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ABSTRACT

Causes and implications of the crisis in liability insurance availability and affordability are discussed in this report. The working group concluded that tort law is a major issue in the insurance crisis and that the federal government can address that issue. The group also concluded that the federal government can do little to remedy other factors, such as the large underwriting losses recently experienced by the insurance industry. Chapter 1 describes significant problems many municipalities, businesses, and professionals have in obtaining liability insurance. Part A of Chapter 2 reviews the current financial condition of the insurance industry and the economic factors leading to that condition. Part B of Chapter 2 reviews the impact of tort law on the insurance availability/affordability crisis. Chapter 3 summarizes responses to the crisis from the insurance industry, its customers, and state regulators. The conclusions of the working group are presented in Chapter 4, along with eight recommendations for tort law reform. Chapter 5 details the undesirable and ineffective consequences of a federal insurance or indemnification program. Concluding remarks list five recommendations for federal action. (RH)

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Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability

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February 1986

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INTRODUCTION
AND
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In October of last year the Attorney General established the Tort Policy Working Group, an inter-agency working group consisting of representatives of ten agencies and the White House. One of the tasks the Working Group was asked to undertake was to examine the rapidly expanding crisis in liability insurance availability and affordability.

The following is the report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the causes, extent and policy implications of this crisis. The primary contributing agencies included the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce and the Small Business Administration.

Chapter 1 of the report (The Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability) describes in detail the significant problems many businesses, professionals and municipalities are having obtaining liability insurance. The Chapter documents a dramatic change in the last two years in the availability, affordability and adequacy of liability insurance. Where insurance is available (and in some areas it simply is not), premium increases of several hundred percent over the last year or two have become commonplace. Few if any private or public entities that rely on liability insurance have escaped the problems generated by this crisis.

Part A of Chapter 2 (The Causes of the Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability) reviews the current financial condition of the insurance industry, and the economic factors leading to that condition. The property-casualty industry in the past two years has suffered significant underwriting losses (\$21 billion in 1984; \$25 billion in 1985) which have limited its ability to offer as much insurance as its customers desire, and have made it reluctant to insure high risk activities which may expose it to further substantial underwriting losses. These underwriting losses appear to be largely a result of coverage written in the late 1970's and early 1980's which may have been underpriced due to the industry's desire to obtain premium income to invest at the then prevailing high interest rates.

Nonetheless, there is little to suggest that the recent massive increases in premiums is related solely to these losses, or that the cost of liability insurance will decline significantly as the industry limits its underwriting losses and restores its desired level of overall profitability. To the contrary,

indications are that developments in tort law are a major cause for the sharp premium increases. 1/

Part B of Chapter 2 reviews the contribution of tort law to the insurance availability/affordability crisis. The Working Group found that in the past decade there has been a veritable explosion of tort liability in the United States. Four specific problem areas are identified and discussed:

- ° The movement toward no-fault liability, which increasingly results in companies and individuals being found liable even in the absence of any wrongdoing on their part.
- ° The undermining of causation through a variety of questionable practices and doctrines which shift liability to "deep pocket" defendants even though they did not cause the underlying injury or had only a limited or tangential involvement.
- ° The explosive growth in the damages awarded in tort lawsuits, particularly with regard to non-economic awards such as pain and suffering or punitive damages. And,
- ° The excessive transaction costs of the tort system, in which virtually two-thirds of every dollar paid out through the system is lost to attorneys' fees and litigation expenses.

The Working Group was particularly struck by the extraordinary growth over the last decade of the number of tort lawsuits and the average award per lawsuit. A few examples amply illustrate this point:

- ° Between 1974 and 1985 there has been a 758% increase in the number of product liability lawsuits filed in federal district court.
- ° The number of medical malpractice lawsuits per 100 physicians doubled between 1979 and 1983, and tripled during that period for obstetricians/gynecologists.
- ° According to a jury verdict reporting service, between 1975 and 1985 the average medical malpractice jury

1/ The Working Group also considered whether state regulation of the insurance industry may be a cause of the crisis, and found little compelling evidence that state regulation is a major cause of these problems.

verdict increased from \$220,018 to \$1,017,716, and the average product liability jury verdict increased from \$393,580 to \$1,850,452. 2/

- ° A survey of punitive damage awards in Cook County, Illinois indicates that the average personal injury punitive damage award (measured in constant 1984 dollars) increased from \$40,000 in 1970-74 to \$1,152,174 in 1980-84.

The above data demonstrates that the insurance industry was selling coverage at constant or even reduced cost over a period of years during which tort liability was undergoing a dramatic expansion. This suggests that a major factor underlying the availability/affordability crisis is the industry's attempt to bring premiums quickly back into line with rapidly growing liability risks. 3/ The high -- and in some areas unaffordable -- insurance premiums reflect the fact that tort law is now placing a massive compensation burden on the private sector.

A second important contribution of tort liability to the availability/affordability crisis is the tremendous uncertainty that has been generated by rapidly changing standards of liability and causation. The "rules of the game" have become so unpredictable that the insurance industry often cannot assess liability risks with any degree of confidence. This appears to have severely exacerbated the problem.

Chapter 3 of the report (Recent Insurance Industry Developments) summarizes a number of responses of the insurance industry, its customers and state regulators to the crisis. These developments include the use of claims-made policies, the inclusion within policy limits of all or part of defense costs, the increasing use of self-insurance and captives, and more exacting state regulation.

In Chapter 4 of the report (Tort Law Reform) the Working Group concludes that while some of the above recent developments in the insurance industry, along with a likely improvement in the industry's financial condition, should relieve some of the current availability/affordability problems, it is unlikely that these changes will provide long-term, systemic relief without

2/ For purposes of comparison, the dollar lost approximately half of its purchasing power during this period.

3/ While some have suggested that the dramatic premium increases are an attempt by the industry to recoup its past underwriting losses, for the reasons discussed in the report such a theory makes little economic sense.

some fundamental reforms of tort law. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that absent such reforms, particularly the insurance affordability problem will remain a long-term fixture of the American economy.

The Working Group recommends eight reforms of tort law that should significantly alleviate the crisis in insurance availability and affordability. The Working Group does not at this time recommend how these reforms should be implemented (whether at the federal or state level, or through legislative or judicial modification of the law); nor are these reforms meant to be an exhaustive list of potential reforms. The recommended reforms are:

- Return to a fault-based standard for liability.
- Base causation findings on credible scientific and medical evidence and opinions.
- Eliminate joint and several liability in cases where defendants have not acted in concert.
- Limit non-economic damages (such as pain and suffering, mental anguish, or punitive damages) to a fair and reasonable maximum dollar amount.
- Provide for periodic (instead of lump-sum) payments of damages for future medical care or lost income.
- Reduce awards in cases where a plaintiff can be compensated by certain collateral sources to prevent a windfall double recovery.
- Limit attorneys' contingency fees to reasonable amounts on a "sliding scale."
- Encourage use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve cases out of court.

Chapter 5 of the report (Government Insurance: A Non-Solution) details the reasons why government insurance or indemnification would be highly undesirable and would do nothing to remedy the problems underlying the availability/affordability crisis. Such a federal insurance or indemnification program would not only be extremely expensive, but also could exacerbate the problems of tort law by making the "deep pocket" of the taxpayer available in many cases. In addition, such a program could undermine public health and safety, require more extensive government regulation of private sector activities, involve the government in substantial litigation, lead to increased federal involvement in state insurance regulation, and inhibit the ability of the private sector to adapt insurance services to changing economic and social conditions.

The Conclusion to the report lists five conclusions as to the appropriate response of the federal government to the current crisis in insurance availability and affordability. In sum, the Working Group concludes that while there are a number of factors underlying the insurance availability/affordability crisis, tort law is a major cause which the federal government can address in various sensible and appropriate ways. As for some of the other factors underlying the crisis, such as the insurance industry's recent large underwriting losses, there is little the federal government can or should do to remedy these problems.

In that both the tort liability and insurance developments in this report are highly dynamic, and because more detailed data and other studies undoubtedly will become available, the Working Group will continue to follow developments in this area, and, where appropriate, supplement its conclusions and recommendations.

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Chairman
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Insurance Availability

February, 1986

CHAPTER 1

THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY

Liability insurance is a linchpin in the operation of the United States economy, yet many American businesses, professionals and municipalities, both large and small, are encountering serious insurance problems arising from premium increases, policy cancellations and refusals to underwrite certain activities.

The liability insurance crisis has three separate but related faces that individually or in various combinations make it difficult for many entities to obtain the desired liability insurance. These problems are availability of insurance, affordability of insurance coverage and adequacy of coverage.

This Chapter describes the current nature and extent of these problems. The Chapter focuses, first, on the problems encountered within the various lines of insurance, and, second, on the effect of those problems on different sectors of the economy.

I. INSURANCE COVERAGE SUMMARIES

The following are insurance summaries taken predominantly from insurance industry reports prepared by the Alliance of American Insurers or published in Business Insurance.

Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance ("EIL")

EIL covers pollution incidents stemming from gradual pollution exposures (as opposed to "sudden and accidental" pollution, which traditionally has been covered under general liability coverage). Two major companies dropped out of the market in 1985, and by the end of the year only two companies were offering EIL coverage. Forty-seven companies were forced to close hazardous-waste management facilities for lack of EIL coverage. Most hazardous waste businesses currently are looking toward captives and self-insurance. Brokers expect significant price increases on the limited insurance still available.

Sudden and Accidental Pollution Coverage

Coverage for sudden and accidental pollution traditionally has been provided as part of general liability coverage. New general liability forms, however, specifically exclude all pollution liability. This is due to court decisions interpreting "sudden and accidental" coverage as also covering gradual and intentional pollution. (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the new policy forms.) The London market currently is excluding pollution coverage from the large risks it insures.

Directors and Officers Liability ("D & O")

Premiums in 1985 rose 50% to 500%, and include larger deductibles, lower limits, more restrictive endorsements and shorter policy durations. Industries particularly affected include financial institutions, electric (nuclear) utilities, new high technology business, wildcat oil and gas companies, research and development enterprises, real estate developers, highly leveraged businesses, petrochemical companies and the steel industry. Capacity constrictions have hurt larger risks more than smaller risks. Traditional primary and reinsurance capacity has been reduced, but Lloyd's of London, which has in the past not been active in this line, is offering primary coverage up to \$20 million. Not surprisingly, business with Lloyd's of London is up to 100% to 200%. Much of the reinsurance market for such coverage has virtually dried up.

Bank Fidelity Bond Coverage

Premiums are up about 300%. A group of fifty banks are creating a mutual insurer to provide D & O and bankers blanket bond coverage.

Motor Carrier Liability Coverage

Bus and trucking companies are having severe difficulties obtaining the insurance coverage required by federal law. The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 requires insurance minimums of from \$750,000 for carriers of non-hazardous cargo to \$5 million for carriers of hazardous waste and most hazardous materials carried in bulk. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 set insurance minimums from \$1.5 million to \$5 million, depending on the passenger capacity of the bus. Capacity is limited both in the primary and reinsurance markets. Small trucking firms and independent owner-operators have the most difficulty getting insurance.

Liquor Liability Coverage

Liquor liability coverage may be available as part of a commercial lines package, but is severely constrained and virtually nonexistent in some parts of the country as monoline coverage. This line has been affected by the bankruptcy of one of the largest dram shop insurers, Ideal Mutual Insurance Company.

Medical Malpractice Insurance

Availability problems are being encountered by nurse/midwives, obstetricians/gynecologists, pediatricians and dentists. Premiums are being raised and coverage limits are being reduced, sometimes by as much as 50%. Reinsurers are also restricting coverage in this line. St. Paul's Insurance Company, the largest medical malpractice insurer, has placed a moratorium on new policies. St. Paul's writes coverage for approximately 20%

of the Nation's doctors, and wrote an estimated \$600 million in malpractice business in 1985. It had a pure loss ratio (excluding loss adjustment expenses and operating expenses) of 81.3% in 1984. Doctor-owned mutual insurance companies account for more than half of the medical liability coverage in the country.

Commercial General Liability ("CGL")

Commercial general liability insurance has undergone significant premium increases. The Insurance Services Office ("ISO"), the property-casualty insurers' statistical and ratemaking organization, has filed a new CGL form which will limit coverage and which contains certain exclusions and policy limitations (see Chapter 3).

Excess Coverage

Excess coverage capacity has been sharply reduced. This coverage currently is offered primarily on a claims-made basis, which may or may not mesh with the primary, reinsurance and other excess layers.

Reinsurance

Reinsurance capacity for the United States market has been severely limited, particularly with regard to Lloyd's of London, which has faced both its own problems and a disillusionment with the American market. This capacity problem is expected to ease somewhat in 1986, but is likely to remain a problem for some time longer.

II. SECTORAL SUMMARIES

The following are summaries of the effect of the insurance availability/affordability crisis on various sectors of the United States economy. This information was obtained from surveys conducted by business groups, articles in the trade press and materials prepared by trade associations or provided by industry representatives. While the following does not include all of the available information, it summarizes the major findings.

Municipalities

Municipalities are among the hardest hit groups by both affordability and availability problems. Local officials preparing their budgets for the next fiscal year report that the market for public entities is "extremely limited" and "diminishing to nothing." Those cities able to secure bids are finding insurance companies' offers prohibitively expensive. Renewal rates have climbed by as much as 400% -- and often for lower coverages with higher deductibles. Some cities are facing premium increases of up to 1,000%.

The United States Conference of Mayors conducted a survey of cities in the summer of 1985. Over half the cities were quoted premium increases of over 100%, and 16 were quoted increases greater than 200%. In addition, a recent report by the Wyatt Company, Public Officials Liability Insurance: Understanding the Market (1986), notes that local governments have reported premium increases of 200% to 300% in the insurance purchased by their officials.

Rather than renew, many cities have decided to "go bare." All cities have been forced to reevaluate and sometimes limit the services they provide their communities. Finally, in the wake of policy cancellations, a number of city and county officials have resigned, fearing personal exposure to lawsuits stemming from their official duties.

Transportation

The American Public Transit Association, the nation's largest organization of transit operators, reports that premiums for those companies able to obtain insurance this year have gone 500% to 1,000%, and sometimes more. In Los Angeles, the Southern California Rapid Transit District's annual premium jumped from \$67,000 to \$1.7 million, while coverage was reduced. Transit problems were compounded by the bankruptcy of one of the largest companies involved in insuring mass transit systems. Some local transit systems have had to suspend operations.

Publishing

Newspaper and magazine publishers are finding it more difficult to obtain libel insurance.

Nurse-Midwives

The American College of Nurse-Midwives represents 2,500 members, 1,400 of whom were covered under a blanket policy through the association. The policy was cancelled on July 1, 1985. The association has been unable to obtain other coverage and has been attempting to create a captive insurer. The captive has started operation by April 1, 1986, but that deadline will not be met.

Grocers

A survey by the National Grocers Association found that its members' liability insurance premium rates had recently increased from 25% to 500%. The survey covered 161 retailers and 20 wholesalers.

Architects and Engineers

Most architectural and engineering firms, and particularly smaller firms, are experiencing severe availability and affordability problems. Insurance premium rate increases of

200% to 300% have become the norm. Roughly 30% to 40% of smaller firms are going bare. Engineering firms involved in asbestos or other toxic substances abatement activities face extreme difficulties in obtaining insurance, with rate increases, where insurance is available, of 5,000% not uncommon.

Day Care Centers

The National Association for Education of Young Children conducted a survey of day care providers. They covered family day care providers who care for children in a home setting, day care centers and headstart programs. The survey found that 40% of the respondents had had their insurance cancelled or not renewed and the majority of those with coverage had premium increases, most of which rose 200% to 300%.

Toy Manufacturers

The Toy Manufacturers of America recently surveyed its 243 members on insurance cost and availability problems. Final results will not be available until April, but initial responses are:

<u>Members</u>	<u>%Increase in premiums</u>
21	50
9	50-100
12	100-150
2	150-200
11	300-500
7	500-1000
1	over-1000
2	cannot obtain insurance

Companies that normally had three to four months to negotiate a policy renewal have been given only 72 hours to do so this year. This permits insufficient time for policy shopping. The association reports that it had recommended a captive to its members a few years ago. Commercial insurers reduced prices upon learning of the proposal, eliminating industry interest in a captive.

Household Appliance Manufacturers

The household appliance industry has seen sharp reductions in available coverage, and the Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers has lost group coverage it had arranged in 1983. Many companies have been able to obtain only about one-third of the coverage sought for product liability, and the cost of that coverage is increasing. Member companies are having similar problems obtaining D & O insurance.

Automobile Repair

The Automotive Services Councils, an association representing automobile repair shops and garages, conducted a survey with 104 responses. Average premium increases were 70% to 80%. Some 13% of the membership reported purchasing an average of 30% less coverage. Approximately 41% had experienced policy cancellations and 26% were unable to find new carriers.

Medical Equipment

The medical equipment industry has had a captive, MedMarc, an affiliate of the Health Industry Manufacturers Association, since 1979. The captive started with 35 companies and has recently reached 100 member companies. The rate of growth increased in 1985 as the result of cancellations by commercial insurers of about 20% of the Association's members and premium increases of five to ten-fold.

Biotechnology

Biotechnology companies are having a particularly difficult time in the tight market because they are generally new, small companies dealing mostly in research and development in a field largely unknown to insurers. Their inability to obtain coverage causes them difficulty in obtaining bank financing, which, in turn, causes some of these companies to sell out or forego promising research. The industry is exploring the creation of a captive.

Oil and Gas Drilling

The International Association of Drilling Contractors represents 1,500 contractors operating drilling rigs. It estimates maritime liability premium increases of 300% to 700% and inland liability premium increases of 100% to 150%.

Construction Contractors

Constructor magazine (October 1985) estimates average increases in general liability coverage of 40% to 75%. For contractors who were able to negotiate significant discounts in past years increases currently are running up to 300%. In 1985 premium increases for umbrella coverage were approximately 300% for less coverage.

Natural Gas Transportation

The National L-P Gas Association represents 4,100 firms that prepare and transport liquefied petroleum gases for residential and industrial users. According to a spokesman, as many as 25% of the transporters are operating with less than the \$5 million in insurance coverage that is required of motor carriers by federal law. Difficulties are attributed to unavailability and prohibitive costs of umbrella insurance.

General Manufacturing

The Machinery & Allied Products Institute ("MAPI") recently conducted a survey of 81 companies producing a broad range of products in the manufacturing industries and obtained an 80% response rate. The typical respondent experienced increases for every type of insurance covered in the survey. The survey covered general liability, D & O, environmental impairment liability, products and other property and casualty coverages. The size of the increases varied with the date of the renewal; consequently, the survey results understate the problem since many of the respondents are not up for renewal until early this year. Significant survey results are shown in the table below.

MAPI Survey Results on Liability Coverages

<u>Premiums</u>	<u>% Higher</u>	<u>% Change (Median)</u>
CGL-Primary	73	40
CGL-Excess	100	250
D & O	72	300
EIL	94	60
Products	95	116
Other	87	40

<u>Lower Limits</u>	<u>% Lower</u>	<u>% Change (Median)</u>
CGL-Primary	13	-36
CGL-Excess	66	-50
D & O	27	-25
EIL	59	-50
Products	33	-50
Other	18	-25

<u>Deductibles & Exclusions</u>	<u>% Higher Deductible</u>	<u>% More Exclusions</u>
CGL-Primary	34	97
CGL-Excess	25	96
D & O	49	95
EIL	50	89
Products	50	100
Other	28	100

In addition to the foregoing, 35% of the MAPI respondents indicated that their general liability coverage excluded "sudden and accidental" pollution coverage, while 49% indicated that it was excluded in some layers and included in others. Some 65% of the respondents indicated that they had some coverages cancelled since January 1, 1985.

Machine Tool Manufacturers

The National Machine Tool Association represents 300 to 400 businesses that manufacture heavy machinery which cuts, shapes and forms metal. Preliminary results of a survey indicated product liability premiums have doubled since 1984, and that about half of the respondents have been or expect to be put on claims-made policy forms.

Battery Recycling & Smelting Companies

Battery recycling companies are typical of many industries where processes create toxic wastes. Recycling 50 million scrap batteries accounts for up to 50% of the annual lead smelter production. If the batteries are not recycled, they will be disposed of in landfills, leading to more serious toxic exposure. One major smelting company was offered a \$10 million policy with a \$2.5 million deductible at a cost of \$650,000. While it deems the policy uneconomic, it has not found an alternative. The problem is widespread with smelters of various metals. The uncertainty of the risk and size of pollution liabilities has led to substantial reductions in coverage with sharp increases in deductibles and premiums.

Power Equipment Manufacturers

Outdoor power equipment manufacturers had been reporting premium increases of from 50% to 70% during the past year. At the end of the year, with many renewals coming due, some have experienced increases of 400% to 600%. The Association once again is considering establishment of a captive.

General Aviation Manufacturers

The General Aviation Manufacturers Association reports that the cost of liability insurance per aircraft was \$51 for the 6,778 business, commuter and private aircraft delivered in 1962, and increased to \$211 for the 9,774 delivered in 1972. Currently, for the 2,000 planes delivered in 1985, the liability insurance cost has increased to \$70,000 per plane. The cost of liability insurance to air frame manufacturers in 1985 was about \$135 million, with a total cost of \$175 to \$200 million for the entire industry that includes manufacturers of engines, electronics and parts.

Ski Operators

Liability insurance premium increases of up to 400% have been reported by the National Ski Areas Association. Some small ski areas have closed, and the average price of lift tickets has increased substantially.

Aerospace Equipment Manufacturers

Aerospace equipment manufacturers are increasingly concerned that the escalating cost of product liability insurance and other associated costs are causing them to lose their ability to compete with overseas manufacturers of similar equipment.

III. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE INSURANCE AVAILABILITY/AFFORDABILITY CRISIS

The above examples of insurance availability, affordability and adequacy problems demonstrate the broad scope of the liability insurance crisis in the mid-1980's. In a similar crisis in the mid-1970's, the problem areas were largely confined to medical malpractice and product liability. Medical malpractice coverage has been a continuing problem, with almost half that coverage currently underwritten by doctors' and hospitals' mutuals and other alternative markets. Product liability coverage, however, was readily available at declining cost during the late 1970's and early 1980's.

A growing capacity shortage over the last year or more has caused commercial insurers to review carefully their underwriting standards and pricing policies in order to determine where insurance capacity can be utilized most profitably. The inevitable result of this reevaluation has been a severe disruption for insurance buyers.

Insurance Availability

Availability problems are occurring in certain specialty commercial insurance markets. These include pollution, day care, municipal, liquor, motor carrier and D & O liability coverages. The bankruptcies of some specialty insurers, particularly in the lines of motor carrier and liquor liability, have affected the capacity in these coverages.

In each of these lines, insurers have perceived the possibility of significant losses based on highly publicized verdicts and settlements. General line insurers who ordinarily would fill the gap left by specialty carriers are unwilling to do so because they can use their scarcer dollars in less volatile and more profitable lines.

Insurance Affordability

Premiums are increasing in virtually all commercial coverages. Examples of affordability problems include nurse-midwives and general aviation manufacturers, both of which face premium costs which may be warranted by the experience, but are too expensive for the buyers. Solutions to problems like these appear to lie outside of the insurance system.

Insurance Adequacy

Problems of insurance adequacy are being experienced across all commercial lines of coverage. The main problem seems to lie with the fact that many buyers are unable to buy as much

insurance as they desire. This is particularly true for large firms which seek large amounts of excess and higher limits coverage. These problems appear related in part to a capacity crunch created both by the insurance cycle and the withdrawal of capacity by the overseas reinsurers. The lack of capacity related to the insurance cycle shows signs of abating as the corner of the cycle has turned and surplus is increasing. But many firms may have to use alternative market mechanisms for at least a couple of years until this capacity fully returns. It may take much longer to get reentry by overseas reinsurers who have grave concerns about the American tort liability system. A second area of inadequacy lies in the growth of exclusions, deductibles and other policy limitations that are just now being introduced into the market. These are discussed in Chapter 3.

The Insurance Availability/Affordability Crisis

Finally, it should be noted that the crisis in insurance availability and affordability does not appear to be a crisis for the insurance industry. While the industry (as discussed in Chapter 2) is suffering substantial underwriting losses, the Working Group does not perceive this crisis to be a major threat to the financial viability of the industry. Rather, it is a crisis for the insureds who cannot obtain or afford the insurance they believe necessary for their on-going activities. And, to the extent that entities are forced to operate without insurance or with inadequate insurance, it is a crisis for victims of tortious conduct who may find that liable defendants cannot pay them their damages.

CHAPTER 2

THE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY

A number of reasons have been proffered for the crisis in the availability, affordability and adequacy of liability insurance. Many of these reasons relate to the economic decisions and performance of the insurance industry over the past decade. Other reasons focus on recent developments in tort law. While the two in fact are closely related, this Chapter discusses each of these areas separately. Part A deals with the general economic reasons for the current crisis; Part B reviews the contribution of tort law. 1/

1/ There have been suggestions that the availability/affordability crisis may be caused by certain aspects of state regulation. While some regulatory measures may have aggravated the problem, the Working Group has found little compelling evidence that the crisis is the result of a regulatory failure, either in the sense of insufficient or inadequate regulation, or in the sense of ill-conceived regulation. In this regard, it is worthwhile noting the 1977 report of the Department of Justice to the Task Group on Antitrust Immunities on The Pricing and Marketing of Insurance, which concluded that "in the commercial lines . . . state regulatory schemes are largely illusory and that insurers are generally free to set their own prices." Id., at vii. The report further indicated that rigid state rate regulation, such as is found in automobile insurance, may in fact aggravate an availability problem. Id., at vi.

In this regard, it is worth noting the conclusion of the Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook (1985), prepared by Henry Manne (general editor) and Barry Anderson, Patricia Danzon, Clark Havighurst, Charles Phelps and Frank Sloan (principal authors) for the Florida Medical Association. The Guidebook concluded that it was difficult to fault the state insurance regulatory system for the high medical malpractice insurance premiums in Florida. Id., at 11. The report concluded that premium increases lag claims costs, and that "malpractice premiums are almost certainly not 'too high' compared to the increases in claims costs emerging over recent years." Id., at 149-50.

Some have pointed to state insurance reserve requirements as a cause of the insurance availability/affordability crisis, to the extent that they believe these requirements to have exacerbated capacity constraints. While the Working Group did not analyze whether state reserve requirements are too high or too low, it should be noted that these requirements exist to ensure the solvency of insurance carriers, and thereby to protect insureds. It also should be noted that the only way that state insurance reserve requirements conceivably could be modified to

(CONTINUED)

A.

I. INSURANCE INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE

Recent news accounts have presented a seemingly conflicting view of the economic performance of the property-casualty insurance industry. In order to understand the financial condition of the industry itself and of some of its specific lines of business, it is useful to compare the condition of the industry as a whole to what has been happening to premiums in the lines which present significant availability/affordability problems.

The table below presents premium and loss data for the property-casualty insurance industry for the period 1981 through 1985.

Year	Net Premiums Written (000)	Loss and LAE (000)	Expenses (000)	Statutory Under- writing Loss after Policyholder Dividends (000)
1981	\$ 98,805,725	\$75,764,229	\$27,132,052	\$- 6,323,534
1982	103,115,653	82,152,241	28,996,122	-10,415,751
1983	107,802,698	87,719,055	30,799,231	-13,285,049
1984	117,743,957	103,720,652	32,980,082	-21,455,300
1985*	142,300,000	126,846,220	37,353,750	-25,200,000

*Estimated

Source:

Best's Insurance
Management Reports

The most striking number in the table, of course, is the \$25 billion underwriting loss estimated for 1985. This number represents the difference between premiums written and expenses, policyholder

1/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)

produce lower premiums would be if the reserve requirements were relaxed. It would be difficult to justify relaxing reserve requirements, however, in light of the fact that both insurance company insolvencies and the number of insurance companies reported to be in financial difficulty have increased substantially in the last two years.

The Working Group is continuing to review the contribution, if any, of state regulation to the insurance availability/affordability crisis.

dividends, 2/ estimated losses and loss adjustment expenses ("LAE").

The underwriting loss, however, while significant, represents only part of the industry's overall financial picture. Since premiums are collected well in advance of any anticipated payout, they are invested and earn income. In addition, other income is generated which also must be considered in reviewing the industry's financial condition. Overall income in 1985 resulted in the industry showing a \$7.6 billion gain in policyholders' surplus (the equivalent of net worth), 3/ on an underwriting loss of \$25.2 billion and net investment and other income of \$32.8 billion. Thus, the industry appears to have made an overall profit in 1985, though at a lower rate than historical levels or other sectors of the economy.

In discussing the overall financial review of the property/casualty industry, Best's reported that:

Investor interest in the property-casualty industry cannot be denied. While the Dow Industrial Average had made headlines by surpassing the 1500 mark (a 25% gain for the year), Best's Index of property/casualty companies has jumped 50% at this writing, and security analysts specializing in insurance--and cognizant of 1985's underwriting losses--nevertheless continue to be optimistic about the industry's prospects. 4/

Two factors must be taken into account in assessing the role of the insurance industry's financial performance in the insurance availability/affordability crisis. First, even though the industry currently is making a profit, that profit is well below the profitability of most other major industries, as well as the insurance industry's historical average. For example, in 1984 the property-casualty insurance industry produced an annual rate

2/ Questions have been raised as to whether or not the \$2.1 billion paid out in policyholder dividends should be included in the underwriting loss. Policyholder dividends are offered to some policyholders in some lines, and reduce the net cost of their insurance coverage. Consequently, any reduction in such premiums simply increases the net cost to policyholders.

3/ Policyholders' surplus is the difference between insurers' assets and liabilities. It is considered "the financial security that stands behind every insurance policy and is that which provides the cushion to support the shock of major catastrophe, stock market declines and loss of reserve inadequacies." ISO, Financial Condition of the Insurance Industry -- An Update (1985).

4/ Best's Insurance Management Reports (December 30, 1985).

of return on net income after taxes as a percent of net worth of 1.8%, whereas the median for Fortune 500 companies was 13.6%. 5/ The comparable rate of return for the property-casualty insurance industry from 1975 to 1984 was 10.9%. 6/

Second, the insurance availability/affordability crisis has not manifested itself across the entire spectrum of insurance services, but only in specific lines. These lines account for a relatively small portion of the industry. For example, the entire property-casualty insurance market accounts for only approximately one-third of the overall insurance market in terms of written premiums. 7/ The two property-casualty lines that have been the primary source of availability/affordability problems -- general commercial liability and medical malpractice -- amounted to only 7% of all the property-casualty lines in terms of 1984 written premiums. 8/ (These two lines thus represent approximately 2.5% of the entire industry's written premiums in 1984.) But, as can be seen in Subsection II, about one-fifth of the property-casualty industry's \$21.5 billion 1984 underwriting loss came from these two lines. And in 1985, the two lines accounted for almost one-quarter of the property-casualty industry's estimated \$25.2 billion underwriting loss. These two lines, as well as the Commercial Multiple Peril line, 9/ are discussed in greater detail in Subsection II.

II. UNDERWRITING RESULTS BY MAJOR LINES

While the industry overall has been profitable, certain lines have made major contributions to the underwriting losses. This section examines the major commercial lines in which availability and affordability problems have been most prominent.

Commercial Multiple Peril

Commercial Multiple Peril ("CMP") is related to the general liability line of insurance in that it is a packaged line of business which includes some commercial general liability coverage and its long-tail losses; that is, losses which may be

5/ Insurance Information Institute, 1985-86 Property/Casualty Factbook, page 22.

6/ Id. The comparable statutory accounting rate of return was 11.9%. Id.

7/ Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, page 150 (January 25, 1986).

8/ Insurance Information Institute, 1985-86 Property/Casualty Factbook, page 16.

9/ If the Commercial Multiple Peril line is taken into account, approximately 14% of the property-casualty industry (in terms of 1984 written premiums) accounted for about one-third of its underwriting losses in both 1984 and 1985. Id.

reported many years after the policy year. CMP experience over the past five years is reflected in the chart below.

Commercial Multiple Peril

Year	Net Premiums Written (Billions)	Loss and LAE (Billions)	Under- writing Expenses (Billions)	Statutory Under- Writing Loss After Policyholder Dividends (Billions)
1981	\$6.8	\$4.6	\$2.5	\$-0.5
1982	6.9	5.3	2.7	-1.2
1983	7.2	5.9	2.9	-1.7
1984	8.2	7.9	3.2	-2.9
1985*	11.7	10.4	4.1	-3.0

*Estimated

Source: Best's Insurance Management Reports 12/30/85

While the underwriting losses for CMP rose to \$3 billion in 1985, it is readily apparent that until recently there had been little premium growth in the line. Best's predicts that the short-tail, non-liability portion of CMP should provide the ability for a fast turnaround for this line. It also notes that ISO's new CGL claims-made form will be added to the standard CMP form, but that market pressures should assure the availability and affordability of the smaller businessowner's package. 10/

Commercial General Liability

Commercial General Liability ("CGL") coverage includes most of the commercial sectors which are experiencing serious availability/affordability problems. It covers product liability, municipalities, day care centers and other commercial coverages. It is the line for which ISO has introduced its new claims-made form. The experience of this line over the past five years is summarized below.

General Liability

Year	Net Premiums Written (Billions)	Loss and LAE (Billions)	Under- writing Expenses (Billions)	Statutory Under- Writing Loss After Policyholder Dividends (Billions)
1981	\$6.0	\$5.1	\$1.8	\$-1.0
1982	5.6	5.4	1.8	-1.7
1983	5.7	6.0	1.8	-2.1
1984	6.5	7.8	1.9	-3.2
1985*	11.1	13.2	2.7	-4.6

*Estimated

Source: Best's Insurance Management Report

10 Best's Insurance Management Reports (December 30, 1985).

As is apparent, written premiums dropped in 1982 and 1983 and rose slightly in 1984. The figures for 1985, however, show a dramatic increase of 72% over the 1984 premium. Increases are continuing to occur in the line as policies come up for renewal. Losses increased throughout the period, but did so at a relatively even pace until 1984, when losses increased by over \$1 billion dollars over the previous year's losses.

Medical Malpractice

Medical malpractice represents only about 1.8% of property/casualty insurance written, but has been the source of major availability/affordability problems. The following chart summarizes the experience of the line over the past five years.

Medical Malpractice				
Year	Net Premiums Written (Billions)	Loss and LAE (Billions)	Under- writing Expenses (Billions)	Statutory Under- writing Loss After Policyholder Dividends (Billions)
1981	\$1.3	\$1.6	\$0.2	\$-0.5
1982	1.5	2.0	0.2	-0.7
1983	1.6	2.1	0.2	-0.8
1984	1.8	2.8	0.3	-1.1
1985*	2.6	3.6	0.3	-1.4

*Estimated

Source: Best's Insurance
Management Report

Medical malpractice experience is receiving considerable attention at the state level. Unlike many lines of coverage such as product liability, rates are based on state claims rather than national data.

III. PREMIUM TRENDS

The recent rapid growth in premiums has been a major element in the current availability/affordability crisis. This section examines this trend. The following data was provided by the ISO.

Cash-flow underwriting is generally acknowledged to have played a role in causing the large underwriting losses presently being experienced in the commercial lines. According to ISO, the industry's current underwriting losses are a result of "a

prolonged period of underpricing and rapidly expanding tort liabilities." 11/ In this regard, the ISO report states:

For the better part of seven years, the insurance industry has been engaged in a brutal price war. During the early 1980's, the price for commercial insurance was decreasing, sometimes sharply, as insurers vied for premium dollars to invest at the high interest rates then in effect. At the time, commercial customers did not complain. Indeed, many realized that commercial insurance in the United States was being sold below cost, even when investment income was considered. 12/

Chart A, based on ISO data, tracks commercial line premiums in constant 1967 dollars. As can be noted from the chart, 1984 marked the first real increase in premiums (in constant dollars) after five consecutive years of declining written premiums. But 1984 written premiums were almost 20% less than premiums collected in 1978, the year preceding the dramatic decline in premiums. At the same time, losses and expenses in 1984 were at an all-time high. 13/

A similar comparison of the general liability premiums written, premiums earned and line outgo over the past ten years (not in constant dollars) is shown in Chart B.

Analyzing this data, the Best's report notes that during the relevant period (1975 - 1985):

. . . the inflation of liability awards could have been no secret to any underwriter. Had the ascending line of premiums written that was established in 1975 through 1978 continued to rise, the general liability losses of \$13 billion incurred in the last six years largely would have been avoided. 14/

11/ ISO, Financial Condition of the Insurance Industry -- An Update (1985).


12/ Id.

13/ Id.

14/ Best's Insurance Management Reports (December 30, 1985).

CHART A


WRITTEN PREMIUM vs. LOSSES & EXPENSES COMMERCIAL LINES IN CONSTANT 1967 DOLLARS



Source: Insurance Services Office

CHART B

GENERAL LIABILITY



Source: Best's Insurance Management Report, 12/30/85

IV. THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OF THE INSURANCE AVAILABILITY/AFFORDABILITY CRISIS

The above discussion indicates that during the late 1970's and early 1980's the insurance industry engaged in significant premium reductions while claim losses increased steadily. The result, not surprisingly, has been massive underwriting losses in recent years.

It is useful in considering the contribution of such economic factors to the insurance availability/affordability crisis to distinguish two different effects which frequently are confused. The first is the inflationary effect on premiums of the recent decline in interest rates. The second is the premium cutting which took place in the late 1970's and early 1980's as a consequence of the industry's desire to take advantage of high interest rates available during that period.

As to the first effect, there is an obvious inverse relationship between premiums and the prevailing interest rate. A significant portion of an insurer's profits stem from the return on the premium income it invests between receipt of the premium and payout of the incurred liabilities. When interest rates are high, premiums tend to be lower since more of the insurer's income comes from such return on investment; and when interest rates are low, premiums will tend to be higher since the insurer is more dependent on the premium principal to cover the anticipated payout. Thus, as interest rates fall -- as they have in the mid-1980's -- insurance premiums inevitably increase.


This inverse relationship is illustrated by Chart C, which compares the prime rate in 1976 through 1985 to the annual percentage change of the total Commercial General Liability (CGL) premiums written by the insurance industry in each of those years. ^{15/} Chart C graphically demonstrates that the rate of growth of the written premiums changes inversely with the movement of the prime interest rate.

To the extent that the recent sharp premium increases are related to the drop in interest rates, there is little the federal (or any) government can or should do to mitigate this market effect. Declining interest rates cause innumerable economic realignments which, on the whole, are quite beneficial to the economy. An increase in insurance premiums resulting from such a reduction in interest rates, while of itself undesirable, is a relatively minor side effect to the far more significant economic consequences of a drop in the interest rate.

^{15/} The percentage change in 1976 through 1984 is obtained from the Insurance Information Institute's most recent Property/Casualty Factbook. The estimate for 1985 is obtained from the ISO data discussed supra.

CHART C

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN GCL PREMIUMS COMPARED TO INTEREST RATE



* PRIME INTEREST RATE	■ ANNUAL % CHANGE IN WRITTEN GENERAL LIABILITY PREMIUMS
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*1985 Data Estimated

Moreover, there is little that can be done to address this source of premium volatility. It would be absurd to try to keep interest rates high simply to keep insurance premiums as low as possible. But as long as interest rates fluctuate, premiums necessarily will reflect such changes.

A second economic factor related to interest rates is the extent to which high interest rates may have triggered "excessive competition" in the insurance industry which led the industry to sell its product too cheaply. For one thing, even assuming one accepts the concept of "excessive competition," it is unclear how such losses in fact contribute to the insurance availability/affordability crisis. As discussed later in this Chapter, such losses are "sunk costs" which the industry cannot recoup simply by charging higher premiums. If premiums in fact are higher than the insured risks and the currently available investment return dictate, either other sources of capital (including insurers who have suffered no losses or lower losses) should offer the same insurance at a lower price, or insureds will retain these "excess profits" for themselves through self-insurance or the formation of captives. The fact that there appears to be little insurance coverage being made available by new or expanding underwriters, and that many insureds are highly reluctant to self insure or form captives (even though many with serious availability problems may have no alternative), strongly indicates that recoupment of losses is not a particularly compelling explanation for the current insurance availability/affordability crisis.

It is particularly puzzling that the proponents of this theory advocate the abolition of the insurance industry's antitrust immunity contained in the McCarran-Ferguson Act (Public Law 79-15) as an appropriate response to the asserted problem of the industry's cash-flow "mismanagement." It is hard to reconcile the argument that the current problems of the insurance industry stem from "excessive competition" with the proffered solution of removing the industry's antitrust immunity. Since the goal of antitrust law is to enhance competition, if one truly believes that the problems of the insurance industry are a result of too much competition, the last thing one would advocate is a legal change which would increase the level of competition. While the Working Group did not review and takes no position on the continuing validity of the industry's antitrust immunity, 16/ it is readily obvious that the suggestion that allegedly "excessive competition" can be cured by even more competition is patently absurd.

16/ Despite the assertions of some, the Working Group found no evidence to suggest that the industry's antitrust immunity is a significant factor in the insurance availability/affordability crisis. It should be noted, however, that the immunity has been criticized for a variety of other reasons. See the 1977 report of the Task Force on Antitrust Immunities, footnote 1, supra.

The reasons why the loss recoupment (or excessive pricing) theories advocated by some make little economic sense can briefly be summarized as follows:

- ° Insurers, like all profit maximizing companies, charge the price which maximizes their profits. Past gains or past losses are irrelevant to setting the price today which will maximize profits tomorrow. The argument that insurers are charging higher premiums to recoup past losses suggests that absent such losses their premiums would be lower -- that is, that they would not be charging premiums that maximize their profits. That makes little sense.
- ° Even if excessive premiums were being charged by some insurers to recoup their past losses, for the reasons discussed, other insurers would offer the same coverage at lower prices reflecting the actual risk, or insureds would retain such excess profits for themselves through self-insurance or the formation of captives. 17/
- ° The commercial lines of insurance, which are at the center of the availability/affordability crisis, in fact are relatively competitive. For example, the 1977 report of the Task Force on Antitrust Immunities (see footnote 1, supra) found that the property-liability insurance industry "appears to possess an atomistic market structure," including over 900 companies. Id., at 7. 18/ The Task Force also found that the restrictions to entry do not appear significant in the property-liability insurance industry, id., at 9, and that there appears to be price competition in this line as a result of "an industry structure that favors competition." Id., at 27-28. 19/ It is, of course,

17/ Many insurance companies are mutuals, meaning that they are owned by their policyholders. The suggestion that they are charging their policyholder-owners unnecessarily high premiums makes even less sense, since any such excess profits must be rebated through policyholder dividends.

18/ The report states that 20 insurance groups account for 53% of written premiums, and that no single group accounts for a major share of the market. Id., at 8. This is consistent with the analysis of the Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook (H. Manne, 1985), which found the medical malpractice insurance market in Florida to be "substantially and effectively competitive." Id., at 166.

19/ See also page 348 of the report summarizing the Task Force's
(CONTINUED)

difficult to conceive how premiums are being kept at artificially high levels for a line of insurance in which prices appear to be competitively determined.

- ° Finally, many of the strongest proponents of the loss recoupment theory also contend that these losses were the result of excessive price competition in the industry. Obviously, it is difficult to reconcile these arguments. 20/

In sum, to the extent that purely economic factors underlie the insurance availability/ affordability crisis, they do not appear to be the type of problems which can be cured by different or more intensive forms of government regulation -- either at the state or federal level -- of the insurance industry. There, however, is a cause of the availability/ affordability crisis at the very heart of that crisis which the government is well placed to address in a variety of constructive ways. That cause is tort law, and its role in the crisis is discussed in Part B of this Chapter.

B.

The above discussion has focused largely on the current financial condition of the insurance industry, and the economic factors leading to that condition. The following discussion examines the state of tort law, and its central role in the insurance availability/affordability crisis.

Unlike the above related economic data on the insurance industry, it is difficult to obtain good empirical data indicating precisely what has happened to tort liability in

19/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)

conclusion that the "industry is structured in a manner conducive to competition." It should be noted that these conclusions did not appear to apply to some other lines of insurance such as life insurance.

20/ These same points apply equally well to arguments that premiums are set excessively high to recoup losses resulting from mismanaged investment portfolios. Just as past losses are irrelevant to determining the premiums which will maximize profits, investment portfolio losses should have no bearing on premiums. In this regard, however, it should be noted that the property-casualty industry made \$32.8 billion from net investment and other income in 1985. See supra.

recent years. 21/ It is plain even to the most uninitiated that tort law has changed dramatically in recent years -- from a relatively quiescent legal backwater into one of the most important and dynamic areas of the law today. 22/ Moreover, a growing body of case examples and empirical data suggest that the current tort system has serious problems and is operating quite poorly. The insurance availability/affordability crisis is one symptom -- albeit the most dramatic and acute symptom -- of the dislocations and problems generated by a malfunctioning tort system.

I. PROBLEM AREAS IN TORT LAW

In attempting to understand what has happened to tort liability in the United States, the Working Group has focused on four interrelated areas: fault, causation, damages and transaction costs. Each is discussed separately below.

The Movement Toward No-Fault Liability

One of the most disturbing aspects of the current tort system is the degree to which it has moved toward no-fault liability. While this movement began in earnest over twenty years ago, it appears to have accelerated dramatically in recent years.

Beginning in the early to mid-1960's it became fashionable to reject the twin pillars upon which tort law historically had been constructed -- deterrence and compensation -- in favor of seemingly more enlightened theories based largely on concepts of societal insurance and risk spreading. 23/ While many of these

21/ The Rand Corporation, through its Institute for Civil Justice, has produced the best empirical data and analyses available in the area. While the Institute has only been able to research discrete areas of civil justice, the conclusions drawn from those analyses are invaluable to understanding many broader problems. The recently published five-year overview of the Institute's program offers an excellent summary of the research, results and continuing work of the Institute's staff.

22/ For example, at the end of fiscal year 1975, what is now the Torts Branch of the United States Department of Justice contained 39 attorneys, who handled or supervised about 4,000 cases totalling approximately \$1 billion in claims. At the end of fiscal year 1985, the Torts Branch had grown to 124 attorneys handling or supervising about 11,000 cases totalling approximately \$200 billion in claims.

23/ One of the most explicit statements of such a theory can be found in the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982), in which the Court expressly denied defendants

(CONTINUED)

theories were couched in terms of economic efficiency, they represented the beginning of a devastating, and to this day, on-going challenge to the role of fault as a predicate of tort liability. The long-term effect of this development has been less to promote a more efficient or sensible tort system, 24/ than to undermine the importance of fault (or wrongdoing) as a moral and doctrinal justification for and limitation on tort liability. As this limitation has been removed or undermined in certain areas of tort liability, tort law increasingly has come to rest only on the pillar of compensation, with compensation often awarded merely for the sake of compensation.

As the tort system moves away from fault it increasingly imposes liability upon persons and companies that have done nothing wrong. This has been accomplished in a variety of ways: by directly reducing or even eliminating the fault requirement; by

23/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)

the opportunity to raise a "state of the art" defense. The Court held that even if the danger at issue was scientifically unknowable at the relevant time, defendants nonetheless were still liable for having failed to warn of an unknowable risk. As justification for its holding, the Court relied heavily on risk spreading. In the words of the Court, "manufacturers and distributors . . . can insure against liability and incorporate the cost of the insurance in the price of the product." 447 A.2d at 547. The Court went on to opine that the likely increase in premiums to compensate for unanticipated risks was "not a bad result." Id.

24/ The belief that tort liability should be no-fault so as to serve as a risk spreading mechanism for all injuries is in fact quite anti-consumer. Such a view of tort liability effectively would mean that the price of every product and service would include an insurance surcharge for the risk of any injury related to the product or service. It has long been understood, however, that because of the extraordinarily high transaction costs of the tort system, such compulsory insurance through the tort system would be among the most inefficient and costly ways for consumers to purchase insurance. Thus, for every \$1 of compensation, the tort system requires the consumer to pay approximately \$3 in premiums (assuming, as discussed infra, two-thirds transaction costs), while that same \$1 of compensation can be obtained through first-party health and disability insurance for only \$1.25. H. Manne, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 143 (1985). It is highly ironic that many proponents of no-fault liability argue that such liability is in the best interest of consumers. In fact, since consumers ultimately pay the premiums of whatever compensation scheme is devised, quite the contrary is the case. See also Epstein, "Products Liability as an Insurance Market," 14 J. Legal Stud. 645 (1985).

defining new duties that effectively create fault where no fault existed previously; and, by engaging in after-the-fact analyses that "find" fault wherever there has been an injury. 25/ The ultimate effect of these developments has been the same -- to shift liability for compensation to "deep pocket" defendants that have the resources to compensate plaintiffs generously. 26/

Fault has not, however, been openly (or completely) rejected as part of our tort law. One reason is that fault remains the only vehicle in tort law capable of distinguishing wrongful (or undesirable) from beneficial (or desirable) conduct. If fault were rejected altogether, it would mean that desirable activities would be just as likely to incur liability as wrongful conduct. An open rejection of fault thus necessarily would result in a sweeping transformation in the public's attitude toward tort law, which continues to be bottomed on the concept of tort liability as a form of justified redress for wrongful conduct. A second reason why fault continues to be part of tort law (and why courts often will engage in amazing distortions of relevant facts or legal doctrines to find fault rather than simply reject the principle of fault) is that fault is the basis of much of the structure and process of tort law.

25/ The duty to warn has been a particularly fertile ground for such after-the-fact compensation oriented findings of fault. It is all too easy after the occurrence of an injury to postulate a warning that might have influenced the plaintiff to be more careful or to reconsider his action, no matter how fanciful or unreasonable such a warning might appear prior to the injury. Such analyses have been a major factor in the medical malpractice and product liability litigation explosion.

26/ A recent and almost classic example of such compensation oriented liability findings is the California Supreme Court's decision in Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal.3d 49, 665 P.2d 947 (1983). In that case, a man was injured when an allegedly intoxicated driver lost control of her car, veered off the street into a parking lot, and crashed into a telephone booth in which the man was standing. Suit was brought against the companies responsible for the design, location, installation, and maintenance of the booth. The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rose Bird, found that the risk that someone might veer off the road and crash into the phone booth was not unforeseeable as a matter of law. The Court also determined that it was of no consequence that the harm to plaintiff came about through the negligent or reckless acts of an allegedly intoxicated driver. In a concluding footnote, Chief Justice Bird stated that "there are no policy considerations which weigh against imposition of liability" against the defendants even though their "conduct may have been without 'moral blame,'" and referred specifically to "the probable availability of insurance for these types of accidents" 665 P.2d at 953 n. 14.

If fault were no longer a central element in determining liability, the current tort system would in many ways be wasteful, inefficient and unfair in the extreme. 27/

Tort law thus has gradually (with a marked acceleration in recent years) been moving in the direction of no-fault liability without an adequate acknowledgement of either the existence or the implications of this development. The result is an increasingly common and perverse combination of fault-based levels of compensation based on no-fault liability.

The Undermining of Causation

Tort law traditionally has sought to place liability only upon those actors whose wrongful conduct actually caused an injury. This principle is found in the concept of "proximate cause," which requires a reasonable relationship between a given cause and effect. For some time, however, proximate cause has been under systematic attack. No single doctrinal change can be identified as the primary vehicle for this attack. Rather, the challenge has come through a variety of questionable practices and doctrinal innovations.

One such development has been the increasing use of joint and several liability to shift the cost of compensation to "deep pockets." Joint and several liability developed in the context of defendants acting in concert. 28/ Over the years, however, it increasingly has been used to make a defendant with only a limited role in causing an injury bear the full cost of compensating plaintiff, even in some cases where the plaintiff may have been largely responsible for his own injury. 29/ The result has been that joint and several liability in the absence of concerted action can and does lead to highly inequitable

27/ For example, the way in which damages are measured and awarded can only be justified, if at all, on the basis of redressing wrongful conduct. Once wrongdoing is removed as an element of liability, many of the principles involving damages become grossly unfair.

28/ See generally Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed. 1984), Chapter 8. As may be obvious, as with so many other aspects of tort law, fault remains a central and essential justification for joint and several liability.

29/ The application of joint and several liability in cases where there in fact is no concerted action is discussed in some detail in Speiser, Krause & Gans, The American Law of Torts § 3:7 (1983). It is interesting to note that the English courts apparently have maintained the traditional common law basis for joint and several liability, and have refused to apply such liability in the absence of concerted action. Id.

treatment of defendants, particularly "deep pocket" defendants. 30/

A related development is the way in which joint and several liability has been applied by some courts to theories of "enterprise" or "market share" liability for injuries caused by generic products (e.g., DES). "Market share" liability, in its pure theoretical sense, allocates liability among manufacturers of a generic product on the basis of their share of the relevant market. While there can be some serious problems and inequities with this approach, as long as all relevant manufacturers (and their respective market shares) are accounted for, and the product is truly generic in nature, such an allocation of liability may be the only way plaintiffs in some cases can obtain compensation for injuries caused by wrongdoing on the part of the manufacturers of such a product. Serious problems with this approach arise, however, when not all relevant manufacturers are accounted for, or where the product is not truly generic in nature. Even more troublesome is the approach of several courts which use some industry liability allocation formula, but then apply joint and several liability to all defendants. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied., 105 S.Ct. 123 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984). This, in fact, represents a clear abuse of joint and several liability, and cannot be justified on the basis of the unique difficulties plaintiffs sometimes face in identifying the manufacturer of an injury causing generic product.

A third means that has been used to undermine causation -- increasingly common in toxic torts cases -- is the use of presumptions or burden-shifting techniques to force the defendant to prove the lack of causation in order to avoid liability. 31/ Frequently, this amounts to asking the defendant

30/ The legal doctrine of contribution in theory could serve to mitigate some of those inequities. In certain areas of the law, such as antitrust law, where joint and several liability generally tends to be applied to established businesses, contribution appears to function quite well. (And, in any event, joint and several liability in antitrust cases is virtually always based on concerted action -- the traditional basis for such liability.) In personal injury cases, however, many multi-defendant cases involve a "deep pocket" and one or more defendants who are either judgment proof or have limited assets or insurance coverage. In such cases, the belief that contribution serves as a mitigating factor is largely illusory.

31/ A particularly dramatic example of such a practice can be found in Allen v. United States, 588 F.Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), a low-level radiation exposure case in which the court shifted to the government the burden of proving that particular cancers were not caused by radiation exposure.

to meet an impossible burden of proving the negative.

Another way in which causation often is undermined -- also an increasingly serious problem in toxic tort cases -- is the reliance by judges and juries on noncredible scientific or medical testimony, studies or opinions. It has become all too common for "experts" or "studies" on the fringes of or even well beyond the outer parameters of mainstream scientific or medical views to be presented to juries as valid evidence from which conclusions may be drawn. The use of such invalid scientific evidence (commonly referred to as "junk science") has resulted in findings of causation which simply cannot be justified or understood from the standpoint of the current state of credible scientific and medical knowledge. 32/ Most importantly, this development has led to a deep and growing cynicism about the ability of tort law to deal with difficult scientific and medical concepts in a principled and rational way.

These are but four developing areas that are causing defendants to be found liable for injuries they did not cause. The one common attribute of these developments is that the defendants to whom liability is shifted almost invariably happen to be those with the deepest pockets.

The Explosive Growth in Damage Awards

Another area of great concern is the explosive growth in tort damages awards over the last decade. A few statistics will illustrate this point.

Jury Verdict Research, Inc., publishes data on the average jury verdict in product liability and medical malpractice cases. The service's latest report 33/ shows that the average medical

32/ An instructive decision in this regard is the district court opinion in Johnston v. United States, 597 F.Supp. 374 (D. Kansas 1984). The court there exhaustively reviewed the theories and credentials of a number of plaintiffs' experts on the effects of low-level radiation, and rejected their testimony as biased, contradictory and totally without scientific merit. Of particular interest is the court's frustration that these same experts had played prominent roles in major radiation cases such as Silkwood and Allen, and that their testimony was being used in numerous cases throughout the country. The court noted its disappointment that such "so-called experts can take such license from the witness stand [to] say and conclude things which . . . they would not dare report in a peer-reviewed format." Id. at 415.

33/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., Injury Valuation: Current Award Trends No. 304 (1986). The 1985 data provided by the service is incomplete, and is subject to refinement. The

(CONTINUED)

malpractice jury verdict increased from \$220,018 in 1975 to \$1,017,716 in 1985 (see Chart D), a 363% increase. 34/ Average product liability jury verdicts during this same period increased from \$393,580 to \$1,850,452, a 370% increase (see Chart E). 35/

Interestingly, much of this increase can be attributed to a remarkable growth in verdicts above \$1 million. In 1975 there were three million-dollar medical malpractice verdicts and nine million-dollar product liability verdicts reported by Jury Verdict Research, Inc. In 1984, the numbers had grown to 71

33/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)

service indicates that it bases "its findings, values and probabilities upon collected verdicts using accepted statistical methods in their analysis and application." Nevertheless, the reported average annual verdicts are not used by the Working Group as an accurate statement (though they may very well be) of the average jury verdict in any particular year. Rather, the Working Group found the Jury Verdict Research data useful for purposes of showing the trend in jury verdicts over the last decade. In this regard, it should be noted that the service has used the same basic methodology since well before the relevant reported years. Moreover, while there are different estimates of average jury verdicts for particular areas and years, a number of other sources that have collected such data -- including the Institute for Civil Justice -- corroborate the overall trends reported by Jury Verdict Research, Inc.

34/ This percentage increase is consistent with a survey of California Superior Court medical malpractice verdicts. That survey shows the average medical malpractice award as increasing from \$152,970 in 1975 to \$649,210 in 1983, a 324% increase. American Medical Association Special Task Force on Professional Liability and Insurance, Professional Liability in the '80s (October 1984). Because the \$250,000 cap in California on awards for non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases was only recently affirmed as constitutional (see Chapter 4), it is unclear what effect, if any, the cap has had on malpractice verdicts in California. It is worth noting, however, that the recent insurance problems for medical malpractice have been far less serious in California than in many other states, and that in California the insurance crisis primarily has affected areas other than medical malpractice (e.g., municipal liability).

35/ This remarkable increase is also reflected in the Institute for Civil Justice study of civil jury verdicts in Cook County, Illinois. For example, the average wrongful death award in Cook County increased (in constant dollar terms) from \$166,000 in 1970-74 to \$336,000 in 1975-79, a doubling over roughly half a decade. M. Peterson, Compensation of Injuries: Civil Jury Verdicts in Cook County 54 (1984).

CHART D

AVERAGE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JURY VERDICT





CHART E

AVERAGE PRODUCT LIABILITY JURY VERDICT



Source: Jury Verdict Research, Inc.

* 1985 Information Not Complete

million-dollar medical malpractice verdicts and 86 million-dollar product liability verdicts (see Chart F), an increase of over 1200% in the number of such verdicts. 36/ If these million-dollar verdicts are deleted, the increase in average verdicts is reduced sharply. For example, the increase in the average medical malpractice jury verdict from 1975 to 1985 drops to 26% and the comparable average product liability verdict jury increase is 87%. 37/ This clearly suggests that the explosion in damages has come largely at the high end of the awards scale.

The Jury Verdict Research data is of only limited value on the absolute number of million-dollar payments, since in all likelihood the vast majority of such payments are through settlements rather than verdicts. The data is highly relevant, however, in that it shows that the percentage rate of increase of verdicts is far higher for large verdicts than for small or medium-size verdicts. Since a significant distinguishing factor between large verdicts and small or medium-size verdicts is that large verdicts tend to be composed to a far greater extent of non-economic damages, 38/ this strongly suggests that non-economic damages play a major role in the explosive growth in large verdicts (as compared to the much more moderate growth in small and medium-size verdicts).

While it is not possible to quantify precisely how much particular elements of damages have contributed to this explosion, it appears that non-economic damages are a substantial factor. Such damages include non-pecuniary compensatory damages for intangible injuries such as pain and suffering and mental anguish, as well as punitive damages. Such non-economic damages are inherently open-ended and subjective, and, therefore, easily susceptible to dramatic inflation. Of interest in this regard is a recent preliminary study by the Institute for Civil Justice which indicates that the average punitive damage award in Cook County, Illinois, increased from \$63,000 in 1970-74 to \$489,000 in 1980-84 (see Chart G). 39/ Of

36/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., supra. The trend toward million-dollar verdicts is also documented by the Institute for Civil Justice. M. Shanley & M. Peterson, Comparative Justice: Civil Jury Verdicts in San Francisco and Cook Counties, 1959-1980 26-30 (1983).

37/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., supra.


38/ H. Manne, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 138-39 (1985). The study shows that for medical malpractice awards between \$100,000 and \$200,000, non-economic damages account for approximately 27% of the total award, while for awards above \$600,000, the non-economic share increases to 54%.

39/ M. Peterson, Punitive Damages: Preliminary Empirical

(CONTINUED)

CHART F

MILLION DOLLAR JURY VERDICTS



Source: Jury Verdict Research, Inc.




CHART G

AVERAGE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IN COOK COUNTY*

\$63,000
(25 Awards)

\$135,000
(39 Awards)

\$489,000
(90 Awards)



1970-74

1975-79

1980-84

Source: Institute for Civil Justice

*1984 Dollars

particular interest is that the average Cook County punitive damage award in personal injury cases increased from \$40,000 in 1970-74 to \$1,152,174 in 1980-84 (see Chart H). 40/

This explosion in damage awards, particularly in the case of non-economic damages, is vastly in excess of the rate of inflation over the comparable period. 41/ For whatever reasons, tort damage awards have suddenly soared in the United States without any apparent justification.

Excessive Transaction Costs

Another serious problem of the tort system is its extraordinarily high transaction costs. A study by the Institute for Civil Justice of the asbestos litigations shows that out of every dollar paid out by the asbestos manufacturers and their insurers as a result of the asbestos litigation, 62 cents on the average is lost attorneys' fees and litigation expenses (see Chart I). 42/ This does not include the transaction costs borne by the courts in adjudicating these claims.

It also is worthwhile viewing the transaction costs from the

39/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)

Findings 13 (1985). These averages were adjusted for inflation and are stated in terms of the 1984 dollar. The study's analysis of punitive damage awards in San Francisco also showed an increase in such awards, though of lesser magnitude than in Cook County.

40/ Id., at 25 (also adjusted for inflation). Peterson notes that personal injury punitive damage awards in Cook County between 1980-84 amounted to over half of all punitive damages awarded in all case categories by Cook County juries from 1960-84.

41/ For purposes of comparison, one dollar in 1985 had approximately half the buying power of one dollar in 1975.

42/ J. Kakalik, P. Ebener, W. Felstiner, G. Haggstrom & M. Shanley, Variations in Asbestos Litigation Compensation and Expenses xviii (1984). These costs, of course, include both plaintiffs' and defendants' litigation expenses. In comparing the costs attributable to defendants' litigation expenses to the costs attributable to plaintiffs' litigation expenses it is useful to remember that defendants incur such costs whether or not they prevail, and, indeed, may incur substantial costs defeating even clearly frivolous claims. Measurements of plaintiffs' litigation expenses (such as in Chart I), reflect only those cases in which plaintiffs prevail, while defendants' litigation expenses include all cases, whether or not plaintiffs prevail.




CHART H

AVERAGE PERSONAL INJURY PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IN COOK COUNTY*

\$40,000
(5 Awards)

\$217,000
(6 Awards)

\$1,152,000
(23 Awards)




1970-74

1975-79

1980-84

CHART I

ALLOCATION OF EVERY DOLLAR PAID OUT IN ASBESTOS CLAIMS



Source: Institute for Civil Justice

perspective of the prevailing plaintiff. The study also shows that for every dollar awarded to plaintiff, 34 cents on the average is lost to legal fees and an additional 5 cents is lost to legal expenses. 43/ In some cases, legal fees alone amounted to as much as 45% of plaintiff's award. 44/

It is difficult to justify such extraordinary transaction costs. But it is particularly difficult to justify such costs when the costs often are borne largely by the seriously injured and by consumers who ultimately must pay for these costs through higher prices for goods and services. The only clear beneficiaries of this system appear to be lawyers.

II. BURGEONING TORT LIABILITY AS A MAJOR CAUSE OF THE INSURANCE AVAILABILITY/AFFORDABILITY CRISIS

The above discussion describes a tort system that in recent years has dramatically increased in scope. One way of measuring that increase is in terms of the increase in the number of tort lawsuits and in the level of damages awarded in such lawsuits. While the available data is limited, and by no means perfect, it clearly confirms that there has been a substantial increase in recent years in both the number of tort lawsuits and awarded damages.

The growth in the number of product liability suits has been astounding. For example, the number of product liability cases filed in federal district courts has increased from 1,579 in 1974 to 13,554 in 1985, a 758% increase (see Chart J). 45/ There is no reason to believe that the states courts have not witnessed a similar dramatic increase in the number of product liability claims.

A similar trend can be found in medical malpractice, where claims 46/ filed against physician-owned companies increased from 10,568 in 1979 to 23,545 in 1983, a 123% increase in four

43/ Id., at 84. For tried claims, these costs increase to 39 cents and 6 cents respectively. Id.


44/ Id. With legal expenses of 5%, prevailing plaintiffs in such cases receive only half of the awarded verdict.

45/ Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

46/ Claims do not, of course, translate directly into lawsuits, since most claims are resolved prior to the filing of litigation. But a substantial increase in claims almost certainly means a corresponding substantial increase in litigation.

CHART J

PRODUCT LIABILITY CASES FILED IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT



Source: Administrative Office of the United States Courts

years. 47/ The number of medical malpractice lawsuits per 100 physicians more than doubled from 1976 to 1981, and for obstetricians/gynecologists actually tripled during this period. 48/ In federal courts, which contain only a fraction of all medical malpractice claims, such claims have increased almost three-fold in the last decade (see Chart K). 49/

A similar increase can be found in claims filed against municipal and county officials. A survey of over twelve hundred local governments found that such claims had increased by 141% between 1979 and 1983. 50/ Tort claims against municipalities also have increased dramatically in recent years. For example, New York City witnessed a 375% increase from 1977 to 1985 in personal injury claims, with a corresponding 345% increase in average settlement cost. 51/ The City's long-term liability for tort claims already filed is projected to be \$1.5 billion. 52/

The explosive growth in damages over the past decade has already been related in detail. Suffice it to say that the increase in the average tort award appears to have outpaced even the extraordinary increase in the number of such lawsuits. The extent of some of these increases are difficult to comprehend. For example, one verdict reporting service found that the average jury verdict in personal injury lawsuits had increased by approximately 25% or more in three separate years (24.5% in 1980, 30.49% in 1981 and 27.54% in 1983). 53/ The average annual increase in such awards since 1975 has been over 15%. 54/ A subcategory of damages that dramatically illustrates this development is the average jury verdict for the wrongful death

47/ American Medical Association Special Task Force on Professional Liability and Insurance, Professional Liability in the '80s 6 (November 1984).

48/ H. Manne, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 18 (1985).

49/ Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

50/ Wyatt Co., Public Officials Liability Insurance: Understanding the Market (1986), page 22 (the provided 1984 data is incomplete, see pages 9-10, and therefore is not used for comparison).

51/ Statement by Mayor Edward I. Koch before the Governor's Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance, February 21, 1986.

52/ Id.

53/ Jury Verdict Research, Inc., supra.

54/ Id. This is more than double the average annual CPI increase during the same period. Id.

of an adult male. The average award increased from \$223,259 in 1975 to \$946,140 in 1985, a more than four-fold (324%) increase in ten years (see Chart L). 55/

The increase in the number of tort lawsuits and the level of awarded damages 56/ (or settlements) in and of itself has an obvious inflating effect on insurance premiums. To illustrate, assuming all other factors are held constant, 57/ if the number of lawsuits against a company or person doubles in ten years, and if the average damage award (or settlement) doubles over this same period, that company or person will experience at least a four-fold increase in insurance premiums over those ten years. As noted above, however, for both medical malpractice and product liability the last ten years have witnessed much more than a doubling in lawsuits and average awards.

The above observation leads to an important but troubling insight into the current insurance availability/affordability crisis. Some have speculated that the crisis is the result of the attempt by the insurance industry to recoup losses resulting from its underpricing in the late 1970's and early 1980's. If this theory is correct, then it would seem likely that as such losses are recouped, premiums would decline. The above analysis, however, suggests that while the insurance industry may have underpriced its product for a period of time, the current explosion in premiums results in large part from the fact that now that the insurance industry is facing substantial underwriting losses, it must price coverage to reflect the actual risks presented by tort law. In other words, for a variety of reasons, the insurance industry appears to have kept prices constant or engaged in price reductions in a period during which the risks generated by tort liability increased

55/ Id.

56/ Jury verdicts, of course, represent only the tip of the claims resolution process. Most claims are resolved before trial. However, settlements by their very nature reflect the range of verdicts available to the plaintiff. Thus, as jury verdicts skyrocket, so do settlements. Settlements also reflect the plaintiff's likelihood of success. As tort law becomes more and more favorable to plaintiffs -- particularly in reducing or even eliminating plaintiff's burden of showing fault or causation -- settlements further increase. Accordingly, in addition to the obvious effect on settlements of increasing jury verdicts, liberalized standards of fault and causation increase the percentage of claims resolved favorably to plaintiff and increase the size of settlements.

57/ Of course, all factors are not held constant. For example, if there is an increase in the percentage of claims resolved favorably to plaintiffs, premiums would have to be increased correspondingly.

dramatically. Now that the industry is attempting to match premiums to risk, there appears to be a dramatic, pent-up increase in premiums to bring premiums back into line with rapidly growing liability risks.

The above analysis, if correct, is troubling in that it suggests that even after the insurance industry's underwriting profitability is restored, premiums are likely to remain relatively high. That is, while the more extreme availability problems may be resolved once the industry controls its underwriting losses, affordability problems may remain as a long-term fixture absent significant reforms of tort law.

There is, however, another important contribution of recent developments in tort law to the availability/affordability crisis which goes beyond the number of lawsuits and size of damage awards. The changing standards of liability and causation have generated tremendous uncertainty. The "rules of the game" of tort liability have changed so dramatically and rapidly in recent years that few are willing to speculate on what those rules will be even a few years hence. Invariably, however, those rules seem to have been changed to the prejudice of parties with pockets sufficiently deep to bear increasingly generous awards of compensation.

This uncertainty as to what the rules of tort liability applicable to any particular company, person or activity will be in future years makes it extremely difficult for the insurance industry to assess risk (and establish appropriate premiums) with any degree of confidence. This undoubtedly exacerbates the affordability problem, and may be a major factor underlying the availability problem. Simply put, insurance, like other business activities, operates most efficiently within a stable legal regime. Tort law, unfortunately, over recent years has been anything but stable.

The recent explosion in tort liability and the lack of legal certainty is a particularly noxious combination that seems to react almost synergistically in promoting the insurance availability/affordability crisis. The rapidly accelerating growth in both the number of tort lawsuits and the size of damage awards in and of itself significantly increases future liability risks. But that risk is magnified by the perception -- based in large part on the lack of a stable legal regime -- that this accelerating growth will continue unabated. The insurance industry thus appears to be extrapolating the massive liability surge of recent years into the future, and seems to be setting its rates in part on the assumption that the on-going deterioration of tort law will continue for some time. Simply put, assessments of future liability risks reflect not only the recent rapid growth in such risks, but the perceived likelihood

that past excesses will be outpaced by the excesses yet to come. 58/

In conclusion, the current problems of tort law can be summarized as follows:

- ° Too many defendants are found liable (or forced into settlements) where there should be no liability, either because they engaged in no wrongful activity, or because they did not cause the underlying injury.
- ° Damages have become excessive, particularly in the area of non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish and punitive damages. And,
- ° Transaction costs are far too high.

The ways in which these aspects of the tort system are contributing to the current insurance availability/affordability crisis can be summarized as follows:

- ° The private sector is being asked to carry a compensation burden which in some instances it simply cannot afford to carry without substantial economic dislocations. Thus, even where insurance is available, in order to carry this compensation burden, it often is priced at unacceptable levels.
- ° The affordability/availability problem is greatly exacerbated by the lack of a stable legal regime which would allow the insurance industry to assess liability risks with some degree of confidence.

58/ A recent Administration study of the childhood vaccine industry, for example, found that uncertainty as to tort liability was a major factor underlying the severe insurance availability problems facing the industry and jeopardizing the childhood vaccination program. See the Report of the Working Group on Vaccine Supply and Liability (April, 1985).

CHAPTER 3

RECENT INSURANCE INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS

The insurance availability/affordability crisis has led both the insurance industry and its customers to consider various changes to the ways in which liability risks are insured. The following is a description of the most significant of these developments and their immediate implications.

I. COVERAGE CHANGES

One of the most important of these changes has been the development of new commercial policy forms by the Insurance Services Office ("ISO"), the statistical and rate-making organization for the property-casualty industry. While these new forms have been filed with each state insurance department, most states have not yet acted on the new submissions.

These new policy forms are more limited in scope than the old forms in that they are written on a claims-made basis and permit certain coverages to be excluded entirely.

Claims-Made Policies

General liability insurance, including product liability coverage, traditionally has been written on an occurrence basis; that is, the policy applies to all injuries and damages that occur during the policy period irrespective of when claims are presented. Under claims-made coverage, the policy covers injuries and damages which occur during the policy period and for which claims are filed during the policy period.

The ISO submission provides that a policyholder can purchase unlimited tail coverage (the period during which claims are covered after termination of the policy) for a cost of up to 200% of the original premium. In addition, a five year extended claims reporting period for known claims is provided for situations where no other insurance is applicable. There is still disagreement over the reinstatement of aggregate policy limits for tail coverage and the effect of defense cost inclusions.

A claims-made policy covers claims occurring after the "retroactive date," ordinarily, the inception date of the policy. Under some circumstances, insurers will be permitted to advance the retroactive date, necessitating the purchase of tail coverage for incidents occurring during the prior period. The retroactive date may be advanced when: (1) there is a change of insurer, (2) there is a change in the insured's operation, (3) if the insured fails to inform the insurer of risks he knew or should have known about, or (4) with the consent of the insured.

The ISO has indicated that it does not intend to limit the use of claims-made policies to specific problem areas such as long-tail or latent injury exposures.

The claims-made forms have not yet been approved by the states, and twelve states have expressly disapproved them as filed. The ISO is working with the Insurance Commissioners to resolve differences.

The insurance industry has indicated that it wishes to use claims-made policies. In general, 1986 is viewed as a transition year during which insurers will train their personnel in the use of the new policy forms and adapt their computers to accommodate the changes. Insurers have indicated that in states where the new forms are not insured, they may use non-admitted subsidiaries or surplus lines carriers to provide the coverage to their clients on claims-made basis for large complex risks and risks in "volatile" classes, or else simply not provide coverage to those risks.

Claims-made policies and other limited coverages also are being adopted by reinsurers. Lloyd's of London has introduced a new claims-made form, as have Weavers and Trenwick American Reinsurance. Each policy is somewhat different. Trenwick, a United States reinsurance company, has stated that it will not write any general liability reinsurance on an occurrence basis after January 1 of this year. Trenwick also has written a claims-made form for use by its ceding companies for "difficult" risks. Other reinsurers have indicated they would reinsure both occurrence and claims-made policies, but would strongly encourage the use of claims-made for heavy casualty risks. As indicated in Chapter 1, some businesses already have been asked to take claims-made coverage for their excess limits coverage. Because of the many different claims-made forms currently being used, this is likely to cause gaps in coverage.

Laser Endorsements

The ISO policy form also includes "laser endorsements" which can be used to limit coverage. These provisions permit an insurer to exclude claims from a specific incident, product or period of time. Several Insurance Commissioners have objected to this provision and stated that, at a minimum, it should be revised to require the signature of the insured indicating an awareness of the exclusion. The inclusion of a laser endorsement would necessitate either the insured's purchase of tail coverage for that product or incident, or the insured's "going bare" for that liability.

Pollution Exclusion

Both the new ISO and Lloyd's of London claims-made commercial general liability policies specifically exclude pollution

coverage. Traditionally, the general liability policy has included the business community's liability for damage caused by the "sudden and accidental" discharge of toxic substances. Environmental Impairment Liability ("EIL") policies are used to cover damages from gradual pollution incidents. In a number of highly controversial cases, courts have expanded the meaning of "sudden and accidental," causing insurers to be liable for EIL-type (gradual pollution) coverage when it was not intended under the policy.

As a result, insurers currently are reluctant to provide any pollution coverage, though Lloyd's of London has indicated a willingness to cover some liability at additional cost on a "named peril" basis only.

Defense Cost Inclusion

Ordinarily, the costs of defending against liability claims are not included within the aggregate limits of the commercial general liability policy. Insurers traditionally have controlled the defense of claims against their insureds by engaging defense counsel and by governing the vigor with which a claim is challenged. The insurers paid all costs, and the full amount of the policy limits were available to pay any settlement or judgment against the insured.

During the product liability crisis of the mid-1970's there were a number of allegations that insurers were, in fact, fueling the claims situation by settling too quickly in many cases that the insureds believed should have been more vigorously contested. As a result, many companies insisted that their insurance contracts include a right to at least partial, if not full, control of defense strategy.

In the mid-1980's, defense costs have escalated rapidly, mostly because of the cost of attorneys' fees, and possibly, in part because of the insureds' desires to contest claims to the fullest degree possible.

In order to control costs, the ISO had proposed to change the commercial general liability form to include defense costs within the aggregate limits of the policy. This practice already is incorporated in at least some other policy forms. 1/

1/ Business Insurance, December 9, 1985, page 1.

The proposal brought a sharp response from insureds, the bar, and the Risk and Insurance Management Society, a trade association of risk managers and insurance buyers. They believe that there will be cases of defense costs exceeding the limits, leaving no money to pay a settlement or judgment. Some are concerned that defense counsel may urge settlement of unworthy claims in order to prevent defense costs from exhausting all available coverage. Others believe that there will be a spate of bad faith claims against insurers when the policy limit is used for legal costs and the insured is left liable for damages.

In response to the concerns of insurance customers, regulators and brokers, the ISO has revised its proposal so that up to 50% of the aggregate limits may be spent on defense costs before the policy limits will begin to be reduced by those expenses. An endorsement will be available so that up to 300% of the limit may be spent on defense costs before the policy limit is affected. A discount will be applied if the policyholder buys less than the 300% endorsement. Insurers apparently will have the option to apply an endorsement which will charge all defense costs to the policy limits. 2/

At its annual meeting in December, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners passed a resolution urging states not to approve the ISO proposal until the proposal can be studied by the Commissioners. The ISO, which had hoped to initiate the defense cost change in July of 1986, will postpone filing its request with the states until at least February 15, 1986. 3/

II. ALTERNATIVE INSURANCE MECHANISMS

As liability insurance becomes unavailable or unaffordable, means of liability protection outside the conventional insurance markets increasingly are being sought and used.

2/ Business Insurance, December 16, 1985, page 1.

3/ Business Insurance, December 23, 1985, page 1.

Insurance Company Creation (Captive or Other)

One response available to large companies unable to buy the insurance coverage they need is to set up their own insurance company. Thirty-three major United States companies recently have established an offshore insurer, A.C.E. Insurance Company, which began operation in November, 1985, and provides up to \$150 million in liability coverage. Founding companies include IBM, GE, U.S. Steel and Chase Manhattan, as well as other companies. While A.C.E. offers coverages not available elsewhere, its policies are available only to large companies since it only pays claims exceeding \$100 million.

In addition, it recently was announced that a group of fifteen chemical and petrochemical companies are creating a company called CASEX, which would provide excess limits coverage for products, directors and officers, and sudden and accidental pollution liability.

Another group of fifty United States banks are creating a mutual insurer, Bankers' Insurance Co., Ltd., to provide directors and officers liability coverage and bankers blanket bonds.

During the medical malpractice crisis in the early to mid-1970's, groups of medical professionals unable to obtain malpractice coverage formed their own companies, commonly known as bedpan mutuals, to handle their claims. Such insurance groups currently provide about half of the coverage in the malpractice liability market.

Self-Insurance

Some industry groups and trade associations, as well as municipalities in several states, have joined together to self-insure as groups, and others have been able to set up a formal self-insurance program just to handle their own claims. ^{4/}

Self-insurance, either individual or group, also has been a useful vehicle for municipalities for which insurance has become either unavailable or unaffordable.

One major problem encountered by firms seeking to set up self-insurance programs is that reserves for self insurance are not

^{4/} A formal self-insurance program is different from "going bare" in that the former sets up reserves to cover claims and treats it similar to an insurance system whereas the latter simply hopes claims do not occur, which may cause financial difficulties if and when they do occur.

accorded the same tax treatment as insurance company reserves, in that self-insurance reserves are fully taxable. While this presents no problem for municipalities and other tax-exempt entities, it is a major hurdle for private entities.

Small firms are generally unable to establish a meaningful self-insurance program individually, but may benefit from group self-insurance if no other insurance is available.

Product Liability Risk Retention Act Groups

The Risk Retention Act ("RRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq., was intended as a mechanism to (1) create an alternative product liability insurance market, and (2) provide a means for smaller insurance buyers to purchase general liability insurance -- including product liability coverage -- as groups. The RRA evolved from an intensive interagency study of the product liability "crisis" in the mid-1970's. President Reagan signed the Act in September 1981, noting that it was a "marketplace solution" to provide product manufacturers, distributors and sellers with affordable product liability insurance.

A Risk Retention Group ("RRG") is formed by any number of product sellers as an insurance company licensed to operate under the laws of any state. The RRG may provide only product liability and completed operations coverage to its members. (Completed operations is work performed by a contractor or product manufacturer installing its product.) The RRG may sell insurance in any state without meeting the licensing or other regulatory requirements of any state other than its domicile. No state may discriminate against an RRG, but states may impose normal premium taxes and enforce compliance with unfair claims settlement practices statutes.

The Act is restrictive in that it limits a RRG to products and completed operations coverage, but permits the establishment of a domestic group captive that is able to do business countrywide.

A Purchasing Group ("PG") may be formed to negotiate for a group policy from any insurer to cover product liability completed operations, and commercial general liability when either of the first two coverages are included. The PG and any entity providing services to the PG are exempt from any state law which would prohibit the PG from purchasing this coverage on a group basis.

A group of companies purchasing together presents an attractive premium base with lower administrative costs to the insurer. In a tight market small companies are subject to cancellation or sharply higher prices because an insurer may prefer to use its

resources on a few large risks. The provisions for purchasing groups was necessary to overcome statutes and regulations in about forty-four states which prohibited so called "fictitious groups" set up for the purpose of buying property or casualty insurance on a group basis.

Very few companies have used the RRA to date, but the rapid change in market conditions likely will lead to a much greater interest in its provision.

One reason that the RRA has been little used is the fact that it is limited to products and completed operations coverages, although groups may include other coverages as long as products is the primary purpose. It is a useful means of expanding insurance capacity, and would provide additional capacity in the alternative market if the products limitation were removed.

III. STATE REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS

State legislators and insurance regulators have recognized the severity of the liability insurance crisis, and have responded in a variety of ways. One state has barred cancellation or non-renewal of policies and prohibited any increases in the cost of policies in effect. Several other states are considering similar actions. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners adopted a resolution opposing mid-term cancellations and short notices of non-renewal. Other states are implementing or considering the use of Market Assistance Programs, which are voluntary assigned risk pools designed to take risks such as day care centers on a rotating or shared basis. Yet other states are considering joint underwriting associations in which the state regulator mandates the sharing of certain risks

Half the states have "file and use" rate regulation in which the insurance department is notified of a rate increase which becomes effective without action by the regulator. Many of these states reportedly are rethinking their systems because of the sharp increases in the rates of some of the problem lines of coverage.

Regulators normally have viewed commercial insurance as transactions between knowledgeable buyers and sellers, and, accordingly, have refrained from interfering with the market's operation. The recent concerns expressed by the Insurance Commissioners is a measure of the depth of the availability/affordability crisis, and may foreshadow a heightening in the regulatory "oversight" of commercial insurance.

CHAPTER 4

TORT LAW REFORM

As discussed in Chapter 2, two primary areas have been the focus of the Working Group's examination into the crisis in liability insurance availability and affordability: the current economic difficulties of the insurance industry; and, the extraordinary growth in tort liability in recent years. For the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, while it seems likely that the insurance industry will be able to work its way out of its present economic straits, it is very unclear -- if not doubtful -- that this will significantly alleviate the crisis in insurance availability and affordability. Early indications are that insurers will continue to avoid areas that present a high risk of tort liability, or, where they do provide insurance, will demand high premiums. That is, while the more extreme aspects of the availability crisis may be resolved once the industry regains its desired level of profitability, it appears unlikely at this time that the high premiums that have led to serious affordability concerns will be reduced significantly.

For these reasons, as well as for the other reasons discussed in Chapter 2, there appears to be little that can or should be done by the federal or any other government to "remedy" the economic factors that underlie the current availability/affordability crisis. The excesses of the tort system, however, present a very real opportunity to address a major cause of the insurance crisis with sensible and appropriate reforms. And while some of the changes in the insurance market currently under contemplation (see Chapter 3) probably will relieve some availability/affordability problems, it seems unlikely that these changes will provide long-term, systemic relief without fundamental reforms of tort law.

The following is a list of eight tort reforms that would bring a greater degree of rationality and predictability to tort law, and thereby significantly assist in resolving the availability/affordability crisis. This is by no means an exhaustive list of possible tort reforms. Nor does the accompanying discussion of these reforms indicate how they necessarily should be implemented; that is, on the federal or state level, or through legislative or judicial modification of the law. Rather, this list identifies eight recommended tort reforms which if implemented should return tort law to a credible fault-based compensation system that provides a fair and reasonable level of compensation to deserving plaintiffs through a more predictable and affordable liability allocating mechanism. While these reforms undoubtedly will be resisted by some, they in fact are quite modest and should not dramatically alter the basic principles of tort law as those have existed for centuries.

Recommendation No. 1: Retain fault as the basis for liability.

For the reasons discussed in Chapter 2, fault should be retained as a basis for tort liability. As noted there, fault is the only mechanism in tort law for distinguishing desirable from undesirable conduct, and is an indispensable predicate to many other aspects of the tort liability system without which the system would generate arbitrary and unfair results.

For non-product liability cases, negligence should remain the applicable standard of liability. Strict product liability should under no circumstances be extended outside the traditional area of product injuries. Thus, theories which would apply strict product liability to landlords or to professionals providing services (e.g., pharmacists, architects, etc.) should be strongly resisted and expressly rejected. The trend in some states ^{1/} to extend strict liability doctrines outside the area of product injuries is a highly pernicious development which will significantly undermine the ability of those sectors of our economy to function properly.

Strict product liability in its traditional sense represents a sensible application of fault-based liability to the realities of modern industrial life. The Working Group, accordingly, does not recommend the abolition of strict product liability, provided the doctrine is kept within its traditional bounds. Unfortunately, strict product liability has been subject to extensive abuse that often has had the effect of transforming the doctrine in practice into absolute liability.

The following are the elements of a strict product liability standard which does not present an impossible or unfair burden to plaintiffs in demonstrating fault on the part of defendant-manufacturers, while at the same time not establishing a scheme of absolute liability which simply uses the manufacturer as an insurer for all risks of injury.

- ° Liability should be predicated on the existence of a defect which is found to make the product unreasonably dangerous.
- ° Defendants should only be held liable for uses of a product that are both reasonable and foreseeable. Liability should not be predicated upon unreasonable or unforeseeable alterations of a product that cause the injury, particularly where such alterations are prohibited or warned against. (Alterations, in this regard, can include the failure to provide required and reasonable safeguards, maintenance or inspections.)

^{1/} See in this regard the recent opinion of the California Supreme Court in Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal.3d 454, 698 P.2d 116 (1985), extending strict product liability to landlords.

- ° Manufacturers should not be liable for defects which have been the subject of an adequate warning or which are readily apparent to the reasonable consumer. Manufacturers should only be required to warn with regard to uses of a product that are both reasonable and foreseeable.
- ° Manufacturers should only be held to the state of the art in existence at the time of manufacture of the product. Manufacturers should not be held liable for unknown or unknowable hazards.

The above elements, if applied in a principled manner, should ensure that strict product liability will serve to compensate persons injured as a result of a manufacturer's fault, while preventing that liability doctrine from simply being used as a risk spreading mechanism designed to operate as a product-based insurance scheme.

Recommendation No. 2: Base causation findings on credible scientific and medical evidence and opinions.

One of the most pernicious developments in tort law has been the extent to which causation findings are based on fringe scientific or medical opinions well outside the mainstream of accepted scientific or medical beliefs. Increasingly, juries are asked to make difficult decisions about highly complicated issues of science and medicine. Unfortunately, the personality and demeanor of expert witnesses often may be more critical in making such determinations than decades of evolving scientific and medical investigation and thought.

This problem has resulted in the growing perception that the tort system often is wholly arbitrary in allocating liability in cases involving difficult issues of science and medicine. This is a particularly problematic situation in toxic tort and drug liability cases. 2/

There are a variety of reasons for this problem:

- ° Many judges do not have the training or inclination to understand complicated scientific and medical concepts, and are unwilling or unable to devote the time and energy needed to educate themselves in a complex body of knowledge.
- ° In order not to deprive plaintiffs of their opportunity for compensation, many courts allow plaintiffs to take

2/ For example, see the discussion of Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., infra.

whatever scientific or medical views they may have -- however incredible -- to the jury.

- ° Many in the legal system do not appreciate how credible scientific and medical views develop, and the degree to which legal decisionmaking is a poor vehicle for developing such views.
- ° There often is an understandable frustration with the fact that science and medicine frequently cannot offer the kind of certainty that the legal decisionmaking mechanisms strive to obtain.

The inability of the tort system to deal credibly with complicated scientific and medical issues strikes at the very heart of the ability of tort law to deal with the growing number of cases involving highly complicated scientific and medical issues. While there are no easy answers, there are several remedial actions that the Working Group recommends:

- ° Greater deference must be paid to government agencies and certain private institutions that have devoted decades of attention and millions of dollars to researching and trying to assess the value of medical and scientific developments. Where such agencies and institutions have determined that particular products, services or techniques are safe or socially beneficial, courts should tread very carefully in overruling those judgments through the vehicle of tort law. Lay juries are a very poor mechanism for second-guessing the judgment of established mainstream scientific and medical views. Other legal mechanisms for determining those views, such as rulemaking and licensing proceedings, generally are far superior in making credible determinations involving complicated issues of science and medicine.
- ° Courts must be more aggressive in determining the credibility of scientific and medical evidence and opinions before trial, and not simply allow parties to present any theory to the jury. Appellate courts, in turn, should give trial courts greater latitude in making such decisions in early stages of litigation. Judges, where feasible, should receive training on basic methods of scientific, medical and statistical analysis so that they can make such determinations. If necessary, impartial masters with appropriate training should be used for this purpose.
- ° Studies and opinions that have not been subjected to the peer review process should be presumed invalid. Where peer review has taken place, judges (or masters, where appropriate) should acquaint themselves with the results of such review.

° Courts must learn to accept the reality of uncertainty. They must understand that the fact that some degree of uncertainty always exists does not mean that every scientific or medical belief is as credible as the next. Judges and legislators must not try to "force" scientific certainty where such certainty simply is not possible. Attempts to do so through burden-shifting, presumptions or by requiring agencies to issue scientific "findings," simply create a misleading and deceptive gloss of scientific certainty that in fact does not exist. ^{3/} Ultimately, the legal system must accept the fact that some things are unknown, and, given existing methods and data, perhaps unknowable for the foreseeable future.

Recommendation No. 3: Eliminate joint and several liability.

One of the most troubling problems in tort law arises from injuries caused by multiple tortfeasors. Historically, such cases were handled by bringing separate actions against each defendant; joint and several liability only existed where concert-of-action was shown (see discussion in Chapter 2). Further, under the doctrine of contributory negligence, a negligent plaintiff could not recover damages from any defendant. Such an approach seemed harsh where plaintiffs were only minimally at fault for their own injuries. Eventually, and in part to remedy the harshness of the old rule, the doctrines of comparative fault and joint and several liability were developed to make it easier for plaintiffs to obtain compensation.

Comparative fault operates to assure that each party, including the plaintiff, is liable for its own fault. Joint and several liability, although originally applied to situations where concert-of-action was shown, is now in many cases applied to all defendants, regardless of their connection to the injury. Comparative fault, when coupled with the doctrine of joint and several liability, allows plaintiffs to recover the entire judgment from "deep pocket" defendants -- even if such defendants are only found to be minimally at fault. Joint and several liability thus frequently operates in a highly inequitable manner -- sometimes making defendants with only a small or even de minimis percentage of fault liable for 100% of plaintiff's damage. Accordingly, joint and several liability in the absence of concerted action has led to the inclusion of many "deep pocket" defendants such as governments, larger corporations, and insured entities whose involvement is only tangential and who probably would not be joined except for the existence of joint and several liability.

^{3/} As noted, the Working Group does not believe that scientific uncertainty can be handled simply by requiring government agencies to issue pronouncements of risk or causation for which there in fact is no credible basis.

Another problem area is the relationship of joint and several liability to "enterprise" or "market share" liability. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). In theory, "market share" liability such as that established in the California Supreme Court's seminal opinion in Sindell attempts to allocate liability for a generic product (e.g., DES) among various producers on the basis of their share of the relevant market. Even assuming such an allocation is reasonable, 4/ some jurisdictions have devised variations of or alternative approaches to Sindell which apply joint and several liability among the producers of a generic product. 5/ See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 123 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis.2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984). 6/ The difficulties plaintiffs face in attempting to show which manufacturer of a generic product was responsible for plaintiff's injury in fact can be (but are not always) substantial. While the Working Group does not advocate one approach over another, it firmly believes that any allocation of liability on the basis of market share should limit a manufacturer's liability to its specific share, and that such liability should not, in the absence of actual concerted action, be joint and several in nature.

The Working Group thus recommends elimination of joint and several liability, except in the limited circumstances where the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendants have actually acted in concert to cause plaintiff's injury. 7/

4/ Because of a number of problems and inequities associated with Sindell, only a few states have embraced the position of the California Supreme Court. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, "Failure to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a Legislative Solution," 73 Calif. L. Rev. 941 (1985).

5/ It is unclear whether even Sindell is a true "market share" allocation decision, since under Sindell plaintiff must only sue manufacturers representing a substantial share of the market, and may allocate all liability among those defendants in proportion to their respective market shares.

6/ Particularly disturbing are decisions such as Abel which appear to distort the principles of concerted action to impute concerted action to manufacturers of a generic product.

7/ Joint and several liability as discussed in this report should not be confused with the legislatively enacted schemes for allocating financial responsibility for the cost of cleanup of hazardous waste sites and spills under the Nation's environmental laws, and, in particular, under the Superfund Act

(CONTINUED)

Recommendation No. 4: Limit non-economic damages to a fair and reasonable amount.

Non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, mental anguish and punitive damages are inherently open-ended. ^{8/} They are entirely subjective, and often defy quantification. For example, in many instances it simply is not possible, no matter how much money is awarded, to compensate someone fully for the pain and anguish of the loss of a loved one or from a serious injury. Moreover, because such damages are essentially subjective, awards for similar injuries can vary immensely from case to case, leading to highly inequitable, lottery-like results. Accordingly, such damages are particularly suitable for a specific limitation.

The open-ended nature of such damages makes them a particular problem from the standpoint of achieving predictability. Unlike economic damages (medical expenses, lost earnings, etc.), which can be reviewed objectively and thus can be predicted within a given range, non-economic damages are entirely subjective and unpredictable.

Non-economic damages also can serve as a significant obstacle in the settlement process. Plaintiffs and defendants often can

7/ (FOOTNOTE CONTINUED)

(the Comprehensive, Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Unlike the tort system, which is intended to compensate injured persons and to deter wrongful conduct (see Chapter 2), Superfund and RCRA represent a legislative choice to allocate the cost of these programs among those who contributed to the problems the programs are designed to remedy. Thus, Superfund and RCRA liability, like the liability established under other environmental laws, are founded upon congressional objectives which provide that those who contributed to the problem or profited from the manufacture which created the waste, ought to bear the cost of cleaning it up. Those whose specific contribution to the site can be identified and severed from the whole are not jointly liable under this scheme. Without some degree of joint and several liability under Superfund and RCRA, the effective enforcement of these programs could be seriously impeded as a result of protracted and costly litigation among responsible parties over the precise allocation of cleanup costs.

^{8/} There are two types of non-economic damages: compensatory (pain and suffering, mental anguish, etc.) and punitive (sometimes called exemplary damages). The latter are designed purely to punish the defendant.

agree quickly on the amount of economic damages, but disagree sharply on non-economic damages. Plaintiffs frequently have unrealistic expectations of non-economic damages in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars to which defendants simply are unwilling to agree. Plaintiffs thus often reject settlement offers that from the standpoint of compensation for economic damages are quite reasonable. Plaintiffs' attorneys also often see high non-economic damage awards as necessary to justify high contingency fees, which may lead them to press for a high non-economic damage award when it may be in their clients' interest to obtain a quick and fair settlement.

Nevertheless, plaintiffs should be entitled to reasonable compensation for their pain and suffering and mental anguish. The key in this regard is to provide such compensation, but to ensure that it will be kept within reasonable bounds.

The Working Group believes that \$100,000 would be such a reasonable limitation. In this regard, it should be noted that only a handful of claims involve non-economic damages in excess of \$100,000. For example, it is estimated that only 2.7% of all medical malpractice claims (5.6% of all paid medical malpractice claims) receive non-economic compensation in excess of \$100,000. 9/ However, in those medical malpractice cases going to verdict where non-economic damages above \$100,000 are awarded, the non-economic damages award averages between \$428,000 and \$738,000 (the latter figure being the "best estimate"). 10/ For such awards including non-economic damages in excess of \$100,000, on the average 80% of the total award is for the non-economic damages component of the award. 11/ Since the non-economic damages in excess of \$100,000 awarded in these cases (including verdicts and settlements) account for between 28% and 50% of all paid out medical malpractice damages, the non-

9/ H. Manne, Medical Malpractice Policy Guidebook 132-48 (1985). In comparison, approximately half of all claims that end in a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff include a non-economic damages award in excess of \$100,000. Id. This suggests that non-economic damages are a major factor in forcing claims to trial.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the Guidebook was prepared for the Florida Medical Association. Henry Manne served as the general editor, and the analysis on the effect of a \$100,000 cap was prepared by Patricia Danzon -- "perhaps the most widely known and published economist in the country on the subject of medical malpractice." Id., at 10.

10/ Id.

11/ Id. In this regard, it is worth noting that non-economic damages as a percentage of overall damages increases substantially as the overall damages increase. Id., at 138-39. See discussion in Chapter 2.

economic damages payments in excess of \$100,000 alone account for up to half of all medical malpractice damages. 12/ Thus, a \$100,000 limitation on non-economic damage awards would affect only a relatively small percentage of all claims, but would introduce substantial predictability into the tort system. 13/

It also is necessary to deal with punitive damages. While some thought was given to an absolute ban on punitive damages, or perhaps a separate limitation, the Working Group concluded that the best approach would be to include punitive damages within the \$100,000 limitation on all non-economic damages. Nevertheless, punitive damages should only be awarded for willful conduct bordering on a criminal violation. Specifically, the Working Group recommends that an award of punitive damages be predicated on a demonstration of actual malice.

Even if these recommendations are adopted, punitive damages at best have a tenuous basis in tort law. Increasingly, there has been growing skepticism among legal scholars about the role of punitive damages, 14/ and numerous instances of extraordinary

12/ Id. The best estimate of the Guidebook is that pain and suffering awards above \$100,000 account for nearly 39% of all medical malpractice damages.

13/ Some states have struck down such limitations on constitutional grounds, primarily on the basis of equal protection, on the theory that it is unfair to limit the recoveries of certain plaintiffs (e.g., medical malpractice claimants) while allowing other plaintiffs to receive unlimited recoveries. Recently, however, both the California Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld such a limitation for medical malpractice verdicts awarded under California law. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665 (1985); Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court refused to hear either case, finding with regard to the former that no substantial federal question was presented. Constitutional concerns such as this, however, can only be sensibly considered in the context of specific legal proposals.

14/ See, e.g., Owen, "Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products," 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1982); Seltzer, "Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness, Efficiency and Control," 52 Fordham L. Rev. 37 (1983); Sugarman, "Doing Away With Tort Law," 73 Calif. L. Rev. 555 (1985); Schwartz, "Deterrence and Punishment in the Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment," 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 133 (1982); Ellis, "Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages," 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1982).

abuses. 15/ Punitive damages add considerable uncertainty, and frequently have very little real deterrent effect because they are awarded years after the offending conduct. In any event, the punishment of misconduct is primarily a function of the public law enforcement system, and should not be a common purpose of private litigation.

Nevertheless, the Working Group does not recommend prohibiting punitive damages in tort cases provided they are included within the limitation on non-economic damages. If this is infeasible, the Working Group recommends that punitive damages be abolished. 16/

Recommendation No. 5: Provide for periodic payments of future economic damages.

Traditionally, a losing defendant is required to pay all of plaintiff's future damages in one lump-sum payment. When damages were within reasonable limits, this generally was not a major problem. But as average damages have skyrocketed into the hundreds of thousands of dollars this has become an increasing burden on the defendant (or defendants' insurers). The Working Group, therefore, recommends that future economic damages be paid periodically. 17/

Allowing defendants to pay for plaintiff's damages periodically has several advantages. First, it gives defendants the ability in some cases to digest major adverse judgments by spacing

15/ One of the most flagrant examples is the \$8 million dollar punitive damage award against the defendant in Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., (District Court No. 81 C 2470), for its decision to produce the Sabin rather than the Salk polio vaccine. Despite the fact that the defendant had complied in this decision with the well established medical judgment of the United States government and virtually the entire medical community, the jury apparently decided to use punitive damages to overrule this judgment and to force the Sabin vaccine off the market. Ironically, the Sabin vaccine has proven far more effective than the Salk vaccine in combating polio. The case presently is on appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court, and the federal government has filed an amicus brief urging reversal.

16/ It frequently is noted that the deterrent effect of punitive damages could be achieved through a system of civil fines.

17/ Where there is legitimate concern that a particular defendant may not be able to make the periodic payments in future years the court should be empowered to require the defendant to ensure the periodic payment through the purchase of an annuity.

payments out over time, much in the same way that many consumers can afford major purchases by buying on installment. Second, society is benefited by the fact that plaintiffs have a guaranteed stream of income, and cannot deplete their awards within a few years. This sharply reduces the possibility that severely injured plaintiffs eventually will become wards of the state.

An important additional advantage of requiring courts to award damages in terms of periodic payments rather than lump-sum awards is that it uses the market's rather than a court's assessment of the applicable interest rate. Under the existing practice in most states, the trial court determines plaintiff's economic loss over plaintiff's lifetime, and then awards plaintiff the present value of those losses in a lump sum. The interest rate used to make that present value calculation is critical, and can significantly reduce or inflate the lump-sum payment. Frequently, courts in making that calculation use interest rates that bear no reasonable relationship to what in fact is available in the market.

A periodic payment requirement effectively avoids this problem by having the court determine the stream of future economic losses and require defendant to purchase an annuity providing a corresponding stream of compensation (where defendant is sufficiently large, an actual annuity probably would be unnecessary). Under such a procedure, the market determines the appropriate interest rate for calculating the present value of those payments (the present value would equal the cost of the annuity). Since the payments are guaranteed through the annuity, subsequent changes in the interest rate would have no effect on plaintiff's compensation. Defendant, on the other hand, would have the market rather than a judge or jury determine the correct interest rate for assessing the present value of future damages.

Periodic payments, as noted, are not unfair to plaintiffs because the payments would be scheduled to be made as the damages are in fact incurred (that is, as earnings are actually lost, or as certain expenses actually occur).

Because the benefits of such a provision would be relatively limited for smaller awards, the Working Group recommends that periodic payments only be required where the total economic damages award exceeds \$100,000.

Recommendation No. 6: Reduce awards by collateral sources of compensation for the same injury.

The collateral source rule prohibits the finder of fact from taking collateral sources of income related to the same injury into account in making an award of damages to the plaintiff. This effectively permits the plaintiff to obtain double recovery of certain components of his damages award.

In an era when collateral sources of income were financed largely by plaintiff himself, the collateral source rule may have been sensible. Today, however, when many collateral sources are provided or subsidized by the government or by third parties (such as employers, who often are required by law to provide certain collateral benefits), the traditional justification is called into question. Increasingly, the collateral source rule simply permits a windfall recovery by the plaintiff.

As to publicly provided collateral sources of compensation, there is no justification for not taking such sources into account in determining plaintiff's ultimate damages. The collateral source rule in such circumstances has the effect of requiring citizens to pay compensation twice -- once as taxpayer, and once as the consumer of the product causing the injury. 18/

The situation is somewhat more complicated in dealing with private sources of collateral compensation, particularly where subrogation is involved. 19/ Where a third party (such as an insurer) is subrogated to plaintiff's claim, the collateral source rule may not in fact result in any double recovery. As a practical matter, however, subrogation often is not a significant consideration in many tort actions. In some areas, such as automobile accidents, subrogation is quite common. In other areas, however, such as medical malpractice, subrogation is far less common.

As to private sources, the best approach appears to be to require collateral sources of compensation related to the same injury to be taken into account as long as a third party is not subrogated to that portion of plaintiff's claim. Further analysis may suggest that elimination of subrogation (that is, simply offsetting all collateral sources against the award, and prohibiting subrogation arrangements) may have a limited effect and be justified on the basis of significant reductions in transaction costs.

While the correct approach to workers' compensation benefits must be considered very carefully, workers should be required to seek their workers' compensation benefits where appropriate. The Working Group takes no position on whether subrogation and indemnification actions between employers and manufacturers

18/ Another reason to be concerned about such a windfall is that much of the windfall is in fact a windfall for attorneys in the form of attorneys' fees.

19/ In the context of insurance, subrogation allows the insurer to obtain from the tortfeasor-defendant all or part of its payments to the insured-plaintiff arising from the injury caused by the tortfeasor.

found liable as third party defendants should be eliminated, as has been proposed in some legislation. The Working Group will continue to review the merits of proposals dealing with such subrogation and indemnification actions.

Recommendation No. 7: Schedule contingency fees.

Currently, plaintiffs' attorneys receive a flat percentage of their clients' awards, usually between 30% and 40%, but sometimes as high as 50%. Where plaintiff's award is moderate, such contingency fee may, in fact, be quite reasonable, since the attorney has significant costs and may face substantial risks that must be reimbursed. But as the average plaintiff's verdict has increased in recent years, such a high percentage becomes difficult to justify. Increasingly, there are indications of extraordinary abuses where attorneys receive fees in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for limited work. Particularly in mass liability cases where the groundwork for liability has been laid in previous cases by other attorneys, the fees often bear no relationship whatsoever to the work of or the risk to plaintiff's attorney. 20/

Nevertheless, the Working Group does not recommend, as some have suggested, the abolition of contingency fees. Often, such fees are the only means available to the poor to afford an attorney and obtain access to the legal system. The problem with contingency fees emerges when awards become very high, and a flat contingency rate becomes excessive. The Working Group, therefore, believes that contingency fees should be scheduled to decrease as awards increase.

Specifically, the Working Group recommends the following schedule: 25% for the first \$100,000, 20% for the next \$100,000, 15% for the next \$100,000, and 10% for the remainder. Thus, for an award of \$500,000, plaintiff's attorney would receive \$80,000 rather than \$166,666 (assuming a one-third contingency fee), and for an award of \$1,000,000, would receive \$130,000 rather than \$333,333.

There are a number of justifications for scheduling contingency fees:

- o Verdicts often are inflated by judges and juries to compensate plaintiff for what is well understood to be high attorneys' fees. Defendants thus pay for such fees through higher insurance premiums or awards,

20/ As discussed in Chapter 2, the prevailing plaintiff is not only liable to his attorney for the agreed to contingency fee, but also for litigation expenses. Such expenses often can amount to an additional five to eight percent of the underlying award.

which, in turn, are passed on to consumers through higher prices. It is difficult to justify placing such a burden on American consumers for the purpose of paying what often amounts to exorbitant attorneys' fees.

- Similarly, in order to compensate plaintiffs for very high contingency fees, settlements often are higher than otherwise would be the case. As with high awards, these payments ultimately are passed through to the consumer. More problematic; however, is that attorneys' fees often can become a major impediment to settlements since defendants may balk at paying a higher than justified award in order to compensate plaintiffs for exorbitant attorneys' fees. In such situations, attorneys' fees create an additional burden by causing cases not to be settled that otherwise would be settled.
- Contingency fees also distort the incentives of attorneys. Such fees may lead plaintiffs' attorneys to hold out for high non-economic damages (and, potentially, windfall profits for the attorney requiring only minimal additional work on the attorney's part), while the clients may be best served with obtaining economic damages and more limited non-economic damages as promptly as possible.
- Scheduling contingency fees also should substantially reduce the excessive transaction costs presently plaguing the tort system. This is particularly important in such areas as the asbestos litigations where there are only limited resources available to compensate a large pool of plaintiffs.

In this regard, it is worth noting that the Federal Tort Claims Act contains a 25% cap on attorneys' fees for lawsuits filed under the Act, and a 20% cap on attorneys' fees for settlements obtained under the Act's administrative claims process. 28 U.S.C. § 2678. Violations of these limitations are punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. A similar 25% attorneys' fee cap (with similar sanctions) is found in the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 406. None of these caps appears to have had any significant effect on the ability of persons suing the government to obtain adequate legal representation. In fact, the number of lawsuits filed under both the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Social Security Act has increased substantially in recent years.

The Working Group has considered and recommends against the adoption of the English Rule on attorneys' fees, which would transfer attorneys' fees to the losing party. While such a rule might deter some frivolous litigation, it also would inhibit many lawsuits that may be merited but where some preliminary discovery may be necessary to determine the strength of plaintiff's claims. Moreover, because many plaintiffs essentially are judgment proof, the widely held belief that such

a rule would significantly deter frivolous litigation may be largely illusory.

A preferable (but still problematic) alternative approach to the English Rule would be to use a transfer of attorneys' fees as a means of motivating parties to settle their claims at an earlier point in litigation. Thus, a rule modeled on Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 21/ but including attorneys' fees, might be useful. Perhaps the most promising approach would be to combine alternative dispute resolution with a transfer of attorneys' fees.

Recommendation No. 8: Develop alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

The Working Group believes that alternative dispute resolution holds much promise. Experimentation and experience, however, is the only reliable vehicle for determining which systems will work. Alternative dispute resolution proposals range from binding arbitration to mediation, and include such procedural innovations as mini-trials and expedited discovery techniques. Many of these proposals are worthy of serious consideration, and states represent excellent laboratories in which to develop and explore these various alternative dispute resolution proposals.

The Working Group strongly supports alternative dispute resolution, and believes that the organized bars, legislatures, and jurists should be more receptive to alternative dispute resolution proposals. Where necessary, particularly in areas such as medical malpractice, states should be encouraged to consider seriously the necessary constitutional changes to permit the use of alternative dispute resolution.

The Working Group believes that the most promising use of alternative dispute resolution will be to encourage the early settlement of lawsuits. For example, requiring non-binding arbitration where part or all of attorneys' fees shift to the party which rejects an arbitration award and obtains a less favorable result in litigation, much as costs of litigation are shifted for rejected offers of settlement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 (see supra), might be an effective means

21/ Rule 68 ("Offer of Judgment") provides that costs of litigation will shift to a plaintiff who has rejected an Offer of Settlement made under the rule and not obtained a judgment more favorable than the rejected offer. There currently is a proposal under consideration to include attorneys' fees in Rule 68, as well as to make other changes to the Rule. Inclusion of attorneys' fees in Rule 68, however, has a number of serious problems that must be considered very carefully. These and other problems have led the Department of Justice to caution against the proposed changes to Rule 68.

for using alternative dispute resolution to facilitate and expedite early settlements.

The Working Group does not believe, however, that alternative dispute resolution needs to or should involve major changes to the standards of liability or causation in tort law. The merits of alternative dispute resolution are largely unrelated to which standard of liability is used in resolving disputes. The value of alternative dispute resolution lies in procedural rather than substantive changes in the law.

CHAPTER 5

GOVERNMENT INSURANCE: A NON-SOLUTION

The growing liability insurance availability/affordability crisis has spawned calls for government insurance or indemnification for persons or companies unable to obtain adequate insurance coverage through the private sector. For the reasons discussed below, such government insurance or indemnification would be highly undesirable and would do nothing to remedy the problems underlying the availability/affordability crisis.

The most serious deficiency with the various schemes for government insurance or indemnification is, as noted, the fact that such proposals do not address the problems that have led to the availability/affordability crisis. Instead, these schemes simply would pass the costs of the crisis directly to the taxpayer. While it is difficult to estimate the potential cost of such a program to the American taxpayer, it should be noted that the insurance industry suffered an estimated \$25 billion underwriting loss in 1985 (see Chapter 2). This loss does not include self-insurance or captive insurer losses, which in all likelihood represent additional billions of dollars.

A government insurance or indemnification program would by definition certainly involve the riskiest activities; that is, those activities that even the insurance industry is unwilling to underwrite. To the extent that the government attempts to address affordability problems by offering coverage more cheaply than the industry, the government, of course, simply would be subsidizing certain purchasers of insurance. Again, the cost of such subsidization is difficult to estimate, but considering that the insurance industry paid out over \$126 billion in 1985, with related expenses of \$37 billion (see Chapter 2), such a subsidy easily could involve tens of billions of dollars annually. ^{1/} (Again, these figures do not include self-insurance or captive insurers).

Government insurance or indemnification would not only pass these costs to the taxpayer, but could exacerbate the current problems of the tort system. One of the few constraints left in tort law is the recognition that "deep pockets" are not after

^{1/} For example, over recent years the National Flood Insurance Fund has been subsidizing flood insurance by roughly \$150 million annually. The cumulative loss for the program to date is approximately \$1.4 billion. The President, in his latest budget submission, reiterated his intention to continue to phase out this costly subsidy. The riot insurance program, which existed from 1968 to 1984, was able to sustain itself through collected premiums. The relative success of the program, however, was largely due to the decline in urban riots after the program was instituted.

all bottomless -- that there is a finite amount of resources that can be reallocated through tort liability. Government indemnification or insurance would remove that last restraint, since the resources of the Federal Government are all too often viewed as without limit. Thus, courts and juries might be even more willing to skew liability and causation standards to ensure compensation, and to award the most generous compensation conceivable.

There are, however, a number of compelling reasons for rejecting the concept of government insurance or indemnification other than because of its potential cost and the failure to address the real problems underlying the crisis. Perhaps foremost among those reasons is that such a program would most likely jeopardize among the most effective and important mechanisms currently existing in the private sector to protect public health and safety. The insurance industry plays a vital role in promoting public health and safety by policing insureds to ensure that risks of injury are minimized. Insureds who fail to minimize such risks, or who experience higher than normal claim rates, may find the desired level of insurance coverage more difficult to obtain and more expensive. The insurance industry thus plays an important role in creating incentives that protect public health and safety, both in policing insureds, and in passing the benefits of safety back to the insureds through lower premiums.

While the role of insurance in promoting public health and safety is by no means perfect, and the above description admittedly is somewhat idealized, insurance creates important health and safety incentives which cannot be dismissed lightly. This critical function of insurance is undermined to the extent that the government supplants the private sector in providing insurance or indemnification, particularly for high risk activities. The government, even if and when it demonstrates the best of intentions, simply does not have the resources, experience, flexibility or incentives to replicate the activities of the private sector in policing insureds' practices and setting premiums to reflect claims experience. In addition, were the government to undertake such activities, the existing health and safety bureaucracies almost certainly would prove inadequate. Substantial additional funds, personnel and resources would need to be devoted to these activities, and in many areas new bureaucratic structures would need to be established. 2/ If, as seems likely, such additional investments of government resources are not made, government insurance or indemnification would operate as a clear disincentive to greater safety since insureds would receive

2/ The necessary collection and analysis of relevant information would of itself be a major undertaking requiring substantial investment of additional government resources.

the benefit of a risk transfer to the government (and, accordingly, would have less incentive to protect public health and safety) without any corresponding checks upon their conduct or activities. Both the consumer and the taxpayer would be the ultimate losers.

To the extent that the government institutes an insurance or indemnification program, such a program also would increase significantly in two ways the involvement of the government in the private sector. First, while the government, as noted, cannot replicate the efforts of the insurance industry, it would have to become involved in the activities it has insured or indemnified to ensure that such insurance or indemnification does not lead to completely open-ended liability on the part of the government. This necessarily would involve new additional forms of government supervision and regulation of private sector activities.

A second undesirable but inevitable effect of such a program would be that the government frequently would be forced to manage, or at least actively oversee, the litigation of cases involving the liability of its insureds, since the insureds often would have only a limited incentive to contest aggressively claims, however meritless, against which they are fully insured or indemnified. Even putting aside the consideration of the massive investment of litigation resources that would be needed by both the insuring agencies and the Department of Justice, this could involve the government directly and actively in some of the most controversial and visible tort litigation in our society, much of which would involve litigation in state court under substantive, procedural and evidentiary rules of state law.

An additional consideration is that such a program necessarily would involve the federal government in state regulation of the insurance industry since such regulation could have a significant impact on the kind of insurance or indemnification the federal government would have to provide. For example, state regulators who might wish to avoid approving politically unpopular rate increases or policy provisions might be far more inclined to withhold such approvals if they perceived the federal government as ready and willing to provide an alternative source of insurance. The federal government, in turn, in order to avoid such wholesale transfers of the insurance burden, could very easily find itself compelled to regulate the insurance industry directly, or to regulate the state regulators. Either way, it would represent a substantial intrusion by the federal government into the regulation of the insurance industry.

Finally, a federal program of insurance or indemnification would interfere with and perhaps severely inhibit the ability of the market to devise new policies, insurance mechanisms, and specific contractual provisions to meet changing economic and

social conditions. Where the current services of the insurance industry prove inadequate or unacceptable, insurers and insureds have strong incentives to restructure those services so that the needs of the marketplace can be met (witness, for example, the current discussions over the introduction of claims-made policies and the inclusion of defense costs). Where government insurance or indemnification is available, however, insureds may be far more inclined to seek such insurance (particularly where it is subsidized, either intentionally or unintentionally) than to negotiate with insurers or invest considerable effort and resources shopping for better conditions. Insurers, in turn, who may feel themselves compelled to offer otherwise unattractive services to customers they wish to retain, may find a government insurance or indemnification program a convenient dumping grounds for the risks they would rather spin-off. 3/ The end result could very well be that the ability of the marketplace to respond to new conditions with innovative solutions could be severely chilled if the "safe harbor" of government insurance or indemnification were available to both the insureds and the insurers. 4/

In sum, government insurance or indemnification would be a highly undesirable and counterproductive response to the current availability/affordability crisis. It effectively would amount to the nationalization of a potentially large portion of one of the Nation's leading financial industries. And, given the history of past government involvement in the private sector, it is all too apparent that removing the federal government from the insurance industry once the purported justification for its presence had passed would be an arduous if not ultimately futile endeavor.

3/ Such risks most likely would include the type of long-latency, catastrophic risks endemic to toxic torts. As is apparent from the asbestos litigations, such insurance would expose the taxpayer to potentially massive liability. The problem of insurers spinning off certain types of business very likely would generate pressure for some form of federal regulation of such practices.

4/ It should be noted in this regard that the contractor indemnification provision which the Administration supports in the context of Superfund reauthorization is purely discretionary in nature, is limited to cleanups under the control of the Environmental Protection Agency, is linked to a critical limitation on liability (liability would be predicated only on negligence), and would be provided only because it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to keep this vital program in operation without such limited and closely regulated contractor indemnification (which presumably will include both limits and deductibles).

CONCLUSION

This report contains within it a number of observations, conclusions and recommendations. The most important of these, however, for the purposes of the Tort Policy Working Group, are what this report implies as to the appropriate response of the federal government to the current crisis in insurance availability and affordability. In this regard, the pertinent conclusions are straightforward and relatively apparent.

First, tort law appears to be a major cause of the insurance availability/affordability crisis.


Second, there are a number of beneficial reforms of tort law that the federal government can support and promote in sensible and appropriate ways.

Third, to the extent that other factors -- such as the recent large underwriting losses of the insurance industry -- underlie this crisis, there is little the federal government can or should do to remedy these problems. While the contribution of these economic factors seems clear, it is likely that these problems will work themselves out in the short-term as the insurance industry restores its desired level of profitability, and as other insurance industry developments (see Chapter 3) are implemented. It seems highly unlikely, however, that these changes will substantially alleviate the crisis, particularly the affordability aspect of the crisis, without substantial reforms of tort law.

Fourth, the Working Group found nothing to support the suggestion that this crisis could be remedied through federal regulation of the insurance industry or of state insurance regulators.

Fifth, while a federal insurance or indemnification program obviously could provide subsidized insurance where insurance is unavailable or unaffordable, for many reasons (see Chapter 5) such a program would be highly undesirable and ultimately counterproductive.

In sum, tort law appears to be a major cause of the insurance availability/affordability crisis which the federal government can and should address in a variety of sensible and appropriate ways. But significant, long-term reform cannot and should not come solely from the federal government. Ultimately, state governments and courts must address the current excesses of tort law. Their active participation is essential to finding workable solutions to the increasingly debilitating problems of tort law.



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