ABSTRACT

          Debate judge philosophy statements have been part of
the Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA) National Debate
Tournament since the tournament's inception. Judges are asked to
identify their preferred debate paradigm in the statement. The
practice has raised the question of whether debate critics understand
the debate paradigms as they are described in the forensics
literature. Where previous attempts have been made to compare debate
critics' professed preferences with their actual behavior, results
have been inconsistent. In evaluating critics' understanding of
debate paradigms, it is necessary first to construct a taxonomy
describing the features of each of the several paradigms. Such a
taxonomy requires an understanding that: (1) paradigms are metaphors;
(2) paradigms construct merging similarities while admitting
dissimilarities; (3) debate paradigms are appropriate for substantive
issues, but are inappropriate for addressing procedural issues; (4)
most paradigms originated in policy debate, but they have been used
in non-policy debate; and (5) the shared meaning of a given paradigm
may be found in the literature describing it. Brief descriptions of
several debate paradigms (stock issues, policy-making, policy
implications, value comparison, hypothesis testing, argument critic,
and tabula rasa) point to dimensions for taxonomic description.
Presumption, stock issues, and critic role show initial promise for a
taxonomy for study. Judges' evaluation questions should be structured
around the three dimensions. (Thirty-seven references are attached.)
(SG)

THE ELEMENTS OF CEDA DEBATE PARADIGMS:

An Investigation of Paradigm Accuracy

Craig A. Dudczak   Donald L. Day   Tina L. Hartwell

Speech Communication   Information Studies   Speech Communication

Syracuse University

ECA Conference

Portland, Maine

May 1992

Elements of CEDA Debate Paradigms:
An Investigation of Paradigm Accuracy

Debate judge philosophy statements have been used in CEDA
Debate at least since the inception of the CEDA National Debate
Tournament in 1986. Philosophy statements have both encouraged
debate judges to articulate their decision criteria as well as
allowed debaters to adapt to their judges' expressed preferences.
Among other items, judges were asked to identify their preferred
debate paradigm in their philosophy statement. The paradigms,
while widely cited in debate philosophy statements, do not appear
to be consistently understood or applied by debate critics (Day &
Dudczak 1991).

The present paper is the first part of a study to determine
whether debate critics understand the debate paradigms as they
are described in the forensics literature. In this paper we will
identify the defining characteristics of each of the several
paradigms which are currently employed in CEDA debate. Later
manuscripts report the comparisons between debate critics'
representations of the paradigms against the paradigm charac-
teristics established in the literature.

This study is justified on several grounds. First, while
surveys of debate paradigm preference in NDT (Cox 1974; Cross &
Matlon 1978) and CEDA (Buckley 1983; Lee, Lee & Seeger 1983; Brey
1989; 1990) have been conducted, these self-report instruments
never attempted to determine whether the paradigm preference
claimed by debate critics corresponds to the actual characteris-
tics defined for the paradigm in the forensic literature.

Second, where attempts have been made to compare the pro-
fessed preference of critics with their actual behavior, the
results have been, at best, inconsistent. Only Henderson and
Boman (1983) have reported high levels of consistency between a
critic's behavior and the preferences professed through a philos-
ophy statement. Their analytic procedures may have favored an
inflated level of apparent consistency and have been questioned
elsewhere[1]. Dudczak and Day (1989a; 1989b; 1991a; 1991b; Day
and Dudczak 1991), on the contrary, have found lower levels of
consistency between critics' professed preferences and their
actual behavior. This inconsistency exists both for aggregate
comparisons of judges within paradigm types as well as within
individual judges (Day & Dudczak 1991). Taken as a whole, the
accumulated evidence supports the proposition that paradigms
are porous and unreliable.

If paradigms are an unreliable predictor of how debate
critics will evaluate a debate, then it is appropriate to ask why
they are unreliable. One possible answer is that while paradigms
are conceptually consistent, debate critics don't accurately
understand them. Dudczak and Day (1991a; 1991b) discuss the
means for testing this possibility as set of alternative proposi-
tions. Either a) paradigms are not meaningful predictors of
subsequent behavior, or b) paradigms are not understood by the
critics who employ them. This test would require an investiga-
tion of the dimension of reliability known as "accuracy."
Dudczak and Day (1991b) further explain:

Accuracy is that dimension by which behavior is assessed
against a standard or norm (Weber 1985).   While a litera-
ture describing the characteristics of the several para-
digms exists, there is no certification of critics who
use them.   If critics' explanations of their preferred
paradigm corresponded with the standard for the paradigm
(as established by its literature), then indirect support
for the first explanation would be obtained.   However, if
critics' explanations were inconsistent with their pre-
ferred paradigm, then direct support for the second explan-
ation would be available. (9)

The current paper addresses the first requirement of this
study.   By establishing the characteristics of each of the
several paradigm, an "accurate" standard can be establisted
against which individual debate critics' beliefs may be tested.
If critics understand the decisional criteria of their own
professed paradim, it may be said that something else is operat-
ing to create the low consistency between critics' professed
philosophy statements and their subsequent debate decision
making.   On the otner hand, if the critics score poorly in
identifying the characteristics of their own preferred paradigm,
then it would serve to explain why critics are inconsistent when
applying their professed beliefs to the evaluation of a debate
round.

Paradigm Characteristics

The first step to evaluating critic understanding of debate
paradigms requires the construction of a taxonomy describing the
features of each of the several paradigms.   The features defining
a paradigm would then constitute the standard against which the
individual debate judge would be compared.   Several assumptions

about the nature of debate paradigms and how their characteristics were selected are explained here.

1) <u>Paradigms in debate are metaphors</u>--That is, they are figurative analogies. Unlike Kuhn's (1970) use of the term--which suggests a constellation of beliefs shared by a given community--debate use of the term "paradigm" refers to the "perspective" with which one views a debate (Parson 1983; Lake 1982).

2) As a metaphor in its debate usage, <u>paradigms construct merging similarities while admitting dissimilarities</u> (Parson 1983). Rowland (1982a), for instance, notes that paradigms are justified by their own internal logic. As such, a debate paradigm may be able to treat some issues quite well while remaining deficient in its treatment of other issues.

3) <u>Debate paradigms are appropriate for addressing "substantive" issues, but are inappropriate for "procedural" issues</u>. Parson (1983) notes that issues of debate format, ethics, and the choice of paradigm are "extra-paradigmatic."

4) <u>While most paradigms originated in Policy (NDT) Debate, they have been applied in Non-Policy (CEDA) debate</u>. Much of this is simple historical development; since policy debate predates the development of CEDA, many of the conceptual models for decision-making were simply expropriated to the new format. It is not our purpose in the current essay to evaluate the applicability of this transference.[2]

5) <u>The "shared meaning" of a given paradigm may be found in the</u> <u>body of literature describing it</u>. Here our assumption goes back to the very purpose of this investigation. The surveys conducted among debate critics have only asked them to identify their paradigm preferences, but with little elaboration describing what a given paradigm should mean. While this assumption privileges those who have written about debate paradigms rather than the community of paradigm users, it nonetheless establishes a ground for what the paradigm should include.

Much of the previous discussion in the debate community has surrounded the question of which paradigm of decision making should be preferred. Rowland's (1982a) initial position and the subsequent debate over both the standards he proposes as well as the desirability of assessing paradigms is beyond the scope of this paper[3]. We are not interested here in comparing the utility of the several paradigm against one another. Rather, we are interested in the description of each paradigm's characteristics only insofar as it would serve as a standard by which its professed adherents could be measured. We assume that the paradigms function to explain the debate critic's expectations for argument. We find Rowland's standards useful as a means of assessing how the debate critic observes the world when observed through the lens of a paradigm. As Rowland notes, "paradigms actually determine what the judge perceives." (133)

In determining which paradigms should be considered for inclusion in this taxonomy, we are primarily interested in functional standards for inclusion--the paradigms that CEDA debate critics actually employ are the most important ones for our consideration. Consequently, we have included those which have been identified by respondents in one or more of the several CEDA judge philosophy studies (Buckley 1983; Gaske, Kugler & Theobald 1985; Dudczak & Day 1989a; 1991a). Paradigms frequently identified by debate critics in CEDA debate were Hypothesis Testing, Tabula Rasa, Stock Issues, Policy Implications. Value Comparison, Policy Making, and Argument Critic.

Each of the paradigms may be described in its own terms as well has through how it addresses some of the recurrent issues in debate. Each paradigm is described through in its own terms and then compared with the others along several standard issues. We attempt to cover the paradigms in some order of their interconnection, although this is not completely realized as the literature on a few paradigms remains incomplete.

Stock Issues--The Stock Issues paradigm begins with the assumption that the are recurring locations at which potential issues may be discovered in propositions of policy (Anderson & Dovre 1968; Ehninger & Brockreide 1963; 1978). Traditional stock issues are located in ill, blame, cure and cost (Hultzen 1958)-- or need, inherency, solvency and benefits (Ehninger & Brockreide 1963; 1978). A presumption was designated in favor of the status quo--existing systems, institutions, policies--and the burden of

proof was assigned to the advocate in favor of change. The normative value of the stock issues paradigm was a conservative assumption that absent a demonstrated reason for change--a deficit or need motivation, the existing state of being would remain (Brock, et al. 1973).

Policy-Making--While seldom described in CEDA debate as a decision paradigm, it nonetheless, contributes to the understanding of other paradigms derived from it. Policy-making originated as a departure from traditional stock issues. The stock issues, while not completely abandoned, located its focus upon the consequences of future events. Systems analysis, with multiple causal paths, if not interacting elements of causation, replaced linear, single-element, causal analysis (Brock, et al., 1973; Lichtman & Rohrer 1973; 1980). The comparison of policy alternatives was ultimately based on a utilitarian conception that the benefit/cost ratio of the competing alternatives would determine the best solution. Presumption was nominally shifted to favor change because it was assumed that in a "process reality," change was constantly occurring--It was less an issue whether "change was justified than a question of which changes should be encouraged (Brock, et al, 1973).

With the presumption shifted towards favoring change, the most relevant of the traditional stock issues were those asking whether a solution would work and what benefits (and costs) were associated with a particular proposal.

Policy Implications--While the stock issues originated

deliberative (policy) propositions, their application to non-policy propositions [propositions of fact and value] in CEDA debate is countenanced through 1) the occasional use of explicit policy propositions in CEDA, and 2) the implication of policy issues even in non-policy propositions (Flaningam 1982; Rowland 1983; Dudczak 1983). The development of the Policy Implications "paradigm" really consisted of the application of traditional stock issues more or less to value propositions (Young and Gaske 1984). Policy Implications are manifestations of value propositions through their instrumental (means) values. The benefit/cost calculus developed through the Policy paradigm also found application here.

While the traditional stock issues may be implied by the consequence of affirming a particular value proposition, the treatment of presumption (and the burden of proof) develops differently than in the stock issues or policy paradigms. The location of presumption depends upon negative argumentation. Were the affirmative to fail to justify its value system, then the presumption would be against the resolution (Young & Gaske 1984). However, presumption does not become automatically located against a value, but rather becomes dependent upon negative arguments. Presumption and the burden of proof become more fluid concepts in this paradigm with designative issues indirectly determining the ultimate location of presumption.

Value Comparison--As an alternative to the wholesale importation of policy stock issues applied to non-policy propositions,

at least one conceptual alternative was to assume that different standards were necessary for assessing non-policy propositions. In developing criteria for evaluating non-policy propositions, Zarefsky (1976) observed that not all non-policy propositions were of the same type. When conflicts were discovered to exist between values, criteria were needed to determine the relative merit of the competing values. Two "issues" are concerned with this exercise. First, the criteria must be established; then the criteria had to be applied in the assessment of the competing values to meet the criteria.

On the face of it, this simple exercise invited a "transcendent" decision rule--Find a criterion which could evaluate the competing values along a common dimension and then compare the values along that dimension. Presumption and burden of proof are not explicitly discussed within this paradigm, although it does not appear Zarefsky was proposing this process as a paradigm, per se. He noted that the process of developing criteria and applying them are equally applicable to policy propositions. He also recognized that a decision rule proposed was itself subject to dispute. Consequently, the value comparison paradigm allows multiple levels of decision criteria to evolve until a consensual, transcendent standard is determined.

Hypothesis Testing--If Zarefsky had not intended value comparison to operate as a paradigm, it appears that he did intend hypothesis testing to serve this role. Borrowing from the assumptions of normal science, Zarefsky (1972; Patterson &

Zarefsky 1983) began with the assumption that presumption was not in favor of any existing system, but rather should be assigned against a proposed change. Consequently, a proposition was to be evaluated for its probative value with the rigor analogous to that the scientist would apply in testing a research hypothesis.

The implications for decision making were substantial. Presumption moved from a normative weight which tacitly favored existing beliefs to an active challenge to any alternative which would replace it. The burden of proof not only was clearly retained by the advocate of change, but appeared to become a greater burden because the proposed change might be challenged repeatedly by alternatives which could be inconsistent with each other.

Argument Critic--The argument critic debate paradigm assumes the role of the judge is as a critic of argument (Balthrop 1983). The judge serves in an interpretive role, mediating the information presented from the debaters through his/her own critical understanding of reality. Unlike the tacit assumption of alternative perspectives which treats the judge as a more or less passive, objective, non-intervening evaluator of argument, the argument critic paradigm authorizes the critic to employ his/her critical knowledge in assessing claims and evidence. The under-standing of claims and evidence is not deferred to only th se meanings provided by the debaters, but rather includes the auditors own reflexive response to the information presented. In short, the critic does not presume to suspend his/her own judg-

ment in subordination to interpretations provided by the de-

baters. The judge remains an active participant in constructing

meaning for the debate.

Tabula Rasa--The Tabula Rasa paradigm stands most opposite

the argument critic perspective. In his more recent explanations

of Tabula Rasa, Ulrich (1992) declines to label it a paradigm.

Earlier versions (Ulrich 1981) were more ambiguous in this

regard. The primary element of this perspective is that the

debate judge utilizes the rules agreed upon by the debaters, or

absent agreement, chooses the rules best defended in the course

of the debate. Without preconceptions for the normative value of

particular argument claims, the critic increases the range of

issues considered by the debaters.

The privileging of any argument or analytic construct is

rejected. In fact, the perspective may allow the debaters to

offer any alternative perspective (or combination of perspec-

tives) within the tabula rasa perspective. With the exception of

certain extra-paradigmatic conventions--rules governing the

activity--the debaters are afforded the maximum latitude for

invention within the debate. While not specifying decision

criteria, or even the means of constructing them, the debaters

may be pressed to construct the standards and criteria for

decision-rule evaluation.

Constructing A Taxonomy

The brief description given the several paradigms identified

here begin to point to dimensions for taxonomic description. All dimensions are not present for each paradigm type. However, the dimensions serve as defining characteristics for the subsequent empirical study. The following dimensions show initial promise for the taxonomy:

1) Presumption--Presumption is a central construct for most paradigms, although it is not directly addressed in others. Those paradigms employing presumption range vary in the amount and direction of its weight.

2) Stock Issues--While the stock issues are central elements to the stock issues paradigm, other paradigms employ some or all of the stock issues. Even those paradigms which do not identify the policy issues employ alternate (non-policy) stock issues.

3) Critic Role--At least two of the paradigms presume a role for the judge to play. These vary along a continuum which emphasizes greater reflexive involvement on the one end to minimal critical involvement on the other end.

While limited in number, the initial three dimensions provide for elaboration within each of the candidate paradigms. Even limited to the three dimensions, distinctive features among the several paradigms emerge. Consequently, the next task in the study requires that the evaluation questions of judges be structured around these dimensions. Reliability measures for subjects' accuracy against a standard of paradigm features may be conducted.

REFERENCES CITED

Anderson, J., and P. Dovre (1968). READINGS IN ARGUMENTATION, (Eds.) Anderson, J., and Dovre, P. Boston: Allyn & Bacon.

Balthrop, V. (1983). "The Debate Judge as 'Critic of Argument': Toward a Transcendent Perspective." JAFA 20: 1-15.

Brey, J. (1989). "A Descriptive Analysis of CEDA Judging Philosophies Part I: Definitive Acceptance or Rejection of Certain Tactics and Arguments," CEDA YEARBOOK 10. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 67-77.

Brey, J. (1990). "An Analysis of CEDA Judging Philosophies - Part II: Accepting Certain Tactics and Arguments with Reservations," CEDA YEARBOOK 11. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 72-79.

Brock, B., J. Chesebro, J. Cragan, & J. Klumpp (1973). PUBLIC POLICY DECISION MAKING: SYSTEMS ANALYSIS AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES DEBATE. New York: Harper & Row.

Buckley, D. (1983). "A Comparison of Judging Paradigms," ARGUMENT IN TRANSITION. (Eds.) Zarefsky, D., Sillars, M., and J. Rhodes. Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association (SCA), 858-870

Cox, J. (1974). "A Study of Judging Philosophies of the Participants of the National Debate Tournament," JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN FORENSIC ASSOCIATION (JAFA) 11: 61-71.

Cross, J., and R. Matlon (1978). "An Analysis of Judging Philosophies in Academic Debate," JAFA 15: 110-123.

Day, D. and C. Dudczak (1991). "Debate Philosophy Statements As Predictors of Critic Attitudes." ARGUMENT IN CONTROVERSY, (Ed.) Parson, D. Annandale, VA: SCA, 441-445.

Dudczak, C. (1983). "Value Argument in a Competitive Setting: An Inhibition to Ordinary Language Use," ARGUMENT IN TRANSITION. (Eds.) Zarefsky, D., Sillars, M., and Rhodes, J. Annandale, VA: SCA, 837-844.

Dudczak, C., and D. Day (1989a). "A Profile of CEDA Debate Critics," SPHERES OF ARGUMENT. (Ed.) Gronbeck, B. Annandale, VA: SCA, 427-433.

Dudczak, C., and D. Day (1989b). "A Taxonomy of CEDA Debate Critics. Unpublished. Paper presented to the SCA Conference, San Francisco. [ERIC # ED 318 071]

Dudczak, C., and D. Day (1991a). "The Impact of Paradigm Consistency on Taxonomic Boundaries in CEDA Debate," CEDA YEARBOOK 12. Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt, 27-47.

Dudczak, C., and D. Day (1991b). "Debate Philosophy Statements as Predictors of Critic Attitudes: A Summary and Direction of Research." Unpublished. Paper presented to the SCA Conference, Atlanta.

Ehninger, D., and W. Brockreide (1963). DECISION BY DEBATE. New York: Dodd, Mead.

Ehninger, D., and W. Brockreide (1978). DECISION BY DEBATE, 2nd Ed. New York: Harper & Row.

Flaningam, C. (1982). "Value-Centered Argument and the Development of Decision Rules," JAFA 19: 107-114.

Gaske, P., D. Kugler, and J. Theobald (1985). "Judging Attitudes and Paradigmatic Preferences in CEDA Debate: A Cumulative and Construct Validity Investigation." CEDA YEARBOOK 6: 57-66.

Henderson, B., and D. Boman (1983). "A Study to Determine If Debate Judges' Philosophy Statements Are Consistent with Their Later Related Ballot Statements," JAFA 19: 191-198.

Hultzen. L. (1958). "Status in Deliberative Analysis," THE RHETORICAL IDIOM, (Ed.) Bryant, D. Ithaca, NY: Cornell.

Kuhn, T. (1970). THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, 2nd Ed., Enlarged. Chicago: University of Chicago.

Lake, R. (1982). "Critical Issues in the Use of Decision Models in Debate: Debunking the Metaphor of the 'Paradigm'." Unpublished. Paper presented to the SCA Conference, Louisville.

Lee, R., K. Lee, and M. Seeger (1983). "Comparison of CEDA and NDT: Differences in Program Characteristics and Forensic Director Attitudes," ARGUMENT IN TRANSITION, (Eds.) Zarefsky, D., Sillars, M., and Rhodes, J. Annandale, VA: SCA, 745-757.

Lichtman, A., and D. Rohrer (1973). "Critique of Zarefsky on Presumption," PROCEEDINGS: NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ARGUMENTATION, (Ed.) Luck, J. Texas Christian University.

Lichtman, A., and D. Rohrer (1980). "The Logic of Policy Dispute," JAFA 16: 236-247.

Lichtman, A., and D. Rohrer (1982). "Policy Disputes and Paradigm Evaluation: A Response to Rowland," JAFA 18: 145-150.

Parson, D. (1983). "Root Metaphors and Terministic Screens: Another Look at Paradigms," ARGUMENT IN TRANSITION, (Eds.) Zarefsky, D., Sillars, M., and Rhodes, J. Annandale, VA: SCA, 792-799.

Patterson, J., and D. Zarefsky (1983). CONTEMPORARY DEBATE. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

Rowland, R. (1982a). "Standards for Paradigm Evaluation." JAFA 18: 133-140.

Rowland, R. (1982b). "The Primacy of Standards for Paradigm Evaluation: A Rejoinder," JAFA 18: 154-160.

Ulrich, W. (1982). "Flexibility in Paradigm Evaluation," JAFA 18: 151-153.

Ulrich, W. (1992). "In Search of Tabula Rasa," ADVANCED DEBATE, 4th Ed., (Eds.) Thomas, D., & Hart, J. Lincolnwood, IL: National Textbook, 310-319. ["In Search of Tabula Rasa," SCA Conf'.ence, 1981]

Weber, R. (1985). BASIC CONTENT ANALYSIS. (Sage University Paper No. 49) Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Young, G., and P. Gaske (1984). "On Prima Facie Value Argumentation: The Policy Implications Affirmative," CEDA YEARBOOK 5, (Ed.) Brownlee, D.

Zarefsky, D. (1972). "A Reformulation of the Concept of Presumption," Unpublished. Central States Speech Association Conference.

Zarefsky, D. (1980). "Criteria for Evaluating Non-Policy Argument," CEDA YEARBOOK 1, (Ed.) Brownlee, D. CEDA.

Zarefsky, D. (1982). "The Perils of Assessing Paradigms," JAFA 18: 141-144.

ENDNOTES

1. See Dudczak, C. and Day, D., endnote #3 (1991) and Day, D. and Dudczak, endnote #5 (1991).

2. Several authors have addressed this question elsewhere. The reader is advised to see Rowland (1983), Dudczak (1983), and Flaningam (1982).

3. For readers interested in pursuing this discussion on standards for evaluating debate paradigms, Please refer to Zarefsky (1982); Lichtman & Rohrer (1982); and Ulrich (1982). All of these papers are presented in a Special Forum published in JAFA 18 (Winter 1982) plus a rejoinder from Rowland.