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ABSTRACT

While the typical pantheon of journalism history heroes is made up almost entirely of individuals who campaigned for more governmental regulation and increased social liberalism, there is also an opposing tradition in American journalism, one based on the premise that governmental cures are in most cases worse than the diseases they are designed to control or eradicate. In looking at forgotten conservative journalists, it is important to examine the career of Frank Kent (1877-1958), a Baltimore "Sun" writer and syndicated columnist who gained a reputation for opposition to President Roosevelt's New Deal policies. In 1933 popular support for Roosevelt was so great that even Congressmen who had objections were reluctant to speak them. The combination of economic and social crises with Roosevelt's personal charm made allies of almost every editor and reporter. Frank Kent, influenced by the historical and political science perspective he brought to reporting and writing, was bothered by this uncritical acceptance of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the National Recovery Administration (NRA). Roosevelt and his administration struck back at Kent and other critics, but by 1934, other journalists began to join Kent in opposition to the NRA, and a study by the liberal Brookings Institute did indeed reveal that the economy was not recovering. The NRA system began breaking down in late 1934; by 1935 small businesses were beginning to openly defy the NRA codes; and by the end of 1935, the Supreme Court declared the NRA unconstitutional. Kent was vindicated. Despite Roosevelt's resounding reelection, Kent's journalistic practice provides a different perspective on the current view of some conservatives that the press should support presidential prerogatives. (HTH)

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SCRATCHING THE FIRST TEFLON PRESIDENCY:
FRANK KENT VS. FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT

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2

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SCRATCHING THE FIRST TEFLON PRESIDENCY:

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The past decade of research in journalism history has witnessed a welcome tendency to spotlight the forgotten. Women, blacks, Hispanics, and others have received long-overdue attention. But one additional neglected group also deserves some recognition: Conservatives.

On the face of it, such a demand for belated notice may seem strange. After all, most media outlets in this country are and have been privately owned, and most have been editorially as well as financially committed to the continuation of private enterprise. And yet, the typical pantheon of journalism history heroes is made up almost entirely of individuals who campaigned for more governmental regulation and increased social liberalism.

For instance, Horace Greeley's enthusiasm for Fourierism and other utopian social programs is well known. On a more down-to-earth level, Edwin and Michael Emery also note that he wanted the state to have "strong regulatory powers." Joseph Pulitzer, the early William Randolph Hearst, E. W. Scripps, Walter Lippmann, and many other heroes of the standard texts were all in what could be called the pro-regulatory camp.¹

There may be good reason for such a tendency among journalists particularly. Many articles over the years have fallen into the standard format: Expose a problem...something must be done...turn to government. But there is also an opposing

tradition in American journalism, one based on the premise that governmental cures are in most cases worse than the diseases they are designed to control or eradicate.

William Leggett, David Hale, Horace White, Mark Sullivan, Whittaker Chambers, and others, were in that capacious camp. Yet, those predecessors of today's James Kilpatricks and William Safires have received very slight mention by journalism historians. This article attempts to begin a new look at forgotten conservative journalists by examining the crucial challenge in the career of Frank Kent (1877-1958), a Baltimore Sun writer and syndicated columnist who gained notoriety for opposition to New Deal policies.

Kent became a hero to some for standing against the tide of 1933. That any journalist might be heroic for doing so might, once again, seem strange to some journalistic historians. After all, wasn't support for the President vital during the dark days of the Depression? Wasn't the press so anti-Roosevelt that a columnist sharing that sentiment would merely be going with the majority? Weren't opponents to the New Deal mainly interested in preserving their own wealth and status? Finally, haven't the "press reactionaries" been shown wrong by the historical and political flow since then?

This article will deal with those questions by analyzing first, the situation in 1933; second, the reaction of many journalists to Roosevelt; third, Frank Kent's views; and fourth, the outcome of the battle. Perhaps the forthcoming answers will encourage a new look at the entire period and some additional analysis of journalism history's progressive tradition.

Popular excitement

Historians often have described the amazing scene on March 9, 1933, when the new Roosevelt administration sent its crucial banking bill to the House of Representatives. Congressmen had no copies of the bill, which had been worked out by Administration members over the past several days. The bill was read aloud from the one available draft, with last-minute, pencil-scribbled corrections inserted. The bill took major steps deserving at least minimal debate: President Roosevelt was given complete control over gold movements; the Federal Reserve bank was given authority to issue new notes; regulators were allowed to extend governmental backing to private bankers. Yet, there was no debate. The House passed the bill by a unanimous voice vote. The Senate, being a deliberative body, did vote, 73-7, to approve the bill, unamended.

The banking bill demanded speed, since the country was facing a banking emergency, but less urgent bills also received little scrutiny. Faced with one bill, Representative John Young Brown of Kentucky said, "I had as soon start a mutiny in the face of a foreign foe as start a mutiny today against the program of the President of the United States."²

Popular support for Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 was so great that even Congressmen who had objections feared to speak them. Those who saw him seemed to believe for a time that they had seen the face of God; one Congressman compared him to Jesus Christ, not unfavorably, and a poll among New York schoolchildren showed God running a poor second to him. Forty-one popular songs were

written about him.

The centerpiece of the New Deal during 1933 was the National Industrial Recovery Act and the regulatory body it established, the National Recovery Administration (NRA). The NRA goal was to establish industry-wide price and wage conformity, supposedly in order to create new jobs and increase purchasing power. The means to such an end was the legally enforceable establishment of favorable prices for some products and unfavorable ones for others, with the result that companies powerful enough to write the rules could help themselves and hurt others.⁴

Proponents conceded or boasted that the NRA ran counter to the emphasis on competitive enterprise that had propelled the American economy during the previous century and a half. Yet, during 1933, it was hailed by many who believed that something, anything, must be done.

Major corporate executives were particularly enthusiastic. Concerning the business elite and their trade association directors, Business Week commented in May, 1933, that "Most of them are fully aware that they may be putting their heads into a noose, but they prefer a noose that binds them strongly together to the old chaos of 'free competition' under depression conditions." Pierre du Pont praised the NRA in 1933; one executive said he hoped God would forgive him his vote for Hoover. A Business Week editorial in June, 1933, summarized considerable corporate sentiment: "The wolves of depression have to be shot, and without the delay inherent in deliberative procedure. It is essentially a one-man job."⁵

With Roosevelt sometimes seen as God and the NRA as

salvation, the NRA's Blue Eagle symbol achieved totemic status during 1933. Eight thousand children stood in formation at a San Francisco baseball park to form the Eagle. One hundred thousand Boston children assembled on Boston Common and reported this pledge: "I promise as a good American citizen to do my part for the NRA. I will buy only where the Blue Eagle flies....I will help President Roosevelt bring back good times." Millions of Americans pledged obedience to Blue Eagle codes designed by government officials and major companies to enforce industry-wide prices and wages, regardless of individual choice. Four young ladies had the eagle tattooed on their backs.

The pressure was great. NRA administrator Hugh Johnson said of his Eagle, "May God have mercy on the man or group of men who attempt to trifle with this bird." Placards and decals everywhere displayed the Eagle, with the slogan "We Do Our Part" beneath its claws. Who would tempt the wrath of Hugh Johnson's god? Who would not do his part?

To pose the question in a slightly different way: In April, 1933, Time reported the posting of this notice at one company: "President Roosevelt has done his part: now you do something. Buy something -- buy anything, anywhere; paint your kitchen, send a telegram, give a party, get a car, pay a bill, rent a flat, fix your roof, get a haircut, see a show, build a house, take a trip, sing a song, get married. It does not matter what you do -- but get going and keep going." Movement, anywhere, was the thing. But is it the job of journalists, at times, to stand aside while the bandwagon rolls by, in order to gain a better understanding of its movement? Should journalists at times stand still while

8

all are moving? Were journalists doing their part in 1933?

Media bandwagon

Washington reporters in 1933 often recorded their impressions of Roosevelt: One wrote that he had the friendship of reporters and "what cooperation they can give consistent with covering the news -- which is quite a lot;" another noted that Roosevelt was "a great hit among the newspapermen at Washington." Marlen Pew of Editor & Publisher wrote with amazement, "I rubbed my ears and opened my eyes when I heard hard-boiled veterans, men who had lived through so many administrations that there are callouses in their brain, talk glibly about the merits of the White House incumbent." Raymond Tucker, in October Collier's, wrote that Roosevelt "has definitely captivated an unusually cynical battalion of correspondents."

Raymond Clapper, in the June 1934 Review of Reviews, noted that FDR "came to Washington. The correspondents saw him and were conquered." Clapper added that reporters sympathized with Roosevelt's political objectives. The San Francisco press club's publication Scogg contended that "the nation's reporters will smile contentedly as long as F.R. sits on the throne..." Arthur Krock, head of the New York Times bureau, approved of the NRA but did note that reporters were pulling their punches. Leo Rosten, during his interviews with over 150 members of the Washington press corps during Roosevelt's first term, saw a definite pro-Roosevelt bias.

Such contentment may have been political, but it also was practical. Correspondent Ernest Lindley wrote that reporters

appreciated Roosevelt's "gift for simple and logical analysis," his ability to give them views easy to incorporate into simple stories. Rosten noted that reporters without much economic knowledge were particularly appreciative of this, as press conference transcripts indicate: In July, 1933, one correspondent asked FDR to explain the effects of possible inflation of the dollar, because "personally, I am as ignorant as a nincompoop on it all." Heywood Broun called Roosevelt "the best newspaperman who has ever been President of the United States," because he not only gave reporters stories but structured their leads as well.

Roosevelt also was extraordinarily skillful at playing up to reporters' egos. As one correspondent who had covered previous administrations noted, "With Roosevelt, this is the only time that I had the feeling that I was welcome here in the White House, that I belonged here, that I was as important here as a member of Cabinet or of Congress -- even more important. I think you'll find that feeling general...that he's our President. Ours. See?" Good humor prevailed at Roosevelt's news conferences, with hard questions dodged through humor and the help of several reporters whose job when the going got rough, according to one serious onlooker, was "to say something so cute that the President doubles up with laughter."

The combination of societal crisis and personal charm kept almost every reporter and editor in Roosevelt's corner during 1933. Because of the crisis, Joseph Medill Patterson promised in the New York Daily News, "Whatever President Roosevelt does or

doesn't do, we're going to be for him. We're going to withhold hostile criticism for one year at least." Concerning the charm, columnist Mark Sullivan once said that Roosevelt "could recite the Polish alphabet and it would be accepted as an eloquent plea for disarmament." Crisis and charm: At the end of Roosevelt's first news conference reporters burst into applause.¹³

But did personal approval translate into press support? Wasn't the press opposed to Roosevelt? Certainly not during the first year, and perhaps not as much as often thought thereafter. Graham White, in EOR and the Press, analyzed editorial reactions of seven influential newspapers -- New York Times, New York Herald Tribune, New York World Telegram, New York Sun, Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and Washington Post -- and found that not one of these newspapers had any unkind editorial comments to make about Roosevelt's initial public presentations; the honeymoon continued into 1934 on the NRA and most other issues.¹⁴

White also noted that even when editorial pages eventually went one way, the front pages often went another, particularly because Roosevelt was the source for many stories. He was able to have his views communicated first as a normal part of reporting the story.¹⁵

Concerning the NRA in particular, major columnists such as Walter Lippmann and Arthur Krock were allies, as were many others including Howard Davis of the Herald Tribune, Emory Thomason of the Chicago Daily Times, and Amon Carter of Fort Worth and C.J.P. Lucas of Louisville. Even Westbrook Pegler, for all his later anti-New Deal vitriol, was a fan at first. He wrote about how Roosevelt at a press conference "sits there and turns his smile

from one wing of the lineup to the other as questions fly out of the gathering and answers them as easily as a traffic cop telling a stranger the way to Walnut Street....I am afraid I couldn't be trusted around Mr. Roosevelt. For the first time in my life in this business, I might find myself squabbling for a chance to carry the champion's water-bucket."

16

Against the Tide

Frank Kent, Baltimore Sun columnist, was bothered by this uncritical acceptance of Roosevelt's programs. Concerning the NRA in particular, Kent wrote in 1933, "...there has been relatively little criticism. On the contrary, practically everybody, including many who did not believe in them, went along with the President, giving him support. A tremendous propaganda emanat[ed] from Washington...Anyone who did not fall in line was regarded as 'rocking the boat,' or 'pulling back on prosperity.' The state of the public mind, the prestige of the President and the Blue Eagle ballyhoo, reduced those who opposed to almost complete silence."

17

The hype, rather than compelling Kent's allegiance, seemed to infuriate him. "Government propaganda," he muttered in one of his 1933 columns, "never has anyone seen anything like it. The publicity men are so numerous that they stumble over each other....The making of favorable news is one of the principal Administration activities and more real efficiency is there shown than in any other department...No critical word taunts this steady stream of laudation."

18

Why was Kent willing to fight the stream?

Frank Kent was born in Baltimore on May 1, 1877. He attended public and private schools and entered the University of Maryland. In 1897 he left school for a job as a reporter on the Baltimore American. Kent worked there one year and then moved to the Sun, where he stayed in one capacity or another for half a century. Kent first covered local and Washington politics, was the Sun's managing editor from 1910 to 1921, and then, after a brief stint as London correspondent, began writing a five-day-a-week column.
19

Kent's politics were "Wilsonian Progressive," with an emphasis on the importance of small business and individual rights. He sharply criticized President Calvin Coolidge for several reasons, including over-friendliness to large economic interests. Kent voted for Roosevelt in 1932, only to be appalled in 1933 when he saw Roosevelt begin working for a big government-big business partnership to get the country moving again.

What perhaps made Kent critical of this, at a time when other reporters were NRA sympathizers, was the historical and political science perspective he brought to reporting and column-writing. Along with his newspaper work, Kent had published several books on political history and analysis, including The Great Game of Politics (1923) and The Democratic Party, a History (1928).

The Great Game of Politics was filled with trenchant observations concerning the emerging role of "publicity bureaus and political press agents." Kent despised the "fine fake game" of flooding the country with newspaper puff pieces and articles

planted in magazines:

This sort of thing is skillfully and cleverly done. A considerable part of it is manufactured in and goes out from Washington. Most of the time neither the periodical press nor the daily press knows that there is a purpose and a machine back of it...the usual procedure is to employ very highly paid publicity experts of the best and most influential types. Much of the publicity is so arranged that it has the appearance of entirely spontaneous and wholly untainted news, but it is all thought out and planned with the utmost care.²⁰

The Democratic Party, a History, showed Kent's respect for the Constitution, desire to keep the Federal government as small as possible, and suspicion of corporate political machinations: Kent suggested that "Big Business" always wants to "cut corners and make its own laws." In both these books and others, Kent displayed a knowledge of past governmental programs so extensive that he would not be among the reporters who had to "wait and see" how a new policy would turn out; Kent, through a remembrance of things past, could be an accurate predictor. Nor would he have to ask President Roosevelt to explain inflation.²¹

When Kent analyzed the NRA in 1933, his historical sense warned him that there was little truly new in it: the price-setting control handed over to industrial trade associations reminded him of a return to medieval guilds, not a leap into a brave new future. Kent saw the NRA as a useful device for large corporations to keep their smaller competitors from cutting prices to gain market share. In July, 1933, he described the "enthusiasm of the industrialists," for the NRA, "their visions of "competition eliminated, prices raised, profits assured..."²²

Kent was clearly correct in his analysis of corporate

policy. As even Virgil Jordan, president of the National Industrial Conference Board, was to acknowledge, "Some industrial interests...thought that by enlisting the aid of the sheriff to control the other fellow they could get some advantage for themselves. They were not concerned about the principle or the inevitable consequences..." The NRA, Kent concluded, was harmful to producers who wanted to offer bargains but would be unable to, and to consumers who would face higher prices.²³

Kent watched carefully through 1933 as, industry by industry, the big boys won. The Steel Code, for instance, was largely controlled by United States Steel and Bethlehem, since those two companies alone had over half the voting strength of their "code authority." As historian Broadus Mitchell has noted, "In general the members of a code authority were chosen by a minority of firms in an industry, often by a small minority of the most powerful...smaller and scattered business units were underrepresented on code authorities, labor and consumers were practical'y not represented at all."²⁴

Overall, Kent noted that over 700 codes were established under NRA auspices, with implementation made possible by about 11,000 Federal administrative orders and 70 Presidential executive orders. Almost every business transaction came under a NRA classification, from Automobile Manufacturing and Cotton Textiles to Lightning Rod Manufacturing and Corn Cob Pipes. Kent pointed out that competitively successful groups faced the prospect of losing their advantages because of political coercion. Four hundred codes allowed for the fixing of minimum prices so that major companies could not be undersold. Other

provisions in many codes restricted trade-in allowances, credit terms, competition in quality, or reduction of prices based on geographical proximity. Thirty industries even received governmental backing to limit the construction of new plants or prevent the opening of closed ones, even though such provisions obviously cut against the announced purpose of job creation. ²⁵

The check on possible abuses was supposed to be the National Recovery Administration itself. Kent, though, saw that NRA administrator Hugh Johnson and his key assistants not only had corporate backgrounds (often a sensible hiring policy) but also shared a preference for greater economic concentration combined with a dislike for entrepreneurial competition. The result, according to one observer, was that complaints tended to end up in a "bargain between business leaders on the one hand and ²⁶ businessmen, in the guise of government officials on the other."

Kent's views of the NRA's unfair workings had been supported by more recent research. For instance, business historian Ellis Hawley concluded that "Most of the price clauses were directed against price cutting by 'little fellows'.... Small firms often existed only because they offered lower prices to offset consumer preferences for advertised brands, prices sometimes made possible by lower wage rates, sometimes by more favorable location, sometimes by other advantages arising out of specialization or recapitalization. It was in the interest of larger firms, therefore, to eliminate price and wage differentials and wipe out ²⁷ the special advantages that made them possible...."

Kent had the economic sophistication to spot such maneuvers

while other journalists were smiling; furthermore, he was not afraid to put his criticism on paper. That is because Kent was concerned about principles, economic and journalistic. Others reporters may have had critical thoughts but were silent; Kent believed that journalists should be adversarial when they thought wrong was being done, even if their views were unpopular.

Kent always spoke out strongly against reportorial conformity (today's "pack journalism") and what he called the "buttering up" of favorites and sources. When Senator Key Pittman of Nevada said of one Kent attack on the Administration, "Your friends in the Senate regret that," Kent replied, "Who said I want friends in the Senate?"²⁸

Kent particularly attacked the Roosevelt Administration's skillful public relations onslaught. While NRA press releases sang of up-to-date recovery in Kansas City and jubilation in Texas, many reporters believed, but Kent waxed sarcastic about the 30 or more NRA public relations specialists whose job was to proclaim that the program was "succeeding beyond expectation, that everything is lovely and the goose hangs high."²⁹

The Administration struck back at Kent and other critics. Johnson's assistant Donald Richberg offered a "love it or leave it" argument, contending that the United States would be improved if opponents would "emigrate to some backward country" and "cease to clutter up progress in the United States with the rubbish of outworn ideas and dead philosophies."³⁰

Other Administration spokesmen restricted themselves to calling NRA opponents "corporals of disaster," "tomtom beaters," and "destructive critics" whose eyes had not "seen the glory."

Kent noted that, "Anyone who did not fall in line was regarded as 'rocking the boat,' or 'pulling back on prosperity,'" and he pointed out that the attacks, combined with "the state of the public mind, the prestige of the President and the Blue Eagle ballyhoo reduced those who opposed to almost complete silence."

31

But Kent was the exception.

Kent's NRA Vindication

In 1934, other journalists began to join Kent in opposition to the NRA. The economy was not recovering, as a study by the liberal Brookings Institution would point out. Brookings scholars found that 1 1/2 million jobs were added during the first year of NRA, but only through work spreading, not job creation. They noted that both hourly wages and living costs had increased by about nine to ten percent during that year, so the average loss in real wages was five to six percent. Brookings concluded that "the NRA on the whole retarded recovery."

32

Even so, it was a news event, not just economic analysis, that seemed to break the reportorial trance. Under pressure from Senator William Borah (R-Idaho), the NRA was forced to hold hearings in January, 1934, concerning complaints about the NRA from small businessmen; Borah said his office had received over nine thousand complaints. At the hearings, an NRA "Consumers' Advisory Board" agreed to by Hugh Johnson was at first kept from presenting its critical findings. Board members protested, and here the press had a conflict story too good to turn down; Articles about "gagging" of the board appeared.

33

Borah kept up the pressure in the Senate chamber and in public speeches. In February, 1934, he gave a radio talk about price fixing by large corporations and destruction of small businesses, noting that "When these conditions are pointed out, someone goes into a trance and begins to ejaculate about how we cannot go back to rugged individualism; that we have arrived at a new era, the era of planned industrialism." Whatever the public relations label, Borah said such railroading was a "travesty upon justice." Following his speech, Borah received over 18,000 requests for help from small businessmen.³⁴

A great rift between large corporations and small businessmen developed. Small businesses pushed for elimination of price and production controls and restoration of free markets, but Kent continued to point out "...the great love of the Big Business Man for the NRA." Companies such as Bethlehem Steel had written into codes strategically advantageous policies, and they were still joyful; Eugene Grace, Bethlehem's head, was still speaking "with glowing approval of what the NRA has done for industry."³⁵

The NRA system itself began breaking down in late 1934, though. The lumber industry's complicated price schedules and production quota systems proved unmanageable and unenforceable. Disputes broke out in other industries as well. Kent and others wrote of the case of the pants-presser who was being prosecuted by the NRA because he had pressed a pair of pants for 39 cents instead of 75 cents.³⁶

By 1935 small businesses were beginning to openly defy the NRA codes. In the service trades code price-fixing provisions

were especially hard to enforce because consumers favored those who offered bargains. Mail-order houses and small manufacturers openly defied the plumbing fixtures code. Minimum price schedules had to be revised or removed in the mop, shoe polish and twine industries. Senator Borah told his constituents to disregard NRA codes, fees, and fines, and tell him of any enforcement attempts.³⁷

Kent kept firing away, and this time with support from other journalists. "The tide of public opinion has turned definitely against" the NRA, he rejoiced in a May 2, 1935, column. Kent's early protests gained their greatest vindication at the end of that month when the Supreme Court unanimously declared the NRA to be unconstitutional. If the Constitution's commerce clause were interpreted as broadly as the Administration wanted, the Court argued "federal authority would embrace practically all the activities of the people," and that was not what the framers of the Constitution had in mind.³⁸

Following the Supreme Court decision, Kent noted that the "tremendous manufactured NRA enthusiasm" was all gone. The hype followed by reality "does leave the American people looking foolish," he commented. "Never has a nation been put in a more ridiculous position. We are right back where we started..."³⁹

But not quite. Not everyone cared as much for Constitutional intent as did Kent and the Supreme Court at that time. President Roosevelt laughed off the decision and soon began running against a Supreme Court which was frustrating economic policies that would work, he insisted, if given enough time and support. In

today's parlance, Roosevelt would be considered a Teflon president; as Kent described the public and journalistic mood following the Court's dashing of the NRA, "The New Dealers, the Brain Trust, General Johnson and Mr. Richberg are all assailed --
40
everybody except Mr. Roosevelt."

President Roosevelt gained a smashing victory in the 1936 elections and a revered place in the history books. Kent, however, has been relegated to footnotes. He was the subject of a chapter of one book published in the 1940s; the title of the chapter was "Ax-Man Kent." Only in the 1980s, with an American turn to the political right, are Kent's ideas receiving another
41
hearing from the political mainstream.

Conclusion

In 1933, almost everyone was swept along in NRA excitement. Every newspaper in the country, with three small exceptions, boasted the blue eagle. Almost everyone cheered. Frank Kent, though, kept his head. Many journalists then, and historians more recently, have wanted to chop it off. Still, even if Kent was a foolish Canute trying to stop the waves, there was something brave about standing against the tide.

Kent's 1933 campaign also requires a second look for one additional reason. His journalistic practice provides a different perspective on the current view of some conservatives that the press should be supportive of presidential prerogatives and primarily reportorial. For Kent and others who came to support him, the New Deal required the development of a conservative adversary press.

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