

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 364 493

SO 023 674

AUTHOR Owen, David B., Ed.; Swartz, Ronald M., Ed.
 TITLE Proceedings of the Annual Conference of the Midwest
 Philosophy of Education Society (Chicago, Illinois,
 November 8-9, 1991, and November 13-14, 1992).
 INSTITUTION Midwest Philosophy of Education Society.
 PUB DATE 93
 NOTE 371p.; For earlier proceedings, see ED 356 992-993,
 ED 345 983-987, ED 319 670, and ED 241 407.
 AVAILABLE FROM Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, Ames, IA
 50010.
 PUB TYPE Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021)
 EDRS PRICE MF01/PC15 Plus Postage.
 DESCRIPTORS Critical Thinking; Democracy; *Educational
 Environment; Educational Objectives; *Educational
 Philosophy; *Educational Theories; *Ethical
 Instruction; Females; Grading; Higher Education;
 Popular Culture; *Social Change; Student Evaluation;
 Teaching (Occupation)
 IDENTIFIERS Beauvoir (Simone de); Confucius; *Dewey (John);
 Peirce (Charles S); *Postmodernism

ABSTRACT

This document consists of papers that were presented at the 1991 and 1992 annual meetings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society. The book is divided into four sections. The first is composed of the society president's address at the 1992 meeting and a response to that address. The presidential address discussed chaos theory and the philosophy of Charles Peirce as it related to the future of philosophy of education. The second section contains the papers presented at the 1991 meeting. Some subjects included are: (1) critical thinking and Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics"; (2) philosophy of popular culture in academia; (3) student disbelief; (4) conflict between individual rights and social values in the civil rights movement; (5) changes in U.S. education as it relates to the teaching profession; (6) and (7) John Dewey's educational philosophy; and (8) democracy and education beyond the classroom. The third section consists of the papers presented at the 1992 annual meeting. Subjects in this section include Simone de Beauvoir's theory of women in society and social change, education and democracy, hopefulness and inner city students, education and love, irreducibility of value, Confucius, the ethics of evaluation and grading, teaching, education initiative and social reconstructivism, educating the emotions, philosophy of life rhythms, critical thinking strategies, poetry, moral education, radical perspectivism, and Catholic education. The final section is appendices of meeting programs, members and officers, and business meeting reports. (DK)

 * Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
 * from the original document. *

ED 364 493

SO 023674

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
CENTER (ERIC)

This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it

Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality

Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy

PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
MIDWEST
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
SOCIETY,
1991 and 1992

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

M. A.
OLIVER

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

PROCEEDINGS
OF THE
MIDWEST
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
SOCIETY,
1991 and 1992

David B. Owen, Editor

Ronald M. Swartz, Associate Editor

© 1993 by the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, Ames, Iowa 50010.
All Rights are reserved. No part of these *Proceedings* may be reproduced
without the permission of the Society.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

David B. Owen	
<i>Preface</i>	vii

I. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

George W. Stickel	
<i>Philosophy of Education for the Year 2000 A.D.:</i> <i>Chaos Theory and the Philosophy</i> <i>of Charles Peirce (Delivered November 13, 1992)</i>	3

Lawrence J. Dennis	
Response. <i>Postmodernism, Seattle, and Stickel</i>	35

II. 1991 ANNUAL MEETING

Charles E. Alberti	
<i>Critical Thinking and Aristotle's Posterior Analytics</i>	41

Don G. Smith	
<i>Toward a Philosophy of Popular Culture in Academia</i>	49

Walter P. Krolkowski	
" <i>Believe Me Not; And Yet I like Not</i> ": <i>A Case For Student Disbelief</i>	53

Joseph Watras	
<i>Was There a Conflict Between Individual Rights and</i> <i>Social Values in the Civil Rights Movement?</i>	67

Robert A. Leone (Graduate Student Award Winner)	
<i>American Education in Fluxion and the Possibility</i> <i>of a Teaching Profession</i>	77

Alexander Makedon	
<i>Reinterpreting Dewey: Some Thoughts on His Views</i> <i>of Science and Play in Education</i>	93

Robert P. Craig	
<i>The Relationship Between Interest and Discipline: John Dewey Revisited</i>	103
Louis Silverstein	
<i>Taking It to the Streets: Democracy and Education Beyond the Classroom</i>	111
III. 1992 ANNUAL MEETING	
Allison E. Williams	
<i>Does Evolution Necessitate Revolution? A Look at the Implications of Simone de Beauvoir's Claim, "One is Not Born a Woman, One Becomes One"</i>	119
Michael A. Olicker	
<i>Analytical Philosophy and the Discourse of Institutional Democracy</i>	127
Michael T. Risku	
<i>Hopefulness: The Value Variable for Inner City Students</i>	135
Ian M. Harris	
<i>On the Relationship Between Education and Love</i>	143
Thomas S. Deeds	
<i>Mark Johnston and David Lewis on the Irreducibility of Value</i>	167
Kyung Hi Kim	
<i>Confucius and His Impact on Education</i>	177
Richard C. Pipan	
<i>Reflections on a Round Table Discussion -- "Thoughts on Evaluation: Moral and Ethical Dilemmas of Grading"</i>	191
Arthur Brown	
<i>Undergraduate Assessment As Pedagogical and Political Control</i>	205

Susan V. Aud (Graduate Student Award Winner)	
<i>Teaching in a Postmodern World</i>	217
Robert P. Craig	
<i>On Educating the Emotions</i>	231
Janis B. Fine	
<i>Philosophy of Education and Relevance for the '90s:</i> <i>Regular Education Initiative and</i> <i>Social Reconstructionism</i>	241
Louis Silverstein	
<i>Sketches of a Philosophy of Life Rhythms & Education</i>	249
Charles E. Alberti	
<i>Whose Critical Thinking Strategy Is of Most Worth?</i>	253
Lawrence Santoro	
<i>From Puggy to Larry: Poetry from Gathering Light</i>	261
David B. Annis	
<i>Moral Education and Integrity: Educating for Higher-Level</i> <i>Character Traits</i>	287
Alexander Makedon	
<i>Humans in the World: Introduction to the Educational Theory</i> <i>of Radical Perspectivism</i>	297
Walter P. Krolkowski	
<i>Philosophy of Catholic Education Before Vatican II</i>	311
Robert N. Barger	
<i>McGucken Revisited: A Fifty-Year Retrospective on</i> <i>American Catholic Educational Philosophy</i>	319
Don G. Smith	
<i>American First and Catholics Second: The Decline of</i> <i>Catholic Education Since Vatican II</i>	327

IV. APPENDICES

Appendix A	
<i>Program of the 1991 Annual Meeting</i>	337
Appendix B	
<i>Program of the 1992 Annual Meeting</i>	343
Appendix C	
<i>Officers and Committees, 1991-1992</i>	349
Appendix D	
<i>Minutes of the Business Meeting, Including</i> <i>Treasurer's Report, November 13, 1992</i>	351
Appendix E	
<i>Membership List, 1991-1992</i>	355
Appendix F	
<i>Cumulative Index to Proceedings, 1977-1992</i>	367

PREFACE

These *Proceedings* are composed of papers which presenters at the 1991 and 1992 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society wished to have published. Each paper herein went through a peer-review process by the Society's Program Committee before being accepted for presentation at its respective Meeting.

The Editors would like to thank the authors represented herein for cooperating with a new approach to publishing their work. Although submitting their papers electronically for publication in this *Proceedings* was undoubtedly awkward for some, it makes for increased accuracy and improved quality of presentation of their contributions. Hopefully the Society will find that the new style of this *Proceedings* shows more strikingly the quality of work the Society's members are doing.

The Annual Meetings on November 8 and 9, 1991, and November 13 and 14, 1992, were held at Loyola University of Chicago. As usual, the Society is greatly indebted to Walter P. Krolkowski for arranging such a well planned and enjoyable setting. In addition, the Society also wants to thank the School of Education, Dean Robert E. Roemer, and the University for generously hosting our two-day gatherings.

The Society would also like to express its appreciation to the Program Committees from 1991 and 1992 for refereeing the papers submitted for presentation and for organizing the programs.

Last, but certainly not least, I would like to thank Ronald Swartz for his help in getting these *Proceedings* together and for his continued advice about various problems as they arose. It is support like his which makes one realize that MPES is a unique professional organization, one composed of genuine colleagues.

David B. Owen
Ames, Iowa

I. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

**PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION FOR THE YEAR 2000 A.D.:
CHAOS THEORY AND
THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES PEIRCE**

**George W. Stickel
Kennesaw State College**

I. Introduction

The job of philosophy, I believe, is to provide a consistent, comprehensive, coherent, and congruent understanding of reality, knowing, and valuing.¹ The role of the philosopher of education is to theorize and apply that understanding to the world of learning and teaching. Such work defines the educational researcher's task and improves the efficiency of data collection.

With each generation, the reality about us or at least our understanding of it changes, and our comprehension of how we know changes with that reality. While values may or may not change, the philosophy of valuing continually gains new insights into the process. For example, philosophies following Newton defined a mechanistic, ordered universe; those that followed Einstein saw a relativism. Earlier this year George F. Smoot, from data collected from the Cosmic Background Explorer satellite, claimed, "The Holy Grail has been found, . . . If you're religious, it's like looking at God."² The data showed the edge of the universe, the "15-billion-year-old fossil" of the Big Bang, or what the universe looked like 300,000 years after the Big Bang (sometimes called the whisper of the Big Bang).³ That data will need to be processed by scientists, but it will also be processed by philosophers as we come to understand the cosmological reality of the edge of this world.

On a scientific front close to education, research comes to further define a reality and even an epistemology. Two major areas of study are calling for new understandings. They are the mathematical theory and application of chaos and the comprehensive research in neuroscience. They are not distant from the frontiers of space because chaos theory is equally at home in scientific cosmology and in human biology. Likewise, central to the cosmology and the current studies in computer simulations of neural learning are the theories of quantum mechanics and thermodynamics. Thermodynamics, in particular, plays a major role in our understanding of chaos.

And what does this have to do with philosophy of education? Plenty, today, as well as in the years to come!

To prove this thesis, one needs to rely upon the work from several quadrants, including the studies in neurophilosophy of Patricia Smith Churchland, in chaos theory and thermodynamics from Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine and others, several studies in education, and the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, with a touch of George Herbert Mead.

Churchland is one voice in philosophy and in neuroscience who begins to bridge the gap between these fields on a frontier of human understanding. Her 1986 book, *Neurophilosophy*, called for a comprehensive mathematical theory of the brain, its thinking, learning, and memory.⁴ Her latest book, *The Computational Brain*, furthers her quest, but also raises further questions for study. One of those questions which is less explicit than implicit, is the role of chaos.⁵

Ilya Prigogine's (et al.) research in thermodynamics of physical chemical systems concentrates on the theories of chaos and fractals. His books argue that the static reality of being, derived from a perspective of Newtonian physics, is in error and that with the dynamic, nonlinear system of chaos there is a new reality of becoming or creation from chance and disequilibrium.⁶ In short, a becoming arises from a turbulence and seeming disorder of chaos and imbalance, which is very like Charles Peirce's concept of design and chance (W 4:544-ff).⁷ Prigogine is well aware of the studies of Charles Peirce,⁸ and rightly has been compared to Peirce in his science and mathematics.

On the educational front, William E. Doll argues that today's curricula need to move beyond the static linearity of a Newtonian world to the nonlinearity of a world of chaos defined by Prigogine.¹⁰ Others in education follow Doll's lead in attempts to define chaos applications to educational understandings, research, and theory.¹¹

Finally, the value of examining the philosophy of Charles Peirce can be found in three areas. First, Peirce provides a comprehensive philosophical approach based upon mathematics and logic, defined by his semiotic studies. (Semiotic studies have been a fertile field for linguists and scholars in literary criticism for several years.) Second, Peirce has value because of where one finds his theories expounded, from Churchland's work¹² to Prigogine's, but also in education on critical thinking. For example, an excellent argument on critical thinking and the classroom has been published by ERIC and the National Council of Teachers of English, which begins with Peirce's method of critical thought.¹³ And third, Peirce's contribution to the thinking of John Dewey and his philosophy of education (which may have been more latent and implicit than actual and explicit) cannot go unnoticed.¹⁴

Each of these scholars mentioned are driven by various epistemological concerns which are at the heart of learning, at the heart of the individual becoming something new in the process of life. Certainly, philosophy of

education is likewise concerned with epistemology, perhaps preeminently so.

II. Chaos Theory

While there are many entrees to chaos, Jean Lindsay's approach is not without merit.¹⁵ Lindsay compares chaos's nonlinearity, its self-similarity, and its strange attractors to the developmental theory of Piaget. In fact many researchers are applying the chaos template to various physical and biological systems, even if few behavioral systems have been studied.

First, linearity, Churchland reminds us, is a straight line on a Cartesian coordinate, where an x value is "mapped" onto a y value.¹⁶ Figure 1 (the Figures follow the text) shows how a value on the x axis can relate specifically to a value on the y axis. The mapping is important, because from a philosophically pragmatic vantage, the object is always distant to the observer and what happens inside the brain is a mapping of that image into some neuronal firing paradigm which stands for that object. Peirce would call the image a sign or an interpretant, as will be shown later.

A nonlinear function maps from the x to the y axis with a more complicated equation, which produces a curved line. A example of a linear function would be: $y = 2x$; a nonlinear function example would be $y = x^2$. Both mappings take the form $y = f(x)$, which is read, "y" equals "f" of "x," or "y" is a function of "x."

More complex lines can be drawn with more complex equations, where the line can change gradually, as one has in the asymptotes of a hyperbola, or the line can change quickly, like a parabolic curve. In chaos one finds that the line can bifurcate or jump at certain points, dependent upon the system's parameters; such jumps are called noncontinuous. Figures 2 and 3 show such bifurcations and jumps.

In physical systems, the jumps in the lines occur at the onset of turbulence, which is also called a point of perturbation. Because of the turbulence, the mathematics was called chaos. While the name "chaos" implies a randomness and indeterminacy, there is a determinism but it is different than expected within Newtonian physics. The jumps come from the system providing a feedback which is never normalized or smoothed out. The system is dynamic where the change from one moment to the next is a function of time (t). The system at a particular time ($X(t)$) will depend upon the system at some earlier time (X_1), plus the change in the system over time (mathematically said to be a function of time). The relationship can be written:¹⁷

$$X(t) = X_1 + x(t)$$

The x_1 value is called the role of the perturbation, where the x is the quality of perturbation. It is interesting that this same concept is used by Dewey as he wrote about the psychology of thinking at the moment of the problematic

situation. He wrote:

From his own standpoint, there is shock, confusion, *perturbation*, uncertainty. For the moment he doesn't know what hit him, as we say, nor where he is going. But a new impulse is stirred which becomes the starting point of an investigation, a looking into things, a trying to see them, to find out what is going on.¹⁸

Within the individual there is a turbulence, at least for Dewey, as learning begins.

Returning to chaos and the perturbation equation, each moment of time within the system (if the system is pushed to turbulence, or what Prigogine calls pushed "far from equilibrium"), the system remembers the past perturbation, and intensifies it in a feedback loop. The feedback is mathematically the whole system, $X(t)$, seen in the relationship of the past, X_n , with the perturbation function, $x(t)$, which becomes the new past, defining a new system $X(t)_2$. It is as if the whole mathematical equation were contained in itself, like the repetitive image one gets when one looks into a mirror which is opposite and parallel to another mirror. Figure 2 shows the recursive behavior of chaotic bifurcations.

The recursive behavior, or self-similarity, allows nature to repeat fairly simplistic mathematical relations (and equations) at different levels, to build complex systems, from the water shed of a river's tributary system, to the branchings of human arteries and veins, to Figure 4 of a computer simulated fern leaf. Jean Lindsay uses the self-similarity to show from Piaget how a child's growth moves through various stages of hominid development--the ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny argument anew. Thus, Lindsay writes, "the thinking of a four-year [old] would be like that of a Neanderthal adult and the logical thinking of the adolescent would reflect [civilization's] great breakthrough into scientific thought."¹⁹

While there are many problems even with a new recapitulation theory (which is not being advocated here), the point is that there is a repetitive nature within chaos, which may well be found within the process of thought. The chaotic reiteration of self-similarity is reminiscent of Peirce's perspective of thought. Peirce used the notion of vortices within vortices when he wrote about the change of the physical energy to mental energy and back as actions led to reaction.²⁰ If one applies these vortices to a reiteration of his sign theory, one has the essence of chaos. Prigogine's becoming, and also a fairly comprehensive theory of brain functioning at multiple levels, from neurochemical to behavioral. More will follow below, however.

The third point of chaos which Lindsay uses is the notion of strange

attractors. Attractors are the states which systems tend toward regardless of their starting points. The states could be represented by single points or periodic cycles or even tori (the mathematical name for the donut shapes, torus for singular). No matter where a system begins, there is a movement toward these "strange attractors" so that the nonlinear lines will eventually spiral toward the attractor like matter or energy to a black hole, never to be released from the point, oval, or torus. A single point attractor is the position of rest for a pendulum winding down. Other complex attractors have been found in animal population trends.²¹ The attraction, Lindsay argues, is exactly like Piaget's equilibration, or self-regulating mechanism.²²

III. Peirce's Philosophy of Learning

Peirce's Semiotic

Peirce is not easy to understand, but is certainly simpler than most have perceived him to be. To approach his writings one must know that mathematics, the semiotic, and logic are central and inseparable. In fact he defined logic as "formal semiotic"--the study of signs--which was contained within his concept of mathematics.²³ Most often, Peirce used his semiotic to discuss thought processes, but his theory was intended to be general to all of nature. On the more general note he wrote:

A definition of a sign will be given which no more refers to human thought than does the definition of a line as a place which a particle occupies, part by part, during a lapse of time. Namely, a sign is something, *A*, which brings something, *B*, its *interpretant* sign determined or created by it, into the same sort of correspondence with something, *C*, its *object*, as that in which itself stands to *C*. It is from this definition, together with a definition of "formal" that I deduce mathematically the principles of logic.²⁴

What is central to Peirce's semiotic is that it is always triadic, never dyadic like Ferdinand de Saussure's semiotic, which is being used in some circles of literary criticism today. (It should be noted that Peirce's semiotic is used far more extensively in Europe than in the United States.) For human thought, Peirce argued, there could never be a mere dyadic, which is similar to a simple stimulus and response. Such simplicity is mathematically akin to a straight line. All branching of a line, similar to expansion of thought, no matter how complex, can be done simply with triadic relations as he showed in Figure 5.

Elsewhere, it has been shown how Peirce's semiotic can be used mathematically to define memory within the cortical columns of the cerebral

cortex, with great similarity to the actual physical structure of neural connections.²⁵ Another work (currently under review) shows how Peirce's semiotic is reiterated at a multiplicity of levels from chemical reactions, to neurochemical synaptic activity, to neural interactions, to habituation and sensitization in a sea hare (*Aplysia Californica*).²⁶ Such reiteration suggests a fractal relation.

Peirce's Logic

Peirce's logic was driven by a mathematical order of the world that Peirce saw about him. That order included both continuity, or what he called syncrism, and chance, which he called tychism. It was out of this continuity and chance that creativity arose.²⁷ Because his system of logic was intended to be comprehensive, his logic had to include the ability to add new ideas or new information into the system, as well as to process the data at hand. For Peirce, abduction (which he also called hypothesis) was logic's process which introduced this new information. Induction was logic's process of creating new rules and deduction was the process of acting upon some rule.²⁸

Any instinct, habit, or belief, for Peirce was a deductive process. He wrote:

In point of fact, a syllogism in *Barbara* virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a decapitated frog. The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve, whatever it may be, constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is the physiological analogue of the major premise. The disturbance of the ganglionic equilibrium, owing to the irritation, is the physiological form of that which, psychologically considered, is a sensation; and, logically considered, is the occurrence of a case. The explosion through the efferent nerve is the physiological form of that which psychologically is a volition, and logically the inference of a result. When we pass from the lowest to the highest forms of innervation, the physiological equivalents escape our observation; but, psychologically, we still have, first, habit,—which in its highest form is understanding, and which corresponds to the major premise of *Barbara*; we have second, feeling, or present consciousness, corresponding to the minor premise of *Barbara*; and we have, third, volition, corresponding to the conclusion of the same mode of syllogism. Although these analogies, like all very broad generalizations, may seem very fanciful at first sight, yet the more the reader reflects upon them the more profoundly true I am confident

they will appear.

Deduction proceeds from Rule and Case to Result; it is the formula of Volition. Induction proceeds from Case and Result to Rule; it is the formula of the formation of a habit or general conception,--a process which psychologically as well as logically, depends on the repetition of instances or sensations. Hypothesis proceeds from Rule and Result to Case; it is the formula of the acquirement of secondary sensation,--a process by which a confused concatenation of predicates is brought into order under a synthesizing predicate.

We usually conceive Nature to be perpetually making deductions in Barbara. This is our natural and anthropomorphic metaphysics.²⁹

The passage from Peirce is suggesting that self-similarity can be found in the form of logic throughout the physical and biological worlds, including the psychological world. There is a continuity in the rules of logic and that logic is embraced within the triadic categories of his semiotic. It is mathematical in nature, both linear and nonlinear as will be shown.

The Spirals of Peirce and Thought

Peirce was fond of using spirals to explain abstract concepts particularly concepts of the body/mind interface.³⁰ The spiraling notion, as Peirce has used it has significant application to the work done on chaos, which likewise is an interface or transition between two physical systems.³¹

Before examining some passages from Peirce, the keys to understanding his ideas on thought, are his concern for continuity between the individual and the environment and continuity between the mind and the body. Secondly, the purpose of the spirals is that while they reflect a continuity from one point to another, they do so with an endless series of transformations. This endless series of transformations separates the two points of the continuity, but yet ties them inextricably. It is this inextricable union which negates a reductionism of the mind for the pragmatists, in general.³²

In a letter to William James, while discussing consciousness, Peirce wrote:

Consider the plane spiral curve whose equation in polar co-ordinates is [a nonlinear equation]

$$\frac{r^2 - 4r + 3}{r - 2} = C\theta. \quad [\text{in footnote also} = C^{\theta}]$$

That curve will start at $r = 1$ [or rather at $r > 1$, as pointed out by a colleague, Shari Brink] and coil outwards toward $r = 2$ making an endless series of revolutions before it reaches $r = 2$. Then it will keep right on and perform an endless series of revolutions before r becomes $2 + e$, no matter how small a distance e may be. Finally, when r becomes 3 the curve will come to an abrupt stop. This shows that although it be true that Being immediately acts only on Being and Representation immediately acts only on Representation, still there may be two endless series, whereby Being and Representation act on one another without any *tertium quid*.³³

Being refers to the material organic body of the individual, while representation is the mental processing of thought. Peirce followed this passage with the spiral found in Figure 6.

Peirce then explained that if the individual points which made up the spirals (atoms in ether) were spirals themselves, and those spirals composed of points similarly constructed ad infinitum, then the sound waves of his voice

should be converted . . . [through] the whole infinite series . . . [which] should be traversed in a fraction of a second, after which they will be in the form of *thoughts* in your mind and so you will come to understand the meaning of those sounds. My logic will open up a world for investigation and show how to set about it.³⁴

His conceptualization was the essence of chaos's self-similarity.

In another spiral passage, this time addressing his philosophy of mind, Peirce continued the same metaphor of an endless series of transformations between matter and mind.³⁵ He considered a spiral (which was not pictured in the passage) to explain what would happen as his dog touched him with its nose to beg to be let out, followed by what would happen in his subsequent processing of the request, then his moving to the door to comply with the dog's wishes. Peirce offered:

Let the radius vector measure the time, beginning at the outermost point, as the instant when the dog's nose touches me and proceeding inwards. Let each coil of the spiral represent the transformation of the motion from one ether to the next. At the end of the period of time represented by one inch of the radius, all that infinite series of transformations will be complete. Now let us suppose that the inner series of coils of the spiral, which instead of being endless,

is beginningless in terms of the coils, though not in time, represents operations governed exclusively by final causation, and therefore purely mental. Let us suppose that, although mental, they are not noticeably conscious until the innermost end of the coil is approached. Here begin those reflections of which I am able to give any account, although from ever so early in the second series of coils the mind was acting rationally, in the sense in which unconsciousness, and therefore uncritical, action can be called rational. Finally, at the innermost end of the spiral will occur my volition to let the dog out. Another similar diagram would be required to show what happens next. . . . But there must be an infinite series of such ratiocinations if the mind only acts rationally. Take any instant after the work of the mind has been done, and at that instant, an infinite series of dynamical transformations will have taken place which are to terminate in the door being opened.³⁶

In the above passage, then, two spirals are needed to exemplify the details of interaction with the dog, thought, and opening the door.

A third spiral passage will clarify further Peirce's conceptualization. He wrote in a letter on the mind, matter, and logic:

The soul [mind] then *certainly* does act dynamically on matter. It does not follow that it acts *directly* upon matter, because there may be involved an [continuation from note] *endless series* of transformations of energy from motion of one fluid to motion of another, all these fluids being spiritual [mental], followed by a *beginningless* series of transformations of energy from motion in one fluid to motion in another, all *these* fluids being material. It is just as a spiral within a circumference *A*, . . . may make an endless series of turns before it reaches an inner circumference *B*, and may then keep right on making a beginningless series of turns before it reaches a third circumference *C*. $\Theta = \log(r - c)$ or even

$$\Theta = \frac{1}{r^2 - c}$$

is a sufficient illustration.³⁷

Peirce offers a spiral diagram (pictured in Figure 7) for the above equation from his next paragraph.

To further explicate Peirce's vorticies and spirals, in the continuity between the mind and the surrounding environment, as an individual interacts with that environment, there is for Peirce the material, the spiritual or mental, and another material. To put the spiral notion into neuroanatomical terms, the first material, is comprised of the sensory neurons, which it can be argued will lead to an endless series of transformations. Somewhere those transformations produce a beginningless series of transformations within the interneurons which are the neurons of the central nervous system (CNS)--Peirce's spiritual component. Those transformations (beginningless since one cannot determine precisely where the group's function begins--or where reflection begins) are also endless as they move toward the last group, the motor neurons. The motor neurons are the second material transformations since they touch matter on the other side. That is, the individual responds by opening the door for the dog.

Where does the sensory portion end and the mental begin? Where does the mental end and the motor portion begin? Those are complex neurological problems beyond the details of this paper, but Peirce's notion of the spirals attempt to provide a framework for the answers.

One final comment is appropriate, in this section. The logarithm was an important function for Peirce and can be seen in his spiral equations. It was important for him because it suggested probability, particularly the probability, or chance of certain transformations occurring within the endless series or beginningless series.³⁸ This concept of chance or randomness is found in the chaotic regions defined in Figure 2.

Mead's Philosophy of Learning

Mead defined learning within his philosophy of the act, with four stages.³⁹ Briefly, they are: the impulse stage, where the individual becomes maladjusted to the environment; the perception stage where the individual is sensitized to the environment; the manipulation stage, where reflective thought takes place; and the consummation of the act, where the individual acts upon the environment to correct the maladjustment. The perception stage calls forth two attitudes which sensitize the individual to the surroundings and to thought within--the attitude of immediate experience, and the attitude of reflective analysis.⁴⁰ Given Peirce's approach, we might assume that these stages of growth or emergence, as Mead called them, are consistent at the unicelled level as well as with human growth. The relationship is not as far fetched as it seems. Table 1 (the Table follows the text) shows the similarities between the two philosophers, as well as with John Dewey.

While the details above are complicated and deserve explication, the concern herein is to provide an overview that can suggest how chaos theory

can be used to define reality of learning and future areas of research.

V. Some Applications of Chaos to Thought

Nonlinearity and Bifurcation

Peirce's spirals and vorticities within vorticities clearly suggest a nonlinear approach to sensation, thought, and action. The attractors evident in the nonlinear approach are what is called self-referential.⁴¹ That is, the system will tend toward one of the attractors when gently bumped or disturbed. However, as the system moves far from equilibrium and the parameters of the system change, additional attractors become evident and new behaviors are to be found.

From a theoretical perspective, suppose that the self-referential system is a set of rules, defined by some simple mathematical equation with a feedback loop. In a homeostatic environment, the rule continues to function as the organism (an individual, for instance) operates. There is no irritant, no doubt, no perturbation, no maladjustment. The organism is operating within the realm of some well defined habit executed logically in the form of Barbara.

Further suppose that there is introduced into the environment some perturbation which redefines the parameters. As the rule or habit is iterated with an intensification of the impulse, the parameters force the simple mathematics into a bifurcation similar to the one found in Figure 2. The sense data at first does not change significantly the mathematical response, but with the increase in perturbation effect, the system calls forth two behavioral options of equal possibility. The two possibilities are two attitudes of the individual which are defined by the parameters of the impulse. The first split in the mapping of the self-referential feedback occurs at the moment the perturbation moves the system far from equilibrium.

As the environment continues to intensify its maladjustment, irritation, or doubt, from continued sense data, the two pronged perception stage of sensorial consciousness bifurcates further into a multiplicity of possibilities. Each of these possibilities define options within the neural workings of the central nervous system. They are the vorticities within vorticities.

The diagram does not show the continuous bifurcations, which result from ever finer parameter differences. It does show, however, that at one point there are only three options as the parameters values increase between 3.8 and 3.9. (For Peirce, it could be argued, these three possibilities would be his firstness, secondness, and thirdness--feelings, action, and cognition.) It suggests that when the lines of the graph go high or low enough that perhaps new cortical and/or subcortical populations of neurons are called forth in some way.

Beyond the three modes there continue to be bifurcations until the parameters reach the extreme right hand portion of the graph. Here the "real" chaos sets in and there is absolutely no order or strange attractor. The system never repeats itself and there is no uniform feedback.

The habit is the original line on the left and depending upon the dynamics of the system as it moves toward the right, perhaps a new habit is formed. The forming of the habit would be in keeping with Peirce's induction and my guess is that it would be driven with a system that would look very much like neural networking and parallel distributed processing (PDP), but both induction and PDP are beyond the dynamics of this paper. (PDP's relationship to chaos can be seen in the Nicolis and Prigogine book.⁴²)

It is interesting to note, given the theorization of the bifurcation within neural activity, that some studies have begun to examine the relationship between chaotic activity and neural activity. Bohner, et al., report that some research has shown that increased mental activity increases the amount of chaos.⁴³ From the above theorization, perturbation moves the individual beyond the linearity of habit into other modes that move toward chaos. On the other hand, Bohner also reports that for rabbits, the "normal, alert state of the brain was chaotic."⁴⁴ When an odor, known to the rabbit was introduced, there was a momentary decrease in the complexity of chaos. Each rabbit had a unique pattern for the odor, but the pattern was consistent over time for that rabbit.⁴⁵ If each pattern were a habit, a rule of action (even the action of identification) which is deduction, then, from the bifurcation diagram, one would find that particular habit as the line on the left of the 3.0 reading. (Perhaps, since the habit itself is being represented by the line on the left, the formation of the habit might suggest that the parameters would actually shift to the left, instead of to the right, as discussed above.)

The two studies referenced by Bohner are not necessarily in disagreement. The alert brain is called to attention with some perturbation, some irritation that sensitizes the organism. So the alert brain is chaotic and the increased mental activity increases the chaos.

Self-similarity

Self-similarity has been pointed out in a variety of places above, particularly in Peirce's logic and semiotic. A key for Peirce is that his semiotic dynamics are everywhere. Given that thesis, Floyd Merrell, in a recent book, *Signs Becoming Signs: Our Perfusive, Pervasive Universe*, argues that all of creation, has arisen from the proliferation of sign dynamics at ever more intricate and comprehensive levels.⁴⁶ His thesis on Peirce's signs is not dissimilar from the self-similarity profusion of chaos. The following section continues the self-similarity motif.

Fractals and Phase Space

In chaos, particularly within physical systems, one often talks about phase space. Phase space (or state space in Churchland's discussion of neural networking systems)⁴⁷ is a mathematical representation of the dynamics of the actual physical system.⁴⁸

What will be presented here will be a mathematical representation of how the mind, using the fractals of chaos, can refine levels of understandings. To begin, a circle will represent the phase space of understanding some dynamical object. The phrase "dynamical object" is from Peirce and is the semiotic reality of some external object--external to the individual learner. The whole of that object can never be fully known, but the pragmatists believed that through experience (including scientific experimentation) one could come close to knowing the object. The circle, then, is the phase space of all potential experience that can define the object.

Within the circle, a Peircean triad will be inscribed, such that the points of the triad mark the vertices of a triangle and are on the circle (see Figure 8). The triad is symbolic of the semiotic sign-object-interpretant relation and represents mathematically the semiotic dynamics within the phase space. For all semiotic dynamics, all three components--sign, object, and interpretant--are necessary, as seen in Peirce's definition of a sign, above.

Benoit Mandelbrot, in his *The Fractal Geometry of Nature*, shows how a shape can be iterated within itself, to produce closer approximations of distances, for example of coastlines.⁴⁹ One could draw a map of some country, using gross geometric shapes to approximate very roughly the coastline. If within the edges of the rough shapes, one duplicated at a smaller scale the same geometric shapes, one's approximation could be refined. The process would be much the same as putting large marbles in an irregularly shaped bottle, in order to find its volume. The large marbles only roughly approximate the volume. If smaller marbles are chosen, say one half the diameter of the large marbles, the volume is more closely approximated. Figure 9 is an example from Mandelbrot, of a repetition of self similarity, using a geometric shape to produce the "monkeys tree."

If the semiotic triad is reproduced at a smaller scale, internal to the sign system, one finds the self similarity of Figure 10. What the iterations of the triads represent is the semiotic refinement of detail over time. Such a refinement in detail would come about with each bifurcation noticed above. Each further feedback of the perturbation results in increased semiotic detail. Such detail over time and with divergent experiences will fill much of the circle defined by the dynamic object. Each iteration of the triad refines the understanding of the object.

The circle and triad are more than a symbol for the sign or understanding of the dynamic object. The triad is a mathematical relationship

(in this case geometric) of the understanding of the object, the object itself, and the sign that binds them together. The iteration of the semiotic in the phase space is the processing at ever finer levels within the brain. The algebraic relationship of this geometric, semiotic phase space is found in the bifurcations diagram. The actual equation is not yet known, but will be found within these dynamics. Figures 11 and 12 continue the degeneration process of Peirce's semiotic triad.

Much more could be discussed from Peirce and chaos to define further the potential for understanding human learning. More study must follow.

VI. Conclusions

A job for philosophy of education at the turn of the millennium, I believe, is to make explicit and comprehensive the mathematical and semiotic understanding of learning and teaching as defined by the nonlinear approach of chaos. (Many fields are sharing in this quest, but the educator and the philosopher of education is conspicuously absent.) To make explicit and comprehensive the mathematical and semiotic understanding of learning means that educational philosophers must examine more closely the nonlinearity of logic in learning and human interaction, drawing conclusions for the metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology. The presentation herein has been more mathematical in nature, but a more philosophical contribution must follow. Further, the conclusions drawn from a sense of reality, knowing, and valuing must be applied to the curriculum and methodology employed in the classroom, and the values taught therein. While there have been laments that philosophy is over, and that philosophy of education is dead, there awaits for the field a ripe and fertile potential that cannot be left to the scientist or the educational practitioner alone.

As the philosophical work on chaos continues, specifics will be offered for the educational researcher to study. From the above discussion, for example, one should begin doing quantitative research on the parameters of perturbation to define the points of bifurcation. Such correlation will begin to define the mathematical rules of habits--the equations. Qualitative research is likewise needed to fill out our understanding of the nonlinearity.

While vast contributions can be made from chaos theory and philosophy of education to learning theory, such work can do much for defining educational policy, which is where Doll was leading. For example, while the rules for action, or habits, decrease chaos, there still exists a high level of chaos activity in the alert brain or the brain that is engaged in mental activity. Assuming that an alert brain (a chaotic brain) is a thing to be valued, what does such understanding suggest for educational policy which promotes specific habits (something more linear) such as an outcomes based education? It would seem at first blush that specific outcomes are limiting

and reminiscent of a Newtonian world, not a Prigoginean world of complexity and becoming. Creativity, abduction (hypothesizing), and new orders of life, it seems arise from the nonlinearity. Educational policy, then, should promote the strange attractors of chaos, if indeed, such things are valued.

Philosophy of education and its role for defining a reality, knowing, or valuing, in the schools, has much to do to articulate chaos theory and the semiotic logic in the coming years. The iterations of these ideas can lead to new levels of creativity for our profession and for the schools. The challenge is ours.

ENDNOTES

¹ See David L. Wolfe, *Epistemology: The Justification of Belief* (Downers Gove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1982), 55.

² *Chronicle of Higher Education* (Washington), 1 July 1992, A9.

³ *Chronicle of Higher Education* (Washington), 29 April 1992, A9.

⁴ Patricia Smith Churchland, *Neurophilosophy* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986), 407.

⁵ Patricia S. Churchland and Terrence J. Sejnowski. *The Computational Brain* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992), 62-65, 81-2, 84-ff.

⁶ Ilya Prigogine, *From Being to Becoming* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1980); Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stenger, *Order Out of Chaos* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1984); Grégoire Nicolis and Ilya Prigogine, *Exploring Complexity* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1989).

⁷ *Writings of Charles S. Peirce*, ed. Christian J.W. Kloesel, et al., vol 4, 1879-1884 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 544-ff, typically referenced W 4:544-ff.

⁸ Prigogine, *Order Out of Chaos*, 17, 302-3.

⁹ The following tie Peirce and Prigogine together: Floyd Merrell, *Signs Becoming Signs* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991); and Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), particularly 176.

¹⁰ William E. Doll, "Curriculum Beyond Stability: Schon, Prigogine, Piaget," in *Contemporary Curriculum Discourses*, ed. William F. Pinar (Scottsdale, AZ: Gorsuch Scarisbrick, Publishers, 1988), 114-133.

¹¹ Ronald F. Bobner, Isadore Newman, and Carol Wessinger, "Chaos Modeling: Increasing Educational Researchers' Awareness of a New Tool" at the Annual Meeting of the Mid-Western Educational Research Association, Chicago, 20 October 1989, Dialog, ERIC, ED 323 215; Jean S. Lindsay, "'Chaos' Theory: Implications for Educational Research," at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Educational Research Association, 21-5 February 1989, Dialog, ERIC ED 317 593; Jean S. Lindsay, "The 'Chaos' Pattern in Piaget's Theory of Cognitive Development," at the Annual Meeting of the Eastern Educational Research Association, Boston, 18-22 February 1991, Dialog, ERIC ED 330 710.

¹² See Churchland, *Neurophilosophy*, 249-251, 275, 393. (It should also be stated that Peirce is only beginning to be read and understood in this country, while scholars in various countries from China to France to Columbia search his work with a diligence.)

¹³ Marjorie Siegal and Robert F. Cary, *Critical Thinking: A Semiotic Perspective* (Bloomington, IN: ERIC Clearinghouse and National Council of Teachers of English, 1989), also Dialog, ERIC ED 303 802.

¹⁴ It has been said that it took Dewey 20 years to comprehend Peirce and another 20 years to apply him. Dewey's pragmatism, however, is not unlike that of his teacher's in many ways, particularly the role of thought and the process of learning. See Peirce's "Fixation of Belief," (W 3:242-257) and "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," (W 3:257-276) for example.

¹⁵ Lindsay, "The 'Chaos' Pattern in Piaget."

¹⁶ Churchland, *The Computational Brain*, 61-62.

¹⁷ Nicolis, *Exploring Complexity*, 66.

¹⁸ *John Dewey: The Middle Works, 1899-1924*, ed. Jo An Boydston, vol 14, 1922: *Human Nature and Conduct* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), 127.

¹⁹ Lindsay, "The 'Chaos' Pattern in Piaget." 11.

²⁰ See George W. Stickel, "Memory, Morphology, and Mathematics: Peirce and Contemporary Neurostudies," in *Charles S. Peirce and the Philosophy of Science: Papers from the Harvard Sesquicentennial Congress*, ed. Edward C. Moore (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1993), 402-418.

²¹ Lindsay, "Chaos Theory Implications," 7; Bobner, "Chaos Modeling," 24-25.

²² Lindsay, "The 'Chaos' Pattern in Piaget," 15.

²³ *The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce*, ed. Carolyn Eisele, vol 4, *Mathematical Philosophy* (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1976), 17 and 20, usually referenced NEM 4:17 & 20.

²⁴ NEM 4:20-21

²⁵ Stickel, "Memory, Morphology, and Mathematics."

²⁶ George W. Stickel, "A Natural Semiotic: The Sign Theory of Neuro-activity and Learning," currently under review, 1993.

²⁷ W 4:544-ff.

²⁸ W 3:323-338.

²⁹ W 4:422.

³⁰ *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur Burks (Cambridge: Harvard University Belknap Press, 1935-58), volumes and paragraphs for *Collected Papers* referenced as follows: CP 1.276-7; also see CP 7.370-1; 8.122n19 and 272-4; see also NEM 3:897-8; and Richard Tursman, *Peirce's Theory of Scientific Discovery: A System of Logic Conceived as Semiotic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 123-5, and 149.

³¹ James Gleick, *Chaos* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 137, 198, 208, 261, as well as other metaphors similar to Peirce's, 141, 150, 158, 162, 177, and 179; and Douglas R. Hofstadter, *Metamagical Themes: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1985), 376.

³² *John Dewey: The Later Works, 1925-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boyston, vol. 12, 1938: *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University, 1986), 30; George Herbert Mead, *The Philosophy of the Act*

(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1938), 412-3; and Hilary Putnam, *Representation and Reality* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988), 58-9, 71, and 82.

³³ CP 8.274.

³⁴ CP 8.275.

³⁵ CP 7.370.

³⁶ CP 7.371.

³⁷ NEM 3:897-98.

³⁸ NEM 3:893-4.

³⁹ Mead, *Philosophy of Act*, 3-25.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁴¹ Bobner, "Chaos Modeling," 13.

⁴² Nicolis, *Exploring Complexity*, 138-141.

⁴³ Bobner, "Chaos Modeling," 27.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ Merrell, *Signs Becoming Signs*.

⁴⁷ Churchland, *The Computational Brain*, 64-5; also, see index for state space.

⁴⁸ Nicolis, *Exploring Complexity*, 49, 80-88, 90, 98-103, 110-115, 123-132.

⁴⁹ Benoit Mandelbrot, *The Fractal Geometry of Nature* (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1983), 25-ff.

⁵⁰ S. Neil Rasband, *Chaotic Dynamics of Nonlinear Systems* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990), 21.

⁵¹ Nicolis, *Exploring Complexity*, 108.

⁵² Gleick, *Chaos*. 238.

⁵³ CP 1.347.

⁵⁴ CP 8.274.

⁵⁵ NEM 3:898.

⁵⁶ Mandelbrot, *Fractal Geometry*, 31.

Table 1: Comparisons of Processes between Mead, Peirce, and Dewey

<u>G.H.Mead</u>	<u>C.S.Peirce</u>	<u>J.Dewey</u>
Habit	Habit/Belief/Rule of action	Habit
Impulse	Irritation (neurologically) Doubt (psychologically)	Problematic Situation
Perception Immediate Exper. Reflective Analysis	Sensorial consciousness Immediate consciousness Polar sense of action	Observation
Manipulation	Synthetic Consciousness Abduction Induction Deduction	Hypothesizing
Consummation	Removal of irritant or doubt	Experiment

Figure 1: Linear and Nonlinear Mapping




Figure 2: Bifurcations of Chaos⁵⁰

The Logistic Map





FIGURE 2 Iterates of the logistic map as a function of μ for $2.8 < \mu < 4.0$. An initial transient of 200 points has been discarded in each case.

Figure 3: Rate of Growth of Chaotic Perturbations⁵¹



Rate of growth, γ , of perturbations

Figure 4: Computer Simulated Fern Leaf⁵²




Figure 5: The Importance of Peirce's Triads³






Figure 6: Peirce's Spiral Relating Being and Representation²⁴



$$\frac{r^2 - 4r + 3}{r - 2} = C \ominus \quad \text{or} \quad = C^{\ominus}$$

Figure 7: Peirce's Dynamical Transformations of Energy⁵⁵

$$\Theta = \frac{1}{r^2 - c} \quad \text{or} \quad \Theta = \log(r - c)$$

Figure 8: Semiotic Phase Space of Experience




Figure 9: The Monkeys Tree and Its Self Similarity⁵⁶






Plate 31 = MONKEYS TREE

Figure 10: The First Degeneration of Peirce's Semiotic Triad



First Iteration


Figure 11: The Second Degeneration of Peirce's Semiotic Triad



First Iteration

Second Iteration

Figure 12: The Third Degeneration of Peirce's Semiotic Triad



First Iteration
Second Iteration
Third Iteration

POSTMODERNISM, SEATTLE, AND STICKEL

Lawrence J. Dennis
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

I am honored to have been invited by George to respond to his presidential address, but I feel he made an error of judgment in doing so. I must confess to you I understand little in the paper, so I stand before you in the position either of being unfair to George or of making a fool of myself. Being unwilling to do either, I decided to make some, I hope not completely irrelevant comments, anchored in the title of George's paper: "Philosophy of Education for the Year 2000 A.D."

Well, assuming that the State of Illinois retirement fund does not go bust, my professional career will be over by the year 2000. But it strikes me that philosophers of education will continue to be placed along the continuum that runs from those most nearly associated with philosophising to those most nearly associated with influencing educational practice. If, on the basis of George's paper, we could place him on the former end, you could perhaps place me closer to the other end.

I came, really accidentally, onto philosophy of education, when the work of Dewey made the scales fall from eyes and I was, in a way, born again. Since that time, as most of you know, I've increasingly concentrated on the work of the reconstructionists, particularly George Counts, with whom I studied, and John Childs, whom I met and whose biography I have just published. Both came from a religious background, thus, they carried into their educational work the idea of St. James that faith without works is dead. Emulating them, I have always tried to focus on the differences that philosophy of education actually makes in the classroom. So let me briefly describe my doctoral class that I am teaching this semester, because I think it may be, in its fashion, an example of the indeterminacy of philosophy of education as we approach the year 2000.

This doctoral seminar, called the Professional Seminar in Cultural Foundations of Education, is required of all doctoral students in our college, not only those in our department. I have been teaching the class for twenty years, and figure that I must have taught it 50 times or so. There are three books required of all students - Dewey's *Experience and Education*, John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*, and George Counts' *Dare the School Build a New*

Social Order? With these as the basic texts, the students (about fifteen to a class) use other books from a movable list which changes from time to time. I make overt my philosophical predilections and the class has a modestly left-wing slant (Bowles & Gintis, Jules Henry, Maxine Greene, for example). For many students the class works well, and most of the time I require a summary paper, some of which over the years have been published. Susan Aud's paper this afternoon began as one written for this class.

OK, enough background. Last August, the night before the first day of class, I awoke with a conviction that I must be daring. I decided to throw out my class syllabus. The next morning, in the light of common day, my courage almost failed, but I was fortified by my conviction that if any faculty member should take such a risk, it had to be me. After all, I am the one who for years has pushed for and advocated change. I am a bit of a campus activist. Walking to the classroom a few minutes before 10:00 o'clock I wavered. After all my class was highly regarded as it was. Still wavering I went into the room, sat down, handed out the syllabus, took the roll and then threw at them Oscar Wilde's educational epigram: "Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to be remember from time to time that nothing of value can be taught." We discussed this for a bit (some seizing the obvious challenge, some sitting in absolute bewilderment) and then I told them to tear up the syllabus.

And so we embarked on what for me, and I believe the students too, has been one of the most exciting and enriching teaching experiences of my career. Why? Here I get back on track - in case you've wondered where I'm going! I told them we were together going to look at postmodernism as it impinges on education. No one, I gather, in my entire college discusses this topic in class, yet it is a force in contemporary education, and young graduate students must be at least familiar with its tenets or be seriously short-changed. So we are all engaged in mutual inquiry, and I've never seen such excitement (sometimes taking the form of skepticism) in a graduate class. I'm not an authority; I structure the class to some extent, and did lead them through the Mill, Dewey and Counts books, because we needed a common language, and some also needed to understand modernism. But at this present point, three quarters of the way into the semester, we are all learners, all inquirers, all participants, all contributors. Students have responded to the intellectual challenge. We do not spin wheels in class and our discussions are not a sharing of ignorance. The classroom is friendly, alive, and respectful, but I am not describing "warm fuzzies." Work is done by all. All learn. Let me repeat, "Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing of value can be *taught*."

It is not the place here, and we certainly don't have the time, to describe in more detail what we do, but postmodernism is teaching us, for

better or worse, a new view of what might go on in classrooms everywhere. Let me quote from George "...educational philosophies must examine more closely the nonlinearity of logic in learning and human interaction... [C]onclusions drawn from a sense of reality, knowing, and valuing must be applied to the curriculum, methodology employed in the classroom, and the values taught therein. While there have been laments that philosophy of education is dead, there awaits for the field a ripe and fertile potential..." Whether the potential is the mathematical and semiotic understanding of learning and teaching, whether it be postmodernism, critical theory, or multiculturalism, or something still struggling to be done time will tell.

Last week I was in Seattle and went to their newly opened Art Institute. It's a postmodernist structure. It's an art gallery alright, but somewhat disconcerting. I couldn't find the elevators easily. When I got off them I didn't know which way to turn. I kept losing any sense of where I was (although one moves easily, almost imperceptibly through the rooms) and kept, as it were, meeting myself. But after a while I found it to be quite congenial and user-friendly, even comfortable bordering on cosy. I had been changed by the building. Maybe you have been changed by George's paper, and the grace with which he delivered it. Thus I have entitled this response, "Postmodernism, Seattle, and Stickel."

II. 1991 ANNUAL MEETING

**CRITICAL THINKING AND ARISTOTLE'S
POSTERIOR ANALYTICS**

**Charles E. Alberti
Bemidji State University**

Nearly twenty years ago my doctoral advisor, Walter P. Krolkowski, S.J., Ph.D., professor of education at Loyola University of Chicago, strongly suggested that I take a course that was being offered entitled, "Aristotle's Posterior Analytics." The course was being given by Dr. Frank Yartz of the Philosophy Department. While I did not see the reason for doing so at the time, the course forced me to *think* and *stretch my mind* further than was previously required. In hindsight I now find that this course, in conjunction with Fr. Krolkowski's "Logic in Teaching" and "Axiology" courses, added significantly to my ability to *think* generally as well as critically.

As I reflect upon the content and processes of these courses I find that the very term "critical thinking" gives me trouble. It has become very popular and almost fashionable to elevate this type of thinking to celebrity status given the brochures that continue to cross my desk. Yet in spite of the many workshops, conferences, institutes, and graduate courses dealing with the topic, there seems to be a variety of discussions regarding what is meant by the term.

Before getting into Aristotle's work I would like to offer a backdrop of a few informal logicians with regard to this topic. Robert Ennis seems to have set the tone for this discussion in his 1962 article in *The Harvard Educational Review* where he offers the definition of critical thinking as "the correct assessing of statements." Harvey Siegel in *Educating Reason* refers to this as "pure skills." A person is a critical thinker if and only if that individual has the skills, abilities, or proficiencies necessary for the correct assessing of statements. Ennis later came to the conclusion that it was not enough for someone to have these characteristics. In addition, there must be a tendency to exercise those proficiencies. Richard W. Paul acknowledges the importance of including the tendency to utilize proficiencies to do critical thinking. Paul suggests that students "already have a highly developed belief system buttressed by deep-seated uncritical, egocentric and socio-centric habits of thought by which he interprets and processes his or her experience." Students do not simply transfer argumentative techniques to more "loaded"

contexts. Rather, they utilize their skills to fend off challenges to their beliefs.²

John McPeck argues, in *Critical Thinking and Education*, that critical thinking cannot be regarded properly as a generalized skill, because there is not any single critical thinking skill that can be applied across subject-area domains. McPeck criticizes the sort of informal logic/critical thinking course which seeks to enhance students thinking ability in general.³

I have put forth these positions partly because of the contemporary perspective they offer, as well as the informal position that still appears to have a formal component.

The first book of the two books that comprise the *Posterior Analytics* treatise, discusses the nature of demonstration and its subsidiary problems. The second book deals with the subjects of scientific investigation and their relationships with definition and other logical contrivances. The main concern of the work is demonstration which presupposes the knowledge of first premises which are not known themselves by demonstration. This, then is the particular place where the investigation of first principles occurs.

Aristotle points out that all teaching and all learning starts from pre-existing knowledge. Upon further consideration he stresses the need for pre-existing knowledge by pointing out that the mathematical sciences, speculative disciplines and syllogistic & inductive dialectical reasoning are acquired in this manner.⁴ Pre-existing knowledge for the teacher and the student would suggest a certain degree of readiness on each of their parts for the imparting and receiving of new knowledge.

Since demonstration (apodexis) for Aristotle means a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge, demonstration must be equivalent to scientific syllogism, whereby syllogism is knowledge and not mere opinion. Hence, it follows that the premises of such demonstration must be (1) true, while those of syllogism in general may be false; (2) primary, i.e., immediate or indemonstrable; (3) more intelligible than the conclusions we draw from them; this is to enable us to perceive the truth more clearly when we become aware of these premises, and (4) must state facts which are the causes of the fact stated in the conclusion, while our knowledge of them must be the cause of our knowledge of the conclusion at the same time.⁵

A syllogism is demonstrative (apodexis) when it proceeds from premises that are true and primary...; it is dialectical when it reasons from opinion (endoxa).⁶ Therefore, pre-existing knowledge of the demonstrative syllogism must be true, primary, and more intelligible than our conclusions. The conclusion can only be necessary if the premises are necessary. Therefore, demonstration is characterized by the nature of its premises. If these premises had to be proved, knowledge would be forever impossible because of infinite regress.⁷ Thus, readiness for teaching and learning would

be based on primary premises, which are the causes of our further knowledge. Since these premises would be better known than our conclusion, we can say that our knowledge of the conclusion is the effect of our knowledge of the premises.⁹

Through the process of critical thinking, as one focuses on information that comes before the mind and senses, integration and analyzation of material occurs before assimilation can take place. This process can be expedient with regard to a time-frame or it can take a much longer period. However, as one integrates and analyzes information one tries to mold or fashion this data into premises, that have a greater degree of truth about them -- primary, more intelligible than the conclusions we draw from them, and must state facts which are the causes of the fact stated in the conclusion. Thus, while conclusions are often brought forward as valid truths, one needs to work back through the steps or premises from which they came, to think critically about the individual premises upon which these conclusions were built.

In looking for basic truths we find ourselves looking for immediate truths in some kind of logical order upon which knowledge might be built. The order of basic truths in each genus are those elements in it the existence of which cannot be proved.⁹ In a logical order, these basic truths are propositions upon which conclusions must depend for their validity. These self-evident basic truths, are what Aristotle calls "first principles." They are all "first" or immediate or self-evident principles in the sense that no one is deduced from any other; however, each is immediately manifested in and advanced from the notion of being.¹⁰ First principles is technically used to express primary intuitions, truths to which assent must be given without any further consideration. These first principles are necessarily involved in demonstrations as is pointed out by Aristotle when he tells us that, demonstrations necessarily involve basic truths and therefore not all truths are demonstrable because an infinite regress is impossible; thus if either of these statements were not a fact, no premise would be an immediate indivisible interval, since conclusions are demonstrated by the interposition of a middle and not by the apposition of an extreme term.¹¹

So as we exercise critical thinking, we come to the realization that there must be some beginning points or "first principles" upon which a discussion can occur -- upon which we agree to disagree. The format that allows for critical thinking to develop must, according to the logic here, be of the nature that is open ended for discussion purposes -- "first principles" presents all discussants in a group with a starting point from which to think critically -- to offer up opposing points of view and analyzations of premises based on information that is judged as having some degree of merit or value.

Commensurate with the line of thought which holds each first

principle to be immediate and self-evident, is a passage from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which states that:

Beginning means (1)that part of a thing from which one would start first...(2)That from which each thing would best be originated, e.g...even in learning we must sometimes begin not from the first point and the beginning of a subject, but from the point from which we would learn most easily...

It is common, then to all beginnings to be the first point from which a thing either is or comes to be or is known.¹²

If this is so, and upon reflection we know these equivalent forms for the term "beginning" to be correct, we are inescapably committed to the assertion that the conclusion follows. These beginnings or first principles are necessary for the acquisition of further knowledge, which should be another reason for the promotion of critical thinking in conjunction with understanding. We must understand information before we can advance the fund of knowledge. If we come to see some of these first principles "by induction, some by perception, some by a certain habituation, and others too in other ways," we come to the realization that Aristotle would assert the need for a multiformative methodology for the securing of first principles. For individuals would come to know the same first principles better in different ways. If the principles are true, all conclusions following will have the potentiality for truth. This potency is, however, prior to the actual cause, and it is not necessary for every thing potential to be actual.¹³

Since Aristotle calls those things in each order that do not admit of proof, principles or beginnings, they must be the judgments to which we go back ultimately for proof in any order or chain of reasoning. These principles must be unmistakable and must be possessed by individuals through induction, perception, habituation, and other ways.

This gives rise, then, to the principle of contradiction in the beginning of knowledge where "being" is not "non-being". Therefore, the principle of contradiction is first in the logical order as a necessary psychological act which distinguishes each being from all other beings. Hence, we can say that the principle of contradiction is not based on syllogistic or inductive reasoning whereby the mind proceeds from the premises to the conclusion, but rather it is founded on an intellectual intuition which is characterized by immediacy. This leading in or on (epagoge) is not a discursive process, rather it is an intuitive grasp of the mind, which Aristotle terms (nous) and which is as certain as demonstration itself. However, it must be made clear that there is a difference for Aristotle between understanding (dianoia) and nous. Dianoia refers to syllogistic reasoning, while nous refers to intuitive knowledge, which stresses the immediacy of first principles.

knowledge.

Since the teacher, according to Aristotle, is the efficient cause of education and serves as a means commensurate with expansive understanding, there would be active forces in bringing about learning. Distributors of facts would not be actualizers of potential. This expansive understanding proceeds from expansive discussion -- the opportunity to think and discuss material critically at all levels of education and in all types of educational settings. But in order for this to occur, participants need the tools of logic to expand understanding. If this is not in place, discussions can be critical and superficial -- you can disagree, but not have the ability to convince the rest of us that we too should disagree. In addition, the first step must be to provide the student with the environment that allows disagreement. Students need to be encouraged to disagree without being penalized.

Many students have come to the point that understanding simply means taking notes and the tests based on those notes. This becomes an empty place of not only critical thinking, but thinking in general. The classroom should (1) have structural freedom where directions of self-discovery are promoted; (2) be in a continual state of curriculum reform, based on current scientific directions (discoveries) that occur in class; (3) a place where the students and teacher are on both the imparting and receiving end of knowledge; (4) a setting, where a teacher skilled in asking the "right" questions to develop other questions in the students minds presides and (5) a high energy environment where further knowledge is fostered through understanding of previous reasoned knowledge and the spontaneity allowed by thinking critically about material put forth. Critical thinking would be the extension of first principles in terms of thought. The process, would seem to allow for further knowledge to be developed, which at times would be coupled with the integration of thought patterns that stem from intuitive insight of premises and the information, notions, and ideas upon which they are built.

ENDNOTES

¹ Ennis, R.H., "A Concept of Critical Thinking," *Harvard Educational Review*, 32, no. 1, 1962, pp. 81-111.

² Siegel, H., *Educating Reason* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

³ McPeck, J.E., *Critical Thinking and Education* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1981).

⁴ Aristotle, "Analytica Posteriora," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, edited by

Such principles, then, are universal conditions, which are common principles of all knowledge. It is impossible to demonstrate the proper principles of each inhering attribute; for basic truths will be the principles of all things and the science to which they belonged would possess universality.¹⁴

How then, are the principles of demonstration known by us? In this regard, Aristotle asks: (1)Is the knowledge of all immediate principles the same or not; (2)Is there a science of all immediate principles or of none; or is there science of some, and some other type of knowledge of those principles come to exist in us after previously not existing, or have they always been in us but escaped our notice?¹⁵

Now it is strange if we possess them from birth; for it means that we possess apprehensions more accurate than demonstration and fail to notice them. If on the other hand we acquire them and do not previously possess them how could we apprehend and learn without a basis of pre-existent knowledge? For that is impossible as we used to find in the case of demonstration. So it emerges that neither can we possess them from birth, nor can they come to be in us if we are without knowledge of them to the extent of having no such developed state at all. Therefore, we must possess a capacity of some sort, but not such as to rank higher in accuracy than these developed states.¹⁶

This "capacity of some sort" would then be a cognitive power that exists previously to the knowledge of principles, but not such that it is stronger as to certitude than the knowledge of principles. Thus, the knowledge of principles does not come about in us from pre-existing knowledge in the same way as things which are known through demonstration.

The student starts with the intellect and the knowledge of the first self-evident principles, which the intellect immediately acquires from sensible things by its own activity as soon as it begins to function. Hence, the teacher must supply the student with material, i.e., propositions and examples; and show the student the order from principles to conclusions. These first principles are the "known" which the teacher presupposes when proposing less universal propositions to the student which are then seen to be "known" as deriving from the more universal principles. Thus, necessity of starting from sensible beginnings is directly related to simple apprehension. These beginnings are due to the fact that we must start from what is best known.

The teacher would not merely be an organizer and distributor of facts, but would serve as a means to understanding and fruition by being an expander of the student's capacity and potentiality for intuitive and scientific

Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1971), i, 1, 71a, pp 3-8.

⁵ Ross, Sir David, *Aristotle* (London: Methusen & Co., Ltd, 1966), p.43.

⁶ Aristotle, "Topica," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, i, 1, 100a, pp. 27-31.

⁷ Brehier, Emile, *The Hellenic Age*, translated by Joseph Thomas (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 167-168.

⁸ Aristotle, "Analytica Posteriora," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, 1,2. 71b, pp. 29-33 & 72a 6-8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, i, 10, 76a, pp. 31-34.

¹⁰ Hart, Charles A., *Thomistic Metaphysics* (Englewood Cliffs, J.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 54.

¹¹ Aristotle, "Analytica Posteriora," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, i, 22, 84a, pp. 28-36.

¹² Aristotle, "Metaphysica," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, v. 1, 1012a, pp 34-35 & 1013a, pp 1-19.

¹³ *Ibid.*, iii, 6, 1002a, pp. 3-5.

¹⁴ Aristotle, "Analytica Posteriora," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, i, 9, pp. 15-18.

¹⁵ Aquinas, St. Thomas, *Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle*, translated by F.R. Larcher, O.P., (Albany, New York: Maji Books, Inc., 1970), pp. 235-236.

¹⁶ Aristotle, "Posterior Analytica," in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ii, 19 99b, pp 26-34.

TOWARD A PHILOSOPHY OF POPULAR CULTURE IN ACADEMIA

Don G. Smith
Eastern Illinois University

Higher education periodically shoots itself in the foot when it becomes confused over its proper function. Such a state of affairs exists today as those in various disciplines seek to infuse the traditional curriculum with works of popular culture before those works have earned distinction.

Departments of popular culture and American studies should academically examine the whole of popular culture, for here the task is to understand society better through the study of what society makes popular. Such departments do not and should not study works of popular culture in themselves and for themselves. That task is rightfully left to the liberal disciplines. A problem arises when we try to decide what criteria the disciplines should employ when examining works of popular culture with an eye toward their possible inclusion in the traditional curriculum.

This paper will suggest a theoretical and practical approach to this process of canon construction. For the purposes of this paper I will limit myself to a discussion of the problem as we find it in the area of literature.

Traditionally, we have included works in the literary canon that we believe demonstrate the quality of enduring greatness. As English professor David Pollard once suggested to me in conversation, the only explanation for teaching an inferior text at the expense of a great one is to make a political point. Let me say at the outset that I oppose the assumption that the traditional canon is a political construction. It is not the proper function of the liberal disciplines to construct curricula for the purpose of politically converting students. It is instead the proper function of the liberal disciplines to acquaint students with the best that has been said and written in an effort to make them good human beings and thoughtful citizens. To those who cry out that what is best is decided on the basis of some conscious or uncounscious political criteria, I simply say "prove it." The evidence is not there, regardless of how loud progressivists and deconstructionists shout. Therefore I begin with general criteria for differentiating popular arts from the great arts.

We identify popular arts on the basis of their popularity alone. If any book, film, musical composition, television program, etc. is popular with the masses, it qualifies for inclusion as a popular art. We might enlarge our

understanding of popularity in the case of the popular arts by considering the following criteria:

1. The public arts are popular to the extent of being almost universally acceptable.
2. They tend to be more and more professionalized, less and less to be practiced privately.
3. They are often produced by teams rather than individuals. They are commissioned, the patron-sponsor-executive providing the pattern.
4. They are by intention ephemeral, paying well initially, but not increasing in value with the passage of time.
5. The public arts are offered to the public as a whole, not to any segment of it.
6. They touch large amounts of people simultaneously, and their effect is not limited to those whom they directly touch.
7. They interconnect and support one another, thus causing a sort of reverberation. They are, to an extent, habit-forming, and their effect is contagious.
8. The public arts popularize the classic arts.
9. Physically, the public arts have a mass or velocity or both, and they tend to outstrip or displace all the other arts.¹

We identify the great arts as those which

1. give form and meaning to life,
2. provide a deeper understanding of our own lives and the lives of others,
3. express the spirit of an age or people,
4. create a certain unity of feeling, and
5. provide diversion from the cares of the day and satisfy desires unfulfilled in our common life.²

Scott Buchanan and Mortimer Adler provide the criteria specifically required of a great book. It is a book that:

1. has been read by the largest number of persons . . . that has, over the centuries, had more readers than other books, and that has "stood the test of time,"
2. has the greatest number of alternative, independent, and consistent interpretations,
3. raises the persistent and unanswerable questions,
4. must be a work of fine art,

5. must be a masterpiece of the liberal arts,
6. must be eminently discussable by virtue of the fact that it deals in a variety of ways with ideas and issues,
7. is not only worth reading more than once, but must be read many times to be fully understood,
8. must be eminently discussable,
9. is not only worth reading once, but many times.
10. must be written by a generalist, who may or may not be a specialist,
11. must be drawn from all types of imaginative and narrative literature and from all areas of human learning, and
12. must not be considered great simply because it was produced by an author who has exerted great influence upon Western culture.³

It should be immediately clear that political considerations do not play a part here; the great books represent authors from Thomas Jefferson to Karl Marx, from Thomas Aquinas to Charles Darwin. It should also be immediately clear that decisions of greatness can properly be made only by those well-grounded in the discipline of literature. To make such distinctions is part of the proper function of English professors in higher education. English professors, for their good, for the good of their students, and for the good of society in general, must therefore cease the practice of elevating books directly from the best seller list to the undergraduate curriculum. Secondary and primary teachers must do likewise, for they should take their cue from those in higher education.

Another practice that must cease is the tendency of elementary and secondary school teachers to "teach" current works of children's and adolescent literature for the precise reason that these recently published works are currently popular with children and adolescents. The tendency here is to give students what they want rather than what they need. These works have not stood the test of time, and they do not meet most of the other criteria enumerated above by Seldes and Adler. Popularity alone does not make a book worthy of inclusion in the canon of children's and adolescent literature. It is the responsibility of the teacher to provide students with educational experiences, not simply entertaining recreational experiences. As Haag writes, "Most of the people who are nourished with homogenized pap never had solid food on which to cut their teeth."⁴ Likewise, in the words of Dwight McDonald, "Bad stuff drives out good since it is more easily understood and enjoyed."⁵ Elementary and secondary teachers must make greatness the foundation of their assigned readings, not ease of exercise.

No one, however, should assume that a work is vulgar simply because it is popular. Dickens's novels in their original magazine appearances

were certainly both mass produced and immensely popular. Still, those in the discipline of literature generally agree that his novels qualify as great art. Likewise, Truman Capote, a fine writer by any discriminating person's standards, wrote a very popular book entitled *In Cold Blood*, which discriminating readers can defend as great art.

The practical process of assessing works of popular culture for inclusion in the traditional literary canon follows. First of all, works of popular culture should be restricted to examination at the graduate level in higher education until those capable of sound judgment generally agree that the work fulfills the theoretical criteria enumerated above. Second, upon fulfillment of the theoretical criteria, popular works should be included in the curriculum at the undergraduate level of higher education and at the levels of secondary and primary schooling. Works failing to fulfill the theoretical criteria should continue to be examined at the graduate level of higher education or be abandoned.

ENDNOTES

¹ Gilbert Seldes, "The Public Arts," in Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White (eds.), *Mass Culture* (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1957), pp. 557-558.

² Gilbert Seldes, "The People and the Arts," *ibid.*, p. 75.

³ Mortimer Adler, *Reforming Education* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1977), pp. 333-334.

⁴ Ernest Van Den Haag, "Of Happiness and Despair We Have No Measure," in Rosenberg and White (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 514.

⁵ Dwight Macdonald, "A Theory of Mass Culture," *ibid.*, p. 61.

**"BELIEVE ME NOT; AND YET I LIE NOT":
A CASE FOR STUDENT DISBELIEF**

**Walter P. Krolikowski
Loyola University of Chicago**

Abstract

Against the regnant presumption that teaching and learning are limited to acts of knowing (and believing), this paper attempts to make a case for including experiences of disbelief on the part of students as a quite normal instrument of learning.

Israel Scheffler is well aware that there is more to the educational enterprise than the cognitive: "Education outstrips cognitive notions altogether in its range, embracing . . . also the formation of propensities and traits, and the development of understanding and appreciation" (p. 21). But it may be that his view of the cognitive, in line with much of educational thinking today, is excessively narrow. He limits the range of the cognitive to belief and knowing:

We have, in sum, connected the educational ideas of learning and teaching with the cognitive ideas of knowledge and belief, as follows: Learning that *Q* involves coming to believe that *Q*. Under certain further conditions (truth of "*Q*" and, for the strong sense of *knowing*, proper backing of "*Q*"), it also involves coming to know that *Q*. Teaching that *Q* involves trying to bring about learning that (and belief that) *Q*, under characteristic restrictions of manner, and, furthermore, knowing that *Q*, as judged by the teacher from his own standpoint. (p. 13)

It will be my contention that other important if less immediately striking cognitive states, like ignorance, doubt, and disbelief deserve attention and analysis in the educational context. In this article, I shall focus on

disbelief both as a state of mind and as act on the part of the student in a classroom situation. I shall contend that disbelief in some form is more pervasive and more valuable than some educators seem to think is the case. Forms of disbelief are pervasive because they are elicited by the teacher many times during a class day, and, even when not elicited and encouraged by the teacher, disbelief can arise naturally in the student. It can be valuable because it can and does foster a quality of active learning, not a simple assimilation of factual material.

I

What, then, is disbelief? As act, it is to say "It is not the case that Q " in response to the assertion that Q . As state of mind or disposition, it is the tendency to assert "It is not the case that Q " whenever another asserts that Q .

Are there examples of disbelief in the classroom? They are more common than some may think. Let us begin with some odd or borderline cases. Every time students mark a test item false they are saying "not Q ." It is an odd case in that it could be claimed that the test item is not being asserted although it is expressed in the form of an assertion.

When students question the correctness of a grade the teacher has assigned them, they are rejecting a teacher's judgment and setting up a judgment of their own in opposition. Again, this is an odd case because a grade is not an assertion but rather an evaluation and its negation is not an assertion but a counter-evaluation.

When students use counterfactual conditionals, they must of necessity deny the antecedent and the consequent in order to understand and assert the conditional itself. Again, this is an odd case because neither the antecedent nor the consequent is asserted, although the entire conditional is asserted.

When students do not implement a teacher's suggestions, they may or may not believe that what the teacher says is true, but they certainly are not convinced of the goodness, prudence, or advisability for themselves of doing what the teacher enjoins.

Other cases are more central. Every time students correct the mathematics of a problem a teacher is working on the chalkboard, every time they correct a teacher about a place or date, they are manifesting a type of disbelief. Even these cases are not quite central. Students can readily believe that the mistake was made inadvertently and does not really represent what the teacher intended.

But a quite clear and central type of disbelief occurs in the student's response to those situations in which teachers propose observations that run counter to the experiences or theoretical frameworks students already possess. For example, that boiling water does not get hotter with the application of

additional heat; that the "large" moon on the horizon is visually the same size as the "smaller" moon in mid-heaven; that whales are not fish; that it is winter in Bolivia when it is summer in North America.

In fact, Nussbaum and Novick (pp. 183-200), along with many other investigators of learning and teaching strategies, make the strong assertion that disbelief is the normal state of affairs in a classroom whenever new theoretical frameworks are being presented. They further claim that to ignore the presence of already existing "alternative frameworks," "schemata," or belief systems is to ignore the "crucial interfering role" they play in coming to grasp new theoretical frameworks.

Surely, none of these situations are unknown; indeed, they are quite common. Possibly because they pass quickly, they do not seem important enough for careful scrutiny. Because they frequently have negative affective overtones, their unpleasantness makes them easy to ignore. Because alternative analyses are possible--could not marking a true-false item false be recognition rather than disbelief?--the effort to pursue the topic of disbelief hardly seems worth the effort. Perhaps, most importantly, because disbelief involves a response to what another person asserts as well as it involves a cognitive content of its own, its analysis harbors complications beyond those, admittedly great, of coming to know.

Frequency of occurrence and difficulty of analysis do not, however, guarantee the worth-whileness of spending the time and effort required to understand a phenomenon. Sneezing, for example, is not a topic discussed very much by educators though it meets the above twin criteria. But the phenomenon of disbelief points to important classroom problems. The disbelieving student may fail to advance or may become discouraged. To connect disbelief to 80% drop-out rates among Hispanic students is not an act of fantasy. Disbelief can indicate an inadequate level of trust by the student or the student's failure to acknowledge the authority of the teacher. The trusting student, it is often noted, finding it very difficult to believe a teacher would mislead, does poorly on T-F items. Thus, paradoxically, the way for such students to improve their learning and to advance may be precisely through thoughtful acts of disbelief.

Beyond these immediate and pressing problems lies a series of questions perennially raised but seldom answered satisfactorily. These questions center on the nature of teaching, of the student, and of the teacher, and disbelieving throws valuable light on the whole series. It is, then, an important part of my claim that recognizing the legitimate role of student disbelief in the classroom illuminates the nature of teaching, of student, and of teacher.

We will try to ask the following questions within the framework of disbelief. First, what is this difficult to explicate experience called teaching?

What kinds of interchanges and relationships are integral to the experience? If teaching is a family of processes in the Wittgensteinian sense, we ought not be surprised that the extraordinary variety of teaching acts evokes an equally extraordinary variety of pupil responses. I list disbelief among these responses and believe that disbelief can be an appropriate and rational response. Secondly, what is a student? A reactor or a taker of initiatives? A trusting subordinate or a sceptical equal? Thirdly, what is a teacher? A declarer of truths, a commander of a rag-tail army, a questioner of received opinion? A person, a role-taker, a player in some contest? Are teachers hired by society to fulfil a custodial role for society or to be themselves? Accounting for rational disbelief in the classroom will help in answering these questions.

Disbelief, of course, can be an irrational reaction. The normal presumption is surely in favor of the teacher's objectivity and accuracy. As expert, the teacher is an authority; as designated leader, the teacher is in authority. Benn and Peters (pp. 20-21) have made all this abundantly clear. The teacher when asking a question of a student ought to be answered. The teacher when issuing a command ought to be obeyed. The teacher when asserting something ought to be believed. Such are the normal presumptions which yield only to strong evidence against the propriety of such responses. But just as a question may be rhetorical ("What are we to think of this?") and a command mistaken ("Sit down!" to a seated student), so an assertion may be false or may be an assertion in grammatical form only (e.g., an imperative sentence in the declarative mood).

II

Let us examine, then, some elements that form pieces of the puzzle involved in the learning process in order to determine some of the possible advantages to disbelief. Our examinations, as we have said, will focus on the school, the teacher, and the student. Each of these subjects of our attention needs a special point of view so that we can catch each of these well-worn themes unawares. James Coleman's analysis of the asymmetric society furnishes a new perspective on the function of the school: Is it an extension of the family or an arm of civil government? We will see that one answer allows a fruitful use for disbelief while the other does not. The role of questions in the classroom furnishes a convenient entry into a discussion of the multiple roles of the teacher as does the place of play in the classroom; both of these furnish solid grounds for cultivating appropriate disbelief. Fred Dretske's essay on the epistemology of belief offers us a convenient vantage from which we can look at the child not only as knower and believer, but also as disbeliever.

In *The Asymmetric Society*, James Coleman contrasts the corporate

actor with the human person. In a technologically oriented society, structures are social inventions which operate because certain persons hold certain set positions within an over-all framework. Who fills the positions is irrelevant. Indeed a machine may fill a position. By way of contrast, in the family, an invention of a much earlier kind of society, "a family member is a part of that family as a person, not as an occupant of a position" (p. 27).

Historically, many structures larger than the family grew out of and are extensions of the family. On the contrary, the corporate actor "has authority over certain activities and responsibility for those activities," not "authority over and responsibility for persons" (p. 124). As a result, in modern society, the family may become an anachronism precisely because of this shift from valuing persons to valuing activities. Corporate actors, being responsible for a set of activities, have describable, limited roles. They can understand and manage to meet the expectations that others have of them. The family member, being responsible for persons, is responsible for a "family" of activities in the Wittgensteinian sense, a set of indefinite activities, a structure of joint productions very difficult to list taxatively in a "job description."

The corporate actor in a sense is irresponsible, not being accountable for the welfare of persons but only for accomplishing agreed-upon activities; individualistic, since sacrifice for others has no relevance to one's role; free, for outside the activity that must be performed no care or concern for others is expected of the actor. Norms are established in accord with one's interest (the corporate actor or the corporation) rather than by the nature of the people involved and the nature of their interactions (pp. 26-27, 119-152). In the corporate society children begin to be perceived as public goods rather than as private goods.

The world has shifted its focus from ascription to contractually limited achievement; the British use "Ltd." to signal this shift. Thus a corporate society is one in which Paolo Freire's banking model of education is the operative structure. Society is interested in having the student receive what is "out there" as efficiently as possible. The essentially passive student is to react only by "receiving, filing and storing the deposits." And the role of the teacher is similarly and correlatively limited (Freire, pp. 57-74).

Again, a corporate society is much at ease with a contractarian theory of social relations such as appears in John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*. George Parkin Grant (pp. 13-47, but especially p. 43) accuses Rawls of playing the old shell game in which the mover's hand shifts the bean of justice now to the shell of self-interest, now seemingly to the shell of altruism, but it always remains under the shell of self-interest. In the corporate society the ultimate reason for relating to others is self-interest, and the means to its realization is the contractual relationship.

In view of this general societal shift in thinking of the value of persons and the role of citizens, where is the school located? Is the school properly considered an extension of the family (and, therefore, concerned with persons) or is it more like many corporations concerned with activities, competencies, etc.? Consider the frequency of contracts being drawn up between professor and student in college courses.

Some forms of disbelief are rampant in the corporate society and can be viewed as symptoms of its sickness. Since self-interest prompts corporate actors to protect their flanks by carefully delimiting the expectations others have of their roles, those they "serve" may be justified in not believing them when they express personal interest in those asking to be "served." But there is also another reason for disbelief. The skepticism which arises when persons are engaged with persons in a healthy way, is disbelief but quite different; for it is engendered in an atmosphere of play¹.

III

What kind of an agent is the teacher? I suggest the following perspective for examining this question. Educators seem to operate on different self-images in their questioning of students. Kate Besser, for example, in her doctoral dissertation makes a strong case for an image which finds expression in "honest questioners." Teachers ought to ask only questions whose answers are not known to them. In practice, questions are thereby limited to probes into a student's conscious states. "What do you think?" "Why did you say that?" "Do you have other reasons for saying that?" "What do you propose we do?" Besser's basic reason for such a stand is an appeal to rationality as the bed rock of the learning-teaching process. Why would rational teachers ask questions for which they already know the answer? Is not teaching based on rationality a sufficient as well as a necessary condition of teaching? Thus far Besser.

At the other extreme stands Socrates and a teacher self-image which finds expression in the Socratic method. Whether the teacher knows the answer to a question is irrelevant. According to the dialectical method of Socrates, the point of questioning is to goad students into answering a question with what is for them the correct answer and then using that reply along with other materials to prove dramatically that they do not indeed know although they have been to this point confident of what they had initially asserted.

Similarly, J.S. Mill (pp. 236-237) advocates the use of negative logic, that is, opposition to a received opinion, in order to arrive at, consequent to the encounter, a clearer apprehension of what had been professed but not well understood. Such a procedure is a queer case of disbelief, because the stance may be hypothetical: "What *would* you say to the following objec-

tion?" The upshot is, however, that the person "knows better" but not necessarily "knows more." (Kenny, p. xxvii.) Though the end in view is clearly greater rationality, the means employed--being a goad or a "devil's advocate"--is confrontational rather than logical.

Nietzsche, by analyzing the role of the teacher Socratically, furnishes another *locus classicus* for disbelief. To escape a following of "blind disciples," and, even more, to arouse "self-mistrust" in the student, Nietzsche advocates that the teacher use masks and deceits: masks which reveal as well as conceal; deceits which lead the student to self-determination through repudiation of the teacher. Education is an *agon*, a contest, best symbolized in the dance (Murphy, pp. 98, 100, 111, 121, 138).

Walter Ong in his Messenger Lectures has written learnedly and provocatively on the agonistic relation in teaching, whose long history he relates and whose recent decline he obviously laments. Only by seeing the schools as places of contest can we understand why the Romans called the school 'ludus,' 'play' or 'game.' Only in this context does "ritualized disbelief" flower into knowing. As Ong says, "if one argued with a teacher about the teacher's own subject, one risked losing." But such a stance has a rationale: "one argued, with some risk, against a more skilled opponent in order to acquire that person's skills and knowledge, and that person attacked one, ritually, in order to teach" (pp. 146-147).

Somewhere between these two kinds of questioning is what might be called ordinary, everyday pedagogical questioning. The teacher knows the answer and asks the student in order to determine whether the student has come to know. At times the teacher is satisfied with a mere mechanical verbal response. At other times the teacher may continue to probe to discover whether the student really understands the answer.

What these differences of method in dialogue and questioning reflect are differences in how the teacher's self-image is conceived. For Besser, the teacher is (exclusively? pre-eminently?) a model of rational inquiry. For Socrates, the teacher is a mid-wife. For others, the teacher is an evaluator of achievement and progress².

Would it be helpful to place teaching--at least some teaching--in the category of play, which of course involves a kind of disbelief? Play is different from a "real" transaction because the commitment it involves must never obliterate a basic disbelief: What is going on is not a real transaction³. Sometimes games are openly used in classrooms. In traditional classrooms, spelling bees⁴, choosing up sides and being quizzed on some material, giving awards for best projects, even grading under some of its aspects--all are games of a sort. Not too far distant are those pedagogical ploys such as refusing the correct answer and deliberately passing on inaccurate information (an incorrect reference, for example, in a class on documentary research).

Because play involves disbelief, there can be objections to being "playful." Here we encounter the problem that Erving Goffman refers to as the problem of "free needs." What reply can a teacher make to a child who asks: "What time is it?" "Where's the bathroom?" When the child asks a straightforward "free needs" question, can the teacher reply in such a way that the reply is deserving of disbelief⁵? What "free needs" alert us to is simply that the place of play and of the kind of disbelief it engenders is limited in the classroom⁶; for there are occasions when they would be out of place.

Sometimes in the classroom something close to charades is played. Professors assume a theoretical or practical position not their own and play the part to the hilt. Today Descartes, tomorrow Hume. The poker player's mask, the conjuror's sleight of hand, feigned surprise, bluffing, the snipe hunt--these are to be found in many classrooms in the land. Histrionics and theatre, Rylean cristics and Socratic irony are parts of many teachers' pedagogical kit. Do not all of these call, in inviting "suspension of disbelief," for some degree of wariness if not of utter disbelief? For example, a teacher gives his students Euler's seven bridge problem, which Gödel has already proved to be impossible of solution, and asks them to solve it. Should not students learn over time to do these exercises in the experience of deception in a spirit of disbelief?

The easy answer is that all of these deceptive practices should be ruled out of court. I am well aware that each and every one of them can be abused--and is. But abuses ought to put us on guard, not deter us from a thoughtful course of action. The relationship of teacher to student is much more complex than simple theories would have it, and we must respect that complexity. The teacher is intruder as well as observer. The experiential and the logical are mixed with the social, expressive, and conative (Halliday and Hasan, pp. 26-27). If games relieve tedium and children's attention-spans are short, games may be very helpful toward maintenance of discipline and a pleasant atmosphere for learning. But games are games; so, if they are played, they have to be played. Many games involve winning and losing outcomes; many games involve strategies which include deliberate deception. If we model teaching on the dynamics of a basketball game instead of on a scientific experiment, we may see more clearly why and how disbelief functions in the teaching-learning process.

Although it backfires--in this world not all teaching ploys are successful--the strategy of a Garry Trudeau professor illustrates aptly the use of "factual" but false statements. The students assiduously write down every word as the professor pontificates: ". . . and in my view, Jefferson's defense of these basic rights lacked conviction." He then says, "Okay, any discussion of what I've covered so far?" Eyes down, the students continue to write. As the professor comments, "Of course not. You're too busy getting it all down," the students momentarily lift their eyes and acknowledge the justness of his

seemingly positive regard for them. He continues: "Let me add that personally I believe the Bill of Rights to be a silly, inconsequential recapitulation of truths already found in the Constitution. Any comment?" The students are busy writing. He raises his voice: "No, *scratch* that! The Constitution *itself* should never have been ratified! It's a dangerous document! All power should rest with the *executive*! What do you think of *that*?" The students write more furiously. The professor shouts: "Jefferson was the *Antichrist*! *Democracy* is *Fascism*! *Black* is *white*! *Night* is *day*!" They continue to write. Among themselves they murmur: "Boy, this course is really getting interesting." And "You said it. I didn't know half this stuff." All the professor can say is "Teaching is dead." Which is surely the point of this paper: Reduce teaching to an authoritative handing on of facts and theories and evaluations, and teaching is indeed dead. Without disbelief as an essential part of a student's kit, the finality of teaching and learning is perverted and destroyed.

IV

The teacher, then, may very well engage in activities the proper response to which is disbelief on the part of the student. Now let us look more closely at the student in a learning situation. Fred Dretske makes some interesting points about belief, which can give us a new way of seeing the student. For one, we can only believe what we might know, which is not to say that we must know x before we believe x . Children who have always been in the dark could not believe an object is blue because the conditions for knowing it is blue are lacking (p. 9). "The beliefs a person is capable of holding as a result of learning are restricted to the sorts of things that that person (given his information processing resources) is capable of knowing" (p. 11). Children may be taught to make correct responses (if, for example, all blue things are furry, children in the dark may correctly select all blue things), but that is not the same. What, then, we may ask, is the proper response when the child is presented something it cannot process? For example, an eight year old is told the facts of life. Consciously the child may not disbelieve but clearly, though the child may be able to respond correctly to questions about the origin of human life, the cognitive content *de facto* is other than that which the presenter has. And if, *per impossible*, the normal eight-year old child could understand the facts of life, it would have to disbelieve them.

Consider another example from Dretske. In this instance, the child is like an altimeter that purports to measure the "gross national product in dollars."

Something like this happens when children first learn to

talk. The toddler who delights his mother by saying "Mommy" whenever she appears disappoints her when he says the *same* thing to his Aunt Mildred. When the child is corrected ("No, Jimmy, *I'm* Mommy, that's Aunt Mildred"), what is this a correction of? A false belief? But does Jimmy really believe that this other woman is his mother? Probably not. It seems more likely that the child simply believes that Aunt Mildred is a woman, or a person, precisely what he believed of his mother when he called her "Mommy", and that he is using the word "Mommy" to express this less determinate notion. Correction here is not the weeding out of false beliefs, but the development of a more discriminating set of concepts and the correlative ability to express these more determinate concepts in linguistically appropriate ways. (p. 13)

The upshot is that a type of disbelief necessarily occurs whenever material is presented that requires understanding beyond the present intellectual capacities of the child. For what are we to call "agreeing verbally but disagreeing conceptually" if not disbelief? Surely an odd case of disbelief, but one which is more commonly present than we ordinarily notice. Much of what is presented to children is about the adult world for which children have but surrogate explanations. Adult explanations are repeated but cannot yield their intelligibility for they lie outside the present capacities of the child.

But what is appropriate when the material presented is within the present capacities of the child? Nussbaum and Novick (pp. 186-189) suggest that the first step in any sequence of instruction is to bring to consciousness the presence of the alternative frameworks, one in the minds of the students, the other in the mind of the instructor. This can be accomplished through the use of an "exposing event" which invites the student to explain the material under consideration "in terms of his own preconceptions." The hoped for consequence is that, in failing, the student experiences "disequilibrium," "cognitive dissonance," or "conceptual conflict." And in this exposure of the inadequacy of his present belief structures, the student may be supported in working through his disbelief in the proposed new theory.

V

What can be said, then, for cultivating certain types of disbelief in the classroom? The thrust of the argument is that disbelief is of necessity found as a constituent element in many class activities. But, further, if teaching ascends to the level of play, disbelief is actually encouraged and becomes a necessary means in coming to know, and a positive instrument of preparation

for entry into the world of adults. For example, if children don't learn some skills of discrimination, how will they cope with the advertising to which we are all exposed and with the insinuated values represented so attractively in the mass media?

Thus, the school, possibly because it is located in a corporate world, cannot allow itself to be so narrowly defined that its activities are coterminous with coming-to-know. Like the family, its purpose is not to bring children or knowers into the world but adults who will prove to be capable of freely and competently interacting with others on a variety of human levels and in various conflicting human systems. And yet it would be less than honest not to admit difficulties with this position. Teachers and administrators in significant parts of our complex of schools no longer are recognized as being *in loco parentis*⁷. There is a significant shift from doing what is good for the child to doing what the child has a right to receive. Teachers are in danger of becoming part of the corporate world. Insofar as we are advocating a greater spirit of play in the classroom, in which disbelief plays an intrinsic part, we are emphasizing the importance of a person-related rather than a task-related atmosphere in the classroom. It would certainly be much more difficult to justify games and a spirit of play as teaching aids if they were to be justified within the context of a corporate society.

Societal expectations of the teacher should not be so narrowly defined that teaching activities are confined to descriptions and explanations. As institutor of games, the teacher steps outside the narrow straits of logical empiricism. As partner in the *agon*, winning and losing and surviving are meaningful categories under the teaching umbrella. As Walter Ong says (p. 33), "adversative structures of truth are not lethal or even hostile, but life-giving, though at some cost⁸."

The student should not be so narrowly defined that learning in school becomes sanitized and discontinuous with other learnings, especially that resulting from constant exposure to the media. Dewey's "simplified, purified, and balanced environment," by seemingly excluding scepticism and wariness, comes perilously close to unfitting students for the variety of attitudes they must display in coming to terms with a masked world. Whether this more person-centered approach will prepare the student for corporate activity in a technological society is another question, one Aldous Huxley answered in his own way in *Brave New World* and *Brave New World Revisited*. What hopefully emerges from these considerations is the great desirability of fostering a dialectic of belief and disbelief in an atmosphere where each is given its due and where the costs, emotional and affective, great as they are, are not as overwhelming as they might be and will be when not mediated through the actions of caring teachers.

REFERENCES

- Alexander, Kern and M. David Alexander. *The Lwas of Schools, Students, and Teachers in a Nutshell*. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1984.
- Benn. S.I. and R.S. Peters. *The Principles of Political Thought*. New York: Free Press, 1965; original edition, 1959.
- Besser, Katherine. "Honest Questioning in the Classroom." Ph.D. dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago, 1985.
- Coleman, James. *The Asymmetric Society*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982.
- Dearden, R.F. *The Philosophy of Primary Education*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968.
- Dretske, Fred I. "The Epistemology of Belief." *Synthèse* 55 (1983): 3-19.
- Freire, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Translated by Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: Seabury Press, 1970.
- Goffman, Erving. *Behavior in Public Places. Notes on Social Organization of Gatherings*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.
- Goffman, Erving. *Encounters*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961.
- Goffman, Erving. *Frame Analysis. An essay on the Organization of Experience*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
- Goffman, Erving. *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1959.
- Grant, George Parkin. *English-Speaking Justice*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985.
- Halliday, M.A.K. and Ruqaiya Hasan. *Cohesion in English*. London: Longman, 1976.
- Kenny, Anthony, ed. *St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologicae. Volume 22*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964.

- Mill, J.S. "On Liberty." In *The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill*, edited by Marshall Cohen. New York: Modern Library, 1961.
- Nussbaum, Joseph and Shimshon Novick. "Alternative Frameworks, Conceptual Conflict and Accommodation: Toward a Principled Teaching Strategy." *Instructional Science* 11 (1982): 183-200.
- Ong, Walter J. *Fighting for Life. Contest, Sexuality, and Consciousness*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.
- Scheffler, Israel. *Conditions of Knowledge. An Introduction to Epistemology and Education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978.
- Sizer, Theodore R. *Horace's Compromise. The Dilemma of the American High School*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1984.

ENDNOTES

¹ We must, nonetheless, acknowledge a complicating factor. As in a family, so in a person-oriented school, there are moments that call for unthinking compliance on the part of students. And yet, there are moments of institutionalized disbelief as well; for example, when games are being played. The situation, thus, can be quite complicated: the shift from straightforward and truthful narration to game-like parries is not always announced.

² See Sizer, especially pp. 143-153, for sketches of teachers as questioners.

³ Dearden, pp. 96-97.

⁴ A "bee" is "a social gathering where people combine work, competition, and amusement." *American Heritage Dictionary*.

⁵ See Goffman, *Behavior in Public Places*, p. 130.

⁶ Erving Goffman's work is enormously suggestive to those of us interested in understanding the diversity of activities, roles, and attitudes manifested by students (and teachers) in the classroom, even though Goffman hardly ever refers to the classroom. Particularly helpful are the following: "Performances," in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, pp. 17-76; "Fun in Games," in *Encounters*, pp. 17-81; *Frame Analysis*, especially on "fabrication" and "discrediting."

⁷ For a brief summary of the present legal situation with regard to *in loco parentis*, see Alexander and Alexander, pp. 147-160.

⁸ In Spanish the word *competencia* has two meanings, seemingly unrelated: 'competency' and 'competition.' Clearly 'to compete' can mean 'to strive or contend with another as for a profit or prize'; that is, to be a rival. Etymologically, however, it means 'to strive together,' the fruits of which striving is competence.

WAS THERE A CONFLICT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND SOCIAL VALUES IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT?

Joseph Watras
University of Dayton

In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville noted that Americans had a great love for the idea of liberty for individuals. He warned that this tendency could isolate Americans from each other. In 1985, several sociologists working with Robert Bellah concluded that the individualism Tocqueville spoke about had grown cancerous to "threaten the survival of freedom itself" (vii). These researchers said that middle class Americans increasingly found their meaning in private spheres, and, if those Americans took part in public affairs, they did so for personal reasons.

Bellah and his colleagues contend that part of the problem is that the image of life inherent in individualism is hostile to ideas of moral order because it centers on the autonomous individual who makes choices on a personal basis, not according to higher truths (47). These researchers also found another part of the problem is that the people they talked to were not free. These people are trying to fit into a society dominated by large corporations which tend to define all parts of life, and these same people adopt a model of relationships taken from therapy where the aim is to help individuals adjust to existing conditions or to find which settings they prefer. Bellah found that, in this way, words of individualism disguise the pressure to conform.

The therapeutic model is not everywhere, Bellah and his co-authors say. Older forms of relationships endure in some parts of society. But, in general, people flaunt individualism as they fit into a society that is interrelated to an extent never imagined before.

I. Are the Contemporary Ideals of Individualism and Community Contradictory?

Bellah contends that the ethic of individualism corrodes our society because people do not seem to recognize that many of the commitments people make to each other are superficial and temporary. For example, instead of historical communities where people of different ages live together, Bellah found what he calls lifestyle enclaves, such as retirement villages or apartments for young single people. Bellah points out that the residents think

of these places as communities and many express loyalty to them, but these enclaves are not founded on things that offer stability. The connection among the people in a lifestyle enclave is the desire the members have to be together, and this derives from the fact that they are of similar age or hold similar interests. As those desires or interests change, the membership changes. Consequently, no one is expected to stay in one for long.

In fairness, Bellah notes these enclaves provide a service by being a place where the members support each other before each person moves on to something or somewhere else. Bellah acknowledges that this is a traditional function of friendship. The problem is that Americans seem to have forgotten that the traditional view of friendship includes deeper more permanent connections such as a shared commitment to a conception of the common good. Bellah says that since Americans think of any commitment to a value orientation as an individual matter, the contemporary view of human relationships that undergirds these lifestyle enclaves is one that ignores criteria that go beyond personal choice and self affirmation.

II. Was the Civil Rights Movement an Alternative to Individualism?

Bellah says an important alternative to the dominating influence of individualism was the civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s. He says this movement was a social force whose members went beyond the individualistic connotations of freedom to show freedom as an affirmation of responsibility uniting different people in just society (299).

Bellah quotes Martin Luther King Jr.'s speech, "I Have a Dream," to show that King borrowed words from scriptural prophets and from patriotic authors to point to a new social order. Bellah adds that in this way, King made clear "the struggle for freedom became a practice of commitment within a vision of American as a community of memory"(249).

III. Was the Civil Rights Movement an Affirmation of Individualism?

Unfortunately, the civil rights movement may not have had the moral power Bellah ascribes to it. King may not have been reshaping the images of a just social order calling on people to take part in something for a greater good. Instead, King may have been criticizing racism as a contradiction of the ethic of individualism. If this view is accurate, King may have strengthened the corrosive effects of individualism that Bellah decries rather than affirmed any historical, common heritage. Evidence supporting this possibility comes from the quotes Bellah offers. One example is illustrative.

Bellah recalls King's statement: "When we let freedom ring... from every village and hamlet..., we will speed up the day when all of God's children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles,... will join hands and

sing the words of that old Negro spiritual 'Free at last! Free at last! Thank God almighty, we are free at last'"(249).

The problem is this statement does not show that King wanted to rebuild social and economic institutions in ways that respect the differences and interdependencies among their members. The image of people singing while holding hands implies connections, but the words are about being free not about a unifying value such as love. Thus, the connection could be the tolerance each person has for another. This is a weak tie because it implies people acknowledging other people's right to be different. It does not say that those differences are of value to everyone nor does it describe how the uniqueness of individuals can improve the society.

IV. Is Freedom a Value?

Bellah says that the image of freedom can go beyond its individualistic connotations and be an essential aspect of any affirmation of the possibility of uniting people in a just society. He does not say how that can be done, but several philosophers offer suggestions to help.

There seem to be three different approaches philosophers use to demonstrate that freedom is inextricably bound to social values. The first is to see freedom as an instrument to reach the higher goal. A second is to see freedom as both the means and the end in some way. And a third is to say freedom is equivalent to something else, such as personal identity, so the focus of debate shifts to that other entity.

The differences among these approaches are determined by the common good that each philosopher sees as important. Five examples illustrate these approaches to formulate political or educational views incorporating freedom. Unfortunately, the civil rights movement did not use any of them although any one of these approaches would have enriched the struggle and made success more likely.

V. Is Freedom an Instrument to Reach Another Aim?

John Dewey illustrates the first approach which we are calling an instrumental one. He argues that freedom is best seen as a tool to encourage growth. Although he measures the worth of a society by the extent to which all members of all groups enjoy a full and free interchange, he does not think people should value individuality for its own sake. Rather, he feels that "a progressive society counts individual variations as precious since it finds in them the means for its own growth" (1916,305). Dewey notes that a democratic society gives its members the best chance to develop their talents and to find new alternatives for thinking.

Dewey is wary of appeals to freedom in the classroom. He sees schools as agencies of social reform. He believes that, in schools, children can

learn to think properly or learn to work together cooperatively. But Dewey does not think teachers should make the children's freedom the goal of their teaching. He believes that children have to be free to move around and to work as they choose. Yet, Dewey says that excessive freedom will destroy the cooperative activities that are the normal source of order. Dewey counsels teachers to think of freedom as a means to help children learn to frame purposes and to carry out projects (1938, 63).

Writing in a more poetic yet equally careful and logical manner, Buber expresses a similar instrumental view. For him, freedom makes it possible for people to meet. Buber contends that free societies allow the full relationships among people that he sees as essential to human life; he says totalitarian societies deny these possibilities (116). But Buber says that freedom cannot be a goal of human life. Buber notes that freedom provides the place for people to turn toward each other, but, he adds, it cannot provide the foundation or basis for community. Buber goes on to say that freedom cannot be dispensed with, nor can it be made use of, yet without it nothing succeeds (90-91).

Buber sees freedom as important in the classroom as well in society. Buber describes how freedom enables a teacher in a classroom to establish a relationship with the students that he calls dialogic. This relationship is complex because it involves mutual giving and taking even though the parties are not on equal terms. Buber believes the teacher is always more aware of the student than the student is aware of the teacher. For there to be such a relationship, the student must be free. Without freedom, the student cannot or will not reveal his or her true feelings and grow from them with the help of the teacher. And without this process of revelation and growth among the students, the teacher cannot develop more understanding of the world through his or her teaching. Without dialogue, Buber would say, teaching is a series of monologues.

VI. Is Freedom an Instrument and an Aim?

The second way philosophers explain how freedom and social values are related is to by saying that human freedom is both an instrument and an aim. A good example of this approach is the work of Paulo Freire who describes a method of political liberation that uses freedom to make everyone free yet humane. Writing about adult literacy programs in Brazil, Freire contends that people need to engage in dialogue. He does not mean that they need to talk or share ideas even though this is part of dialogue. Freire says all thought and discussion must be aimed at transforming the world in the direction of increased liberation (77). Freire describes a process of instruction he calls "problem-posing education" in which teachers and students discuss problems that mutually trouble them. Together, they suggest solutions and try them out. The results become the substance of more problem-posing

as the process goes on indefinitely. Freire contrasts this style with problem-solving which is more authoritarian. Freire contends problem-posing education is essential for changing the oppressive nature of modern society.

Although Freire says the aim of all dialogue is the liberation of the people involved, he limits the freedom that results. It is qualified by humility among the participants, by love for the world and other people, and by faith in people's powers to cooperate in efforts to remake themselves and the world. For Freire, freedom does not allow individuals to be solitary nor sociopathic because he defines freedom as the ability to enter dialogue with other people in order to learn how to continue it. For Freire, dialogue is the means and the end of human life.

Other philosophers who are religious use a similar view of freedom as being both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable for their ends. An example of this is found in the work of Jacques Maritain who sees freedom as the means and at least part of the goal of social life. Maritain asserts that "human society is...a group of human freedoms which accept obedience and a common law for the general welfare..."(15). Maritain says that individuals and their society are mingled together with each subordinating itself to and yet surpassing the other in different ways. "Man finds himself subordinating himself to the group," Maritain says, "and the group attains its goal only by serving man and realizing that man has secrets which escape the group and a vocation which is not included in the group" (sic) (15). The vocation that Maritain refers to is a religious one; he feels human beings must use their intellects to voluntarily obey the law of God. He says human beings perfect themselves by loving the Lord.

Freedom is an end and a means for Maritain because he sees freedom as the highest social value that must be extended to human beings for them to grow spiritually. In as much as freedom is the highest social value, it is an end, but it is a means for other values that only individuals can attain.

Interestingly, Maritain says he advocates these religious definitions of humanity and society because they underlie all humanistic views in our JudeoGreco-Christian civilization. He says that the community of analogy shared by Western peoples makes it possible for individuals who do not share the Christian creed to find direction in the midst of competing views of human personality and society. Consequently, when Maritain talks of an education for a democracy, he speaks of a college program open to all people built upon teaching those subjects best able to advance human reason. Thus, he recommends courses that are similar to the liberal arts including rhetoric, literature, mathematics, and science. He adds philosophy and theology to the list of subjects to be taught. However, Maritain is careful to say these subjects are taught not to make the students believe anything in particular.

He says they should be taught because, for example, a person unfamiliar with theology cannot understand Western culture.

VII. Is Freedom a Function of a Person's Identity?

The third approach philosophers use to discuss the relation of personal freedom and politics or education is to identify freedom with something else. Frithjof Bergmann illustrates this approach by saying one should not ask if some one is acting freely. He says one should ask if someone is acting in accord with his or her personal identity. For him, this a more fruitful approach.

Frithjof Bergmann contends "the concept of freedom is not a fit instrument for thought"(12). He adds that it puts social matters into tangles when those issues are understandable otherwise. Bergmann says that people should begin to think in a direction that is different from the poles of contention the question of freedom marks out. Bergmann advances his argument by offering a definition of freedom which he uses to consider the way people have thought about freedom in psychology, in education, and in social life. Bergmann says "an act is free if the agent identifies with the elements from which it flows" (37).

Bergmann uses his definition to evaluate other definitions of freedom finding them faulty if they give little chance for people to discover or to form a true self. In this manner, for example, Bergmann discounts Rousseau's definition of a free person as one who obeys the General Will. He says Rousseau is overly concerned with the social or external influence on people. At the same time, Bergmann criticizes democratic conceptions of freedom if these imply people should leave other people alone; his theory implies the society must help people develop their identities so they can increase the scope of acts with which they could identify.

VIII. Is Freedom Related to Obligation?

It should be clear that each of these approaches that philosophers use to discuss freedom contains the grounds for establishing positive connections among people. In the case of Dewey, the connection is the mutual interdependence of people in society. Language, roads, and artificial lights are things produced by people for their own use and for the social good. These physical improvements enable everyone in that society to do more than they would be able to do without them.

For Buber, the reality of relationships illuminates the higher values because it is in relationships that people recognize the truth of creation. Buber says moral life derives from an openness among people. Buber says this openness would be impossible if people felt constrained.

For Freire, liberation is the goal of life and the means by which life is humanly lived. Freire thinks liberation implies community because the ties

in community have to be desires to increase the freedom all people share.

For Maritain, the community of analogy provides discipline and tradition. Each individual accepts the tradition, struggles against it, and thereby enriches it. It is that tradition that offers the definition of human kind from which freedom as an essential and ultimate social value follows.

Finally, Bergmann sees the connections among people to be the opportunities offered to each person to form a genuine self. Freedom for him is the ability to act in accordance with this identity

XI. Did the Civil Rights Movement Point to any Obligations?

If, as Bellah said, the civil rights movement aimed towards an affirmation of individual liberty within a cooperative social order, it would have similar expressions of the relationship between personal freedom and the social good which explained why people should live in racially integrated settings. Unfortunately, this was not the case.

Instead of being built on pleas for racial integration, the civil rights movement advanced on the basis of complaints against discrimination. The legal cases from which the movement drew its strength were findings of constitutional violations of the right minority groups had to receive services extended by the states. The US Supreme Court could not easily define what rights came to African-American "children from the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause--to attend an integrated school or merely to be free from state-imposed segregated schooling" (Salomone, *Equal Protection Under Law*, 44). The Court seemed to decide in 1974 that black children were only entitled to be free from imposed segregation when it forbade merging the school districts in and around Detroit to form a metropolitan plan unless there was proof of interdistrict violation. This seemed to cause a shift in thinking that may be seen in the change people made in their language replacing the earlier and more positive word, "integration." with the word "desegregation."

There is a good reason why the civil rights movement was built on complaints about discrimination. It enlisted people who disagreed about many things to fight to change society. In such circumstances, it is easier for people to point to what they dislike rather than to what they want. At the same time, when people agree something should be reformed, they move towards a general agreement about what should be in place.

X. Why is the Civil Rights Movement Important?

None the less, the question why the civil rights movement stopped short of its goals is important because the answer indicates what people must do to improve society. If the civil rights movement represented a positive

moral force necessary to a basic reconstruction of American society, as Bellah asserts, then researchers must locate the malevolent forces that worked against its goodness. However, if, as this paper argues, the language that was used by the civil rights activists was flawed, then researchers should search for ways to frame values so that the words capture the American affection for personal freedom but turn it towards efforts to make the society harmonious and cooperative.

The problem with the words "freedom" and "rights" is that neither of these terms points to a reason for different types of people to live and work together. For example, when a person says that all black people should be free, one implication is to think that all people should be separate in some ways from the society in which they live. To some extent, this is what happened in the civil rights movement.

The images that came from the campaign could not explain why society should restrain those groups who did not want to ride across town to a new school even when the distances were short or why white people stay in a city when a single race suburb is available. Conservatives began to complain that white children had rights to go to a school in their neighborhoods, and Richard Nixon won the presidency, in part, because he campaigned against busing. In short, the civil rights movement could not tell people why they should live in cooperative relationships with people who were different.

In fairness to such civil rights leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr., they may have thought that the image of a movement which joined all sorts of people to fight for the rights of the most down trodden would overcome the disintegrative effect of the words they used. But if civil rights leaders thought the campaign was more influential than the slogans, they may have been wrong. And this mistake may show why political movements may have a more lasting effect if they involve philosophers who can help fashion statements that accurately point to what should come into being.

Unfortunately, the problems persist. Educators should consider the aims of the civil rights movement in order to recognize similar difficulties in the contemporary programs of multi-cultural education or critical pedagogy. As different as these programs are from each other, they share a concern for notions of tolerance and openness that may have been the fatal flaw of the civil rights movement. Consequently, these curricular innovations will not have the lasting effect their advocates hope to have unless they think more clearly about the aims they wish to achieve.

REFERENCES

- Bellah, Robert N., *et al.* *Habits of the Heart*. New York: Harper and Row, 1985.
- Bergmann, Frithjof. *On Being Free*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977.
- Buber, Martin. *Between Man and Man*. New York: Collier Books, 1965.
- Dewey, John. *Democracy and Education*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1916.
- . *Experience and Education*. New York: Macmillan Co., 1938.
- Freire, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. New York: Continuum, 1989.
- Maritain, Jacques. *Education of the Crossroads*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943.
- Salomone, Rosemary. *Equal Education Under Law*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986.

**AMERICAN EDUCATION IN FLUXION
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A TEACHING PROFESSION**

Robert A. Leone, Temple University
Winner of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society's
1991 Graduate Student Award

Abstract

In a philosophical essay on the historical sociology of teacher education, the author argues that the inability of teaching to rise to the status of a profession is due to the constant state of rapid dislocation that has prevented the establishment of a discipline of pedagogy. Leone terms this state of affairs a **FLUXION**. Five factors have created a fluxion in teacher education. First, the different institutions in which teacher education has been housed--normal school, teacher's college, university based schools of education--have had inconsistent expectations for teacher education. Second, teacher educators have historically set up an ideal of professional education for themselves--the medical school ideal--which they have not succeeded in emulating. Third, the establishment of Graduate Schools of Education has created a new profession of Educational Leadership that has goals that are not compatible with a profession of teaching. Fourth, educators have failed to establish a discipline of pedagogy that can serve as the basis for the professional authority of teachers. Finally, the public does not perceive educators as producing results that justify the granting of professional authority to teachers. (Michael A. Olikier)

I. Concepts and Institutions In Flux

There seems to be little doubt that teaching in America has not become a profession in the accepted sense of the term, at least not in the way that law and medicine are so recognized, though they may be regarded as the elite professions. These occupations, along with others slightly lesser in stature such as engineering and architecture, all were subjected to the same

phenomenon of professionalization that occurred in this country at the turn of the century. They were transformed into professions but teaching never quite made the change. The reasons lie with the increasingly complex mixture of historical, sociological and philosophical development of American education and its transmission that exists to this very day. It will be my contention in this paper (though not mine alone) that the inability of teaching to rise to the status of a profession is due to a state of flux that education, teaching and teacher education find themselves. It is a diverse plethora that perpetuates confusion over what we mean by such terms which continues to the present. Unraveling this flux is by no means a small task and I cannot hope to achieve it here in complete satisfaction. However, I will attempt to assess some of the key historical and sociological developments that will ultimately lead to a philosophical discussion of whether teaching is a discipline or paradigm from which research, experimentation and methods can be derived to guide the enterprise. There are some who believe that education or pedagogy as a discipline is possible, that a consensus among those in the field can be reached, and if properly formulated and employed, will lead to the acceptance of teaching as a profession. I will consider some of these proposals and arguments in hope of better grasping the problems and solutions inherent with the creation and acceptance of a discipline of pedagogy.

As previously stated, the candidate for an explanation as to why the conception of American education is in a state of flux is to be found in the admixture of historical, sociological and philosophical reasons. But, one may ask that although historical and sociological trends may mix, doesn't philosophy lie outside of these in a more objective sense? It is true that there is an important distinction between a historical and sociological perspective of a profession on the one hand and its criteria on the other. The latter is the domain of philosophy, but the former may shape the function of philosophy or tap one of its capabilities. A philosophical analysis may reveal that what history and sociology says passes for education in a particular society is really indoctrination. But I do not wish to engage in a debate over the authority of philosophy versus history and sociology. I only want to show that the historical and sociological forces at work during the era of American professionalization significantly altered the concepts of "education", "pedagogy" and "college". It requires a philosophical perspective to understand this change, as well as, to formulate and evaluate the possibility of teaching as a theory-based practice. Furthermore, though a philosophical perspective may indicate that a discipline of pedagogy is possible, these same historical and sociological forces can thwart its creation.

If American professionalization shows us anything, it is that the concepts of "education", "pedagogy" and "college" are not fixed entities secured in meaning and function.(1) The birth of the American public school

as an institution and an expanding mass education system from the late 19th century through the 20th century is a relatively new phenomenon. Prior to their emergence, "education" and "teaching" were concepts whose focus was intrinsic individual growth. The cultivated wisdom and moral character of the unique person were the primary goals, thus making education almost exclusively personal and inward looking processes. The expansion of schooling in tandem with the rise of the industrial age and its perceived potentialities for the work force which include professionalism, combined to shift education away from individual growth and towards a more universal and utilitarian instrument necessary to satisfy diverse cultural needs.(2)

The consequence of this changing notion of education was to make it an increasingly complex enterprise. Perhaps the best example of this complexity takes place in higher education where the college in mid-19th century is transformed into the American university. But the transformation is not a smooth one, for with it comes the three trends of utility, research and liberal culture that compete within the university for priority.(3) Likewise, three models in higher education develop that reflect these trends: the land grant university where utility merges with the supreme faith in science to achieve practical results and efficacy, the research university where research and scholarship become the ideal to pursue knowledge for its own sake and the tradition college which fosters the transmission of traditional culture. But where one trend may have dominated in any one university, the other two vied for attention and recognition. The diversity of these trends within the university results in the ambiguity of the curriculum. Designing the proper course of study was complicated by the clash of purposes-- from educating the individual (some remnants of the old education persisted in the university) to the pursuit of specialized training, to solutions of immediate practical problems and social demands.(4)

As the transformation of the concept of education led to ambiguity to and confusion, it comes as no surprise that teacher education suffers a similar fate. If we are not sure what education has become, then not only are we unsure of what to teach, but how to teach and, therefore, unsure of the preparatory knowledge and skills for teachers. The confusion over what teacher education should be is borne out in its transition from the normal school to the university education school. the crux of the difficulty lies in the relationship between the study of education and the preparation of teachers.

Could a convincing case be made that teaching is a theory-based practice, i.e., grounded in a discipline or paradigm? Educators hoped that teaching could claim a body of esoteric knowledge that guides the methods and practice in a way that, say, biochemistry and anatomy do so for medicine. Indeed, the success of science as a source of foundation for that field, as well as, for agriculture and engineering made it seem possible that the same could

he said of teaching, especially with the expansion of science into such relevant fields as psychology and sociology. However, such hope was overshadowed by the question of whether teaching was essentially a science or an art. If teaching was an art, then was it some sort of recognizable talent that could be located in potential teachers or could it be fostered and transmitted to others? If education was empirical, then the correct targets for examination had to be found and whether it was the learning process, the classroom or the teacher all fed fire to a continuing controversy. But, most of all, one had to come to grips with whether there was a discipline or paradigm of "pedagogy" that was *sui generis* with principles from which pertinent methods, questions and areas of research could be derived which guide the field on its proper course.(5)

II. Medical Education and the Criteria of a Profession

It may be instructive to compare that circumstances that contribute to the formation of medical education and the medical school with that of the education of teacher if only because the former was one of the first to successfully achieve status as a profession and a profession school, hence, became the model which the education school attempted to adopt.(6) The Johns Hopkins University Medical School served as the exemplar of what training for a theory-based practice should be and pioneered the creation of the professional school. So powerful was its normative image of the ideal medical school that when Abraham Flexner used it as a standard to evaluate and subsequently condemn most of the medical schools in the U.S. and Canada, half of those schools closed within the decade after he published a report (1910-1920). The report seemed to ease the transition of medical training, conducted in medical schools at the time as an apprenticeship for high-school graduates, to a university education which would require a college background in basic science disciplines before admission.(7) Flexner's report alone did not revolutionize medical education, but it was part of a reform movement bolstered by well organized medical societies, particularly, the American Medical Association that sought to eliminate "quacks" in the field as competitors(8) and gain the prestige that both a prerequisite liberal arts education and its compression with scientific research would provide.(9) The ultimate realization of medical education's transition to the university and a key factor to professionalization overall, was that it sociologically changed the entrance into a field from sponsored mobility (who you know)(10) to one that was meritocratic (what you know).

The criteria for the professional school has four elements: 1) its intention or purpose is the training of individuals for a profession; 2) its curriculum seeks to develop practical knowledge and skills of candidates who must have a background in basic disciplines; 3) its program remain..

autonomous from other departments and colleges in the university and 4) the professional school is influenced by professional organizations and public criticism.(11) The medical school was able to meet this criteria, but schools of education fell short particularly in the areas of curriculum, where disagreement prevents the attainment of a core, and the weak influence of professional organizations along with acute public criticism. However, the latter two outcomes really have their causal roots in the former because if the curriculum of education schools had been able to reflect a consensus of how to train professionals and, hence, actually train them as such, then professional organizations like the National Education Association, instead of serving merely as an advocate for public education,(12) could strengthen their reciprocal influence upon those schools and the profession itself because the organizations would contain true professionals. Similarly, the recognition by American society that teachers were truly of a profession would dampen public criticism by virtue of teachers position as a profession, hence, their profession school and professional organizations would be able to properly address its concerns.

We need, then, to take a closer look at the historical and sociological forces that were at work during the period of transition of teacher education to the university to better understand how it failed to meet the criterion of the professional school curriculum. It is important to realize that the mass common school movement was in place before the phenomenon of professionalization began to effect American higher education. Indeed, most common schools were at the level of what we call elementary schools today and this created a wide gulf between their relation to institutions of "higher" learning. As the common school system rapidly expanded, it became surprisingly apparent that there was a need for more teachers and a body of thought to guide their preparation.(13) The training of teachers at this time occurred informally, through various study groups and institutes taught by administrators who were given this position by the legislators that felt responsible and held accountable to the general public. By the time it became obvious that this informal structure for teaching training was inadequate, the American high school, perceived in that day as a "college of the people",(14) had emerged as the place to train teachers, usually, in the high school's separate normal department. The latter, in turn, begat the normal school and for the first time, prospective teachers had their incipient professional school.(15)

Notice that, in the span of little more than fifty years (from the mid-1800's to the turn of the 20th century), the training ground for teachers moves from the informal structure of study groups and institutes to the high school and from there to the normal school. Such rapid repositioning of the place for teacher education could not help but contribute to its entanglement

in what I have called the fluxion of American education. It is only a short time after teacher training is lodged to the arena of the university, continuing the trend of rapid dislocation.

The incorporation of the normal school into the university mirrored the changing conception of education in the disoriented curriculum of teacher education. Initially for all professional schools within the university, there was a resistance by academe towards vocational training which results in the former's attempt to make technical knowledge more academic and scientific, but ultimately distorts the focus of the curriculum. In schools of education the problem becomes acutely amplified and divides the faculty into two groups: those who profess scientific and disciplinary knowledge/methods and those who concentrate on the practice of schooling. Ironically, the former are "contextless" from which to apply what they know and the latter lack the tools to illuminate their practical experience.(16) It could be said that three programs of study vied for a dominant position within the teacher education curriculum: the purist, the integrationist and the eclectic.(17) It can be alternately be claimed that the curriculum passed through three phases: practitioner, technologist, and theorist borne out by a cast study of the University of Illinois between the years of 1890 to the 1930s.(18) The first triad is only loosely related to the second and I briefly describe them here only to exemplify the confusion within the teacher education curriculum.

Those who supported a purist curriculum for prospective teachers argued for a four year concentration in liberal arts that was to be separate from the fifth year of professional training.(19) The integrationists sought to merge or blend liberal/academic education with professional training and it is perhaps with this group that the potential of formulating a discipline of education remains hopeful(20) (a point to which I will return to later). The eclectic program is probably the one that is the most pervasive curriculum in schools of education today. It is parallel curriculum designed to be mutually respectful of both liberal and professional inputs.(21)

The University of Illinois provides an example of what might have transpired at similar land grant institutions. From the beginning, it did not seem to know how to prepare teachers and this was related, again, to the general confusion over the nature of education.(22) Since the curriculum of the normal school had strictly practical concerns such as classroom management, its initial adoption into the University of Illinois understandably pushed teacher training further into a practitioner phase complete with practice-schools. In the second phase, technology began to have a greater impact on the curriculum of teacher training and it seemed to give it that mission element which could elevate teaching into a profession, i.e., the power of scientific achievement.(23) The years between 1920 and 1930 saw the University of Illinois pursue pure science and art which culminates in the emphasis upon theory. In this theorist phase, teacher education was left

behind, remaining largely at the technological stage as it struggled to find a discipline a pedagogy.(24) At this point, the competing arguments between the purists, integrationists and eclectics move on the scene.

If there was confusion and turmoil over the nature of the teacher training curriculum, this perhaps, reflects a larger but similar disorientation over the mission of the university education school that became increasingly broad and takes on diversified goals of specialized training: high school teachers, normal school teachers, school librarians, psychologists, educational researchers and professors of education.(25) A historical perspective could conclude that schools of education tried to do too much, but they really had no choice given the demands of the rapidly expanding American school system. Part of that expansion included the graduate school of education which evolves almost immediately with the transmission of training the educational work force to the university. A significant development occurs in this bastion of the academic profession that impacts upon and misdirects the path teaching takes on the road to professionalization.

III. Misdirected Professionalism: The Graduate Study of Education

The graduate school was the crown jewel of any university because it helped secure the prestige, legitimacy and faith in American higher education. The best examples which show that it deserved such public status was the breakthroughs and discoveries via research and the training of professionals. Education schools seeking to achieve the same status quickly created graduate schools along with undergraduate schools and they did so before other professional schools followed suit.(26) However, despite the education school's position at the vanguard of this development, the pressing demand to provide as many teachers as possible in the public school system curtails that work force's professional aspirations at the level of the undergraduate degree or certification. Most elementary and secondary school teachers did not perceive graduate work as an advancement to a profession (if they ever have at all). This meant that the likely candidates for admission into graduate schools of education were the administrators of the new school system. Thus, what develops in the graduate school of education is a professional culture of academics made up of school administrators and professors of education who become the self-defined leaders for any reform movement to perpetuate the professionalization of education.(27) But the norms of academic skills rather than professional values dominate the curriculum of the graduate education school and cause it to lose sight of those conceptions of teacher education from the normal school that were more aligned with practical knowledge.(28) So, the prestige of the graduate school that is ruled by the norms of academe and which is enough to create a professional culture of academics, ends up divorcing itself within the college

of education from part of its proposed mission: to professionalize teachers.

This development alone may not have been enough to thwart the ascendance of teaching into a profession, but the alienation of public school teachers from the professional culture of academics further aggravates two other sociological trends that compounds the problem: low pay and feminization. The fact teaching is a low paying job has always been the case in America and can be traced to the colonial period. As early as 1658, there was an attempt at Harvard to create scholarships for math teachers to offset the unattractiveness of a meager salary.(29) Low pay contributes to another early pattern in teaching: the high turnover in the field. Both of these factors were present before the feminization of the teaching corps, but served to set the stage for its inception. However, contrary to the assumption that men left teaching due to the professionalization of other occupations to which they were subsequently drawn, one must be reminded that this phenomenon occurs after the common school movement had reached a level of substantial expansion and after the recruitment apparatus for teachers was in place.(30)

This raises a curious problem for historians: why did the displacement of men by women in teaching occur before the professionalization of a number of occupations that would attract men and would ultimately be dominated by them? The answer lies in the social perception of gender as it relates to jobs. The Second Great Awakening (1790s to 1850s) fostered an ideal of the American woman as Christian wife, mother teacher. This ideal is promoted by religious groups who push teaching as an important female mission. Concomitant with this trend, another develops as an effect of the mass education movement: as attendance in district schools rises for females, they are in turn recruited to teach in them.(31) Thus, when the call for more teachers rings out from such highly visible and influential people such as Horace Mann, it propels a growing female force that was moving in the direction of becoming teachers and with little opportunities for employment elsewhere other than the textile mills.(32) Thus, it is not just low pay that keeps men from pursuing a career in teaching, but a social perception that teaching is just not the sort of work men should do. By the time that professional education school rises within the university, feminization of teaching reinforces the perception of it by men as a low prestige job.(33)

The paradox, here, is that the perception of teaching as a low status occupation becomes prevalent in the very institution that claimed, in the formative years, to be able to create a profession of teaching, i.e., the university school of education.(34) Its inability to discover or produce a discipline of education in pedagogy left the prospective teacher with an undergraduate curriculum that was, at best, an eclectic choice between courses in practical and liberal knowledge, did nothing to alleviate the perception and more than likely galvanized it. Hope remained, of course, that the graduate school of education would someday lay claim to such a

discipline, but instead, it only gave the appearance that it could by pretending that a science of teaching and learning was imminent. This was enough to instill the somewhat dubious belief that a new profession was created. A widening gulf occurs between undergraduate and graduate programs in education which is indicative of the separation of teachers from the new professional in education: the administrator and educational researcher. As the undergraduate school of education produces teachers, the graduate school produces what is essentially the new school managers who claim specialized knowledge and the salaries of this new professional group quickly surpasses that of teachers.(35)

The message to teachers was clear: if you want to become a professional in the field of education, you must leave teaching and enter administration. The only way you could stay in teaching and still attain professional status was to become a professor of education, but professors in all university graduate schools were shifting away from teaching and more towards the academic norm of research. In any case, the larger professional force was in education administration and as it grows and becomes more bureaucratized, the subordination of teachers is an inevitable outcome as they surrender more of their *de facto* power to those new managers.(36)

Ironically, the conclusion that is drawn from the historical and sociological analysis of the movement to professionalize teaching is that it results in a reverse trend: deprofessionalization. It may be presumptuous to argue that teaching has become deprofessionalized if it has never reached the status of a profession in the first place. But it is important to realize that these historical and sociological developments have created conditions that turn any attempt to professionalize teaching back on itself in such a way as to both inhibit such attempts and cause teaching to lose any preliminary status as a profession. Low pay, feminization and the mass common school movement were previously established inhibitors to the attempt to professionalize teaching, but all of the other disabling trends result from the impact professionalization has upon the conception of American education. Professionalization causes the shift in education from one of personal growth to university utility and places our conception of it in a flux of unresolved confusion that particularly acute in teacher education. This fluxion is borne out in a lack of a consensus among the learned on a discipline of pedagogy, while at the same time, teacher education experiences a rapid displacement from institutes and study groups, to the normal school, to the university. The failure of teacher education to adopt the model of the professional school that was so successful for fields like medicine, the weak professional organizations for teachers which makes them vulnerable to public criticism and the divorce of the graduate education school from teacher education while creating another professional culture that subordinates teachers, all can be traced to

the absence of a discipline of education. These combined sociological patterns leave the hope for the professionalization of teaching stillborn within the university and create the adverse effect of deprofessionalization.

IV. The Need for a Discipline of Pedagogy

If there had been an established discipline of pedagogy, then there would be a consensus among the learned (i.e., teachers) where there is agreement about concepts and modes of inquiry that would structure the field of practice. Thus, teacher education would be able to meet the criterion of a professional school that calls for a curriculum which develops practical knowledge and skills supported by theory. Teaching as a recognized theory based practice would strengthen its professional organizations who could, in turn, effectively influence the professional school of education by directing it toward the study of education and teachers *for* teachers, while coping with and protecting itself from public criticism. Finally, a professional culture of teachers would emerge that would probably rise to the status level of school administrators (perhaps, making the former more difficult to be managed by the latter).

So much, then, seems to depend upon the creation of a discipline of pedagogy for the transformation of teaching into a profession that one must investigate its possibility. I will make an initial attempt to sketch the elements of a discipline and to do so requires more of a philosophical approach. A discipline is an enterprise of a particular intellectual community that employs one or more paradigms(37) which rule over the enterprise and direct it towards identifying the appropriate phenomena, concepts, theories, data and techniques of methodology which help to determine the problems and solutions that fall into its domain. Disciplines function in professional education in such a way as to structure its field of practice.(38) While a discipline may, at first, appear unique in nature, it is important to note that they borrow information and techniques from other disciplines. Even an apparently autonomous discipline such as mathematics borrows methods from logic which belongs to philosophy. New disciplines are composed of other disciplines e.g., social psychology (sociology and psychology) and biochemistry (biology and chemistry). The unity and uniqueness of a discipline derives from the manner in which it *guides* the subdisciplines (39) which produce subject matter that is not reducible to them.(40) Thus, the study of law draws upon the subdiscipline of ethics, but the subject matter it yields is that which is legal, not necessarily ethical. Not all disciplines have to be organized hierarchically, i.e., with general laws governing a tight logical structure. A recognized discipline such as English whose modes of inquiry include language, literature, composition, style and communication all are loosely related.(41)

Given this outline of what a discipline looks like, we can begin to see how a discipline of pedagogy takes form. It is composed of subdisciplines such as philosophy, history, sociology, cultural anthropology, political science and psychology which are cross-related in such a way as to achieve complete integration. What would make a discipline of pedagogy fully integrated rather a mere eclectic choice of subdisciplines is the *context* in which they are presented.(42) Since education is a social enterprise, it would not be enough to present, say, the methods of psychology to the teacher-pupil relationship abstracted from the relation of schooling to society. The structures and processes of any theory of teaching and learning must be assessed in the context of the institutional structures and processes of contemporary society. Obviously, this requires studies in cultural anthropology and sociology to arrive at the best normative judgements a teacher will have to make.(43) The evolution of institutions in a democracy demands an historical account along with a consideration of political theory.(44) Finally, a philosophical perspective is needed in order to apply the criteria of any pedagogical theory. All of the subdisciplines of a discipline of pedagogy are fully integrated by being presented in the educational context upon which they impinge. If properly conducted, the integration of these subdisciplines forge the modes of inquiry that yield the unique content of pedagogy.

But, it is one matter to describe a possible discipline of pedagogy and quite another to suggest how it can be *created* and its creation is the first step to professionalization of teaching in America. A recent proposal for a discipline of pedagogy show that its creation begins with the identification of paradigm cases that would constitute a core of experience. These arise from the practice of teaching in the schools so that one can relate what transpires in grade four at school A in community X with what happens in grade four at school B in community Y. From such cases one can collect the legitimate generic activities of teaching. The scholarship of the subdisciplines of pedagogy supports those activities of teaching as generic (45) and so a *reciprocal process* between practice and theory is set in motion to create pedagogy as an accepted discipline for teacher education.

A proposal such as this appears promising, but much depends upon actual discovery of paradigm cases of teaching-learning so that one can see what they actually look like and, thus, be better to clarify the structure and function of the reciprocal process between practice and theory. In any case, I would suspect that my brief description of it here, along with my definitional sketches of a discipline and a discipline of pedagogy are nothing new to the literature of educational research. I use them only to set up the following question: If a discipline of pedagogy is possible, why hasn't it taken root in the American university?

V. Why Is There No Discipline of Pedagogy?

The answer to this question leads one back to the complicated historical and sociological factors that cause what I have called the fluxion that American education is today and inhibits creation of a discipline of pedagogy. American education as a fluxion results in the university's attempt to study the possibility of a discipline for education but excludes teaching from the enterprise.(46) It causes the research trend in the university to become increasingly specialized, that, in conjunction with a belief in the science of education, (47) results in the diverse taxonomies of teaching and learning objectives, curriculum design and methodologies.(48) (Indeed, the entrenchment of scientific psychology and sociology within today's education curriculum show no let up of the belief in a science of education.)(49)

The above described proposal to create a discipline of pedagogy via paradigm cases points to the activities of the classroom as the locus of those cases. But the classroom has historically proved to be a difficult domain for educational researchers from the university. This was, in part, due to the prejudice within the professional culture of academics that perceived the activities in the classroom as unacademic and teaching itself as a low status, uninteresting occupation.(50) However, case studies are ethnographic and small-scale which resist the large-scale research of sociology. (51) These conditions have produced the growing separation between the research into teaching and its origin of practice, i.e., the classroom, something that does not occur between schools or medicine and hospitals. (52)

Finally, the expansion of elementary and secondary schools into a mass public school system contributes to the fluxion in American education by creating the circumstances that bring the emergence of school administration as a professional culture from the university graduate school of education and causes the exodus of teachers from their craft.(53) The need to find a discipline of pedagogy is superseded by the migration of teachers into a new field. One recent study argues that the preoccupation with the management of schools in the university has created a mechanism that produces and distributes any knowledge about pedagogy to administrators, Boards of Education and legislators while filtering it away from teachers. (54) In short, the creation of pedagogy as a discipline is inhibited by this intertwining complexity of historical, sociological and political factors, despite how appealing theoretical proposals may be.

One further consideration is needed to show that the creation of a discipline of pedagogy which, in turn, would lead to the professionalization of teaching depends more on directing social and political forces than it does on any attractive theoretical proposal. An occupation is transformed into a profession not only by the practitioner's claim to a body of esoteric knowledge --- that it is a theory-based practice, but also by convincing the general public that its claim is true. It is often said by professionals that what

they have learned in the university as preparatory training differs markedly from what they experience on the job. Medical school students study biology, chemistry and anatomy in the abstract realm of textbooks, charts and theory. But, when they are on the job as doctors, they quickly learn that what they must know is how to diagnose symptoms and observe behavior. Students of law study countless law cases, theories and arguments, but as lawyers they must know how to cut a deal between the prosecution and defense, persuade a jury and defer to the idiosyncrasies of judges. In short, the relationship between the knowledge and skills learned in higher education (theory) and job experience (practice) appears tenuous at best and challenges the assumption that a professional applies what he or she learns in school to the everyday practice of the job.

If this argument is correct, then it changes our conception of a profession as evolving out of a foundation of theory or esoteric knowledge. One has to be reminded, however, that both the practice of medicine and law produce *successful results*. The creation of a vaccine at a research hospital that virtually eliminates a disease, the correct diagnosis and prescribed cure of a common ailment by the family doctor, or an attorney winning a case for a client are what convinces the public to accept doctors and lawyers as professionals even if they achieve that success more from practitioner knowledge than esoteric knowledge. Perhaps this means that practitioner knowledge (that which is learned on the job) is truly esoteric knowledge, not what is learned in the professional school. Yet, the societal phenomenon that develops is that the occupation's ability to produce successful results is what leads the public to accept *both* it as a profession and the profession's claim that what legitimizes it as a profession is that body of esoteric knowledge learned in school. When we apply this view to teaching and teacher education, we immediately see that teaching has not produced successful results (at least, not successful enough), thus, any claims by the teaching work force to esoteric knowledge are not accepted by society.

I have tried to show that complex of historical, sociological and political factors have prevented the professionalization of teaching by creating a fluxion in the meaning of American education. I have also tried to demonstrate that although a discipline of pedagogy may be possible, its public acceptance depends upon its ability to produce results of successful teaching and learning that builds a consensus on what we mean by education in this country.

ENDNOTES

¹ Henry C. Johnson, Jr. and Erwin V. Johanningmeier, *Teachers for the*

Prairie (Urbana, Chicago, London: University of Illinois Press, 1972). p. 447.

² *Ibid.*, p. 449.

³ Laurence R. Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1965). Veysey develops the thesis of competition between these trends throughout this book.

⁴ Johnson and Johanningmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 453.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.451-452.

⁶ Geraldine Joncich Clifford and James W. Guthrie, *Ed School* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988), pp. 82, 87.

⁷ Lee S. Shulman, "Reconnecting Foundations to the Substance of Teacher Education", *Teachers College Record*, Vol. 91. No.3 (Spring, 1990), pp. 300-301.

⁸ Clifford and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹³ Johnson and Johanningmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 454.

¹⁴ As quoted in Johnson and Johanningmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 455.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 455.

¹⁶ Clifford and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

¹⁷ Merle L. Borrowman, "Liberal Education and the Professional Preparation of Teachers" in *Teacher Education in America* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1965), pp.1-53.

¹⁸ Johnson and Johanningmeier, *op. cit.*, pp. 456-459.

- ¹⁹ Borrowman, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
- ²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 30.
- ²¹ *Ibid*, p. 41.
- ²² Johnson and Johanningmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 456.
- ²³ *Ibid*, p. 458.
- ²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 459.
- ²⁵ Clifford and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 54.
- ²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 73.
- ²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 83.
- ²⁸ *Ibid*, p. 84.
- ²⁹ Borrowman, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.
- ³⁰ Johnson and Johanningmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 454.
- ³¹ Barbara Miller Solomon, *In the Company of Educated Women* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), pp. 16-17.
- ³² Borrowman, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.
- ³³ Clifford and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
- ³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 116.
- ³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 117.
- ³⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 117-118.
- ³⁷ Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Kuhn was the first to use the concept of a "paradigm" in the hard science disciplines.
- ³⁸ Harry S. Broudy "Case Studies----Why and How", *Teachers College Record*,

Vol. 91, No. 3(Spring, 1990), p. 450.

³⁹ George F. Kneller, "The Proper Study of Education", *AESA News and Comments*, Vol. 14, No. 2(March, 1984), p. 6.

⁴⁰ Johnson and Johanningmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 463.

⁴¹ Kneller, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁴² Steve Tozer and Stuart McAninch, "Social Foundations of Education in Historical Perspective", *Educational Foundations*, N.V./1, (Fall, 1986), pp. 20-21.

⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 21.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, p. 25.

⁴⁵ Broudy, *op. cit.*, pp. 452-453.

⁴⁶ Johnson and Johanningmeier, *op. cit.*, p. 464.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p. 460. and Clifford and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁴⁸ Broudy, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

⁴⁹ Kneller, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

⁵⁰ Clifford and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁵¹ Christopher J. Hurn, *The Limits and Possibilities of Schooling*, second edition (Massachusetts: Allan and Bacon, Inc., 1985), p. 196.

⁵² Clifford and Guthrie, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁵⁴ James W. Garrison, "Democracy, Scientific Knowledge and Teacher Empowerment", *Teachers College Record*, Vol. 89, No.4 (Summer, 1988), pp. 487-489.

**REINTERPRETING DEWEY: SOME THOUGHTS
ON HIS VIEWS OF SCIENCE AND PLAY IN EDUCATION**

**Alexander Makedon
Chicago State University**

I. Dewey's View of Science

Science is very near the core of everything that Dewey said regarding society, education, philosophy, or human beings¹. Typical of his overall approach to science is his statement that "Ultimately and philosophically, science is the organ of general social progress."² If, as some philosophers argue, art is for art's sake, it may be said that to Dewey science should be pursued for the sake of science. According to Dewey, the scientific method allows for maximum possible impartiality³, is the only one compatible with the democratic way of life⁴, lends itself to public scrutiny⁵, and is the method of intelligence⁶. In his enthusiasm for modern scientific methods, Dewey went so far as not only to redefine the role of scientific method in education, but in the hope of changing people's attitudes about science, even re-defined the common dictionary definition of such terms as habit and work⁷. Although Dewey offered a more or less "conventional" definition of science, such as, the testing of hypotheses in experience, or the changing of old conclusions to fit new empirical findings⁸, his real contribution lies in building a network of science-centered concepts that seem to underlie not only scientific inquiry, but the whole concept of a democratic society⁹. Overall, he praised science almost unqualifiedly even in spite of his frequent, and on their face seemingly contradictory disclaimers regarding the inhumane uses to which science may be put¹⁰, its cold instrumentality¹¹, or the primary role of the artistic (as opposed to scientific) attitude in professional teaching¹². Her majesty science is crowned as much the rightful queen in Dewey's kingdom, as philosophy is in Plato's Republic. Dewey's travels in philosophy are those of a protector of the new age of science, constantly in search of new converts, new methods, new ideas, new habits, and new attitudes. He advocated that science become a habit "with intense emotional allegiance,"¹³ meaning, something which people will zealously believe in, fight for, and defend. He approved of the possibility of science becoming a widespread human desire, and thus reinforcing itself in ever increasing social circles¹⁴. It is small wonder that Dewey should become involved in education. Like all moral philosophers worth their salt, Dewey, too, sought to re-build society by re-constructing

education. As the guarantor of ideological survival of scientific paradigms well into the future, science-like education plays a key role in Dewey's thought in generating scientific attitudes and beliefs, and in closing the self-perpetuating circle that starts-ends with education, and ends-starts with scientific institutions.

Like all great philosophers ever since Plato, Dewey, too, travelled in ever larger circles that made it harder and harder for the non-initiated to see their common center. In his enthusiasm for the role of science in society, and by default, if not by design, in education, Dewey seems to have allowed a much more central role for science, than the underlying logic of his premises may have warranted. For example, he did not fully address some of the more obvious criticisms against science, or anticipate or discuss the educational usefulness of non-scientific methods. For example, he did not fully discuss or credit the role that imagination-centered education, role-play, or metaphysical discussion, may have in the development of democratic character. Other issues which merit further analysis include the morality of treating nature as a mere means for scientific development; the purely a-moral or instrumental nature of science¹⁵; the employment of scientific methods by non-democratic regimes¹⁶; the possible non-objectivity of scientific inquiry, including its underlying historical and cultural relativism¹⁷; its possibly becoming another essence in the Deweyan lexicon of imperative anti-essentialism¹⁸; its game-like qualities; and finally, and more importantly from an educational perspective, science being possibly used in education not as a means for more control over nature, or more useful work, or more human-centered or "utilitarian" purposes, as advocated by Dewey¹⁹, but for better understanding other cultures, coexisting with non-human world-parts (= parts of world that are not limited to human beings), and engaging in meaningful and enjoyable play²⁰.

II. Science and Nature

Dewey saw science as giving humans control over nature²¹. For example, he wrote that "[m]odern experimental science is an art of control."²² He went on to argue that ever since the rise of modern science, nature has become "...something to be modified, to be intentionally controlled."²³ His human-centered, utilitarian approach to nature (as contrasted to a more universal approach that sees humans as only the interpreters of universal phenomena²⁴) comes clearly through in his statement that nature is material to "be acted upon" to benefit humans. As he put it,

[Nature] is material to act upon so as to transform it into new objects which better answer our needs. Nature as it exists at any particular time is a challenge, rather than a completion; it provides possible starting points and opportu-

itics rather than final ends²⁵.

It may be argued that humans should have at least some control over nature to survive physically. This doesn't mean that they should use science to "control" or "master" nature, as was proposed by Dewey, since historically there is proof they were able to survive long before the advent of modern science, and may even cause themselves more harm, than good, by trying to control it²⁶. It would have been interesting to know whether Dewey might have been as enthusiastic a proponent of science, or of its contributions to natural mastery, if he were alive today to witness the constant destruction of nature by technologically advanced humans. Perhaps his dislike for any type of teleological morality may account for his inability to foresee the destructive uses to which science may be put. On the other hand, had he approached metaphysical morality more selectively, on the basis, for example, of extrinsically good and bad ends (as opposed to rejecting outright all apriori notions of morality²⁷), then he may have defended more arduously the sanctity of nature over the unbridled exercise of the scientific method.

Although Dewey points disapprovingly to the bad uses to which science may be put, such as, coercion, intimidation, and deception²⁸ (and in retrospect one may add the development of weapons of mass destruction), he mentioned its possible abuses without further analysis, almost as a footnote to his more elaborate development of scientific benefits. His definitely pro-scientific attitude is so apparent that one may argue that even in spite of his anti-essentialist attacks, science has become another essential value, metaphysical idea, or ideal ethic in his philosophy²⁹. In his defense, Dewey may argue that science is by nature anti-essentialist, as its aims are to verify claims in experience, as opposed to ascribing experience itself to a prior essence. Apart from the issue of whether any hypothesis testing can begin without some prior preconception of what constitutes "testing," if not "experience" itself, and therefore without some type of preconceived ideas or "essences," the fact remains that Dewey didn't analyze his own metaphysical claims thoroughly enough to respond to the criticism that science, too, is no more than another preconceived essence, value, or belief system. Ironically, an ideal it seems to have become in Dewey's philosophy, however large the circle that Dewey drew around it, his attacks anti-metaphysical, his exhortations anti-essentialistic³⁰.

III. Science, Morals, and Democracy

What kind of morals does science provide? Implied in Dewey's assertions about science is the idea that underlying science is a certain type of true morality. Although Dewey referred to science as a method, he also broke down the distinction between ends and means³¹, implying that a

method, such as science, can also serve as an end. It may be argued that according to Dewey, democracy is a larger end than science³². If that were the case, then why didn't Dewey advocate democracy even in spite of the use of the scientific method? As he put it, "[t]he experimental method is the only one compatible with the democratic way of life, as we understand it."³³ Dewey felt that the scientific method will promote cooperation and scientific habits that ultimately will help produce democratic personalities. Yet the fact is that many scientists work in isolation. They discover something new frequently as a result of an inspiration they had while hit by the proverbial apple all alone under a lonely tree, than as a result of the give and take which Dewey described. It may be argued that scientists should not work that way, but instead work cooperatively, in a Deweyan fashion, to count as "true" scientists. If we reject what many scientists do, or how science is often used, to make our conception of science fit Dewey's, then aren't we redefining science even in spite of "scientific evidence" to the contrary? Finally, if Dewey really valued the establishment of democratic habit more than science, then why not include in education all those methods which Dewey clearly considered unscientific, such as, untestable story telling, metaphysical class discussions, or unreal role playing, but which collectively may contribute as much to the development of democratic character, as does science?

IV. Dewey's View of Play

Play is too subjective, and sometimes has the uncontrollable tendency of becoming too imaginative, for anyone as reality-bound, experiential, and pragmatic, as Dewey, to really like it. According to Dewey, play apart from work is foolishness³⁴, may be demoralizing³⁵, may stifle educational growth³⁶, and if pursued for its own sake may lead to irresponsible behavior³⁷. Some of the other terms used by Dewey to characterize play, which collectively may be seen as his philosophical necklace of "poisonous play pearls," include play as arbitrary and fanciful³⁸, morbid³⁹, aimless⁴⁰, and useless⁴¹. There are several theorists who may disagree with Dewey's assessment of the value, usefulness, or desirability of play⁴². For example, regarding its lack of ends, something which Dewey emphasized in his analysis, several theorists wrote that play is not only well aimed, but serves as the basis of civilization⁴³. Dewey also felt that play may lead to exercising one's imagination without doing, experimentation, or actualization, which is dangerous⁴⁴. True, Dewey did acknowledge the usefulness of play as a means for the achievement of other goals, but only as a means⁴⁵. Although there are times when Dewey rose above his scientific corner, as when he acknowledges the social⁴⁶, moral⁴⁷, educational⁴⁸, and psychological benefits of play⁴⁹, and even ridicules the puritanical distrust of play⁵⁰, nevertheless he failed to recognize that play may be no less educative than the scientific method, and equally no more miseducative if used for undesirable ends. In

retrospect, it may be said that given the secondary role that he assigned to play vis-a-vis work and science, not to mention his stinging attack against its presumably asocial qualities, he may have been himself the victim of the social attitude toward play which he criticized.

By contrast to his view of play, work holds a much higher place in Dewey's hierarchy of desirable goals. In fact, work is so important a goal in Dewey's ethereal world, that one wonders how much the protestant work ethic influenced his philosophy of play, even in spite of his religious liberalism, child-centered views in education, or outright criticism of puritanical extremes. Play is sacrificed in Dewey's scheme of things at the altar of purposeful work. Everywhere in his writings, play is stripped of its own identity as possibly an end-in-itself, and becomes, instead, the perennial "handmaiden:" handmaiden to science⁵¹, work⁵², society⁵³, or education⁵⁴. Thus play allows for more ideas at the pretesting stage, play allows the teacher to find the native needs and interests of the child, play is preparation for work. Play even allows for the release of energy, characteristically serving as a safety valve, but not as the key to educational development⁵⁵. Compared to his view of work and science, play is denied full citizenship in his world of relative ends.

Dewey was faced with the problem of advocating a child centered education which makes direct appeal to a student's "native needs and interests," while simultaneously holding on to an idea as clearly non-inner directed, let alone hedonistic, as work. This dual allegiance to work and child-centeredness becomes even more problematic in the context of a largely protestant culture, as was the United States at the time that Dewey wrote, which sees work as a means of keeping away evil, if not as the only road to personal salvation⁵⁶. The work ethic gains a new significance in this country because of its puritanical roots, which gave it a particularly self-denying twist. Perhaps realizing that he can't advocate work while simultaneously holding on to such human-centered views as democracy and interest, Dewey decided simply to redefine work to mean something more like play, that is, voluntary, spontaneous, authentic, and purposeful. As he put it regarding his description of work activities, "[t]he dictionary does not permit us to call such activities work."⁵⁷ His view of work, then, is that it is play, except it seems to be more social, purposeful, and utilitarian. He calls other types of work that are not intrinsically motivated drudgery, toil, or labor⁵⁸. Elsewhere, he offered that both play and work, or at least as he redefined the meaning of the term "work," are "... equally free and intrinsically motivated, apart from false economic conditions which tend to make play into idle excitement for the well to do, and work into uncongenial labor for the poor."⁵⁹ On its face, it seems that given Dewey's emphasis on interest and personal background, play should play a more paramount role in his pedagogy than either science, or

"work." In fact, for all practical purposes, he really meant by work "play," except perhaps he may have been psychologically unprepared to call such work "play." In any event, the author would like to propose that instead of play becoming the handmaiden of science, as proposed by Dewey, science is used to understand nature, so students can engage in more meaningful interplay among themselves, and between humans and other world parts⁶⁰.

ENDNOTES

All references to Dewey's works, except where noted, are from *The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston (Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969-1991). *The Collected Works* are divided into three parts in the series:

- The Early Works, 1882-1898;
- The Middle Works, 1899-1924; and
- The Later Works, 1925-1953.

Since Dewey's works have been exhaustively indexed in the series, the author limited his endnotes, below, to the title of a work appearing in the series, followed by the page number(s) for the specific reference made in the paper. He included the period and volume number only on the first appearance of a reference in the endnotes.

¹ Dewey's enthusiasm for science is evident in several of his writings. For example, see *Underlying Philosophy of Education*, Later Works, vol. 8, p. 102; *Abstracts of Kaizo Articles*, Middle Works, vol. 13, p.434; *Experience and Education*, Later Works, vol. 13, p. 54; *Democracy and Education*, Middle Works, vol. 9, p. 239.

² *Democracy and Education*, p. 239.

³ *Abstracts of Kaizo Articles*, p. 434.

⁴ *Underlying Philosophy of Education*, p. 102.

⁵ *Abstracts of Kaizo Articles*, p. 434.

⁶ *Experience and Education*, p. 54.

⁷ On Dewey's view of work, see *How We Think* (1933), Later Works, vol. 8, p. 286; *Democracy and Education*, pp. 214, 325; *Individualism Old and New*, Later Works, vol. 5, p. 120; on his view of habit, see *Democracy and Education*, p. 334.

⁸ *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, Later Works, vol. 12, pp. 115-116, 122.

⁹ *Underlying Philosophy of Education*, p. 102.

¹⁰ *Abstracts of Kaizo Articles*, pp. 435-436.

¹¹ *Individualism Old and New*, pp. 105-106; *Democracy and Education*, p. 339.

¹² *Sources of a Science of Education*, Later Works, vol. 5, pp. 16-17.

¹³ *Experience and Education*, p. 54.

¹⁴ *Freedom and Culture*, Later Works, vol. 13, p. 163.

¹⁵ On Dewey's view of the instrumentality of science, see *Individualism Old and New*, pp. 105-106; and *Democracy and Education*, p. 292.

¹⁶ On Dewey's discussion of some of the bad uses to which science may be put, see *Abstracts of the Kaizo Articles*, pp. 435-436.

¹⁷ Typical of this view is Thomas Kuhn's classic work on the history of scientific progress, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

¹⁸ We return to this point, below.

¹⁹ On Dewey's view of the relation between science and nature, see *Quest for Certainty*, Later Works, vol. 4, pp. 80-82, 85, 103; *Sources of a Science of Education*, Introduction, p. xxx; and *Democracy and Education*, pp. 219, 231.

²⁰ A. Makedon, chapter on "Science," *Humans in the World: An Introduction to Radical Perspectivism* (in progress).

²¹ *Democracy and Education*, pp. 219, 231, 292; *Quest for Certainty*, pp. 80-82, 85. See also Paul Kurtz's interpretation, Introduction, *Sources of a Science of Education*, p. xxxi.

²² *Quest for Certainty*, p.80.

²³ *Quest for Certainty*, pp. 80-81.

²⁴ See chapter on "ManWorld," *Humans in the World*.

²⁵ *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 81.

²⁶ See the chapter on "Conquest," *Humans in the World*.

²⁷ *Human Nature and Conduct*, Middle Works, vol. 14, pp. 6-9.

²⁸ *Abstracts of Kaizo Articles*, pp. 435-436.

²⁹ A point noted also by Richard Rorty, Introduction, *Later Works*, vol. 8, p. xiv.

³⁰ For a review of the logic of science, see A. Makedon, "The Logic of Science," in Makedon, "Is Teaching a Science or an Art," *Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, 1989 & 1990*, ed. D. B. Annis and M. A. Oliker, pp. 238-239. ERIC Document no. ED 330 683.

³¹ *Superstition and Necessity*, Early Works, vol. 4, pp. 29-32; *Interest and Effort in Education*, Middle Works, vol. 7, pp. 165-174; *Human Nature and Conduct*, Middle Works, vol. 14, 184-188; *Experience and Nature*, Later Works, vol. 1, p. 276-277; *The Quest for Certainty*, pp. 222-224; *Theory of Valuation*, Later Works, vol. 13, pp. 211- 216.

³² See Sidney Hook's analysis, Introduction, *Democracy and Education*, Middle Works, vol. 9, pp. ix-xii.

³³ *Underlying Philosophy of Education*, p. 102.

³⁴ *How We Think*, p. 346.

³⁵ *Democracy and Education*, pp. 211-212.

³⁶ *School and Society*, Middle Works, vol. 1, p. 88.

³⁷ *How We Think*, p. 285.

³⁸ *How We Think*, p. 285.

- ³⁹ *School and Society*, p. 202.
- ⁴⁰ *School and Society*, pp. 209-210.
- ⁴¹ *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 112-113.
- ⁴² For a review of theories of play, see A. Makedon, *Theories of Play* (Ann Arbor, MI: Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 1981); and Makedon, "Playful Gaming," *Simulation and Games* (vol. 15, no. 1, March 1984), pp. 25-64.
- ⁴³ Joan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950); Josef Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* (New York: The New American Library, 1963); and Friedrich Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Lectures*, tr. R. Snell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954).
- ⁴⁴ *School and Society*, p. 340.
- ⁴⁵ *Schools of Tomorrow*, Middle Works, vol. 8, p. 288; *Interest and Effort in Education*, p. 323; *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 112; *How We Think*, p. 346.
- ⁴⁶ *Schools of Tomorrow*, p. 289.
- ⁴⁷ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 112.
- ⁴⁸ *Interest and Effort in Education*, p. 320; *Schools of Tomorrow*, p. 288.
- ⁴⁹ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 111.
- ⁵⁰ *Human Nature and Conduct*, p. 110.
- ⁵¹ *How We Think*, p. 309.
- ⁵² *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 112-113; *Democracy and Education*, p. 212.
- ⁵³ *Contributions to A Cyclopedia of Education*, Middle Works, vol. 7, p.322.
- ⁵⁴ *Interest and Effort in Education* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1913), pp. 76-80, 86. This version, published in 1913, does not appear in the Collected Works.

⁵⁵ *School and Society*, pp. 198. This is an idea held originally by Karl Groos, *The Play of Man* (New York: Appleton, 1898).

⁵⁶ This idea is examined by Max Weber in his classic analysis of the "protestant ethic" in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London: George Alen and Unwin, 1930).

⁵⁷ *How We Think*, p. 286.

⁵⁸ *How We Think*, p. 346; *Interest and Effort in Education*, pp. 189-190.

⁵⁹ *Democracy and Education*, p. 214.

⁶⁰ On the author's view of the role of science and play in education, see chapters on science, play, and pedagogy in *Humans in the World*.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTEREST AND DISCIPLINE: JOHN DEWEY REVISITED

Robert P. Craig
University of Houston

I. Introduction

I will state my conclusions first: (1) A soft version: Interest and discipline are so interrelated so as to be indistinguishable. (2) A harder version: Interest and discipline are synonymous terms. Although I will not argue this in detail, it seems to me that some of the contradictions, inconsistencies, and ambiguities in Dewey's analysis of the terms is, in point of fact, because they are synonymous. (3) If a distinction is to be made (and maybe "distinction" is the wrong term), it is between interest/discipline, on the one hand, and passion, on the other hand.

At one time in philosophical journey I was fond of the quote from Bertrand Russell, where he says somewhere: "Never affirm. Seldom deny. But always distinguish." It seems to me that distinctions are (usually) helpful for conceptual and heuristic reasons, that is, for clarity and for noting conceptual usage. But, now, the "Always distinguish" bothers me. One can take the distinctions as having an independent reality, when in point of fact the distinction is merely a conceptual and/or heuristic tool. I think this is the case with Dewey's distinction between interest and discipline.

Likewise, Russell's "Never affirm" bothers me. Never affirming is tantamount to not taking a stance; and borders on the unethical. Does not a philosopher have the moral responsibility to affirm? Even when wrong, is this not one way in which progress in philosophy is possible? Obviously, my answer is affirmative.

II. The Meaning of Terms

Dewey notes the differences between the attitudes of a spectator and that of a participant. He suggests that the attitude of the participant incorporates the thought or idea of future consequences. These consequences are what influence the behavior or attitude of the participant, thus setting or creating the difference between the spectator and the participant. Attitude is denoted by Dewey as "concern, or interest."¹ These terms suggest that the person is "eager to act so as to give things one turn rather than another."²

"Interest, and aims, concern and purpose are necessarily connected"³,

according to Dewey. He suggests that these words emphasize "results" which are desired. (Oddly enough, we often take for granted the personal attitude or eagerness of the participant). For Dewey, 'results' makes the difference--the participant is an active being who partakes of the consequences instead of standing outside the situation. There is obviously a personal interactive element and perhaps energizer for the person who is involved, as opposed to someone who is merely watching.

Dewey states that "interest and concern mean that self and world are engaged with each other in developing situation."⁴ Interest, most commonly means (i) a whole state of active development. (ii) objective results which are foreseen, and wanted, having a (iii) personal emotional inclination. For Dewey, interest, "the point at which an object touches or engages a man, is the point where it influences him,"⁵ thus, the emphasis is that interest relates to personal attitudes. The educational objective of interest is to "discover objects and modes of action which are connected with present powers,"⁶ whereby the function of the material is in the engaging of an activity and carrying it on consistently and continuously. And, this is interest. Interest, etymologically speaking, refers to "what is between, that connects two things otherwise distant."⁷ In education the process takes time to mature, in which there is a growth that occurs from the beginning or initial stage to its process completion. Often it is the middle period that is overlooked.

Dewey advocates pointing out to the student the connection which exists between student interest and the material present. However, he emphatically states the "procuring interest through extraneous and artificial inducements deserves all the bad names which have been applied to the doctrine of interest in education."⁸

Dewey provides a number of analogies to strengthen or perhaps illuminate his position. He refers to human will as having two factors: 1) foresight of results, and 2) the depth or hold the foreseen outcome has upon the person. Dewey further distinguishes between obstinacy and stubbornness, equating neither to the notion of will. He states, "obstinacy is persistence but it is not strength of volitions"⁹ "the people we call weak-willed or self-indulgent always deceive themselves as to the consequences of their acts."¹⁰ Dewey purports that "the primary difference between strong and feeble volition is intellectual--consisting in the degree of persistent firmness and fullness with which consequences are thought out."

Discipline is evident in people who are trained to consider their actions, and to undertake these actions deliberately. The power to endure an intellectually chosen course in the face of distraction, confusion, and difficulty is what it means to be disciplined, according to Dewey. For Dewey, discipline is power at command, the mastery of resources for action undertaken: to know what to do and to move to do it promptly by use of the requisite means. This makes discipline positive. It becomes evident, then,

that discipline and interest are connected, not opposed. Dewey claims, that "deliberation will be perfunctory and superficial where there is not interest."¹² Interest, then, is the depth of the grip which the foreseen end has upon one to act for its realization.

III. The Importance of the Idea of Interest in Education

Dewey states that "interest represents the moving force of objects--whether perceived or presented in imagination--in any experience having a purpose."¹³ If the teacher is able to recognize and stimulate the student's interest, then each student's individual needs, specific capacities, and preferences will be met. Dewey makes an important point when he states the necessity for teachers to recognize that all minds do not work in the same manner just because they all have the same teacher and textbook.¹⁴

Human intelligence, according to Dewey, is "not a peculiar position which a person owns"¹⁵ but, a person is intelligent in regard to the activities in which he/she plays part ("something in which the person *engages* and *partakes*").¹⁶ Dewey suggests that problems of instruction result because of the need to find material which will "engage a person in specific activities having an aim or purpose of moment or interest to him, and dealing with things not as gymnastic appliances but as conditions for the attainment of ends."¹⁷ The error in the historic practice of education has been two-fold, then. First, the conception of the mind consisted of leaving out the movements of things to future results in which the individual shared and, secondly, in the direction of which observation, imagination, and memory were perceived. Here Dewey claims that the label used by the school acts to protect or safeguard intelligent criticism and needs revision. One such label is "disciplinary." Society as a whole is reluctant to challenge subject matter which is considered disciplined.

Dewey points to two central problems which evolved. The first had to do with the term "discipline," in which a student who did not succeed to learn the required material was at fault "due to either laxity of application, and/or insufficient power of intelligent self-direction."¹⁸ The teacher or the methods used were never blamed. The responsibility lies with the student, not the educator, (as the logic suggested that the material did not have to meet specific requirements, but that the student had to show competency in the given area). Thus, the student who did not succeed was essentially unwilling to be disciplined.

Also, there was a negative conception of discipline instead of an "identification with growth in the constructive power of achievement."¹⁹ Here Dewey refers to 'growth' as a criterion for judging qualitative change in a process whose ultimate outcome is unknown. The intelligence is the alertness in foreseeing the various conclusions to which present data and considerations

are tending together with continually renewed observation and recollection to understand the subject matter. Not integrating discipline and interest suggests a person's proclivity for comprehending the pre-set curriculum. An assumption may be made that the individual who proceeds to work despite the uncongenial nature of the material presented is disciplined. Discipline, however, is more than just completion of a difficult task, according to Dewey.

In the traditional schemes of education, subject matter referred to pre-assigned material to be studied, each subject existing as an entity by itself. Dewey feels that "the act of learning or studying is artificial and ineffective to the degree in which pupils are merely presented with a lesson to be learned."²⁰ Dewey states that "study is effectual to the degree in which the pupil recognizes the place of the numerical truth he is dealing with in carrying to fruition activities in which he is concerned."²¹

IV. Critical Assessment

Dewey presents an argument which incorporated the elements of interest and discipline and the importance of these components to education. What does not seem to be addressed is how these two components work together. For example, if a child has insufficient interest, no amount of discipline can provoke interest. The student is either interested or not interested. Discipline cannot create interest.

Likewise, no amount of interest a student possesses can invoke or create discipline. The student who is captivated or interested in a subject matter does not necessarily possess the discipline to study the subject, or learn more about the specific field. Thus, a case can be made that regardless of the amount of either component an inconsistency is evident in that interest cannot create discipline nor can discipline create interest.

Although Dewey suggests that the two are correlated, the fact remains that neither discipline nor interest can create in the student the desire or drive to learn. Interest does not mean endless dedication to a given subject, just as discipline does not mean a cultivation or eventual love for a given topic. Therefore, a case can be made that just as contradictions are a prevalent aspect of human life, inconsistency or contradictions also exist in terms of how we perceive interest and discipline.

In terms of Dewey's stance on interest and discipline, it is apparent that he has neglected to adequately explain the inconsistency which exists between them. For example, one can argue that a student can have many interest. The adage states "a jack of all traits is a master of none." Here perhaps the idea conveyed is that the individual is not sufficiently disciplined to focus long enough on a specific area and thus she ends up dabbling in various areas without any specialized skill. To take this one step further, the individual can be viewed as having no focus and thus lacking both sufficient interest and discipline.

One may argue that a skilled teacher could create discipline through interest. The assumption here is that the student becomes so interested or involved in the given subject matter that the interest that has been provoked unconsciously makes her more disciplined. As a result, the student begins to spend more time studying (discipline without awareness of it). This, however, is not the discipline nor interest that Dewey advocates.

Likewise, Dewey fails to acknowledge the effects of age in terms of interest and discipline. He does not address how discipline and interest change with age and time. If the student is viewed as a developing being, it would be expected that as time progressed, her needs would also change. If we expect the needs of the student to change, is it not also probable that her interest and discipline would change? In order for the teacher to successfully maintain the interest of the student, the teacher must be aware of both the student's capacity in terms of her age and life-situation.

V. Conclusion

Several years ago Art Brown and I began systematic reflections on the relationship between interest and discipline. Any inaccuracies in this article are my own. But our purpose was to note the paucity of reflection on this issue. Although nothing was published, Art's insistence on the importance of the topic remained with me. Although I have been a member of the M.P.E.S. for almost 20 years, I have never publicly shared personal thoughts on Dewey's ideas. Perhaps Dewey seemed to me to be like the God of the Ancient Hebrews, that is, no one said his name in public for fear of excommunication, especially if she got it wrong.

Yet, reflecting on my own life, two interests of mine stand out as exemplifying the relationship between interest and discipline: (1) I played minor league baseball. I was so interested in the sport that I played all winter--in Chicago--often merely throwing a golf ball against a wall to try to catch it in the snow and ice. I play third base. (2) At one time I published poetry. Again, the discipline followed the interest. Or better put, interest and discipline were so interrelated that I could not distinguish where one began and the other left off.

But beyond the interrelationship between interest and discipline, I perceived a third operative factor not mentioned by Dewey: passion. I remember a graduate school philosophy seminar in which whenever a student made "real" philosophical comment (which was rare) the professor, gleaming, would say, "There is a hard nosed philosopher, someone who has passion." I am not competent to discuss what passion means, now how it is developed, if it can be. Maybe like the Muse, it is either there or it is not.

I hope this digression will be excused, noting that the mystical is beyond conceptual grasp. My personal "stories" add little to either Dewey's

ideas or my previous analysis: except to suggest that is it PASSION we need in a world of measurement and quantification. And it is PASSION which, somehow, mysteriously interconnects interest and discipline.

ENDNOTES

¹ Dewey, *Democracy and Education*. New York: The Free Press, 1916, p. 125.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Intelligence being the alertness in foreseeing the various conclusions to which present data and considerations are tending together with continually renewed observation and recollection to the whole of the subject matter.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

²¹ *Ibid.*

**TAKING IT TO THE STREETS:
DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION BEYOND THE CLASSROOM**

**Louis Silverstein
Columbia College Chicago**

"Education is not preparation for life; education is life itself."

- John Dewey

Going beyond the hallowed halls and walls of academia, a teacher of yore, Socrates being his name, who was sentenced to death for the raising of questions which went beyond the pale of what were the acceptable limits of scholarly endeavor of his times, questions concerning the perils to human understanding and growth of the life left unexamined in the realms of the societal and personal, left as his legacy to the continuing debate on the ultimate purpose(s) of the general and liberal studies the dictum that education is a journey not only into the nature of what it is to be learned, but also into the nature of what it is to be good; that is, to be learned without being good, and to be good without being learned is to be less, much less, than educated.

The true state of education in any society is to be fathomed not by the tests that are measurable or from the scratchings on paper and computer, but by to what extent and how well we live the teachings of the subject matter which we study in our daily lives: What we talk about in our home? our workplaces? our social gatherings? What we read and view when we are not to be tested? How we engage in discourse with those who have authority over us, and whom we have authority over? How we relate to ourselves? How we respond to a call (critically/unthinkingly, reflectively/robot-like) from our maximum leader (a man who doesn't like to read that "serious stuff," but who prefers to be our education president) that we get ourselves into a killing mood as the linchpin for a new world order. As George Orwell informed us: WAR IS PEACE!

John Dewey,¹ noted philosopher and educator, instructed those of us who believe in the compatibility of democracy and human beings that knowledge is not an inert body of facts to be committed to memory; rather, it consists of experiences that should be used to solve present problems, with classrooms to be laboratories for students to experiment with life and learn

to work together. Authoritarian governments and authoritarian schools are both a disservice to democracy. Students should participate in shaping their education in order that they learn as well as be taught; so that they might choose to continue with such an educative process and work towards shaping their lives as concern, informed, involved and empowered adults.

In more recent times, Jonathan Kozol² has reached out to use with his words that schools prevent children from relating to the great social reformers and revolutionaries of our times and in our history by packaging them in harmless sweet stories, or keeps them on pedestals where children can't relate to them as fellow human beings. The message being that somehow to be brave, heroic, risk-taking in the pursuit of the public good is not to be someone like you or me.

Continuing in such a vein, Kozol goes on to say that we teach children how to live with guilt, to accept the injustices of our times, to look at manmade misery without rage, to talk with concern without being moved to action, save for the acceptable and safe "action" of tests and papers, and to trim the sails of what it means to be good as well as to be learned.

In such a vein, Mark Gelber³, Dean of Special Programs, Skidmore College, issues a plea to educators:

As teachers we provide students, young and old, with the opportunity to gain a liberal education. If we succeed, we will have helped students gain the ability to ask questions, analyze options, and reach logical conclusions; they will be able to read, speak, write, and listen with effectiveness; they will be able to understand and use mathematics, have developed personal values, be cognizant not only of their own culture but of other cultures as well, including languages, and will have demonstrated their ability to pursue learning beyond the superficial. And if this is all we have done as their teachers, we shall have failed unless we give them as well the spirit to change our world and theirs for the better. By that I mean to make it a safer, more equitable, more beautiful place.

By engaging our students to be active learners we will prepare them to be active citizens with the power to bring about positive change and the wisdom to recognize what needs to be changed. No matter what one's political, religious, ethnic interests, any student who completes a baccalaureate program without feeling an obligation to do something about the threat of nuclear war, about social inequity, has been failed by his schools, no matter what its curriculum.

Crystallizing such thoughts, Thomas A. Dutton and Brad C. Grant write⁴:

Recognizing the inherently political nature of teaching and schooling, critical pedagogy is interested in moving toward theories and practices that would organize pedagogy, schooling and diversity around a transformative social project...that distinguishes critical educational theory from what Kathleen Weiler calls traditional educational theory: In general, traditional educational theory has taken the existing arrangement of society as given, not changeable in any serious way, and desirable. ...schools have been seen as the means of rationally distributing individuals in what is conceived as basically just society...Critical educational theory...rests in a critical view of the existing society, arguing that the society is both exploitative and oppressive, but also is capable of being changed...(based) on the need for both individual empowerment and social transformation.

If we can focus on the substance of what Socrates, Dewey, Gelber, Dutton and Grant, and Weiler have to say, and not get hung up on labels such as "political correctness," for conflict, debate, reasoned, and heartfelt argument and dialogue over what is to be taught and how such is to be taught is at the core of the structure and process of educational endeavors in a democratic society that practices what it preaches, there is much out there, beyond the halls and walls of educational institutions, in the realm of polity that should give all educators concerned with instilling democratic values and practices in our youth reason to pause.

Although we Americans have the world's longest lasting democracy, we sometimes lose sight of what makes democracy possible: the condition of democratic practice in our country. We need only look at such indices of democratic practices as voting patterns among college-age youth to more fully realize that to be informed does not necessarily translate into not acting as if one were an idiot in the Greek sense of the term, which equated lack of participation in the public arena of the polity as idiocy.

Youth are the least likely to exercise their right to vote, the most quantifiable form of political participation. As reported in the November 1990 issue of *NEA Today*, the percentage of 18-24 year olds voting in Presidential elections has taken the following form: in 1972, 41.6% voted; in 1976, 36.5% voted; in 1984, 34% voted; in 1988, 28.9% voted.

In recognition of the fact that a healthy democracy requires the inculcation of democratic practices in the lives of youth, the idiocy, in terms

of lack of involvement in the affairs of the polity, appears to be an increasing phenomenon among college-age youth, and that the state of their society, their world, demands active involvement by the "best and the brightest" in order that the clarion call of modern society-"buy, buy, buy"-might be challenged by the essential teaching of the general and liberal studies-"reflect, reflect, reflect," coupled with the essential truth that unless students do what they know and reflect upon while their life practices are being shaped and honed in the institution of teaching and learning.

Believing that C. Wright Mills was correct when he wrote:

Whether or not they are aware of them, men in a mass society are gripped by personal troubles which they are not able to turn into social issues. They do not understand the interplay of these personal troubles of their milieu with problems of social structure: The knowledgeable man is a genuine public, on the other hand, is able to do just that.⁵

A group of students at Columbia College Chicago, an inner-city, open admissions liberal arts college with majors in the arts and communications, undertook a project under my tutelage to engage other students, the general public, and their government in a dialogue revolving around some of the basic questions raised by the teachings of the general and liberal studies. To wit, what is the nature of my relationship to the earth? to other humans? to one's own self? The question at hand being what role can students play in their courses of study?

These students, known collectively as Students For A Better World, went into student centers, where rap, the pursuit of the material and the sexual, soda, Baby Ruth candy bars, and croissants were the topics of the day, day in/day out, to raise the quality of dialogue and concerns among their fellow students now that their country was about to go to war.

Students For A Better World (SBW) went into elementary, middle, and high schools and houses of worship in an attempt to raise questions concerning what does it mean to pursue the educational and spiritual when your country is preparing to go to war, and is at war.

SBW went into classrooms other than their own (with consent of the instructor), appeared on the college radio station, wrote letters to the editor section of their college newspaper, arranged social events, held teach-in's, all these activities centered around what should be included in one's studies when your country is about to go to war, and is at war.

SBW utilized the mass media to reach out to the general public. They held news conference prior to mass demonstrations; wrote letters to the editor of the city-wide and community newspapers; kept editors of college newspapers other than Columbia aware of student protests; and held media

events such as street theater. (It should be noted that while the print media gave some limited coverage to student protests against the war, with the sole exception of college radio stations and the local public radio station, electronic mass media shut out protestors' access to the general public.)

SBW petitioned their governmental representatives; held voter registration drives; leafletted in the streets and on mass transportation; they spoke at churches; went into their communities to engage their neighbors on a door-to-door basis in a dialogue on the state of the nation; and, finally, there were the street demonstrations.

What resulted from all this extraordinary undertaking by students to take education beyond the halls and walls of academia was, on the one hand, "failure." For all their efforts did not result in the prevention of a war. The sobering truth, the truth of death, destruction, disease, and the militarization of America, is still having its effect on the consciousness and actions of students--in largest part, they have withdrawn into their private selves, and to see service to others, not political involvement as that which they can affect by their efforts. But, I believe that this is a short-term effect, like a cat licking its wounds before going out into the street again.

However, other lessons were learned, lessons of a much more positive and long-lasting nature. SBW learned that one's school is the community-at-large; that one's education does not end at the end of the school day, at the end of the school year, at graduation; the teaching and learning is hard and disciplined work; that the lessons of the general and liberal studies are a process, not a fixed stage; that the true test of what we have learned in our educational institutions is to what extent and how we apply these teachings in our lives beyond the classroom door, when our lives are not under the control of tests and grades; that democracy need to be lived as well as studied. These are life lessons, knowledge, value, and skill based which SBW can take with them throughout their lives.

To participate effectively in social change, students must be taught and learn how to engage in social criticism with other than friendly audiences, to reach out to the other side; they must come to appreciate and value the work that must be done to close the gap between our country's ideals and social realities; and how students can, as individuals and groups, influence the socio/political system in U.S. society. In sum, how to do what they have come to know, and hence, shape their lives.

ENDNOTES

¹ Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education*, Free Press; *Experience and Education*, Macmillan.

² Kozol, Jonathan, *The Night Is Dark And I Am Far From Home*. Simon and Schuster.

³ Gelber, Mark, *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 3/2/85.

⁴ Dutton, Thomas and Grant, Bradford, "Campus Design and Critical Pedagogy," *ACADEME*, July-August 1991.

⁵ Mills, C. Wright, source unknown.

III. 1992 ANNUAL MEETING

120

**DOES EVOLUTION NECESSITATE REVOLUTION? A LOOK
AT THE IMPLICATIONS OF SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR'S CLAIM,
"ONE IS NOT BORN A WOMAN, ONE BECOMES ONE."**

**Allison E. Williams
Loyola University of Chicago**

I. Introduction

In her powerful book *The Second Sex*, Simone de Beauvoir modifies existential philosophy to reflect the real limitations that are placed on women, and, through extrapolation, on minority cultures. Her ideology is profoundly influenced by Jean Paul Sartre, her lifelong companion, and it is imperative that the concepts of existential philosophy are understood if we are to appreciate her point of view.

Like Sartre, Beauvoir identifies personal freedom, choice, and responsibility as the fundamental qualities that characterize human nature and behavior. She emphasizes the plight of the individual, and the natural inclination to distrust and compete with others (Beauvoir, 1948; Beauvoir 1949). She considers the individual consciousness as the subject, and the consciousnesses of others to be the objects. The distance between the subject and object lends an air of suspicion to the consciousness of the object, which she names the Other. The Other which is opposed to the One (the subject), is viewed as a potential threat to the One who fears losing its freedom to the Other. Consequently, the One defines the Other with respect to itself, and, inevitably, attempts to restrict the freedom of the Other. However, as we are all simultaneously the One and the Other, the threat to personal liberty is tempered by attracting and opposing forces. We set ourselves up as the One, yet our consciousness acknowledges our status as the Other. Thus, we are drawn to and repelled by others in our quest to live authentic lives (Beauvoir, 1948; Beauvoir, 1949).

Authenticity is not possible, however, when society positions a group of people as the One, and all other groups as the Other. Those members of the One are afforded opportunities of choice, and the power to deny those opportunities to the members of the Other (Beauvoir, 1949; Urmson & Ree, 1989). In contemporary society there are many groups that have been assigned Other status. Among these are: African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native Americans, Asian-Americans, Gays and Lesbians, and,

perhaps most universally, women (Beauvoir, 1949).

The ideas presented in *Th. Second Sex* ring as true today as they did when they caused such a furor in the 1940's. The culture does tend to impose stereotypes on women which restrict their freedom and pigeonhole them in sex-role congruent occupations. According to Beauvoir, individual choices are divided into male and female categories. Typically, society makes it easier for a woman to express her personal liberty when she chooses an occupation, lifestyle, and temperament that is congruent with what has been deemed feminine. Hence, the statement "One is not born a woman, one becomes one" is not necessarily a denial of freedom or responsibility, but a realistic comment concerning the pool of possibilities which set limited boundaries for a woman's existence.

Moreover, the culture can position a group of people as the Other, and deny them opportunities unless they abide by their rules. The rules regarding "woman" behavior have been passed down through the centuries and, through formal and informal education, have become what men and women regard as "woman." If we are to change our schemata of "woman," and allow her to live an authentic existence, it appears that we will have to change the structure of society as a whole (Beauvoir, 1949; Butler, 1986; Le Doeuff & Gordon, 1979; Urmson & Rec, 1989).

II. Discussion

There are many perspectives that support the idea that people are influenced by their environment. Simone de Beauvoir's stance is unique--as a proponent of existentialism she is against the idea that we are determined by natural or supernatural external factors, or that we are innately anything (Beauvoir, 1948; Urmson & Rec, 1989). She sees the environment as limiting the choices for women, and proposes that in order to maximize her liberty and freedom, a woman must adopt the behaviors prescribed to her by men. Woman is the Other who is being controlled by the One, namely men (Beauvoir, 1949; Le Doeuff, 1979; Leon, 1988).

While other theories acknowledge that factors outside of oneself can impose an identity upon one's self, most of these theories stand diametrically opposed to the fundamental assumptions of existentialism. These theories, such as Marxism, illustrate the oppressive nature of society, but do not seem to emphasize individual responsibility as do the existentialists. Consequently, though they also call for revolution, it is dubious whether they dictate the same type of social change as Simone de Beauvoir implies.

Simone de Beauvoir's main argument for societal reconstruction is revealed in *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. In *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, Beauvoir focuses on freedom as the universal principle that guides human behavior and determines our moral code. We are only as free as our brothers and sisters--

therefore, it is in our best interest to maximize the freedom to choose for everybody. By restricting the freedom of not just one individual, but entire groups of people, we severely limit the entire society. As women are over half of the population, it would follow that limiting their choices would have dramatic repercussions for the liberty of the society as a whole. Who knows what we could be individually or together if it were not for the sexism and racism that taints our social system.

It has been suggested that our society is dominated by a white male system. Anne Wilson Schaeff in her book *Women's Reality* describes the characteristics of this system. "It [the White Male System]...controls almost every aspect of our culture. It makes our laws, runs our economy, sets our salaries, and decides when and if we will go to war or remain at home. It decides what is knowledge and how it is to be taught. Like any other system, it has both positive and negative qualities. But because it is only a system, it can be clarified, examined, and changed, both from within and without." (Schaeff, 1985, p. 2)

By emphasizing the fact that the system can be changed, Schaeff (1985) seems to be in accordance with existential attitudes. We have the freedom to set up our society, and to create the laws which govern us. These laws are not dictated to us by some higher, intangible power--they are decided and can be changed by human beings. The way our society is set up is not necessarily the right way, or the only way. According to Schaeff, it is an unfair way, and if we are to maximize personal liberty it must change.

Change, it has been said, is the only constant. This certainly seems true when one considers the ascension and descension of power structures over the course of history. Women, however, are an aberration. They have remained the oppressed throughout the course of written history, and there is reason to believe that theirs was an unchampioned cause long before men put pen to paper. I specifically say men, as history--both men's and women's, has primarily been revealed to the modern world in their words. Beauvoir believes that, consequently, history is more than a little biased. In *The Second Sex*, she quotes 'little known seventeenth century feminist,' Poulin de la Barre to make her point. "Poulin de la Barre put it this way: 'All that has been written about women by men should be suspect, for the men are at once judge and party to the lawsuit'" (Beauvoir, 1949, p. 21). Beauvoir again quotes de la Barre when discussing the laws that govern human behavior: "those who have made and compiled the laws have favoured their own sex, and jurists have elevated these laws into principles" (Beauvoir, 1949, p. 22).

Laws created by men were used to control the behavior of men and women. Many of these laws became principles which, though modified, still are measures of acceptable behavior today. Time has ascribed credibility to rules that ultimately appear to be measured by how well they maintain an

unjust distribution of power. Too often, this credibility goes unchallenged and women accept their limited opportunities because that's the way it is. Schaef (1985) provides a good analogy for this phenomenon. She compares the imposing White Male System to chronic pollution. If the polluted air is all you have ever known, you are not aware of your clouded vision until it is removed. Here again, is a call to revolutionize our social structure.

Even such figures as Freud and Marx sympathized with the dilemma of the oppressed. It is not too difficult to find parallels between the proletariat and woman, the bourgeoisie and man. They are two great classes of people who stand opposed to one another. Simone de Beauvoir notes that "in the economic sphere men and women can almost be said to make up two castes, other things being equal, the former hold the better jobs, get higher wages, and have more opportunity for success.." (Beauvoir, 1949, p. 20) In a society which equates material wealth with success and assigns power accordingly, it seems obvious that this would ensure that women remain the Other. Just as the proletariat remained inferior to the bourgeoisie, so women do to men. "The most mediocre of males feels himself a demigod as compared with women" (Beauvoir, 1949, p. 24).

This attitude is strikingly similar to that of the bourgeoisie who sought to expand their wealth by imposing their system on 'inferior' countries. Marx and Engels (1948) accused the bourgeoisie of exploiting those countries, and imposing a value system upon them that was oppressive and incongruent with their own. Similarly, men through the ages have made woman his slave, and have only yielded opportunities to her that did not reduce his own (Beauvoir, 1949). Perhaps, women should heed the advice of Marx and Engels: "Let the ruling classes tremble at a [women's] revolution. ...[They] have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. [Women] of all countries, unite!" (Marx & Engels, 1948, p. 44)

III. Objections

Several arguments may be raised which oppose Beauvoir's thesis. These arguments will be presented and discussed in the following sections.

In *Civilizations and Its Discontents*, Freud claims that women stand in opposition to society. Women, according to Freud, represent the interests of the family and of sexual life: the work of civilization is the business of men. Men are responsible for pursuing the cultural aims of a society, and must sublimate their instinctual drives to achieve their difficult tasks. Women are incapable of such sublimation, and therefore, should not be afforded such opportunities. The relegation to the status of Other naturally evolves as men must separate themselves in order to go about their business of maintaining society. Women and men, thus, are divided in order to prevent the animal nature of man to overtake him and destroy society. "Woman finds herself

forced into the background by the claims of civilization and she adopts a hostile attitude towards it." (Freud, 1961, p. 56) Woman is incapable of making choices that are rational, and therefore, her freedom to choose should be limited.

In addition, the theory of Charles Darwin seems to oppose the liberation of women. Like Freud's ideology, the notion of 'natural selection' implies that women have lost the struggle for resources and power because they are inferior. However, Darwin does not accuse instinctual, psychical drives as being the culprit. Darwin's writings suggest that women simply encountered a formidable opponent--man. Men are better equipped to deal with the demands of society, and therefore, have naturally been selected to control society. To tamper with the order that has naturally evolved would threaten the survival of civilization and, ultimately, our species. Therefore, society does not need to change in order to accommodate the personal liberty of woman, she needs to adapt to it (Volpe, 1985).

IV. Discussion of Objections

Many, both men and women, might find Freud's (1961) premise offensive. Although, he is relegating women to an inferior status, at the same time he is portraying men as slaves of their libidos. To be civilized, men must constantly be aware of their natural, destructive instincts in order to keep them under control. It is implied, that man is walking a fine line, and a gentle breeze could cause him to topple into a state of debauchery. Women are the personification of this gentle breeze, and, therefore, threaten man's integrity and the entire society. A philosophy such as this inevitably creates a civilization of discontents--people who suspect the motives of others, and perceive themselves as inherently bad. This type of society necessitates laws which limit personal freedom for everyone--men as well as women. His argument that women are inferior weakens as we discover that they have achieved this status only because men perceive them to be a threat. And, logically, if one indeed is inferior she should not be a source of insecurity. Thus, it appears that the freedom of women is to be limited in order to prevent them from taking opportunities away from men--not because they are inferior.

Darwin's argument is more difficult to challenge. Why is it that women have not naturally ascended into positions of power, if indeed, they are the best candidates? Why would women have accepted the status of the Other; and, more importantly, why would it have endured if it were not the natural order of things? Perhaps the best response to this is that it is not really important to determine why women have remained in second place for so long. The quest for this answer seems to be the fuel that has sustained this oppressive ideology. Furthermore, societal structure is too complex to be

analyzed from a 'survival of the fittest' approach. As a social animal, man depends on his relationships with others for his survival. Thus, there would seem to be great resistance to changing the nature of those relationships--even if they are wrong. There is too much at stake. At this point, it seems more prudent to acknowledge that, for whatever reason, women have not been allotted the same amount of freedom as men, and that allowing them their personal liberty does not mean that men will have to sacrifice any of theirs. Freedom is not finite.

The subtle arguments against the personal liberty for women are, potentially, the most dangerous. These are directly and indirectly espoused by the educational system, the family, and the media. They are difficult to oppose because they remain faceless, but it is important to note the profound way in which they help to maintain the status quo. They definitely provide arenas in which we might model and create opportunities for personal liberty for women (Gage & Berliner, 1988; Osborne, 1990; Shaffer, 1989).

V. Conclusion

Overall, it would appear that Simone de Beauvoir's statement that 'one is not born a woman, one becomes one' implies social revolution. If women are to be allowed the chance to make choices, assume responsibility for those choices, and to live authentically, they should not be restricted by a male biased society. In this paper, I have chosen to highlight the philosophers and conditions that depict the experience of the Other. I have specifically considered the plight of the woman, as this was Simone de Beauvoir's main contribution to existentialism; however, most of her ideas seem applicable to the situation of the minorities in the United States.

Most importantly, Simone de Beauvoir was able to integrate social factors and existential philosophy without abandoning the tenets of personal liberty and responsibility. I think this is significant as negating the influence of external factors creates a tendency to 'blame the victim.' With *The Second Sex* Beauvoir started her own revolution by drawing attention to the conditions that have reduced the value women have in society. She, thus, challenged many of the dominant male figures in philosophy--including Sartre. Her life was a tribute to existentialism, and contributed much to the advancement of personal freedom for women.

REFERENCES

- Beauvoir, Simone de (1949). *The Second Sex*. New York: Viking Penguin Inc.

- Beauvoir, Simone de (1943). *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. New York: Carol Communications.
- Butler, Judith (1986). Variations on Sex and Gender: Beauvoir, Wittig, and Foucault. *Praxis-International*, 5, 505-516.
- Freud, Sigmund (1961). *Civilizations and Its Discontents*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.
- Gage, N. & Berliner, D. (1988). *Educational Psychology*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
- Le Docuff, M. & Gordon, C. (1979). Operative Philosophy: Simone de Beauvoir and Existentialism. *I and C*, 6, 47-57.
- Leon, C. (1988). Simone de Beauvoir's Woman: Eunuch or Male? *Ultimate Reality and Meaning*, 11, 196-211.
- Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1948). *The Communist Manifesto*. New York: International Publishers.
- Osborne, N. (1990). Library Resources for Gender Balancing the Curriculum. Paper presented at the 1990 Summer Institute on Cultural Diversity. Oswego, New York. August 23-25.
- Schaeff, A. W. (1981). *Women's Reality*. San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Shaffer, D. (1989). *Developmental Psychology: Childhood and Adolescence*. Pacific Grove: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
- Urmson, J. & Ree, J. (1989). *The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy and Philosophers*. London: Unwin Hyman, Ltd.
- Volpe, E. (1984). *Understanding Evolution*. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown.

ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE DISCOURSE OF INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY

Michael A. Olicker

I. Analytical Philosophy of Education: Wanted Dead or Alive?

In his introduction to the 1986 *Proceedings* of the national Philosophy of Education Society, the editor, Nicholas C. Burbules, pronounced Analytical Philosophy of Education (APE) dead.¹ As an inveterate fan of Bela Lugosi's appearances as Count Dracula, I was not sure whether or not to take this seriously. Only a few years before, the historian of American philosophy Bruce Kuklick had sarcastically compared American philosophy as a whole to an "undead vampire . . . parasitic on really living organisms."² While this was *not* intended to be praise, Kuklick overlooks one positive characteristic of vampires: *they come back*. When, in the classic lowbrow comedy *Abbott and Costello Meet Frankenstein*, Abbott tells Costello that the legend of Dracula is "bunk" we know that it is just a matter of time before Bela Lugosi emerges from that coffin.

So APE may be dead for the moment. There are those in the audience who no doubt cheered at this announcement. But there is a younger generation who may know nothing of APE or may only have heard of APE from professors who have contempt for it. So instead of repeating Burbules's attempt to collect a bounty on the corpse of APE, let me tell you of its life. Then I will try to show you what an APE is capable of.

II. The Living and the Dead in APE.

Textbook writers usually portray APE as a single viewpoint³, but even if we restrict our discussion to the American version of APE, we are still faced with two versions of APE. The first was developed by B. Othanel Smith at the University of Illinois during the 1940s.⁴ The second and somewhat better known version of APE in the US emerged from the work of Israel Scheffler at Harvard University during the 1950s.⁵ Smith was a product of Teachers College, Columbia University who taught solely in Colleges of Education. Scheffler holds a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania and teaches in both Education and Philosophy at Harvard.

Both Smith and Scheffler would address questions of philosophy by

addressing the philosophers' use of language and the logic of their arguments. But the similarity ends there. Smith's lifelong concern was with problems in the education of educators. Scheffler, by contrast, is primarily concerned with attempting to show the relevance of general philosophy to issues in education. Both advocate the professionalization of philosophy of education but Scheffler is more concerned with the problems of professional *philosophers* while Smith was concerned with the problems of professional *educators*.

APE took hold during the 1950s when university professors retreated from the advocacy of political ideology into a defense of professional expertise.⁶ By the 1960s, practitioners of APE had begun to take controversial stands. A student of Smith, James E. McClellan, published two books that joined the skills of APE to a neo-Marxist critique of educational policy.⁷ Richard Pratte of Ohio State University published three books during the 1970s that attempted to synthesize APE with a Deweyan liberalism.⁸ These books and other more technical works were favorably received by professionals in philosophy of education. From 1975 to 1984, APes controlled the presidency of the national PES with McClellan running unsuccessfully in 1976 and Pratte being elected in 1980. But the writings of the APes proved difficult reading for students. By the mid-1980s, Burbules could pronounce APE dead and be relatively correct. Let me briefly conclude this section by simply asserting some strengths and weaknesses of APE.

A. Weaknesses

1. A tendency to address technical issues that are of interest only to other APes.
2. The claim to be able to establish criteria of true statements on any field of expertise. (English, history, math, etc.)
3. The view that a representational view of language can enable APes to identify "meaningless" statements or "bullshit" in educational discourse.
4. The view that educational researchers should ignore value questions and confine themselves to establishing facts.

B. Strengths

1. The view that APE can serve as the basis for a critique of educational ideology and practice.
2. The view that educational language must be studied in its institutional context and in terms of its function.
3. The view that critical thinking is central to any theory of teaching.
4. The view that questions of value *can* be the subject of rational argument.

III. APE and Political Discourse

One difficulty in presenting APE to introductory students is that APEs, when they are writing for each other, often employ a technical terminology and utilize highly rigorous argumentation. Authors of textbooks who are not sympathetic to APE often will utilize the most technical discussions of APE as being typical and overlook those works that are either written for larger audiences or address issues that are of broader interest.⁹ In addition, critics of APE often attack APE as addressing technical issues that are detached from the real world of politics and ideology. In his 1983 book *Understanding Education* the Marxist philosopher Walter Feinberg makes this kind of criticism of APE. He concludes a chapter criticizing some papers by British APEs with the complaint that APE "fails to capture the significance of concepts in a total system of practice." Feinberg goes on to generalize that APE deals only with "crystallized concepts" and fails to discuss "struggles over meaning."¹⁰

Feinberg has a legitimate complaint against certain APEs but he seems to want to defend the position that APE *cannot* address such issues. But fact is that certain that certain APEs *have* addressed the political functions of language. In 1971, B. Paul Komisar published a paper entitled "Language of Education" in the *Encyclopedia of Education* - a publication obviously intended for educators in general and not just philosophers. Komisar distinguishes between the language of teachers in the classroom and the language of educators in general and then describes four kinds of discourse under "educator talk"; 1. school routine; 2. subject matter; 3. scientific; and 4. political. We will be concerned here with "Political Discourse." For Komisar, when educators use Political Discourse they are attempting to persuade an audience by using language that may be vague or elusive in meaning or have new meanings that are intended to show their audience that old events can be looked at in a new way. Political Discourse takes three forms. The first is *philosophy of education itself* which Komisar sees as creative or innovative uses of language that are intended to stimulate new ideas. Second is *policy discourse*. This is the vague language used by administrators and policy makers in an attempt to build consensus and avoid being pinned down to a controversial position. The third and final form of Political Discourse is *publicity discourse*. This is educational discourse at its most vague and elusive. It is the kind of ceremonial and celebrative language that one finds in commencement addresses, goals statements in college catalogs, and in the writings of school public relations specialists. Unbelievers in education are quick to dismiss publicity discourse -- and sometimes all political discourse -- as bullshit. But this is exactly the sort of language that can be the battleground in the "struggles over meaning" that Feinberg thinks that APEs cannot address.¹¹

IV. The APE goes to work: Brown and McGregor on "Democracy."

One of the most discussed papers ever presented at the Midwest PES is Arthur Brown's 1978 Presidential Address on "Institutional Democracy." In that Address, Brown leans on the work of Douglas McGregor (1906-1964) a famed industrial psychologist who served as President of Ohio's Antioch college from 1948-1954. Brown treats McGregor's work as providing considerable evidence that "Institutional Democracy" can be a successful approach to the management of educational organizations.¹² It will be my contention in the remainder of this paper that a close examination of McGregor's language will show that McGregor is employing a form of political discourse that may *not* be congenial to *Brown's* ideal of institutional democracy and that an examination of McGregor's years at Antioch College casts doubt on claims that his approach to management was successful. In the course of my discussion, I will raise some questions that are typical of an APE:

1. What are the key definitions and are they adequate?
2. Are vague or ambiguous claims used and how those claims function?
3. What sorts of examples are used to illustrate the claims?
4. What kinds of arguments are used?

Let me assure my reader that my purpose is neither to attack Art Brown personally nor to attack the idea of "Institutional Democracy." In a choice between Institutional Democracy and Ellwood P. Cubberley's notorious "factory model of schooling,"¹³ I stand firmly with Art Brown. My point is that a close scrutiny of Douglas McGregor's arguments shows that McGregor might *not* stand with Art Brown.

Brown makes four points about McGregor utilizing McGregor's famous dichotomy between two theories of human motivation: Theory X (a mechanistic cause-and-effect viewpoint) and Theory Y (a functional needsassessment viewpoint).

1. McGregor is correct to claim that Theory X is an inadequate basis for motivation toward organizational goals.
2. McGregor's Theory Y can be equated with democratic management.
3. Theory Y is an adequate explanation of the conditions under which people *will in fact* direct their efforts toward organizational goals.
4. McGregor's work demonstrates that Institutional Democracy is the more efficient management system.¹⁴

First, consider McGregor's claim that Theory Y is an adequate basis for motivation toward organizational goals while Theory X is not. Notice that both Theory X and Theory Y assume that organizations universally *have* goals. The underlying logic of McGregor's view of management theory is the logic of means-end reasoning.¹⁵ In recent years, James G. March has raised serious questions about means-ends rationality as an adequate basis for organization and management theory.¹⁶ Ironically, Art Brown himself published a paper in 1974 that attacks the emphasis on educational goals. In *that* paper, Brown leans on the work of the British APE R. S. Peters!¹⁷

Second, consider McGregor's use of the term "democracy." In his essays on education, McGregor utilizes a distinction between "democratic" and "authoritarian" organizations that is roughly parallel to the later dichotomy between "Theory Y" and "Theory X." But McGregor's view of the relationship between students and administration also parallels his view of the relationship between labor and management. He is opposed to students having a vote on policy questions. While students should have more power over student affairs and faculty should have greater responsibility for dealing with students, administration is *not* expected to treat anyone as equal and should have more power to make subordinates *feel* involved without actually being involved.¹⁸

Third, it is not all that obvious that Theory Y actually has the results that McGregor claims for it. Surely Douglas McGregor *was* one of the most popular presidents Antioch College ever had. But does McGregor have the right to confidently claim that "Policy A causes Outcome B?"¹⁹ The usual assessment of McGregor's years at Antioch is that his policies had unintended consequences that were near disasters for the school. McGregor adopted a policy of participative management at a time when the school was under attack as a hotbed of Communist subversion. During the early 1950s a professional informer by the name of Harvey Matusow was able to gain access to the Antioch campus and concoct accounts of subversion that impressed Congressional committees and made national headlines. Only when Matusow publicly confessed to being a liar did the controversy at Antioch die down. In addition sociological accounts of the McGregor Administration describe a sort of social disorganization on campus that resulted in a breakdown of student discipline and a growing tension between faculty and administration.²⁰

Finally, there is Brown's use of McGregor's work. Brown clearly cites McGregor because he believes that McGregor's work shows that "Institutional Democracy" is *efficient*. While Brown is quick to reject a "quantitative" notion of efficiency and to declare that he stands "with Rawls against the utilitarians" he has opened himself to the charge that McGregor's years at Antioch *prove* that "Institutional Democracy" is "inefficient."²¹ Here

I sense a curious convergence of Brown and the more hardboiled APEs who would have questions of value be determined entirely by "the facts." Like Dewey, I would hold that while it is appropriate to inquire into any problem, there are some solutions that are simply not open to consideration.²² The critic who proposes that "Institutional Democracy" should be abandoned on the grounds of "inefficiency" is proposing that institutions abandon any pretense of being educational and simply seek to achieve goals no matter what the cost.²³ This is an interesting topic for the classroom, but in the real world individuals who SERIOUSLY work for the abandonment of democracy usually belong in one of those notorious basement rooms in Marion, Illinois, not in a lecture hall in Chicago. Even philosophical analysis must stop *somewhere!*²⁴

ENDNOTES

¹ Nicholas C. Burbules, *Introduction, Philosophy of Education 1986*, ed. Nicholas C. Burbules (Normal, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 1987), vii.

² Bruce Kuklick, "The Changing Character of Philosophizing in America," *Philosophical Forum* 10 (Fall 1978): 11.

³ Howard A. Ozmon and Samuel M. Craver, *Philosophical Foundations of Education*, 4th ed. (Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1990), 270-308.

⁴ B. Othanel Smith, *Logical Aspects of Educational Measurement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938) and "The Improvement of Critical Thinking," *Progressive Education* 30 (March 1953): 129-134. See also Ronald D. Szoke, Smith, Bunnie Othanel, in *Biographical Dictionary of American Educators*, 1978 ed. My thanks to Ron Szoke for bringing this to my attention.

⁵ Israel Scheffler, *Reason and Teaching* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1973.), 9-17.

⁶ Eugenic Ann Conser Potter, "The Linguistic Turn in Philosophy of Education: An Historical Study of Selected Factors Affecting an Academic Discipline" (Ph.D diss., University of Arizona, 1988).

⁷ Solon T. Kimball and James E. McClellan, Jr. *Education and the New America* (New York: Vintage Books, 1962) and James McClellan, *Toward an*

Effective Critique of American Education (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1968).

⁸ Richard Pratte, *The Public School Movement* (New York: McKay, 1973) and *Ideology and Education* (New York: McKay, 1977) and *Pluralism in Education* (Springfield, Illinois: Thomas, 1979). See also Michael A. Oliner, "Reason to Believe," *Journal of Educational Thought* 15 (April 1981): 77-81.

⁹ See Ozmon and Craver, 270-308.

¹⁰ Walter Feinberg, *Understanding Education* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 114.

¹¹ B. Paul Komisar, "Language of Education," *Encyclopedia of Education*, 1971 ed.

¹² Arthur Brown, "Institutional Democracy: Problems and Prospects." *Educational Theory* 29 (Spring 1979): 85-95.

¹³ Ellwood P. Cubberley, *Public School Administration* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1916), 338. See also Kimball and McClellan, 211-215.

¹⁴ Brown, "Institutional Democracy," 93.

¹⁵ Michael A. Oliner, "Douglas McGregor's Theory Y and the Structure of Educational Institutions" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1976), 60-70.

¹⁶ James G. March, "Model Bias in Social Action," *Review of Educational Research* 42 (Fall 1972): 413-429.

¹⁷ Brown, "The Case for Uncommon Goals in Education," *Elementary School Journal* 74 (February 1974): 260-265. See also Brown "What Could Be Bad? Some Reflections on the Accountability Movement," *English Journal* 62 (March 1973): 461-463.

¹⁸ Oliner, "Douglas McGregor's Theory Y," 150-170.

¹⁹ Robert H. Ennis, "On Causality," *Educational Researcher* 2 (June 1973): 4-11.

²⁰ Oliner, "Douglas McGregor's Theory Y," 22-25.

²¹ Brown, "Institutional Democracy," 93, n. 21.

²² John Blewett, SJ, "Democracy as Religion: Unity in Human Relations," in *John Dewey: His Thought and Influence*, ed. John Blewett, SJ (New York: Fordham University Press, 1960), 33-58.

²³ See John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (New York: Macmillan, 1916; reprint, New York: Free Press, 1966), 86-88, 97-98 and *Philosophy of Education (Problems of Men)* (Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams, 1961), 57-69.

²⁴ For a similar point see McClellan, *Toward an Effective Critique*, 249-250. See also Richard Rorty, "Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein," *Political Theory* 15 (November 1987): 564-580 and "The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy," in *The Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom*, eds. Merrill Peterson and Robert Vaughan (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 257-282.

HOPEFULNESS: THE VALUE VARIABLE FOR INNER CITY STUDENTS

Michael T. Risku
University of Minnesota-Morris

Abstract

Values based parochial schools have long provided an educational alternative to those residing in our inner cities. But are these past "Islands of Hope" becoming "public" schools reflecting the same ills? A comprehensive values survey was administered comparing the values development of transcents (N=63) in the Central City Catholic Schools (CCCSS) of Milwaukee, Wisconsin to students in Catholic schools nationwide (N=7,551). Despite a racial composition of 22.2% African Americans nationwide and 90.5% in the CCCSS, a high correlation (0.813) of values development was found. However two value statements were significantly different, the foremost relates to the value of "hopefulness." Seemingly white transcents possess significantly higher degrees of hopefulness than black transcents.

1. Introduction

With the growing concern for and attention to urban education, it is the contention of most national educators that better efforts are needed to serve the inner city's educational needs in this country. We as a nation have come to realize that we cannot afford to disenfranchise such a large segment of our population, specifically the black student population. This realization, although slow in coming, has created an increased consciousness of and concern for urban education throughout the nation.

Throughout the 19th Century, and particularly following the Civil War and the ensuing period of national expansion, the United States of America welcomed masses of immigrants from Europe. Most of these immigrants settled in the industrial urban centers of the North and Midwest because there they could find work. Cordasco (1971) states a large

percentage of the immigrant nationalities was Roman Catholic, particularly the Poles, Italians, southern Germans, Irish, and Hispanics.

In the midst of dislocation and the encounter with an alien culture, many immigrant Catholic communities found their neighborhood parish a reliable anchor point and an avenue for social advancement. By the early 20th Century, the neighborhood parochial schools increasingly became the means by which immigrant parents hoped to advance the cultural, social, economic and political fortunes of their children. The parochial school became an "Island of Hope" among those citizens seeking to free their children from their own social and economic restraints.

By the late 1950's, however, circumstances in inner city parishes and their schools began to change significantly as social patterns in American urban centers shifted. White inner city populations, including Catholic ethnics, moved increasingly to city suburbs. Their places in the old city neighborhoods were taken largely by African-Americans newly arrived from the South. These new inner city populations were either not Catholic, or--while Catholic by background--were open to the appeal of other religious communities.

Both inner city Catholic parishes and many 'main line' Protestant churches found their communities dwindling. Parishes found it increasingly difficult to maintain schools in the face of reduced populations and resources, and many were ultimately forced to close their schools. Some parishes, however, were able to maintain their schools in these changed circumstances and to continue to offer an academic formation.

Why have African American inner city families who have no tradition of supporting parochial education, whose religious backgrounds and traditions suggest appreciable divergence from Catholic views, and whose children may readily attend public schools--why would these families enroll their children in a struggling parochial school system at additional cost? Do these parents believe that the general education their children will receive in these schools is superior to that offered in the public system? The answer is probably, "no." Do these parents believe that their children will be better disciplined in the parochial setting? Again the answer is probably, "no" (O'Neill, 1978).

Proponents of the parochial education tradition point to "instruction in values" as the distinguishing difference between public and private religiously-affiliated schools. Many educators (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1985) maintain that "value-free" education is impossible, and that formation in values is an essential element in any educational mission. O'Neill further states that differences in values and value education are one of the most often cited reasons why parents send their children to private religiously-affiliated schools rather than to public schools.

African Americans have embraced inner city parochial schools for

many reasons, not the least being that these schools have enabled the black student and parent to achieve a greater sense of self-worth that is of supreme importance in their fight for identity as persons of dignity, worth, and equality. Paramount to that end is an education that provides values on which the above objectives are based. According to Asher (1986) African Americans have filled inner city Catholic schools not because they for the most part are Catholics, but because the values that are being taught in those schools are more closely aligned with their traditional American values and the goals that parents wish for their children. Black critics of public education have made a particular point of noting:

. . . the particular barrenness, the lack of values commitments, that characterize the ideal educational situation to which Americans seem to be committed. . . Viewed in this light, nonpublic school systems which are free to thrust questions of value and commitment into the heart of the educational process would appear to be useful agencies in black communities (Smith, 1973, p. 383).

The "particular barrenness" equates to hopelessness and it has been too present--a negative value among black students.

A hypothesis might be proposed that Catholic education has provided fertile ground for the growth of self-liberation of the urban poor in the Church's efforts to maintain parochial schools, but perhaps more by accident than design. On the other hand, one may wonder if parochial schools promote ethnic and racial separatism in American schools.

The relationship between minorities and Catholic parochial education is well established, especially in regard to African Americans. It is perhaps oxymoronic that blacks are increasingly looking towards schools within their own inner city neighborhoods for a value based education, yet most wish to move away from those very neighborhoods. Private inner city schools represent an accessible alternative for the minority student and the value of "hopefulness" needs to be foremost within that education.

Religion continues to play a major role in the lives of black people. Many of the leaders of the black movement and black community have been ministers. Just because many black people live in inner city areas of America, it cannot be assumed religion or religious values are no longer important in their lives. Religion's role of motivating the poor is unmeasurable. Catholic parochial education's active participation within the inner city has historically provided a catalyst for self-improvement for inner city residents. Within the last two decades in the United States, parochial schools and poor black minorities have established a new urban relationship. The

offering of religion and values have oftentimes been focal for minorities and the poor as religion provides hope when often their environment does not. It is my contention that "hope" is the most important value that we can impart to children. I also posit that white children possess hopefulness in varying degrees by virtue of simply being white, but that all too many black children are denied hopefulness simply because they are black.

My study examined a gamut of values-education, and specifically the values base of the education offered in one private system, the Central City Catholic School System (CCCSS) of Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The focal question was whether the system's value base differed from the national norm for Catholic schools. Ancillary to the overall findings that concluded that there was no significant difference between the system's value base and the national norm of other Catholic schools were however two disturbing differences. Both of these differences I believe can be directly related to a lack of hopefulness among inner city children. Sadly these differences, (outliers) I believe can be attributed to the racial composition of the system (CCCSS) versus the national norm. Black students comprised 22.2% of a National Catholic Education Association (NCEA) survey whereas 90.5% of the CCCSS. The question becomes: What is the difference--the value variable? Hopefulness.

II. Method

A correlation was sought between the national rankings of student responses (N=7,551) on the NCEA "Student Values Survey" and the responses by students of the CCCSS on the same instrument (N=63). The de facto evaluation of values was derived from the total population of 8th grade students attending the four CCCSS campuses in the spring of 1989.

Subjects. The subjects were all 8th grade students enrolled in the four campuses (Holy Angels, St. Leo, St. Rose, and St. Thomas) of the CCCSS. The sample consisted of all 8th graders in the four campuses. The justification for this selection was that the 8th grade was the highest grade within the CCCSS and closest to the lowest grade, grade nine, that the NCEA's Student Survey was administered. According to a currently accepted developmental theory of value formation (Kohlberg), these subjects should have possessed the highest level of value formation amongst the students enrolled in the CCCSS. Moreover, the NCEA Student Survey was administered to low-income urban subjects; all four schools within the CCCSS fall into this category. It is recognized that because of the grade difference, 8th vs. 9th, that comparisons may be questioned. However, there were only four months difference (NCEA 9th graders were surveyed in the fall and CCCSS 8th graders were surveyed in the spring) and because of this closeness general similarities should be observable.

Materials. To evaluate the CCCSS's student level of value development this study used one research instrument. The instrument was the NCEA Student Survey. The survey was developed by the Educational Testing Service under contract with the National Center for Educational Statistics. For the purpose of this study the section that measures values was used. Multiple-item scales were developed for each section. The values survey was replicated at CCCSS schools. The survey statements are found in Table 1.

Procedure. The data in regard to the CCCSS de facto student values were garnered from a replication of the NCEA survey which consisted of the ranking of 16 life goals or value statements. Students were instructed to first read the entire list. Then they were asked to rank four of the values as "extremely important," four as "important," four as "somewhat important," and four as "not very important." Two of the 65 8th graders were absent and did not take the survey.

Design. The analysis of data gathered from the evaluation of the de facto values within the CCCSS was analyzed in relation to the NCEA outcomes. Student ratings were divided into broad categories and the analysis showed the rankings of the sixteen life goals based on how frequently each was rated "extremely important." Spearman Rank correlation was employed using a Minitab System. To test the significance of the correlation, the question was asked, is there a significant linear trend to the picture (rankings)? This was easiest to answer in Minitab using the analysis of variance procedure. The statistical test to see whether or not there is a significant correlation is ($H_0: r_s=0$), that there is not therefore ($R_s = \text{zero}$) and ($H_a: r_s \neq 0$), that there is a significant correlation (R_s is not zero). To test the significance (H_0) was assumed true.

III. Results

The CCCSS and NCEA rankings were significant similar at a level of 0.813. $T=5.22$ with 14 degrees of freedom, significant at $P = .0005$, therefore, (H_0) is rejected in favor of (H_a) and assume that there is a significant correlation between the NCEA and CCCSS student rankings. Table 1 shows the survey statements and the CCCSS student ranking of values compared to the NCEA rankings. Figure 1 is a scatter graph of the CCCSS and NCEA rankings. General inferences (Bredeweg, 1985; Gertler, 1974) may be possible because two-thirds of all private elementary, middle, and secondary schools in the United States are Catholic. Moreover, a case can be made that private inner city schools in Milwaukee are representative of private inner city education nationwide. Of the eighteen major cities where statistical data has been gathered, Milwaukee is ninth in

the total population of private elementary and secondary enrollment. Variations among large cities make generalizations concerning their nonpublic schools and pupils problematic, but useful in the sense to show that Milwaukee is near the norm nationwide and has been used in recent longitudinal studies (Simmons, Black, and Zhou, 1991) because of this generalizability. Both descriptive and quantitative findings also suggest that Milwaukee is near the national average in regard to parochial education.

The overall rankings of the two student populations show that they are very similar to each other despite their racial compositions or their religious affiliation. The NCEA student population was 78.4% Catholic. The CCCSS student population is 44.5% Catholic. Yet the values base of the CCCSS is very similar to that of the national NCEA Catholic values base; and these students are apparently receiving more or less the same values education as any other Catholic school in this country. The focus on black students and the black community has not changed the Catholic identity of the CCCSS or the values it imparts. But as edifying and reaffirming this data may be to the CCCSS, it still reflects shortcomings because of the educational nature of the two significant differences.

There were significant and notable differences in the rankings of two of the values statements. Statement 2, "To help other people have a better life" was ranked 10th by the NCEA students and 16th (last) by the CCCSS. This lower ranking by CCCSS students may reflect the economic environs of their community and families and the racial composition of the CCCSS. It might be assumed that since black students are more subjected to poverty than white students, black students are more concerned about themselves and their families having a better life at least at this point in their lives. Black students again comprised 22.2% of the NCEA survey whereas 90.5% of the CCCSS are black students.

However, the other statement that was ranked significantly different and maybe more disturbing from the NCEA rankings was "To have a happy family life." This statement directly relates to the value of hopefulness. NCEA students ranked this statement first; CCCSS students ranked it as being the 7th most important. Suffice it to say that this ranking does reflect a major difference between white and black students in their attitudes about family and their future. This difference reflects a disparity between black and white students and I contend that the value variable is hopefulness.

Research (Greeley, McCready, and McCourt, 1976) found a relationship between Catholic education and hopefulness, and found it to be firmly established. Yet it has been concluded that the inculcation thereof has only been moderately successful as is the case with the CCCSS. Further, Greeley found that private education was more important than parent religiosity in terms of producing hopefulness in children, and that parochial education and hopefulness combined has a strong positive influence on racial

tolerance. These findings differ from statements in the past that found parents to be the most significant force in the value development in the child. However, it should be noted that the researchers only concluded these findings based on the value of hopefulness.

IV. Discussion

Although inner city private schools are still different than their public counterparts, the gap between public and private inner city schools is narrowing. The reason given for this narrowing is that inner city alternative schools are often preoccupied with finances, and yet subjected to much the same problems and concerns as nearby public schools. These private inner city schools, especially parochial schools, for all practical purposes, become public schools. This should not be surprising especially in light of the philosophies that calls for a student-centered evaluation based on individual ability.

The reevaluation and possible revision of a system's philosophy statement, philosophy of education, mission statement, and curriculum to inculcate hopefulness would prove beneficial for all students. Hopefulness is very important in education, especially minority inner city education. It is recommended that all schools incorporate the value of hopefulness in their philosophy and mission statements and make a comprehensive ongoing effort throughout the system to achieve this end. Moreover, a comprehensive curricula be developed throughout that integrates hopefulness: The value variable.

REFERENCES

- Asher, C. (1986). *Black students and private schooling*. Washington, D.C.: Educational Research and Improvement. (ERIC ED 273 718)
- Bredeweg, F.H. (1985). *United States elementary and secondary schools, 1984-1985, a statistical report on schools, enrollment, and staffing, a special focus on minority and non-Catholic enrollment*. Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Education Association. (ERIC ED 256 052)
- Cordasco, F. (1971). The Catholic urban school: The patterns of survival. *Urban Education*, 6, 119-129.
- Gertler, D.B. (1974). *Nonpublic schools in large cities*. Washington, D.C.: National Center for Educational Statistics. (ERIC ED 100 024)

- Greeley, A.M., McCready, W.C., & McCourt, K. (1976). *Catholic schools in a declining church*. Kansas City: Sheed.
- O'Neill, M. (1978). Catholic education: The largest alternative system. *Thrust for Educational Leadership*, 7, 25-26.
- Simmons, R.G., Black, A., & Zhou, Y. (1991). African-American versus white children and the transition into junior high school. *American Education*, 99, 481-520.

ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATION AND LOVE

Ian M. Harris
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

"If you don't have people standing in front of those kids who love them, care about them, and respect them, learning is not going to take place."

Howard Fuller, Superintendent, Milwaukee Public Schools

Pestalozzi, the nineteenth century Swiss educator, sought to create an emotionally secure environment for children. The success of his method depended upon a love relationship between teacher and student.¹ He believed that the impulses of love spring from the child's innermost being. Like a delicate plant, these impulses need to be nourished if children are to grow into healthy, productive adults. Educators should provide pupils an environment of love where children trust enough to take risks to learn about their world. Pestalozzi maintained that all teachers must demonstrate a capacity to love before they are allowed into the classroom.

Martin Buber defined love as taking responsibility for another.² Martin Luther King Jr. defined love as understanding good will,³ and Scott Peck defined love as the will to extend one's self for the purpose of nurturing one's own or another's spiritual growth.⁴ Because Scott Peck's definition mentions spirituality, and there exist traditional divisions between church and state in the United States, this author will ignore that appealing definition and will combine the two previous definitions in the following statement: Love is an understanding good will that urges humans to take responsibility for others. Love is not just good will but is based upon an understanding of the object/person loved. Love motivates people to care for others and to act towards them in ways that will allow them to reach their potential.

Love plays a key role in human affairs. Babies are born crying for love. Erich Fromm said, "Without love we couldn't exist for a day."⁵ Gandhi stated that love forms the very basis of human society. Without it there would be anarchy.⁶ In spite of the fundamental importance of love to human existence, it receives very little attention in American schools. Educators in the United States pay more attention to logos, the development of the mind, than they do to eros, the development of passion, and ignore the

importance of love in their lessons. Following the teachings of Plato and the western ideal which sees intellectual activity as pursuit of abstract ideas, most teachers scorn anything as emotional as the topic of love. James Conant, in an earlier decade, argued for larger, centralized schools with increased emphasis on math and science.⁷ Such appeals have created the impersonal bureaucracies and rational curricula that characterize contemporary schooling in the United States. In the modern debate about reforming schools, Allan Bloom and other conservative commentators have argued that schools should teach the intellectual canons of the western society and not principles of emotional development.⁸ The key to a good education, according to this perspective, is to teach with rigor the intellect, and not waste valuable class time dealing with "soft" issues like love.

Ashley Montagu argued that love is a basic human need:

I have become convinced that the characteristic that distinguishes humans from all other creatures is educability and that the most important of all basic needs is the need for love.⁹

Why should modern education ignore such a basic part of human existence? The educability of students often depends upon how loved and secure they feel. Many schools provide hot lunches, school nurses, and psychologists to respond to the complex needs of the pupils they teach. Why should they ignore the affective domain? Traditionally, the most attention paid to love in education has been through the character of the teacher who, as a nurturing adult, is said to model love. But teachers are neither trained in teacher education programs to nurture their pupils' emotional growth nor are they rigorously exposed to many complex aspects of love in other aspects of their education. This paper will argue that a sensible reform to deal with the problems of modern schools will acknowledge this basic need for love by teaching systematically all the different types of love. A serious consideration of love has the potential to greatly enhance educational endeavors.

There are three main aspects to the relationship between education and love--pedagogical, managerial, and curricular. Most attention to the relationship between education and love has been focussed on the pedagogical connection between teacher and student, an aspect that will be discussed below in the section "Education and Care." The managerial aspects concern how best to run a schooling enterprise. Consideration of all the various types of love provides guidelines for dealing with the varieties of conflict at both the macro and the micro levels that plague current schooling endeavors--tax initiatives, conflicting values, increasing levels of violence in schools and their surrounding communities, racial and ethnic tensions, political pressures, demands for equality, and struggles for control of schooling. Careful

attention to the relationship between education and love suggests that the best way to manage these conflicts is to adopt a loving attitude, respecting different points of view, including them in the operation of a school, employing group process skills to build consensus, and using conflict resolution techniques to manage conflicts. This paper will not focus on the complexities involved in the managerial aspects of the relationship between education and love. Rather, the bulk of this paper will focus on curricular aspects, arguing that teachers should include a rigorous examination all of the different aspects of love in what they teach. The impetus behind this thesis is that if educators teach love to pupils they will grow into loving adults who will attempt to create a more loving social order. Before discussing the different types of love that can be taught, this paper will review existing literature on education and care and present four assumptions that argue for the importance of including love in educational endeavors.

1. Education and Care

Love has recently been brought into discussions about education through considerations of caring. Pedagogical relationships between teachers and students provide rich arenas for examining the relationship between love and education. Feminist educators have been proclaiming the importance of caring, one type of love, as an educational reform which urges the 3C's of care, concern, and connection.¹⁰ Jane Roland Martin has argued that a person cannot properly be considered to be educated unless that person's capacity for care has been developed.¹¹ Those who promote the importance of caring criticize traditional educational practice for ignoring the fundamental role love plays in human life and for being solely concerned with the productive processes of society, where the dominant values are rational analysis, critical thinking, and self-sufficiency. In traditional classrooms the development of feelings and emotions are ignored. Intimacy and connection are considered private realms left out of schooling practice.

Many current educational reform efforts attempt to create a caring classroom¹² by using cooperative learning¹³ and collaborative approaches to teaching.¹⁴ These strategies are seen to be effective not only in teaching traditional classroom material but also in motivating students. They acknowledge that pupils are persons with many different needs and don't take a narrow, intellectual approach to education.

Education based upon the principles of care would elevate the development of moral human beings to a high level in educational practice. Caring provides the basis of morality:

Our alternative is to change the structure of schools and teaching so that caring can flourish, and the hope is that by

doing that we may attain both a higher level of cognitive achievement and a more, caring, ethical society.¹⁵

According to this line of reasoning, each person has a responsibility for the moral perfection of others, a responsibility that should not rest solely with the family or church, but ought to be carried into schools.

Most of the literature on love and education focusses on the pedagogical relationship which should be based upon a spirit of caring, helping students grow, where growing is understood as the development and actualization of the self.¹⁶ Richard Hult defined the relationship of teaching and caring in terms of the roles played by both teachers and students. "When we speak of caring about someone, we usually refer to the sense of concern and appreciation for the special uniqueness and circumstances of the person".¹⁷ In this relationship a teacher does not care for a pupil as a psychotherapist might care for a patient, but rather treats students with certain rights accorded by virtue of them being unique persons. J. Theodore Klein argues that teaching is analogous to maternal practice and that mothering is gender neutral--something both men and women can do, although it is normally attributed to females.¹⁸ Klein's presentation of mother love urges teachers to pay special attention to the relationship between teaching and caring.

These various discussions of the implications of caring for education spell out important educational reforms which focus on pupils' affective development. They have the capacity to enhance the moral capacities of students and improve the quality of pedagogical relationships between students and teachers, but they do not go far enough in addressing the serious problems brought about in contemporary society because of a lack of love. This paper will go beyond the relationship between teaching and caring. As seen below, caring is only one aspect of love. This paper will argue for inclusion of all the different varieties of love into educational practice. As Leo Buscaglia has pointed out, love is not something human beings automatically learn.¹⁹ Love, an understanding good will that urges people to take responsibility for others, should be taught in schools to counteract rising levels of social violence:

Moreover, today's startling statistics on child abuse, rape, and family violence testify that this love will not necessarily be acquired informally in the course of growing up, at least not in our society.²¹

Teachers should take more seriously the power of love not only to address the high levels of violence in their own schools and classrooms, but also to help children deal with violence.

This approach to education and love rests on four assumptions. Before discussing the varieties of love that can be taught in today's schools, these assumptions will be presented and clarified: 1) The goals of education include teaching students [a] how to create a humane society and [b] how to nurture the Earth so that people can reach their potential. 2) Violence impedes the ability of educators to reach these goals. 3) The best way to overcome violence is through love. 4) Educators have to teach love in order to help their students reach their potential. These assumptions taken together produce a syllogism that argues for teaching about the power of love into today's schools.

II. Key Assumptions

1. *The goals of education include teaching students a) how to create a humane society and b) how to nurture the Earth so that people can reach their potential.* This assumption is divided into two parts. The first, concerning a humane society, has been brought into the curriculum through the teaching of civics. John Dewey in *Democracy and Education* discussed the role of schools in preparing people to live in a democracy.²¹ Schools can give students skills to create a just society that would treat its members humanely by teaching social and moral responsibility. Young people must be taught to care and make a personal investment in social and civic action in order to create a more humane world. Pine and Hillard state that "a major goal of socialization should be to promote civic virtue and those qualities that enable children to become productive and dependable citizens in a just society".²² Most recently some social critics have argued that schools should prepare students to create "the good society".²³

The second part about teaching students to nurture the Earth has been brought into the American consciousness by the recent environmental movement, although it has existed on this continent for a long time through the belief systems of indigenous people. This assumption was supported by J. Theodore Klein in an article referred to above: "Love and caring need to be extended not only to humans but to nonhuman forms and environments supportive of life."²⁴ This assumption will be controversial because not all people concerned with education have bought into this recent environment ethic that holds the Earth up as a sacred entity.

Assumption one is important not just because teachers might want to teach their students to be altruistic and care for others. By describing the best way to live on the Earth, it appeals to self interest. A greedy society that is not humane will cause untold suffering for its inhabitants. Living in tune with the Earth's natural processes has enormous benefits. A bounteous Earth provides water, air, and food for its inhabitants. A scorched Earth that is not revered will poison its inhabitants, creating high levels of cancer and

other problems related to pollution. Assumption one should be adopted because it provides guidelines that create the best possibility for all to reach their potential.

2. *Violence impedes the ability of educators to reach these goals.* Not enough attention has been paid to the role of violence in educational endeavors. Violence both indirectly and directly impedes learning. At the macrocosmic level structural violence in the community, country and world denies students resources they need to grow into fully actualized human beings. Violence at the microcosmic level has a direct affect on students' lives. Students who experience physical violence suffer pain, fear, and anxieties that distract them from school tasks.

Peace researchers have pointed out that the problems of violence that impede the work of educators don't just come from physical violence, which is where somebody strikes another person, but rather also from structural violence, a concept developed by the Norwegian peace educator, Johann Galtung, that describes a society that turns its back on the poor, that doesn't provide health care, jobs, sufficient income, decent education, or human rights.²⁵ In such a society the dignity of human beings is denied. It's hard for people to set goals and develop an optimistic outlook towards life. Children raised in societies with high levels of structural violence are likely to be hostile to authorities and subsequently they come to school angry at a social order that neglects their needs:

More satisfying to me is an idea suggested by psychologist Louis Ramey which I think can be extended to apply to poor whites. Black males living in poverty, Ramey suggested, are awash in what he called "free-floating anger." This generalized anger, accompanied by feeling of frustration and helplessness, results from a feeling that the deck is stacked against them--that the double whammy of class and race places them so far outside the economic and social mainstream that they can never find a place inside. Disenfranchised, they are perpetually irritable, like a person who wakes up on the wrong side of the bed day after day. Their free-floating, non-specific feelings of anger are easy to ignite. Any small provocation can cause an explosion. Then black males strike out at the nearest target, displacing their pent up anger on the nearest target, usually another male like themselves.²⁶

Violence in the larger society (macrocosm) impedes the ability of educators to teach students how to create a humane society and to help

students develop their potential. In a more indirect way the relationship between violence and education has a very broad scope, which includes the defense budget, cancer, policies in such arenas as the criminal justice system, and the need for public resources to support public education. Seymour Melman has argued persuasively that federal expenditures for defense have robbed precious tax dollars from education, so that in today's budget climate, when at least 30% of tax dollars go to the military it is hard for school districts to convince taxpayers of the need for additional tax levies to support education.²⁷ Reliance upon military force to resolve conflicts diverts attention and resources away from the key role schools can play in teaching students nonviolent ways to resolve disputes. Schools have an important role to play in civilizing the citizenry so that adults can solve their conflicts nonviolently and won't resort to force to solve disputes. Expensive treatments for cancer, the rising cost of health care, and the rising expense of incarcerating criminals have further depleted public coffers of funds that could support education. The cost of crime and the criminal justice system robs states and local governments of funds they could use to improve the quality of schooling. The cost of treating the results of violent crimes also has an indirect impact upon the amount of money available for public education. Recent estimates show that over 1 billion dollars is spent annually treating gunshot wounds in the United States. Eighty-five percent of this cost is underwritten by taxpayers. Approximately \$60 billion each year is spent treating violent injuries.²⁸ If the United States were to become less more nonviolent--reducing the amount of money spent on defense, eliminating pollution which does violence to the Earth and cause cancer, and lessening the number of violent crimes--more funds would be available to raise teachers' salaries, buy school supplies, modernize school buildings, pay child care workers decent wages, and reduce student teacher ratios--reforms which would raise the quality of education.

At the individual level direct physical violence makes it hard for students to complete their education and develop their intellectual capacities. In order to succeed in schools students need high self esteem and need to trust adults, their teachers. Many children fail and/or drop out of school because high levels of violence in their lives distract them from school work. These pupils are not doing poorly because they are stupid. Rather, they are at risk of school failure because they are so stressed out they cannot focus on school assignments. Students from violent homes where they are abused, neglected, or abandoned will have low self esteem and will be distrustful of adults. Therefore, there is an inverse relationship between levels of violence in a student's life and the ability of children to succeed in school--the greater violence a student experiences outside the classroom the greater the risk of failure within the classroom. An important strategy for dealing

with students at risk of failing is to provide them the kind of love that will help them deal with the wounds and hurts they bring to school from violent environments.

Direct violence in students' lives includes war, crime, rape, sexual and domestic abuse. These forms of violence impede school learning because students who live in violent environments bring to school anxieties that make it hard for them to focus on school assignments. Many students come from communities with high levels of street crime, fighting, random acts of violence, and other terrifying events that distract them from school work. Young people surrounded with media images which depict violent aggression being rewarded may think that schooling will not deliver the rewards they seek. Junk bond salesman get rich while daycare workers stay poor. Desert Storm is seen as heroic. Violent men who conquer evil are rewarded by pretty women. Rape scenes and pornography glorify violence. Such images provide a powerful counterpoint to the civilizing effects of education in the minds of youth.

Research on violence and children should be studied carefully by teachers because of its far reaching educational consequences. Child abuse has very damaging effects that put children at high risk for school failure. There are many different types of child abuse: physical, sexual, emotional, and neglect. Most studies of abuse deal with very severe cases where a sample of young people brought into a hospital with clear physical symptoms of abuse is compared to a control group and studied over time. These studies ignore the devastating effects of verbal and emotional abuse which are not understood as criminal acts, even though they are so damaging to children's self-esteem.²⁹ Some have even argued that as many as 90% of the children in the United States come from dysfunctional families where various forms of abuse influence the way children behave in schools.³⁰ Studies show that abused children have less ability to show empathy. They have fewer friends and play with their friends less often.³¹ When asked to think about what kind of occupation they will have, abused children tend to select lower-class occupations.³² Twice as many abused children as opposed to non-abused children answer "don't know" when asked what they want to do when they grow up.³³ Abused children are likely to exhibit the following behaviors: hitting, kicking, cursing and damaging property.³⁴ Perry et al. found that abused children have lower intelligence scores and lower communication skills than a matched control group.³⁵ Abused children grow into adults with higher alcoholism rates, greater than 20% probability of being unemployed and 11% more suicides.³⁶ Neurological function and developmental progress can become impaired because of an abusive environment.³⁷ Statistics such as these suggest that the difficulties educators face in teaching children to grow into responsible adults are confounded by violence in their students' lives.

People who have been abused often become depressed. Research shows that depressed mothers are more likely to be physically violent to their children.³⁸ Moderately and severely depressed mothers show high levels of verbal and symbolic aggression towards their children. Severely depressed mothers are more likely to neglect children. Moderately depressed mothers are at greater risk for physical aggression that causes injury.

The depression of mothers is just one part of the violence problem that confounds educational endeavors. Another part, which has not been adequately studied, is the often distant role that fathers play in the lives of their children. Research studies show that over half the fathers in the United States either abandon their children, are physically present but psychologically absent, or are present but act inappropriately towards them.³⁹ This kind of neglect by fathers has disastrous psychological consequences upon children. A series of articles in *The St. Petersburg Times* entitled "South of Heaven" documented with a case history format how two teen age dropouts from Clearwater High School in Florida were severely disturbed by the lack of a consistent and appropriate father in their lives.⁴⁰ These stories suggest a direct correlation between father neglect and children's distress, anxious rule breaking behavior, and anti-social tendencies which cause young people to do poorly and even drop out of school. Neglect of children by their parents is a type of violence that creates many obstacles to teachers' ability to teach pupils effectively.

Children aren't born stupid, but they are so distraught by violence that they can't focus on what teachers expect of them in schools. Educational reforms that ignore the impact of violence in pupil's lives are trying to save the Titanic by rearranging its deck chairs. The well-intended reforms of adult educators will be destroyed by huge icebergs of violence that lurk under the surface of students' learning capacities.

3. *The best way to overcome violence is through love.* Responding to violent acts with more violence creates vengeance, hatred, and increased levels of violence. Those who use force to get their way stimulate resentment. Love gets people out of the cycles of violence and presents an alternative to endless acts of retribution. Gandhi said that social relations are like spider webs, indicating ways that humans relate to each other. An act of violence is like taking a knife and cutting through the spider web. Gandhi emphasized that the only way to restore the web is through love. Love and retribution allow human beings to forgive past wrongs. Love counteracts isolation and self-centeredness and draws people into communities of caring. As Martin Luther King Jr. stated, our goals as adults should be to create beloved communities.⁴¹

Love has an infinite power. Let's say a teacher performs an act of love in a classroom. A student who is affected goes home and might act

kindly towards her mother, who in turn responds warmly to people in her office, and so on. Love charges the human heart so it can deal with the slings and arrows of violent culture. "By regularly receiving as well as giving nurturing, a person is in a better position to nurture well in mothering or teaching".⁴² Teaching and modelling love in our schools can help students confront violence nonviolently.

Kenneth Boulding has argued that human beings should replace authoritarian power with integrative power.⁴³ His understanding of the different uses of power, spelled out in *The Three Faces of Power*, can easily be applied to education. Authoritarian uses of power in schools alienate students from formal learning, while integrative power appeals to the whole person, seeking to involve students in educational endeavors. Integrative power gains its authority from building relationships based upon mutual respect. Teachers using integrative power will involve students in setting limits and boundaries in their classes rather than threatening and using authoritarian power to discipline. Using power in a loving way will make it possible for teachers to include alienated and hostile students who are turned off to education because of the harsh, unloving ways that authoritarian power deals with at-risk students.

4. *Educators have to teach love in order to help their students reach their potential.* People overwhelmed by violence will never reach their potential. Martin Luther King, Jr. argued that love is the most important power humans possess. Educators need to embrace this power in order to replace the violence that is becoming so commonplace in the United States with nonviolence, which is, itself, a form of love. Harris has argued elsewhere that the best way to counteract violence is through peace education, which teaches about the problems of violence and the promise of nonviolence.⁴⁴ Peace educators use love to teach alternatives to violent behavior. Young people today are not being exposed systematically to alternatives to violence. Ninety-three percent of parents use physical ways of punishing their children.⁴⁵ In modern day homes children are learning negative, hostile, punitive, and unproductive ways to be nurtured. "If a new form of love is what the future requires, we must look to education".⁴⁶ Students can learn about the power of love in schools, even though they may not see it exhibited at home or on television.

Because adults do not consciously teach about love, human beings do not understand love very well. People learn about love by falling in love and having friendships, but with the possible exception of some churches and church related schools, there is no place where adults consciously teach others to be better lovers. Most references to love are to romantic love and overlook many of the most dynamic aspects of this rich part of human life.

III. Forms of Love

This paper will present fifteen different types of love in the hope that educators will become more appreciative of the power of love and strive to teach love can be taught in their classes. These types of love are agape, biophilia, camaraderie, caring, charity, compassion, eros, esprit de corps, family, friendship, gaiaphilia, harmony, kinship, nonviolence, and self love. An explanation of these different types of love demonstrates that love is much more complex than the popular images of passion or eros that dominate popular culture. Indeed, most types of love have nothing to do with sexuality. These different types of love are like cousins. Each stands by itself as an important part of human emotions, but they all resemble each other in that they are a passion that urges people to take responsibility for others. The purpose of this presentation is to stimulate the reader to appreciate the diversity of all the different aspects of love. Some of these aspects, like caring and nonviolence, may belong to each of the other aspects. This presentation is not arguing that each of these is distinct. In some ways these forms of love run into each other and don't have distinct boundaries, but such a presentation does underscore the richness of the concept love.

Agape comes from the Greek and refers to an unconditional regard for other persons. *Agape*, a basis for morality, provides a foundation of justice. The golden rule that we should treat others as we want to be treated expresses the type of love in *agape*. Without *agape* humans would live in a chaotic society, better characterized by anarchy than social cooperation. *Agape* love is universal and requires love for the human race. Teachers can teach this form of love by demonstrating the horrors of hatred and the value of forgiving.

Biophilia, the love of life, is opposed to necrophilia, the love of death. This love of all different forms of life is very deeply enmeshed in native cultures. Indigenous people worship the very process of creation itself, show great respect for all forms of life, and hold the belief that humans have a responsibility towards all plant and animal life. Erich Fromm stated that teachers should be biophilic who maintain that all that leads to growth and development is good, while all that hinders and detracts from life is bad:

The educator is a biophilic man, who loves and is drawn to the very process of living, to growth and development. He is constructive, inquisitive, searching; he is in love with the adventures of life.⁴⁷

Biophilia invokes the image of the sumptuous Garden of Eden, where humans live in a pristine environment replete with fresh fruit, nutritious foods, clean water, and pure air. Without this form of love, life can be a barren desert.

Such images challenge teachers to figure out how to get their students to respect all forms of life.

Camaraderie comes from knowing people over time, sharing the burden. It's a sense of "we are in this together" for the long haul. The Greeks called this type of nonpassionate love "storge". It's the love a husband has for his wife after living with her for 15 years, which differs from the eros or passion that same couple may have had for each other when they were courting. Without this type of love people can be lonely. *Camaraderie* develops a sense of fellowship that sets in over time. Human communities that lack this form of love can be vicious, where people have no respect for each other. Feelings of *camaraderie* can be developed in schools by allowing pupils to stay together in the same peer group. At the elementary level this already happens in some specialty programs (Montessori and Waldorf schools) that allow students to stay with the same teacher for 3 years or more, as opposed to switching classes every year.

Caring describes the love teachers have for students. It's the same type of love that nurses and doctors have for their clients. *Caring* involves healing and requires distance from the beloved. The goal of caring is to get the beloved to become a healthy independent person. "Thus we may speak of the responsible parent as one who helps his child to grow, and the responsible citizen as one who cares for his community".⁴⁸ *Caring* implies a devotion to nurture another person's well-being. It is a moral virtue necessary for guiding action and reducing alienation. People who receive no caring have no sense of belonging. Nel Noddings points out that humans treat each other morally because they care:

Our alternative is to change the structure of schools and teaching so that caring can flourish, and the hope is that by doing that we may attain both a higher level of cognitive achievement and a more caring, ethical society.⁴⁹

An ethics of care endows relationships with moral significance. Teachers can model this ethic by listening attentively (using the skills of active listening) to the developmental and emotional concerns of their pupils.

Charity involves altruism and action. In the New Testament this concept implies loving neighbors and turning the other cheek. A charitable individual performs charitable deeds. Often called "brotherly love," philanthropy, or giving to others, charity involves doing something to help those less fortunate. With charity comes security. Without charity people who turn their backs to suffering can harbor a kind of hatred that blames victims for their misfortune. Teachers can use the concept of charity to engage students in service activities.

Compassion is an extremely powerful and important form of love. Buddha said that "life is suffering". What Buddha meant by that is not that all humans are miserable and poor without shelter, food, or clothing and other basic necessities, but that people experience hardship because beloved acquaintances die, move away, or get injured. Because life has these tragic aspects, individual human beings experience great grief, and should have compassion for others who experience similar sadness. Compassion leads to contentment. Without compassion people experience depression. Compassion is an appropriate response in inner-city schools where students face tremendous amounts of violence in their homes and communities. A compassionate school will be a refuge for children exposed to abuse and neglect. It will provide a supportive atmosphere in which students can deal with problems caused by violence. Compassion teaches students empathy, which helps break down enemy stereotypes that contribute to violence. Compassion develops an attitude of caring for others, and differs from charity which often requires some form of activity to help those less fortunate.

Eros, the subject of most presentations on love, is an important part of love's contribution to the human condition. Eros, commonly called romantic love, involves sexuality. Because the Greeks contrasted eros with logos, a Greek word for reason, eros is often characterized as being unreasonable and irrational. Eros implies union with others and hence differs from caring which implies separation. Plato mentioned that eros had a divine characteristic. If a male and a female unite in an erotic relationship, there is a possibility they will have offspring. If their children have children, the original couple can have a sense of their genes carrying on into the future so that through procreation human beings can touch immortality. Without eros people can feel separate, worthless and lonely. A person in love wants to be with the beloved. Educators can teach students about the sanctity of this aspect of love which far transcends the popular images of sexual attraction projected through the media.

Esprit de Corps is similar to camaraderie but implies being on a team and achieving a goal, a sense of pride that comes from accomplishment. Schools already teach this aspect of love through team sports and extra curricular activities that encourage students to work together. Athletics allow members of a team to build a sense of appreciation for each other that comes from achieving a goal. People who don't experience the special feelings that come from teamwork often feel isolated. *Esprit de corps* builds a sense of togetherness.

Family love is a type of love that brothers and sisters have. Children raised in large families understand that family love is not often warm and fuzzy. Siblings who have a great deal of bitterness, even contempt for each other, can develop feelings of love for family members. Family love teaches

that love sometimes can be painful and requires overcoming feelings of anger in order to nurture its growth. This type of love can be taught in schools by processing classroom dynamics to resolve tensions.

Friendship is a tremendous gift that comes from non-physical intimacy, mutuality with another being, and the sharing of secrets. People choose their friends. What they share and don't share determines the quality of their friendships. People without friends are lonely, while those who do have friends receive great help in overcoming some of the difficulties in living. Educators can teach about this important aspect of life by encouraging students to develop friendships in school.

Gaiaphilia is love of the planet and concern for its well-being. Although this term has been coined by the modern spiritual writer Thomas Berry,³⁰ indigenous Native American traditions have for centuries valued of honoring the Earth. Gaiaphilia implies a stewardship of the land. People who love this Earth cherish the water, the air, and the many elements that make life possible upon it. Without this love there is great fear for the future. Humans who do not nurture the Earth can create an environment that won't sustain them and have no future. A love for the planet connects people to the larger life forces that exist in the cosmos. The modern environmental movement is beginning to make an impact upon schools, but the principles of gaiaphilia should not just be taught in science classes. All teachers should emphasize how important it is to revere the Earth.

Harmony, a concept that belongs to many different cultures, is most developed within Taoism, where it refers to the reconciliation of opposites, yang and yin, bringing together separate parts into a unity. Harmony builds a higher unity from disparate parts. It contains a vision of androgyny, where an individual's male and female characteristics work together to develop talents. In a pluralistic world harmony allows for the smooth functioning of many diverse parts. In the modern world harmony contains the dream of a multi-ethnic society where different groups contribute to the greater good of the whole:

All through our lives we are faced with the task of reconciling opposites which in logical thought cannot be reconciled. The typical problems of life are insolvable on the level of being on which we normally find ourselves. How can one reconcile the demands of freedom and discipline in education? Countless mothers and teachers, in fact, do it, but no one can write down a solution. They do it by buying into the situation a force that brings to a higher level where opposites are transcended--the power of love Divergent problems, as it were, force human beings to strain them-

selves to a level above themselves; they demand, and thus provoke the supply of forces from a higher level, thus bringing love, beauty, goodness, and truth into our lives. It is only with the help of these higher forces that the opposites can be reconciled in the living situation.⁵¹

Harmony in the human community brings together opposites to create a symphony from disparate notes. Out of different experiences harmony draws on the power of love to create a polyphony. Without this type of love humans are destined to live in separate, warring camps. Educators can teach this aspect of love by using cooperative learning principles where students in diverse groups learn the value of respecting each other's opinions.

Kinship provides the basis for a sense of community, a deep longing to be connected to others. Without feelings of kinship humans would live in total chaos--robbing, lying, stealing, and hating each other. Feelings of kinship provide stability. People can go to market and trade and do commerce because of kinship. A society based upon greed ignores the importance of kinship, a sentiment that promotes neighborliness. Kinship differs from agape, which is a more universal sentiment. Feelings of kinship are usually tied into particular communities. Given the high levels of violence in modern communities, teachers who figure out how to teach this aspect of love in schools can help prevent further social dissolution. Educators can promote feelings of kinship by responding to pupils' concerns rather than having pupils treat each other as fellow competitors for a few rewards. A loving classroom would allow students to listen to and respond to each other's problems. It would develop feelings of kinship by teaching understanding good will and urging students to take responsibility for each other.

Nonviolence, as Carol Gilligan has pointed out, is the highest form of morality.⁵² Nonviolence, which implies treating all creatures with love and respect, comes from a longing not to be hurt, a desire for safety. Nonviolence is both a spiritual belief that provides guidelines on how to behave and a powerful force for social change. As a spiritual belief, nonviolence orients humans towards a way of living that does not want to harm other creatures, towards an attitude that reveres all forms of life. Nonviolence, practiced by the people of Poland and East Germany, helped bring down the Iron Curtain and end the Cold War between the superpowers. In the United States the theory of nonviolence was articulated by Henry David Thoreau in 1850, in his essay "Civil Disobedience".⁵³ Nonviolence has also been used in the Civil Rights marches of the 1950s and '60s, demonstrations against the Vietnam War, and protests about the dangers of nuclear weapons. Various strategies for nonviolence have been collected by Gene Sharp.⁵⁴ As a social change strategy based upon the principles of love, nonviolence requires

respecting your enemy and trying to convince the opposition, as opposed to using force to coerce people. At the high school level teachers can emphasize the power of this aspect of love by teaching about the many accomplishments of the various peace movements which are ignored in standard history texts that celebrate the bloody deeds of war heroes. At the elementary level nonviolence can be taught by having pupils take care of pets in the classroom. Nonviolence urges people not to harm others.

Self-love is the basis of all love. Love is like a battery in a flashlight. When a battery has no charge, it won't light the bulb. Likewise, when a human being has no love, it's hard for that person to love. People who have not received love have low self esteem and often act destructively both towards themselves and others. Self-love implies respect, self care, and trusting intuitions. It urges people to take responsibility for their own actions and gives them the courage and energy to become social change activists dealing with oppression. In Islamic thought the major jihad is controlling the forces of violence and hatred that exist within the psyche. Much of the world's violence comes from acting out inner violence, an effort to get rid of inner demons by projecting them "out there." Self-love encourages people to confront angry and scared feelings and respond to conflict nonviolently. In teacher training institutes all potential educators should be introduced to the myriad of ways that teachers can promote self esteem in their classes.

These fifteen different types of love speak out the richness of this tremendous resource, understanding good will that urges people to take responsibility for others, and provide a tribute to multiculturalism because many of these types come from different cultures. Together they provide resources to address the problems of violence in modern life and evidence of the value of diversity. Understanding these different forms of love presents teachers with a challenge. How can educators draw upon these assets, which belong to the human race, to teach their students to be better lovers?

IV. Conclusions

Modern efforts at school reform ignore the redemptive power of love to heal some of the wounds that cause so many young people to despair, give up on school, withdraw from the social order, and abandon their own futures as productive citizens. These reform efforts, often urged by business leaders, promote increased competition.⁵⁵ This paper, in arguing for school reform based upon the principles of love, fits within earlier reform efforts for schooling that emphasized the development of moral character.⁵⁶

Today's schools are like arcs, from Noah's fable, where a few chosen creatures get to be saved. Because of competition for scarce resources, the best jobs often go to best students, so that salvation comes from succeeding in school, while those who don't do well in school are relegated to the scrap

heap. This paper suggests a drastic way of revising the curriculum so that graduates of modern schools are more compassionate towards those less fortunate and will create a super highway, instead of an arc, so that many people can cross over to the promised land. Love teaches that salvation rests in inclusion, not in hoarding. Education based upon the principles of love hopes to teach citizens the understanding good will to take responsibility for each other and for the flora and fauna that support life on this planet. Such education does not raise children primarily to get ahead of each other but to become caring, cooperative, and compassionate human beings. Inclusion and cooperation are qualities of love that should guide teaching practice.

Integrating these concepts of love into the curriculum will challenge students to move beyond greed, isolation, and self-centeredness into community and compassion:

I feel my incompleteness inside me, at the biological, affective, critical, and intellectual levels, an incompleteness that pushes me constantly, curiously, and lovingly toward other people and the world, searching for solidarity and transcendence of solitude. All of this implies wanting to love, a capacity for love that people must create in themselves. This capacity increases to the degree that one loves; it diminishes when one is afraid to love. Of course, in our society it is not easy to love, because we derive much of our happiness from sadness, that is, very often for us to feel happy, others must be sad. Under these circumstances it is difficult to love, but it is necessary to do so.³⁷

With the right education, just social institutions and appropriate environmental conditions human beings can reach their potential in societies that nurture the Earth. Schools can help children grow into loving, trusting adults. A goal of education should be to develop those loving characteristics that benefit the individual, the family, the community, the society, and the world. Professional educators can teach the different types of love to help students break out of the endless cycles of violence that characterize so much of human existence.

Education based upon principles of love will allow students:

to know the world not simply as an objectified system of empirical objects in logical connection with each other, but as an organic body of personal relations and responses, a living and loving community of creativity and compassion. Education of this sort means more than teaching the facts

and learning the reasons so we can manipulate life toward our ends. It means being drawn into personal responsiveness and accountability to each other and the world of which we are a part.⁵⁸

Bringing love into educational activities discourages pupils from seeing the world as a collection of objects to be manipulated and owned, but encourages them to view their worlds as a community for which all have responsibility and to which all belong. Knowing the truth of that world implies recovering the bonds of personhood and community that have been lost in modern societies based upon greed and competition. Nonviolence, as promoted by Gandhi, commits educators and students to a form of love that embraces the truth, not the abstract truth of scientific laws and legal principles but an organic truth based on the daily experiences of learners. A loving school will allow teachers and students to learn from each other in order to create a beloved community based upon mutual respect and care. A commitment to love establishes an ideal in which all belong and have valuable contributions to make not only to the successful operation of educational institutions but also to the operation of daily life in civic society.

A commitment to love in education requires restructuring schools so that adults listen to diverse voices. Studies have shown that small, compassionate schools can motivate at-risk students to perform.⁵⁹ Schooling "factories" should be broken down into smaller units so that students can bond and build trusting relations with each other and their teachers. It is impossible for both students and teachers crammed into large classes for a short period of time to take responsibility for others students shuttled from one class to another without any time to bond. The modern day high school which allows a teacher to spend 45 minutes with a class of 30 students has to develop a new schedule so teachers and students can develop trusting relationships:

I believe the highest form of learning occurs when the teacher loves and accepts the students so fully that they feel safe enough to go within to see themselves and to emerge with new answers about themselves and their lives.⁶⁰

Large, impersonal academic institutions do not allow for the intimate contact that makes schools into loving places. Breaking schools down into smaller communities provides a greater possibility that students will participate in loving communities where they know and respect each other. Learning about love in school will give adults important knowledge about how to create loving societies.

Paying close attention to all the different aspects of love encourages

educators to create safe learning environments that will encourage students' growth and development. Such trusting environments are noticeably lacking in contemporary schools where educators are often forced to deal with direct violent assaults and anxieties brought to school by students who live in deeply violent worlds. An understanding of the different types of love leads educators to embrace conflict resolution techniques to resolve differences and disputes that take place in schools. The various managerial aspects of the relationship between education and love can be used to restructure schools to encourage loving relationships. Others have argued that schools need to become communities of care.⁶¹ This will require huge financial investments to reverse the high rate of failure of current schooling systems that ignore the power of love. Unfortunately, the citizens of the United States do not seem willing at this time to make such an investment. How much more suffering will they tolerate before they realize the necessity of turning to love to deal with all the various manifestations of violence that plague the modern world?

Teachers can use the curricular aspects of the relationship between education and love to give students an appreciation for the power of love by teaching the skills of nonviolence and conflict resolution to help young people deal with the violence they experience in their worlds. Studies indicate that it is possible to teach students to care.⁶² Curriculum reforms like peace education and peer mediation are teaching alternatives to violence and need to be expanded to solve the problems of alienation, hostility, and violence that plague contemporary educational endeavors.

The pedagogical aspects of the relationship between education and love can be taught through family groups at the high school level that include students from all grades. Family groups should replace boring homerooms and teach students conflict transformation skills as well as value clarification exercises that will help young people find their place in the modern world. Authoritarian classroom discipline methods further alienate young people. Students should be introduced to a pedagogy based upon the principles of peace.⁶³ Teacher training institutions can contribute to these reform efforts by teaching potential teachers to bring young people into dialogue so they can start to construct a view of the world based upon the principles of care, concern, and connection in classrooms where love, caring, and cooperation are the predominant themes in place of fear and competition. As Goethe said, it was not the most brilliant teachers who had the greatest influence on him, but those who loved him the most.

ENDNOTES

¹ J. H. Pestalozzi, *How Gertrude teaches her children*, trans. L.E. Holland &

F.C. Turner (Syracuse, NY: C. W. Barden, 1915).

² Martin Buber, *I and Thou* (New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1970.)

³ Martin Luther King Jr., *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1968.)

⁴ Scott Peck, *The Road Less Traveled: A New Psychology of Love, Traditional Values and Spiritual Growth* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978.)

⁵ Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (New York: Harper and Row, 1956), 15.

⁶ Mahatma Gandhi, *My Experiments with Truth* (Ahmedabad: Narijan Publishing House, 1948).

⁷ James Conant, *The American High School Today* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959).

⁸ Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987).

⁹ Ashley Montagu, "My Idea of Education," *Today's Education* 69 (Jan. 1980): 48-49.

¹⁰ Mary Brabeck, *Who Cares? Theory, Research and Educational Implications of the Ethics of Caring* (New York: Praeger, 1989); Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984); Sarah Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," *Feminist Studies* (1980): 347-367.

¹¹ Jane M. Martin, *Reclaiming a Conversation. The Ideal of the Educated Woman* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

¹² D. J. Carducci and J. B. Carducci, *The Caring Classroom: A Guide for Teachers Troubled by the Difficult Student and Classroom Disruption* (Palo Alto, CA: Bull Publishing Co., 1984); L. Davis, *Caring for Secondary Pupils* (London: Heinemann, 1985).

¹³ D. W. Johnson, R. T. Johnson, and E. J. Houlubec, *Circles of Learning* (Edina, MN: Interaction Book Company, 1984).

¹⁴ G. A. Griffin, "Interactive Staff Development: Using What We Know," in

A. Lieberman & L. Miller, eds., *Staff Development for Education in the '90s: New Demands, New Realities, New Perspectives* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1990), 243-258.

¹⁵ Noddings, 180.

¹⁶ M. Maycroff, "On Caring," *The International Philosophical Quarterly* (September, 1965): 463-474.

¹⁷ Robert E. Hult Jr., "On Pedagogical Caring," *Educational Theory* 29(Summer 1979): 238.

¹⁸ J. Theodore Klein, "Teaching and Maternal Love," *Educational Theory* 1989, 39(4): 373-383.

¹⁹ Leo Buscaglia, *Love* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972).

²⁰ Jane Roland Martin, "Transforming Moral Education," in *Who Cares? Theory, Research, and Educational Implication of the Ethic of Care*, ed. M. M Brabeck (New York: Praeger, 1989), 185.

²¹ John Dewey, *Educational and Democracy* (New York: The Free Press, 1944).

²² G. J. Pine and A. G. Hillard, "Rx for Racism: Imperatives for America's Schools," *Phi Delta Kappan* 71(8) (1990): 599.

²³ R. Bellah et al., *The Good Society* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991).

²⁴ Klein, 382.

²⁵ Johann Galtung, *There Are Alternatives* (New York: The Free Press, 1980).

²⁶ Deborah Prothrow-Stith, *Deadly Consequences: How Violence is Destroying Our Teenage Population And A Plan to Begin Solving the Problem* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 6-7.

²⁷ Seymour Melman, *The Permanent War Economy: American Capitalism in Decline* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974).

²⁸ Prothrow-Stith, 30.

- ²⁹ G. Straker and R. Jacobsen, "Aggression, Emotional Maladjustment, and Empathy in the Abused Child," *Developmental Psychology* 17 (1981): 762-765.
- ³⁰ J. Bradshaw, *Homecoming: Reclaiming and Championing Your Inner Child* (New York: Bantam Books, 1990).
- ³¹ L. Lamphear, "Impact of Maltreatment on Children's Psychosocial Adjustment: A Review of the Research," *Child Abuse and Neglect* 9(1985): 251-263.
- ³² D. F. Oates and A. Peacock, "Self Esteem of Abused Children," *Child Abuse and Neglect* 9(1985): 159-163.
- ³³ *Ibid.*
- ³⁴ A. Kolman and B. Robinson, "The Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist and Incidence of Abuse and Neglect in Outpatient and Residential Treatment Population" (Paper presented at the Conference on Children's Mental Health -- Issues in Research, Tampa, FL, 1991).
- ³⁵ M. Perry, L. Dornan, and E. Well, "Developmental and Behavioral Characteristics of the Abused and Neglected Child," *Journal of Clinical Child Psychology*, 12(1983): 320-324.
- ³⁶ C. S. Widom, "Child Abuse, Neglect, and Adult Behavior: Research Design and Findings on Criminology, Violence, and Child Abuse," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 59(1991): 355-367
- ³⁷ H. Martin, "The Neuro-psycho-developmental Aspects of Child Abuse and Neglect," *Child Abuse and Neglect, a Medical Reference*, ed. N. S. Ellerstein (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1981), 95-103.
- ³⁸ S. J. Zuravian, "Severity of Maternal Depression and Three Types of Mother-to Child Aggression," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, 59(1989): 377-390.
- ³⁹ S. Osherson, *Finding Our Fathers: How a Man's Life is Shaped by His Relationship With His Father* (New York: Faucett Columbine, 1986).
- ⁴⁰ T. French, "South of Heaven: A Year in the Life of a High School," *St. Petersburg Times*, 12-21 May 1991.

- ⁴¹ J. J. Ansbro, *Martin Luther King, Jr.: The Making of a Mind* (Maryknoll, NY.: Orbis books, 1982).
- ⁴² Klein, 380.
- ⁴³ K. Boulding, *The Three Faces of Power* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989).
- ⁴⁴ Ian M. Harris, *Peace Education* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co. 1989).
- ⁴⁵ R. Stark and J. M. Evoy, "Middle Class Violence," *Psychology Today* (November 1970): 52-54.
- ⁴⁶ J. R. Martin, "Transforming Moral Education:" 185.
- ⁴⁷ A. Cohen, *Love and Hope: Form and Education* (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1990), 78.
- ⁴⁸ Mayeroff, 472.
- ⁴⁹ Noddings, 180.
- ⁵⁰ Thomas Berry, *The Dream of the Earth* (San Francisco: Sierra Club, 1988).
- ⁵¹ E. F. Schumacher, *Small is Beautiful* (New York: Venennial Library, 1975), 97-98.
- ⁵² Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
- ⁵³ Henry D. Thoreau, "Civil Disobedience," in *Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice*, ed. H.A. Bedau (New York: Pegasus, 1969).
- ⁵⁴ Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolence*, (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).
- ⁵⁵ Christine Shea, F. Kahane, and P. Sola, *The New Servants of Power*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989).
- ⁵⁶ L. Fuller, *On Crisis in Education* (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1965), 88-124.
- ⁵⁷ P. Friere, *The Politics of Education*, (New York: Bergin & Garvey, 1985),

197-198.

⁵⁸ Parker Palmer, *To Know as We are Known: A Spirituality of Education* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983), 14-15.

⁵⁹ Gary Wehlage et al., *Reducing the Risk: Schools as Communities of Support* (New York: The Falmer Press, 1989).

⁶⁰ J. D. Lowry, "Caring in the Classroom: The Opening of the American Student's Heart," *College Teaching* 38(3) (1990): 83.

⁶¹ R. Freeman Butts, "Public Education in a Pluralistic Society," *Educational Theory*, 17(Winter 1977): 356-371.

⁶² D. Kobak, "Teaching Children to Care," *Children Today*, 8(2) (1979): 1-5.

⁶³ Ian M. Harris, "Principles of Peace Pedagogy," *Peace and Change*, 15(3) (1990): 254-272.

**MARK JOHNSTON AND DAVID LEWIS ON
THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF VALUE**

**Thomas S. Decds
University of Nebraska**

Ever since David Hume noticed the illegitimacy of arguments which proceed solely from factual premises about the world to conclusions involving moral evaluations, philosophers have been wrangling over exactly what is the connection between facts and values. Broadly speaking naturalists have argued that ethical terms can be defined and or reduced to factual terms and ethical judgments are a species of empirical assertion which can be justified empirically. Non-naturalists such as G. E. Moore hold the contrary position: Value terms can't be reduced to factual terms because value terms refer to non-natural properties which are different in kind from natural properties barring reduction. For Moore knowledge of value comes from intuitions about these non-natural properties. A third, more radical position is held by non-cognitivists (dissatisfied with the two above alternatives and emerging from a positivist tradition) who are skeptical about any entity which is not empirically verifiable. They conclude that moral judgments, although seeming to refer to matters of fact, are really just expressions of emotional attitudes toward a given state of affairs. Hence such judgments are not actually truth assessable. Two disputants about a moral judgment may agree as to all of the facts but freely disagree in attitude. What is accomplished in an abortion is not in dispute but differing attitudes towards abortion are violently opposed. The non-cognitivist notices that moral language does seem to express propositions as if they were factual statements (ie Murder IS wrong). However the factuality of such propositions is only an appearance because they don't really refer at all to actual states of affairs but rather merely express emotional responses to those states of affairs. Non-cognitivists take the splits between emotion/reason, and expression/description to be fundamentally different relations humans have to reality. Coupling reason/description allows propositions which are scientifically truth assessable whereas the former (emotion/expression) do not. Propositions containing value assertions are intelligible only as emotion/expressions.

David Lewis follows the naturalist strategy by proposing a reduction of value to dispositions to value and offers the notion of imaginative acquaintance as constitutive of the ideal condition in which an observer can

discover whether or not he/she is disposed to desire a desire. Lewis further suggests that it is possible that a novelist's work of art may represent our best effort at determining a value through imaginative acquaintance, although he doesn't want to preclude the deliverances of scientific experiment (Lewis, p. 113,114). Mark Johnston responds that substantive reason which can fully criticize a value is a more adequate conception of how we approximate the ideal condition. Furthermore Johnston takes issue with Lewis' willingness to claim the reduction of value to a dispositional theory of desire (Johnston, p 156). I am going to support Lewis' notion of imaginative acquaintance as one interesting method of exploring value but agree with Johnston's denial of Lewis' reduction of value language to the language of second-order desires.

Mark Johnston is critical of both of Lewis' primary positions. He claims both that imaginative acquaintance is severely insufficient for determining a value and that the reduction of value to second order desires is not justified due to the conceptual autonomy of normative notions. Johnston believes that value language contains response dependent concepts, that is a concept which is tied to concepts of our responses under certain conditions. In particular, the concept of the valuable implies the response of commendation. Any reductive analysis of normative notions will necessarily contain normative constraints in the conclusion (Johnston, P. 144). Johnston, for instance will argue that something is good only if we would have good reasons for believing it to be good. Notice the normative 'good reasons' appearing in the (non)reduction. Johnston, however believes that circular accounts such as his are informative as long as they don't imply the triviality of the biconditional. Johnston concludes that commendatory normative notions are conceptually autonomous and irreducible.

Lewis responds to Moore's 'open question argument' against reductive analyses however his critique does not address Johnston's circularity argument (Lewis, 129,130,131). We can't throw out all analytic reductions simply because it is always an open question whether or not they are totally successful. Lewis is also aware that analytic reductions can be equivocal. A concept may be analytically reducible under one interpretation of the concept but not another. But neither of these reasons to accept the irreducibility of value are compelling for Lewis; he simply accepts that his reduction of value to second order desires will likely be somewhat questionable on Moore's terms, as well as potentially equivocal, but still be informative. Lewis argues that making analytic hypotheses in spite of open questions simply fits accepted practice. He believes that his method of determining a value is what we actually do for the most part.

The controversy between Lewis and Johnston leads me to consider the issue of reduction of value to some other concept. It seems to me that analytic reductions are problematic if one is arguing that the reduction captures both the extension and intension of the concept being reduced. This

is particularly true of the reduction of values to natural properties. Even scientific reductions such as water is H₂O, where the extension seems right runs into problems on the intensional dimension. The term 'water' is a rich word in English with a myriad of connotations and inseparable conceptual associations. A poet is very likely to use the word 'water' rather than 'H₂O' unless he or she is being ironic. 'Water' contains within its meaning associations such as preciousness, indispensability, transcendental purity or even salvation whereas H₂O is almost universally used devoid of all such connotations while focusing on the micro-structural properties of the referent.

The valuable is a rich concept like water. To reduce its intensional meanings is likely to mislead rather than enlighten. Even classic examples of analytic statements such as 'all bachelors are unmarried men' can clearly run into problems with intensional meanings and even with referents. The word 'bachelor' occasionally connotes male celebrants at wild parties and sexual availability whereas 'unmarried man' seems to carry a more neutral connotations.

However it seems clear that analytic reductions of value are potentially appropriate in particular scientific and instrumental contexts of discourse. For example, one might appropriately use the concept of ideally considered second order desires in a counseling context as a stand-in for the idea of value because the reduction is closer to psychological roots of behavior. The concept of second order desire may be illuminating to the addict who feels torn by his/her raging desire for a drug and his/her incapacity to act on prudential desires. In this context Lewis' reduction amounts to the translation of value language into the language of imaginatively considered wants and needs. Perhaps in this context Lewis' reduction will make more sense for the psychologically struggling person.

The classic utilitarian reduction of value to maximizing benefits and minimizing costs for the greatest number is often used to good effect in political and legislative contexts where planning requires forecast of social consequences. Such instrumental contexts almost require simplifications. Lewis' point that we have to start somewhere in spite of the equivocal or unobvious aspect of analytic reductions is well taken. Reductions sometime result in a highly elaborated body of theoretical discourse. Notice however that the employment of such reductions carries the risk that once we have accepted the reduction we are likely to forget that it is equivocal and unobvious. We look past the ambiguity and sometimes even begin to claim that there was no lack of clarity in the analysis from the outset. As in a computer program we need an escape key which we can push to bring us back to the most general choices in the program. If we sit down at a computer which has been used by someone else who left it running at some unknown level of a particular program, then we are at a complete loss until

we have backed out and understood the 'reductive context.' Whereas it may make sense to use such analytic reductions in particular instrumentally appropriate contexts, it might also make sense to avoid reductions when discussing values on the most general philosophical level.

So far I have criticized Lewis' reduction because I think it misleads along the intensional dimension however I think his view has problems related to extensional issues as well. Johnston uses the "So What?" argument along these lines. A person who values something on his or her terms, when confronted by the ideal observer who claims that the person's values are mistaken, may simply say 'So, what I value what I value anyway.' (Johnston P. 157) The question is how can we legitimately say that such an individual is not really valuing the right thing. It could also be argued that the reduction of value to second order desires is extensionally wrong because under conditions of ideal imaginative acquaintance the ideal observer might argue that we shouldn't desire anything at all. For example, classic Buddhism holds that the source of suffering is the grasping quality of our desires. The extinction of desire ends suffering. Here we have a case where the value held (nirvana or the state of non-desiring) is in contradiction to the entire complex of desire whether it be first or second order desire.

McDowell in "Virtue and Reason" supports a non-reductive philosophical discussion of value:

The remoteness of the Form of the Good is a metaphorical version of the thesis that value is not in the world, utterly distinct from the dreary literal version which has obsessed recent moral philosophy. The point of the metaphor is the colossal difficulty of attaining a capacity to cope clear-sightedly with the ethical reality which is part of our world. Unlike other philosophical responses to uncodifiability, this one may actually work towards moral improvement; negatively, by inducing humility, and positively, by an inspiring effect akin to that of a religious conversion. (McDowell, p. 347)

McDowell argues that the ethical is better conceived from "the inside out" as it were from the internal point of view of the virtuous person. The particularity of the individual encountering unique predicaments calling for moral choice must precede generalized codes and reductive analyses. The unique answer each individual gives to the question "how ought life to be lived?" will figure inevitably into every moral choice he or she will make. Each individual will have a different overall answer to that question and therefore divergent moral choices will inevitably result. In some sense values are the very structures which organize not only our activities but our

being-itself. Values are intrinsic to the historically moving and located "whirl of organism." To reduce value to facts about an objective world is a kind of suicide of subjectivity and consequently a disappearance of that which we are trying to analytically reduce. Attempts at codifying with finality objective rules and principles of right action are based upon the positivist illusion of achieving realistic certainty through impossible objective viewpoints (McDowell, p. 12 of 'Aesthetic Value').

The usefulness of an analytic reduction of value is called into question in the context of artistic expression. Perhaps there are good reasons why a scientist but not a poet would want to research the reality of water under the description/expression "H₂O".

Suzanne K. Langer in *Problems of Art* addresses the issue of how art can capture broader aspects of human experience than the rational discursive intellect. Much of our experience is simply not formulable in language.

The usual factoring of that life-stream into mental emotional, and sensory units is an arbitrary scheme of simplification that makes scientific treatment possible to a considerable extent; but we may already be close to the limit of its usefulness, that is close to the point where its simplicity becomes an obstacle to further questioning and discovery instead of the revealing, ever-suitable logical projection it was expected to be. Whatever resists projection into the discursive form of language is, indeed, hard to hold in conception, and perhaps impossible to communicate, in the proper and strict sense of the word 'communicate.' But fortunately our logical intuition, or form-perception, is really much more powerful than we commonly believe, and our knowledge--genuine knowledge, understanding--is considerably wider than our discourse. Even in the use of language, if we want to name something that is too new to have a name(e.g. a newly invented gadget or a newly discovered creature), or want to express a relationship for which there is no verb or other connective word, we resort to metaphor; we mention it or describe it as something else, something analogous....it formulates a new conception for our direct imaginative grasp. (Langer p.22,23).

Although Lewis' proposed reduction has been criticized, his emphasis on imaginative acquaintance explorations coupled with a richer non-reductive use of value concepts offer the opportunity to deepen discernment and moral sensibilities. The argument from the analogy with art will generally support

non-reductive, hermeneutical (ie circular as in Johnston's program), determinations of value but also tend to support Lewis' claims for imaginative acquaintance over Johnston's preference for values criticized by substantive reason. Nevertheless Johnston and Lewis may not be as far apart on the issue of imaginative acquaintance versus reasoned judgment as it appears at first. Clearly a novelist such as Melville when he labors to imagine characters acting in a fictional world is using a great deal of substantive reason in his work. The imaginative act is painstaking and well-considered, indeed the creative/aesthetic act is also a moral act. This kind of disciplined imagination is to be distinguished from mere fantasy or day-dreaming. Notice that even different meta-ethical views can be weighed within imaginative literary experiments. For example it seems that Melville was appreciating (and criticizing) virtue ethics in the literary person of Billy Budd, while Captain Vere's judgment is handicapped by utilitarian reasoning. Melville is fairly explicit that these were at least some of his interests in writing the novel. Johnston recognizes that Lewis' imaginative acquaintance has implicit connections to practical reason which haven't been specified (Johnston, 151.) However he suspects Lewis of conceiving imaginative acquaintance as a quasi-perceptual process and establishing the objectivity of value in this manner. Johnston believes that quasi-realist perceptions of value arguments are fraught with difficulty and prefers a non-reductive response-dependent account of value.

The world considered with respect to value is currently open, expanding and deepening. The objects of such perception are primarily human events and relations however they extend to other forms of life and to the fate of the universe itself. The deliverances of human moral sensitivities involve a fantastically complex blending of cognition, perception, emotion and even sensation. This blending of capacities may or may not be usefully described as "intuition," "moral insight," "conscience," "moral sense," or "moral judgment." The pragmatic test of value claims depends upon whether they activate and refine moral experience and activity or whether they tend to reify and deaden. Depending on a person's level of understanding and motivation the same ethical view may enlighten one mind and darken another, or even enlighten or darken the same person at different times. For example, a newly elected legislator might find utilitarian analyses of value particularly illuminating for his/her legislative practice but as awareness deepens about how legislation affects particular people perhaps naturalist ethics will be seen to have important limitations which blind some aspects of ethical experience as it reveals others.

The example of art reminds us that human understanding is much broader, deeper and more open-ended than any particular realm of reductive discourse. The creative process is open in the sense that the artist would be hard-pressed to decide whether the moment of creation is one of discovery,

invention or reflection. The ethicist is in the same position with respect to values as the art critic is to a work of art or even the artist to his/her own work. The art critic is endeavoring to understand the work of art and to describe it for the benefit of readers. Any sensitive art critic is going to realize that the work which is being approached will never be reductively subsumed by the criticism. To believe otherwise would be the height of arrogance. The intention of the artist can be pondered but not known with much certainty. Artists often feel as though the act of creation transcends their conscious intentions. An art work can be a mystery to be understood even by the artist who created it. The art critic endeavors to closely track the meanings and aesthetic choices implicit in the work but hardly to claim to have represented it completely. Although it would seem to be possible that a work of criticism can become a more interesting and valuable work of art than the work of art which originally inspired the criticism. The ethicist is in same position.

At the bottom of the cognitive/non-cognitive debate about ethics, is either the attempt to radically subjectivize or objectivize value. Some writers like Mackie, because they hold a too rigorous standard of objectivity relegate values to the realm of subjective appearance. On the other hand, those who are intent on an empiricist view of value are tempted to engage in reductive analyses which neglect the essential connection values have to lived experience. I seek a position which critiques both the notion of pure subjectivity or pure objectivity with respect to value. I believe that some value claims can be mistaken or inferior to others while simultaneously recognizing that values are subjectively invented as well as discovered in our responses to the world. Values are the means with which we organize/express ourselves and ultimately determine and become our essence. The adage "what thou lovest well is thine true heritage" captures nicely the idea that we become our values or at least the activity which whirls about our values. Some people hold for a lifetime particular values from a very early age. It is remarkable how often adult vocations are determined by childhood interests and the sense of relief some adults experience when they return to those interests after prolonged work in other fields. Values are the theories on which we bet our lives.

It seems to me that values at their most objective extreme can be witnessed as does Jorge Luis Borges when contemplating human artifacts such as his dagger in his poem "The Dagger."

A dagger rests in a drawer.

It was forged in Toledo at the end of the last century. Luis Melian Lafinur gave it to my father, who brought it from Uruguay.

Evaristo Carreigo once held it in his hand,
Whoever lays eyes on it has to pick up the
dagger and toy with it, as if he had always
been on the lookout for it. The hand is
quick to grip the waiting hilt, and the
powerful obeying blade slides in and out
of the sheath with a click.

This is not what the dagger wants.
It is more than a structure of metal; men
conceived it and shaped it with a single end
in mind. It is, in some eternal way, the
dagger that last night knifed a man in
Tacuarembó and the daggers that reined on
Caesar. It wants to kill, it wants to shed
sudden blood.

In a drawer of my writing table, among draft
pages and old letters, the dagger dreams
over and over its simple tiger's dream. On
wielding it the hand comes alive because
the metal comes alive, sensing itself, each
time handled, in touch with the killer for
whom it was forged.

At times I am sorry for it. Such power and
single-mindedness, so impassive or innocent
its pride, and the years slip by, unheeding.

Such witnessing is not "mere" projection of subjective attitudes on a 'factual' world devoid of value. On the other hand such properties are subjective insofar as they can only fully resonate with a conscious subjectivity which is capable of perceiving such properties. Values can be shaped and embodied into artifacts, into art works and more subtly into organized patterns of behavior such as institutions. Notice how once shaped, values in turn shape and become a part of our physical and cultural environment.

The means of discerning values are manifold depending on the subjectivity at work. Johnston's preference for the critical deliverances of substantive reason is a classic predisposition of philosophers. Lewis' emphasis on imaginative acquaintance would naturally be the choice of many artists. On the other hand both writers balance their choices. Lewis is willing to argue for an analytic reduction of value to ideally imagined desire while Johnston is more hermeneutical in his cheerful acceptance of value conditions in the premises of his arguments. I would take a more extreme position accepting the irreducibility claim in Johnston's argument as well as Lewis' notion of imaginative acquaintance.

Educational Implications

It is clear that value issues are central to the ways in which educational processes work themselves out. Values are in the very architecture of schools as well as in curricular choices and teacher styles. Values influence context and much of the content of schooling. It is crucial to be thoughtful and explicit about addressing value concerns in schools.

The problem of the objectivity or subjectivity of value can be addressed developmentally. It would seem that moral realists who want to teach the objectivity of value, that is that values are objective interests cognitively and empirically determined, have a persuasive argument for their position when it comes to teaching students in lower grade levels. The realist position, however, is not the full story because it can't do justice to the irreducibility of value and to the subjective/creative side of value. The subjective complexity of value can be approached first through the semantic avenue of the intensionality/extensionality discussion when students are a bit more prepared for the problematizing of existence.

Meta-ethical relativism copes nicely with the subjective side of value and with the diversity of belief across cultures and yet it has few resources to contemplate value as properties as does Borges when he contemplates his dagger or like the empiricist who carefully addresses the value conditions which can enable life to flourish. Our consumer culture tends to support an impoverished version of relativism which reduces to value to brute preference and the power to gratify first order desires. If you want it, and get it then it is good. Even clear health risks such as smoking get glossed as fun in the sun. This sort of simple-minded meta-ethical view is pernicious but widely held and in need of criticism.

Educators need to promote a kind of dialectical development in the understanding of value. Sheer egoism must open to consider objective interests and prudential desires which in turn get broadened to include the interests of the community, but at some point the whole issue of relativity/subjectivity needs to challenge objectivity. Then, once the subjectivity of value is accepted, it needs the criticism once more of objectivity. It puts me in mind of the ancient Asian adage, "First there is a mountain, then there is no mountain, then there is."

REFERENCES

- Borges, Jorge. "The Dagger." From *Selected Poems*, edited by Norman Thomas Di Giovanni, Delta Press, 1973.
- Johnston, Mark. "Dispositional Theories of Value." *Proceedings of the*

Aristotelian Society, 1979.

Langer, Suzanne. *Problems of Art*. Scribner 1957.

Lewis, David. "Dispositional Theories of Value." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1979.

McDowell, John. "Virtue and Reason." *The Monist*, Vol 62, 1979.

---. "Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World." From *Pleasure, Preference and Value*, edited by Eva Schaper, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

CONFUCIUS AND HIS IMPACT ON EDUCATION

Kyung Hi Kim
Northern Illinois University

Confucius was born in the state of Lu, China in 551 B.C. and died in 479 B.C., ten years after Socrates was born. Throughout his life, Confucius sought to function as a true educator, but with a philosophical attitude. He believed that education is a process of cultivating one's wisdom and moral consciousness. Wisdom and moral consciousness, he claimed, are the distinctive and imperative human character, and are the roots of establishing moral social order and harmony among people, in society, and with nature.

Confucius lived through times of moral, social, and political chaos. Wars were prevalent owing to the decline of the power of central government, the collapse of feudal system, and the selfishness of different states. The misery and oppression of the poor were increased, governments were corrupted, and thieves and robbers were roamed throughout the states of China. (Chen, 1990) Confucius's lifelong project was, therefore, to correct, reform, and reestablish the moral, social, and political ills that were prohibitive to the development of moral social order and harmony.

The importance of his ideas and educational praxis can be found in his emphasis on the distinction between the roots and branches of human lives in society and in nature. He does this in order to redirect human search towards realization of wisdom and moral consciousness. According to him, success, power, fame, and wealth are not the roots of human life but the branches or the results of some specific action. The persons who search for and strive toward realization of the roots of humanity and life are the persons who aspire to achieve wisdom and moral character. Education ought to promote and facilitate the development of roots of human nature and life. In short, Confucius believed that the development of good persons through education is fundamental to both the development of morally well-ordered and harmonized life and society.

In this paper, I will discuss the Confucian concepts of true person, true education, and genuine life. For this purpose, an analyses of following concepts will be included: *Tao* (The way), *Teh* (Non-deviation), *Yang and Yin* (Initiation and Completion), *Yi* (Righteousness), *Jen* (Humanheartedness),

Li (Propriety), *Chih* (Wisdom), and *Chung Yung* (The Golden Mean).¹

Bahm(1969) interprets that "*Tao* is Nature. By "Nature" meant the whole universe, including everything within the universe, as it proceeds on its course without interruption. *Tao* is the way. It is the way of Nature which proceeds through comings and goings, beginnings and endings." (p. 18) Nature consists of natures. The universe is constituted of beings, such as humans, animals, trees, mountains, wind, and water etc. Each of these different beings has its own nature. The universal *Tao* consists of many taos, and every tao has its own way to follow, from its beginning to its end in its own way. "Nature is good; natures are good so long as it pursues its own course without being interfered with by other natures or without imposing its own nature upon others." (Bahm, 1969, p.19) Here, we can relate the concept of *Tao* to the understanding of human nature and the realization of human way. Confucius clearly meant wisdom in the sense of recognizing and actualizing human nature and human way in relation to nature and society.

"*Teh* is the ability of anything to follow its own nature. It is the power of Nature to be natural, and it is the power of each particular being to behave in accordance with its own nature." (Bahm, 1969) *Teh* is the capability of those who do not fail to deviate from one's natural way. In this sense of being able to or have a will to steadfast to natural way, the concept of *Teh* is deeply related to the concept of *Chung Yung* which is interpreted as "golden mean" for some, and for others as "genuine living."²

"By *Chung* (central) is meant is not one-sided, and by *Yung* (enduring) meant what is unchangeable. *Chung* is the correct path of the world and *Yung* is the definite principle of the world." (Chan, 1973) Bahm considers that

Chung Yung is behavior that is enduringly undeviating. This is genuine living. Those who deviate, who lean toward either one side or the other of the way (*Tao*), lack *Teh*. They lack genuineness. They fail to adhere to their true nature. Some attain *Chung*, but do not maintain it for long. They lack *Yung*. steadfastness, constancy, persistence, or strength to continue virtuously. (1969, p.51)

In the book, *Golden Mean*, Confucius claimed, "What Heaven imparts to person is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way (*Tao*). Cultivating the Way is called education." (Chan, 1973) Confucius illustrates:

being true to oneself is the law of God. To try to be true to oneself is the law of man. He who is naturally true to

himself is one who, without effort, hits upon what is right, and without thinking understands what he wants to know, whose life is easily and naturally in harmony with the moral law. Such a one is what we call a saint or a man of divine nature. He who learns to be his true self is one who finds out what is good and holds fast to it. In order to learn to be one's true self, it is necessary to obtain a wide and extensive knowledge of what has been said and done in the world; critically to inquire into it; carefully to ponder over it; clearly to sift it; and earnestly to carry it out. To arrive at understanding from being one's true self is called nature, and to arrive at being one's true self from understanding is called culture. He who is his true self has thereby understanding, and he who has understanding finds thereby his true self. (Lin, 1943)

Confucius further comments on the inseparable relationship between the development of true self and its influential power that a person has to oneself and to others by illustrating that:

realization of the true self compels expression; expression becomes evidence; evidence becomes clarity or luminosity of knowledge; clarity or luminosity of knowledge activates; active knowledge becomes power and power becomes a pervading influence. Only those who are absolutely their true selves in this world can have pervading influence. (Lin, 1943)

The concept of *Yang and Yin* is also related to understanding *Tao*. The beginnings and endings of all things in Nature are referred to as *yang and yin*. Bahm elaborates the concepts of *yang and yin* as follows:

The tendency toward opposition is ever present. Opposition is the source of all growth. The principle of opposition is inherent in Nature, so oppositeness will continue forever, no matter how many opposites may come and go. The principle of initiation (*yang*) and the principle of completion (*yin*) continues also...All things are impregnated by two alternating tendencies, the tendency toward completion and the tendency toward initiation, which acting together, complement each other. Ultimate reality involves initiation of growth, initiation of growth involves completion of growth,

and completions of growth involves returning to that whence it came. (1969, p. 25-26)

Therefore, we can see through *yang* and *yin* principle of nature, "each thing which grows and develops to the fullness of its own nature completes its course by declining again in a manner inherently determined by its own nature." (Bahm, 1969) Confucius added that humans are naturally social beings, so we can apply the principle of *yang and yin* to the naturalness of human association.

Yi refers the right, proper and the best way of doing things. "When a *tao* has *teh*, then *yi* prevails. When *yi* prevails, then a *tao* has *teh*. It is by self-activity that all things fulfill themselves. If there were no self-activity, life would cease. If self-activity did not govern, then disruption would set in. By letting each thing act in accordance with its own nature, everything that needs to be done gets done. This is the best way of doing things." (Bahm, p.29)

Bahm interprets that "knowing *yi* not only entails understanding how undisturbed self-activity leads to fulfillment of each being but also provides insight into what is best in social relations. Wise person knows that each thing has a nature which is able to take care of itself. Knowing this, he is willing that each thing follow its own course." (p.28) in the book, *Golden Mean*, (Chan, 1973) Confucius defines *yi* (Righteousness) is the principle of setting things right and proper. He further elaborates the concept of *yi* and relates it in the book of *The Great Learning*:

The ancient who wished to preserve the fresh or clear character of the people of the world, would first set about ordering their national life. Those who wished to order their national life, would first set about regulating their family life. Those who wished to regulate their family life would set about their personal life. Those who wished to cultivate their personal lives, would first set about setting their hearts right. Those who wished to set about their hearts right would first set about making their wills sincere. Those who wished to make their wills sincere would first set about achieving true knowledge. The achieving of true knowledge depended upon the investigation of things. When things are investigated, then true knowledge is achieved; when true knowledge is achieved, then the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, then the heart is set right (or the mind sees the right); when the heart is set right, then the personal life is cultivated, then the family life is regulated; when the family is regulated, then the national life is

orderly; and when the national life is orderly, then there is peace in this world. From the emperor down to the common man, all must regard the cultivation of the personal life as the root of foundation. There is never an orderly upshoot or superstructure when the root or foundation is disorderly. There is never yet a tree whose trunk is slim and slender and whose top branches are thick and heavy. This is called "to know the root or foundation of things." (Lin, 1943, p.126)

We can see that Confucius's attempt to relate the accomplishment of *yi* to the cultivating wisdom and moral character which are fundamental to the development of ultimate good life and society.

Fung Yu-Lan (1948) considers *Yi* (righteousness) that it means the "oughtness" of a situation. It is a categorical imperative. Everyone in the society has certain things which he ought to do, and which must be done for their own sake, because they are morally right things to do. If, however, he does them only because of other non-moral considerations, then even though he does what he ought to do, his action is no longer a righteous one. He is then acting for 'profit'. (Fung Yu-Lan, 1948)

Confucius add the concrete and human hearted love sense of *yen* to the formal and duty oriented sense of *yi* in emphasizing moral consciousness and *praxis*.

Yen is interpreted by Jaspers (1957) as "humanity and morality in one." Fung Yu-Lan relates *yi* to *yen* as follows: "the formal essence of the duties of man in society is in their "oughtness," because all these duties are what he ought to do. But the material sense of these duties is "loving others," i.e., *jen* or human-heartedness." In the book, *The Analects*, when Confucius asked about humanity, he answered, "It is to love men." (Chan, 1963) Confucius adds that the person who really loves others is one who is able to perform one's duties in society. Jaspers elaborates the concept of *yen* as follows:

The ideogram of *yen* means "man" and "two," that is to say: to be human means to be in communication. The question of the nature of man is answered, first in the elucidation of what he is and should be; second in an account of the diversity of his existence. ... First, A man must become a

man. For man is not like the animals which are as they are, whose instincts govern their existence without conscious thought; he is a task to himself. Men actively shape their life together and, transcend all instincts, build it on their human obligation. Humanity underlies every particular good. Only he who is in *yen* can truly love and hate. *Jen* is all-embracing source. It is through *yen* that the particular virtue becomes truth. (Jaspers, 1957)

Confucius distinguished the person of *yen* (true person) from the person of "goody-goodies." In fact, Confucius claimed that "the goody-goodies are the thieves of virtue." Mencius attempt to describe these class of people:

They say, "Why be idealistic like those people? When their words do not tally with their words, they say, "The ancient people! The ancient people!" Why are they so supercilious toward the world and so cool and detached in their conduct? When a man lives in the present world and acts according to the standard of the present world, and succeeds, it is quite enough! They are the class of people who are quite contented to secure the approval of society. These are what the country folk call "good man," or "goody-goodies." (Lin, 1943)

Mencius further explains why Confucius calls those people as 'the thieves of virtue.' Mencius said:

You want to criticize them and they seem so perfect; you want to lampoon them, and seem so correct; they fall in with the current conventions and thoroughly identify themselves with the ways of the times. In their living they seem to be so honest and faithful, and in their conduct they seem to be so moral. Everybody likes them and they are quite pleased with themselves. But it is impossible to lead them into the ways of *Tao*. ... They resemble the real things but are not the real things." (Lin, 1943)

In *The Analects*, when Confucius was asked about the meaning of *jen*, Confucius answered: "Do not do to others what you do not wish yourself. ... The man of *jen* is one who, desiring to sustain himself, sustains others, and desiring to develop himself, develop others. To be able from one's own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others; that may be called the way to

practice *jen*." (Fung, 1948) In the practice of *jen*, the consideration for others is crucial. Fung (1948) further illustrates that

Do to others what you wish yourself is the positive expression of the practice, which was called by Confucius *chung* or "conscientiousness to others. And the negative aspect, which was called by Confucius *shu*, "altruism," or "the principle of reciprocity" is: "Do not do to others what you do not wish yourself." Therefore, the principle of *chung* and *shu* is the "way to practice *jen*." (p.43)

Li (propriety, ritual) is, according to Lin's interpretation:

the foundation or indispensable principle of government, cannot merely mean the observance of ritual, but represents a philosophy of social order and social control. *Li* practically covers the entire social, moral and religious structure of ancient Chinese society. Its aim was to restore the ancient feudal order, with a clear hierarchy of ranks, but this principle of social order was extended and broadened to cover the essential human relationships in the family and social and political life. It was therefore to establish a complete moral order in the nation by a clear and simple, but sharp, definition of social status and its specific obligations, thus providing the moral basis for political order. (Lin, 1943)

Regarding *Li*, the central conception of Confucian project:

It means the study of the ritualism of religious worship, state ceremonies, folk festivals, the marriage ceremony, funeral, "capping" and "coiffure" ceremonies for boys and girls reaching maturity (at the age of twenty for boys and fifteen for girls), army discipline, the educational system, conduct of the sexes and home life, eating and drinking and sports (especially archery, carriage driving, and the hunt), music and dance. It means a system of well-defined social relationships with definite attitudes towards one another, love in the parents, filial piety in the children, respect in the younger brothers, friendliness in the elder brothers, loyalty among friends, respect for authority among subjects and benevolence in the rulers. It means the mental state of

piety. It means moral discipline in man's personal conduct. As a broad principle of personal conduct, it means "propriety" in everything, or doing the proper thing. As a broad social principle, it means "the order of things," or "everything in its right place." It means ritualism and the observance of forms. It means continuity with the past. Finally, it means courtesy and good manners. (Lin, 1943, p.190)

Duke Ai asked Confucius, in the book of *LIKI*, the importance of *li*. Confucius said: "What I have learned is this, that of all the things that the people live by, *li* is the greatest. Without *li*, we do not know how to conduct a proper worship of the spirits of the universe; or how to establish the proper status of the king and the ministers, the ruler and the ruled, and the elders and the juniors; or how to establish the moral relationships between the sexes, between parents and the children and between brothers; or how to distinguish the different degrees of relationships in the family." (Lin, 1943) Here we can see that following *li* is the basis of establishing moral social order and harmony.³

In cultivating *li*, Confucius put a great emphasis on name rectification, sincerity, and respect. Confucius believed that name rectification is the first step to rebuild the moral social chaos. Confucius said:

Words must be set aright. What inheres in words should be brought out. The prince should be a prince, the father a father, the man a man. But language is constantly misused, words are employed for meanings that do not befit them. A separation arises between being and language. "He who has the inner being also has the words; he who has words does not always have the inner being." If the language is in disorder, everything goes wrong. "If words (designations, concepts) are not right, judgements are not clear; works do not product; punishments do not strike the right man, and the people do not know where to set hand and foot." "Therefore the superior man chooses words that can be employed without doubt, and forms judgements that can be converted into actions without fear or doubt. The superior man tolerates no imprecision of his speech." (Jaspers, 1956)

The concept of sincerity is related to both the principle of reciprocity and the cultivation of *li*. Sincerity is fundamental in dealing with others. When you are not sincere with others, according to the principle of reciprocity, they will insincere with you. Pretended good will result in pretended good

will to you. Pretention is deceitful and deceit begets deceit, distrust, and fear. (Bahm, 1969) Sincerity is also necessary in developing the appropriate forms or representation of *li* in the sense of having unity of between inner feelings and outer expression. Bahm (1969) illustrates on this:

To learn the customary forms of external behavior without understanding their inner significance is artificial, not natural. To learn the social properties without learning why they are appropriate is to be misinformed. Confucius viewed as artificial any manner of behaving which failed to express one's true intentions. When one's external forms do not correctly reveal one's internal attitudes, one's behavior is formalistic. Sincerity requires that one be not formalistic. (p.43)

In the book *LIKI*, Confucius relate the concept of respect to the cultivation of *li*. Confucius said:

A superior person is always respectful or always shows regard for everything. First of all he is respectful, or shows a pious regard toward himself. How dare he be disrespectful or have no pious regard for himself since the self is a branch of the family line? Not to show regard for one's self is to injure the family, and to injure the family is to injure the root, and when the root is injured, the branches die off. These three things, the relationship toward one's wife, toward one's children and toward one's self, are a symbol of the human relationships among people. When a sovereign carries out these three things, his example will be imitated by the entire country. Thus harmonious relationships will prevail in the country." (Lin, 1943)

Confucius meant by saying 'showing respect for one's self':

When a sovereign makes a mistake in his speech, the people quote him, and when a sovereign makes a mistake in his conduct, the people imitate him. When a sovereign makes no mistakes in his speech or his conduct, then the people learn respect for him without any laws or regulations. In this way the sovereign shows respect for himself." (Lin, 1943)

Here, Confucius implied the distinctions between genuine, long lasting, and natural respect from manipulated and imposed respect.

Chih is wisdom. It consists in understanding the significance of *yen* (Human heartedness or good will), *yi* (righteousness), *li* (propriety), and following the *chung yung* (the golden mean or genuine living). Bahm (1969) views that

wisdom involves 1) understanding *yi*, i.e., that acting naturally is the best way of doing things; 2) having *jen*, i.e., embodying genuine good will sincerely; 3) knowing and conscientiously practicing *li*, i.e., acting in a manner which always appropriately express one's attitude and actions a complete willingness to act in accordance with *yi*, *yen*, and *li*. It is this unreserved commitment to wanting and doing whatever is best which constitutes *chih*. ... wisdom is not a momentary affair, but is a persisting tendency to respond, both genuinely and willingly, to each personal and social task as it comes. (p. 49-50)

In relating the importance of education to the development of wisdom and moral character, Confucius gave a remarkable answer in the book of *The Analects*:

If a man loves kindness, but doesn't love study, his shortcoming will be ignorance. If a man loves wisdom but does not love study, his shortcoming will be having fanciful or unsound ideas. If a man loves honesty and does not love study, his shortcoming will be a tendency to spoil or upset things. If a man loves simplicity but does not love study, his shortcoming will be sheer following of routine. If a man loves decision of character and does not love study, his shortcoming will be self-will or headstrong belief in himself. (Lin, 1943)

In another book of *LIKI*, Confucius put emphasis on the unity among continuous educating or advancing knowledge, true person, and developing harmoniously ordered good government. Confucius said:

To govern a country without *li* is like tilling a field without a plough. To observe *li* without basing it on the standard of right is like tilling the field and forgetting to sow the seeds. To try to do right without cultivating knowledge is like

sowing the seeds without weeding the field. To cultivate knowledge without bringing it back to the aim of true manhood, is like weeding the field without harvesting it. And to arrive at the aim of true manhood without coming to enjoy it through music, is like harvesting and forgetting to eat the harvest. To enjoy true manhood through music and not arrive at complete harmony with nature is like eating and not be coming well-fed, or healthy. (Lin, 1943)

Confucius further elaborated and emphasized the significance of lifelong educational process in actualizing a true person in the book *LIKI*:

Forever occupy your thoughts with education. ... Only through education does one come to be dissatisfied with his own knowledge, and only through teaching others does one come to realize the uncomfortable inadequacy of his knowledge. Being dissatisfied with his own knowledge, one then realizes that the trouble lies with himself, and realizing the uncomfortable inadequacy of his knowledge, one then feels stimulated to improve himself. (Lin, 1943)

Good education cannot be achieved without a good teacher. Confucius considers that "a good teacher guides his students but does not pull them along; he urges them to go forward and does not suppress them; he opens the way, but does not take them to the place. Guiding without pulling makes the process of learning gentle; urging without suppressing makes the process of learning easy; and opening the way without leading the students to the place makes them think for themselves." (Lin, 1943) According to Confucius, only a true person, who continuously cultivates oneself in order to achieve wisdom and moral character, can be a good teacher who makes others follow one's ideal. Confucius illustrates that "his words are concise but expressive, casual but full of hidden meaning, and he is good at drawing ingenious examples to make people understand him." (Lin, 1943)

In conclusion, true education, when it promotes or moves toward the roots of human life - actualization of wisdom and moral consciousness - completes the process of cultivating human character. There are inseparable relationships among true person, true education, democratic and moral society, and finally good life for all. According to Confucius, true person is the person who strives to achieve *yen* (human-heartedness, or humanity), *yi* (righteousness), *li* (propriety), and *chih* (wisdom). These moral human character or virtues cannot be obtained without continuous inquiry and learning. Democratic and moral society require persons or members who can

recognize and strive to realize the principles of good society and humanity. The major impact of Confucius on education, I believe, is the attempt to correct and reconsider the direction of the educational process through recognizing the distinction between the roots or sources and branches or outlets of human life. Education is also attempt to realize the full significance of the genuineness of moral persons in society in tune with nature.

ENDNOTES

¹ For background understanding of Chinese philosophy and culture, and Confucius' life, I referred to Allison (1989), Chang (1954), Chen (1972), C. Cheng (1991), T. Cheng (1935), Creel (1960 and 1965), Cua (1982), Eno (1990), and Fung (1962). For Korean interpretation and application of Confucius and confucianism, I referred to: Cho (1986), Chung (1980), H. Kim (1991), H. S. Kim and others (1986), Y. Kim (1991), and Kum (1989).

² Refer to Chan (1973), Creel (1960), Dawson (1981), Doebelin (1965), Kaizuka (1956), and Legge (1971).

³ Refer to Fingerette (1972), Giles (1970), Legge (1971), and Ware (1955).

REFERENCES

- Allison, R.E. (1989). *Understanding the Chinese Mind*. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
- Bahm, A.J. (1969). *The Heart of Confucius*. New York & Tokyo: Walker/Weatherhill.
- Chan, Wing-Tsit. (1973). *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Chang, Chi-Yun. (1954). *A Life of Confucius*. Taipei: China Culture Publishing Foundation.
- Chen, JingPan. (1990). *Confucius as a Teacher*. Beijing: Foreign Language Press.
- Chen, Li-Fu. (1972). *Why Confucius has been revered as the model teacher of all ages*. New York: St. John's University Press.

- Cheng, Chung-Ying. (1991). *New Dimensions of Confucian and Neo-Confucian Philosophy*. State University of New York Press.
- Cheng, Tien-Hsi. (1935). *China moulded by Confucius: The Chinese Way in Western Light*. Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press.
- Cho, M.K. (1986). *The deep analysis of Korean ideas*. Seoul: WooSuk.
- Chung, B. (1980). *Educational Ideas of Confucius*. Seoul: Gyp Moon Press.
- Creel, H.G. (1960). *Confucius and the Chinese Way*. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
- Creel, H.G. (1965). *Chinese thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung*. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Cua, A.S. (1982). *The Unity of Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang Yang-Ming's Moral Psychology*. Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press.
- Dawson, R. (1981). *Confucius*. Oxford, Toronto, Melbourne: Oxford University Press.
- Doebelin, A. (1965). *The Living Thoughts of Confucius*. A Premier Book.
- Eno, R. (1990). *The Confucian Creation of Heaven*. State University of New York Press.
- Fang, T.H. (1957). *The Chinese View of Life: The Philosophy of Comprehensive Harmony*. Hong Kong: The Union Press.
- Fingerette, H. (1972). *Confucius: The Secular as Sacred*. New York, Evanston, San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks.
- Fung, Yu-Lan. (1948). *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*. New York: Free Press.
- Fung, Yu-Lan. (1962). *The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Giles, L. (1970). *The Analects of Confucius*. New York: The Heritage Press.

- Jaspers, K. (1962). *The Great Philosophers*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
- Kaizuka, S. (1956). *Confucius*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Kim, H. (1991). *The Great Learning & The Golden Mean*. Seoul: Il Sin Press.
- Kim, H.S. & An, I.H. & Jung, H.S. (1986). *The Understanding of Eastern Classical Educational Ideas*. Seoul: Ewha Womens University Press.
- Kim, Y.C. (1951). *The Introduction of Chinese Ideas*. Seoul: Theory and Practice
- Kum, J.T. (1989). *The Understanding of Korean Confucianism*. Seoul: National Culture Press.
- Legge, J. (1971). *Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine of the Mean*. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.
- Legge, J. *The Philosophy of Confucius*. New York: Mount Vernon.
- Lin, YuTang, (1943). *The Wisdom of Confucius*. The Illustrated Modern Library.
- Ware, J.R. (1955). *The Sayings of Confucius*. New York, Ontario: A Mentor Book.

**REFLECTIONS ON A ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION --
"THOUGHTS ON EVALUATION:
MORAL AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS OF GRADING"**

**Richard C. Pipan
Oakland University**

Author's note: This paper offers the author's reflections on the Round Table discussion on the topic "Thoughts on Evaluation: Moral and Ethical Dilemmas of Grading" held at the Midwest Philosophy of Education Conference in Chicago on November 13th 1992. As an alternative to a more conventional, formal paper presentation, this session was proposed to the MPES Program Committee in the interest of promoting scholarly research, reflection and dialogue. This author shares the view -- as expressed in AERA's Division B (Curriculum Studies) *December 1992 Newsletter* -- that "experimental format" sessions ("*...dialogues, multi-media sessions, audience-participation sessions, and other revolutionary things...*") need to be included within the spectrum of, and valued as, scholarly work. In a sense, there was a double dialectic in operation at the Round Table Discussion: not only was the session about evaluation, it was designed as a scholarly activity to provoke questions about *how one evaluates scholarship in the area of evaluation*. It is hoped that future MPES conferences and publications will encourage and reflect emerging forms and practices of scholarship.

The author wishes to thank all those who attended and participated in the session, and special thanks are extended to those who contributed reading materials for our consideration at the discussion. Quotations cited from the Round Table have been transcribed from an audio tape cassette which is available on request from the author.

I. Introduction

It is safe to say that each of us has been subject to processes of

evaluation and grading as we advanced through formal educational systems. Many of us attending the MPES Conference have moved from the role of students as recipients of evaluations and grades to that of teachers who offer evaluations and assign grades to the students enrolled in our courses. [This is not to ignore the fact that, as professors and teachers, we remain subject to evaluation and "grading" procedures consonant with tenure review, ongoing professional development, and peer review of our scholarly efforts. But that is another topic for another time....]

Given the intensity of our discussion at the Round Table session, it is apparent that we are not dispassionate about our role as evaluators of student performance. The matter of effective, articulate and humane evaluation evoked spirited debate and exchange. The focus of this paper will outline moral and ethical dilemmas raised in our discussion, very briefly summarize technical and procedural approaches to evaluation and grading that have been suggested as worthy of our consideration, identify unresolved questions, and last, suggest curricular and educational policy issues that we as philosophers of education might address. As a *reflection* on the Round Table Discussion, this paper is not intended to objectively describe nor "report on" the discussion; rather, it offers selections from the discussion and combines with them this author's impressions and interpretations.

II. Moral and Ethical Dilemmas

In the interest of brevity, moral and ethical dilemmas raised at the Round Table will be framed in the form of questions. Each question will, in turn, be briefly commented upon drawing from key statements made by participants in the session. While, perhaps, not every issue will be recounted here, hopefully the most salient dilemmas will have been conveyed.

1. *How do standardized tests impact our evaluation processes?*

Two interrelated themes emerged in our discussion on this topic: the first raised the issue of the validity and reliability of standardized tests themselves; the second addressed questions of how standardized tests impinge upon the professional judgement of the individual educator. The first theme might be summarized in the following manner: *If a standardized test can be constructed so that it is both valid and reliable, does it serve an educative function and avoid moral and ethical dilemmas?* The crux of this argument is based upon the view that a valid and reliable test avoids bias and is therefore *fair*. The main line of discussion on this theme focussed on two sub-topics: first, the *conditional nature* of fairness, and second, the *function* of standardized testing. On the first sub-topic, Robert Barger advanced the view that fairness is the test of the test. If it can be determined that a test is reliable and valid, then objections to it can not necessarily be made on the

issue of fairness. Arthur Brown countered (citing his and Bob Craig's (1977) publication *Grading Testing and Grading*) that research on standardized testing provides compelling evidence that standardized tests fail to achieve a degree of validity that is adequate to many investigators, are culturally and ideologically biased, and furthermore, "Tests do not do what they purport to do." Given the findings of meta analyses of research on standardized testing, according to Brown, standardized tests are a source of injustice. Even if the criteria of reliability and validity, and therefore fairness, were met, moral and ethical issues remain due to the function of these tests.

Arthur Brown passionately outlined his criticism of standardized testing on pedagogical grounds. Brown maintained that standardized tests impinge upon the professional judgement of individual educators. Brown stated:

I have to rely on my own professional judgement, and I don't want to rely on *others'* professional judgement.... So I [standardized tests] locks me out if my students' grades or status as students will be determined by authorities other than myself.

Brown went on to say:

I just don't want those little standardized tests which are going to divert my attention from my own professional responsibilities and focus my activities and my teaching on the students passing someone else's test.

Brown noted that "Any accountability system which we don't worthily accept is going to... force us into antisocial behavior: lying and cheating." He maintained that research evidence and his own experience show that educators will often "teach to the test" and will thereby often subvert the test in the interest of their students' (and their own) survival within an accountability system which values and employs standardized tests.

Given the conditional acceptance of, and the criticisms leveled against, standardized testing, its use in educational settings remains fraught with moral and ethical dilemmas. Also given that we as educators are rarely able to examine and critique standardized tests administered to our students, we frequently remain ignorant of the specific limitations or inadequacies (and attributes) of any specific test. The locus of control for such assessment and evaluation remains outside our individual (and sometimes collective) judgement.

2. *Given the emergence of portfolio assessment as a form of evaluation, what promise and problems are associated with this approach?*

The strongest case made for considering student portfolios as evidence of their achievement was that portfolios offer multidimensional, longitudinal and individualized documentation of a student's learning. As an ongoing and unfolding project, portfolios may offer greater opportunities for reflective and integrative analyses of one's inquiry and discoveries. Furthermore, unlike "test-teach-test" forms of assessment (particularly short answer, completion, multiple choice or, especially machine-scored tests), portfolios may promote more dialogic encounters between an educator and her or his students and offer greater opportunities for expansion and improvement of a student's projects. Like many artists who document and preserve their accomplishments within a portfolio, students in courses might make more concrete and tangible their educational achievements. One further possibility of portfolios is that the evidence gathered within it might serve as a resource for the student's future educational and occupational responsibilities. In a sense, it has potential to advance the craft of the student.

While the abovementioned attributes of portfolios within an assessment or evaluation process were noted as potential benefits, some problems and constraints posed by them were also noted. Initial reservations regarding the use of portfolios for evaluation were raised by Ronald Swartz: "I hesitate to think that the public is going to accept...subjective assessment of a portfolio as a criterion for how those students are doing in schools." Swartz points to the trust that "the public" places upon the presumed objectivity and accuracy of standardized tests. By implication, Swartz recognized that "the public" may lack the confidence in an individual educator's professional judgement, criteria for evaluation and objectivity.

On a more logistical level, portfolios were recognized as posing a "data management" problem: What is to be done with the sheer volume of the evidence? How will records be maintained? What storage and retrieval problems will we face? How will the application processes for scholarships, college admission, or employment be affected by the bulk of these documents? While these concerns are logistical, they are not without moral and ethical implications.

In the interest of efficiency, avenues to humane evaluation and assessment may be foreclosed. In the pursuit of objectivity, professional judgement and subjective (intuitive) evaluation are precluded. For the purpose of comparative evaluation, person-centered evaluation is abrogated. Conflicts between institutional requirements and academic freedom arise as conventional and alternative forms of evaluation are considered. These and a host of other dilemmas remain as educators seek more precise and communicative educational exchanges.

3. *Do compulsory or required assignments and/or courses present particular moral and ethical dilemmas?*

If there were ever a proverbial tip of the iceberg, the matter of compulsory or required educational activity certainly underlies the tip. The issue of required courses, or at the microcosmic level, required assignments, seems to be least problematically considered by educators. From our discussion, it appears that few educators or institutions of higher learning have resolved the dilemma of requiring students (and faculty and staff?) to meet *a priori* performance standards. Questions of power, social control, authority, and the direction of educational endeavors are related to this issue of requirements and compulsoriness. It is not uncommon in the pedagogical practices of higher education that professors and curriculum committees define what a student is expected to do and how this is to be evaluated. Both the activities and criteria for assessment are usually decided -- ostensibly in the best interest of the student -- but often without the students' involvement or consultation. At worst, this is simply autocratic; at best, it is a benevolent oligarchy or meritocracy. It is hardly democratic.

One of the issues that arose in our discussion was a case in which a student filed a grievance against a professor for a grade that was received. That some educational institutions have formulated grievance procedures attests to their recognition of the appropriateness of a system of due process to address conflicts arising in academic disputes. A system of review and deliberation may afford some means for adjudicating alleged injustices. The simplest cases merely examine whether the procedures for course conduct and evaluation were followed. More complex deliberations are necessitated when the dispute focuses on the adequacy of the criteria or the professional competence of the evaluator. What is striking here is that it is only the relatively rare cases of formal grievance where such review is conducted; the vast majority of disagreements regarding academic conduct or fairness are borne silently by students. From the cradle to the grave, we are subjected to social, political, bureaucratic and interpersonal power inequalities and injustices arising from these inequalities. While this may be descriptive of human encounters, it need not be accommodated nor tolerated. How we resolve our positional power over students will, to a large extent, reveal the moral and ethical consideration we have focused on the relationship between teacher and student. If any aspect of student-teacher relationships were to reveal power inequalities, the evaluation and grading process would certainly be one.

4. *How are qualitative and quantitative measures addressed in evaluation processes?*

Whether it was the characteristics of standardized tests, the

evaluation of portfolios, determination of the accuracy of grades assigned to students in courses (or on individual projects such as comprehensive examinations), discrete measures of performance took on quantitative overtones. From our discussion, it appeared that the shield against subjective and presumably biased judgement was an appeal to quantifiable indicators. And therein lies one appeal of "objective tests." At times it appears that both students and professors gravitate toward objective-type tests because the focus becomes "How many items were answered correctly?" rather than the more problematic "Is this a correct answer?" or more problematic still "Is this an appropriate item to be included on a test?"

In the grade grievance case cited earlier, a very revealing statement was made by one of the participants in the discussion. In this case and in others, when a student attempts to find out "Why I received this grade?", he or she "expects a quantitative answer." What does this reveal? First, it reveals that as students, we become accustomed to quantitative indicators of our progress; second, it suggests the belief that "unless something can be measured, it shouldn't count." Perhaps the positivist tradition has not yet been transcended! Third, the demand for specificity of criteria for evaluation in advance of educational activity indicates the pervasiveness of convergent curricula. That is, it is presumed that we know in advance that which must be learned and how such learning will be identified and evaluated. While this model of curriculum and evaluation design may be pervasive, it reflects woeful ignorance of phenomenological or experiential concepts or processes.

At the university in which I am a faculty member, our grade reporting system is based upon a 4 point scale. While this in itself presents obvious dilemmas, this grading system is further complicated by the fact that the 4 point scale is -- presumably in the interest of greater precision -- divided into tenths (e.g., 3.8, 3.7, 3.6). With the exception of the most quantitative, objective testing (sic), I question whether one can meaningfully discern a qualitative difference between any of the grade points indicated above. What is the difference between a 3.8 and a 3.7? Have we subjected this grading process to a test of inter-rater reliability? Not to my knowledge. Quantifiable indicators of qualitative evaluation is not an exact science... and may be an art, but is more likely alchemy.

5. What are the bases for standards and criteria used in evaluation processes?

Perhaps the most spirited exchange at our discussion focused on the question of criteria and standards for educational evaluation. As Eleanor Nicholson stated so clearly: "There has to be some, more or less, objective measure as they [students]...make the transition from one level to another." While the qualifiers "more or less" call into question the entire cachet of "objectivity," the desire to identify discrete levels of achievement is well

taken.

Lawrence Dennis outlined what he termed "generic guidelines" for grading:

- a) The grading has to be related to the content of the course and not to character [of the student].
- b) It has to be nondiscriminatory.
- c) All students have to be judged by the same standards.

These "generic guidelines" are helpful in that they not only identify procedures; they communicate normative values as well: the purview of our evaluation in specific settings and within particular social contracts is that the criteria reflect the content of a bounded universe of study. By "nondiscriminatory," we can extrapolate that there must be both a recognition of differences and a striving for justice within the process. As a corollary of the nondiscrimination guideline, whatever standards selected apply to all, fairly.

6. *How do grades function in the educational process?*

Despite widespread discussion of and efforts toward educational reform and "restructuring," little progress has been made in the area of grading. As one participant in the Round Table conversation put it: "There is no talk of getting rid of grades." While it may be true that there are conscientious efforts to improve the evaluation of student performance, these efforts more often than not focus on identifying more significant and meaningful (e.g., "higher order thinking skills" (sic)) learning, not revisiting the issue of grading itself. It appeared that, among those present at the conference discussion, grading just appears to "come with the territory" of formal education.

That grading appears to "come with the territory" does not mean that it is embraced. David Owen testified to the struggle he faces when grading students: "I find grading the most difficult thing I do in all my teaching. And basically I believe I should not do it." Owen admitted that "There's no way to escape it." Perhaps the most condemning criticism offered by Owen was revealed when he charged that "The system has been perverted from without." By this, Owen implicated that interests other than educational were affecting academic processes -- specifically, that business and other interests desire that students be sorted and labelled to facilitate, for example, placement in employment categories. This author cited a distinction that Ralph Nader made during his speech at a Conference of the Center for Academic Ethics at Wayne State University in 1990. Nader, pointing to a traditional and important service that institutions of higher education provide to civic life, stated that these institutions can advocate for and reflect

nonmercantile values. Values such as personal growth and development, social justice, freedom of inquiry, civic responsibility and caring might better be embodied, advanced and defended in institutions committed to education and learning rather than to more narrow economic considerations. When institutions of higher education identify themselves too closely with corporate and vocational interests, the preservation of nonmercantile values may be jeopardized.

Ronald Swartz identified an ethical dimension of grading when he stated that "I think grades are an obstacle for learning and an obstacle for my having contact with my students." If the process of grading erodes authentic, dialogic human relationships, it has miseducative and questionable ethical value. Swartz, like Owen, recognized the seeming unavailability, murkiness and bureaucratic function of grading when he stated (tongue-in-cheek): "I just muddle through every semester and try to get those grade sheets in on time."

Eleanor Nicholson clearly indicated that grading, as opposed to constructive evaluation, is reductionist and unhelpful: "Teachers want to know more about that child or that individual than that he is an 'A' student or a 'B' student or a 'C' student. They want to know how he learns; they want to know what he is interested in; they want to know how he behaves in class. An 'A' or a 'C' or a 'D' doesn't communicate any of that." Nicholson raises crucial questions about how and what is communicated about a student to others. If grades themselves are vague in meaning, opaque to interpretation and unhelpful, surely these are causes for concern. Many of us have recognized some significant limitations of, and moral problems associated with, grading; but even after sometimes decades of experience in this process, the process appears as entrenched and immutable as ever.

III. The Search for Alternative Evaluation Approaches

While the institutional requirements for grading seem unyielding, many have struggled to humanize evaluation *in the context* of grading. Several approaches were discussed at the conference session and will be outlined here.

Foremost among the approaches mentioned was the design of student assignments which fostered ongoing and cyclical review and modification. The heart of evaluation was recognized as the offering of constructive criticism and support for student projects. While the word "feedback" was often used, a more expressive and adequate term that was also used was "*professional judgement*." By providing professional judgement and articulate commentary on student projects, educators extend the educative possibility of each project. By inviting student response and dialogue, by affording possibilities for thoughtful revision and improvement of these projects, the quality of the projects and student learning is encouraged.

Reflective student journals were frequently cited as a means through which an educator (and the student) might better uncover what has been understood in the process of inquiry. Whether autobiographical or more topically focused, journals seemed to be valued for their narrative, integrative, analytical and cumulative qualities. Because they are longitudinal, potentially dialogic, reflective and personal, journals afford greater continuity and developmental scope. More articulate professional commentary may be ascribed to journals.

Inquiry projects also seemed to offer greater opportunities for meaningful learning, and thereby, evaluative substance. Being perhaps less convergent, inquiry projects place greater responsibility on the student to select and pursue topics and questions of interest. Rather than the student having to conform to the questions an instructor finds compelling, the student is afforded the opportunity to identify and frame questions that are personally significant. This process does not negate an instructor's expertise nor responsibilities, rather, it enables the instructor to engage in collaborative planning and inquiry with the student.

Robert Craig noted that he has been employing a Jungian analysis of students to better design learning projects. By better recognizing students' personality characteristics, learning projects may be tailored to draw upon each student's strengths and encourage development in areas of his or her personality that are nascent. This approach holds great potential in that it may better inform evaluators of phenomenological and psychological dimensions of student experiences. Evaluation may then be framed in more meaningful and articulate forms of discourse.

Arthur Brown broadened the scope of evaluation reconceptualization he stated he had "... problems... with an evaluation process when there is too much focus on what the deficiencies are of the student and not why the student has those deficiencies.... The student becomes the one who is penalized for it rather than the system." Brown's indictment of systemic and structural dimensions of formal education offers yet another avenue for addressing moral and ethical dilemmas. The quality of educational experience is not solely the result of student or instructor effort; it is grounded in institutional, social and political contexts as well. Brown's critique advances the cause for organizational and social change.

IV. Unresolved Questions

Perhaps this section of the paper would be briefer if it were entitled "Resolved Questions." Given that the conference discussion did little to put to rest many of the questions that were brought to it, several of the more salient, haunting questions can be cited here as reminders and as a challenge for further thought.

1. *What is excellence in education?*

One participant at the conference session asked the questions: "Excellence -- do we really know what it is?" and "Are we competent to judge excellence?". His reply: "... my answer is 'no' on both grounds. We don't know what excellence is, and we are not competent to judge it. And we should admit it." While extreme, this view is at least potentially honest and courageous. We may recognize excellence and may aspire to it, but judging it with certainty or precision is yet another matter. Evaluation -- especially evaluation of human development, philosophical thought and moral reasoning is far from an exact science. We do the best we can.

2. *Whose standards do we use in evaluating educational achievement?*

While Arthur Brown eschews standardized tests, he readily admits that he upholds standards -- standards he has arrived at through personal and professional experience. Each institution has unique educational, organizational and bureaucratic standards. The question of externally as opposed to personally (and professionally) determined standards remained a significant topic of debate.

3. *Should we rank, sort or otherwise label students?*

Some participants were resolute in their acceptance of a competitive educational ethic; others objected to subjecting education to that logic. If education is to serve a stratification function, comparative grading may be consistent with that function. If education is to serve a human-centered, personal growth and development function, comparisons may be extraneous to the process.

4. *Can grading and evaluation serve an educative function?*

There was general consensus that evaluation should and can be educative. To subject one's efforts to the review of those whose judgement and expertise we value can be a powerful means to understanding. The translation of evaluative comments to symbolic characters (numbers, letters, etc.) remains more problematic. Grading was more often viewed by participants in the discussion as an obstacle or unsavory aspect of teaching. Perhaps there is something to be learned from engaging in processes that challenge our deepest sensibilities. The question remains, however, what we will learn from this experience and how our actions will be guided by our understanding.

V. Curricular and Educational Policy Issues

To summarize the curricular and educational policy issues raised by the questions that focused the conference discussion and which arose upon

reflection, several recommendations might be offered. If education is to promote social democratic values, the evaluation and grading processes need to reflect and uphold those values. Evaluation and grading processes that are meritocratic and which exacerbate social stratification (especially as such stratification reinforces cultural advantage or disadvantage) are problematic. If the purpose of education is the facilitation of human growth and development, do our evaluation and grading processes enhance or inhibit such growth and development?

A convergent curriculum of cultural transmission may be enacted to "uphold the standards" of any given society. But as a process of maintenance of the status quo, such a curriculum model is often guilty of unproblematically accepting its own standards. A critical curriculum of cultural transformation seeks to examine and submit to critical reflection the standards and values advocated by educators and the institutions of which they are members.

What remains starkly clear from our discussion and subsequent reflection upon it, is that grading rather than evaluation has within it greater potential for coercion and oppression than it has liberative possibilities. No one at our conference session spoke with warmth and ardor about grading as human fulfillment. Many spoke with passion and enthusiasm about how the exercise of professional judgement and communication in the process of evaluation were intellectually and personally gratifying. Perhaps we should listen more carefully to the human voice echoing in the halls of academe....

ENDNOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

Readings that were contributed to the conference Round Table by participants are listed below. Following this list are references this author has found instructive on the topic of evaluation and grading.

Contributed Readings:

An Answer That's a Problem. (no bibliographic information accompanied this document).

Brown, A. (1992) Undergraduate Assessment as Pedagogical and Political Control. Paper presented at the Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore, March 9, 1992, unpublished manuscript.

Brown, A. & Craig, R. (1977) Grading Testing and Grading. *The Elementary*

School Journal, vol. 77, number 5, May 1977, Chicago: University of Chicago.

Grading = Evaluation. In *Memo to the Faculty* from the Center for Research on Learning and Teaching, number 46, October 1971, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Harris, S. (1972) Why Grades Should Be Abolished. In *For the Time Being*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Macdonald, J. (circa 1971) Evaluation and Human Dignity. University of North Carolina at Greensboro, unpublished manuscript.

Revenge for 'F' leaves 4 dead. From the Associated Press, reprinted in *The Ann Arbor News*, May 3, 1992, p. A4.

Russell, W. Selected poetry by various authors: Ciardi, J. "On Flunking a Nice Boy Out of School," Ridland, J. "Grading," Shapiro, K. "Lower the Standard: That's My Motto".

Urmson, J. (1950) On Grading. from *Mind*, LXIX published by the Mind Association, 145-169.

Walsh, B. (n.d.), Position Paper on Grading. Memorandum to Education Department of Merrimack College, unpublished manuscript.

Recommended Readings:

Aronowitz, S. & Giroux, H. (1985) *Education Under Siege: The Conservative, Liberal and Radical Debate Over Schooling*, South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey Publishers.

Eisner, E. (1993) Why Standards May Not Improve Schools, in *Educational Leadership*, February 1993, 22-23.

Huebner, W. (1975) Poetry and Power: The Politics of Curriculum Development, in Pinar, W. ed. (1975), *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists*. Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 271-280.

Knowles, M. (1970) *The Modern Practice of Adult Education: Andragogy versus Pedagogy*, New York: Association Press.

Macdonald, J. (1969) The High School in Human Terms: Curriculum Design, in *Humanizing the Secondary School*, Washington, D.C.: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, NEA, 35-54.

Purpel, D. (1989) *The Moral and Spiritual Crisis in Education*, Granby, MA: Bergin & Garvey.

Simmons, W., & Resnick, L. (1993) Assessment as the Catalyst of School Reform, in *Educational Leadership*, February 1993, 11-15.

Watts, A. (1983) *The Way of Liberation: Essays and Lectures on the Transformation of the Self*, New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill.

UNDERGRADUATE ASSESSMENT AS PEDAGOGICAL AND POLITICAL CONTROL¹

Arthur Brown
Wayne State University

In the early 70's a movement in education grew around the concept of performance or behavioral objectives, discrete and measurable manifestations of academic achievement. In brief, proponents of the movement took the position that performance objectives would systematize the educational process, would make teaching more assessable and teachers more accountable, and, as a consequence, test scores would rise and eventually, also, the economic status of the under class. The fact that none of this came true apparently is regarded as not a sufficient reason for giving up on the concept, for since the publication of *A Nation at Risk* (1983), the testing movement in the public schools has become more powerful than ever.² Further, tracking test scores is now a national pastime, and a comparison of test results with those of students in other countries, a constant cause for breastbeating and an inexhaustible source of grist for political mills.

Although a drop in Graduate Record examination scores has been reported,³ the recent surge in the popularity of assessment programs at the undergraduate level does not derive,⁴ as is the case with the public schools, from unhappiness with test scores. Rather, undergraduate assessment has become popular for a number of other reasons. Foremost among them is the growing economic importance of higher education. For one thing, higher education is now generally considered as the gateway to personal financial success and social status. And, like the schools, colleges and universities have come to be regarded by business and government officials as necessary instruments for success in intra and international economic competition.

Other factors which probably play a role in or contribute to the demand for assessment of undergraduate academic achievement are soaring tuition, the rising cost of state support, a perception that the education of undergraduates is being sacrificed for research activities, excessive reliance on graduate teaching assistants and part-timers, the trend toward centralization in institutional governance, and the political and public relations value of assessment. But there is more to the matter--much more. Certain values associated with higher education, viz., professional autonomy, academic

freedom, free and open inquiry, and pluralism, do not sit well with many conservatives, a number of whom are ardent advocates of assessment. By channeling the curriculum and/or establishing a system of accountability for educational outcomes, many conservatives, I would venture to say, hope to gain control over those values. I don't believe that it would be inaccurate to include among them William Bennett, Allan Bloom, E.D. Hirsch, and Chester Finn along with Presidents Reagan and Bush and a host of state governors. I shall elaborate on this later. But first I should like to go back in time to provide some perspective, at least on my own views. In 1968, I gave a talk entitled, "Education and the New Morality," in which I made the observation that

. . . the New Morality represents a reaction to one or another of the various kinds of established authority and traditional moral codes on the assumption that they fail to achieve for individuals their fullest human potential and limit excessively the opportunity for self-direction, [and that] the New Morality is the historical and logical extension of a long-standing quest to expand individual freedom.⁵

True, much of what went on in the name of the New Morality was irrational and destructive. Yet the late 60's were euphoric days of experimentation at a number of schools and colleges. Among my recollections is a young member of a quite conservative physic department, who created a stir by experimenting with Rogerian techniques in his introductory physics course. (His contract, of course, was not renewed.)

Although I correctly predicted in that 1968 speech a reaction to the New Morality (as is the case with virtually all such movements), including a call for "constitutionalism" and "back to the basics" in education, I certainly did not anticipate the force and pervasiveness of that reaction. And so, 16 years later, in 1984, in another talk, "Pluralism--with Intelligence: A Challenge to Education and Society," I said:

. . . the liberal and humane spirit of the New Morality, predicated on faith in human intelligence to control events, has given way to a pervasive conservatism which values instead accommodation to presumed independent realities. Thus, we are witnessing once again the rise of absolutism and determinism, exemplified by ... religious fundamentalism and its intrusion into politics and education; renewed faith in the "invisible hand" for resolving economic problems; the revival of social darwinism as a rationale for legitimizing hierarchical social arrangements; and confidence that studies

of our genes, such as those done by ethologists and sociobiologists, will be able to inform our ethics and our politics.

It is not diversity, then, it is not cultural pluralism or ethnic differences or divergent thinking which, in my view, pose a major threat to democratic community in America. Rather it is conformity--the conformity generated by bureaucratized social institutions, entrenched economic and political interests, monopolized sources of information, and moral majoritarianism.⁶

Assessment in higher education I see, then, as an extension of the new conservatism in American Society, as a move toward conformity. Though rationalized as a means for heightening institutional efficiency⁷ and improving the educational experiences of students, in the final analysis assessment is driven by a philosophic orthodoxy which promises to undermine the values which higher education represents.

Before pursuing the matter further, I want to inquire briefly into what assessment is and what it is supposed to accomplish. According to one expert,

...assessment is a method for the psychological evaluation of individuals that involves testing and observing individuals in a group setting, with a multiplicity of tests and procedures, by a number of staff members. Through a pooling of test scores and subjective impressions, the assessors formulate psychodynamic descriptions of the assessed subjects which, hopefully, will permit prediction of certain kinds of behavior in certain kinds of roles and situations.⁸

If one can cut through the Kafkaesque imagery in this definition, at least we have a place to start in examining how assessment in undergraduate education might be conducted and what might be expected of it. For that purpose, I thought it would be helpful to examine how well assessment programs used in some other parts of the academy predict "certain kinds of behavior in certain kinds of roles and situations." The research I have looked at is, to say the least, not encouraging. To illustrate.

In a 1987 study of 247 people who had taken the Iowa licensing exam in social work, Johnson and Huff concluded:

The written test, used for social work licensures, falls short in measuring knowledge unique to the profession; furthermore, there is not a demonstrated relationship

between a written exam and practice competence.⁹

Johnson and Huff added that the "major issue raised by the...study is the validity of the examination.... [I]t does not appear to measure an applicant's knowledge of social work practice."

Although in this instance the issue was the validity of the social work licensing exam, Johnson and Huff do make the assumption that knowledge of the criteria of practice competence for social workers exists. Whether that be true, I do not know, but it seems *not* to be the case, at least, for medical clinical competence, according to Forsythe and his associates. In a 1986 study, they observed that there is a need for further development of a theory of medical competence, one that

- (a) explicitly defines the attributes comprising medical clinical competence and their indicative behaviors,
- (b) specifies relationships between the attributes, and
- (c) explicitly considers attributes in the context of methods of measurement.¹⁰

Since it is obvious that the first prerequisite for having confidence in an assessment program is knowledge about what constitutes professional or occupational competence, Leonard Baird's conclusions should be especially disquieting to advocates of assessment. In a very comprehensive review of studies on the subject of prediction, published in 1985, entitled, "Do Grades and Tests Predict Adult Accomplishment?," Baird points out that: "In general, the studies demonstrated low positive relationship between academic aptitude and/or grades and accomplishments."¹¹ And one of the reasons for the low positive relationships, Baird adds, "is the statistical inadequacy and unreliability of criteria [for accomplishment]."¹²

We find ourselves, then, in a bit of a dilemma, do we not? If we accept Baird's conclusion, assessment is chimerical. Hence, we should stop any further discussion about it until we can uncover the criteria for successful accomplishment in the several occupations and professions. Further, if the criteria for successful accomplishment in the occupations and professions are hard to come by, what shall we say about the criteria for assessing undergraduate education, the major purpose of which, I presume, is to enable students to live a "successful" life in a democratic society?

Regardless of the questionable ethical foundation on which it rests, assessment will no doubt continue to play a major role in academic life. We may not be able to predict "adult accomplishment," but at least we can do some legal sorting and screening as well as satisfy, to some extent, the public demand for accountability. With the advent of assessment activities designed

to evaluate the education of undergraduates, the problem that must be addressed is how to employ them in such a way that they do as little harm as possible, and perhaps some good.

For that purpose I turn to a brief review of what has happened at my own institution. For several years, Wayne State University has been in the process of developing a program of assessment, but, unlike the situation in many institutions, not because of a mandate from the state to do so. Assessment of students in the major field as a condition for graduation was first proposed almost 10 years ago by the President of the University. After much delay, the matter was subsequently studied by the Curriculum and Instruction Committee of the University Council (now called the Academic Senate).

Following a year of study, in April 1987 the Committee submitted a report which it titled, "The Program Evaluation Plan," as distinguished from a prior administration draft policy which was titled, "Assessment of Comprehensive Knowledge in Major Fields for Undergraduate Programs." What distinguished the plan put forward by the Curriculum and Instruction Committee from that of the administration draft policy was that it called for *program evaluation* and rejected *assessment* of individual students.

In studying the problem, the committee came to the realization that the assessment of student knowledge as a condition for graduation was a hazardous enterprise that would encounter a minefield of unreliable and invalid tests as well as heavy resistance from faculty and students. Hence, C&I cautioned: "Faculty, students, and administrators must work together in the decision-making process," and

The program must move forward carefully and deliberately, in order to gain the respect of faculty and students, and to avoid policies and procedures that will alienate faculty and be detrimental to the goals of the University.

At one forum or another, the C&I committee made plain its belief that assessment does not have to include testing; that tests are the most controversial part of assessment; that valid, reliable tests are not available; that they are by far the aspect of assessment most threatening to students and faculty; that program evaluation must be the focus, not assessment of individual students; that program evaluation can be effectively made through the use of such techniques as surveys of student and alumni satisfaction, interviews, performance reviews, and seminars; and that it can be carried out with only a sample of students, rather than the total population. All in all, the Program Evaluation Plan, which I shall call "soft assessment," would

seem to be a reasonable approach toward improving undergraduate education without risking the alienation of students and faculty or doing too much damage in other ways.

When it approved the plan proposed by the Curriculum and Instruction Committee, in order to ensure no misunderstanding on the part of the administration, the University Council added an amendment: "...the Program Evaluation Plan *shall not* [italics mine] contain a provision for mandatory universal testing as one of the instruments to be used for evaluation."

Notwithstanding the position of the Council, the administration expressed its intention to push ahead full speed toward an assessment program which *would* examine the knowledge of *all* students in both general education and in their major field. With respect to testing in general education, the Provost pointed out that the "administration does not necessarily agree...that the mandatory testing of general education skills and knowledge should be precluded in the development of an assessment plan."¹³ And with respect to the assessment of students in their major field and the role of testing in such a program, the Provost said:

...This issue is a clear and focussed one. It asks this question: does a student who receives his/her degree in economics (anthropology, mathematics, education, accounting, etc.) have a mastery of the core subject matter and the intellectual method of that field? This question can presumably be answered only by assessing the specific knowledge that each student has in his/her subject area. Answering this question especially lends itself to testing, although that is not the only method for addressing it.

And, the Provost added:

The University administration remains strongly committed to a policy of systematic assessment of students' knowledge in the major field. This would assure that students are properly prepared in fields in which the University certifies their knowledge by awarding them a degree. It would serve students by advising them of the level of their competence in their field, thus guiding them toward further education if necessary. As a secondary effect, such assessment would serve academic units well by informing them whether their curriculum is properly focussed and whether teaching is effectively conveying the subject matter to students. It

would also permit evaluation of grading systems by allowing academic units to compare student grade point averages in courses with student performance on assessment devices representing core knowledge in the field.¹⁴

As for the position of the President of the University on testing students in their major field, although not yet fully committed to that procedure, the President observed that a "vast number" of departments in the University do use the Graduate Record exam as a condition for admitting students into their graduate programs. And every department, he said, does require qualifying exams for doctoral students prior to the writing of the thesis. "So, assessment of knowledge is not completely unknown to the University."¹⁵ (The President, no doubt, meant testing rather than assessment.)

To sum up, the views of the administration are in conflict with those of the University Council on two major points. First, the administration expressed itself as committed to assessing *each* student in the major field as a condition for graduation; the Council, on the other hand, recommended that the emphasis be on evaluation of programs and, therefore, for that purpose, assessment could be confined to only a sample of students. Second, the administration is at least open to, if not positively in favor of, testing as part of an assessment program; the Council categorically opposes testing.

One may wonder why it is that the recommendations of academicians who are by tradition responsible for certifying students for graduation and who had made a reasonably comprehensive study of the problem were not readily accepted, especially in a situation where the state had not mandated an assessment program. I offer a few explanations. They obviously do not exhaust the possibilities, but they may serve as a basis for a more comprehensive analysis of a very difficult and important problem confronting higher education. What I shall say here is an extension of my earlier remarks.

First, institutions of higher education have become highly politicized; the loftier values which higher education represents are more subordinate to political and economic considerations than was previously the case. As a result, presidents have been rendered especially sensitive to public demands. Along with other criteria commonly perceived as signs of success, like research grants and contracts, assessment, including testing of individual students, can be used to demonstrate to its several constituencies that the institution is very concerned about the quality of its undergraduate educational programs.

Second, the competition for students, money, and prestige has accelerated, and has rationalized the view that tighter controls are needed. As a consequence, the decision-making process in institutions of higher education

has become more centralized, more bureaucratized.¹⁶ Insofar as the curriculum contributes to a college's competitive posture, some find it reasonable to assume that its effectiveness, like that of other institutional activities, would be enhanced by greater centralization of authority. What follows is inevitable. Centralized control of the curriculum ultimately will mean control of the faculty (a possibility that might not be especially distasteful to some administrators; faculty, after all, can be an unruly lot). Consider in this regard the implications of the aforementioned statement by the Provost that assessment of each student in the major field would serve to determine "whether [the] curriculum is properly focussed and whether teaching is effectively conveying the subject matter to students," and "would permit evaluation of grading systems by allowing academic units to compare student grade point averages in courses with student performance in assessment devices..." Under such circumstances, contract renewals, tenure, promotion, and merit pay could well depend on the scores on uniform and externally constructed examinations made by students of a particular professor in particular courses.

Third, college and university presidents, I would judge, are generally not well read in educational theory or knowledgeable about pedagogical research. (Some are, in fact, disdainful of such matters.) And they have made it through the system passing tests and being evaluated at every turn; hence the idea of assessment and the use of standardized, external examinations pose for them no philosophic problem. Indeed, I would venture to say that very few chief executive officers in higher education would not feel favorably disposed toward E.D. Hirsch's best selling book, *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Should Know*, with its conservative values and political orientation and its traditional pedagogical views. Nor, I might add, would they look to Dewey or Buber or to contemporary educational theorists like Maxine Greene or Henry Giroux for guidance in educational matters.

My concluding remarks should come as no surprise. However desirable tight control may be for certain functions in a university, e.g., the financial accounting system, it is not desirable for the academic function, especially at the pre-professional level. In fact, it is likely to be educationally destructive. This is not to say there should be no controls; some may be of pedagogical value (program reviews, for instance). But the academy thrives on a certain amount of untidiness. It needs room and freedom to experiment and to deal with unconventional ideas, particularly "dangerous" ones. Professional autonomy constitutes the heart of education. As Bertrand Russell put it:

The teacher, like the artist, the philosopher, and the man of letters can only perform adequately if he feels

himself an individual directed by an inner creative impulse, not dominated and festered by authority.

Further, professional autonomy and academic freedom are indivisible. Insofar as an assessment program constricts professional autonomy, it also constricts academic freedom and, as a consequence, undermines the essential values of higher education which are so vital to a democratic society.

And it is not only professional autonomy and academic freedom which are endangered. The educational process itself--what goes on between teachers and students--inseparable as it is from the essential nature of the academy--will be compromised. If outcomes at the undergraduate level are to be measured using standardized tests or externally constructed examinations--and this seems to be the core of most assessment programs--and an accountability system is instituted, the same kind of corruption of the educational process, such as teaching to the test and the trivialization of the subject matter, can be expected at the higher level as has occurred in the schools, to say nothing about the plight of students who pass courses but fail assessment tests.¹⁷ Moreover, the most competent teachers will either not want to enter the profession or, if in it, will leave. Eleanor Friedman may show the way. I cite a New York Times article entitled, "The System' Wins Over a Dedicated Teacher."

Dr. Eleanor Friedman, an outstanding New York English teacher and department chair, described as a woman in perpetual motion in the classroom who proffers William Faulkner's words as if they were a gift, who takes enormous pleasure in finally teaching her slower students that they must bring a pencil with them each day, has retired at age 54. "I really thought," she said, "when I was 70 years old somebody would say 'You cannot teach any more' and pull me out the school kicking and screaming. I thought that was how it would end."

And why is Dr. Friedman retiring? Not because of the kids...."It is the system that I hate. There is less and less interest in what is. They are interested in what it says on paper is." And she is tired of having to draw up lesson plans when she is most comfortable with a few leading questions scrawled on a slip of paper. And she is tired of producing pages of goals and objectives for the coming school year when her goals are quite simply to have the teacher teach and the students learn. "I am out of sync with the system. We are here for the kids. We are not here to make paper for 110 Livingston Street. And that is why I am retiring."¹⁸

ENDNOTES

¹ This is a revision of a paper presented before a small group at the Eighth International Human Science Research Conference, August 18-22, 1989, held at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. I should like to express my gratitude to my doctoral student, Della Goodwin, for her assistance. The revised version was later read at a symposium on "Ethics and the University," Hoffberger Center for Professional Ethics, University of Baltimore, March 9, 1992, and served also as a basis for a panel session on assessment at the 1992 meeting of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society.

² In this connection, of significance is the highly publicized report of the National Council on Education Standards and Testing recently submitted to Congress and the Education Department. The report calls for the establishment of national standards and national tests in English, geography, history, mathematics, and science and the possible use of the results of those tests in determining who graduates from high school, who is admitted to college, or who is certified for certain types of employment. The National Council on Education Standards and Testing serves as an advisory panel to the National Education Goals Panel "which is charged with overseeing the national effort to achieve the six education goals that President Bush and the governors established in 1990." See Thomas J. DeLoughry, "National Standards for Schools Backed in Report to Government Leaders," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, February 5, 1992, p.A35.

³ "The Governors' Report on Education: Text of the Section on College Quality," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 7, 1986, p. 79.

⁴ In 1991, 81% of colleges had assessment activities underway as compared to 55% in 1988. Much of the increase is no doubt attributable to state mandates (in about 40 states) or newly established requirements of regional accrediting associations. See Theodore J. Marchese, "Introduction," and other sections of the *NCA Quarterly*, Fall, 1990. (The *Quarterly* is a publication of the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools.) Also see Education Commission of the States, *Assessing College Outcomes: What State Leaders Need to Know*, November, 1991.

⁵ "Education and the New Morality," in Fisher and Smith, *Schools in An Age of Crisis* (Van Nostrand Co.), 1969.

⁶ "Pluralism--with Intelligence: a Challenge to Education and Society," ERIC, Vol. 22, No. 1 (January, 1987). For an elaboration of this thesis, see Donna

Kerr, *Barriers to Integrity: Modern Modes of Knowledge Utilization* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 1983. Also see Steven Tozer, "Elite Power and Democratic Ideals" in Kenneth Benne and Steven Tozer (eds.), *Society As Educator in an Age of Transition*, 88th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1987.

⁷ Proponents of assessment at the higher level would do well to study the history of efficiency movements in the public schools. The most frequently cited work is Raymond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), 1962.

⁸ Donald Mackinnon cited in Terry W. Hartle, "The Growing Interest in Measuring the Educational Achievement of College Students," *Assessment in American Higher Education: Issues and Concepts* (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Educational Research and Improvement), n.d.

⁹ David Johnson and Dan Huff, "Licensing Exams: How Valid are They?," *Social Work*, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 159-161.

¹⁰ George D. Forsythe, William C. McGaghie, and Charles R. Friedman, "Construct Validity of Medical Clinical Competence Measures: A Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix Study Using Confirmatory Factor Analysis," *American Educational Research Journal*, Summer, 1986, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 315-336.

¹¹ Leonard L. Baird, "Do Grades and Tests Predict Adult Accomplishment?," *Research in Higher Education*, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 3.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.7.

¹³ Sanford Cohen, "Assessment of Student Knowledge: Information Report," Academic Affairs Committee Agenda, July 15 and September 9, 1987.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ Minutes of the September 9, 1987 meeting of the Academic Affairs Committee of the Board of Governors.

¹⁶ See Ernst Benjamin, "Democracy in the University," *Thresholds in Education*, February, 1989, Vol. XV, No. 1, pp. 19-20. Benjamin is the General Secretary of the American Association of University Professors.

¹⁷ For some years, students at Wayne State have had to pass proficiency examinations in English, math, and speech prior to graduation. Failure on the English exam (at least) has aroused considerable unhappiness among students who had earlier passed their English courses.

¹⁸ *New York Times*, June 15, 1983, Section 2, p.5. Mohammed Ali once said about the same thing. When asked how he planned to fight a particular opponent, he replied: "I have no plan. I go into the ring with all my tools and will use whatever the situation demands."

TEACHING IN A POSTMODERN WORLD

Susan V. Aud, Southern Illinois University
Winner of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society's
1992 Graduate Student Award

I. Introduction

We live in a postmodern world. Contemporary sociologists and historians describe the myriad ways in which we have stretched the ideals of modernity and progress to their breaking point. Kroker, Kroker, and Cook (1990) declare postmodern culture in North America "what is playing at your local theater, TV set, shopping mall, office tower, etc. . . . not the beginning of anything new or the end of anything old but the catastrophic implosion of America within a whole series of panic scenes at the *fin-de-millennium*" (p. 443).

What is postmodernism? Though all scholars credit twentieth century architecture for generating the term, there are many interpretations of what postmodernism means when applied to culture and philosophy. Aronowitz and Giroux (1991) argue:

The discourse of postmodernism is worth struggling over, and not merely as a semantic category that needs to be subjected to ever more precise definitional rigor. . . . Postmodernism in the broadest sense refers to an intellectual position, a form of cultural criticism, as well as to an emerging set of social, cultural, and economic conditions that have come to characterize the age of global capitalism and industrialism. (p. 62)

Mongardini (1992) also makes a distinction between the postmodern condition and the ideology of postmodernity. He says, "The postmodern condition is . . . modernity which has become a problem" (p. 56). The modern search for truth in the form of knowledge which improves the control of reality has had, ultimately, the opposite effect. Technology, information, and urban life have all generated as many problems as they have yielded improvements in the quality of life. Hence the mood of panic, the assumption of change as a value, and what Mongardini (1992) noted as "the

rediscovery of the aesthetic justification for life" (p. 61).

What is apparent to many people is that postmodernism is a major paradigm shift, as defined by Kuhn (1971), in both the academic world and the world at large. Mongardini's emphasis is on the permanent nature of this shift. He says:

Whether we like it or not, and whatever the terms we like to use, the postmodern condition marks the end of an old order. It is a cultural revolution, silent, a long-term affair which is, above all, characterized by the radical change in the relevance and priorities of needs, choices, objects and experiences of material life. (1992, p. 57)

Postmodernism has major implications for both research and education. In keeping with the new frontiers of research methodology (Rowland, Rowland, & Winter, 1990), what follows is fiction--but fiction originating in a real teacher's attempt to understand how to teach in changing schools and universities.

Janet finished the presentation of one of her favorite pieces of ethnographic research with a question.

"Can you think of what skills the children you work with bring to school that you could build on, use to forge a connection with the subject matter you're trying to get across?"

She could tell from the quiet absorption of the class that the research had affected them as she had hoped. It took them a few moments to react.

"What amazes me," said Ann, shifting in her chair and coming to life, "is the children who come to school knowing every word of an M.C. Hammer song and not knowing their colors! I mean, it's such a basic thing. It's so easy to teach your children. I can remember when my kids were little, every time we'd go outside in the winter, for instance, I'd say, 'Would you like to put on your red mittens or your green gloves today?' --things like that every day. My kids knew their colors by the time they were three or four."

"Colors are important to you," reflected Janet.

"You bet! Colors are so basic to all the instructions we give in school. I tell a child to get out their blue book, or look at the red heading in the table of contents, and these kids are lost."

"But if--just imagine if--we didn't set up schooling that way. Are colors really so important in life?"

Even as Janet asked that question she could see the disbelief spread over their faces. She was questioning something much too basic. These graduate students weren't ready to suspend a construct they had all mastered

in kindergarten, and been so consistently rewarded for using.

Silence. . . .

And then Marguerite broke the tension with hearty irony, "If they're going to drive a car through an intersection with a traffic light, they'd better know colors!"

Laughter. Relief.

Janet laughed too, and dropped it. She could have argued with Marguerite. After all, color blind people drive, and have learned to pay attention to other cues, such as the position of traffic lights. But she knew there is only so much change you can expect of people in eight weeks time. She had planed the seed of doubt in these teachers, and could only hope that, in a classroom with children whose versions of reality were obviously different from their own, that seed would sprout, grow, and bear fruit of tolerance for diversity.

Later that day, and throughout the rest of the term, Janet couldn't help reflecting on that interchange.

The relativity of culture.

Being truly supportive of other cultures means accepting a different version of reality—that was the key concept she had hoped to impart when she was given the opportunity to teach the summer's course on multicultural education. But she had underestimated, even to herself, what impact that concept has on the psyche.

Until that day in class, Janet had never questioned the value of talking specifically about colors with young children, though she had noticed how some adults seemed obsessed with colors when they talked with preschoolers. When Ann brought up that example, Janet had suddenly recognized a cultural eccentricity in the energy devoted to teaching the construct of color. But her personal noumenon was not something she had the ability to teach, and that was frustrating.

Janet's noumenon was, of course, my own. The unease that comes with encountering a concept you know is important, but one you are not yet skilled enough to teach, stayed with me until I delved into the literature on postmodernism. For the first time, I began to understand why that class incident was so disturbing, and so crucial.

Postmodern thought goes beyond the existentialist assertion that reality is relative. Ontology is both relative *and* absolute: There is a real cosmos, but there are many relatively valid versions of it. The social construction of reality, first extensively discussed by Berger and Luckmann (1966), has become more accepted as communications technology makes us aware of so many different others. We realize that cultures can have very different perceptions of what is real, which the same people in those cultures

share, and which is reflected in their language. But cultures and their interpretations of reality also change, and hence postmodern scholars have been busy deconstructing our former interpretations of history, art, and literature. Foucault (1972), for example, advocates scrutinizing all social constructs in order to come to more mature understanding:

We must question those ready made syntheses, those groupings that we normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; . . . and instead of according them unqualified, spontaneous value, we must accept, in the name of methodological rigour, that, in the first instance, they concern only a population of dispersed events. (p. 22)

The centrality of a critical view of human history and the interpretation of both past and present events is also stated by Lyotard (1979/1984): "Simplifying to the extreme," he says, "I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives" (p. xxiv).

But, as many of us--including "Janet"--have discovered, it's difficult to live with relativism. Anderson (1990) describes the unexamined malaise that characterizes the academic world:

Few of us realize that even to hold a *concept* of relative truth makes us entirely different from people who lived only a few decades ago, and we complacently overlook the evidence that many people living today profoundly hate the view of reality that seems so eminently tolerant and sensible to the Western liberal mind. . . . Nor have we pursued our liberal tolerance to its logical conclusions, and accepted the enormous uncertainties and vast possibilities of the life it opens up before us. (p. xii)

Postmodernism is still, and may for quite a while remain, in the process of being conceived and defined. Its accelerated development, according to Anderson (1990), was stimulated by the social turmoil of the U.S. in the sixties, which, he claims, "left a legacy of doubt about the public reality---about all public realities" (p. 48). He adds:

In a way we have all dropped out--not out of the modern worldview completely, but out of the simple acceptance of it that once prevailed, and certainly out of the innocent belief that there are no alternatives. (p. 48)

I believe this "dropping out" of the "simple acceptance of the modern worldview" has had a profound effect on the lives of children who have been born since the 1960's. So much so, that we, as teachers, are failing to connect with kids on the most fundamental levels: what is truth, and what is reality. In the remainder of the paper I will present five directions for classroom teaching on all levels that I believe are indicated by postmodernism.

II. Global Perspectives

The technological infrastructure of the postmodern world consists of four elements: communication links and networks (hardware); sensors connecting the networks to the real world; burgeoning data bases; and information processors--the people who keep the network operating, enter the data, and manipulate the sensors (Borgman, 1992, p. 102). This technological network makes it possible, for the first time in history, for almost all people to experience the same event, in what Anderson (1990) calls "global theater."

Anderson (1990) describes a personal experience of global theater, travelling in Europe during the demonstrations and subsequent military action that took place in Tienamen Square. Everyone was watching television, lured by the sense that something important was happening, but unable, and perhaps not even desiring, to do anything about it.

Our children, and we ourselves, if we hope for our children to reach maturity with the potential for living a good life, will have to do something about it. There is growing recognition that our Western capitalist standard of living, endorsed by the modern idea of progress, cannot be physically supported indefinitely (Rifkin, 1980; Weiner, 1990), and cannot continue to be exported and promoted as attainable by all people (Lasch, 1991). We share the same planet, the same limited resources, with a host of peoples, and our fate is inextricably linked with theirs.

Teaching globalism--what Anderson (1990) calls "the half-discovered shape of the one unity that transcends all our differences" (p. 231)--is already gaining ground in United States schools. In 1989 the state of Iowa created a standard which calls for each school board to adopt a plan which incorporates global perspectives into all areas and levels of the educational program (DeKock & Craig, 1989). Since 1988, the Advancing Teaching and Learning in Arkansas Schools (ATLAS) program has arranged for international, interpersonal connections between participating Arkansas districts and Guatemalan schools and teachers (Stanford, 1990). Currently operating are a student art exchange and a joint writing project, one of which was initiated by the American teachers, and the other, by the Guatemalan teachers.

Small communities, as well as cities, all over the U.S. now have technological and interpersonal links to the world, and creative teachers like

Roselle Chartock are assisting their students in investigating those global connections. Chartock (1991) challenged student teachers to prepare global education units through local links, and they unearthed the following in the town of North Adams, Massachusetts:

- A major factory had ties with Mexico.
- The local Catholic church sponsored friendship projects with Haiti.
- The owner of a gift shop made frequent buying trips to Guatemala.
- A neighboring college hosted several Asian and African students each year while the students completed master's degrees. [etc. through 6 more items] (p. 51)

These local links were used as a springboard to learning more about the cultures of the countries through inviting the appropriate community resource persons into the classroom and researching the cultures in the local library.

III. Reflection on Our Inner Voices

The uncritical acceptance of our cultural norms results in a state Zais (1976) calls "encapsulation." Because of the postmodern networks and links, it is difficult for us to remain unaware and unaffected by differing worldviews, but many people still attempt to retreat to what is perceived as a psychologically safe haven. Wiggins (1989) states: "The sign of a poor education, in short, is not ignorance. It is rationalization, the thoughtless habit of believing that one's unexamined, superficial, or parochial opinions and feelings *are* the truth" (p. 57).

Therefore, postmodern teachers must strive to instill the habit of reflective thinking in their students. Reflection allows a person to recognize both inner and outer influences upon his or her thought. Canning (1991) describes her method of teaching reflective thinking and writing, and states her rationale as follows:

When each person is ready, he or she has access to the questions as well as the "answers" needed for the challenges of his or her own life, and in reflection these are internally uncovered and integrated into the subjective fabric that is that person's self-concept and worldview. (p. 18)

Such reflection and intrapersonal integration must recognize the possibility of internal dialogues--the expression of the multiple internal voices we usually

possess. To allow these voices to be heard in personal reflection is not to be schizophrenic, but to be sane in a postmodern world.

IV. A Renaissance of Progressive Education

Aronowitz and Giroux (1991) echo John Dewey in their vision of postmodern education. They declare:

We argue that any viable educational theory has to begin with a language that links schooling to democratic public life, that defines teachers as engaged intellectuals and border crossers, and develops forms of pedagogy that incorporate difference, plurality, and the language of the everyday as central to the production and legitimation of learning. (p. 187)

Especially important to postmodern education, according to Aronowitz and Giroux, is the development of public discourse in schools which is built on both diversity and the pursuit of the common good. The main instructional tool they feel will accomplish this is what they term "counter-memory"--or, by their definition, a "critical reading of how the past informs the present and how the present reads the past" (p. 124). Students and teachers jointly engage in intellectual criticism of history, culture (including popular culture), and current events.

Wiggins (1989) summarizes the evolution of curriculum, and maintains that the oldest forms of instruction still dominate our schools:

The myth that everything can be learned through didactic teaching amounts to a pre-modern view of learning. . . . The lecture--once necessary in a world without ready access to books--survives as a dominant methodology. (p. 45)

As Dewey did, Wiggins believes that "the modern educational task is to put students in the habit of thoughtful inquiry, mimicking the work of professionals" (p. 47). The postmodern curriculum makes essential questions its focus.

At Central Park East Secondary School in East Harlem, all courses are designed around the following five sets of questions:

1. Whose voice am I hearing? From where is the statement or image coming? What's the point of view?
2. What is the evidence? How do we or they know? How credible is the evidence?
3. How do things fit together? What else do I know that

- fits with this? [or what reader response theorists in the field of English literature call "intertextuality"]
4. What if? could it have been otherwise? Are there alternatives?
 5. What difference does it make? Who cares? Why should I care? (Wiggins, 1989, p. 57)

The role of the teacher is to be the "intellectual librarian" who helps students find non-canonical literature and history, human resources, and new methods of expression that can add new perspectives on these questions in relation to any given subject. An interdisciplinary team teaching approach obviously makes this role more possible, more creative and productive.

The return to the model of progressive education is notably postmodern. It reflects a growing realization by educators that instructional models based only on humanistic psychology, scientific inquiry, or critical theory have not met the needs of students or society (Bell & Schniedewind, 1989). The social construction of a global reality necessitates individual and societal skills of cooperation and dialogue, and the sharing of personal, as well as material, resources. A variety of restructuring techniques are being used at the classroom, school, and district levels to effect the return of progressive education in its postmodern form (Jervis & Montag, 1991).

V. Postmodern Styles of Inquiry

Kniep (1989) proposes four domains of student inquiry in the progressive tradition which will serve us well in the 21st century:

The Study of Human Values: Universal values defining what it means to be human and diverse values derived from group membership which contribute to particular worldviews.

The Study of Systems: Global economic, political, technological, and ecological systems.

The Study of Global Issues and Problems: Peace and security issues, national and international development issues, local and global environment issues, and human rights issues.

The Study of Global History: Focusing on the contact and borrowing among cultures and civilizations and the evolution of human values, contemporary global systems, and the causes of today's persistent problems. (p. 43)

The last domain should be investigated from multiple points of view to be truly postmodern.

Besides the shifting focus of inquiry in a postmodern world, new methods of conducting research are also needed. The fine arts have always been one of the human ways of interpreting the world, but, in the postmodern age, they no longer have to be totally separate from, or subsidiary to, the sciences.

Gallas (1991) encouraged her first grade class in Brookline, Massachusetts to use the arts as a way of exploring and expressing knowledge. Her pupils studied the life cycles of insects through drawing, drama, and song, as well as through more traditional techniques of observation, semantic mapping, and discussion. One of her examples:

Sean, who is a talented artist, had become fascinated by the notion of relative size. He asked if he and Jeffrey could do a picture to go with his poem. They spent a week working on a huge mural, drawing towering blades of grass, large rocks and giant sunflowers, then adding tiny insects trudging up the huge plants. Sean's fascination expanded my ideas of what was possible both for these children to grasp conceptually and for all of us to achieve aesthetically. (p. 46)

On a graduate and post-graduate level, this recognition of the arts as a way of knowing includes the use of fiction to report and conduct educational research (Eisner & Peshkin, 1990; Rowland et al., 1990). Elliot Eisner has articulated at length the rationale for using artistic, as well as scientific, approaches to research (Eisner, 1981). He clarifies the differences between the two, and advocates the use of both methods in the field of education:

Science aims at making true statements about the world. Artistic approaches to research are less concerned with the discovery of truth than with the creation of meaning. . . . Truth implies singularity and monopoly. Meaning implies relativism and diversity. . . . Each approach to the study of educational situations has its own unique perspective to provide. Each sheds its own light on the situations that humans seek to understand. The field of education in particular needs to avoid methodological monism. (Eisner, 1981, p. 9)

Rowland, Rowland, and Winter (1990) also point out the uses of fiction in the beginning of investigations in education:

Writing in a fictional form enables familiar ideas and experiences to be brought into new relationships, and new ideas to be set alongside the familiar. Through fictional writing related to our professional context we can test out new ideas and explore the values upon which our practice is based. (p. 291)

In a postmodern world, we can't afford to limit our ways of perceiving, sharing, and constructing knowledge to the narrow parameters of modern science, when concepts such as "facts," "data," and "laws" have been shown to be as subjective as any other form of expression.

VI. Stories as Curriculum

The assembly line metaphor has dominated education in this century, supporting the linear ends-means concept of educational planning through the use of educational objectives, or measurable units of instruction. Egan (1988) proposes the story as an equally useful metaphor for planning instruction, and offers an elaboration of the framework of stories which could be used.

For example, Egan (1988) encourages primary grade teachers to model their lessons on the fairy tale by 1) identifying the importance of the topic and what makes it affectively engaging, 2) finding binary opposites that best capture the importance to serve as a source of conflict, 3) organizing the content into a dramatic or literary form, 4) arriving at a resolution (or possible resolutions) of the dramatic conflict, and 5) identifying methods of evaluating the children's knowledge of the content which are consistent with its presentation.

Gudmundsdottir (1991) studied secondary teachers who already teach this way, identifying themes (stories) which unite the content they teach over the course of a year through narrative strands, such as "war" or "economic value." Though these stories did not sound like traditional myths, legends, or fairy tales, differing both in content and structure, Gudmundsdottir felt they contained enough similarities to provide a prototype of what she calls "pedagogical content knowledge as a narrative way of knowing" (p. 210)

VII. Conclusion

The postmodern condition is urgently with us, but postmodern ideology is controversial. Many communities are scandalized by the concept of relative truth and divided by the decision of what to teach in their schools. For schools and for society at large, the advent of postmodernism raises more questions than it answers.

The United States and the former Soviet Union have been the quintessential modern societies, the two political poles of modernity. But Marxism has now been abandoned, and the Soviet republics do not seem to

want to remain united. Though many see this as the victory of capitalism and democracy, will capitalism itself, and hence the U.S., suffer a similar fate?

Many social analysts note the growing polarization between various groups in our nation. Will "schools of choice" become the educational system championed by increasingly alienated parents, and, if school choice becomes the dominant system, what will prevent these groups in our society from becoming even more polarized?

Are contemporary schools flexible enough in structure to accommodate postmodern teaching styles? Will our society be able to acknowledge the value of these styles and support teachers? Will a national curriculum be necessary to overcome the divisive struggles over local curricula?

It is not enough for postmodern educators to develop new teaching styles to reach postmodern students. We must also inform ourselves about our world's shifting paradigms and be democratically active in our communities and school districts, to promote greater unity while advocating the support of our cultural diversity. It is a critical time to clarify our educational philosophy and firmly root our curriculum and instruction in a realistically postmodern framework.

REFERENCES

- Anderson, W.T. (1990). *Reality isn't what it used to be*. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
- Aronowitz, S., & Giroux, H.A. (1991). *Postmodern education: Politics, culture, and social criticism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Bell, L., & Schniedewind, N. (1989). Realizing the promise of humanistic education: A reconstructed pedagogy for personal and social change. *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, 29, 200-223.
- Berger, P., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company.
- Berman, M. (1982). *All that is solid melts into air: The experience of modernity*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Borgmann, A. (1992). *Crossing the postmodern divide*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Canning, C. (1991). What teachers say about reflection. *Educational Leadership*, 49(7), 18-21.
- Chartock, R.K. (1991). Identifying local links to the world. *Educational Leadership*, 49(8), 50-52.
- DeKock, A., & Craig, P. (1989). One district's commitment to global education. *Educational Leadership*, 47(1), 46-49.
- Egan, K. (1988). Metaphors in collision: Objectives, assembly lines, and stories. *Curriculum Inquiry*, 18, 63-86.
- Eisner, E. (1981). On the differences between scientific and artistic approaches to qualitative research. *Educational Researcher*, 10(4), 5-9.
- Eisner, E., & Peshkin, A. (Eds.) (1990). *Qualitative inquiry in education: The continuing debate*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *The archaeology of knowledge*. New York: Pantheon Press.
- Gallas, K. (1991). Arts as epistemology: Enabling children to know what they know. *Harvard Educational Review*, 61, 40-50.
- Gudmundsdottir, S. (1991). Story-maker, story-teller: Narrative structures in curriculum. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 23, 207-218.
- Jervis, K., & Montag, C. (Eds.) (1991). *Progressive education for the 1990s*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Kniep, W.M. (1989). Global education as school reform. *Educational Leadership*, 47(1), 43-45.
- Kroker, A., Kroker, M., & Cook, D. (1990). Panic USA: Hypermodernism as America's postmodernism. *Social Problems*, 37, 443-459.
- Kuhn, T. (1971). *The structure of scientific revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Lasch, C. (1991). *The true and only heaven: Progress and its critics*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.

- Lyotard, J.F. (1984). *The postmodern condition: A report on knowledge* (G. Bennington & B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (original work published 1979).
- Mongardini, C. (1992). The ideology of postmodernity. *Theory, Culture, & Society*, 9, 55-65.
- Rifkin, J. (1980). *Entropy: Into the greenhouse world*. New York: Viking Press.
- Rowland, G., Rowland, S., & Winter, R. (1990). Writing fiction as inquiry into professional practice. *Journal of Curriculum Studies*, 22, 291-293.
- Stanford, B. (1990). My air, your rain forest: An experiment in global responsibility. *Educational Leadership*, 48,(3), 97-100.
- Weiner, J. (1990). *The next one hundred years: Shaping the fate of our living earth*. New York: Bantam Books.
- Wiggins, G. (1989). The futility of trying to teach everything of importance. *Educational Leadership*, 47(3), 44-59.
- Zais, R.S. (1976). *Curriculum: Principles and foundations*. New York: Harper & Row.

ON EDUCATING THE EMOTIONS: SOME RECENT IMPLICATIONS ON MORAL EDUCATION

Robert P. Craig
University of Houston

There has been a long tradition in philosophy and in moral theory which has separated human emotions from principles and processes of human rationality. Plato is an exemplary theorist in this regard. His metaphor of the soul being the captain and the body being the ship demonstrates his distinction in another context.¹ That is, the soul ought to control the body, with its passions and emotions. St. Augustine held a similar view with his separation between the flesh and the spirit.² Likewise for Immanuel Kant practical reason bears no relationship to human interests, emotions and desires.³

Even as recently as in the work of the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, human reason and affect are rigidly demarcated. Kohlberg asserts that "affect is merely an aspect of cognition" if this were true moral education would merely be a process of applying the rules of reason and logic to moral problematics; and virtue ethics would be a contradiction in terms.

Recently, however, the moral philosopher and the moral psychologist have become unlikely bedfellows. Philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre find it necessary to address the historical and emotion side of human agency.⁵ Reinterpreting the thought of Aristotle, it becomes necessary to view human moral growth more holistically, as the interest in the relationship(s) between human character and the development of moral dispositions and virtues necessitates a close examination of the place of human emotion in the moral life.⁶

Put more technically, some process must guide moral judgment-making besides human rationality, for as MacIntyre, among others, argues human rationality is the name of nothing clear. That is competing views of rationality are inherent in various moral traditions.⁷ Thus the discernment of perception and virtuous dispositions is, in part, directed by well ordered affectivity. Reason and affectivity, then, interplay and interact within moral experience.

I. Rationality and Human Emotions

Amelie Rorty has noted the difficulty in defining the nature of

human emotions.⁸ She writes that the emotions, whatever they are, "do not form a natural class."⁹ Although she emphasizes the cultural, historical and personal factors in emotions (and in the development of virtue), she is unable to gain any precision as to their exact nature.

Bernard Williams comes to the same fork in the road. He suggests that philosophers generally have found little analytical connection between emotions and moral concepts or language.¹⁰ Although Pascal says somewhere that "the heart has reasons the mind will never understand," the reasons of the heart resist precise correlation and definition in relationship to the reasons of rational explanation.

Robert Solomon argues that the view that emotions are mere blind impulses caused by unconscious forces is false.¹¹ He refers to this view of the emotions as "the hydraulic model," that is, the emotions are seen as bursts of energy which lift us up to act in certain ways.¹² On the other hand, Solomon suggests emotions are at heart (to mix a metaphor) rational judgments or evaluations. He writes:

... they require an advanced degree of conceptual sophistication, including a conception of Self and at least some ability in abstraction. They require at least minimal intelligence and a sense of self esteem and they proceed purposefully in accordance with a sometimes extremely complex set of rules and strategies.¹³

Yet as Paul Ricoeur has argued, emotions are rational in a limited sense, that is, they follow the principles (logic) of pre reflective awareness.¹⁴ What makes emotions rational is that they, like rationality, are teleological: indicating purposiveness and intelligent ordering. As Solomon says:

Every emotion lays down a set of standards, to which the world, other people, most importantly, our Selves are expected to comply.¹⁵

Solomon then is critical of the Aristotelian view that the purpose of human life is directed towards happiness. Solomon finds this view too ambiguous and indeterminate. Rather he argues that the purpose or ordering of the emotions is towards self-esteem. In fact, this is precisely why emotions are rational for Solomon: they constitute strategies which maximize self-esteem.¹⁶

It would take me too far afield to elaborate on the 37 emotions Solomon describes. Suffice it to say that he notes that the emotions have an integral relationship to human moral judgment-making. In fact, human emotions are constituted in such a way that they possess constitutive

judgments about the nature of human existence, the natural world, and normative requirements regarding human action, that is, the emotions become guiding patterns leading to purposive action. Yet Solomon realizes that human emotion is often self-defeating, for humans are often not aware of the import of the logic of their emotions.¹⁷ The educational task, then, is to bring emotions to consciousness so that humans can (and must) become morally responsible for them.

Ruberto Unger is another theorist who argues that emotions are informed by a purposive, ordering structure.¹⁸ Yet, unlike Solomon, Unger does not describe emotions in terms of rational structures or strategies. Rather he writes that emotion is:

The living out of a specific aspect of the problem of solidarity. . . . Remember that these conditions (to be able to assert oneself as person) are the imperative of engagement with other people and the need to prevent this engagement from turning into subjugation and depersonalization . . . each passion is conceived as no more than a typical recurrent place within the same unified experience of mutual longing and jeopardy.¹⁹

But Unger takes his argument one step further by noting that human emotions, such as love, hope, and faith, ought to be the bedrock of a stable society: In fact, these ought to be the very emotions which transform social institutions, according to Unger.²⁰ Put differently, it is love, hope, and faith which are affirming emotions, for they affirm the other in relationship to human engagements and projects. Other emotions, such as hate, pride, and envy, have the opposite result, namely, subordinating rather than engaging the other. What makes Unger's and Solomon's views on human emotions similar is that they both argue that emotion has a basic structure and purposiveness. This teleology of emotions is integral to each thinker. Unger, however, uses a phenomenological method, which Solomon is more analytical. Likewise, Unger's field of interest is broader than Solomon's: Unger is concerned with the transformation of social institutions; while Solomon is primarily concerned with the transformation of the individual, that is, the bringing to individual consciousness the directionality of one's emotional life.

As suspected, there has been much reaction by the philosophical and psychological communities to Solomon's and Unger's work. Some critics, such as Stephen Leighton, argue that rationality and emotions are logically distinct.²¹ This is the case because rational judgments can (and do) occur without emotions, and vice versa. Michael Stocker notes that some emotions are based upon evidential belief structures.²²

Solomon insists that such evaluations of his position are overly-intellectualistic.²³ He further argues that emotions are inherent in structures, and thus cannot properly be analyzed in isolation from these structures as Leighton and Stocker apparently attempt. As Solomon replies:

An emotion is the entire system of judgments that constitute the emotion by virtue of their place in that system.²⁴

The movement, then, between rationality and emotions is not a strictly logical one. One's beliefs and experiences enter the web of rationality/experience; but humans interpret their world through rationality and emotions.²⁵ Put differently, the world is experienced through the judgments (rational/emotional) we make.

To give an example, many human judgments (the use of rationality) have built into them, as it were, specific emotions. I am told that because of budget cuts I will not receive a raise in pay this year. As I begin to grasp the whole situation (the work I did, the expectations I had, what I had been told by my department chair, what my family needs, etc.) I begin to feel an intense sense of injustice. The emotion is built into the grasping of the situation. The imaginatively I recollect experiences which help me interpret the situation (This same situation occurred when I was at another university. It happened this way...). The above two experiences, stimulated by the emotion of injustice, but tempered by rationality (the imaginative reconstruction of experience), let me to an action, motivated largely by my emotion. So, I say, "Well, next year I'm going to do more of the things I like, such as spending more time with the kids and with me poetry--as I may not be rewarded financially for my hard work anyway."

II. Emotions and Moral Principles

It is often the case that human emotions are contrasted with moral principles. This is an awkward way of saying that the recognition that a moral principle applies to specific situation *x* is a rational process, unaffected by the emotions.²⁶ Although it is true that contradictory judgments about how to act in situation *x* need resolution, what I wish to argue is that the emotions play a necessary role in leading to moral judgment-making.

As Patricia Greenspan has noted, conflicting emotions within a moral problematic are both healthy and creative. She writes:

Commitment to different points of view, in short, can motivate behavior unlike to arise from emotional detachment.²⁷

Although she suggests that emotions are not incompatible with rationality, she

also argues that emotions are closer to attitudes than to mere rational judgments. Yet, emotions are attitudes "that generally correspond to judgments, but which seem to exhibit a logic of their own."²⁸ I will dwell on the relationship of the culture and the education of the emotions in the next section, suggesting that the above is integral to the logic of the emotions. Likewise, the appropriateness of emotions in a particular situation or moral problematic does need the justification of rational moral principles. As Greenspan says:

...an emotion seems to be appropriate relative to a particular set of grounds, and not necessarily a unified evaluation of ones total body of evidence.²⁹

Take the example of a high school basketball team winning the state championship. The coach of the losing team may (appropriately and sincerely) experience envy at the other team. Thus, conflicting emotions can, and do, occur in response to human situations. The logic of appropriateness here is much different than the logic of the acceptability of X moral principle in Y situation. Put differently, the tightness (perhaps type) of logic applied to the truth of X moral principle is different than the logic of the appropriateness of x emotion. What is being discussed are two areas of discourse and response, perhaps, that of truth in relationship to emotions. The point that since emotions can be evaluated as either appropriate or inappropriate suggests they are judgments.

Amelie Rorty goes further when she argues that emotions need more than rational (or evaluative) appropriateness in specific situations or moral problematics. She connects emotions with habits and habits with virtue.³⁰ And she notes that the virtuous person possesses a particular type of emotional configuration, namely, a practical wisdom "...with appropriate habits arising from well-formed perceptions and attitudes."³¹ This, she notes, will lead to human "thriving," that is, "habits arising from well-formed perceptions and attitudes," will lead to the development of moral character.³²

Rorty also argues that there is a moral aspect to the appropriateness of emotional experience. She writes:

Rationality (as defined by truthfulness supported by validity) is a central guide to appropriateness, and appropriateness a central guide to flourishing.³³

Although I would quibble with her definition of rationality always encompassing truthfulness, what Rorty is asserting is the connection between rationality and emotional appropriateness in specific moral problematics.

It is clear, then, if the above is correct, that moral education consists of much more than the development of logic and rational approaches to applying moral principles to specific moral problematics. Moral education also consists in ordering one's emotions and perceptions, developing sound emotional habits (responding to specific situations appropriately and habitually), self-examination regarding one's beliefs, attitudes and preferences, and as Stanley Hauerwas insists, identification with a specific moral community and its stories,³⁴ among other factors perhaps. This makes moral education more complex than theories which emphasize the development of rationality convey. But, it also makes moral education more realistic, as the human person is more than his/her reason, and human persons relate to more problematics in a holistic way. To note such complexity does not mean that moral education is unmanageable. A task for some future theorist is to ingrate the various elements previously mentioned into a holistic theory of moral education. My task in the final section will be to turn to one aspect of the task (and even to this necessarily briefly and inadequately): the education of the emotions.

III. Education And Human Emotions

John Dewey notes that such characteristics as "open-mindedness, single-mindedness, breadth of outlook, thoroughness, assumption of responsibility...are moral traits."³⁵ Dewey likewise argues that attitudes "have ethical value and have moral results."³⁶ It seems like, then, although Dewey would not agree fully, that learning how to be appropriately angry, how to show care and compassion, when and what to fear, what to admire, and so on are more important in moral education than the mere inculcation of moral principles.

As Dewey also notes, human emotions contain cognitive, affective, and volitional ingredients.³⁷ Again a mere approach to moral education which emphasized the education of rationality and logic as the *modus operandi* of moral growth is one dimensional. Moral educators also need to pay attention to habits, beliefs, attitudes, etc. when attempting to educate the emotions.

Roger Scruton offers some prescriptions for educating the emotions. He distinguishes between universal and particular emotions. Universal emotions, such as admiration and contempt, are directed at impersonal objects, he suggests; while emotions such as love and hate are directed toward particular individuals. Universal and particular emotions demand a different type of pedagogy, he argues.³⁸

Take the universal emotion of courage. The teacher would educate for the emotion of courage by illustrating historical and contemporary examples of its opposite, that is, cowardice. This develops in the student "a sense of what is appropriate not just here and now but universally."³⁹ Put

another way, the student is able to generalize through a *via negativa* process from what is appropriate generally (what does not generally count as courage) to what generally does.

Particular emotions, on the other hand, since they are tied in a integral way to ones very personness, demand an individual response.⁴⁰ One does not grieve the death of someone he/she does not know the same way one grieves the death of a spouse, for instance. Thus, universal emotions are related to this or that particular individual.

Scruton also suggests that since emotion is tied to culture we learn what to feel by learning what to do (an acceptable cultural practice) in specific circumstances.⁴¹ It is in this sense that particular emotions take on more universal characteristics. For instance, various religions have specific practices when death occurs, and it is by knowing what to do (which practice of grieving is appropriate that) that one learn how to grieve. This is a more relative sense of universal that Scruton used previously (but in cultures like the United States there is a pluralism of customs and practices related to specific emotions. Yet this is at least a recognition that there is a relationship between what one does and the education of the emotions.

As I have noted elsewhere, it is sad that moral educators have neglected the education of the emotions.⁴² Moral education has recently emphasized the cognitive to the neglect of the affective. This is a common criticism of such approaches as cognitive developmental psychology.⁴³ The education of the emotions, then, serves at least two functions: (1) if tied to appropriate community ways of acting in situations such as those eliciting anger, grieve, or joy, the education of the emotions anchors them in a support mechanism, that is, the individual knows how to respond emotionally in specific situations. (2) Education of the emotions also has a transforming quality. The development of empathy, for instance, when tied to specific practices, transforms the individual from mere egotistical responses to other more interrelational ones. Is this not at the heart of what we mean by moral education?

ENDNOTES

¹ Plato discusses various metaphors of the relationship between the body and the soul in *Phaedo*, in *Plato's Phaedo*, trns. by F.M.A. Grube. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977).

² St. Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. by R.S. Pine-Coffin. (New York: Penguin Books, 1961).

³ Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. by Paul Carus. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977).

⁴ Lawrence Kohlbert, *Essays on Moral Development*, Vol. 1 (San Francisco: Harper & Ros, Publishers, 1981), p. 143.

⁵ Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).

⁶ MacIntyre develops an Aristotelian approach to morality in *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Amelie O. Rorty, ed., *Explaining Emotions*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

⁹ *Ibid* p. 104.

¹⁰ Bernard Williams, *Philosophical Papers*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

¹¹ Robert C. Solomon, *The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 144

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 240. Solomon has likewise defended this position in "On Emotions As Judgements," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 25 (1988), pp. 183-191.

¹⁴ Paul Ricoeur, *The Rule of Metaphor: Multidisciplinary Studies in the Creation of Meaning in Language*. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).

¹⁵ Solomon, *The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion*, p. 201.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 384.

¹⁷ Solomon, "On Emotions As Judgements," pp. 185-187.

- ¹⁸ Roberto Manabeira Unger, *Social Theory: Its Situation And Its Task*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.
- ²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 115.
- ²¹ Stephen R. Leighton, "A New View Of Emotion." *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 22 (1985), pp. 133-141.
- ²² Michael Stocker, "Emotional Thoughts." *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 24 (1987), pp. 59-69.
- ²³ Solomon, "Emotions as Judgements," p. 186.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 187.
- ²⁵ Brain Hall, *The Genesis Effect: Personal and Organizational Transformations*, (New York: Paulist Press, 1986).
- ²⁶ This is a common interpretation of Kant's position, for instance.
- ²⁷ Patricia Greenspan, "A Case of Mixed Feelings: Ambivalence and the Logic of Emotion," In Rorty, ed., *Explaining Emotions*, p. 223.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 234.
- ²⁹ *ibid.*, P. 236.
- ³⁰ Amelie O. Rorty, *Mind in Action*. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), p. 131.
- ³¹ *Ibid.*
- ³² *Ibid.*
- ³³ *Ibid.*, p. 134.
- ³⁴ Stanley Hauerwas, *Truthfulness and Tragedy*. (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1977).
- ³⁵ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1936), pp. 356-357.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 357.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Chapter 13.

³⁸ Roger Scruton, "Emotion, Practical Knowledge and Common Culture," in Rorty, *Explaining Emotions*, p. 526.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 529.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 530.

⁴² Robert Craig, et. al., *Ethnic Committees: A Practical Approach*. (St. Louis: CHA, 1986).

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Chapter Three

**PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION AND RELEVANCE
FOR THE '90s: REGULAR EDUCATION INITIATIVE
AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTIONISM**

**Janis B. Fine
Loyola University Chicago**

When we begin to seek a firm base for an education suited to our age, we encounter at once a most obvious and, at the same time, a most fundamental truth: education is always a function of some particular civilization at some particular time in history. It can never be a purely autonomous process, independent of time and place and conducted according to its own laws. It is as much an integral part of a civilization as is an economic or political system. The very way in which education is conceived, whether its purpose is to free or enslave the mind, is a feature of the civilization which it serves. The great differences in educational philosophies and practices from society to society are due primarily to differences in civilization.¹

The degree of success that a person with disabilities enjoys in the normal routine of daily life does not depend solely on his or her skills and abilities. In large measure, integrating people with disabilities into contemporary society depends on the attitudes and actions of the citizens.

Society controls who enters and who is kept out, so as the gatekeeper lets some visitors pass but refuses others. For a particular individual, society's gatekeeper may have been a doctor who urged parents to institutionalize their child, a teacher who resisted having any problems in class, or an employer who had no interest in hiring workers with disabilities.

How society views people with disabilities influences how individual members of the community respond. In the '90s society's views are being changed by people who believe that our past principle of exclusion is primitive and unfair. Nowhere can we find this better exemplified than in recent court cases and laws.

Since the 1975 passage of Public Law 94-142, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, federal and state laws have protected the civil rights and have assured equal education opportunities for all disabled students. The law, amended three times by Congress, requires that a free and appropriate public education be provided the disabled student in the least restrictive educational setting that meets his or her needs. As states are

permitted to determine the delivery models for compliance, service systems have varied from state to state.

Many states across the nation are currently in the process of aggressively adopting the Regular Education Initiative (REI), a concept which emphasizes increased collaboration between regular and special education, and a change in the way that education has traditionally provided education services to disabled students. REI seeks to develop a network of support services and resources to assist the student with disabilities in the regular classroom. As a concept, REI strongly recommends restructuring the relationship between special education and regular education. It advocates a shared responsibility between regular and special education for disabled students.

Concurrent with the adoption of REI has been the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Effective in phases which began in January 1992, the ADA is a federal law designed to eradicate discrimination against physically and mentally disabled individuals. Considered the most sweeping anti-discrimination law since the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the ADA requires equal treatment of disabled persons in various aspects of contemporary life: public and private employment; public transportation, commercial facilities and other public accommodations; and telecommunication services.

George S. Counts epitomized the progressive educators during the Depression who urged American educators to assume the ideological commitment to create a "new social order."² Counts urged educators to examine the culture, and ally with those social forces and groups that exemplified the democratic ethic in the light of emergent trends. He challenged teachers to "fashion the curriculum and procedures of the schools so that they could shape the social attitudes, ideals and behavior of the coming generation."³

This paper will examine the underlying philosophical and ideological bases of the Regular Education Initiative. As such, REI will be examined as an agent of social reconstructionism as it utilizes the classroom as a specialized social agency established to bring children into group life through the deliberate cultivation of socially preferred skills, knowledge and values. The schools, then, will help to create the society that embraces the philosophy underlying the Americans with Disabilities Act...an allegiance to human equality, brotherhood, dignity and worth.

It is said that a society can be judged by the way it treats those who are different. By this criterion, our society has less than a distinguished history. We have long perpetrated an attitude of intolerance toward the disabled. The story of the disabled on the pages of world history is often saddening and pathetic. Through a brief historical perspective, attitudes toward the disabled can be recognized.

Even in ancient times, the disabled posed an economic hazard to the group in that they neither joined the hunt nor assisted in the production of food supplies. They required the safeguard of their tribesmen against both wild beasts and tribal enemies. If they were deserted by the fleeing tribal enemies. If they were deserted by the fleeing tribe, the handicapped were easily captured by the enemy and often became the victims of cruel ceremonies and rites.

In ancient times, in keeping with the ancient Greek's admiration for physical perfection and the Athenians' worship of beauty, infanticide was widely practiced. Physically handicapped children were exposed, destroyed or deserted. Cripples, dwarfs and other physically deformed persons were otherwise exploited as jesters and entertainers for the courts. The mentally handicapped were considered demon-possessed as their confused mumblings were taken as manifestations of evil spirits.⁴

The Middle Ages were characterized by ridicule and scorn for the crippled. To nobility, they continued to provide amusement, entertainment and a source of mockery. Anything inexplicable was attributed to black magic. In the case of the handicapped, exorcisms were performed in order to drive the evil spirits out of the victim's soul.⁵

A new philosophy emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which influenced the attitudes toward the handicapped. Realism, with its emphasis on the use of the senses and the inductive methods in education became the basis for training the disabled. Yet, by the 1800s, proponents of Social Darwinism came to view limitations of intelligence as stigmatic and degrading to a complex social order. Shortly thereafter was launched the negative eugenics movement based on Social Darwinism. By applying the Darwinian theory to the human race, it would be possible to eliminate the unfit, and man could actively assist nature in promoting the survival of only the highest quality of human being. The second decade of the 1900s witnessed the emergence of sterilization laws in the United States as well as a burgeoning of state institutions to segregate those who were deemed as menacing taints to an otherwise pristine society.⁶

The decade of the 1950s heralded the turning point for the handicapped community. The disabled, community members and professionals participated jointly as social change agents in major legislative efforts and landmark litigation. Significant advances for the disabled were witnessed in two forceful trends: expanded recognition of human and civil rights and substantially increased federal funding of human services and programs.

Regrettably, when local public schools began to accept a measure of responsibility for educating exceptional students, a philosophy of segregation continued to prevail. Children received labels such as mentally retarded and emotionally disturbed. Children were confined mainly to isolated self-

contained classrooms.

As our concepts of equality, freedom and justice were expanded, exceptional children and their families were gradually moved from isolation to participation. The recent history of increased integration of special education is related to the civil rights movement.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination based on race, color or national origin. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 extended civil rights to people with disabilities. This regulation states, in part, that "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual, shall, solely by reason of his handicap be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." It called for expanded opportunities to children and adults with disabilities in education, employment, and various settings.

Yet, as Section 504 was not a federal grant program, it did not provide any federal money to assist people with disabilities. Rather, it imposed a duty on every recipient of federal funds not to discriminate against handicapped people. It demanded that no handicapped person may be excluded from a program because of the lack of an appropriate aid. Emphasis was on accessibility to a program, not on physical modifications on all structures.

As federally funded facilities complied with Section 504, persons with disabilities had increased accessibility and integration into the mainstream of society. Section 504 called for nondiscriminatory placement in the most integrated setting appropriate, and served as the basis for many court cases over alleged discrimination against individuals with disabilities.

The special education legislation which followed on the heels of Section 504, P.L. 94-142, applied to the educational placement of handicapped children in the least restrictive environment. Handicapped children were to be placed in special classes or separate schools only when their education could not be achieved satisfactorily in the regular classroom, even with special aids and services. In fact, full integration into the regular classroom was rare. Pull-out resource services as well as self-contained special education classes continued to segregate the disabled student both educationally and socially. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote, in his landmark Supreme Court decision *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954), "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal, as they generate a feeling of inferiority as to children's status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone." Such segregation of the students into special education divisions continued to undermine the full integration of disabled and non-disabled participants. Attitudes of separatism and exclusion have continued.

Most recently, the Regular Education Initiative movement in special education has taken hold around the country. Led by special educators, this

initiative strongly recommends the restructuring of the relationship between regular education and special education. The regular education classroom, with expanded and enhanced resources and services, would become an effective and successful instructional program for disabled students. It would, in effect, cease the dual system of education that has existed for special education students since the passage of P.L. 94-142, a system, which by virtue of its duality, has inhibited true integration.

The REI concept, when implemented appropriately, develops a network of support, services and resources to assist the student with disabilities in the regular classroom. Regular Education Initiative demands a strong emphasis on communication, collaboration, planning and problem solving for teachers and students and teachers in the regular education classroom.

The seeds of REI were planted almost a decade ago by Madeline C. Will, then Assistant Secretary for the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services of the U.S. Department of Education. The seeds are sprouting now, on the heels of the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act, a federal law designed to eradicate discrimination against physically and mentally disabled individuals.

After easily passing Congress, the ADA was signed into law on July 26, 1990. The ADA has been called the most sweeping anti-discrimination law since the Civil Rights Act. Although titled the Americans with Disabilities Act, it protects all qualified individuals regardless of citizenship or national origin. As reflected in Section 2 of the ADA, Congress found that, as a group, disabled persons tend to be isolated and relegated to an inferior status in society, and that discrimination against disabled persons is exacerbated by architectural, transportation, and communication barriers. The ADA, therefore, requires equal treatment of disabled persons in various aspects of contemporary life.

Title I of the Act covers public and private employment. Title II covers the activities of state and local governments, including public transit. Title III prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in the provision of goods and services by or within virtually all buildings to which the public is admitted such as, hotels, restaurants, movie theaters, auditoriums, bakeries, doctors, lawyers and accountant's offices, hospitals, banks, barber shops, museums, libraries, and social service establishments such as day care centers or homeless shelters. Finally, telecommunications services are covered in Title IV. The overall goal of the ADA is to integrate individuals with disabilities into society. To advance this goal, the Act is designed to ensure disabled individuals full and equal access to the same, or similar benefits enjoyed by the general, non-disabled public.

Those educators who now urge the adoption of the Regular

Education Initiative are restructuring educational provisions and opportunities to likewise ensure disabled individuals, the students, full and equal access to the same or similar benefits enjoyed by the general, non-disabled students. Those educators and policy-makers are social reconstructionists as they reconstruct educational institutions and values to meet the needs of modern life.

George S. Counts, considered to be the first and foremost proponent of reconstructionism, stated in *Dare the School Build a New Social Order* that the great crises of the twentieth century were a result of profound transition and rapid change. According to Counts, it is not change itself but rather, the inability of humans to deal with change that promotes crises. Counts believed that educational systems had failed to equip people, both cognitively and attitudinally, to deal with pervasive social and cultural changes. The crisis was further compounded because change occurred multilaterally, that is changes in one arena of society affect changes in other arenas.⁷

As the ADA both prohibits discrimination in hiring and promotion on the basis of disability, disabled and non-disabled will work and advance together in their careers. The required removal of physical barriers in public places will further ensure the transition toward a society where the disabled are fully integrated. A reconstructed program of special education into the regular education program would then have the school functioning as a specialized social agency. The full integration of disabled students would enculturate all children into the group life of this new social order. Exclusionary attitudes toward the disabled would be eradicated through this deliberate cultivation of socially preferred skills, knowledge and values.

As Counts wrote in *The Social Foundations of Education*, a fact never to be forgotten is that education, taken in its entirety, is by no means, an exclusively intellectual matter. It is not merely a process of acquiring facts and becoming familiar with ideas. The major object of education since the beginning of time has been the induction of the immature individual into the life of the group. This involves not only the development of intellectual powers, but also the formation of character, the acquisition of habits, attitudes, and dispositions suited to a given set of living conditions, a given level of culture, and a given body of ideals and aspirations.⁸

As the American Disabilities Act seeks to remove barriers to individuals with disabilities, it stands to have great impact on the overall infrastructure of American society.

The current widespread adaption of the REI will prepare our young citizens for the full integration of individuals with disabilities into mainstream life. As it ceases the dual system for special education, and it takes the disabled child into the regular education milieu, it will come to be regarded not only as an educational concept whose time has come, but moreso as a

great agent of social change.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ George S. Counts, *Education and the Promise of America* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1955), 24.
- ² Gerald L. Gutek, *George S. Counts and American Civilization: The Educator as Social Theorist* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1984), 15-20.
- ³ George S. Counts, *Dare the School Build a New Social Order?* (New York: John Day, 1932), 28-29.
- ⁴ Douglas C. McMurtric, "Early History of the Care and Treatment of Cripples," *Johns Hopkins Bulletin* 25, No. 276 (1914): 49.
- ⁵ Merle E. Frampton and Hugh Grant Rowell, eds., *Education of the Handicapped* (New York: World Book Company, 1938), 46-47.
- ⁶ Blecker Van Wegenen, "Surgical Sterilization as a Eugenic Measure," *Journal of Psycho-Aesthetics* 18 (1914): 185-187.
- ⁷ Counts, *Dare the School....*
- ⁸ George S. Counts, *The Social Foundations of Education* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), 536.

SKETCHES OF A PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE RHYTHMS & EDUCATION

Louis Silverstein
Columbia College, Chicago

Some years ago, when I returned from a sabbatical leave, many a colleague of mine inquired of me as to what did I do with my time. I responded: "Reflection, contemplation and communion." Inevitably, my response was followed with these words: "Yes, but what did you do?"

In this essay I am not so much concerned with the discipline which can be characterized as compliance with external demands made on the self to hew the straight and narrow line, but, rather, with the discipline that resides in and emanates from the self, the discipline that one owns and carries with oneself as part and parcel of one's very being, the contribution to which being one of the great gifts which we can help impart to our students.

A human can be conceived of and perceived in a number of ways, one of which is a system of energies seeking release and expression in the daily life of the self. These energies which the child brings into the world are then played upon by the forces of socialization of which education plays a most significant part, to gravitate toward and resonate with a chaotic beat, that is a pattern of rhythms lacking direction, cohesiveness and focus, or to gravitate toward and resonate with a harmonious beat, that is a pattern of rhythms (moves) replete with direction, cohesiveness and focus, in essence a disciplined educational path for the self.

Among the courses which I have taught in one entitled, "Contemporary History: Understanding the News." In this course my students and I first place our attention on current news of major import as these events have been reported on in the mass media--both print and electronic. We then proceed to place the issues in a larger historical context that we may gain a broader and deeper understanding of the subject matter at hand. Lastly, we construct alternative future scenarios given the variables and options which we have become aware of during the course of study. Skill acquisition--e.g., learning how to construct models of perception, how to gather and synthesize information, how to ponder and reflect, how to utilize all one's senses for the purpose of gaining understanding--plays as important a role as the actual acquisition of information itself.

In pursuit of the objective of skill acquisition, for the last few years

I have begun each semester's class by giving my students an assignment which they find most unusual and which they react to with groans and cries of disbelief, and, for some, with cries of dismay. Unusual, because it is rare when a teacher assigns his students the task of not doing something. Groans, cries of disbelief,, and even dismay because my students realize immediately, although at differing levels of conscious understanding, that the rhythm of their jives is about to be seriously disrupted, that the beat of their daily existence shall go on but on a vastly different level and be of a vastly different kind.

My students are assigned the task that for one week they are not to read, listen to, or view any print or electronic media--newspapers, magazines, books, radio, tape recorder, CD player, stereo, film, television--save that which they are assigned to do by other teachers or by employers. The primary purpose of such an assignment is to afford my students an opportunity to clearly grasp the enormous role that the mass media play in their lives by having them experience first-hand, utilizing withdrawal as the means in addition to reading, hearing and seeing, how the mass media affect we humans by the manner in which the mass media shape the very nature of the ways in which we experience, make sense of, respond to and move about our world.

When we gather together the next week, I ask each and every student to share with the rest of us how he or she coped with the assignment. As you can readily imagine, virtually all of the students found the assignment--to go "cold turkey" on the media--one of the most difficult tasks to carry out successfully which they have ever been given to do in their entire school experience. Most last no more than two or three days, with a sizable number "turning on" before even a day has gone by. In their own words repeated over and over again semester after semester, "I had to have it."

It is then that we turn our attention to coming to a fuller appreciation and understanding of what *IT* is that so many cannot live without. The *IT* being a living out of a life rhythm and beat which fosters haste over contemplation; shallowness over depth; the sensational over the daily fabric of life; the violent over the gentle; the hodgepodge over the thematic; the hyper over the calm; the descriptive over the imaginative; the destructive over the creative. In sum, quite a lens to see the world through, for as my students put it, what you see is what you get; or, to put it in a more academic way, *how* (in the case of the media, the means) one perceives plays a most important role in determining *what* one perceives and to which life rhythms one becomes habituated to. So while the specifics (the events of the day) change, what remains constant are the conclusions that we draw from the day's events about the world in which we live due to the mind set which we have incorporated into our way of looking at that which the mass media

presents to us in terms of form as much as content.

For the following week, I modify the previous week's assignment. My students are now given permission to read the newspaper, but they can only read one story. They are instructed to read and re-read this one story until they feel confident that they really understand the story--in addition to its contents, its premises, its assumptions, its biases, its conclusions (implicit as well as explicit) its effect(s) on their lives. They are further told to reflect on what more they would want to know about the subject of the story to gain a more complete understanding of the event being reported on as well as to reflect on how they would have written the story to make it more objective and informative. In effect, they are asked to read in depth rather than speedily or superficially, to be more concerned with understanding than with finishing. (But "Dr. Silverstein, how can I read like you want me to when I have so many and so much class assignments to do?")

Come the next class meeting, they are now given as their next assignments the task of choosing a news story either print or visually based, dealing with human tragedy that has wide ranging social implications, and to either read or view this story with feeling as well as with their mind; that is, feelings and intellect are to be jointly used to gain a greater understanding. The primary purpose of this assignment is to demonstrate to the students that feelings and intellect need not be antagonistic forces battling for dominance; to the contrary, that feelings and intellect can be utilized as complementary tools to make sense out of that which we experience, both of which must be incorporated as integral parts of the learning process if we are to more fully realize our very human ways of knowing. Furthermore, they are instructed once they really are in touch with the story to reflect upon their response to it and to compare and contrast this response, or lack of any observable one, to how they responded to such stories in the past when all that material presented in the coverage of the story, all that stuff to see, hear and read enveloped them, became their master, instead of they being in charge of their learning.

An example of what is meant by reading, viewing or hearing with feeling as well as with intellect is probably now in order. Let us say that the class has decided to read a story on the bombing and shelling of the Lebanese people such as had been reported on in the mass media again and again. My students would first be told to read the story in the manner that they customarily would do so and make note of their emotional reaction(s) or seemingly lack of. For the second reading the students would be instructed to stop after each paragraph and to allow whatever feelings that were engendered by the story to come to the fore. For the third reading, they are instructed to repeat the step two process after each sentence.

For the fourth and final reading, the students are told to allow their

feeling potential to be realized to the point that the subject at hand is not only being read about but to actually experience the content of the words--to become part and parcel of the story, to consciously become killer and killed and observer. What I am after here is that becoming part and parcel of the story being brought under control of the student rather than allowing such an envelopment to occur, and it always occurs, albeit most of the time unconsciously, even if the sum total of our response to such stories repeated over and over again in the media is indifference and callousness to such material as we hastily move on to read, view or hear about the next item in the news.

Then, we all sit back to reflect upon and exchange our understandings of the role(s) and effect(s) of the media on our lives--how we come to perceive what is being portrayed to us as what that which is out there is all about; how these perceptions, the ways in which we take in the world, are internalized, and in turn, become the masters of how we come to view the world and make sense of it; how that which is the nature of mass media, both form and content, causes us to move at and crave a certain rhythm in our daily lives to the point that which does not feed such a dependency dealt with summarily or as a diversion from what is important (what we want). Reflection is a bore, contemplation is a bore when the beat of the mass media becomes the beat of our lives.

Never have I been made aware of the profound and life shaping effect of the mass media in the lives of our children than when my daughter, once three and one-half years of age, said to me in the form of an inquiry after hearing of the assassination of Olaf Palme, the Prime Minister of Sweden, on a radio playing in our kitchen: "Daddy, does anybody ever die, or is everybody killed?" She had put the parts together, the bits of information that no one realized that she was paying attention to, to form a whole understanding of modern life.

So, our students put the parts together to form a whole in terms of the rhythm of their lives from that which they take in from their trusted and constant buddies and companions--that print and electronic "stuff" which is everywhere, always being shown to you or kept turned on by someone. And, in the immortal words of Sonny and Cher, the best goes on.

Yes, my students, all of them, read, view and hear too fast and too much. However, as is the class with virtually anyone hooked onto a substance which limits the human potential rather than enlarging it who you are trying to get to beat the habit, I don't just tell them that fact about their lives. I also allow them to experience this fact. By assisting them to read, to view and to listen more fully, to merge feeling and intellect into a refined tool of understanding, in essence, to bring more of their human gifts of the senses, our tools for finding out and comprehending, into play when dealing with the world, they are afforded the opportunity to learn the lesson well.

WHOSE CRITICAL THINKING STRATEGY IS OF MOST WORTH?

Charles E. Alberti
Bemidji State University

Despite current interest and attention focused on the relationship of critical thinking and education, there does not appear to be any clear agreement concerning a definition of the term. However, if we are to continue this dialogue and investigation, it is essential that the term "critical thinking" be discussed with some clarity of what we are talking about. It is necessary to have a better understanding of what we are trying to say before we try to put the concept into practice. Unfortunately, from elementary schools through colleges and universities, proponents of improving students' critical thinking ability are attempting to carry this academic dance to distorted proportions -- sometimes under the umbrella of creative thinking, sometimes skillful thinking, and yes, at other times even critical thinking.

Reaching back into Socratic history we find the development of a questioning method -- one that sequenced questions in a manner that sought to disturb the confident, yet weak, claims to the pursuit of knowledge. The writings of such notables as Voltaire, Mill, Newman and others continued to articulate this process of in-depth questioning from the eighteenth through the twentieth centuries.

In addition, as we move forward in this century, we come upon a broadened perception of the the critical thinking movement with the work of Edward Glaser in both *An Experiment in the Development of Critical Thinking* (1941) and the *Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal* (1940). However, the three conceptions of critical thinking, that are addressed here, rest on the work of Robert Ennis, Richard W. Paul, and John E. McPeck. All three of these individuals have been associated with the Informal Logic Movement -- the movement that appears to be permeating the "critical thinking" discussion taking place in the United States.

I. Robert Ennis

Ennis has been concerned with critical thinking for many years. The fact of the matter is that contemporary interest in the notion and its relevance to education can be traced to his 1962 article in *The Harvard Educational*

Review entitled "A Concept of Critical Thinking." In this paper Ennis explicates critical thinking as "the correct assessing of statements," and offers both a list of aspects of statement assessment and criteria for the correct assessment of various sorts of statements. To this end Ennis offers us a model that focuses entirely on an individual's ability to assess or evaluate certain sorts of statements. Ennis points out that "this list is not intended to provide mutually exclusive categories. Instead it shows common pitfalls, and items about which people are concerned."

Hence, the twelve aspects of critical thinking, according to Ennis (1962) are:

1. Grasping the meaning of a statement.
2. Judging whether there is ambiguity in a line of reasoning.
3. Judging whether certain statements contradict each other.
4. Judging whether a conclusion follows necessarily.
5. Judging whether a statement is specific enough.
6. Judging whether a statement is actually the application of a certain principle.
7. Judging whether an observation statement is reliable.
8. Judging whether an inductive conclusion is warranted.
9. Judging whether the problem has been identified.
10. Judging whether something is an assumption.
11. Judging whether a definition is adequate.
12. Judging whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable.

As an important part of this writing, Ennis goes on to elaborate on each of these aspects. An example of this under the first aspect of "Grasping the meaning of a statement," is that "If a person knows the meaning of a statement, the individual should know what would count as evidence for and against it. This places a great deal of responsibility on the individual to understand the intrinsic meaning of the statement.

Within the context of Ennis' work we find him actually developing a lengthy range definition of critical thinking. This has been provided by listing twelve aspects which characterize a critical thinker. Furthermore, under the aspects of critical thinking a list of criteria is presented -- criteria which may be used in making the judgment called for.

Education for critical thinking, according to Ennis, involves the imparting to students of the requisite skills, abilities, or proficiencies. No mention is made of the student's actual utilization of his or her skills and abilities. If the student is able to assess statements correctly, then he/she is regarded as a critical thinker.

Since the paper appeared, Ennis has become aware of the difficulty

of regarding a person as a critical thinker even though that person never, or infrequently, thinks critically. Ennis has said that proficiency is indeed not enough. There must be a tendency to exercise the proficiency.

This aids the understanding that critical thinking extends far beyond skills of statement assessment. Ennis ends up supporting the idea that we must consider the individual's character traits, habits of mind, and disposition to be a critical thinker.

One of the major problems with Ennis' list of proficiencies or aspects of critical thinking is that it is overwhelming. In order to consider the assessment of a statement, one would have to take to memory his/her list of proficiencies and measure the statement against each. The list, however, is without elaboration.

II. Richard W. Paul

Paul acknowledges the importance of including the tendency to utilize proficiencies to do critical thinking. Paul suggests that students already have "a highly developed belief system buttressed by deep-seated uncritical, egocentric and sociocentric habits of thought by which he interprets and processes his or her experience...The practical result is that most students find it easy to question just, and only, those beliefs, assumptions and inferences that (they) have already "rejected" and very difficult, in some cases traumatic, to question those in which they have a personal, egocentric investment." (Paul, 1982)

When learning techniques of argument assessment in "egocentrically neutral" cases, students do not simply transfer skills and techniques to more loaded contexts. Paul claims that they utilize their newly developed skills to repel challenges to their deeply held beliefs -- they become more skilled in rationalizing and intellectualizing the biases they already have. Here we can see students who are adept at manipulating argumentative exchanges in such a way that they always "demonstrate those deep-seated beliefs and commitments which they are not willing to explore or reject. Paul focusses on the necessity of utilizing one's critical thinking skills to challenge one's own fundamental beliefs and attitudes.

According to Paul, there are at least seven interdependent traits of mind that we need to cultivate if we want students to become critical thinkers. They are (Paul, 1990):

- A) Intellectual Humility: Awareness of the limits of one's knowledge, including sensitivity to circumstances in which one's native egocentrism is likely to function self-deceptively; sensitivity to bias and prejudice in, and limitations of one's viewpoint.

- B) **Intellectual Courage:** The willingness to face and assess ideas fairly, beliefs, or viewpoints to which we have not given a serious hearing, regardless of our strong negative reactions to them.
- C) **Intellectual Empathy:** Recognizing the need to imaginatively put one-self in the place of others to genuinely understand them.
- D) **Intellectual Good Faith (Integrity):** Recognition of the need to be true to one's own thinking, to be consistent in the intellectual standards one applies, to hold one's self to the same rigorous standards of evidence and proof to which one holds one's antagonists.
- E) **Intellectual Perseverance:** Willingness to pursue intellectual insights and truths despite difficulties, obstacles, and frustration.
- F) **Faith in Reason:** confidence that in the long run one's own higher interests and those of humankind at large will be served best by giving the freest play to reason, by encouraging people to come to their own conclusions by developing their own rational faculties.
- G) **Intellectual Sense of Justice:** Willingness to entertain all viewpoints sympathetically and to assess them with the same intellectual standards, without reference to one's own feelings or vested interests, or the feelings or vested interests of one's friends, community, or nation.

Paul argues that it is not possible to develop a coherent concept of critical thinking without developing a "coherent concept of rationality, irrationality, education, socialization, the critical person, and the critical society, as they bear upon and mutually illuminate one another." (Paul, 1986)

This reflects a holistic approach allowing us to focus on the multi-logical problems that cross disciplines. This position is in opposition to the cognitive psychologists who tend to restrict their attention to artificial or self-contained monological problems. These would be problems that exist in a field-specific conceptual framework.

Schooling, for Paul, should increase the student's ability to distinguish monological from multi-logical problems and be able to address each of these as they impact the conduct of everyday existence. The critical thinker would be aware of the necessity of putting his/her assumptions to the test of the strongest objections. In order to do this he/she will have a disciplined mind

-- one that avoids confusing concepts that belong in different categories.

Students must come to terms not only with how they feel about issues, both inside and outside of the curriculum, but also with the extent to which those feelings are irrational. It is not a surprise to expect many teachers to be fearful of the prospect of highlighting controversial issues in the classroom. The teacher becomes a critical thinking student in this situation.

III. John E. McPeck

McPeck (1981) argues that critical thinking cannot be regarded properly as a generalized skill, because there is not, and cannot be, any single critical thinking skill that can be applied across subject-area domains. This is because "thinking is always thinking about something". McPeck criticizes the sort of informal thinking course which seeks to enhance students thinking ability in general without regard to any particular subject matter.

In defense of teaching critical thinking through the disciplines, McPeck argues that if the disciplines are properly taught, we will get the kind of intelligent thought from students that we normally associate with the phrase "critical thinking." (McPeck, 1990)

As a reflection on "properly taught" discipline he argues that there are almost as many distinguishable logics, or kinds of reasoning, as there are distinguishable kinds of subjects. He further points out that there is no way to learn these different logics apart from learning the language of these subjects. An intelligible statement for that discipline is determined at the semantic level.

McPeck wants us to consider how various kinds of knowledge of things shape the way we properly think about those things. This approach makes us tackle the properties of each subject we are dealing with.

Thus, McPeck draws on Wittgenstein's perspective regarding the intimate connection between thought and language. Hence, in order that we improve students' capacity for thought, you must improve their capacity to use language first. McPeck's own logic argues that the change which comes about is that a person begins to learn how to think and reason through language. This naturally becomes more sophisticated as one learns more about a particular subject. Being able to talk about a scientific issue during graduate school would be a more elevated discussion after many years of study than that afforded to the third grade student. The net effect of disciplinary knowledge is to increase a student's capacity to think.

McPeck defines critical thinking as "the appropriate use of reflective skepticism" to establish "good reasons for various beliefs" and maintains that since what constitutes "good reasons" depends on the epistemological and logical norms of the subject area in question. (McPeck 1981)

In support of his discipline related push, McPeck argues that another obstacle in the path of measuring the effectiveness of various critical thinking programs is that different definitions of "critical thinking" will require different criteria of measurement.

While Ennis, Paul and McPeck have each mellowed in their models of "critical thinking," it is important to note that they have not merged into each other's thinking on the subject -- the dialogue continues.

In the final analysis it would seem that there are almost as many different kinds of critical thinking as there are different kinds of things to think about. The criteria for applying and assessing critical thinking derive from the thing being discussed or thought about at the time -- this could be very general or specific. More importantly what one must address with some conscious attention is the specificity of the process from a developmental viewpoint -- both for the student and the teacher and to realize that when we speak of critical thinking, we are discussing a much broader and complex topic than the proponents are suggesting.

REFERENCES

- Ennis, R.H., "A Concept of Critical Thinking," *Harvard Educational Review*, 32, no. 1, 1962, pp. 81-111.
- Ennis, R.H., "On Causality," *Educational Researcher*, 2, no. 6, 1973, pp. 4-10.
- Ennis, R.H., "Research in Philosophy of Science Bearing on Science Education," in P.D. Asquith and H.E. Kyburg, Jr., eds., *Current Research in Philosophy of Science*, East Lansing, Michigan, Philosophy of Science Association, 1979, pp. 138-170.
- Ennis, R.H., "A Conception of Rational Thinking," in J.R. Coombs, ed., *Philosophy of Education 1979: Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, Bloomington, Illinois, Philosophy of Education Society, 1980, pp. 3-30.
- Ennis, R.H., "Rational Thinking and Educational Practice," in J.F. Soltis ed., *Philosophy and Education: Eightieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1*, Chicago, Illinois, The National Society for the Study of Education, 1981, pp. 143-83.
- Ennis, R.H., "Problems in testing Informal Logic/Critical Thinking/Reasoning Ability," *Informal Logic*, 6, no. 1, 1984, pp. 3-9.

- Ennis, R.H., "A Logical Basis for Measuring Critical Thinking Skills," *Educational Leadership*, 43, no. 2, 1985. 45-48.
- Ennis, R.H., "Is Answering Questions Teaching?" *Educational Theory*, 36, no.4, 1986, pp. 343-347.
- Ennis, R.H., "A Taxonomy of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities, in J. Baron and R. Sternberg, eds., *Teaching for Thinking*, New York, W.H. Freeman, 1987, pp. 9-26.
- Ennis, R.H., "The Extent to Which Critical Thinking is Subject-Specific: Further Clarification," *Educational Researcher*, 19, no. 4, 1990, pp. 13-16.
- McPeck, J.E., *Critical Thinking and Education*, New York, St. Martain's Press, 1981.
- McPeck, J.E., *Teaching Critical Thinking*, New York, Routledge, 1990.
- McPeck, J.E., "Critical Thinking & Subject Specificity," *Educational Researcher*, 19, no. 4, 1990, pp. 10-12.
- Paul, R.W., "Teaching Critical Thinking in the "Strong Sense: A Focus on Self-Deception, World Views, and a Dialectical Mode of Analysis," *Informal Logic Newsletter*, 4, no. 2, 1982, pp. 2-7.
- Paul, R.W., "Critical Thinking and Educational Reform: The Emerging Revolution," Paper presented at the Harvard International conference on Thinking, August 19-23, 1984, 1-20.
- Paul, R.W., "Critical Thinking: Fundamental to Education for a Free Society," *Educational Leadership*, September, 1984, pp. 4-14.
- Paul, R.W. and Walsh, D., *The Goal of Critical Thinking: From Educational Ideal to Educational Reality*, Washington, D.C., American Federation of Teachers, 1986, pp. 1-68.
- Paul, R.W., *Critical Thinking: What Every Person needs To Survive in a Rapidly Changing World*, California, Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique, 1990.

Siegel, H., "Justification, Discovery and the Naturalizing of Epistemology," *Philosophy of Science*, 47, no. 2, 1980, pp. 297-321.

Siegel, H., "McPeck, Informal Logic, and the Nature of Critical Thinking, in D. Nyberg, ed., *Philosophy of Education 1985: Proceedings of the Forty-First Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society*, Normal, Illinois, Philosophy of Education Society, 1986, pp. 61-72.

Siegel, H., *Educating Reason*, New York, Routledge, 1990.

**FROM PUGGY TO LARRY:
POETRY FROM *GATHERING LIGHT***

Lawrence Santoro

Baby Talk

Soon the world is magic placed.

When hunger's filled,
and cold dissolves to warm down 'round your tummy,

When hard deflates to soft
and shiny bright becomes a muted pastel murmur;

Then the magics start...
And the world begins to have an order
and stretches, connected, out forever.

The only law that world will have is magic, then.

You will see such wondrous things that tickle you for explication...

You'll wonder why...That man in kilt and tartan sash stands upon your corner
in the sun

And pipes his wheezing scream-bag

And for his music, there, bites and dribbles down his chin,
a ripe tomato offered him, streaming juice and seeds and grins.

You'll wonder why the stairway creaks below at night
when you're alone, above

And the phone rings once -- then waits until tomorrow night.

You'll wonder what they *do* in there -- the dry old women in the corner house all bushy-dark and shadow-curtained.

Where the grass is long and weedy and cats forever the rolling ball, the ill-tossed toy;

What they do with twiggy fingers when they part the drapes like dusty breeze within

And parchment eyes lean out to grab your soul running past to warmer neighbors...

Remember the terrors, they are holy.
Keep them close to hand, in mind.

When night is filled with glimmer glamour,

And the shadows breathe where the alley bends down into eternity

And the branches tap the windowpane

And the stairs are dark at top

And the hallway creaks down there;

When the closet fills with monsters

And that dead space between the bed and wall beseems
a cave of dread-scaled and spiny feasting-beasts;

When stories, books and night-told tales
become the world and walk in you through streets you'll walk, forever...

Remember: time is not a river but a puddle, rather
which grows down and deeper as you get longer

And they're there, below;
Your shadow brother terrors...

Hold them, keep them holy,

They, sadly, do not last forever

But hold the magic in your head.

It will be your mind, your soul
and best friend, later

When the cold returns and all the witches, dead.

Nanna

Later, I noticed the picture on the mantle in my parent's house;

Frame of metal, curls and cartouches,
Enclosing that woman, that lady in white;

That long white female line against her tapestry of stags and hounds.

It knew it was Nanna but never, before, like this.

Pop-pop had been cut from the picture;

Had left her long and alone, her hand drifted off at the finger-tips
Where he once sat some 40 years gone.

I knew it was Nanna but it was not the Nanna I knew.

That old woman, thinned by life, dried from white to ash;

That old woman, icicle-hard, thump on the bottom and off to the prickly chair
To wait the tick-tock sticky hour til daddy returns to deal with me.

This Nanna was white and soft and glowed in silver nitrate haze
Of dust and years,

Of dust and years before my birth.

This was not the Nanna who died in my hand,
Her finger twigs wraithed around my plumping knuckles,
Her hands sobbing slowly into silence.

Sunday morning. Downstairs, Pop-pop in the kitchen; Gabriel Heater on the
radio.

I, dressed for church but not ready for it.

"Come, Puggy. Don't dawdle. Take my hand and stop acting like an
I donowhat. Goodness!"

Then down two steps.

Pumping my hand. "Oh, oh, oh, Larry! I can't see. Can't hear."

Twitching, writhing. Words sliding into noises, noises going funny in her throat.

Twitch. Writhe. Bang, bang, the head against the wall.

Funny, Nanna. Nanna being funny. For the first time in my life Nanna was funny.

I ran to Pop-pop and Gabriel Heater to tell: Nanna is funny, finally funny.

Now, Nanna was never funny.

Not Nanna. Nanna of the dainty dishes, of doilies delicate.

Not at Carsonia Park where the roller coaster rolled without me.

"Goodness! On that thing! I hear a man lost his head in the air
Up there where he stood to show off."
Sheared by the "don't stand" sign.

But Nanna was being funny now!

Of course, by then, my parents had heard the beating on the stairs

And the funny old woman, my mother's mother, being funny
For the first time in her son's life.

Pop-pop out of the kitchen through the house and up the stairs.
All of us meeting there two steps from the top

To watch Nanna's funny.

I saw my Pop-pop's face. Only that, his nose and jowls and eyes. "You stop that, now. You stop that, hear!"

Funny Nanna.

Doctor Kotzen came and went. Nanna stayed.
Laid in the center of her bed. Her bed with Pop-pop.

She slept. Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,

Watched her breathe. And breathe.
Then stop.

And, worried about laughing at the viewing, I bit my cheeks hard Inside my mouth...

But did laugh a little.
Even though I had killed her, I could still fear laughter.

Pop-pop said, "Nanna was dying and you was laughing,"
Pop-pop said.

Goodness! Nanna would have said. Goodness.

But not that beauty on the mantle, that white, elegant silver line of a woman
Who smiled from forty years gone at the snowy Pennsylvania mountains over
my shoulder.
Not that woman. Her word would not have been goodness.

I could love her, that woman on the mantle. Honest to god. I could.

And I could forgive her for being funny Nanna
Whom I killed
One Sunday on our stairs with my laughter.

That Name

Deep down I'm still my family's namething: Puggy;

Though I never understood the why of it

Or what it meant, I'm Puggy, still...

At the call of others, older, wiser, stronger than I can ever be

In soul, in mind, in time in fact...

I am Puggy, then and now.

The kid in sailor suit
Who runs in scratchy black and flaring white

Through Pandora's trees in flicker-shades of gray,

And stands on teeter feet beside the waterfall

And yearns to dive on in and down and through the foam

To swim away, the water's way...

Flowing underground...

But stops and turns and waves and smiles at someone up ahead

And waits.

Then, snatched on up by mother's arms,

Is saved.

Facts of Life

After love and the long giggle-making, shrivel-tickle out of her;

After holding,
our separate beauties salted with the taste of memory,

And the slow exfoliation of our skins,
breasts and thighs, bellies and bushes, peeling back,
untwining;

After lips and tongue had cleaned and dried and tidied her;
her parts and places;

After,
and while the pungency of our slippery last two hours crusted, delicious on
my face;

After,
while my fingers, combing,

Unfolded her parting lips in an echo, remembering...

Remembering after.

Remembering the last words my mother gave, sending me off
to 16th and haak...

Pushing me,
Snuffling, shuffling
Through the brownstone arch into the rest of my life...

Before letting go, a little bit, forever...

Remembering my mother's last suggestion,

Tucking, wetting back the cowlick tuft,
Turning me round and round at the whirlwind border

Where our street delined the playlot pipes and chains,
its billion brushburns waiting

Potential, now, in slick black and bubbly asphalt redolence
in September summer remnant hot and bright.

Remembering our final language lesson. This:

If you have to go
Say number one or number two.
Number one is to tinkle
Number two is to make your uglies.
They won't know those words. Our words.
Those words are ours.
Remember: number one is to tinkle
Number two is to make your uglies.
You remember?

This gets complicated but you have to learn *sometime*

I was a quiet kid. Sheltered, perhaps...
By the mountain in our yard...

By the books beneath my bed...
By the opera, saturdays...

By mother, nanna, pop-pop and daddy.

And in my turn, I sheltered them from what I was and could become.

But this is the way it was:

The colored girl -- brenda -- in our class was going to have a baby.

Head down, silent in her side row, back-of-the-room seat
While we giggled by her last few days with us,
Then gone.

Gone back to the place where the orphans lived.

One block up, one block over. The home, we called it.
1010 Center avenue, mrs. Feinerfrock called it.

Sixth grade and going to have a baby!

"What," mother asked sudden and slow that evening, after dinner,
Daddy at the paper, just fingers and legs on the couch,

"What...would you do if she says *you* are her baby's father?"

Oh, God! Oh, Gulp!

God gulping not at fathering brenda's baby...
That was silly...

It was my mother's slide across the floor toward me, which God- engulfed
me.

Her plie into the seat next to mine
And her purr... "Oh, puggy. You *have* to know the facts of life
Sometime!"

In fact I knew them.

That last summer --
Cousin Fred, up from Chester, for the yearly meld of family
kids --

Ours -- me!
And aunt edwina 'n uncle jim's -- barbara, fred and gail --
the Germans...

Cousin Fred broke my life one day that summer
Told the tale that day, on the way from the matinee...

How daddy and mommy did it --
And why!

"You know where -- down there -- you have your thing?
Well, down there she doesn't have that. Hasn't got it.

Down 'round the belly button she's got nothing..."

"She?"

"Your mother. Less than nothing. A hole down there.
And when you're in love you put it there..."

"In there!"

"And move around and back and forth and pretty soon
It feels real good..."

"In that hole down there?"

"Feels so good they soon begin to hug and kiss."

"They do?"

"They do. And then they have a baby, later."

"Have a baby because they love each other?"

"Because it feels real good," he said.
He said, "they do it for fun is why."

For fun!

I am for fun.
I!

For one pump and stroke of fun.
I!

With his thing, his tinkler thing.
And her thing, no thing.
I!

I am.

Now, tinkler fun I knew.

It gets complicated but you have to learn *sometime*
the secret.

Sixteenth and Haak. Kindergarten. First day...
Number one and number two day...

"No, uh, Larry," she said, "Larry is it? Isn't it Larry?"
Not now, Larry. You have to wait 'til we all can go."

"Discipline," she said this little lady person,

This lean young little lady, not my mother, not an aunt nor nanna
This lady suddenly supreme, with power, complete, over number one And
number two,

We'd all go together. At one time...She said.

And then, later. Forever later...
In rows down the hall to the place of boys, the place of girls.

Sixteen boys.
All together in that place. The lava-tory.

Eight at the trough, the other eight waiting, behind.

Water-sweated pipes dripping...Trickling and,
Yes,

Tinkling...Down the zinc-ey sides of where half the boy-half
number oned together, giggling...

Eight alphabetized boys, waiting our time, behind,

Waiting to the liquid hiss and hubble, in bouncing tummy pain and kidney
pop.

Sixteen boys a'giggle, tinklers a'hand, doing or waiting...
Nudging, splashing, spraying...

'Til one, who could not wait, nudged between and wet his neighbor

And the neighbor wetted him,
Then they, their neighbors both, they wetted...

Til back row, waiting, could wait no longer and waded in to the Tinkler
party...

Waving aloft or low, fencing, jousting...
Ballistic arcs, trajectories, dead-eye shots,

Soaking sprinkles ganged on fatty stevie hartranft holding us back with ack-
ack bursts and laughs

Shoe soaks, socks seeped through,
Pants and shirts...

Until our lean young little lady, she who was not our mother, Blew wide the door and wondered just what we thought we did?

And marched us, dripping, past the crisp girls, waiting.
Marched us, laughing, past the dry girls, giggling.

That was tinkler fun.

But this other this.
This *this* from where I came!
Gets complicated but you have to learn *sometime!*

It all made sense.
The nights lost in my bed, turned by dark and terror, crawling down the hall to my parents room on hands and knees

Or on tummy, shrivling past the long side hall to the attic where the dark things waited...

And in their starlit room, pulling down the tented sheets
Fell safely sleeping on their floor, by their feet.

Then their anger in the mornings, finding me there, wondering...
Wondering, just what did I think I was doing?

Quiet kid. Sheltered
By the mountain in our yard...

Protected by the books beneath my bed...
By the opera, Saturdays...

By mother, Nanna, pop-pop and daddy.

Then...Oh, puggy! You *have* to know the facts of life *sometime!*

And I ran, ran to my room, and closed me in
and sheltered them from what I was and could become.

Til I killed them, one by one,

Then, bit by bit.

Became them, all.

Magics

To list the magics...
Close at hand were:

Rubber bands
And lengths of clothesline rope --
The braided kind, not the plastic stuff which,
Weathered, rusty, broke

String and wire.
A candle's end.

A handkerchief or better yet
A thrown out sheet.

An oatmeal tube, a White Owl box, Prince Albert tin

An orange crate, *one* roller skate.
An Esso map of a distant place.

Some empty spools. Some railroad spikes.

Real tools,
Straight nails, right sized bolts and unstripped screws.

And Topsy, blind, who walked remembered patterns through aunt Florence's
labyrinth of slender woods and chatter chill-glass critters

And never shivered one, not one, to pieces on the floor.

Now further off, but near:
The neighborhood --
Its shape and places

Holes and covers,

Thorns and turtles, witches, wonders

The space between us.
Us within the space.

The school, the yard, the night.

And further yet:
The mountain, our horizon.

The river coming in from when? And going out where?

The roads advancing through, around us.

The railway yards and lines assembling in the town,
diverging out forever.

The planes which flew so high above as to be beyond a wish.

And the bells at midnight in the echo town below.

More distant yet were
 jungles, natives;
 caravans and deserts;

Distant temples, angry gods.

The tumbling tumult of the waters' fall
Out west, up north or
Far away in Africa.

Canyons, veldt, savanah,
Steppe and tundra.

Taller than our lives, the trees
In far-off forests, deeper than our deaths.

And beyond:
the fronds and ferns and trilobites.
Brontosaur, Triceratop;

The Moon and Mars
Far Antares and

The past. The future. And a plan

Were magics, all, and ours.

In The Attic

Another picture I remembered,
Remember still...

Mother there, alone, a child, oh five or six. Standing by a stool,
A piano stool.

Pleated gray, a mist behind her
And a potted fern beside. Her name was Fern. you see.

And her. Alone. Standing, staring through the picture, up ahead. Years ahead,
at me.

And her, alone, about to cry, to break, but still a smile on top.
But that was her. Of course.

"Why do you look so sad?" I asked.
"I didn't know," she said. "I thought that when you had a picture Taken that
then you'd *be* no more. That after that, I wouldn't be!"

Now, the museum of my parent's lives
Held no exhibit of my father's days alone

Our attic was a record of my mother's times and bringing up,
Photographs and browning books with fading waxy orange scrawls,

And wooly, mothball-pungent cloth. ig...
Her kilts and wigs and stiffly rustling skirts from ballet class
And other dances.

A certificate of penmanship.

And pictured back, her parent's, theirs.
Their brothers, sisters, aunts and cousins back and back on back;

Pop-pop's trophies, urns, memorials;
Nanna's tatting, shawls and dust-lace things...

All piled and packed in painted brass-bound trunks of splintering wood,

Lined with yellowed paper -- polka-blue but faded dots --

Which we plundered now and then for holidays or costume times of year
Or at other times, for fun,

To bangle out in raucous beads and marble pearls on drying string,
A crown or savage charm...

But of my father, nothing.

Yes, things of theirs; yes, their together things.
Old clothes and hats now charming, dumb or crunched and flaking
Decades back.

And pictures, there, from "on the road" -- they said,
From when they danced from town to town all down the coast and back.

"When you ran away." Pop-pop laughed, "to join the circus," said
And laughed again.

Where she met my father. Then married him.
Those things, yes.

Pictures of my mother-swan reaching up, on point,
Her helmet hair in molded curls, grasping out beyond the picture's edge...
From a book-to-be called, "Fern" she said. A book which never was.

Or them on southern beaches or further south in Florida,
A pyramid of perfect form, of bodies perfect to the sun and sand.

Mother, father, others, friends...
Those spoken of the times I hid my cars and would not hear of being "On the
road" in dance...

But of my father, his life before,
A nothing, there, to see or hold.

Of his childhood...Nothing. His parents -- now both dead whom I hardly
knew -- nothing. Of his brothers, sisters...Not a thing.

Nor aunts and uncles, those old, small people
Glimpsed there and then in church, at funerals, mostly,

The distant ones across the room in tears, nodding to some sorrow
I could not feel, in black and wailing wrinkled skin;

Who, husking, voiced the name of he or she now going, gone.
Rounding it with another tongue, another speech...

Something I would never speak. Not ever. Never speak nor know...

Of these, the museum of my parents house had not one artifact
Or touch.

Nothing of my father's life alone. Not a thing at all
I wondered why...

Dancer

My mother wrote my shame on the floor with her toes.

The guys were around

Playing,

Taking apart my trains,

When mother came in flowing.

Floating.

Drifting like a fingertip across my lips.

Oh my god!

Oh, je-sus christ!

In pirouettes!

The Main Thing

"This is the main thing," is what Pop-pop said, last,
Looking at me,

He, a-dwindle in the sheets, tubed to the bed below; the long chain lamp
dusting down from ceilings
Plaster brown, and painted saints around.

Eyes, brushburned holes in his face, thinner, now than when I looked last,
that face.

While nuns and nurses slumbered past
Black and white in the halls beyond, where I waited,
Waiting to listen at last.

Where all the women gathered round: my mother, his daughter, his other
daughters, my aunts, watching him.

Waiting. Waiting for him to go.

Eyes clutching one another, hands touching, holding him
Or nudging further toward his going out...

Going out like a balloon on a headboard, going out like a finger 'cross the
check.

Going out like dusk, going out long last.

"*This* is the main thing," is what Pop-pop said at me.

While hands -- all knuckles, now -- waved inward toward himself
And out.

What is the main thing?
What?

Well, there was Carsonia Park...

Through the smiling clown mouth

In the morning, in the evening...

Water slapping the wooden drum, the boat.
Evenrude putter in that dry rot hole

Ain't we got fun?

Pop-popping out, that wooden hole shoving the black night water aside, Pop-pop and I.

On shore, bumping backward, the midway brights, steel hiss and shriek of roller coaster,

Machinery drawn and sketched by lights.

Bullet tumbling, dragging flame behind, catching itself in the circle, sniffing its tail.

Drifting back, the women on the shore, hopeful in the evening:
Thank goodness, this was the last thing, this day. Thank goodness.

Waving hands at us...us manfully forth on Carsonia Lake.

"Puggy," he said at last, in our hole in the water. "Now, Puggy.
You remember this sometime..."

Now, I'd had a bad day.
The women! Mother, Nanna, the portly aunts -- Ida and Edwina!

What's the point of Carsonia Park? To come and look
Or be whizzing scared to bumpy death!

I didn't ask. I knew, of course.
The fears.
The fears of course!

Of falling like a meat balloon
And ground like burger in the rusty cogs,

Or, overshot, in an arc...aloft forever or dwindling off
While mother shrieked and pointed...

While the portly aunts hugged so long and tight they fried together in the

sawdust sand...

While Nanna clicked and shook her head, "I told him so...
I told him this would happen!"

That was the point of Carsonia Park!

Now this is what I'd done!

My weight was guessed. Correctly. And my age. One year off.
Too young.

I'd tossed -- and missed -- three wooden rings, at the necks of green-glass
bottles.

I'd been taken -- *taken* -- on the carousel.
Been sat, and belted, hugged and nurtured.

Padded between Ida and Edwina upon a bench -- the swan I think.
While everywhere the brass and wooden horses pumped,
All others leaning out and down the swirly world around...

'Til Nanna, mother, Pop-pop, all, buttered and bled together in
A ring-a-ling thunder clash and brash of calliope steam and cymbals.

No roller coaster. No bullet. No bump cars.
Almost...

Almost...The Old Mill house of horrors.

Until, mother, listening at the creaks and moans, the slap-pock water As the
boats came bumping out,

'Til mother, squinting at the sounds beneath the round bass thrum of
Millwheel creak and groan, the shrieks of kids, of lovers,

Until mother, last, below it all, detected there:
The voice of Rats.

"Puggy," he said in our wooden hole in water. "Puggy, you'll remember this
sometime.

"The hands will hold you back. The bony fingers, flesh -- the flesh of women's hands. Carsonia Park's for you, not them.
Not for the bony hands."

And there, at his last, I remembered it.
This is the main thing? That?

Well, his stories, they'd be gone forever?
Forever, if I did not tell them, gone.

His days, those horse and buggy days when he and Abner and Israel, His brothers, when he and they played Halloween

And took to pieces their neighbor's cart and carried it above to the stable roof,

Reassembled it there for morn., g.
That?

Well, there *was* that Christmas...
Feasts and presents.

Uncles, aunts and cousins mousing forth to our house...
His house -- Ours!

Round with smells of roasting bird and cranberry sauce,
Bulged with onions in white wheat and butter gravy.

Pop-pop, there, the founder of the feast, dwindled by his family, in his house
-- our house --

Pop-pop sifted among us, there, and showed us all his gifts,
Afraid that we had missed -- not noticed them...

The wine no one would drink,
The books I already had
And, of course, had read by then.

And the whispers in the kitchen

The whispers of the women, my mother, her sisters shaking heads, and
clicking kitchen tongues.

"He'll be off to *her*, tonight. He will!"
Shaking heads and clicking tongues...

"I remember mother weeping as he dropped a dollar in her lap, Passing."

Shaking heads, clicking tongues. Yes.

And when he passed from the house -- yes, as predicted in the kitchen, yes -
- No one noticed. Yes.

But now, this, *this* was the main thing. This.

This is the man, I told myself, was cut from his wedding picture
The main thing? That?

Face and skin hissing in toward bone beneath,
The bone beneath yearning to peel outward into the room,
Into the past forever.

Eyes bulging. Eyes bulging which read to me seated on his lap,
Seated on his lap on the glider on our porch.

And I, oh, three or four, watched his finger flow the page, the words,
Watched his finger birth the worlds which dawned alive behind my eyes.

Belfry arches, muffled oars; middlesexes, village and farms.

"This is the main thing." Pop-pop said, at last. To me.
Who had killed his wife, my Nanna, oh, years ago, now.

"This is the main thing," Pop-pop said, last, as the women waited for him to
go.

No. *This* is the main thing. Waving like a flame in breath.
Then gone.

Take pop-pop's hand someone said, go on.
No I said. No. And went.

MORAL EDUCATION AND INTEGRITY: EDUCATING FOR HIGHER-LEVEL CHARACTER TRAITS

David B. Annis
Ball State University

I. The Need for Moral Education in Schools and Colleges

There is a growing consensus in the United States that the schools at all levels need to do more in the area of moral education. William J. Bennett, when he was Secretary of Education, sharply criticized schools and universities for their failure to instruct students in moral values.¹ Many business, governmental, and professional leaders have complained about the perceived "moral drift" and ethical uncertainty in the nation. A recent *U.S. News* survey found that 71 percent of those polled are dissatisfied with our current standards of honesty and conduct in the United States, and that 54 percent thought we are less honest today than ten years ago.²

There certainly is good reason for concern about our moral values. A survey by *Psychology Today* found that 22 percent of the respondents would buy a color TV set they knew was stolen (a felony in most jurisdictions), 44 percent would drive away after denting a parked car with their car without attempting to notify the owner, 37 percent would cheat on their spouse and only 68 percent thought this was unethical. Thirty-three percent had deceived a best friend in the past year about something important, even though Americans rank honesty as extremely important in a friend. Thirty-eight percent had withheld information or lied about their taxes in order to pay less, 47 percent had taken sick days from work when they were well, 28 percent had taken office supplies, tools, or other materials home, 37 percent made personal long-distance calls at the expense of the employer, and the depressing litany goes on!³

Surveys also have found that there is a significant and apparently increasing amount of cheating by students on academic assignments and tests, that there is substantial abuse by students of public financial aid, and that the theft and destruction of library materials is a serious problem on college campuses. For example, a recent survey of 200,000 American college freshmen indicated 30 percent of them cheated in school during 1987. That figure increased to 37 percent in 1988.⁴ Other studies found a much greater incidence of cheating in higher education. There is even a paperback student

guide which teaches the fundamentals of cheating in college. *Newsweek* described it as an 87-page guide to academic guile. *Cheating* offers the finer points of plagiarism, swiping exams, and passing notes right under the professor's nose. It is no wonder that there has been a call to stress moral education in the schools and universities.

II. Concerns about Teaching Moral Values in the Schools

There are a variety of concerns about teaching moral values in the schools. One concern appeals to the fact that we live in a pluralistic society, one where toleration is an important value. Teaching ethics in state institutions, however, would tend to erode this pluralism, or so it is claimed, and hence it ought not be taught in the public schools.

Pluralism may simply be the descriptive thesis that people in our society hold many different moral, political, and religious values, or it may be the normative thesis that the diversity of such values in our culture should be preserved. Consider the descriptive version of the argument.

1. People in our society hold many different moral, political, and religious values.
2. There is an obligation to be tolerant of these different values.
3. Hence, we ought to refrain from undermining this pluralism.
4. The teaching of ethics at state institutions would undermine this pluralism.
5. Thus, we should not teach ethics at such institutions.

There are several replies to this argument. First, the movement known as "values clarification" was a direct response to the claims made in the argument. The conclusion drawn was not that ethics shouldn't be taught, but that it had to be taught in a certain way. In the values clarification approach, the basic idea was that students should be free to choose their own values. Schools should foster self-esteem and individual freedom rather than teach various values. The approach was "value neutral." Teachers could ask students who had expressed a value non-judgmental questions to clarify the value--what they meant, where they learned the value, how they felt about it, how it related to other values they had, and so on.⁵

This approach is consistent with pluralism, and hence as long as ethics is approached in this value neutral way, ethics may be taught. There are, however, a number of problems with this approach. First, we teach a variety of moral values in schools. Respecting others, being honest, not cheating, not stealing, not fighting or assaulting others, and being responsible

are all values "taught" in school. If we find students cheating, fighting, or stealing, we tell them to stop it in no uncertain terms! We aren't simply clarifying their values; we are directly conveying that it is wrong to do these things. Furthermore, withholding comments or judgment in some situations raises moral questions of its own. Some values are so important--not assaulting others, not stealing, not lying--that being "neutral" is unacceptable. Not viciously assaulting another person is not one value among many competing values. Being neutral with regard to this value suggests that it is, and may even weaken the value. That ought not be the outcome of teaching ethics! Values clarification is an important part of teaching values, but there has to be more than simply clarification. Thus, we may not avoid the pluralism argument by appealing to the values clarification approach.

Premises two and three of the above pluralism argument are questionable. Even though toleration of diverse opinions may be a basic value in a constitutional democracy such as ours, it simply doesn't follow that we should accept or tolerate *all* those values. Suppose the values include racism, political oppression, intolerance of religious minorities etc.⁶ Furthermore, there is still widespread agreement on certain values: murder, kidnapping, enslaving, stealing, are all generally rejected in our society, while freedom, equality, justice, respect for persons are values underlying our Constitution.

Values clarification can be contrasted with *directed value teaching*, where the instructor endorses certain principles, goals, or values, and urges students to accept them and act accordingly. Another argument against teaching moral values in the schools appeals to the notion of indoctrination. The argument states:

1. Directed value teaching in the schools is an instance of indoctrination.
2. Indoctrination is unacceptable in teaching values in public education.
3. Hence, moral values should not be taught or a different approach used.

This argument turns on what indoctrination is and its moral status. Assume a young child is playing with a kitten and pulls its tail. We might stop the child and say that "it is wrong to hurt the kitten. It feels pain when you pull its tail like that." This is an instance of directed value teaching. We are trying to get the child to accept a value, internalize it, and act accordingly. Doing this does not seem morally problematic at all. As a matter of fact, if we failed to stop the child or failed to try and teach the child, our behavior would seem irresponsible. Suppose the child continued to pull the kitten's

tail. We might "verbally" punish the child by saying, "No! That is wrong; stop it!" Making the child stay in his or her room, not letting it play with the kitten, spanking the child are other forms of punishment that might be used.

Using punishment as a means to teach the child may raise moral problems of its own, but this is a separate matter. Furthermore, if it takes gentle punishment such as mild scolding to get the child to stop hurting the kitten, I would argue we are justified in doing it. Nay, that we are required to do it to be morally responsible. It follows that directed value teaching is not unjustified, even when this may involve mild punishment when necessary. Directed value teaching with mild punishment may involve a violation of the child's autonomy to some extent, but autonomy may sometimes be justifiably overridden, especially when it is to prevent harm to others.

One recent characterization of indoctrination is: "a systematic attempt to persuade students of the validity of a belief system, one that (a) radically rules out the possibility of accepting other belief systems; (b) in a deliberate fashion, involves withholding from students either serious objections to that system or those tools of analysis that would enable the student to see its flaws; (c) excludes the possibility of rejection of the belief system; and (d) penalizes deviation."⁷ One can teach moral values in a way that satisfies this characterization of indoctrination, but not all forms of directed value teaching imply indoctrination in the above objectionable sense. For example, directed value teaching does not necessarily imply conditions (a), (b), (c), or (d).

III. The Empirical Research on Moral Development and Moral Conduct

There has been a lot of empirical research on the psychology of moral development and moral conduct. Although the literature on moral psychology is vast, and much of it is inconsistent with each other, it is possible to distill from the literature some general findings that seem fairly well supported.⁸

Most psychologists who do research on moral psychology believe that morality in individuals develops over time and that aging alters children's ideas about right and wrong. Children learn about morality from observing and interacting with adults and other children. From an early age children express moral values and have moral concerns. For example by the age of 1-2 they express feelings of concern for another's distress. Thus they may offer their beloved blanket to an unhappy child. By the age of 10-12, their concern is not limited to particular people they observe, but they manifest empathy for people who are in unfortunate situations. Children with strong empathic capacities tend to engage in less aggressive behavior than children with lesser empathy. Empathy is also positively associated with a child's tendency to help others or to share with others. It can be enhanced by various activities such as role-taking, recreating a situation, and confronting the child with the consequences of his or her behavior for another, what the

person felt, and that the child is responsible for this consequence. Children also learn at an early age about justice, reciprocity, equality, sharing and cooperating through various activities such as playing games with other children and adults.

Styles of parental authority also seem to play an important role in moral development.

- * Clearly communicating what is expected morally,
- * Providing a rationale or justification for a rule or decision,
- * Confronting children regularly and in a consistent way about moral transgressions,
- * Supporting the child's empathic response by explicitly confronting children about the harm to others resulting from their acts,
- * Using the minimal force necessary for controlling a child's behavior,

tend to have the most positive results for moral development and conduct. For example, children are better behaved, resist temptation better, are more cooperative, helpful, and empathic etc. These are some of the basic findings that are fairly well supported in the literature.

It is possible to draw some inferences from these general findings about teaching moral values in schools. Take academic dishonesty. Dishonesty in general is a deceitful violation of trust to secure personal advantage.⁹ *Academic dishonesty* involves this violation of trust in a variety of academic activities, for example, test-taking, use of sources for papers and projects, collecting and reporting data, destruction, theft or misuse of academic resources, and so on. I suspect part of the increase in academic dishonesty in schools is due to our failure to communicate clearly what is expected. For example, college catalogs rarely give much guidance on academic dishonesty, and student and faculty understanding of what constitutes academic dishonesty differ.¹⁰ Nor does there seem to be much discussion on college campuses of the rationale against the various forms of academic dishonesty. In addition there is evidence that faculty disregard reporting academic dishonesty, so students are not confronted in a regular and consistent way about such transgressions.¹¹ In short, we have failed to satisfy the fundamental principles on teaching values revealed by the empirical research on moral development. It is no wonder that we aren't teaching college students to be academically honest.

There are schools, however, that are attempting to teach moral values in a way that satisfies the above basic principles. Dry Creek Elementary School in Clovis, California has a character development

program. Each month during the school year a basic moral value is stressed. The whole school focuses on the value. Teachers discuss it with their classes, it is included in writing assignments and projects, and there are special displays involving the value. In addition the school gives public recognition to the students who do some act that clearly manifests the value being stressed. Some of the values focused upon include: friendship, cooperation, loyalty, ambition, team spirit, initiative, self-control, and honesty. Schools "must provide a moral environment that accepts good values and keeps them in the forefront of everyone's consciousness."¹²

IV. Education for Integrity and Higher Level Traits

A character trait such as honesty involves a set of dispositions to perceive, think, desire, feel, and act in various ways.¹³ The honest person is committed to avoiding deceitful violations of trust, and this trait is manifested in the person's *perceiving* situations as calling for honesty, in his or her *wanting* to be honest, *feeling* ashamed when he or she violates this commitment, and so on. By stressing honesty in education, what it requires, why it is important, and responding in a consistent way to dishonesty, we have a chance, *based on the empirical evidence*, of helping to etch the trait of honesty into a person's character. We may not have done a good job of educating for honesty, but that is not because we don't have a good idea as to how to educate for it. But what of higher-level character traits such as integrity? How are we to educate for these traits?

Personal integrity is being true to one's identity-conferring, autonomously held commitments, even in the face of temptation or adversity, when most would find it difficult to do so.¹⁴ Identity-conferring commitments are concerns about which one deeply cares, concerns that define who one is. Being true to them requires a coherence of thinking, feeling, and action. One must act according to one's commitments, but one must do so with the right spirit or motivation, and the concerns must fit together to form an integrated whole.

Moral integrity is a specific form of personal integrity. It involves being true to moral concerns, and includes the traditional virtues of honesty, fairness, and uprightness (doing the right thing). Such integrity has been viewed as important and desirable trait, one that we wish to see people have. Its structure, however, raises problems for knowing just how to help people develop the trait. One has to live up to the requirement of honesty, fairness, and uprightness *taken as individual traits*, but one also has to *integrate* these and other moral concerns. Being a person of integrity requires a fair degree of wholeness, an integrated life, and this requires more than simply having individual moral traits such as honesty or fairness. One has to have an understanding of some larger coherent moral picture, of what ends are worth

pursuing, how they may be sought, a ranking among ends, a sense of proportion. One has to learn to balance goods; there are times, e.g., when honesty may conflict with kindness or fairness.

Integrity can be viewed as a mean between extremes, as lying between the excess of fanaticism and various deficiencies including cowardice, hypocrisy, baseness, and so on. The fanatic has commitments, but to the extreme. It is the excessive zeal for a commitment to the exclusion of other important values. The person of integrity, by contrast, has integrated various values for a more balanced life.

Integrity is a higher-level character trait. It is higher level at least because it involves integrating other character traits and values. It also may be higher-level because of its possible hierarchical structure. Integrity may be an executive virtue that coordinates and operates on other virtues such as honesty and fairness.

Given the nature of integrity, it is difficult to satisfy the basic principles for moral education discussed above. We may be able to clearly communicate, at least in lots of situations, what honesty requires, and because of this, we can confront students in a consistent way about lapses. But since integrity requires integrating various values, it is more difficult to describe what is expected morally, and hence to be consistent in responding to possible lapses.

We can, of course, stress in the schools the importance of integrity, and that it involves fidelity to various integrated worthwhile commitments. This would be at least to communicate the general nature of integrity. And we certainly can provide a rationale for why integrity is a valued trait. The person of integrity has courage, persistence, can be relied on and trusted, and is honorable. But communicating the general nature of integrity and its rationale is only a start; at best this is too abstract.

To witness integrity, we have to see it over time in an integrated life. In short we need to study lives. One good way to do this is through biographies, by studying the lives of those who have shown great integrity. Sir Thomas Moore, Mohandes Gandhi, Mother Teresa all displayed great integrity. Novels, dramas, and other literature provide additional rich sources for learning about integrity and why it is such a valued trait. Given the empirical evidence on moral development, there is at least some reason for believing that the use of literature and biographies would have an impact on the development of integrity. Modeling clearly has been shown to influence moral behavior. Role-playing and recreating a situation also have been found to have an impact on moral development.¹⁵

Concepts frequently form fields. To understand one notion in the field, we need to see what its relationships are to other concepts in the field. Integrity is a field concept. We associate the person of integrity with being

noble, and honorable, and a person of principle. We contrast the person of integrity with the coward, the hypocrite, the opportunist, the shallow or base person, and the fanatic. Hence, to help students appreciate integrity, we also can use literature to study the lives of hypocrites, fanatics and related kin folk.

The empirical research indicates that literally seeing ourselves perform actions can cause us to alter our behavior. We also need to help our students see their lives, to see who they are becoming, to become more self-conscious about their own biography, the biography that they write each day. What commitments are most important to them? What concerns are they willing to stand by? Exploring questions such as these will help them to be more self-conscious about their degree of integrity. They will be in a better position to see their integrity or lack of it, and hence to alter the biography they are writing.

In conclusion, while it may be more difficult to educate for a higher-level moral trait such as integrity, in part because we haven't done much to explore the psychology of such traits, as educators we do have some means at our disposal for helping students develop integrity.

ENDNOTES

¹ William J. Bennett, "The Teacher, the Curriculum, and Value Education," *New Directions for Higher Education* 8 (1980):27-34.

² *U.S. News and World Report*, "A nation of Liars," February 23, 1987, pp. 54-60.

³ *Psychology Today* 15 (11, 1981):34-53.

⁴ American Council on Education study reported in the *Muncie Press*, March 6, 1990, p. 13. See also Carnegie Council on Policy Studies in Higher Education, *Fair Practices in Higher Education* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1979).

⁵ See L. Rath, M. Harmin, and S. Simon, *Values and Teaching* (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1966).

⁶ Compare Ruth Macklin, "Problems in the Teaching of Ethics: Pluralism and Indoctrination," in *Ethics Teaching in Higher Education* (ed.) Daniel Callahan and Sissila Bok (NY: Plenum Press, 1980), pp. 81-101.

⁷ Hastings Center Report, *The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education* (NY: Institute of Society, Ethics, and Life Sciences, 1980), p. 59.

⁸ See, e.g., the reviews of the literature by Martin L. Hoffman, "Moral Development," in *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology*, 3rd (ed.) Paul H. Mussen (NY: John Wiley, 1970), pp. 261-359 and James R. Rest, "Morality," *Handbook of Child Psychology*, 4th (ed.) Paul H. Mussen (NY: John Wiley, 1983), pp. 556-629, William Damon, *The Moral Child* (NY: The Free Press, 1988).

⁹ James D. Wallace, *Virtues and Vices* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).

¹⁰ David C. Barnett and Jon C. Dalton, "Why College Students Cheat," *Journal of College Student Personnel* 22 (1981): .

¹¹ Richard A. Fass, "Cheating and Plagiarism," in William W. May (ed.), *Ethics and Higher Education* (NY: Macmillan, 1990):170-184).

¹² Thomas Lickona, "What Is Good Character?" The Poynter Center, Indiana University, 1991, p. 12. Lickona describes the character development program at Dry Creek Elementary School.

¹³ Jack J. Kupperman, *Character* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1991).

¹⁴ Jeffrey Blustein, *Care and Commitment* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), Part II.

¹⁵ See the references in footnote 8.

**HUMANS IN THE WORLD:
INTRODUCTION TO THE EDUCATIONAL THEORY
OF RADICAL PERSPECTIVISM¹**

**Alexander Makedon
Chicago State University**

I. Introduction

We define radical perspectivism, below, including its goals, teaching methods and curriculum. Suffice it to mention here that radical perspectivism identifies not only with this or that culture, reform effort, or epoch, but with the whole universe. Under the tenets of radical perspectivism, human beings are redefined to encompass the whole universe, while pedagogy becomes an exercise in representing it. This is accomplished primarily through role play, empathic understanding, and perspectivistic analysis. In perspectivist pedagogy, students learn to use their ability to think and imagine as the Other, while in the process they learn to expand their sense of self to include the world.

II. What is Radical Perspectivism?

Radical perspectivism is the idea that to really understand something, be it visible or invisible, past or present, abstract or concrete, it must be considered from a variety of human and non-human perspectives. It is "perspectivist," because its theories of truth, value, meaning, or being are based not on any single perspective, but collectively on a variety of even conflicting perspectives about the world. It is "radical," because it extends its search for perspectival diversity well beyond human perspectives, to those which humans can imagine other animate and inanimate parts of the world might have about the world. Radical perspectivism brings back to humans the harmony of the planets, as it forces them to live in harmony with non-human perspectives which at the beginning they may even "dislike." Out of this diversity of perspectives arises an understanding of the universe as a whole, and with it man's role as a "universal perspectivist."

The tenets of perspectivist theory have been used, assumed, or built upon for centuries by philosophers and others, but never as explicitly stated as they are here. The closest philosophers have come to acknowledging the significance of perspectivist theory *as a theory*, and not merely as a routine

method of philosophical analysis, is when they attempt to state explicitly the underlying assumptions or first definitions in their system building, as have idealists ever since Plato; in analyzing the underlying assumptions of existing theories, as did Marxist and Freudian philosophers, and recently critical theorists and hermeneuticists²; in requiring that one empathize with the other to understand it, as did Wilhelm Dilthey and the phenomenologists; in postulating pantheism, or the existence of cosmic monads or universal wills, as did, respectively, Baruch Spinoza, Gottfried Leibniz, and Friedrich Nietzsche³; or, finally, in postulating the existence of immortal or recurring souls, spirits, and deities in the universe, as did ancient, Eastern, and African religions and theosophies, such as Zoroastrianism, Senegalese animism, Jainism, and Buddhism. In other words, philosophers have always used the perspectivist approach, thus implicitly acknowledging at least its analytical utility, but never explicitly acknowledged it as a theory of truth in its own right.

Underlying radical perspectivism is the assumption that no one assumption about the world is more true than another, although all of them collectively are "true" about the world. This is so because the world is equally all of its parts, and therefore one can be no more partial toward any one of them in trying to understand the world, than the world is more one part than another. Similar to perspectivist drawing in art or architecture, so is philosophical perspectivism angular in its approach, spherical in its process, and unifying in its conclusions. By including the perspectives of other world-parts in our reinterpretations of the world, such as, other animals, plants, nature (mountains, planets), or even human-made artifacts, we include the world, and as a result our conclusions can be no less "worldly."

More than "multicultural," radical perspectivism requires an open mind not only toward other cultures, but also non-human perspectives. Less the colonizer, and more the reinterpreter, the perspectivist human lives in harmony with the universe simply to *live*. As a philosophy, radical perspectivism prepares humans for the cosmic age, where their view of themselves as reinterpreters is colored by their understanding of the universe. Their recently acquired technical skills, such as, the ability to travel away from planet earth, may allow them to "see" the world from remotely human perspectives, and therefore to really begin to see it. For example, seeing the "blue planet" from a perspective outside earth, they may come to realize how much lacking in perspective their treatment of the earth so far may have been. At the same time, there is the danger that they may become too scientific to really "see" the world, as they may fail to realize how much more world there is that can't be discovered through science.

Psychologically, the perspectivist's sense of self expands to include the universe as a whole. As possibly the last frontier in his intellectual

odyssey, the radical perspectivist expands his horizons to include those world perspectives which in the modern western world have been either ridiculed or ignored, but which may bring him back home to himself. He may begin to see the significance of empathizing with the world, as have several non-western cultures (Native American, African, South American, or Asian). The further away he travels from himself, through what he can see through the microscope, telescope, or spacecraft window, the more he may find out about himself that he could have known even if he had never left the earth behind. Ironically, the more advanced he becomes technologically, the more he may come to identify with those world beliefs and rituals which presently are held in "primitive" societies that have none of his highly technical capacities.

As a method of questioning, radical perspectivism extends the socratic "torpedo shock" well beyond anything that humans may have experienced: it brings to surface those non-human perspectives that humans have always sensed are "true," but either took *too* seriously in the past, or not seriously enough, especially in the modern age, to allow the world to play them. Ironically, the same play element that they find ludicrous in non-human perspectives, is the attitude required of them to seriously "understand the world. Their "seriousness" under radical perspectivism is no more "serious," than is a child's absorption in his role-play, or for that matter, the adult audience identifying with the characters in a drama.

Aware of their ability to tell lies, invent illusions with which to feel secure in a threatening world, or teach the young how to role-play, nevertheless humans relegate their ability to role-play to myth, religion, theater, or children's stories, but not also to their social or political life, or, for that matter, to education. Instead of using the world to build their institutions, write their laws, or shape the attitudes of their young, they feel they must use themselves as the standard by which to change the world, or even "conquer" it to survive. Modern humans have failed to realize that to understand the world, if not *live* to understand it, they must become a little more like a child, that is, playful, imaginative, and open-minded.

Radical perspectivism can cause our view of the world to change. In this, it is no different than any of the other philosophical systems with radically different world views. For example, regarding science, radical perspectivism requires that we supplement scientific technique with role-play, even if that means that we role-play the scientific method. In the process of role-playing the other, we allow other world-parts to re-enlist our imagination in reinterpreting them, or in re-educating ourselves or our young to "identify" with nature. Under the tenets of radical perspectivism, our views on morality, science, education, language, method, religion, or truth change drastically to enable us to perceive the world from universal perspectives. In the end, radical perspectivism brings us back into the universal fold without denying

us our humanity, if not salvage it from the mire of self-centered assumptions about the world that threaten to destroy us. Ideologically, radical perspectivism is closely allied with environmentalism. Radical perspectivism helps humans to identify with the world as a whole, even if that means changing oneself to help other world parts survive. Thus the "perspectivist human" identifies his own survival with the world's. Ultimately, perspectivism helps humans develop those beliefs or attitudes that will help them live in a world which they must help to survive.

Logically, radical perspectivism may be arrived at independently of any prior social or political agenda by analyzing the nature of human thought, the development of human values, or the logic of human survival. The author does this in his book on radical perspectivism, in the chapter on "first assumptions," where he analyzes human thought, specifically, the assumptions necessary for anyone to be able to think, talk, or imagine anything. Even while examining radical perspectivism from the outside on the basis of non-perspectivist assumptions, we are led to the same conclusions about it as might a follower of radical perspectivism who examines it from the inside. In the book on radical perspectivism, the author begins with an analysis of assumptions that undergrid all human thought, and concludes with categories of "perspectival" assumption-types.

Radical perspectivism takes issue with Husserl's method of phenomenological research⁴. According to Husserl, to really see the world or understand it as-is, we should suspend our presuppositions before we even begin to observe it⁵. To a large extent, Husserl's approach is perspectivistic. For example, by asking the observer to bracket his presuppositions in his world observations, Husserl seems to acknowledge the existence of non-self-centered perspectives. Nevertheless, Husserl failed to realize the extent to which humans can role-play the presupposition of the other, or, by contrast, their inability to think *without* presuppositions. Instead of asking humans to bracket their atomic presuppositions, under radical perspectivism we ask them to expand them to include other world-parts.

Radical perspectivism also takes issue with the text-centered interpretations of several hermeneuticists and post-structuralists, including Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Derrida⁶. By making text-like paradigms paramount, hermeneuticists may have "texted" the world out of sight. This is so because text is a particularly human-bound phenomenon, and one which is limited to certain text-bound cultures or social groups. As such, it is too textual to be the world's. To paraphrase Heidegger, a text interpretation of the world is circular: it assumes in human-like terms precisely those man-made assumptions which it is trying to understand.

In the pages that follow the author gives a brief introduction to the goals, teaching methods, and curriculum of radical perspectivism, including its

hidden curriculum. He adds dialectical validity to the theory by raising two objections against its underlying assumptions, and subsequently making an effort to answer them⁷. Finally, he illustrates its applicability by discussing its significance for moral education.

III. Goals of Perspectivist Education

The five most important goals in radical perspectivist education are, *first*, to understand the world not only from a human perspective, but also from the diverse perspectives of other world-parts. *Second*, to begin to see ourselves as an integral part of the world which we are trying to understand. *Third*, to rediscover our ability to represent the world by allowing it to think through us, as in role play. *Fourth*, to visualize the world's universal possibilities, including the possibilities for survival of other world-parts. And *fifth*, to begin to think of concrete steps that humans can take to stop destroying the world's universal possibilities, if not help expand them, including those which help humans themselves survive⁸.

IV. Method of Perspectivist Education

Students follow five steps in their learning about the world: *first*, they learn about the world through the conventional curriculum, except they begin with an awareness that there is more "curriculum" than their conventional curriculum can provide. In fact, as an introduction to the perspectivist curriculum, they briefly review all five steps of their teaching methodology at the beginning of their educational experience, including briefly role-playing other world parts (other humans, animals, or inanimate parts). As a result, they become intellectually aware of the possible man-centeredness of their conventional curriculum, meaning, the man-centered-in-the-present interperations of the world offered by traditional subjects. To supplement their understanding of the world, or, more correctly, to really begin to understand, they embark on the next four steps in their methodology. As a next (*second*) step, they begin to learn about the world from the world's perspective, even apart from all they may have learned so far about how the world must be like to be true. As a *first substep*, they begin by gradually rediscovering the assumptions that they can imagine other world-parts may have about the world. Next (= *second substep*), they make an effort to divide assumptions according to the degree to which they are self-centered or atomic, cross-cultural, or universal⁹. Finally, as a *third sub-step*, they begin to role-play other world parts, including other humans, animals, or other animate or inanimate parts, not unlike young children frequently do in their make-believe games. At this stage, students learn about universal possibilities by gradually universalizing their understanding of the world. Instead of pre-defining the universe in man-centered ways, they learn how to redefine their

understanding of the world through role-play. Is pretending to be the other possible? That it is, is shown from the fact that we have always imagined what other animals, plants, or even inanimate parts of nature (mountains, the sun) might have said or done were they capable of thinking, imagining, or speaking to us. Witness, for example, the colorful stories in eastern mythologies, Aristophanes' *Frogs*, or children's literature today. When doing so, we often make an effort to represent other world parts as they might have reinterpreted themselves, us, or the world, presumably on the basis of their own first assumptions about the world. Theirs may be non-man-bound "reinterpretations" of the world, in the sense that they may be interpreted to have a point of view which as humans we rarely use in our everyday lives. For example, an elephant who is in danger of extinction because of the settlement of forests by humans may have a very different view of the world than do the humans that are settling in the forest. However culture or time inclusive our first assumptions may become, they remain man-bound if they exclude other animate or inanimate parts of the world, and therefore too limited to allow us to see the world as a reinterpretable whole. If students exclude from their reinterpretations those of the non-human world, they may be excluding precisely the world which they have set out to understand. It is in this sense that people who write children's or animal stories, or have visualized in myth or religion how the world might be from non-human perspectives, may have more keys to understanding it, than scientists who analyze it "objectively." At the next (*third*) stage of their understanding, students begin to analyze their role-play experience through class discussions, written assignments, or even further role-play. Having gone through the experience of being like-the-other, they can empathize better with it, than if they were to study it strictly intellectually, or even inactively in their imagination. Now they can truly compare their own understanding of the world, with the understanding which they remember they had when they were the other. They can begin to compare what they learned about the world of the conventional curriculum, with the world they learned about in their role play. This leads naturally to the next stage in their education, which is "worlding" the curriculum, meaning, imbuing it with world perspectives which so far man may have largely ignored (except in his role-play). During the *fourth* stage, students together with their instructor begin to re-write the curriculum to represent the world. In other words, to "world their understanding," meaning, imbue it with the world which they are trying to understand (and not merely to understand the world, meaning from only human or scientific perspectives), they use those teaching methods which they can imagine other world-parts might have liked them to use. At this stage, they not only describe orally or in writing methods of role-playing the world, itself useful as a preliminary stage to learning about other world perspectives, but

also restructure their learning environment to be more world-like, especially more like the world that they would like to role play. For example, they may study birds by "birding" their learning, that is, by flying like birds, which in turn may require that they include bird-flying experiences that may be found outside the conventional classroom, such as, sky gliding; or, lacking the resources, have at least some kind of bird-like flying device near their school that will allow them to simulate it, such as, a playground. In fact, the more students world their curriculum, the more they may come to realize that the only reason they cannot learn about it in school may be *not* because it is not available, but because their school may be too limited to human assumptions about learning to include them. Ultimately, the nature of schooling itself may be redefined to include all of nature, and thus to extend its "course offerings" well beyond the conventional walls of a traditional school. Finally at the *fifth* or last stage of their learning, which may be seen as the ethical stage, they begin to think of ways to help the world become more "worldly," that is, expand its universal possibilities, including their own. By "universal possibilities" here is meant the possibilities for different world-categories to become, or their individual members to evolve. By "evolution" here is meant re-adjustment, exploration, and re-emergence, or, more broadly, play, than strictly straightforward mutation. Thus the expansion of world possibilities doesn't mean that no world part may change or "disappear," since its possibilities as a future-world-part may result in a world-part-descendant that is "different" from its current existence; nor does it mean that no world part may overtake another, two world parts unite into a new synthesis, or a world part come naturally to the end of its possibilities, but that as a result of these combinatory or self-imposed actions the possibilities of each world part, or, to paraphrase from Aristotle, its potential-in-the-present as a becoming-world-part, are not hastily eliminated through mindless exploitation of nature. Witness the variety of "lifestyle" s which modern biology has shown is possible among life forms on earth, from symbiosis to parasitism, each of which may be seen morally as maintaining, minimizing, or maximizing the future possibilities of their own or other world parts, and therefore, on the basis of a reciprocal view of morality, as more or less universally desirable¹⁰. Unlike other philosophies that sway man away from action, perspectivist education moves him to action that will benefit not only humans-in-the-present, but other world parts whose possibilities for survival are tied to the world's.

V. Perspectivist Curriculum

A perspectivist curriculum prepares students to analyze, imagine, apply, or role-play the world from a variety of world-perspectives. We refer to this type of world curriculum as "universal." Students study other cultures, or other animate or inanimate parts of the world, including world-parts even

beyond the planet earth. A universal curriculum might include cross-cultural studies, the study of cultures across time, diverse "philosophies," the lifestyles of other animals (as in ethology), or the biological and non-biological aspects of other world-parts. A universal curriculum also includes the study of unreal worlds, such as, fictional worlds that have already been written about, and those which students can write about, discuss, imagine, or role-play from scratch. The method of study becomes part of the curriculum, that is, discussed or analyzed, as are also the moral aspects of man's place in the universe¹¹. Finally, as we discuss under the section "Hidden Curriculum," below, the teaching method of radical perspectivist education is itself another type of curriculum. Seen from the perspective of method-as-another-type-of-curriculum, a perspectivist curriculum requires that we study not only the world-as-subject, but also the world-as-method.

The Hidden Curriculum

The hidden curriculum is the message conveyed to our students not through what we say in the classroom, but through what we do, or "how" we say it. For example, the very fact that we use a classroom conveys something regarding how we think students should be learning, as contrasted to learning any which way they would like. Thus as a result of their classroom learning, students may come to sanction only that type of learning that is classroom-derived, associate learning with classroom experiences, or seek to form classrooms when trying to learn or teach something. Although perhaps unable to articulate clearly the underlying assumptions of classroom-centered learning, in the end they may have learned at least as much from the way they learned, including the physical architecture or anthropology of their educational environment, as from their professed or "open" curriculum. But even within the classroom, the method used to teach a subject may have a more lasting effect on the students' belief system, than the ideas expressed in class or during lecture. For example, a junior high school teacher may be teaching about democracy, but use dictatorial teaching methods. As a result, his students may come to learn more about dictatorship through his teaching example, although they may not know what to call it at the time, than about democracy through what they listen to in class¹². The same reversal may be applied to the curriculum. This is so because the curriculum itself may be seen as another method, that is, the method of organizing or conveying knowledge in curriculum-like form. Such curriculum may be seen as the "hidden method" in education. Finally, on a more abstract level, there is the curriculum of our first assumptions about our choice of method. Although less apparent than the open curriculum which students see or experience, it may become apparent by asking the teacher himself not only what method he or she is using, but more importantly, *why*. Other ways of unearthing hidden

methodological assumptions, which in turn may serve as the basis for redesigning teaching methodologies from different perspectives, may include role-playing the method; asking students what they think they may have learned as a result of being taught by this rather than that method; or analyzing the results, reinterpretations, or criticisms which such method may have had in other classes, cross-culturally, or in alternative educational environments. For example, competitive teaching methods may help improve student academic achievement more in western middle class environments, than in cultures that prize sharing or cooperation¹³.

VI. Objections to Perspectivist Education

In the book on radical perspectivism, the author answers several objections to perspectivist theory in addition to those which he has raised here¹⁴. In this section he limits himself only to two, the objection regarding animism, and the objection regarding human-like intentions.

The Problem of Animism

It may be objected that radical perspectivism is another form of animism, that is, the idea that all animate and inanimate parts in the world have human-like characteristics. This is so because in our selection of universal first assumptions we expect non-human parts of the world to have "assumptions," which presumably only human beings can have. Furthermore, it might be objected that we have not only ascribed human-like characteristics to the world, but also confused man's interpretation of the world with the world's own interpretation of itself. We have three responses to this objection. First, we never really ascribed intentions or assumptions to the world, apart from how human beings re-interpret the world, for example in their role-play. In fact, it is precisely because historically humans have often ascribed human-like characteristics on the world, that we propose that we re-interpret the world from non-human "perspectives." For example, humans frequently saw certain animals as having human-like characteristics, when in fact seen from the perspective of these animals they may be no more "human" than the atomic first assumptions which humans project on them. For example, a snake may be no more "evil," or even the representative of evil, than man's theological beliefs about evil. Likewise with other animals which humans have either lionized, satanized, domesticated, or anthropomorphized. Second, we are as much part of the world as anything else, as is shown from the fact that we can't live without the world (for example, without the food that the world provides, the air, etc.). Consequently, the world-as-something-that-includes-us can think about itself through us, as world-man. Humans can help fulfill the world's possibilities, as it is through humans that the world as world-man can express them to itself. In this pairing of reflexive humans and reinterpretable

world, humans are no more "human" than their mirror view of themselves-in-the-world. Third, if by animism we understand not that everything in the world has human-like characteristics, but that human beings have the ability to better represent the world, for example, through role play, then radical perspectivism is as "animistic" as is our ability as humans to role-play, imagine, empathize, or hypothesize. In other words, although we are able to role play the world from different non-human perspectives, as some people do in rituals, actors in their dramas, or children in their plays, it doesn't mean that along with such perspectives other animate or inanimate parts of the world also have our ability to think, write, or hypothesize. If people in certain cultures have been playing world in their rituals, it may be not because they failed to understand it, but because we failed to understand the world. If they were unable to explain what they have been doing in a way that we can understand, for example, by articulating a theory similar to radical perspectivism, it doesn't mean that they can't teach us something about how to live in the world, or, for that matter, how to understand it. In fact, even our use of the term "animism" may reflect more the projection of our beliefs on nature, than the "naturalizing" of our beliefs: we invented a term, "animism," to protect our view of the world from foreign world views, which we redefine in order to justify our own.

The Problem of Human-Like Intentions

It may be objected that we have described the world as something that can assume, or have a perspective or a view, and therefore as something that has human-like intentions (such as, the intention to assume this rather than that view or perspective). This is so because we said that the world may have perspectives or "first assumptions" other than our own. In response to this objection, it may be said that, first, whether the world has "intentions" depends on how one defines the term "intention." If by intention is meant the inclination to do something, then there is little doubt that there are numerous non-human elements in the world that intend all the time: if left without its brakes on, my car has the "intention" to run down the hill. If left unperturbed, the moon has the "intention" of revolving around the earth. If allowed to choose freely, my cat has the "intention" of chasing after a string-toy. If, on the other hand, intention is defined in strictly human terms as the type of "intention" which only humans have, then it makes no sense that it should ever apply to any-one or any-thing other than human beings: it is only human-like intention "by definition." Consequently, it makes no sense to speak of my car as having "intentions." Likewise with our description of the world. If we pre-define non-human world parts as completely different from humans, then no non-human world-part can be human-like. In such a dichotomous world, it becomes almost impossible for humans to open a horizontal dialogue

with the world, where the world can communicate freely with humans with "words" that humans can understand. If we re-define or expand the meaning of the term "intention" to include its possibly being held by non-humans, then it no longer sounds strange to speak of another world-part as having intentions. For example, a shark may *assume* that I am edible, and therefore *intend* to eat me. Although the shark's atomic first assumption may be less "sophisticated" than mine, in the sense that he has *less* the capacity to imagine, interrelate, analyze, or pretend than I can as a human being, it has no less the capacity to assume certain things about me, as I have about the shark when I go fishing (perhaps even fishing for sharks). Perhaps it is for this reason that certain writers allow nature in their work to be itself apart from what assumptions human beings may commonly make about nature at the time. For example, in Hemingway's *The Old Man and the Sea*³ the fisherman develops an almost perspectivistic understanding of his prey, while the hunted whale is seen as no less understanding of the fisherman's intentions. These writers allow their human and non-human characters to assume radically non-atomic perspectives.

Intentions by Inanimate World-Parts

A related objection may be that although animate parts of the world, such as, other animals, may have the capacity to assume, how can we show that so do inanimate parts of the world, such as, trees, mountains, rivers, or even such plain things as stones, or human artifacts (table, painting, bicycle)? Again, whether they do depends on our definition of the term "assumption." By pre-defining "assumption" to include only animals, we have excluded even thinking about "assumptions" held by inanimate "objects." This is so because by so pre-defining "assumption" to include only animate beings we engage in re-establishing in-fact how our definition has predictably predefined the "facts" to be like. For example, we may exclude from our thinking even thinking about the *possibility* of any-thing non-animate being capable of having any assumptions, let alone an assumption about us or the world, and therefore don't even try to find them. It is in this sense that much of the modern discussion of science, meaning, or language, may be no more than the linguistic evolution of a pre-determined epistemological agenda: terms are pre-defined, or assumed to have been defined a certain way, and therefore "found," predictably enough, to apply only to human-centered assumptions. If we expand our definition of "assumption" to include assumptions held by non-animate parts of the world, such as, rivers, trees, or mountains, then it doesn't sound strange that a river should "assume" whatever we may be able to imagine in our role-play a river might be capable of assuming. Witness the role that rivers play in epic, religious, or allegorical stories, where they are fully capable of "assuming" (as was the river Xanthos in Homer's *Iliad*).

Witness, also, how people in certain cultures role-play in their rituals different inanimate parts of nature: they are capable of imagining how a river might reinterpret the world. Thus to take the river's perspective, while a human being might assume that a river may be used to water his crops, build a dam, or travel with a boat, the river may possibly see him as a user of its water, builder of dams that stop its flow, or maker of boats with which to navigate it. It is in this sense that cultures that role-play the world may know more about the world, since they are willing to reinterpret it also from a variety of non-human perspectives, than we do in the west even in spite of our usually more advanced technical or scientific knowledge¹⁶.

VII. Moral Education

A world where no-one world is for sure, as is the world of our world, is a world beyond conventional morality. By having their minds subjected to a variety of first assumptions in their re-interpretations of the world, some students may find that the morality inside which they have safely managed to survive may not be the only one possible. This doesn't necessarily mean that theirs is any better or worse than other views of morality, but only that other people's might be at least as good an alternative as theirs, and therefore neither better nor worse. If introduced suddenly, a radically perspectivist morality may cause some students so much insecurity, as to reject reinterpretation in favor of a less "reinterpretable" morality where nothing is uncertain¹⁷.

It may be argued that there can't possibly be a morality other than that which humans designed. In fact, the very idea of something being moral is a human-made idea, and therefore impossible for non-human parts of the world to have a "morality." If morality is defined in strictly human terms, then the world is clearly a-moral: What is "moral" from the perspective of humans, is *not* from the perspective of the world. It is in this sense, to paraphrase Nietzsche, that our world is beyond good or evil¹⁸. The problem with the use of the term "morality" in human affairs is that it is so inextricably tied to only human-made moral rules that it doesn't seem to make sense to speak of a morality other than that which humans designed. It is in that sense that a human-made morality may be no less self-serving, and no more universal, than is man's myopic understanding of the world. By expanding their conception of morality to include the perspectives of other world-parts, students transcend their culture-bound, time-bound, or human-bound first assumptions regarding morality. They can do this by role-playing the world's moral possibilities as the world itself might have interpreted them: their morality becomes cosmic.

It may be argued that certain human-made moral rules are moral even in spite of the fact that humans made them: they are inherently

generalizable, and therefore applicable to every part in the world. The problem with such a view is, again, that it is based on certain human-bound first assumptions regarding "generalization" which other parts of the world may not share. The only possible exception to this might be the idea of morality as reciprocity, or what is known as the "golden rule." This is so because underlying the golden rule of reciprocity is a mathematics of equal returns that may be applied to any world part irrespective of time or place. It is in this sense that if there is a morality that the universe obeys, it is a mathematical one of harmony among all of its parts. To paraphrase several philosophers and mathematicians ever since Pythagoras first postulated the idea, the mathematics of the universe is a type of non-human-bound morality that humans can understand.

ENDNOTES

¹ The paper is based on a book-in-progress written by the author during 1991-1992, *Humans in the World: An Introduction to Radical Perspectivism*.

² Some of the more recent Marxist critiques in education include Herbert Bowles and Samuel Gintis, *Schooling in Capitalist America*. New York: Basic Books, 1976; and Michael Apple, *Education and Power*. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982. Critical theorists include Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society*. Boston: Beacon, 1964; and Jurgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*. London: Heinemann, 1972. Hermeneuticists include Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*. Tr. and ed. G. Barden and J. Cumming. New York: Seabury Press, 1975; and Paul Ricoeur in *Ricoeur: Paul A. Ricoeur Reader. Reflection and Imagination*. Ed. M. J. Valdes. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991.

³ The history of radical perspectivism is briefly examined in the chapter on "History of Perspectivist Ideas," *Humans in the World*.

⁴ See the chapter on "Husserl and Phenomenology" in *Humans in the World*.

⁵ Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Tr. with an intro. D. Carr. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970; *Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*. Tr. J. Scanlon. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977.

⁶ Gadamer, *Truth and Method*; and Ricoeur, *Ricoeur Reader*. Derrida's ideas

may be found in *Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida*. Ed J. Sallis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987.

⁷ For a more detailed discussion of objections against radical perspectivist theory, see the chapter on "Objections" in *Humans in the World*.

⁸ See chapter on "Responsibility" in *Humans and the World*.

⁹ See chapter on "First Assumptions" in *Humans in the World*.

¹⁰ See chapters on "Morality" and "Ethics" in *Humans in the World*.

¹¹ See section on moral education, below.

¹² *The Hidden Curriculum and Moral Education: Deception or Discovery?* Ed. Henry Giroux and David Purpel. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1983. Robert Dreeben, *On What Is Learned in School*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1985.

¹³ Edward C. Stewart, *American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective*. Pittsburgh, Penn.: Society for Intercultural Education, Training and Research, 1971.

¹⁴ Some of the objections raised in *Humans in the World* include the problem regarding the existence of a deceptive God, first assumptions in young children, dogmaticity, the problem of biased observations, first assumptions in role play, selection of universal first assumptions, universalization, and the problem of unknown world-categories. See chapter on "Objections."

¹⁵ Ernest Hemingway, *The Old Man and the Sea*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952.

¹⁶ See chapter on "Culture" in *Humans in the World*.

¹⁷ See the chapter on "Psychology" in *Humans in the World*.

¹⁸ Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*. New York: Macmillan, 1907.

**PHILOSOPHY OF CATHOLIC EDUCATION
BEFORE VATICAN II**

**Walter P. Krolkowski
Loyola University of Chicago**

I spend summers working on a *Dictionary of Jesuit History* in what some people seriously call *Roma eterna*, eternal Rome. At times I think that Rome will have fallen into the dust before the *Dictionary* is completed. But we're not here to talk about how long it takes to complete a dictionary nor, really, about eternal Rome. In any case, Rome does have some evidence for its claim: it has lasted for a very long time. Nevertheless, as we all know, it changes, and it has changed radically over the centuries. Our topic today is the Philosophy of Catholic Education, and to many, friends and foes alike, it sometimes seems that it too claims, like Rome, to be eternal, unchanging, immutable, and yet, like Rome, it changes.

We will be looking at the philosophy of Catholic education as it appeared in a representative figure just fifty years ago. The other speakers will then look at it as it has moved through those years up until the present, Is it immutable? Is there continuity in change? Has there been a radical break between past and present? These are good questions that we hope this session will help you answer.

We will begin with a representative figure. We could have chosen Jacques Maritain, for instance, if we wanted a lay figure of international renown, or William Cunningham, if we wanted simply an American priest. I have chosen William J. McGucken¹ because in his person he unites that complex of characteristics which we identify as a Catholic philosopher of education. His education was Catholic; his professional experience was in Catholic high schools and universities; he was a teacher and an administrator; he was a priest and a Jesuit, and Jesuits have, among Catholics, been very active on the higher educational scene. And being a mid-westerner, he has something in common with all of us.

The Reverend William J. McGucken, of the Society of Jesus, to give him his full title, was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on March 10, 1889, went to a parochial grade school called Holy Rosary, attended a Jesuit high school, Marquette College, and then went to what it became, Marquette University. He taught a year in the high school and the following year entered the Jesuits

in 1910 (25 July) at Florissant, Missouri. He was a novice for two years, studied the classics for one, and taught, probably, freshman mathematics at Chicago's St. Ignatius College from 1913 to 1915. He studied philosophy for three years at St. Louis University (1915-1918) and theology there for two (1921-1923) and then at Hastings (England) for two more. He was ordained a priest in 1923 (27 June). Only once did he break his pattern of Catholic education. He attended the University of Chicago (1925-1927) and received a doctorate in education in 1927.² He spent a final year of spiritual training (Cleveland, 1927-1928) and was then ready at age 39 to begin his professional career as a priest-educator. He taught in the School of Education at St. Louis University (Missouri) from 1928 to 1943, was its Dean³ from 1928 to 1930, and Regent⁴ from 1930 to 1937. St. Louis University had so few full-time education students that late-afternoon classes when part-time students could come were all that kept the School alive. In 1935 he was also appointed General Prefect of Studies for the Missouri Province of the Society of Jesus, which meant that he was in charge of the education programs of the younger Jesuits. It was then that he became quite active on committees of learned societies, both national and Jesuit. From 1934 to 1940 he was an editor of *Thought*. And the article I am going to analyze is part of a symposium on philosophy of education sponsored and published by the National Society for the Study of Education in 1942.⁵ McGucken died on 5 November 1943.

Now to analysis. McGucken is a clear writer. So interpretation should not be difficult. But that does not mean that his ideas are easy to accept nor that there is not a sub-text of presuppositions and intentions that may not have been consciously held. What he says, then, can be summarized fairly brutally; interpretation may take longer.

The philosophy of Catholic education is a consequence of a Catholic philosophy of life. That life is centered in God who has created a world and, most especially, humankind. The human person is composed of body and soul, intelligence and will and imagination. The person is teleologically poised toward life in God, which telos then furnishes norms for what is good and what is evil. The human fate is complicated by an early history of an Edenic Adam falling and being redeemed, cognitively through revelation and, more completely, through the death and resurrection of Jesus. Individually the person's redemption is brought about by the grace of Jesus with which the educator cooperates by putting the student in contact with the true, the good, and the beautiful: Christian humanism. Cognitively, the intelligence resides in a wounded person but one still capable of finding the truth. Socially, the individual is part of an organism seeking completion without, however, being subordinated or lost within the group. That, I think, is a fair summary of McGucken's position. It deserves a close analysis. We will take up in turn five topics: the relationship of philosophy of education to a life-vi. ; God-

centered education; humanism and the centrality of the fully human; Christian humanism; and social humanism.

The relationship of philosophy of education to a life-view. To see a quasi-deductive relationship between philosophy of education and a life-view is not surprising. Many thinkers see such a relationship. The Communists develop a theory of education from a view of the human in relation to an ideology which in itself rests on a more basic sub-structure. James E. McClellan⁶ has in recent years been at work preparing a very sophisticated version of this relationship. J. Donald Butler⁷ and his four philosophies (then five and six) has shown how this relationship can be worked out from several Weltanschauungen, and he only tips his hand a bit in favor of idealism. Farther afield, we yearly watch the Supreme Court try to do the same thing, deriving concrete proposals from the Constitution and other relevant documents. Which is not to say that there are not alternatives to deducing a philosophy of education. Analysts abandon the deductive project and elect to analyze second-order concepts: for example, the meaning of the concept of aim or play or teach. John Dewey's philosophy of education may rest on a view of life, but in his argumentation he tries to proceed from much more neutral grounds. He does not begin; he ends up (even if fairly quickly, that is, by the end of chapter seven of *Democracy and Education*) with a life-view.

God-centered Education. That education should be God-centered strikes many of us at first glance as strange or, perhaps worse, medieval. And yet there has been hardly a private university begun in the United States that has not been sectarian and, therefore, in some real sense God-centered. There has been the tradition of clergymen for college presidents and, where not clergyman, Christians. Many of us still remember Dwight Eisenhower. He was responsible for Columbia University, John Dewey's university, changing its statutes to allow a non-Anglican to be president of what was once King's College--and Eisenhower was Presbyterian. In a sense, in 1942 McGucken was sailing with the crowd, even though there were many signs of imminent change, such as the Vashti McCollum⁸ case in Champaign, Illinois in the 1940s.

But some changes are less changes than we are sometimes willing to admit. The nation-state, especially as it appeared in the 30s and 40s, may have pulled down church statues, but it quickly replaced them with statues of its own leaders. The totalitarian state clearly meant itself to be a more worthy replacement for God. The 1960 Torcaso⁹ case in Maryland broadened our concept of religion to include a commitment to any absolute, and, paradoxically, secular humanism was on the court's list of forms of religion. Absolutes do abound. The 18th century (at least one small but significant sector) raised reason on a pedestal; the nineteenth, duty (in a Rousseauvian

and Kantian sense), progress, history, the will to power (in a Nietzschean sense)--all were proposed as worthy substitutes. The concept of God may change, but clearly educators have had a teleological bent, with the telos often enough transcendent but occasionally immanent. Think of the gentle Froebel and the gentle kindergarten, and you are thinking of a perfect example of a teleological and immanentist approach. But it looks like the reigning candidate is the human. What better candidate for God is coming up for election than humanity in the singular or in the plural?

Humanism: The centrality of the fully human. McGucken, I suspect like the rest of us, is double-minded about the human. Misery and grandeur, in the Pascalian sense. On the one hand, the person is deeply flawed, and McGucken accepts the biblical account in Genesis as giving something of an acceptable explanation for that state of affairs. The educator is working with a flawed product, and failure is always a possibility. On the other hand, persons are redeemed and are, through grace and education, empowered to be like the Godhead, but always as they are in all their complexities. For McGucken what is educated is not a disembodied spirit, a creature striving for autonomy, a creature of sentiment or creativity, a rugged individualist, or a team player. To pick and choose one is to devalue another which is equally and authentically human. And therefore the only true education is a general education in the widest sense. We might note in passing a theory of transfer of learning lurking in the background to make a general education feasible.¹⁰

Christian Humanism. McGucken confronts a two-sided problem: hierarchy and integration. Spencer's old question still lingers: What knowledge is of most worth? McGucken's reply is not Spencer's: the knowledge of most worth is not science; it is, as another Englishman J.H. Newman would say, theology. A humanism that ignores knowledge of God and that knowledge of the human which feeds off revelation is not fully human. Knowledge is hierarchical. But is the hierarchy two-stepped, theology on top and all else heaped together beneath? McGucken would say, no. Is there an order that in some sense is reflected in the order of study that goes from elementary school to higher education? McGucken would say, yes. In a sense, McGucken has settled for "forms of knowledge" in the Hirst and Peters' sense, and that may not be a foolish position. He may put theology at the top, but there are other forms of knowledge that are indeed knowledge.

Integration offers a similar problem. Dewey has a three-step formula of integration: doing (and play) through space and time (ecology and history) to science, the first two of which are *aufgehoben* dialectically in the synthesis which is science. For McGucken the problem remains hovering in the air, as it does, to again cite them, for Hirst and Peters. Various forms of knowledge are not inconsistent, but what the principle of integration might be remains unknown.

Social Humanism. McGucken may think of his educational philosophy as timeless, thereby putting himself on the side of the essentialists, but existential considerations at least prompt his giving attention to certain topics. In this case, World War II, Nazism, Fascism, and Democracy at war with each other furnish grounds for and give some urgency to discussing the relationship of the individual to the group. Individuals come from the group (it takes two to tango), are supported by the group, are asked in war to sacrifice their lives for the group. Is, then, the individual subordinated to society? In democracy McGucken sees a dialectical balance in which ultimately society is for the individual, in which, paradoxically, the individual is not lost in the mass, and in which the masses deserve special attention and care. Needless to say, McGucken is holding a dead-center position, a position echoed in the war-time writings of everyone from Boyd Bode and John Dewey to Robert Maynard Hutchins and Alexander Meiklejohn.¹¹

Just one last topic, one that goes beyond the time setting of McGucken and looks to more recent work. I hope that I will not be stepping into the territory marked out for Robert Barger and Don Smith. McGucken's exposition is primarily and per se of his own position. If there is any glaring deficiency from our point of view, it is McGucken's seeming lack of concern for cultures other than our own. He flunks the multi-cultural criterion. Seemingly for him the East does not exist; the third world is beyond his horizons. And yet, in a world where we are all desperately trying to be cross-cultural and multi-horizoned, trying to put our feet down on something solid in a world where relativity reigns, McGucken is at least not fallen into the traps of paternalism and colonialism cross-cultural researchers have fallen into. McGucken eschews a paternalistic line which desperately tries to save what it can from primitive cultures; he eschews a colonial line which speaks to the powerless from a position of power; he eschews trying to represent the thought of others without being chosen to represent them.¹² Of course he knows that there are positions other than his own. In fact, the symposium in which his article is embedded is living proof of that. Contributors speak for themselves and let the others speak for themselves. McGucken is no Kantian, but he does understand and practice the Categorical Imperative.

ENDNOTES

¹ For those interested in the philosophy of Catholic education, it is conceivable that they may find the works of the Mexican but German educated Jesuit Jaime Castiello even more interesting. See his *A Humane Psychology of Education* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936) and Xavier Ortiz Monasterio, *Jaime Castiello--muestro y guía de la juventud universitaria*

(Mexico City: Editorial Jus, 1956).

² McGucken's dissertation is entitled "Jesuit Secondary Education in the United States." It is worth noting that he completed his doctoral studies in two academic years, but that fact should be kept in perspective: Ralph Tyler entered the University of Chicago in 1926 and graduated with McGucken in 1927.

³ Dean is our title; the Jesuits' title was "prefect of studies."

⁴ A Regent, as defined at St. Louis University, is a personal representative of the president, giving by his presence concrete evidence of the president's concern, and the communal representative of Jesuit educational viewpoints and of the long traditions of St. Louis University.

⁵ "The Philosophy of Catholic Education." In *The Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Part I. Philosophies of Education*, pp. 251-288. Edited by Nelson B. Henry. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942). Other contributors were Edward H. Reisner, William H. Kilpatrick, Frederick S. Breed, Herman H. Horne, Mortimer J. Adler, and John S. Brubacher. For another work of McGucken on the topic, see *The Catholic Way in Education* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1934).

⁶ See McClellan's "Making a Mess of Marxism," in *Philosophy of Education 1984. Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society* (Normal, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society 1985), pp. 265-271. See also his "First Philosophy and Education," in *Philosophy and Education. Eightieth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education* (Chicago: NSSE, 1981), pp. 263-288.

⁷ J. Donald Butler, *Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and Religion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968).

⁸ *People ex rel. McCollum v Board of Education* 71 NE 2d 161. 22 January 1947. And the United States Supreme Court's decision of 8 March 1948, *Illinois ex rel. Vashti McCollum v. Board of Education of Champaign County*. For an astute analysis, see Edward S. Corwin, "The Supreme Court as National School Board," *Thought* 23 (1948): 665-683.

⁹ *Torcaso vs Watkins*, clerk of the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Md. 162 A2d 438. 30 June 1960.

¹⁰ C.H. Judd may have influenced McGucken on this point. For a survey of the question by a contemporary of McGucken, see Albert Rapp, "The Experimental Background of the Problem of Learning," *Classical Journal* (where else?) 40 (1945): 467-480.

¹¹ See William J. McGucken, S.J., "Jesuit Defenders of Democracy" and Robert M. Hutchins, "Education and the Defense of Democracy," in *Three Addresses in Honor of Quadricentennial Celebration of Founding of the Society of Jesus* (Chicago: Loyola University, 1941), pp. 5-13 and 14-24 respectively. I am grateful to Michael Grace, Loyola University Archivist, for showing me these two addresses. For the most subtle and profound discussion of personal and corporate responsibility, see two articles of I. Th. Eschmann that reflect war-time concerns: "Studies on the Notion of Society in St. Thomas Aquinas. I. St. Thomas and the Decretal of Innocent IV *Romana Ecclesia: Ceterum*," *Mediaeval Studies* 8 (1946): 1-42; "II. Thomistic Social Philosophy and the Theology of Original Sin," *Mediaeval Studies* 9 (1947): 19-55. To my knowledge, no one has done a better job.

¹² Behind this paragraph lies Thomas McCarthy's very perceptive review essay, "Doing the Right Thing in Cross-cultural Representation," *Ethics* 102 (1992): 635-649.

McGUCKEN REVISITED: A FIFTY-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN CATHOLIC EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY

Robert N. Barger
Eastern Illinois University

In 1942, Rev. William McGucken, S.J., Professor of Education at Saint Louis University, authored an article in the Forty-first Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. The title of that article was "The Philosophy of Catholic Education." The present paper will attempt to summarize briefly McGucken's position on Catholic educational philosophy as he expressed it in that article. Then it will survey views touching philosophical concerns in education expressed in the Second Vatican Council's "Declaration on Christian Education," written in 1965, and views of the American Catholic Bishops' Pastoral "To Teach As Jesus Did," written in 1972. Finally, conclusions will be offered concerning changes in philosophical perspective which have occurred over the past fifty years.

I. McGucken's Position

Professor McGucken's view of the philosophy of Catholic education in 1942 is one clearly based on Neo-Thomistic philosophy (McGucken, p. 251). It presupposes a personal God. This presupposition in turn requires that the whole person, body and soul, intellect and will, be educated. McGucken makes clear that any education of the human character which is without a theological basis is not only inadequate, but false (McGucken, p. 253). The purpose of Catholic schools, according to McGucken, is first of all religious (McGucken, p. 264). In his view, the hereafter is more important than the here and now (McGucken, p. 287). He therefore believes that religion must permeate all Catholic education from arithmetic to zoology (McGucken, p. 279). The child, he maintains, is not just a mere creature of the state. Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's 1925 decision in the Oregon School Case, he maintains that the family has a higher right than the state in the education of children (McGucken, p. 282). He goes on to say that the Catholic Church also has educational rights regarding its own members. Making reference to the metaphor of the Mystical Body of Christ, he says that the aim of the Church is not "information" but the "formation" of its members into "other Christs" (McGucken, p. 283).

Near the end of his article, Professor McGucken speaks of the

Catholic view regarding democracy and education. He does not agree with the view that democracy is the only absolute. He calls this a Rousseauistic type of democracy. While he sees democracy as a valid form of political government, it is clear that he is in disagreement with proponents of educational democracy who would question the place of "discipline and authority and traditional subjects" in the training of American youth (McGucken, p. 283).

II. The Declaration on Christian Education

In contrast to the McGucken article, the first thing that is apparent in the Second Vatican Council's "Declaration on Christian Education," written in 1965, is its emphasis on concerns of this present world (pp. 673-638). Indeed, the basic position that the Fathers of the Council take in the Declaration is that although the Church's ultimate concern is the supernatural calling of humankind, such supernatural life begins here and now, in this natural world. This view is known in theology as "realized eschatology." The Fathers of the Council are at pains to make the point that the earthly part of human life cannot be separated from the heavenly part which follows it. As is the case in all areas of the Council's teaching, the Fathers of the Council want to dispel a false religious dicotomy between the "here and now" and the "elsewhere and hereafter." Thus, the Declaration expresses concern for "the whole of man's life" (p. 638, Note 4).

The Declaration makes twelve basic statements regarding education. It leaves to a postconciliar commission and to national Bishops' conferences the development of these statements.

In the first statement, education is declared to be an inalienable right, since education aims at the formation of men and women with respect to their ultimate goal and simultaneously with respect to their membership in human society (p.639). The second statement declares that Christians are entitled to a Christian education. The placement of this statement of the right to a Christian education after the right to a fundamental human education is a departure from the emphasis of the McGucken article.

The Declaration next confirms the place, first of parents, then of the state (in a role supportive of parents), and finally of the Church, regarding the possession of the right to educate (pp. 641-642). There follows in the Declaration a rather circumspect statement that the right of parents to choice of schools and the following of their consciences in educating their children ought to be honored by the state in the way it subsidizes education (p. 644).

Another departure from the approach of the McGucken article occurs in the Declaration's seventh statement:

7. The Church is keenly aware of her very grave obligation to give zealous attention to the moral and religious educa-

tion of all her children. To those large numbers of them who are being trained in schools which are not Catholic, she needs to be present with her special affection and helpfulness (p. 645).

Whereas Professor McGucken does not seem to envision many Catholics attending non-Catholic schools, the Declaration acknowledges that, in 1965, this is no longer the case. The Declaration does note in its eighth statement, however: "As for Catholic parents, the Council calls to mind their duty to entrust their children to Catholic schools, **WHEN AND WHERE THIS IS POSSIBLE...**" (p. 647, emphasis added).

Statement nine of the Declaration speaks of new types of educational institutions (e.g., technical schools, adult education institutes, and special education schools). These types of institutions are not mentioned in the McGucken article. In its tenth statement (on higher education), the Declaration speaks in much more favorable terms than does McGucken of the role of scientific investigation:

10. The Church is preoccupied too with schools of higher learning, especially colleges and universities and their faculties. In schools of this sort which are dependent on her, she seeks in a systematic way to have individual branches of knowledge studied according to their own proper principles and methods, and with due freedom of scientific investigation. She intends thereby to promote an ever deeper understanding of these fields, and as a result of extremely precise evaluation of modern problems and inquiries, to have it seen more profoundly how faith and reason give harmonious witness to the unity of all truth (p. 648).

Finally, after mentioning the importance of graduate Catholic theology faculties, the Declaration concludes with a call for collaboration between Catholic and secular universities (pp. 650-651). This type of collaboration is something not envisioned in the McGucken article.

III. "To Teach As Jesus Did"

The American Catholic Bishops' pastoral message "To Teach As Jesus Did," written in 1972, begins by noting that it is written in response to the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on Christian Education. In keeping with the emphasis of that Declaration, the Bishops' pastoral message says that "the educational efforts of the Church must encompass the twin purposes of personal sanctification and social reform in light of Christian values" (#7).

There is a strong reaffirmation in the pastoral message of the teaching of the Declaration on Christian Education regarding the continuity between the natural and the supernatural aspects of human life.

The pastoral message goes on to present a theological solution to the age-old philosophical dilemma of "the one and the many" (i.e., the dilemma as to whether the individual or the group is the primary unit of society). The solution is contained in the statement that "The educational efforts of the Church must therefore be directed to forming persons-in-community; for the education of the individual Christian is important not only to his solitary destiny but also to the destinies of the many communities in which he lives" (#13). Once again, emphasis is placed on uniting the concerns of the elsewhere and hereafter with those of the here and now.

The pastoral message says that the Church must use contemporary methods and language to proclaim its message. To this it adds: "Furthermore, within the fundamental unity of the faith, there is room for a plurality of cultural differences, forms of expression, and theological views." Yet, it continues: "But what is taught and how it is expressed are subject to the magisterium, the teaching authority of the Church, as guarantor of authenticity" (#18).

Speaking on the topic of community, the pastoral message says that community is not only a concept to be taught but a reality to be lived: "Through education, men must be moved to build community in all areas of life; they can do this best if they have learned the meaning of community by experiencing it" (#23). Adverting to the theme of the continuity between the supernatural and the natural, the message says "From a Christian perspective, integral personal growth, even growth in grace and the spiritual life, is not possible without integral social life. To understand this is a high form of learning; to foster such understanding is a crucial task of education" (#24).

After speaking briefly of new developments in technology, which the message says could become either a curse or a blessing, the message goes on to consider several types of educational activity. The first is adult education.

A clear democratic outlook is assumed regarding adult education. The message says: "Those who teach in the name of the Church do not simply instruct adults, but also learn from them; they will only be heard by adults if they listen to them. For this reason adult programs must be planned and conducted in ways that emphasize self-direction, dialogue, and mutual responsibility" (#44). Repeating the theme of realized eschatology, the message states: "The content of such a program will include contemporary sociological and cultural developments considered in the light of faith, current questions concerning religious and moral issues, the relationship of the 'temporal' and 'ecclesial' spheres of life, and the 'rational foundations' of religious belief....Adult religious education should strive not only to impart instruction to adults but to enable them better to assume responsibility for the

building of community and for Christian service in the world" (#48). In closing its section on adult education, the message says: "Even though Christians may at times err in their facts, interpretations, and conclusions about social issues, they must not fail to apply the Gospel to contemporary life" (#61).

Taking up the topic of higher education, the message notes that the great majority of Catholics who enroll in college go to non-Catholic institutions. Thus Catholic concern is "extended to all of higher education" and Catholics are called, in this wide context, to the "full and free pursuit and study of truth" (#65).

The message moves next to the topic of religious education for youth who are not in Catholic schools. In explaining the priority given to this subject, the message says: "we choose to deal here first with religious education programs for children and young people who attend public and other non-Catholic schools not because Catholic schools are any less important than in the past - their importance is in fact greater now than ever before - but because the urgency and the difficulty of the educational ministry to the students outside them warrants this emphasis" (#84). The message says that the task of programs for the religious education of youths outside Catholic schools is not merely to teach about religion. "Instead such programs must strive to teach doctrine fully, foster community, and prepare their students for Christian service" (#87).

The message then turns to the subject of Catholic schools. It says that "Christian education is intended to 'make men's faith become living, conscious, and active, through the light of instruction.'...The Catholic school is the unique setting within which this ideal can be realized in the lives of Catholic children and young people" (#102). In a subsection headed "The Crisis of Catholic Schools," the Bishops reflect on the current problems of Catholic schools:

114. Today this school system is shrinking visibly. The reasons are many and include complex sociological, demographic and psychological factors. Some believe there has been an excessive effort informal education and too much concentration on schools at the expense of other educational programs. Some are convinced that other forms of Christian service take unequivocal priority over service rendered in the classroom. Some feel American Catholics no longer have the material resources to support so ambitious an educational enterprise.

115. Financial problems have contributed significantly to the

present crisis. Burdened by the spiraling costs of both public and non-public education, those who support non-public schools have placed their cause before their fellow Americans. While legislators have responded in many instances, courts have often rejected laws favorable to non-public education, sometimes on grounds which many find extremely difficult to understand or accept.

The Bishops then go on record as reaffirming that Catholic schools are the most effective means of transmitting a Christian education. They "call on all members of the Catholic community to do everything in their power to maintain and strengthen Catholic schools which embrace the threefold purpose of Christian education [to teach doctrine, to build community, and to serve]" (#118).

Next, the Bishops reflect on what action might be taken to ensure the continuance and improvement of Catholic schools. They suggest that such action might include: stating clearly and compellingly the distinctive goals of the Catholic school, increasing associations with other non-public and public schools; practicing fiscal, professional, academic, and civic accountability; conducting vigorous programs of student recruitment; joining with other non-public schools in public relations efforts; exercising firm control over operating costs and practicing greater efficiency in the use of facilities and personnel; intensifying efforts to increase income from private sources; entering into partnership with institutions of higher learning; undertaking school consolidations at the elementary and secondary levels where circumstances make this educationally desirable; and participating fully in the search for solutions to the racial crisis in American education (#120). The Bishops state: "If the Catholic community is convinced of the values and advantages of Catholic schools, it must and will act now to adopt such measures and face such challenges as these" (#122).

The Bishops then suggest that some Catholic schools may have to reorganize. "While the Christian purpose of the Catholic school must always be clearly evident, no one form is prescribed for it" (#123). The message continues:

124. The search for new forms of schooling should therefore continue. Some may bear little resemblance to schooling as we have known it: the parish education center; the family education center; the school without walls, drawing extensively on community resources; the counseling center; etc....The point is that one must be open to the possibility that the school of the future, including the Catholic school, will in many ways be very different from the school of the

past.

Toward the end of the message, the Bishops speak of shared governance for Catholic education. "Under the leadership of the Ordinary and his priests, planning and implementing the educational mission of the Church must involve the entire Catholic community (#139)...One such agency, long a part of the American experience and in recent years increasingly widespread in Catholic education, is the representative board of education, which, acting on behalf of the community it serves, seeks patiently and conscientiously to direct the entire range of educational institutions and programs within the educational ministry" (#140).

The message concludes:

152. The educational mission is not exhausted by any one program or institution. By their complementary functions and cooperative activities all programs and activities contribute to the present realization of the Church's educational mission. All should remain open to new forms, new programs, new methods which give promise of fuller realization of this mission in the future.

153. The educational mission is not directed to any single group within the Christian community or mankind. All have a role to play; all should have a voice in planning and directing.

IV. Conclusion

The foregoing retrospective may be summarized by saying that the philosophical viewpoint of Professor McGucken in 1942 was a Neo-Thomistic one, with heavy emphasis on the Idealistic element of Neo-Thomism. At the Second Vatican Council in 1965, the same basic philosophical stance was maintained, but the Realistic element of Neo-Thomism was more emphasized. Seven years later in 1972 when the American Bishops wrote "To Teach As Jesus Did," the Council's commitment to a here-and-now focus, a less-isolationist stance, and greater participation by the laity in the leadership of the Church was stated in the context of the post-conciliar American Church.

Perhaps the Catholic Church in the United States has always been and still remains, on average, more liberal than the Church in most other countries (Barger, 1988). Still, the 1972 Bishops' message did not involve any significant change from the Council's statement in 1965. And the Council's worldview, even granting its shift of emphasis, did not involve a radical change from the view of McGucken. Neo-Thomism may be thought of as a

blend of Idealism and Realism. If this is true, then the philosophy underlying American Catholic Education fifty years after McGucken might still be said to be Neo-Thomistic. Because of the influence of Vatican II, it might now be said to be Neo-Thomistic with a heavy emphasis on Neo-Thomism's Realistic element.

REFERENCES

Barger, Robert N. (1988). *John Lancaster Spalding: Catholic Educator and Social Emissary*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.

Declaration on Christian Education. (1966). In Walter M. Abbott, S.J. (Ed.), *The Documents of Vatican II*. New York: Herder and Herder.

McGucker, William, S.J. (1942). The Philosophy of Catholic Education. In Nelson B. Henry (Ed.), *The Forty-first Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education. Part I: Philosophies of Education*. Bloomington, IL: Public School Publishing Co.

To Teach As Jesus Did. (1972). Washington: United States Catholic Conference.

**AMERICANS FIRST AND CATHOLICS SECOND:
THE DECLINE OF CATHOLIC EDUCATION
SINCE VATICAN II**

**Don G. Smith
Eastern Illinois University**

At the present time Roman Catholicism is in the process of phasing out Catholic schools and replacing them with CCD [Confraternity of Christian Doctrine] classes. As the CCD movement gains strength, Catholic school enrollment declines, Catholic schools close, and new ones are not built. According to Catholic sociologist Andrew Greeley, "Catholic schools simply are no longer as important to the ecclesiastical institution as they were at the time of the Vatican Council. . . . Catholic schools are a casualty of the era following the Second Vatican Council. They have not disappeared completely but they are in trouble - and they are in trouble despite the fact that the consumers of Catholic education are, for the most part, very happy with the product they purchase when they send their young people to parochial schools." This paper will examine causal factors accounting for the decline of Catholic education after Vatican II, concluding that Catholic schools have declined because Catholics have come to view themselves as Americans first and Catholics second.

According to research, Catholic schools are not declining because they are failing in their appointed mission. In his article "The Philosophy of Catholic Education," William McGucken, S. J., identifies the following as the aims of Catholic elementary education: "In a word, the elementary school aims to impart those knowledge and skills, habits and appreciative attitudes that will fit the child to be an intelligent practical Catholic, a good citizen, a good member of society, including the various groups to which he belongs, family, working group, neighborhood, and the like."² He says that the Catholic secondary school has as its goals to produce "a) an intelligent human being according to his capacities; b) an intelligent, practical Catholic, with all that these terms connote; c) an intelligent, good American citizen; d) an intelligent, helpful member of society and of these particular groups of which he is or will be a member - the family, professions, vocations, etc."³ Have Catholic schools succeeded in achieving these goals? The evidence shows that they have.

The research of Andrew Greeley shows that Catholic school

attendance has had a statistically significant impact on the religious behavior of young people in regard to mass attendance, frequency of communion, belief in life after death membership in parish organizations, serious thought regarding religious vocations, the reading of Catholic periodicals, and opposition to abortion.⁴ Attendance of CCD classes did not show anywhere near the same effect.

Regarding the goal of producing intelligent human beings, the Coleman Reports of 1982 and 1987⁵ found that Catholic high school students out-perform public school and other private school students in math, reading comprehension, vocabulary, and writing skills. They attend college 20 to 30 percent more often, succeed in college more often than public school children with similar backgrounds, and drop out of high school four times less often than public school students do. On the basis of the evidence, Coleman concludes that Catholic high schools are educationally superior. Catholics, therefore, have empirical assurance that Father McGucken's criterion regarding intelligence is being met.

In regard to Father McGucken's criterion of producing good American citizens and helpful members of society, reports by the National Opinion Research Center have repeatedly produced strong statistically significant evidence in favor of Catholic schools.⁶ For example, Catholics who attended Catholic schools were less prejudiced and more enlightened than were Catholic students who attended public schools. They scored systematically higher on measures of support for women's equality. They were more likely to be trusting of their fellow human beings and to take a more benign view of humanity in general. Interestingly, they were also more likely to stress the importance of their own conscience above orders of church authorities and to reject the notion that moral problems have easy black and white answers.

In regard to Father McGucken's criterion of producing good members of family, professions, and vocations, statistically significant evidence produced by the NORC is again encouraging. For example, Catholics who attended Catholic schools scored consistently higher on measures of morale and satisfaction derived from family life.

Both Greeley and Coleman conclude that the community-forming component of Catholic schools is the major factor in their effectiveness. Catholics who attend Catholic schools are introduced to and participate in more components of the larger Catholic community and parish life. They accumulate a "social capital" that they continue to draw upon and replenish throughout a lifetime.

The Catholic community, therefore, has no evidence from which to conclude that Catholic schools are failing in their purpose. Why, then, the decline in support? Greeley cites financial reasons as the most common scapegoat. Yet, as he notes, according to statistics, Catholic schools have

generally paid for themselves through the extra Sunday contributions made by those with children in Catholic schools.' Still, no matter how one examines the issue, finances only mask a deeper cause. If the Catholic laity wants their schools and are willing to pay for them, then there exists a loss of nerve on the part of the Catholic hierarchy regarding their support. If, on the other hand, the Catholic hierarchy is committed to Catholic education, but the finances are not available, then there exists a loss of nerve on the part of the laity. Perhaps there exists a loss of nerve on the part of both. So, why this loss of nerve? The answer is not at all clear. Still, I want to suggest several possibilities, all of which have at their core Vatican II's shift in philosophy, and all of which have at their core the spectre of modernism.

We must set the stage, however, before entering into a discussion of Vatican II. In the early years of our nation, mainstream Protestant culture discriminated against Roman Catholics. American Catholics' reliance on the spiritual leadership of Rome certainly made Protestant America suspicious regarding Catholic patriotism and allegiance. As early as the 1870's, the Catholic Americanist movement sought to calm those suspicions by "[phasing] out what they considered unessential Romanist traditions and [by presenting] the Catholic faith in a positive light to a Protestant society."⁸ As James Davison Hunter points out, "In the eyes of the Vatican, the Americanists' idea of presenting truths of the Catholic Church 'positively' in a Protestant context was seen as the watering down of doctrine, their praise of religious liberty was perceived as the praise of religious subjectivism, and their desire to accommodate the Catholic Church to American democratic institutions (the separation of church and state) was viewed as a desire to deny the temporal powers of the papacy - to introduce democracy into the church."⁹ In essence the Church denounced Americanism because of its close tie to modernism. Indeed, according to Henry Commager Steele, the American mind has always been pragmatic, optimistic, and secular.¹⁰ In agreement with Steele, Arthur Schlesinger writes that secularity is the dominant trait of American society: "The American mind is by nature and tradition skeptical, irreverent, pluralistic and relativistic."¹¹ In other words, we are a Pragmatist and Progressivist nation - and, notwithstanding William James, Pragmatism and Progressivism are antithetical to a religious world view. Historically, the Catholic Church was correct in recognizing an enemy.

When John Kennedy announced his candidacy for president of the United States, Protestants still distrusted American Catholics. Much of that distrust was laid to rest, however, when on September 12, 1960, Kennedy delivered his address to the ministers of Houston. In that speech, Kennedy said that he did not feel bound by Papal pronouncements, Bishop's statements, or any other directives by Catholic leaders. He continued, "Whatever issue may come before me as president if I should be elected - on birth

control, divorce, censorship, gambling, or any other subject - I will make my decision in accordance with these views, in accordance with what my conscience tells me to be in the national interest, and without regard to outside religious pressure or dictates."¹²

I believe that before this speech, a general climate of opinion existed among Catholics that they were Catholics first and Americans second. They certainly did perceive themselves as Americans, but they would have been largely unwilling to support actions on behalf of America that violated the teachings of Rome. Although Kennedy did say in his speech that he would resign his office if he ever had to violate his conscience or violate the national interest, his speech was a major milestone in bringing Catholic America fully into the acceptance of Protestant, secular, Progressivist America. The Kennedy speech set a tone that encouraged Catholics to enter fully into American life by placing American interests above church teachings. It is only a short step from this to the conclusion that Catholics could enter into public schools, further becoming Americans first and Catholics second. Church teachings could be picked up in church or through the family. But if Catholic children were to grow up to be fully American, the public school stood as the symbolic melting pot.

Hot on the heels of the Kennedy speech came Vatican II (1962--1965). The Catholic Church has always differed from Protestant churches in two fundamental ways. First the Catholic church teaches that "the pope enjoys both supreme jurisdictional power in the universal church and the privilege of infallibility when he teaches concerning faith and morals. . . and second that "tradition is revelatory . . . and must be recognized as one of the sources of the deposit of faith."¹³ Vatican II, as an attempt to "update the church's message and internal structure and to soften its opposition to the modern world,"¹⁴ violated what many Catholics considered church tradition. Vatican II made Catholicism much more palatable to Protestants and secularists, but in the process it was perceived by traditional Catholics as doing so at too high a price. Regardless, the upshot was that the world viewed Catholicism as having finally made its peace with modernism. Unfortunately for Catholic schools, many Catholics seem to have viewed Vatican II likewise. No longer was there a need to send children to Catholic schools in order to give them an alternative to modernism. The church itself had seemingly embraced modernism in Vatican II. But this concept of modernism as championed by the public schools requires some explanation.

The philosophy that most characterizes America and American public schools is pragmatism. Pragmatism is "based on the principle that the usefulness, workability, and practicality of ideas, policies, and proposals are the criteria of their merit."¹⁵ In opposition, the philosophy that most characterizes Catholicism is Neo-Thomism or Neo-Scholasticism. McGucken writes, "Nothing is more irritating to the modern than the dogma of the

supernatural, a dogma that cannot be proved by anthropology, history, psychology, or any other human science. Yet nothing is more certain than this, that all historic Christianity is inextricably bound up with this. It cannot be demonstrated by human reason; it requires God's revelation to bring to our knowledge this fact that man is supernaturalized.¹⁶ Catholicism is not anti-rational. Reason, however, serves as the handmaiden of faith. In Pragmatism, the supernatural plays no part. William James attempted to give it a place based upon its utility, but he was much taken to task over his attempt, and today I think it is safe to say that pragmatism has been thoroughly secularized. Neo-scholasticism violates another principle of modernism in general and pragmatism in particular in positing that ultimate truth is unchangeable and that educational theory derived from ultimate truth is likewise unchangeable. In opposition, Pragmatism holds the view that there are no metaphysical, epistemological, or axiological absolutes. Truth is what works, and what works changes as conditions change. Here we have a battle between the children of Heraclitus and the children of God. As Catholics have become Americans first and Catholics second, they have relegated the importance of supernatural, unchanging truth to a secondary position behind practical preparation for a world of economic and social change. As a consequence, Catholic schools have suffered.

Put simply, modernism in the form of American Pragmatism permeates American thought. While democracy does not necessitate the adoption of pragmatism, pragmatism certainly necessitates the adoption of democracy. The twin forces of pragmatism and democracy are fundamentally in opposition to the hierarchical structure of the Catholic church and to its Thomistic philosophy. As long as people viewed themselves as Catholics first and Americans second, there existed a strong impetus for the support of Catholic schools. After the Kennedy speech and Vatican II, as Catholics began increasingly to view themselves as Americans first, Catholic schools took on the character of luxuries rather than necessities. When Catholicism made its peace with modernism, she also made her peace with public education.

A second factor in the equation is that of democracy. Pragmatism requires faith in democracy. If there are no absolute truths to be passed on across the generations, truth must evolve as a function of consensus. While I think it is safe to say that the Catholic church favors democracy as a political system, she does not favor democracy in deciding metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological truth. Here Catholics are encouraged to turn to scripture and church tradition. The Church supports democracy as a political system while encouraging the laity to vote in ways that are consistent with Catholic teachings. The Catholic church has never shrunk from standing as an authority in the spiritual realm, and when the spiritual overlaps with or

possibly conflicts with the political, the Church has encouraged its members to be Catholics first and Americans second.

Modernism in general and pragmatism in particular is opposed to authority. Since America is basically pragmatist, America is basically opposed to authority. As Richard Sennett writes in his study of authority, "We have come to fear the influence of authority as a threat to our liberties, in the family and in society at large. The very need for authority redoubles this modern fear: will we give up our liberties, become abjectly dependent, because we want so much for someone to take care of us?"¹⁷ At the same time, he cautions, "Without ties of loyalty, authority, and fraternity, no society as a whole, and none of its institutions, could long function."¹⁸ Cardinal Ratzinger articulates the position of the Catholic hierarchy regarding the deterioration of faith in authority: "Broad circles in theology seem to have forgotten that the subject who pursues theology is not the individual scholar but the Catholic community as a whole, the entire Church. From this forgetfulness of theological work as ecclesial service derives a theological pluralism that in reality is often a subjectivism and individualism that has little to do with the bases of the common tradition. Every theologian now seems to want to be 'creative.' But his proper task is to deepen the common deposit of faith as well as to help in understanding and proclaiming it, not 'to create it.' Otherwise faith will be fragmenized into a series of often conflicting schools and currents to the grave harm of the disconcerted people of God. . . In this subjective view of theology, dogma is often viewed as an intolerable strait-jacket, an assault on the freedom of the individual scholar."¹⁹

It is true that Vatican II produced what Bokenkotter refers to as a "renewed Catholic theology of authority,"²⁰ an authority which recognizes that the Holy Spirit. . . distributes special graces to the faithful of every rank."²¹ Of course, creative dissent has always been present within the Catholic Church, but in the past it was largely restricted to theologians. Today, dissent runs rampant among the laity. The church, in making its peace with modernism, also has made its peace with democracy. This peace, however, has brought the church anything but peace as dissident groups engage in what has been called "cafeteria Catholicism." For example, since Vatican II Progressivist Catholic groups have sprung up which are pro-choice, pro-ordination of women, pro-birth control, pro-Equal Rights Amendment, anti-priest celibacy, pro-gay rights, etc.²²

Whereas Catholicism stresses obedience to the church, Pragmatism and democracy stress consensus. Biblical revelation and church teachings assure Catholics that Jesus was, is, and always will be the Son of God. Pragmatism and democracy, on the other hand, tell Catholics that Jesus remains the Son of God only so long as He has the votes. After Vatican II, the Protestant American world view is no longer considered a threat to the Catholic world view. As Americans first and Catholics second, the laity no

longer sees public schools as a negative influence. Apparently the Catholic bishops agree.

Another possible explanation for the decline of Catholic education is the influence of the print and broadcast media upon the lives of all Americans. Because of their acceptance by Protestant, secular, Progressivist America, and because of their now equal socioeconomic mobility, the tendency for Catholics to cling to their ethnicity and denomination has largely disappeared. Catholics now want to be perceived as being "with it." Challenging this view, the American media often presents the Catholic Church as an intolerant, medieval anachronism. For example, when John Cardinal O'Connor of New York suggested that the Church might consider excommunicating Catholic politicians who took a strong public position in favor of abortion, the media unmercifully took him to task. In addition the media has also been strongly critical of the Church's position on women, homosexuality, and birth control. Such an American climate of opinion encourages Catholics to distance themselves from their Church. Catholic schools have suffered as a result.

ENDNOTES

¹ Andrew M. Greeley, *The Catholic Myth: The Behavior and Beliefs of American Catholics* (Collier Books, 1990, 172).

² William McGucken, S. J., "The Philosophy of Catholic Education" in Nelson B. Henry, ed., *National Society for the Study of Education, Forty-First Yearbook, Part 1* (University of Chicago Press, 1942, 267).

³ McGucken, S. J., "The Philosophy of Catholic Education, 267.

⁴ Greeley, *The Catholic Myth: The Behavior and Beliefs of American Catholics*, chapter nine.

⁵ See James S. Coleman, *Public and Private High Schools: The Impact of Communities* (Basic Books, 1987) and *High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared* (Basic Books, 1982).

⁶ Cited in Greeley, *The Catholic Myth: The Behavior and Beliefs of American Catholics*, chapter nine.

⁷ Greeley, *The Catholic Myth: The Behavior and Beliefs of American Catholics*, 169-170.

- ⁸ James Davison Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America* (Basic Books, 1991, 79).
- ⁹ Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*, 83-84.
- ¹⁰ Henry Steele Commager, cited in Gary Willis, "The Secularist Prejudice," *Christian Century* 107 (24 October, 1990, 969-970).
- ¹¹ Arthur Schlesinger, cited in Gary Willis, "The Secularist Prejudice," *Christian Century* 107 (24 October, 1990, 969-970).
- ¹² John F. Kennedy, "Address to the Ministers of Houston" in *The Annals of America* (*Encyclopedia Britannica*, Volume 17, 589-591).
- ¹³ *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Fifteenth edition, 1991, Volume 10, 149).
- ¹⁴ *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Fifteenth edition, 1991, Volume 10, 149).
- ¹⁵ *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Fifteenth edition, 1991, Volume 9, 662).
- ¹⁶ McGucken, S. J., "The Philosophy of Catholic Education," 261.
- ¹⁷ Richard Sennett, *Authority* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1980, 15).
- ¹⁸ Sennett, *Authority*, 3.
- ¹⁹ Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger with Vittorio Messori, *The Ratzinger Report* (Ignatius Press, 1985, 71,72).
- ²⁰ Thomas Bokenkotter, *Essential Catholicism* (Image Books, 1986, 94-97).
- ²¹ Bokenkotter, *Essential Catholicism*, 94-97.
- ²² Hunter, *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*, 93-94.

IV. APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. PROGRAM (1991)

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

1991 Annual Conference

November 8 and 9

Loyola University of Chicago

Water Tower Campus Marquette Center
Rush and Pearson Streets
Chicago, Illinois 60611

HOST

School of Education
Loyola University of Chicago

Robert E. Roemer, Dean

Friday, November 8

12:00-1:00 p.m. REGISTRATION
Marquette Center 30

1:00-2:00 p.m. FIRST GENERAL SESSION
Marquette Center 30

Critical Thinking and Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.
Charles E. Alberti, Bemidji State University

Poetry for Philosophers of Education.
William Russell, Merrimack College

Presiding: Ronald M. Swartz, Oakland University

2:15-3:15 p.m. SECOND GENERAL SESSION
Marquette Center 30

Community, Language, and Televisual Culture.
Michael Preston, University of Cincinnati

Toward a Philosophy of Popular Culture in Academia.
Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University

Presiding: Michael A. Oliker

3:30-4:30 p.m. THIRD GENERAL SESSION
Marquette Center 30

"Believe Me Not; And Yet I Lie Not": A Case for Student
Disbelief
Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola U. of Chicago

The Civil Rights Movement: A Conflict of Individual
Rights and Social Values.
Joseph Watras, University of Dayton

Presiding: David Annis, Ball State University

4:45-5:45 p.m. FOURTH GENERAL SESSION
Marquette Center 30

American Education in Fluxion and the Possibility of a
Teaching Profession.
Winner of Graduate Student Competition:
Robert A. Leone, Temple University

Innocence and Experience in Academic Government:
The Education of Arthur Brown.
Arthur Brown, Wayne State University

Presiding: George W. Stickel, Northwestern College

5:45-6:15 p.m. BUSINESS MEETING
Marquette Center 30

Presiding: George W. Stickel, Northwestern College
President, Midwest Philosophy of Education Society

6:15-7:00 p.m. WINE AND CHEESE RECEPTION
Marquette Center 30

Saturday, November 9

9:00-10:00 a.m. FIFTH GENERAL SESSION
Marquette Center 30

Reinterpreting Dewey: Some Thoughts on His Views of
Play and Science in Education.

Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University

The Relationship Between Interest and Discipline:
John Dewey Revisited.

Robert P. Craig, University of Houston

Presiding: George Kizer, Iowa State University

10:15-11:15 a.m. SIXTH GENERAL SESSION
Marquette Center 30

Ricoeuran Self and Identity; Implications for
Multicultural Education.

Mary Abascal-Hildebrand, University of Toledo

The Future of Curriculum as a Field.

Philip L. Smith, Ohio State University

Presiding: David B. Owen, Iowa State University

11:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. SEVENTH GENERAL SESSION
Marquette Center 30

Class Participation: Pedagogy of Coercion.
Richard C. Pipan, Oakland University

Taking It to the Streets: Democracy and Education
Beyond the Classroom.
Louis Silverstein, Columbia College Chicago

Presiding: Lawrence J. Dennis, Southern Illinois U.

OFFICERS OF THE SOCIETY

President: George W. Stickel, Northwestern College
Vice-President: David B. Owen, Iowa State University
Secretary-Treasurer: Charles E. Bruckerhoff, University
of Connecticut

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Mary Abascal-Hildebrand, University of Toledo
Michael A. Olikier
Ronald M. Swartz, Oakland University

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

David B. Owen, Iowa State University

ARRANGEMENTS

Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola U. of Chicago
Mark Yoon, Loyola University of Chicago

HOTEL INFORMATION

- 1) The Talbott Hotel
20 E. Delaware Place
Chicago, Illinois 60611

312-944-4970 (Within Illinois)
800-621-8506 (Outside Illinois)

Single: \$ 85
Double: \$ 85

Deadline: October 20

- 2) Allerton Hotel
701 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

312-572-7839 (Within Illinois)
800-621-8311 (Outside Illinois)

Single: \$ 69
Double: \$ 69

Deadline: October 18

APPENDIX B. PROGRAM (1992)

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

1992 Annual Conference

November 13 and 14

Loyola University of Chicago

Water Tower Campus Marquette Center
Rush and Pearson Streets
Chicago, Illinois 60611

HOST

School of Education
Loyola University of Chicago

Robert E. Rocmer, Dean

Friday, November 13

12:00-1:00 p.m. REGISTRATION
Marquette Center 30

1:00-1:45 p.m. FIRST CONCURRENT SESSION

1) Marquette Center 30

Does Evolution Necessitate Revolution? A Look at a
Claim by Simone de Beauvoir.

Allison E. Williams, Loyola University of Chicago

2) Marquette Center Alumni Lounge

Analytical Philosophy and the Discourse of Institutional
Democracy.

Michael A. Olicker, Midwest PES

3) Marquette Center Room 417

Denial and Education.

Joseph Yacoub, Calumet College of St. Joseph

2:00-2:45 p.m. SECOND CONCURRENT SESSION

- 1) Marquette Center 30
Classroom Social Structure and Moral Education.
Jerome A. Popp, Southern Illinois U., Edwardsville
- 2) Marquette Center Alumni Lounge
Hopefulness: The Value Variable for Inner City Students.
Michael T. Risku, University of Minnesota, Morris
- 3) Marquette Center Room 417
On the Relationship Between Love and Education.
Ian M. Harris, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

3:00-4:00 p.m. THIRD CONCURRENT SESSION

- 1) Marquette Center 30
Cooperative Education: Our Hope For the Future.
Clinton P. Honkomp, O.P., Loyola U. of Chicago
A Suggested Basis For Understanding James Mark Baldwin.
Robert H. Keppta, University of Houston
- 2) Marquette Center Alumni Lounge
Mark Johnston and David Lewis on the Irreducibility of Value.
Thomas S. Deeds, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Confucius and His Impact on Education.
Kyung Hi Kim, Northern Illinois University
- 3) Marquette Center Room 417
Roundtable: Thoughts on Evaluation: Moral and Ethical Dilemmas of Grading.
Convener: Richard C. Pipan, Oakland University

4:15-5:00 p.m. FOURTH CONCURRENT SESSION

- 1) Marquette Center 30
Teaching in a Postmodern World.
Susan V. Aud, Southern Illinois U., Carbondale
Winner of Graduate Student Award
- 2) Marquette Center Alumni Lounge
On Educating the Emotions: Some Recent Implications for Moral Education.
Robert P. Craig, University of Houston
- 3) Marquette Center Room 417
Philosophy of Education and Relevance For the '90s.
Janis B. Fine, Loyola University of Chicago

5:15-5:45 p.m. FIRST GENERAL SESSION

Marquette Center 30

Editing Educational Theory.

Nicholas C. Burbules, Editor, Educational Theory.

University of Illinois, Champaign

5:45-6:15 p.m. BUSINESS MEETING

Marquette Center 30

Presiding: George W. Stickel, Kennesaw State College

President, Midwest Philosophy of Education Society

6:15-7:00 p.m. WINE AND CHEESE RECEPTION

Marquette Center 30

7:00 p.m. PRESIDENTIAL DINNER

Marquette Center Faculty Dining Room

8:00 p.m. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Philosophy of Education For the Year 2000.

George W. Stickel, Kennesaw State College

Commentator: Lawrence J. Dennis, Southern Illinois

University, Carbondale

RESERVATIONS: Required For Presidential Dinner**\$16 per person in advance by November 1**

Saturday, November 14**9:00-9:45 a.m. FIFTH CONCURRENT SESSION**

1) Marquette Center 30

Sketches of a Philosophy of Life: Rhythms and Education.

Louis Silverstein, Columbia College Chicago

2) Marquette Center Alumni Lounge

A Model of Action, A Portrait of the Good Community in

Miguel de Unamuno's St. Emmanuel The Good, Martyr.

William Russell, Merrimack College

3) Marquette Center Room 317

Whose Critical Thinking Is of Most Worth?

Charles E. Alberti, Bemidji State University

10:00-10:45 a.m. SIXTH CONCURRENT SESSION

1) Marquette Center 30

"From Puggy to Larry": Poetry from Gathering Light.

Lawrence Santoro, Chicago Headline Club

Moderator: Michael A. Oliker, Midwest PES

2) Marquette Center Alumni Lounge

Moral Education and Integrity: Educating For Higher-Level Character Traits.

David B. Annis, Ball State University

3) Marquette Center Room 317

Humans in the World: Introduction to the Educational Theory of Radical Perspectivism.

Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University

11:00 a.m.-12:15 p.m. SECOND GENERAL SESSION

Marquette Center 30

The Philosophy of Catholic Education in the Last Half Century.

Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola U. of Chicago

"Philosophy of Catholic Education in the '40s."

Robert N. Barger, Eastern Illinois University

"McGucken Revisited: A Fifty-year Retrospective."

Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University

"Americans First and Catholics Second: The Decline of Catholic Education Since Vatican II."

OFFICERS OF THE SOCIETY

President: George W. Stickel, Northwestern College

Vice-President: David B. Owen, Iowa State University

Secretary-Treasurer: Charles E. Bruckerhoff, University of Connecticut

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Mary Abascal-Hildebrand, University of San Francisco

Michael A. Oliker, Midwest PES

Ronald M. Swartz, Oakland University

Appendix B

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

David B. Owen, Chair, Iowa State University
Lawrence J. Dennis, Southern Illinois U., Carbondale
Richard C. Pipan, Oakland University

NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Lawrence J. Dennis, Southern Illinois U., Carbondale
Philip L. Smith, Ohio State University

ARRANGEMENTS

Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola U. of Chicago

HOTEL INFORMATION

- 1) The Talbott Hotel
20 E. Delaware Place
Chicago, Illinois 60611

312-944-4970 (Within Illinois)
800-621-8506 (Outside Illinois)

Single: \$ 85
Double: \$ 85

Deadline: October 23

- 2) Allerton Hotel
701 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

312-440-1500 (Within Illinois)
800-621-8311 (Outside Illinois)

Single: \$ 74
Double: \$ 74

Deadline: October 23

APPENDIX C. OFFICERS AND COMMITTEES, 1991-1992

OFFICERS

President

George W. Stickel, Northwestern College

Vice President

David B. Owen, Iowa State University

Secretary-Treasurer

Charles E. Bruckerhoff, University of Connecticut

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Mary Abascal-Hildebrand, University of Toledo

Michael A. Olikier

Ronald M. Swartz, Oakland University

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

David B. Owen (Chair), Iowa State University

Lawrence J. Dennis, Southern Illinois U., Carbondale

Richard C. Pipan, Oakland University

NOMINATING COMMITTEE

Lawrence J. Dennis, Southern Illinois U., Carbondale

Philip L. Smith, Ohio State University

ARRANGEMENTS

Walter J. Krolikowski, Loyola University of Chicago

**APPENDIX D. MINUTES OF THE BUSINESS MEETING,
INCLUDING TREASURER'S REPORT, NOVEMBER 13, 1992**

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

The meeting was called to order by President George Stickel at 5:50 pm. Given the absence of Secretary-Treasurer Charles Bruckerhoff, President Stickel asked Secretary-Treasurer-nominee Alexander Makedon to keep minutes for this meeting.

AGENDA

1. Minutes From 1991 Meeting

President Stickel reported that there were no minutes from the 1991 meeting.

2. Treasurer's Report

David Owen gave the Treasurer's Report, which had been sent to him by Charles Bruckerhoff.

TREASURER'S REPORT

November 13, 1992

11-10-91 through 11-13-92

RECEIPTS:

Balance Brought Forward	\$ 419.32
1991 Dues Paid	80.00
1989-1990 Proceedings Sales	82.00
Conference Receipts (Includes Dues, Conference Fees & 1989-1990 Proceedings Sales)	415.00
	<hr/>
Subtotal	\$ 996.32

DISBURSEMENTS:

1991 Graduate Student Paper Award (Robert Leone)	\$ 100.00
Contribution to <i>Educational Theory</i>	50.00
Contribution to CLS (Council of Learned Societies)	50.00
Postage	8.00

Subtotal \$ 208.00

BALANCE (as of 11-13-92) \$ 788.32

Respectfully submitted,
Charles E. Bruckerhoff,
Secretary-Treasurer

Philip Smith moved to approve the Report. Tom Stark seconded. The motion passed unanimously.

3. Program

President Stickel thanked the Program Committee--Lawrence Dennis, David Owen (Chair), and Richard Pipan--for preparing the 1992 Meeting. He also thanked Walter Krolikowski and Loyola University for their hospitality in hosting the Society.

4. *Educational Theory*

Lawrence Dennis moved that the new officers consider increasing the annual contribution to *Educational Theory* to \$100 per year but offer no less than \$50. Philip Smith seconded. During the discussion that followed, Nicholas Burbules, editor of the journal, explained that an additional \$50 may not have a significant impact on the journal. He further stated that although the journal is in excellent financial standing, the additional contribution could serve symbolically as a sign of support for the work of the journal. It was decided by consensus that the size of the contribution (\$50 or \$100) should be left to the new officers for consideration.

5. *Council of Learned Societies*

A similar motion was made by Ronald Swartz and seconded by Byron Radebaugh, regarding increasing the contribution to the Council of Learned Societies from \$50 to \$100. During the discussion, Arthur Brown mentioned that the Council plays a significant role in NCATE deliberations,

and recommended that the Society should consider increasing its annual support to the Council. A similar decision was reached by consensus to leave it up to the new officers to decide the size of the contribution (\$50 or \$100).

6. *Editor, Midwest Philosophy of Education Society Proceedings*

Ronald Swartz agreed to act as Editor for the 1991 and 1992 *Proceedings*. Walter Krolkowski suggested that the editor send out style sheets to authors. A subcommittee of Arthur Brown, David Owen, and Ronald Swartz was set up to consider ways to improve the publication of the *Proceedings*.

7. *Annual Dues*

David Owen moved that beginning next year, the Society consider increasing the annual dues for members to \$15 from \$10 and for students to \$10 from \$5. He said the additional \$5 over two years would about cover the roughly \$10 cost of producing the biennial *Proceedings*, in which case each member would automatically receive a copy of the *Proceedings* when published. Lawrence Dennis seconded. The motion passed unanimously.

8. *Archivist Report*

Walter Krolkowski reported that he had not yet received any materials for the archives. He encouraged members to send him appropriate records of the Society.

9. *ERIC Report*

Michael Olikier reported that ERIC has yet to catalog any additional issues of the MPES *Proceedings*. The only *Proceedings* cataloged so far are those from 1982 and 1987-1988. It was recommended that an index to all the *Proceedings* be prepared for the 1991-1992 *Proceedings*. In addition, after discussion of whether members wanted their telephone numbers published, it was agreed without objection that a list of MPES members, their addresses and telephone numbers also be published in the forthcoming *Proceedings*.

10. *Identification Tags*

Tom Stark suggested that conference participants be provided with identification labels so that new members or participants can learn the names of other meeting attendees.

11. *New Officers*

The Nominating Committee of Philip Smith and Ronald Swartz submitted the following slate of Officers and Executive Committee members:

OFFICERS:

President	David B. Owen
Vice President	Robert P. Craig
Secretary-Treasurer	Alexander Makedon

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE:

Michael A. Olikier
George W. Stickel
Joseph Yacoub

The floor was opened for additional nominations. Michael Olikier nominated Jerome Popp as a candidate for the Executive Committee, but the latter withdrew his nomination. Following the closing of nominations, the slate was unanimously approved as presented.

12. *Adjournment*

The meeting was adjourned at 6:30 p.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Alexander Makedon,
Secretary-Treasurer

APPENDIX E. MEMBERSHIP 1991-1992

Accvedo, Jose A.
2431 N. Mango Ave.
Chicago, IL 60639

Alberti, Charles L.
Dept. of Professional Education
Bemidji State University
1500 Birchmont Drive NE
Bemidji, MN 56601

4651 Waville Rd., NE
Bemidji, MN 56601

Annis, David B.
Department of Philosophy
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306
317-285-1242

317-289-9427

Barger, Robert N.
Dept. of Secondary Education & Foundations
Buzzard Education Building, BB 213
Eastern Illinois University
Charleston, IL 61920
217-581-5931

2519 Village Rd.
Charleston, IL 61920
217-345-5949

Boscia, Joan C.
1100 Oakwood Drive
Westmont, IL 60559
312-325-1553

Brosio, Richard A.

Teachers College, TC 806
Dept. of Sec., Higher & Fdns of Ed
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

3212 W. Woodbridge
Muncie, IN 47304

Broudy, Harry S.

College of Education
1310 South 6th Street
University of Illinois
Champaign, IL 61820

101 W. Windsor Road, #5206
Urbana, IL 61801

Brown, Arthur

College of Education
399 Education Building
Wayne State University
Detroit, MI 48202
313-577-8290

13343 Hart
Huntington Woods, MI 48070

Broyer, John A.

Department of Philosophy
Box 1433
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville, IL 62026

Bruckerhoff, Charles E.

Dept. of Curriculum and Instruction
School of Education
The University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT 06268
203-486-2483

Chalmers-Neubauer, Irene
1902 Kathlin Drive
Iowa City, IA 52246
319-351-0260

Collins, Peter
School of Education , SC 164
Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI 53233
414-224-7558

2645 N. Farwell Ave., No. 307
Milwaukee, WI 53211
414-964-4142

Craig, Robert P.
Dept. of Educational Leadership
College of Education
University of Houston
Houston, TX 77204
713-749-7281

5114 Whittier Oaks Dr.
Friendswood, TX 77546
996-6955

Davis, Michael
CESP
Illinois Institute of Technology
IIT Center
Chicago, IL 60616
312-567-3017

5300 South Shore Drive, #57
Chicago, IL 60615

Deeds, Thomas S.
2210 Sheridan Blvd.
Lincoln, NE 68502

Dennis, Lawrence

Dept. of Ed. Administration & Higher Educ.
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale, IL 62901
618-453-2121

817 W. High
Carbondale, IL 62901
618-549-2292

Dupuis, Adrian M.

School of Education, SC 164
Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI 53233
414-224-7378

5352 North 48th Street
Milwaukee, WI 53218

Fine, Janis B.

School of Education
Loyola University, Water Tower Campus
820 N. Michigan Ave.
Chicago, IL

9745 N. Keeler
Skokie, IL 60076
708-675-4102

Glazek, Marianne Seemann

Department of Gerontology
Madonna College
30600 Schoolcraft
Livonia, MI 48150

1081 Barton Drive, #102
Ann Arbor, MI 48105
313-665-7243

Appendix E

Goodchild, Lester F.

School of Education
University of Denver
Denver, CO 80208

Gray-Whiteley, Peter M.

Carroll College
100 N. East Avenue
Waukesha, WI 53186
414-524-7129

Gutek, Gerald

School of Education
Loyola University, Water Tower Campus
820 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611
312-670-3030

437 S. Edgewood
La Grange, IL 60525

Harris, Ian M.

Dept. of Ed. Policy & Community Studies
University of Wisconsin--Milwaukee
P.O. Box 413
Milwaukee, WI 53201

923 N. 29th St.
Milwaukee, WI 53208
414-933-9742

Heinrich, June

938 North Blvd., #205
Oak Park, IL 60301

Hostetler, Karl

Dept. of Elementary/Secondary Education
Teachers College, 26 Henzlik Hall
University of Nebraska
Lincoln, NE 68588

Hughen, Richard

Department of Philosophy
Fort Hays State University
600 Park Street
Hays, KS 67601

415 West 7th Street
Hays, KS 67601
628-8209

Kaider, Friederika

61 E. Goethe, #310
Chicago, IL 60610

Kaman, Rita M.

343 North Grove Avenue
Oak Park, IL 60302

Keprta, Robert H.

P.O. Box 236
Lane City, TX 77453

Kim, Kyung Hi

Dept. of Leadership & Ed Policy Studies
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL 60115

128 Pearl Street
DeKalb, IL 60115
758-5828

Kizer, George

3919 Dawes Drive
Ames, IA 50010
515-232-1446

Krolikowski, Fr. Walter P.

School of Education
Loyola University, Water Tower Campus
820 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611
312-670-3059

Kroll, Allen L.

1516 S. 51st Court
Cicero, IL 60650

Larson, W. Douglas

5744 S. Garfield
Hinsdale, IL 60521

Lynk, Mildred

7258 S. Euclid
Chicago, IL 60649

Makedon, Alexander

Education Building / 319
Chicago State University
95th Street at King Drive
Chicago, IL 60628
312-995-2086

2800 N. Pine Grove, #6G

Chicago, IL 60657
312-929-4408

McKarty, Luise Prior

205 Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47405

Meng, Yue

6519 N. Newgard, #3D
Chicago, IL 60626

Merritt, James

419 Garden Road
De Kalb, IL 60115

Miller, Marshall L.

2045 New York Avenue
Whiting, IN 46394
219-659-3412

Miller, Steven I.

School of Education
Loyola University of Chicago
820 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611

Nicholson, Eleanor A.

5000 East End Avenue
Chicago, IL 60615

Nordberg, Robert B.

School of Education
Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI 53233

999 E. Quarles Place
Fox Point, WI 53217
414-351-2810

Oliker, Michael A.

5006 W. Grace St.
Chicago, IL 60641
312-202-9280

Owen, David B.

Dept. of Curriculum & Instruction
N 165 C Lagomarcino Hall
Iowa State University
515-294-7317

2511 Kellogg Avenue
Ames, IA 50010
515-233-3298

Page, Ralph C.

Dept. of Educational Policy Studies
1310 South 6th Street, College of Education
University of Illinois
Champaign, IL 61820

1612 B Maynard Dr.
Champaign, IL 61821

Pipan, Richard C.

Dept. of Human Development & Child Services
542 O'Dowd Hall
Oakland University
Rochester, MI 48309

700 Mt. Pleasant
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
665-7800

Popp, Jerome

Dept. of Educational Leadership
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville, IL62026

1809 Monticello Place
Edwardsville, IL62025

Radebaugh, Byron F.

Dept. of Leadership & Ed. Policy Studies
408 Graham Hall
Northern Illinois University
De Kalb, IL 60115
815-753-1561

1126 Stafford St.
De Kalb, IL 60115
815-756-9363

Riordan, Timothy M.

Alverno College
3401 S. 39th Street
P. O. Box 343922
Milwaukee, WI 53234

Risku, Michael T.

116 S. Oregon
Morris, MN 56267

Russell, William E.

Dept. of Education
Merrimack College
North Andover, MA 01845

Ryan, Carole Ann
1329 Mound
Jacksonville, IL 62650

Schubert, William H.
College of Education, M/C 147
University of Illinois at Chicago
1040 W. Harrison St.
Chicago, IL 60607
312-413-2411

727-J South Ashland Ave
Chicago, IL 60607
312-738-0601

Schuller, Marian M.
Division of Education
Indiana University Northwest
3400 Broadway
Gary, IN 46408

2260 Woodlawn
Crete, IL 60417

Silverstein, Louis
Dept. of Liberal Education
Columbia College Chicago
600 S. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60605
312-663-1600

1211 Leonard Pl.
Evanston, IL 60201
708-475-8912

Smith, Don G.
Dept. of Secondary Educ & Foundations
Buzzard Building, Rm. 213-G
Eastern Illinois University
Charleston, IL 61920

1825 Phillips Place
Charleston, IL 61920

Smith, Philip L.

248 Larkins Hall
School of Health, Physical Ed. & Recreation
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210
614-292-6538
3051 Oakridge Road
Columbus, OH 43221
614-486-3061

Stark, Thomas I.

City Colleges of Chicago

5510 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637

Stickel, George W.

Dept. of Secondary & Middle School Educ
Kennesaw State College
P.O. Box 444
Marietta, GA 30061
404-423-6314

2130 Shillings Chase Ct.
Kennesaw, GA 30144
404-419-1006

Sutton, Kenneth

2317 Stoner Drive West
Charleston, IL 61920
217-345-3622

Swartz, Ronald

School of Education & Human Services
Oakland University
Rochester, MI 48063
313-370-3078

2915 Tewksbury
Troy, MI 48098
313-879-2778

Watras, Joseph

Dept. of Teacher Education
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

Whitchhead, Copeland

Department of Educational Foundations
Western Illinois University
Macomb, IL 61455

515 N. Albert
Macomb, IL 61455

Wozniak, John M.

School of Education
Loyola University - Water Tower Campus
820 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611

4960 Lee Street
Skokie, IL 60077

Yacoub, Joseph M.

Calumet College of St. Joseph
2400 New York Avenue
Whiting, IN 46394

1500 Freel St.
Whiting, IN 46394

**APPENDIX F. INDEX TO THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY,
1977-1992**

Compiled by Michael A. Oliker

INTRODUCTION:

In 1977, The Midwest Philosophy of Education Society began publishing the proceedings of its annual meeting. An annual proceedings was published from 1977 until 1984, although no proceedings was published of the 1981 and 1984 meetings. Beginning in 1987, the *Proceedings* was published every two years. Copies of the *Proceedings* are now available as ERIC documents. The document numbers (ED numbers) are listed below. Some copies of the *Proceedings* are also indexed in the Institute for Scientific Information's *Index to Social Sciences & Humanities Proceedings*.

This index is primarily an author index. Items in the *Proceedings* only by title are listed by title. This index covers the period from 1977 to 1990. The most frequent contributors during this period are: Philip L. Smith -- 8, Robert P. Craig -- 7, Lawrence J. Dennis and George W. Stuckel -- 6 each, Michael C. Smith and Ronald Swartz -- 5 each, and Arthur Brown -- 4.

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>PROGRAM CHR</u>	<u>EDITORS</u>	<u>ERIC DOC #</u>
1977	W. Krolikowski	R. Craig & F.C. Neff	ED 345 986
1978	F.C. Neff	J. Merritt, et al	ED 356 992
1979	D. Angus	M.C. Smith & A. Dupuis	ED 345 983
1980	P.L. Smith	P.L. Smith	ED 345 984
1982	A. Makedon	M.C. Smith & J. Williams	ED 241 407
1983	A. Makedon	M.C. Smith	ED 345 985
1985-86	D.B. Annis	P.L. Smith	ED 356 993
1987-88	P. Collins	L.J. Dennis	ED 319 670
1989-90	M.A. Oliker	D.B. Annis & M.A. Oliker	ED 345 987
1991-92	D. B. Owen	D.B. Owen & R. Swartz	---

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:

I am grateful to Arthur Brown, Alexander Makedon, and Philip L. Smith for their donations of back copies of the Proceedings and to Lawrence Santoro for his help in preparing this index.

ADDENDUM: (By David B. Owen)

I have included the items from the current 1991-1992 *Proceedings* in the following index, thereby making it exhaustive for 1977 through 1992. These current items, however, do not yet have an ERIC Document Number.

INDEX

- Abascal-Hildebrand, Mary. "Conversation for Diversity: A Case for Critical Hermeneutics." 1989-90: 90.
- "Agenda 1979 Business Meeting." 1979: 79.
- Alberti, Charles E. "Critical Thinking and Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*." 1991-92: 41.
- Alberti, Charles E. "Whose Critical Thinking Strategy Is of Most Worth?" 1991-92: 253.
- Andris, James F. "Jim Teaches Fang to Sit." 1979: 11.
- Annis, David B. "Moral Education and Integrity: Educating for Higher Level Character Traits." 1991-92: 287.
- Annis, David B., and Linda F. Annis. "The Nature, Purpose, and Value of Liberal Education." 1982: 14.
- Annis, David B. "Preface." 1989-90: 7.
- Annis, David B. "VICE AND VIRTUE IN HIGHER EDUCATION: A FORGOTTEN ISSUE." PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. 1987-88: 160. See also Brown, 1987-88: 176.
- Annis, Linda F. and David B. Annis. "The Nature, Purpose, and Value of Liberal Education." 1982: 14.
- Aud, Susan V. "Teaching in a Postmodern World." Graduate Student Award Winner. 1991-92: 217.
- Barger, Robert Newton. "The Influence of J.L. Spalding's Educational Theory on His Theology." 1979: 25.
- Barger, Robert Newton. "John Lancaster Spalding: Idealist or Pragmatist?" 1977: 58.
- Barger, Robert N. "McGucken Revisited: A Fifty-Year Retrospective on American Catholic Educational Philosophy." 1991-92: 319. See also W. Krolikowski, 1991-92: 311, and D. Smith, 1991-92: 327.

- Bricker, David. "Teachers as Agents of Equal Opportunity." 1978: 48.
- Brosio, Richard. "The Legacy of Counts: Contemporary Motivational Theory in Education and the Power of the Status Quo." 1989-90: 32.
- Broudy, Harry S. "Comments." 1989-90: 153. Response to Popp, 1989-90: 142.
- Brown, Arthur. "INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS." PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. 1978: 64. See also Morris, 1978: 81.
- Brown, Arthur. "Institutional Democracy Reconsidered." 1989-90: 134. See also Craig 1989-90: 130 and Radebaugh 1989-90: 128.
- Brown, Arthur. "Philosophy of Liberal Education and Teacher Education." 1987-88: 29. See also Neiman, 1987-88: 24.
- Brown, Arthur. "A Response to 'Vice and Virtue in Higher Education: A Forgotten Issue.'" 1987-88: 176. Response to Annis, 1987-88: 160.
- Brown, Arthur. "Undergraduate Assessment as Pedagogical and Political Control." 1991-92: 205. See also R. Pipan, 1991-92: 191.
- Brown, Marcia S. "Evaluating Synthesizing Skills: A Logical Analysis." 1978: 56.
- "Business Meeting Minutes." 1977: 87.
- Business Meeting Minutes, 1979. See "Minutes, Business Meeting (November 11, 1978)," 1979: 81.
- "Business Meeting Minutes." 1980: 173.
- Business Meeting Minutes, 1983. See "Minutes, Business Meeting (November 11, 1983)," 1983: 11.
- Business Meeting, Minutes of (November 13, 1992). See 1991-92: 351.
- Cohen, Carl. "John Dewey on War and the League of Nations." 1982: 156.
- "Constitution of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society." 1979: 83.

- Craig, Robert P. "Accountability and Responsibility: Some Fundamental Differences." 1982: 133.
- Craig, Robert P., and Frederick C. Neff. "Acknowledgements." 1977: 1.
- Craig, Robert P. "Kohlberg's Justification of Stage Theory: A Critique." 1978: 83.
- Craig, Robert P. "Democratizing Health Care Facilities." 1989-90: 130. See also Brown, 1989-90: 134, and Radebaugh, 1989-90: 128.
- Craig, Robert P. "Institutional Democracy: An Ethical Demand." 1989-90: 213.
- Craig, Robert P. "On Educating the Emotions: Some Recent Implications on Moral Education." 1991-92: 231.
- Craig, Robert P. "The Relationship Between Interest and Discipline: John Dewey Revisited." 1991-92: 103.
- Craig, Robert P. "Taking the Moral Point of View: An Uneven Relationship to Moral Judgment-Making." 1987-88: 58.
- Craig, Robert P. "The Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Development: A Critique." 1987-88: 98.
- Dalin, George D. "A Plea for Philosophical Reflection." 1985-86: 13.
- Deeds, Thomas S. "Mark Johnston and David Lewis on the Irreducibility of Value." 1991-92: 167.
- Dennis, Lawrence J. "DID DEWEY DANCE? -- AN ARTISTIC ASSAY I: THE CRITIC AS TEACHER." PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. 1985-86: 155. See also Smith, Philip L. 1985-86: 169.
- Dennis, Lawrence J. "Did Dewey Dance?: An Artistic Assay II or The Subjective Element in Esthetic Experience." 1987-88: 84.
- Dennis, Lawrence J. "George S. Counts on Indoctrination." 1982: 1.
- Dennis, Lawrence J. "The Lady from Spain: Response." 1989-90: 211. Response to Swartz. 1989-90: 195.

- Dennis, Lawrence J. "Political Activities of George S. Counts and John L. Childs." 1989-90: 18. See also Ryan, 1989-90: 11 and Schilpp, 1989-90:23.
- Dennis, Lawrence J. "Postmodernism, Seattle, and Stickel." Response to Stickel, 1991-92: 3.
- Dennis, Lawrence J. "Preface." 1987-88: 6.
- Donoso, Anton. "The Relation of *The Paideia Proposal* and Ortega's Philosophy of Education." 1983: 1.
- Dupuis, Adrian. "Acknowledgements." 1978: i.
- Dupuis, Adrian and Michael C. Smith. "Acknowledgements." 1979: i.
- Dupuis, Adrian. "ORTHODOXY AND DISSENT IN RELIGIOUS AFFILIATED INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION." PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS. 1980: 91.
- Fine, Janis B. "Philosophy of Education and Relevance for the '90s: Regular Education Initiative and Social Reconstructionism." 1991-92: 241.
- Gibson, John H. "Performance Versus Results: A Critique of Excellence in Modern Sport." 1985-86: 129.
- Glazek, Marianne S. "Latent Hegelianism: Roots of Conservatism in John Dewey." 1978: 28.
- Gross, Michael. "Democratic Character and Democratic Education: A Cognitive and Rational Reappraisal." 1989-90: 106.
- Gutek, Gerald L. "The Renewal of Democratic Education: The Need for Disinterested Criticism." 1977: 44.
- Harris, Ian M. "On the Relationship Between Education and Love." 1991-92: 143.
- Harrison, Alton, Jr. and Diann Musial. "The Mythos and Realities of Social Reform or Why People Would Rather Kill than Drive Slowly." 1985-86: 55.

- Heinrich, June Sark. "Mainstream Education for Older People: A Philosophical Justification." 1982: 103.
- Hellman, Nathan. "Dewey on Morality and the Morally Educative." 1980: 53.
- Hoff, Joan Whitman. "Child Custody, Children's Rights, and Education." 1987-88: 112. See also Papan, 1987-88: 126.
- Hoffman, David C. "Can Children Have a Right to Education?" 1978: 100.
- Hollinger, Robert. "Hermeneutics and Paideia." 1982: 55.
- Kelly, James S. "Community, Individualism, and Epistemic Encounters." 1989-90: 182.
- Kelly, James S. "Makers of Meaning: Students as Active Participants." 1989-90: 51.
- Kim, Kyung Hi. "Confucius and His Impact on Education." 1991-92: 177.
- Kizer, George A. "PHILOSOPHY FOR EVERYONE?" PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. 1982: 87.
- Kizer, George A. "Philosophy of Education in an Era of Reform." 1985-86: 101.
- Knight, W. Hal and Charles E. Litz. "Organizational Theory as an Exercise in Philosophy of Education." 1982: 120.
- Krolikowski, Walter P. "Believe Me Not; And Yet I Like Not: A Case For Student Disbelief." 1991-92: 53.
- Krolikowski, Walter P. "Disbelief in the Classroom: Second Thoughts." 1983: 93.
- Krolikowski, Walter P. "Intermediate Between Clinking and Ringing: The Jingle-Jangle Fallacies." 1979: 37.
- Krolikowski, Walter P. "The Moral Development of the Developmentally Disabled." 1985-86: 71.

- Krolikowski, Walter P. "Philosophy of Catholic Education before Vatican II." 1991-92: 311. See also R. Barger, 1991-92: 319, and D. Smith, 1991-92: 327.
- Leone, Robert A. "American Education in Fluxion and the Possibility of a Teaching Profession." Graduate Student Award Winner. 1991-92: 77.
- Lesnoff-Caravaglia, Gari. "Ageism and the Youth Cult: Educational Dilemma." 1977: 18.
- "List of Members." 1977: 90.
- Litz, Charles E. "Objectivity in History: A Comment Concerning Historical Methodology." 1978: 91.
- Litz, Charles E. and W. Hal Knight. "Organizational Theory as an Exercise in Philosophy of Education." 1982: 120.
- Makedon, Alexander. "Freedom Education: Toward an Educational Synthesis of Dewey's and Sartre's Philosophy of Freedom." 1977: 34.
- Makedon, Alexander. "Humans in the World: Introduction to the Educational Theory of Radical Perspectivism." 1991-92: 297.
- Makedon, Alexander. "Is Teaching a Science or an Art?" 1989-90: 231. See also ED 330 683.
- Makedon, Alexander. "Playful Gaming." 1980: 123.
- Makedon, Alexander. "Reinterpreting Dewey: Some Thoughts on His Views of Science and Play in Education." 1991-92: 93.
- Maori, Vincent. "The Habit of Inquiry and the Content of Inquiry: Implications for Curriculum." 1985-86: 141.
- McAninch, Amy Raths. "Mortimer Adler and the Progressive Tradition." 1983: 51.
- McAninch, Amy Raths. "The Recitation: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow." 1985-86: 17.

- McBride, Frank. "Dewey's Theory of Inquiry Revisited: The Bain Connection." 1982: 141.
- Membership List, 1977. See "List of Members," 1977: 90.
- "Membership List." 1980: 176.
- "Membership List, 1987-1988." 1987-88: 227.
- "Membership List, 1991-1992." See Appendix E, 1991-92: 355.
- Merritt, James. "Folklore on 'The Self Concept.'" 1980: 103.
- Milzarek, Gary. "Educational Evaluation and Emancipation." 1978: 1.
- Minutes, Business Meeting. See "Business Meeting Minutes," 1977: 87.
- "Minutes, Business Meeting (November 11, 1978)." 1979: 81.
- Minutes, Business Meeting. See "Business Meeting Minutes," 1980: 173.
- "Minutes, Business Meeting (November 11, 1983)." 1983: 111.
- "Minutes of Business Meeting, Including Treasurer's Report (November 13, 1992)." See Appendix D, 1991-92: 351.
- Miranda, Wilma. "Implications in Dewey for Feminist Theory in Education." 1979: 1.
- Miranda, Wilma. "Why Dewey's Method Failed as Social Criticism: A Response to Revisionist Positions." 1980: 83.
- Montgomery, Pat. "A Basic Ingredient of Alternative Education: A Blend of Philosophies." 1982: 65.
- Morris, Van Cleve. "Plato's 'Philosopher King': Position Impossible." 1980: 1.
- Morris, Van Cleve. "Response to the President's Address." 1978: 81.
Response to Brown, 1978: 64.
- Musial, Diann and Alton Harrison, Jr. "The Myth and Realities of Social Reform or Why People Would Rather Kill than Drive Slowly." 1985-86: 55.

- Neff, Frederick C., and Robert Craig. "Acknowledgements." 1977: i.
- Neiman, Alven M. "In Praise of the Philosophy of Liberal Education." 1987-88: 24. See also Brown, 1987-88: 29.
- Nordberg, Robert B. "Intellectual Capacities and the Liberal Arts." 1983: 43.
- Nordberg, Robert B. "Liberal and Conservative Creeds in Education." 1985-86: 177.
- "Officers." 1980: 171.
- "Officers." 1982: 170.
- "Officers and Committees." 1979: 77.
- "Officers and Committees." 1983: 109.
- "Officers and Committees." 1989-90: 3.
- "Officers and Committees, 1991-92." See Appendix C, 1991-92: 349.
- Oliker, Michael A. "Analytical Philosophy and the Discourse of Institutional Democracy." 1991-92: 127.
- Owen, David B. "Classics and Beyond." 1989-90: 247.
- Owen, David B. "The Classics, Progress, and the Future." 1987-88: 212.
- Owen, David B. "Conversation and Character: Teachable Moments in Plato's *Republic*." 1987-88: 9.
- Owen, David B. "Preface." 1991-92: vii.
- Owens, Richard H. "A Century of Evolution: The Changing Role and Function of the College or University President." 1989-90: 172.
- Phillips, Glynn. "Moral Principles and Moral Education." 1985-86: 191.
- Pipan, Richard C. "Children's Rights Revisited: A Philosophical Basis for Protective Action." 1987-88: 126. Response to Hoff 1987-88: 112.

- Pipan, Richard C. "Reflections on a Round Table Discussion: 'Thoughts on Evaluation: Moral and Ethical Dilemmas of Grading'." 1991-92: 191. See also A. Brown, 1991-92: 205.
- Popp, Jerome A. "Ahead to the Past: Adventures in Pragmatic Justification." 1989-90: 142. See also Broudy, 1989-90: 153.
- Popp, Jerome A. "Teacher Directed Study." 1977: 1.
- Preston, Michael. "Rortyan Foundations of Education." 1989-90: 164.
- "Program (1977)." 1977: ii.
- "Program (1978)." 1978: ii.
- "Program (1979)." 1979: iii.
- "Program (1980)." 1980: iii.
- "Program (1982)." 1982: iii.
- "Program (1983)." 1983: iii.
- "Program (1985)." 1985-86: 9.
- "Program (1986)." 1985-86: 67.
- "Program (1987)." 1987-88: 8.
- "Program (1988)." 1987-88: 97.
- "Program (1989)." 1989-90: 9.
- "Program (1990)." 1989-90: 139.
- "Program (1991)." See Appendix A, 1991-92: 337.
- "Program (1992)." See Appendix B, 1991-92: 343.
- Radebaugh, Byron F. "Introduction: Education and Institutional Democracy." 1989-90: 128. See also Brown, 1989-90: 134 and Craig 1989-90: 130.

- Reagan, Timothy. "Ivan Illich on Education: Epimetheus Unbound?" 1982: 41.
- Riegle, Rodney P. "Chariots of the Clods: Philosophy of Education and the AESA Standards." 1980: 159.
- Rinke, Dwight C. "The Elastic Circle: A Scheme of John Dewey's Social Philosophy." 1985-86: 27.
- Risku, Michael T. "Hopefulness: The Value Variable for Inner City Students." 1991-92: 135.
- Rozycki, Edward G. "Teaching Philosophy of Education: The Inherent Tensions." 1989-90: 219.
- Ryan, Carole Ann. "George S. Counts: Dare Educators Inspire World Vision?" 1989-90: 11. See also Dennis 1989-90: 18 and Schilpp, 1989-90: 23.
- Samec, Charles Edward. "A Philosophical Analysis of Richard H. Brown's Pursuit of Genuine Questions in History." 1977: 24.
- Santoro, Lawrence. "From Puggy to Larry: Poetry from *Gathering Light*." 1991-92: 261.
- Schilpp, Paul Arthur. "Recollection." 1989-90: 23. Response to Dennis, 1989-90: 18 and Ryan, 1989-90: 11.
- Schley, Craig. "Some Comments on Definitions in Education." 1980: 141.
- Schroeder, Steven. "Making History, Making Lives, and Making Connections." 1989-90: 68.
- Schultz, Dayvid. "Zen Buddhism: A Religious Paradigm of Pedagogy." 1989-90: 39.
- Shoop, Bob. "The Quest for Individual Power: A Response to Social Ennui." 1980: 43.
- Silverstein, Louis. "Sketches of a Philosophy of Life Rhythms and Education." 1991-92: 249.

- Silverstein, Louis. "Taking It to the Streets: Democracy and Education Beyond the Classroom." 1991-92: 111.
- Smith, Don G. "Americans First and Catholics Second: The Decline of Catholic Education since Vatican II." 1991-92: 327. See also W. Krolikowski, 1991-92: 311, and R. Barger, 1991-92: 319.
- Smith, Don G. "Anti-Intellectualism and *The Paideia Proposal*." 1983: 35.
- Smith, Don G. "The Failure of Reconstructionism." 1989-90: 26.
- Smith, Don G. "Toward a Philosophy of Popular Culture in Academia." 1991-92: 49.
- Smith, Michael C. "Acknowledgements." 1983: i.
- Smith, Michael C., and Adrian Dupuis. "Acknowledgements." 1979: i.
- Smith, Michael C. and Jack Williams. "Acknowledgements." 1982: i.
- Smith, Michael C. "Education and Alienation: A Development of Marx's Theory of Education." 1980: 31.
- Smith, Michael C. "Karl Marx's Philosophy of Education: A Reconstruction of Marx's Ideas on Education." 1979: 47.
- Smith, Philip L. "Abstractions in Progressive Thought." 1977: 76.
- Smith, Philip L. "Acknowledgements." 1980: i.
- Smith, Philip L. and Rob Traver. "Classical Living and Classical Learning: The Search for Equity and Excellence." 1983: 79.
- Smith, Philip L. "The Evolution of the Idea of Reason and Its Educational Consequence." 1982: 29.
- Smith, Philip L. "Is There a Reasonable Alternative to Objectivist Theories of Meaning and Rationality as a Basis for Curriculum?: A Work in Progress." 1987-88: 202.

- Smith, Philip L. "Philosophy and the Artistic Quest: Are There Objects of Art? Response to the Presidential Address." 1985-86: 169. Response to Dennis. 1985-86: 155.
- Smith, Philip L. "Preface." 1985-86: 5.
- Smith, Philip L. "Socialization and Personal Freedom: The Debate Between Bode and Russell." 1978: 36.
- Snauwaert, Dale T. "Democratic Theory and the Educational Policy Process." 1987-88: 40.
- Snauwaert, Dale T. "Sorokin's Theory of Sociocultural Change, Creative Altruism, and Education." 1987-88: 136.
- Stickel, George W. "Adler: Ideological Imperialist." 1983: 25.
- Stickel, George W. "Is There Consciousness in Writing?: A Philosophical Exploration." 1987-88: 58.
- Stickel, George W. "Neurophilosophy of Sensorial Epistemology: An Update on G.H. Mead's Second Stage of the Act." 1989-90: 81.
- Stickel, George W. "Philosophy of Education and Partnership in Reform." 1985-86: 115.
- Stickel, George W. "PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION FOR THE YEAR 2000 A.D.: CHAOS THEORY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHARLES PEIRCE." PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. 1991-92: 3. See also, L. Dennis, 1991-92: 35.
- Stickel, George W. "The Semiotics of Habit: A View of Charles Sanders Peirce's Categories in Learning." 1989-90: 154.
- Stickel, George W. "Wiemer's Creative Event as an Educational Phenomenon." 1985-86: 37.
- Swartz, Ronald. "DOING DEWEY AGAIN AND AGAIN." PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS. 1989-90: 195. See also Dennis, 1989-90: 211.
- Swartz, Ronald. "Janusz Korczak and Self-Governing Schools in the Twentieth Century." 1987-88: 183.

- Swartz, Ronald. "On Why Self-Government Failed at Bronson Alcott's Temple School." 1985-86: 85.
- Swartz, Ronald. "Paul Goodman as a Twentieth Century Advocate of a Socratic Educational Philosophy." 1979: 61.
- Swartz, Ronald. "Student Choices and a Standardized Curriculum Reconsidered." 1983: 63.
- Tankard, David. "Can Limitations on Student Freedom Be Justified?" 1978: 19.
- Torvik, Patricia A. "'One for All, and All for One' or 'Each Man for Himself?': G.H. Mead's Analysis of Patriotism." 1980: 113.
- Traver, Rob and Philip L. Smith. "Classical Living and Classical Learning: The Search for Equity and Excellence." 1983: 79.
- "Treasurer's Report." 1977: 89.
- "Treasurer's Report." 1980: 174.
- "Treasurer's Report." 1983: 113.
- Treasurer's Report (1992). See: Appendix D, 1991-92: 351.
- Van Meter, Eddy J. "The Rhetoric and Reality: Current Research Emphases Concerning Educational Administrative and Organizational Behavior." 1980: 9.
- Watras, Joseph. "Was There a Conflict Between Individual Rights and Social Values in the Civil Rights Movement?" 1991-92: 67.
- Williams, Allison E. "Does Evolution Necessitate Revolution? A Look at the Implications of Simone de Beauvoir's Claim, 'One Is Not Born a Woman, One Becomes One.'" 1991-92: 119.
- Williams, Jack and Michael C. Smith. "Acknowledgements." 1982: i.
- Wolf, Charles. "The Case of the Renegade Principal: Collective Perceptions in the Ethics of School Leadership." 1980: 147.