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ABSTRACT

The term "underclass" is often used to describe concentrations of inner-city Blacks in urban neighborhoods where social problems are common, mostly in large metropolitan areas. The most widely used empirical measurements of underclass are the spatial concentrations of poverty and social problems. Characterizing the underclass as almost entirely a minority problem may result from focusing on large metropolitan areas. There is uncertainty about the actual racial and ethnic compositions of the underclass. Analyzing differences in the spatial concentrations of poverty and social problems in small, middle-sized, and large metropolitan areas, and separating Hispanic Americans, non-Hispanic Blacks, and non-Hispanic Whites reveals the composition of the underclass more accurately. Data are analyzed from the Urban Institute Underclass Data Base, which contains tabulations from over 42,000 tracts from the 1980 census and over 34,000 in the 1970 census. As the size of the metropolitan area falls, the Black share of population in underclass neighborhoods falls, but the White and Hispanic American shares rise. If one looks beyond Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles, underclass neighborhoods are most likely to be populated by Blacks, then Whites, and then Hispanic Americans. By ignoring small and middle-sized metropolitan areas, scholars and journalists have ignored the White underclass. Statistical data are provided in 12 tables. There are 25 references. (SLD)

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
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**UNDERCLASS VARIATIONS BY RACE AND PLACE:
HAVE LARGE CITIES DARKENED OUR
PICTURE OF THE UNDERCLASS?**

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Urban neighborhoods where social problems are commonplace received widespread attention from both media and academy in the 1980s. Several books and articles gave detailed descriptions of such neighborhoods (Lehman, 1986; Glasgow 1980; Auletta 1982). The social problems most often cited were poverty, welfare dependency, male joblessness, crime and drug abuse, dropping out of high school, and out-of-wedlock childbearing among adults and teenagers. These accounts used the term underclass to describe concentrations of inner-city blacks who live in these neighborhoods, which are located mostly in large metropolitan areas.

Researchers have developed three different empirical criteria for measuring underclass size, growth, and composition. The first two are the spatial concentration of poverty and the spatial concentration of social problems; the third is persistent poverty. Measuring persistent poverty involves using longitudinal survey data. These data reveal persistent characteristics of individual survey respondents and their families, but reveal nothing about respondent's neighbors. Concentration effects -- the idea that neighbors affect the behavior of individuals -- are however, central to Wilson's definition of the underclass concept. He lists four criteria: (1) poverty; (2) other social problems, including joblessness; (3) the persistence of poverty or social problems; and (4) spatial concentration of the first three elements (1987). Since longitudinal data bases that provide information about neighbors is just now becoming available, the persistent poverty definition has received somewhat less attention in underclass research. Thus, the most widely used empirical measurements are the spatial concentrations of poverty and social problems.

Empirical studies leave questions about the race and ethnic composition of the underclass unanswered. Studies agree that minorities are overrepresented, but vary widely

in estimates of the size of the white underclass. Those based on the spatial concentration of poverty assume or conclude that the underclass is almost entirely a minority problem (Clark and Nathan 1982; Gottschalk and Danziger 1986; Kaus 1986; Wilson 1987; Bane and Jargowsky 1988). This conclusion may be the result of focussing on larger metropolitan areas, where minorities concentrate. While studies of the spatial concentration of social problems find that whites are a significant minority of the underclass (Ricketts and Sawhill 1988; Ricketts and Mincy 1990), they do not distinguish between Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic whites. This raises the question, "How does the disaggregation of the Hispanic population affect findings on the racial and ethnic composition of the underclass?"

Uncertainty about the race and ethnic composition of the underclass leaves theoretical and policy questions unanswered. The theoretical question arises because structural economic changes are a major explanation for emergence of the underclass (Wilson 1987; Kasarda forthcoming). Given this emphasis, one might ask why the adverse effects of these changes fell so disproportionately on minorities. The policy question arises from criticisms of studies that focus on social problems other than poverty. Several observers claim that these studies have a chilling effect on social policy because they blame poor minority members for their problems (Gans 1990; Wilson 1989; Wilson 1990). This raises the question, "Would the same chilling effect occur if the underclass phenomenon affected low-skilled members of all race and ethnic groups, including whites?"

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze differences in the spatial concentration of poverty and social problems in small, middle-sized, and large metropolitan areas, separating Hispanics, non-Hispanic blacks (from now on, blacks), and non-Hispanic whites (from now on, whites). Using comprehensive census tract data should reveal more accurately the actual racial and ethnic composition of the underclass and the variations that exist by size-of-place.

To begin, we review the rationale for studying the spatial concentration of poverty and examine the potential effects of this criterion on estimates of the racial and ethnic

composition of the underclass. This review shows that studies focused on larger metropolitan areas could bias estimates of the racial/ethnic composition of the underclass. Second, we review hypotheses about the emergence and growth of the underclass that anticipate the racial and ethnic composition of the group. Third, we discuss the data used to analyze the racial and ethnic composition of the underclass and present the results of the analysis. Then, we describe some correlates of the underclass across race, ethnic group, and size-of-place, and offer policy conclusions, based on a clearer understanding of the racial, ethnic, and size-of-place variations in the underclass.

Rationale for Studying the Spatial Concentration of Poverty

According to Wilson (1987), two developments are responsible for the growth of poverty and social problems in inner-city neighborhoods. First, structural change in urban economies reduced the demand for low-skilled workers, which led to the growth in urban joblessness, and thus increased inner-city poverty. Second, the increasing concentration of poverty in inner-city neighborhoods produced an increase in social problems. Wilson argues that government policies such as the Fair Housing Act and equal employment opportunity legislation favored better-educated blacks. This promoted out-migration of working and middle-class blacks from once stable, economically integrated, but racially segregated, neighborhoods. Thus, out-migration of advantaged blacks resulted in the increasing concentration of inner-city poverty and social problems.

Out-migration is an important aspect of Wilson's hypothesis of underclass formation. He asserts that when located in the same neighborhoods where less-advantaged blacks lived, middle and working-class blacks provided valuable community resources that stabilized inner-city neighborhoods. These included: (1) role models of upward mobility for the children of poorer blacks; (2) networks leading to mainstream jobs for poorer blacks; (3) resources for maintaining neighborhood institutions (e.g., churches, local businesses); (4)

social sanctions against criminal behavior; and (5) mainstream patterns of schooling and family formation.

Once working and middle-class blacks left inner city neighborhoods, these resources were no longer available. This destabilized black, inner-city neighborhoods. The result, according to Wilson, was the growing isolation of poor black neighborhoods from mainstream society and an increase in social problems in the isolated neighborhoods (e.g., crime, joblessness, welfare dependency, single parenting, and dropping out of high school). Increasing concentrations of poverty caused an increase in social problems through what Wilson calls "concentration effects."

To support his underclass thesis, Wilson amasses data on poverty and other social problems from several disparate sources. He frequently presents tabulations from published sources, disaggregated by race, ethnicity, and metropolitan area residence. He makes the strongest case for growth in the spatial concentration of poverty for the largest five and the largest fifty cities. Together these data support two general propositions about changes during the 1970s and early 1980s. First, spatial concentration of poverty increased dramatically over the period and the increase among blacks dominated increases among other race and ethnic groups. Second, social problems also grew most dramatically among blacks.

Extensions of Wilson's analysis offered the earliest comprehensive measures of the underclass (Gottschalk and Danziger 1986; Nathan 1986; Bane and Jargowsky 1988). Most of these studies used published census data on the poor population in poor neighborhoods (i.e., the spatial concentration of poverty) in large cities. The studies disaggregated results by race and ethnicity or examined blacks and Hispanics only. Some studies focused on neighborhoods with poverty rates of 20 percent or more (poverty neighborhoods), others focused on neighborhoods with poverty rates of 40 percent or more (extreme poverty neighborhoods).

These studies support the idea that the underclass is almost exclusively a minority problem. Table 1 shows typical results for the race and ethnic composition of the poor in poverty and extreme poverty neighborhoods, using published data for the 100 largest cities.¹ Blacks are 57 percent of the poor in poverty neighborhoods, Hispanics are 17 percent, and whites are 17 percent (column 2). Minority shares of the poor living in extreme poverty neighborhoods are even larger. Blacks are 68 percent of this population, Hispanics are 21 percent, and whites are just 10 percent (column 5).

Location patterns, which vary considerably by race and ethnicity, partly account for these results. For example, Table 2 shows the fraction of the U.S. population living anywhere in the 100 largest cities and the fractions of the U.S. poverty population living anywhere, in poverty neighborhoods, and in extreme poverty neighborhoods in these same cities. For purposes of discussion, we divide the fractions in the table for each minority group by the fractions for whites. The results are the relative propensities of minorities to live in large cities.²

Minorities are two to three times as likely as whites to live anywhere in these cities. Further, blacks have higher relative propensities to live in these cities than Hispanics. Finally, as neighborhoods get poorer, the relative propensities of poor minorities to live in these cities increase. Thus, poor blacks are 6.6 times as likely as poor whites to live in poverty neighborhoods in these 100 cities. Poor blacks are 17.0 times as likely as poor whites to live in extreme poverty neighborhoods in these cities.

Very different hypotheses could account for these location patterns. Historically, minorities may have preferred large cities because these cities held better job prospects for low-skilled workers. More recently, the decline in demand for such workers in large cities may have increased their poverty rates. But if sources of public assistance are more readily available in larger cities, these groups would be more likely to remain (Kasarda forthcoming). Segregation is another possible explanation. Segregation in low-income

housing markets in smaller cities may restrict poor minorities to larger cities. Finally, Hispanics may concentrate in large cities because these cities are close to the points at which they, or their parents, entered the country.

Thus, spatial criteria affect the race and ethnic composition of the underclass. Poor whites are less likely than poor minorities to live in poverty or extreme poverty neighborhoods in the 100 largest cities. Therefore, a more racially and ethnically diverse underclass might emerge if studies: (1) used some criteria other than the poverty rate to define an underclass neighborhood; and (2) included data from small, middle size, and large places.

Theory and the Race/Ethnic Composition of the Underclass

Do theoretical considerations also give us reason to expect more racial and ethnic diversity than studies of large cities show? Most of the conceptual literature tries to explain the emergence of a black underclass. Studies rarely consider the possibility that non-blacks are in the underclass. Therefore, to answer our question, we must reinterpret the conceptual literature.

Values, attitudes, and migration determine the racial and ethnic composition of the underclass in the conceptual literature.³ For example, Lehman (1986) emphasizes that blacks are descendants of recent immigrants to cities with values and attitudes that differ from those of longer term urban residents (whites). This explanation implies that the underclass is almost exclusively black. The remaining explanations emphasize structural economic change, migration, and government policy and do not assume that values and attitudes are transported through migration or that values and attitudes vary by race or ethnicity. Instead, if values and attitudes play a role at all, this role may be as either cause or effect.

Lehman's (1986) explanation of the emergence of the underclass has implications for blacks only. Blacks are descendants of immigrants with values and attitudes shaped by

sharecropping and employment discrimination in rural southern towns after slavery. Through sharecropping, blacks learned to accept economic dependence upon whites. Through employment discrimination, black men became accustomed to a life of "hustling," rather than stable employment. With very unstable incomes, these men rarely supported their families consistently. So unstable common-law marriages, matriarchal families, and male non-participation in the labor force developed into accepted patterns in lower-class black communities. When blacks migrated north they brought these attitudes with them. In the present generation, these attitudes are manifest in social problems such as welfare dependency, female-headed households, and male non-participation in the labor force.

Other explanations need not apply strictly to blacks. Recall that Wilson's explanation rests on two key ideas. First, structural changes reduced the demand for low-wage labor in urban areas, leaving low-skilled blacks in urban areas jobless and poor. Second, out-migration of middle and working class blacks isolated low-skilled blacks from mainstream role models and other resources. These ideas seem plausible, but do they have implications for other race and ethnic groups?

Low-skilled members of other race and ethnic groups were not immune to structural changes. These changes also reduced employment and real wages among low-skilled whites and Hispanics (Lichter 1988; Berlin and Sum 1988; Blackburn, Bloom, and Freeman 1990; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce 1989).

One might argue that migration prevented the emergence of an underclass among low skilled non-blacks. Then why did migration not prevent the formation of an underclass among low-skilled blacks? Kasarda (forthcoming) argues that in the metropolitan areas hardest hit by structural change, low-skilled blacks found substitutes for the income, goods, and services formerly derived from employment. The major substitutes -- welfare, public housing, and employment in the underground economy--removed the pressure for jobless blacks to migrate to other areas where the demand for low-skilled workers remained high.

But were displaced members of other race and ethnic groups more likely than displaced blacks to migrate?⁴ Were they less likely than displaced blacks to depend on welfare, public housing, and the underground economy? These questions remain unanswered.

Wilson's second argument seems to apply strictly to blacks, but this argument receives mixed support from the data. The Fair Housing Act of 1970 released a flood of middle and working-class blacks who wanted to leave ghetto areas. Similar phenomena did not come into play for non-blacks. But, at the end of the decade, poor and non-poor blacks were no more spatially isolated from one another than poor and non-poor members of other race and ethnic groups (Massey and Eggers 1989). If poor whites and Hispanics were also isolated from upwardly mobile members of their race and ethnic group, why didn't their neighborhoods destabilize? Why didn't social isolation from mainstream role models and resources produce some increase in social problems among these race and ethnic groups?

Finally, government policies play a key role in conservative explanations of underclass emergence (Murray 1984; Mead 1986). For example, Mead argues that the War on Poverty provided AFDC benefits and other assistance to the poor, but these programs did not impose social obligations (e.g., work, finishing high school, and delaying parenthood until one can support children). So these programs encouraged the social problems associated with the underclass.

While minorities furnish their main examples, Murray and Mead do not assume that values and attitudes regarding work and welfare vary by race and ethnicity. Therefore, their explanations should apply to low-skilled members of other race and ethnic groups, who presumably also find government programs attractive alternatives to work at low wages.

Rationale for Studying Spatial Concentration of Social Problems

Wilson (1987) also provides the rationale for studying the spatial concentration of social problems. His definition of the underclass emphasizes a heterogeneous grouping of families and individuals. Although members of this grouping have distinct social problems.

they live and interact in the same troubled neighborhoods, which help to isolate them from the mainstream.

Ricketts and Sawhill (1989) designed a measure of underclass neighborhoods to reflect this definition. According to Ricketts and Sawhill, an underclass neighborhood (hence an R/S neighborhood) is a census tract with above average rates of the following four social problems: (1) households headed by females with children; (2) households receiving public assistance; (3) male detachment from the labor force; (4) and dropping out of high school among teenagers. This definition uses the areal unit of observation in Census tract data. This allows Ricketts and Sawhill to study a heterogeneous group of families and individuals who exhibit distinct social problems but live and interact in the same neighborhood.

Conceptually, everyone who lives in an underclass-neighborhood is in the underclass neighborhood population, whether or not they exhibit the social problems used as underclass neighborhood criteria. Some observers object that this stigmatizes people because of their residence. Neither Wilson nor Ricketts and Sawhill intend to stigmatize. Instead, the underclass, using Wilson's definition, and the underclass-neighborhood population, using the Ricketts and Sawhill definition, are inclusive conceptual and empirical constructs meant to center attention on concentration effects.

For example, a boy who grows up in a neighborhood where a large fraction of the men rarely work or look for work may eventually accept this outcome as the norm for adult males. When a girl sees that women head a large fraction of the neighborhood families and support these families by AFDC, she may foresee this outcome for the family she might someday form. Finally, children growing up in neighborhoods where a large fraction of the teenagers -- including their older brothers and sisters -- fail to complete high school, may themselves expect to become high school dropouts. If concentration effects are important, the focus of study and policy should not only include those who already exhibit social problems, but should extend to those who are at risk for developing social problems. At

risk people live in neighborhoods where social problems are commonplace. The inclusive constructs proposed by Wilson and Ricketts and Sawhill meet this objective.

The Ricketts and Sawhill study has three other features that merit close attention. First, its definition is very restrictive. A census tract cannot become an underclass neighborhood unless the incidence of each social problem is at least one standard deviation above the mean for all tracted areas. Such values coincided for 880 neighborhoods in the Ricketts and Sawhill study. These neighborhoods included 2.5 million people. Second, Ricketts and Sawhill assess the incidence of social problems in a neighborhood through comparisons with means for all tracted areas, not means for each metropolitan area. The mean for all tracted areas more closely resembles norms that prevail throughout society while the mean for a particular metropolitan area could vary considerably from social norms. This would make standards for including neighborhoods in the underclass vary from one metropolitan area to another (Ricketts and Mincy 1990). Third, because Ricketts and Sawhill use all tracted areas, there should be no large metropolitan area bias in their results.

Ricketts and Sawhill disaggregate the underclass-neighborhood population into three race and ethnic groups: blacks, whites, and Hispanics who did not report their race as white. They found that blacks represented 59 percent of the underclass-neighborhood population, whites represented 28 percent, and Hispanics represented 10 percent. The Ricketts and Sawhill estimate of the white share of the underclass-neighborhood population is much higher than estimates based on the spatial concentration of poverty in the 100 largest cities. This leads one to ask what the white share of the underclass area population would be, if Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic whites were tabulated separately.

This introduces a second rationale for studying the spatial concentration of social problems by race and ethnicity. Jargowsky and Bane (1990), study the poor in poverty neighborhoods and the social conditions of all people in such neighborhoods. Thus their study uses both exclusive and inclusive constructs, though they reject the term underclass in

favor of ghetto poverty. Jargowsky and Bane omit whites from discussions of the level of ghetto poverty for three reasons: (1) few whites live in poor neighborhoods, (2) white ghetto poverty is constant across regions and cities, and (3) whites who live in neighborhoods with poverty rates exceeding 20 percent appear to be either college students or Hispanics. The third observation suggests that the concentration of poverty among whites is some kind of anomaly, unworthy of policy attention.⁵

Spatial concentrations of the social problems that Wilson and Ricketts and Sawhill emphasize are not subject to this interpretation. Concentrations of idle teenagers, idle adult males, and female headed families that depend upon welfare, reveal a serious and undeniable social problem. This heterogeneous grouping of troubled families and individuals cannot be mistaken for a population that postpones employment to invest in schooling. Further, if we are careful to distinguish between racial and ethnic groups, the data can tell us if the problem belongs to minorities exclusively.

Reconciling The Estimates: Data and Methods.

To reconcile estimates of the race and ethnic composition of the underclass, we make three adjustments to previous work. First, we include small, medium, and large metropolitan areas in the sample to adjust for differential location patterns by race, ethnicity, and size-of-place area. Second, we disaggregate race and ethnicity into mutually exclusive groups: (1) persons of Hispanic origin (Hispanic); (2) non-Hispanic black; (3) non-Hispanic white; and (4) other. Third, we make both spatial measures inclusive by including all persons living in R/S neighborhoods or all persons living in extreme poverty neighborhoods. In this way, both measures reflect concentration effects and we avoid confusing results for non-Hispanic whites with results for non-Hispanic members of other racial groups.⁶

The data come from the Urban Institute Underclass Data Base (UDB), which includes tabulations from over 42,000 tracts in the 1980 census and over 34,000 tracts in the 1970

census. These tabulations include demographic characteristics and social problem indicators for each tract. Although UDB can match data for the same tract in 1970 and 1980, we use the 1980 data only because Census Bureau methods for counting the number of Hispanics are not comparable in the 1980 and 1970 censuses.⁷

The source of these tabulations is the 1980 Census of Population, Summary Tape File 3A. This file contains aggregate counts of people with different characteristics in each census tract. The major advantage of these data is that they are very large and contain very detailed information about small geographic areas (census tracts) that are the statistical equivalents of neighborhoods. On average each census tract includes 4,000 persons. The unit of observation for this data file is an area -- the neighborhood -- not a person. This unit of observation is the same used by Ricketts and Sawhill and is well suited for Wilson's inclusive underclass concept.

The data have two disadvantages. First, they cover only tracted areas, 99 percent of which were inside metropolitan areas. Therefore, one cannot observe concentrations of social problems that may exist among the rural poor. This would tend to underestimate the white underclass. Second, the data are aggregate cross-tabulations of characteristics chosen by the Census Bureau, which means that one cannot specify certain subgroups or social problems as precisely as one might like. In particular, one cannot distinguish many of the social and economic characteristics of the poor who live in extreme poverty areas from the social and economic characteristics of the non-poor who live in those areas.

Findings

Size-of-place has an important effect on the racial and ethnic composition of the underclass. This effect is apparent when we look at the distribution of racial and ethnic groups across neighborhoods in metropolitan areas of different sizes. It is also apparent when we look at black, white, and Hispanic neighborhoods across metropolitan areas of

different sizes. Both views show that the underclass is a multiracial and multiethnic phenomenon, and that focussing on large cities hides the white underclass.

The Population in Underclass Neighborhoods. The two spatial measures produce remarkably similar pictures of the racial and ethnic composition of underclass neighborhoods.⁸ Blacks represent 58 to 59 percent of the people in R/S or extreme poverty neighborhoods, whites represent 20 to 21 percent, and Hispanics represent 19 percent (Table 3A). After including small, medium, and large metropolitan areas, blacks and Hispanics are still overrepresented in underclass neighborhoods, but clearly the underclass is not exclusively a minority problem.

Further disaggregating these results by size-of-place underscores the multiracial and multiethnic character of the population in underclass neighborhoods (Tables 3B and 3C). In metropolitan areas of all sizes, blacks represent more than half of the people in underclass neighborhoods. Whites are the next largest demographic group, except in underclass neighborhoods located in metropolitan areas with 5 million people or more. Hispanics represent the smallest of the three major racial/ethnic groups, except in these largest metropolitan areas.

Close examination of these data suggests that size-of-place is almost as important as race in explaining the racial and ethnic composition of the population in underclass neighborhoods. In metropolitan areas with 5 million people or more -- Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles -- blacks represent 52 percent of the people in R/S (Table 3B) neighborhoods and 59 percent of the people in extreme poverty neighborhoods (Table 3C). Hispanics represent 38 of the people in R/S neighborhoods and 33 percent of the people in extreme poverty neighborhoods. Whites represent 9 percent of the people in R/S neighborhoods and 7 percent of the people in extreme poverty neighborhoods in these large metropolitan areas.

The race and ethnic composition of the population in underclass neighborhoods changes in smaller places. For example, in metropolitan areas with 2 to 5 million people (e.g., Boston, Baltimore, Detroit, Houston, Oakland-San Francisco, and Sacramento) the Hispanic share of the population in underclass neighborhoods drops sharply, and the black and white shares rise. Then as the size of the metropolitan area falls, the black share of population in underclass neighborhoods falls, but the white and Hispanic shares rise. There are few Hispanics in non-metropolitan areas, so whites are 25 percent of the people in R/S neighborhoods and 30 percent of extreme poverty neighborhoods in non-metropolitan areas. These data show that if one looks beyond Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles one would find that underclass neighborhoods are most likely to be populated by blacks, then whites, then Hispanics.

Racial/Ethnic Underclass Neighborhoods. Although the foregoing results suggest that the underclass is a multiracial and multiethnic problem, inclusive definitions still leave room for skepticism. Observers wedded to the conventional wisdom that only minorities are in the underclass might ask if the whites in R/S or extreme poverty neighborhoods were simply residents of neighborhoods in which troubled blacks and Hispanics made up most of the population. To answer this question we disaggregate R/S and extreme poverty neighborhoods into categories depending upon which racial/ethnic group represented most of the population. These categories represent census tracts in which either black, white, or Hispanic people constituted more than 51 percent of the population. We refer to neighborhoods where whites, blacks, or Hispanics are in the majority as white, black, or Hispanic neighborhoods, respectively.

Disaggregating neighborhoods by the race and ethnic majority of the population produces little change in our picture of the racial/ethnic composition of the underclass (Table 4A). Blacks are in the majority in 59 percent of the R/S neighborhoods and 60 percent of the extreme poverty neighborhoods. These neighborhoods included 58 percent of

all people living in R/S neighborhoods and 61 percent of all people living in extreme poverty neighborhoods. There are more R/S and extreme poverty neighborhoods with white majorities than Hispanic majorities, although these neighborhoods contain roughly equal shares of all people living in R/S or extreme poverty neighborhoods.

Further disaggregating these results by size-of-place adds nothing to what we learned in the previous section (Tables 4B and 4C). Black underclass neighborhoods represent half-or-more of all underclass neighborhoods, no matter what the size of the metropolitan area. Hispanic neighborhoods represent the second largest share of underclass neighborhoods only in the largest metropolitan areas. Black neighborhoods represent the overwhelming majority of underclass neighborhoods in metropolitan areas with 2 to 5 million people. Then as the size of the metropolitan area falls, the black share of underclass neighborhoods falls, but the white and Hispanic shares rise.

Values could explain these patterns, but in a different way than current explanations emphasizing values. Presently such explanations (e.g., Lehman, 1986) argue that blacks have perverse values that lead to social problems. The data in tables 1 through 4 suggest an alternative hypothesis, involving three propositions.

First, values about work and dependency are constant across racial and ethnic groups, but there are important cross race and cross ethnic group differences in the distribution of economic well-being and in preferences for large places.⁹ Second, minorities are more likely to be economically disadvantaged and they prefer large places. Third, whites are less likely to be economically disadvantaged and disadvantaged whites prefer smaller places. This hypothesis and the tendency to focus on large places when observing the behavior of disadvantaged people, could explain why many observers believe that the underclass is exclusively a minority problem.

Tables 5 and 6 provide the most direct answer to the question with which we began: Do large metropolitan areas distort our picture of the underclass? These tables show how

black, white, and Hispanic underclass neighborhoods are distributed by size-of-place. Metropolitan areas with 5 million or more people contain 66 percent of the Hispanic underclass neighborhoods and 54 percent of the Hispanic extreme poverty neighborhoods. Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, the Hispanic groups most likely to be in the underclass, concentrate in these metropolitan areas. These same metropolitan areas contain 22 percent of the black R/S neighborhoods and 24 percent of the black extreme poverty neighborhoods. But these metropolitan areas contain only 4 percent of the white underclass neighborhoods and 3 percent of the white extreme poverty neighborhoods. If media and scholarly accounts focus on these metropolitan areas, one would think that the underclass is almost exclusively a minority problem.

Adding metropolitan areas with between 2 and 5 million people greatly increases the number of R/S and extreme poverty neighborhoods with black and white majorities. Metropolitan areas with over 2 million people contain almost half the black R/S and extreme poverty neighborhoods. These metropolitan areas also contain almost one-quarter of the white R/S and extreme poverty neighborhoods. Adding metropolitan areas with between 2 and 5 million people produces little change in the shares of Hispanic R/S and extreme poverty neighborhoods.

Finally, small and medium size metropolitan areas--those with less than one million people--contain most of the white underclass neighborhoods, but less than 40 percent of the black and Hispanic underclass neighborhoods. These metropolitan areas contain: 55 percent of the white R/S neighborhoods and 65 percent of the white extreme poverty neighborhoods; 35 percent of the black R/S neighborhoods and 38 percent of the black extreme poverty neighborhoods; and 18 percent of the Hispanic underclass neighborhoods and 31 percent of the Hispanic extreme poverty neighborhoods.

Focussing on the total population living in underclass neighborhoods also highlights black and Hispanic neighborhoods in larger places. Of persons living in black R/S

neighborhoods 52 percent live in metropolitan areas with 2 million or more people; 34 percent live in metropolitan areas of 380,000 to 999,999; and 14 percent live in smaller places.¹⁰ Using the data from Table 6, 48 percent of the people living in black extreme poverty neighborhoods live in metropolitan areas of more than 2 million, 35 percent live in mid-sized metropolitan areas, and 17 percent live in smaller places.

The large-metropolitan area concentration of the population living in Hispanic underclass neighborhoods is even more striking. Metropolitan areas with 2 million or more people contain 73 percent of persons living in Hispanic R/S neighborhoods; another 25 percent of this population lives in middle-size metropolitan areas; and only 2 percent live in the smallest places. The data from Table 6 show that metropolitan areas of 2 million or more people contain 53 percent of those living in Hispanic extreme poverty neighborhoods; middle-sized metropolitan areas contain 21 percent; and smaller places contain 26 percent.

Again, small- and middle-size places contain a disproportionate share of the population living in white underclass neighborhoods. Metropolitan areas with 2 million or more people contain 27 percent of this population; while middle-sized metropolitan areas contain 45 percent; and smaller places contain the remaining 28 percent. Data for the population living in white extreme poverty neighborhoods show 18 percent living in the largest metropolitan areas, 35 percent in middle-sized metropolitan areas, and 46 percent in smaller places.

Thus, three features account for the popular perception that the underclass is exclusively a minority problem: (1) the number of white underclass neighborhoods; (2) the distribution of white underclass neighborhoods by size-of-place; (3) and the distribution of the population living in such neighborhoods by size-of-place. White R/S and extreme poverty neighborhoods represent roughly 19 percent of underclass neighborhoods (Table 4A). Further, small and medium size metropolitan areas--those with less than one million people--contain most such neighborhoods and most people living in such neighborhoods.

Finally, in 1980, 88 percent of the metropolitan areas in the United States had less than one million people. In other words, there are only a few white underclass neighborhoods and these neighborhoods are in small and medium size places all around the country. By contrast there are many minority underclass neighborhoods and these neighborhoods are in the largest, most visible places.

Besides being located in metropolitan areas of different sizes, how do white, black, and Hispanic underclass neighborhoods differ? In particular, are minorities who live in underclass neighborhoods worse off than their white counterparts?

The data in Tables 7 and 8 suggest that they are not. When compared with white underclass neighborhoods, black and Hispanic underclass neighborhoods generally have higher mean poverty rates and higher mean values of other social problem indicators. But after adjusting for statistical variations, these differences are statistically insignificant (Tables 7 and 8, columns 1-6).¹¹ The most striking difference among these neighborhoods is that they are either almost all black, all white, or all Hispanic. Two-thirds to four-fifths of the residents of these neighborhoods are members of the same race or ethnic group, though we required only 51 percent majority for disaggregation (Tables 7 and 8, columns 7-9).

Summary and Conclusion

Most studies of the underclass center attention on minorities, especially blacks. This view is the result of early descriptive and empirical studies that emphasize large cities where minorities concentrate. This work also measures the underclass by the poor who live in poor neighborhoods. This narrow definition does not reflect concentration effects, which are central to Wilson's underclass concept.

The conceptual underclass literature does not explain why the underclass is exclusively a minority problem. This literature explains that structural changes in urban economies have disproportionately affected minorities, but these forces should have had some adverse

effects on low-skilled members of all race and ethnic groups. Thus, one suspects more race and ethnic diversity in the underclass than the earliest studies show.

We examine underclass neighborhoods in small, medium, and large metropolitan areas and the characteristics of the total population living in these neighborhoods. We find that minorities are overrepresented in this population, but non-Hispanic whites are a significant minority--about 20 percent. This is true whether we use the spatial concentration of poverty or the spatial concentration of other social problems to define an underclass neighborhood.

There are only a few white underclass neighborhoods and these neighborhoods are located in small and medium size metropolitan areas all around the country. By contrast there are many minority underclass neighborhoods and these neighborhoods are located in the largest metropolitan areas. Thus, by ignoring concentrations of poverty and social problems in small and medium size metropolitan areas, scholars and journalists have ignored the white underclass.

Throwing the spotlight on large metropolitan areas has benefits for research and policy. Large metropolitan areas experienced the greatest increases in the spatial concentration of poverty and other social problems between 1970 and 1980. Large metropolitan areas also may have experienced the greatest losses in high paying jobs for low-skilled workers. These losses are an important part of the explanation of the growing spatial concentration of poverty and social problems. Thus, research and policy targeted at large metropolitan areas may have greater potential payoffs.

But putting the spotlight on large metropolitan area has important costs, because most white underclass neighborhoods are in small and medium size metropolitan areas. This large-metropolitan-area focus: (1) feeds the public's perception that the underclass is exclusively a minority problem; (2) undermines the conceptual focus on structural economic changes that should affect all low-skilled workers; and (3) undermines the call for non-race specific policies to help people move out of the underclass. Thus, a true chilling effect on

social policy may occur if researchers and journalists continue to ignore concentrations of social problems in small and middle size metropolitan areas.

Finally, by ignoring small and middle size metropolitan areas, we may be missing important clues. For example, why do blacks with social problems concentrate in certain neighborhoods in large metropolitan areas, but whites with the same problems avoid these neighborhoods and metropolitan areas? Would policies to increase affordable and nonsegregated housing in smaller metropolitan areas help to mitigate the effects of the dramatic growth in the underclass in larger metropolitan areas? Underclass neighborhoods in small and medium size metropolitan areas have the same problems as underclass neighborhoods in large metropolitan areas. But the former are in areas of different scale and have greater racial and ethnic diversity. Thus, smaller metropolitan areas may provide researchers and policymakers with better laboratories for developing and testing interventions.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ The source of these data is the 1980 Census of Population report (PC80-entitled "Poverty Areas in Large cities." This report includes data for the 100 largest central cities, which vary considerably by population size. Cities with over 1 million people constitute 30 percent of this group. More than two-thirds of the cities in this group have less than 1 million people.
- ² For example, Table 2 shows that 15 percent of all non-Hispanic whites in the U.S. lived in the 100 largest cities, while 41 percent of all Hispanic whites lived in these cities. Dividing the latter by the former we see that Hispanic whites were 2.7 times as likely as non-Hispanic whites to live in the 100 largest cities. This is what we mean by a relative propensity.
- ³ This section draws heavily from an unpublished review of the theoretical literature in Ricketts (1987).
- ⁴ This is quite possible. Blacks in the 1970s were mostly second generation migrants to metropolitan areas in the North. As such, they were more likely to reject employment at low wages than low-skilled whites who had no recent parental migrant experience with which to compare, or Hispanics, who arrived more recently (Piore, 1979). Many working age blacks were just one or two generations removed from family members who migrated from the South. Therefore, they might be less likely to migrate South for employment than low-skilled whites or Hispanics who had no recent experience with Southern out-migration.
- ⁵ Jargowsky and Bane (1990) do not make this explicit conclusion.
- ⁶ We cannot disaggregate estimates of the race and ethnic composition of the poor in extreme poverty areas, unless we rely on published data for large central cities. Census tract micro-data files do not tabulate data by race, ethnicity, and poverty status. Jargowsky and Bane (1990) circumvent this problem by creating a category called non-Hispanic whites and other races. This is a reasonable procedure for most neighborhoods, because non-Hispanic whites are the majority group in U.S. population. But in Ricketts and Sawhill underclass and extreme poverty neighborhoods, non-Hispanic whites may be numerical minorities, especially if the group in question is poor. Since the race and ethnic composition of the underclass is critical to the question of the chilling effect of underclass research on social policy, we prefer to identify race and ethnicity as carefully as possible.
- ⁷ In the 1970 census, the count of Hispanics was determined by observations of census enumerators, by the surname of respondents, or by residence in South America, which many respondents took to mean southern United States. In the 1980 census, the count of Hispanics was determined on the basis of respondent's answers to questions about parentage.
- ⁸ This is not a necessary result. The two spatial measures imply different numbers of tracts. There are 880 underclass neighborhoods and 1861 extreme poverty neighborhoods. Further, underclass neighborhoods are not entirely a subset of extreme poverty neighborhoods. About sixty percent of the underclass neighborhoods are also extreme poverty neighborhoods.

9 Economists tend to express values in terms of preferences.

10 Some people living in black underclass neighborhoods are not black.

11 Assuming normality, tests of null hypotheses that mean values of social problem for minorities exceed mean values of social problem indicators for whites are rejected at the ninety-five percent significant level.

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TABLE 1

THE DISTRIBUTION OF POOR PERSONS LIVING IN POVERTY AREAS IN THE
100 LARGEST CENTRAL CITIES BY RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP
AND TYPE OF POVERTY AREA, 1980

Racial/Ethnic Group	POOR PERSONS IN POVERTY AREAS			POOR PERSONS IN EXTREME POVERTY AREAS		
	Number Poor	Percent of All Poor in These Areas	Percent of Racial/Ethnic Group in These Areas	Number Poor	Percent of All Poor in These Areas	Percent of Racial/Ethnic Group in These Areas
Non-Hispanic Black	2,971,409	57	37	1,248,151	68	51
Non-Hispanic White	902,278	17	23	175,178	10	39
Hispanic	1,168,567	23	37	383,355	21	52
Other	148,860	3	N.A.	27,700	2	N.A.
TOTAL	5,191,114	100	34	1,834,384	100	50

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "1980 Census of the Population, Vol. 2: Poverty Areas in Large Cities," Subject Reports PC80-2-8D, Table 1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).

- a. This column should be interpreted as: 37% of Non-Hispanic Black persons in poverty areas are poor.

TABLE 2

THE PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL POPULATION AND THE POVERTY
POPULATION IN THE 100 LARGEST CENTRAL CITIES
BY RACE AND TYPE OF POVERTY AREA, 1980

Racial/Ethnic Group	Percent of U.S. Population Living in 100 Largest Central Cities	Percent of U.S. Poverty Population Living in 100 Largest Central Cities		
		All Areas of City	Poverty Areas	Extreme Poverty Areas ^a
Non-Hispanic Black	47	48	40	17
Non-Hispanic White	15	17	6	1
Hispanic	41	47	35	11
Other	33	33	17	3
TOTAL	21	30	19	7

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "1980 Census of Population, Vol. 1: General Social and Economic Characteristics," U.S. Summary PC80-1-C1 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983) Tables 74, 75, 96, 171.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, "1980 Census of the Population, Vol. 2: Poverty Areas in Large Cities," Subject Reports PC80-2-80 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985) Table 1.

a. This column should be interpreted as: 17% of poor blacks live in extreme poverty areas in the 100 largest central cities.

TABLE 3A

THE RACIAL/ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION IN UNDERCLASS
NEIGHBORHOODS AND EXTREME POVERTY NEIGHBORHOODS, 1980

Racial/ Ethnic Group	Underclass Neighborhoods		Extreme Poverty Neighborhoods	
	Percent Distribution	Population	Percent Distribution	Population
Non-Hispanic Black	58	1,436,881	59	3,243,683
Non-Hispanic White	21	518,791	20	1,099,969
Hispanic	19	479,794	19	1,070,203
Other	2	48,210	2	127,082
TOTAL	100	2,483,676	100	5,540,937

SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations based on 1980 Census data.

TABLE 3B
Distribution of R/S Underclass Neighborhood Residents
By Metropolitan-Area Size and Racial/Ethnic Group,
1980

Metropolitan-Area Size and Racial/Ethnic Population	Population	
	Number	Percent
5 to 10 Million		
Non-Hispanic Black	374601	52
Non-Hispanic White	64919	9
Hispanic	264061	37
Other	14809	2
TOTAL	718390	100
2 Million TO 4,999,999		
Non-Hispanic Black	398480	69
Non-Hispanic White	118038	21
Hispanic	49477	9
Other	8701	2
TOTAL	574696	100
1 Million to 1,999,999		
Non-Hispanic Black	235901	69
Non-Hispanic White	87283	21
Hispanic	74209	9
Other	7449	2
TOTAL	404842	100
380,000 to 999,999		
Non-Hispanic Black	243334	54
Non-Hispanic White	126479	28
Hispanic	70676	16
Other	7168	2
TOTAL	447657	100
Zero to 379,999		
Non-Hispanic Black	165041	54
Non-Hispanic White	113612	37
Hispanic	20615	7
Other	5002	2
TOTAL	304270	100
Not in an SMSA		
Non-Hispanic Black	19524	58
Non-Hispanic White	8460	25
Hispanic	756	2
Other	5081	15
TOTAL	33821	100

TABLE 3C
Distribution of Extreme Poverty Neighborhood Residents
By Metropolitan-Area Size and Racial/Ethnic Group,
1980

Metropolitan-Area Size and Racial/Ethnic Population	Population	
	Number	Percent
5 to 10 Million		
Non-Hispanic Black	874334	59
Non-Hispanic White	110157	7
Hispanic	485414	33
Other	21746	1
TOTAL	1491551	100
2 Million TO 4,999,999		
Non-Hispanic Black	716762	76
Non-Hispanic White	150958	16
Hispanic	61492	6
Other	17635	2
TOTAL	946847	100
1 Million to 1,999,999		
Non-Hispanic Black	496527	62
Non-Hispanic White	144985	18
Hispanic	146573	18
Other	14147	2
TOTAL	802232	100
380,000 to 999,999		
Non-Hispanic Black	615703	62
Non-Hispanic White	241881	24
Hispanic	105058	11
Other	28776	3
TOTAL	991418	100
Zero to 379,999		
Non-Hispanic Black	437368	40
Non-Hispanic White	390648	35
Hispanic	259770	24
Other	15492	1
TOTAL	1103278	100
Not in an SMSA		
Non-Hispanic Black	102989	50
Non-Hispanic White	61340	30
Hispanic	11906	6
Other	29286	14
TOTAL	205521	100

SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations based on 1980 Census data.

TABLE 4A

NUMBER, POPULATION AND RACIAL/ETHNIC MAJORITY OF TRACTS
BY ALTERNATE UNDERCLASS DEFINITIONS, 1980

Racial/ Ethnic Majority	RICKETTS/SAWHILL				EXTREME POVERTY			
	Tracts		Population		Tracts		Population	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Non-Hispanic Black	517	58.8	1,447,931	58.3	1,111	59.7	3,358,550	60.6
Non-Hispanic White	171	19.4	398,901	16.1	349	18.8	880,901	15.9
Hispanic	129	14.7	414,592	16.7	297	16.0	991,627	17.9
Other	63	7.2	222,252	8.9	104	5.6	309,859	5.6
Total	880	100	2,483,676	100	1,861	100	5,540,937	100

SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations based on 1980 Census data.

TABLE 4B
THE DISTRIBUTION OF R/S UNDERCLASS TRACTS BY
RACIAL/ETHNIC MAJORITY AND SIZE OF METROPOLITAN AREA,
1980

Metropolitan-Area Size and Racial/Ethnic Majority	TRACTS		POPULATION	
	Number	Proportion of all R/S Underclass Tracts of this racial/ethnic majority	Number	Proportion of all R/S Underclass Tracts of this racial/ethnic majority
5 to 10 Million				
Non-Hispanic Black	112	0.50	336715	0.47
Non-Hispanic White	7	0.03	15849	0.02
Hispanic	85	0.38	273731	0.38
Other	20	0.09	92095	0.13
TOTAL	224	1.00	718390	1.00
2 Million TO 4,999,999				
Non-Hispanic Black	133	0.73	423459	0.74
Non-Hispanic White	34	0.19	92766	0.16
Hispanic	6	0.03	30428	0.05
Other	10	0.05	28043	0.05
TOTAL	183	1.00	574696	1.00
1 Million to 1,999,999				
Non-Hispanic Black	31	0.61	241334	0.60
Non-Hispanic White	91	0.21	64209	0.16
Hispanic	15	0.10	51063	0.13
Other	12	0.08	48236	0.12
TOTAL	149	1.00	404842	1.00
380,000 to 999,999				
Non-Hispanic Black	73	0.57	165539	0.56
Non-Hispanic White	42	0.26	101461	0.26
Hispanic	9	0.11	21905	0.12
Other	8	0.07	19640	0.06
TOTAL	132	1.00	308545	1.00
Zero to 379,999				
Non-Hispanic Black	5	0.54	85211	0.57
Non-Hispanic White	31	0.38	13481	0.35
Hispanic	11	0.02	30963	0.02
Other	4	0.06	9457	0.06
TOTAL	51	1.00	139112	1.00
Not in an SMSA				
Non-Hispanic Black	68	0.64	172182	0.69
Non-Hispanic White	48	0.29	105998	0.15
Hispanic	3	0.00	6502	0.00
Other	8	0.07	19588	0.15
TOTAL	127	1.00	304270	1.00

TABLE 4C
THE DISTRIBUTION OF EXTREME POVERTY NEIGHBORHOODS BY
RACIAL/ETHNIC MAJORITY AND SIZE OF METROPOLITAN AREA,
1980

Metropolitan-Area Size and Racial/Ethnic Majority	TRACTS		POPULATION	
	Number	Proportion of all Extreme Poverty Neigh. of this racial/ethnic majority	Number	Proportion of all R/S Underclass Tracts of this racial/ethnic majority
5 to 10 Million				
Non-Hispanic Black	265	0.54	846067	0.44
Non-Hispanic White	28	0.06	48929	0.25
Hispanic	160	0.33	484329	0.25
Other	34	0.07	112326	0.06
TOTAL	487	1.00	1491651	1.00
2 Million TO 4,999,999				
Non-Hispanic Black	242	0.76	767598	0.88
Non-Hispanic White	54	0.17	108348	0.04
Hispanic	13	0.04	37298	0.04
Other	9	0.03	33603	0.04
TOTAL	318	1.00	946847	1.00
1 Million to 1,999,999				
Non-Hispanic Black	183	0.62	520719	0.70
Non-Hispanic White	58	0.20	107768	0.16
Hispanic	33	0.11	121535	0.07
Other	19	0.06	52210	0.07
TOTAL	293	1.00	802232	1.00
380,000 to 999,999				
Non-Hispanic Black	177	0.63	484855	0.78
Non-Hispanic White	67	0.22	156681	0.10
Hispanic	13	0.09	29329	0.06
Other	15	0.06	30063	0.06
TOTAL	272	1.00	700928	1.00
Zero to 379,999				
Non-Hispanic Black	55	0.46	168063	0.61
Non-Hispanic White	15	0.34	49394	0.34
Hispanic	19	0.17	56840	0.01
Other	8	0.04	16183	0.04
TOTAL	98	1.00	290480	1.00
Not in an SMSA				
Non-Hispanic Black	153	0.58	455687	0.72
Non-Hispanic White	113	0.23	364969	0.06
Hispanic	55	0.07	252806	0.00
Other	12	0.12	29816	0.22
TOTAL	333	1.00	1103278	1.00

TABLE 5

THE DISTRIBUTION OF RICKETTS/SAWHILL UNDERCLASS NEIGHBORHOODS BY RACIAL/ETHNIC
MAJORITY AND SIZE OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA, 1980

Racial/Ethnic Majority and City Size	TRACTS		POPULATION	
	Number	Proportion of all underclass tracts of this racial/ethnic majority	Number	Proportion of total population in underclass tracts of this racial/ ethnic majority
Non-Hispanic Black				
5 to 10 million	112	22	336,715	23
2 million to 4,999,999	133	26	423,459	29
1 million to 1,999,999	91	18	241,334	17
380,000 to 999,999	104	20	250,750	17
Less than 380,000	68	13	172,182	12
Not in an SMSA	9	2	23,491	2
TOTAL	517	100	1,447,931	100
Non-Hispanic White				
5 to 10 million	7	4	15,849	4
2 million to 4,999,999	34	20	92,766	23
1 million to 1,999,999	31	18	64,209	16
380,000 to 999,999	47	27	114,942	29
Less than 380,000	48	28	105,998	27
Not in an SMSA	4	2	5,137	1
TOTAL	171	100	398,901	100
Hispanic				
5 to 10 million	85	66	273,731	66
2 million to 4,999,999	6	5	30,428	7
1 million to 1,999,999	15	12	51,063	12
380,000 to 999,999	20	16	52,868	13
Zero to 380,000	3	2	6,502	2
Not in an SMSA	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	129	100	414,592	100

SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations based on 1980 Census data.

Note: The 100 largest metropolitan areas have populations of 380,000 or larger. Thus, the categories "380,000 to 999,999" to "5 to 10 million" contain the largest 100 and only 100 metropolitan areas.

TABLE 6

THE DISTRIBUTION OF EXTREME POVERTY BY RACIAL/ETHNIC
MAJORITY AND SIZE OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA, 1980

Racial/Ethnic Majority and City Size	TRACTS		POPULATION	
	Number	Proportion of all extreme poverty tracts of this racial/ethnic majority	Number	Proportion of total population in extreme poverty tracts of this racial/ethnic majority
Non-Hispanic Black				
5 to 10 million	265	24	846,067	25
2 million to 4,999,999	242	22	767,590	23
1 million to 1,999,999	183	16	520,719	16
380,000 to 999,999	233	21	652,918	19
Less than 380,000	153	14	455,687	14
Not in an SMSA	35	3	115,561	3
TOTAL	1111	100	3,358,550	100
Non-Hispanic White				
5 to 10 million	28	8	48,929	6
2 million to 4,999,999	54	15	108,348	12
1 million to 1,999,999	58	17	107,768	12
380,000 to 999,999	82	23	206,075	23
Less than 380,000	113	32	364,969	41
Not in an SMSA	14	4	44,812	5
TOTAL	349	100	880,901	100
Hispanic				
5 to 10 million	160	54	484,329	49
2 million to 4,999,999	13	4	37,298	4
1 million to 1,999,999	33	11	121,535	12
380,000 to 999,999	32	11	86,169	9
Less than 380,000	55	19	252,806	25
Not in an SMSA	4	1	9,490	1
TOTAL	297	100	991,627	100

SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations based on 1980 Census data.

Note: The 100 largest metropolitan areas have populations of 380,000 or larger. Thus, the categories "380,000 to 999,999" to "5 to 10 million" contain the largest 100 and only 100 metropolitan areas.

TABLE 7

THE PREVALENCE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND THE RACIAL/ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION WITHIN
RICKETTS/SAWHILL UNDERCLASS NEIGHBORHOODS BY RACIAL/ETHNIC MAJORITY, 1980

Racial/ Ethnic Majority	INDICATORS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS (As a Percentage of Tract Population)						RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP (Average Percent of Tract Population)		
	Female- Headed Families	High School Dropouts	Male Non-Labor Force Par- ticipants	Welfare Recipients	Poor	Unemployed	Non- Hispanic White	Non- Hispanic Black	Hispanic
Non-Hispanic Black									
Mean	0.65	0.37	0.59	0.36	0.46	0.19	0.10	0.84	0.06
Standard Deviation	0.12	0.10	0.09	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.12	0.15	0.10
Non-Hispanic White									
Mean	0.51	0.47	0.54	0.27	0.36	0.16	0.73	0.16	0.08
Standard Deviation	0.14	0.18	0.09	0.07	0.10	0.08	0.14	0.13	0.10
Hispanic									
Mean	0.56	0.39	0.57	0.40	0.50	0.15	0.12	0.19	0.67
Standard Deviation	0.12	0.09	0.08	0.10	0.10	0.06	0.11	0.13	0.13
Other									
Mean	0.52	0.42	0.55	0.31	0.39	0.16	0.30	0.30	0.32
Standard Deviation	0.11	0.15	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.07	0.15	0.15	0.14

SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations based on 1980 Census data.

TABLE 8

THE PREVALENCE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND THE RACIAL/ETHNIC DISTRIBUTION WITHIN
EXTREME POVERTY NEIGHBORHOODS BY RACIAL/ETHNIC MAJORITY, 1980

Racial/ Ethnic Majority	INDICATORS OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS (As a Percent of Tract Population)						RACIAL/ETHNIC GROUP (As a Percent of Tract Population)		
	Female- Headed Families	High School Dropouts	Male Non-Labor Force Par- ticipants	Welfare Recipients	Poor	Unemployed	Non- Hispanic White	Non- Hispanic Black	Hispanic
Non-Hispanic Black									
Mean	0.65	0.24	0.59	0.37	0.51	0.18	0.08	0.86	0.05
Standard Deviation	0.15	0.14	0.11	0.13	0.10	0.09	0.11	0.14	0.09
Non-Hispanic White									
Mean	0.32	0.23	0.62	0.14	0.51	0.11	0.76	0.15	0.06
Standard Deviation	0.30	0.28	0.16	0.15	0.12	0.09	0.15	0.14	0.09
Hispanic									
Mean	0.45	0.31	0.52	0.34	0.49	0.13	0.10	0.16	0.73
Standard Deviation	0.20	0.14	0.11	0.14	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.14	0.16
Other									
Mean	0.47	0.32	0.57	0.30	0.49	0.16	0.26	0.29	0.28
Standard Deviation	0.21	0.22	0.13	0.13	0.11	0.08	0.17	0.17	0.17

SOURCE: Urban Institute calculations based on 1980 Census data.