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ABSTRACT

College students (N=98) made self-reference judgments about the same 120 trait adjectives from two perspectives, once in terms of the "real" self and once in terms of the "ideal" self. Traits could then be separated into four categories of distinctiveness: those descriptive of both real and ideal self-concepts; those descriptive of real self only; those descriptive of ideal self only; and those in neither the real nor ideal self-concept. When the target was the real self, unique traits (real only or ideal only) took more time for self-descriptiveness decisions than less distinctive (both) traits, whereas this time lag did not appear when the target was the ideal self. It was also observed that ideal-self decisions were made more quickly than real-self decisions, regardless of trait distinctiveness. Traits judged to be descriptive of the real self (both or real only) were later recalled better than those not descriptive of real self (ideal only and neither), but there was no corresponding difference for those desired for the ideal self versus those undesired. References are included, and three data analysis figures are appended. (Author/TE)

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## TRAIT DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE IDEAL-SELF CONCEPT

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ABSTRACT

Subjects made self-reference judgments about the same trait adjectives from two perspectives, once in terms of the "real" self and once in terms of the "ideal" self. Traits could then be partitioned into four categories of distinctiveness: those descriptive of both real and ideal-self concepts, descriptive of real self only (not in the ideal-self concept), descriptive of ideal self only (not in the real-self concept), and those in neither the real nor ideal-self concept. When the target was real self, unique traits (Real Only or Ideal Only) took more time for self-descriptiveness decisions than less distinctive (Both) traits, whereas this was not true when the target was ideal self. It was also observed that ideal-self decisions were made quicker than real-self decisions, regardless of trait distinctiveness. Traits judged to be descriptive of the real self (Both or Real Only) were recalled better than those not descriptive of real self (Ideal Only and Neither), but there was no corresponding difference for those desired for the ideal self versus those undesired.

Deciding that an adjective describes oneself generally yields better retention of that adjective than would be the case for making a synonym judgment, and self-reference decisions are generally made more quickly than other decisions (see, for example, Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984, and Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). The generality of such effects (i.e., faster decisions and/or better retention) has been used to make inferences about the structure of the self concept. For example, Derry and Kuiper (1981) argued that if the self concept is distorted so that certain information is missing, then self-referencing that material will not be effective. In other words, self-referenced material won't be remembered better than material involved in nonself decisions, nor accessed faster, unless the targeted material is in the self concept. This content specificity hypothesis was supported when depressed subjects showed self-reference benefits for depressed-content adjectives (e.g., "bleak," "gloomy"), but showed no such benefits for nondepressed adjectives (e.g., "energetic," "amiable"). Thus it appeared that self-reference benefits accrued specifically for content that was a part of the subject's self concept, the "real self" concept.

The present research used the self-reference paradigm to study traits that are not precisely a part of the subject's actual-self concept, but which are sufficiently important that the traits constitute a part of the subject's "ideal" self, or what Markus and Nurius (1986) have labeled the "possible" or future self. Most of this work has been concerned with the motivational value of such an ideal, as it guides present and future activities, focusing on the generated affect that

subjects experience as progress either occurs or does not occur toward that goal.

However, our interest is more directed to the information processing consequences of the ideal self as a construct or schema. One recent study suggests that the ideal-self concept can produce benefits similar to those for the real self (Grove & Mueller, 1988). Although, strictly speaking, this might seem at odds with the content specificity view, it need not be construed that way. A number of studies (cf. Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Keenan & Baillet, 1980) have shown that decisions about familiar or well-known others can produce processing benefits comparable to self reference, presumably because familiar others involve well developed schemas as well. Therefore, perhaps such benefits can be expected if the ideal self also is a well-integrated cognitive structure, whether the content is actually a part of the real-self concept or not.

The Grove and Mueller study compared a semantic decision (synonym judgment) and a physical structure decision (word length) to a decision about whether or not the trait word actually described the subject (i.e., "real" self) and a decision about whether or not the trait word described how the subject would like to be (i.e., "ideal" self). As usual, the results indicated better performance for the semantic decision compared to the structural task, but, more important, both types of self-reference decisions led to performance even better than the semantic task, with no significant difference between the actual and ideal self decisions. For both of the self-reference decisions (real and ideal), subjects high in private self consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975; Buss, 1980) showed the greatest gains in recall. Furthermore, for the ideal-self decisions, the moderating effect of high

private self consciousness was especially pronounced for subjects who were low in self esteem (Coopersmith, 1967).

Obviously further examination is in order<sup>1</sup>, and the present study was an effort to identify just what traits might be in the real and ideal-self concepts, and how those in the ideal-self concept affect the encoding and retrieval of experiences. In particular, disparities between the real and ideal self have been implicated by various theorists (e.g., Ogilvie, 1987). This concern really can't be addressed well by the random assignment of traits to specific orienting decisions, so an alternative method is required. We adapted a procedure that has been useful in identifying trait distinctiveness. Some traits seem to be more general in that they are true of a number of people as well as a given person (i.e., shared), whereas other traits are more specific to that one person (unshared). Such trait distinctiveness can be identified by requiring subjects to judge each adjective twice, once for self-descriptiveness, and then again for other-descriptiveness (Mueller & Ross, 1984; Mueller, Ross, & Heesacker, 1984; Ross, Mueller, & de la Torre, 1985). Thus traits can be classified as (1) descriptive of both self and other, (2) descriptive of self but not others -- self-only, (3) descriptive of others but not self -- other-only, or (4) descriptive of neither. In this way we can identify not just whether a trait is a part of the self concept, but how central or distinctive the trait is for that individual. This classification potentially yields different results than can be obtained by merely asking subjects to rate how much a trait characterizes them, because a trait that may be quite salient (e.g., friendly), and thus rated highly, can still be one that the person shares with many other people (cf. Mueller, Thompson, & Dugan, 1986).<sup>2</sup>

The present experiment applied this double judgment task to two targets, the real self and the ideal self, thus effecting a similar four-fold classification. In this case, some traits will be judged to be in (1) both the real and ideal-self concepts, (2) some just in the real self, (3) some only in the ideal self, and (4) some in neither real nor ideal-self concepts. In this framework, unshared traits (i.e., those that are Real Only or Ideal Only) are presumably more distinctive than those that are shared or "actualized" (Both).

The questions of interest have to do with how the shared traits differ in processing from those that are unshared, and how the two distinctive categories (Real Only and Ideal Only) differ from one another. Furthermore, we sought to determine whether the effects of certain individual differences would be more pronounced when trait distinctiveness was enhanced. For example, subjects who differ in self esteem may show different degrees of development of the ideal self concept, and different representations of desirable and undesirable traits in the ideal self. In addition, given that high private self consciousness sometimes increases the benefits of self-referencing, is that effect magnified when the traits are highly distinctive (e.g., Real Only), or alternatively is that effect eliminated when the traits become sufficiently distinctive?

#### METHOD

##### Subjects

The subjects were 98 students (65 females) enrolled in introductory psychology courses, participating in return for extra credit in their course.

##### Materials

The 120 traits were selected from the Anderson (1968) norms.

There were 40 words for each of three levels of social desirability, "likeable," "neutral," and "unlikeable," with meaningfulness level equated for the three subsets (see Table 1).

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Insert Table 1 about here  
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### Procedure

The rating phase involved making a self-descriptiveness judgment from two perspectives, once in terms of "real self" and once in terms of "ideal self". The 120 adjectives were randomly ordered for each subject, and presented one at a time on a video monitor controlled by a microcomputer, accompanied by one of two questions, "Are you actually" or "Would you like to be." Subjects indicated "yes" or "no" by pressing a key on the keyboard. Subjects were instructed to answer rapidly, on the basis of a first impression. For half of the subjects, all 120 words were rated for real self first and then all 120 were rated again for ideal self, whereas for the other subjects the order was reversed.

After the words had been rated twice, there was an unannounced free recall test. Subjects typed in as many of the 120 words as they could remember, or wrote them out for the experimenter to type in.

The next phase of the experiment was the Self-Consciousness Questionnaire (Fenigstein, et al., 1975; Buss, 1980). This instrument consists of 23-items answered on a 5-point scale, and has three subscales that provide estimates of private self-consciousness (proneness to examine motives, moods, etc.), public self-consciousness (monitoring of appearance to others), and social anxiety (arousal in the presence of others). Self-awareness is sometimes related to the

magnitude of the self-reference effects (cf. Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984).

This was followed by the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). This questionnaire assesses the extent to which an individual engages in and enjoys effortful cognitive activity. There are 18-items, answered on a 5-point scale (e.g., I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems). Its effect has not been examined very often in the self-reference domain, but it seems of potential interest as a generalized measure of reflection.

The final phase of the experiment was the Coopersmith (1967) Self-Esteem Inventory, which consists of 58 statements answered as "like me" or "unlike me" (e.g., I'm pretty sure of myself, I can usually take care of myself, and so forth). This measure seems likely to be critical with regard to mismatches between the content of the real and ideal-self concepts.

### RESULTS

The primary data are summarized in Table 2, by real-ideal subtype and trait desirability. The **Both** items are those for which the subject said "yes" with regard to both the real and ideal self questions, the **Real-Only** items are those for which the subject said "yes" to the real-self judgment and "no" for the ideal self, the **Ideal-Only** items are those where the subject said "no" to the real-self judgment and "yes" to the ideal-self judgment, and the **Neither** items are those for which the subject said "no" to both targets.

The data were initially analyzed in 2 X 2 X 3 analyses of variance, for Real Self (yes, no) by Ideal Self (yes, no) by Likeability, all three factors being within-subjects. In addition, the dependent variable in each of the cells in Table 2 was correlated with each of the

five individual differences measures, with significant ( $p < .05$ ) relationships indicated in the table.

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Insert Table 2 about here  
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### Endorsements

The endorsement data indicate how the items were classified as a result of the two decisions. Predictably perhaps, the pattern for trait desirability was quite clear, in that the likeable items mostly showed up either as "I actually am" and "I want to be" or at least as "I want to be," whereas the unlikeable items showed up as "not me" and "not the way I want to be." The traits that are intermediate in likeability showed a more even distribution across the four subtypes of items. The likeability effects were highly significant (producing one  $F > 5,700$ ). These will be elaborated upon in conjunction with the self-esteem variable below.

### Latencies: Real-Self as Target

Overall, there was a Real-Self main effect, as decisions about traits descriptive of the real self (i.e., Both and Real-Only combined,  $M = 1512$  msec) were made more rapidly than for nondescriptive traits (Ideal-Only and Both combined,  $M = 1661$  msec),  $F(1,48) = 11.84$ ,  $p < .002$ .

The Ideal-Self main effect was not significant,  $F < 1$ , but there was a significant interaction for Real Self by Ideal Self (pooled over likeability),  $F(1,48) = 59.68$ ,  $p < .0001$ , as follows: the Both and Neither traits were answered more rapidly ( $M_s = 1346$  and  $1477$  msec, respectively) than the Real-Only or Ideal-Only traits ( $M_s = 1697$  and  $1861$  msec). In other words, distinctive traits of either sort were

answered more slowly than shared traits, analogous to what we have found for "unique" traits elsewhere (e.g., Mueller et al., 1986).

The likeability main effect was significant,  $F(2,96) = 23.77$ ,  $p < .0001$ , with the intermediate traits taking more time ( $M = 1733$  msec) than either the likeable or unlikeable traits ( $M_s = 1506$  and  $1441$  msec). There was a significant Real Self X Likeability interaction,  $F(2,96) = 61.69$ ,  $p < .0001$ , as this pattern was apparent only for the traits answered "yes," and not for the "no" traits. This occurred mostly because subjects were especially slow to answer "no" to likeable traits.

#### Latencies: Ideal-Self as Target

The judgments of Ideal Self revealed no main effects for either Real Self or Ideal Self outcomes, nor any interaction of Real Self X Ideal Self,  $F_s(1,48) < 3.03$ .

The likeability main effect was again significant,  $F(2,96) = 34.89$ ,  $p < .0001$ , as trait desirability effects again showed ideal self judgments to be slower for the intermediate traits ( $M = 1514$  msec) than for the likeable and unlikeable traits ( $M_s = 1080$  and  $1293$  msec).

Both the Real Self X Likeability and Ideal Self X Likeability interactions were significant,  $F_s(2,96) = 10.63$  and  $8.31$ ,  $ps < .001$ . In this case, it was answering "yes" for either real or ideal self for unlikeable traits that disrupted the likeability pattern just described.

It should also be noted that for 10 of the 12 cells the decision speeds for the Ideal-Self target was faster than for the Real-Self target, the two exceptions understandably being with unlikeable traits.

#### Probability of Recall

The recall data indicated three significant effects. First, the Real-Self main effect was significant,  $F(1,48) = 3.95$ ,  $p < .05$ , as traits judged to be descriptive of the actual self (Both and Real-Only

combined) were recalled better than those judged not descriptive (Ideal-Only and Neither combined) of the actual self ( $M_s = 24.4\%$  vs.  $21.6\%$ , respectively). The Ideal-Self main effect was not significant, nor was the Real Self by Ideal Self interaction ( $F_s < 1$ ). There was no significant difference in the recall of Real-Only and Both traits overall ( $M_s = 25.3\%$  and  $23.5\%$ ), but Real-Only traits seemed to be better recalled than Ideal-Only traits ( $M_s = 25.3\%$  versus  $22.5\%$ ,  $p < .05$ ).

The likeability main effect was significant overall,  $F(2,96) = 8.24$ ,  $p < .001$ , with likeable and unlikeable traits being remembered better than the intermediate traits ( $M_s = 26.6\%$ ,  $25.2\%$ , and  $19.4\%$ , respectively).

Finally, there was a significant Real-Self by Likeability interaction,  $F(1,96) = 10.57$ . As Figure 1 shows, for the Both and Real-Only subtypes ("yes" answers to the "I am" question) subjects recalled more of the unlikeable traits, compared to the likeable and neutral traits, whereas for the Ideal-Only and Neither subtypes subjects recalled likeable traits better than unlikeable and neutral traits. In other words, subjects were best able to remember undesirable aspects of the way they really were and desirable aspects of the way they are not.

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Insert Figure 1 about here  
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### Ancillary Results

The intercorrelations among the individual differences measures are shown in Table 3. The issue here is the independence of the dimensions examined. Although the Self-Consciousness Questionnaire and Need for Cognition scores seem minimally related (see also Mueller, Haupt, &

Grove, 1988), self esteem seems inversely related to private self consciousness and positively related to need for cognition.

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Insert Table 3 about here  
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Finally, the four item subtypes formed by the yes/no answers to the real- and ideal-self decisions were subjected to separate 2 X 3 analyses of variance, in a Questionnaire (high, low) by Likeability layout. This was done for Private Self Consciousness, Need for Cognition, and the Self Esteem scores, using basically a median split but excluding scores just above and just below the median in each case, with the result that the comparisons involved essentially the upper and lower thirds of the distributions rather than simply a median split per se.

**Self Esteem.** Subjects scoring 44 or above were considered "high" ( $M = 46.3$ ,  $SD = 2.3$ ) in self esteem, and those scoring 40 or below were classified as "low" ( $M = 31.6$ ,  $SD = 6.9$ ).

Overall, high esteem subjects classified more items in the Both category than did low scorers ( $M_s = 16.6$  vs.  $14.8$ ); fewer items in the Ideal-Only category ( $M_s = 1.9$  vs.  $3.5$ ), fewer in the Real-Only category ( $M_s = 3.5$  vs.  $6.5$ ), and more in the Neither category ( $M_s = 17.9$  vs.  $15.2$ ). All of these self-esteem main effects were significant,  $F_s(1,75) > 12.75$ . High self esteem was clearly associated with judgments to the effect that "I already am the way I want to be."

These patterns are clear in Figure 2, which also makes it clear that higher self-esteem is associated with fewer unshared traits, whether Real-Only or Ideal-Only, and higher self-esteem is associated with a greater number of shared traits. In other words, high-self esteem subjects seem to see "me like thee," whereas low self-esteem

subjects see themselves as special, i.e., possessing unshared traits (particularly unshared unlikeable traits).

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Insert Figure 2 about here  
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The self-esteem endorsement pattern varied with trait likeability, as indicated in two interactions (shown in Figure 3). In the case of the Real-Only traits, there was a significant interaction between Esteem and Likeability,  $F(2,150) = 12.35, p < .0001$ , as the tendency for high esteem subjects to generate fewer such traits of this type was greatest for unlikeable and intermediate traits (although present for likeable traits as well). There also was an Esteem by Likeability interaction for Ideal-Only traits,  $F(2,150) = 14.92, p < .0001$ , as the tendency for high esteem subjects to generate fewer such traits was most clear for likeable traits. It's clear that low self esteem subjects saw unlikeable traits as Real-Only to a disproportionate extent, and likeable traits as Ideal-Only, whereas high self esteem subjects tended to see likeable traits as actualized (Both).

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Insert Figure 3 about here  
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The one interesting effect in the latency data was the Esteem by Likeability interaction for Both traits when the target was ideal self,  $F(2,150) = 10.03, p < .0001$ . High esteem subjects took more time on these traits, but primarily so for the likeable items. This same effect was also present for the Real-Only traits  $F(2,150) = 5.14, p < .01$ .

There were no significant recall effects involving level of self esteem in these analyses.

**Private Self Consciousness.** Subjects who scored 36 or higher were classified as "high" in this analysis ( $M = 39.7$ ,  $SD = 3.0$ ), and those who scored 32 or below were classified as "low" ( $M = 28.8$ ,  $SD = 3.0$ ). Two effects of note emerged for the Real-Only traits.

First, there was a significant Private Self Consciousness by Likeability interaction for decision latency when the target was real self,  $F(2,78) = 3.48$ ,  $p < .03$ . High private self consciousness subjects were substantially slower to make real self decisions for Real-Only traits when the trait was likeable ( $M_s = 1699$  vs. 1342 msec for low private subjects), or unlikeable, ( $M_s = 1533$  vs. 1365), but there was no difference due to private self consciousness level for intermediate traits.

Second, for recall of the Real-Only traits, there was also a significant Private Self Consciousness by Likeability interaction,  $F(2,78) = 3.25$ ,  $p < .05$ . High private subjects recalled more likeable Real-Only traits than low private subjects ( $M_s = 37.5\%$  vs. 3.7%), but there was no difference for intermediate or unlikeable traits.

A significant Private by Likeability interaction for the Both traits,  $F(2,78) = 4.03$ ,  $p < .05$ , indicated that high private recalled more unlikeable traits ( $M_s = 38.8\%$  vs. 17.6%), but there was no difference for likeable or intermediate traits.

There were no significant interactions for Private Self Consciousness by Likeability for the Ideal-Only traits for any of the dependent variables. Thus private self consciousness had its only impact on the Real-Only traits, as if such subjects are more aware of how they really are but not more aware of how they would like to be.

**Need for Cognition.** Subjects who scored 66 or above on this

inventory were considered "high" need for cognition ( $M = 72.1$ ,  $SD = 5.3$ ), and those who scored 59 or below were considered "low" ( $M = 49.7$ ,  $SD = 8.0$ ).

High need for cognition subjects placed significantly more traits in the Both subset than did low need for cognition subjects,  $F(1,88) = 9.57$ ,  $p < .003$ ,  $M_s = 16.5$  vs. 15.1. The Ideal-Only traits also showed some differences in that high need for cognition subjects placed fewer traits in this category overall than did low scorers ( $M_s = 2.2$  vs. 3.3),  $F(1,88) = 10.48$ ,  $p < .002$ , with this pattern being clear for the likeable and intermediate traits ( $M_s = 2.9$  vs. 5.2, and 2.9 vs. 3.9, respectively) and not apparent for unlikeable traits (0.8 vs. 0.7). The Real-Only traits were likewise produced less often by high need for cognition subjects than by low need for cognition subjects,  $F(1,88) = 4.68$ ,  $p < .03$ , ( $M_s = 5.7$  versus 4.4), at least for unlikeable ( $M_s = 5.4$  and 6.6) and intermediate traits ( $M_s = 7.1$  versus 10.3) if not the likeable ( $M_s = 0.7$  and 0.3).

#### DISCUSSION

This experiment was conducted to (1) examine a way that traits could be identified as part of the ideal-self concept whether they were in the real-self concept or not; (2) to determine how the ideal and real-self concepts affect speed of access and memorability, (3) to determine whether various individual differences were more important to the processing of information for one self concept than for the other.

Clearly traits could be identified as to whether they were present in both the real and ideal-self concepts or just one or the other. "Actualized" traits, those in both, tended to be the more socially desirable traits, and these led to faster (real-self) decisions than did traits which were only in the real-self or ideal-self concepts alone.

However, these actualized traits did not lead to superior recall relative to real-only or ideal-only traits in general, though more unlikeable actualized traits were recalled better than unlikeable ideal-only traits.

Considering the extreme effects of social desirability, it may be useful to corroborate this conclusion by examining just the intermediate likeability traits. In this case, it is quite clear that actualized traits led to faster decisions relative to the more distinctive real-only and ideal-only traits. For intermediate likeability, actualized traits (20.5%) show no recall advantage relative to ideal-only (18.9%), and in fact were recalled significantly less than the real-only traits (20.9%).

The two types of subtypes of distinctive traits, real-only and ideal-only, showed opposite likeability patterns in terms of endorsement. These patterns were quite understandable, given that many of the likeable traits will be accepted as both real and desired, or if not that then at least desired, whereas unlikeable traits will be generally considered as not true and not desired, or at least as not desired. There seemed to be no consistent pattern of difference in decision speeds for real-only versus ideal-only traits, but real-only traits were consistently recalled better.

In terms of the individual differences measures, three generalizations can be offered (see Table 2). First, self esteem effects were clear in the endorsement pattern, with high esteem leading to more actualized likeable traits and fewer actualized unlikeable traits, but self esteem had quite limited effects on decision speed and recall. Second, self consciousness differences (private and public) were fairly apparent for decision speed, but not for endorsement

patterns or recall. And third, need for cognition effects were present only for a few of the ideal-only cells.

In conclusion, these data indicate that traits can be identified in terms of their presence in the real- and/or ideal-self concepts, and that those which are jointly present are accessed and remembered somewhat differently than those which are more singularly represented. One aspect of the difference seems understandable as "distinctiveness," but another aspect is more related to "actualization."

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FOOTNOTES

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1. We are also aware of another study that used the ideal self as an orienting task, but it used facial photographs as the stimuli and is thus hard to integrate with the large body of self-reference work using trait adjectives (Mueller, Nicodemus, & Ross, 1981). It is worth noting though that face memory for real self and ideal self tasks was equivalent, in accord with Grove and Mueller (1988).
2. This line of reasoning is well known in terms of physical features, where being bald and wearing glasses, for example, may be actual features of the person but quite nondistinctive in many respects (e.g., eyewitness identification) because they are features shared with many other people.

Table 1

Traits evaluated, with rated likeability (L) and meaningfulness (M)  
sums for 100 subjects in the Anderson (1968) norms.

	L	M		L	M		L	M
ALERT	480	370	CAUTIOUS	334	364	BORING	97	374
AMBITIOUS	484	378	CHANGEABLE	297	356	CARELESS	140	374
ATTENTIVE	450	372	CHOOSY	272	334	COLD	113	360
CAPABLE	471	370	COMPULSIVE	205	320	CONCEITED	74	378
CLEVER	490	370	DAYDREAMER	260	368	COWARDLY	110	374
CONSIDERATE	521	372	DELIBERATE	345	344	CRUEL	40	376
COOPERATIVE	476	380	DISSATISFIED	239	356	DECEITFUL	62	360
COURTEOUS	494	366	ECCENTRIC	257	336	DOMINATING	153	372
CREATIVE	462	366	EXCITABLE	317	366	ENVIIOUS	157	364
DEPENDABLE	536	386	FEARFUL	214	370	GLOOMY	136	376
EFFICIENT	482	374	FORGETFUL	224	386	GOSSIPY	119	376
ENERGETIC	457	384	HESITANT	290	358	GREEDY	72	374
ETHICAL	476	336	IMPRACTICAL	213	364	HOSTILE	91	372
FORGIVING	486	370	IMPULSIVE	307	380	IMPOLITE	103	374
FRANK	450	378	INDECISIVE	219	376	INSULTING	69	370
FRIENDLY	519	380	INDIFFERENT	202	372	IRRESPONSIBLE	106	372
GENEROUS	459	370	INNOCENT	332	342	JEALOUS	104	372
GRATEFUL	482	346	INOFFENSIVE	332	330	LAZY	126	380
HAPPY	514	370	METHODICAL	325	336	LIAR	26	392
HELPFUL	492	374	METICULOUS	346	348	MALICIOUS	52	346
HONEST	555	384	MODERATE	351	312	MEAN	37	356
IMAGINATIVE	492	364	OPPORTUNIST	270	342	MEDDLESOME	116	344
INDEPENDENT	455	374	ORDINARY	266	332	NOISY	173	378
INTELLIGENT	537	368	PERSISTENT	347	382	OBNOXIOUS	48	376
KIND	520	368	PREOCCUPIED	216	353	PHONY	27	360
LOGICAL	465	370	PRUDENT	348	320	PREJUDICED	106	376
LOYAL	547	366	QUIET	311	376	PROFANE	137	312
MATURE	522	344	RESERVED	348	356	RUDE	76	376
NEAT	466	382	RESTLESS	274	362	SELFISH	82	384
PATIENT	478	376	SHREWD	328	346	SLOPPY	153	376
PLEASANT	495	372	SOLEMN	289	338	SMUG	161	304
PROMPT	465	380	STERN	257	356	SNOBBISH	96	356
REASONABLE	500	362	SUBMISSIVE	219	336	SPITEFUL	72	338
SENSIBLE	464	368	THEATRICAL	269	326	STINGY	143	368
SINCERE	573	370	TIMID	222	380	SUSPICIOUS	163	362
TACTFUL	494	354	UNCULTURED	201	342	THOUGHTLESS	77	366
TALENTED	478	368	UNEMOTIONAL	209	366	UNGRATEFUL	109	370
TOLERANT	461	372	UNLUCKY	280	360	UNSOCIABLE	161	354
WARY	522	356	WITHDRAWN	213	356	UNSYMPATHETIC	153	366
WITTY	480	370	WORRIER	205	376	WASTEFUL	160	366
Averages =	492	370		274	353		105	366

Table 2

Endorsement Pattern, Decision Latencies (msec), and Percent Recall, by  
Trait Distinctiveness and Trait Likeability

	<u>BOTH</u>	<u>REAL-ONLY</u>	<u>IDEAL-ONLY</u>	<u>NEITHER</u>
<u>Endorsements</u>				
Likeable	35.2 <sup>c,D,E</sup>	0.5	3.9 <sup>C,d,e</sup>	0.4
Middle	10.9 <sup>A,D</sup>	8.5 <sup>C,d,e</sup>	3.4 <sup>C,e</sup>	17.1 <sup>a,c,D,E</sup>
Unlikeable	1.1	5.8 <sup>C,d,e</sup>	0.7 <sup>C</sup>	32.4 <sup>a,c,E</sup>
<u>Real-Self Latency</u>				
Likeable	1165 <sup>d,e</sup>	1322	1921 <sup>d</sup>	1695
Middle	1553 <sup>b,d</sup>	1804	1979	1618 <sup>e</sup>
Unlikeable	1294	1705 <sup>d</sup>	1430	1273 <sup>A,C,e</sup>
<u>Ideal-Self Latency</u>				
Likeable	959 <sup>d</sup>	1150 <sup>b</sup>	1035	1555
Middle	1489	1418 <sup>b</sup>	1748 <sup>b</sup>	1419 <sup>d,e</sup>
Unlikeable	1779 <sup>e</sup>	1221	1446	1066
<u>Percent Recall</u>				
Likeable	23.9	20.9 <sup>A,B</sup>	28.8 <sup>D</sup>	35.7 <sup>c</sup>
Middle	20.5	20.9	18.9	17.5
Unlikeable	28.9	31.6	17.3	20.3

NOTE: Significant ( $p < .05$ ) correlations are indicated by superscripts (positive correlations are capitalized, negative in lower-case) for (a) Private Self Consciousness, (b) Public Self Consciousness, (c) Social Anxiety, (d) Need for Cognition, (e) Self Esteem.

Table 3

Correlations among the individual differences measures (\* p < .05).

	Pub. SC	Soc. Anx.	Need Cog.	Self Esteem
Private SC	.38*	.13	.04	-.24*
Public SC		.15	-.17	-.16
Social Anxiety			-.24*	-.42*
Need Cog.				.45*

Figure Captions

Figure 1. Percent recall by real-ideal subtype and trait likeability.

Figure 2. Number of endorsements by real-ideal subtype as a function of level of self esteem, collapsed over trait likeability.

Figure 3. Endorsements by self-esteem and likeability for each real-ideal subtype.

Figure 1




Figure 2

