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ABSTRACT

Anwar el-Sadat's speaking style became a key factor in his ability to maintain a balance between the goals essential to Egypt's future and the position taken by Israelis in the settlement of the Mideast conflict. Three speeches (two addressing the Egyptian National Assembly, one the Israeli Knesset) were examined to explore the rhetorical choices Sadat made as he addressed different cultural audiences. The study shows that as Egypt's position improved, Sadat's use of ornate language increased, and as he became more powerful and important in the settlement of the Mideast conflict, his speeches contained more personal references and fewer impersonal references to Israel as the "enemy." Sadat's ethos in Israel grew as a result of his speeches and his decision to address the Israelis in person. He balanced his personal philosophy with the points of view held by his separate audiences, and he was thereby able to pursue peace despite external Arab opposition. Sadat's rhetoric differed vastly from that of other Arab leaders, who espoused violence and total elimination of the Israeli state, preferring war to communication. (AEW)

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THE RHETORIC OF BALANCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED SPEECHES BY
ANWAR EL-SADAT

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Abstract

This study explores the rhetorical choices made by Anwar el-Sadat as he addressed different cultural audiences in three speeches delivered during his presidency of Egypt. The speeches selected for analysis include: The February 4, 1971 speech to the Egyptian National Assembly; the October 16, 1973 speech delivered before the Egyptian National Assembly; and the November 22, 1977 speech to the Israeli Knesset.

THE RHETORIC OF BALANCE:
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The assassination of Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat in 1981 was but one example of the long-held belief that the Middle East is a hotbed of political and religious unrest. Although the motivation behind the assassination of Sadat appeared to have been religious, the fact that a man could have been killed for his political motivations is not inconsistent with this time or place in history. Because Sadat chose the pathway to peace in the volatile Middle East, his speeches and the way in which he appealed to different audiences are worthy of study.

When dealing with the public speeches of a political leaders, one overriding generalization emerges: Due to the different groups that may be receiving the speaker's message, effectiveness is often determined on the basis of the speaker's ability to analyze how the different audiences will interpret the messages.

Theoretically, when a public figure addresses a group of constituents, it is likely that speaker and audience may share several common attitudes, beliefs or values. Thus, the message being transmitted in this intracultural communication act is often understood due to these shared cultural factors. However, as other culturally-diverse audiences are layered onto the first, different meanings are likely to be perceived. These variant meanings confound the clarity of the position being espoused by the speaker; thereby providing an impetus for the emergence of the following question: What happens when a public figure must address different international audiences simultaneously?

Anwar el-Sadat found himself in a situation where he had to reflect the values of the Arab world while recognizing that coexistence with Israel was

necessary if peace were to come to the Middle East. An examination of the manner in which he shaped his messages and retained his political power until his death may enable us to understand better why a speaker must bear in mind the different perceptions being created by a message transmitted to different audiences.

Three of Sadat's speeches will be used to help provide some answers to the question raised in this paper. They are Sadat's speech to the Egyptian National Assembly delivered on February 4, 1971; his speech delivered before the Egyptian National Assembly on October 16, 1973; and his speech to the Israeli Knesset delivered on November 22, 1977.¹ An analysis of these speeches will show Sadat to have been very conscious of his audiences' compositions and how these groups perceived his remarks. Although working with English translations of the speeches, Sadat himself, who was fluent in English, believed the translations to be true to his intent. Others in diplomatic and literary circles concur.²

Historical Context

International concern has long been focused on the tumultuous Middle East. The issue of control over the land has contributed overwhelmingly to the hostilities between Arabs and Jews. Chaim Weizman, the first president of Israel recognized the need to view the conflict from a perspective other than right or wrong. Using an intercultural perspective, he wrote that both Arab and Jew must see the problem through the eyes of the other (Stone, 1975). Until Sadat became president of Egypt, the Middle East experienced little in the spirit of Weizman's words.

Sadat was able to play an important part in the negotiation of the conflict for several reasons. Politically, he led a nation that was geographically, demographically, militarily, and religiously regarded as the champion of the

Arab cause (Dawisha, 1976). While most of the radical Arab leaders called for the elimination of the Jewish state by means of warfare, Sadat pursued a negotiated settlement using both direct and indirect communication channels (Bruzonsky, 1977). Religiously, Sadat established himself as leader of the Islamic faith by being instrumental in the development of the Islamic Congress prior to his nomination as Egypt's president. Sadat was also an important military leader, rising through the ranks of the Army and leading the successful surprise attack on Israel on the eve of Yom Kippur, in 1973. Although no major victories were secured, this feat gave the Egyptian leader leverage in his bargaining with the Israelis.

To formulate an answer to the question of how Sadat addressed different cultural audiences simultaneously, an examination of his personal style will be undertaken. His style had a clear influence on the ethos he was able to develop. Through his speeches, Sadat sought harmony between his goals for peace (via control of land providing for guaranteed Arab rights) and the views, sensibilities and aspirations of not only the Israelis who felt threatened, but the other Arab countries of the Middle East that felt equally unsure of their positions. Sadat's speeches were dramatic in terms of what they proposed for Egypt, Israel, and the Middle East as a whole.

An examination of these speeches would suggest that Sadat balanced his philosophical perspectives on the Mideast situation with those beliefs held by his countrymen and other members of the Arab community. Sadat did not want to alienate his political base; and yet, he also did not wish to fail in his endeavor to find and negotiate a peaceful settlement with Israel.

An Examination of the Speeches

Through a general stylistic evaluation of the three foreign policy speeches, Sadat was found to use examples of abstract and concrete language, ornate and

simple phrasing, and personal and impersonal references.³

All three speeches being examined in this study contained examples of abstract and concrete language. Abstract references to Egypt and Israel were made and they varied significantly from speech to speech.⁴ Egypt was commonly referred to in a positive manner, as follows: "We lost a battle and had the honour and courage to face the setback and also face the others with the reality" (February 4, paragraph 5). Israel was generally depicted in a negative fashion. Speaking after the Yom Kippur victory, Sadat said: "When I issued my order to them to repulse the provocations of the enemy and curb his arrogance, they proved themselves capable of doing so" (October 16, paragraph 27). Concrete references to Egyptian and Israeli people, places, and things were common.⁵ Generally, these were used to evoke national pride and international cooperation in the resolution of the Mideast conflict. The emphasis varied as Sadat used these concrete examples. When building his personal support early in his term as President, Sadat referred to his "duty toward our people in Egypt" (February 4, paragraph 1). When addressing the Knesset, concrete references were made to Israeli people. For example, "A wife who becomes a widow is a human being entitled to a happy family life, whether she be an Arab or Israeli" (November 22, paragraph 20). Sadat's mention of Egyptian and Israeli places dealt specifically with the territory both countries want. In the February 4th speech, these territories were identified as "Arab Jerusalem, the West Bank of the Jordan, the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Heights and Sinai" (paragraph 10). He continued, "The enemy held the three main cities: Suez, Ismailia and Port Said, hostage at the mercy of its artillery" (paragraph 18). After the 1973 war, Sadat used the issue of land extensively in his call for a settlement. When speaking of any Egyptian victory, Sadat used concrete examples to illustrate his success: "Our naval units were in combat with the

enemy's units and sunk 'Eilat' one of the major pieces of its fleet" (February 4, paragraph 15).

Another criterion appropriate to the study of foreign policy focuses on the use of ornate and simple language. Political leaders recognize the importance of speaking simply enough to communicate with their audiences. They also understand that in order to inspire their listeners to follow them in whatever course of action they might pursue, they must use ornate language. In this area of evaluation, the use of ornate language varied as the strength of Egypt changed.⁶ As Egypt's position improved after the 1973 victory, so did Sadat's use of ornate language increase. From his October 16th speech, the following example illustrates the point:

The night was long and oppressive, but the people never doubted that the day would dawn. I say without presumption that history will record on behalf of this people, that its setback was not a fall, but merely a shortlived stumble; that its movement was not effervescence, but a lofty rise. Our people have exerted boundless efforts, made unlimited sacrifices and manifested unending awareness (paragraph 11).

Ornate language was also employed to demonstrate Sadat's role in the Middle East; as well as, the role of cooperation between Egypt and Israel reflected a "nobler" style.⁷ There was evidence to support the claim that as Sadat saw his political power stabilize and his credibility with Israel and the world increase, he increased his use of ornate language. The following quotation from the Knesset speech substantiates this point:

I wish to say peace and the mercy of God Almighty be upon you and may peace be with us all God willing. Peace for us all of the Arab lands and in Israel, as

well as in every part of this big world, which is so beset by conflicts, perturbed by its deep contradictions, menaced now and then by destructive wars launched by man to annihilate his fellow men. . . . Amidst the ruins of what man has built among the remains of the victims of mankind there emerges neither victory nor vanquished. The only vanquished remains always a man, God's most sublime creation. Man, whom God has created, as Gandhi, the apostle of peace puts it, to forge ahead, to mold the way of life and to worship God Almighty (paragraphs 2 and 3).

Sadat used simple language primarily in his transitional and preview materials within each of the speeches. However, he used a simple repetition in the Knesset speech to leave his audience with the full impact of his message. The phrase, "a permanent peace based on justice," was found in paragraphs 24, 27, 31, 36, 37, 42, 46, 47, 49, 58, 81, 89, 93, 96, and 114.

A third criterion demonstrating the personal and impersonal references made by Sadat is also very useful in the evaluation process. Personal references to himself, his countrymen, the Arabs and Israelis jointly, and to Israel alone were found in all three speeches.⁸ There were many personal references, such as: "I deemed it my duty..." (February 4, paragraph 1); "I found it fitting to come to you..." (October 16, paragraph 2); and "I come to you today on solid ground to shape a new life..." (November 22, paragraph 4). As Sadat's power increased, his identification with his countrymen and the Arab world also expanded. As an example, "I found it fitting to come to you today to speak to you, to the masses of our people, to the peoples of our Arab Nation and to a world concerned with what occurs on our territory..." (October 16, paragraph

2). To demonstrate his sincerity to the Israelis, he disclosed the risk he was taking in coming to Israel proposing peace: "As I have already declared, I have not consulted as far as this decision is concerned with any of my colleagues or brothers, the Arab heads of state or the confrontation states" (November 22, paragraph 11). Sadat appealed for unity among Arabs and Jews by making joint personal references. Some examples were: "Peace for us all, of the Arab lands and in Israel...;" "We all love this land, the land of God, we all, Moslems, Christians and Jews, all worship God;" and "We all still bear the consequences of four fierce wars..." (November 22, paragraphs 2, 4, and 10). Impersonal references to Israel as the enemy were common, but these were reduced as peace was proposed. Impersonal references to Egyptian respect for the Israeli point of view and to Egypt itself, were also found in the speeches and increased with each new audience.⁹ An example of Sadat's respect for the Israeli viewpoint was evident in his November 22nd address, as follows: "I would go to Israel, for I want to put before the people of Israel all the facts. . .and let you decide for yourselves" (paragraphs 8 and 15).

Insofar as Sadat was able to utilize the different extremes developed within the criteria of abstract/concrete, ornate/simple, and personal/impersonal, his style became a key factor in his ability to maintain a balance between the goals essential to Egypt's future and the views and position taken by the Israelis in the settlement of the Mideast conflict.

Audience Responses

Several conclusions regarding the way Sadat shaped his messages to appeal to the different audiences emerge. Initially, one of Sadat's unique characteristics was the consistency with which he pursued his personal goals. Quite definitely, Sadat remained resolute toward his goals to the end. The

values Sadat developed had their roots in the teachings of his grandmother, and were more fully refined while Sadat was imprisoned during and after World War II (Sadat, 1978). The concepts which Sadat developed into personal philosophy added greatly to his credibility as a world leader. He was committed first to following the best course of action for Egypt; the goals of the Arab world came second. Sadat supported some Arab goals. However, he used his rhetoric to allow him the flexibility needed to pursue a peaceful settlement with Israel. After each of the speeches, observers commented that Sadat was able to be flexible with his offers for a settlement, even though he also reaffirmed hard-line Arab positions. From all indications, while advocating his personal values and representing the Arab and Egyptian views, Sadat also balanced these concerns with his desire for flexibility in negotiating a settlement to the Mideast conflict.

A second conclusion emerging from this study relates to Sadat's ability to adapt to his audiences. The extent to which Sadat adapted to his various listeners can be determined by returning to an examination of the three speeches. In the February 4th and October 16th speeches, Egypt was referred to positively. Israel was generally depicted negatively. In the November 22nd speech, these abstract references were generally diminished and a strong emphasis was placed upon "joint efforts" made by both Egypt and Israel. The February 4th speech made strong concrete references to Egyptian people. This speech was given only five months after Gamal Abd al-Nasser's death when Sadat was building his own power base. Sadat called upon the memory of Nasser many times during the speech. In the October 16th speech, the emphasis was on concrete "things." This speech was delivered after Egypt had scored victories in the Suez Canal area. Considering "land" to be a "thing," Sadat demonstrated explicitly what was important to Egypt at that time. In the November 22nd

speech, the major elements of the concrete language referred to a cooperation toward "things" taken by both Israelis and Egyptians.

Examples can illustrate Sadat's ability to speak to his specific audiences. In the February 4th and October 16th speeches, the preponderance of ornate language referred to Egypt in some way. There was a dramatic shift in the November 22nd speech. Ornate language referring to Egypt was greatly minimized and language which called for joint action and cooperation was most significantly ornate. The calling for cooperation significantly increased from the first two speeches delivered in the Egyptian National Assembly to the third speech presented in the Israeli Knesset. Simple, precise language was employed more often in the November 22nd speech to make sure the audience clearly understood the background for the historic meeting.

Sadat's use of personal and impersonal references clearly demonstrated his ability to adapt to his audiences. As Sadat became more powerful and important in the settlement of the Mideast conflict, the references to self also increased. His personal references to Arabs and Egyptians diminished greatly from the February 4th and October 16th speeches to the November 22nd address. Sadat did not make any personal references to joint action between the two nations until his speech in Israel on November 22, 1977. Israel was not mentioned significantly in a personal manner until Sadat spoke before the Israeli Knesset. Sadat's impersonal references to Israel as the "enemy" diminished significantly with each speech he delivered. Egypt's respect for the Israeli point of view was not witnessed until Sadat spoke on November 22nd.

Perhaps it was his unique ability to adapt to his audiences that enabled Sadat to offer peace and still retain his position of prominence in Egypt and the Arab world. However, it is clear that Sadat placed pressure on Israel with his peace initiatives. Sadat made his position known and seemed dedicated to

the idea of settling the Arab-Israeli (or at least the Egyptian-Israeli) conflict once and for all. Most of Sadat's critics were content to wait until his success or failure was obvious. If the peace that Sadat sought materialized, then other Arab leaders might have begun to work out their own peace settlements with Israel. If the peace did not come about, then most Arabs could denounce Sadat as a traitor and he would not maintain his political base. Sadat had to make his political gamble work. If he failed, more was at stake than his political power.

When determining the effect of Sadat's speeches on his ethos within Egypt, the Middle East, Israel, and in the eyes of the world, each must be individually investigated. For the most part, Sadat's methods remained strong within Egypt. Although some powerful political leaders tried to remove him from office, they were unsuccessful in 1971. Despite the lack of applause when Sadat first presented his decision to extend the cease fire in 1971 (Anderson, 1971) the attitude of most Egyptians changed and support developed for Sadat's peace plan with Israel (Safadi, 1977). The people believed that Sadat was working for their benefit and because of their faith in his sincerity, he was able to maintain his ethos with his countrymen. Most Arab leaders generally opposed his position because of the Palestinian issue and because they feared Sadat would sign a separate peace treaty with Israel without consulting the other Arab leaders. In the eyes of the Arab leaders, this would have left them with virtually no bargaining power. The moderates who supported Sadat did not come out solidly behind him. Their skepticism was based on their perception of Sadat's performance. If successful, they would support him as though they had never left his "camp." If he failed, nothing would have been lost in the eyes of the more verbal Arab opponents to Sadat and his peace initiative. Sadat was not considered to be a "hero" in the eyes of his fellow Arabs; however, he was

considered very powerful. To this extent, he did have a strong influence in the Arab world simply because he controlled the future of the Middle East during his peace initiatives.

Sadat's ethos grew in Israel as a result of his speeches and the actions he took to bring about peace. In 1971, the Israelis were unsure of Sadat's sincerity (Smith, 1977). Unable to convince the Israelis of his intent, Sadat decided to address the Israelis in person. This way, he believed he could persuade the people of his conviction. In fact, his trip to Israel was an overt indication of his concern about the Israeli perception of his dedication to peace (Safadi, 1977). If nothing else, the Israelis admired the courage of a man who would risk his political future to fulfill the realization of his personal goal of peace.

World leaders were very interested in the future of Sadat's peace plan. Because of his dedication to a peaceful resolution of the conflict, many western leaders favored the Egyptian president and his position.¹⁰ Several American magazines featured articles about him and in 1978, Sadat and Menaghem Begin jointly received the Nobel Peace Prize. World leaders wanted a resolution of the Mideast conflict for several reasons. Obviously, a major war in the area would ultimately involve the superpowers and might have resulted in nuclear disaster; and selfishly, a resolution of the conflict could have meant a more secure source of energy--namely oil. By helping to bring about the settlement of this generation-old conflict, Sadat commanded the respect of the world.

Within his speeches, Sadat established a positive basis for strong ethos with his audiences. Throughout the speeches, Sadat's sincerity was never in doubt. His belief in God was reiterated throughout every speech. The language Sadat used tended to be ornate and the speeches well-constructed. Because of these constant variables, the audiences could be sure that Sadat had thoroughly

formulated everything he planned to say. Unlike Nasser, Sadat had no desire to "cover old ground" or go back on a policy previously initiated. Sadat balanced his sincere, personal philosophy with the point of view held by his separate audiences; thereby enabling him to pursue peace despite external Arab opposition.

A final area of analysis would explore how the rhetoric of Sadat affected his position in the Arab world. From the beginning of his term as Egyptian president, Sadat developed a leadership style that demonstrated his personal confidence. Egypt was seen as a leader of the Arab nations because of its population, its military strength, the strong Islamic and Arab nationalism which is exhibited, and the established Islam institutions found within its borders (Dawisha, 1976). As leader of this Arab nation, Sadat drew upon Egypt's power and influence to ultimately stage a possible negotiation to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Sadat's ability to retain his position while promoting a settlement without personally "selling out" to the Israelis is important to note. Throughout his leadership of Egypt, he attempted to maintain a balance between his personal desires for peaceful economic prosperity and the traditional Arab point of view calling for the elimination of the Jewish State. Sadat used diplomacy to help maintain and improve political ties among his fellow Arab leaders.

Since coming to power in 1970...Sadat had been busy mending political fences with his fellow Arabs, especially with Syrian President Hafez Assad and Jordan's King Hussein. . . .Sadat's rapprochement with the late King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and the and the Sheikhs of the Persian Gulf states prior to the Yom Kippur War harnessed a weapon that Arabs

had never before attempted to use--oil (Bruzonsky, 1977).

In addition to using oil as a weapon against Israel and her western allies, he also attempted to be flexible enough to encourage the Israelis to negotiate, as follows:

In speaking before the Israeli Knesset on November 21, 1977, both Anwar el-Sadat, President of Egypt, and Menahem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, declared their willingness to negotiate a comprehensive settlement of all major issues involved in the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict (AFSC, 1978).

Generally, there was widespread opposition to Sadat's peace initiatives from the other nations in the Arab world. A few of the moderate Arab leaders who agreed with Sadat were individually not strong enough to withstand the pressure from the more powerful Arab nations, and therefore, remained silent.¹¹ Within Egypt, there was considerable support for Sadat's policies. Sadat eliminated most of his political opponents and won over the military with his leadership in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. His humble birth and early childhood experiences fostered a concern in Sadat that enabled him to maintain strong ties with the common man. He appealed to "better times ahead" for the lower classes of Egyptians. His genuine concern for the Egyptian people helped him develop a strong base of power among his countrymen. This base, along with earlier moves to make his position more secure, enabled Sadat to retain a prominent position within his own country and the Arab world even though he promoted a settlement contrary to the traditional Arab point of view.

In the world today, two of the available options for leaders striving to resolve conflicts are to either map out a course of warfare or open channels of

communciation in an effort to negotiate a settlement. The mere fact that Sadat demonstrated a preference for peace establishes him as a unique world leader. There is yet another factor making Sadat worthy of study. This element is how Sadat's rhetoric differed from other Arab leaders. Generally espousing violence and the total elimination of the Israeli state, most Arab leaders demonstrated their preference for war over communciation. Sadat's rhetoric of reason served to make his man stand out among other Arab leaders.

The Middle East is a volatile area where political power is a relatively uncertain commodity. Sadat's assassination certainly speaks of this truth. However, throughout his rise to power in Egypt, he held on to certain fundamental values. All of these ideals pointed to those things that would primarily benefit the Egyptian people. Because of his convictions, he attempted to bring about peace in the Middle East. It would have been easier for Sadat to go along with the other Arab leaders in opposing the existence of Israel, as a state. Sadat did not take the easy path. He took the best, and only course available to him as political, religious, and military leader of Egypt. In the "Prologue" to his autobiography, Sadat wrote:

This is the story of my life. . .It is, I believe, like every man's life, a journey in search of identity. Each step I have taken over the years has been for the good of Egypt, and has been designed to serve the cause of right, liberty, and peace (Sadat, 1978).

This study was undertaken to discover how Sadat could follow his conscience and maintain the political support of his constituents. Future research in this area should pursue the isolation of variables other than style that may help to shape the perceptions of varying audience groups hearing the same rhetorical message.

ENDNOTES

¹The February 4, 1971 speech was selected because it was his first major address concerning the Egyptian-Israeli conflict after becoming president in 1970; the October 16, 1973 address was chosen because it was delivered after Egypt had attacked Israel and recovered a portion of the Sinai; and the November 22, 1977 address was included because it represented an important personal move by Sadat to establish open negotiations with Israel. It was also the first time an Egyptian president had addressed the Israeli Knesset.

²Upon consultation with Gigi Lackson, a member of the Press and Information Bureau for the Embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Washington, D.C., and Simon Michael Bessi, Senior Vice President for Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., Sadat was found to have been aided in his writing only by Dr. Rashad Rushdy, a distinguished Egyptian playwright and writer and Professor of English Literature at the University of Cairo. The February 4, 1971, and October 16, 1973 speeches were taken from official government transcripts provided from the Embassy by Ms. Lackson. The text from the November 22, 1977 speech was also provided by the Embassy. This copy of the text corresponded exactly with one transcribed by Sadat and found in his autobiographical work, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1978).

³For detailed examples see "A Rhetorical Analysis of Selected Speeches Delivered by Anwar el-Sadat Since Becoming President of Egypt in 1970," an unpublished thesis, Fargo, ND: North Dakota State University, March 1979, 62-77.

⁴"A Rhetorical Analysis...", 78-83. Abstract references made about Egypt, depicting that country in a positive manner are found in each of the speeches.

In all three speeches, Israel was generally referred to in a negative manner. There were joint references to Egypt and Israel which were made in both a positive and negative manner. Joint references were made only in the November 22nd speech. With regard to the abstract use of the word "peace," the February 4th speech mentioned "peace" in five of the 51 paragraphs (9%) using abstract language. In the October 16th address, "peace" was used in ten of the 51 paragraphs (19%) using abstract language. In the November 22nd speech, the word "peace" was used at least once in 48 of the 84 paragraphs (57%) using abstract language.

5 "A Rhetorical Analysis...", 83-92. To categorize Sadat's use of concrete language, a division of references to people, places, and things was followed. Sadat mentioned the Egyptian people in all three speeches. However, the rate of mention fell from 30% of the concrete references in the February 4th speech to 7% of the concrete references in the November 22nd address. Sadat used concrete terms when referring to Israel, but the rate did not vary significantly (3% on February 4th, 8% on October 16th, 6% on November 22nd). While there were no concrete references to Egyptian or Israeli people together in the February 4th or October 16th speeches, there were 13 paragraphs where such mention was made during the November 22nd address. Sadat used concrete language when he referred to Egyptian and Israeli places. In his February 4th speech, 21% of the 52 paragraphs using concrete language referred to Egypt. Twenty-three percent of the 34 paragraphs using concrete language on October 16th referred to Egypt. The references dropped to 7% of the eighty paragraphs in the November 22nd speech. Concrete references were made in all three speeches to Israeli places. In the February 4th speech, 21% of the concrete references specified Israeli places. In the October 16th speech, 8% of the paragraphs referred to Israel.

There were nine paragraphs (11%) making concrete references to Israel in the November 22nd speech. In the February 4th and October 16th speeches, there were no joint references to Egyptian or Israeli places. In the November 22nd speech, 7% of the 80 references described Egypt and Israel jointly. All three speeches had concrete references to things. In the February 4th speech, 38% of the paragraphs using concrete language referred to Egyptian things. In the October 16th speech, 82% of the concrete examples referred to Egyptian things. In the November 22nd address, 23% of the concrete examples referred to Egyptian things. In the February 4th speech, 40% of the references specified Israeli things. In Sadat's October 16 speech, 11% referred to Israeli things. In the November 22nd speech, 13% of the concrete references dealt with Israeli things. There were no joint examples of Egyptian and Israeli things presented in the February 4th or October 16th speeches. In the November 22nd speech, 43% of the concrete references concerned Egyptian and Israeli things jointly.

⁶"A Rhetorical Analysis...", 93-95. Ornate language was utilized by Sadat when he described the strength of Egypt. In the February 4th speech, 24 of the 24 paragraphs referring to Egypt, and 70% of all ornate paragraphs in the address, illustrated Egypt's strength. In the October 16th speech, 55% of the paragraphs with ornate language referred to Egypt's strength. In the November 22nd address, 10% of the 58 paragraphs using an ornate style, demonstrated the strength of Egypt.

⁷"A Rhetorical Analysis...", 95-98. In his February 4th speech, five percent of the paragraphs mentioned his role in a settlement. In the October 16th speech, 47% of the paragraphs mentioned Sadat's role. In his November 22nd speech, 25% of the paragraphs using ornate language made reference to Sadat's role. He also utilized ornate language when presenting arguments for

cooperation between Egypt and Israel in the Middle East. From 8% in 1971, to 7% in 1973, Sadat increased his use of ornate language calling for cooperation to 48% in his November 22nd speech.

8"A Rhetorical Analysis...", 101-106. In all three speeches, Sadat made personal references to himself (from 18% in the February 4th speech, to 50% in the October 16th speech, to 57% of the paragraphs utilizing personal references in the November 22nd speech). Personal language was also used in each speech when Sadat referred to himself as a member of the Egyptian and Arab nation. In the February 4th speech, 90% of the paragraphs using personal language referred to Sadat in this way. In the October 16th speech, 84% of the paragraphs made a personal reference to Sadat as a member of the Arab nation. Twenty seven percent of the references in the November 22nd speech mentioned Sadat and the combined Arab nation. When considering references made by Sadat to include both Egyptian and Israelis together in a personal manner, both the February 4th and the October 16th speeches lacked any such personal language. There were 34 references (36%) of the 92 paragraphs using personal language in the November 22nd speech, which did make joint reference. Sadat did not refer to the Israelis as "Brothers" or "Brethren" as he did when addressing an Arab audience. In references made about Israel, there were no personal examples in the February 4th speech. In the October 16th speech, 9% of the 63 paragraphs referred to Israel. In the November 22nd speech, 50% of the personal references mentioned Israel.

9"A Rhetorical Analysis...", 107-109. All three speeches made impersonal references to Israel as the "enemy." In the February 4th speech, 48% of the 31 paragraphs using impersonal language referred to Israel in this manner. In his October 16th address, 28% of the 39 paragraphs referred to Israel as the enemy.

Only 3% of the paragraphs in the November 22nd speech made impersonal references that depicted Israel as the enemy. In terms of impersonal examples presenting evidence of Egyptian respect for the Israeli point of view, there were no such items provided in either the February 4th or October 16th speeches. Fifteen percent of the impersonal references in the November 22nd speech demonstrated respect for Israel. Sadat made impersonal references to Egypt in all three speeches, varying from 29% in his February 4th speech, to 58% in the October 16th speech, to 39% in the November 22nd speech.

10¹⁰The first reaction here to President Sadat's offer to reopen the Suez Canal to world shipping if Israel withdrew her troops from the eastern bank during the new truce period was that the offer was not necessarily related to the future of the ceasefire, but rather, represented a new negotiating position. In a sense, some officials suggested Mr. Sadat may have been trying to show a new flexibility in demanding, in the immediate future, only a partial Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories" (Anderson, 1971); "Many Western diplomats said they expected a far more violent attack on the U.S. [because of Egypt's victory over Israel]. President Sadat, they said, appeared eager to keep all doors open" (Tanner, 1973); "Begin pledged to launch 'serious substantive' talks on a Middle East peace settlement with Sadat, noting that the Egyptian leader's agreement to come here was a 'rare' chance to advance understanding between Israel and her neighbours...The premier cautioned that Israel and Egypt have no illusions about their differences on basic issues. But Begin stressed that they could now talk at the highest level in a bid to resolve their disputes" (Safadi, 1977).

11¹¹Those Arab leaders considered most radical were Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi of Libya, President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr of Iraq, President Hafez al-Assad of

Syria, and Yasir Arafat representing the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The leaders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Morocco would be considered as moderates (see Bruzonsky).

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