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ABSTRACT

A pertinent problem in the area of moral development is whether most people can distinguish moral from conventional issues. Some research has shown children and adolescents consider moral (intrinsic) transgressions more serious than violations of convention. To expand this research by examining in detail the role of intrinsicity in moral discriminations, and to examine Catholic students' judgments of morally and conventionally wrong sexual acts, 101 Catholic undergraduates rated the seriousness of 16 sexual and nonsexual (violations of church rules) acts. The questionnaire contained four scales to measure criteria for distinguishing between morality and convention: seriousness, unalterability, universality, and intrinsicity. The results showed that most Catholic university students saw a clear distinction between eight acts in the moral domain (intrinsically wrong), four acts in the conventional domain (not intrinsically wrong), and four acts in the prudential domain (not wrong at all). The results also revealed sex differences in the students' attitudes toward rules of their church (males saw violations of church rules as more wrong than did females) and in their attitudes toward some sexual acts (females were more emotional in their ratings of sexual acts). The results cast doubt on the validity of Kohlberg's test of moral development since the results of his test indicate that very few undergraduates can distinguish between morality and convention. (MCF)

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Morality vs. Convention:

Is Kohlberg Right?

Jean M. Bradt*

Running Head: MORAL DISCRIMINATIONS

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ABSTRACT

A questionnaire administered to 101 undergraduates at Loyola University of Chicago showed that most Catholic university students see a clear distinction between eight acts that are in the moral domain (intrinsically wrong), four acts that are in the conventional domain (not intrinsically wrong) and four acts that are in the prudential domain (not wrong at all). The questionnaire contained four scales: seriousness, unalterability, universality and intrinsicity, which were used to measure Elliott Turiel's four criteria for distinguishing between morality and convention. Use of the scales showed that the students saw the moral breaches as more seriously wrong, less alterable, and more likely to be universally applicable and wrong or reasons intrinsic to the acts themselves than the conventional and prudential breaches. These results cast doubt on the validity of Kohlberg's test of moral development since the results of his test indicate that very few undergraduates can distinguish between morality and convention.

During the past two decades, psychological and educational researchers have developed a great interest in the new field of moral development. One of the most pertinent problems that has arisen in this area is that of whether or not most people can distinguish moral issues from conventional issues. That is, can all children and adults tell the difference between acts that are wrong because of their intrinsic features and acts that are only wrong because of societal rules against them? Or is this, on the other hand, a skill mastered only by the most highly morally developed adults? This problem is important because this assumption (i.e., that only a few adults and virtually no children can distinguish between morality and convention) is at the base of Lawrence Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Inventory (MJII), the leading test of moral development in the field.

Although very few researchers have attempted to find the answer to this problem, the attempts that have been made have shown that even very young children treat certain acts as morally wrong and certain acts as conventionally wrong. One of the first researchers to address this problem, Elliott Turiel (1983), has observed four criteria that children seem to use in order to distinguish between morally-wrong, conventionally-wrong and prudentially-wrong acts. (Acts that are prudentially wrong are wrong only because they have bad consequences for the actor. For instance, it would be prudentially wrong for a cook to forget to salt the meat or for a thief not to wear gloves.)

These four criteria are intrinsicity, unalterability, universality, and seriousness.

The first of Turiel's criteria will be referred to as "intrinsicity" here, although Turiel has not given it a name. Turiel has designated certain acts as belonging in the moral domain because children act as if they sense that these acts intrinsically (by their very nature) harm other persons or are unfair. For instance, hitting another person, by its very nature, causes harm, and taking others' possessions against their will or without their knowledge is intrinsically unfair to them. Children often mention these negative consequences when they witness these acts.

When describing other acts, however, children tend to mention only that they break rules, disobey authorities, or incur their peers' disapproval. Turiel places these acts in the conventional domain. For instance, children respond to boys kissing boys, a conventional transgression, simply with loud laughter, signalling their disapproval or uneasiness. None of the common responses to conventional acts seem to depend on characteristics of the acts themselves. No one mentions why a convention breaks a rule, why the authority made the rule, or why he or she disapproves of the act. Emotional statements such as "It's wrong because it's disgusting" are sometimes heard, but few people can explain why they are disgusted by this act as opposed to some other act. In other words, their disgust does not seem to stem from intrinsic features of the act.

Several researchers have observed the behavior of children and adolescents and have inferred that they were using this intrinsicity criterion in making moral judgments (Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Much & Shweder, 1978; Turiel & Nucci, 1982a; Nucci, Turiel & Gawrich, 1981). Intrinsicity is therefore considered by these researchers to be a criterion that children use in determining whether transgressions are moral or conventional.

However, in coming to this conclusion, these authors further assume that because children or adolescents mention intrinsic consequences when saying why moral breaches are wrong, they understand that the intrinsic consequences are what make the breaches wrong. It may be that the children and adolescents only connect intrinsic consequences with moral acts because the intrinsic consequences are the ones they have learned from their religious leaders (whom they associate with morality) whereas the non-intrinsic consequences are the ones they have learned from their peers (who do not make moral rules.)

The second criterion suggested by Turiel for distinguishing between morally-wrong, conventionally-wrong, and acceptable acts is unalterability. Thus, most people consider conventional standards (the rules they see as coming from authorities' or others' disapproval) to be alterable, whereas they see moral prescriptions (that have intrinsically negative consequences) as unchangeable. Several researchers have found that children say that

certain rules (the ones for which they have just mentioned intrinsic consequences) cannot be changed and that all the other rules can (Davidson et al., 1983; Nucci & Turiel, 1978; Nucci & Nucci, 1982; Weston & Turiel, 1980).

Turiel's third criterion is universality. Most children and adolescents see moral transgressions as universally wrong, that is, wrong regardless of whether there are rules against them in their school or church (Weston & Turiel, 1980). However, conventional acts are usually viewed as culturally relative, that is, as wrong only if they violate school or church rules. Thus, moral rules are seen as applying to all human beings, whereas conventions are seen as applying only to the members of the child's school or religion.

Turiel's final criterion is seriousness. In general, moral (intrinsic) transgressions are considered to be more serious than violations of convention. Two studies have found this to be true for children (Smetana, 1981; Davidson et al., 1983), and Larry Nucci (1981) has found this to be true for both children and adolescents.

Elementary school children and high school youths have been shown to use all four of Turiel's criteria for distinguishing between moral and conventional breaches. However, college youths have only been tested for the use of three of the criteria: seriousness, unalterability, and universality. This test was done in a study by Nucci and Junker (1982). These researchers gave 50 high school

MORAL DISCRIMINATIONS 7

sophomores who were Catholics and 50 Catholic undergraduates at the University of Illinois at Chicago a questionnaire in a supervised group setting. The questionnaire briefly described 24 acts, 12 of which they predicted would be considered morally (intrinsically) wrong and 12 of which they predicted would be seen as conventionally wrong. All the acts are considered to be serious sins by the Catholic Church, and the first page of the questionnaire confirmed that the subjects were aware of this fact.

The students first rated the seriousness (Criterion 4) of each transgression using a scale that ranged from 1 (very seriously wrong) to 4 (not wrong at all). A significant number of subjects rated the issues predicted to be moral ones, such as murder, as more serious than the breaches specific to Catholics, such as missing Mass on Sunday.

The questionnaire then tested Criterion 2 (unalterability) by asking if each act would be "still wrong" or "alright" if the pope and cardinals were to drop the rule or law forbidding it. As predicted, the overwhelming majority of the students indicated that it would be wrong for Catholic authorities to remove the prohibitions that had been predicted to be moral rules. On the other hand, less than half the subjects believed that it was wrong to remove the conventional prohibitions.

The final segment of the questionnaire tested for Criterion 3 (universality) by asking if each act was "still wrong" or "alright" for non-Catholics. Almost all the

subjects universalized the moral transgressions: they viewed moral breaches, such as stealing and killing, as wrong for non-Catholics as well as for themselves. However, less than half the students saw the conventional transgressions as wrong for non-Catholics, whose church leaders seldom prohibit any of the acts mentioned. Nucci and Junker concluded that the areas of morality and of religious convention are indeed seen as two separate domains even by members of a religion with a very strong set of conventions.

Unfortunately, the Nucci & Junker study just described did not examine the crucial intrinsicity criterion. Also, as mentioned before, the studies that have examined the intrinsicity criterion have not determined whether children and adolescents really see some acts as intrinsically wrong and some as not intrinsically wrong or whether they merely have learned from their peers and authorities to associate certain acts with intrinsic justifications and some with other kinds of reasons why they are wrong.

The study reported here was an expansion of Nucci and Junker's study which also addressed four other issues. First, it was an attempted replication of Nucci and Junker's finding that Catholic youths clearly distinguish between morality and convention using the criteria of seriousness, unalterability, and universality. Second, this study examined in detail the role of intrinsicity in the making of moral discriminations.

Third, this study examined Nucci and Junker's contention that Catholic students place all sexual acts in a "gray area" between morally and conventionally wrong, seriously wrong and totally acceptable. It was predicted that Catholic university students would consider four sexual acts (male and female homosexuality, nonmarital intercourse, and open marriage) to be morally wrong and thus seriously wrong. On the other hand, four other sexual acts (kissing, masturbation, birth control, and premarital intercourse) would be considered to be conventionally wrong and thus in the moderately wrong area, not in a "gray" area between morality and convention.

The sexual acts predicted to be serious were designated "Type A" and the less serious acts "Type B." For consistency's sake, the nonsexual acts were then also split into two groups according to whether Nucci and Junker's subjects had considered them to be seriously wrong or not. The Type A nonsexual acts were rape, stealing, breaking a serious promise, and murder. The Type B nonsexual acts were four breaches of important Catholic rules: missing Mass on Sunday, missing Communion on Sunday, missing Mass on Christmas and Easter, and getting divorced.

Finally, this study examined the question of whether there are any sex differences in how seriously wrong Catholic youths rate the various sexual acts, or in the reasons why they think they are wrong. It was predicted that females would consider sexual acts to be more seriously

MORAL DISCRIMINATIONS 10

wrong than males would, and that they would use more conventional and emotional reasons for why sexual acts were wrong.

METHODS

A total of 101 Loyola University undergraduates who considered themselves to be practicing Catholics (47 males, 50 females and four students who failed to record their sex) volunteered to participate in the study. A cover sheet ascertained that all the subjects attend Catholic Mass at least a few times a year and have had at least one year of Catholic religious instruction.

The students were given a questionnaire listing 13 of the acts tested by Nucci and Junker. Three acts were added, bringing the total to 16, in order to make sure that eight of the acts would be sexual acts and eight would be nonsexual acts.

The seriousness, unalterability and universality criteria were tested by methods similar to those used by Nucci and Junker. The students rated the seriousness of each transgression on a scale of 1 (very seriously wrong) to 4 (not wrong at all). They rated the acts' alterability by placing checkmarks on blanks to indicate whether each act would be "still wrong" or "all right" if the pope and cardinals were to drop the rule or law forbidding it. Last, they rated universality by checking whether each act was "still wrong" or "all right" for non-Catholics.

The intrinsicity criterion was measured by specifically asked the students what factors made certain acts wrong. The questionnaire asked the youths to chose from a list of possible intrinsic and non-intrinsic justifications rather

tian using their own more difficult to classify wording, as in the previous studies. (The students, of course, were not told which factors were intrinsic and which were not, or even what was being tested.)

The students chose one justification from a list of 13 justifications for why each act could be wrong. Seven of the reasons were moral ones; that is, they mentioned the intrinsic consequences (harm or injustice) of an act or the universality and unalterability of its wrongness. Students who gave these reasons could be said to be reasoning from the acts' intrinsic features to the fact that they were wrong. The moral justifications were:

1. To do/not do this would very likely hurt another person.
2. It violates the natural order, which requires preserving life (including procreation), to do/not do this.
3. If everybody did/didn't do this, the whole world would be in trouble.
4. It is dishonest to do/not do this; either it breaks a promise or vow or should be accompanied by a permanent commitment to the partner.
5. It is unfair to do/not do this; it violates others' rights.
6. To do/not do this is against the law laid down by God for all human beings for all time.
7. In this situation, it is selfish to do/not do this.

Eight of the justifications were not moral; they did not involve intrinsic features of acts. Of the nonmoral

reasons, six were conventional, since they stated that the act violated Catholic rules or could cause the perpetrator to incur scorn or disgust. These conventional reasons were:

1. If Catholics did/didn't do this, the Church would be in trouble.
2. It is disgusting to do/not do this.
3. Anyone who did/didn't do this would be scorned or laughed at.
4. To do/not do this violates the laws laid down explicitly by the Catholic Church (Canon Law) for Catholics.
5. Somebody told me so.
6. To do/not do this is against the law daid down by God for Catholics.

Two of the justifications were prudential reasons:

1. Anyone who did/didn't do this would hurt him/herself physically.
2. Anyone who did/didn't do this would hurt him/herself psychologically.

People who gave prudential reasons could not be said to be giving reasons why the acts were wrong. It was predicted that these reasons would not be chosen, since acts rated as not being wrong were not given justifications at all.

The students were asked to read the list of justifications and return to the pages where they had rated the seriousness of the acts. They wrote the letter corresponding to the justification they considered most appropriate after each act they had rated as being wrong

(that is, as 1, 2, or 3).

RESULTS

Five repeated-measures analyses of variance (R-ANOVA's) were used to analyse the data. In the first analysis, the dependent variable was the percentage of moral justifications given for why the acts that were later rated as alterable or unalterable were wrong (Tables 1 and 2). Supporting the prediction that Nucci and Junker's results would be replicated, the acts rated as unalterable received a significantly higher percentage of moral justifications than the acts rated as alterable [$F(1,91)=49.48, p<.0001$]. The rules these youths rated as unalterable were the same ones they considered to be matters of morality, not of convention.

The second analysis used the percentage of moral justifications for the universality ratings as the dependent variable (Tables 2 and 3). Again, the acts rated as universally wrong received a significantly higher percentage of moral justifications than the acts not rated universally wrong [$F(1,91)=64.98, p<.0001$]. University students seem to consider the universal rules to be matters of morality and the rules they see as not universal to be matters of convention, a second replication of Nucci and Junker's study.

The third analysis (Tables 4 and 5) tested the prediction that the sexual acts would be clearly placed into a morally-

wrong group and a conventionally-wrong group. A repeated-measures ANOVA was again performed, but this time the 16 acts were divided into four groups according to whether they were designated as Type A or Type B, sexual or nonsexual, in order to discern differential attitudes about each group of acts. The sexual/nonsexual independent variable was designated "nature"; the Type A/B independent variable was designated "wrongness." The two levels of wrongness were nested within the two levels of nature, and the two levels of nature were nested within the two levels of the between-subject independent variable, which was "sex of subject". The dependent variable was the sum of the seriousness ratings that were given to each of the groups of acts.

The eight Type A acts received significantly higher total seriousness ratings than the eight Type B acts [$F(1,95) = 890.70, p < .0001$]. This supports the prediction concerning which acts would be seen as most seriously wrong. Adolescents also appear to use the seriousness criterion to distinguish between moral and conventional matters, a further replication of Nucci and Junker's results.

Since half the Type A and half the Type B acts were sexual acts, the prediction that some sexual acts would be seen as seriously wrong and some would not be seen as seriously wrong was strongly supported by these same data. Catholic youths seem to have very clear opinions about the seriousness of sexual acts. Grouping all the sexual acts together hid this fact from Nucci and Junker because

university students' ratings of the sexual acts are so strongly polarized. Some acts are seen as extremely wrong, some are not considered wrong at all, and these two extremes cancel each other out.

The prediction that the sexual acts that were seen as not seriously wrong would instead be seen as moderately wrong was not supported. On the contrary, the four Type A acts (kissing, masturbation, birth control and premarital intercourse) were not seen as wrong at all. (See Table 4.)

The fourth analysis (Table 6) again used a nested R-ANOVA, but here the dependent variable was the sum of the moral justifications given for why the acts in each of the four groups (Type A nonsexual, Type A sexual, Type B nonsexual, and Type B sexual) were rated as wrong. The sexual acts that were previously rated as seriously wrong were, as predicted, given moral justifications for why they were wrong. The sexual acts that were rated as not wrong at all were, of course, not given reasons why they were wrong. The fact that few conventional reasons were used for the sexual acts shows that, despite the hypothesis, the students did not consider any of the sexual acts to be conventionally wrong, that is, moderately wrong because the Catholic church says they are. They either considered the sexual acts to be seriously morally wrong or not wrong at all.

But there was, unexpectedly, a group of acts that was considered to be moderately wrong and was given conventional justifications: the Type B nonsexual acts (acts that

violate Catholic rules to attend Mass and Communion and to avoid divorce). The end result was that four sexual acts were rated as more seriously wrong than the church laws were rated and four sexual acts were rated as less seriously wrong than the church laws were.

Tables 4 and 5 show that males considered the Type B nonsexual acts (Church laws such as to attend Mass and Communion) to be significantly more seriously wrong than females considered them to be. The other three groups of acts were given equivalent seriousness ratings by males and females. Thus, not only was the prediction that females would rate the sexual acts more seriously wrong than males not supported by the data; males actually saw one of the groups of nonsexual acts as more seriously wrong than females did.

A tally was performed of the justifications assigned to the Catholic church laws in a futile attempt to clarify why these acts were considered to be more seriously wrong by males. The vast majority of the students of both sexes considered missing Mass and Communion on both Sundays and holidays to be wrong because it violates either Canon Law or "God's law for Catholics"; a chi square analysis revealed that there was no significant difference between the sexes in the reasons they gave why the acts were wrong.

The prediction that females would use more conventional reasons to justify the sexual acts was also not borne out by the data. Males and females used the same number of moral,

conventional, and prudential justifications for each of the four groups of acts.

To test the hypothesis that females would choose more emotional justifications for the sexual acts, a second tally was done of use of the justification "The act is disgusting." Forty females and 21 males used this justification; a chi square analysis revealed that the difference was significant [$p < .001$]. (The "disgusting" justification was only used for sexual acts.)

DISCUSSION

The results of this study replicate and extend Nucci and Junker's findings that Catholic university students make a consistent set of distinctions between acts that are moral issues and acts that are not moral issues. The students placed the same acts in the moral domain and the same acts in a nonmoral domain (either conventional or prudential) whether they were using Turiel's unalterability, universality, seriousness, or intrinsicity criteria.

These findings contradict Kohlberg's assertion that few adults and virtually no children have reached the principled level of moral development, which involves being able to distinguish between morality and convention. This means that his test of moral development, upon which the assertion is based, may not be valid.

The seriousness and intrinsicity ratings showed that

the Type B sexual acts were seen as not wrong at all rather than as moderately wrong because the church prohibits them. It was the group of church laws (Type B nonsexual acts) that were seen as moderately and conventionally wrong. These unexpected results may be interpretable in retrospect. The church rules may have been given considerably higher seriousness ratings than the Type B sexual rules because Catholic youths understand their importance to the Catholic church (their value as conventions), while they do not conceive of the sexual rules as having any power to hold the church together.

Also, the university environment may have affected the students' attitudes toward the seriousness of sexual rules more than it affected their attitudes toward the seriousness of the rules specific to the Catholic Church. Yet they gave the Type B sexual and nonsexual acts equal (but low) percentages of moral justifications, probably because the two groups of rules are nevertheless considered equally as alterable and as applicable only to Catholics.

The fact that males gave more serious ratings to the breaches of Catholic rules (divorce and missing Mass and Communion) than females did is difficult to interpret in light of the fact that fewer males than females are usually seen at Catholic Mass. The reasoning of Gilligan (1982) and Raan (1975) that males are more likely than females to reason hypothetically in moral situations may explain these results.

Gilligan compared the responses of girls and of boys on Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Inventory (MJJ). She found that girls focused on relationship factors when solving moral dilemmas while boys focused, as Kohlberg expects, on logical deduction from hypothetical rights and duties. When presented with one of the dilemmas in the MJJ, the "Heinz" dilemma, boys usually said that Heinz has a moral duty to steal a drug needed to save his wife's life because the druggist refused to give him the drug and his wife has a right to life. However, many girls refused to see the issue as a logic problem for Heinz, as it was intended, and instead saw it as a practical relationship problem between Heinz and the druggist. They suggested improving the communication between them, an interpersonal solution.

The Catholic males in the present study, while answering what they saw as a theoretical question, said that the rule to attend Mass and Communion was a serious one. However, while deciding whether or not to actually obey it they may look for loopholes. On the other hand, the Catholic females may have considered the rule from a more practical, interpersonal viewpoint while answering the questionnaire. It could well be that a healthy person would miss Mass and Communion because his or her child is ill, because a friend needs help, or for any number of relationship-centered reasons. And, as Gilligan states, love and interpersonal responsibility are the major determinants of moral right and wrong for females.

True, the questionnaire asked only for evaluation of the hypothetical rightness and wrongness of the acts, but the females may have nonetheless remembered real situations in their own past and therefore marked these rules as less seriously wrong than the males did because of the extenuating interpersonal circumstances they remembered. The acts that were not Catholic church rules may not have been affected by this hypothetical/practical sex difference because all those acts already involve interpersonal situations.

Divorce was one of the Catholic rules rated more seriously wrong by the males. There was a noticeable, though insignificant, sex difference between the reasons given why divorce was wrong. Only females mentioned that getting divorced might bring harm upon oneself, a very practical reason. Also, only one female gave "God's law" for all human beings as the reason why divorce was wrong, while five males gave this very theoretical justification. This can be seen as evidence that the males were thinking more hypothetically than the females were.

There is another possible explanation for these unexpected results. Catholic males may not usually attend Mass unless they are quite religious, while Catholic females may attend Mass whether they are devout or not. All the subjects of this study reported that they attend Mass; most said they attend once a week. Thus, the males in this study may have been more religious than the females. This would

explain why they would rate the church laws more seriously.

Last, the fact that significantly more females than males used the justification "The act is disgusting" for sexual rules indicates that girls may be socialized differently from boys concerning sexual morality. Females did not see the sexual acts as more seriously wrong than males did, but females did seem to view the morality of sexual acts from a more emotional viewpoint. The females' socializers may have obtained a different result from the one they desired. Instead of instilling a strict, at least as compared to the boys, attitude toward sexuality in the girls, they may have merely instilled an attitude of disgust toward sexual matters.

In conclusion, this study has shown, first, that Catholic university students do see a clear distinction between morality and convention, even when sexual acts are involved. In fact, most students are in agreement about what is and is not morally right and wrong.

Second, it has been shown that there may be a sex difference in Catholic adolescents' attitudes toward the rules of their church. This finding, if upheld by future research, can be useful to religious educators.

Third, there is a sex difference in Catholic youths' attitudes toward sexual acts, as shown by the greater use by females of the justification "The act is disgusting." Anyone who does research or education in the area of adolescent sexuality should take this difference into

account.

These findings are important not only for psychologists seeking to understand moral reasoning processes but for educators of adolescents. Values and sex education can be improved greatly by basing testing and curricula on the greater knowledge of moral reasoning and sexual attitudes contributed by this and similar research.

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Table 1. Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Unalterability and Sex

	Male	Female
Unalterable	66.6	66.7
Alterable	44.1	26.1

Table 2. Percentage of Subjects Saying that Acts are Unalterable orUniversal

Act Rating	Unalterable	Universal
<u>Type A Nonsexual Acts</u>		
Rape	99.0	95.0
Stealing	97.1	96.0
Breaking a Promise	96.1	89.1
Murder	99.0	97.0
<u>Type A Sexual Acts</u>		
Nonmarital Intercourse	54.5	47.5
Male Homosexuality	79.2	73.3
Open Marriages	87.1	83.2
Female Homosexuality	79.2	74.3
<u>Type B Nonsexual Acts</u>		
Missing Mass	59.4	46.5
Missing Communion	65.3	48.5
Missing Easter Duty	71.3	56.4
Divorce	47.5	47.5
<u>Type B Sexual Acts</u>		
Kissing	6.9	7.9
Masturbation	37.6	37.6
Birth Control	15.8	20.8
Nonmarital Intercourse	18.8	25.7

Table 3. Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Universality and Sex

	Male	Female
Universal	68.4	69.2
Relative	39.8	26.1

Table 4. Mean Seriousness Ratings by Nature and Wrongness of Act and

	<u>Sex of Subject</u>	
	Male	Female
Type B Nonsexual	6.362	5.200
Type A Nonsexual	10.702	10.840
Type B Sexual	2.170	2.320
Type A Sexual	8.298	7.660

Table 5. Percentage of Responses Given Using Each Seriousness Rating

	Very Seriously Wrong		Seriously Wrong		Fairly Seriously Wrong		Not Wrong At All	
<u>Type A Nonsexual Acts</u>								
	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>
Rape	95.8	98.0	2.1	2.0	0.0	0.0	2.1	0.0
Stealing	64.6	71.4	31.3	28.6	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Breaking a Promise	41.7	61.2	41.7	30.6	14.6	8.2	2.1	0.0
Murder	97.9	95.9	2.1	2.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0
<u>Type A Sexual Acts</u>								
Nonmarital Intercourse	14.6	22.4	18.8	16.3	33.3	34.7	33.3	26.5
Male Homosexuality	68.8	34.7	16.7	26.5	8.3	26.5	6.3	12.2
Open Marriage	41.7	71.4	39.6	18.4	12.5	6.1	6.3	4.1
Female Homosexuality	62.5	40.8	20.8	22.4	10.4	24.5	6.3	12.2
<u>Type B Nonsexual Acts</u>								
Miss Mass	10.4	8.2	29.2	12.2	39.6	55.1	20.8	24.5
Miss Communion	22.9	14.3	35.4	20.4	27.1	40.8	14.6	24.5
Christmas, Easter	29.2	28.6	31.3	20.4	31.3	34.7	8.3	16.3
Divorce	22.9	14.3	35.4	22.4	18.8	36.7	22.9	26.5
<u>Type B Sexual Acts</u>								
Kissing	0.0	0.0	2.1	4.1	12.5	10.2	85.4	85.7
Masturbation	6.3	10.2	18.8	14.3	29.2	22.4	45.8	53.1
Birth Control	4.2	4.1	6.3	8.2	25.0	20.4	64.6	67.3
Premarital Intercourse	4.2	8.2	10.4	18.4	27.1	18.4	58.3	55.1

Table 6. Mean Percent of Moral Justifications by Nature, Wrongness and Sex of Subject

	Male	Female
Type B Nonsexual	31.6	28.2
Type A Nonsexual	87.6	88.1
Type B Sexual	32.0	24.4
Type A Sexual	65.9	55.8