This theme issue of the serial "Educational Foundations" contains five articles devoted to the "Images of the Foundations." In "Through the Disarray of Social Foundations: Some Notes Toward a New Social Foundations" (Erwin V. Johanningmeier) traces developments in the field and challenges a move beyond the images of school and society based on the transition to an industrial economy. In the second article, "'Maybe When I Have My Own Classroom...': Foundational Irrelevance in Pre-Service Teacher Education," Ron Dippo highlights the frustrations of undergraduate students in foundations courses who are involved in student teaching. Svi Shapiro's "Postmodernism and the Crisis of Reason: Social Change or the Drama of the Aesthetic?" examines the political, moral, and spiritual implications of postmodern intellectual thought. In "Education and the Service Ethic," Robert C. Serow provides an historical analysis of the origins and development of the service ethic in the United States and an argument for the inclusion of moral education in the curriculum. In the fifth article, "Fundamental Pedagogics: A Philosophy OF or FOR Education?" George D. Yonge examines the implications and distinctions between a philosophy of as opposed to a philosophy for education. (CK)
Issue Theme:

Images of the Foundations

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Editorial Overview

Educational Foundations seeks to help fulfill the stated mission of the American Educational Studies Association to enhance scholarship in and among the educational foundations disciplines by providing a vehicle for publication of articles and essays which feature analysis of the foundations, of foundations methodology, of applications of such methodology to key issues of the day, and of significant research which evolves from and unifies the foundations disciplines, all focusing on the interdisciplinary nature of the educational foundations fields.

Educational Foundations seeks articles and essays in four primary areas:

1. Exposition on the nature of the educational foundations—essays exploring the foundations, highlighting definition, interrelationships, strengths, difficulties, and other aspects of the combined fields.

2. Application of the foundations disciplines to an issue of significance—collections of articles around a specified theme, bringing to bear the nature of the various foundations disciplines on such themes. Information concerning themes for future issues of the journal may be obtained from the co-editors.

3. Methodology—articles exploring methodological issues of the foundations fields, stressing similarities and differences among the disciplines.

4. Research—articles describing or reporting on new research in the foundations fields, with emphasis on interdisciplinary aspects of such research.

Contributions to Educational Foundations are solicited from members of the American Educational Studies Association as well as from all other scholars in the foundations of education and related fields of study. While the journal is open to submissions from all interested scholars, the standards for review and acceptance of articles and essays are stringent. Submissions should follow the Chicago Manual of Style, with a suggested length of 25-30 doubled-spaced pages, and be sent in triplicate to: Kathryn M. Borman, Co-Editor, Educational Foundations, College of Education, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221. When an article is accepted, authors are asked to submit the final version in an ascii textfile on computer disk.
Introduction: Images of the Foundations

In this issue's first article, "Through the Disarray of Social Foundations: Some Notes Toward a New Social Foundations," Erwin W. Johanningmeier traces the development of our field from its earliest days as an emerging area for study at Teachers College, Columbia University, in the 1920s to the present moment in our history. Johanningmeier challenges us to move beyond images of social relations and society that were central to the earliest conceptualizations of educational foundations in which he asserts we are still mired. Johanningmeier argues that images of the school and the society in which it is embedded still center around the issues that followed from the shift to an industrial economy that occurred in the 19th century. Rather, he argues, our experience today is most strongly influenced by events occurring in the wake of World War II, most notably the proliferation of nuclear energy, the computer, and electronic media. Far from being a prosaic or defensive account in the "whither foundations" tradition, Johanningmeier's important essay is a witty and sensitive examination of the field to which he is deeply committed.
Introduction

Undergraduate students in foundations courses frequently protest that notions about the school in society are of little immediate application in their learning to be classroom teachers. Don Dippo’s reflections on their frustration in “‘Maybe When I Have My Own Classroom...’: Foundational Irrelevance in Pre-Service Teacher Education” highlight the particular frustration faced by foundations students who are also involved in student teaching when taking his class. As Dippo acknowledges, “the student teaching experience is one which too often emphasizes immediate effect and personal technique,” while obscuring “the importance of a coherent educational vision...” This helpful analysis of college classroom praxis provides foundations instructors an approach that goes beyond “hype, and hints, and recipes that practically oriented students feel they need.”

In his essay, “Postmodernism and the Crisis of Reason: Social Change or the Drama of the Aesthetic?,” Svi Shapiro examines the political, moral, and spiritual implications of postmodern intellectual thought. Rather than a positivistic search to understand the world and construct it in a rational way, he observes that the postmodern undertakes endless processes of textual deconstruction, spurred by the conviction that certain knowledge cannot be approached. Most disturbing to Shapiro is the insularity and epistemological nihilism that characterize postmodernism. Shapiro concludes his essay by pointing to currents in critical theory that allow us to see beyond present realities to examine other forms of social life.

Robert C. Serow’s article, “Education and the Service Ethic,” is both an historical analysis of the origins and development of the service ethic in the United States and an argument for the inclusion of moral education in the curriculum. Persuasively, Serow argues that while the service ethic is deeply embedded in such past programs as the Peace Corps, in volunteer work, and in professional codes of ethics, today’s youth are as alienated as postmodern intellectuals from the political ideals inherent in community service. The use of what Serow calls the “therapeutic culture” at best partially compensates for youths’ political malaise. Indeed, students may be more disposed toward personal intervention as a problem-solving strategy. Community service may, then, be a reasonable vehicle for direct moral education.

Finally, this issue’s concluding essay, George Yonge’s “Fundamental Pedagogics: A Philosophy of or for Education?,” was in part prompted by Timothy Reagan’s “Philosophy of Education in the Service of Apartheid: The Role of ‘Fundamental Pedagogies’ in South African Education,” from an earlier issue of Educational Foundations (Volume 4, Number 2, Spring 1990). While Reagan’s essay is a starting point, Yonge moves on in his analysis to closely examine the implications and distinctions between a philosophy of as opposed to a philosophy for education.

--Kathryn M. Borman
Co-Editor
Through the Disarray of Social Foundations: Some Notes Toward a New Social Foundations

By Erwin V. Johanningmeier

The title of this paper probably suggests that I intend to work my way through the disarray to a clear vision of what social foundations either is or should be, but I am not that sanguine. I fear all I have accomplished is some rummaging in our attic. But just as a day in our grandparents’ attic may give us a new appreciation and understanding of their lives, so some consideration of our origins, common task, and concerns may give us some appreciation of the professional responsibilities we share. That those of us who teach social foundations need to find more effective ways to meet our responsibilities is a claim that has been abundantly and repeatedly documented. Participants in John I. Goodlad’s study of the education of educators found “more than 30 articles and essays that refer to or presume a serious erosion, decline, decay, or demise of foundational studies in teacher education programs.” While I am mindful of this literature and use some of
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Harry S. Broudy was correct when he suggested that "foundations" conjured up inappropriate images and expectations. "Inevitably," he reminded us, "the word makes one think of the building trades, or those great philanthropic geese that lay the golden eggs for educational reform, or the art of corsetry." Quite right, he instructed that "the metaphor of a foundation as holding something up, something on which one builds, fails badly when used in connection with educational history and philosophy, and limps even with regard to the psychology and sociology of education." At the turn of the century, when the initial attempts were being made to create education as a field, discipline, or activity appropriate for university acceptance, attention, and support, history of education and philosophy of education were there first. Back then they may have been functional. When, for example, Charles DeGarmo and his friends went to Europe to study just after the nation's centennial celebration, they went to study the history and the philosophy of education. It was then fashionable and customary to take directions from history and philosophy, for there was no place else to begin. Now it is not so fashionable, but, still, our history may be instructive.

There is a considerable body of literature which addresses the questions: What is social foundations? Is it a discipline? Is it a field? What are its relationships to the academic disciplines? What is its relationship to practice? Must teachers have it? Kenneth A. Sirotnik reports that "what is meant by foundations continues to be a matter of some dispute among educators and philosophers." The view he and his associates accepted is commonly held. Foundations, or social foundations, includes "the history, philosophy, and sociology of education as well as contemporary issues in the sociopolitical study of education and educational policy." This is a conception which fails to note the two definitions we have carried with us since the early 1950s. When the University of Illinois Social Foundations Faculty published *The Theoretical Foundations of Education*, it noted that "social foundations" was an ambiguous term and offered two reasons for the ambiguity. The first was that it was used in a "broad collective sense" and in a "much more restricted sense." In the "collective sense" social foundations was used to designate the 'non-psychological' foundation fields...such fields as the history of education, comparative education, philosophy of education, educational sociology, educational anthropology, and educational economics." In its restricted sense it was used to designate "a specific foundation field which is co-ordin..."
with, but distinct from, the other fields.'' The Illinois faculty indicated that it refrained from using the term ''sociological foundations of education,'' for fear of possible confusion between 'social foundations' and 'educational sociology.'''

The second reason for the ambiguity was that ''the field of 'social foundations' is relatively new and unstabilized, and is not taught as a separate discipline in many teacher training institutions.'"6

The Illinois faculty did give a fairly clear statement of how it saw the field and how social foundations in the restricted sense related to other fields:

Social foundations, as a field, is concerned with those aspects and problems of society which need to be taken into account in determining educational policy, especially as this policy concerns the social role of the school, and in determining broader social policies which affect educational policy... This definition of the field distinguishes it from educational history and philosophy on the one hand, and from educational sociology on the other. Although there should be a close relationship, and some overlapping, between the problems studied in social foundations and those studied in the history and philosophy of education, the approach to, and the data brought to bear upon, the problems is [sic] different. The problems of social foundations are the problems of policy-formulation and policy-evaluation set by contemporary social conditions. Although the history and philosophy of education can and should throw light on such policy questions, the problems studied in courses in those fields found to be set and defined within the developing scholarly disciplines of ''history'' and ''history of education'' or ''philosophy'' and ''philosophy of education.'''7

While I am not attempting to provide a comprehensive review of the literature that tries to define social foundations, I do believe that one of us ought to attempt a meta-analysis of that literature. As Mary Anne Raywid has observed, ''There is more than little conceptual spadework to be done in straightening out the terminological difficulties associated with the field.'''8

Normand R. Bernier and Averil E. McClelland may have been guilty of gross understatement when they wrote that ''the foundations of education is not merely the educational application of the behavioral and social sciences,'''9 for there is difficulty with the belief that social foundations practitioners are to find the implications of the disciplines--the social and behavioral sciences--for education.

Selecting from the disciplines creates problems. What are we to select? We can not afford, for a variety of ethical and political reasons, to select anything but the best. If the disciplines were all tidy enterprises free of controversy and free of claims questioning the validity and utility of their principles and conclusions, we would have no problems. That is not the case. Scholars in the disciplines have
nearly as many problems trying to decide what they are about as we do. If we presume to decide what is best in a field other than our own and in a field where the experts do not agree, we can only do so at the risk of properly being identified as arrogant and presumptuous. If we decide we will only select what is useful for our purposes, then we have a defensible criterion. If, of course, we know what our purposes are. But then, our focus is, or certainly should be, on educational problems rather than the disciplines.

How to apply a discipline is more difficult than it may seem. If we do not adhere to the standards set in the disciplines, we are in danger of making misapplications that can result in unsound and useless conclusions and applications as well as criticism from the practitioners of those disciplines. We become amateurs subject to the criticism of experts. When what we select loses its currency among the practitioners of those disciplines but maintains its utility for us, we confront another problem. We must explain why we are not using the latest that psychology, marketing, or whatever the field is has to offer. We are then behind the times. Seeking our status and credibility through knowledge of our neighbors' affairs distracts us from our own field and the problems we should be examining.

How to apply a discipline to education is very much like, if not tantamount to, turning research into practice. Common sense seems to tell us that scientific knowledge should inform practice and render it more efficacious, but common sense does not always apply. Two generations ago, Dewey reminded us that “no conclusion of scientific research can be converted into an immediate rule of educational art.” William James made that point a generation before Dewey’s Sources when he advised that psychology was a science, and teaching was an art. The latter could not be directly deduced from the former. Instructed James:

I say moreover, that you make a great, a very great mistake, if you think that psychology, being the science of the mind’s laws, is something from which you can deduce definite programmes and methods of instruction for immediate schoolroom use. Psychology is a science, and teaching is an art; and sciences never generate arts directly out of themselves. To derive rules for the art of pedagogical practice from the science of psychology one needed the requisite for any technology that attempts to convert theory into practice—what James termed an “inventive mine.”

Foster McMurray, in his attempt to demonstrate why and how education should and could be “an autonomous discipline,” addressed the applications-implications issue in this way:

A tendency frequently discernible in contemporary [1955] research is an attempt to mark out a kind of inquiry especially appropriate for investigators employed by colleges of education. An educational psychologist will propose to investigate learning as it occurs in school rooms, feeling that this geographic
localization is sufficient distinction of his own province. Or an educational sociologist will direct research upon the school as an institution interacting with other institutions, believing that this focus upon schools sets him apart from sociologists in general and justifies describing his professional role with the adjective "educational". However useful and scientifically proper this may be, it is not what I mean by a unique discipline of education. The educational psychologist is a psychologist with special interest in education. The educational sociologist is a contributor to the discipline of sociology rather than to education. This is no mere semantic distinction. What is important to recognize is that the empirical findings of research conducted in or concerning the schools, when problems and procedures are those of the recognized social sciences, tell us how to teach but not what to teach. In the same way that application of pure science to industrial process is not found by simple deduction from basic knowledge, but is rather the product of creative invention, so the "meaning" of the social sciences for education must be discovered by activities of a higher intellectual order than following suggestions, analogies, or supposed "implications" from foundational sciences.... The point is that we cannot expect a true discipline of education to arise simply by localizing the questions of some other discipline within a school setting."

If we adhere to the standards set in the disciplines, we face two difficulties. First, we may indeed make some significant contribution to the disciplines, but that is not--certainly it should not be--our primary purpose. A contribution to one of the disciplines is not necessarily a contribution to the field of education. Second, if our standards of inquiry and objects of inquiry are taken from some other discipline, we further remove ourselves from our other colleagues in education. The distance between us and our other colleagues in education does not need to be increased.

Theoretically speaking, the disciplines are ancillary to our task. Practically speaking, they are indispensable. How to define our objects of inquiry so that they are truly educational and yet be able to use properly and wisely whatever will contribute to successful inquiries are problems for which there are no clear answers. Perhaps the tension between those requirements should be maintained so that it informs--I use "inform" in the Aristotelian sense--our endeavors. That, of course, assumes that we have distinctive and identifiable endeavors to pursue, endeavors different from those of our colleagues in the disciplines and other professional fields. The difference between our interests and those of our colleagues in the disciplines may not be easily reconciled. Arthur Powell related that Harvard’s Philip Rulon "regarded academic content educationally indispensable,
but academicians as enemies of the educational use of their fields." He further 
claimed that the differences between arts and sciences faculty and education 
faculty could not be bridged: "one wanted to advance knowledge, the other to find 
out how to inculcate in youth the needed adult skills." The differences between 
the two do not necessarily contradict each other, but they are contrary.

Another way to define social foundations is to accept that it is whatever it is 
those who claim to be doing it say it is. That may be interesting, but it is impractical 
and dangerous. It would be a very unpleasant undertaking, for we would have to 
 discriminate between the honest and the dishonest endeavors. In many institutions, 
faculty not trained in foundations are teaching our courses. University and 
college administrators, often junior college administrators, claim they should 
continue to teach these courses as foundations courses. Even at major institutions, 
there are faculty not trained in social foundations assigned to teach our courses. 
Like it or not, justly or unjustly, we share the blame for what occurs in such courses. 
Those in the field know that foundations is not the same as introduction to 
education, but, as the Sirotnik report indicates, the substitution of one for the other, 
mostly introduction in place of foundations, continues. He and his associates 
"formally observed... introduction to education' classes in which founda-
tional studies are typically 'covered'."

To define social foundations by surveying what occurs under its name would 
inevitably require us to admit that educational policy studies is indeed an integral 
part of social foundations and does not constitute a new field of study. As earlier 
indicated, the Illinois faculty clearly identified the formulation and evaluation of 
policy as the problem of social foundations. Policy-studies advocates probably fall 
into one of three groups. First, some believe education as a social process should 
be studied as carefully and as rigorously as other social processes. Second, others 
still believe in social reconstructionism or some form of it but realize that social 
foundations is not an a la mode term. "Policy studies" is believed to have more 
"sex appeal." If we use it, we show that we are au courant. Third, still others simply 
like power. They like to be associated with power and believe "expertise" in 
"educational policy studies" will provide access to the politicians who do, in fact, 
have power to set the course of public education.

Current practice is indeed rich and diverse, but it gives us too much to describe 
and sort. Bernier and McClelland have reported:

A variety of innovative suggestions by foundations scholars is already in evidence. Such proposals include new methodologi-
cal approaches concerned with setting-based action research, 
new interdisciplinary models of educational ecology and aes-
thetic education, policy studies of social and educational change, 
an emphasis on strengthened study in the disciplines and the 
phenomenon of knowledge, and the relationship between social 
avocacies and educational change.
Still another way to try to define social foundations is to look at its origins. The first use of the term "social foundations," according to Joe Newman, probably occurred in 1924 when George S. Counts and J. Crosby Chapman, an educational psychologist at Yale, published their *Principles of Education*. In that text, 25 "problems" were organized under four major headings:

- What Is the Place of Education in Individual and Social Life?
- What Are the Psychological Foundations of Education?
- What Are the Sociological Foundations of Education?
- What Principles Govern the Conduct of the School?

If 1924 is too early for our beginning, we can move the date up to 1927 or 1934. In the 1920s, faculty at Teachers College, Columbia University, were discussing the need for a new approach to teacher education. Some who participated systematically in those discussions are now known as the "Kilpatrick Discussion Group." By 1927, the small group from Teachers College who were meeting for bi-monthly dinners and conversation at Kilpatrick's home were discussing the relationship between school and society. They soon asked how educators ought to respond to the crises made so evident by the Great Depression. Harold O. Rugg reported that by 1932 we had become a cohesive group, taking our stand together for the general conception of a welfare state, agreeing fairly closely on the constituents of the democratic principle. In 1934, the "first" course in social foundations, Education 200F, largely developed by Kilpatrick, Rugg, Childs, Cottrell, and Counts, was created. They had created not only a course, but a new field. Once the course was approved by the Teachers College faculty, "continuing teaching groups were formed... The groups were Counts, Newlon, Spence (a psychologist), and Childs; Kilpatrick, Rugg, and Ernest Johnson (religion); Watson, Clark, and Bruner; Raup, Butts, and Benne."

It should not be overlooked, either by us or our colleagues in teacher education, that coincident with the first course in foundations at Teachers College there was a reorganization of Teachers College. The reorganization, which took effect in 1934, was the result of "a long series of faculty conferences," "a soul-searching process" which began in January, 1929. Foundations faculty were not excluded from these discussions. Foundations faculty did not exclude themselves from these discussions. Now inclusion in such discussions is not the rule. Social foundations faculty are often excluded from such endeavors; often they exclude themselves. We ought to petition the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education to insure that the customary exclusion will not occur when teacher education institutions conduct their self-studies. Social foundations faculty ought not to allow themselves to be represented by educational psychology faculty even though such faculty are often seen as foundational. Our interests are not the
same as theirs. They tend to focus on learning, and sometimes teaching, while our focus tends to be on education and on schooling.

Social foundations was the result not of a few committee meetings, but of "hundreds of hours of friendly argument." It was also the consequence of attending to concerns and questions about the kind of professionals the nation needed in its schools. A brief examination of the circumstances surrounding the creation of Education 200F and the new field reveals that many of the issues and difficulties we now face were present at the very beginning. Our problems may be more severe than they were a half century ago, but they are not all new. The literature of decline may be largely based on a belief in the existence of halcyon days that never were. We may need to be mindful of Gertrude Stein's observation about there being no there there when you get there.

Foundations was one of five new divisions at Teachers College. The other four were: (1) Administration, (2) Curriculum and Instruction, (3) Guidance, and (4) Tests and Measurements. "When these four groups were abstracted, one principal area remained: the field now embraced by the Foundations of Education." Foundations of Education, philosophy of education, educational sociology, educational economics, comparative education, and educational psychology were placed into the Division of Foundations. As Dean William Russell explained, after the other four divisions were created, "all that was left" was placed into Foundations. For Russell, the Foundations Division was "fundamental to all four (other Divisions), providing the general knowledge of the raw material of education, the product desired, and the recognized means of changing the former into the latter." The historians of Teachers College explained that "The College had long maintained that work in the foundations fields was fundamental to all members of the profession, thus delegating to the faculty in that area a uniquely important service function."26

The notion that our work is but service to other programs has endured. The Illinois faculty indicated that it accepted four instructional functions, and the first of them was "Service to the College through instruction in those courses within its field of competence which, in the judgment of the faculty of the College, form an indispensable part of the common professional orientation of all educational workers and which should, therefore, be required at the appropriate levels of professional education."27

Many still accept that our function is "service," and many of our colleagues still so describe our function. It may be useful to ask why we have not and why our colleagues have not accepted a different conceptualization. A conceptualization which suggests a division of labor in the education and the preparation of professionals for the nation's schools would better serve all parties, faculty and students. As long as we allow the "service" notion to obtain, we allow ourselves to be not fundamentally responsible for the preparation and the education of the people who work and will work in the schools. We ought not to abdicate that
responsibility. The service metaphor tempts many to eliminate "outside vendors" and assume the responsibility for "service" themselves, especially when we exclude ourselves or allow ourselves to be excluded from those discussions which relate to the preparation of educational personnel.

The creators of the first foundations course had a vision that included more than service. Clearly, the chair of the Foundations Division saw its mission as consisting of something other than service. According to its chair, Kilpatrick, "Division I specializes in the critical study of education considered as a single process operating, on the one hand, in the life of the individual child and, on the other, within the total social process." The historians of Teachers College wrote that the new course, Education 200F, "was the attempt to draw from the various foundational disciplines certain understandings, outlooks, and terminologies which would eventually be the common property of the entire educational profession." Newman relates that the foundations faculty were committed to three important principles:

First, the group believed that teachers needed to study education in its broadest social context, stressing the role of the school in social change...teachers rarely had a chance to consider the larger implications of their work. Their faith in "democracy in education" convinced them that teachers would increasingly become involved in educational policy making. To make the difficult decisions that confronted them, teachers needed a broad social perspective. The dislocations of the Depression made the need for this perspective seem even more urgent.

The second principle...was that the teachers' study of school and society would have to cut across the boundaries of the traditional academic disciplines. Discrete courses based on a single discipline tended to give teachers a narrow outlook on their work. What was needed...was an "integrated" course that would bring several disciplines to bear on fundamental social and educational problems.

The members of the discussion group were also committed to a third principle that shaped the foundations course: they believed that teacher education was too narrowly focused on "fact finding," the empirical study of education... There was more information than ever before, but as Kilpatrick pointed out, "many students and educators seemed bewildered, losing the town for the houses." The newly created Division of Foundations had a new course, Education 200F, to which it devoted "primary attention." The majority of the faculty at Teachers College agreed that all students should complete "8 points in the Foundations of Education." Students usually satisfied the requirement by enrolling in Education
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200Fa and 200Fb. Students who had completed comparable course work elsewhere were allowed to have the requirement to enroll in 200Fa and 200Fb waived, but those wavers "were carefully controlled by Division I."32 The course was successful, but it also had its critics:

Needless to say, critics who had fought the course even before its inception continued relentlessly in their opposition. Some continued to argue that the effort to build an interdisciplinary approach could yield only superficiality; others could find little relevance to the actual business of teaching.33

The critics of the course were not immediately persuasive. In spite of the criticism, "support in the faculty seemed not only to hold its own but to increase,"34 during the first years that the course was offered.

The First Cracks

What the founders of the course saw as a strength eventually became a source of criticism for those who built upon what the inventors of the course and field bequeathed to them. The topics discussed in the course were many and diverse: "nationalism, technology, and cultural determinism in the first semester, or learning, religion, and vocation in the second." By introducing students to "a host of social, political, economic, and personal issues formerly considered alien to the educator’s scope," the foundations faculty had given "the whole conception of the educator’s task... an immeasurable broadening." The scope of the new field was so broad, there was so much from which too select, that individual sections of the course began to differ from each other. Indeed, the differences were embedded in the course upon its invention. Benne reported to Tozer that each group "taught as a panel" and developed "its own course outline and syllabus."35 The foundations faculty saw the differences as "nothing but the healthiest sign."36 Many still maintain that differences from section to section or instructor to instructor are indices of the field’s vitality.

Many of our colleagues in teacher education remain to be convinced that variation is a sign of vitality. They often claim that if a course is as necessary as we claim, then we should be better able and more willing to specify what it is and either eliminate or greatly reduce the variation. To them the variations and differences constitute all the evidence they need to support their claims that social foundations is not necessary. We have not yet resolved this difficulty. The variation is a twofold problem: it is political and it is intellectual. Each and the relationship between the two demand our attention. Once we move outside the confines of an institution the problem becomes even more complicated, for there is nothing approaching consensus on how teachers should be educated and trained. The Illinois faculty recognized that in the early 1950s, and Borman effectively begins her contribution to the Handbook of Research on Teacher Education by
making the same point. Some conceptions of teacher education programs are more hospitable to social foundations than others and some, as Douglas Simpson, who has reviewed several of the 1980s reports on educational reform, has shown, ignore them completely.

The critics of the foundations requirement at Teachers College were not immediately successful, but after about a decade, they achieved some success in their attempts to get out from under the foundations requirement. In their discussion of developments in the mid-1940s, the historians of Teachers College report that "One of the most persistent...problems involved the long-standing requirement in Foundations of Education." The nature of the criticism changed, but the criticism persisted:

Generally, criticism had changed somewhat from those of the early years: they were now mostly concerned with the inflexibility of any all College requirement. As the College became more and more heterogeneous, as programs became more varied and diverse, many advisers felt that Education 200F was no longer universally appropriate.

By 1948, the critics had made a crack in the foundations wall:

Whereas for over a decade non-major requirements for most students had been conceived exclusively in terms of work in the Foundations of Education, this non-major area would now be broadened. The requirement in foundations would remain primary and central. Nevertheless, under the new arrangement, a student could elect to take two points of his eight-point minimum in approved "general" courses in curriculum, administration, or guidance.

"Flexibility" is still a standard around which our colleagues in teacher education rally. It is the standard which usually shows either their intellectual dishonesty or their intellectual limitations. When our courses show variation from section to section or instructor to instructor, they want standardization and specification of goals and objectives, not of purposes. They tell us that will make us relevant and useful. When we oblige, they claim we need to offer special sections suited to the needs of individual groups of students or, and this is the usual claim, that we need to be eliminated so programs and students will have some flexibility. Perhaps theirs is a neurotic reaction. They may want to be able to explore alternatives in their own specializations but either can not because of the boxes they have built around themselves or do not know how. Consequently, assuming theirs are neurotic reactions as opposed to intellectual dishonesty or intellectual limitations, they strike out against us. That is understandable, for we usually are at some distance from them because we are seen as "outside vendors" who only provide a "service." The distance allows them to see us as outsiders, as the enemies who are thus eligible prey.
Donald Warren has posed and tried to answer the question: “What went wrong with the Foundations?” “One possibility,” he suggested, “is that the field was torpedoed from without by those seeking to impose a narrow vocationalism on teacher education.”4 That is certainly not an implausible answer, but there were difficulties from the very beginning. They should not be overlooked. The early days at Teachers College were not halcyon days. There was, as has been noted, opposition to social foundations from the beginning.

Our founders gave us important work and a good beginning, but they also gave us some problems. Newman’s account suggests that there were some difficulties with what the “Kilpatrick Discussion Group” invented. One was that “Kilpatrick, Counts, and Rugg brought to the foundations course a Social Frontier point of view, a particular interpretation of the changes occurring in American life.”42 That point of view drew criticism from within as well as from without. Social Frontier views were by no means universally accepted either among educators in general or the Teachers College staff in particular.” Opposition to those views existed “both in and out of Division I.”43

The text used in the course may have presented difficulties. Newman reports that “The foundations faculty accepted Kilpatrick’s idea the students in an introductory course should read broadly in the works of many authors rather than deeply in the works of one or two.” The model for the two-volume Readings in the Foundations of Education (1941) the faculty prepared for the course was Kilpatrick’s Source Book in the Philosophy of Education (1923). The Source Book contained 557 selections in its 339 pages.4 Volume two of Readings, if I counted correctly, contains 210 selections in its 660 pages. Like it or not, students and many of our colleagues believe a course must have a text. To argue against using original sources rather than second-hand accounts is stupid. It may, however, be appropriate to ask whether those of us who continue in the readings tradition provide an adequate framework for the readings. Some texts do; others do not. If we believe that a text consisting of readings should include an appropriate framework, I suggest we examine the clearly and carefully crafted framework in the Stanley-Smith-Benne-Anderson text.45 Our frameworks may not be as explicit as we believe. We may be speaking to each other cryptically, in a sophisticated, tightly “packed” language which needs to be “unpacked” and spelled out for our colleagues in teacher education as well as for our students. Reading widely and from a wide variety of sources may look like superficiality, especially if the sources or no longer than a sound byte.

Kilpatrick claimed, and many still so claim, that he did not tell students what to think but that he was trying to teach them how to think. Some found that a profitable and enjoyable experience:

Many teachers who took the course during the thirties never forgot the intellectual excitement generated by the discussion method and the academic challenge of analyzing a variety of
opinions. With Kilpatrick and his colleagues constantly urging students to carve out their own positions on the issues, many teachers claim the foundations course did indeed teach them how to think.46 Not all agree that thought can be divorced from content. As Michael Oakeshott once observed, to say that the purpose of education is to teach people to think is like asking an orchestra to play music but no particular music.47

Carefully selected materials and an approach to those materials that forces students to think create, for some, a profitable and enjoyable experience. Others find profit and enjoyment elsewhere and complain and criticize when so confronted:

The foundations approach has been criticized, however, for pressing students into taking positions on complex issues after a cursory examination of limited information. This criticism, heard at Teachers College during the thirties and at numerous other institutions since, brands foundations courses as superficial at best and doctrinaire at worst.48 The sock may have been turned wrong side out. We need to ask whether we have moved, however unwittingly, from indoctrinating to inculcating relativism. Sirotnik found that students in teacher education from one end of the nation to the other were able to articulate relativistic values very well.49 It is equally plausible, perhaps even more so, that the perceived “relativism” can be traced back to the 1950s at the University of Illinois. When Stanley, Smith, Benne, and Anderson published their Theoretical Foundations of Education, they clearly noted that there was no agreement about the purposes and functions of education in American society.50 The Illinois faculty was truly remarkable in its ability to recognize the legitimacy and even the cogency of views and arguments different from theirs. Being the good democrats and good academics they were, they wanted all differences and disagreements to be resolved through the proper processes of scientific inquiry and the democratic system. They were not willing to force conclusions or to interfere with scientific and democratic processes. Unfortunately, those who want immediate answers see such integrity as equivocation or relativism.

Ignorance and the Disciplines

Soon after World War II, public education was the object of the public’s intense and extensive scrutiny. Now it is possible to interpret that scrutiny and criticism as the public’s reaffirmation of its faith in and commitment to public education, but those close to that reaffirmation had some difficulty in taking such a sanguine view. They saw the criticism as an attack on an essential institution in a democratic society, as a loss of faith in public education. In those years before
the Civil Rights Movement and the hostilities in Southeast Asia won our attention, educators were interested, or told to be interested, in excellence (something comparable to what is now called "quality"). Those who had committed their professional lives to the study of public education and the preparation of teachers were keenly interested in improving public education. They were usually willing to do whatever seemed necessary to make public education better. Many were convinced that ignorance of the field in which they were working was a virtue. Those who wanted to pursue a career in education were encouraged to study not education but something else, the social and behavioral sciences, history, philosophy, or perhaps even business administration.

In the social, economic, political, professional, and intellectual climate of the 1950s and 1960s, ignorance of the field gave one status and credibility. Ignorance of education was highly prized and often handsomely rewarded. There was a widespread belief that the study and practice of education could only be improved if it were firmly rooted in some discipline the legitimacy of which was readily recognizable and generally not questioned by scholars in the traditional disciplines.

Society's decision makers were soliciting and following the advice not of professional educators but of those with credentials in the traditional disciplines. Experience and expertise in public education was rarely an asset, often a liability. The Carnegie Corporation did not hire professional educators to assess the junior high school, the high school, or the education of teachers. It did give generous support to a chemist, James Bryant Conant, to direct those evaluations. In the late 1950s, when the United States Congress was investigating how science and education could be supported to improve the nation's defense, William G. Carr, executive secretary of the National Education Association, asked for general aid. He wanted local school districts to have wide discretion in how federal funds would be used. Congress, however, was then predisposed to follow the advice of scientists and academicians who complained that public schools gave too much attention to "socialization" and areas that were rightly the province of home and church.

The schools, so the scientists and academicians maintained, needed to abandon their anti-intellectualism by paying more attention to the academic disciplines. Congress, we may recall, acted on the request President Eisenhower sent it in January 1958 and accepted their advice. It gave the nation the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) and increased the appropriations for the National Science Foundation (NSF). Carr's request for general aid was denied. Funds were given to mathematicians and scientists, to scholars, to make better curricula. Through the NDEA, the U. S. Office of Education (USOE) was empowered to introduce the new mathematics and science curricula the scientists were constructing with NSF support. Educators received funds to implement what the scholars decided should be taught.

Just before we entered the 1960s, the Education Committee of the National
Academy of Sciences called a meeting— and the NSF, the USOE, the Air Force, and the Rand Corporation financed it—to enable 35 scientists, scholars, and educators to meet for ten days at Woods Hole on Cape Cod “to discuss how education might be improved in our primary and secondary schools.” After the meeting, Jerome S. Bruner boldly claimed that any student could learn anything at any age if we would only attend to the structure of the disciplines. Educators believed him and tried to do what he said we should do. Psychologists knew about learning so they could tell us how to teach what the scholars were telling us to teach. Bruner was a proper psychologist and was reporting what a distinguished group of scholars from a variety of disciplines just knew had to be so. His was a strong and a popular voice, but not the only voice, telling educators how important the scholarly disciplines were. Bruner effectively set the agenda for educators.

Education needed sound and rigorous theory, preferably a theory from one of the disciplines. Schools were bad and students did not know what they should know, so it seemed, because educational practice did not rest upon a sound theoretical base. Professors of education were all but exclusively responsible for the educational shortcomings Americans had discovered in their schools. In The Education of American Teachers, Conant acknowledged that:

Professors of education had been pointing out for several decades that the faculties of arts and sciences had shown little interest in school problems. In the nineteenth century they had been quite ready to leave to the normal schools the task of preparing teachers for the elementary grades. When social changes in this century transformed the nature of the high school, the typical college professor himself was viewing with disgust and dismay what was happening in the schools... With few exceptions, college professors turned their backs on the problem of mass secondary education and eyed with envy Great Britain and the Continent, where such problems did not exist.

The arts and science faculties were not blameless, but professors of education were assigned most of the blame for the conditions in the schools. Schools were bad because of what arts and science faculty had not done and because of what professors of education had done. The “criticism” directed at professors of education “was not without justification.” According to Conant, “The deficiencies in our public schools, particularly in our high schools, to which a number of writers (among whom I must include myself) have called attention, were in no small part a consequence of their activities.” The point was not easy to miss. To improve the schools it was necessary to turn to those who knew nothing about them and those who had no scholarly interest in them. Expertise in one area was believed to be immediately applicable to another. Many professional educators eventually came to believe that as well. They acted on that belief by increasing their attention to methodological issues and by allowing the creation of courses and departments...
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devoted to research and evaluation as though research and evaluation were
processes which could and should be studied in and of themselves without any
regard for the purposes for which they may be used. For example, in 1971 three
researchers at the University of Virginia observed:

In the past decade, a new recipe for research in the social
sciences, particularly Educational Theory, has come into vogue.
It is the idea that a good way for someone interested in theorizing
about education to proceed is to compare educational theory
with other established disciplines, drawing up a list of points of
similarity. This process is referred to as finding a "model" for
the theory of education involved in the comparison.

No one thinks that absolutely every list of comparisons between
some aspects of education and some other theory is worth
making, any more than anyone thinks that just any computer
calculation or statistical study is worth while. There is, nonethe-
less, a tendency for these procedures to become ends in them-
selves, and for research involving such procedures to be encour-
gaged without demanding further justification. 56

Conant's work on the education of teachers, published in 1963, was written
in response to a request he received in 1961. He visited 77 schools in 22 states, but
he did not attend to developments in two important "foundational" areas, the
philosophy of education and the history of education.

The philosophers of education and the historians of education had turned to
the "parent" disciplines for direction before Conant began to study the education
of teachers. Philosophers of education had been trying to become more philosophi-
cal than they had been and were strengthening their relationships to "pure" or
"straight" philosophy. In 1955 the National Society for the Study of Education
(NSSE) devoted one of its yearbooks to the philosophy of education, the second
NSSE yearbook ever to be devoted to that subject. Like the earlier yearbook (the
41st in 1942), it was organized according to the now out of fashion "isms," but
the explicators of the "isms" were not philosophers of education. As Harry S.
Broudy later observed, "it entrusted the writing of the chapters to 'real' philoso-
phers..." Each real philosopher was assigned "a philosopher of education to keep
him relevant, so to speak, to problems of education." 57 Broudy further observed
that "the decision to have the chapters written by philosophers rather than by
philosophers of education reflected an awareness on the part of some of the
prominent figures in the Philosophy of Education Society that philosophy of
education needed more philosophy." 58

Philosophy of education needed more philosophy, and history of education
needed more history. On October 16-17, 1959, Bernard Bailyn presented his
interpretive essay on "Education in the Forming of American Society," 59 and the
historians of education had a historiographical essay prepared for them by a proper
historian. Soon thereafter, Lawrence A. Cremin argued in *The Transformation of the School* (1961) that progressive education ran amok because it lost touch with the sound social, psychological, and philosophical theories that supported it in its early years. Cremin's work, methods, conclusions, and even his subsequent historiographical essay in which he effectively gave us our declaration of independence from Cubberley (originally presented not to professors of education but at a conference sponsored by the Committee on the Role of Education in American History) were difficult to ignore, for *The Transformation* earned him the Bancroft Prize—a prize from one of the academic disciplines. In *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (1962), Raymond E. Callahan studied most of the same period Cremin studied and concluded that the schools had gone soft because school administrators had not studied the social and behavioral sciences. Consequently, they not only lost touch with sound educational theory and sound educational values but also allowed the schools to abandon the traditional curriculum. Intellectual rigor lost to a shallow conception of efficiency. Cremin wanted educational theory to be rooted in the disciplines housed across the street from Teachers College, and Callahan effectively agreed that would be good for school administrators too. The professors of school administration agreed.

During the 1960s, educational researchers almost seemed prepared to define educational research out of existence. There was a clear attempt to hide or to minimize the differences between educational research and research in the disciplines. In the 4th edition of the *Encyclopedia of Educational Research* (1969), Fred M. Kerlinger offered a definition of educational research that emphasized how similar educational research was to the disciplines. Educational research, he wrote:

...is social scientific research, for a simple reason: an overwhelming majority of its variables are psychological, sociological, or social-psychological. Consider some of them: achievement, aptitude, motivation, intelligence, teacher characteristics, reinforcement, level of aspiration, class atmosphere, discipline, social class, race. All of these but the last two are psychological constructs. If the large portion of the variables are psychological, sociological, or social-psychological, then the conceptual and methodological problems of educational research are very similar to the problems of psychological and sociological research.

For Kerlinger, educational research that was neither historical nor social scientific was simply "not as important as" that which was.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was some confidence that our understanding of school-society relationships would be enhanced if we did a better job of applying the academic disciplines to our analyses of public education. At its best, this new emphasis brought new vitality to our inquiries and a desire to
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examine critically the schools and how well they functioned. Eventually, pursuit of this emphasis helped us see more clearly than ever before the significance of the difference between education and schooling. At its worst, this emphasis gave us reason to set aside the problems of education so that academic or methodological purity could be insured. The belief that schools could neither be understood nor improved unless they were seen from the variety of perspectives the various disciplines afforded was not new. The virtual abandonment of educational concerns was. Disciplinary and methodological questions pushed aside educational questions. As educators scrambled to find relevant and promising models from the disciplines, there developed "a tendency for these procedures to become ends in themselves."

There is some belief that the fascination with the disciplines virtually destroyed social foundations. Kathryn Borman has observed that Clifford's and Guthrie's suggestion that social foundations may have committed suicide by aligning itself with the disciplines has limited utility "because their discussion of educational foundations programs is limited to Teachers College, Columbia." While it may be argued that developments at Teachers College are indicative of developments elsewhere, there is no reason to doubt Borman's claim that "the problem of aligning teacher education coursework in foundations with the disciplinary departments in universities, as contrasted with creating stronger ties with practitioners in the field, is far from resolved."

During this era, social foundations was all but disassembled and gave way to specialized work rooted in one of the disciplines. Anthropology of education, sociology of education, and economics of education were obviously better than a course the base of which consisted of a little from many disciplines and not very much from any one of them. Ironically, that disassembly may have helped philosophy of education and history of education. Their very names suggested the disciplines. History and philosophy as well as sociology and anthropology were easily found in the arts and sciences colleges but not social foundations. During this era, people who did not know anything about the process of public schooling were deliberately sought out and hired to teach our courses. Many of them continue to do so. Subsequently and consequently, our courses were often found to be neither useful nor relevant to those interested in preparing people to work in the schools. Whether students find our courses worthwhile--I am deliberately avoid making distinctions among how well students like our courses, how much utility they find in them, and how interesting they find them--is not clear. Sirotik produces data to indicate that they do not, and Borman cites studies that indicate that they do. While legitimate questions can be asked about the data and studies each uses to make his/her claims, Borman's claim is more likely to withstand such questions. Sirotik clearly fails to distinguish clearly between introduction to education courses and fails to ask about the qualifications of those who teach the courses. On the other hand, Borman recognizes that "the importance of so many
nonfoundations specialists and the quality of their courses warrants further systematic research. If nothing else, we need to undertake a national inventory to determine what we are doing and what is being done for us. A large part of our difficulty may be found in what is being done not by us but for us.

Equality

The exhortations to base our work in the disciplines were soon overwhelmed by an even louder exhortation, for relevance and equality. As Broudy observed: Overnight the new math and the new biology and the new physics and the new language labs were pushed into the background. The research funds began to flow into schemes in which elitist subjects and activities were "put down" so that poor children would be "turned on."

By the mid-sixties, the unresponsiveness of the schools was said to be toward the children of the city ghetto, then toward all poor children, and finally toward all children and youth. By the end of the sixties, the schools were alleged to be unresponsive to all social evils—poverty, racism, the war in Vietnam, and the pollution of the environment. In short, the schools at all levels were unresponsive to the Age of Aquarius.

Whether the schools had been unresponsive to social evils can be argued. What is clear, however, is that those identified with social foundations had long been concerned with social problems and issues and their relevance to public education, particularly the importance of equality of opportunity in American society. One of the finest expressions of our concern with equality of opportunity, built on the tradition of the Teachers College course Education 200F, was the Stanley-Smith-Benne-Anderson text. A generation ago, Stanley, Smith, Benne, and Anderson paid more than passing attention to social class, ethnic groups, and welfare levels. They addressed "color caste" and "the pathological impact of caste." They saw the significance of the growth of competing interest groups that did not share common purposes, an uneven distribution of opportunity, and a significant decrease in social mobility. Dire social, psychological, and political consequences were likely if some reconstruction of society and some redistribution or extension of opportunity were not effected. The public school could and should, they believed, play a major part in the needed reconstruction of society. For them, there was no doubt that "the school is an institution established by society for the purpose of preparing the young to participate in that society."

Social foundations texts continue to emphasize the importance of equality. The rights and problems of those who have been denied the right and the means to participate in the society have not been neglected by our field.

If there is an issue which has held social foundations together during the last
generation, if not from its very beginning, that issue is equality. It may also be the issue which still causes us to be described as "doctrinaire". We have never denied its importance. We are inclined to explain inequality in terms of the societal, economic, and political structures. Our colleagues in teacher education are more inclined than we are to believe that a new curriculum or a new instructional delivery system will reduce or eliminate the inequalities. Like it or not, they hit a point just as we do. In the post-Coleman Report era, public education has been required to address social, political, and economic inequalities with pedagogical and curricular means. As absurd and as horrifying as that may be, we still probably have not paid enough attention to the Coleman Report, how it changed the definition of "educational opportunity" and "equality," and how analyses of the relationship between education and economic opportunity subsequent to the Coleman Report gave policymakers reason to neglect public education.

In Inequality Christopher Jencks reassessed the relationship between schooling and family and challenged the widely held notion that educational reforms and the extension of educational opportunities would eliminate poverty. The belief that middle class children rarely wound up poor and that poor children could be made into middle class children in the public schools was a belief without foundation. Jencks and his associates did not find any evidence to support the belief that more or improved education would have a positive effect on the other elements that comprised a person's life conditions. Economic and social inequalities could not be reduced through educational reforms. Jencks reported in his conclusion:

We have seen that educational opportunities, cognitive skills, educational credentials, occupational status, income, and job satisfaction are all unequally distributed. We have not, however, been very successful in explaining most of these inequalities. The association between one variable of inequality and another is usually quite weak, which means that equalizing one thing is unlikely to have much effect on the degree of inequality in other areas."

Conventional school reforms simply were not powerful enough to "make adults more equal." Schools appeared not to have as much influence on children as their homes, the street, and television. Typical reforms focused on how resources were allocated, new curricula, and pupil assignment, while what made a difference--"the way teachers and students actually treat each other minute by minute"--was outside the control of reformers. Moreover, whatever influence the school did have on a child, it was, Jencks claimed, unlikely "to persist into adulthood.""

By the mid 1970s, the national policy on equality of educational opportunity that had been assembled in the late 1950s and the early 1960s was clearly being disassembled. As David Cohen and Michael Garret have described it, this policy ...rested partly on the idea that poverty, unemployment and
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delinquency resulted from the absence of particular skills and
attitudes—reading ability, motivation to achieve in school and
the like. There was also an assumption that schools inculcated
these skills and attitudes and that acquiring them would lead to
economic and occupational success. In other words, this policy
assumed that doing well in schools led to doing well in life.
Finally, the emerging policy, which came to be called compensa-
tory education, assumed that providing schools with more
resources would enable and induce them to remedy students' de-
iciencies.76

By the mid 1970s, the studies, discussions, and controversies inspired by the
Coleman Report, the Report itself, and what Cohen and Garret described as “the
stream of negative Title I evaluations,” all “gradually eroded the assumptions
underlying compensatory policy.”77 In the political arena the erosion of those
assumptions made a difference when resources were allocated. As Godfrey
Hodgson reported:

“The Jencks report” was freely cited by the Nixon
administration’s Office of Management and Budget on Capitol
Hill in justification of cutting the budget for fiscal 1974. There
was a wide-spread feeling that “Coleman and Jencks” provided
a respectable rationale for giving a low priority to spending on
education.78

The ideas of reformers and educators may have been challenged and perhaps
even seriously discredited in some sectors, but the problems they were trying to
address certainly did not disappear. Equality, inequality, achievement, integra-
tion, desegregation strategies, family-social background, the special problems of
handicapped children, and the needs and rights of non-English-speaking Ameri-
cans merit our continued attention, but in attending to them we must be ever
mindful that our “contemporary social condition” is quite different from that of
our founders.

During the days of the Great Society, it seemed that our society was committed
to equality of opportunity, and education was selected as the major instrument for
achieving it. To the extent that the Great Society was successful—and its successes
were limited—education suffered. As new groups were brought into the schools and
as honest attempts were made to attend to their needs, the schools became the target
of those who did not wish to extend opportunities. As Patricia Albjerg Graham has
observed, “The schools are the stage on which our implicit social dramas are made
explicit, and the dramas are played to audiences that are sometimes filled with
hostile critics.”79 As the public and as school officials grew concerned about how
the new groups behaved or did not behave in schools, behavior management
became the beginning, middle, and end of teacher education. Now that the
students’ behavior seems to be almost under control attempts are being made to
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bring the behavior of teachers under control. That is being done on the foundation of the process-product research that allegedly is the basis for the evaluation systems now being used to assess teachers' performances. As long as social foundations is interested in promoting purposeful behavior, it will have difficulty with those who simply want to control behavior.

The selection of education as the chief instrument for building the Great Society reflected the faith American society has in education. Education was then selected, and we may have overlooked this point, because it was politically expedient to do so. As Hodgson has remarked about the plan to build the Great Society:

President Johnson's Great Society was to be built without alienating Congress. From the start, education was an important part of his administration's strategy for reducing poverty and racial inequality. But as other approaches, especially "community action," ran into political opposition, the Great Society's reliance on education programs grew accordingly. In the end the Johnson administration, committed up to the eyebrows to reducing inequality, was almost equally committed to education as the chief way of doing it.80

It should have been known then, that education would have limited and delayed effects. Myrdal told us that in the 1940s.81 More recently, William Julius Wilson has persuasively argued that the problem of equality is rooted in the economic structure and that traditional conceptions and approaches to the problem are inadequate.82

The failure of the Great Society and the failure of education to effect true equality of opportunity should prompt us to examine the foundations of foundations and to ask whether social foundations needs new foundations. Education may not be as powerful an agency for reform of society as many in the field believe. We probably have deeply rooted tacit beliefs about the power of education that need to be made explicit and examined. Borman has observed that "the field's roots [are] in the social reconstructionism of the 1930s."83 Social reconstructionism, it may be recalled, was a response to a social-economic crisis that developed before World War II, before the emphasis on the disciplines, and before the advent of the post-industrial society. Social foundations may be suffering from its identification with social reconstructionism. There is today no universal agreement that social foundations should be equivalent to social reconstructionism.84 Commitment to social reconstructionism entails a commitment to the democratic welfare state, and neither the body politic nor the teaching profession can be expected to accept that political philosophy in the near future. It is a position deeply embedded in late 19th and early 20th century liberal thought. It is founded on the belief that social engineering is possible and desirable: that it is possible to discern how society works; that once such knowledge is gained, it can be used; that the
modern state has the resources to secure such knowledge; that it has the power to enforce its use; and since it has that ability and power, it ought to use them to create one kind of society rather than another. Not all believe in social engineering. Among those who agree that it may be a good idea, there is no agreement about the direction in which it should be engineered. Once we get beyond a declaration of faith in democracy, we encounter difficulty. We may agree that it entails a commitment to equality, but we do not even have agreement on what constitutes equality.

As the nation became concerned with extending equality of opportunity and doing something about its social evils in the era of the Great Society, professors of education ceased to be the objects of blame and scorn. One who helped to remove us, however temporarily, from the center of the blame circle was Charles E. Silberman. With support from the Carnegie Corporation, he set out to write a book about the education of teachers. He concluded that it was not possible to indicate how teacher education should be improved unless one first had "some clear notion of what the schools themselves are going to be like--and what they should be like."\(^{85}\) Like other journalists before him in his recent past, he agreed that the public schools were not what they should be. Unlike others, he did not blame the dismal state of the schools on teachers and professors of education. Teachers frequently failed to be civil to students. They even "unconsciously" showed contempt for their students, but, as a group, teachers were neither evil nor stupid. Like most other Americans, they suffered from the malady of "mindlessness." "Mindlessness" was the failure to think seriously about educational purpose, the reluctance to question established practice. It pervaded all society's institutions. All Americans, not only the educators, had to determine "whether it is possible in the modern bureaucratic state to develop a sense of long-range purpose and to inquire into the meaning of the activity."\(^{86}\)

The most cynical among us may have already concluded that it is not possible in the modern bureaucratic state "to develop a sense of long-range purpose and to inquire into the meaning of the activity," for another kind of ethos was dogging the steps of whatever joy, enthusiasm, and optimism Silberman and his ilk were engendering. With the distance that a decade has given us, we can now see that the desires for expansion and contraction, for alternatives and accountability developed not one after the other but nearly side-by-side. While Vernon Smith was touting the significance and importance of alternatives in education, he was also reporting that "accountability is the word in public education today."\(^{87}\) Accountability brought an ethos to which many of us objected:

This ethos--whose governing principles are based on a technological-economic world view--is distinguished by its frenzied insistence on the large-scale transportation of attitudes and practices from the world of business, engineering, and science to the world of education. One result of this slavish dependence
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on the beliefs and procedures of other fields has been to reduce the total educational endeavor to a tired litany of achievement, performance, and production characterized by the blank torpor of systems analysis, technological engineering, quality control, and replicability.

Many still believe we live in an era and ply our trades in settings where any concern for purpose has all but been abandoned, if it has not actually been abandoned, for goals and objectives defined not by our purposes but by the few allegedly effective processes we have at our disposal. Students, or so Sirotnik found, only gave “silence” when asked “Is there any underlying educational philosophy in the teacher education program...?” Borman’s recent statement that “several models of teacher education have emerged” and that they “range from a strongly behaviorist, narrow conception of competency based teacher education to a view of teacher education as primarily a means to empower and fully involve teachers in all phases of their own instruction including the classroom and school-based research that informs it” indicates that the ethos and procedures that so often come with accountability have not disappeared.

During the 1970s, accountability, relevance, and supply and demand created pressures which made it easy for teacher educators to embrace very crass sorts of vocationalism and consumerism. Deans of teacher education listened to superintendents and legislators and came back to tell us that we must train prospective teachers to control the classroom and somehow enable them to convince children not to use drugs. Faculty who taught social foundations were frequently expected to teach prospective teachers how to handle and control students who were victims of social problems. We were, and continue to be, ill prepared to satisfy that expectation. Our leaders, and perhaps some of us, forgot that our ultimate responsibility was to children in the classrooms of public schools, not legislators, not superintendents, not school systems.

Prospective teachers were sent out to the schools early in the teacher education programs to gain practical experience before they knew anything about schooling, mostly because the people we brought into the field a few years earlier specifically because they did not know anything about education had recently discovered schools and decided that all should immediately learn about what they had just discovered. Course work in social foundations was and still is frequently declared to have no relevance. The no relevance claim usually means that what is taught and learned cannot always be used in a replicative manner by students who have been thrown into the schools without adequate preparation as well as by those who have thrown them into the schools.

Student claims about the impracticality and irrelevance of social foundations or of any other component of a teacher preparation program should have been and ought now to be all but ignored. To grant power to non-certified, non-experienced, non-knowledgeable--the clinical term here is “ignorant”--students to control
content and methods of a professional training program is an unwarranted surrender of responsibility which is stupid and morally reprehensible. The purpose of professional preparation must be to guarantee a minimum level of service to the ultimate recipients of the service, children in public schools. The purpose of the preparation, training, and education is to protect the client from the practitioner. The preference and dislikes of those who claim they want to render that social service are ancillary to that task no matter how strong their beliefs, convictions, and opinions are. Their feelings are important but cannot serve as the proper bases for building programs. On the other hand, we ought to listen with a different ear to the voices of experienced teachers. In many instances they should probably be separated from the inexperienced teachers. The common practice of mixing experienced teachers who are beginning work on advanced degrees with students who have been awarded a baccalaureate but need to be certified in our master’s level courses may not be a good practice. Abandonment of that practice may prompt us to think about what we are doing. It may cause us to refuse admission to some students in some courses. The short-term consequence would certainly be some loss of FTE. The long-term effect may be quite surprising. We should remember that what is too easily achieved is too often too lightly esteemed.

**Conclusion**

Now that we have entered the 1990s, we can and should ask what remains two generations after that group in New York “invented” social foundations. I would submit that if we continue to try to work with their conclusions, we will suffer either continued bad times or even worse times. It is appropriate for us to be critical and even to insist that our colleagues and students face up to the fact that education is a normative and political undertaking, but the bases of our criticism demand reconsideration. Notions of the democratic welfare state so finely expressed in the 1930s and 1940s and even the early 1950s may still be useful. If they are, we must demonstrate, not just accept, their utility.

Our predecessors looked at their society, its problems, its crises, and decided education was essential in solving those problems and resolving the crises. To address the problems they identified, they invented social foundations. After they assembled their invention, they worked diligently to distribute it. Newman reports that “After Word War II Rugg made several trips to lend his support to developing foundations programs at other institutions, including one fourteen thousand mile journey that took him to thirty-five colleges and universities.” Their purpose was noble and relevant. Their invention—social foundations—deserves less attention to their concerns and the ways they went about realizing those concerns.

The foundations of social foundations were laid before World War II. Those who laid them were rightfully and understandably focusing on the transition of American society from an agrarian to an industrial society and on what some
believed was the collapse of democratic capitalism. Even as late as the early 1950s, Counts was focusing on the difference between the agrarian society and the industrial society:

All peoples are living in a period of most profound social and cultural transition. We in America have come to the end of an age that began with the first settlements along the Atlantic seaboard in the early decades of the seventeenth century. Even the great events that attended first to founding and later the preservation of the Republic were less disturbing and explosive than those that beat upon us today. Both in our domestic affairs and in our relations with the rest of the world we are confronted with new conditions, new dangers, and new possibilities. "The decade of the nineties," writes Henry Steele Commager, "is the watershed of American history"--a watershed between an "America, predominantly agricultural" and an "America, predominantly urban and industrial."

Our troubles are due largely to the fact that the times are out-of-joint. We stand between two civilizations--one that is passing away and another that is in birth. We stand between the agrarian and mercantile civilization of our ancestors and a strange and as yet undefined industrial civilization in which our children will live.92

While the Stanley-Smith-Benne-Anderson text included materials from the post-World War II era, its structure and intellectual foundations were from the other side of World War II. The intellectual bases of that work rested on theory provided by Karl Mannheim (Man and Society in Age of Reconstruction and Ideology and Utopia), Gunnar Myrdal (An American Dilemma), William F. Ogburn, and descriptive data provided by W. Lloyd Warner, Marchia Meeker, Kenneth Eells, Allison Davis, and other social scientists who mostly subscribed to the functionalist view of society.

The foundations of social foundations have passed their fiftieth birthday. Standing on these foundations may get in the way of our asking some important questions about the factors that began to influence schooling in America while the original foundations were being distributed by the tireless Rugg.

We may have grown too accustomed to the notion that ours is a society characterized by rapid scientific and technological advances and that to participate and to understand society more schooling is necessary for more people than ever before. For the most part, that notion seems to have been widely accepted. We continue to fret about "laggards" and "drop outs," and more people seem to be acquiring more schooling than ever before. Yet, the belief that the scientific and technological advances that were to take us to the post-industrial society would also require ever increasing numbers of highly trained and highly skilled personnel
to maintain it should be examined. The conventional wisdom about the relationship between work and schooling needs our attention, particularly in light of youth's inability to find work and its disaffection with schooling. The conventional wisdom about the relationship between schooling and work persists in the calls for educational reform. We need to examine it and challenge it more forcefully than we have. If we remain committed to our frontloading notions of education, we will isolate children and youth from meaningful participation to a greater degree than they now are. Schools are directly related to the economic requirements of society and people do and will probably continue to want to use the schools to gain access to the rewarding and comfortable rungs on the occupational ladder. Whether schools can be totally separated from the occupational structure is a question that has been raised, but our interest in it has not been sustained. It should be. How can a society fashion institutions unrelated to the work of its people? Does a post-industrial society have the resources and opportunity to pursue such a question? The persistence of the traditional school into the post-industrial society has effectively isolated children and youth from adult society. What was once preparation and induction may have become isolation.

We need to ask whether schooling can assume forms different from those we now know. Can we achieve the same, similar, or even better results by exploiting the access to information and ideas that the electronic media and computers offer? Such a question entails not asking how we can use the media and computers to aid the schools in its commitment to print media, but asking whether they can be used to effect a degree of literacy and knowledge about the world as effectively but more efficiently than schools as they are presently organized and administered. Clearly, these technologies seem not to have the capability to serve the custodial functions of the school, but the custodial function is certainly not sufficient reason to maintain a public school system. Other institutions can be invented and assigned that function. Social foundations should be exploring and explaining the distinctions Carl Bereiter made among training, schooling, and care. His distinctions allow us to see that there are indeed different ways to institutionalize schooling and education.

In "Schools Without Education," Bereiter argued that "schools should drop their educational function in order to do a better job of child care and training." He wanted schools to "narrow their teaching efforts to a simple concern with getting children to perform adequately in reading, writing, and arithmetic." The distinctions he made among education, care, and training are powerful, useful, and warrant some review as do the significance of his ability to make those distinctions so clearly and the reasons he gave for insisting upon "schools without education." He clearly and effectively showed that education, training, and care could be separated from each other and that "child care and training should be separated, carried out by different people according to different styles."93

Education according to Bereiter, "is not development but the effort to
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influence development." While not denying that "intellectual growth" and "personality development" were likely to continue to occur in schools, he maintained that any attempt to direct these processes in any direction could and should be abandoned. Child care, he readily admitted, supports the development of children but "is distinguished from education by its relative neutrality. It consists of providing resources, services, activities, love, and attention for children, but with no attempt to influence the course of development."94 Training, like education, is directive but only attempts "to produce a certain kind of performance in the child."95 How a child uses a skill and "how it is integrated into his personality" are not to be considered, for such concerns are "educational."

Bereiter's proposal was based on three claims: (1) the theoretical but practical impossibility of education in schools, (2) the demise of the traditional school; and (3) the exclusive right of parents to educate. While he did not deny that education was "in principle" possible, he believed in "the impossibility of mass education."96 He believed his proposal to narrow the scope of schooling was "not immoral," for it was his conviction and argument that "schools do not and cannot successfully educate, that is, influence how children turn out in any important way." The evidence that schools made educative differences was not compelling. The observable and demonstrable correspondence between the values students hold and the values schools teach does not necessarily mean that the school caused the students to hold such values, for it is just as plausible to claim that the correspondence between the two is evidence that "we are merely looking at two sides of the same thing, namely, the prevailing values of society."97 Similarly, the development of intellectual abilities is not necessarily related to schooling: "As they proceed through school, pupils get better at both mathematical reasoning and mathematical knowledge, but only the latter is related to the taking of mathematics courses."98 If the distinction between growth and education is observed, it is seen that schools take credit (as well as blame) for what would occur even if there were no schools. The education that can be achieved in school is "indoctrination. What does not seem to work in school is "intellectual". What represents education in a higher sense as the effort to develop a whole person, to draw forth potentialities of the individual and so on."99

Bereiter believed that life in the traditional school was characterized by "peace, enjoyment, and the child's sense that what he does is important."100 When Bereiter was writing, however, life in the traditional school was already very much like life in a peacetime army: "Both the child and the peacetime soldier are being readied for future activity, but in both cases the future activity is too remote and unforeseeable to serve as adequate motivation or purpose on a day-to-day basis."101 There was no question that the traditional school lost its efficacy. "Armed attacks on teachers and policemen in the halls" showed that it was neither a safe nor pleasant place to be. Its "demise" was "clearly underway" and "seems inevitable." He observed that:

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...the perspective of the outer world is penetrating the school. The traditional school cannot survive such an invasion, for if goings on in school come to be judged by the same standards as goings on outside they will be seen as ridiculous and the structure will collapse. You cannot have a room full of ten-year old Paul Goodmans and Edgar Z. Friedenbergs and hope to run a traditional school, especially if the teacher holds the same viewpoint.102

The school had once been isolated from the "outer world" but once it was dropped into it, there was no way to reverse the effects of its having been dunked. The schools we know are not the schools the founders of social foundations knew.

Bereiter further claimed that parents "are the only ones who have a clear-cut right to educate."103 In making the claim that the right to educate is exclusively the right of parents, Bereiter was either rejecting or unaware of the assumptions on which public education has been built. His position was contrary to the educators' longstanding conventional wisdom that the state has the right to educate children to protect the interests of both the child and the state. For example, Aristotle wrote that "we ought not to think that any of the citizens of the state belongs to himself, but that all belong to the state." For Aristotle those systems of education that allowed parents to teach their children whatever and however they saw fit were contrary to the best interests of the state.

That Bereiter would claim that the right of education belongs to the family is understandable. That such a belief is so commonly and widely held may be due to how professional educators who are essentially creatures of progressivism have behaved since the end of the nineteenth century and even before. As Cremin has observed, "though progressives asserted the primacy of familial education, they advanced the pre-eminence of schooling."104 The commitment to the proposition that the state has the right to educate created the conditions which eventually allowed instruction as conceptualized by modern psychology to rout ruthlessly education from schools, for progressives were committed to science and they accepted that psychology was science. The public school became the arena in which education and instruction did battle; and instruction won. Bereiter's proposal for schools without education is as much a statement about what became of education in public schools as it was a proposal. We have an obligation to question whether public schooling, an invention of the industrial society, is an appropriate institution for a post-industrial society.

It is time to look beyond our foundations, foundations that were first laid in the 1930s, and 1940s. To look beyond may require us to look at what transpired in our society before the 1960s and 1970s and after the 1930s. As William E. Leuchtenberg has observed, "historians have, curiously, given more attention to the 1960s than to the decade and a half immediately after the war [World War II]."105 In the 1930s, the founders of our field were looking at the significance of
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the 1890s. A half century later, it may be appropriate for us to look at the World War II and post-World War II eras when the transition from atomic to nuclear physics was completed. The completion of that transition gave us nuclear weaponry. Since then, traditional ways of conceptualizing war and peace have been inadequate. That is also the era during which we were introduced to computers. Nuclear energy, the computer, and television may constitute something even greater than the watershed and the transition of the 1890s. Our predecessors did a fairly good job of paying attention to how their world had been transformed. We should pay attention to ours, not theirs. Our space is different from theirs. It is furnished differently, and the human relationships within it are different. We only need to reflect upon the ever present concern with the family to begin to comprehend the difference. Then and now there were several educational institutions: family, school, church, the peer group, and media. Now the power of each and the relationship of each to the others are different. The new mix requires our attention.

Notes


2. While I cover much of the same territory covered by Steve Tozer and Stuart McAninch (“Social Foundations of Education in Historical Perspective,” Educational Foundations, No. 1 (Fall 1986), pp. 5-32). I believe I find difficulties they do not find. I suspect I find them because I less willing to accept social reconstructionism and the notion of democracy it entails than they are. If I have misread them, I apologize. In any event, I only wish to emphasize that we may differ.


7. Ibid. Emphasis added. I am aware that others may emphasize other parts of this quotation, especially the sentence devoted to the “social role of the school.”


32. Ibid., p. 217.

33. Ibid., p. 152.

34. Ibid.

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39. Ibid., p. 217.
40. Ibid., p. 218.
51. For an earlier expression of this belief see: T. R. McConnell, “The Nature of Educational Research,” The Conceptual Structure of Educational Research, a symposium held in connection with the fiftieth anniversary celebration of the University of Chicago. Suplementary Educational Monographs published in conjunction with The School Review and The Elementary School Journal, No. 55 (May 1942). McConnell wrote: “Competent educational research cannot be conducted without thorough knowledge of relevant phases of the basic disciplines which provide the foundations for a given field of educational activity. Problems in financing of education are obviously related to the whole field of public finance. Educational administration is one of several forms of public administration. It is difficult to see how research in educational finance and administration could be intelligently planned or executed without an understanding of the related portions of economics and political science. Almost every field of educational activity and research is, in like manner, tied in with other fields of knowledge and investigation” (p. 4).
53. After the appearance of The Process of Education, educators quickly turned their attention to the disciplines, to the structure of knowledge, and to the uses of knowledge. The National Education Association’s Project on Instruction sponsored a Seminar on the Disciplines, which “was called to facilitate student and effective use of the disciplines by (a) focusing on those fundamental ideas and methods of inquiry from selected fields of study which should be in the mainstream of the instructional program of the public schools and (b) exploring frontier thinking and research in the nature of knowledge and ways of knowing” (p. 2). The NEA was sponsoring a seminar designed not to lead the nation toward a new plan for education but one designed to follow the lead that had already been provided by the scholars. See: The Scholars Look at the Schools: A Report of the Disciplines Seminar. (Washington, D.C.: National...
Johanningmeier

Education Association, 1962). Shortly after the NEA Seminar, the School of Education at the University of Wisconsin--Milwaukee sponsored an invitational conference on "The Nature of Knowledge." The participants discussed the need for knowing, ways of knowing, knowledge and the structure of the disciplines, conceptions of knowledge and their significance for the curriculum, knowledge about knowledge for teachers, the structure of knowledge and the interrelationship of ideas, the relationships among knowledge, schooling and the preparation of teachers. See: William A. Jenkins (ed.). The Nature of Knowledge: Implications for the Education of Teachers (Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 1961).

55. Ibid., p. 6.
58. Ibid., p. 21.
61. It may or may not be to their credit but those responsible for the training of school administrators generally did what Callahan suggested. In their recent attempt at a history of educational administration, Roald F. Campbell, Thomas Fleming, L. Jackson Newell, and John W. Bennion clearly show the extent to which Callahan has influenced educational administration. Callahan is cited on the first page of their text and is cited four times as frequently as is Cremin. See: A History of Thought and Practice in Educational Administration (New York: Teachers College Press, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1987), pp. 1, 23, 32-44, 39-40, 103, 126, 128, 130, 131.
63. Perhaps the best and most recent work to focus on this distinction is: David Hamilton. Towards a Theory of Schooling (London: The Falmer Press, 1989).
66. Ibid.
69. Sirotnik, "Eroding Foundations," p. 714. Unfortunately, Sirotnik may not be alone in his failure to distinguish between social foundations and introduction to education. It has been reported in the newsletter of the Florida Foundations of Education and Policy
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Studies Society (June 1, 1990) that "Twenty-four of the 28 Florida community colleges have responded to an FFEPS request to identify the foundations courses they offer for teacher preparation. While 'Introduction to Education,' or 'Orientation to Education' is the most common offering, some colleges offer other courses as well..." Nothing was reported about either the training or the credentials of those who are teaching introduction and orientation courses but believe they are teaching foundations courses.

73. Ibid., p. 2.
75. Ibid., 255-256.
77. Ibid., 23.
86. Ibid., p. 11.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid., p. 392.
96. Ibid, p. 394.
98. Ibid, p. 393.
100. Ibid, p. 396.
102. Ibid, p. 399.
103. Ibid.
Correction

Rae W. Rohfeld, co-author of "New Perspectives on Community and Self: Implications of Constructing History--A Case Study" in the Spring 1991 issue of Educational Foundations, was incorrectly identified in the author statement on page 47 of that issue.

She is an associate professor with the Adult Education Program, School of Education, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York.
"Maybe When I Have My Own Classroom...": Foundational Irrelevance in Pre-Service Teacher Education

By Don Dippo

Many of us who teach social foundations courses believe that they can and should be important in the preparation of teachers to the extent that they are able to encourage the formulation of conceptual frameworks and analytic tools for making sense of experiences, critiquing common-sense understandings, and informing courses of action. If this is indeed the case, it would seem sensible to try to link, wherever possible, foundations studies to everyday life in schools. But what is so evidently sensible is not always so easily accomplished.

Most of the students in the foundations courses I teach are involved in a student-teaching practicum--usually one or two full days per week in a classroom. With this in mind, I generally try to draw on students' experiences to demonstrate the value and utility of
foundations disciplines—that is, to show how everyday "teaching concerns" can often be understood as manifestations of larger social/educational issues—issues with histories and which often encompass a multiplicity of perspectives on, interests in, commitments to, and philosophies of, education. The intention is to have students develop some measure of insight into the socio-historical contexts of education, on the assumption that such insights guide effective teaching practice. But students, for the most part, don't buy this.

The title of this paper has been changed from "Why Waste Our Time With This Stuff When There's So Much We Have To Learn" to "Maybe When I Have My Own Classroom..." This change reflects, I think, a measure of progress in my own teaching. For most students, my courses are no longer totally irrelevant (as implied in "why waste our time...")) but they still lack any vital connection to the "here and now" of their student-teaching lives. This paper is an exploration of why this might be so and what might be done about it.

Reflecting on Teaching Practice

When thinking about the circumstances which occasion a re-examination of practice on the part of teachers, I would include, based on my own public school teaching experiences, such things as: recurrent problems with methods or materials that just don't seem to work; ongoing contact with students and their families and an appreciation of the often difficult circumstances of their lives; conflicting pressures and demands made by school officials, the local community, the educational "system," and the society at large. The social relations which organize the work of teaching are such that, in time, they tend to create an acute awareness on the part of teachers that their work in classrooms is inexorably linked to social, political, and economic conditions outside the school walls. This awareness, of course, does not inevitably lead to a re-examination of principles and purposes and/or a re-formulation of teaching practices—indifference and cynicism are always options.

The realities of teaching do, however, generate the conditions and provide the circumstances (but only rarely the opportunities) to use history, philosophy, and social theory to formulate insights into or develop clearer understandings of the complexities of everyday classroom life.

Situating Student Teaching

Student teachers in classrooms, however, face a different set of circumstances. The social relations which organize the work of the student teacher are such that performance very often becomes paramount. Over the course of their placements, student teachers are usually expected to demonstrate that they are able: to plan conventional lessons (and/or a series or sequence of lessons); to teach those lessons while maintaining order and control; and to do both of these in such a way as to
satisfy the expectations of someone (school-based, university-based, or both) charged with evaluating their performances. While teachers in host classrooms commonly view the relationship between themselves and their student teachers as similar to the relationship between masters and apprentices, from the student teacher's point of view often the relationship more closely resembles that which exists between casting directors and aspiring actors at an audition. Very often they express a sense of feeling "over-supervised, over-evaluated, and always under scrutiny" (An interesting exception here is when a student teacher is placed with a new or relatively new teacher and a more collaborative relationship develops).

The lack of opportunity to "practice in private," at least partially understood in relation to the perceived consequences of making "mistakes" (e.g., kids might get out of hand, established routines might be challenged), structures the student teaching situation in such a way as to discourage innovation, trying out one's own ideas, taking risks, and instead encourages student teachers to try to maintain a "business as usual" posture; that is, to work within and around existing classroom practices ("If I can 'take the place of' or 'step in for' my host teacher and the kids go along, s/he'll probably give me a good evaluation. If I try my own ideas, change classroom routines, etc., I might bomb, I might get a bad evaluation, and my future as a teacher might be jeopardized. Why chance it?").

Organized into fragmentary and discontinuous events, understood in performance/evaluation terms, the student teaching experience is one which too often emphasizes immediate effect and personal technique, and obscures the importance of a coherent educational vision or project which shapes and gives purpose to the everyday practice of teaching. Such vision and sense of project are, in many respects, what enable teachers to situate the events of any given day within a broader, more comprehensive educational context. An idea that doesn't work out can be understood as simply that, and not necessarily the catastrophe it often represents for the student teacher.

One unfortunate outcome of a performance-oriented practicum structure is that it supports, even encourages, a view of teaching as merely a technical activity, and an image of teachers as primarily operatives, functionaries, or technicians held to account for what they do in terms established by someone else, somewhere else. Tips, rather than contextualized knowledge of teaching, serve the immediate, practical needs of student-teachers-as-students for whom the classroom is a stage and testing ground of their abilities to perform as if they were teachers. Situated in the vivid present, confronted often for the first time with the unexpected events and unanticipated problems which routinely intrude upon "daily plans," observed and assessed on their performance, is it any wonder that tips for minding and motivating and monitoring students have the value they do for student teachers?

It's easy enough to fault pre-service student teachers for being a-theoretical and even anti-intellectual: to complain to each other about their seeming inability
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or unwillingness even to try to make connections between processes of analysis and the practice of teaching. Yet the important question to be asked is what have we, as teacher educators, done to “dis-able” students in this regard? Have we thought through what it would mean for students to really make those connections, to take foundational issues seriously into account?

Empowering Intentions
with Dis-Empowering Implications

Early attempts to link my own foundations courses with students’ practicum experiences were based on the notion that theory and research could and should be used to problematize students’ taken-for-granted understandings of what schools do. The idea of a “hidden curriculum” provides an interesting and informative example. As students aspiring to become teachers, many were surprised (even incensed) at the suggestion that one of the aims of schooling might be to produce students who are compliant and deferential to authority. Yet, often when they would recollect their own experiences in schools, these same student teachers were able to see why and how the concept and its critique of schooling made sense. Thinking about the “hidden curriculum” with reference to their student teaching experiences, however, they wondered how things could possibly be otherwise. Of course they wanted compliant and deferential students! How else could you teach them? What kind of teacher would encourage students to “Question Authority!”? (Certainly not a student teacher struggling daily to establish some kind of classroom authority.)

The point of seeing classroom problems as manifestations of larger social, historical, and/or economic issues often, as in this example, ends up being immobilizing rather than empowering. If the problem of students “acting out” in class is related to issues of power and control, both inside and outside the school, then the student teacher has few options other than feeling implicated in supporting the reproduction of an unjust, oppressive society, because the classroom situation as s/he experiences it demands control. “I’ve got to be able to get kids to sit down and be quiet. I’m a student teacher. I’m being evaluated. What do you expect me to do?” In retrospect, I see this now as a case of trying to use the context of student teaching to illustrate social theory without fully appreciating the difficult situation of the student teacher.

The danger in coupling a “foundations-as-critique” approach to a “you’re-on-your-own-and-we’re-watching” practicum structure is that it entraps those who take the critiques seriously in a web of futility and despair. The effect is to disable rather than to empower, i.e., that individuals as teachers are seen as being personally implicated in and held to account for the part schooling plays in reproducing social and economic injustices. What makes issues of equity and social justice seem so overwhelming is that they require collective solutions, and
student teachers (like ordinary teachers) have very little opportunity to develop a sense of being a part of a community of educators committed to a vision of what schools might be like. To the extent that these large issues as problems seem overwhelming or outside the purview of the ordinary classroom teacher, the issues themselves and courses which deal with them are likely to be seen as having little practical import.

The immediate reality of the classroom for student teachers exists at the level of practices, problems, and tips/techniques which afford personal solutions. Even when social, political, and economic issues are salient for students, the personalist view of teaching we encourage in our programs often results in a well-intentioned naivete—"Somehow I'll help the students in my class to overcome social, historical, and economic injustice" or "If I can really make a difference in just one life it'll be worth it." As a student in my class concluded a paper recently: "Definite class structures exist in our society and some kids attend schools in rich areas while others attend 'inner city' schools. I guess as teachers the best thing for us to do is try. We have to believe in what we are doing and believe that we will make a difference. In an inner city school, the successes may be few, but any success makes it all seem worthwhile." In their practicum placements few students will ever "see for themselves" the limitations of such personalist solutions. Nor will many of them come to appreciate the value of an analysis which points the way towards collaboration and collective action aimed at the sources of recurrent or chronic problems. Student teachers, in short, don't have and are generally not getting the kinds of experiences in which to ground foundational studies.

From Foundations as Critique to Foundations as Possibility

Another orientation to the problem of forging links between foundational studies and school experience is to emphasize the practicability of examining underlying assumptions rather than merely critiquing existing practices. While critique of practice does not necessarily entail the formulation of alternatives, to focus on underlying assumptions opens up the possibility of reconceptualizing the understandings and redefining the situations which are so often taken for granted. Reflected upon and reconsidered, the inevitability and supposed naturalness of existing practice gives way to more open-ended and unorthodox ways of thinking which support and encourage the creation of alternative and oppositional forms.

But speculation about alternatives, while certainly a step in the right direction, is insufficient. To realize alternative possibilities requires the provision of a kind of student teaching experience in which ideas can be enacted in practice. In other words, to provide a praxis-oriented program of teacher education, it is not enough simply to provide the occasion for student teachers to talk about and reflect upon what they saw and did in classrooms. It is also necessary to provide the occasions...
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for them to act upon what they have been talking and thinking about. This means de-emphasizing the performance/evaluation aspects of the student teaching experience and encouraging innovation and experimentation beyond the usual rhetoric. This, of course, is easier said than done. Even when a particular concept or analysis provides insights into the assumptions which underlay an existing practice and offers the possibility of thinking about and doing things otherwise, and even when the opportunity to experiment, to do otherwise, presents itself, the fact that "people are watching" creates an understandable desire for "scripted lessons" with "no surprises."

Class-Rules Meetings: An Example

In colleges of education where progressive and humanistic ideals prevail, there is a principled belief that, generally speaking, if students are engaged in activities which are interesting and worthwhile, there will be no discipline problems. It follows from this belief that if there are discipline problems, the quality and nature of classroom activities should be examined and reconsidered. This seems consistent with at least the first part of the Deweyan dictum that: "...the primary source of social control resides in the nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility" (Dewey, 1938, p.56).

Concerns about discipline and classroom control, therefore, are often dismissed as unimportant: "If your classroom is set up right and your activities are well planned there'll be no problems." But student teachers see real problems in classrooms and they wonder and worry about students getting "out of control." Many resort to close readings of "How to..." books mostly written from the perspective of behavioral psychology. While they know better than to talk too openly about "positive reinforcement" and "token economies," they regularly share tips and texts with each other. In these circumstances, the teacher-controlled, child-centered classroom comes to be seen, not as contradictory, but as balanced: combining the best elements of old and new thinking "in ways that work."

To formulate effective alternatives to these increasingly popular "classroom management" techniques requires being able to reconceptualize problems of discipline and to address rather than ignore issues of order and control. Dewey provides a useful starting point in the above quotation when he qualifies "the nature of the work done." It is not simply "the work" which is the source of control, but the work "as a social enterprise in which all individuals have the opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility." For Dewey, the kind of control which is most compatible with progressive philosophy is control which is social—that is, shared and consensual—rather than a manifestation of personal will as embodied in the teacher.

Order based on shared commitments and consent is an attractive alternative
to control imposed and order kept exclusively by the teacher. It opens up possibilities for thinking about harmonious and supportive classroom social relations without having to resort to manipulative management techniques. An appealing prospect, the task of building commitment and community in the classroom is not one which can or should be conceptualized in terms of quick and easy techniques, nor undertaken in fits and starts. Nonetheless, there are those student teachers who are encouraged (even inspired) by Dewey’s educational vision and seek to establish some semblance of classroom community through experiments with limited forms of democratic participation. Most often these efforts take the form of class meetings, usually because at some point in their school careers (as students or classroom observers) student teachers have seen or experienced at least one “class meeting.” Unfortunately, the version of a class meeting most often recalled and re-enacted is one which appeals in the same way that tips appeal—they are scripted events in which students demonstrate some degree of interest and even enthusiasm, but more importantly, there are no problems and no surprises.

In its most common variant, the teacher or student teacher sits down with the class intent on generating a list of class rules “that we can all live with.” While class rules sessions most often take place in September, they can occur any time during the school year when the teacher wants to divest him/her self of the more autocratic qualities of personal authority. Students who have spent any time at all in schools are usually able to generate with relative ease the standard list of rules: do not interrupt when someone else is speaking; raise your hand if you want to talk; don’t mess around with other peoples stuff; don’t swear or call people names; etc. Sometimes there is discussion and negotiation:

...I think we should be able to get a drink anytime we want.
But what would happen if everyone wanted a drink at the same time?
Okay then, only one person getting a drink at a time.
Last year Mr. McIntyre had a wooden DrinkPass that you needed to have if you wanted a drink.
Ya, let’s do that again this year...

Sometimes the rules go beyond simply stating the code of behavior to include agreed upon sanctions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Butting in line</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>go to the end</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calling names</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>miss one recess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>see the principal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Occasionally discussion includes matters of curriculum and pedagogy:

No activities until all your work is done.

Part of what makes this exercise so appealing, especially to student teachers, is that it is so predictable. In the absence of a counter-vision of what classrooms might be like, students come up with what must seem to them to be the Universal
Set of Classroom Rules (USCR). Clearly there are local variations, Mr. McIntyre's DrinkPass for example, but the necessity for a drink rule is taken for granted. What's more, if the teacher decides that there are some rules missing, s/he can count on the students to be able to figure out what the appropriate rule might be:

Do we need any special rules for gym?
No gym unless you have your gym clothes.
And why is that?
You might get hurt.
And no throwing balls at someone's head...

As well, students can be counted on to dismiss those rules which really challenge existing structures of authority:

How 'bout if we come to school anytime we want?
Yeah! Yeah! Anytime we want!
Don't be crazy Edward or you'll ruin it for the rest of us.
Why not then?
Because school starts at nine-o'clock. That's why.

Another appealing thing about the class rules exercise, especially for student teachers, is that the "Code of Conduct" or "Class Charter" can be invoked anytime there is a "discipline problem":
Robyn, you've got to stop interrupting. Remember our rules...

No, I'm sorry you can't have gym. There's nothing I can do. The class made the rules...

The problem here is that while the process seems to resemble what Dewey had in mind when he suggested "all contribute and hence all feel responsible," the content which results, the rules themselves, are artificial because the process is so inauthentic. They have less to do with engendering a sense of community within the classroom and more to do with obfuscating the position of teacher in the structure of classroom social relations--as the "keeper" of order and control.

Another variation of the class rules exercise has been suggested by the Canadian Human Rights Foundation (1988). In an attempt to put substance into the form of the class rules meeting, they suggest that rather than starting from nothing (which often results in a "guess what I'm thinking" exercise), a class "Declaration of Rights" be developed in response to discussions and interpretations of the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1959 (resolution 1386 [XIV]). The advantage of starting with the Declaration is that it affords the opportunity to extend the discussion beyond the boundaries of what would ordinarily otherwise be considered in the negotiable class rules realm. For example, consideration of Principle 2 of the Declaration, which deals with the right to live and develop in a healthy and normal environment in conditions of freedom and dignity, provides the opportunity to discuss, among other things: the risk posed by asbestos in the boiler...
room, the temperature of the classroom, criteria for establishing what is "normal" or reasonable when it comes to classroom cleanliness or desk tidiness, and put-downs and other patronizing comments made by teachers and students alike. Clearly, such a discussion puts limits on the arbitrary authority of the teacher in areas where such authority is often presumed (remember those teachers who said cold rooms were good for you? or who subscribed to a " tidy desk means a tidy mind" semiotic).

Principle 3 states that the child shall be entitled to a name and a nationality. This opens the way for discussion of forms of address and forms of inclusion. If the students in grade five don't like being called "boys and girls," should the teacher change his/her form of address? Is Chow entitled to be called "Chow" instead of "Joe" if that's what he prefers? What if Sundeep wants to be called "Sunny"? Or if Walter wants to be called "Mad Dog"? Regarding inclusion and exclusion: Can/should a student be sent out of the room to work in "isolation"? Or left out of a class activity or trip? What kinds of responsibilities do class members have to include each other? For example, "If we don't want Tanya to play with us, do we have to let her?"

Principle 4 states that children have the right to be well-fed. Consider what can/should class members do about those who come to school hungry? Is there food being wasted and/or tossed out at lunchtime? Are there ways to bring hungry kids and excessive lunches together in ways which are not demeaning (where the ill-fed receive the leftovers of the over-fed)?

Principle 7 says that children should have the opportunity for recreation and play. What are the implications for once-a-week physical education or the practice of withholding recess?

When we discuss these possibilities in the foundations course I teach, student teachers seem genuinely interested and enthusiastic. But the unpredictability of this version of the class rules exercise makes them understandably wary. This is where "Maybe when I have my own classroom..." comes in. They recognize that the project of building a caring community in the classroom is one which requires broad vision, sustained effort, and the tenacity not to be discouraged when supportive structures and sustaining practices break down, as they occasionally but inevitably will.

The performance/evaluation problematic which organizes much current practicum teaching, however, is not one which encourages experimentation with a more foundationally-informed classroom practice. Instead, student teachers are positioned in such a way that the safest options always make the most sense. Class meetings to come up with a set of class rules are becoming increasingly popular in my town. Student teachers generally feel quite comfortable with this exercise, in that they can rest assured that nothing will ever come out of such meetings which challenge or contravene existing classroom practices. At least, they say, it's a step in the right direction, which of course it isn't in so far as it represents not a genuine
sharing of power, but only a more insidious and covert form of manipulation and control.

Reorienting the Practicum to Accommodate Foundational Studies

One way to enhance the relevance and utility of foundational studies would be to restructure the practicum in such a way as to provide students with the opportunity to develop a more comprehensive and contextualized knowledge of teaching. Beyond the technical demands of “teaching lessons,” student teachers need to know much more about how working teachers actually “know what to do,” decide how to do it, justify it to others, and make sense of it themselves, all the while continually mediating conflicting demands and expectations regarding what “ought to be” done in their classrooms. As well, they should be made party to the doubts and reservations, disappointments and regrets, small pleasures, modest accomplishments, and sweet victories which occur outside classrooms, outside school hours, among colleagues, with former students, involving parents, which are so much a part of the day to day practice of teaching. What’s often missing in teacher education is this kind of depth and breadth of actual teaching experiences. It’s not just that these other kinds of experiences are “part of the job,” but also that they have a strong bearing on what goes on (and doesn’t go on) in classrooms because of the ways in which they shape teachers’ understandings of relations with students, among themselves, between themselves and administrations, and between schools and local communities.

In addition to the provision of an expanded range of experiences, and based on the assumption that an overemphasis on “weeding out” incompetents often has the effect of inhibiting the development of competence in student-teachers, a reconstructed practicum could be at least as inquiry-focused as it is currently performance-based. This would entail recognizing the student teacher as a resource, as an inquirer as well as an observer cum practitioner, as someone able and entitled to pose serious questions, to comment on problems, and to contribute to efforts at finding solutions. This in turn opens up the possibility for developing a more mutually supportive, collaborative relationship between host and student teachers (and between foundations teachers and practicum coordinators as well). Both parties stand to benefit from a more deliberate and focused inquiry into everyday teaching practice. Experienced teachers willing to enlist the support of novices in pursuit of answers to real pedagogical questions (“Do you see any differences in the ways I interact with different kinds of students?,” “I’m getting so tired of these math workbooks, do you know about any more exciting ways to teach this stuff?,” “I’d really like to know more about what happens to the students who drop-out of this program,”) would find themselves learning as well as teaching, and likely becoming better teachers in the process.
A practicum program designed to encourage inquiry would also enable students to ask many of the kinds of questions which too often remain unposed when the student/teacher relation is defined strictly in terms of performance/evaluation. Rather than speculate about or presume to know the political/pedagogical intentions and understandings which teachers use to organize everyday life in classrooms and perennial living in schools, students would be encouraged (even required!) to engage their host teachers in discussions of theory, to raise issues of social philosophy, and to ask questions about the politics of teaching. Being explicit about the rationale for such an inquiry-oriented practicum is crucial to ensure that such questions are not understood as inappropriate, insolent, or "unprofessional." This kind of openness and collaboration would enable both host and student teachers to clarify for themselves and, indeed, extend their own senses of purpose and understandings of the commitments which underlie and guide teaching practice.

Because teaching is inevitably a moral and political enterprise, developing a clear sense of educational project is important in that it provides a framework for discussing and understanding classroom life and formulating courses of action which are consistent with an overall sense of purpose. Solutions to specific problems then are derived not from "tips" but from insights into the dynamics of classroom life and commitments to a particular understanding of the relation between schools and society. The relevance of foundations studies to this kind of exploration into the knowledge and commitments which underlie teaching practice is clear. A practicum reconceptualized along these lines, aimed at forging links between theory and practice, would be a practicum which supported learning about teaching in addition to learning to teach.

Notes
1. For a further discussion of cynicism among experienced teachers see Connell (1985).
2. See Beyer (1985) for an interesting analysis of how field-experiences tend to encourage imitation and uniformity. See also Britzman (1991) for a discussion of how the "pervasive myths" of student teaching as "trial and error," "sink or swim," and "baptism by fire" support student teachers' perceptions of the classroom as a "proving ground."
3. Liston and Zeichner (1991) stress the need for collaboration and shared vision in arguing for a "social-reconstructionist agenda" in education.
4. Britzman (1991:213) argues that what is needed are more opportunities for student-teachers to "practice in meaningful ways."
6. See Liston and Zeichner (1991), especially Chapter 6, for an outline of "an inquiry-oriented student teaching program."
References


Postmodernism and the Crisis of Reason: Social Change or the Drama of the Aesthetic?

By Svi Shapiro

The Problem of Knowledge and the Politics of Common Sense

In a time of rapidly increasing social decay, economic dislocation, and cultural confusion it has become more and more difficult to maintain the conviction that social scientists or academic experts are really capable of intervening effectively to redress our societal ills. The "politics of common-sense" of the Reagan (and Thatcher) era was surely, in part, a rebuff to the perceived hubris and ineffectiveness of social science. To fulfill its own promises and claims—to make urban school systems work, to substantially increase the levels of literacy among both young people and adults, to staunch the flow of drug abuse, to stem
violent crime, or to solve the problems of poverty and a burgeoning underclass. The paradox of the vast army of university-trained experts, equipped with complex and sophisticated systems of technology, rendered near useless in their capacity to ameliorate (let alone eliminate) the scars and blights within our culture has not gone unnoticed by either the public, the politician, or within the academy itself.

Such failure, of course, is a more complex business than the wrongheadedness of the experts. Their competence, knowledge, or ability is only a part of an explanation which, more fully, would have to address the difficulties of bringing about ameliorative change in a piecemeal manner. For example, curtailing the widespread use of drugs is unlikely without seriously addressing the larger issues of economic hopelessness, racial injustice, and political disempowerment. It would require, in other words a commitment to undertake fundamental changes in the structure of power and opportunity in American society--something that goes way beyond the usually limited policy advice of social scientists.

Still, the ineffectiveness of the university, as a whole, in intervening reconstructively in society has had its demoralizing effects on intellectual life. Perhaps nowhere has this been more apparent than within the field of professional education. Schools of education have become notorious sources of an endless, while suspect, production of "new" techniques, technologies, and methods for the improvement of schools and teaching. The generally modest classroom usefulness or success of all this has led to the widespread delegitimation of educational research. The notion that "experience works, theory doesn't" is common currency in the profession (as well as widely-held outside it). Certainly there is little relationship between the vast and endless outpouring of research reported in the academic journals and the actual effect on what happens in the classroom, or in the administration and practices of schools.

But the unfolding crisis of faith among critical intellectuals--that is those concerned with radical social change--rests on more than the relatively pragmatic issues of whether ideas and theories in the academy can be made effective and relevant to the real world outside. Intellectually, there is a deeper crisis that has called into question many of the underlying assumptions that have supported the quest for knowledge in the modern era. This "postmodern" perspective has raised serious concern over humankind's capacity to know about our world as well as the reliability of our moral and political convictions. It has cast a shadow over assumptions about the relationship between human understanding and freedom that have been at the core of the beliefs of critical intellectuals during this century.

These doubts have fundamentally undermined the claims that traditional social science, including educational research, can provide a valid, accurate, and objective understanding of the social world and human experience. The kind of knowledge such research produces is one that treats human beings as things to be manipulated and objectified, much like the inert, unconscious materials found in the scientific laboratory. The goal of such research--whether in the social or the
natural world--is the production of knowledge that will allow us to create the conditions for predictable, that is controllable, behavior. The recent recognition of the pervasiveness of this logic in most research has deeply alienated critically-minded intellectuals for whom such research has increasingly come to be seen as but another version of how the "will to knowledge" becomes the "will to power." In education or in other areas of the culture positivist research, as it is usually referred to, while parading as an ameliorative human practice, actually contributes to the dehumanization and dispowerment of human beings. It supports the imperium of intellectuals and experts who can and will know more about the world of their human subjects than the latter are apparently able to. For critical intellectuals, knowledge gained through positivist research, whatever its ostensible purpose, actually negates the vision of a democratic culture because of the way it magnifies and distinguishes the voices of experts (and the corporate managers who employ or supervise them) over and against those who are disenfranchised by the ignorance about their own work and lives.

The problem of knowledge is not, however, simply that it legitimates hierarchy and supports a way of being which objectifies people into the voiceless, consciousness, spiritless forms of scientific matter. It is also that it aims to know people as abstractions. In the language of postmodern theory, it emphasizes "sameness" over "difference." Its goal is a description of human experience which reduces it to its most homogeneous, generalizable features. What counts is that part of the experience that can be fitted into some universal explanatory framework--some abstract system of human accounting in which what really matters is what the influential French philosopher Jean Francois Lyotard calls the "Grand Narrative"--what we might more simply call, "the big picture." The big picture is able to explain everyone in general but no one in particular. The specificity of human life in its richly detailed diversity and particularity is lost to the drive for universal schemes of knowledge that can provide the masterkeys for understanding human existence and social life.

The mania to provide such universal explanations--through approaches as diverse as Marxism or scientific research, theories of human nature or philosophical systems--is driven by the search for the means to predict and to control the social world. It is this drive, say the critics, which is at the heart of "modernity"--no matter in what political guise it appears (liberal, communist, social-democratic, fascist). Since the Enlightenment and the inception of the modern world, man (and, say the critics, this is meant literally) has sought and valued a kind of knowledge which might unlock the basic mechanisms of societal change. Such knowledge, it was hoped, would make man the master of the universe, the diviner of historical progress. Indeed, on the basis of this system of knowledge, intellectuals or experts could decide what kinds of human behaviors, ethics, or institutions might represent a greater or lesser degree of human progress, reflect cultures that can with infinite certainty be seen as more advanced or less primitive.
Yet, as writers like Sharon Welch have warned us, universal discourse is the language of the privileged--denied to women, the poor, and other subordinate and dominated groups of human beings. She says it is precisely in the name of universal values or prescriptions for the world--even where those talk about justice and freedom--that oppression has been practiced or legitimated. We must, she cautions, be acutely wary of universal theories that being about everybody in general subsume the particular history, struggles, voices, knowledge, and sensibilities of those who are not privileged enough to enter into this kind of discourse. The temptation to define--in the name of some universal definition of justice and freedom--the hopes of others for liberation has only perpetuated oppression. It is this capacity to define in universal theoretical, moral, and political terms that has been the trademark of critical intellectuals during the last two centuries.

**Postmodern Despair and the Crisis of Reason**

Postmodern thinking has cast serious doubt on our assumptions about knowledge and freedom, reason and progress. These assumptions are at the heart of the intellectual and political ideas which together form what the German critical theorist Jurgen Habermas called the “enlightenment project”--a set of ideas which until recently provided the universal vision and justification for radical social change. Within it historical progress is measured by the expanding capacity of human reason to make both nature and society transparently clear and ascertifiable. And in this disclosing of the truth about our world proper thought and understanding offer up greater possibilities of human freedom. Mystery and ideology are replaced (sometimes gradually, sometimes through violent upheaval) by a world in which being and consciousness--the way we live and the way we think--no longer belie one another. Truth and freedom, progress and knowledge are wedded together through the liberating promise of the great intellectual systems of modern society. No matter that these systems may, in themselves, fundamentally oppose or contradict one another, each offers itself as the way in which human beings can come to progressively grasp the truth about the world.

Yet after the Gulag and Auschwitz, modern “metanarratives,” as they are sometimes called, have lost their credibility. After the degeneration and corruption of radical regimes and revolutionary movements with their promises of a more just and human society, and after the recognition of impending ecological catastrophe, a consequence of scientific reason run amok, the visionary dreams of radical intellectuals have been stifled if not extinguished. The world-transforming hopes and dreams of critical intellectuals in the 20th century have been undermined by a deepening crisis in the systems of analysis and explanation that had been crucial to the belief that their hopes were more than pie-in-the-sky utopias. In this sense, as Marshall Berman has argued, the postmodern mood is the self-expression of those who have lost the sense of hope and possibility about significantly changing...
our world. Berman has suggested, for example, that the most devoted followers of the intellectually influential French postmodernism were people who had come of age in the 1970s, who had inherited all of the bitterness of the 60s Left and the Vietnam war generation, without having any of the experiences of protracted struggle leading to limited but significant gains in the world. It was, he said, a generation that "appropriated and deepened all our radical negations but ignored our radical hopes." The failures of the 1960s (and more particularly for French intellectuals, of May 1968) and of Marxism as a liberating political practice have been central to the developing cynicism towards all ambitions for total, systematic understanding of history. The runaway destructive power of technology has generated despair at the possibility of a world which might be rationally controlled. At the close of the 20th century, bleak uncertainty and doubt has replaced the exhilarating promise of either a human history made meaningful and lawful or a natural universe whose own unfolding coherence ensured a human existence of unlimited freedom. The fateful and glittering prizes promised by totalizing, systematic knowledge of nature and of society have crumbled away, leaving only sobering, even paralyzing doubts. This mood is captured well by Salman Rushdie who, in an interview in 1989, said:

Doubt it seems to me is the central condition of a human-being in the 20th century. One of the things that has happened to us in the 20th century as a human race is to learn how certainty crumbles in your hand. We cannot any longer have a fixed certain view of anything--the table that we're sitting next to, the laws of science, are full of doubt now. Everything we know is pervaded by doubt and not by certainty.

At the center of what Rushdie refers to has been the growing inability of human beings to affix to what we call reality some enduring consistent facticity. What we call reality seems more and more to consist of a fleeting and transient flux of images and symbols. It is within these conditions that the radically-minded intellectual has, in the 1970s and 80s, increasingly begun to doubt the mode of analysis called "ideology critique"--a form of critical reason that rests on the claim that it is really possible to lift the veil of ideas and images that conceal the world as it really is. In penetrating our false and distorted perceptions of the world, ideology-critique suggests that it is possible to apprehend in some correct way the underlying structures of reality. For many critical intellectuals the search for true understanding about the world has been replaced by the endless (and playful) process of "textual deconstruction." Reflecting the enormous influence of developments within the field of literary criticism, we have been persuaded to treat with derision all claims that human beings can really say or know what they mean--that there can be anything more than an endless series of stories told from within the historical, cultural, and linguistic perspective and horizon of the story-teller. The Hegelian
promise of emancipated consciousness in which humanity can fully grasp and understand the conditions of its own existence is derided as outdated myths of progress and freedom. The postmodern intellectual culture surrounds us with a way of thinking that urges us to abandon our illusions that connect freedom to knowledge. It accuses this kind of intellectual reason as reflecting little more than masculine hubris and fantasy about a world in which all can be revealed, and hence all can be brought under rational control.

Central to this more decentered and humbling view of human understanding is the collapse of the notion of some real world outside of language. In the view of literary critics, all references to a "real" object in a "real" world are reduced to a kind of myth. In describing man's imprisonment in a world of language which perpetually limits any knowledge we may have of reality, the Marxist scholar Fred Jameson notes that it is no longer possible to talk about the real as something "out there" that the human subject can see or grasp:

It [the subject] can no longer look directly out of its eyes at the real world for the referent but must, as in Plato's cave, trace its mental images of the world on its confining walls.\(^{18}\)

He goes on:

If there is any realism left, it is a 'realism' which springs from the shock of grasping that confinement and of realizing that, for whatever peculiar reasons, we seem condemned to seek the historical past through our own pop images and stereotypes about the past, which itself remain forever out of reach.

This erosion in our confidence about describing the real world in which we live has followed the widespread popularity of models of language associated with the work of post-structuralist writers like Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan. In all of this work the notion that the sign—that is the sound of a word or its inscription that represents meaning—has some immediate relation to something outside of itself is dismissed as metaphysical nonsense. From this perspective the world that we take to be reality can be no more than the illusory world of language. Condemned, as we are, to grasping or seeing reality through language, the real world eludes us and is replaced with the conventions of what is socially-constructed and discursively familiar. There can be little doubt as to the power of this kind of analysis in sweeping away claims to realistic accounts of the world which assert positive or definite knowledge or understanding about reality. There is, in this view, an insistence that language is not a way of naming a pre-existing world. It is nothing more than an arbitrary system of classification based on the creation of distinctions or differences. Catherine Belsey lucidly describes this process:

far from providing a set of labels for entities which exist independently in the world, language precedes the existence of independent entities, making the world intelligible by differen-
Of course, in the normal course of events, words appear to refer to some reference or object external to language. Language gives the illusion of being a transparent window to a world outside of it. Yet, as Belsey argues, this is so because language and its way of classifying and ordering the world precedes our understanding of the world. In other words, the existence of language precedes any understanding of the world we might have:

Words seem to be symbols for things because things are inconceivable outside the system of differences which constitutes the language. Similarly these very things seem to be represented in the mind in an autonomous realm of thought because thought is in essence symbolic, dependent on the differences brought about by the symbolic order. And so language is "overlooked," suppressed in favor of a quest for meaning in experience and/or the mind. The world of things and subjectivity then becomes the twin guarantors of truth.

But no such truth is now available. Neither of these "guarantors" of truth is now tenable. It is not possible to somehow actually know the world of things through some objective empirical scientific method. Nor can human reason somehow penetrate to the reality of things. In the post-structural world the claim to really know something about the nature of reality is invalidated. All we can ever know are the meanings made available through one or other discourse or language. Whether through the conventional words of everyday life, or through critical reason that claims to see through mystifying appearances to what really exists, we can never actually move beyond the signs to what is truly the nature of this world. We can never finally escape the prison-house of language.

The End of Truth and the Decline of Conviction

In the work of the French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault the postmodern invalidation of truth claims find its sharpest proponent—and the one whose work is most obviously linked to matters of politics and social change. Under the influence of Foucault we have been forced to face the full consequences of a world where our ethical and political commitments have been brutally cut loose from all claims to be anchored in some Archimedean or absolute point of knowing. For Foucault, what determines "truth" is nothing but a preference about who we wish to stand with in struggle—whose side are we on socially, politically, and morally. Foucault’s criticism of Marxism (something especially important in the context of French Left culture) is also applicable to all the other "isms" of the modern era. All of them, says Foucault, arrogate to themselves, more particularly to intellectuals who represent and live by them, the capacity to find what is true and real. Their premises are almost always ones of epistemological certainty.
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each there is the apparently clear distinction between truth and error, science and ideology. Each offers the promise of accurately and correctly knowing the nature of things. But from Foucault's point of view all that we ever get--whether or not something is described as true--is a language and perspective dressed up as truth. If one discourse or language is given more value than another this is not because of its intrinsic character or "truth" but because of the way this particular version of reality organizes our perceptions and understandings of the world. And every such version of reality is tied in with the exercise of power by one social group or another.

All "discursive regimes," as Foucault calls the intimate way that language constitutes the world we actually live in, implies some exercise of power. Human existence is unthinkable without it. Power is not, he emphasizes, just about domination and control--it also is essential to the process that makes possible the existence of any kind of human culture. Any culture is founded on a knowledge that provides human beings with a way to understand the world, to make distinctions among their experiences, and to perceive things in a particular way. This is only possible by suppressing some other ways of looking at and understanding our world. The notion that human beings can live in a state of pure liberation and freedom is a fantasy--though one that has been historically seductive. For Foucault, the notion of critical reason is misleading if what it promises is a truth not distorted through the effects of power and domination. This, he holds, is impossible. The very notion, he argues, that reason and theory can provide truth is nothing more than the way that intellectuals have been able to dominate the very object they say they wish to free--man.

Foucault's unsettling highly politicized view of truth has been described by the American feminist theologian Sharon Welch--a writer broadly sympathetic to his ideas. The idea of universal and absolute truth is, she says, intrinsically related to oppression. All thought is inextricably political and represents the perspective of one side or another in a struggle within society. To deny the one-sidedness of knowledge is to mystify the potential veracity of knowledge. The longing for pure or absolute truth is a dangerous notion deeply rooted in Western tradition. Knowledge is always and everywhere part of a discourse that is contingent and particularistic; its uncertain and transitory nature makes it inevitably "destined for oblivion."

Foucault's own work makes no claims that it contains transhistorical truth. To the contrary, his histories are, he says, for the present and for those who are struggling against what he calls the "apparatuses of power/knowledge." Foucault's work is marked by an unabashed combination of epistemological relativism ("I am well aware that I have never written anything but fiction") with resistance to, and critique of, particular forms of domination:

It's not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, for truth is already power) but...
Foucault’s work brings us clearly to what Welch describes as the inevitable—and necessary—epistemological nihilism of the twentieth century. The events of this century, she asserts, “Make it impossible to honestly assert with any assurance the likelihood of certain knowledge...” There is no ultimate reference point for truth outside of a history that might make it become true. In a world where brutalities, injustice, and degradation demand resolute and determined human response there is the paradox of increasing uncertainty about what we know, and the ethical/political commitments that are consequent on this knowledge. If knowledge is always dependent on the interests of human groups who are we to believe?, and on what basis can we act? A deep—indeed infinite—suspicion must settle over all our choices.

Radical Politics in the Age of Hyperreality

All of this strikes hard at the notion of a future in which critique, insight, and knowledge can free us from social domination. It undercuts the central plank of critical thought in which the spread of human reason makes possible a world that is fully democratic and socially just. At the root of the postmodern condition is a terrible failure of hope and possibility. The notion of transcending human oppression may be dismissed as political mythologizing. There is a deep underlying cynicism towards the possibilities of transforming society so as to bring about human liberation. Radical politics within the postmodern world view is much more likely to be an absurd cultural spectacle or put us on the road to some other form of domination. Strong ethical commitment is but another version of the will to power and one must be suspicious of it. As often as not “those who claimed to have released what had been ‘crushed’ were themselves engaged in crushing elsewhere.”

It is hard to believe that the sensibility we have described here will not be powerfully reinforced by the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe. The popular insurrections there startlingly laid bare the pervasive corruption, authoritarianism, and deceit behind the utopian posturing of these societies. In the West, however, according to some postmodern commentators, such insurrections become less and less likely. Radical social criticism becomes more and more improbable as the distinction between what things look like and what’s really going on dissolve into what Jean Baudrillard calls the “hyperreality” of the media age. It is no longer possible to see through the appearance of things. There appears to be nothing but a bewildering variety of surfaces. Images and signs increasingly take on a life of their own referring not to a real world outside themselves but to their own “reality”:
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In this world of surfaces TV takes over from the real as the place where real things happen only if they’re screened... In such a thoroughly imaged universe... ‘politics’ becomes largely an adjunct of PR and show biz.  

In this kind of world, rational critique and the will to change things are replaced by what Baudrillard calls the ‘‘ecstasy of communication’’–a state characterized by banal education and mindless fascination that do not require any kind of serious artistic, moral, or political judgement. There is here something of a return to the one-dimensional view of cultural life described two decades ago by Herbert Marcuse. But it is without Marcuse’s fervent search—in spite of his own pessimistic analysis—for the possibilities of an emancipatory politics. For Marcuse, there were still social groups not fully integrated into the “totalitarian mass culture” of advanced capitalist societies, and there was still the possibility of aesthetic and moral critique that could “blow the whistle” on the repressive conformity of the dominant culture. This cannot be said for Baudrillard’s postmodern world. It is a world that offers no radical political exit. The image has achieved total primacy. All talk of reality is moribund. There is nothing beyond the shifting, endless play of signs. Those who sell beer by telling us that it doesn’t get any more real than this are quite literally right. Commodities have lost all connections to their uses. Distinctions between “real” and “false” needs collapse as consumption is “primarily about individuals and groups using commodities like a language to mark out taste and status differences between themselves.”

In this world in which the image is primary, so-called critique becomes nothing more than the floating of a new image—part of an all-encompassing “publicity game.” Resistance is futile—destined ultimately to do no more than feed on the mindlessness of the consumer culture. Of course, such a condition vitiates any notion of a public realm in which the people, through informed debate, might discriminate between what is true and what isn’t. In the age of USA Today style journalism and reenacted news events, Dick Hebdige is surely right to argue that the disintegration of the line between fact and interpretation frees the reader “from any obligation to believe in the bourgeois myth of disinterested truth.” The result, however, he says, is the collapse of the whole “economy of truth.” The very idea of verifiable knowledge or information becomes discarded as meaningless and irrelevant. What is happening is not merely a recognition of the precarious and shifting nature of such information—the way it is subject to negotiation and competition by different interest groups and ideologies. It establishes the feeling that all attempts to ascertain what is really going on becomes passé. There is no meaningful public space left which concerns itself with the struggle to define reality. Instead the ceaseless, changing images of the media-dominated society have turned nearly everything into a PR event: they have become a part of the “mega-publicity operation that is America.” In such a world the masses can only become increasingly manipulated, passive, and cynical.
Perhaps what is especially disturbing about the postmodernism of Baudrillard and others is that it is presented with a sensibility that seems not so much to condemn as to celebrate its presence. Baudrillard himself seems to view his own characterization of society with an attitude that is between a cynical detachment and the humor of one who views what he is doing as playing intellectual pranks. His words display little or no sense of despair or outrage, passionate conviction about the need for change or, of course, any hope the liberating human or social transformation is a possibility. One is compelled to wonder, what brings critical intellectuals to celebrate such a point of view. What does this disposition indicate about the public life and the cultural role of intellectuals and the current historical moment? Their discourse seems to be an analogue to the kind of ‘‘post-satiric’’ humor one finds in television’s David Letterman Show or Saturday Night Live. The jokes are not really meant to explode the phoniness or hypocrisy of the culture—to point us beyond the inauthenticity of the mass-mediated images. Instead, we are invited to share in the fun of a world where all and everything is a joke. There is not really anything to the lunacy of what surrounds us. What you see is what you get. There is less here than meets the eye. The humor implies no critical dissent of television, politics, art, etc., rather a frathouse binge on the most nauseating moments of the culture. Absent is any sense of some affirmative vision of human life and the potentialities of just and authentic social relations.

Conclusions:
Social Change or the Drama of the Aesthetic?

The mood that is represented in all of this seems to be one that despairs of the possibility of fundamental social change. Commitment, conviction, hope, and possibility seem to be passe leftovers from a more romantic or naively idealistic time. It might be held to reflect the apparent death of any real social movement of large enough proportions and with sufficient identity and conviction that is concerned with a radical transformation of our society. Indeed, what we seem to be faced with now, in place of such a force, is the proliferation of interest groups each seeking some particular and limited agenda. As undeniably important as some of these concerns might be, they still reflect a relatively narrow, circumscribed focus for social and political action. Their mobile and temporary constituencies melt away quickly with the end of the cultural spectacle (“Live-Aid”, “Hands Across America”) or some relatively modest legislative gain or turn of events. Each social movement or interest group challenges some specific aspect of our economic, cultural, or political life, but its demands are, for the most part, contained and the groups do not, as a whole, constitute a bloc united in opposition to the existing social order. It is perhaps the insularity or political impotence of intellectuals that has led many of them to consign all notions of reality to what is the more manageable terrain of language, signs, and texts. Yet we need, of course,
to recognize that real social struggle cannot be reduced to, or be the equivalent of, the critical texts of scholars. The noted black literary scholar Henry Louis Gates has expressed the confusion in these terms:

As writers, teachers, or intellectuals most of us would like to claim greater efficacy for our labors than we’re entitled to. These days literary criticism likes to think of itself as “war by other means.”

But it should start to wonder have its victories come too easily? The recent turn towards politics and history in literary studies has turned the analysis of texts into a marionette theatre of the political, to which we bring the passion of our real-world concerns. And that’s why it is sometimes necessary to remind ourselves of the distance from the classroom to the streets.36

The sense of the improbability of radical moral and political challenges to the society is mirrored not only in the increasing emphasis put on aesthetic concerns and cultural analysis,37 but also in the way that the conscious, intentional nature of human subjectivity has been denied and dismissed. The increasingly popular view of subjectivity is one in which the self is a fiction; in Foucault’s infamous description, a figure that would “be erased like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea.”38 Instead, what exists is what Suzanne Moore has called a kind of cultural autism where the individual is emptied of any subjective center.39 Human subjectivity becomes nothing more than a series of social positions which together form a devastatingly contradictory and wholly elusive notion of the self. Such a view fails to speak to the existential quality of human experience and choices. It leaves us without responsibility, conscience, or hope. It fails to capture the quality of becoming as men or women project themselves forward in order to address the incompleteness of their existence, struggle for greater freedom or an expansion of justice in the world. It is a view of the self which seems to reflect and reinforce the separation of intellectual life from politics, of academic theory from the flesh and blood world of commitment, sacrifice, and struggle.

Yet it would be unfair to suggest that postmodernism is devoid of all subversive or critical social values. A number of writers have, for example, argued that it is necessary to make a distinction between a complacent, conservative postmodernism and an emancipatory version.40 Certainly, for example, the postmodern view of the self with its emphasis on the shifting and mobile nature of identity does express and support a “politics of identity” with its important celebration of human difference and diversity. In other important ways too much can be made of the break between postmodern critical theory and the other “traditions” of critical theory (including feminism and those that draw, in some way, on neo-Marxist forms of analysis and thought). All of these are part of what the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur called the “hermeneutics of suspicion.”
They have taught us to see how it is that our words, images, ideas, and judgements are constantly and thoroughly implicated in relationships of power—whether it is the domination of class, or race, or gender, our homophobic sexuality, Eurocentric cultural attitudes, or our techno-rationality that urges us to seek to control both inner and outer nature. In whatever form, the spread of critical theorizing into so many areas of intellectual life has succeeded in making the familiar increasingly strange. More than ever, it has become hard to see the world as simply existing and given rather than socially constructed; one that is historically contingent, not timeless. Such a consciousness inevitably invites us to see the present reality as one possible outcome among others. And it becomes much harder to ignore or deny the institutional and political forces that stand behind the vast and terrible forms of material and cultural suffering in our world. The currents of critical intellectual thought that are now ubiquitous in almost every area of American academic life do not flow in one direction—certainly not towards the avowal of some morally explicit declaration of political aims. Yet their existence speaks to the gnawing and growing uncertainty of life in this culture, and within that context to the desperate, if increasingly elusive, necessity for some common human vision.

For those of us who have been, and continue to be, engaged in the development of a critical theory and practice of education, the postmodern “world-view” certainly confronts us with some troubling difficulties for which no easy or formulaic answers exist. How, for example, should we affirm the salience of cultural differences and diversity without succumbing to an educational vision that has no overriding sense of human solidarity and connectedness? How can we recognize the discursive construction of human identity and the multi-vocal nature of subjectivity without losing what Freire once called the human “ontological vocation towards freedom”; the existential struggle for self-realization and authenticity. Or how can we reconcile the undoubtedly necessary element of ideology-critique in critical pedagogy without falling into hierarchies predicated on the distinction between those who possess either false or correct perceptions of the social world? And how shall we hold onto a compelling moral and political vision of social transformation without the hubris of pedagogic “vanguardism.”

Let us be clear. Despite these difficulties there can be no critical pedagogy that does not contain the possibilities of an understanding of the world that is more accurate and less distorted than what is generally the case. And there can be no critical pedagogy without the assertion of a moral vision that is preferable to the one that is hegemonic. Critical pedagogy, while acceding to postmodernism’s most trenchant claim about the discursive construction of the world, must still assert some things in the work are real enough—homelessness, poverty, war, hunger, torture, brutality, etc. Human life is not, as some postmodern intellectuals would have us believe, a mere shadow game (do we really need to argue this after the horrors of the past few months). And despite our chastened convictions about universal explanations or solutions to the continuing barbarism we still need to act,
even if, as Welch says, we must do so in a manner that is "half-sure but whole-hearted." Critical pedagogy must indeed address itself to the serious questions raised by postmodern theories and ideas, but the project of an education concerned with liberation and social justice in a world awash in what Marcuse once described as unnecessary suffering is surely not in doubt.

Notes
2. There is, by now, a vast literature on this. It includes the writings of Frankfurtp School intellectuals like Theodore Adorno and Jurgen Habermas, and other critical scholars such as Brian Fay, David Bloo, Theodore Roszack, Stephen Gould, Murray Bookchin, Evelyn Fox Keller, Carolyn Merchant, and Peter Sloterdijk.
3. Such a view represents the widespread turn towards a Nietzschean philosophy in postmodern writing.
4. See, for example, Stanley Aronowitz, Science As Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988).
8. See, for example, David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity (University of Chicago, 1986).
9. See, for example, Jim Collins, Uncommon Cultures (New York: Routledge, 1989).
11. See, for example, Jurgen Habermas, Modernity vs. Post Modernity, in Hal Foster (ed.) The Anti Aesthetic (Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1983).
13. Ibid., p. 83.
16. The major influences in this notion of reason and its attendant idea of a "social unconscious" were, of course, Hegel, Marx, and in some respects, Freud. Its most prominent exponents in this century were the members of the Frankfort School of Social Research. These must be distinguished from that tributary of critical thought initiated by Nietzsche and developed later in the 20th century by individuals like Heidegger, Derrida, Lyotard, and Foucault. As I agree in this paper, the latter must be distinguished by its abandonment of epistemology for aesthetics, questions of truth for matters of rhetorical persuasiveness.
23. See, Welch, *Communities of Resistance and Solidarity*.
34. Hebdige, 'After the Masses,' p. 51.
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   ________________________________
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Education and the Service Ethic

By Robert C. Serow

I have been a selfish being all my life in practice, though not in principle.
--Mr. Darcy, in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice

The belief that unselfish behavior is better learned through practice than through the study of principle alone has gained a firm foothold in American education. Several of the most widely praised innovations of the past decade depend largely on this concept, including cooperative learning, which emphasizes collaborative activity within heterogeneous work groups (Slavin, 1983), and the Child Development Project, which structures classroom environments around prosocial values and behaviors (Solomon et al., 1988).

This essay examines another dimension of the trend toward practical altruism--namely, the growing numbers of high school and college students who participate in off-campus community service projects. Participation is in most instances voluntary, though...
service requirements do exist in some schools. Several nationwide organizations now exist for the purpose of promoting students' community service, and the movement as a whole stands to benefit from the enactment of the National and Community Service Act of 1990, which allocates nearly 300 million dollars for voluntary youth service programs.

Community service is regarded by educators and policy-makers as a promising solution to an incipient crisis in citizenship preparation and commitment. In the words of one study, the growing complexity of the modern world places an ever greater demand on higher education—a demand for graduates who have a profound understanding of what it means to be a citizen; graduates capable of an interest larger than self-interest; graduates capable of helping this country to be not simply a strong competitor but a responsible and effective leader in a complicated world. Yet by every measure that we have been able to find, today's graduates are less interested in and less prepared to exercise their civic responsibilities. Colleges and universities are less willing to recognize the teaching of civic skills as part of their missions (Newman, 1985, p. xiv).

Community service has thus been proposed as a means by which educational institutions can promote citizenship participation without compromising their own reluctance to advance a specific political agenda. Unlike some other approaches to moral education (notably values clarification), service projects provoke little opposition among parent and taxpayer groups. In fact, approval ratings of nearly 90 per cent have been reported for proposals to institutionalize community service in the high schools (Flam and Gallup, 1989). On a broader basis, the example of the Peace Corps and Vista volunteers, and before them, the Civilian Conservation Corps workers of the 1930s, has given rise to the hope that service experience will provide an economical and uncontroversial instrument of national revitalization (Moskos, 1988; Janowitz, 1983).

The prominence of these civic themes among adult advocates has led some analysts to attribute similar aims to the young people who participate in community service programs. For example, Levine and Hirsch (1990, p. 11) assert that the rising interest in voluntary service signifies "a revival on the part of students in political action, more interest in the 'relevance' of the college curriculum, more concern with international issues and greater emphasis on campus governance and societal concerns."

Although Levine and Hirsch are not alone in seeing the community service boom of the late 1980s as a forerunner of student political activism in the 1990s, this interpretation stands in sharp contrast to other research on student culture, which has consistently reported the goals of youth more in terms of egoism and careerism than altruism or civism. A well-known example is Levine's 1980 study, *When Dreams and Heroes Died*, which described the mood among university
students as "going first class on the Titanic," meaning that they were seeking to maximize their own chances for material and occupational success during an era of economic contraction and societal decline (Levine, 1980, pp. 103-115). Subsequent studies have done little to challenge that finding. Rather, the conclusion has been that students' "basic philosophy" is "to work, study, and get rich" (Horowitz, 1987, p. 263), and that "real satisfaction and fulfillment...are personal matters" (Moffat, 1989, p. 40). A similar judgement has been applied to high school-age youngsters (People for the American Way, 1989).

In the absence of any fresher evidence of a wholesale shift in student values, there is scant basis for interpreting the community service movement as the dawn of a new era of political engagement. But this is not to suggest that the personal goals so central to student life are necessarily incompatible with a genuine regard for the welfare of other people. Indeed, certain sectors of society, notably the professions, have managed to prosper while maintaining an ethic of service to others. The service ethic has received a great deal of attention over the years largely because its existence has depended less on the character or political orientations of individual practitioners than on the norms of the professions themselves. As such, it is said to offer one of the most striking examples of institutionalized prosocial action within modern society (Merton and Gieryn, 1982).

The principal concerns of this paper, therefore, are the nature of the service ethic and its possible utility in promoting the socialization goals of educational institutions. The argument begins by examining the ethic of service as it was formulated within the traditional professions and then as it was disseminated to a broader audience through local service clubs, the field of social work, public schools and youth organizations, and more recently through the burgeoning personal service professions. From there, the essay goes on to consider community service as an alternative to existing approaches to moral education. After a brief critique of prevailing practices, the case is made that the service ethic will be most effective if it addresses personal goals as well as the larger objective of an enhanced community life.

The Service Ethic

The most general conception of service, according to Talcott Parsons (1934, p. 672), is "any act of an individual in so far as it contributes to the realization of the ends of other individuals." Service may be either unlimited and diffuse, such as is rendered within the family, or when the product of other social roles, more circumscribed in nature. In the western world, the growth of non-familial forms of service was heavily influenced by Christian ethics, and specifically by the belief in the inherent worth and dignity of each person. With the Protestant Reformation, worldly service to others came to be understood as a religious duty and, under Calvinism, as a badge of the elect. As secularization proceeded, "what was
Service Ethic

originally conceived as disinterested service to God" gradually became "at best an end in itself" (Parsons, 1934, p. 673).

The Professions

The secularization of the service ethic was abetted by a rapidly spreading culture of professionalism (Bledstein, 1976), which looked to codified, scientific knowledge as the basis for human endeavor. One aspect of professional culture was an ethical code that stressed the disinterestedness of the individual practitioner, by which was meant a willingness to put the needs of the client ahead of the practitioner's immediate self-interest. With respect to fees, advertising, cooperation with other practitioners, and provision of services, the ideals that guided the relationship of professional to client were quite distinct from the doctrine of caveat emptor that prevailed in dealings between business proprietors and their customers. Conventional marketplace morality was deemed unsuitable because the urgency of their problems often necessitated that clients place themselves totally in the hands of the practitioner—a situation with enormous potential for financial and emotional exploitation (Merton and Gieryn, 1982; Moore, 1970).

The intent behind the norm of disinterestedness was not primarily altruistic, but can be traced to the necessity of gaining popular trust—and hence autonomy—for medicine, law, and other professional fields. Still, the pecuniary rewards that were to follow from the establishment of a reliable market for professional services were seldom the sole objective. As Larson (1977, p. 58) has noted:

the production of new needs, or the direction of largely unrecognized needs toward new forms of fulfillment, is a civilizing function, to the extent that it does not obey first to the profit motive, but seeks first to improve the quality of life.

As a major feature of the professional codes, the service ethic was enforced by state medical and bar associations, who had accepted the burdens of self-policing in lieu of regulation by government. Although evasions and outright violations were not uncommon, the overall level of compliance is thought to have been high. Indeed, the idea that an ethical code could be maintained without the threat of legal sanctions was of great interest to social theorists who had anticipated a moral vacuum following the decline of traditional socializing agencies. By the turn of the century, leading scholars had begun to contrast the norm of disinterestedness observed by the professions with the dubious ethics and intense competitiveness found within commerce and industry:

There are professional ethics for the priest, the soldier, the lawyer, the magistrate, and so on. Why should there not be one for trade and industry? Why should there not be obligations of the employee towards the employer and vice versa; or of business men one towards the other, so as to lessen or regulate
the competition they set up and to prevent it from turning into a conflict sometimes—as today—almost as cruel as actual warfare? (Durkheim, 1957, pp. 29-30)

**Service Clubs**

The same theme would eventually make its way into popular opinion, often to the detriment of the small business operator. In the United States, Rotary, Kiwanis, the Lions, and other businessmen’s service clubs all were founded during this period. Rotary, established in 1906, was the first, largest and most influential of these organizations. Like the others, its membership was restricted to men. Its chief purposes were “to encourage and foster the ideal of service as a basis for worthy enterprise and, in particular, to encourage and foster...high ethical standards of business and professions” (Rotary International, 1948, p. 12). The clubs’ version of the service ideal had two parts: First, communities were served through the clubs’ efforts to regulate competitive pressures within local commerce and industry; second, by adopting charities and organizing their own efforts at humanitarian relief, members were encouraged to take a somewhat broader view of the businessman’s stake in community welfare.

Even less than in the case of the professions did the business clubs’ adoption of the service ethic signify a triumph of pure altruism. Marden (1935) has argued that beyond the obvious goal of refurbishing their public image, community service offered owners of small businesses a chance to mitigate the internal strains arising from the daily pursuit of economic self-interest. Thus, the club member resents the implication that his enterprise or the methods he uses to promote it are not for the best interests of the community. He likes to feel that there is no other way that the economic scheme can function effectively than by his making a considerable amount of money. This situation creates a problem which must be solved. Profits and service must somehow be reconciled (pp. 136-137).

**Social Work**

As practiced in business and the professions, the service ethic did not represent a decisive departure from the older humanitarian ideals associated with religion and philanthropy. Indeed, it had much in common with contemporary movements in both domains, notably the Social Gospel and the Gospel of Wealth, each of which called on adherents to tend to the needs of the poor as a step toward fulfilling their ethical obligations and, especially in the latter case, advancing their own interests as well. As Bremner (1988, pp. 85-86) has described, the newly-minted millionaires of the Gilded Age invested heavily in benevolence:

Charitable directories published in the 1880s needed as many as
a hundred pages to list and describe the numerous agencies alleviating misery and combating disease, pauperism, ignorance, and crime. At least a part, and sometimes a generous part, of vast fortunes made by fair means or foul found its way back to the community in gifts to hospitals, libraries, art museums, churches, relief societies, orphan asylums, (and) homes for the aged..."

By 1900, these philanthropic ventures had given rise to a substantial cadre of full-time, salaried workers. Sparked by the example of Jane Addams and other leaders in the settlement house movement, the emerging field of social work began to question some of the basic premises of organized charity. At issue especially was the idea that the relief of poverty should continue to depend on the largesse of those who benefitted most from existing social arrangements. In so doing, the social work profession was instrumental in fashioning an ideology to support the gradual shift in welfare management from private to public auspices that would occur over the next half-century (Bremner, 1988, pp. 108-111).

Youth Service

The growth of the public welfare apparatus did not obviate voluntary social service. On the contrary, personal participation in fundraising and other charitable causes continued to be a central objective in the education of young women from upper and upper-middle class homes. (See, for example, Daniels, 1988.) Likewise, an active concern for the general good was heavily stressed in proposals for the civic education of young men. One noteworthy case in point was William James's essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War." A pacifist, James nevertheless found much to praise in the discipline and physical rigor of military life, and recommended these to the "gilded youth" of the era. With what he took to be the inevitable triumph of socialism, war would soon become obsolete. Hence, James proposed an "army enlisted against Nature," whose aim would be to even out life's hardships while educating every young man of the upper classes as to "the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life." Having done their work in coal mines, factories, ships, or construction sites, "they would tread the earth more proudly, the women would value them more highly, they would be better fathers and teachers of the following generation" (James, 1962 [1910], p. 325).

The army that James envisioned did not materialize until a quarter-century later, when the nation was enmeshed in the Great Depression. Even then, the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration enlisted mostly working-class volunteers, who turned to these positions more out of economic necessity than from the desire for experience (Moskos, 1988, pp. 31-38).

Closer in time and in spirit to the Jamesian ideal were the youth organizations that came into existence during the first two decades of the twentieth century.
Among these were the Boy Scouts of America (BSA). As Macleod (1983) has written, urbanization and the decline of traditional socializing agencies had brought about increases in juvenile crime and an attendant demand for new instruments of social control. The Boy Scouts, together with the YMCA, sought to use group participation as a basis for instilling conventional middle-class aspirations in young men. Towards this end, scouts were expected to attend meetings, to follow a code of conduct, to earn recognition by acquiring new skills, and to participate in supervised camping trips. However, none of these internal activities embodied Scouting’s long-range goals as effectively as the requirement that each scout perform acts of community service:

(Service projects laid claim to public support while affirming the boys’ middle class status...Voluntary service was becoming central to middle-class self-affirmation, whether codified in professional ethics, advertised by business firms, or ritualized in Rotary and Kiwanis. To bestow service, rather than receive it, was to assert one’s personal respectability. Hence, BSA officials strenuously resisted any implication that participation in community chest drives marked their movement as a charity, for Boy Scouts gave service (Macleod, 1983, p. 173).

Schools

The service ethic first entered the public schools under the aegis of character education, a movement that sought to provide a modern, secular counterpart to the Biblically-derived moral teachings found in nineteenth-century textbooks. Service, in the sense of being actively helpful to others around the school, at home, and in the community, was encouraged as both a means and an end of character education. Community projects were organized chiefly by extracurricular organizations, some of which were affiliated with local civic clubs. The adult groups looked to their adolescent counterparts not just for molding character but also for developing skills that could one day be put to practical use. In Chicago, for example, the Association of Commerce joined with the Board of Education in cosponsoring Civic Industrial clubs, among whose objectives was “to fit ourselves more definitely for the business world” (Reavis, 1926, p. 98).

Other groups endorsed the concept of student service, but for different reasons. In Youth Serves the Community, a report of the Progressive Education Association, the emphasis was less on the formation of individual character than on marshalling youthful energies in the cause of civic improvement. “Cooperative community activities,” according to William Heard Kilpatrick, were to be part of a new approach to human development, in which “true democracy, true ethics, and true education are but three names for intelligently defensible action” (Kilpatrick, 1936, p.7). Thus, the student’s personal involvement in the problems of the

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Service Ethic

community provided one means of developing the practical activism that the Progressives hoped would be the engine for societal reform.

With the advent of World War II, community service focused on military preparedness. Schools proved to be highly effective in mobilizing students for scrap metal and paper drives, for packaging comfort kits for the armed forces, and for a variety of helpful tasks in the community, such as baby-sitting the children of war-workers. Educational institutions also accounted for the sale of two billion dollars in war bonds, and through organizations such as the Victory Corps, helped students make the transition to military life (Kandel, 1948).

Personal Service Professions

By the early 1960s, the service ethic had become a sufficiently integral part of middle-class culture to insure an overwhelmingly favorable response to the creation of the all-volunteer Peace Corps and its domestic counterpart, VISTA. Nevertheless, the number of volunteers who actually served in these organizations—a total of about 20,000 in peak years—was minuscule in comparison to military enlistments. Likewise, the glamor of the Kennedy administration helped to make politics and government fashionable career choices among the young. Thus the popular ideal of service encompassed various forms of endeavor, including electoral office and the military as well volunteer work at home and abroad.

Subsequent decades have seen a marked divergence between the public and private spheres of service, to the extent that the founder of a leading national organization for community service has disavowed any connection between service work and politics:

Today’s students seem much more inclined to get involved in community service than in political issues. In other words, they would rather teach English in a Spanish-speaking neighborhood than work for a political action group. They would rather visit with a senior citizen than get involved in city politics...Such direct service is motivated not out of a political interest, but rather out of a concern for real human needs (Meisel 1986, p. 9-6). Such sentiments may reflect a reaction to the perceived failures of the political system in the Vietnam War, Watergate, and elsewhere. However, the pattern extends beyond politics to include other institutional sectors of American society, such as religion, the military, business, and the law (Yankelovitch, 1981). While much of the authority that once resided in these institutions has simply evaporated, part of it seems to have been transferred to newer agencies, particularly television and rock music.

Rivaling the electronic media as a cultural force is the complex of agencies
and ideas known as the therapeutic or personal service professions. The nomenclature is significant because it suggests first, the proliferation of occupational fields that now enjoy professional status; and second, the emphasis that contemporary society places on healing and well-being. The personal service professions are those "whose principal function is to bring about changes in the body or personality of the client" (Halmos, 1970, p. 22), and thus include not only medicine and nursing, but also such rapidly growing fields as clinical psychology, counseling, psychiatric social work, physical therapy, speech therapy, special education, and alcohol and drug rehabilitation. The goal of most of these occupations is to treat problems that restrict the individual's ability to achieve autonomy and self-fulfillment. Although the clients' behavior may be a contributing factor, the ultimate causes are usually defined in terms of some prior agency, such as genetics or the social and physical environments (Reiff, 1966; Halmos, 1970).

Table 1

Employment in Personal Service Professions, 1970-1988
(in thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1988</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional and related services</td>
<td>12,904</td>
<td>19,853</td>
<td>23,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital-based</td>
<td>2,843</td>
<td>4,036</td>
<td>4,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other health workers</td>
<td>1,628</td>
<td>3,345</td>
<td>4,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social services</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>1,590</td>
<td>2,042</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The influence of the therapeutic culture is reflected not only in the rising numbers of practitioners (Table 1) but also in recent changes in public attitudes and values. Insofar as it locates the solution to most problems as lying within the individual, "the therapeutic attitude distances us from particular social roles, relationships, and practices; and from their attendant measures of authority, duty, and virtue" (Bellah, et al., 1985, p. 127). On the other hand, the dissemination of therapeutic culture has been quite congenial to the service ethic. First, as the focus shifts from blame to treatment, there are more people to be helped. Consequently, various forms of helping activity are undertaken by paid staff, by volunteers, and by the clients themselves. Second, as the level of educational attainment rises,
more young people are exposed to therapeutic ideas through professional studies, the social sciences, and the humanities. Outside the classroom as well, the educational environment is saturated with the language and assumptions of the personal service professions. Areas of school and college life that exemplify this pattern include student discipline, academic evaluation, health care, and staff development. But most striking is the transformation of the role of the counselor from a position specializing in academic and vocational guidance to one that entails a substantial psychotherapeutic function. Moreover, the counselor may merely be one of several school-based therapists that students encounter during their educational careers. In the public schools, social workers and school psychologists play a therapeutic role, as do special education teachers. At the college and university level, the work of the counseling center is supplemented by residence hall staff, student affairs personnel, and a host of other non-academic advisors. And this list does not include the private therapists that a student may see in connection with academic or personal problems.

Community Service and Moral Education

In short, the charge that the current generation of students is insensitive to human needs loses some of its force when viewed in the context of the therapeutic culture. Having encountered therapeutic ideas through study and experience, students may be disposed toward personal intervention as a problem-solving strategy. Accordingly, it would not be inconsistent for them to be indifferent to political solutions to social problems while donating their own time to community service work. In fact, recent studies have found a strong tendency among student volunteers to emphasize personal helpfulness and efficacy—the essence of therapeutic culture—while giving scant attention to equity, justice, and other political objectives implicit in voluntarism (Abdennur, 1987; Rutter and Newmann, 1989; Serow, 1991; see also Meisel, 1986).

The Limits of Indirect Moral Education

The same logic would suggest that contrary to the hopes of some advocates, community service might not be a reliable vehicle for citizenship education. Much would depend on the exact nature of the task. But the larger question is whether it is citizenship education that is required, or moral education. The distinction between the two is not always clear, especially in the United States, which is nearly alone among the industrial nations in providing for little or no explicit moral instruction in its public schools. Given the legal constraints on religious instruction, as well as the absence of any consensually-accepted secular moral code, the preferred approach throughout much of the twentieth century has been to teach morality indirectly. Specifically, this entails relying on the social studies curriculum and a relatively democratic public school environment to transmit the
normative orientations deemed necessary for effective social participation in adulthood (Yun-kyung Cha, Suk-ying Wong, and Meyer, 1988; Butts, 1989).

The indirect approach to moral education has been called into question in recent decades. With respect to the democratic ethos of public schools, it is said that the culture of the elementary grades is one of pervasive rule-following while the high schools are devoid of any shared moral understanding beyond a fragile mutual toleration between students and staff (Jackson, 1968; Grant, 1988). Even in higher education, usually thought to be a fairly democratic milieu, there have been suggestions that the transmission of desired outcomes is being hindered by rampant bureaucratization (Moffat, 1988). In a similar vein, social studies curricula have been denounced as cumbersome structures that lack any real potential for promoting moral growth. Specific complaints take a variety of forms, including allegations that students learn more about rights than about responsibilities (Janowitz, 1983) and that social studies is too often concerned with government rather than relationships among people (Oliner, 1983).

**Service as Community-Building**

In challenging the policy of substituting social studies for moral education, many critics would agree with Pratte that “good citizenship is a function of being a good person” (1988, p. 156). The demand, therefore, is for closer attention to the moral dimension of civic and social roles, with particular reference to the personal obligations that one assumes as a member of a community. The concept of community is itself defined at various levels, ranging from the neighborhood or ethnic group to all present and future generations of humanity.

The communitarian view does not presuppose adherence to any particular sociopolitical orientation, other than a discomfort with extreme expressions of contemporary individualism. Instead, it attributes most social problems to the isolation and fragmentation of modern life. The broad outline of the communitarian analysis is roughly as follows. Under the influence of science and technology, the diffuse face-to-face interaction and permanent bonding characteristic of traditional social institutions have given way to exchanges that are transient, impersonal, and functionally specific. As the bases for genuine relationships contract, schools and other socializing agencies are able to transmit only a narrow range of cultural outcomes; consequently, it becomes more difficult to maintain existing social standards or to promulgate new ones. At the same time, the impersonality of the daily routine leaves individuals susceptible to a variety of psychic or spiritual maladies, among which are boredom, alienation, and feelings of aimlessness or drift. The ensuing behavior aims at achieving temporary sensation and at the gratification of artificially-induced desires. At the societal level, isolation leads to the misuse of economic, cultural, and political resources, especially as manifested in the rise of giant corporate actors, both governmental and private. Nearly all
individuals and small groups are vulnerable in the face of such institutional power, but the risk is greatest among those handicapped by poverty, age, or illness, and among those whose beliefs or traditions separate them from the modern mainstream (Nisbet, 1969; Cramer, 1976; Purpel, 1989).

Despite differences as to the ultimately desirable arrangements for society, there is agreement that steps can be taken to improve the immediate prospects for community. As previously suggested, communitarians would provide opportunities for students to engage in direct relationships with a broader range of people than is encountered during the course of a typical school day. Hence, some overlap can be found with the therapeutic culture, insofar as both regard community service as a means for providing assistance to at-risk members of society and as a form of experiential education that will prepare the learner to assume adult responsibilities.

Where the two approaches differ is in the nature of the intended learning outcomes. In particular, therapeutically-oriented service has the flavor of a pre-professional internship, in that it seeks to introduce the learner to the technical skills associated with the professional role and to instill some of the appropriate attitudes, including concern and compassion for the client. From the communitarian perspective, such experiences are deficient in at least two respects. First, they fail to provide an adequate basis for reflecting on the social context in which the service occurs, thereby encouraging students to comprehend the situation in terms more of personal problems than public needs. Second, they encourage one-dimensional relationships between helpers and helped. Specifically, they cast the student in the role of patron or benefactor, even though the intended recipient often gains little or nothing from the experience. In assuming the patron’s role, the student may fail to develop the intended prosocial orientations. Instead of understanding and compassion, what is acquired instead is more likely to be an enhanced sense of self-esteem (Illich, 1990).

Similar criticisms, of course, have long been directed to the service ethic of the professions, which is sometimes seen as a mere gesture toward humanitari-

anism and not as a basis for building genuine community. Indeed, by substituting expertise for custom and folk knowledge, professionalism can be disruptive of community life. In the context of the youth service movement, the communitarian critique has had a significant impact on policy development. At a recent con-

ference, some 75 organizational sponsors of community service adopted a series of recommendations aimed at upgrading the service experience. While some of the proposals concern procedural matters, the overall effect has been to establish a consensus that is close to the communitarian model of service delivery. Among the key recommendations are that all programs address significant social needs; that ample opportunity be afforded for feedback and reflection; that all parties, including the intended recipients, participate in planning the service program; and that sponsoring and receiving organizations insure that the resources are adequate.
Institutioanlizing the Service Ethic: The Role of Self-Interest

Whether these changes will have much effect on the overall educational process remains uncertain. Although community service has become a more visible activity, estimates are that only about one in four high school and college students participate regularly. Short of economic or environmental catastrophe, it is difficult to foresee circumstances in which voluntary service would attract a majority of American youth.

Recognizing this, some observers have called for mandatory public service, through either a joint civilian-military draft or a service requirement for high school graduation. Reduced to its essentials, the case for mandatory service is that voluntary participation is insufficiently appealing to offset the pull of college and career. Accordingly, government intervention is necessary to insure that service attracts more than just the idealistic and the unemployable. The standard rebuttal to this argument is that compulsory non-penal service violates the democratic norm of consent by the governed and can therefore be justified only in cases of extreme emergency, such as war. There are also some concerns about the quality of service that would be rendered by conscriptees, the effects on local labor markets, the costs of training, and the difficulties of enforcement (Danzig and Szanton, 1986; Moskos, 1988).

The service ethic that has been discussed in this essay represents a middle course between compulsion and voluntarism. On the one hand, the choice of a profession or a club is presumably made freely and with prior knowledge of the ethical standards that obtain. Once admitted to the group, compliance with its expectations is assumed to follow more or less automatically from an identification of one's own long-term interests with those of the group. At the same time, the enforcement of standards by peers significantly restricts individual discretion, as violators may be subject to sanctions, including expulsion.

The service ethic thus exemplifies what Merton and Gieryn (1982, p.110) call institutionalized altruism, i.e., "the special form of altruism in which structural arrangements, notably the distribution of rewards and penalties, promote behavior that is beneficial to others." Stated differently, institutionalization occurs when practitioners routinely perform prosocial acts not out of innate goodness but because it is advantageous for them to do so.

Within educational institutions, the closest parallel might be service clubs, fraternities, sororities, and other organizations that gain cohesiveness and recognition from successfully carrying out community projects. In the main, however, research evidence suggests that students are less likely than adults to cite enlightened self-interest as a reason for participating in service work. What they
do mention is a sense of obligation or the satisfaction they derive from helping other people (Fitch, 1987; Serow, 1991). The implication is that few students openly look to community service for extrinsic rewards. This may help to explain why despite having comparatively large amounts of discretionary time and ready access to sponsoring organizations, most students choose not to participate in service work.

Among participants and non-participants alike, it is possible that a substantial number possess a capacity for genuine altruism. For the rest, community service might be more attractive if it appealed directly to individual or collective self-interest. Some approaches that are currently being tested include: granting preference to service participants in college admissions and scholarships; publicizing students' community service efforts through local media; incorporating service experience into dropout prevention programs; building a service component into elective courses; and supplementing the budgets of clubs that sponsor community service.

**Conclusion**

The preceding sections of this essay have discussed the development of the service ethic in American education. Among other points, it was suggested that community service be considered as an alternative to existing forms of moral education. Specifically, service was seen as appealing to young people by affording them a chance to achieve personal as well as communitarian aims. Although some educators might prefer a purer form of altruism, we would do well to recall the warning by Nisbet (1969) that communities exist only as long as they satisfy the needs of their individual members. In the same vein, sociologists and anthropologists have concluded that although benevolence is one of the most reliable means by which aspiring leaders can enhance their legitimacy and status, it also provides society with a clear test of the aspirant's capacity to act on behalf of the greater good (Gouldner, 1973, pp. 273-278). In other words, the outcomes of a benevolent act matter at least as much as the actor's intention.

That many existing service projects fail to produce the desired prosocial outcomes could be due more to the fragmentary quality of the programs than to the concept of community service itself. In particular, commitments are unlikely to develop if students look on service work as yet another assignment to be completed or as simply a way of rounding out one's week. Tying extrinsic rewards to the reliable performance of service has the initial advantage of focusing students' attention on the task at hand. But beyond this stage, internal reinforcements should take hold. Follow-up studies often show that service-providers consider their experience to have been personally satisfying. Institutional support, joint planning, and opportunity for reflection can help a project realize its potential for community-oriented moral education as well.
There are other moral objectives that might be profitably pursued through organized community service projects. Some of these are best summarized as an awareness of externalities, a concept originated by economists to describe the broader consequences that follow from a particular course of action. Environmentalists have been arguing for some years that the failure to forecast the external effects of policy decisions poses a major threat to the quality of life in all parts of the world. Although environmental impact statements may now be required, the problem of adjudicating individual responsibility over extended periods of time remains unresolved. This is so not only because of the constant shifting of responsibilities among managers but also because of the separation of personal and institutional interests that is built into every bureaucratic role (Coleman, 1990, pp. 553-578).

From an educational standpoint, the need is to conceive of the socialization of children as "the process of somehow getting them to bring the interests of other persons inside" (Coleman, 1990, p. 568). The service ethic can be particularly useful because it relocates students from the comparatively sheltered world of the campus into settings where they might not only gain first-hand knowledge of human and environmental externalities, but also assume a small measure of responsibility for helping to resolve them.

Finally, it may be worthwhile to consider the claim of the social welfare scholar Richard Titmuss (1970) that human beings have a fundamental right to be altruistic. By that he means that each person must be allowed "to exercise a moral choice to give in non-monetary forms to strangers" (p. 13). While the rise of welfare states has reduced dependence on personal charity, the growing stake in science and technology has brought a new type of gift relationship, in which many of us are asked to donate something of ourselves—time, energy, skills, and perhaps blood or bodily parts—to causes from which we will extract no personal benefit. Very often, the burden falls on those who are least able to resist the demands or enticements made by institutions. For them, the volitional element in altruism is effectively precluded, while some others who are more favorably situated exercise their moral choice by participating in the least onerous and most satisfying situations, if they participate at all (Titmuss, 1970, pp. 215-225).

The implications for moral education are clear enough. First, whether or not one accepts the idea of altruism as a basic human right, there is considerable appeal in the call for a more equitable distribution of non-monetary gift-giving. Second, the prospects for achieving this goal would be enhanced if young people were educated more closely in the role that altruism plays in contemporary society. Such education might well include the personal experience of being a donor of time and talent in the type of gift relationship that has been discussed in this essay.
Service Ethic

Notes

1. Some believe that the importance of the service ethic within the professions has been greatly exaggerated. Freidson (1970, p.81), for example, asserts that there is "no reliable information which actually demonstrates that a service orientation is in fact strong and widespread among professionals" and that a profession's service orientation is little more than "a public imputation it has successfully won in a process by which its leaders have persuaded society to grant and support its autonomy." Merton and Gieryn's response to such criticism is that "there is no zero-sum relationship between altruism and reward." Rather, one achieves the latter by pursuing the former (1982, p. 121). Regarding the extent to which service norms are actually honored, Merton and Gieryn acknowledge the paucity of empirical data but contend that the point is not that professionals are necessarily more altruistic than people in other fields. What matters is that "the frequency of exploitative behavior by professionals is less than it would be if the institutionalized norm of altruism were not operative" (130).

2. While male youth of the towns and cities were the primary target of the character movement, the Girl Scouts and YWCA sought to instill a similar norm of helpfulness to the community among young women. Both 4-H and the Junior Red Cross promoted similar goals on a co-ed basis, as did numerous local groups.

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Service Ethic


Fundamental Pedagogics: A Philosophy OF or FOR Education?

By George D. Yonge

This paper is motivated by the recent article by Timothy Reagan¹ in which he presents an inaccurate and misleading view of the purpose and value of fundamental pedagogics. In his article, among other things, Reagan incorrectly claims the following: fundamental pedagogics is a South African ideology of education supportive of apartheid and merely is a vehicle for justifying and sustaining this policy; a Christian worldview is built into fundamental pedagogic thought; it mystifies and reifies some relatively simple, straightforward concepts about education; and this educational philosophy promotes an anti-democratic, authoritarian adult-child relationship.

Elsewhere² I have refuted Reagan's assertions by indicating in some detail the bases for his serious misreadings of fundamental pedagogic thought. Aside from making several non-sequiturs and false assumptions, there is a substantive reason for some of his misreadings of fundamental pedagogic thought worthy.
Fundamental Pedagogics

of our consideration because it rests on his failure to make a distinction not clearly explicated in our own literature. That distinction is between a philosophy of and a philosophy for education. Without this distinction, a good deal of fundamental pedagogic thought will appear to be opaque if not self-contradictory.

My purpose is four-fold. First, I briefly explicate the nature of fundamental pedagogic thought and some of its results. Second, I consider the important distinction between a philosophy of and a philosophy for education. Third, I suggest why this distinction is absent from our literature. Fourth, I show how the failure to make this distinction has lead Reagan and others to an inadequate understanding of fundamental pedagogic thought.

What is Fundamental Pedagogics?

Pedagogics is the human science of the phenomenon of an adult accompanying or guiding a child to adulthood. Because of the nature of this phenomenon (education) and all that it entails, pedagogics necessarily is divided into several distinguishable but inseparable part disciplines or perspectives. These various part perspectives constitute pedagogics, the autonomous science of education; it is autonomous because it has its own field of study, terminology, and methods. The primary part perspectives of pedagogics are fundamental pedagogics (philosophy of education), psychopedagogics (educational psychology), and didactic pedagogics (curriculum and instruction). They are primary because they are of explicit relevance to any pedagogical study of education. There are other, secondary, part perspectives such as sociopedagogics, orthopedagogics, and historicopedagogics that may or may not be of immediate relevance. The various part perspectives form the unified whole of pedagogics owing to their common point of departure in the phenomenon of guiding a child to adulthood and to phenomenology as their primary method. That is, these part perspectives constitute a unified theoretical view of education because each discloses and describes an aspect of the essential and inseparable structures of the phenomenon of education.

Fundamental pedagogics is the core part perspective of pedagogics because it provides a philosophically (i.e., phenomenologically) grounded perspective on education in its entirety by explicating the link between this phenomenon on the one hand and philosophical anthropology as well as ontology on the other hand. Also, it is a "holistic" part perspective which emphasizes the unity and interrelatedness of the other part perspectives by requiring that they always take their point of departure from and remain rooted in the phenomenon of education. That is, fundamental pedagogics provides the horizon or frame of reference within which everything pertaining to pedagogics is placed and evaluated. It also has the task of reflecting phenomenologically on the education phenomenon and situation and on this basis to disclose and describe essential structures (categories) of it which then can serve as criteria for critically evaluating the pedagogic account-
ability of concrete educative practices, and the pedagogic relevance of the
categories disclosed by the other part perspectives as well as by related sciences
external to education, such as psychology. Examples of these categories and
criteria are presented below.

**Fundamental Pedagogic Categories and Criteria**

What are some of the fundamental pedagogic categories descriptive of the
essential structures of the event of guiding a child to adulthood? When one’s point
of departure is the adult’s accompaniment of a child to adulthood, it becomes
evident that this event only occurs within a special adult-child relationship; it
displays a dynamic sequence; it requires the mutual participation of the child and
the adult in activities necessary to help and guide the child to become a morally
responsible, independent adult—the aim. The categories descriptive of the relation-
ship, the sequence, the activity, and the aim structures are presented in detail
elsewhere and they are based on the extensive research by Landman and his
students.

To keep this paper manageable, I will limit myself to a brief summary of the
essential aspects (categories) of the structure of the adult-child relationship, and
I will derive a few evaluative questions (criteria) from these categories or essences.
Phenomenological studies of the phenomenon “accompanying a child to adult-
hood” reveal that the required adult-child educative relationship is based on
mutual trust and understanding. Even though these two support and pave the way
for the third aspect of this relationship, the exercise of pedagogic authority, all
three are essential for effectively guiding the child to adulthood. What is meant by
each?

**Trust**

Mutual trust is necessary for a child to feel confident and secure enough to be
ready and willing to explore her open world. This confidence and security arises
when the adult provides the child with an emotionally secure, caring space, and
makes her feel at home, welcome, and close to the adult. Thus, an essential aspect
of educative trust is acceptance. The adult accepts the child as she is and trusts that
she will become what she can and ought to be. Also, an intimate bonding should
occur within which the child is treated as a person of dignity. But the child must
also trust and accept the adult because this amounts to the child accepting the adult
as a model for her own future.

Even so, mutual acceptance is not enough; mutual commitment also is
required. That is, the adult must act in behalf of the best interests of the child to
guide the child to a life worthy of a human being. And for this to occur, the child
must, in a sense, temporarily commit her future to the trusted adult.

By phrasing some of the main points above as questions, fundamental
pedagogic criteria can be generated. Some examples for trust are:

- Do the adult and child accept each other?
- Does the adult help the child feel confident and secure?
- Does the child feel emotionally ready and willing to explore and learn?
- Does the adult respect the dignity of the child?
- Does the child accept and identify with the adult as a model?
- Does the child (temporarily) commit herself and her future to the adult?

**Understanding**

The required mutual understanding means that the adult (educator) understand the child in his situation and as someone in need of guidance on the way to adulthood. It also means that the child has a notion that the adult can and will assist him to explore and learn about reality.

At first, the child has a limited understanding of himself and the situations he is in. Therefore, the adult must select, clarify, and explain these as yet unknown life contents (reality) to the child. This clarification requires the child’s participation by giving meaning to the content such that he comes to understand these situations and make them his own. It should be mentioned that this clarification and resulting understanding are not just a cognitive but also an affective (feeling) and normative (moral) matter.

Some criteria based on the above description are:

- Does the adult understand the child as someone in need of guidance?
- Does the child feel understood by the adult?
- Is the child responsive to the adult’s understanding and knowledge?
- Does the adult take responsibility for selecting and clarifying aspects of reality (e.g., norms and values) for the child?

**Authority**

The relationship of authority implies that the adult has something to “tell” the child that is for her benefit and thus she should listen. But this telling and listening must take the form of a dialogue in order for the child to be a full participant in her own education.

What does the adult have to tell the child? The valued and particularly the values and norms derived therefrom are what the adult tells the child about and shows her. Here it is critically important that the adult show the child that she accepts and lives in accordance with the authority of the same norms and values she is helping the child experience and interpret. Thus, the adult is a mediator or
bridge between the norms and values and the child.

At first, the child cannot see past the adult to the norms per se, but rather responds to the presence of the adult in a docile way. Docility occurs when the child mis-takes the adult as the authority. Eventually, the child sees that the adult also is guided by the same norms and values (authority) she is addressing to the child. Then, the child answers to the authority of the values and norms represented by and through the educator's example (words and deeds) and there is then mention of the values having become internalized by the child.¹¹

Some evaluative criteria derived from the above are:

Is the adult's intervention authoritative rather than authoritarian?
Is there dialogue between adult and child within which the adult exemplifies a valued behavior to the child?
Does the adult indicate to the child (by example) that she behaves in accordance with the same norms and values (behaviors) she is asking the child to follow?

These three facets of the adult-child educative relationship are distinguishable but not separable. If any aspect is inadequately actualized, a dysfunctional educational situation is likely to arise.¹² For example, without adequate trust and understanding, the exercise of authority will tend to be authoritarian rather than authoritative, and this could impede the child's progress to an independent, responsible form of adulthood.

These categories and criteria, along with those from psychopedagogics and didactic pedagogics, constitute an educational frame of reference rooted in the reality of guiding a child to adulthood. Further, to the extent that educative schooling is an institutionalized, formalized extension of the primary parent-child relationship, this frame of reference provides a foundational perspective for teacher education.¹³

The Distinction Between

a Philosophy OF and a Philosophy FOR Education

The two preconditions for engaging in fundamental pedagogic thought are that the point of departure is the phenomenon of an adult guiding, accompanying a child to adulthood (education as educare) and that phenomenology is the primary method of studying this phenomenon. Indeed, as noted earlier, fundamental pedagogics is a phenomenology of education. Further, as Van Rensburg and Landman¹⁴ point out, in the pedagogic literature, fundamental pedagogics and philosophy of education are used as synonyms. In other words, in this literature, philosophy of education is a phenomenology of education. This last statement may strike many educational philosophers who do not subscribe to or accept a phenomenological approach as an unwarranted usurpation of terminology. And to
say further, as Van Rensburg and Landman do, that educational philosophies other than fundamental pedagogics are philosophies for education seems to confirm this. However, let us consider what this distinction is attempting to point out.

In arguing for calling their approach to the study of education fundamental pedagogics rather than philosophy of education, Van Rensburg and Landman say:

The term “philosophy of education” very easily gives rise to a philosophy on or even a philosophy for education which then forms the basis for a particular education practice and which, as a particular theory on education, prescribes to that education practice. In reality, such a philosophy on or for education is a theory on education arising from a particular philosophy of life. There is nothing wrong with such a particular theory on education, as such, provided it does not become elevated to a philosophy of education.15

Fundamental pedagogics, in its disclosure and description of essential structures of the educative event itself, reveals that whenever and wherever education, as guiding a child to adulthood, occurs it is in terms of these structures. Thus, on the level of the phenomenon there is one form. These essential structures of the phenomenon of education and their interrelationships constitute an educational perspective or a philosophy of education in the sense that these structures and their interconnections are what any concrete practice of education must adequately actualize to be true to the nature of education itself. In other words, these essential structures are of or from the phenomenon itself.

If there is one form on the level of the phenomenon of education, why is diversity accurately descriptive of the appearance or practice of educating across cultures and, to a lesser degree, within a particular culture? This diversity is the manifestation of different philosophies for educating rooted in different philosophies of life. Each and every practice of educating essentially occurs in terms of a particular philosophy of life as a hierarchy of values arising from elsewhere than the phenomenon of education itself. That is, a particular philosophy for educating is required to give life and content to the essential structures (form) revealed by fundamental pedagogics.16

It is important to recognize that a particular philosophy for educating, based on one’s philosophy of life, essentially functions as an ideology applied to the educative act. Ideology is not used here in a pejorative sense; rather, as McNeil17 says, an ideology is “a value or belief system that is accepted as a fact or truth by some group, providing the believer with a picture of the world both as it is and as it should be.” Van Rensburg and Landman18 add that an ideology is “a specific philosophy of life or attitude towards life.”

As a philosophy of education, fundamental pedagogics is not the application of an ideology to the phenomenon of education. Its purpose is to disclose and describe essential structures irrespective of any particular ideology. Where
fundamental pedagogics is focused on education as it essentially is, an ideology is focused on education as it ought to be in terms of that ideology.

A philosophy of and a philosophy for educating should not be separated. For example, if a presumed fundamental pedagogic essence (category) cannot be actualized in terms of a particular philosophy for educating, this is an indication that it may not be an essence after all, because a necessary form or structure of education underlies all authentic educative practice, whatever its ideological nuances. On the other hand, a practice arising from a philosophy for educating can and should be evaluated in terms of the nature of education as disclosed in fundamental pedagogic categories (philosophy of education). Such a dialogue can only serve to further clarify (and test) fundamental pedagogic structures and to improve educative practice.

Why is a Fundamental Pedagogic View (Philosophy of Education) Virtually Absent from Our Literature?

The perspectives on education appearing in our academic discourse are almost exclusively rooted in points of departure external to the phenomenon of education and are then applied to the study and practice of education. A clear illustration of this is the outstanding and comprehensive textbook by Gutek in which he presents seven philosophical systems (e.g., Idealism, Naturalism, Existentialism), five ideologies (e.g., Liberalism, Conservatism, Marxism), and four “theories” (e.g., Essentialism, Progressivism, Social Reconstructionism) among some of which there is overlap. With the exception of Philosophical Analysis, all of the philosophical, ideological, and “theoretical” views treated by Gutek are “isms” which connotes “adherence to a system or class of principles <stoicism> “or” doctrine: theory: cult <Buddhism>.”

If the full range of our acceptable educational philosophies, ideologies, and “theories” have their roots external to the phenomenon of guiding a child to adulthood, then the basis for a distinction between a philosophy of and a philosophy for education will tend to go unnoticed and, with that, there will be no need to make it. That is, each of these “isms” in their application to the study and practice of educating qualifies as a philosophy for educating. What is more, there is nothing in Gutek’s book remotely related to a fundamental pedagogic perspective or a philosophy of education.

A focus on the empirical diversity of the occurrences of education is emphasized and encouraged by these various perspectives or ideologies. In turn, this focus on diversity tends to obscure the fact that education has a fundamental form or essence which is at the root of these diverse occurrences and which can be disclosed and described. In addition, the grip that schooling, as a point of focus, holds on the literature distracts attention from the primary life world phenomenon
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of guiding a child to adulthood. Of course, fundamental pedagogics is interested in schooling and all that it entails. After all, schooling is the most pervasive institutionalized form of educating to be found in contemporary society. Even so, schooling is not the point of departure or the phenomenon of primary interest to fundamental pedagogics. The reason is that in terms of human existence, educative schooling, as a late development in human history, is a derived or second-order phenomenon based on the more primary one of guiding a child to adulthood.23

The Failure to Distinguish Between a Philosophy OF and a Philosophy FOR Education and a Misreading of Fundamental Pedagogic Thought: the Case of T. Reagan

In his paper, Reagan identifies what he considers to be two articles of faith central to fundamental pedagogic thought. In this regard, his serious misunderstanding of fundamental pedagogic thought stems directly from his failure to distinguish between a philosophy of and a philosophy for education. In fact, it should become evident that Reagan reads fundamental pedagogics as if it were an ideology or a philosophy for educating rather than a philosophy of education.

Thus, Reagan says, ‘‘perhaps the central article of faith of fundamental pedagogics is that different cultural groups have different ‘philosophies of life,’ and that, in turn, appropriate educations for different cultural groups must therefore be grounded in significantly different philosophies of education.’’24 Of course, it is a truism that different cultural groups have different philosophies of life. However, from a fundamental pedagogic view, different philosophies of life do not imply different philosophies of education.

Since Reagan sees fundamental pedagogics essentially as a philosophy for and not a philosophy of education (he calls it a philosophy of education because he is not aware of the distinction), he is lead to conclude that the central article of faith mentioned above implies that fundamental pedagogics is ‘‘an integral
component of the foundation of apartheid", and is used both to "justify and legitimate the reality of separate educational systems." And further, he claims that "fundamental pedagogicians in essence deny the possibility of a unified integrated educational system in South Africa." Thus, Reagan concludes, we have an "intellectual and 'scientific' justification for racist and separatist policies." Clearly, Reagan views fundamental pedagogics as an ideology or a philosophy for education. In fact, the unique contribution of fundamental pedagogics to the foundations of education is that it is not an ideology or philosophy for education but rather a philosophy of education.

Another way to consider the difference between a philosophy of and a philosophy for education is to note that the fundamental pedagogician tries not to let his philosophy of life (and philosophy for education) bias his penetration to the fundamental structures of education. He does this by "bracketing" or controlling for pet theories, his hierarchy of values, worldviews, etc.; on the other hand, the practitioner has no choice but to actualize these fundamental structures in terms of his philosophy of life and thus philosophy for education.

A phenomenological (fundamental pedagogic) investigation of the occurrence of education is possible for anyone to pursue irrespective of political and religious beliefs or country of origin. Fundamental pedagogics as an approach to the study of education knows no citizenship. Contrary to Reagan's claims, it is not fundamental pedagogics that has religious, political-social commitments and convictions, but rather the individuals who take this approach. Consequently, Landman et al., e.g., insist that one study the phenomenon of education separately from one's philosophy of life. This is possible in the sense that one's descriptions of education (its structures, preconditions) should not and need not reveal an iota about one's philosophy of life.

It is unfortunate that erroneous interpretations of South African fundamental pedagogics, such as Reagan’s, are promoted by the manner in which most books on fundamental pedagogics are written. Explicitly, fundamental pedagogic findings almost always are intermingled with pronouncements stemming from the author's philosophy of life. Even though this is a serious annoyance, it is possible to sift the fundamental pedagogic results from philosophy of life beliefs and values and to then verify, for oneself, the fundamental pedagogic results against the phenomenon of education. When this is done, it is clear that these results transcend any particular philosophy of life (one's philosophy on or for education and also the South African context). Then one also can see that fundamental pedagogics is an important breakthrough in foundational educational thought. The reason for this breakthrough is that by penetrating to the essential structures of the phenomenon of education, as an adult guiding a child to adulthood, an educational perspective (in contrast to, e.g., a psychological, philosophical, sociological one) becomes possible.

The distinction between a philosophy of and a philosophy for education
Fundamental Pedagogics

explicated above is helpful in clarifying an additional point made by Reagan. That is, he sees another article of faith of fundamental pedagogics - "the principle that the child must as a function of his or her educational experience, be made 'morally defensible against ideologies' (such as liberalism, pragmatism, communism, and so on) through the inculcation of the 'Christian philosophy of life.'" This statement, ignorant and out of place to most of us, is a clear example of the kind of pronouncement stemming from Landman's Christian philosophy of life or philosophy for education that one finds interspersed among fundamental pedagogic results. I cannot fault Reagan and others for being misled and even outraged by such statements. But if one keeps in mind the distinction between a philosophy of and a philosophy for education, it becomes relatively easy to identify such statements for what they are. Why do they occur? Although I do not agree with their strategy, I believe the reason South African educationists write in this way is because of their limited audience. These books are written for South Africans who do or will participate in that country's Christian National Education System. Hence, Landman, e.g., is interested in presenting both fundamental pedagogic insights and reflections on the philosophy of life of which Christian National Education is an expression. He is interested in doing this because any practitioner has the task of actualizing the fundamental pedagogic structures in accordance with his philosophy of life, Christian or other.

With this background, it can be seen that the so-called article of faith regarding "moral defensibility" is not related to a fundamental pedagogic perspective, as such. Specifically, what I believe Landman means by "moral defensibility" is that some of the assumptions and contents of these ideologies are not acceptable from a Christian philosophy of life. Consequently, when Christian educators present these ideologies to their students, they are obligated to do so in terms of what these ideologies espouse and in terms of what is acceptable or objectionable about them from a Christian point of view; this is a philosophy of life (i.e., ideological) issue and not a fundamental pedagogic one. Thus, Reagan's claim that fundamental pedagogies takes a Protestant Christian view to critique other philosophic systems and worldviews is ill conceived because it confuses a philosophy for with a philosophy of education.

When it is said that the worldviews of liberalism, pragmatism, communism, etc., if taken as one's point of departure for studying the education event, conceal the phenomenon of education, this is made from within a fundamental pedagogic (phenomenological) perspective and not a philosophy of life perspective because, phenomenologically speaking, any such worldview, including a Christian one, will conceal the phenomenon of education. In this context, I see Landman's explicit statement that "...a Christian knows that his own philosophy of life can prevent the education reality from becoming clear and translucent..." as a further indication that when he talks about a Christian Nationalist view of education he is not speaking from a fundamental pedagogic perspective but rather from a
philosophy of life perspective. This line of thought is consistent with the phenomenological requirement of "bracketing" one's philosophy of life (to the extent possible) in order to penetrate to and describe the phenomenon of education.

To continue briefly with the issue of the concealment of the phenomenon of education by "worldviews" or ideologies and their respective philosophies for education, the Educational Ideologies Inventory developed by O'Neill to reflect key ideas from each of a broad range of educational philosophies (really philosophies for education) is particularly illustrative. The philosophies (ideologies) represented are fundamentalism, intellectualism, conservatism, liberalism, libertarianism, and anarchism. Virtually none of the 104 items comprising this inventory reflect any content resembling the essential structures of education disclosed by fundamental pedagogics and this is consistent with what was already noted with respect to Gutek's book. Rather, for the most part, the items refer to schooling, have a strong political flavor, or both. That is, true to the name of this questionnaire, the items primarily reflect ideological commitments.

To this point, it is evident that by erroneously viewing Christian National Education as the source of fundamental pedagogics and by failing to distinguish between a philosophy of and a philosophy for education, Reagan is lead to gloss over the rootedness of fundamental pedagogics in continental phenomenology, and he is lead to understand it as "a rather odd assortment of concepts, claims, and technical language drawn from traditional Calvinist theology, continental phenomenology, and a variety of other sources" (emphasis added). This quotation misrepresents the nature of fundamental pedagogic thought as well as its results, and, according to Reagan, the implication is that this "odd assortment" is best left in South Africa.

Conclusions

Fundamental pedagogics, as a phenomenology of an adult guiding a child to adulthood, is not an ideology or a philosophy for educating. Rather, it is a philosophy of education in that it discloses and describes essential structures of the education phenomenon and from these descriptions derives criteria or evaluative questions that form an educational frame of reference rooted in the reality of education. These questions can be used to guide and improve one's own practice of educating as well as to evaluate the educational accountability of techniques and procedures such as assertive discipline and behavior modification.

A distinction, critical to understanding fundamental pedagogic thought, not prominent in our own literature is that between a philosophy of and a philosophy for education. Essentially, a philosophy of education uses categories or concepts derived from the phenomenon of education itself whereas a philosophy for education views education in terms of concepts rooted in perspectives external to the phenomenon of education (e.g., Idealism, Pragmatism). A major reason the
above distinction is not made in our literature is because virtually the entire range of acceptable educational philosophies and ideologies, though called philosophies of education, in fact are philosophies for education as that distinction has been developed in the present paper. Thus, the need for such a distinction goes unnoticed.

Two serious misreadings of fundamental pedagogics by Reagan were shown to stem from his failure to distinguish between a philosophy of and for education. The end result is that he interprets fundamental pedagogic thought as an ideology applied to educating and thus obscures its potential contribution to our philosophical foundations of education.

Notes


6. Phenomenologically speaking, one cannot validly disclose the essences or structures of one phenomenon in terms of another (e.g., education in terms of learning; childhood in terms of adulthood). Consequently, one's point of departure is critically important. In fact, that point of departure must be the phenomenon of interest. If it is not, one's disclosure of the essences of that phenomenon (e.g., education) will tend to be obscured by the phenomenon or perspective on which one's point of departure is based (i.e., naturalism, existentialism).

7. Education, as guiding a child to adulthood, is derived from the Latin *educare*, meaning to rear or to bring up.


Yonge


15. My translation of Van Rensburg and Landman, *ibid.,* p. 56. See also their translation of this same passage on page 416.
18. Van Rensburg and Landman, *op. cit.,* p. 344.
20. Gutek also presents a chapter on philosophical analysis and education.
29. Landman et al, *op. cit.,* pp. 82-83.
34. For example, most of the contributors to P. N. G. Bead and W. E. Morrow, eds., *Problems of Pedagogies.* (Durban: Butterworth, 1981).
36. See Landman, Kilian, Swanepoel, and Bodenstein, *op. cit.,* p. 82.
38. Reagan, *op. cit.,* p. 64.
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