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ABSTRACT

These classroom materials on Romania are intended to be used in U.S. history, European history, world history, area studies, or current affairs courses. The materials are designed to offer an historical framework for considering current events, as well as some insight into the events, ideas, issues, and personalities involved in Romania's struggle for democracy. The materials include maps, a timeline, geographic information, and a series of articles from newspapers and magazines. (DB)

EDUCATION FOR DEMOCRACY PROJECT

ROMANIA

A
SELECTION
OF TEACHING
MATERIALS

We need free trade unions, free mass media, lots of different structures -- until Romania has a civil society, elections are of no significance. The parties are only names. If we are lucky, a good government could emerge and give us freedom and liberty. But only a civil society can assure it.

Gabriel Andreescu

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS AFL CIO

NOTE TO TEACHERS

These supplemental classroom materials on Romania were produced by the American Federation of Teachers to be photocopied for use in secondary schools in conjunction with the Education for Democracy's Classroom-To-Classroom project.

Recent events in Eastern Europe mark a major change in the post-World War II world. After decades of Soviet domination and communist dictatorship, Eastern European countries are demanding and achieving democracy, human rights and an end to the Soviet Union's military presence.

The democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe should help American students gain a greater appreciation of and interest in the subject of history and attain a deeper understanding of the ideas and principles of democracy, for which millions of Eastern Europeans have risked their lives.

We hope that this collection of materials on Romania will offer an historical framework for considering current events, as well as some insight into the events, ideas, issues, and personalities that have propelled Romania's continuing struggle for democracy. A timeline and maps are included to give a basic historical context. Editorial cartoons, a resource guide, and suggested classroom activities are also included.

Materials were designed to be used in American History, European History, World History, Area Studies or Current Affairs courses. We have tried to design the packet to be flexible enough to be used in many different ways. Some suggestions are:

- Using the material as a unit to be completed in one week to a week and a half. The timeline and maps can be handed out the first day, with each section as assigned reading for succeeding classes. Section questions can be used for homework, and students can be asked to pick one activity as a long-term project.
- The entire packet can be handed out at one time, with students given two or three weeks to read the unit. One or two classes can be devoted to discussion, and students can then be asked to choose an activity as a long-term project.
- In World History or European History courses, sections can be assigned as additional reading, scheduled to coincide with historical periods in the general course of study. Essays answering the section questions, or activities could be assigned, perhaps as extra credit.
- For students in World History, European History or Current Affairs courses who wish to do a term paper or project on Eastern Europe, both the packet and the resource guide can be offered.
- One or two reading selections from each section can be assigned to students. In American History courses, this could be done either to coincide with the historical period in the general course of study, or as supplemental material when U.S. foreign policy or U.S.-Soviet relations are being discussed.

We hope that the series of materials will be a useful contribution to the historical, current affairs and primary source resources available to U.S. educators. Suggestions and comments from teachers are welcome, please send them to:

Education For Democracy Project
American Federation of Teachers
555 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

about the education for democracy project

Education for Democracy, a joint project of the American Federation of Teachers, the Educational Excellence Network and Freedom House, was launched in 1987 with a statement of principles signed by more than 150 prominent Americans. Its purpose is to encourage schools to impart to students the learning necessary for an informed, reasoned allegiance to the ideals and practices of a democratic society.

ROMANIA

Size:	91,699 sq. mi. (Slightly smaller than Oregon.)
Capital:	Bucharest
Population:	23,153,475
Ethnic Groups:	89.1% Romanian; 7.8% Hungarian; 1.5% German; 1.6% Ukranian, Serb, Croat, Russian, Turk, and Gypsy.
Government:	Led by the National Salvation Front, which took power after the fall of Nicolae Ceausescu on December 22, 1989. President Ion Iliescu is a former Communist Central Committee member. Prime Minister Petre Roman heads a governing council largely composed of former Communist officials.

CENTRAL EUROPE

PRE-WORLD WAR I



POST-WORLD WAR II



Warsaw Pact Member States

TIMELINE

100s	The legions of the Roman emperor Trajan are stationed in the area of the Thracian tribe (Dacians). What is to become the Romanian nation is formed through the union of the Romans and the native populations.
500s	Slavic tribes begin to settle in this area.
600s	Bulgarians also begin moving into the area.
864	The Bulgarian Tsar, Boris, converts to Christianity and brings it in its eastern, Byzantine form to the region. This is the origin of Romania's Orthodox faith.
900s	Hungarian (Magyar) advances drive the Romanians into the Carpathian mountains, where an independent kingdom is established in Transylvania.
1000s	Transylvania is conquered by King Istvan of Hungary and is incorporated into his kingdom. [A large Hungarian minority becomes established in Transylvania, and a debate over whether these lands should be considered Hungarian or Romanian continues to this day.]
1241	A Mongol invasion destroys all records of Transylvania's early inhabitants. [It is not until the end of the 20th century that documents are found to prove that two Romanian principalities had been established: one to the south called Valachia and one to the east called Moldavia. They remain separate until 1774 when they are combined under Turkish rule.]
1417	Valachia surrenders to the Islamic forces of Turkish Sultan Muhammad I, but is allowed to maintain its ruling family, territory and religion.
1600s	Michael the Brave, with the support of Christian Europe, wins several battles against the Turks, and establishes Romania as a kingdom in the Hapsburg-ruled Holy Roman Empire. [Although their independence was short-lived, Romanians celebrate Michael as a national hero -- the first leader to bring all the Romanians of Valachia, Moldavia and Transylvania together under a single rule. Full national unity will not be realized again until 1918.]
1608	After re-gaining control, the Turks move the Romanian capital to Bucharest. The three principalities are again divided and a series of local rulers are appointed to help administer Turkish rule.
1700s	As the Sultan's power begins to decline, direct rule is imposed. Greek *Voivods* (princes) are used as Turkey's agents. Each *voivod* is only allowed to rule for a brief period, and the Romanians suffer as each new ruler attempts to leave office taking as much from the people as possible.
1806	The Russian Empire, at war with the Turks, demand Moldavia and Valachia. As a counter, Napoleon urges the Sultan to dethrone the ruling princes in these lands. After defeating Napoleon,

the Russians seize both principalities. During the six-year Russian occupation, the people are made to surrender their produce and are subjected to forced labor. Resisters are sent to Siberia.

1848 Inspired by the French, a nationalist movement emerges, and sporadic uprisings break out. At Russian insistence, the Turks put down the rebels.

1859 An attempt to unite Moldavia and Valachia under the name of Romania is blocked. However, one prince, Alexander Cuza, is named ruler of both regions. His progressive land reforms go far enough to infuriate the landowners and the Church, but not far enough to please the peasants. He is deposed in 1866 and replaced by a German prince: Carol of the Hohenzollerns. Although these lands are still considered part of the Turkish Empire, Carol establishes a liberal, independent government.

1877 Russia and Turkey again go to war. The Romanians side with the victorious Russians, and in 1878, the Treaty of Berlin recognizes Romania's full independence. Transylvania, still a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, remains outside of the new state.

1881 The prince is crowned King Carol.

1907 A major peasant uprising is violently repressed.

1914 King Carol I dies and his nephew, Ferdinand I takes the throne. With the onset of World War I, Romania declares itself neutral.

1916 Romania enters the war on the side of the Allied forces against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires.

1919 As one of the victors in the war, Romania is able to re-acquire a great deal of historical territory: Transylvania, Bukovina and Bessarabia (part of Moldavia) and the Banat.

1920s The country enters a period of political uncertainty, as political parties on the left and the right jockey for power. Ferdinand's son, Crown Prince Carol, is so little respected, he is forced to renounce any claim on the crown. Instead, Carol's five-year-old son is proclaimed heir. Ferdinand dies in 1928, and Carol begins plotting to return and regain the crown from his son.

1930 Carol is crowned Carol II, ruler of a republican monarchy.

1933 The Iron Guard, a fascist organization, assassinates the prime minister.

1937 In the 1930s, fascist forces throughout Europe gain strength. Carol II, fearful that Nazi Germany would support a Hungarian invasion to reclaim Transylvania, signs a treaty with Germany that gives it broad influence over Romanian domestic policies.

1938 Right-wing parties, with the exc. ion of the Iron Guard, establish a government. After several months, Carol II ousts the new government, and proclaims a royal dictatorship. All political parties are banned, except for Carol II's National Rebirth Front.

1939	With the outbreak of World War II, Romania again declares itself neutral, but quickly feels the effects of the war. Germany and the Soviet Union sign an agreement (Hitler-Stalin Pact), which divides up Eastern Europe between the two powers and forces Romania to relinquish territory: 40% of Transylvania to Hungary, Dobruja to the Bulgarians, and Bessarabia and Bukovina to the Soviet Union.
1940	Carol II abdicates in favor of his son Michael. A military dictatorship is formed, led by General Ion Antonescu and backed by the Iron Guard, it aligns itself with Germany. A reign of terror begins.
1941	General Antonescu, seeking to regain Bessarabia and Bukovina, sends Romanian armed forces join the German invasion of the Soviet Union.
1944	In response to Antonescu's failed military policy, King Michael organizes a coup, overthrows the government, and declares support for the Allies. As the Soviets and the Allies begin to close in on Germany, the Red Army enters Romania. The Soviet occupation force tolerates the establishment of a coalition government, but begins to place Romanian communists in key government positions.
1945	In March, King Michael, under extreme Soviet pressure, accepts the installation of communist Petru Groza as prime minister. After objections by the United States and Great Britain, it is agreed that elections will be held.
1946	Through fraud, the elections sweep a communist-led government to power. Antonescu is tried and executed. Many non-communist politicians are imprisoned.
1947	With communist dictatorship firmly established, King Michael is forced to abdicate the throne, and a Romanian People's Republic is proclaimed. Banks and industries are nationalized.
1948	New "elections" are held, but only one list of candidates is on the ballot. A treaty of "friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance" is signed with Moscow, firmly binding Romania to the Soviet Union. A period of Stalinist repression and purges of the communist party. [By June of 1950, 192,000 people will have been expelled from the ranks of the Communist Party.]
1951	In September, ten Roman Catholic priests are tried on charges of espionage and anti-state activity. All receive long prison terms.
1952	A new constitution is written, almost identical to the Soviet Union's. In an internal battle for control of the Romanian Communist Party, a nationalist faction, led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, takes power.
1953	In the Soviet Union, Stalin dies.
1955	In response to the creation of NATO, the Soviet Union establishes the Warsaw Pact, a formal military-political alliance with the nations of the Soviet bloc. The People's Republic of Romania joins.
1960s	Gheorghiu-Dej begins to loosen ties with the Soviets, and openly cultivates ties with Tito's Yugoslavia, Mao's China and the West.

1964 In April, the Romanian Workers' Party proclaims Romania's neutrality in the split between China and the Soviets, declaring that China has the right to develop its own "road to socialism."

In May, a USA-Romanian joint trade agreement is announced.

In June, Romania announces the release of practically all of the political prisoners jailed over the previous three years.

1965 Dej dies. Nicolae Ceausescu, Dej's cellmate during the war, is named the new First Secretary of the Communist Party. The country's name is changed to the Socialist Republic of Romania.

1967 Romania is the only Warsaw Pact nation that does not break off relations with Israel after the Six Day War.

1968 Despite its membership in the Warsaw Pact, Romania criticizes the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia and does not send troops.

1969 Believing that Romania is moving away from the Soviet camp, U.S. President Richard Nixon pays an official visit to Ceausescu.

1970s Despite Romania's foreign policy, repression mounts under Ceausescu's rule.

1980 In a joint statement with Great Britain, Romania criticizes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

1983 After borrowing heavily to finance massive building projects, Ceausescu announces that he will pay off the nation's $21 billion foreign debt. He imposes strict domestic austerity measures; food is rationed, heat is restricted in the winter, and electricity is rationed, leaving entire cities dark during the night. Within five years, the nation has the lowest standard of living in Europe.

1986 A human rights group, Helsinki Watch, describes the totalitarian control in Romania as the most repressive in Eastern Europe. In Romania it is illegal to speak to foreigners. Paper is rationed, and all typewriters must be registered with the police. Since Ceausescu has declared that the population must rise from 22 million to 30 million by the year 2000, every woman is expected to bear five children. All forms of birth control and abortion are illegal. All women are required to have a gynecological exam every three months to insure that they are obeying the law. Abandoned children live on the streets and swell the ill-equipped orphanages, where they receive little food and almost no adult attention. All decrees are enforced by the secret police -- the Securitate.

1987 Soviet leader Gorbachev visits Romania. Ceausescu states that the liberalization occurring in some other Eastern European nations will not take place in Romania.

In November, after long years of energy rationing, thousands of truck and tractor workers in Brasov demonstrate in protest over low living standards. They attack the local Communist Party headquarters and burn it. Authorities move in quickly and arrest hundreds. An unknown number are killed; prison sentences of 5-10 years are handed out to the leaders of the strike.

1988 Ethnic tensions are heightened in March when Ceausescu announces a policy of "urbanization," with plans to destroy 8,000 villages and resettle the inhabitants. 50,000 of those to be relocated are Hungarians.

1989

In July, after reports that Romania has begun construction of a barbed-wire fence along its border with Hungary, officials from both nations meet to discuss Romania's treatment of ethnic Hungarians.

On November 17, Romania seals its border with Hungary. A week later at the Romanian Communist Party's 14th Congress, Ceausescu is reelected General Secretary, and denies any suggestion that reforms are necessary.

On December 15, demonstrators surround a church in Timisoara to prevent the arrest of a priest, Laszlo Tokes, a prominent spokesman for the rights of ethnic Hungarians. On December 17, the army opens fire on demonstrators in Arad and Timisoara; hundreds are killed. Protests soon spread to other cities.

On December 20, Ceausescu declares a state of emergency in Timisoara. On the 21st, the revolt spreads to Bucharest, where security forces fire on demonstrators. Ceausescu is shouted down at a staged rally.

On December 22, army units join the rebellion. Ceausescu, party leader and head of state, resigns and flees. A group of communists and ex-communists declare themselves to be the National Salvation Front, and seizes power.

On December 23, the new government captures the Ceausescus. Street fighting occurs between the army, which backs the new government, and elements of the secret police still loyal to Ceausescu.

On December 25, the Ceausescus are given a "trial," summarily sentenced to death and executed. The secret police battle the rebels until December 28, the provisional regime's deadline for security forces to surrender or face execution.

On December 29, the National Salvation Front vows to hold free elections in April and to establish a democracy. Leaders declare that they will not run in the elections. Ion Iliescu, a former member of the Communist Central Committee, assumes the presidency as the head of the National Salvation Front.

No independent figures are given, but it is reported that upwards of 2,000 fatalities occurred during the December fighting.

1990

On January 12, up to five thousand demonstrators gather in Bucharest to protest continuing communist control of the government. They march to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the National Salvation Front is headquartered, shouting, "Down with communism!" "Who elected them?" and "What is the Front hiding?"

On January 23, the Front declares that, contrary to an earlier promise, it will compete in the upcoming national elections. Ion Iliescu announces that he will run for president.

On February 9, the new provisional Parliament, the Council for National Unity, convenes.

In March, the Student League and other opposition organizations hold protest demonstrations and begin hunger strikes.

Elections are held in May, the first elections since 1937. The National Salvation Front wins 66% of the vote. Iliescu becomes president with 85% of the vote. Anti-government demonstrations continue.

In response to government calls to stop the protests, securitate police and pro-government mine workers rampage through Bucharest on June 13. Student leaders are beaten and arrested, and offices of the anti-Front political parties and other independent groups are ransacked. Seven people are reported killed.

On July 13, more than 200,000 anti-government protestors rally in Bucharest's Victory Square, to demand the release of the student leaders and to protest the Front's actions.

On October 18, Premier Petre Roman offers legislation for rapid free-market reform.

On December 15, a crowd of 8,000 marches in Timisoara to commemorate the first anniversary of the street demonstrations that led to the ouster of Ceausescu. They call for a 'second revolution' against the Iliescu government, still dominated by former communists.

Opposition parties continue to ask for new elections and a coalition government. Dissatisfaction with the government's inaction against the Securitate and continued poor economic performance seems to be growing.

1991 In Hungary, on February 25, leaders of the Republics of Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and the USSR sign a formal protocol dissolving the Warsaw Pact.

An Index of Readings

I. "Romania: When the Lights Went Out," *Europe: A Tapestry of Nations,* by Flora Lewis.

II. "Ceausescu Bear Hunt Shows a Dictator Hunting for Honor," *The Milwaukee Journal,* January 13, 1991, &

"Where Policemen Outnumber Pigeons," by Mircea Dinescu, *Uncaptive Minds,* May/June/July 1989.

III. Excerpt from "Report from Romania: Down with the Tyrant," by Robert Cullen, *The New Yorker,* April 2, 1990.

IV. "New Masks, Old Faces," by Vladimir Tismaneanu, *The New Republic,* February 5, 1990, &

"Street Theater," by Anna Husarska, *The New Republic,* February 5, 1990.

V. "June 20, 1990 Protest by the Student League," *Uncaptive Minds*, August/September/October 1990.

VI. "Homage to Golania," by Vladimir Tismaneanu, *The New Republic,* July 30/August 6, 1990.

ROMANIA
The Lights Went Out

ROMANIA HAS LONG BEEN CALLED a maverick country, and it keeps finding new ways to prove that it is indeed different. It is the only Latin state in southeastern Europe, surrounded by Slavs and Magyars. But while many of its Slav neighbors are Roman Catholics with traditions looking to the West, Romanians received their religion from Byzantium via Bulgaria, though not their alphabet. They remain Orthodox Catholics but use Roman letters. Before World War II, Bucharest delighted in its sobriquet "Paris of the East," a frivolous, pleasure-loving capital, stylish, with grand tree-lined avenues and vast squares, places to promenade in finery. Cultural life was greatly influenced by France. But politics were tough, with a strong fascist movement and an affinity for Germany. Afterward, like all the rest of the area occupied by Soviet forces, Romania went Communist, something of a tour de force because the Romanian Communist Party had eight hundred members at the end of the war, of whom half were in exile and many were from ethnic minorities. The country managed to get rid of Soviet troops in 1957, the year after the invasion of Hungary, and to establish a foreign policy divergent from and sometimes openly contradictory to Moscow's.

Romania found a way to teeter between the Soviets and China when the two great Communist powers broke relations and all the rest of Eastern Europe had to follow Moscow's line. It helped to arrange Chinese-American contacts when President Richard Nixon was secretly

planning his dramatic trip of reconciliation. It refused to follow the Soviet bloc in breaking relations with Israel after the Six Day War in 1967, and helped establish the contacts that led to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's spectacular visit to Jerusalem. It was the only Warsaw Pact country which denounced the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and did not participate with troops, and the only one to take part in the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.

But it was also the only Warsaw Pact member to make scarcely any effort to experiment with economic reform, maintaining a rigidly orthodox Stalinist system and a sycophantic "cult of personality" long after the others had backed away. It has a witty, saucy intellectual elite, almost totally silenced, and a glum, deeply depressed population, which has suffered far worse deprivations than those which drove Polish workers to create the Solidarity movement. There was scarcely more resistance than mutters of "Thank God it isn't worse." It ought to be the richest country in the region, with oil, minerals and unusually large resources of fertile land, and it became the poorest. Juliana G. Pilon, an academic who fled into exile, wrote of her benighted land that it had been turned "from the breadbasket of Europe into a basket case" where bread was rationed.

Nicolae Ceaușescu, the lifelong Communist who came to power in 1965, styled himself "Conducator," which means the leader, just as Der Führer and Il Duce do. His wife, Elena, took second place in the hierarchy, and some sixty members of his family manned the upper echelons in a fashion little short of imperial. Playing on Stalin's dictum of the 1920s that Soviet policy of that period should concentrate on "building socialism in one country," Romanians came to say that their state's contribution to ideology was "building socialism in one family." All the trappings of Marxist-Leninist theory were present, total state monopoly of the economy without even restaurants or taxis left to private enterprise, and a huge Communist Party of 3.5 million in 1985 (in a population of 23 million) with control of everything. An official claimed that a proof of Romania's "democratic" management was that in factories the head of the party unit was invariably the head of the workers' council, and the deputy head of the unit was the factory manager. A saddened, terribly hard-pressed but still spunky artist said, "We do have real equality here—at the very bottom and at the lowest possible level."

Somehow the texture of Romanian society doesn't seem to have

much to do with communism at all, though the windy slogans express the conventional dogmas. It is much more reminiscent of the worst traditional Byzantine despotism, functioning by fear, venality, cultivation of deviousness to circumvent an unbudgeable, swollen bureaucracy, patronage and, above all, the unquestionable whim of one man, one family. Some say that one out of every four Romanians works directly or indirectly for the secret police. Others say no, it is one in three. It is hard to tell whether Romania's "difference" provoked what happened, or whether it was the result.

It is a relatively large country, twelfth in area in Europe, the size of Oregon. The climate runs to extremes; in a typical year the temperature in Bucharest descends to −11°F during the long, hard winter and up to 102° in summer. But nature favored it topographically, with a generous balance of plains, plateaus and mountains, rivers and woods and beaches. The scenery is awesome in parts, in the peaks of the Carpathians in Transylvania and the raw majesty of the Iron Gates, where the Danube flows through a deep gorge cut between rugged red cliffs. In other areas it is bucolic, bright fields rolling over gentle hills, wildflowers alongside the narrow roads. Peasant traditions are strong; villagers sing and dance and flaunt their brilliantly embroidered costumes as they have for centuries. But the lands they till no longer bear the name of an aristocratic proprietor, they have been turned into collectives with such names as "The New Life" or "In the Socialist Way." Over a quarter of the people still make their living in agriculture, though the men have been drained off to the factories and four out of five farm workers are women. The men send money home to help their families.

Like the rest of the Balkans, Romania was late in developing, cut off from the European mainstream by Turkish overlordship, with feudal habits and extremes of wealth and poverty. For all the cosmopolitan sophistication of the capital, the people were largely illiterate well into the twentieth century. In Western eyes, Romania was embodied in dazzling blond actresses such as Elvira Popescu or the ingeniously surrealistic dramatist Eugene Ionesco, exciting figures who were part of the general sparkle of European culture. There were writers and painters and professors who could be at home anywhere, and who contributed to the saying that "Romanian isn't a nationality, it's a profession."

As World War II approached, Bucharest was a fabled capital of intrigue, high life, refugees and espionage. The dowager Queen Marie,

of royal British and Russian descent, was a breathtaking world figure who deliberately attracted attention with the extravagance of her wardrobe and her dalliances. Her biographer, Hannah Pakula, called her "the last romantic." The Athenée Palace Hotel was an international center for the people whose names provided the glitter of gossip columns and, no doubt, for many whose names fattened police dossiers. For some years afterward, it was still elegant but the comfortable chairs in the lobby and by the elevators on each floor were occupied by sharp-eyed, awkwardly dressed men who pretended to read the same newspaper all day long. Now the police are still there, but the hotel is dark and shabby, with miserable little refrigerators that never work in each room and cheap furniture with the veneer splitting off.

Romania has always been a land of great beauty and great hardship, a slow place moving no faster nor further with the centuries than a horse-drawn cart can move. The original inhabitants were Dacians, a people whom Herodotus described as "the most valiant and righteous of the Thracians." They had an advanced civilization with achievements in music, astronomy and medicine and wrote in both the Greek and Latin alphabets. Under Emperor Trajan, Rome conquered Dacia in A.D. 106 after long, stubborn campaigns spanning more than a generation. The conquest was followed by intensive colonization in which the populations merged, creating a new Daco-Roman ethnicity with strong roots and high culture. The Latin poet Ovid lived much of his life in exile at Tomis, near Constantsa, a subtropical city on the Black Sea whose languid climate and pleasant life encouraged thoughts of romantic love. Because of its prosperity, the province was known as Dacia Felix, one of the empire's most agreeable and civilized. In A.D. 271, Emperor Aurelian officially withdrew the Roman legions to tighten his embattled defenses. Historians disagree about the mixture of peoples after that. But the dominant view is that large numbers of the colonists had stayed on, and resisted assimilation by waves of invading Asian tribes who moved into Europe in the second half of the millennium. The language and the customs remained firmly based on Latin culture.

But the people were unable to organize their society in the face of succeeding onslaughts by Goths, Slavs, Avars, Bulgars and Magyars. After the conversion of the Bulgarian Tsar Boris in 864, during a period of Bulgarian dominion in Dacia, Christianity was brought to the region in its eastern, Byzantine form. That was the origin of Romania's Ortho-

dox faith. It had lost all ties with Rome. Magyar advances drove the people into the Carpathians, where they became known as the Vlach tribes and established an independent kingdom in Transylvania in the second half of the tenth century. In the eleventh century, they were conquered by King Stephen and Transylvania was incorporated into his kingdom of Hungary.

The dispute persists today over whether Transylvania should be considered historically as a Romanian or Hungarian land. Romania's large Hungarian minority is concentrated there, and its treatment is a constant source of friction with Hungary because of attempts at forced assimilation. The capital of Transylvania, called Cluj in Romanian and Kolozsvár in Hungarian, is a large, handsome old city with proud traditions. Records of the area's early inhabitants were all destroyed during a Mongol invasion in 1241. It was not until the end of that century that existing documents confirm the development of two Romanian principalities, one south of the Carpathians, called Valachia, and the other to the east, called Moldavia. They remained separate until 1774, when their annals were combined under a uniform Turkish administration.

The Turkish advance had begun in the fifteenth century. Valachia sought help from the Bulgars and the Serbs, first against Hungary and then against the Turks, but all the sovereignties of the region were succumbing to the overwhelming Turkish expansion. Joint Christian forces, with expeditions from France and Burgundy, were defeated at the Battle of Nikopol in 1396. Valachia was finally forced to capitulate to Sultan Muhammad I in 1417, but in subjection was allowed to maintain its dynasty, territory and religion. Resistance continued under Hungarian leadership until the death of the unbelievably cruel local Romanian ruler Vlad IV. His full name was Vlad Dracul, but he was known as Vlad Tepes (Vlad the Impaler) because of his atrocities. He was the origin of the story of Dracula, the vampire. Some say the myth of his depraved rituals was deliberately spread to Western Europe by subjects who sought revenge by defaming him. But with or without satanic connotations, his behavior was monstrous enough to inspire the nineteenth-century novelist Bram Stoker's horror story. His supposed tomb lies in a little chapel on an island in Lake Snagov, not far from Bucharest. Romanians are of two minds about his memory, because for all his crimes he did mount an effective opposition to the Turks, but it collapsed after him.

Over the next two centuries, there were fitful but generally unsuccessful efforts to wrench free from Turkish suzerainty. At the start of the seventeenth century, Michael the Brave did amass enough support from Christian powers to win battles and establish a kingdom under the Habsburg emperor, although it was short-lived. Nonetheless, he is remembered as Romania's leading national hero because for the first time since the Roman period he brought the Romanians of Transylvania, Valachia and Moldavia under a single rule and established the goal of full national unity, which was not to be realized again until 1918. Michael's was the last stand against Turkish domination, which was exercised increasingly through Greek surrogates.

The Turks moved the capital to Bucharest in 1608, away from the frontier of restive Transylvania, and appointed a series of local rulers who both accepted and intrigued against their dominion. By the start of the eighteenth century, the Sultan's vast power had entered decline and reinforcement was sought by shifting to direct rule of the principalities. Greeks from the Phanar district of Constantinople were chosen as Turkey's agents. But these hospodars (princes) were given brief and uncertain tenure of their stewardship. Thus they felt obliged to extract as much as possible from their subjects as quickly as possible. The average reign was two and a half years. So the word *Phanariot* came to stand for bribery, exaction and corruption, though the hospodars themselves were said to have often been men of culture and intelligence.

Many peasants fled the oppressive regime, drastically reducing the population. Meanwhile, Russia was pressing hard against the Turks. After important victories, Empress Catherine demanded that Turkey recognize the independence of Valachia and Moldavia under Russian power. In the early nineteenth century, St. Petersburg's influence increased. To counter it, Napoleon urged the Sultan to dethrone the princes of Moldavia and Valachia in 1806. It led to a disastrous six-year Russian occupation of the principalities, with requisition of their produce, forced labor and deportation of resisters to Siberia. The Romanians never forgot. By their count, Russia invaded their country thirteen times, always bringing distress. Once Romania invaded Russia to recover lost territory, but it was a costly failure. Unlike the neighboring Bulgarians, who remember the Russians as Christian liberators from the Turks, Romanians feel a deep-rooted hostility and fear of Russia.

In the revolutionary year 1848 there were uprisings in several places. A national movement emerged, inspired by France, which had become a beacon for the Romanian intelligentsia. The Turks, at Russian insis-

tence, put down the rebels. European influence was enhanced by the Treaty of Paris in 1856. An attempt to unite the principalities under the name of Romania and to proclaim neutrality was blocked, but a single prince was named as the ruler of both regions in 1859. He was Alexander Cuza, a man of progressive views but despotic ways whose agrarian reforms infuriated the landowners and the Church without going far enough to please the peasantry. He was deposed in 1866 and replaced, by general agreement, with a German princeling. The new ruler, accorded hereditary rights, was Charles, second son of Prince Charles Anthony of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. Before the unity of Germany, its noble houses were a desirable fount for countries in search of a ruler with legitimate claim to a title but without the power status which would provoke rivalry from the important European states.

Prince Charles, who romanized his name to Carol, accepted a new constitution based on the liberal Belgian constitution of 1831, after Belgian independence. The country remained nominally under the Turkish empire, but it developed autonomous government. When Russia and Turkey went to war again in 1877, however, Romania joined on Russia's side and was rewarded, by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, with formal recognition of its full independence. Authority was restored over the province of Dobrudja. But Transylvania, part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, remained outside the new state. Prince Carol was crowned King Carol in 1881. Having no heir, he arranged to have his nephew Prince Ferdinand of Hohenzollern named his rightful successor.

Political power was held tightly by Liberal Party leader Jon Bratianu and his Francophile supporters, whose policy was to encourage the development of a strong middle class. The opposition Conservatives were divided into the old nobility, who tended to favor Russia, and a younger pro-German group. The standing of Jews became an abrasive issue. There had been few in the country before independence, but they immigrated in large numbers afterward. Russia's failed 1905 revolution sparked a peasant uprising in Romania against the Jews, who were considered a cause of poverty because of their money-lending businesses, and against the large landowners.

The country was in social, political and financial trouble when King Carol died at the beginning of World War I. He had tried to bring Romania into the war as an ally of his relative the Kaiser. His nephew,

who become King Ferdinand I, was less fervently pro-German, and Queen Marie, Ferdinand's wife, was adamantly anti-German. She had been born Princess Marie of Edinburgh, a granddaughter of Queen Victoria and of Tsar Alexander II, and her favors were firmly for England and Russia. (She died in 1938, as Romania again faced the choice of which side to join in the coming war.) The country stayed neutral for the first two years of World War I, courted by each side with an offer of territory from the other. The Central Powers promised to return Russian-held Bessarabia, and the Allies offered Transylvania, of much more emotional as well as economic importance to the Romanians.

So Romania declared war on Austro-Hungary on August 22, 1916. It was a disaster, bringing both Germans and Russians into the country and resulting in the fall of Bucharest. With the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917 and Russia's withdrawal from the war, the Russian forces in Romania broke down into scavenging bands. An armistice was signed with the Central Powers in December, taking Romania out of the war at great cost. By the terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, signed on May 7, 1918, half of Dobrudja was ceded to Bulgaria with only the pledge of a trade route to Constantsa affording access to the Black Sea. Hungary's Transylvanian border was advanced eastward, and far-reaching concessions had to be granted on Danube transport, the railroads and the oil fields. It was a national catastrophe. Then, on November 9, 1918, two days before Germany signed the armistice acknowledging its defeat, Romania again declared war on the Central Powers in another attempt to emerge on the winning side. On November 30, when German troops evacuated in accordance with the surrender terms in Western Europe, the King returned to Bucharest.

Romania then proceeded to proclaim the incorporation of Transylvania, fulfilling the old dream of national unity. But there remained the problem of obtaining Allied recognition, complicated by Romania's ambitious invasion of further Hungarian territory and occupation of Hungary's capital, Budapest, defenseless in the turmoil of Béla Kun's Communist revolution. The Treaties of Saint Germain, Trianon and Neuilly finally fixed internationally recognized borders, less than Romania had hoped to obtain by the initial 1916 agreement to enter the war but still satisfying major aspirations. They left an important Hungarian minority within Romania, a source of continuing irredentism, as well as the traditional ethnic minorities of Germans, Jews, Gypsies and others.

The internal political situation was unruly. The old Conservative Party collapsed because of its failed pro-German policy. Eighty percent of the population were peasants, leaving the Socialists and the Communists with little of their customary working class base. They tried to make up for it by audacity; as a result, their leadership was arrested and in 1924 the Communist Party was outlawed. There was fierce controversy over a promised agrarian reform and expropriation, finally passed by the legislature but to no one's satisfaction. And there was trouble over the succession to the monarchy. Crown Prince Carol, King Ferdinand's son, was a notorious, extravagant playboy. In 1925, he was forced to renounce his right to the throne and his five-year-old son was recognized as next in line under a regency council. But two years later when King Ferdinand died, Carol plotted to return and take the throne back from his own son. He finally succeeded and was crowned King Carol II in 1930.

In this time of disorder, a right-wing terrorist organization rose to prominence. It used various names in various periods, but it was generally known as the Iron Guard. The government's foreign policy was opposed to the interwar fascist powers; Romania supported the Balkan Entente of 1934 and opposed Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland and annexation of Austria. But, supported and financed by the Nazis, the Iron Guard and its death teams kept the country in chaos. In 1938, hoping to regain control, King Carol banned all political parties and proclaimed a royal dictatorship. When World War II began right after the Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939, the King tried to bargain with the belligerents as his father had done in World War I to see which side would pay the most for Romania's participation. He sought first to get promises of territorial expansion from Britain and France, but, dissatisfied with their offers, he then turned to Germany. Hitler offered economic aid but demanded inclusion of the Iron Guard in the cabinet. When the King refused, Hitler outmaneuvered him and made agreements with Romania's rivals which partly dismembered the country. The Soviets, still at peace with Germany, were awarded Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Southern Dobrudja, twice taken from Bulgaria since 1913, was returned to Bulgaria again, and Transylvania was restored to Hungary. As a consequence, Carol was forced to abdicate in September 1940. His son Michael, by then twenty, once again was crowned King, but as a puppet in the hands of a military dictatorship backed by the Iron Guard.

The new leader was the pro-Nazi Marshal Ion Antonescu. Carol was packed off into exile, along with his flamboyant, redheaded Jewish mistress, Magda Lupescu. The new regime launched a reign of terror, but the Iron Guard still was not sated. It tried to oust Marshal Antonescu and seize power for itself alone in January 1941. But the army was opposed, rallying to the marshal, who proceeded to apply the terror to the Iron Guard in its turn, executing all of the leaders. Though he suppressed the Nazis' Romanian counterparts, Antonescu took the country into the war on Germany's side. Once again, Bucharest gambled on a German victory to gain territory. By February, there were 500,000 German troops in Romania, which declared war on the Soviet Union. Great Britain declared war on Romania, and after Pearl Harbor, Romania declared war on the United States. Joining the Nazis was popular at first because Romania was rewarded with Bessarabia, since the German invasion of Russia in May 1941 had overthrown the previous Hitler-Stalin agreement.

But when the casualty lists arrived from Stalingrad and it gradually became clear that Romania had again chosen the losing side, public discontent increased. The outlawed political parties had managed to keep their organizations. The four main ones were the National Peasants, the Liberals, the Social Democrats and the Communists, who had recruited Iron Guards eager for action but without direction after the execution of their leaders. The four joined to support a coup mounted by King Michael, which overthrew Antonescu and switched sides in the war on August 23, 1944. Soviet troops poured into the country even before the formal armistice, signed in Moscow on September 12, 1944. The reversal was in the nick of time to regain Transylvania but too late to prevent Soviet domination, despite wartime Allied agreements. Antonescu was tried and executed in 1946.

As in the other countries occupied by the Red Army, the Soviets at first accepted a coalition government and encouraged organization of a national bloc. There simply weren't enough Communists to be installed from the start, and Stalin was cautious about not being too flagrant in undermining the accords with Roosevelt and Churchill signed at Yalta in early 1945. The agreement was that postwar governments were to be democratic and antifascist. Nonetheless, he sent Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vishinsky, who had been the prosecutor at the prewar Moscow purge trials, to install Petru Groza as Premier. Groza was head of a splinter leftist peasants' party called the Ploughman's Front. Britain

and the United States objected because the National Peasant Party and the Liberals, by far the most popular, were excluded.

In response to an appeal from King Michael, the Big Three agreed in Moscow in December 1945 on naming a broadly based government which would hold elections. They took place in November 1946. But by then, the Communists had established themselves in key ministries and put their candidates on a single government bloc list so that their strength could not be measured. In the Romanian peace treaty signed the next year, it was provided that Soviet forces could remain in the country until peace was concluded with Austria. That assured adequate time for Soviet influence to be firmly implanted.

Stalin never accepted an Austrian peace treaty. It was not until Nikita Khrushchev sought to relax tensions with the West that the Austrian treaty was signed, in 1955, providing the legal basis on which the Romanian government could secure Soviet withdrawal in 1957. The Romanian peace treaty ceded Bessarabia and northern Bukovina to the Soviets again, awarded southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria again, but returned northern Transylvania from Hungary, establishing the country's current frontiers.

After the 1946 elections, however, when Romanian Communists were still very close to Moscow, non-Communist politicians and their followers were imprisoned. The National Peasant Party, which had majority support, was outlawed. A split was maneuvered within the Social Democrats which led to a forced merger with the Communists, to create the Romanian Workers' Party. That pattern was followed in almost all of Eastern Europe. New elections were called in 1948 with a single list presented by the People's Democratic Front, which claimed 405 out of the 414 seats in the assembly. Shortly before the elections, a treaty of "friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance" was signed with the Soviet Union, firmly binding Romanian policy to Moscow. Then, with the other politicians out of the way, the internal Communist purges began. The party had been swollen by gorging all it could sweep into its ranks right after the war. In 1949, it threw out 18 percent of its membership, admitted new people more carefully vetted for reliability and by mid-1950 announced its strength at 720,000 card carriers.

The leader was Gheorge Gheorghiu-Dej, a dark-eyed, rather handsome man who had spent the war in prison and escaped just before the 1944 coup. He was the son of a laborer with only a few years of formal schooling, but a long experience of agitation, jail and labor camps. He

had added "Dej" to his surname after he was interned in that town in the 1930s. After the arrival of the Soviets and his inclusion in the government as Minister of Communication, he went off to Moscow for a time, returning in January 1945. He was known as an ambitious, unscrupulous, subtly cunning man, skilled at outbidding his rivals for Soviet support whatever the Moscow line of the moment. He was secretive about his personal life, but his stolid, rustic figure was seen at times in Bucharest cafés. Gheorghiu-Dej was junior to others in the party. But he was an ethnic Romanian and he had been a worker, on the railroads, claims which few of his comrades could advance. In 1945 he became the party's First Secretary.

From outside, the most visible member of the leadership was Ana Pauker, a grim-faced, lumpy woman who kept her iron-gray hair in an awkward bob and wore ill-fitting mannish suits. There was no more telling image of what was happening in Romania than her arrival on an official visit to Warsaw in 1947. She went by train—air service was still uncertain—and used one of the luxurious old Orient Express specials, newly painted and polished. The Warsaw station had been totally destroyed in the war, made into a crater of twisted tracks. So Mrs. Pauker's train pulled up in an open clearing just outside the city, where the Polish dignitaries lined up to greet her. The contrast between her and her escort was even greater than that between the elegant cars and the devastation. At each window as the train slowed to a stop were the men of her honor guard, wearing extravagant red and blue uniforms with operetta decorations. Some were obviously corseted, their cheeks and lips rouged, their moustaches waxed and twirled. Then came Ana Pauker. She clomped to the ground, eyes steely and lips sternly set. She made no concessions. The men around her were nothing more than Romania's vanishing past.

She was born Ana Rabinsohn, daughter of a Moldavian Jewish butcher, and had taught Hebrew at a Bucharest synagogue school before going to Zurich to study medicine. There she met and married Marcel Pauker, a Romanian student whose father was a newspaper publisher. But she developed a consuming interest in Marxism, joined the Communist Party in 1921 and was elected to its Central Committee after only a year. She had the usual experiences of underground work, arrest, study in her filthy, solitary cell. The main difference in her career from those of her comrades was that during the late 1920s she had lived in the United States, where her husband represented the

Soviet trade organization. That was only an interlude, however. Back in Romania, she landed in prison again. In 1940, there was a Soviet-Romanian exchange of prisoners after the occupation of Bessarabia, and she was released to Moscow. During the war, she helped organize a special Red Army division of Romanian prisoners of war and marched home with them in 1944, wearing the major's uniform of a political commissar.

Ana Pauker's visit to Warsaw was for the meeting which drafted a new manifesto reviving the official international Communist movement and establishing the Cominform. She was not to become Foreign Minister until two months later, but she already ranked among the world's top Communist figures, along with Yugoslavia's Tito and Bulgaria's Dimitrov. She was said to be the only Romanian with direct access to Stalin. Along with Mrs. Pauker and Gheorghiu-Dej, Finance Minister Vasile Luca (an ethnic Hungarian whose real name was Laszlo Lukacs) appeared to compose a sturdy leadership troika that could not be budged. But the Romanian Communists were having trouble. The country had been plundered, had lost a fifth of its territory and, on top of that, had had to pay heavy reparations to the Soviets. The peasants resisted collectivization, which was imposed slowly but inexorably. Over 12 percent of the population belonged to restive minorities. Turks and Jews were allowed to emigrate in the early years, but Germans, Serbs and, most of all, the large number of Hungarians were difficult to deal with. Monetary reform, introduced suddenly, wiped out both inflation and virtually all private savings. The Romanian leadership was totally dependent on Moscow, and Moscow was not entirely pleased with its results.

The break between Stalin and Tito gave Gheorghiu-Dej the arguments to eliminate first the "nationalists" among his Communist rivals and then, in 1952, the "cosmopolites," which in the context meant nonethnic Romanians and intellectuals, especially Mrs. Pauker and Luca. With some shrewd detours, he continued to consolidate his power. Later, Gheorghiu-Dej was to take credit for creating some distance from the Soviets on foreign policy. But at the time, he was always in step, providing new headquarters for the Cominform in Bucharest after it had to be moved from Belgrade. When Tito demonstrably succeeded in escaping from satellitedom, however, the Romanian leader began to feel the attraction of more independence. He moved gradually, but the people noticed the growing coolness toward the Russians

and were delighted. Gheorghiu-Dej had found that nationalism was a more effective way to force down the pill of Stalinism. Besides, he was having increasing arguments with Khrushchev, who had observed the productive impulse that the Common Market was giving Western Europe. The Soviet leader determined to reverse the Eastern bloc's economic policy, built on trying to imitate the Soviet's heavy-industry model in each country, and to increase cooperation and trade by allocating each state a special task. East Germany and Czechoslovakia were pleased, anticipating benefits because of their industrial base. But Romania was sharply opposed. Bucharest was determined to continue its policy of self-sufficiency and grandiose projects.

Unaware of these underlying arguments and what they would mean to the development of Romania's economy, the public applauded any sign of defiance to Moscow. The Soviets were seen as the source of the worst difficulties, and people found ingenious ways to show general dissatisfaction with their rulers. In the summer of 1956 I asked a man standing in a packed truckload of workers, waiting to be taken to a "spontaneous demonstration" of approval for the government, a deliberately ambiguous, neutral question: "How are things here?" He shouted down a wily answer which revealed all: "We're not allowed to tell you." There were reports later of uprisings in Transylvania during the Hungarian revolution that fall. One rumor reaching other parts of Eastern Europe was that two Romanian army divisions had been disarmed. But it was never clear whether Soviet or other Romanian troops took the action and, although credible, the report was never documented. Undoubtedly, the uneasy situation precipitated the decision to demand removal of Soviet forces the following year, which Khrushchev accepted because he had larger concerns at the time.

Gheorghiu-Dej made the most of the people's joyous reaction for reviving nationalism. He had all the streets and cinemas, which had been given Russian names, rebaptized in Romanian. He had history rewritten to claim that the Romanians had "liberated" themselves, without the Red Army, an ironic assertion because in that case the Communists would never have had the slightest chance at power. He even re-explained the purges to pretend that he had shrewdly gotten rid of the pro-Moscow people in the leadership by the devious charges of "nationalism" and "cosmopolitanism." Romania remained in the Warsaw Pact, but as an increasingly obstreperous member. After 1962 it prohibited Pact maneuvers on its territory and began to diverge from

Soviet foreign policy. In principle, the Romanians have also refused transit rights to Soviet forces. In fact, however, Soviet units have been seen crossing to Bulgaria for exercises. Romania's military stand came to be compared with that of France in NATO, a prickly, uncooperative ally but an ally all the same. At the time of Tito's death in neighboring Yugoslavia, when there were fears of Soviet attempts to reestablish a pro-Moscow regime by force, Romania constituted a barrier on a vital invasion route.

By 1964 the schism reached a point of openly declared policy. The Romanian party proclaimed that "there cannot be a father party and a son party, a superior party and a subordinate party, only a great family of Communist and workers' parties with equal rights." It was called a Romanian declaration of independence, a claim to follow the party's "own road to socialism," as the Yugoslav and Italian Communists had done before. But unlike the other quarrels between Communist leaders and Moscow, it advanced no real issue of ideology, no departures in the theory or practice of "building socialism" and brought no internal innovations. Gheorghiu-Dej died on March 19, 1965, at the age of sixty-three, without having relinquished a jot of power.

Once again, there appeared to be a troika. There was Ion Maurer, an intelligent, educated man who was then Premier; Chivu Stoica, a party stalwart who had long done Gheorghiu-Dej's bidding and was elected President, and Nicolae Ceauşescu, only forty-seven at the time, who had had a meteoric climb through the party hierarchy, rising all the way to the Politburo in the decade 1945–55. Ceauşescu took over as First Secretary. He had the coveted credentials of being an ethnic Romanian, coming from a poor family, having been involved with the Communist movement from his early teens and being young and healthy. It soon became clear who was the absolute boss. Ceauşescu did not change the policies of his mentor, Gheorghiu-Dej, either in foreign affairs or internally. He reinforced them. Romania continued to straddle the Moscow-Peking divide and seek improved relations with the West, pursue extravagant development plans at the cost of living standards and clamp the tightest possible lid on any expression of complaint or even mild challenge.

Ceauşescu is a small man, which is seldom noted because he takes care to be photographed in the midst of children or standing above the people around him. His hair is curly, his eyes narrow, his nose sharp, and his portraits show him with a warm smile, though he holds himself

with a cold, royal reserve. A comrade who served time with him in the severe Doftana prison in King Carol's days described him as "a skinny kid who rarely said a word. He didn't whine when they lashed him. He didn't smile when they fed him." As supreme leader, he took great pains to control his image. "Luminous beacon," "Helmsman who guides," "Our lay God," "Thinking polar star," "The first thinker of this earth," "The most eminent personality of international political and scientific life," "The earth lives today under the Sign of Ceauşescu"—the minions were made to gush geysers of adulation. Ceauşescu's imaginative scriptwriters even surpassed Stalin's commandeered hagiographers.

In 1980, he made his wife, Elena, his second-in-command, with the title of Vice Premier, and the key job of control of party personnel. She too was accorded the right to the most extravagant encomia. Her "good and tender smile replaces the sun on a gray day," read the officially published "Homage to Comrade Elena Ceauşescu" on the occasion of her promotion in the government. A poem offered by the Union of Romanian Writers said, "By your wisdom, you are our mother, a valiant woman who has conquered all the secrets of science, the worthy and proud companion of the Magnificent Man." The official biographies are as discreet about the facts of the reigning couple's lives before the ascent to glory as they are garrulous about the Ceauşescus' professed virtues. Elena was born the daughter of a landowner in a little southern Carpathian village and made her way as a girl to Bucharest, where she worked in a textile factory. The only claim made for early political activity was that she was chosen queen of the ball on May Day in 1939. But once installed in power beside her husband, she insisted on being treated not just as a consort, a first lady, but as a political and intellectual luminary in her own right.

Ceauşescu's method of rule was to rely on his family and to keep reshuffling the rest of the governing apparatus so that everyone owed position and privilege directly to him and could never forget it. The result was such a stifling, paralyzed hierarchy, with the most trivial decisions requiring a ruling from on high, that even Communist Chinese delegates told Westerners they disliked doing business with Romania because nothing could be moved through its bureaucracy.

Though their images were ubiquitous, the leading couple were so insulated, so distant from the everyday life of the country, that sometimes people wondered whether they actually knew what was going on. But there could be little doubt in a system of such stringent and cen-

tralized control. When food shortages became acute, Ceauşescu announced that 30 percent of illness throughout the country was due to gluttony. He prescribed a "scientific diet" for health purposes. It permitted, per month, 10 eggs, ¼ pound of butter, 2.2 pounds of cooking oil and 2.2 pounds of meat—though he did not say how these items were to be found in the empty markets. Sharp-tongued Romanians said it was a new contribution to historic ideology, "dietetic Marxism." Bread was rationed in 1981. One of the few known incidents of disorder came when Ceauşescu visited a mining town shortly afterward and was greeted with a hail of stones. He fled by helicopter.

Energy was also critically short. Because of Romania's rejection of integration in planning by Comecon, the Soviet economic bloc, the Soviets refused "ruble oil" and petroleum had to be bought with hard currency. Huge tubes of methane gas, which looked like crude rockets, were placed atop city buses for their fuel. The streets, and even the luxury hotels built for foreign tourists, were left in a dim gloom at night. Police had a right to enter anyone's home at any hour to see if they were using more than the ration of electricity. Light bulbs over 40 watts were no longer on sale. Refrigerators had to be unplugged in winter, and apartment dwellers caught using forbidden electric heaters risked penalties. Except for special occasions, such as celebration of a Ceauşescu birthday, TV stations broadcast only two hours a night. In any event, it was such dreary, propagandistic television that people took to watching Bulgarian broadcasts, which could be received in Bucharest and some other parts of the country. Bulgarian TV schedules circulated clandestinely. An underground Bulgarian-Romanian dictionary was compiled for viewers, but even without understanding the words, people felt the pictures were livelier, more interesting. And they could see that Bulgarians lived better. That hurt. Romanians were accustomed to looking down on Bulgarians as backward, crude, less European. "I never in my life would have imagined that the day would come when we would envy Bulgarians," said a famous painter's sister.

A new kind of personal solidarity arose among the people, exchanging little favors and services, getting up to queue in the middle of the night or passing on word about a country family who managed to hide from the authorities part of the goat cheese it produced and was willing to sell. A woman told about a friend who was ecstatic at having found a pair of stockings and added sadly, "It takes so little to make us happy now." But there was nothing like the social cohesion which developed into the Solidarity movement in Poland. People grumbled and cringed

There seemed to be a degree of sadism and megalomania that went well beyond mere totalitarian mismanagement of the country. A large part of old Bucharest was razed to build another monumental forum and triumphal avenue. Some of the fine old villas were left, occupied often by foreign diplomats, but most people were jammed into jerry-built anthills of apartment blocks. Central heating and hot water were available only occasionally. People would get up at 3 or 4 A.M. to see if the two hours of hot water promised daily happened to be on. Kent cigarettes and small packets of coffee became a medium of exchange, needed to get quick attention from a doctor or to persuade a plumber to moonlight. The national currency, the lei, was not of great use, and it was dangerous to be caught with unauthorized foreign currency.

In the circumstances, foreign observers speculated about after-Ceauşescu. Nobody imagined that he might fall, but he was at least human enough to be mortal. Few supposed that his high-living, hot-tempered, self-indulgent son Nicu would really be able to hold the succession which his father was preparing for him. "I don't mind that he drinks, chases women, gets into fights," one official confided, "but he's incompetent." Yet nobody outside the family had been allowed to rise to a position where power might be transferred smoothly. Would there be a battle of factions or a great upheaval? It seemed that so much repression, so much deprivation, such concentration of power could bring an explosive relief when the dictator ultimately disappeared. But Romanians, asked what they expected, tended to furrow their brows in puzzlement. The editor of the Communist Party paper *Scinteia*, a position of high importance, said blandly, "Life always brings new problems." The regime did not show fears, and the people did not show hopes of change. It was as though the existing situation had become so pervasive, so embedded in the country's thought, that it was impossible for people even to imagine things might be different. They appeared to have renounced the future in the dogged effort to survive the present.

The basic resources of the country and its industrious, if exhausted and sullen, population should provide for a happier future for Romania if it can ever emerge from its political deadlock. But it has always had to squeeze by on wit and wishes, on ducking when possible and bowing when necessary, on evasion and ingratiation. It has escaped a measure of Soviet thralldom in international relations only to be hopelessly ensnared in its own, no longer a consolation. There is nothing different on the horizon.

Ceausescu Bear Hunt Shows A Dictator Hunting For Honor

Milwaukee Journal, January 13, 1991

[Editor's Note: The following article describes a bear hunt organized for the benefit of Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, who was toppled in the revolution of December 1989. Verging on a parody, the story of the hunt is an authentic document of the Ceausescu dictatorship, a lesson on the technique of maintaining power. The account first appeared in the German newspaper Die Zeit *and was translated into English by* The World Paper.*]*

October 10, 1984

2 A.M.: The director of the zoo in Marosvasarhely is awakened by the telephone. The secretary of the district party council gives him brief instructions: The director is to dress immediately and report to work.

Two members of the secret police are waiting in front of the main building. Two large brown bears are to be delivered immediately, and with the utmost secrecy, to the representatives of the Bucharest State Circus, who have been waiting for an hour. The circus people tranquilize, tie and load the bears by wheelbarrow into the special truck. They take off.

4 A.M.: The car stops in a small clearing. The soldier-like prison guards curse as they struggle with the bears. The animals, foaming at the mouth, are thrown to the ground and, still tied, bite into the dew-covered grass.

A veterinarian rushes to examine them and nods with satisfaction; the bears, muzzled to prevent them from eating or drinking before the hunt begins, must have already gone three or four days without food. Their jaws are locked with steel clamps, their hind legs tied to tree trunks.

8 A.M.: A dark green armed helicopter lands nearby and the special Pioneer Division perfectly camouflages the bears and the horse's body with pine branches and leaves. Eighty yards away, the Pioneers clear trees and bushes from a 20-yard radius and in a half-hour build a stand in the clearing for Ceausescu.

October 11, 1984

4 A.M.: Air surveillance, under way for 10 days now, enters Phase 2: Ceausescu's air force flies into the air space between Deda and the Goergeny Alps. Now the bravest warrior of the Carpathians can battle the bears protected by jets and attack helicopters. By the order of the Party, all industrial, trade, cultural and administrative activities halt in the town of Szasz-regen. The inhabitants - Hungarians, Romanians and Germans - are pressed to the sidewalks, soldiers in front, two rows of secret police behind. The knowing (informed) throng is silent.

The agitators stare into people's eyes, shake them and bellow at each of them, "Long live Nicolae Ceausescu, most beloved son of the Romanian people!" until each joins the cry.

5:30 P.M.: More than five hours have passed since the crowds were ordered to the streets. They stand tired, hungry, thirsty and listless.

That same hour a beet-red helicopter appears to the northeast and a commotion breaks out around the Laposnya hunting lodge. Only Comrade Ceausescu has a red helicopter! It lands on the court d'honneur in front of the castle. A man dressed as a hunter steps gracelessly from the copter - Ceausescu's double! In the twilight, uncertainty...who knows where the real Ceausescu disembarked?

The real one had flown in early that afternoon.

October 12, 1984

9 A.M.: The throng of invited guests from the Romanian Communist Party and the government, the press and the diplomatic corps, falls in place to the rhythm of a military march.

Ceausescu's arrival marks the climax. A ceremonial column is led by the secret police.
The beaters orders are to rouse the bear and direct him toward the hunting tower.

Activity in the clearing is suspect. The two bears - tranquilized again - are freed. They gradually awaken and appear in the arena unsteady and bellowing.

The keenest falcon of the Carpathians begins to take aim, first closing his right eye and then his left while his finger rests tensely on the trigger. One sharp shot, then a second loud bang. Blood spews fountain-like from the bear's chest near his heart.

The other bear, apparently sensing his end is near, bellows dangerously, attempting to escape; it seems he was able to free one of his legs.

The marksmen in the treetops are silent. They are completely satisfied with the current situation. After all, through their joint efforts they have already felled one of the bears. The collaboration went as planned; the moment Ceausescu placed his first finger on the trigger the little red LED lamps on the sharpshooters rifles' rifles lit up, and when Ceausescu squeezed, the three marksmen also fired - with silencers so that this small technical assistance could be rendered with the utmost discretion.

And so the hero of the battle at Goergeny conquered the first giant bear with only two shots. Meanwhile, the other bear is pulling at his bindings with unbelievable might. The thin steel wire little by little saws deeper into the bones of the ailing animal. One last yank at the binding and the animal is free.

The racket confuses the doomed bear and he attempts to escape. Ceausescu, up above, red in the face and shaking, lifts his weapon. His consternation is understandable; he has never had the opportunity to fire at a wild animal at such close range. And so the brave hunter fires without aiming!

The band breaks off; there is a pained silence. The bear stands frozen; he was not hit. Ceausescu throws his rifle to the ground hysterically and slams his fist on the stand's railing. He fired, so the bear must have been hit! A president does not fire a second time. The marksmen in the trees save the dramatic situation. Their dampened shots slice through the animals chest. The giant wavers a few moments in a pool of its own blood and falls.

The national anthem follows and Ceausescu, visibly pleased, waves from the stand and descends the ladder. He pauses on the first rung to lift his chest proudly and is awarded the gold medal for the best marksman in Romania in 1984.

Where Policemen Outnumber Pigeons

Mircea Dinescu, *Uncaptive Minds*, May-June-July 1989

This is an incredible country -- a country where people can't even immolate themselves publicly because of a shortage of matches, or hang themselves because of a shortage of rope. Look at Bucharest, well on its way to becoming the first European city without a single church, where policemen outnumber pigeons, and black marketers have succeeded in introducing a new kind of currency: Kent cigarettes. There's also the disease of gigantism that measures human happiness in cubic meters of concrete. It's an absurd land where the border guards point their weapons toward their own country, where wheat is harvested on television but rots in the fields, where workers are called 'proprietors' so that they can be made to buy what the Constitution says is rightfully theirs: their means of livelihood. Streetcar conductors are obliged to buy their streetcars, drillers their own drills, and peasants have to purchase the porches in their own yards....

When you go home, tell everyone that God has turned his back on Romania.

Report From Romania: Down With The Tyrant

Robert Cullen, *The New Yorker*, April 2, 1990

In bare outline, Nicolae Ceausescu's life and career closely resembled Stalin's. Like Stalin, he was born in poverty -- to a peasant family from a village called Scornicesti, about a hundred miles west of Bucharest. He received only a few years of education before, at the age of eleven, he left his family, moved to the capital, and found work as a shoemaker's apprentice. Like Stalin, he became a Communist and a revolutionary while still in his teens. The Romanian press first noticed him in 1936, when the government tried him on a charge of Communist activity, convicted him, and sentenced him to eighteen months in jail; he received an additional six months' sentence for a courtroom outburst. Like Stalin, he got his higher education from fellow revolutionaries in trouble with the law; he spent most of the time between 1936 and 1944 in jail with other Party members.

By 1947, the government was firmly in the hands of the Communists, and Ceausescu, as one of the few Romanian Communist Party members whose allegiance predated the arrival of the Soviets, was well launched on a government career. He brought certain talents to it. Ion Mihai Pacepa who served as the director of Romania's foreign-intelligence forces until 1978, when he defected, described Ceausescu as a man of "native intelligence, phenomenal memory, and iron will."

Ceausescu came to power, in 1965, and positioned himself as a reformer and a nationalist. Alone among the Warsaw Pact leaders, he publicly opposed Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Many Romanian intellectuals joined the Party in those years, and the Nixon administration singled Ceausescu out as America's favorite Eastern European leader: he was the only one it invited to the White House. But Ceausescu's devotion to liberal reforms lasted only as long as it took him to eliminate the old Stalinists in the Party who might have challenged him for power. He gained control over the military in 1969, and became president in 1974. He had accrued power so gradually at first that for years many Romanians and many outsiders who studied the country could not quite believe what he had become.

Once he had achieved power, he preserved it by means of a nepotism so rife that it assures him a special place in the annals of Communism. His brother, Ilie, became a vice-minister of defense. A second brother, Nicolae Andruta, became a lieutenant general in the security forces. A third brother, Ion, became the first vice-chairman of the state planning agency. Ceausescu's youngest child and namesake, known as Nicu, became the head of the Communist youth organization and then the Party leader in Sibiu, Transylvannia. But the most despised beneficiary of Ceausescu's nepotism was his wife, Elena. I spoke about her with Vladimir Tismaneanu, who is now a scholar at Philadelphia's Foreign Policy Research Institute. In the fifties and sixties, Tismaneanu, the son of a ranking Romanian official, attended school with Nicu Ceausescu. Mrs. Ceausescu, he remembers, behaved much as any other mother until her husband became the leader. Tismaneanu knew that things had changed when an edition of the official Romanian encyclopedia listing the year of her birth as 1917, a year before her husband's, was recalled and destroyed. "The next edition said she was born in 1919," Tismaneanu recalled, smiling. Mrs. Ceausescu then decided that she wanted a doctorate in chemistry, though she had never completed grade school. In 1967, she approached one of Romania's most respected chemists, a professor at the Polytechnic Institute of Bucharest named Costin Nenitescu, and asked him to award her one. He refused. Mrs. Ceausescu then found a more pliant professor, at a provincial university in the town of Iasi. She received her doctorate, and soon thereafter became the chairman of the National Council for Science and Technology; the Romanian media began to praise her as one of the world's most distinguished scientists. Textbooks and scientific encyclopedias were published under her guidance. The unfortunate Professor Nenitescu went into premature retirement.

Mrs. Ceausescu had meanwhile added political work to her scientific duties. She joined the Romanian Communist Party's Central Committee in 1972 and became a member of its ruling board, the Political Executive Committee, in 1974. Romania became a diarchy, and Mrs. Ceausescu was so feared that people referred to her only as She. I spoke with a man named Vasile Negrescu.

who was the director of the state's metals-trading company in the nineteen-seventies. After an earthquake demolished the company's headquarters, in 1977, Negrescu solicited relief donations from foreign companies with which he did business. He collected two million dollars for the construction of a new headquarters building and deposited it in the state bank. One day, ready to begin the project, he called the bank's director about withdrawing the funds. The money was no longer there, the banker said, because "She took it." Negrescu knew precisely whom he meant, and he knew there was nothing that either of them could do about it.

Romania is a fertile land, and only gross mismanagement could drive it to abject poverty. The Ceausescus provided just that. In the early years of the regime, Romania borrowed deeply from abroad to build heavy industry -- particularly petrochemical factories, which would rely on imported oil. But world oil prices soared, and there was little demand for Romania's industrial production. Ceausescu then determined that repayment of the debt would be the nation's highest priority, lest it fall under the influence of foreign creditors. To accomplish this, he squeezed the consumer sector unmercifully, shipping much of the country's food abroad. In April of last year, the government triumphantly announced that the debt had been paid, but no improvement in consumer supplies followed. The stores in Bucharest last summer offered some peas and pickles in jars and a little flour; at the butchers' counters, people could buy pigs' heads and pigs' knuckles, but there was no sign of any of the intermediate parts of the animal.

While Ceausescu was paying off the debt, he was also pouring resources into a demolition-and-construction program he called "systemization." When he announced the program, in 1974, it struck many Romanians as a benign version of urban renewal. But over the years Ceausescu transformed it. Had he completed his "systemization," it would have razed the majority of the nations thirteen thousand rural villages, because villages with populations of less than two thousand people were deemed "economically unviable," and the populations would have been transferred to apartment blocks in designated agro-industrial centers. In the towns and cities the program would have razed more than ninety per cent of existing housing, along with dozens of churches, and replaced them with concrete apartment blocks. As it happened, Ceausescu had neither the time nor the money to "systemize" the entire country, but his program still destroyed thousands of urban homes and a handful of villages.

Ceausescu had a purpose in all this destruction. "He truly believed in the Soviet model of the ninteen-thirties -- in building a new society," a Romanian historian named Dinu Giurescu, who now lives in this country, told me last year. "If you want to have this type of society, you need a totally new type of human being -- a being who will willingly, cheerfully, and diligently carry out all the orders given by the leadership. To have such an individual, you must create a new environment for him. If you allow this individual to be on his own, to have personal reactions, then he will oppose this new society, because that's human nature. But if the individual is totally dependent on the collective from his birth to his exit, then he will react according to the will of the collective."

The Ceausescus ordered the clearance of a swath of land in the center of Bucharest about three miles long and a quarter of a mile wide for the centerpiece of systematization, which they called the Boulevard of the Victory of Socialism. Roger Kirk, the American Ambassador to Bucharest at the time of the demolition, estimated that at least forty thousand people lost their homes; some of Romania's oldest churches and monasteries were either destroyed or moved. The new boulevard runs die-straight across the belly of the city, flanked by parallel rows of nearly identical white ten-story apartment buildings, ornamented with balconies and columns. The boulevard is about ninety yards wide -- wider, Ceausescu's architects liked to boast, than the Champs-Elysees. At its west end looms a new House of the People, on which construction started in 1986, and which covers as much ground space as the United States Capitol, and has about a thousand rooms, many of them the size of respectable college gymnasiums. The interior decor features white marble, enormous columns, and gilt. According to Lieutenant Colonel Mihai Evores, an Army officer, who showed reporters around the nearly completed building in January, Ceausescu dropped by two or three times a week to supervise the construction, and on almost every visit he ordered design changes. "He changed the scale or the materials of the staircase in the south foyer twelve times," Evores said.

In Eastern Europe, urban design has always been inseparable from politics. The careful preservation or reconstruction of old and venerable parts of Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw were statements of respect for national heritage and an asser-

tion that the values of the past have not been lost. The Boulevard of the Victory of Socialism makes a statement that deliberately belittles the contributions of vanished generations, and claims the Ceausescu era to be a gigantic, irreversible stride forward. Few urban landscapes in the world equal its scale. In fact, its only true rival may be an avenue that existed solely as an architect's model: the grand avenue that Adolph Hitler planned for Berlin.

The Ceausescus demanded and received constant public veneration. I visited Bucharest last summer, a few days before the principal national holiday -- August.23rd, which celebrates the 1944 anti-German coup. Walking around the city in the late afternoon, I often came to wooden police barricades blocking off a few streets. Beyond the barricades were throngs of people rehearsing for the big holiday parade -- practicing chants, and waving poles bearing signs and portraits. Afterward, they would stream past the barricades with their poles slung over their shoulders like miners' shovels. One common slogan, in white letters on a red banner, read "1965-1989. THE ERA OF NICOLAE CEAUSESCU. THE GOLDEN ERA." The portraits were all of Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu. Recent photographs of Ceausescu show a man with gray hair, a deeply lined face, and suspicious, hawklike eyes. The ubiquitous official portrait, however, depicted him as he perhaps looked years ago -- with a bushy brown pompadour, smooth cheeks, and a kindly smile playing the full pink lips.

Few in Bucharest could escape that face as the holiday approached. Romania has one television channel, which at that time broadcast for three hours each evening. I caught most of the program on August 22nd. The newscast led with a long report on a reception at which the two Ceausescus clinked glasses with the diplomatic corps. A report on counties that had overfulfilled their production plans in honor of the holiday was next, and that completed the news. Then came a musical hour. A choir massed under Ceausescu's portrait sang a long hymn in praise of the nation's leader. The music was followed by a documentary film about the achievements of the Romanian economy, which consisted principally of clips showing the Ceausescus snipping ribbons, inspecting dams and factories, and greeting happy workers, who were carrying the official portraits.

The next day, cheers and chants and the sound of marching feet awakened me shortly after dawn. From my hotel window I could see marchers in phalanxes of several hundred moving through the streets below, and I went downstairs to follow them. The paraders, carrying icons and their banners, filed through sleepy, quiet neighborhoods toward Strada Berzei, the starting point for the parade. Middle-aged men in tan suits escorted them. Once in a while, one of the escorts would give a signal, and his group would practice a chant: "Ceau-ses-cu, Er-o-ism! Ro-ma-ni-a, Com-munism!" Many groups wore costumes; there were girls in diaphanous white dresses, dancers in colorfully embroidered peasant clothes with cockaded hats, and wiry young athletes in bright-red shirts, red sweatpants, and red caps. As the paraders neared Strada Berzei, they bunched up, stopped, and waited. Some draped their filmy red banners on the curb or the pavement and sat on them, to protect their costumes. Some propped themselves against lampposts and smoked or chewed sunflower seeds. Here and there, a man in a suit walked through a group with pen and paper, and wrote down names. Parade participation was an obligation that rotated among the staff members of every factory and office. The leaders of each workplace Party cell designated the appropriate number of marchers and made sure they attended.

At the head of the line, on Strada Berzei, was a cordon of policemen. Behind them I could see the military segment of the parade. Dark-green tanks, mobile anti-aircraft guns, and trucks filled with troops waited on the cobblestones while engines idled, filling the air with exhaust fumes. I wanted to walk farther, to get ahead of the parade and watch it go past, but the policemen stopped me. Only people with special passes could stand along the line of march, a policeman explained. The parade, it turned out, was only three blocks long, and went past a temporary reviewing stand in front of a museum under construction on Strada Stirbei Voda. Only invited diplomats, selected officials, and the Ceausescus watched it in person. The rest of the nation could see it on television. I turned around and headed back to my hotel. Along the way, I passed a line of people at a sidewalk table where someone was selling butter. It was the only spontaneous crowd I saw that day.

On television, the parade made an impressive spectacle. A military band, standing in formation across the avenue from the reviewing stand, provided background music. Legions of chanting workers marched past the cameras, their faces almost obscured by the forest of Ceausescu por-

traits and banners. The girls in white dresses pirouetted prettily. As they passed the reviewing stand, the young men in the special red costumes broke ranks and regrouped to spell "C-E-A-U-S-E--S-C-U" in precise block letters. Then they formed the Roman numerals -- "IX, X, XI, XII, XIII" -- that designated the Party congresses over which Ceausescu had presided. The cameras panned often to the reviewing stand, where the Ceausescus stood, smiling and waving -- she in a white dress, he in a dark suit. In contrast to the custom at Soviet parades, where the Party leadership lines up on top of the Lenin Mausoleum in political pecking order, the Ceausescus stood in regal isolation. There would be no pictures the next day that analysts might use to spot a potential successor.

When the last marcher had passed, soldiers rolled out a red carpet from the reviewing stand to the street. A single black car drove up, and the Ceausescus walked to it, side by side. At the curb, a dozen or so schoolchildren in red neckerchiefs lined up with bouquets of flowers in hand. One by one, they stepped up to one or the other of the Ceausescus and presented their bouquets. Ceausescu accepted them with practiced ease, taking a bouquet in his right hand, embracing the child with his left, and kissing a proffered young cheek. As he kissed, the right arm swung out toward a aide, standing just out of the camera's view. The flowers disappeared, the arm swung back and Ceausescu was ready to greet another youngster. The ritual consumed but a moment or two. Then, with a final smile and wave, the Ceausescus got into the back seat of the car and were driven away. They looked proud and happy.

Ceausescu professed to believe that carefully orchestrated ceremonies represented the adulation of a prosperous and grateful people. Two years ago, in a meeting with John C. Whitehead, the Reagan Administration's Deputy Secretary of State, he complained about an American newspaper article that portrayed him as unpopular. "I'm extremely popular," he said. "I have evidence of it every day. Every time I make a speech, people rise and applaud." He also upbraided Whitehead for a reference that President Reagan had made to Romania's economic difficulties, and asked whether the President knew that Romanians' per capita income had been rising steadily for eight years. Whitehead concluded that Ceausescu must have surrounded himself with sycophants who made up statistics to please him.

Whether or not he truly believed that his people loved him, Ceausescu, as he aged, displayed acute fears of poisoning and germs. He had radiation detectors installed in his offices and residences, and employed special bodyguards to taste all his food before he ate it. Immediately after duty required him to shake the hand of a stranger, he washed his right hand in alcohol. On a journalists' tour of Ceausescu's Bucharest residence after the revolution, I found among some papers strewn on a coffee table in the entrance hall a document from a hospital laboratory certifying that a case of cooking oil sent to the residence's kitchen had been tested and found free of contaminants. A Bucharest physician I spoke with told me that all the children who presented the Ceausescus with flowers were selected in advance, sent to hospitals, examined, and certified free of infection before they were permitted to profer their cheeks for his kiss.

Ceausescu created a vast security apparatus to protect his regime. It is estimated that by the end of the seventies three million people -- out of a total population of twenty-three million -- worked or informed for the Securitate. The Securitate maintained a collection of handwriting samples from sixty per cent of the population. Anyone with a typewriter had to register it. Mail and telephones were routinely monitored. As a result, anyone tempted to send a letter to, say, Amnesty International had to assume he would be caught. An unpublished law, Decree 408, required Romanians to report to the police any contacts they had with foreigners. A physician in the provincial city of Medias told me about some of the equipment found in the Securitate headquarters there after the revolution. On the ground floor was a bank of electronic equipment that could tap, and record conversations from, any telephone in the city. In the basement was a chamber with an operating table, a device for electroshock, and various instruments for torture, including needles and a vise. In a bag secreted in a wall were files listing the sexual specialties of several dozen women, who were being blackmailed and forced to ensnare others. Until December, the vast majority of the Romanian people feared the Securitate and submitted weakly to its control.

A handful of people did not. But the regime had a method -- similar to the South African practice of banning -- of silencing people without creating the kinds of martyrs to human rights that might have attracted condemnation from outside the country. In the fall of 1988, Silviu Bru-

can, a seventy-two-year-old Communist who had once edited the Party newspaper, composed a letter criticizing nearly every aspect of Ceausescu's rule; operating quietly and secretly, he got five other aging former members of the elite to agree to its contents and managed to smuggle a copy out of the country, and it was published early in 1989. After interrogating Brucan, the Securitate forced him to move to a two-room cottage in the village of Damaroaia, outside Bucharest. Police erected a spotlight to illuminate his doorway day and night, and prevented him from receiving visitors or leaving the village.

Occasionally, foreign journalists would manage to meet and interview dissidents. In early 1989, a poet named Mircea Dinescu told a reporter for *Liberation* that God had turned his face away from Romania. The Party expelled him, and he lost his job on the editorial board of a literary magazine. Securitate agents showed up on the street in front of his house and stood guard, putting him under the same kind of house arrest that Brucan suffered. Last August, I called on a dissident physicist named Gabriel Andreescu at his apartment in southern Bucharest. For eight years, Andreescu had quietly struggled against the regime, principally by smuggling out letters and essays of protest to Western human-rights groups. For almost as long, the regime had tried to intimidate him. He had spent a month in prison in 1988, and the police had recently threatened to commit him to a mental institution unless he emigrated or abandoned his political activities. I dropped in on him uninvited, and he hesitated before agreeing to an interview. Once committed, however, he responded in earnest when I asked why Romania, in contrast to countries like Poland and Hungary, had never developed more than an atomized dissident movement. Partly, he said, it was the country's history and tradition; its people had been conditioned to submit during the centuries of Ottoman rule, and neither the pre-Communist Romanian aristocracy nor the Communist regime had done much to change that. And partly, he went on, it was the efficiency of the Securitate. No Communist country had developed a dissident movement under conditions of unbridled Stalinism. As if to demonstrate the veracity of the latter point, Securitate agents arrested me as I left Andreescu's apartment, and expelled me from the country within hours. They summoned Andreescu for several days of interrogation, and after he refused once again to emigrate they exiled him to a small town called Buzau, where no foreigners were likely to encounter him.

A poet named Dan Desliu had left Romania in 1987 to live in Canada with his wife, a pianist who had defected during a foreign tour. Then he decided that in the years left to him he wanted to oppose the regime in his native country. Desliu, who was then sixty-one, returned to Bucharest in 1988 and got an open letter published abroad in the spring of 1989. He suffered three months of house arrest. Thereafter, the Securitate summoned him periodically for further interrogation and intimidation. At the last of these sessions, on December 12th, his interrogator mocked the country's handful of dissidents. "Can't you see that in our country everything is silent?" the interrogator asked. "Nothing is moving and nothing will ever move."

On Sunday, December 17th, after two days of rioting in Timisoara, Ceausescu convened a meeting of the Political Executive Committee of the Romanian Communist Party. According to a transcript that was published some three weeks later by the newspaper *Romania Libera*, there was a telecommunications hookup from the meeting room in Bucharest to remote sites where some of his generals and security men were monitoring events. In the transcript, Ceausescu demanded to know why the military had yet to open fire on the Timisoara demonstrators. "Why didn't they shoot?" he asked Defense Minister Vasile Milea. "They should have shot to put them on the ground, to warn them -- shot them in the legs." Apparently addressing his own commanders on the scene, Ceausescu said, "Everybody who doesn't submit to the soldiers -- I've given the order to shoot. They'll get a warning, and if they don't submit, they'll have to be shot. It was a mistake to turn the other cheek....In an hour, order should be reestablished in Timisoara."

Ceausescu left shortly afterward for a previously planned three-day visit to Iran, apparently unaware of how fragile his situation had become. His support in the Romanian army had been eroding for years.

But the regime had other forces at its disposal -- troops of the Ministry of the Interior, and Securitate agents trained for combat. On Sunday, December 17th, thousands of Timisoara demonstrators moved through the city. Many broke into bookstores, tore apart displays of books by and about the Ceausescus, and set them afire on the pavement. A large group gathered outside the gray granite Communist Party headquarters, on the

broad Boulevard of August 23rd. The Prime Minister, Constantin Dascalescu, who had been sent from Bucharest to restore order, appeared on a balcony along with the local Party leader, and both officials told the crowd to go home. The crowd booed, and more cries of "Down with Ceausescu!" rang out. The officials withdrew, and the demonstrators, emboldened, broke into the building, tore portraits of Ceausescu from the walls, and hurled them through the windows. They broke into a storeroom and found cases of such delicacies as coffee and salami, which the party had been hoarding. These were liberated. A fire truck came to the scene, presumably to disperse the crowd by spraying it with fire hoses. The crowd seized the truck and burned it. At that point, according to Sandor Bicsok, armed men in civilian clothes opened fire; he presumed that they were Securitate agents.

The shooting spread to other quarters of the city on Sunday night, in what Timisoarans came to call "the massacre." Exactly how many people died will never be known. Some witnesses said that Securitate agents in trucks picked up bodies and hauled them away to prevent a complete count. The city hospital, I was told, counted a hundred and ten dead before its list of victims was confiscated by the Securitate. However, reports that thousands of people died in Timisoara, and tens of thousands in the rest of the country in the ensuing week, were doubtless exaggerated, by people who could not believe that a regime so feared could fall without taking an enormous amount of victims with it. A month after the events, the new government announced a revised national count of six hundred and eighty-nine dead -- a figure that seems creditable.

The confrontation in Timisoara continued for three more days, with government forces either unable or unwilling to kill enough of the city's three hundred and fifty thousand people to end the uprising. Gradually, power began to swing to the demonstrators. On December 20th, the rebellion gained control of one of the city's largest factories, a petrochemical plant called Solventul, and threatened to burn it down unless all prisoners in the city jail were released. The Securitate let the prisoners go. More important, the rest of Romania began to hear about the events in Timisoara. Most people in Bucharest told me that they had first learned about what was going on by listening to the BBC or Radio Free Europe on December 18th. Some of the Timisoarans themselves, afraid that they would be isolated and crushed if their revolt failed to spread, began telling friends about it in carefully veiled phone calls: "There is a big storm, and the sky is red."

Ceausescu returned to Bucharest on December 20th, and immediately addressed the nation on television. Anyone who expected him to be conciliatory was disappointed. He called the Timisoara demonstrators "a few group[s] of hooligan elements," and said, "On the basis of data available so far, one can say with full conviction that these actions of a terrorist nature were organized and unleashed in close connection with reactionary, imperialist, irredentist, chauvinist circles, and foreign espionage services in various foreign countries." He scheduled a demonstration of support for the regime the following day, in the square in front of the Central Committee building. The Party apparatus got to work organizing a crowd and handing out the usual banners and portraits.

As the rally began, it appeared that the regime would once again be able to demonstrate that the people were, if not loyal, at least docile. Ceausescu, wearing a black fur hat, stepped out onto the second-story balcony. Mrs. Ceausescu and members of the Political Executive Committee flanked him. A crowd of several thousand people had assembled, under a thicket of banners and portraits. "To begin with, I would like to extend to you...warm revolutionary greetings," Ceausescu said, with unintended irony. Cheers and chants of "Ceausescu! Romania!" answered him.

A lamppost wobbled, and its lamp fell to the ground, shattering with a loud crash. The woman standing next to it shrieked. Immediately, the people around her assumed that she had been shot by the Securitate. Someone shouted "Timisoara! Timisoara!" to suggest that another massacre had begun. Some young people at the edge of the crowd chose that moment to unfurl a homemade banner they had secretly been carrying: "DOWN WITH CEAUSESCU." Other people began to run away.

The noise and confusion seemed to startle Ceausescu. He stopped speaking and waved his arms. "What! No, no...Hello, hello," he said, apparently thinking that something was wrong with the microphone. He looked, for a moment, old, bewildered, and vulnerable. Mrs. Ceausescu stepped to the microphone and called for silence. The confusion lasted for three minutes, during which Romanian television interrupted the broadcast and played a patriotic song. Then Ceausescu

resumed his speech, which offered to raise pensions and the minimum wage. There were even a few obedient cheers and chants from the front of the crowd. But the damage to the regime had been done. The shrieks and the confusion, combined with the interruption of the broadcast, had produced a moment of weakness, and that, in turn, had punctured irreparably the notion that the people of Bucharest would once again submit weakly to Ceausescus' rule.

The center of the turmoil was the university, a few blocks from the Central Committee building. There was ironic justice in this. In 1968, Ceausescu had decided that Romania needed a bigger population to fulfill his plans, and had issued a decree banning abortions. For a few years, the birth rate in the country shot up, until women found alternative, albeit often crude and dangerous, forms of birth control. The children born in the late sixties and early seventies were called "decree babies," and, because nothing else in society expanded with the birth rate, they had always been particularly deprived. There were never enough shoes, or toys, or classroom space for them. Decree babies at the university made up a good part of the crowd in the streets of the capital that day, and decree babies were the Army conscripts on whom the fate of Ceausescu now depended.

The regime responded hesitantly and ineffectually to the turmoil in the streets. Around the country, the Securitate rounded up dissidents but not all. Tanks and armored personnel carriers patrolled the streets out did not control them. Some soldiers received orders to fire, and shot into the air. Others, possibly Securitate agents, wounded and killed demonstrators. Some fired tear gas. Some used fire hoses to try to disperse the crowds. But the regime's ability to intimidate had vanished, perhaps because of Ceausescu's display of weakness, because of the people's knowledge of what had happened elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and because of an exhilarating sense that Romanians were finally standing up and asserting themselves after decades of humiliation.

Ceausescu's downfall came the next morning. He made a final effort to speak to the angry crowds from the balcony of the Central Committee building. The people booed and, according to one witness, threw things at him including potatoes and shoes. He retreated inside the building and again ordered the Army to fire on the crowds. What happened next was that the Minister of Defense, Vasile Milea, was shot. His death was announced as a traitor's suicide, and a later account by the military confirmed that Milea had shot himself rather than carry out his orders. Many Romanians nevertheless believed that Ceausescu had ordered Milea's summary execution. However it occurred, Milea's death did not bend the Army to Ceausescu's will. By that time, many of the soldiers and junior officers had defected to the crowds in the streets. A crowd surged against the Central Committee building and began to break in. Ceausescu, his wife, and some of his entourage went to a landing pad on the roof, squeezed into a helicopter, and fled the city.

At the Central Committee building, meanwhile, power seemingly lay for a moment on the littered floor, available to whoever had the wit and determination to grab it. I spoke with a witness to all of the events in the building, Valentin Gabrielescu, who had been an officer in the Romanian Army during the Second World War and afterward had joined the National Peasants' Party. He was in the square when Ceausescu's helicopter took off, and he entered the building a few minutes later. In the confusion, Gabrielescu recalled, no one seemed to be in charge. Prime Minister Dascalescu came out onto the balcony and announced that Ceausescu's government had been dismissed. According to a later newspaper account, there was a short-lived effort by a member of Ceausescu's Political Executive Board, Ilie Verdet, to form a successor government. About an hour later, Ion Iliescu arrived...

The Romanian junta's familiar look.

NEW MASKS, OLD FACES

By Vladimir Tismaneanu

Revolutions tend to be drawn in black and white. The revolutionaries, naturally enough, tend to romanticize their rebellion's roots, to idealize their victory, and to demonize their enemies. This alone does not make the revolutionaries liars or their revolutions illegitimate. A stylization of history can be essentially true without being true to every detail. But it also can be essentially false, and that is the danger looming in Romania today: that the lineaments of revolutionary change will be used to disguise ideological continuity.

Questions about what is true and false in the story of Romania's revolution begin with the execution of the Ceausescus. As the story is told, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu fled Bucharest by helicopter just after noon on December 22. They were captured by the army later that day. The new government, facing fierce resistance from pro-Ceausescu forces, felt it could not risk a fair (and inevitably prolonged) trial. As long as the dictator and his wife remained alive, their followers might somehow manage to spring them and use them as a rallying point. Hence the quick Christmas executions, a mere acceleration of a certain conclusion. Of course it would have been gratifying to see the Ceausescus on trial, Nuremberg-fashion, their crimes detailed before the world. But circumstances in Bucharest, the new leaders claimed, were too volatile to allow such an approach.

Many Romanian intellectuals think the best solution would have been to skip a trial, with its predetermined outcome, and simply kill the Ceausescus on the spot. Why offer them a chance to defend themselves against the irrefutable? Moreover, as the tape of the trial shows, theirs was a trial in name only. The faces of the prosecutors remain invisible, their names secret. In this sense Romania's new leaders chose the worst of all alternatives: tyrannicide pretending to be law. By attempting to keep the revolution pure, they sullied it.

Such, at any rate, are the various versions of the accepted story. But could there have been more to the regime's action? Did those who ordered Ceausescu killed have a personal interest in his quick and private death? Who are these people who constitute the new regime? And are they using the myth of revolutionary justice and military expediency to hide other motives?

To answer these questions, we must understand the nature of the revolutionary upheaval in Romania. On the one hand, there was undoubtedly a spontaneous revolt from below, the first successful plebeian revolution in the Soviet empire. On the other hand, it seems, there did exist an intra-Party conspiracy, long prepared by disenchanted cadres from the government and the military bureaucracies. This movement was directed narrowly at the Ceausescus and their camarilla. The Party bureaucrats, inspired by Mikhail Gorbachev's reform from above, wanted to humanize socialism, not replace it. By contrast, the grass-roots activists, particularly the student leaders, wanted to dismantle the Communist order and establish a Western-style democracy.

At the moment, judging from the composition of the Council of the National Salvation Front now in control, the Party faction seems to be winning out. Its president, Ion Iliescu, is a seasoned Party apparatchik. Born to a longtime Communist family, he studied in Moscow in the early 1950s, where he socialized with Gorbachev, then a Komsomol leader at Moscow University. In 1956, as chairman of the Romanian Students' Association, Iliescu participated in repressive campaigns against students who expressed their solidarity with the Hungarian revolution. Later he became the leader of the Romanian Communist Youth Union (UTC) and ingratiated himself with Ceausescu to the extent that in early 1971 he became the Party secretary in charge of ideology. True, he refused to abide all of Ceausescu's whims and was gradually marginalized. But his participation in Party activities continued. At the 12th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in 1979, Iliescu was elected a member of the Central Committee, serving as chief of the Party organization in Iasi. In the 1980s he was appointed chairman of the State Committee for Waters and later director of the Technical Publishing House in Bucharest. Until December 22, 1989, Iliescu did not make any public disavowal of the regime or its leader.

The National Salvation Front chose Virgil Magureanu to read its first communiqué on Romanian television. Magureanu is a professor at the Party academy who for

VLADIMIR TISMANEANU, a resident scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, left Romania in 1981. He is now completing a history of Romanian communism.

the past 15 years has taught scientific socialism, which in Romania meant Ceausescu Thought. The secretary of the NSF Council is Marian Dan, Iliescu's short-lived successor as head of the UTC and former propaganda boss of the Bucharest Communist Party organization. His area of expertise is also scientific socialism.

The first deputy chairman of the NSF Council is Dumitru Mazilu, who in the 1970s served as the commander of the security police school in Baneasa, a township just outside Bucharest. Mazilu held the rank of a Securitate colonel and was one of Ceausescu's speechwriters for more than a decade. He broke with the dictatorship two years ago, when he smuggled out of Romania a report for the United Nations Youth Commission on human rights violations. Placed under house arrest, Mazilu resurfaced immediately after Ceausescu's escape from Bucharest on December 22. On January 12 Mazilu was acclaimed by a Bucharest mob as he histrionically chanted, "Death to Communism." On January 13 the newspaper *Romania Libera* published Mazilu's true biography, including his tenebrous links with the hated Securitate. Friends of mine who have formed the pro-Western, pluralistic Group for Social Dialogue indicate that many Romanians have misgivings about Mazilu's "Bonapartist" ambitions. Indeed, some intellectuals wonder whether his hysterical performance before the mob was a sign of mental illness, or simply a continuation of his role as a provocateur in Securitate.

The chairman of the commission dealing with international relations is Silviu Brucan, a Party veteran whose dissident record indicates Gorbachevite sympathies. In the 1950s Brucan served as the acting editor of *Scinteia*, the Communist Party's official daily. In the 1970s, with Ceausescu's permission, he published a number of books in the United States (by Praeger Publishers in New York), in which, not surprisingly, he refrained from any criticism of the regime's abysmal human rights record. Even in his latest book, *World*

Street Theater

BUCHAREST

"*Astazi e Craciun, nu mai e nebun*" went the chant. "Today is Christmas, the madman's gone."

The fighting was over in most of the city by the fifth day of the revolution. The Palace Square in front of the former Central Committee building smelled of wet ashes from burned-out buildings. The tanks still had their engines running, but the soldiers, in helmets and long heavy coats reminiscent of World War I, were carelessly walking around accepting food and cigarettes from the people. In the streets and squares thin orange candles stuck in pieces of bread burned to commemorate the dead, a Romanian tradition.

On day six, almost overnight, the task of rebuilding began. In the town center teams of architects assessed the damage. Trucks took away cars flattened by charging tanks. Window glass was replaced. People returned to houses they had evacuated under fire; white flags still hung above the doorsteps.

Inside the TV studios, the National Salvation Front broadcast appeals for calm, declarations of intentions, messages of support from all over the country and from abroad, and reassurances about the city's tap water (it was not contaminated). The broadcasts, at first spontaneous, even chaotic, quickly took shape. The messages of support gave way to communiqués and decrees. At the same time formerly forbidden videotapes of Tina Turner and Michael Jackson were introduced. On December 28 came the first full-length film: *The Great Dictator* (1940), with Charlie Chaplin playing the merciless ruler of a country called Tomania.

The newspapers also changed dramatically—if only because the "he" whose speeches and schedule used to occupy 80 percent of the news hole was no more. Several new dailies appeared, such as the evening *Libertatea* and *Tineretul Liber* (Free Youth). *Romania Libera* didn't bother to change its already apt title, but it took off the logo "Workers of the World, Unite" and started trying to live up to its name.

The previous Communist Party organ *Scinteia* (Spark) underwent a strange mutation. In the first days of the fighting the word "*Poporului*" (of the people) was added to the title; then the whole thing was changed to *Adevarul*, which means truth. There is a telling precedent to this mutation: Lenin's first newspaper was called *Iskra* (Spark), later to be renamed *Pravda* (Truth).

Adevarul is now a "sociopolitical independent daily." Some 90 percent of its editors are from *Scinteia*, and it is produced in the "Casa Scinteia," a frightful Stalinist wedding-cake of a building in the style of Moscow University. Dumitru Tinu, now deputy editor, told me that "there is no continuation" between the two papers. "The overzealous supporters of Ceausescu simply stopped coming to work, but the majority of us stayed," he said. He saw nothing strange in the fact that the same people who used to praise the "Falcon of the Carpathians" are now eagerly denouncing the vicious tyrant.

For the first two weeks after the revolution, the newspaper's attention was divided between reproducing the decrees, programs, and agendas of the National Salvation Front (in perfectly wooden language); printing formerly forbidden materials (text of the Helsinki agreements, basic facts about Amnesty International, installments from *Red Horizons*, a book by a Securitate defector); and denouncing the Ceausescu clan (a half-page reproduction of Elena's grades when she was ten years old showing that she failed every subject but music, sports, and manual work; a huge document from Ceausescu's son's divorce; numerous photographs of Nicolae's sumptuous palaces).

Trying to make sense of political life by following the press was confusing. Take the formation of the new government: the names of the prime minister, his deputy, and the defense minister were announced nine days before the publication of a decree-law of the National Salvation Front Council that stated: "Romania's government is set up as the supreme body of state administration." How supreme it is was explained in the decree: the council appoints the prime minister, who then proposes the Cabinet that has to be approved by the council. Oh yes, and all decisions of the government can be annulled by the Front if they are considered "contrary to the interests of

Socialism at the Crossroads (1987), Brucan did not directly challenge the disastrous course of Romanian communism. His official break with Ceausescu occurred in November 1987, when he issued a warning against the use of violence to stop working-class unrest in Brasov. Later, in March 1989, he was instrumental in convincing five other Party veterans to sign a letter condemning the president's economic and social policies.

The foreign minister, Sergiu Celac, was until 1978 Ceausescu's personal interpreter for Russian and English, a position that was the equivalent of a directorial office in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Celac—a personal friend not only of the new president but also of Stefan Andrei, Ceausescu's long-time foreign minister and until the revolution one of the dictator's closest associates—kept a low profile as an editor of the Scientific Publishing House in Bucharest.

As for the new prime minister, the 43-year-old Petre Roman is a symbol of the "new look" of Romanian communism. Born to a high-ranking *nomenklatura* family, he is the son of the late Valter Roman, a Spanish Civil War and Comintern veteran who, until his death in 1983, was a member of Ceausescu's Central Committee and the director of the Communist Party's publishing house. Petre Roman, who got his Ph.D. from the University of Toulouse in France, is a professor of hydraulic engineering at the Polytechnical Institute in Bucharest. Until December he was an uncritical member of the Romanian Communist Party.

That any one of these former apparatchiks and technocrats should try to return to Romania's post-revolutionary government is perhaps understandable. But that this particular group should come back jointly, to such high positions, is worrisome. Celac and Roman graduated from the same elite Russian high school in Bucharest, and through the years visited frequently with both Iliescu and Brucan. All of these men have belonged to an informal discussion group on the impact

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the Romanian people."

The obvious next question is the legitimacy of the Front itself. In an interview with Silviu Brucan, a leading member of the council and éminence grise of the new regime, I asked about the mechanisms inside the Front that will prevent it from turning into another dictatorship.

A. The only guarantee I can think of is the development of pluralism inside the Front and outside the Front.

Q. But you are the ones who are setting the rules of the game.

A. That's the product of the revolution.

Q. Yes, but there was no agreement made. Some people just found themselves in the TV studio and became members of the Front, in an ad hoc way.

A. Yes, it's an ad hoc body, but we did it. That's our legitimacy, that we did it.

Q. Does the fact that you fought against a dictator by itself give you legitimacy?

A. Oh yes, the fact that we were the only ones who deposed Ceausescu gives us legitimacy. We could have taken advantage of that. We didn't have to have elections.

Q. But you said yourself that the youth, the students, demanded elections. You have to respect their will.

A. Well, we could reach an agreement with them . . .

Q. But then you would not govern as a legitimate government, you would remain provisional . . .

A. Well, we could manage if we wanted, with such popular measures as food, heating, electricity. Those are much more persuasive arguments than this kind of democratic pluralism. We won because we want real democracy, and we want it because in a modern society there is no other way.

A week after Brucan spoke to me about the Front's legitimacy, the street replied. On Friday, January 12, declared a national day of mourning by the Front, some 3,000 people demonstrated in Bucharest outside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs building, the Front's headquarters. They chanted, "Down with communism!" "Death for death!" "Who elected them?" "What is the Front hiding?" And: "Down with Brucan!" The demonstration went on for more than 12 hours, which is very impressive in freezing weather and in a country where for decades there was not a single unofficial public meeting.

That evening the president of the Front, Ion Iliescu, the first deputy chairman, Dumitru Mazilu, and the prime minister, Petre Roman, tried to have a dialogue with the crowd while standing on a tank outside the ministry. Iliescu was asked to explain his activity during the past five years (which he did); Mazilu was asked the same (which he didn't).

Late at night the three men appeared in the window of the ministry and announced concessions to the demonstrators by issuing three decrees: calling a national referendum on reinstituting the death penalty, which the Front had abolished two weeks earlier; outlawing the Communist Party; and forming a special commission to deal with complaints of those who suffered under the Ceausescu dictatorship.

The next day's press reaction was the first sign that not all is quiet on the Front front. *România Libera* strongly accused Mazilu of manipulating the crowd and asked that he step down. That same evening during a TV broadcast the three men from the tank declared almost in unison that they should not have given in to the crowd, and they annulled the 18-hour-old decree that outlawed the Communist Party. (Its fate is to be decided by a national referendum.)

In early December Corneliu Bogdan, who had been ambassador to the United States from 1967 to '77, returned to Romania after a fellowship at the Smithsonian Institution's Wilson Center. In late December he took office as deputy foreign minister, but died of a heart attack days later. In a meeting shortly before his death, I asked him the same question that I put to Brucan about the Front and a system of checks and balances. Without hesitating, he said that the watchdog is the street. He didn't know how quickly events would confirm his words.

ANNA HUSARSKA

Anna Husarska is a foreign editor at the Polish independent daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*.

of the scientific revolution on contemporary socialism, run by Roman's father and by Mihai Draganescu, a Party technocrat who is now the deputy prime minister.

In one of Iliescu's first interviews, he went out of his way on French television to distinguish the Romanian revolution from the other movements in Eastern Europe. Romania's, he said, was a spontaneous anti-dictatorial outburst, involving no Party faction or plot. But then a videotape was smuggled out of Romania and broadcast on French TV. Clandestinely filmed during the first NSF Council meeting, it showed the new defense minister, Col. Gen. Nicolae Militaru—a man with well-known pro-Soviet leanings—mentioning the existence of this organization for the past six months. When confronted with this embarrassing document, the usually soft-spoken Petre Roman lost his temper and accused the foreign media of slandering the new regime.

But why should these people refuse to acknowledge that a conspiracy existed? Would that not establish their revolutionary bona fides? Why do they need the myth of an unorganized revolt? The likely answer is that they need anti-Communist camouflage. If they admit that a Party plot existed, then their sudden appearance at the balcony of the well-guarded Central Committee building in Bucharest's Palace Square on December 22, 1989, might begin to look more like a pre-emptive Party coup against the people's revolution than the fulfillment of that revolution.

The composition of their NSF Council might come under greater scrutiny as well, with Romanians objecting that former apparatchiks hold most of the key positions while true opponents of the Communist regime have been assigned to largely ceremonial posts. And, finally, Ceausescu's execution might appear not only as a tyrannicide but also as a method of silencing him.

I confess I have a personal reason for believing in this darker version of Romania's revolution. In 1980 I was walking in a Bucharest park with a professor from the Party academy, a man now closely linked to the ruling team. Assuming a confidential voice, he whispered to me: "We are a group that will soon get rid of the Ceausescu tribe." At the time, knowing the man and his institution, I suspected a provocation. But apparently he was telling the truth. There did exist a group who wished to supplant the ruling tyrant and establish their own oligarchy. They did not want to topple state socialism, only to rationalize it. As practitioners of realpolitik, they walked the Byzantine corridors of power, cultivated the narcissistic ego of the general secretary, and waited for their hour to come.

Now it has come. They left it to the students, the workers, the soldiers, and the millions of other Romanians who took to the streets last December to put an end to the Ceausescus. Then, at a critical moment, Iliescu and his associates climbed the crest of the historical wave. No wonder true Romanian revolutionaries have begun to question their leaders' democratic protestations.

Nor is the return of old faces and old voices a phenomenon limited to the top leadership. I have known Corneliu Vadim Tudor since we were sociology students in Bucharest. I have also known him as the official minstrel of the Ceausescu court, specializing in well-paid hosannas. And I have known him as the author of several scurrilous anti-Semitic versifications and racist pamphlets. Then, on December 21, Tudor sent abroad a furious anti-Ceausescu manifesto, denouncing his former idol for being "the most bloodthirsty criminal in Romanian history, a monster worse than Stalin and Hitler—a Balkanic Caligula." Moreover, Tudor argued, the massacre in Timisoara convinced him that "it was not the Russians, the Hungarians, and the Jews who were threatening Romania," but the bloodthirsty tyrant whom he had so lavishly praised only several years ago.

Similar views have been voiced by other erstwhile bootlickers. Mihnea Gheorghiu, who served as president of the Academy of Social and Political Sciences, appeared on Romanian television to express his disgust with Ceausescu's "primitive obscurantism." Constantin Bostina, Ceausescu's former chief of staff, was appointed by the new regime to be deputy minister of the economy and lost his job only under pressure from the student movement. The list of these sunshine patriots could be continued ad nauseam.

In all fairness to the new regime, one should mention that it includes genuine dissidents, such as the art historian Andrei Plesu and the literary critic Mihai Sora, appointed ministers of culture and education, respectively. The State Committee for Radio and Television is headed by the dissident writer Aurel Dragos Munteanu (although plenty of holdovers are still serving on its staff).

Yet no crucial ministry has yet been assigned to someone who really opposed the dictatorship. It is true that given the ubiquity of Ceausescu's cult, one could not find a large contingent of suitable officials untainted by collaborationism. But a sufficient number could be found. Some examples should suffice: the electronics engineer Radu Filipescu, who was arrested in the early 1980s for distribution of anti-Ceausescu leaflets; the literary critic Dan Petrescu, one of the most courageous opponents of the regime; the sociologist Alin Teodorescu, who dared to criticize the anti-Hungarian policies under Ceausescu; the economist Ion Blaga, who in the 1970s refused to serve as the president's economic adviser. In any case a sense of decency should prevent those who participated directly in the ideological orgies of Ceausescuism from posturing as long-time resistance fighters.

Apart from one's sense of revulsion, though, does it matter? In its initial statement, the NSF pledged to be a transitional government, with no pretense of monopolizing political power. Unfortunately, Silviu Brucan has now announced the NSF's intention to present its own candidates in the April elections. Brucan, who has emerged as the most articulate of Romania's new leaders, said in an interview with the *Financial Times* of London on December 29 that he did not see any reason for the NSF not to enjoy the benefits of its revolutionary victory. But leaders of the newly formed opposition

groups—among them the Democratic Party, the Liberals, and the National Peasants—have already expressed their concern that these benefits include the NSF's attempt to set up its cells at workplaces, and thus consolidate its current pre-eminence.

Brucan has also denied that the NSF had any links with the now defunct Romanian Communist Party, and has proclaimed that communism is "irrelevant" in Romania. Yet many Romanians have noticed how, regrouped within the NSF's top leadership, Gorbachev's disciples are revamping their Marxist creed. Knowing how much Romanians execrate the Communist Party, these leaders are striving to rescue socialism by abandoning its Communist image. And they pursue the Bolshevik strategy in which they were schooled: control the media; fragment and isolate the opposition; buy off the rest with promises.

Can the West do anything to help prevent the Romanian revolution from being hijacked? Certainly the Western media should become aware that this is a danger, and strive to identify genuine proponents of democracy in Romania and monitor their struggle against any who might subvert democracy. And private and public organizations should contribute to the democratic parties, as they did to Solidarity, the advice and wherewithal that is needed to conduct a political campaign. Today's Romanians have never known a free election. The danger is that, deceived by communism's "new face," they never will. •

Protest by the Student League

On June 13, government forces broke up a three-month-long protest on University Square by those opposed to the National Salvation Front. Fighting occurred between demonstrators and police; shortly thereafter, violence engulfed the better part of Bucharest. In a televised address the next day, President Iliescu called on the miners of the Jiu valley to come to Bucharest and reestablish order. When they came, they unleashed a two-day reign of terror. With lists of names and addresses in hand, they went looking for oppositionists and student activists, beating up whomever they found. Before they returned home, President Iliescu thanked them at a special ceremony for saving the revolution.

The following protest, which was published in the June 20 issue of **România Liberă**, *was addressed to the parliament, the president, and the government.*

The student organizations that have signed this protest deny that they were in any way responsible for triggering the acts of violence which took place on June 13.

The student organizations have repeatedly criticized violent behavior. They have firmly declared that all their actions have been, are, and shall be peaceable. Democracy is incompatible with any display of violence, whether by isolated individuals, organizations, or spontaneously formed groups. Moreover, we herewith restate our conviction that democracy is only possible in a climate of legality, in which freedom of speech is guaranteed for every shade of opinion. Any attempt to limit the free expression of opinions causes great harm to the process of democratization in Romania.

We state our complete opposition to the violent acts perpetrated on June 13, 1990 against government institutions. If it is established that students participated directly in those acts, these persons can in no way be considered representative of our organizations.

The student organizations reaffirm their apolitical character: they support no political party nor group engaged in the struggle for political power. However, the students cannot be indifferent to attempts to stifle the opposition forces, for if the opposition were to disappear, democracy itself, along with the very possibility of acting in accordance with civic responsibilities, would disappear also.

We therefore protest the violation of the autonomy and immunity of the universities by detachments of miners who, on June 14, 1990, invaded the Ion Mircu Architectural Institute, the University of Bucharest, the Medical and Pharmaceutical Institute, and the March 6 university complex.

We protest the attacks on male and female students and teaching staff.

We protest the sacking of our classrooms, laboratories, and administrative offices.

We protest the defilement and destruction of the libraries of the Department of Literature and the School of Architecture

We protest the confiscation of typewriters, photocopiers, duplicating machines, and other equipment, documents, and valuables belonging to legally constituted student organizations. The stolen items were either gifts from international organizations or the property of students and teaching staff.

We protest the acts of violence perpetrated by the miners in certain neighborhoods of Bucharest. Students and intellectuals, who were the main victims of these acts, were virtually hunted down.

We protest the unjustified detention of students by the miners, in flagrant violation of the laws guaranteeing freedom of movement to individuals.

We protest the climate of terror this violence has created in the capital, a climate that jeopardizes fundamental democratic and human rights.

We protest the passivity of the police force, which failed to protect institutions of higher learning, restrain aggressors, and conduct inquiries at the scenes of crimes.

We protest the truncated coverage given by Romanian radio and television to the events of June 13-15, 1990 in Bucharest

We protest the repeated presentation of the events of June 13 (which we condemn above) in the absence of coverage of the acts of violence perpetrated by the miners on June 14-15

In conclusion, we demand the formation of a parliamentary commission of inquiry to consist of representatives of all political parties present in parliament. This commission would determine:

- the sequence of events on June 13-15, 1990;
- those directly or indirectly responsible for the violence committed on those dates, concentrating on those acts directed against institutions of higher learning and student organizations;
- the extent of the government's responsibility for triggering these events and for failing to prevent the breakdown of public order.

The commission would see to it that the final report, in its entirety, is presented in the media.

Equipment confiscated by the miners on June 14, 1990:

6 mechanical typewriters, 24 electric typewriters, 2 electronic typewriters, 1 office calculator, 1 pocket calculator, 2 video cameras, 3 video cassettes, 2 fax machines, 4 megaphones, 2 photocopiers, 2 duplicating machines, 1 video recorder, 1 computer, 1 radio cassette player, 2 telex machines, 1 tape recorder, 50 rolls of film, notebooks, adhesive tape, pencils, felt-tipped pens, typewriter ribbons, cans of food.

This equipment came from donations made to the Student League by various international organizations and private individuals, and was in perfect working order.

Documents confiscated by the miners on June 14, 1990:

- inventory of documents
- file of international contacts
- telephone directory
- list of members of the League
- photocopies of legal documents.

We avow that — owing to the theft of the inventory — the above list was compiled in the presence of witnesses. The miners have refused to make a statement in this matter

This list was drawn up by Mirela Moldovan and Basil Constantinescu on June 15, 1990.

The Romanian opposition gets bashed.

HOMAGE TO GOLANIA

By Vladimir Tismaneanu

BUCHAREST

I went to Romania on June 9 expecting to witness some unpleasantness between the government and the opposition. The sit-in staged by students, workers, and intellectuals at University Square was approaching its third month, and President Ion Iliescu had not disguised his opinions of dissidents. Following his election on May 20, official publications of the National Salvation Front embarked on a smear campaign against independent intellectuals and magazines. Leaders of the opposition parties were accused of being on the payroll of Western secret services. Student leaders—particularly the charismatic Marian Munteanu, one of the main orators in University Square—were preposterously charged with having served as members of the Securitate during the Ceausescu regime. Still, I never could have anticipated the outburst of reactionary populism—indeed, a Stalinist-fascist orgy—I saw in Bucharest between June 13 and June 15.

The sit-in began during the election campaign, on April 24. In the drab world of Romania's pseudo-normalization (Iliescu ran under the slogan "a president for our peace of mind"), University Square had been a political bonfire of fantasy and inspiration. The original purpose of the demonstration was to demand enactment of Point 8 of the "Proclamation of Timisoara," which proposed that "the electoral law prohibit—for the first three consecutive legislatures—the right of former Communist activists and of former Securitate officers to run in elections." The demand was not met, and the former Communists of the NSF received a landslide vote in the election. Conceding defeat, the major organizations that had participated in this "Commune of Bucharest" moved out of the square, and by June the dwindling number of protesters were asking for little more than allowing one independent television station. But Iliescu refused to negotiate with his critics, denouncing them as *golani*—ruffians or tramps. (In response, supporters of the demonstrators dubbed the square Golania, the country of the *golani* and the "first zone free of neo-communism.") Iliescu need only have waited another week. The flickering anarchist fire in the heart of Bucharest was almost extinguished.

But at 4 a.m. on June 13 I was awakened at my hotel by Vasile Gogea, a philosopher and civic activist from Brasov, whom I had left an hour earlier. He urged me to go out to the street: "The civil war has started." The air smelled insufferably of disinfectant. Suddenly a group of plainclothed individuals commanded us to stop. Their arrogant, insulting behavior betrayed them as Securitate men, and they ordered us to go back to the hotel. In any case the road was blocked, and within minutes police trucks arrived in the square to dismantle the tents of the hunger strikers and the platform the demonstrators had erected for speeches. Protesters were beaten up and forcibly removed, and the hunger strikers were transported to unidentified army hospitals.

This proved to be only the first stage. It wasn't long before thousands of incensed citizens, mostly students, began demonstrating against the government's brutal evacuation of the square. Munteanu futilely implored the crowd to avoid violence. But there were apparently enough planted provocateurs to keep the mob's collective wrath rolling. (During the tumult pictures were taken in which former Securitate officers can be seen among the crowd.) As teenagers threw hundreds of Molotov cocktails at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Romanian Service of Information, the army made no effort to intervene. In a scene reminiscent of East Germany early this year, the mob stormed the former building of the Securitate, and a group of "demonstrators" set fire to the ninth floor—where the most sensitive files were stored. This appalling display of collective delirium continued for the next two days, a terrifying illustration of the nature of power in post-Ceausescu Romania.

Ceausescu's downfall was the result of two elements: a spontaneous, anti-Communist, and pro-Western social movement from below, and a long-planned coup d'état organized by a coalition of disenchanted Party apparatchiks, top Securitate officials, and some army generals. Iliescu's rise to prominence and the Front's hegemony were not the result of popular will but of the general confusion that followed the collapse of the Ceausescu regime. The ruling group is made up of committed Leninists, power-hungry technocrats, political adventurers, and demagogues, including some with criminal records. Add to this strange mixture some ecstatic idealists and ambitious political scientists, and you have a picture of the NSF pinnacle. I had two long conversations with the Front's acting chairman, Nicolae S. Dumitru, a romantic Marxist convinced that under his guidance the NSF would turn into a "party of incorruptibles." In a country where corruption, nepotism, and sordid intrigues are endemic, this sounded almost pathetic. As dissident writer Dorin Tudoran puts it, the interests of the popular uprising and the palace conspiracy were bound to collide.

To stay in power and stabilize his government, Iliescu clearly accepted a pact with the Securitate and the army, two forces directly implicated in the Timisoara massacres of December 1989: they would guarantee his power, in return for which he would ensure their survival. Then, under pressure from below, he initiated a partial purge of the secret police. The Securitate, however, refused to accept this humiliation and boycotted the democratic process by organizing a series of provoca-

tions that came to a climax with the June uprising. It is very likely that its members exploited Iliescu's anguishes to prompt him into irrational actions.

Instead of using the legal tools at his command, Iliescu appealed to an extralegal force, the coal miners, giving them his presidential blessing to exert unbounded terror in Bucharest on June 14 and 15. While the official media were lambasting the opposition, the students, and the intellectuals for their alleged "Iron Guard" affiliations and for being morally responsible for the violence, the miners rampaged through the headquarters of the National Peasant and Liberal parties, savagely beat up the students, and ransacked the offices of independent newspapers. I saw them in full exercise of their mission, together with their civilian "coordinators," carrying lists of those who had dared to criticize the president, the prime minister, the NSF, and the official story about the Romanian revolution. According to *Romania Libera*, the country's largest independent daily, among the miners one could identify active members of the Securitate and of its so-called "special anti-terrorist units."

In addition to the better-known targets of repression, the regime used the miners to "cleanse" the Gypsy neighborhoods. Unlike the other victims, Gypsies have virtually no contact with the foreign media. According to an independent intellectual association, the Group for Social Dialogue, the government exploited a widespread chauvinism to accuse the Gypsies of having been an instrument of the "fascist" rebellion. After the pogroms and deportations Gypsies suffered during World War II, they were now victimized in the name of anti-fascism.

I was with some friends in the building of the Group for Social Dialogue when the miners arrived, accompanied by a delegate of the NSF-sponsored "Free Youth Foundation," the reincarnation of Nicu Ceausescu's Communist Youth Union. The only Group member present at the time was Gabriel Andreescu, a physicist and human rights activist persecuted by the Ceausescu regime. It was only thanks to his persuasive power that the miners left without serving us the lesson they had already administered to other designated victims of their "working-class justice," as the Front propaganda described it.

On June 16 I visited Munteanu at the Emergency Hospital. I found him smiling stoically, with a large wooden crucifix on his chest, his left leg broken, wounds on his skull, and marks of a monstrous whipping on his back. To his right was a young boy, unable to utter a word, completely smashed by torture. This living corpse was Munteanu's brother, whom the miners had taken for the student leader and treated accordingly—one of the many "errors" in Iliescu's search for what he called an "original democracy"—that is, a non-Western, non-pluralistic regime.

Munteanu told me that the police had asked him to go to University Square to calm down the demonstrators, and that he was later chased by miners as a "turbulent instigator." But before we could finish our conversation, we were informed that Vice Premier Cazimir Ionescu had called and threatened to have Munteanu removed to an army clinic if he continued to speak to foreign journalists. I left immediately, but the next day Munteanu was charged with "anti-state activities" and taken to a penitentiary hospital. As for the miners, they had left Bucharest after holding a huge meeting where Iliescu thanked them for their selfless commitment to the defense of Romania's "young democracy."

What was the purpose of the miners' vigilantism, and who inspired the clashes? In whose interest was it to create a state of general panic and unrest? According to Nicolae Manolescu, the editor of *Romania Libera* and one of the country's most influential intellectuals, there are three possible interpretations.

The first, propagated by Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman, maintains that the miners pre-empted a fascist coup inspired by inimical foreign forces. Iliescu claims that his regime was threatened by a right-wing, Iron Guard-type rebellion, in which the independent groups that participated in the University Square meetings acted in accordance with a plan concocted by some unnamed Western spy agencies. In several discussions with top members of Iliescu's entourage, I heard the same leitmotiv: the University Square demonstrations were fomented by the West, which cannot resign itself to the victory of a left-of-center formation in an Eastern European country. Even some sophisticated political scientists among Iliescu's advisers refuse to admit that political opposition is a normal phenomenon within a democracy.

The second scenario, suggested by some opposition forces, sees the NSF as the chief culprit and responsible for the escalation of violence following the provocative evacuation of University Square. The whole spiral of violence, they say, is Iliescu's well-designed plan to monopolize power, compromise the opposition, and establish a neo-Communist dictatorship. But this scenario operates with the same demonic stereotypes as the government's: it attributes considerable imagination to its enemy, and it assumes that the government is indifferent to international opinion. It's unlikely that Iliescu and his supporters would have gone out of their way to create a situation that has isolated Romania nearly as totally as it was at the end of the Ceausescu regime.

The third and most convincing scenario is Manolescu's. In an article in *Romania Libera* he takes into account the existence of irrational forces both within the ruling team and among some opposition groups. There was no clear-cut government conspiracy, but there was a deliberate attempt by Securitate-linked top officials to contain and manipulate the discontent of certain social groups, primarily students, intellectuals, and some radical anti-Communists. Slander, distortion, and semantic fraud were used to fabricate the image of a beleaguered power. According to this interpretation, the "Proclamation of Timisoara" and the peaceful anti-government demonstrations in University Square reflected a real state of mind among large strata of the Romanian population. Far from having been inspired from abroad, the protests were homegrown and spontaneous in their anti-Communist ardor. At a certain mo-

ment, however, elements of the former Securitate managed to infiltrate and manipulate these expressions of public dissatisfaction. Only this scenario, says Manolescu, explains why one could recognize former Securitate officers among both the demonstrators and the miners on June 13. The purpose of the Securitate was to arrest Romania's democratic evolution and force Iliescu to toughen his stance against the opposition.

What Manolescu fails to point out is that the Securitate has never been a monolithic organization. Even now there are two secret police organizations in Romania: one is subordinated to the defense minister, General Victor Stanculescu, Ceausescu's former military aide, who was entrusted with the protection of the Central Committee building in December 1989. (It was Stanculescu's treason that made possible Ceausescu's rapid capture, pseudo-trial, and execution in December 1989.) This faction of the Securitate would have a strong interest in helping Stanculescu establish a military dictatorship to suppress what they would label the "democratic anarchy." His strategy of destabilizing the government was seen at work in the June uprising, most obviously in the army's refusal to restore order.

Another faction is represented by the Romanian Service of Information (SRI), headed by Virgil Magureanu, a former political science professor at the Communist Party school and an Iliescu loyalist. Created in March 1990, following ethnic strife between Hungarians and Romanians in Tirgu-Mures, the SRI can best be described as Iliescu's personal secret police. It is very likely that the SRI was instrumental in organizing the miners' retaliations. Nobody else could have provided the miners with lists of names, addresses, and pictures of all opponents of the Iliescu regime.

My hypothesis is that the succession of bloody events in mid-June cannot be understood without reference to the personal conflict between Iliescu and Stanculescu, as well as to the role played by the different factions of the secret police. Since this struggle has not come to an end, new outbursts of violence can be predicted. In all of the current political confusion, one thing is now apparent: Iliescu has lost control of the country. Stanculescu rules the army and may yet prove himself powerful enough to launch a coup; and Magureanu's faction is practicing the old techniques of diversion and deception, enhancing a state of hysteria. So long as Iliescu and the Front continue to be at the mercy of this political mafia, rejecting the spirit of dialogue and resorting to assault squads to silence the opposition, no genuine democratization can take place. Until then, the very mention of a state of law in Romania will remain an embarrassing joke.

VLADIMIR TISMANEANU is a resident scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia and author of *In Search of Civil Society: Independent Peace Movements in the Soviet Bloc*, forthcoming from Routledge.

Suggested Questions

I. Romania: When the Lights Went Out

1. What does Flora Lewis mean when she says that Romania under Ceausescu was more like despotism than communism? Do you agree?

2. Why does the history of Transylvania make it a likely place for unrest to begin?

3. How does Flora Lewis explain Romanian opposition to Soviet foreign policies, at the same time that Romanian leaders were mirroring Soviet domestic policies?

4. What does Lewis mean when she says that Romania did not have the "social cohesion which developed into the Solidarity movement in Poland?"

II. Ceausescu Bear Hunt/ Where Policemen Outnumber Pigeons

1. Why do you think that someone would set up an elaborate charade like the bear hunt? What does it tell you about Ceausescu and his rule?

2. Why does the caption say that Ceausescu is "hunting for honor?" What else might he be hunting for?

3. Why does Dinescu say that "God has turned his back on Romania?"

4. Dinescu was arrested and sent into internal exile because of the passage that you just read. In light of the bear hunt, why would these few sentences be seen to be a crime against the state?

III. Down With the Tyrant

1. What do the bear hunt and the change in Elena's year of birth tell you about the Ceausescu government's attitude toward history? toward truth? Why would this require that all typewriters be registered?

2. What does Giurescu mean when he says that if you want a "new society" you need "a totally new type of human being?" How does Ceausescu set about producing this "new man?"

3. How was Romania's economy disrupted by Ceausescu's policies?

4. Why would Cullen compare Ceausescu's plan for Bucharest with Hitler's plan for Berlin? What is he trying to say about both men?

IV. New Masks, Old Faces/ Street Theater

1. Why might Ceausescu's trial and execution have been rushed and held in secret? In your opinion, does this strengthen Tismaneanu's claim that Ceausescu's overthrow was as much a communist coup as a democratic revolution?

2. What does Tismaneanu mean when he says that the new rulers wanted to "humanize [communism], not replace it?" What does he offer as proof?

3. According to Husaraka, what did Brucan mean when he said that "the watchdog is in the street?" Has this proven to be true?

4. According to Tismaneanu, what was the "Bolshevik strategy" for maintaining power? What does he recommend for Western policy toward the new Romanian government?

V. Protest by the Student League

1. According to the students, what would happen if the opposition forces were to be crushed?

2. What are the students' demands?

3. What kind of equipment was confiscated from the students? Where did the students get it from?

4. Why would this type of equipment be seized by the miners? By the government?

VI. Homage to Golonia

1. What does "Golonia" mean literally? As Tismaneanu and the protesters used it?

2. According to Tismaneanu, how did the coal miners come to be in Bucharest on June 14 and 15?

3. According to *Romania Libera*, who was seen in the crowd of miners? Why is this so significant?

4. What does Tismaneanu predict for Romania's future? Do you agree? Why? Why not?



What is being said about the pace of change in Eastern Europe? Some people would argue that Romanian leaders have hit the pause (or even the rewind) button. Do you agree? Why? Why not?

Suggested Activities

1. Read the quote by Gabriel Andreescu on the cover page. Using this quote and your knowledge of the Bill Of Rights, design a model Bill Of Rights for a democratic Romanian government.

2. Research the tactics used by Martin Luther King Jr. and A. Philip Randolph in winning civil rights for African Americans. Compare them with the tactics being used by Romanian dissidents to try to win democracy, and human and civil rights for their country. Write a report explaining the advantages and disadvantages that each group of people had in their struggle.

3. Choose one country in Eastern Europe other than Romania and make a timeline of events in its quest for freedom. Illustrate your timeline. If a computer is available, draw your timeline, using the *Timeliner* computer program. Cover the time period 1930-1991.

4. Divide students into small groups. Assign each group one country that has emerged from dictatorship (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Haiti, the Philippines, Spain, Japan, Argentina, Panama, Chile, etc.) and have them research the circumstances under which the dictatorship was ended (or perhaps not yet completely ended). Within each group have two students consider what effect external forces may have had, two others what institutions played key roles (churches, unions, civic groups, the military, etc.), two others what role(s) the most significant leader(s) played.

Reorganize students into new groups according to their specialty. Each new group should prepare to argue that the factors that they studied (outside forces, internal institutions, or outstanding leaders) were most important in bringing down the dictatorship. Each student should then write a short essay on what combination of factors seems necessary to successfully defeat a dictatorship.

5. Think about the needs and difficulties that might be inherent in separating the press, property, industry, student organizations, an educational system, the arts and other civic institutions from the state. Follow the newspapers over the next several weeks, noting different problems that the Romanians and other Eastern Europeans will have to overcome if they are to create a stable democratic society. Develop a scrap book documenting the growth, or lack thereof, of independent civic institutions in Eastern European countries.

6. Consider the fate of such short-lived democratic governments as the Russian Provisional Government of 1917, Weimar Germany in the 1920's, Czechoslovakia in 1946-48, or Brazil from 1945-64. Split the class into four groups and assign one of the countries to each. Have them look at the political traditions, economic conditions, relations between the socio/economic classes, character of the activist movements, role of external forces, and roles of the key individuals in their country. Have each group report on what factors they think are

necessary for a democratic society to flourish. Ask the class to try to use these findings to look at the past and present of Romania.

7. Many Romanian observers believe that the present government achieved power through a successful coup. Have students read press reports on the failed Soviet coup of August 1991, then write a research paper explaining the reasons that the coup against Gorbachev might have failed, while the coup against Ceausescu succeeded.

8. Have students read the enclosed *American Educator* interview with Romanian labor leader Catalin Croitoru and/or the *Uncaptive Minds* profile of Smaranda Enache. Ask students to identify someone in their community who was involved in the struggle to establish a democracy in another country or to extend it in this country (an emigre from a dictatorship, civil rights activist, voting rights activist, civic and community group members, immigrants rights activist, etc.). Have them conduct an interview and write an oral history.

9. *(As there are adult themes and* violence in this series, this assignment should be for older students, and might be made optional.)

Have the class watch the segments of *I, Claudius* (PBS, Masterpiece Theater) that depict the rise and fall of the Emperor Caligula, another egocentric totalitarian ruler. Split the class into three groups and have each group write and perform a one act out of play on the rise and fall of Nicolae Ceausescu. Assign one group to do the opening act, the second to do an act from the middle of the play, and the third to do the final act.

10. *(For students who have already completed American history and American government courses, this would be a challenging undertaking, and could be adapted as a final exhibition project in an advanced-level government or history course.)*

Split students into small groups to prepare a presentation on "Democracy in America," aimed at Romanian students. Students may wish to use any combination of essays, letters, literary and historical quotes, photographs, video, audio tapes, or any other media, to address such themes as: history; government; culture; the evolution of rights and responsibilities; popular attitudes toward the democratic system; strengths and weaknesses of American political arrangements; the civic society; union and disunion in a multicultural, multi-partisan society; hopes (and/or fears) for the future.

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Radio Free Europe's Report On Eastern Europe. Washington: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, U.S. Government. Weekly; Free; 1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036.

Uncaptive Minds: A Journal Of Information And Opinion On Eastern Europe. New York: Institute For Democracy In Eastern Europe. Bimonthly; $15 per year, $10 for AFT members; Whole sets 1987-1990 available for $40; 48 East 21st Street, New York, NY 10010. (212) 677-5801.