi leadership. Writers, as Peter Jelavich points out (Background Paper 4), were divided between those who wished to forget the past and those who felt it was necessary for Germans to face it. Those who wrote about the Nazi era and World War II were accused of writing “rubble literature.” The purpose of this lesson is to look at some of the writers and issues of the era to see the implications of that cultural debate. Just as it is important to understand the Marshall Plan and the re-building of Europe, it is also valuable to understand how Germans have reconstructed their past.

## OBJECTIVES

Students will be able to:

1. explain why “zero hour” has become an accepted term by some.
2. identify several themes present in “rubble literature”.
3. analyze the major points of Boll’s argument that “rubble literature” is more fitting for an artist’s duty.
4. understand how different groups have stakes in the themes of literature.
5. point out images that writers use to make their points more vivid to readers.

## **PROCEDURES**

The lesson is divided into five short parts with "points to consider" about the readings. Students may work in groups, individually or as a class to analyze the materials. If time is pressing, the teacher may wish to assign different groups a reading and then bring the information together in a group discussion. The teacher may wish to use the lesson in conjunction with a discussion of the end of World War II and the Marshall Plan, thus discussing literary as well as physical reconstruction.

## **CONCLUDING THE LESSON**

After analyzing and discussing the five handouts, use the following questions for a concluding discussion:

1. What difficulties did Germans have in trying to create a new literature to replace former Nazi propaganda?
2. Is the role of the writer to confront the darker side, to amuse, or to prod to the future? How would you characterize the works given above?
3. Do you see Germany's confrontation with its past as unique or would you see other countries struggling to write about difficult issues of their own?



## Part A: "In Defense of 'Rubble Literature'" (1952)

Heinrich Böll became one of the leading proponents of the position that German writers needed to confront their past. Much of the recent past had been terrible: the lost of German democracy, Nazi dictatorship, the persecution of Jews, Romani, the handicapped, homosexuals, Jehovahs Witnesses, and political opponents; and wartime aggression and exploitation of many European nations. Böll's position on why it was important to face that past is explained in an essay, "In Defense of 'Rubble Literature.'" Parts of that essay follow:

*The first literary attempts of our generation since 1945 have been described as excessively preoccupied with the bomb-ravaged cities and towns of Germany and hence dismissed as "rubble literature." We have not defended ourselves against this appellation because it was justified. It is a fact that the people we wrote about lived in and under ruins, men and women, even children, all equally war-scarred. And they were sharp-eyed: they could see. Moreover, their living conditions were far from peacetime ones, neither their surroundings nor their own state nor anything else about them could be described as idyllic, and we writers felt close enough to them to identify with them: to identify with black-market operators and black-market victims, with refugees and with all those who for one reasons or another had lost their homes—but above all, of course, with our own generation, which for the most part found itself in a strange and significant situation: a generation that was "coming home," coming home from a war which scarcely a soul still believed would ever end.*

*So we wrote about the war, about coming home, and about what we had seen during the war and were faced with on our return: about ruins. Hence the three cliches with which this budding literature was labeled: a literature of war, of homecoming and or rubble.*

*These labels, as such, are warranted: there had been a war lasting six years, we were coming home from this war, we found rubble and we wrote about it. What was odd, suspicious even, was the reproachful, almost injured tone accompanying these labels; although we were not, apparently, being held responsible for the war; for the ruin on all sides, we were obviously giving offense by having seen these things and continuing to see them. But we were not blindfolded, we did see these things and a sharp eye is one of a writer's essential tools.*

*To offer our contemporaries an escape into some idyll would have been too cruel for words, the awakening too appalling—or ought we really all to have played blind man's bluff? ...*

*It is our task to remind the world that a human being exists for something more than to be bureaucratized—and that the destruction in our world is not merely external or so trivial that we can presume to heal it within a few years.*

*Throughout our Western culture the name of Homer is above suspicion. Homer is the progenitor of the European epic, yet Homer tells of the Trojan War, of the destruction of Troy, and of Ulysses' homecoming—a literature of war, rubble and homecoming. We have no reason to be ashamed of these labels. (Böll: 126-131)*

## POINTS TO CONSIDER

1. What themes does Böll see as part of "rubble literature"?
2. To whom does he suggest the writers have given offense? What image does he use to describe the critics? What "game" do they play?
3. He suggests at the end of the essay that the rubble writers are part of a great enduring literary tradition. With whom does he compare these writers and why? Is there anything that might be different in the outcome of the comparison, however? Lesson 7, Handout 2



## Part B: “Stunde Null”: The Zero Hour

Germans have had difficulty in deciding what to call the year 1945, the end of World War II. In one sense it is the “Year of Liberation” which marked the end of Hitler’s dictatorship in Germany. Hitler’s leadership had cost millions of German lives and had brought the calamity of military defeat. On the other hand, the nation was defeated militarily and was occupied and divided by foreign forces. “Liberation” did not seem an apt word to describe these conditions in 1945. To resolve the dilemma, Germans began to refer to 1945 as the “Stunde Null”—the zero hour. The historian David Marsh describes why this phrase was so powerful:

*The Germans described 1945 as “Stunde Null”—zero hour, a new start. The horrors, the lunacies, the shame before that date were deliberately—and perhaps inevitably—pushed into the background. Freed from Hitler the “magic-manipulator,” the post-1945 Germans were only too willing to accept the myth that his spell alone accounted for the destruction of civilized values and the violation of human rights. As the shutters came down on the view back to the Third Reich, Germany swivelled into a new relationship with the conquerors. The defeated nation became a focus of ideological and military struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Germans in East and West identified themselves with their respective victor power—almost as if they had been on the same side all along. Amid the helter-skelter of reconstruction, guilt about the Nazi state was “swept away with the rubble.” (Marsh:23)*

## POINTS TO CONSIDER

1. Why would the term "zero hour" clash with the aims of the writers of rubble literature?
2. What groups in Germany might be more comfortable with the term "zero hour"? Why might the United States government also support a "zero hour" interpretation?
3. Currently, scholars of the history of the Holocaust are debating whether or not the Holocaust was a unique event in history or part of a series of genocides. What implications might the "zero hour" interpretation have on Holocaust studies?



## Part C: American's Image in "Rubble Literature"

As the United States became the major power affecting the fate of Western Germany, its influence became recognized by German writers and teachers. One of the tasks the United States set after World War II was the de-Nazification of Germany and the creation of German democracy. The task was complicated by many issues: the widespread participation of Germans in Nazi groups, the split with the Soviet Union, and the racism still present in the United States. Many German wanted the United States as a model for change, but some writers questioned whether or not American capitalism and race relations were the humane world they sought.

Two readings follow. One is a description of a teacher's movie-going after World War II—as Jelavich points out in Background Paper 4, 60% of the movies Germans see are American made. The second reading is by Max Frisch about an encounter with an American major.

*"Comments by a German Teacher":*

*I was just barely in my teens in 1945, but I remember that after the War it seemed all we saw were American movies. The one I remember the most is "Gone With the Wind"—advertisements for it were everywhere. I suppose the Americans showed it because it was about Reconstruction. The message was that just as the South had been rebuilt, so hard working people could rebuild Germany. But at the time, I could not help wondering how Americans would show a film that showed blacks as slaves and subservient when we were supposed to be ridding ourselves of Nazi racial theories. And the enemy in the film, destroying the heroine's beautiful cities of the South were the Yankees! (Comments made to Author)*

*Max Frisch: "Departure from Lichterfelde"*

*An American major refuses to sleep in the same compartment as a negro who is also wearing an American uniform. The German guard, a Swabian, has to find some other place to put him. The guard nods, as if to say: Oh, say no more, I quite understand, and he races off down the corridor, not without a smirk on his face that he does not conceal from us—it is not directed against the negro. That is how it is: the racial question, re-education, no doubt, why he is in the corridor. He stares through the streaming windows, although it is night outside, nothing but night. When the guard comes back, babbling in Swabian, and tells him where to sleep, he nods, without looking at the guard, who repeats the number of the compartment. He remains standing, smoking, looking into the black glass...(World history is not yet at its end.)(Swann)*

## **POINTS TO CONSIDER**

1. In what ways would American Jim Crow laws and army segregation complicate the de-Nazification process?
2. "Gone With the Wind" was made in 1939, the same year World War II began in Europe. Was it a fitting film to show in post-war Germany? If you have seen the film you may wish to expand on different scenes that may apply to your view.
3. What films would you suggest as illustrating admirable American values that might be imitated by a culture trying to find itself?
4. How might criticism of America also fit into German desire for a better image of themselves?
5. In the reading about the incident on the train, how does the author use the color black to reinforce the irony of the situation?



## Part D: Two Poems About the War

Several generalizations might be made about German soldiers in World War II. One is that they were often brave, resourceful, and dedicated. They were also part of terrible destruction and cruelty. Though defeated also in World War I, German soldiers might still be seen as serving their country "with honor." But in World War II, there was little post war honor in having been part of Hitler's annihilation plans for a good share of Europe. What, then, was the German soldier left with after World War II? Poets of the "Rubble Literature" suggest the fragments:

Günter Eich:  
"Inventory"

*This is my cap,  
this is my greatcoat,  
and here's my shaving kit  
in its linen bag.*

*A can of meat:  
my plate, my mug,  
into its tin  
I've scratched my name.*

*Scatched it with this  
invaluable nail  
which I keep hidden  
from covetous eyes.*

*My bread bag holds  
two woollen socks  
and a couple of things  
I show to no one,  
like that it serves me  
as a pillow at night.  
Between me and the earth  
I lay this cardboard.*

*This pencil lead  
is what I love most:  
by day it writes verses  
I thought up in the night.*

*This is my notebook  
and this is my groundsheet  
this is my towel,  
this is my thread.*

Rainer Brambach:  
"Paul"

*born 1917  
on a day below zero.  
running wild  
across the playground,  
fell, and ran on,*

*tossing a ball  
across the school-yard,  
fell, and ran on,  
rifle in arm  
across the training-ground,  
fell, and ran on,  
one day, below zero,  
into Russian cross-fire,  
and fell. (Swann)*

## POINTS TO CONSIDER

1. In the Eich poem, what are the things the soldier comes to value? What sorts of a person's "inventory" are not mentioned?
2. In the poem, "Paul," how is the subject's life described? Often words like "heroism" or "sacrifice" are used in poems about fallen soldiers. Why do you think the poem is so "bare" of these terms? Is its bareness effective?
3. In one battle on the Russian front, Stalingrad, there were 1,000,000 casualties. German soldiers also died in Normandy, North Africa, and Italy. But why might the poet choose the Russian front as particularly symbolic of the death of a German soldier?



## Part E: Re-thinking Women's Roles

After World War II, German women were faced with rebuilding homes, families, and financial security. Some had been through firestorm bombings, as in Hamburg and Dresden; others suffered rape during the Russian advance. Though women had given loyal support generally to the German army in World War II, Nazi propaganda did little for women's image or opportunities. Hitler has addressed women as subservient to men and pushed women out of the universities and professions. Women, he claimed, should serve the state by raising German children loyal to the Reich. After the war, German women pushed for more rights and opportunities and for more peaceful solutions to world issues. The following poem by Marie Luise Kaschnitz suggest some of the rebellion against past constraints.

Marie Luise Kaschnitz: "Women's Broadcast"

*Someday I'll announce on the radio  
Toward morning when on one is listening  
Certain recipes of mine*

*Pour milk into the telephone  
Let cats breed  
In the dishwasher  
Stamp on watches in the was basin  
Kick off your shoes*

*Season a peach with paprika  
And spread honey on meat*

*Teach your children the basic skills of female foxes  
Turn the leaves in the garden over on the silver side  
Discuss something with an odd-ball*

*When it is summer, put on your furs  
Meet the men coming down from the mountains  
The bagpipe player  
Kick off your shoes*

*Don't be so sure  
That evening will fall  
Not so sure  
That God Love You.  
(Cocalis: 95)*

## POINTS TO CONSIDER

1. Kaschnitz suggests several outrageous things in her poem—what are they? Günter Grass is another writer known for the unlikely things that occur in his novel *Tin Drum*. What purpose would these two writers have in upsetting the usual “reality”?
2. In Nazi Germany, what would have happened to the “odd-ball” she suggests talking to?
3. Why does she end the poem wanting “you” to be more uncertain and less dogmatic in “your” beliefs: Why might she be suspicious of those who speak of certain truths?
4. The poem might be addressed to anyone, but why particularly does she entitle it “Women’s Broadcast”?

## REFERENCES

Böll, Heinrich. *Missing Persons and Other Essays*. Translated by Leila Vennewitz. London: Seeker and Warbur, 1977.

Cocalis, Susan, ed. *The Defiant Muse; German Feminist Poems from the Middle Ages to the Present*. New York: The Feminist Press, 1986.

Comments to the Author: Made by a teacher from Hamburg during discussions at the Conference on Development of Democracy after World War II, Bundeszentrale of North Rhine-Westphalia, September 1989.

Hamburger, Michael, ed. *German Poetry: 1910-1975. An Anthology*. Manchester: Carcanet New Press, 1977.

Marsh, David. *The Germans: The Pivotal Nation*. New York: St. Martins Press, 1990.

Swann, Joseph Thomas. Translations of the selections from Brambach and Frisch were from photocopied materials from the Bundesztrale Conference in 1989.



# Artistic Expression in Germany Since World War II

by Claudia Seiter and David Seiter

## OVERVIEW

This lesson focuses on the changes in East and West German plays, film, and fiction from 1945 to the present. It contains:

1. A look back at the height of German culture prior to the 20th-century wars, and compares it to Nazi and post-World War II art.
2. A discussion of early attempts to revitalize art.
  - (a) noting the West's avoidance of the Holocaust and the East's encouragement of examination of the event.
  - (b) an examination of Western superficial scrutiny vs. Socialist complicity.
  - (c) opposition and frustration on the part of German writers and artists.

## OBJECTIVES

Students will be able to:

1. identify the main issue in the historical development and regression of German art.
2. compare and contrast development of the arts in East and West Germany.
3. predict outcomes of future artistic endeavors in Germany based on their knowledge of the past.

## OPENING THE LESSON

Students should read in their U.S. or World History textbooks about the coming to power of Adolf Hitler in Germany. Have students discuss the following questions:

1. What is totalitarianism?
2. How does totalitarianism affect artistic expression?
3. Why would a government be interested in regulating art?
4. What might be negative outcomes of government regulating art?
5. What circumstances are necessary in a society for the fullest encouragement of artistic expression?

## DEVELOPING THE LESSON

- Make copies of Background Paper 4 by Peter Jelavich, *German Culture in a Modern World* and have students read it carefully.
- Have students complete the accompanying chart listing the authors' names, one example of a major work of the author, and the impact on society of the work. Ask students to explain their judgment about the impact of each work.
- Have the class discuss how events in Germany and the world have affected the attitudes and achievements of German artists.
- From the chart they have completed, have students identify which artists fought the most for freedom after the war to deal with political issues. How did difficulties of West German artists differ from the difficulties faced by East German artists? Is there any irony in this?

## CONCLUDING THE LESSON

Conduct a discussion in which students attempt to forecast the future of German literary and dramatic culture as East and West Germany merge.



# Artistic Expression in Germany Since World War II

Author's Name	Examples of Major Works	East or West?	Impact of Work on Public Opinion or Attitudes (Great, Moderate, Little)



# Germans Face Unification: Four Simulations

by James Diehl and Carl Schulkin

## OVERVIEW

The following lesson attempts to simulate several of the most important social consequences of the reunification of Germany. It is intended to provide high school teachers with innovative materials which can help them teach their students to appreciate what the "Revolution of '89" meant for ordinary people in both the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany. For the sake of brevity, we have sketched only one plan for using these materials in the high school classroom. We invite our colleagues to adapt or amend our lesson plan to meet the particular needs of their students.

Our lesson plan has been developed as a companion to Background Paper 5 by Konrad Jarausch, *From Revolution to Unification*. We recommend that instructors begin by either assigning that article to their students or summarizing its contents for them. We suggest that the contents of Professor Jarausch's paper be presented within the context of a more detailed study of the origins and course of the events of 1989 and 1990 in Germany. Once students are familiar with the course of events and with the general nature of the different social and political systems which existed in the two Germanies on the eve of the Revolution, they should be in a position to come to grips with the four scenarios we have created.

Our lesson has been designed for implementation within the confines of two forty to forty-five minute class periods. During the first class period, students should be divided into groups of four to six students and each

group should be provided with a single sheet of paper containing one of the four scenarios provided below. Each group should be instructed to appoint one student to be a scribe, to record the outcome of their deliberations, and a second student to be a spokesperson, to report on their deliberations to the class as a whole. Each group should then be told that they must study its problem carefully and try to reach a consensus on which one of their options appears most promising. They should be informed that, after deliberating for twenty minutes, the spokesperson for each group will be required to explain their problem and proposed solution to remainder of the class, including their reasons for rejecting each option they have not embraced and for embracing the one they have decided upon.

Depending on the size of the class, implementation of this first phase of the lesson plan should take at least one class period and, most likely, the first ten or fifteen minutes of a second. The remainder of the second class period should be devoted to debriefing the exercise. The instructor should encourage students to question the solutions proposed by other groups with the object of making sure that each student has been exposed to presentations explaining the advantages and disadvantages of choosing each of the options provided in the four scenarios. In addition to the scenarios themselves, we have provided a brief guide to the historical parameters built into the scenarios to assist instructors in debriefing the simulation orally. We leave it to individual instructors to decide whether they wish to hold students accountable for a written assignment as well. For those instructors who encourage journal writing, we would suggest assigning an entry of between 250 and 500 words focusing on what the student learned about the German Revolution of 1989 from this simulation.

Four scenarios and character sketches are presented on the following pages. The titles of these four pieces are: (1) Helga Mecklenburger, (2) Wolfgang Gollbach, (3) Muhammad "Michael" Salaam, and (4) Klaus-Jürgen Sonnenfeld.

With respect to pedagogy, we hope to 1) expose other teachers to a particular type of social history simulation which has proven to be effective in promoting active learning in our own classrooms; and 2) demonstrate that collaboration between university professors and high school teachers can result in the production of innovative teaching materials suitable for classroom use.

## OBJECTIVES

Students will be able to:

- 1) appreciate the fact that neither the political leaders nor ordinary people in either the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany had a clear understanding of what the social consequences of reunification would be.
- 2) illustrate with concrete examples some of those individuals who might be worse off and some who might be better off, at least in the short run, as a result of the "Revolution of '89".
- 3) place the crucial events of 1989 and 1990 into their broader social and historical contexts in a manner that high school students would find both understandable and interesting.

## Lesson 9, Handout 1



### Scenario 1: Helga Mecklenburger

Your name is Helga Mecklenburger and you are twenty-five years old. You live with your twenty-six year old husband, Hans-Peter, in the city of Leipzig in the German Democratic Republic. You work in the state-owned Walter Ulbricht Textile Factory and your husband works for the post office. You have been married for more than three years, but you waited until you were earning sufficient income before deciding to begin a family. After Hans-Peter's recent promotion, the two of you decided that the time had come to have your first child. It is March 1990 and you are three months pregnant. The recent unrest in the German Democratic Republic and appeals for reform have resulted in the calling of the first free elections in your country's history. You and your husband must now decide which party to vote for. Should you cast your vote for:

- a) the Party of Democratic Socialism, the successor to the Socialist Unity Party, the party of Walter Ulbricht and Erich Honecker. Although communism has clearly failed to provide the kind of economic prosperity enjoyed by citizens of the Federal Republic and the other nations belonging to the European Economic Community, you believe that there are elements of the way of life you have grown up with that are worth preserving. In particular, you appreciate the fact that when your child is born the government will provide you with maternity care and, when you are ready to return to work, with the child care you and your family will require. You recognize that some of the former members of the Socialist Unity Party that are running as candidates of the Party of Democratic Socialism are sincere, well-intentioned reformers. However, you are concerned that they will be unable to wrest control of the party from the *apparatchiki* (bureaucrats) who have dominated for as long as you can remember.
- b) the Social Democratic Party, the party of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. Although they have been out of power since 1982, the Social Democrats have taken a cautious attitude toward reform and possible reunification, a caution which you believe to be justified given the

unexpected events of the past year and the accelerating pace of change. The Social Democrats, your husband has tried to convince you, are in favor of preserving those elements of the communist system, such as universal health and child care, which benefited the average citizen, while avoiding the excesses of a capitalism which has not been tempered by a commitment to social justice. Social Democratic candidates have stressed the experience of their party in governing in the past and their carefully considered policy of planning for the future.

- c) West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's coalition consisting of the Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic Party. Coalition candidates have argued that they represent a united and prosperous future for the German people. They have accused the Social Democrats of dragging their heels, of delaying the change from an impoverished though egalitarian society to one in which every citizen will have the opportunity to enjoy the fruits of prosperity. From what you have learned recently from television broadcasts originating in the Federal Republic and from your mother's recent visit to her relatives in Hanover, the potential material benefits are impressive indeed.

### Scenario 2: Wolfgang Gollbach

Your name is Wolfgang Gollbach and you are thirty-nine years old. You are currently a professor of history (formerly a professor of Marxist-Leninist studies) at the University of Dresden. It is April of 1990 and, with the recent victory of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's coalition in the first free elections in the history of the German Democratic Republic, you have come to believe that the reunification of Germany is only a matter of time. Changes have taken place so rapidly in your country during the past year and a half that you are fearful that, if you do not change with the times, you may be one of those relegated to the proverbial trash heap of history. You are, therefore, seriously considering resigning your position at the University of Dresden and applying for one of several positions you have learned of. Will you:

- a) apply for the position of Professor of Modern History at the University of Hamburg. The University of Hamburg has had a long tradition of respecting differing viewpoints and you believe that they will overlook the fact that your earliest publications condemned the monopoly capitalists of the Ruhr for their allegedly unpatriotic actions during the first half of the twentieth century. In your most recent book, published

four years ago, you have demonstrated your ability to master prodigious amounts of archival materials and to present your findings in a balanced, non-ideological fashion. You believe that favorable reviews from your colleagues in the Federal Republic will help make you one of the leading candidates for this prestigious position.

- b) apply for the position of senior research associate at the Academy of Historical Sciences in East Berlin. You are confident that, regardless of the changes that take place, the board of governors of this prestigious research institute will continue to be more interested in outstanding scholarship than ideology. Based on the merits of your past scholarship, you anticipate that you would be a very strong candidate for this position.
- c) apply for the position of political adviser to and speech writer for the Party of Democratic Socialism. Your qualifications for this position may be enhanced somewhat by your Marxist-Leninist past and your recent scholarship identifies you as someone who understands the need to change with the changing times. You anticipate that your knowledge of twentieth-century German politics and your ability to express your thoughts and those of others clearly and eloquently should enable you to become the leading candidate for this position.
- d) attempt to retain your professorship at the University of Dresden by making it clear to the future leaders of a reunited Germany that you are well aware of the direction in which the wind is blowing. A strategically placed repudiation of your earlier findings critical of the captains of industry of the Ruhr region would, you anticipate, enhance the chances that your latest manuscript would be accepted for publication and strengthen your case for retaining your current appointment after reunification is an accomplished fact.

### Scenario 3: Muhammad "Michael" Salaam

Your name is Muhammad Salaam, but your German friends call you "Michael." You are twenty-three years old and you live with your mother and father in a suburb of Stuttgart. You earn a good living as an assembly-line worker at the Daimler Benz automobile plant near Stuttgart. Your family emigrated from the region of Anatolia in Turkey to the Federal Republic of Germany in 1962. Your father was determined to provide a better life for his family and, through hard labor as a construction worker and carefully saving his earnings, he has succeeded in lifting the Salaam family out of poverty. Although you were born in the Federal Republic,

you are not a German citizen and you recognize that full citizenship may be difficult to obtain. It is January 1991 and, as the two Germanies embark upon the difficult task of reunification, you have begun to re-examine your own future in light of the opportunities which may be offered to you in reunited Germany. You have been discussing your future plans with three individuals close to you, each of which has either suggested or hinted at a path that they would encourage you to take. Will you:

- a) accept your father's offer to return with him and your mother to Turkey. Your father has dreamed of opening his own restaurant and now that you are earning a good living and your older sisters are married there is nothing to stand in the way of that dream. He has saved a substantial sum of money and if you will add your small savings as well, the two of you could easily afford to open the restaurant of his dreams in Ankara. Your father has told you that you could enjoy the benefits of full citizenship as well as the fruits of your joint labors. Upon your return, he has suggested that you begin looking for a traditional Turkish woman to marry and start a family. To encourage you to accept his offer, your father has promised that upon his retirement, you will become the sole owner of the restaurant, providing a healthy and reliable source of income for you and your family.
- b) take the hints which your good friend Sabine Rheinsdorf has been dropping and begin courting her seriously. Sabine is twenty-two years old and the daughter of local trade union leader Otto Rheinsdorf, an outspoken advocate of equal wages for *gastarbeiter* (guestworkers) like yourself. Sabine's grandfather was executed in July 1944 for his role in opposing the Nazi regime and her family has had a long tradition of defending victims of persecution. Sabine is an idealistic young university student and you find her and her youthful idealism very attractive. If your courtship were to lead to marriage, you would anticipate applying to become a full German citizen and raising a family all of whose members would be an integral part of the bright future of a reunited Germany.
- c) initiate a serious courtship of Asli Acemi, the daughter of one of your father's closest friends. You have known Asli since the age of three, when you played together in the local park. Asli is twenty-one years old and a student at the *Pedagogische Hochschule* (Teacher's College) in Stuttgart. She has always done well in school and has decided that she would like to pursue a career in teaching in order to educate other Turkish children in Germany to prepare them for a better future. Asli is not only well educated and, like yourself, speaks unaccented German, you and she share both a Turkish and a Muslim heritage as well.

#### Scenario 4: Klaus-Jürgen Sonnenfeld

Your name is Klaus-Jürgen Sonnenfeld and you are forty-two years old. (You were born on August 23, 1949, the day on which the Federal Republic officially came into being with the implementation of the Basic Law.) You live in the town of Vegesack, a suburb of Bremen. You are an engineer by training, and you have utilized your technical training to advance to the position of Vice President of the Consumer Electronics division of the Mannesmann/Tally Corporation. You have developed a particular expertise in the designing and selling of printers for microcomputers. You are well educated and well traveled. You have been an American Field Service exchange student in the United States and you have traveled to each of the member nations of the European Economic Community promoting your company's products. It is March 1991 and elections have been called for the city council in Vegesack. As the son of a steelworker, you grew up as a loyal follower of the Social Democratic Party, which has traditionally championed the interests of the less affluent members of society. In the early 1980s you switched your allegiance to the newly-formed coalition of the Christian Democratic Union and Free Democratic Party, headed by Helmut Kohl, which represents the interests of the business and managerial class to which you now belong. As the city elections approach, you are trying to decide which party to support this time. Should you vote for:

- a) Chancellor Kohl's coalition of the Christian Democratic Union and the Free Democratic Party. Although you have been very disappointed by the social and economic problems caused by reunification and especially with Kohl's breaking his promise not to raise taxes, you still believe that the coalition represents future prosperity. They are firmly committed to the European Economic Community and to the economic growth which international cooperation promises. Perhaps it is worth paying higher taxes in the short run to insure long term prosperity.
- b) Social Democratic Party, the traditional friend of the working man. In your youth you had been a loyal supporter of the Social Democrats and, now that you have seen Chancellor Kohl break important promises, you are seriously considering supporting them again. Their argument in the December 1990 elections that Chancellor Kohl was moving too fast appears to have been correct. Moreover, they seem to be more willing to help those hurt by the social dislocation that has followed in the wake of reunification. Although they have offered no specific alternative plan,

you are attracted by the idea of proceeding more cautiously and humanely.

- c) Deutsche Volkunion, a very conservative party which has been accused of being a neo-Nazi organization. Prior to November 1989, you would never have considered supporting such a party. However, several of their predictions have apparently come true. The influx of foreigners from Eastern Europe has increased. Crime has increased and the Deutsche Volkunion claims that these newcomers are the cause. Chancellor Kohl and his colleagues do not seem to be handling the tremendous problems associated with reunification very well. Their promises that no one would be harmed by their reunification policies and that taxes in the states of the former Federal Republic would not be raised have both proven to be false. You are repelled by the strong nationalist and racist appeals of the Deutsche Volkunion, but you are attracted by the idea of sending Chancellor Kohl and his coalition parties a strong message by casting a protest vote for this right wing party.

## **A TEACHER'S GUIDE TO THE FOUR SCENARIOS**

### **Helga Mecklenburger**

If Helga casts her vote for the Party of Democratic Socialism, she will find that she has supported a losing cause. This new party has been discredited by its links to the former ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party. It is able, therefore, to attract only a small minority and remains powerless. The reformers within it are unable to wrest control of the organization from the old hard line communists.

A vote for the Social Democratic Party also represents support for a losing cause, at least in the short run. In the course of the campaign, the Social Democrats are unable to convince the voters in the German Democratic Republic that they are a viable alternative to the old communist party or the Kohl coalition. Despite their expectations of victory, the Social Democrats find that they have underestimated the East German people's desire for immediate and sweeping change.

If Helga chooses to cast her vote for the CDU coalition, she will be voting with the majority of the East German electorate. Chancellor Kohl and his allies win an overwhelming victory. His promises of a quick and painless reunification, which will soon raise the standard of living in the former Eastern states to the same level enjoyed by the prosperous Western states, prove decisive.

## **Wolfgang Gollbach**

If Professor Gollbach applies for the professorship in Modern European History at the University of Hamburg, he will almost certainly be shocked to find that the anticipated intellectual migration that follows unification occurs almost exclusively from West to East. The competition for such positions in the Federal Republic was already intense prior to reunification. In such a competition, applicants from the former German Democratic Republic, no matter what their scholarly qualifications, are quickly eliminated by the taint of their former association with the East German regime.

Unfortunately for Professor Gollbach, shortly after the process of reunification begins, the Academy of Historical Sciences is dissolved, the assumption being that there is no longer a need for an institution that was merely a tool of a totalitarian regime. He will quickly discover that this is not a real choice.

The Party of Democratic Socialism does poorly in the elections of March 1990 and December 1990 and continues to limp along. It has meager resources and those that it does have, it devotes to hiring outside experts from the West who are more familiar with the workings of electoral politics in a democratic society.

Recanting one's previous Marxist-Leninist views will very likely be insufficient to guarantee Professor Gollbach's retention of his present position. Throughout the Eastern states, university professors are systematically purged, particularly those in the fields of History and Political Science. The assumption is that their function has been one of political indoctrination and that they have no place in institutions whose mission is the disinterested pursuit of knowledge.

## **Michael Salaam**

As much as you would like to honor your father's wishes and accompany him on his journey back to Turkey, you recognize that you have become too much of a German to make such a transition easily. You feel much more at home in Germany than you do in Turkey. You don't believe you could find happiness married to a traditional Turkish woman. You have grown accustomed to the idea that marriage is a partnership and you feel uncomfortable with the prospect of entering into a strict patriarchal relationship with your wife. You are also aware that the educational

opportunities for your future offspring will be much greater in Germany than they are in Turkey.

Although you find Sabine very attractive, both physically and intellectually, you recognize that your ethnic heritage is Turkish and not German. Even though there has been greater acceptance of late of Turkish immigrants, full assimilation remains a distant goal. It seems even more problematic now that ethnic violence has increased in the wake of reunification and the declining economy. Sabine and her family may be very accepting, but they are the exception. You believe that you would be doing Sabine a disservice by marrying her, for she might then become the target of the same discrimination and potential violence that you and your fellow Turks have been subjected to.

Marriage to Asli makes a great deal of sense under the present circumstances. She shares both his Turkish heritage and his commitment to a western style partnership. He recognizes that his aspirations for a brighter future for his offspring stand a very good chance of being realized if he marries such a woman and remains in Germany. Nevertheless, he cannot ignore the threat posed by the recent fire bombings of Turkish dwellings instigated by right wing skinheads and the other violence that has become more prevalent.

### **Klaus-Jürgen Sonnenfeld**

Your vote for the CDU-FDP coalition does not keep it from losing its majority. Many former supporters of Kohl's coalition have voted for other parties, especially the right wing Deutsche Volkunion. More importantly, many former supporters simply stayed home to show their dissatisfaction, an unusual and significant action in a country in which the turn out for elections is traditionally very high.

Your vote for the SPD helps to increase its vote and the party is able to improve its showing from the previous election. Unfortunately, the new votes gained from disaffected supporters from the coalition parties are more than offset by losses to the Green party, a relatively new competitor to the left of the SPD. Spokesmen of the Green party have characterized the reunification as a blatant takeover of the east by the west, which benefits the wealthy interests in the west at the expense of the east. This claim attracted the support of numerous citizens from the former German Democratic Republic, the so-called *Ossi*, who have flocked to the Bremen

area in the hopes of finding jobs but have instead encountered unemployment and discrimination.

Your vote for the Deutsche Volkunion has the intended effect of registering a protest, but it also produces some unintended and undesirable consequences. The party wins ten percent of the votes, which denies the CDU-FDP a majority, and, taken in combination with the SPD's failure to win a majority, creates a situation of considerable political instability. Moreover, emboldened by the Deutsche Volkspartei's election victory, a number of skinheads mounted a victory celebration that ended with the beating up of some Turkish guestworkers and the fire-bombing of a Turkish home. These violent acts attracted unfavorable attention both at home and abroad and has resulted in the reconsideration of several foreign investors whose support is necessary to finance plans of the Mannesmann/Tally Corporation to expand its productive capacity in order to meet the increased demand for its products in the newly reunited east German states.



# Time Line: An Annotated Chronology of Events in Postwar Germany and the European Community

by Dagmar Kraemer

This selective chronology aims to reflect three aspects of postwar German history that are essential for understanding its current role in the world: the origins of the postwar German division, the effects of two major (West) German policy decisions after 1949, and the unification process after 1989.

This overview focuses on the first two of these aspects, especially on (1) Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's preference for anchoring the (old) Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) firmly in the West rather than giving priority to German unification or neutrality, and (2) Chancellor Willy Brandt's gradual shaping of a West German policy toward the Eastern bloc and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), while maintaining Germany's ties to NATO and pursuing (West) European union.

After the Berlin Wall fell, Germany vigorously pursued unification within NATO and under the umbrella of a gradually uniting Europe. The goal of that new German policy was what German Nobel laureate for literature, Thomas Mann, had been pleading for as early as the late 1920s, namely to create "a European Germany rather than a German Europe".

For a united Germany, just as it has been for West Germany, there is no other alternative than an eventual deeper and wider community. This larger community, however, will not have the cozy familiarity of a

relatively small and transparent group of players. Rather, it might separate into several subgroups that move at various speeds toward eventual union. In this Europe, France and Germany will remain the core countries.

The greatest challenge for the European Community of any size will be a gradual transformation into a multicultural society. The current developments in Yugoslavia, in Germany, and in other member states coping with massive migration and acculturation of culturally and ethnically divergent groups—refugees, resettlers, and individuals seeking asylum from the disenfranchised and war-ridden parts of the world—give us an idea of the challenges that lie ahead. The current problems in the intra-German unification process are a case study for the severity of the task before the Europeans.

#### 1945

On May 8, the German armed forces capitulate unconditionally in Reims (France) and Berlin. In July and August, the Allied Powers convene in Potsdam and establish the division of Germany into (eventually) four occupation zones.

In early fall, schools reopen in Germany. More than half the school buildings had been destroyed during the war, and approximately two-thirds of the (largely male) teaching staff were either dead or still held as prisoners of war.

Also in the fall, the Nuremberg Trials against Nazi war criminals and those responsible for the Holocaust begin.

#### 1946

The Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Communist Party of Germany are coerced to merge in the Soviet occupation zone (later to become the German Democratic Republic) and to form the Socialist Unity Party, the ruling Communist party of East Germany (until 1990).

*Länder* (new federal states) emerge in the Western occupation zones (eventually ten); the five old states in the Soviet zone are abolished. Berlin has a special status that will maintain until 1990.

#### 1947

Passage of the "containment strategy" (the Truman Doctrine against the spread of communism) by the U.S. Congress. Beginning of the Cold War

and the ideological, political, and, later, total division of Germany and Europe by the so-called Iron Curtain (the Soviet response).

On June 5, U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall initiates the Marshall Plan for the Recovery of Europe (and Germany) in a speech at Harvard University.

#### 1948

The devastation of World War II had provided new impetus to the idea of a united Europe. A first step in that direction had been the Benelux customs union of 1944 between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg which, in March of 1948, are joined by France and England. Expanded into the West European Union, it is no longer directed against Germany, but against the USSR.

The Organization of European Economic Cooperation, comprised of sixteen (West) European member states, is founded to administer the Marshall Plan aid on April 16. It is later reconstituted as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which monitors and fosters economic relations between the industrialized West and the third world. On June 20, a currency reform is announced in the three western zones of Germany through the introduction of the Deutsche mark as sole legal tender. As an answer to the currency reform in the western zones, the Soviet Union starts the Berlin Blockade. U.S. and British forces keep the beleaguered city of Berlin supplied through a huge airlift operation.

#### 1949

On April 4, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is founded with twelve initial member states. A month later, the Council of Europe, with ten exclusively European member states, is founded.

The Berlin Blockade ends on May 4. A few days later, German and Allied authorities adopt the (West) German Basic Law, a provisional constitution for the (merged) three western occupation zones. On May 23, the Federal Republic of Germany is formally constituted and the Basic Law goes into effect. As a response, the USSR creates a second German state on the territory of its occupation zone on October 7: the German Democratic Republic, or East Germany. While the FRG is organized according to Western democratic principles and a free-market system, the GDR is characterized by Communist party rule and a planned economy.

The first postwar free and independent elections are held in the FRG. The Christian Democratic Union narrowly wins the elections, and Konrad Adenauer becomes the first chancellor of West Germany. Chancellor Adenauer declares the FRG the sole legal representative of all Germans. This declaration implies that the FRG takes sole responsibility for the Nazi past.

In the GDR, Walter Ulbricht emerges as a central figure to lead the Socialist Unity Party, the ruling Communist party of East Germany. The leaders of the second German state claim strong antifascist credentials: they emerged from Soviet exile during the war and maintain close ties to their mentors in Moscow.

### **1950-51**

French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman announces the plan for a European Coal and Steel Community. The ECSC Treaty, which establishes European authority over coal and steel industries, is signed on April 1, 1951, by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy. In the autumn of 1951, the two Germanies sign an intra-German trade agreement which later serves as the basis for the special trade status that the GDR will enjoy with the European Community.

The GDR proposes to hold free elections in all of Germany and to initiate negotiations with the Allied Powers on a peace treaty (the latter never materialized).

### **1952**

The two "Stalin Notes" of March 10 and April 9, offer German unity under conditions of neutrality for a united Germany (the solution adopted for Austria, a policy later called "Finlandization") and free all-German elections. The West and Chancellor Adenauer reject the offers.

The West German government expresses its intent to make restitution and pay compensations for the crimes of the Nazis. The Luxembourg Reparations Agreement of September 10 between the states of West Germany and Israel is the first in a series of legislative acts (laid down in global agreements) intended to regulate restitution and compensation for Nazi crimes. The Luxembourg Agreement accords the Federal Republic international recognition, while providing economic and financial support

to Israel, which had assumed the major burden of accepting surviving victims of Nazi persecution from Europe.

The three Western powers grant partial sovereignty rights to the Federal Republic in the German Treaty of May 16. This treaty, however, is closely tied to the establishment of a European Defense Community, which would place a possible future German army under European command. As a countermove to this proposal, the GDR tightens its borders to West Germany and curbs traffic between East and West Berlin.

The agreement on the European Defense Community is not endorsed in the French Assembly, and concomitant plans for a European (Political) Community are shelved for the time being. As an alternative to membership in the ill-fated European Defense Community, Italy and Germany are invited to join NATO.

#### 1953

On June 17, workers in the GDR rise in protest against work conditions imposed upon them by their government. The popular uprising is crushed by the Communist government with the help of Soviet tanks, and the party is cleansed of internal dissidents. In 1963, the day of the uprising becomes a national holiday in the Federal Republic.

#### 1955

West Germany joins NATO as a semisovereign state. The German *Bundeswehr* (Federal armed forces) is created after much internal debate over the wisdom of remilitarization. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies form the Warsaw Pact as a counterweight to NATO. East Germany signs a treaty on its future relations with the Soviet Union (later upgraded to a "friendship treaty").

The FRG declares that it will not establish diplomatic relations with any country that recognizes the GDR as a sovereign state, but excepts the Soviet Union.

#### 1957

Treaties creating the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Commission are signed in Rome. The founding members include the six ECSC members: the three Benelux countries, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy.

The council of ministers of the European Community commissions a paper on the possibilities of developing the European Community into an economic and monetary union.

Willy Brandt is elected chancellor by the new German coalition government of Social and Free Democrats and, in addition to his policy of reconciliation toward the East, promotes enlargement of the European Community. Brandt calls for the reopening of negotiations with Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway.

#### 1970

The West German government, under the leadership of Chancellor Brandt, concludes the Moscow Treaty in which the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union pledge the inviolability of the borders of all states in Europe—including the border between the FRG and the GDR. Chancellor Brandt signs a treaty of reconciliation with Poland that essentially recognizes the Oder-Neisse line as Poland's western border.

#### 1971

Erich Honecker replaces Walter Ulbricht as the head of the GDR government. The changing of the guard marks the beginning of increased international recognition, in politics and sports, of the socialist German state as a second (semisovereign) German state.

Brandt is awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his *Ostpolitik*.

#### 1972

On September 3, in the spirit of detente, the four powers conclude the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, in which the Soviet Union promises to facilitate the elimination of tensions and recognizes the right of the Western Allies to free access to Greater Berlin.

In the Treaty on Basic Relations (signed on December 21), the two Germanies define their relationship and settle several controversial issues concerning property rights, citizenship, and border formalities.

At the Olympic Games in Munich, the Israeli team is subject to an Arab terrorist attack. Eleven teammates are killed when a rescue attempt fails.

#### 1973

Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom join the European Community (Norway declines the invitation). The FRG and GDR become

the 133d and 134th members of the United Nations.

Industrial free-trade areas are created between the European Community and Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland (the European Free Trade Association countries).

#### **1974**

Permanent missions in Bonn and Berlin are instituted by the FRG and the GDR, respectively, for the administration of matters following increased intra-German relations.

Chancellor Willy Brandt resigns when it is revealed that an East German spy was planted in his office by the Stasi. Helmut Schmidt becomes his successor.

#### **1975**

The European Currency Unit is introduced as an accounting unit within the community. Based on a weighted specified contribution of each EC currency, the composition of one ECU is subject to change every five years.

#### **1979**

At the initiative of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and French President Giscard d'Estaing, the European Monetary System becomes operative on March 13.

The first direct universal elections to the European Parliament are held in June.

#### **1981**

Free from the shackles of military dictatorship, and after lengthy entry negotiations, democratic Greece joins the European Community.

#### **1982-83**

Western Europe is caught up in the missile debate. The formation of a solidly pacifist wing in the Federal Republic, as evident in the creation of the Green party, opposed to the deployment of U.S. missiles on German soil, polarizes the debate. Estranged from both the left wing of his own party and his coalition partner, the Free Democrats, Chancellor Schmidt resigns from office and the Christian Democratic leader, Helmut Kohl, is elected chancellor.

### 1983

Special commissions are set up in the United States and (West) Germany to conduct the commemoration of three hundred years of German immigration to the United States. President Ronald Reagan proclaims October 6 "German American Day." Reagan and Chancellor Kohl establish the German-American Youth Exchange Initiative.

### 1985

High unemployment, slow European growth, internal bureaucratic blocks, and policy quarrels beset Europe and give rise to the so-called Eurosclerosis and Europessimism. In an attempt to get the European train back on track, EC leaders endorse the White Paper, which outlines the steps toward the creation of a single internal market by 1992, and identifies the existing barriers to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people.

### 1986

After the end of their respective dictatorships, democratic Spain and Portugal join the European Community. The Single European Act, amending the EC treaties, is adopted. Its objective is the completion of the frontier-free market—as outlined in the 1985 White Paper—by the end of 1992.

### 1989

In June 1989, the European Council reviews plans to achieve monetary union by the end of the century.

In the summer, a mass exodus of East Germans to the West, via Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, signals the beginning of serious upheavals in the Eastern bloc that will eventually erode Communist solidarity and lead to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in the aftermath of the December "velvet" revolutions across Eastern Europe. Many former dissidents with no political experience take over government responsibilities all over Eastern Europe.

From the days of the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the GDR on, hundreds of thousands of East German protesters march through Berlin and Leipzig and demonstrate for freedom of speech and reforms, i.e., for "socialism with a human face" or a "third way" between Soviet-style socialism and capitalism. When President Mikhail Gorbachev refuses to mobilize Soviet tanks to silence the unrest—and when reform-minded

members of the GDR's political elite prevent a repetition of the "Chinese solution" in Tiananmen Square—General Secretary Erich Honecker is deposed. Due to increased internal pressures, the East German government opens the Berlin Wall on November 9.

#### 1990

GDR citizens vote with their feet and leave the GDR in large numbers in search of a better life in West Germany. On February 13, the foreign ministers of the two German states and the Four Powers (Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States) agree on formal "two-plus-four" talks on German unity. The tacit assumption is that European union will precede German unification. In return for a smooth and timely agreement on the creation of a united Germany, both Germanies pledge continued membership in NATO, the limitation of the armed forces to 370,000, payment of \$7.5 billion to facilitate the withdrawal of the Red Army from the former East Germany, and the supply of wide-ranging economic and technical assistance to the Soviet Union. Regarding the German-Polish border, the German government asserts the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse border and foreswears any future territorial claims on Poland.

On March 18, the first free and independent elections take place in the GDR after nearly sixty years of Nazi and Communist dictatorships. The new government opts for speedy unification with the West. It also apologizes to Israel and the individual victims of the Holocaust for the East's past failure to recognize its responsibility and pledges restitution and compensation along the West German model.

On July 1, an economic, monetary, and social union is established between the two German states. As a result of the Allied agreement, which terminates Allied rights in Germany, the two Germanies become fully sovereign on October 1. Two days later, they enter into a constitutional and legal union by the accession of the GDR to the FRG and on the basis of a Unity Treaty.

#### 1991

In the "widening versus deepening" debate, the European Community decides on deepening integration between the twelve member states before widening the community by taking in new members. On October 21, the European Council negotiates the treaty on European union in Maastricht. In December, the Maastricht Treaty is initialed by the twelve

heads of government. The agreement establishes the goal of common economic, monetary, foreign, and defense policies by the end of the century.

Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are granted associate EC membership and sign far-reaching trade and cooperation agreements with the community. (Romania becomes an associate member the following year.)

### 1992

In June, Danish voters reject the Maastricht Treaty. In an attempt to revive the treaty, and anticipating a resounding yes-vote, French President Francois Mitterrand puts the Maastricht Treaty up to a referendum in September. A devastating currency crisis, however, shakes European markets and threatens to demolish the European Monetary System, damaging popular confidence in the European Community. French voters approve the treaty by only a razor-thin margin. The German Bundestag approves it with little opposition.

The single market is not affected by the debate over Maastricht. With the completion of the single market, an economic area of 350 million consumers has been created—the world's biggest economy with greater economic potential than any other major domestic market, including the United States.

### 1993

Ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union escalate to civil wars, and outbursts of xenophobic right-wing violence across Western Europe and, especially, Germany throw the continent into political turmoil. In a second referendum, Danish voters approve the Maastricht Treaty on May 18. It can only go into effect, however, if and when it is ratified by all twelve member states; the United Kingdom is scheduled to decide on ratification this summer. A ruling on the constitutionality of the treaty is still pending in Germany.



## Papers in ERIC on Germany and Europe Since World War II

by Vickie J. Schlene

The papers on Germany and Europe Since World War II in the following list and several items in the annotated bibliography of curriculum materials (Part VII) can be obtained through ERIC. These items in the ERIC database can be recognized by the ED numbers that are printed at the end of the annotations in the bibliography of curriculum materials and at the end of the citations in the following list. What is ERIC? How can materials in the ERIC database on the Germany and Europe since World War II be obtained?

ERIC (Educational Resources Information Center) is a nationwide educational information system operated by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement of the U.S. Department of Education. ERIC documents are abstracted monthly in ERIC's *RIE (Resources in Education)* index. *RIE* indexes are available in more than 850 libraries throughout the country. These libraries may also have a complete collection of ERIC documents on microfiche for viewing and photocopying.

ERIC documents may be purchased from the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS), 7420 Fullerton Road, Suite 110, Springfield, VA 22153-2852, in microfiche (MF). Some documents may also be available in paper copy (PC). The telephone numbers are (703) 404-1400 or (800) 443-3742. The FAX number is (703) 440-1408. When ordering by mail, be sure to include the ED number, specify either MF or PC, if available, and enclose a check or money order.

The ERIC documents included in this publication are merely a few of the many curriculum materials and background papers that can be found in the ERIC database on Germany and Europe since World War II. These items exemplify the large pool of documents on this topic that can be obtained through ERIC.

The papers in the following annotated list were selected because of their relevance to social studies teachers in elementary and secondary schools. Some of these papers were presented at meetings of major professional associations. Other papers on this list were developed through projects of universities, state-level departments of education, and foreign organizations interested in educating the world about the changes in Germany and Europe since World War II.

Beck, Klaus, and Volker Krumm. *Economic Literacy in German Speaking Countries and the United States. First Steps to a Comparative Study*. San Francisco, CA: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 1989. ED 310 027.

The lack of a German language testing instrument for economic literacy has led to problems for researchers in German-speaking countries. The translation of the 23rd edition (1987) of the Test of Economic Literacy (TEL) into a German version, known as the Wirtschaftliche Bildung Test (WBT), has enabled that research process to begin. The TEL was adapted for German-speaking students and the economic terms were translated with the goal of maintaining the subjective difficulty of the examination. Problems with intercultural differences caused several questions to be modified. Thirty-one experts at eight German-speaking universities, when asked to judge how well the test does measure economic literacy, but more than half of them felt that essential aspects of economic literacy were not tested. Testing shows that just as the TEL discriminates between groups of students with different educational backgrounds in economics, so does the WBT.

Bjerstedt, Ake, ed. *Peace Education: Glimpses from the EUPRA Conference in Firenze*. Malmö, Sweden: Department of Educational and Psychological Research, 1991. ED 359 104.

The European Peace Research Association (EURPA) held its first conference in Firenze, Italy, November 8 through 10, 1991. Most of the work took place in workshops that were subgroups for reading papers and discussing special themes. This report presents the material from the workshop on peace education.

Conradt, David P. *How Democratic is the Federal Republic? The Remade Political Culture at 40*. Duesseldorf, West Germany: Paper presented at the Conference on the Development of Democracy after World War II in Germany, Europe and the United States, 1989. ED 331 735.

This document examines the definition of democracy and the political attitudes and values of the West German public and implications of these attitudes for future German politics and Germany-U.S. relations. The stability of postwar

democracy in West Germany, it is agreed, is related to changes in the characteristics of the political culture over the last 40 years, and reflects a consensus on democratic values and institutions never before present in German political history. Five reasons for these changes are identified: social structure, policy success, political socialization, absence of a credible alternative, and the postwar international economy. The paper discusses two decades of survey data that examine the political attitudes, social beliefs, and democratic values. One of the surveys asked respondents to describe their concept of the West German democracy. The results showed between 70 and 90 percent of the West German adult population were supportive of basic democratic institutions, values, and norms.

Cornia, Giovanni Andrea, and Sandor Sipos, eds. *Children and the Transition to the Market Economy: Safety Nets and Social Policies in Central and Eastern Europe*. New York, NY: United Nation's Children's Fund, 1991. ED 343 705.

Organized into two parts, this book explores methods for incorporating concern for human needs into economic policies in eastern and central European countries that are making the transition to a market economy. Part I of the book considers economic reform, social policy, and child welfare in central and eastern Europe as a whole. Topics include: (1) child welfare, and social policy trends and alternatives, before and after the economic reform; (2) the efficiency, cost, and underlying philosophy of the models of social policy in the United States, Germany, and Sweden; and (3) the components and implementation of economic reforms and the consequences of these reforms for child and human welfare. Part II of the book profiles four case studies of efforts to reform social policies for children in central and eastern Europe. These studies include analyses of reforms in Hungary and Poland that have been underway for some time, and reforms in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia that were introduced in 1991.

*Cultural Life in the Federal Republic of Germany*. Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1989. ED 330 613.

By the nature of the subject, it is impossible to do justice to the cultural developments of more than 40 years in a brief survey. The aim of this document is to explore the diverse cultural life of West Germany complete with photographs of past and present artists, art products, and other aspects of German culture. The subject areas treated are: literature, fine arts, museums and exhibitions, theater, music, arts and crafts, architecture and the preservation of historical monuments, design, film and television, customs and festivals, and exchange and encounter.

Derenbach, Rolf. *The EC and the Labour Market Oriented Vocational Training Policies of the European Regions: Examples and Evaluations*. Berlin, West Germany: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 1989. ED 319 886.

This summary of the plans for additional research in the project called "Vocational Training and Regional Development" lists the following aspects and criteria of the common evaluation approach: regional framework conditions, program structure, organizational features, pedagogical approach, and procedure in evaluating the success of the program. The approach is to be used to decide where regional and local authorities, rather than national authorities, can act in dealing with unemployment, the restructuring of industries, and the lack of vocational training opportunities. Brief descriptions of 18 program case studies are included to indicate the range of programs that will be assessed systematically in terms of their operability and success in accordance with the criteria. A description of the evaluating team and the typc

of cooperation needed is followed by a description of the synthesis report planned.

Dohmen, Karin. *Female and Male Attitudes to Profession, Family, and Partnership. Results of 4 Opinion Questionings in West Germany*. Atlantic City, NJ: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for Adult and Continuing Education, 1989. ED 312 462.

The attitudes of today's West German women about family, profession, and society are framed in recent history, most of it negative to women. A survey of 538 West German women of different age groups conducted in 1985-86 showed that women thought it necessary that all women get vocational training. However, only 63 percent felt that a woman should take a job if she does not need to earn money. Possibly because of school schedules that send children home for a 2-hour lunch, 58 percent of the women think that mothers with small children must give up their jobs. More than half wished for equal part-time jobs for fathers and mothers. Three-fourths of the women believed that women did not get as good positions as men did because they did not like and did not use male behavior, whereas about half also saw the reason for women attaining lesser jobs as the handicapping condition of caring for children. A similar questionnaire complete by 529 young West German men in 1987 and 1988 showed that most would not take part-time work to help care for children; 59 percent were in favor of marriage.

*The Fun of Learning Starts in Kindergarten: Preschool Education in the Federal Republic of Germany*. Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1989. ED 310 963.

In our modern industrial society, kindergartens are an indispensable, independent educational facility for children. Priority is given to the all-round, comprehensive promotion of children's natural resources rather than to subject-tied programs. Basic reform in the concept of kindergarten work was initiated in the 1970s, characterized by the concepts of social learning and elementary social education. Addresses of authorities and bodies concerned with kindergarten education, a list of 16 references, and a German-English glossary of keywords are included.

*Functional Literacy in Eastern and Western Europe. A UIA-UNESCO/EC/OECD-CERI Seminar*. Hamburg, Germany: United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, 1990. ED 340 921.

This report describes presentations and discussions at a seminar to bring together research initiatives in the area of functional literacy and to explore appropriate ways of developing policy-drive research in all countries. Issues raised in discussions of appropriate strategies for the assessment of adult literacy are listed. Outlines depict the situation of different countries in research on the subject of functional literacy.

*Further Education in Germany: Qualification in a Changing World*. Bonn, Germany: Inter Nationes, 1991. ED 342 976.

The further education of adults in Germany has its roots in the 19th century. In a unified Germany, further education and training enjoy a key position in the establishment of free market economy structures. Further education enjoys equal status with all other educational sectors. It is distinguished by the plurality of organizing bodies and diversity of programs offered. Anticipating the European internal market in 1993, employees regard acquisition of "European qualifications" as the objective of their further training. The political parties are concerning themselves with further education and training matters,

although they have differing objectives.

Garland, James. *A Comparison of the Two-Party and Multi-Party Political Systems: A Case Study Using the United States and West Germany*. Indiana: 1990. ED 318 682.

The political system of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) is explained and comparisons are made with the U.S. system. Descriptions are given of the West German political parties and the process and importance of forming coalitions is explained. A lesson plan is presented that utilizes the case study and includes a simulation exercise that presumes the United States becomes a multi-party system and gives students the chance to form coalitions in the government. A study guide and three charts conclude this document.

*German Minorities in Poland and Italy During the Second World War and Minorities in Germany After 1945. 3rd Edition*. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, 13th, Milwaukee, WI, 1990. ED number will be assigned.

Since World War II, many immigrants have moved into Germany. Among newcomers are national ethnic minorities, political refugee groups, autochthone national ethnic minorities, religious minorities, old ethnic immigrant minorities, and citizens of other European Community nations. Growing regional movements have increased Europe's ethnic and cultural diversity. Most German political parties tolerate Germany's minorities. The Jewish communities in Germany continue to show a discomfort with their non-Jewish environment, which may take generations to overcome.

Glass, Bernard. *Literacy Education in Industrialized Countries. Reasons and Programs for Promoting Basic Cultural Techniques in the Federal Republic of Germany and Other Countries of the Europe Region*. Bonn, West Germany: German Commission for UNESCO, 1990. ED 330 851.

This publication presents a collection of materials on the German experience with literacy education. A timeline offers a brief account of adult literacy in the Federal Republic of Germany. This document includes sections on "Literacy as a Problem in the Federal Republic of Germany"; "Literacy in Industrialized Countries"; "The Federal Republic of Germany Preparing for International Literacy Year 1990"; and "Towards Basic Education for All".

Glenn, Charles L. *Choice of Schools in Six Nations: France, Netherlands, Belgium, Britain, Canada, West Germany*. Washington, DC: Office of Educational Research and Improvement, 1989. ED 316 478.

The role of parent choice in publicly funded education in six selected nations is examined. Focusing on education in developed Western democracies, this study is intended to be instructive to U.S. education and parents' right of choice. Each country is discussed separately, examining: (1) historical background, (2) research on reasons for parents' decisions about their children's schools, and (3) current policy debates. In these six nations, parents' choice of particular schools or forms of education for their children is generally based upon either religious reasons, or language of instruction.

Hamilton, David. *From Curriculum to Bildung (Some Preliminary Considerations)*. Prague, Czechoslovakia: A version of this paper was presented at the International Standing Conference for the History of Education, 1990. ED 339 620.

There exists a longstanding split in European educational thought. Schooling and higher education in the English-speaking world are dominated by the idea

of curriculum; whereas in Germany, Scandinavia, and Eastern Europe the intellectual work of students is shaped by the concept of Bildung (students are expected to be self-directed in their choice and pursuit of studies). An exploration of the history of these educational differences is important to understanding the issues presented by potential social and economic, even intellectual union, among the nations of Europe. The paper seeks to bridge the conceptual and historical gulf that divides curriculum from Bildung. First, it recounts the 16th and 17th century circumstances that surrounded the emergence of the curriculum idea. Secondly, it examines the role of 17th century figures, like J.A. Comenius, in the gradual substitution of Bildung for curriculum. Finally, it focuses on the elements of pietist and enlightenment thought that nourished the Bildung concept in 18th century Germany.

Hamilton, Stephen F. *Learning on the Job. Apprentices in West Germany*. San Francisco, CA: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 1989. ED 305 481.

One focus of a year-long study of West German apprenticeship was the conditions that are most supportive of learning on the job. The study design incorporated two distinctions that the Germans consider critical: manual versus white-collar occupation and the size of training firm. Four case studies were analyzed through use of a framework that consisted of four characteristics critical to assessing a workplace's potential as a learning environment. Four workplaces were analyzed as learning environments. Four needs for further research were identified.

Harmgarth, Friederike, and Gunter Reus. *Pluralism on the Screen: Children's Broadcasting in Germany*. Chicago, IL: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association, 1991. ED 340 054.

Children's broadcasting in Germany is traditionally educational broadcasting that aims to show and explain the world to children, and seeks to motivate them to discover and use their creativity and imagination. The old, public service television system has to compete with the new private channels. The strength of the German tradition in educational broadcasting and the competition for the audience has resulted in considerable pluralism and variety in programming.

Holtz-Bacha, Christina. *How to Sell a Powerless Parliament—Symbolic Politics During the European Election Campaign*. San Francisco, CA: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Communication Association, 1989. ED 311 488.

A study examined the role of the mass media in the symbolization process (a process which was necessary to distract attention from the political and economic problems of the European community and to enhance support of the powerless parliament) during the European election campaign of 1984 and whether symbolization strengthened the motivation for voting. Subject, 1,413 individuals representative of the West German electorate, were surveyed and interviewed in three waves preceding the election and one wave after the election concerning their views on the election.

Hopmann, Stefan. *The Multiple Realities of Curriculum Policy Making*. Chicago, IL: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 1991. ED 335 796.

Concerning curriculum making, it is impossible to integrate the different meanings of "curriculum" into a single formula. Read as social constructions,

different conceptions reflect varying educational, social-political, and historical contexts. This paper explores how these contexts, or multiple realities, evolved historically and how they shape features of curriculum making's social process as they have emerged in Prussia and in most other Central and Northern European countries since 1800. Part 2 shows how these features have shaped the current system of curriculum and education policy making in Germany, stressing the present conditions of curriculum design within administration, some aspects of curriculum committees' working routine, the related system of organized public deliberation, and the status of syllabi at the classroom level.

Kraemer, Dagmar, and Manfred Stassen. *The New Europe and the New Germany in U.S. Classrooms: International Cooperation and Curricular Reform in the 1990s*. Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1991. ED 339 670.

This report summarizes a conference that was held as part of a continuing effort to develop methods by which U.S. schools can better respond to challenges in international education for the 1990s.

Kraemer, Dagmar, and Manfred Stassen. *Europe in U.S. Social Studies: Textbooks and Teaching Materials (Case Study: Germany) and Executive Summary*. Washington, DC: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1991. ED 354 207.

This study examines the representation of Western Europe, particularly Germany, in world history, world geography, western civilization, and U.S. history textbooks used in U.S. social studies classrooms. With regard to Germany, the study called for an emphasis on recent developments, historical traditions, technological prowess, and updated information on developments since World War II.

Krewson, Margrit B. *The German Speaking Countries of Europe: A Selective Bibliography*. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1989. ED 315 374.

This bibliography was compiled to provide researchers and students with a current guide to sources on the German-speaking countries of Europe. Some of the subject areas covered include: bibliographies and reference works; description and travel; economy; education; history; and politics and government. The bibliography emphasizes publications from the 1980s. It also focuses on the broad nature of the material's appeal within its subject area, and its availability to the reading public. The sources selected attempt to highlight the uniqueness of the relationship of each country with the United States.

Krumm, Volker, and Klaus Beck. *Economic Literacy in the United States, Germany, and Austria: Results of Cross National Studies*. Los Angeles, CA: Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Joint Council on Economic Education/National Association of Economic Educators, 1990. ED 340 629.

Designed to assess the economic literacy of high school students in Austria, Germany, and the United States, this research study involved the administration of an economic literacy test and gathering data on attitudes toward economics, on intelligence, and on moral maturity. The main focus of the research was a comparison between 11th and 12th grade students in the United States with those in Germany and Austria. At the time the report was prepared, data from the German students was incomplete. Among the more significant findings of the study was that the achievement of Austrian students in economic literacy was no better or worse than their U.S. peers. A difference in the performance levels between male and female students both Austria and the United States was noted.

Lange, Wilhelm, and Michael Breuer. *Freedom of Development for Industry and Consumers. Small Business and the Social Market Economy in the Federal Republic of Germany*. Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1989. ED 303 620.

Small businesses have made a decisive contribution to the reconstruction and development of the German economy and society since World War II. The Federal Republic of Germany considers small-scale industry important and has granted tax relief and initiated a wide range of loan and guarantee programs for them. The promotion of small business is one of the priorities of German development aid. Improving the research situation of small- and medium-sized enterprises is a major goal of Bonn's research policy. Federal reforms of the health system, postal service, and statutory old-age pension scheme are intended to promote small business.

Loewenthal, Nessa P. *Update: Federal Republic of Germany*. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press, 1990. ED 336 283.

The Federal Republic of Germany is widely respected for its highly developed economy, rich cultural life, and significant contributions to science, mathematics, and the arts. Designed for families or individuals planning to move to or live in Germany for an extended period of time, this book provides guidance in such practical matters as entry requirements, transportation, money, housing, schools, and insurance. The book contains 13 sections, on such topics as: background, values and customs, doing business in Germany, and health and medical care. Students participating in a foreign exchange program along with their parents also would find this information helpful.

Maertens, Rita. *Youth Research in West and East. Special Report. German Youth Institute Offers Benefit of Its Experience. Sozial-Report*. Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1992. ED 340 982.

This social report concerns the efforts of the German Youth Institute in working with other institutions and with other countries to develop youth policies and programs. It begins by describing German and Soviet youth researchers working together to develop a concept for a long-term youth policy based on democratic structures. The German approach to youth services and youth policy is briefly reviewed and policy changes needed to keep pace with the growing individualization of lifestyles are addressed. Lecture activities, publications, and research efforts of the institute were described and international cooperation between the German Youth Institute and a number of other countries in conducting research is discussed. The document concludes by noting that German assistance is being discussed in Latin America for the development of youth services and youth policies in Argentina and Chile and for projects with Costa Rica and Uruguay.

Mason, Peter. *Independent Education in Western Europe. ISIS Document No. 34*. London, England: National Independent Schools Information Service, 1991. ED number will be assigned.

This study describes the legal status, aims, organization, resources, role and future prospects of the independent educational sector of each of 17 countries of Western Europe and the context in which it operates. The term "independent" schools is meant to include what traditionally have been called private schools, and also includes schools that are run by either charitable or non-profit making institutions that differ from the state system by reason of their independent status and their freedom to control their own affairs. The study is also intended to demonstrate the nature of and the reasons for the very considerable

differences between independent education amongst Western European countries in the degree of freedom allowed and support given to independent schools and parents in order to ensure equality of opportunity to choose and variety of educational offerings.

Meyn, Hermann. *Update on Germany: Now Eastern Germany Gets A Free Press*. Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1991. ED 337 831.

Since the former East German Communist State—the German Democratic Republic—was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany, the federal constitution has been valid throughout the whole of Germany, guaranteeing press freedom and ending press censorship in eastern Germany. Less than two years after the democratic transformation of the GDR, the structural shape of the West German press has become entrenched in most parts of the five new federal states: there are only a few supra-regional newspapers; the regional press has established a strong position; there is virtually no party press; and the press has become “concentrated” as mergers between publishing chains continue and as competition forces some newspapers and periodicals out of business. The large West German publishing concerns are likely to gain the edge on the market in eastern Germany. At the same time, foreign multi-media concerns have gained a foothold in the new federal states. This increasing globalization of the mass media is of concern and great interest to media students.

*National Tests: What Other Countries Expect Their Students to Know*. Washington, DC: National Endowment for the Humanities, 1991. ED 338 644.

Several leaders in education have concluded that the United States should have some form of national achievement testing. Such tests are proposed as part of the “America 2000” education strategy. Believing that the experience of other countries will be useful to educators, policymakers, and concerned citizens, the National Endowment for the Humanities provides English examples, in this document, of tests administered in other countries. Tests in the humanities are sampled, because the importance of the humanities is more likely to be overlooked than mathematics and the sciences. The examinations sampled make it clear that other nations are setting very high standards for the humanities. Most advocates of national testing in the United States argue that the test should demonstrate that students can use the knowledge they have gained (performance tests). It is emphasized that national testing need not entail a national curriculum. Test examples from France, West Germany, United Kingdom, Japan, and the European Schools of the European Community are presented.

Oerter, Rolf. *Persons' Conception of Human Nature: A Comparative Study in Germany, Indonesia and the U.S.A.* Seattle, WA: Paper presented at the Biennial Meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, 1991. ED 339 536.

This study examined individual's concepts of human nature in Germany, the United States, and Indonesia. Three procedures were used with about 100 subjects in each country. Only the second procedure, a presentation of a story involving a character's dilemma that has moral and social consequences, is reported here. In each culture, there were some understanding of human nature. The three highest states are discussed. In State IIIa, individuals are conceived as autonomous identities. In Stage IIIb, individuals are conceived as parts of a larger system. Stages IIIb and IV are characterized by dialectical thinking. Western and Indonesian subject exhibited differences in the way they

understood these stages. Results indicated a higher proportion of individuals from Germany and the United States approached the dilemma with a Stage IV understanding than individuals from Indonesia. Indonesians showed a lower frequency of the use of dialectical thought than subjects from Germany or the United States.

*On the Path to German Unity: Chronology of Events.* Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1991. ED 332 887.

A detailed chronology of events from July 1989 to December 1990 that led to the unification of East and West Germany is presented. Teachers of social studies courses, including global studies and world history, as well as students researching this topic, may find this summary useful.

Ostertag, Vesna. *The Effects of Socio-Political Changes in Eastern Europe on Military Education.* Nova University, 1990. ED 323 331.

Reunification of Germany, democratic changes in Eastern European countries, and new government policies of the Soviet Union will lead to the reduction of U.S. troops in West Germany. As a Department of Defense contractor providing associate degrees to soldiers in Europe, Central Texas College will be severely affected by the troop reductions. This serves as another example of the ramifications of major changes that are taking place in the new united Germany.

Paulsell, Patricia R. *Teaching the Grammar and Syntax of Business German: Problems and Practical Suggestions. Innovative Strategies and Exercises for Computer-Aided Instruction: Word Order Variation.* Ypsilanti, MI: Paper presented at the Annual Eastern Michigan University Conference on Language and Communication for World Business and the Professions, 1991. ED 343 445.

A computer program is described that is a substack of the "Business German" HyperCard program previously developed by Paulsell and designed as a tutorial to be used with materials for a business German course.

Perrine, Byron K. *What Worked in My Classroom. Ideas for Context Design Team for the 1991 Foreign Language Professional Development Seminar.* Frankfort, KY: Information presented on the Kentucky Educational Television Foreign Language series, "Star Channels" Professional Development Seminars, 1991. ED 340 231.

Techniques learned in the Goethe-Institut German classroom in Germany, are described and recommended for American use, particularly the immersion approach and emphasis on variety in instructional activities. Other features are also discussed, including: the role of a teacher's willingness to provide multi-sensory activities, creative use of the basal text, individualized instruction, an emphasis on proficiency rather than simply earning credits, ways to "demystify" foreign language, and networking with professional organizations and cultural ministries. Implications of the new Europe of 1992 for language learning are noted.

Reuter, Lutz, R. *Minorities in Germany after 1945. Discussion Papers.* Milwaukee, WI: Presented at the Annual Conference of the German Studies Association, 1989. ED 318 654.

Member of minority groups in Germany were subjected to extreme forms of repression and in some cases extermination at the hands of the Nazis. Today, for many different reasons, member of minority groups are living in West Germany again. This paper presents the experience of minorities in West Germany since 1945 in light of several factors, some of which include, German

history, living conditions, language skills, and the way minorities see themselves within the society. Minority-majority relations are especially considered as they constitute significant indicators for the political culture of West Germany or any other country. The increasing ethnic and cultural diversity of West Germany, and indeed, all of Europe, is already a fact, but its consequences will depend on the attitudes of the citizens and the public policies pursued.

Reuter, Konrad. *Sixteen States, One Country: The Political Structure of the Federal Republic of Germany*. Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1991. ED 341 594.

The relationships between the federal German state ("Bund" or Federation) to the 16 constituent states known as Länder is explored in this document. The first part explains the federal structure. The document's second part provides a description of each of the 16 constituent states. Descriptions mention the history, geography, economy, and overall identity of each state in relation to the republic.

Reuter, Lutz R. *German Constitutions after 1945 and the Current Constitution Debate*. Hamburg, Germany: Beitrage aus dem Fachbereich Padagogik der Universitat der Bundeswehr Hamburg, 1991. ED number will be assigned.

The post-World War II constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany resulted from a 195-47 conference of the Three Powers and representatives of the Benelux countries. Ministers to the conference bypassed a permanent constitution for western Germany in favor of a Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of the transitory state. Military governors from the Western Allies insisted upon the inclusion of a declaration of human rights. Parliaments of the German Länder (states) selected a parliamentary council. After initiating the constituent process the influence of the Three Powers was small. The Basic Law was approved by the Parliamentary Council, then the military governors and the Länder. Most of the western Länder themselves adopted constitutions in 1946 and 1947. In eastern Germany, a German Democratic Republic was formed in 1949. Despite the communists' de facto monopoly on power, the government structure had the appearance of a parliamentary system. By 1952 the individual eastern Länder lost any remaining authority in central government. The free election in 1990 of pro-reunification delegates to the East German parliament put into motion the rapid rejoining of the two Germanies. West Germany quickly adopted a Unity Treaty. Major topics of discussion concerning constitutional reform in the newly reunited German state include human rights, state goals, individual obligations, and federalism.

Reuter, Lutz R. *Political Participation of Non-Citizens in Germany and Western Europe*. Based on three papers presented at the Conference of Europeanists, 7th, Washington, DC, March 23-25, 1990. ED number will be assigned.

This paper compares the present social, economic, and political rights labor immigrants enjoy within the European community (EC). Its focus is the current debate about the municipal suffrage of permanent residents. Currently 12-15 million or four to five percent of the inhabitants of the European Community are without democratic rights.

Schroder, Hartmut. *How to Avoid Ethnocentricity and Stereotypes in Analyzing Another Culture*. In *Communication and Discourse Across Cultures and Languages*, 1991. ED 341 273.

Methodological problems caused by an ethnocentric view in analyzing another culture are discussed along with some aspects of culture analysis in general and

stereotypes about other cultures and their functions in cross-cultural communication. It is suggested that miscommunication is subject to various norms and value systems that are not made explicit in communication, but which underlie linguistic behavior. Contextualization cues are found to play an important role, but their presence cannot be assumed in intercultural communication. Examples of the use of stereotypes in written business communication are shown from an advertisement campaign of the German Mercedes-Benz, which contains stereotypes about Finland.

Schroder, Karsten. *Impetus for Economic Growth and Development. The Federal Republic of Germany Promoting Trade and Industry in the Third World*. Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1989. ED 314 639.

Rural development, the strengthening of market-oriented approaches to the economy, and the promotion of private industry in the countries of the Third World are among the stated priorities of West German development policy. A market-oriented approach to the economy contributes to a rise in the standard of living in the developing countries. In general, development policy can only provide help for self-help. The development of private initiative in industry is a particularly important form of self-help. The West German government provides not only capital but also technical and business know-how for these efforts. German organizations support the economic advancement of the developing countries by providing help for direct investment, small business promotion projects, and a cooperative bank. This report includes a list of names and addresses of German agencies involved in Third World development.

Thomas, R. Murray, ed. *Education's Role in National Development Plans: Ten Country Cases*. Westport, CT: Praeger, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992. ED 344 980.

The place education has been assigned in the national development programs of 10 nations is discussed, the problems that these countries have encountered in managing education are examined, and the measures adopted to solve educational problems are assessed. Two of the chapters feature the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union.

*Tomorrow's Training—A Challenge for Trainers*. Berlin, Germany: European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training, 1991. ED 337 593.

This issue of a biannual journal on vocational training focuses on national and European Community initiatives for the training of trainers. Appendixes include a list of references and documentation on the training of trainers and information sources by country. Useful addresses, relevant references, professional organizations, and research projects are provided for many countries, including Germany, Spain, and Denmark.

Towell, Bonita Rae, and Gerry K. Tsugi. *School-Aged Child Care Programs: A Review of the Literature*. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: MGS Publications Services, 1990. ED 341 477.

This report is presented in three parts. Part I consists of synopses of the child care situation in 13 countries. For each country, the child care environment, including the philosophy and historical background of child care, appropriate legislation, and types of child care services provided, are discussed. The countries represented include the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Part 2 of the report synthesizes the information presented in Part I under four topics, including the role of the government and the of economics in parents' choices of child care. Part 3 is comprised of an annotated

bibliography divided into nine subject headings, including guidelines and how-to manuals and unlicensed care.

Van Der Dussen, Michael, and Hans Hooghoff, eds. *Towards a Global Political Science. A Report on the World Congress of the Political Science Association*. Enschede, Netherlands, 1989. ED 324 255.

A discussion of the 1988 conference of the International Political Science Association along with a report on the meaning of the IPSA for the Dutch National Institute for Curriculum Development are presented in this document. Items included are discussions on many related topics, including "Trends of the Current West German Educational Policy" and "The Spiral of De-Legitimation of Power in Poland".

Von Borries, Bodo. *German History. A Pupil's Competition for the Federal President's Prize*. Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1989. ED 317 473.

The Pupil's Competition for the Federal President's German History Prize is one of the many youth competitions held every year in West Germany and sponsored by government offices, industries, common interest groups, and foundations. In this competition, which draws over 1,000 entries from all age groups, participants are expected to make an original relevant contribution to German history. The primary objective of the series is to promote democratic traditions and political participation among young people by encouraging them to explore German history, particularly from local and regional perspectives. The competitions are valuable not only in developing historical skills and understanding in young people, but also in preparing the way for future studies by historians.

Wegner, Gregory P. *Teaching About the New Europe and the New Germany in American Teacher Education Programs*. Paper presented at The New Europe and the New Germany in U.S. Classrooms Conference, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1991. ED 335 272.

Teacher education programs of U.S. universities hold great potential for promoting new ways of thinking about the formation of a united Germany and its future role in Europe. These programs are important because they influence teacher candidates as to how they will teach about the New Europe. Three recommendations are offered to expand the understanding of the New Europe in the social studies curriculum to the benefit of U.S. citizens.

Williams, Richard L. *A Comparative Study of Logical Thinking Skills: West German Data*. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the National Association for Research in Science Teaching, San Francisco, CA, 1989. ED 305 249.

The Group Assessment of Logical Thinking (GALT) instrument has been widely used to gather cross-cultural data regarding the acquisition of adolescents using the instrument adds further comparative data regarding the development of logical thinking skills. Additional data were gathered to determine correlations between logical thinking and the number of hours spent in the study of science and mathematics. West German students' responses are included in this data.



## Select Annotated Bibliography of Journal Articles in the ERIC Database

by Vickie J. Schlene

The following annotations of articles from journals in the ERIC database represent an extensive sample of articles written on this important topic. All of the annotations appear in the *Current Index to Journals in Education (CIJE)*, which is published on a monthly basis and is available at larger libraries throughout the country. The annotations are intended to briefly describe the contents of the articles in general terms. Therefore, it is suggested that the reader locate the entire article in the journal section of a larger public or university library. Reprints of the article may be available from University Microfilms International (UMI), 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, (800) 732-0616.

Readers are encouraged to complete their own searches of the ERIC database to discover new articles which are constantly being added to the system. Educators will find these articles a valuable resource for fostering understanding, application, and evaluation on the wealth of information being published concerning Germany and Europe since World War II.

Baum, Daniel Jay. "Crumbling Walls, Enduring Obstacles: Cultural Blocks to Democracy in Eastern Europe." *Update On Law-Related Education* 4 (Fall 1990): 3-8, 45-46. EJ 427 743.

Within the context of German history and reunification, this article considers what occurs when a traditionally authoritarian culture is exposed to freedom. It explores the impact of this cultural change on education and the development of a free press in Eastern Europe and examines issues of minority rights,

antisemitism, and nationalism. It also provides questions and resources for classroom discussion.

Becker, Klaus Peter, and Grosse, Klaus Dietrich. "Educational Rehabilitation in the German Democratic Republic." *International Journal Of Disability, Development, and Education* 37 (1990): 99-108. EJ 427 026.

The article reviews educational rehabilitation services for persons with disabilities in the former German Democratic Republic. The paper describes the education system, the health and welfare services, the nature and organization of special education services, integration, training of special educators, and effects of political changes in the country.

Berentsen, William H. "A Geopolitical Overview of Europe." *Social Education* 57 (April-May 1993): 170-76. EJ number will be assigned.

This article contends that political instability in Europe and the rise and fall of European nations has occurred regularly throughout history. It reviews European geopolitical events and trends from 1815 to the present and maintains that the rise of a strong Central Europe with German leaderships will determine the future of the European Community.

Berggreen, Ingeborg. "Europe '92: Consequences of the European Unification for Cultural Federalism in the Federal Republic of Germany." *Zeitschrift Fur Pädagogik* 36 (November 1990): 827-47. EJ 429 320.

This article discusses consequences of European unification in the Federal Republic of Germany. It focuses on the relationships between the European Community, the federal government of Germany, and the German states and suggests that the German states are aware of their responsibility to give education and culture a European dimension.

Berry, Phyllis. "The West German Chancellor and the Study of Comparative Education." *Teaching Political Science* 16 (Spring 1989): 131-39. EJ 401 570.

This article describes how the West German parliamentary government, although originally modeled after the British parliament, is different because it allows for separation of powers similar to the U.S. government and illustrates how a teacher can use an examination of the executive office to describe governmental relationships.

Biglmaier, Franz. "Recent Political Changes in Germany and Their Impact on Teaching Reading." *Reading Teacher* 44 (May 1991): 634-37. EJ 425 425.

This article shares the views of one professor of reading in Berlin on reading instruction in Germany both before and after the reunification of Germany.

Cassey, Bernard, and others. "Temporary Employment in Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany: An Overview." *International Labour Review* 128 (1989): 449-66. EJ 394 664.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, temporary employment has been extensively regulated, whereas the British government has been more permissive. Despite differences in legislation, the level, distribution, and characteristics of temporary employment and workers are very similar. The number of temporary jobs has not grown as expected.

Chan, Adrian. "Nationalism and Free Rights in the New Europe. Teaching Strategy." *Update on Law-Related Education* 16 (Fall 1992): 34-39. EJ number will be assigned.

This article presents a lesson plan designed to teach upper grade level

secondary students about nationalism and civil rights in post-Cold War Europe. It examines the rise of nationalism and discrimination against ethnic minorities in eastern Europe since the end of Communist rule and includes a map of Europe, suggested teaching procedures, and follow-up activities.

Cheney, Lynne V. "National Tests: What Other Countries Expect Their Students to Know." *Humanities* 12 (July-August 1991): 11-19. EJ 438 403.

This article proposes a system of achievement testing for all U.S. students rather than just those who are college bound. It criticizes present achievement testing as a patchwork system that fails to provide parents with information about how much their children are learning in comparison to others and provides a sampling of national achievement test questions from other developed nations, such as the Federal Republic of Germany.

Cogan, John J. "Berlin: United Again." *Social Education* 54 (November-December 1990): 415, 16, 469. EJ 419 200.

This article compares East and West Berlin before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and offers divergent viewpoints on German reunification from interviews of two professors: one from East Germany, the other from West Germany. It recommends that social studies classes incorporate current events such as German reunification.

Colle-Michel, Marcella. "What to Know about European History by the End of Compulsory Schooling." *European Education* 24 (Winter 1992-93): 17-27. EJ number will be assigned.

This article reports on a European teachers' seminar and points out the difficulties of making generalizations about history instruction in European nations. It concludes that it is essential to emphasize societal aspects that bind people together and that national history should be taught in a European and global context.

Costello, Kevin. "After the Wall: The Remaking of East German Education." *Executive Educator* 14 (April 1992): 38-39. EJ 441 196.

This article contains comments from students, teachers, and administrators at Potsdam's William and Alexander Humboldt High School, just outside Berlin. These comments highlight the difficult tasks involved in reforming an impoverished and repressive school system.

Dascalu, Nicolae M. "History Teaching in Romania." *European Education* 24 (Winter 1992-93): 28-38. EJ number will be assigned.

This article focuses on the 1970s when much emphasis was placed on a Marxist, nationalist-based approach to history. It reviews the changes since 1990 and discusses difficulties in moving toward a more objective concept of historiography and pedagogy.

Diehl, James M. "Germany in Defeat, 1918 and 1945: Some Comparisons and Contrasts." *History Teacher* 22 (August 1989): 397-409. EJ 406 215.

This article analyzes how Germans viewed defeat after the two world wars, and how these perceptions influenced subsequent political developments and compares questions of guilt and responsibility following the two wars. It also examines the growth of democracy, its defeat after World War I, and success after World War II and discusses the influence of the occupation governments.

Dinan, Desmond. "The Economic Development of Postwar Germany." *Social Education* 57 (April-May 1993): 181-83. EJ number will be assigned.

This article reviews the economic restoration of West Germany through the Marshall Plan following World War II. It traces the development of the European Community from the Schuman Declaration of 1950 to the present and contends that Germany's economy must remain closely tied to a united Europe in the post-Cold War international system.

Durr, Karlheinz. "East German Education: A System in Transition." *Phi Delta Kappan* 73 (January 1992): 390-93. EJ 437 610.

Reunited Germany is facing an intricate network of social, economic, and political problems. It will take at least a generation of students to adapt to the new Western system espousing freedom of choice, self-motivation, equal opportunity, and critical awareness. Standards of the former West Germany are endangered by changing social attitudes, overregulation, cumbersome bureaucracy, and overcrowded universities.

Eulefeld, Gunter. "Environmental Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: A Survey." *European Journal of Education* 26 (1991): 301-06. EJ 443 172.

The evolution of environmental education in West Germany from the last 1960s to late 1980s is chronicled, and insights into the process of environmental education gained from these experiences are discussed. Additional emphasis on direct contact with natural phenomena, more innovative teaching methods, and increased focus on collaboration are recommended.

Friedrich, Walter. "Changes in Attitudes of Youth in the GDR." *European Education* 23 (Spring 1991): 6-30. EJ 438 414.

This article presents results of surveys of apprentices, young workers, and students in former East Germany from 1970 through 1989. It includes data on attitudes toward religion, Marxism/Leninism, the Soviet Union, East and West Germany, and the media. It also reports tremendous attitude changes in almost all categories assessed from 1979 to 1989, with those changes appearing last among students.

Garland, James. "A New Germany." *Social Studies* 82 (January-February 1991): 5-6. EJ 427 754.

This article presents a teacher's report on personal reactions and attitudes of both German students and teachers toward German reunification. Information was obtained through interviews during a week stay in Germany in March 1990. This article includes many quotes expressing fear of nationalism and hope for the future, and recognizing social and economic problems Germany now faces.

Glowka, Detlef. "Anglo-German Perceptions of Education." *Comparative Education* 25 (1989): 319-32. EJ 409 213.

This article comments on the selective nature of the Thatcher government's interest in and enthusiasm for features of the West German education system and compares Great Britain's and West Germany's systems with regard to students assessment, compulsory curriculum, school-leaving qualifications, vocational education, and centralization of authority.

Haft, Henning, and Stefan Hopmann. "State-run Curriculum Development in the Federal Republic of Germany: Trends in the Work and Composition of Commissions." *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 21 (March-April 1989): 185-90. EJ 389 826.

This article discusses information from two surveys involving former and current curriculum commission members in the Federal Republic of Germany

and observes that, relative to task, composition, and trends, the basic patterns of curricular work has not changes in 20 years. It makes comments concerning the present state of curriculum work.

Hahn, Carole L., and Cynthia M. Tocci. "Classroom Climate and Controversial Issues Discussions: A Five Nation Study." *Theory and Research in Social Education* 18 (Fall 1990): 344-62. EJ 426 399.

Questionnaires were administered to 1,459 secondary social studies students in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands to examine age, gender, and country differences in adolescents' perceptions of classroom climate. It studied relationships between political attitudes and perceived classroom climate and between the use of value analysis strategy in controversial issues discussion and students' political attitudes.

Hansen, Georg. "Intercultural Learning—A Challenge to the Educational Policy in the European Community." *European Education* 23 (Summer 1991): 59-68. EJ 442 161.

This article discusses the problems of intercultural education in the European Community and specifies that, for education not to discriminate, both majority and minorities must experience common learning processes and have opportunities to acquire relatively unbiased information about each other. It also examines educational policy, school structure, and language policy and compares the European Community outlook with nationalism.

Hastings, William L., and Kenneth A. Payne. "Democratic Orientations among High School Seniors in the United States and Germany." *Social Education* 54 (November-December 1990): 458-65, 469. EJ 419 213.

This article investigates strengths of national identity and degrees of democratic orientation among honors high school seniors taking advanced political science courses in 1986 in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. It finds West German students less tolerant of minority free speech, more fearful of consequences of dissent, and less politically efficacious and concludes these differences reflect Nazism's psychological legacy.

Heater, Derek. "Education for European Citizenship." *Westminister Studies in Education* 15 (1992): 53-67. EJ number will be assigned.

This article argues that European schools must begin to deal with the issue of citizenship education in light of the emergence of the European Community. It concludes that both preservice and inservice teacher training will be critical to success efforts to promote European citizenship.

Heckelmann, Dieter. "An Opening to Society: Chances and Prospects of Science, Research, and Services." *Western European Education* 21 (Spring 1989): 65-68. EJ 392 863.

This article describes how the Free University of Berlin (West Germany) has become more open to the public. The Free University has strengthened its cooperation with private companies in research and funding, promoted internal research, and increased its accelerated and continuing education programs in order to improve its image.

Hilton, Margaret. "Shared Training: Learning from Germany." *Monthly Labor Review* 114 (March 1991): 33-37. EJ 424 022.

Compared to the United States, German employers make more systematic, long-term investments in worker training, especially through the cooperation of

industry associations that pool training costs and benefits. Encouraging U.S. firms to participate in shared training requires sustained government support.

Huber, Ludwig. "Disciplinary Cultures and Social Reproduction." *European Journal of Education* 25 (1990): 241-61. EJ 418 434.

Data from German universities suggest that considerable differences in the social composition of the student population by discipline, or group of disciplines, continue to exist, the result of self-selection. Implications are found for gender differences and the role of the academic labor market in students' choice of academic field.

"Interview with an East German Teacher about the Effects of German Unification on Schools in the 'New Federal States.'" *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 249-50. EJ number will be assigned.

This article reports on an interview with a former East German English teacher and describes her view that the ideologically determined curriculum, particularly in social studies education, was a major barrier to effective education. It discusses her contention that a loss of moral and ethical values among youth was a result of reunification and the demise of the East German school system.

Kirkwood, Toni Fuss. "Reunification: Perspectives from Inside Germany." *Social Studies* 82 (January-February 1991): 7-10. EJ 427 755.

This article presents commentaries concerning German reunification made by prominent German intellectuals and focuses on social and economic adjustments necessary for successful reunification. It also lists topics for classroom discussion and suggests how to examine the implications of reunification from a global perspective.

Kraemer, Dagmar. "The Dual System of Vocational Training in Germany." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 245-47. EJ number will be assigned.

This article describes the German system of vocational training that bridges the transition from school to work. It explains that the system has developed a highly-qualified work force and minimized youth unemployment. It also contends that a commitment to preparing students for the work force and close cooperation between the private and public sectors are the primary reasons for the system's success.

Kritzberg, Barry. "An East German Novel for the English Curriculum." *English Journal* 79 (April 1990): 20-22.

This article argues that Christa Wolf's novel "Patterns of Childhood" provides opportunities for students to consider the adolescent dilemmas of the protagonist Nelly and to reflect on how they themselves are coming to terms with the world. It also notes that the novel forces students to see Nazi Germany with new eyes.

Kurtz, Beth E., and others. "Strategy Instruction and Attributional Beliefs in West Germany and the United States: Do Teachers Foster Metacognitive Development?" *Contemporary Educational Psychology* 15 (July 1990): 268-83. EJ 414 273.

Teachers' reported instruction of strategies and metacognitive knowledge in the classroom, and their attributional beliefs about the reasons underlying children's academic successes/failures were studied, using 59 teachers from West Germany and 43 teachers from the United States. A 7-item questionnaire

was administered and implications for metacognitive development theory are discussed.

Lankowski, Carl. "Germany's Social Movement Sector, the Greens, and the European Community." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 242-45. EJ number will be assigned.

This article argues that a new political culture has developed since the 1960s in West Germany. It discusses the interest in issues related to the environment, women's rights, peace, and similar issues. It also describes the development of the Green Party and its impact on mainstream political parties and the movement toward European unity.

Large, David Clay. "Germany in Europe, 1945-92: A Historical Overview." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 232-36. EJ number will be assigned.

This article presents a historical review of German relations with European nations from the end of World War II until 1992. It claims that Chancellor Willy Brandt's efforts to improve East-West relations set the stage for German reunification. And it contends that Germany's role in a united Europe has yet to be determined.

Latka-Johring, Sigrid. "East Germany's System of State Planning Faces a Thorough Free Market Shake-Up." *European Education* 23 (Spring 1991): 31-36. EJ 438 415.

This article discusses the difficulties of educational reform in what was formerly East Germany and describes the educational system in East Germany as uniform and military in nature. It also criticizes the one-sidedness of socialist education and its politicalization and compares classroom atmospheres before and after the Germanies were united.

LeBaron, John, and Virginia Teichmann. "KITES: A Middle School Environmental Science Telelink to West Germany." *Educational Technology* 29 (December 1989): 51-53. EJ 405 645.

This article describes KITES (Kids Interactive Telecommunications Experience by Satellite), a cooperative program that involved an eighth grade class in Massachusetts and a ninth grade class in West Germany; the program focused on environmental science and English language instruction. The computer technology used is described, problems are discussed, and suggestions for future plans are offered.

Lob, R.E. "Environmental Education in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Inventory, 1989." *Environmental Education and Information* 8 (April-June 1989): 81-89. EJ 397 075.

This article describes German involvement in the UNESCO program for environmental education: Environmental awareness education in primary and secondary schools, universities, and professional training are discussed. Media participation is recognized and current main developments are highlighted.

McKinnon, Mike. "How to Encourage Studying Germany." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 231-32. EJ number will be assigned.

This article presents two activities from an "Idea Bank for Teaching Germany and Europe U.S. Classrooms K-12." It includes a role playing exercise involving significant individuals from European history and a student project involving cooperative learning about individual European nations. It also provides an address for obtaining a free copy of the "Idea Bank."

McKinnon, Mike. "Impressions of Germany: A Personal Vignette." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 248-49. EJ number will be assigned.

This article describes a student exchange program in which eight Canadian and 80 U.S. high school students visited Germany for three weeks. It contends that the students came to understand and believe that a unified Europe was part of their future. It also argues that studying Germany and Europe helps prepare students for life in an interdependent world.

McKinnon, Mike. "Why Study Germany and Europe Now?" *Social Education* 57 (April-May 1993): 168-70. EJ number will be assigned.

This article provides 10 reasons why the study of Germany and the European Community should be taught in U.S. social studies. It argues that the cultural interrelationships between the United States and Germany are historically significant and contends that the experiences of post World War II German reconstruction and the reunification after the Cold War can serve as models for other nations.

Markovits, Andrei. "Political Parties in Germany: Agents of Stability in a Sea of Change." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 239-42. EJ number will be assigned.

This article argues that stability and continuity have been the primary characteristics of German political parties since World War II. It points out that even with reunification, the German political party system has experienced little change and contends that the response of the political parties to the continued impact of reunification largely will determine the fate of Germany and Europe.

Marshall, Stephanie. "The German Perspective." *Comparative Education* 25 (1989): 309-17. EJ 409 212.

This article examines aspects of the West German education system of interest in Great Britain: centralization of authority within each state, curriculum development, student assessment, reform movements, and the "dual apprenticeship system" of vocational education. It argues that cross-cultural transfer of such features is impossible without contextual consideration.

Martin, Philip L., and Mark J. Miller. "Guests or Immigrants? Contradiction and Change in the German Immigration Policy Debate since the Recruitment Stop." *Migration World Magazine* 18 (1990): 8-13. EJ 411 273.

This article reviews the conflicting West German immigration policies toward the growing number of foreign workers since 1973 and emphasizes the contradiction between policies that encourage foreigners to return home and those that encourage the integration of foreigners into German society.

Mitter, Wolfgang. "Comprehensive Schools in Germany: Concepts, Developments, and Issues." *European Journal of Education* 26 (June 1991): 155-65. EJ 431 540.

A discussion of the status of the comprehensive secondary school in Germany looks at its history within the overall educational system, curriculum design, the relatively traditional approach taken by West Germany in comparison to other European countries, and the changes for comprehensive schools in a united Germany.

Moldenhauer, Gebhard. "2 X Germany; 2 X Political Education." *European Education* 23 (Spring 1991): 51-58. EJ 438 417.

This article describes textbooks of both East and West Germany from 1949-56, 1957-62, 1963-69, and 1970 on and discusses a shift in West German texts from

intense antagonism during the Cold War to a more critical comparison by the 1980s. It compares East German text development that increased in hostility over time, viewing West Germany as a negative alternative to socialism.

Mueller, Frank. "Designing Flexible Teamwork: Comparing German and Japanese Approaches." *Employee Relations* 14 (1992): 5-16. EJ 440 668.

Two approaches to work organization in the auto industry were compared: (1) the German model of apprenticeship and skilled production workers; and (2) the Japanese model of continuous on-the-job training and flexibility. The Japanese model may be better for British companies given the current labor market situation.

Muller-Michaels, Harro. "The Teacher is Not Always Right—Teaching Literature in the Two German States." *European Education* 23 (Spring 1991): 59-65. EJ 438 418.

This article compares the teaching of literature in East and West Germany. It discusses both the nature and titles of the material taught and problems of teaching literature espousing individual thought and criticism in a communist system. It also describes common group in the literature curriculum of both that may serve as a basis for curriculum of unified Germany.

Murray-Seegert, Carola. "Integration in Germany: Mainstreaming or Swimming Upstream?" *Remedial and Special Education* 13 (January-February 1992): 34-43. EJ 441 370.

This article provides an overview of European trends in integration for persons with disabilities, with emphasis on the slow pace of integration in Germany. The historical, attitudinal, and political context of German disability services are stressed, noting the effects of reunification, community living, workplace and school integration, and general and special education structures.

Perry, Rick L. "The German Apprenticeship System. Everybody's Talking About It, but Is It the Right Model for America?" *Vocational Education Journal* 66 (May 1991): 30-31, 46. EJ 425 204.

The introduction of the German-style dual apprenticeship system into the United States will mean part-time vocational schools teaching academics and vocational skills combined with on-the-job training at local companies.

Phillips, David. "Assessment in German Schools." *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 23 (November-December 1991): 544-48. EJ 443 729.

This article describes assessment in the German school system as regular, systematic, and officially controlled through legislation and emphasizes that even strict grading levels combine criterion and norm referencing because teacher determination must include a subjective element. It concludes that other systems may best learn negative lessons from the German experience.

Phillips, David. "Transitions and Traditions: Educational Developments in the New Germany in Their Historical Context." *Oxford Studies in Comparative Education* 2 (1992): 121-26. EJ number will be assigned.

This article reviews developments in German education since reunification. It contends that differences between the educational systems of the former German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany will result in tensions and delay full reintegration. It concludes that this process could open the door for needed reforms in Germany's educational system.

Portera, Agostino. "Is an Interactive Integration of the European Peoples Possible? An Example for Italian Youth in the West German Republic." *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development* 12 (1991): 271-77. EJ 439 682.

In an examination of the feasibility of developing a "European melting pot," the psychosocial situation of Italian youth in Germany was studied. The need to develop a consciousness for political and social, not just economic, unity of all European countries is noted.

Pritchard, Rosalind M. O. "German Classrooms Observed: A Foreigner's Perspective." *Oxford Review of Education* 19 (1992): 213-25. EJ number will be assigned.

This article reports observations of Germany's teacher education programs by an Irish teacher educator. It describes lessons on curriculum design and planning instruction and contends that German teachers believe that education should develop self-confident, knowledgeable students who will be active participants in a democratic society.

Przeworski, Adam. "The 'East' Becomes the 'South'? The 'Autumn of the People' and the Future of Eastern Europe." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24 (March 1991): 20-24. EJ 438 475.

This article discusses the fall of communism in eastern Europe. It applies Latin America models to Eastern Europe and suggests that revolutions are shaped by the systems against which they are directed. It concludes that problems of eastern Europe are not caused by the system so much as by geography and argues that poor capitalism may lie in the future for eastern Europe.

Riemer, Jeremiah. "The ECU as the 'Mark' of Unity: Europe Between Monetary Integration and Monetary Union." *Social Education* 57 (April-May 1993): 184-86. EJ number will be assigned.

This article reviews progress toward economic integration and monetary union within the European Economic Community. It maintains that Germany has the greatest influence on the system because of its strong currency and monetary policies. It concludes that a "two-speed" course toward economic union may be the only practical path.

Roedel, Ralf. "A Constitution for a United Germany: The Basic Law." *Update on Law-Related Education* 16 (Fall 1992): 28-33. EJ number will be assigned.

This article describes the development and structure of the German constitution, known as The Basic Law. It discusses recent changes, particularly in areas of family law and women's rights. It also contends that the German parliament is considering expanding provisions related to human rights.

Rohrs, Hermann. "Education for Peace: A Neglected Aspect of Re-Education in Germany." *Oxford Review of Education* 15 (1989): 147-64. EJ 401 563.

This article analyzes the reconstruction of education in West Germany following World War II based on the author's personal experiences and notes that the primary aim of re-education was to overcome nationalism, militarism, and the ideology of National Socialism, but that the efforts were not successful. It concludes by offering explanations for this lack of success.

Schlomerkemper, Jorg. "The Comprehensive School—A Reform Model in Contradiction." *Western European Education* 22 (Fall 1990): 59-70. EJ 427 816.

This article describes the integrated comprehensive school (ICS) in Germany, where, as of 1988, 90 percent of all students attended traditional schools and traces the history of comprehensive schools in Germany and examines their

philosophy and objectives. It also states comprehensive schooling cannot create equal social entitlements, but can encourage all students to develop in an optimal way.

Schmid, Gerhard. "Immigration in Europe: How Much 'Other' Is Too Much?" *Social Education* 57 (April-May 1993): 181-83. EJ number will be assigned.

This article examines the increase in immigration and foreign nationals in European communities since the 1950s. It points out that liberal immigration laws made Germany the most popular haven for refugees and others and contends that Germans will have to adjust to a multicultural Germany within a multicultural Europe.

Schumer, Gundel. "Worksheets in Primary Classrooms—Results of a Survey Among Principals and Teachers in Four of the German Lander." *Zeitschrift Fur Padagogik* 37 (September 1991): 807-25. EJ 442 190.

This article provides an outline of the general educational practice in German elementary school classrooms and its institutional frame factors and gives the teachers' use of worksheets as an example. It also presents results derived from a larger study seeking insights into the effectiveness of state regulations and restrictions concerning instructional media and processes.

Schwartz, Donald. "'Who Will Tell Them After We're Gone?' Reflections on Teaching the Holocaust." *History Teacher* 23 (February 1990): 95-110. EJ 429 259.

This article explores the rationale for including the Holocaust in the social studies curriculum and analyzes how aspects can be introduced at elementary grade levels. It outlines course objectives for studying the Holocaust that are relevant to major issues in social studies and notes 34 states that do not require world history courses and textbook content is uneven.

Schweitzer, Friederich. "Forgetting About Auschwitz? Remembrance as a Difficult Task of Moral Education." *Journal of Moral Education* 18 (October 1989): 163-73. EJ 403 094.

This article addresses the issue of educating German youth about Auschwitz and questions whether students feel guilty as opposed to feeling responsible for Auschwitz, and if so, is it reasonable for succeeding generations to assume guilt for the acts of previous generations.

Schweitzer, Hartmut. "Two Germanies Becoming One: Restructuring the Educational System." *Journal of Educational Administration* 29 (1991): 39-50. EJ 437 619.

This article outlines the differing educational philosophies, policies, and organizational structures of the two Germanies, from nursery to university level. It examines future prospects for integrating both institutions and personnel. Although unification was made possible by the former East Germans, they and their institutions must make the greater adaptation effort.

Seidler, Klaus W. "Old Wine in New Bottles? A Video-Letter Exchange Project as a Means of Organizing Cross-Cultural Learning." *British Journal of Language Teaching* 27 (Spring 1989): 30-35. EJ 393 780.

This article describes the organization of a video-letter exchange between a German ninth-grade class and a high school in the United States. The German students' experiences, feelings, and thoughts relating to the exchange formed the basis of a class questionnaire, and quotations from students responses are appended.

Shafer, Susanne M. "Influences on Political Education in the Federal Republic of Germany." *International Journal of Social Education* 5 (Winter 1990-91): 72-91. EJ 435 026.

This article discusses political education in the postwar Federal Republic of Germany and describes a U.S. led re-education program founded upon principles of denazification and democracy and examines German responses. It identifies the influence of the Soviet Union upon West German education and analyzes the growth of political education in the 1960s, its maturation, and current status.

Sidorsky, Phyllis G. "Along the German Fairy-Tale Road." *Childhood Education* 66 (Spring 1990): 151-54. EJ 410 746.

This article describes a tour of the German Fairy Tale Road, which extends through northern Germany, where many fairy tales originated.

Stassen, Donna. "A United Germany in a Uniting Europe." *Social Education* 57 (April-May 1993): 187-90. EJ number will be assigned.

This article presents a contemporary view of Germany since reunification and the end of the Cold War. It includes 13 photographs portraying scenes from daily life in Germany.

Stassen, Manfred. "The German Statutory Health Insurance Program." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 247-48. EJ number will be assigned.

This article describes the German health insurance system which is mandatory for nearly all German citizens. It explains that, along with pension, accident, and unemployment insurance, health insurance is one of four pillars of the German national social security system. It also asserts that controlling costs while maintaining high health care standards is a national priority in Germany.

Stassen, Manfred, and Dagmar Kraemer. "Europe's New Center. United Germany in a Uniting Europe, Part 1." *Social Education* 57 (April-May 1993): 166-67. EJ number will be assigned.

This article introduces part 1 of a special section on teaching about Germany and the European Community and argues that the end of the Cold War and the movement toward European economic union brought new political realities that will affect the United States. It also contends that the data about Germany and Europe are presented is timely and more appropriate for classroom use.

Torpey, John. "Growing Together, Coming Apart: German Society Since Unification." *Social Education* 57 (September 1993): 236-39. EJ number will be assigned.

This article reviews the impact of German unification on German society, politics, and culture. It contends that four decades of separation created political and cultural differences that are difficult to overcome and expresses concern about the growth of intolerant attitudes and nationalism among citizens of the former East Germany.

Trommsdorff, Gisela, and Saburo Iwawaki. "Students' Perceptions of Socialisation and Gender Role in Japan and Germany." *International Journal of Behavioral Development* 12 (December 1989): 485-93. EJ 402 913.

This article reports on the differences in perceptions of socialization and gender roles in 175 Japanese and 120 German university students. Japanese students reported more parental acceptance and control than German students. Japanese students had more traditional gender-role orientations than German students.

Truper, Matthias, and Michael Hustedde. "Geography Education in West German High Schools: Do Four Years Make a Difference?" *Journal of Geography* 89 (May-June 1990): 109-12. EJ 414 148.

This article presents an overview of geography as taught in West German public schools that is intended to stimulate discussion among U.S. geography teachers. It focuses on the mandatory programs in secondary education and argues that strengthened geography programs depend on educators' understanding of sound geography content and pedagogy.

Vahlbusch, Jeffort B., and others. "German Unification: A Survey by American Students." *Unterrichtspraxis Teaching German* 24 (Fall 1991): 200-04. EJ 435 984.

This article presents samples of responses U.S. students received to their survey of German citizens regarding their feelings about German unification, focusing on how developing and interpreting such surveys constitute an effective, hands-on teaching technique that can be used to enhance language and cultural understanding.

Von, Recum, Hasso. "Education in the Postmodern Period." *Western European Education* 22 (Spring 1990): 6-16. EJ 415 793.

This article notes that 57 percent of West German teachers who responded to a survey believed that it was difficult to transmit values to students and indicated the high degree of social differentiation in an industrial society promoted social fragmentation. It also argues that values education should not be the sole responsibility of the school, but shared by the entire society.

Waugaman, Paul G. "University-Industry Technology Transfer in Germany: Implications for U.S. Partners." *Journal of the Society of Research Administrators* 22 (Summer 1990): 7-15. EJ 424 656.

A survey of university-industry technology transfer practices in the Federal Republic of Germany revealed how many of the organizational, financial, and legal features of the German system of higher education and research promotion affect technology transfer. American research administrators would benefit from an understanding of these political and economic factors.

Wegner, Gregory P. "Germany's Past Contested: The Soviet-American Conflict in Berlin Over History Curriculum Reform, 1945-48." *History of Education Quarterly* 30 (Spring 1990): 1-16. EJ 406 231.

This article recounts the dialogue between U.S. and Soviet members of the Allied Kommandature Education Committee (AKEC) in post World War II Berlin regarding the formation of a new history curriculum for German youth. It concludes that the history curriculum accord represented a U.S.-Soviet desire to use schools as a means of denazifying Berlin youth.

Wegner, Gregory P. "Schooling for a New Mythos: Race, Anti-Semitism, and the Curriculum Materials of a Nazi Race Educator." *Paedagogica Historica* 27 (1991): 189-213. EJ 436 676.

This article discusses racist teaching charts which accompanied a Nazi German teacher's textbook on race biology. It examines the significance of the work of Alfred Vogel within the context of Nazi race education and warns that school curriculum can easily be used to pervert science and advance racism when under control of a racist state.

Weiler, Hans N. "Curriculum Reform and the Legitimation of Educational Objectives: The Case of the Federal Republic of Germany." *Oxford Review of Education* 16 (1990): 15-27. EJ 417 346.

This article posits that compensatory legitimation is the modern state's response to its legitimation crisis and is manifested through educational reform. It delineates how the state interprets society's norms and values through the curriculum and offers the West German curriculum reform debates of the 1960s and 1970s as an example.

Weiss, Manfred, and Horse Weishaupt. "Experiences with Comprehensive Educational Planning: Lessons from the Federal Republic of Germany." *European Journal of Education* 25 (1990): 83-97. EJ 412 007.

The formulation of priorities in educational policy in the Federal Republic of Germany and their transformation into concrete goals were heavily influenced by the expected demographic change, which is the most important determinant of educational demand (enrollments) and the situation in the labor market and employment system.



## Select Bibliography of Scholarly Works

by James F. Harris

The books in this select bibliography pertain to the history of Europe and Germany during the twentieth century, with an emphasis on the last fifty years. Each book includes ideas and information of use to teachers in preparation for planning and conducting classroom instruction. These books are merely a few of the many outstanding volumes in print on various aspects of the history and social organizations of Europe and Germany since World War II. These works are, however, some of the very best books that are related to the content of the social studies curriculum and the concerns of elementary and secondary school teachers and their students.

Ash, Timothy Garton, *Magic Lantern: The Revolution of '89 Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (New York, Random House, 1990).

Baring, Arnulf, *Uprising in East Germany* (New York, Cornell University Press, 1972).

Berghahn, V. R., *Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, second edition (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Black, Cyril E., et al., *Rebirth: A History of Europe Since World War II* (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1992).

Borneman, John, *After the Wall: East Meets West in the New Berlin* (New York, Basic Books, 1991).

Braun, Hans-Joachim, *The German Economy in the Twentieth Century* (London, Croom Helm, 1983).

Bullivant, Keith, ed., *After the "Death" of Literature: West German Writing of the 1970s* (Oxford, Berg, 1989).

Cipolla, Carlo M., ed., *The Fontana Economic History of Europe* (London, Collins/Fontana, 1972-), vol. 5, *The Twentieth Century*; vol. 6, *The Contemporary*

*Economies.*

- Corrigan, Timothy, *New German Film: The Displaced Image* (Austin, University of Texas Press, 1983).
- Craig, Gordon A., *Germany 1866-1945* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1981).
- Darnton, Robert, *Berlin Journal, 1989-1990* (New York, W. W. Norton, 1991).
- Demetz, Peter, *After the Fires: Recent Writing in the Germanies, Austria and Switzerland* (San Diego, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1992).
- , *Postwar German Literature: A Critical Introduction* (New York, Pegasus, 1970).
- Diefendorf, Jeffry M., *In the Wake of War. The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993).
- Diefendorf, Jeffry M., Axel Frohn and Hermann-Josef Rupieper, eds., *American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955* (Washington, D.C., German Historical Institute, 1993).
- Economist Editorial Staff, *The Economist Atlas of the New Europe* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1992).
- Edinger, Lewis, *West German Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986).
- Ellwood, David W., *Rebuilding Europe: Western Europe, American and Postwar Reconstruction* (London, Longman, 1992).
- Fulbrook, Mary, *The Divided Nation: A History of Germany, 1918-1990* (New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992).
- James, Harold and Marla Stone, eds., *When the Wall Came Down: Reactions to German Unification* (New York, Routledge, 1992).
- Jarusch, Konrad, *The Rush to German Unity* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993).
- Jarusch, Konrad and Volker Gransow, eds., *United Germany. Documents and Debates* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994).
- Kaes, Anton, *From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989).
- Koch, H. W., *A Constitutional History of Germany in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (London, Longman, 1984).
- Kolinsky, Eva, *Women in West Germany* (Oxford, Berg, 1989).
- Laqueur, Walter, *Europe in Our Time: A History, 1945-1992* (New York, Penguin Books, 1992).
- Maier, Charles and Günter Bischof, eds., *The Marshall Plan and Germany* (New York and Oxford, Berg, 1991).
- McAdams, A. James, *Germany Divided: From the Wall to Reunification* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993).
- McCauley, Martin, *The German Democratic Republic Since 1945* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1983).
- McCormick, Richard, *Politics of the Self: Feminism and the Postmodern in West German Literature and Film* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991).
- Merkel, Peter, *German Unification in the European Context* (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993).

- Merritt, A.J. and R. L. Merritt, eds., *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-49* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1970).
- Milward, Alan, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1951* (Berkeley, California, University of California Press, 1984).
- Mitchell, B.R., *European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1975, paper ed., 1978).
- Noelle, Elisabeth, and Erich Peter Neumann, eds., *The Germans. Public Opinion Polls 1947-1966* (Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 1981).
- Nugent, Neill, *The European Community: An Annual Review of Activities* (Cambridge, Mass., Blackwell Publishers, 1994).
- Peterson, Edward, *The American Occupation of Germany* (Detroit, Wayne State University Press, 1978).
- Philipsen, Dirk, *We Were the People: Voices from East Germany's Revolutionary Autumn of 1989* (Durham and London, Duke University Press, 1993).
- Ruhm von Oppen, B., ed., *Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-55* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1955).
- Schweitzer, C. C., et al, eds., *Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Documents* (Leamington Spa, England, Berg Publishers, 1984).
- Stevenson, John, *The Columbia Dictionary of European Political History Since 1914* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1992).
- Szabo, Stephen F. *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1992).
- Tent, James F., *Mission on the Rhine: Re-education and Denazification in American-occupied Germany* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1982).
- Turner, Henry Ashby, *The Two Germanies since 1945* (Binghamton, N.Y., Vail Ballou Press, 1987).



# Curriculum Materials on Germany and Europe Since World War II

by Fay Metcalf

## Kits and Guides

A number of teaching aids with materials have been developed by Inter Naciones, Bonn, and are being distributed jointly by the American Association of Teachers of German (AATG) and Goethe House New York. All are well done, but *The Geography of Germany*, written by Glen Blankenship and D. William Tinkler, deserves special mention. Just released, this set of lessons for high school classrooms uses the five themes of geography developed by the Joint Committee on Geographic Education of the National Council for Geographic Education and the Association of American Geographers and promoted by the National Geographic Society, in a particularly effective way. The lessons are thoughtfully prepared and the quality of the 14 included transparencies is spectacular. The unit could be used with good effect in courses on world history, world geography, and in comparative government courses.

Blankenship, Glen, and D. William Tinkler. *Overview of the Federal Republic and the Federal States*. Bonn, West Germany: Inter Naciones Bonn, 1993.

This program is designed for use in middle school classrooms. The four lessons in the package correlate to the typical curriculum pattern in the United States, world culture, geography, and government. The materials focus on world-studies and state studies from a comparative U.S./Germany perspective.

McKinnon, Mike. *Common Ground: Practical Ideas to Promote Interdisciplinary Cooperation between Social Studies and Second Language Instructors [Germany as a Model]*. Cherry Hill, NJ: American Association for Teachers of German, Inc., 1992.

The purpose of "Common Ground" is to promote cooperation and integration of instruction between teachers of German and their peers in Social Studies and elementary classrooms. This initiative is based on three premises: (1) Cross-discipline planning and teaching enhances student learning by providing appropriate and meaningful exchange opportunities; (2) Social studies and German teachers share a "common ground" in addressing a Europe marked by rapid change and historic events; and (3) German and Social Studies teachers have a common interest in culture—in identifying similarities and differences of lifestyles that help students increase their sensitivity to and understanding of the realities of an emerging European dimension in our contemporary world.

*A Kid Like Me Across the Sea: A Look into the World of a German Child.* Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1994.

This is a series of five lessons for primary/elementary students. These lessons address the following topics: physical and cultural geography; basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter; community services and community helpers; transportation and communication; political symbols; and migration of people.

*Cultural Reflections: Work, Politics, and Daily Life in Germany.* Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1994.

The three lessons in this instructional kit, intended for high school level, include "The German Worker," "Culture and Daily Life in Germany," and "Government in Germany." Student activities focus on worker training/apprenticeship programs, structure of the school system, family income, leisure time activities, structure of the federal government, and social programs and health care.

*Communities and Regions in Germany.* Bonn, West Germany: Inter Nationes, 1994.

These three publications, intended for upper elementary grades, stress basic map and globe/geography skills and present case studies of communities (villages/towns/cities) across Germany.

Czarra, Fred. *Germany and the World: A Geography Primer.*

This 68-page booklet is an introductory resource in the important field of geography for both German and social studies teachers at all levels and should support interdisciplinary work between these fields. Czarra presents the five major geographic themes and then through dozens of classroom activities, he reinforces the themes using Germany as a focus and model. The materials are hole-punched for easy use and include an extensive bibliography as well as a variety of maps for reproduction.

Reeves, Ines. *Democracy in Action: 40 Years Federal Republic of Germany.* Cherry Hill, New Jersey: American Association of Teachers of German, Inc., 1988.

This guide is written by a teacher for her peers in both social studies and German language classrooms. It provides background information, classroom strategies, general references, and suggested activities in developing a common unit on contemporary Germany. "Democracy in Action" is a practical tool in establishing introductory knowledge of the Federal Republic until 1990.

---

\* The materials listed above can be ordered from the American Association of Teachers of German (AATG) or the Goethe House New York. Both of these organization's addresses are included in Part VIII of this volume, Directory of Resources.

Seletzky, Martin. *German Unification, Materials and Lessons*. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio Department of Education, 1990.

A series of activities designed for high school students to actively express their opinions about a newly united Germany. Role playing is utilized to focus attention on ten policy issues that need to be resolved by the newly elected government of Germany.

## Periodicals and Articles

*National Council for the Social Studies Social Education*, two special issues on the united Germany.

April/May 1993 "United Germany in a Uniting Europe"

September 1993 "The Case of Germany"

Both issues provide information on German life covering topics, ranging from geopolitical concerns to how unification affects the schools. Both are essential resources for teachers planning units on the new Germany and its relationship with other European nations, as well as for up-to-date information on changes with the nation.

*Focus on Germany - Magazine for Allied Forces in Germany*

*Germany: Toward Unity*

*Scala: The Magazine from Germany* Colorful, upbeat magazine from Germany that highlights contemporary topics and personalities. Highly appropriate for classroom use, it contains a variety of episodic pieces, photo essays, and an extended feature of interest to students of an emerging Europe. Great bulletin board potential.

*The Week in Germany* An eight-page weekly news bulletin in English that features current perspectives on political, economic, and miscellaneous news from Germany. Readable, concise, and focused on a menu of topics of interest to both social studies and second language educators.

All are available from:  
German Information Center  
950 Third Avenue  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 888-9840

Friedrich, Otto. "German History, More or Less as Germans See It." *Smithsonian Magazine*, April, 1991. An abbreviated, 5000 word survey of Germany from the Roman period to 1933 that is filled with anecdotes. It develops a theme of slowly, coalescing nationhood. The interpretative text is complimented with colorful photographs and artwork that portray important episodes in Teutonic history. Special emphasis is placed on three figures: Martin Luther, Friedrich II, and Otto von Bismarck.

*Trans Atlantic Perspectives* available from:

The German Marshall Fund of the U.S.  
11 Du Pont Circle, NW  
Washington, DC 20030

## Timeline

*Germany: Divided and United, 1945 and Beyond* is especially useful as a brief and readable overview of the past 50 years. Other topics are covered from time to time. Timeline U.S.A. Inc., P.O. Box 141166, Coral Gables, FL 33114.

\* You will also find a textual timeline located in Part III of this volume.

## Audio Visual

*"Spotlight: Germany, the First Year of Unity."* This 28-minute video focuses on Germany after unification. What is happening in this country and its capital, Berlin—no longer divided by an "iron curtain" and the infamous wall? Mostly it's a story of revival and renewal; in the eastern part of Germany the focus is on privatizing business, coping with workers and their need for jobs. In Berlin, the city is reconnecting itself—heating up the cultural mix of theater, cinema, and the arts. Workers, business people, famous film directors, and several artists speak their mind. Some are cautious, even frightened; most have an expanding vision and growing confidence. Berlin is experiencing a renaissance. And in that, the city is a metaphor for all of Germany, aspiring to a more central place in Europe and the world. This video is sponsored by Intercontinental Hotels, United Airlines, and Sixt-Budget. Both this video and the next may be purchased as a set.

*"One Nation, Undivided: Impressions of a New Germany."* Sponsored by Lufthansa and Intercontinental Hotels, this 28-minute video in English, produced in 1990, describes the problems and promises of the united Germany. You will meet an American serviceman who was stationed at Checkpoint Charlie on the night the Wall came down, spend a day with a young couple as they go to vote in a unified Germany for the first time in their lives, and hear the hopes and ambitions of businesspeople and entrepreneurs as they consider the task of economic rebuilding. Young Germans from every part of the country will give you a glimpse of the future for Germany and the unification of Europe.

\*\*\* NOTE: Several of the curriculum kits listed also contain AV materials.

## Books and Guides

Diroy, Stephane. *Berlin: Portrait of a City*. Toronto, Canada: Bulfinch Press, 1990.

Published to celebrate the opening of the Berlin Wall, this fascinating photographic essay chronicles the spirit of the two Berlins over the last decade. There are many poignant full-color photographs that captures an atmosphere not normally seen on television or in news magazines.

Stern, Susan. *Meet United Germany: Perspectives*.

Stern, Susan. *Meet United Germany: Handbook 1991/92*.

both Stern books are available from:

American Association of Teachers of German, Inc.  
523 Building, Route 38  
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034  
(609) 663-5264

Sichrovsky, Peter. *Strangers in Their Own Land*. New York: Basic Books, 1986.

This short book focuses on a series of wide-ranging, frank, interviews with thirteen postwar Jewish men and women living in Germany and Austria today. The author, a distinguished journalist, and himself an Austrian Jew, sought commentary on questions like, "How did the experiences of the holocaust impact his generation? ... and bluntly ... "How do the children of the killers live together in the same country with the children of the victims?"

Tillman, Terry. *The Writings on the Wall. A Triumph of Human Spirit*. It is difficult to image more colorful depictions of the Berlin Wall than those in this glossy English language paperback volume with over 70 full-color pictures and text by Terry Tillman. Every other page has short vignettes which describe walls, barriers, peace, power. For your information, 25% of the profits of sales of this book are donated by the publisher to the Institute for Individual and World Peace.

*The German Americans*. From the series *The Peoples of North America* (Chelsea House Publishers), author Anne Galicich tells the story of German-American immigrants, who began to come to America over 300 years ago. Today almost 50 million Americans claim German ancestors. Contents of this 127-page English language text include: Strength in Numbers, In the Colonies, Settling the New Nation, Picture Essay; Folk Arts, Fine Arts, Industrialization and War, and the German-American Contribution. The book is particularly valuable for students in the early stages of language learning for out-of-class assignments.

## Curriculum Materials on Germany and Europe Since World War II in the ERIC Database

Aldridge, Ron, and Kenneth Townsend. *Hitler and the Holocaust. Senior High School U.S. History, World History, English*. Charlotte, NC: Charlotte-Mecklenburg Public Schools, 1987. ED 302 443.

This curriculum outline, designed for use in U.S. history, world history, or English courses, presents information about Adolf Hitler and the Holocaust. Part 1 provides a rationale for teaching about this subject, while part 2 presents an outline of historical information from 1887 to 1934 concerning Hitler's life and the rise of the Nazi party. Part 3 outlines the Holocaust in terms of: (1) the roots of European anti-Semitism; (2) the persecution of Jews from 1933-1938 through the use of the established legal system; (3) the intensification of Jewish persecution from 1938-1940 by legal and extra-legal means; and (4) the physical destruction of European Jews from 1941-1945. Part 4 contains a 20-item partially annotated bibliography.

Birkenhauer, Josef, and Bill Marsden, eds. *German Didactics of Geography in the Seventies and Eighties. A Review of Trends and Endeavours*. Edmonton, Alberta, Canada: International Geographical Union, 1988. ED 322 041.

A survey of recent trends in geographic education, this book contains a series of papers by West German experts in the field, and is intended to provide for the international community of geographical educators an account of the state of the art in this country. The seven papers include "Handbooks for the Teaching of Geography", "The Geography Curriculum in the Federal Republic of Germany after the Reform Circa 1970", and "Recent Changes in Systematic and Regional Geography in West German Schools".

Coatney, Louis R. *German Eagle vs. Russian Bear: A World War II Russian Front Boardgame Kit*. Juneau, AK: Coatech, Inc., 1987. ED 287 786.

This board game encourages junior and senior high school student analysis of the German campaign against the USSR and gauges student decision-making skills.

Fritzsche, K. Peter. *NATO in History and Civics Textbooks: The West German Case*. Paper presented at the International Conference on NATO in History and Civics Textbooks, The Hague, Belgium, November 24-25, 1990. ED 330 636.

When analyzing the degree to which a balanced presentation of NATO is achieved in West German history textbooks, two standards may be used: first, inclusion of information on NATO's formation, aims, strategies, and achievements; second, inclusion of the criticisms that have been leveled at NATO from various points of view. This paper undertakes an analysis of West German history and civics textbooks based on these standards, the first of which is said to deal with "factual" themes, and the second, with "controversial" themes.

*Germany and Georgia: Partners for the Future. Instructional Materials for Georgia Schools, Volumes I and II*. Atlanta, GA: Georgia State Department of Education, 1990. ED 325 426.

A collection of lessons is presented for teaching about the Federal Republic of Germany that were developed as a result of a study/travel seminar attended by 18 Georgia educators during the summer of 1989. Lessons are designed so that they may either be used individually, integrated into the curriculum at appropriate places, or be used as a complete unit. Each lesson begins with an outline for teaching that includes instructional objectives, and a sequenced list of procedures for using the activities provided with the lesson. Volume I contains lessons on an introduction to Germany, geography and environment, history and culture, and people. Volume II contains lessons on these topics concerning contemporary Germany: government, economics, society, and the fine arts.

Holt, Evelyn R. *"Remember Our Faces"—Teaching about the Holocaust*. ERIC Digest EDO-SO-92-1. Bloomington, IN: ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education, 1992. ED 345 990.

This Digest presents a rationale for Holocaust education, discusses curriculum placement for inclusion of the topic, lists organizations and resources available to help teachers in teaching about the Holocaust, and provides a bibliography of relevant materials in the ERIC database.

Irish, Ann B. *Constitutional Rights and Liberties in the United States Constitution and the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany*. Bloomington, IN: ERIC Clearinghouse on Social Studies/Social Science Education, 1987. ED 290 672.

The lesson's goal is to enhance student understanding of basic civil rights and liberties through a comparison of the basic documents undergirding the laws of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. The unit can be introduced with the quiz (included) to stimulate interest in the differences between the two countries.

Kalfus, Richard. "Euphemisms Of Death: Interpreting a Primary Source Document on the Holocaust." *History Teacher* 23 (February 1990): 87-93. EJ 429 258.

This article analyzes primary document from German Holocaust period in which German bureaucrats described in euphemistic terms the murder of the Jews. It illustrates how the document can be used as a teaching aid by having students replace the euphemisms using words with their intended meaning, and reading it aloud in class.

Reeves, Ines, and others. *Democracy in Action: 40 Years, Federal Republic of Germany. A Practical Guide for Teachers*. Cherry Hill, NJ: American Association of Teachers of German, Inc., 1988. ED 309 121. (See above section for annotation.)

Sloan, Stanley R. *East-West Relations in Europe. Foreign Policy Association Headline Series*. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1986. ED 282 816.

This booklet is one of a series on world issues that investigates East-West relations in Europe by addressing important questions and dilemmas. These include: (1) What are the goals of the European countries in their relations with one another? (2) How do they view the division of Europe, its origins and its consequences? (3) To what extent are the goals of East and West European states in conflict with the interests of their superpower allies?

Wicke, Rainer E., comp. *Funkbrücke Conference Call*. Edmonton, Alberta, Canada: Alberta Department of Education, 1989. ED 316 047.

A guide to the use of radio and telecommunications to promote international student communication describes a project in which teenagers from Cologne, West Germany, and Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, discuss their concerns via radio as well as provide descriptions of life in West Germany and Canada. Materials include transcripts from two radio programs, photographs of the students, teaching tips, worksheets, and newspaper articles about the project.



# Germany and Europe Since World War II: Directory of Resources and Useful Addresses

by Vickie J. Schlene

## Legal and Government Documents

Schweitzer, Carl, and Detlev Karsen, eds. *Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Documents*. Leamington Spa, U.S.: Berg Publishers, 1984.

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. *Documents on Germany, 1944-1985*. Department of State publication 9446. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 1985.

Gallis, Paul E., and Steven J. Woehrel. *Germany's Future and U.S. Interests: Issue Brief*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, updated regularly.

*European Political Cooperation*. Bonn, Germany: Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic, 1988. Copies may be obtained from: German Information Center, 950 Third Ave., 23th Floor, New York, NY 10022.

*Europe and the United States: Competition and Cooperation in the 1990s. Study Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and*

*Trade and the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1993. Copies may be obtained from:

Superintendent of Documents,  
Congressional Sales Office,  
Washington, DC 20402.

## General Background Reading

Copies of the following publications may be obtained free of charge from: German Information Center, 950 Third Ave., 24th Floor, New York, NY 10022.

*Facts about Germany*. Frankfurt, Germany: Societata-Verlag, annual.

*Germany and the USA*. New York: German Information Center, 1989.

*Germany: Constitution and Legal System*. Bonn, Germany: Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, 1991.

*Germany: Country and People*. Bonn, Germany: Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government, 1992.

*Germany: Elections, Parliament, and Political Parties.* New York: German Information Center, 1990.

Nawrocki, Joachim. *Update on Germany: The Germans are United Again.* Bonn, Germany: Inter Nationes, 1991.

Brassloff, A.M., and W. Braddloff, eds. *European Insights: Postwar Politics, Society, Culture.* New York: Elsevier Science Publishing Co., 1991.

Calleo, David P., and Phillip Gordon, eds. *From the Atlantic to the Urals: National Perspectives on the New Europe.* Arlington, VA: Seven Locks Press, 1992.

Hufbauer, Gary Claude, d. *Europe 1992: An American Perspective.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1990.

Krause, Axel. *Inside the New Europe.* New York: HarpersCollins, 1991.

Treverton, Gregory, ed. *The Shape of the New Europe.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1992.

## EC Documents

Copies of the following booklets may be obtained for a nominal shipping and handling fee from: Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities, 2100 M Street, NW, Suite 707, Washington, DC 20037.

*A Community of Twelve: Key Figures.* Commission of the European Communities. Eurostat, 6-7/1991. Catalog number: CC-AD-91-007-EN-C. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991.

*Europe, Our Future: The Institutions of the European Community.* Commission of the European Communities/European Parliament. Catalog number: CC-AD-89-016-EN-D. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990.

*European Union.* Commission of the European Communities. Catalog number: CC-74-92-265-EN-C.

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992.

*Economic and Monetary Union.* Commission of the European Communities. Catalog number: CC-60-91-725-EN-C. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991.

*Opening Up the European Market.* Commission of the European Communities. Catalog number: CC-60-91-434-EN-C. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991.

*A Citizen's Europe.* Commission of the European Communities. Catalog number: CC-60-91-773-EN-C. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991.

*Europe—A Fresh Start: The Schumann Declaration 1950-90. Pascal Fontaine. European Documentation.* Catalogue number: CB-NC-90-003-EN-C. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990.

*Europe on the Move: European File Series.* Commission of the European Communities. Catalog number: CC-72-91-835-EN-C. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1991. A complete list of available booklets, leaflets, and maps.

## Curricular Resources

All compendiums may be obtained from the authors for a nominal fee.

*Germany and Georgia: Partners for the Future.* Georgia Department of Education. Write to: Dr. Glen Blankenship, Coordinator of Social Studies, Gwinnett County School, 52 Gwinnett Drive, Lawrenceville, GA 30245.

*German Unification: Materials and Lessons.* Ohio Department of Education. Write to: Dr. Martin

Seletzky, 65 South Front Street,  
Columbus, OH 43266.

McKinnon, Mike. *Common Ground:  
Practical Ideas to Promote  
Interdisciplinary Cooperations between  
Social Studies and Second Language  
Instructors*. Write to: American  
Association of Teachers of German,  
112 Haddontowne Court, Suite 104,  
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034.

Reeve, Ines. *Democracy in Action: Forty  
Years Federal Republic of Germany*.  
Write to: American Association of  
Teachers of German, 112  
Haddontowne Court, Suite 104,  
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034.

## Journals on German Affairs

*German Politics and Society*. Center for  
European Studies, Harvard  
University, 5 Bryant Street,  
Cambridge, MA 02138.

*German Studies Review*. Arizona State  
University, Tempe, AZ 85287-4205.

*New German Critique: An  
Interdisciplinary Journal of German  
Studies*. Telos Press, 431 East 12th  
Street, New York, NY 10009.

*Europe: Magazine of the European  
Community*. Available by  
subscription for \$19.95 per year from:  
Delegation of the Commission of the  
European Communities, 2100 M  
Street, NW, Suite 707, Washington,  
DC 20037.

## Weekly Newsmagazine

*This Week in Germany*. Weekly  
publication of the German  
Information Center. By subscription  
(free of charge) or, in advance of the  
print edition, electronically via  
NewsNet, Predicast, Lexis/Nexis,  
and GENIE's German Roundtable.

## EC Publications on Special Issues

The following publications may be  
ordered from: UNIPUB, 4611-F  
Assembly Drive, Lanham, MD 20706-  
4391; (800) 274-4888.

### Business and Industry

Merritt, Giles. *Eastern Europe and the  
USSR: The Challenge of Freedom*.  
EC/Kogan Page, 1991. 256 pp. \$17.95.

*From EMS to Monetary Union*. EC, 1990.  
76 pp. \$10.00.

### Finance

*The ECU Report*. EC, 1991. 216 pp.  
\$14.00.

*The Single Financial Market*. 2d ed. EC,  
1991. 63 pp. \$10.00.

### Economics

*One Market, One Money: European  
Economy No. 44, October 1990*. EC,  
1990. 200 pp. \$25.00.

*Economic Survey of Europe in 1990-1991*.  
UN, 1991. 315 pp. \$80.00.

### Trade and Tariffs

*GATT Activities, 1990: An Annual  
Review of the Work at GATT*. GATT,  
1991. 141 pp. \$17.50.

### Law and Legislation

1993 *The New Treaties*. EC, 1991. 206  
pp. \$13.00.

### Socioeconomics

*Europe into the 1990s*. Wilton Park  
Papers No 8, 1990. \$18.00.

*European and US Economies*. Wilton  
Park Papers No. 33, 1991. \$17.00.

*Widening the Community? EC Relations  
with European and Global Partners*.  
Wilton Park Papers No 40, 1991.  
\$17.00.

*Demographic Statistics (EC): 1991*. EC,  
1991. 248 pp. \$13.00.

*A Social Portrait of Europe*. EC, 1991. 142  
pp. \$13.00.

*Europe 2000: Outlook for the Development  
of the Community's Territory*. EC, 1991.  
36 pp. \$7.00.

### **Labor and Employment**

*Working in the European Community: A Guide for Graduate Recruiters and Job-Seekers.* EC, 1991. 210 pp. \$18.00.

*CEDEFOP—Vocational Training Information Bulletin.* EC. \$15.00.

### **Environment**

*This Common Inheritance: The First Year Report.* HMSO, 1991. 201 pp. \$50.00.

### **Education Reference Books**

*Higher Education in the European Community—A Directory of Courses and Institutions in Twelve Countries: The Student Handbook.* EC, 1990. 470 pp. \$24.95.

*Thesaurus: European Education Thesaurus 1991.* EC, 1991. 500 pp. \$65.00.

### **Useful Addresses**

Ellie Valentine, Associate Director  
Russian & East European Institute  
Ballantine Hall 566  
Indiana University  
Bloomington, IN 47405  
(812) 855-0391

Amanda Ciccarelli, Outreach  
Coordinator  
West European Studies Center  
Ballantine Hall 542  
Indiana University  
Bloomington, IN 47405  
(812) 855-0036

Lois Plew, Program Assistant  
Polish Studies Center  
Memorial Hall W002  
Indiana University  
Bloomington, IN 47405  
(812) 855-8119

Center for Slavic and East European  
Studies  
University of California at Berkeley  
361 Stephens Hall  
Berkeley, CA 94720  
(415) 642-3230

Center for Russian and East European  
Studies  
University of California at Los Angeles,  
with the RAND Institute  
334 Kinsey Hall  
405 Hilgard Ave.  
Los Angeles, CA 90024  
UCLA (213) 825-4998  
RAND (213) 393-0411

W. Averill Harriman Institute for  
Advanced Study of the Soviet Union  
Columbia University  
420 West 118th Street  
New York, NY 10027  
(212) 854-4623

Institute on East Central Europe  
Columbia University  
1228 International Affairs Bldg.  
New York, NY 10027  
(212) 854-4008

Soviet and East European Language  
and Area Center  
Harvard University  
1737 Cambridge Street  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
(617) 495-4037

Russian and East European Studies  
Center  
University of Illinois  
104 International Studies Building  
910 S. Fifth Street  
Champaign, IL 61820  
(217) 333-1244

Center for Russian and East European  
Studies  
University of Michigan  
210 Lane Hall  
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1290  
(313) 764-0351

Center for Slavic and East European  
Studies  
Ohio State University  
344 Oxley Hall  
1712 Neil Ave.  
Columbus, OH 43210-1219  
(614) 292-8770

Russian and East European Studies  
Center  
University of Pennsylvania  
Philadelphia, PA 10174  
(215) 898-8704

Russian and East European Studies  
University of Pittsburgh  
4E-23 Forbes Quad.  
Pittsburgh, PA 15260  
(412) 624-3973

Soviet and East European Center  
Stanford University  
Stanford, CA 94305  
(415) 497-9468

Center for Russian and East European  
Studies  
University of Virginia  
103 Levering Hall  
Charlottesville, VA 22903  
(804) 924-3033

Russian and East European Language  
and Area Center  
University of Washington  
Thompson Hall 504, DR-05  
Seattle, WA 98195  
(206) 543-4852

Russian and East European Studies  
Middlebury College  
Middlebury, VT 05753  
(802) 338-3711

Center for East European Studies  
Columbia University  
International Affairs Building  
420 West 118th Street  
New York, NY 10027  
(212) 854-4627

Russian and East European Center  
University of Wisconsin  
Madison, WI 53706  
(608) 262-9632

Center for Russian and East European  
Studies  
Emory University  
311 Cox Hall  
Athens, GA 30322  
(404) 727-6582

Soviet and East European Studies  
University of Kansas  
108 Lippincott Hall  
Lawrence, KS 66045  
(913) 864-4236

Russian and East European Studies  
Center  
University of Oregon  
c/o The Department of Political Science  
Eugene, OR 97403  
(503) 686-4877

Center for Soviet and East European  
Studies  
University of Texas  
Geography 106  
Austin, TX 78712  
(512) 471-3607

Council on Russian and East European  
Studies  
Yale University  
Box 13 A Yale Station  
New Haven, CT 06520  
(203) 432-3423

Center for Slavic, Eurasian, and East  
European Studies  
Duke University  
Box 98259  
Durham, NC 27708-0259  
(919) 684-3575

Center for Russian and East European  
Studies  
University of North Carolina/  
Chapel Hill  
Chapel Hill, NC 27599  
(919) 681-8489

Institute for European Studies  
120 Uris Hall  
Cornell University  
Ithaca, NY 14853  
(607) 255-7592

Center for European Studies  
New York University  
Casa Italiana  
24 E. 12th Street  
New York, NY 10011  
(212) 998-3838

Institute on Western Europe  
Columbia University  
420 W. 118th Street, 13th Floor  
New York, NY 10027  
(212) 854-4618

Center for European Studies  
University of Minnesota  
309 Social Sciences  
Minneapolis, MN 55455  
(612) 625-1557  
FAX: (612) 626-2242

Center for European Studies  
Box 6314 Station B  
Vanderbilt University  
Nashville, TN 37235  
(615) 322-2527

Council on West European Studies  
Yale University  
P. O. Box 208206  
New Haven, CT 06520-8206  
(203) 432-3434

West European Studies Program  
University of Pittsburgh  
4E01 Forbes Quadrangle  
Pittsburgh, PA 15260  
(412) 648-7405

Center for Western European Studies  
University of California at Berkeley  
248 Moses Hall  
Berkeley, CA 94720  
(510) 642-9314

Center for German and European  
Studies  
University of California at Berkeley  
254 Moses Hall  
Berkeley, CA 94720  
(510) 643-5777

Austrian Institute  
11 East 52nd Street  
New York, NY 10022

Belgian Tourist Office  
745 Fifth Avenue  
New York, NY 10151

British Information Services  
845 Third Avenue  
New York, NY 10022-6691  
(212) 745-0200 FAX: (212) 758-5395

Council for European Studies  
Columbia University  
Box 44, Schermerhorn  
New York, NY 10027  
(212) 854-4172

Embassy of Luxembourg  
2200 Massachusetts, NW  
Washington, DC 20038

Norwegian Information Service  
825 Third Avenue  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 421-7333

Cultural Counsellor  
Embassy of Portugal  
2125 Kalorama Road, NW  
Washington, DC 20008

The American-Scandinavian  
Foundation  
725 Park Avenue  
New York, NY 10021  
(212) 879-9779

Embassy of Spain - Education Office  
1350 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite  
1050  
Washington, DC 20036  
(202) 452-0005

United States Holocaust Memorial  
Museum  
100 Raoul Wallenberg Place, SW  
Washington, DC 20024  
202/488-0400

## **EC Contacts**

Office of Press and Public Affairs  
Delegation of the Commission of the  
European Community, 7th Floor  
2100 M Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20037  
(202) 862-9500

Office of Press and Public Affairs  
Three Dag Hammarskjold Plaza  
305 E. 47th Street  
New York, NY 10017  
(212) 371-3804

Office of Press and Public Affairs  
Suite 3830  
44 Montgomery Street  
San Francisco, CA 94104  
(415) 288-1990

### **Audiovisual Resources**

Modern Talking Picture Scheduling  
Center  
5000 Park Street N.  
St. Petersburg, FL 33709  
(800) 243-6877

### **EC Official Publications**

UNIPUB  
4611-F Assembly Drive  
Lanham, MD 20706-4391  
(301) 459-7666

U.S. Exchange Organizations (with  
Programs for Europe)  
AFS International/Intercultural  
Programs  
313 E. 43rd Street  
New York, NY 10017  
(212) 949-4242

American Intercultural Student  
Exchange  
7720 Herschel Avenue  
La Jolla, CA 92037  
(619) 459-9761

ASSIST  
Mr. Kenneth Lindfors  
40 General Miller Road  
Peterborough, NH 03458  
(603) 924-9659

Council on International Educational  
Exchange  
205 E. 42nd Street  
New York, NY 10017  
(212) 661-1414

Council for International Exchange of  
Scholars  
(Fulbright programs for faculty and  
administrators)  
3007 Tilden Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20008  
(202) 686-4000

German Information Center  
950 Third Avenue, 24th Floor  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 888-9840

Institute of International Education  
(Fulbright programs for students and  
teaching assistants)  
809 United Nations Plaza  
New York, NY 10017  
(212) 883-8200

Institute of International Education  
Suite 150  
515 Post Oak Blvd.  
Houston, TX 77027  
(713) 621-6300

Institute of International Education  
Suite 650  
1400 K Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20005  
(202) 898-0600

Institute of International Education  
Suite 722  
401 N. Wabash Ave.  
Chicago, IL 60611-3580  
(312) 644-1400

Institute of International Education  
Suite 510  
41 Sutter Street  
San Francisco, CA 94104  
(415) 362-6520

American Institute for Foreign Study  
Scholarship Foundation  
100 Greenwich Ave.  
Greenwich, CT 06830  
(203) 625-0755

Open Door Student Exchange Program  
250 Fulton Ave.  
Hempstead, NY 11551  
(516) 486-7330

People-to-People International  
501 E. Armour Blvd.  
Kansas City, MO 64109  
(816) 531-4701

United States Information Agency  
Teacher Exchange Branch  
Bureau of Education and Cultural  
Affairs  
Room 234, 301 4th Street, SW  
Washington, DC 20547  
(202) 619-4360

World Learning Inc.  
(formerly Experiment in International  
Living)  
Kipling Road  
Brattleboro, VT 05301  
(802) 257-7751

Youth for Understanding  
3501 Newark Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20016  
(202) 966-6808

### **Sources of Information on the Federal Republic of Germany**

Embassy of the Federal Republic of  
Germany  
4645 Reservoir Road, NW  
Washington, DC 20007-1998  
(202) 298-4000

German Information Center  
950 Third Avenue  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 888-9840

Goethe-Institut  
City Center Building  
Suite 210  
220 East Huron  
Ann Arbor, MI 48104  
(313) 996-8600

Goethe-Institut  
German Cultural Center  
400 Colony Square  
Street Level  
Atlanta, GA 30361-2401  
(404) 892-2388

Goethe-Institut  
German Cultural Center for New  
England  
170 Beacon Street  
Boston, MA 02116  
(616) 262-6050

Goethe-Institut  
German Cultural Center  
401 N. Michigan Avenue  
Chicago, IL 60611  
(312) 329-0917

Goethe-Institut  
559 Liberty Hill  
Pendelton House  
Cincinnati, OH 45210  
(513) 721-2777

Goethe-Institut  
German Cultural Center  
3120 Southwest Freeway  
Suite 100  
Houston, TX 77098  
(713) 528-2787

Goethe-Institut Los Angeles  
8501 Wilshire Blvd.  
Suite 205  
Beverly Hills, CA 90211  
(213) 854-0993

Goethe-Institut New York  
1014 Fifth Avenue  
New York, NY 10028  
(212) 439-8700

Goethe-Institut  
530 Bush Street  
San Francisco, CA 94108  
(415) 391-0370

Goethe-Institut  
Mutual Life Building  
605 First Avenue, Suite 401  
Seattle, WA 98104  
(206) 622-9694

Goethe-Institut  
326 North Euclid Avenue  
2nd Floor South  
St. Louis, MO 63108  
(314) 367-2452

Goethe-Institut Washington  
1607 New Hampshire Avenue  
Washington, DC 20009-2562  
(202) 319-0702

American Association of Teachers of  
German  
112 Haddontowne Court 104  
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034  
(609) 795-5553

American Institute for Contemporary  
German Studies  
Suite 350  
11 Dupont Circle, NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
(202) 332-9312

American Council on Germany  
Suite 606  
14 E. 60th Street  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 826-3636

German Internship Programs  
Professor George K. Romoser  
PO Box 345  
Durham, NH 03824  
(603) 862-1778

German Marshall Fund of the United  
States  
Suite 750  
11 Dupont Circle, NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
(202) 745-3950

German Studies Association  
Arizona State University  
Tempe, AZ 85287-4205  
(602) 965-9011

Max Kade Institute for German-  
American Studies  
University of Wisconsin  
818 Van Hise Hall  
1220 Linden Drive  
Madison, WI 53706  
(608) 262-2192

Max Kade Institute for Austrian,  
German, and Swiss Studies  
University of Southern California  
THH 402 University Park  
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0351  
(213) 743-2280

Institute for German-American  
Relations  
Suite 102  
9380 McKnight Road  
Pittsburgh, PA 15237  
(412) 364-7752

Institute for the Study of German-  
American Relations  
Dr. William McDonald  
University of Virginia  
Dept. of Germanic Languages and  
Literatures  
108 Cocke Hall  
Charlottesville, VA 22903  
(804) 924-6695

Institute of Texas-German Studies  
University of Houston  
German Department  
4800 Calhoun Road  
Houston, TX 77004  
(713) 749-2159/63

Society for German-American Studies  
Don Heinrich Tolzmann  
Langsam Library, ML33  
University of Cincinnati  
Cincinnati, OH 45221  
(513) 556-1859

United States Information Agency  
German-American Contact Staff  
301 4th Street, SW  
Washington, DC 20547  
(202) 619-6184

Alexander von Humboldt Foundation  
(AvH)  
1350 Connecticut Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
(202) 296-2990

German Academic Exchange Service  
(DAAD)  
19th Floor  
950 Third Avenue  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 758-3223

German Historical Institute  
1607 New Hampshire Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20009  
(202) 387-3555

Konrad Adenauer Foundation  
2005 Massachusetts Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20036  
(202) 986-9460

Friederich Ebert Foundation  
Suite 111  
1133 15th Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20005  
(202) 331-1819

or  
27th Floor  
950 Third Avenue  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 688-8770

Friedrich Naumann Foundation  
1759 R Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20009  
(202) 667-4885

Hanns Seidel Foundation  
Suite 355  
214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE  
Washington, DC 20002  
(202) 546-4744

## Consulates-General

### Germany

Marquis Two Tower, Suite 901  
285 Peach Tree Center Avenue NE  
Atlanta, GA 30303  
(404) 659-4760/61/62  
(serves AL, GA, MS, NC, SC, TN)

Suite 500  
Three Copley Place  
Boston, MA 02116-6505  
(617) 536-4414  
(serves CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT)  
Monroe Building, 10th Floor  
Suite 3200  
676 N. Michigan Avenue  
Chicago, IL 60611  
(312) 580-1199  
(serves IL, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND,  
SD, WI)

Edison Plaza, Suite 2100  
660 Plaza Drive  
Detroit, MI 48226-1849  
(313) 962-6526  
(serves IN, KY, MI, OH)

Suite 1850  
1330 Post Oak Boulevard  
Houston, TX 77056-3818  
(713) 627-7771  
(serves AR, NM, OK, TX)

Suite 500  
6222 Wilshire Blvd.  
Los Angeles, CA 90048  
(213) 930-2703  
(serves CA, AZ)

Suite 2210  
100 N. Biscayne Boulevard  
Miami, FL 33132  
(305) 358-0290  
(serves FL)

225 Baronne Street  
New Orleans, LA 70112  
(504) 569-4289  
(serves LA)

460 Park Avenue  
New York, NY 10022  
(212) 308-8700  
(serves NY, NJ, PA, CT, Puerto Rico)

1960 Jackson Street  
San Francisco, CA 94109  
(415) 775-1061  
(serves CA, HI, NV, UT, CO, WY)

One Union Square Building  
600 University Street  
Seattle, WA 98101  
(206) 682-4313  
(serves AK, ID, MT, OR, WA)

**Austria**  
Wrigley Building, Suite 707  
400 N. Michigan Avenue  
Chicago, IL 60611

**Netherlands**  
393 East Wacker Drive, Suite 410  
Chicago, IL 60601-5279

### **German Schools**

Deutsche Schule New York  
50 Partridge Road  
White Plains, NY 10605  
(914) 948-6513

German American School San  
Francisco  
275 Elliot Drive  
Menlo Park, CA 94025  
(415) 324-8617

Deutsche Schule Washington DC  
8617 Chateau Drive  
Potomac, MD 20854  
(301) 365-4400

Carl Duisburg Society (CDS  
International, Inc.)  
330 7th Avenue  
New York, NY 10001  
(212) 760-1400

CDS International Inc.  
3475 Lenox Road NE  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
(404) 239-9495

CDS International Inc.  
Midwest Regional Office  
Suite 201  
309 W. Washington Street  
Indianapolis, IN 46204  
(317) 637-1280

### **Chambers of Commerce**

German American Chamber of  
Commerce  
31st Floor  
40 W. 57th Street  
New York, NY 10019  
(212) 974-8830

Suite 620  
3475 Lenox Road NE  
Atlanta, GA 30326  
(404) 239-9494

Suite 1030  
555 San Felipe  
Houston, TX 77056  
(713) 877-1114


Suite 600  
104 S. Michigan Avenue  
Chicago, IL 60603  
(312) 782-8557

Suite 1112  
3259 Wilshire Boulevard  
Los Angeles, CA 90010  
(213) 381-2236/7

Suite 910  
465 California Street  
San Francisco, CA 94104  
(415) 392-2262

Representative of German Industry and  
Trade  
One Farragut Square S., NW  
Washington, DC 20006  
(202) 347-0247

German National Tourist Office  
c/o German American Chamber of  
Commerce  
104 S. Michigan Avenue, Suite 600  
Chicago, IL 60603-5978  
(312) 782-8557



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

ISBN: 0-941339-18-1  
1994

