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ABSTRACT

This document presents testimony and prepared statements from the Congressional hearings held to summarize information from field hearings which were held in five states to examine the resources and support given by the federal government to local law enforcement officers to fight the problems of illegal drug use and abuse. Testimony and prepared statements are presented from police officials, congressmen, and representatives from programs organized to stop marijuana planting and drug trafficking in these states. Topics covered include drug abuse treatment programs, narcotics trafficking, and efforts to control drug problems (New York); marijuana crops grown on federal lands and the difficulties involved in locating and destroying crops (California); corruption of a town brought about by drug dealing (Florida); the growing influx of heroin from Mexico (Texas); and problems of marijuana planting and transshipments of drugs (Hawaii). Witnesses' views are given concerning the need for better drug education and rehabilitation programs, more cooperation with local law enforcement agencies from the federal government, dissatisfaction with federal government assistance cutbacks, and a need for commitment from the federal government along with resources and financial assistance. Also included are a 1983 Campaign Against Marijuana Planting Report and excerpts from the Attorney General's Commission on Narcotics Final Report. (NRB)

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UPDATE OF 1983-84 FIELD HEARINGS

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HEARING BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS


SECOND SESSION

APRIL 10, 1984

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WASHINGTON : 1984

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UPDATE OF 1983-84 FIELD HEARINGS

TUESDAY, APRIL 10, 1984

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles B. Rangel, presiding.

Present: Representatives Charles B. Rangel, Daniel K. Akaka, Sam B. Hall, Jr., Solomon P. Ortiz, Benjamin A. Gilman, Gene Chappie, and Tom Lewis.

Staff present: John T. Cusack, chief of staff; Richard B. Lowe, chief counsel; Elliott A. Brown, minority staff director; George R. Gilbert, counsel; Edward H. Jurith, counsel; Michael J. Kelley, counsel; Marc Lippman, counsel; John J. Capers, chief investigator; Martin I. Kurke, researcher; James W. Lawrence, minority professional staff; Catherine E. Shaw, minority professional staff; C. Robert Pfeifle, press officer; and Karen E. Watson, professional staff.

Mr. RANGEL. The select committee will come to order, and I want to share with the audience exactly what the agenda is of the select committee.

We have visited 11 countries, drug producing countries, in order to see what we could do to encourage these countries from growing these narcotics that are flowing into our Nation.

We also offered assistance where there was some move toward eradication, in terms of providing economic and technical assistance, and also we made it abundantly clear that this Congress was not prepared just to move on, giving military and economic assistance to those countries that had no concern about the drug problem as we saw it.

In addition to that, we felt a responsibility to go around the country to see exactly as to what resources and what support the Federal Government was giving to local law enforcement officers. So, we had hearings in New York, Florida, Texas, California, and Hawaii, and we were amazed as to the gap that existed between local law enforcement and the presence of the Federal task forces that were operating in most of these towns.

So, what we are doing now is regrouping before we make our final recommendations to the administration and the Congress by revisiting in Washington, the places where we have had hearings, and, so, while we start off with the city of New York panel, we also hope to hear from people that we have talked with at hearings that we have had in California, Florida, Texas, and from the other sites that we've visited.

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And, so, before I call the first witness, I'd like to recognize Mr. Benjamin Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to welcome our witnesses today, and thank them for giving of their time, and sharing their concerns in this very critical issue. I'm pleased that we're able to conduct this summary of where we have been and where we are going. The conclusions that we have reached during our recent field hearings, and after our missions to Latin America, to the Caribbean, to Southeast and Southwest Asia, reconfirmed the urgency with which we're going to have to act if we're going to stop the flow of drugs into our own Nation.

Trafficking production and abuse are up, the illicit narcotics industry in our Nation, unfortunately, rakes in over \$90 billion a year. That's \$90 billion, not million. Countless lives are lost because of drug abuse and countless futures that are without hope, and it's affecting mostly our young people across the Nation.

And, yet, we are being called upon to help our Nation and the producing nations of the world combat the epidemic of narcotics, and through our efforts, we adopted some legislation the Rangel-Gilman amendment was passed and adopted, and our State Department has begun to use this important tool in foreign policy considerations as our Nation attempts to make the narcotics issue a central one in our foreign policy.

And, as you know, that measure cuts off economic assistance to any nation that does not cooperate in cutting off the supply of narcotics and their producing areas.

One of the most important facts for our review and attention is the fact that in our hearings, across the country last year, we were told time and time again that the drug problem was not getting better; in fact, it was getting worse and that it's necessary to stop the flow into our country if we're going to really make a dent in this problem.

In New York City, we heard that the treatment programs were having difficulty serving the thousands of individuals in need of treatment, the jails were becoming infested with narcotics, the delays in prosecution, the backlog in prosecution.

In California, we heard that the marijuana crop had become our Nation's second largest cash crop. Marijuana cultivators had taken the law into their own hands, and were making certain that marijuana finds its way onto Federal land.

In Florida, we heard from law enforcement officials who told us that the narcotics situation was so devastating that an entire town had been turned to the lure of narcotics and had become corrupted by the profits and lifestyle associated with narcotics.

We also learned that the South Florida Task Force was not effective in halting the flow of narcotics into that region.

And, while in Texas, we met with treatment and law enforcement officials, it was pretty much the same story, with the reduction in funds and the growing influx of heroin from Mexico, the drug situation along the gulf coast was a pretty serious one.

And, during our trip to Southeast Asia, we had the opportunity to stop in Hawaii, and to meet with the law enforcement officials there and discuss the escalating problem of transshipments and Hawaiian grown marijuana.

And, I was amazed to hear that the production of marijuana in Hawaii exceeded the cultivation of agricultural crops in that entire State.

We'll begin examining today ways that we can improve this situation across the Nation. We are planning to hear from our witnesses and from members representing the five districts in which our committee has already held hearings last year about how the narcotics problem has improved or possibly worsened since our visit there last year.

I'd like our witnesses to be frank in assessing the situation in their areas, and we hope that some workable recommendations will be made so that our committee can help our local governments, our State governments, and help our national administration in meeting the challenges of combating illegal narcotics.

We were pleased to learn about the arrested 31 people accused of running a \$1.6 billion heroin operation in the New York City area, and we hope to hear a little more about that from our visiting police commissioner.

Again, we thank all of you for joining us today, and, hopefully, together, we can find some worthwhile solutions to this very critical problem.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

I don't have a statement to make this morning, but I certainly would like to welcome the witnesses and say one thing: we really value your input and your ideas. I know that on a daily basis, you are closer to some of the problems we are faced with than a lot of other people. So, this morning, we would like to welcome you to our committee.

Mr. RANGEL. I am honored to call people that I have worked with long before I was able to be a Member of this Congress, Sterling Johnson, former police officer, and now the special narcotics prosecutor for the city of New York, on this panel; Julio Martinez, who himself has felt the effects of being addicted to drugs and is now one of the Nation's leaders in rehabilitation as he directs the Division of Substance Abuse Services, Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse; and, of course, now internationally famous Benjamin Ward, a no-nonsense professional that has been recently appointed as the police commissioner for the largest police force in the world.

Gentlemen, as I said earlier in my opening statement, the general feeling of this administration publicly, certainly last week in private, is that they have a handle on this devastating narcotic problem, that they are working very closely with the local officials, and that they are providing the resources necessary to get a handle on this.

And, of course, reference is constantly made to the so-called task force that operates in New York and in other cities.

This is in sharp conflict with our field hearings. In New York, we have found that illicit drug use was increasing, notwithstanding the Federal presence, if any; emergency room admissions in New York City has climbed during 1982; cocaine use in New York State has tripled in the last 5 years; that while there were 12,000 arrests for drug offenses in the city of New York, and that doesn't include

marijuana, that only 55 of these resulted in convictions, and only a quarter of those convicted received any prison sentence at all.

We found that two-thirds of the prison inmates were drug addicts or abusers, and that 20 percent were actually heroin addicts. We know of the drug marketing that exists, and I shared with the Federal officials the frustrations of the policemen on the beat, that is dedicated to law enforcement and respect for his uniform, and yet it appears as though they feel so frustrated that they don't have the resources to effectively do their job, and constantly remind us in the Congress that it's an international and national problem.

The Drug Enforcement Administration is sharing with us that it's local.

I hope that you don't believe that this is one of these hearings where we bring in witnesses to Washington to just talk about problems that we already know exist. What we hope to do with this committee is to reaffirm our field hearings to see whether anything has changed since we have been to the city and State of New York, and we ask that you not only prepare statements as to the direction in which you'd like to see your Federal Government go, but to also prepare statements which could be submitted at a later point in the record to give specifics as to what you think is necessary if we're going to get any type of handle on this problem.

We ask that you summarize the testimony that you have this morning, and by unanimous consent, your entire statement will be entered into the record.

And, Commissioner Ward, I'd like to start off with you. There is hardly anyone in the city of New York that is not proud of the initiatives that you have taken to bring confidence in all people of the city of New York, especially our police department.

We recognize the task force that you've taken in east New York and in central Harlem, but we know that's not the answer to the problem, even though we appreciate the fact that for most of us politically, even though it's not resolving the problem, we believe these people should be at least hassled if we can't get rid of them.

And, so, I want the record to state that we have been using you as an example to our colleagues of the fact that even though the resources are not there, at least we can see that there is an awareness and attempt to do something about it.

Suppose we lead off with your testimony, Commissioner.

TESTIMONY OF BENJAMIN WARD, POLICE COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. WARD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to start by offering a letter addressed to you as part of the record, and which I will not read. It has an appendix that shows you some of the massive commitment of resources and manpower that we have put into two major, three major operations in New York beginning in 1984; one we call Operation Pressure Point on the Lower East Side; a second one up in your district, Gateway to Harlem; and a third one which we began Friday in Brooklyn, in which we are attempting to close down the smokeshops and being rather successful at it.

The letter is a brief letter. It outlines three major factors that I think this committee and the Federal Government should take into consideration, and I start with education as being the most important treatment.

Mr. Martinez will address what I think is the second most important factor, and finally, maybe it's strange for a police officer to say it, I think enforcement is the least important factor of the three because I don't believe we can get a handle on this problem until we get better education, better treatment facilities and resources for the treatment, and the police will do their job.

Please allow me to convey my thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today. I have a brief statement, and to describe firsthand the problems of narcotic trafficking facing authorities in New York City, and the steps we are taking to deal with them.

I believe you will see, upon conclusion of these hearings, that New York, as well as other cities, does not possess the capability of combatting the availability of illegal drugs throughout the country.

In the mid-1970's, department strategy shifted from massive street arrests to the pursuit of mid-level and major drug dealers. At the same time, international agreements between the United States and opium producing countries reduced the flow of heroin into the city.

A combination of these actions resulted in the significant diminution of heroin trafficking in New York City, and for a brief period, it appeared that inroads were being made. Unfortunately, this phenomena was short-lived, and it was not long before heroin could once again be freely found.

On June 20 of last year, a representative of the New York City Police Department appeared before this body and described narcotics enforcement efforts for the previous calendar year.

It was reported at that time that we expected to arrest—our arrest figures to exceed those of 1982, and they did.

In 1984, as a result of the continued availability of drugs on the street, our arrest activity will again show a significant increase.

During 1983, our narcotics division, a single entity of the department, consisting of 600 investigators, was responsible for over 19,000 arrests, the seizure of over \$1,700,000, 550 guns, and 29 vehicles.

The department as a whole made approximately 40,000 drug related arrests. Despite the enormous efforts as evidenced by the arrest data, I found that upon being sworn in as police commissioner, that the narcotics trade in the city was flourishing at even greater levels than it was when I was last in the police department.

Heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and pills are readily available all over New York City.

In view of these findings, I directed the development of plans to return to the streets for the people of the city of New York, and on January 19 of this year, I instituted the first of these plans, known as Operation Pressure Point 1 in the Lower East Side of Manhattan.

Pressure Point 1 undercover officers were sent into the Lower East Side to make drug buys and conduct observations. Immediately following these buys, the sellers were arrested, and a uniformed

police officer was posted at each location in order to prevent the reoccupation by other drug dealers. This neighborhood, nicknamed Alphabet City, became a supply point for the purchase of narcotics by people from out of State as well as from within the metropolitan area.

Home addresses and intelligence gathered from police departments in New Jersey, Connecticut, Long Island, and Pennsylvania supported this fact.

Pressure Point 1 to date has resulted in over 3,860 arrests. This undertaking has proved so successful that it is being applied to a second area where serious narcotics conditions exist, and I should point out to you that in that area, we also experienced a 51 percent drop in robberies and a 35 percent drop in burglaries as well.

A second operation called Pressure Point 2 in the West Harlem area of Manhattan follows a similar enforcement concept, and has yielded 593 arrests to date since its inception on March 1.

As a result of this effort, a visible reduction in street trafficking has been noted, and I don't believe that you have ever seen Eighth Avenue in the condition that Eighth Avenue is today, it's clean. The drug dealers are off there.

The third and most recent enforcement action, Operation Close Down, commenced last Friday in a target area in Brooklyn, along Mastrand Avenue, where we located over 48 smokeshops and numbers drops in an 8-block area.

Unlike the Pressure Point, Operation Close Down is designed to combat all street smoke locations which have become a focal point of community concern.

It is my intention to stress the quality of life within this city, and operations such as the above will be continued and expanded city-wide.

It must be emphasized that this effort, although extremely costly, and labor intensive, is necessary if we are to succeed in achieving our goal for safety of our citizens.

I must remind you again that none of the circumstances outlined are a consequence of a product developed within this country. With the exception of a small percentage of marijuana, all of the drugs of choice utilized in the United States are brought in through clandestine, illegal operations, such as the one that we were involved in yesterday, \$1.6 billion operation.

A third evaluation of government policies concerning drug enforcement must be undertaken at the highest level involving both the executive and legislative branches. International narcotics control must be elevated in priority in formulating foreign policy, keeping in mind the frequently stated strategies to attack the source of supply abroad by eradication in the field.

A reexamination of the role the intelligence gathering community plays in narcotics controls should be conducted, and a greater percentage of Federal funds allocated for domestic enforcement, treatment, rehabilitation of drug addicts.

Specifically, I would offer the following recommendations for the effective national war on drugs:

Destruction of the source of the plants in the countries of origin under pressures by both diplomatic and economic sanctions.

Interdiction of drugs at the importation level by the Federal Government.

Enforcement against major and mid-level traffickers at the Federal, State, and city level.

Enforcement against street level traffickers by local governments.

Education and treatment of addicts at all levels of government to eliminate the demand, as indicated.

The New York City Police Department has initiated programs to lessen the fears of those who live and work within our boundaries and those who simply come to visit.

We do, however, need help if we are to return the streets to their rightful owners. We do not shun our mandated responsibility of enforcing the laws at the local level.

I cannot, however, overstate the importance of intense Federal participation in areas beyond our jurisdiction. It is time to acknowledge past mistakes, and take bold and innovative actions to correct them.

I recommend a total take over of high level drug enforcement by the Federal Government, thereby allowing municipal governments to concentrate on the preservation of quality of life conditions in the city, that a special 100 man task force be funded by the Federal Government to concentrate solely on street level enforcement within New York City, that the Drug Enforcement Administration be called on to increase their response to problems which result from a failure to interdict drugs at our borders, that funds be made available in the amount of \$2 million earmarked specifically for buy money and other investigative expenses by the New York City Police Department in connection with this narcotics enforcement.

That is my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I would like to add that I am not only extremely dissatisfied with the effort that the Federal Government is making in New York City, I have made that known to them, we have a tremendous level of cooperation with the FBI in a number of task force operations that netted arrests that were made yesterday involving 31 people and about \$1.6 billion operation as an example of the kind of cooperation we're getting out of the FBI, and that the outstanding efforts of Rudy Giuliani, who has taken over cases and is prosecuting those cases in the Federal court, and I am very proud and happy that he has taken that attitude.

On the other hand, I am not getting nearly that level of cooperation from the Drug Enforcement Administration. There is something allegedly called—well, one's the FBI and they deal with heroin. Most of the Italian heroin, and they don't bother with the cocaine or anything else.

When we have an effort—we have a small task force with them. But, with the DEA, they have something that they call the Federal task force. I have been looking for it since January 1. I have not found it in New York. It's called a Federal task force. I have 90 detectives in there, and they have 30.

I am contributing three times the manpower that the DEA is contributing to what is alleged to be a Federal task force. I am seriously considering taking my 90 detectives out of that task force, and returning them to fighting quality-of-life crimes on the street

with the kind of success that I was able to achieve in the Lower East Side and in Harlem, and I think I'll be able to achieve in Brooklyn.

I believe that what the Drug Enforcement Administration does in New York or attempts to do is to deal with the higher level traffickers. That's a Federal problem.

I don't understand why New York City should pick up the costs of 90 detectives to handle that. Today, I will have lunch with some Federal authorities after I leave here, and I will tell them that as well.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ward appears on p. 92.]

Mr. RANGEL. Well, let me thank you for your testimony. I don't understand why it's so unusual to hear a police commissioner be as candid as you are about this serious problem.

Do you have police commissioner conferences where these issues discussed and that you come up with an agenda where when I raised this with the administrator of drug enforcement, he told me he was the chairman of the entire group?

Mr. WARD. We have various conferences. We are all members of the International Association of Chiefs of Police. You know my background since 1975, at least, has been in the field of correction.

You're absolutely correct that somewhere between 60 percent and two-thirds of the prison population either have a drug problem or have been involved in drugs that have led to them going in prison.

In fact, there would be no prison overcrowding problem in this country were it not for the very serious drug problem that we have. We have all implored the Federal Government to become more involved in this problem.

In fact, I wrote an op-ed piece approximately a year ago, and accused the Federal prison population of dropping down because they were shifting the burden over to the local authorities.

I heard you say before the committee started that someone said did they expect the Federal Government to investigate all bank robberies. Why not? It's a Federal crime. Why shouldn't the Federal Government be further involved in the narcotics trade and enforcement?

It's their concurrent jurisdiction, and they certainly have more resources than the almost bankrupt New York City, and more money and more effort should be put into that effort.

If I do not get more help from them, I'm going to shift my forces to street level enforcement, and get reductions in robberies and burglaries, and I'm sure we'll get no greater increase in narcotics. They are coming in like water anyway.

Mr. RANGEL. This committee is having a problem, when you asked the question, why not, is because the same way they explain now that it's a priority in terms of enforcing the Federal law, that they have written off bank robberies as being a local problem.

I was shocked and amazed to hear this statement, but when you compare the international drug traffic epidemic which is now hitting many of the producing countries to bank robberies it emphasizes—this is not a staff clerk. This is the person that's in charge of our national effort, and I think he's making it abundantly clear that it is a local problem.

So, my question to you is, before we just become critical, because that's too easy to do, do you think it would—and I'm glad to hear that you're meeting this afternoon. Make it abundantly clear that what this committee was talking to him about, at least in the city of New York, does have accuracy, and I hope you share with him what you intended to do. I hope it doesn't happen, but it may be that type of dramatic effort has to be made because it seems as though we're deputizing New York City policemen as Federal law enforcement officers, as opposed to having Federal law enforcement officers coming in there to assist your police department.

But, if you think it would make any sense, and I don't need any answer now, we're prepared to accept recommendations from you, of police commissioners that have similar types of problems in the areas of high drug trafficking, we will set up this meeting because, for some reason, the Federal Government is so proud of the job that they are doing, that before we just have hearings, we will set up the meeting, which they said that they would welcome, so that you can exchange some ideas before we make the recommendations.

But, I want to thank you for at least reminding the members of this committee that we did go to New York City, that we did receive this type of testimony, and that nothing has changed.

I know you have a tight schedule, and let me move swiftly.

Mr. Martinez——

Mr. WARD. Before you start, Mr. Chairman, there is a specific proposal at the end of that letter that I submitted to you and asked you to make part of the record.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you. The entire letter will be a part of the record, and while I can appreciate that you're emphasizing education and rehab as a part of the total solution, what I would like to see is that every policeman would be in a position to know that his city, with the cooperation of the Federal Government, had the resources to deal with violations of the law.

And, one of the things that has really hurt me is to see the embarrassment that police officers feel in knowing that it's out of hand, and I've heard them say legalize it, I've heard them say education, I've heard them say we've got to stop it from abroad. But, I know that you would agree with me that while this is something that individually should happen, that we want to make certain that we protect the integrity of local law enforcement officers and not have task forces that they can't see claiming that they are working in partnership.

Mr. Martinez, your record is established with this committee and the Nation. We know about the severe cutbacks that have occurred in the rehabilitation area. Of course, we have tried to substitute that with visits of the First Lady to a lot of rehabilitation centers, and also we hope that you appreciate the contribution the First Lady has made on the television.

And, we do hope that has eased the heavy weight that your agencies have carried, notwithstanding the decrease in Federal dollars.

**TESTIMONY OF JULIO A. MARTINEZ, DIRECTOR, NEW YORK
STATE DIVISION OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES**

Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, let me start by commending Ben Ward and Sterling Johnson and Rudy Giuliani for Operation Pressure Point. It has been so successful that I have coined the phrase: Ben Ward is the Wyatt Earp of New York in technicolor.

Although Ben has been doing one hell of a job, because I feel if I need Operation Acupuncture. Ben has been so successful that I have a backlog of more than 1,000 people waiting to come into our treatment system.

I think one thing that has to be made clear here is that back in 1979 or 1980 when I testified before this committee, I stated that there was approximately 1,500 metric tons of heroin coming into the country.

That heroin is here. So, what I want to say is that to a great degree, we're playing catch-up ball. We're trying to cope after the fact; we're backpedaling.

Let me read my statement, and let me also state for the record that I changed it a little bit for the simple reason that there is a lot of frustration on my part, and I want to share that frustration with the committee members and those visitors who are here.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, and committee staff, it is indeed a pleasure being here today. I have submitted my complete prepared statement for the record, and have a shorter version to present now. We have come a long way since the last time I spoke to then Chairman Lester Wolfe and committee members. By saying we have come a long way, I do not want to mislead. I am not talking about progress, I am talking about the drug abuse problem having grown considerably worse.

Drug abuse has increased almost threefold in New York State since I last spoke to you. I must admit that I am frustrated by that development. It seems that the Government does everything ass backward, or should I say, half-ass forward.

In New York State, we have seen the Federal share of moneys for drug abuse services drop from \$31 million in 1981 to \$19 million in 1983-84. This drop does not even include the related loss of Federal funds from food stamps, medicaid and other such programs available to my treatment population.

As you well know, these cutbacks have taken place while the number of people using drugs has ever increased. What is most frustrating to me is the attitude of Washington when we come to present our case. The administration says, here's New York again asking for more money. Well, let me just make the point that New York State outmatches every other State, dollar-for-dollar in its commitment to combat drug abuse.

New York State appropriates \$85.3 million for drug abuse services versus the Federal appropriation of \$14.8 million. Certainly New York State has a major drug problem, but the Federal Government also has a clear responsibility when a considerable part of New York's problem stems from its position as perhaps the major port of entry for drugs smuggled into the United States from foreign countries.

Even disregarding the compassion that we should have for human life, doesn't the miserable failure of Federal interdiction efforts mean that the administration should take the responsibility for helping treat the casualties caused by the lack of effectiveness?

I often wonder where our priorities are when I listen to the news reports about the huge amounts of money laundered by crime organizations, the shady real estate ventures, people avoiding taxes, and the exorbitant overcharging that takes place in Defense. How can we be so wasteful on one hand and so neglectful of our responsibilities on the other? We can spend hundreds of dollars for a machine part that actually costs less than a dollar, yet we cannot pay to save a human life.

Let me provide you with a few statistics on the problem in our State. There were approximately 530 narcotic related deaths in New York City in 1983, an increase of 150 percent over the 1978 figure of 246 deaths. The number of deaths has remained above the 500 mark for the past 3 years, and the 1983 number is the highest since the 1974 figure of 694 deaths.

Clearly, the heroin problem is a fact. Treatment programs in New York State are serving 40,633 persons. There are an additional 13,830 in prevention and intervention programs.

New York State has focused on increasing public awareness, especially among parents and children, of the dangers and consequences of drug abuse through our "Open Your Eyes" and "Try Harder" campaigns.

The Federal Government's answer to the problem is to put out comic books. It goes to show you they don't think the problem is serious.

The State has also taken the initiative to develop proposals such as "Take Back the Streets," and the coordinated plan to suggest new ways in which Government can address the drug problem.

I cannot seem to get the administration to understand that they, too, must make a complete commitment to help those who are the victims of the drug dealing vultures who make their dollars from human misery and decay. Neither can I seem to get the administration to understand that if we ignore the person in need of treatment, it will cost us much more later.

The addict will do anything to support his habit, and it costs society and the Government a great deal. Sooner or later, he probably will encounter the criminal justice system. That means police costs, judicial costs, jail and prison costs, and when he is released, it will be no different than when he went in because he doesn't receive any rehabilitation services.

Some addicts never end up in jail. They just go on stealing and stealing to support their habit.

It is time for this administration to take off the blinders and to look at the total picture. They are wrong to say it is cheaper to ignore the drug problem. The simple fact is that the drug problem is no longer the individual heroin addict on the street, even though he is the most visible manifestation.

Behind the drug problem is an enormous, highly organized, sophisticated business that deals in a multibillion dollar a year product, and the impact of that business effects every level of American society, our entire economy and on every person in this country.

We must recognize that fact and move forward to do something about it. The administration can give away billions and billions of dollars for needy countries to help people to survive, but what about helping our own people survive. Remember, charity begins at home.

Now, for my recommendations.

One, a special cabinet post should be created to oversee and coordinate all drug related enforcement, treatment, prevention and research activities.

Two, a better funding formula should be developed to allocate Federal moneys to drug programs. Included in this should be a mechanism for channeling funds to areas of high drug abuse.

Three, a Federal prevention campaign that is tailored to the needs of specific communities should be initiated.

Four, we should cooperate on the asset forfeiture. For example, if a million dollar bust is made in New York City, \$500,000 would go to the Federal Government and the State and the city would each get \$250,000. Such an arrangement could enhance cooperation among all levels of the criminal justice system.

Five, we must cooperate to ensure that those who are rehabilitated in our treatment programs are not discriminated against.

I want to stop now before the list of ideas grows too long, but would like to leave you with this to think about: when you take away treatment services and such things as food stamps and CETA opportunities, you are left with a hungry, unemployed, unskilled drug addict with no alternative except to go back to the one thing he knows best: stealing and dealing for his survival.

Over the past 5 years, I have kept in touch with the committee and with the New York delegation to offer my suggestions on combatting the drug abuse problems, including our reports detailing street drug activities.

I will continue to do this, in hopes that my pleas to help the poor, the forgotten and the disadvantaged will be heard.

Thanks for having me here. I am being very candid with you because I consider the committee a friend and an ally.

Let me close by asking God to give you the wisdom, the strength, and the power to overcome this enormous problem that is destroying the fabric of our society.

My prayer for the last 5 years has been that the scourge of drug abuse be addressed in a more aggressive manner by the Federal Government. Unfortunately, the results have been ever decreasing dollars for treatment and prevention.

I continue to hope that my prayers will be answered soon. This administration wants prayers in the schools, God knows prayer can't hurt, but with the prayers, I say loud and clear that we also need funds. Otherwise, the only thing we're going to have in our schools will be filled with stoned-out drug-addicted children. I will do my best to see that this doesn't happen, but I also need help from you as representatives of the people and as role models for today's youth.

I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinez appears on p. 93.]

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Martinez. Your prayers, I hope, will be heard. I see the impact of Reverend Jackson's campaign has been stronger than I expected, where instead of coming to Washington for funds, we are praying for understanding.

But, I have been advised by staff as it relates to New York City that we are planning and Sterling is playing a key role in this, a congressional delegation meeting.

This is separate and apart from the law enforcement aspect that I've discussed with you earlier, Commissioner.

It is hoped that we will be bringing the people saying everything's alright in New York City to you in New York City, so that we can have the discussions between what they say they are doing and how it affects us.

Thank you for your testimony. As your first page gives some pretty dramatic statistical data, indicating that 3 million State residents, 22 percent of the population, are recent abusers of such substances as cocaine, heroin, marijuana, PCP, and pills.

That is a rather dramatic statistic, and we will be using that in trying to get the attention of the administration and I would advise staff, too, to share this with the multinational corporations that are doing business in the city and State of New York, that they should consider this as a part of their problem.

Sterling Johnson is the special prosecutor, and he has been one of the major fighters in trying to focus Federal attention to the problem, being a former assistant U.S. attorney himself, a former New York City police officer, and now having the responsibility of prosecuting those people that are arrested for violating the State narcotic laws, which, of course, are the same as the Federal narcotic laws.

You were there when we came to New York. You have heard what the direction the committee will be going, and we also appreciate the U.S. Attorney's Office offering the type of cooperation that he's given in the city of New York.

I never thought I would see the day that I, as a citizen, would be congratulating the Federal Government for enforcing the Federal law, but since we have to do that, I want to join with you in congratulating the U.S. Attorney's Office for prosecution violations of the Federal narcotic laws.

Thank you, Mr. Johnson, for being with us. We look forward to receiving your testimony. I'd like to acknowledge the presence of our dear friend and hardworking member of the committee, Sam Hall from Texas, as well as Gene Chappie who I was discussing earlier. We had hearings in his district in California.

Mr. Johnson.

TESTIMONY OF STERLING JOHNSON, JR., SPECIAL NARCOTICS PROSECUTOR FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee and staff.

I'd like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you again, to give you an update on conditions in New York as I perceive them.

You have a copy of our prepared statement that I will read. I also have enclosed a copy of the press release that the Justice Department released yesterday. Detailing the good investigation and the arrests that they made in New York in cooperation with various Federal agencies, my office, and also the New York City Police Department.

I appreciate the opportunity to return to this committee to give you an update on drug conditions in New York City since June, 1983, the month I last testified.

Intelligence reports indicate all forms of drugs are still available and drug abuse continues to remain a problem.

There have been several major seizures of heroin since last June, yet the quality of heroin at the street level remains constant while prices have declined slightly.

In February 1984, almost 2 dozen persons in Connecticut died as a result of heroin overdoses. Intelligence sources indicate that the high quality heroin that caused these deaths came from New York City.

Cocaine is so plentiful it is sometimes referred to as "nose candy." In some neighborhoods, getting the "candy" is as easy as buying a newspaper.

Recently, the Drug Enforcement Administration confiscated almost 500 pounds of cocaine from a ship in Brooklyn. Several weeks later, another 1,600 pounds was confiscated in Long Island.

As late as March 1984, the Colombian Government reportedly seized more than 12 tons of cocaine in that country.

The significant fact about all of these seizures is that it has not had an impact on the cocaine market in New York. There was no panic after the seizures. Coke prices are still declining and purity is rising.

In January 1983, the price for a kilo of cocaine cost as much as \$60,000. By September 1983, the price had plummeted as low as \$18,000.

During these difficult and frustrating times, the New York City Police Department has admirably continued to maintain pressure on all drug sellers.

On January 19, 1984, Operation Pressure Point was commenced on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. In addition to assigning narcotic squad officers to a targeted area, the fifth, seventh, and ninth precincts, uniform personnel were also committed.

After 2 months, the streets once clogged with sellers and buyers became deserted. Users rushed to get into drug programs. Dealers from out of town went back home. Others went to other drug neighborhoods. The police are keeping up the pressure. They vow to address any drug condition that exists in the city.

Statistics compiled over these 2 months disclosed some startling results. In the targeted area of Operation Pressure Point, robberies decreased an average of 51 percent, burglaries 35 percent, and grand larcenies 8 percent.

In the surrounding precincts, the 6th, 10th, and 13th, robberies decreased an average of 24 percent and burglaries 19 percent. Grand larceny was the only crime to increase, and this rose a mere 4 percent.

The narcotics problem still exists in New York City. To make any meaningful impact, the Federal Government must demonstrate its commitment and send resources, not only to law enforcement, but to treatment, prevention, rehabilitation, and education.

The significant things that have occurred since last June really have been the things that have been touched upon earlier by the other speakers.

No. 1. We have been getting excellent cooperation from the U.S. Attorney's Office, and he is taking some cases and prosecuting them in the Federal courts.

No. 2. We have a new police commissioner, and he has hit the ground running, has started Operation Pressure Point, he started an operation in Central Harlem, and recently he started an operation in Brooklyn.

To continue operations such as this, we are going to need commitment from the Federal Government, and commitment with resources. Not just rhetoric.

It's going to be nigh impossible to continue operations like this without some sort of help from the Federal Government.

One of my recommendations, I agree with Commissioner Ward when he says we have to do something about treatment, rehabilitation, education, but we must do these not at the expense of one discipline over the other; you must do all these things at one time.

And, much like the moving parts of an automobile, and this moving automobile has 10,000 moving parts, and they all move with one purpose, to compel that vehicle forward. So, we're going to have to have all of these things.

The other thing that I think that we need, we desperately need, as Julio Martinez said, you do need someone, whether you call him a drug czar or somebody who has a cabinet post, but somebody who is a direct spokesman from the President to the various disciplines in the drug abuse area, and he can advise the President that you do need more resources in these various areas.

If you have any questions, I'd be glad to respond to them.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Johnson appears on p. 97.]

Mr. RANGEL. OK. Let me point out that this meeting we're going to have with the New York congressional delegation has very little to do with this full committee, and I hope that when we bring these people from Washington, that you be prepared to show what contribution they can be making because the delegation will be there to see how helpful they can be as a group, to understand the problem, and to respond to the Federal Government.

My office staff would be glad to work with you toward that. It's not going to be a hearing. There's not a lot of mikes and not a lot of cameras and it's not any publicity; it's going to be just a working meeting to see how we can catch up these resources with the problems that we face.

Mr. MARTINEZ. It will only take me 5 seconds, I thought of this thing all the way from New York City, So, I should share it with you.

Here is yours truly with a bunny, and this is how our fiscal magic works. Ask someone from the administration to take the furry little bunny and put it in the hat, I say the magic words,

block grant, slash, and pull its hair, and all I get from Washington is good luck and I wind up with a rabbit's foot.

So, the point I'm trying to make here is from a bunny that I had after the Federal block grant, I wound up with nothing, with a rabbit's foot.

I mean, this is a disgrace. I kid you not. It is a disgrace.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, you have to learn how to do more with less.

Mr. MARTINEZ. You know, that's my boss' favorite word. And, I have been doing that. But---

Mr. RANGEL. You don't watch television enough, that's your problem. If you watched the First Lady on "Different Strokes," the contribution she's making, you know, this should help you. You probably don't feel the impact.

Mr. MARTINEZ. I'm not going to touch that with a 10-foot pole because I know that none---

Mr. RANGEL. The gentleman from Texas.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You know, I've never gotten over the testimony we heard in New York City last year, when you talked about those 36 schools, you had one, Brooklyn Ten, that was clean that day.

I've used that so much that I'm sure this committee staff knows what I'm going to say. But, I'm impressed by what you say has happened, favorably impressed, since your January 19, 1984, Operation Pressure Point was commenced in that certain area, Manhattan.

And, as Mr. Johnson says, you cannot keep that up forever. How long can you keep these pressure points as you have in the Manhattan project, and you have done a tremendous job in that 2 months?

Where they were once clogged with sellers and buyers, it's become deserted. Users are rushing to get into drug programs, have left, gone back to other areas.

How long can you continue this sort of thing without additional Government help?

Mr. WARD. Not very long. Frankly, what we will be doing is really shifting resources around the city.

I've had to shift into Central Harlem. I do not have a third task force that I could shift into a third part of the city.

I will probably have to take some calculated risks of moving some of the people out of the Lower East Side and move that force some place else, and hope that the pushers don't come back before I can get back there.

But, I really don't have enough force, and when I leave here today, I will be going back to see the mayor at 4:30, and trying to make him see that if he, in fact, has this surplus as a result of the MAC bonds, that some of that better be put into New York City Police, and we'd better be getting more help from the Federal authorities as well.

Mr. HALL. Did you say, generally, how many people did you have in Operation Pressure Point on the Lower East Side of Manhattan?

Mr. WARD. We employed about 250 uniformed and undercover agents a day. In the letter that Chairman Rangel has, it has the cumulative amount of manhours that have gone into that oper-

ation from January 19 to today, and I think it's somewhere around 16,000 man-hours.

Mr. HALL. You have 250 people on this one project?

Mr. WARD. On that one project.

Mr. HALL. Now, if you move those 250 people from that project to another area, I presume that those who have left the Manhattan area would come right back in and you'd start cleaning up another area, is that correct?

Mr. WARD. Something like that will probably happen. I think it will take them a considerable amount of time to get back in the force that they were in there in the beginning of January. But, sure, it will slowly build up again.

Mr. HALL. If you had the power today to wave the magic wand for New York City, knowing what you three gentlemen know about the situation there, what would be the first thing that you would desire to help combat this situation?

Mr. WARD. The last page of the letter I gave to the chairman, which calls for \$10 million as a start. It's not enough, but I thought that would be reasonable.

Mr. RANGEL. This is the first time that we've ever had a police commissioner admit there was a problem that the Federal Government could come in and give this type of assistance.

Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. Hall, let me give you an example. Ben is doing one hell of a job. The problem is that Ben is locking them up, then we have a twofold problem, and that is where do we put them. New York State prison's population is about up to capacity.

New York City will eventually get there too. The other alternative is them coming into the rehabilitation program that I run. Well, let me say that the inn is closed. We cannot even deal with the people who are coming through our doors.

So, what I'm saying is although Ben is locking them up, we're going to need space to put these guys up. Right now, you have to look at prison space as one, and two, you've got to have the fire-power to keep those men out on the street. Sterling Johnson is going to need the buy money to make these busts, and then yours truly is here offering the alternative if they want treatment, because as soon as Ben puts on the pressure, a lot of these guys will say: "Well, the streets are hot, let me try to get my act together, and go into a program."

We need something like a four-pronged approach, and it can't just be law enforcement, forgetting about treatment, or the other part of the criminal justice system. It cannot exclude the courts and the backlog that they have.

Mr. HALL. Well, the \$10 million that the commissioner speaks of is just in his area.

Mr. MARTINEZ. He doesn't want to give me any of that, I would assume. Right. Ben?

Mr. HALL. I take it to mean that in addition to that \$10 million, you're going to need additional millions of dollars to have areas where you can place these people. You say you're nearly to capacity now.

Mr. MARTINEZ. I'm not a hungry man. I'm saying keep me where I used to be, at the \$31 million.

Mr. HALL. What do—

Mr. MARTINEZ. Give me back the amount that I lost from the Feds to bring me up to where I was a few years ago.

Mr. HALL. \$31 million annually?

Mr. MARTINEZ. Yes.

Mr. HALL. What is your annual budget now?

Mr. MARTINEZ. \$85 million. The State of New York puts up approximately \$85 million, the Federal Government puts up approximately \$14 million.

Mr. HALL. As opposed to \$31 million from the Feds?

Mr. MARTINEZ. Right. As opposed to \$31 million Feds.

Mr. HALL. All right. If you could get that additional, from \$14 to \$30 million, an additional \$16 million, and the commissioner got \$10 million, Mr. Johnson, how much would you need in the prosecution end of this to try to get a handle on this thing in New York?

Mr. JOHNSON. I think we will be able to do that when the New York Congressional delegation comes up, but what happens is that the Commissioner Ward's police officers have—I've forgotten the number of arrests that they have made on the Lower East Side, and I was allocated four attorneys who handle these thousands and thousands of arrests that he had made.

And, I am asking right now for \$5 to \$10 million just to keep current. The problem is also compounded, not only with Pressure Point, but people have seen the dramatic results that this type of operation has created, and every public official is being badgered and rightfully so by his constituents to have a type of operation like Pressure Point in his part of the city.

And, it's not impossible to do that.

Mr. HALL. So, we're talking about roughly an additional \$30 million for New York City to try to get a handle, so to speak on this problem?

Mr. JOHNSON. That's right.

Mr. WARD. There's a very unfortunate thing happening in New York. I sometimes don't know whether to laugh or cry, but I forgot about Julio's treatment programs when I started making the address, and I immediately got criticized because I made a kind of panic in the street, the drug addicts can't get their narcotics, so they are running down to the Methadone Treatment Center, and he doesn't have enough money to take them in. They are telling them wait 6 months.

How can an addict wait 6 months to go into a treatment program? And, I'm being criticized for locking up the source of supply.

I intend to continue to lock them up, and I think somebody better give him some money to handle the treatment problem, or we're going to have a lot of sick people on our hands.

Mr. JOHNSON. Or worse than that, you're going to have criminals, people going back to crime to support their habits.

If they can't get treatment from Julio, they are going to go back out into the street.

Mr. HALL. Thank you.

Mr. MARTINEZ. You know, let me give you this simple math to do. In New York State, it costs approximately \$20,000 to incarcerate an individual. My agency does it for about \$5,000, but we don't

incarcerate anyone. We treat, rehabilitate, educate, and house that individual.

Now, a good mathematician can figure that out. It's very simple. The Federal Government or, for that matter, the State or the locality, is saving \$15,000. Simple mathematics.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. I hope you help me in correcting staff. You understand that those people that are criminal, even though they are addicted, have to do some time.

Mr. MARTINEZ. Oh, sure. No question about it. I mean, I don't want to mislead the group. I mean, some of those are dealing in hard heavy drugs, I say, you know, put them away, put them away for life.

I'm talking about your basic—

Mr. RANGEL. I understand completely. I just want to make it abundantly clear that you're not saying that treatment center is an alternative for hard core criminals—

Mr. MARTINEZ. Oh, no, no, no. I'm talking about the street level guy who is trying to support his habit, the victim, That's the one I'm talking about.

Mr. RANGEL. All right. Mr. Chappie?

Mr. CHAPPIE. No questions.

Mr. RANGEL. Let me thank this panel. We haven't completed our work. I want to thank you for making another trip to Washington. I'll hope that we can cut out these trips to Washington.

I wish you luck on your exchanges here today. I promise to bring Washington to you and the respective agencies that you deal with, with the congressional delegation, to see what political clout we can bring to you to be working with you, and if you have any other ideas that you did not bring today, even though I have a very detailed statement from the Commissioner, please forward them to us to include in the record. The record will remain open for that purpose.

Thank you very much.

Mr. WARD. Thank you very much.

Mr. MARTINEZ. Thank you.

Mr. RANGEL. And, I could stand another one of those task force in my district.

Mr. WARD. You got one coming.

Mr. RANGEL. Gene Chappie will be the lead off. Congressman Chappie was one of the first people, and, indeed, Members to bring to my attention the serious question of the United States becoming a drug producing country.

And, I think he has his people there that he will be introducing to the committee. At this time, I would like to call upon an outstanding Member of Congress and a hard-working member of the select committee, Representative Gene Chappie.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I really welcome the opportunity to explore further the increasingly serious problem of the domestic cultivation of marijuana.

While this is a national concern, as we learned from the 1983 DEA eradication statistics, California experiences many unique difficulties.

I've asked the gentlemen before us, who are on their way up, to testify on the continuing or developing problems in California, focusing especially on public lands. And, I hope through their testimony and through questioning, we can come up with recommendations for improved Federal involvement in the eradication effort.

For my colleagues who were unable to attend the California hearings sponsored by this committee in Redding, I'd like to outline briefly some of our previous findings. I hope the witnesses will also summarize last year's testimony.

The issue of marijuana growing on public lands first received my attention when it became clear that innocent citizens, campers, hikers, BLM and Forest Service employees, were stumbling onto life threatening situations in our national forests and wilderness areas.

We know that cultivation of marijuana is big business. It's estimated that a single marijuana plant is valued between \$1,200 and \$4,000. I saw in a recent Washington Post article that marijuana is replacing corn as the Nation's largest cash crop. We're talking about receipts of over \$13.5 billion.

As the marijuana strains, like sinsemilla, command higher prices on the streets, danger to the public increases as the efforts made for detection of the plants become more determined.

The situation is increasingly dangerous as more and more growers seek the anonymity and seclusion of public lands. Countless horror stories have been documented about the types of booby traps used to deter folks from getting too close to their gardens.

In addition to the public safety, cultivation of marijuana on public lands poses a very serious threat to our environment. Elaborate irrigation systems, unsafe herbicides and rodenticides violate these areas and upset the ecology system.

Six fires in northern California alone were attributed to careless growers.

One further and very important aspect of domestic marijuana is our credibility in the international effort to battle narcotics.

The question we must ask ourselves, as you have repeatedly pointed out, Mr. Chairman, is, "How can we expect foreign governments to make an effort to curb their country's narcotics production and exportation if we don't commit the time and resources here at home to destroy these marijuana fields?"

I look forward to today's testimony, and to finding solutions for this grave problem.

We will start off with Mr. Randy Rossi, whose organization exemplifies the coordination between Federal, State, and local law enforcement agents we seek.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Rossi, welcome to the select committee.

TESTIMONY OF RANDY ROSSI, DIRECTOR OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Rossi. Thank you very much, sir.

Again, my name is Randy Rossi. I'm a special agent with the California Department of Justice. I am the operations commander

for the 1984 CAMP Program [Campaign Against Marijuana Planting].

I appreciate being invited before the select committee. The California Attorney General Van de Kamp submitted a prepared statement to the committee during the hearings which were held in Redding, CA, on July 22, 1983.

Chief S.C. Helsley of the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement testified before the committee on that date and described the evolution of California's cannabis eradication program and plans for the 1983 Campaign Against Marijuana Planting Program.

With your permission, I would like to submit for the record a copy of the final report for the 1983 effort, a draft proposal for the 1984 program, and a report prepared by the Butte County Sheriff's Office concerning their marijuana growing prevention program.

I would like to briefly describe the CAMP Program. Since 1977, the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration together developed training courses to provide local jurisdictions with the expertise necessary to eradicate commercial growing—marijuana growing operations.

As law enforcement put added pressure on the cultivators, their cultivation techniques changed. The commercial marijuana cultivators moved their operations to the more remote areas of California.

Growers went to great lengths to camouflage their crops through the use of greenhouses, camouflage nets, and other techniques. The rugged terrain, the bulk of the crops, and the time that investigative techniques require, placed a tremendous demand on the sheriff's department.

Cultivation of marijuana continued to increase dramatically as did the violence associated with cultivating marijuana. During the 1982 growing season, over 500 firearms were confiscated, 77 percent of the cultivators were armed or employed the use of booby traps to protect their crops.

Mr. Chairman, I have here a book that shows photographs of some of these booby traps that were found. I'd like to have the members see them.

Mr. RANGEL. Without objection.

Mr. Rossi. Thank you very much.

Over 50 percent of the cultivations occurred on public land or on private land without the consent of the owners.

It became apparent that the problem required a coordinated Federal/State and local program.

In March 1983, the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement invited the principal Federal and State agencies to meet and plan a unified program. These were the Federal agencies of the Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Forest Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the California agencies of the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, the Office of Emergency Services, the California Department of Forestry, and the Western States Information Network.

As the program developed, additional agencies became involved, the U.S. Marshal's Office, U.S. Customs Service, California Army National Guard, California Highway Patrol, as well as 14 sheriff's offices. The number and diversity of agencies providing the needed resources dictated that they be brought together in a highly structured and coordinated manner.

This coordinated multilevel, multiagency operation became known as the Campaign Against Marijuana Planting, and is referred to as CAMP. CAMP operates under the direction of an incident command system which effectively directs the manpower and equipment of this major operation. Memorandums of understanding were developed which identified the roles and responsibilities accepted by each of the participating agencies.

CAMP conducted 524 raids and seized over 270,000 pounds of marijuana worth in excess of \$130 million. CAMP combined the technology, training, and resources of 27 Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. The key to the success of the CAMP Program is the tremendous coordinated effort put forth by all of the agencies involved.

On November 1 and 2, 1983, a 2 day "CAMP Critique" conference was held to evaluate the program's effectiveness and to make suggestions for the 1984 program. Mr. Chairman, the details of the critique are contained the 1983 CAMP report which I have already requested to be submitted for the record.

[These reports appear on p. 126.]

Mr. Rossi. It was the unanimous conclusion of the agencies participating in CAMP that the program must be expanded to support additional sheriffs who feel they need the support of CAMP.

CAMP has been expanded, 36 counties have expressed an interest in participating in CAMP 1984. The 1984 program is even more ambitious than the 1983 program, and will necessitate increased manpower, resources, finances, and management commitments by all the participating agencies.

CAMP has received international recognition as a model marijuana eradication program. Through the U.S. State Department, command level law enforcement officials from Peru and the Ivory Coast recently visited California to obtain information on the CAMP program. Additionally, CAMP is at the forefront in proposing new legislation and new means of detection, destruction, and deterrence. CAMP staff have drafted legislation which establishes maximum sentences for cultivation and prohibits the use, sale, and manufacture of injurious devices to protect the marijuana crops.

CAMP staff are working with the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management in evaluating new techniques in detecting marijuana from the air that would be more cost effective than traditional techniques.

Marijuana destruction has always been a problem. CAMP raid teams seized up to 10 tons per day during the operation. The CAMP staff are exploring new techniques in destruction from portable burning systems to new sprays that would render the marijuana useless.

CAMP is developing a public awareness program on the marijuana cultivation problem as well as supporting prevention programs such as the Butte County Growers Awareness Program. This program is a high visibility, helicopter patrol program designed to deter and prevent the cultivation of marijuana on public and private lands.

Domestic cultivation of marijuana diminishes the quality of life where it occurs by damaging the environment and potentiating violence. CAMP is the most visible domestic cannabis eradication pro-

gram and its successes have been widely reported in both the national and international media. The importance and efficacy of the program have also been addressed in the recently released Attorney General's Commission on Narcotics, final report. I request that pages 23 through 26 be included for the record.

[This information appears on p. 166.]

Mr. RANGEL. Without objection.

Mr. ROSSI. In spite of all the goodwill, planning, and coordination that has come from the CAMP Program, the program is in serious jeopardy.

Helicopters with lift capability are essential so that remote crops can be assessed. In past years, this support has been provided by the California Army National Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Customs Service. Because of the summer Olympic games and the Democratic National Convention, these resources will not be available.

We have been working to find a solution since last fall when Attorney General Van de Kamp and Chief Helsley came to Washington to meet with Special Assistant to the President, Dr. Carlton Turner, to discuss the problem. Chief Helsley also described the problem during the roundtable discussion on the use of the military in the control of illegal drugs which was cosponsored by the National Governor's Association, U.S. Department of Justice, National Criminal Justice Association, National Guard Association of the United States, and State Drug Enforcement Alliance, on November 9 and 10, 1983, in Washington, DC.

Since that time, we have been working with Dr. Turner's staff and the Department of Defense to obtain helicopters and other equipment for training and enforcement operations.

I would like to submit for the record a copy of a letter dated March 6, 1984, sent by Attorney General Van de Kamp to Secretary of Defense Weinberger requesting military support. We are now working with Lieutenant General Tice and others at the Department of Defense to determine what level of support is available and expect a response very soon.

This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rossi appears on p. 98.]

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, Mr. Rossi.

Mr. Chappie.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You have made mention of the Growers' Awareness Program, Mr. Rossi. Is that program on schedule now?

Mr. ROSSI. Yes; the program sponsored by the Butte County Sheriff's Office, the flyers have already been finished for that program. Some funding has already been committed to that program. I believe there is still some additional funding that they are requesting, on the order of \$15,000 approximately.

But, yes, that's a prevention program where a low-altitude aircraft would fly over public and private lands in the hopes that they would prevent the cultivating of marijuana on these lands.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Very good. I understand that your primary thrust this month is to use some helicopters to patrol in an effort to discourage growers, you know, from making the initial plantings.

I don't know whether this is good or not, but might that provoke them to move to other areas? I know we've had comments from neighboring States.

Mr. Rossi. Probably at this late stage of the game, after they have already established their watering lines, probably some of the soil in California now is warm enough where they could actually plant in the ground now, they are fairly committed to a certain location now.

For them to abandon those fields and move to another location, and try to raise the plants from start, would be certainly not cost effective and just not very practical.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Would you say that your efforts have provoked some of these folks to go into greenhouses?

Mr. Rossi. Some. Less than 15 percent of the cultivations that occur in California occur in greenhouses or indoors. Most of them are still in the public and private lands of California.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Do you have any idea how prevalent greenhouse program is?

Mr. Rossi. We know from our aerial detection program, that greenhouses stand out very readily. The marijuana plant can be spotted through greenhouses. It's a very fast growing plant. It can grow under good conditions up to 2½ inches a day.

So, it's fairly easy for us to spot it, even growing in greenhouses. We don't see a great move at this time toward greenhouses.

Mr. CHAPPIE. What can you tell us about the 90-day wonder situation?

Mr. Rossi. They are more popular in Hawaii than they are in California. We do see some in California, but predominantly in California, they go for the bigger, the larger plant. That traditionally takes several months to produce.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Have you developed a prototype of people that you're apprehending? You know, if you can raise two or three plants or four and supplement your income by \$3,000 or \$10,000 a year, have you brushed with this type of individual as opposed to one that goes into remote areas?

Mr. Rossi. This program addresses that large marijuana cultivator. These programs are not the individuals that go out and grow 5 or 10 plants; these are ones that would take over private or public lands, grow larger plantations, average over 100 plants, and is the more violent, vigilante type that go in, cultivate, go back to the urban areas where they either live or sell the product.

Mr. CHAPPIE. In terms of the funds that you receive, do you channel any of these funds into the educational programs that some of the various counties have, or do you work cooperatively with the State department of education?

Mr. Rossi. The Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement does work with other agencies as far as education programs. We work with the California for a Drug-Free Youth Program. We actively speak at those conferences.

But, as far as our funding, we are strapped this year with not even being able to put the program on with our desperate need for helicopters.

Mr. CHAPPIE. I was pleased to see that Glenn County was added to the list of counties joining in your efforts.

Sheriff made some references to the media recently concerning the use of U-2 planes. I think his quote was that they had terrible results.

Would you care to comment?

Mr. Rossi. Well, last year was an experimental program with the U-2. It was used in some of the counties that were involved in the CAMP Program.

However, that was not specifically a CAMP function. No search warrants were written as a result of any U-2 photographs. I don't know if the final determination has been made this year on whether or not it will be used.

Certainly our funds would be better directed toward getting us helicopters so that we can eradicate the crop.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Now, I was trying to think—there was some problems with the court of appeals. Will that frustrate your efforts in terms of using any of those types of aircraft?

Mr. Rossi. Those cases were mainly dealt with with the residential type gardens. The CAMP operation goes after larger commercial gardens. Those cases address the urban areas where our program addresses the rural areas where the homicides and booby-traps exist.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Now, in terms of funding, DEA gave California about \$233,000 last year to help defray the add-on expenses to the local entities.

Can you estimate how much of these moneys went to CAMP as opposed to the counties?

Mr. Rossi. It's broken down in the CAMP Program. I want to say \$215,000 went to the CAMP Program. The CAMP Program supplies the local jurisdictions with the training, the 2-week schools, so that the observers can be trained in eradication.

It supplies the counties with a helicopter-trained team and a trained team leader so that they can go out and eradicate the large and remote marijuana gardens.

It is a resource for the counties so that they can carry out the eradication raids.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Do you feel that you'll have sufficient funding to continue your operations this year, excluding the problems with the helicopters?

Mr. Rossi. Excluding the helicopter problem, I think the CAMP Program alone is in better shape. I think the counties need some additional funding for overtime, and other necessities, so that they can go out and do some eradicating.

It's a very complex investigative case actually to work up a cultivation case, from the time you first initially fly out, going to the assessor's office, and so forth. It's a very lengthy and involved case.

Mr. CHAPPIE. I—well, we have talked about the problem we're going to have at the Olympics.

Mr. Chairman, I think very definitely that this committee should lend their efforts to the program to see if we can encourage someone in DOD to provide some of this equipment to the CAMP Program.

Mr. HALL. If the gentleman would yield, I'd like to ask a question of Mr. Rossi.

Mr. CHAPPIE. I yield.

Mr. HALL. Why is it that when the Olympics are there and the convention is there, will you no longer have the use of the helicopters?

Mr. Rossi. The California National Guard has to supply medivac equipment for the California connection for the summer Olympics, for the 1984 Olympics.

They are committed—they have committed all their hours to that because their primary responsibility is that of medivac.

Mr. HALL. Well, how many helicopters do you have at your disposal?

Mr. Rossi. We need seven helicopters. The National Guard has quite a few, but their hours and then some are taken up by the Olympics.

To ask their men to come in additional hours would jeopardize their jobs, also the maintenance costs, and other elements, that would be extremely high.

Mr. HALL. Well, I understand that, but because of the summer Olympic games and other demands, these resources will not be available. Are you talking now of the helicopters or any other resources or just the helicopters?

Mr. Rossi. We're talking helicopters, sir.

Mr. HALL. Well, has any effort been made to try to retain some of those helicopters during that period of time? As I understand from news accounts, that during the time of the Olympics and the convention, that there may be a lot of drugs used or sold during that period of time. Is that a correct statement?

Mr. Rossi. I would imagine so, sir. The Department of Defense the Army has offered or made a tentative offer to supply us with seven Huey's, which would be fine on face value.

The problem is the maintenance costs, the fuel costs, and the piloting costs, and the insurance costs would be on the order of \$1.5 million.

If we had that additional funding, that would be fine.

Mr. HALL. In other words, the Department of Defense has agreed to give you seven helicopter—

Mr. Rossi. Tentatively, yes.

Mr. HALL [continuing]. Tentatively, but they haven't agreed to pay for the costs of operating those helicopters?

Mr. Rossi. That's correct.

Mr. HALL. Well, who is paying for the cost of operating the seven helicopters that you have now?

Mr. Rossi. The California National Guard.

Mr. HALL. Well, is there any reason as to why, if California is handling it now, they couldn't handle it again if they had the helicopters available?

Mr. Rossi. Their maintenance, fuel, et cetera is committed for the Olympic games. They approximate 4,800 hours or so that they are committing to the 1984 Olympic games.

That far exceeds their normal function as far as training. They are even cutting back on their annual training to try to fulfill this Olympic request.

For every 1 hour the helicopter flies, that particular helicopter requires 4 hours maintenance. So, those maintenance hours, the piloting hours and all are committed to the Olympics.

Mr. HALL. As I understand it, your program, the CAMP Program, deals only with marijuana growing prevention, the prevention of marijuana growing in California.

Mr. Rossi. Eradication.

Mr. HALL. Eradication. It does not have anything to do with any other drug, just the marijuana area?

Mr. Rossi. No other drugs, but quite a few auxilliary crimes, No other drugs, only the cultivation of marijuana.

Mr. HALL. All right. Now, you mentioned about a meeting that was held last fall between the Attorney General Van de Kamp and the Special Assistant to the President, Dr. Turner.

What response have you received from the Federal Government with reference to that meeting?

Mr. Rossi. Very favorable response. Dr. Carlton Turner was out to visit our program 2 weeks ago. He is 100 percent supportive of the program, and is also looking into alternatives to the use of military.

Mr. HALL. Well, I realize that a person would be a fool not to be in favor of your program, but has there been any tangible results coming from that meeting last fall?

Have they agreed to pay any—to give any resources like money or have they agreed to pay that million dollars to operate those seven helicopters?

Mr. Rossi. No.

Mr. HALL. Have they done anything other than say you've got a good program going? What else have they agreed to do?

Mr. Rossi. No financial commitment. They did express that they would make sure we could contact the right people, et cetera, but, no, sir, no financial commitment.

Mr. HALL. Well, I assume that that's what your attorney general and Chief Helsley were here for, to try to get some financial assistance for California.

Mr. Rossi. They were initially here to try to change the posse comitatus act for the military, so that the military would come in as the National Guard did to fly these missions.

That's a very touchy area, and it will probably take several years to resolve. That's what's being explored right now.

Mr. HALL. Well, of course, we just passed the posse comitatus law last year for the south Florida area, and it's working to some degree of satisfaction. Not as well as we'd like for it to.

But, are you willing to change that posse comitatus statute to do what, that it does not do now?

Mr. Rossi. Well, I'm certainly no expert in posse comitatus, but apparently when it involves U.S. citizens, there is some specific problem in using military personnel to arrest U.S. citizens.

Mr. HALL. Well, are you having the assistance now of aircraft in California to help in the program that you are working on?

Mr. Rossi. Yes; under the California National Guard, if it's under the request and control of the Governor, it falls under a different criteria and is no longer federalized status.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Rossi.

I yield back to the gentleman.

Mr. CHAPPIE. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HALL. We appreciate your testimony very much, Mr. Rossi.

I notice that you say the DEA is working very closely with you there.

Mr. Rossi. Yes, all the Federal agencies and State agencies in this program have just been outstanding. It's been a very well organized, well planned, coordinated effort.

Mr. HALL. Well, now, some areas, I understand, DEA is not as active in working with local officials as they are in California. I certainly commend them for doing it in that area. I wish they would do it all over the United States.

Appreciate your being here and your testimony will certainly be given consideration.

Mr. Rossi. Thank you, sir.

Mr. HALL. Now, the next are Mr. Conrad and Mr. Smith.

TESTIMONY OF ZANE SMITH, JR., REGIONAL FORESTER, PACIFIC SOUTHWEST REGION, FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. SMITH. Right. My name is Zane Smith, Mr. Chairman. I am the regional forester for the Pacific Southwest region of the Forest Service, which includes California.

We appreciate the opportunity to appear again before this committee regarding illegal cannabis growing on the national forests in California.

I think Mr. Rossi covered the past situation in some of our planning very well, and what I'll try to do is simply highlight my remarks and submit the full remarks for the record.

We continue to be concerned about marijuana and cannabis growing on the public lands in California. It's a problem that represents considerable danger, safety, to our employees, to our cooperators who conduct programs on the national forest, and to the general using public.

It certainly represents an unauthorized use of national forest lands, and interferes with our managers' ability to manage these lands under the statute.

The whole matter is a very, very serious problem. Public lands, of course, are a favorite place to conduct illegal activities because they are quite remote. California is a very large State. Most of it is very remote, much of it is unroaded with limited access. There are few visitors to many of these areas, and practically no permanent residents.

Confrontations between the Forest Service and the growers and public users and the growers continues. Increasingly, these growers are using a variety of dangerous methods to protect their gardens.

Mr. Rossi mentioned some of those and passed some pictures around. You can see by looking at those pictures they are damaging, very fatal types of devices. We continue to get threats, personal threats, to Forest Service employees working in areas that contain plantations.

There have been several shooting incidents on national forests involving both Forest Service people being shot at and the public.

These gardens very often use elaborate irrigation systems, and they use enormous amounts of pesticides and fertilizers. These substances are applied without the normal safeguards, thus threaten-

ing other vegetation, threatening wildlife, eventually work their way into the waters.

A variety of corrective and preventative programs have been undertaken by public agencies, both State and Federal, and, as a matter of fact, locally, particularly in the last 2 years.

We believe these coordinated efforts have had some effect as a general deterrent to growing marijuana. We expect to continue, even expand, our activities during 1984.

We began to recognize the seriousness of all of this on the national forests in 1980. By early 1982, an indepth study was conducted by an interagency group consisting of State, local, and Federal agencies, wherein we drafted an action plan.

The action plan focused on efforts to eradicate existing plantations, and to prevent future plantings. During the 1982 campaign, State and local law enforcement agencies provided the on the ground leadership with personnel and financial assistance from other agencies, including the Forest Service.

In 1982, we supplied approximately 2,400 person days to supplement a similar involvement by State and local law enforcement agencies.

We contributed in 1982, more than \$195,000 of cooperative law enforcement funds, which were appropriated to us at the national level. These funds went to local sheriffs.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman.

Now, that \$195,000 was outside of the \$233,000 from DEA?

Mr. SMITH. That's correct.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. This, of course, was in 1982.

In 1982, there were more than 400 illicit operations discovered, resulting in 55,000 cannabis plants being confiscated. Moving to 1983, we embarked on our multiagency coordinated campaign called CAMP.

Mr. Rossi, I think, explained that very adequately. But, this was a formal association of 27 local, State, and Federal units, including such nonlaw enforcement agencies as the Forest Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the California Department of Forestry.

We believe that the interagency nature of the planned action and the resulting CAMP Program has contributed substantially to our success in California. There were four geographic regions within the State. The eradication effort was conducted on both public and private lands.

In 1983, 64,000 plants were removed at over 500 sites in 14 counties. More importantly perhaps, 138 arrests were made.

Seven national forests, seven of the eighteen national forests, were included in the CAMP Program in California.

Now, 1984, we have made the decision collectively to continue to expand the program during the 1984, and this was based on the evaluation that Mr. Rossi referred to in his testimony.

Detection and eradication activities will be increased from 14 to tentatively 36 California counties. These will be in six geographic regions that include 15 national forests, 15 of the 18 national forests.

Forest Service will participate by supplying administrative assistance to the CAMP headquarters in Sacramento, providing supplementary personnel during the field operations, and contributing a variety of other skilled personnel to support administrative public information and education, aircraft operation, and other logistical activities.

In addition to the CAMP Program, the Forest Service continued its regular law enforcement efforts throughout the Pacific Southwest region, and here, on top of CAMP now, we confiscated more than 48,000 plants and made 95 arrests.

We estimate that a total of eight person years and about \$570,000 were invested in 1983. \$250,000 of that was a part of CAMP itself. The remainder was outside the CAMP areas.

Now, this year, we plan to attack the whole cannabis problem on three fronts.

First of all, through, again, our regular cooperation with the local sheriffs.

Second, by continuing our involvement and we're planning to expand it in the CAMP Program.

And, last, with a new initiative, we call the New River project.

I want to speak to the New River project just briefly. This is a cooperative effort, somewhat of a pilot or demonstration effort, with Trinity County in north central California.

The Forest Service and the Trinity County Sheriff's Department will concentrate on preventing the plantations establishment to begin with.

The New River drainage is a remote area. It's 115,000 acres area. A place on the national forest, the Shasta-Trinity National Forest, which has become a place where shootings, arson, and physical violence are commonplace.

We believe that the whole marijuana matter is underlying a good deal of the trouble. Indeed, the Forest Service has had to withdraw, virtually cease management, of this entire acreage.

Consequently, public use of this area is almost nonexistent. I'm pleased to report to you that just this weekend, we began this program, and we established a law enforcement presence in the New River drainage.

There are eight Forest Service officers who are trained and equipped for law enforcement activities, and two county deputy sheriffs, patrolling the project area in an effort to discourage illegal use of these lands.

As we gain control, these same crews will be used to provide normal management activities such as trail maintenance, fish and wildlife habitat improvement, and administer contracts.

We expect this project to last about 3 years. It will probably cost us approximately \$1.6 million. The project is receiving national attention. It enjoys, I believe, outside of the immediate people being focused on, good local public and press support.

CBS TV's "American Parade" will air a story on the New River initiative, and they were to have done that tonight at 8 o'clock. But, I learned this morning, earlier, that they had rescheduled that to some time later.

ABC and NBC also plan a film coverage of this activity.

I think the interagency cooperative CAMP Program in California is having a very positive effect. Of course, as Mr. Rossi notes, much more needs to be done.

The Forest Service, however, intends to carry out its role. We believe that role is to cooperate with appropriate local, State, and Federal agencies to reduce the number of operations on National Forest lands.

We feel strongly that the leadership role, the guy leading the parade out there, ought to be the local sheriff. And, we ought to be placing resources in the form of personnel and money at his right hand to get this job done.

We'll continue to work at this interagency effort aggressively.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my formal remarks. If there are any other comments the committee would like to have from me, I'm pleased to offer them.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith appears on p. 100.]

Mr. CHAPPIE. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to commend Mr. Smith for his efforts in this area, in many of the areas that I represent are included.

I have been real fortunate a few times—there's downtown Cecilville and forks of the Salmon in that project.

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Well, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that sun-down, you leave town. Those areas are truly dangerous. There have been some interesting experiences up there.

Mr. Smith, you mentioned the PILT Program, payment in lieu of taxes, for law enforcement, and that obviously is near and dear to my heart, having observed the bullet holes and the Trinity County Sheriff's planes.

Would you care to comment what your view might be in terms of further augmenting those funds to Forest areas?

Mr. SMITH. I'd be happy to, Mr. Chappie.

Our primary source of cooperative funds with local agencies is the—what we call the cooperative law enforcement funds.

This is Public Law 92-82, which was designed specifically to allow the Forest Service to contribute funding to local sheriffs for the whole variety of law enforcement activities that might occur on the National Forests.

Marijuana is one of those problems that has emerged recently.

The Forest Service receives in the neighborhood of \$5 million a year through regular congressional appropriations for that program. In California, that's been running about a million dollars a year, and we have 36 agreements, 36 separate agreements, with local sheriffs.

In 1984, we have distributed about three-quarters of a million dollars directly to the sheriffs through these agreements, and we have held in reserve about \$200,000 for emergency situations, such as the New River matter, such as the Butte County initiative where we have been asked to provide \$20,000 to the sheriff there to assist in his program.

Now, there is probably no end to the amount of money that the sheriffs could use. We distribute it all to the sheriffs. It's a matter of reaching some sort of balance, I suppose.

But, for the marijuana problem, there is a need, such as Mr. Rossi explained, overtime for financing these helicopters, fuel and operation.

So, again, I think the sheriffs would be very anxious to receive some additional funds. We are distributing our full appropriation.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Inasmuch as I have 11 of those counties, I think virtually all of them are affected, what would be the proper mechanism to gather information as to the additional needs of those counties by way of overtime, things of that nature? Is CAMP capable of doing that? Should we go to the sheriffs' association?

Personally, I am certain the committee would like to have those statistics so that we could be better equipped to help you folks.

Mr. SMITH. I would judge that CAMP with its contacts, formal structure with the sheriffs, would be a good vehicle for collecting those data.

You could go directly, for example, to your counties or to the sheriffs' association, and I believe the county sheriffs would be delighted to do that.

Each one, as I understand it, Mr. Rossi knows better, but each one has had to in their appearances before the county board of supervisors, outline to them their needs and what they could use effectively.

So, I believe that that could be done.

Mr. CHAPPIE. How many square miles in Trinity County, off the top of your head?

Mr. SMITH. Oh, I deal in acres more than in square miles, but Trinity County, I suppose, is somewhere around a million acres or so.

Mr. CHAPPIE. I would, off the top of my head, say that perhaps that sheriff at the very best has a dozen deputies.

Mr. SMITH. I think that's a fair observation. We have been able to finance two additional deputies through the New River initiative, but all the sheriffs in northern California, in particular, are just stretched to the very limit, and that's one reason that we are unable to provide the kind of surveillance, the law enforcement presence, in these remote counties.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Thank you.

I have no further questions.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Smith, how many acres in cultivation in California would you say we have in these marijuana fields?

Mr. SMITH. I don't have figures.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. HALL. Yes.

Mr. CHAPPIE. That's kind of a double barreled question in that, for example, Glenn County, the corn patch county, is not in the national forest. So, we have some unique problems in that respect.

Mr. HALL. Well, I noticed in one of the statements that the gentleman made that during the 1983 campaign, 64,000 plants were removed from over 500 sites in the 14 county area.

And, then later, in that same testimony, that more than 48,000 plants were confiscated on national forests outside the CAMP.

I assume 48,000 in the national parks' plants, 64,000 plants outside of the national parks; is that a correct statement?

Mr. SMITH. Let me clarify that for the record.

In the CAMP Program, there were 64,579 plants confiscated. Of those, 17,460 some were on national forests.

Outside of the CAMP, particular CAMP multiagency effort, there were an additional 48,300 plants seized on national forest lands, taking a total off the national forest of somewhere around 65,700 plants.

Mr. HALL. Well, how many plants do you put on an acre? How does it vary?

Mr. SMITH. It varies. We have discovered plants growing in pots in oak trees as a part of the effort to obscure them. But, these are relatively small gardens. They are called gardens, and they really are. Just—you know, if you see a garden of several acres, you're seeing a very large one because that is very conspicuous.

Mr. HALL. Well, you use the term plantations throughout your statement. There are plantations in my part of the country. It doesn't mean what it does out in your part of the country.

Mr. SMITH. Right. I should refer to them as gardens because they are really more like backyard type size gardens. They are done that way purposely to remain undetected.

Mr. HALL. Well, now, these pictures that you have shown, presented to us, I think Mr. Rossi—I mean, you show military fragmentation grenades rigged with a tripwire in certain counties, camouflaged tripwires rigged to a 12 gauge shotgun, and nails that drop down from the—well, you step on these nails, sharpened nails placed in boards covered with leaves, and you have them in counties where these things occur.

Now, that, to me, is not a pot plant. I mean, I assume that's leading up to a pretty good size operation, is it not?

Mr. SMITH. Well, you have to understand, sir, that these plants, individual plants, are worth anywhere from \$1,500 to \$4,000 a piece. So, a very small plot, size of this room, for example, can represent very, very substantial amounts of money.

Mr. HALL. Well, do you have any estimate as to how many acres of land in California are devoted primarily to this growing of marijuana?

Mr. SMITH. I do not have that estimate. I will defer to Mr. Rossi. He may have some estimates.

Mr. Rossi. That would be very difficult to determine. We only get a fraction of what is out there.

Last year, California confiscated in the area of 303,000 plants, which is only a fraction of what is grown out there.

Other States have eradication rates that they report up to 95 percent.

We are behind the curve in eradicating marijuana in our State because of the funding.

Mr. HALL. Well, now, these telephotos that you have shown us, I assume that that was not placed there by a small child; that was placed there by someone who means business and who is in this in a big way.

Mr. Rossi. That's correct.

Mr. HALL. Do you connect the Mafia with any of this?

Mr. Rossi. We have no ties to the Mafia or any organized group. We do have co-ops, and so forth, certain groups that are contracted out to protect the gardens.

One garden of 100 plants, which is, say, average, is worth somewhere on the order of \$100,000 to \$150,000.

Mr. HALL. Well, now, you have some very sophisticated devices here.

Mr. ROSSI. Yes, sir.

Mr. HALL. Do these devices cause death. I know they do. Have they caused any deaths in the past?

Mr. ROSSI. Yes, we have at least 15 homicides a week we can contribute directly to cultivations. We don't know if they occurred by boobytraps or other devices.

These devices are so remote that we're sure that these 15 only represent again a small fraction of how many people are killed out there.

We receive thousands of threats a year. Many areas that we went into hadn't seen law enforcement for 5 years because of the violence associated with the cultivation.

Mr. HALL. And, I'm sure that these devices that you've shown here just indicate the tip of the iceberg as to what may be really out there that you haven't uncovered yet.

Mr. ROSSI. Absolutely.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Would the gentleman yield?

I think by way of illustration, when we took the committee up to my district so that they could observe the raid, I believe 600 plants were harvested in that operation.

In my estimation, an area twice the size of this hearing room. So, it's very, very difficult to deal with acreages in that many of these are on almost vertical hillsides.

They look for secluded areas that have water supplies, that are not easily detected, except aerially, and it be well worth their while to booby trap an area of that size considering the dollars involved.

Mr. HALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. HALL. I believe Mr. Conrad is the next witness.

TESTIMONY OF BRUCE CONRAD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, CALIFORNIA STATE OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I really appreciate the opportunity to explain BLM's role in the CAMP Program for not only last year but this year.

I would like to state, Mr. Hastey "Ed," the State director, is very sorry he couldn't attend, but because of a previous commitment, however, wishes you best of luck in this hearing.

In light of being repetitious, I would like to submit my testimony formally for the record, and then highlight—

Mr. HALL. Without objection.

Mr. CONRAD. The 1983 CAMP effort started out with our involvement with two full-time special agents in the initial planning effort for the 1983 CAMP Program.

Those two special agents were involved in the program from start to finish, from pre- to post-operation, and also during the 9-week raid effort.

In addition to that, during the 9-week raid effort, all of our 5 BLM special agents were involved either as operation chiefs within headquarters or as raid team members.

In addition to our special agents, we committed several of our fire crew members primarily to assist in slinging with helicopters. These people are our experts in helicopter slinging.

Also, because of our fire experience and our experience in the incident command system, we provided expertise early on in the CAMP Program to train all of the incident commanders involved with CAMP.

One of our efforts that we had outside of CAMP was our employee awareness program, in which all of our district and area employees received a 1-day orientation on not only what to do when you come across a garden, but also how to report them, and that had a real positive benefit because once the CAMP headquarters was set up, they could report any gardens or any sightings of marijuana into the incident commander.

The 1983 effort cost us approximately \$64,000 last year. We also provided a considerable amount of equipment and vehicles.

This effort reaped around 8,000 plants off of BLM administered public land, and we really feel like we got a bang for our buck in the 1983 effort.

It involved, as Mr. Rossi stated, 14 county sheriffs, and we, like the Forest Service, maintained a support role in the total program. We depended an awful lot on the California Department of Justice along with the county sheriffs to take a lead, not only in the headquarters CAMP effort, but in the field.

We look forward to the 1984 effort. I think as an indication of the success of 1983, is the increase in the support by having 36 counties involved now instead of the original 14.

If anything shows a positive effect of CAMP, the support that the county sheriffs are getting this year is a good indication.

We again are going to provide the same roles as we did in the 1983 effort, with approximately \$64,000 support again. We are going to try to get several of our out of State special agents to participate in the program this year, if their workload permits.

In closing, I feel that in 1983, the growers felt not only from the CAMP effort, but also the support from this committee by having hearings in Redding, the impact, and I think that they are going to feel quite an impact with an increased effort this year.

We very much look forward to participating with the members of CAMP this year, and I'd be more than happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Conrad appears on p. 101.]

Mr. CHAPPIE. It's my understanding that we can get things into perspective in terms of what your jurisdiction is, how many acres does BLM have in the State of California involved in this problem?

Mr. CONRAD. Approximately 17 million acres.

Most of the area lies around the King Range National Conservation Area, and up in Humboldt County, which is around 60,000 acres.

Mr. CHAPPIE. So, you're principally on the coast?

Mr. CONRAD. Yes.

Mr. CHAPPIE. It's my understanding that you folks have been experimenting with dye markers and odorants.

Can you tell us a little bit about that?

Mr. CONRAD. We have been experimenting in cooperation with the State police in Arkansas, and we have developed a nontoxic dye that smells terrible. It has a deer repellent in it, and it smells like rotten eggs.

It's been very successful, and, in fact, the Arkansas people want to go ahead and test it again this year if they can clear it through the State, to test some of this dye.

It makes the plant virtually unsmokeable. It kills the plant, but yet it doesn't yield any toxic effects.

Mr. CHAPPIE. So, you first locate the operation, then you aerially apply this?

Mr. CONRAD. Either aerially or manually with tank sprayers.

Mr. CHAPPIE. So, you're saying, in effect, that there is hope with this approach also?

Mr. CONRAD. I believe there is, and there is a big money saver, too. Any time you involve large helicopters under those kind of conditions, altitude and terrain, you're talking about large amounts of money.

When you can airlift with a small helicopter, a couple agents and with tank sprayers to spray that, you're talking about cost effectiveness.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Were any of the fires that people feel were attributed to these folks on your land?

Mr. CONRAD. We know of one fire on the King Range, just to get rid of the underbrush, was started in the spring to prepare for their gardens.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Well, this is a problem that, if you have six of them, obviously Zane had the other five, no one has really commented on that added cost.

Aerial tankers, obviously, are employed, States through their coop in terms of fire prevention. Does anyone have a handle, a round figure as to what that cost may have been?

Mr. SMITH. On the national forest, Mr. Chappie, it's been a fairly small amount because these fires have not got away.

However, the potential is there for major project fires, depending on the weather, and this year, we're moving into a much different weather pattern than we have in the last 2 to 3 years.

We've gone 3 years in California without a normal fire season. This year looks to be like a normal or more severe than normal.

So, although the costs have been relatively small, the potential there is for huge amounts of costs.

Mr. CHAPPIE. Even with the small fires, I would suspect that the initial attack you use is aerial tanks at about a thousand bucks a piece or per hour, so that there could be a very significant cost if one of those got away?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. CHAPPIE. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Conrad, you say there were 76 arrests made on site in 1983. How many of those arrests led to convictions?

Mr. CONRAD. There were 76 arrests made in the total CAMP Program. Mr. Rossi, do you know how many convictions?

Mr. Rossi. A lot of them are still tied up in the court process. We should have a good firm number for you in about 2 more months.

Mr. HALL. How long does it usually take to get a case to trial out there?

Mr. Rossi. In the area of probably 3 months before anything gets resolved, normally.

Mr. HALL. All right. Now, we're dealing—you say in your statement here, some of you do, that this is a \$2 billion a year estimated crop value, marijuana.

Now, what about cocaine and heroin and the others that you have? Is that a major problem with the people in California? And, how is it being treated, and is it being in any way approached in the program that you have here?

Mr. Rossi. We do have a similar program with our methamphetamine laboratories. They are a major problem also.

Mr. HALL. Is it bigger than marijuana?

Mr. Rossi. I don't know if I could answer that. I would say it certainly is a competitor with it, if not bigger. Of course, marijuana is the source problem of California, meaning that it originates from California. The other drug problems don't normally use booby traps like the marijuana cultivators do, and they normally don't trespass on public and private lands, like marijuana cultivators do.

Mr. HALL. Are the people who are growing marijuana in California local people, that is Californians?

Mr. Rossi. They are normally Californians, although we have had some people from Nevada. California is a fairly lenient State as far as sentences, and, so, it is rather conducive to the cultivators.

Mr. HALL. Give me the penalty stages in marijuana. What is your first offense?

Mr. Rossi. Well, even though the offense for possession is the mere fine, their cultivation is viewed as a felony. However, it is not unusual at all for these cases to be dropped from court, dismissed, or even diverted so that no time is actually served for cultivating.

That's a problem with our—

Mr. HALL. Well, is the law enforcement in California lax on marijuana?

Mr. Rossi. The law enforcement isn't; the judicial system might be.

Mr. HALL. Judicial system.

Mr. CHAPPIE. I feel compelled to comment on that point. We have a Governor for 8 years who has had rather different views in terms of the role of the judicial branch of government. We have extremely lenient judges in our State, and some other liberal laws, State statutes, even issued citations—

Mr. Rossi. For less than the amount of the ticket, but we feel for cultivation, the penalty certainly should be fairly severe because of the trespass and the life threatening and since it is a source problem, we can't—it's difficult to illustrate to the other source countries that we're doing something serious about the problem if we don't address it seriously.

Mr. HALL. Are you using paraquat?

Mr. Rossi. No, sir; not at this time.

Mr. HALL. Have you in the past?

Mr. Rossi. No, California has not, to the best of my knowledge, ever used paraquat.

Mr. HALL. Well, have you experimented with any herbicides other than that in the eradication?

Mr. Rossi. California has not experimented with any herbicides whatsoever.

Mr. HALL. Well, how do you eradicate marijuana when you find it?

Mr. Rossi. We manually eradicate it by chopping down the plant. The plant will grow from, say, 4 feet to—we've seen them as tall as 28 feet in height. They range in weight from, say, 3 pounds to 40 pounds.

So, they are like a small tree when you cut them down.

Mr. HALL. Someone made the comment a moment ago that a single marijuana plant has a value of about \$1,500.

Mr. Rossi. That's very conservative.

Mr. HALL. That 28-foot plant that you're talking about, what value would you place on that?

Mr. Rossi. The value of the sinsemilla is directly related to the portion of the plant that is developed in the bud. Sinsemilla meaning without seeds. The female plant is that part of the plant which is worth the money.

A plant will produce—the sinsemilla plant will produce approximately, conservatively, 1 pound of sinsemilla. One pound of sinsemilla has a wholesale value of around \$2,000 a pound.

So, \$2,000 per plant is a very conservative figure.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Conrad, you state on page 4 of your statement that the fiscal year 1985 President's budget includes \$300,000 which would be used to fund an additional 15 co-op agreements.

Mr. CONRAD. Yes, sir; nationwide, however, it would be about five in California.

Mr. HALL. That's a mere pittance, isn't it?

Mr. CONRAD. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. HALL. Well, does that lead you to believe that the Federal Government does not consider domestic cultivated marijuana eradication a very high priority?

Mr. CONRAD. In view of our total law enforcement budget for the Bureau, it's not a mere pittance; it's quite a bit of money. Because of our limited law enforcement capability Bureauwide, we have 27 special agents nationwide; of that, 5 are in California.

I am like Mr. Smith, I feel like there does need to be somewhere an increase to the local county sheriffs for not only marijuana, but for other law enforcement activities in which we deal with also.

Mr. HALL. All right. Mr. Smith, you made a comment a moment ago that you have allocated funds out to these sheriffs, and I think you mentioned a \$20,000 figure to one.

What is that money used for by local sheriffs?

Mr. SMITH. It's used for salary, equipment, transportation for the law enforcement activities that occur on the national forests. Understand, these national forests are under what we call proprietorial jurisdiction, that is the Federal Government has rights and title to the land, but the authority and jurisdiction for law enforcement of State and local statutes is retained by the State and local law enforcement officials.

These moneys then are transferred in view of what amounts to an additional impact on the counties by the mere presence of Federal lands and Federal programs. The cooperative law enforcement funds that we have used all these years have been used for such things as antisocial behavior in our campgrounds, such as theft and murder and assault, that kind of thing.

It has just been recently that we have had the marijuana problem. So, it's kind of an add-on problem, and, very often, added on to counties that have not experienced a great deal of public use in the past.

Mr. HALL. Yield to the gentleman from Hawaii.

Mr. AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The \$300,000 that is being budgeted by the President in fiscal year 1985 is one-seventh of what you claim you need on page 4 of Mr. Conrad's testimony, and that's excluding helicopter costs.

I think you inferred that amount was adequate funds. You said well, you know, that's lots of money, \$300,000. But, in fact, that's only one-seventh of what you feel you need to carry on the program.

Mr. CONRAD. Yes, sir, it is.

On the CAMP-wide basis. Actually, the \$57,000—\$64,000 which we contributed last year, and which we intend to contribute this year, is ample as far as BLM is concerned to fund our special agents and to fund our equipment for the CAMP Program.

Where additional funding is needed is to the local law enforcement officers, the sheriffs, for CAMP because this is really outside of their scope, what they are normally funded for.

However, our funding, the \$64,000, pays our support organization for CAMP.

Mr. AKAKA. How many trips do you make in any given year to eradicate marijuana?

Mr. CONRAD. The CAMP Program last year during the 9-week period, made a total of 524 raids.

Mr. AKAKA. So, this means if you had more money, more than the \$300,000, you'd be able to have more frequent eradication schedules for California, is that right?

Mr. CONRAD. I don't believe it would be more frequent; I think what it would do is the additional support for the county sheriffs.

Mr. CHAPPIE. If the gentleman would yield on that point?

Mr. AKAKA. Yes; certainly.

Mr. CHAPPIE. The problem is quite unique in that the role of BLM is not one of law enforcement; it's only in the recent years that they have even been permitted to arm their personnel as with the Forest Service, correct?

So that that duty falls primarily on the shoulders of the sheriff of the county. One of our smaller counties, for example, 93 percent of the land in that county is held in public ownership. So, the sheriffs confronted with 7 percent of that mass by way of the tax base to provide his law enforcement program.

It's extremely difficult, and that's, I think, the point these gentlemen are attempting to make subtly. I suspect they have restraints from the hierarchy, is that there is a decided mean for additional funding, and I think it's the responsibility of this committee to do what we can to support them in their efforts.

I yield back.

Mr. AKAKA. Thank you.

Is the CAMP organization considered to be a formal organization of local, State, and Federal agencies?

Mr. CONRAD. Did you want me to answer that?

Mr. AKAKA. What I am looking for is, is it considered informal?

Mr. CONRAD. It's considered formal. We sign formal agreements.

Mr. AKAKA. I noticed by some of the data I have, that California is rated as No. 1 producer of marijuana in the Nation, and Hawaii is No. 2, and I just wondered whether you know how close we were, whether we're still No. 2, or whether we're No. 1?

Mr. CHAPPIE. We'd be most pleased to give you the title.

Mr. ROSSI. I might be able to answer that. As far as the total amount grown, I think without question California is, unfortunately, No. 1.

As far as plants seized, last year, California seized in the area of 303,000 plants, where Hawaii eradicated 579,000. So, they seized a lot more. They have a fairly expanded program plus their cultivation techniques differ a lot from that of California.

Mr. CONRAD. In going over the news article that was in the Washington Post here last week, it rated, California as 2 billion, and right behind that is 1.6 billion from Hawaii. Oregon and Kentucky is tied for third at 600 million, and then followed by North Carolina at 550 million.

Mr. AKAKA. Well, I thank you very much.

Do you have any further questions?

Mr. CHAPPIE. No further questions.

Mr. AKAKA. Well, we thank you very much for your testimony, and it will be included in the record. We wish you well in your future endeavors. Thank you very much.

The Chair calls Mr. Lilly and Mr. Wakita.

I want to welcome Mr. Lilly, who is the first deputy attorney general of the State of Hawaii, and Lt. Charles Wakita, commanding officer in charge of the vice section, Hawaii County Police Department. I welcome both of you to this hearing.

We will include your testimony in the record, and ask you to paraphrase or highlight your testimony as you will.

For the record, Mr. Lilly is the No. 2 law enforcement officer of the State of Hawaii. He manages the State's attorney general's office with its 215 employees, including 90 deputy attorneys.

He has also been instrumental in maintaining liaison with all Federal and State and local law enforcement agencies in Hawaii.

Lieutenant Wakita has been in law enforcement for 18 years, as an officer of the Honolulu Police Department and the Hawaii County Police Department.

I am proud to note that Lieutenant Wakita played a major role in Operation Pele as the supervisor in charge for Hawaii County.

As some of my colleagues will recall, Operation Pele was a coordinated effort of Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to end the use of the U.S. Postal System as a means of moving marijuana grown in Hawaii to the mainland of the United States.

As commanding officer in charge of Hawaii County's vice section, Mr. Wakita has also been directly involved in Operation Green

Harvest, a program utilizing Federal, State, and local authorities to eradicate the cultivation of marijuana,

Mr. Lilly and Lieutenant Wakita, are key players in the effort to combat illicit narcotics production and trafficking in Hawaii.

As this committee knows, they participated in a briefing for the select committee during its stopover in Hawaii, and I'm extremely glad that they are here today at this hearing to present Hawaii's prospectus on our country's growing narcotics problem and to bring us up to date as to the latest developments on the programs in Hawaii.

Welcome, gentlemen, and you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL A. LILLY, FIRST DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF HAWAII, DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

Mr. LILLY. Thank you, Representative Akaka. I'm Michael Lilly, first deputy attorney general, and I am not only honored to be here, but I take heart, and I know that the law enforcement in Hawaii takes heart, that the committee views drug abuse as such an important area for law enforcement to have the tools to attack.

I view drugs as not a local problem; it's not even a national problem; it's an international problem. It permeates our entire society, and our entire globe, and it needs some strong efforts at the national level to help us combat this insidious problem that's infecting our community and ruining our kids.

In Hawaii, I think it's without a doubt that marijuana continues to be the State's No. 1 drug problem. I don't know whether we're No. 1 or No. 2 in the Nation for production of marijuana, but I know that we seize more marijuana in Hawaii than any other State in the Nation. We seize twice as much marijuana as California does in all their 58 counties. And we seized over half the marijuana confiscated by the five Pacific States in 1983.

Last year, we seized over 636,000 pounds of marijuana in 1983. Guy Paul, police chief of Hawaii County, has come up with some estimates based upon his view of marijuana production in Hawaii County, and it looks like we confiscated only about 10 to 12 percent of the crop in 1983, and that's a decrease from 1982.

We estimated in Hawaii County in the year before that we were getting 15 to 20 percent of the crop. That means we're confiscating more marijuana but less of the total crop because there is more marijuana being grown every year.

The problem is getting greater, and it's very easy to see why the problem is growing out of control. I remember Chief Francis Keala of the Honolulu Police Department telling me a couple of years ago that marijuana coming across the border from Mexico sold for \$50 a pound. Colombian marijuana sold for about \$500 a pound, and Hawaii marijuana sold for up to \$3,500 a pound, and I just heard recently that it's going as high as \$4,500 a pound for marijuana grown in Hawaii.

To give you an example, a couple of years ago, they confiscated a case of Hawaiian marijuana in Chicago. The growers get these home canning kits from Sears or whatever, and they can 1 pound cans of marijuana and ship it to the mainland, and we caught a

case of this in Chicago and it had on the outside of the can, Maui chips or something.

But, the case, 24 1-pound cans, sold for over \$50,000. They even had examples of California marijuana being sent to Hawaii to be mailed from Hawaii and just because it was mailed from Hawaii, the price went up.

It's something that's just going out of control throughout our country and certainly in Hawaii.

And, one of the more insidious parts of it is not just what it does to our kids, but the life threatening tactics that are being utilized in our hills and in our valleys. It's just going out of control up there. I understand you heard earlier this morning from California about life-threatening tactics.

We have seen the same things. We see boobytraps, punji sticks, shotgun shell boobytraps, flares to warn growers when we're going up in to the valleys, fish hooks that are strung from the trees at eye level that catch you, and wires to trap helicopters.

I've brought an example of a shotgun-shell boobytrap that we actually sprung in Kalihi Valley, which is only about 4 or 5 miles from my office in the State capital.

This is a typical boobytrap that the marijuana growers use. It's pretty crude, but it's effective. In the back, they have what appears to be a rattrap, and the rattrap is set with a trip wire. Right in the center is a nail, and it's devised so that when the trap is sprung, it strikes the nail, which in turn sets off the shotgun shell.

Now, this particular one here has a tripwire, and the policeman came along and found the tripwire. The boobytrap was tied to a tree, and he found the tripwire and he cut it. But, he didn't know there was a second tripwire, and he hit the second tripwire and set off a 20-gauge shotgun shell. You can see the powder burns on the back of the trap.

Fortunately, the charge missed the policeman. This is not unusual. Also, we have flares. This is a stake they put in the ground, and it's got a flare device with a tripwire, and the policeman hit the tripwire and it set off the flare which warned the growers up in the valleys that we were on the way.

We have examples of hikers being turned away from the valleys and mountains by growers. I know pig hunters make a special effort to avoid going in certain areas where they know marijuana is growing.

We have had examples in which marijuana growers disappeared from the face of the Earth. There were two up in a place called Kipapa Gulch, that disappeared. We never heard from them since, and we speculate that they met with foul play, either because they raided someone else's marijuana patch or they defended their own.

Two years ago, all of the major law enforcement agencies in Hawaii, composed of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. attorney, my office, the Coast Guard, the county police departments, the FBI, Naval Investigative Service and Army CID, formed an informal task force that we called the statewide Hawaii narcotics task force which brought together all of our resources to attack the problem of drugs in the State, and, in particular, the cultivation of marijuana.

I dedicated an attorney to the U.S. Attorney's Office who was cross-designated as a special assistant U.S. attorney to prosecute the cases that the task force brought, and we brought lots of cases. We had a very effective program.

The Coast Guard gave us a C-130 to bring in people and materiel to the Big Island, for example. We attacked the growers in Volcanoes National Park on the Big Island, and we made a lot of cases. Last year, we prosecuted and convicted and sentenced a grower, University of Hawaii student, to 6 years in Federal prison for marijuana cultivation.

It was just incredible how effective that program was, and the park service can tell you that we virtually eliminated marijuana growing in the national parks. The growers moved next door onto our State land.

The statewide Hawaii narcotics task force disbanded last year because of the DEA at the national level. The local level supported it 100 percent, gave us space and phones and support. However, the national level yanked it because it wasn't, as I understand, an official task force. It didn't fit the bureaucratic definition of an official task force, and also the Attorney General was coming on line with a law enforcement coordinating committee in Hawaii which allegedly would do the same thing.

The law enforcement coordinating committee in Hawaii has been very effective. We had a prosecutor instructor that the law enforcement coordinating committee brought on for 4 months, December through about March of this year, who trained our local prosecutors in prosecuting drug cases and other cases. It was very effective, but it was not really designed to do what the statewide task force did, and it's unfortunate that DEA pulled its support because the task force fell apart as a result.

There are several other things I'd like to bring up in overview.

One is, I cannot stress strongly enough how effective Western States Information Network [WSIN] is to our Western States. It's funded by the Department of Justice. The Department of Justice always eliminates WSIN from its budget, and, thankfully, Congress always sticks the budget back in.

I have submitted a copy of the WSIN 1984 marijuana report which is just hot off the press. It gives you a good overview of marijuana production in the West. I also gave you WSIN's annual report. It's just an outstanding program. Since 1981, WSIN has been responsible for 1,300 drug-related arrests, and over \$200 million in confiscations of narcotics and property in narcotics arrests. It is just an outstanding program.

Briefly, on heroin transshipment, there is a possibility that Hawaii could become one of the major, if not already became one of the major transshipment, points for heroin coming out of Asia.

Last year, customs confiscated 56.4 pounds of 90 percent pure heroin coming through the airport. We also have an airport task force of six police officers and three DEA agents, and that body has to take care of all of the transshipments, uncover all the transshipments of drugs through and into and out of the islands.

So, you can imagine, we don't have the law enforcement support that we really need, particularly if we're becoming one of the major transshipment places for drugs coming out of Asia.

We see an increase in cocaine coming into Hawaii. The price is dropping, but the amounts are increasing.

One of the members of our airport detail told me before I came up here that they are afraid that we may become another Miami, and the problem is that we just don't have the support, we don't have the police support, the law enforcement support, that places like Miami can gather.

Two other areas. One, look-alike drugs are skyrocketing in Hawaii. We are making more and more arrests of people that we find are possessing only look-alikes. I think we're going to be the 40th State to have look-alike legislation.

I've brought with me here some examples: look-alike quaaludes, look-alike black beauties. These were confiscated in drug busts. Look-alike LSD tabs. This is a national problem, and it needs national legislation. It's not enough just to have the individual States attack look-alike problems. The kids are dying from overdosing on look-alikes; they are dying on overdosing when suddenly they are not taking look-alikes, but they are taking the real thing.

The other problem is drug paraphernalia. I don't see our State passing a law outlawing paraphernalia, at least in the near future. I haven't been able to get a State law through on drug paraphernalia, but paraphernalia is infecting our community.

I had an undercover officer go in and buy in a headshop downtown. He bought all kinds of things. The saleswoman told him what he needed in order to free base, sold him a free-basing cocaine pipe, sold him a free-basing kit, sold him a book telling him how to do it, and said you need these things to do it safely so you don't wind up like Richard Pryor.

I'm just aghast that these things can be sold in our streets. Anybody can walk in and buy this stuff, and I've got examples of it here with me today.

For example, cocaine travel kit complete with a little cocaine vial to carry your cocaine, a mirror, a made in United States razor blade, a metal straw, metal spoon. All innocent items, but sold for carrying cocaine. Costs \$26. And, they make a lot of money on it.

A cocaine free-basing pipe costs \$7.25. It's got a little screen in there. It's got a nice picture of a rose etched on the stem, and they tell you how to use it. Made in the U.S.A.

They make them attractive. It's becoming kind of an "in thing" to do. There is a message being communicated out there. Here's a \$13 mirror. It's real fancy. It's got its own grooves so you don't have to line up your cocaine, you just push it into the grooves, and you can snort it right out of those grooves, and it's kind of a joke.

It's a simulated hundred dollar bill, with the picture of a guy that looks like he's on a drug trip, called Head West, and it's called the United Flakes of America. This is a "Federal Reserve Nose," and "this nose is tender for all coke, whacked or not." You know it's a joke, but if the kids perceive that cocaine use is a joke out in the community, then it's OK. It's a funny thing; it's not something that's really deadly serious. It's not something to be afraid of.

And then they have things like, I'm sure you have seen them, carburetor smoking devices. This is a glass tube with three chambers in it, and you put your marijuana cigarette or whatever you're smoking, heroin, whatever you're smoking, in a hole at one end.

Then you smoke it from the other end. What happens is the chambers fill up with smoke, and you let it go, and it shoots into your lungs and you get a deeper high because it's going down into your lungs deeper. And, when you go into the shops, they'll tell you how to use it. It's legal to sell it, it's legal to sell the books, it's legal to advertise for it. What I perceive is the main problem with drug paraphernalia, in allowing it to proliferate in the community, its advertisement to everybody that drug use is OK.

If you want to be in, you've got to snort or smoke cocaine. Cocaine is what the middle class America does. What the successful young men do. What up and coming young ladies do.

In conclusion, I really appreciate the effort that's being done by this committee. It's helping put a message out in Hawaii and other places in our community that there is national attention to this problem. And, every time we have been able to work together, Federal, State, and county, we're effective.

We have efforts like the narcotics task force that are effective because we work together and not at odds. And, Hawaii has always enjoyed a unique experience of being together. We work together. We need to foster that experience more at the national level.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lilly appears on p. 103.]

Mr. AKAKA. Thank you very much. We'll hold our questions until later.

May I call on Lieutenant Wakita?

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES WAKITA, COMMANDING OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE VICE SECTION, HAWAII COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. WAKITA. Gentlemen, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you.

So as not to repeat the testimony provided by Mr. Lilly, I'll get into the enforcement area that Hawaii County uses for marijuana eradication.

The enforcement of all drugs, gambling, and morals laws is the primary responsibility of the Hawaii County Police Department Vice Section.

The vice section consists of only nine investigators and two supervisors. In an effort to put a dent into the marijuana production on the islands, the Hawaii County Police Department has undertaken a regular marijuana eradication mission since 1978.

Supplemented by uniformed patrol personnel, the vice section goes on frequent raids into the marijuana growing areas, and recovers as much marijuana as possible for destruction. In this effort, we have found that the helicopter is the most essential tool in obtaining any measure of success.

These missions have caused the growers to seek out more and more remote areas for marijuana cultivation, and they have developed a method of planting that minimizes the effects of any eradication mission on their overall crop. Marijuana crops are now being found 2 miles away from the end of the closest four wheel drive road in forests so thick that normal airlifting of police personnel into these crops are impossible.

To make matters more difficult, the marijuana crops are cultivated in plots consisting of not more than 20 plants, and these plots are scattered along trails throughout the forests for as long as 1 mile.

This causes the eradication effort to be time consuming and expensive. In an effort to counteract this strategy, Hawaii County, with the assistance of the FBI, Hawaii Volcano National Park Rangers, have trained county police officers to repel from helicopters into marijuana plants.

These harvested plants are then airlifted out of the area. In attempting to place as much pressure on marijuana growers as possible, our department has gone to as many sources of support that's necessary.

However, we have found that no one source has the ability or resources to contend with the requirements of a successful marijuana suppression program.

At the present, the bulk of this suppression program is being carried out by Hawaii County. We have obtained valuable support from the Drug Enforcement Administration in the form of monetary grants to support the State government with the use of the National Guard helicopters doing green-harvest operations.

From information developed, we find the primary meaning of export from Hawaii County is U.S. mail. In conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the U.S. Postal Service and the Hawaii County Police Department implemented Operation Pele.

This operation intercepted over 1,000 packages. 441 Federal search warrants were served on these packages. We seized approximately 700 pounds of high grade processed marijuana with a value total at \$1.3 million.

We have intercepted incoming drugs through this operation with a value of \$375,000. We have seized 45 vehicles with a value of \$170,000. And, we have seized incoming cash at \$14,800.

We have noticed an increasing connection between our marijuana trade and cocaine. The marijuana growers are now trading their marijuana for cocaine instead of cash. That's why we have so much cocaine coming into our county.

We have come across the cultivation of coca plants in our county on a regular basis.

Our biggest need is for helicopter support. The Drug Enforcement Administration gave \$30,000 to Hawaii County last year for marijuana eradication. With these funds, we eradicated 124,000 plants, valued at over \$8 million. We need this support again.

Mr. AKAKA. Thank you very much, Lieutenant Wakita.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. KANGEL. Let me welcome you here, and we were glad to hear from Congressman Akaka that our short visit there had stimulated more interest in the Federal Government to give both of you the opportunity to do a more effective job in that area.

And, it's my understanding that as it relates to the parcel post shipment of marijuana that we were able to come up with some better ideas to curtail that.

I assume that the strategic location of the State of Hawaii will cause you some special problems as long as we have this high degree of international drug trafficking.

But, one of the major reasons why we have revisited outside hearings this way in asking those people that we talked with in coming here is that we have a responsibility to report to the American people and our constituents as to what we are doing on the Federal level, and we meet with the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, and he assured us last week that he is working in partnership with local and State governments, that they believe that they are doing all that they can.

And, when we go to the sites, this is not what we hear from local law enforcement officers, and certainly in our last field trips, some people say the task force is here, but we've never met them. Whatever they are doing, they are doing.

But, this morning, were you here for Commissioner Ward's testimony?

Mr. LILLY. No, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. He's got 90 detectives in the task force, and that he's afraid he's going to have to pull them out because he doesn't know what they are doing and he needs his people on the street where the Federal Government hasn't even recognized there is a problem.

So, I guess what I'm asking is, What would you recommend that this committee do in terms of reporting to the Drug Enforcement Administration as to how they can be more helpful in your doing what you have to do? Lieutenant Wakita, I don't know whether you have the same problem that our policemen are having in New York, but to the general public, because of the widespread drug trafficking, there is a complete lack of respect for law enforcement.

Law enforcement is admitting that the problem is so out of hand that they are saying that it requires an international solution.

This morning, the police chief was talking about education as being one of the vital tools, and, so, I just want to know, do you think that your Federal Government is doing all they can do to allow you to do your job efficiently and effectively?

Mr. WAKITA. The local drug enforcement office in Honolulu is doing everything they can. Everything we have asked for they have given us, if they have the resources to do it.

They are presently shorthanded, and they still send people up to my island for the Operation Pele on a regular basis. They have had an agent sitting there throughout the full operation.

We understand if they can shake another agent loose, they send him up for a week or so.

Mr. RANGEL. I don't know what you're saying, Lieutenant. Are you saying that they are doing all they can with what they have to work with?

Mr. WAKITA. Yes, sir. I have no problems working with the Federal people.

Mr. RANGEL. Nobody has a problem in working with them. They are nice people.

The question is, Do you believe that the Federal Government is providing the resources for you to do your job effectively? That's—

Mr. WAKITA. No, sir, I don't.

Mr. RANGEL. I don't know why law enforcement finds that difficult. It's something they must have sent you fellows to the same

school where you are not supposed to complain, you're supposed to just march and you're supposed to say we're doing the best we can, and I hope that what has happened to New York doesn't happen to Honolulu because I have had police precinct commanders tell me that they need my help to close the smoke shops.

That the police got so frustrated that they just broke the neon signs because they can't even identify making a sale. They've got a steel wall up, a hole in the wall, they can't send a buyer in there, that just a hand comes out, and buyers are coming in from Jersey and Connecticut, and the police are telling me that it's out of control.

And, so, I'm hoping that we can find some way where you can feel that you're not violating any public trusts in sharing with us what you think we should be doing.

It doesn't mean that we're able to get those resources, it does mean that we have a responsibility to try to get the House to give more priority to this type of thing.

Mr. WAKITA. Let me give you an example, sir.

The State of Hawaii is earmarked for \$165,000 from DEA for the next fiscal year for marijuana eradication. This is below what we requested, collectively.

They have made a request for an additional quarter of a million dollars earmarked for the State of Hawaii, and my information is it's hung up someplace. It left DEA and it's hung up someplace and nobody is telling where it's at.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, you have not only a personable and distinguished Congressman, but a rather influential Congressman and we hope that you share these things with him because that's why he gives the Congress and this committee so much of his time, in trying to accelerate and expedite your requests.

And, believe me, we hope that you're successful in Hawaii. We don't want to hear horror stories that things are working out all right, because it's not just marijuana eradication, it was rather dramatic for us to see the degree in which that had to sell to agriculture production.

But, we're concerned with other drug problems as well.

Mr. LILLY. If I could identify just a few areas where the national level could assist us, one is restore the statewide narcotics task force, which DEA at the national level yanked, not the local level. I think why Charlie Wakita said nice things about the local DEA is that they are things I would echo.

We work well with our local law enforcement at all levels, Federal, State, and county. The local DEA and our office works very well together. It was committed to the statewide narcotics task force that we formed and we were being very effective.

My understanding is that the DEA at the national level yanked it because we didn't fit into an official, formal task force. And, so, they yanked it.

Now, that was an effective program. Restore that.

We need more money set aside for National Guard helicopter use. Right now, we've got a problem because whenever we have an emergency like Pele erupting or a hurricane, they use up all the National Guard moneys in the emergencies and those are the same moneys that are allocated to the training programs that we use in

Green Harvest. We need money set aside specifically for training programs, that would be used for Green Harvest operations.

We need more agents, DEA agents, for example, at the airport. We've got three DEA agents in our airport task force, and they are responsible, they and six police officers, are the people responsible for interdicting, investigating and getting drugs going through the airports and all the islands. And, now, we've got planes going in and out of Maui and Kona as well directly. So, we're really spread thin. So, we need that.

We also need more customs agents to interdict drugs coming in from Asia, particularly since we are becoming a major transshipment point.

And, finally, I'd say we need to get the military at the highest level to be committed to making their material available and their personnel available to assist Green Harvest operation.

Until they tell their people in Hawaii that they've got to be committed to this, we're not going to get the material and personnel in Hawaii from the military.

"Operation Pele" and "Operation Wilt" should be reviewed by the Postal Service and DEA, respectively, for implementation nationwide.

And the sale and possession of look-alike drugs and drug paraphernalia should be made Federal crimes.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, we know that you've come a great distance to share this with us. I will personally be working with Mr. Akaka to see whether or not we can arrange with some people in the administration to meet with them to address their request. I'm doing the same thing in New York. And, it could very well be that we're talking at each other and not with each other.

But, the administration allowed us to believe that they were doing all that they could. So, we want to thank you and if there are any recommendations and ideas that you have that you didn't get a chance to express today, the record will remain open, and I want to thank Mr. Akaka for arranging to bring you here.

I assume that someone explained to you that we are attempting to revisit, we don't intend to be going into congressional districts and getting a lot of publicity and just leaving. We do hope that you continue to maintain communications with us. You're a very important State with a very important Congressman.

Thank you.

Mr. LILLY. Thank you very much. I appreciate your interest out in Hawaii. It gives local law enforcement, when they see the national level and the Congress showing an interest, gives us a feeling that we're going to get the support we need.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you for coming.

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, may I—

Mr. RANGEL. I'm terribly sorry. Mr. Akaka.

Mr. AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Lilly, and Mr. Wakita.

We certainly thank you for coming. You were just questioned by the chairman of our committee, a champion fighting against narcotics internationally, as well as nationally.

Chairman Rangel has worked arduously and endlessly in trying to determine the kind of problems we have in our country, and by hearings like this, we look forward to fashioning some program

that will be able to help you folks in enforcement or in justice to be able to interdict and eradicate the abuse of narcotics in our country.

What is so important about this is that it's a menace to mankind, and our chairman should be commended for what he is doing in this area.

You mentioned the official task force that was pulled apart because DEA pulled out of it. The orders came from the national level.

Was there any attempt made to refashion or reestablish this task force?

Mr. LILLY. No formal efforts have been made to reestablish the task force. There have been informal attempts, but we just received a letter last year from the DEA saying that they were disbanding it, withdrawing their material, their spaces, and their phones. It was an abrupt sort of end to the task force.

Mr. AKAKA. I would ask the committee to inquire into this with the hope that we can find some means of reestablishing it on the basis of your report that it was working well, and it was attacking the problem of narcotics in Hawaii.

You also mentioned about the Western States I.N. magazine.

Mr. LILLY. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKAKA. And, reported that there was not enough funding for that magazine.

What's the status of that now?

Mr. LILLY. Well, let me just say, this is one of the many reports WSIN put out. It's a functioning, working organization. I think we have something on the order of 500 plus law enforcement agencies in the five Pacific States that are members of this organization.

Every quarter, we admit new members. It is effective. I'd say that their funding is adequate. What happens is that the Department of Justice funds WSIN. Its budget allocates funds for the different regional drug task agencies throughout the Nation, and WSIN is one of them.

And the Department of Justice eliminates WSIN budget every year when it is brought to Congress, and every year, fortunately, Congress replaces those funds into the Department of Justice. This is a really effective program because what it basically does is bring the drug law enforcement agencies of the five Pacific States together.

If I'm working a drug case, I can call up WSIN today, right now, I've got an 800 number, and I can tell them I'm working this suspect, and they will go to the computer and they will find officers who are maybe working the same suspect in one or more other agencies, and they will connect me to that person, and then it's up to me and that person if we're going to share our information.

And, as a direct result of that sharing of information, we've made 1,300 arrests in just 3 years now.

Mr. AKAKA. What would you suggest the committee do to improve these programs throughout the country.

Is this a program that needs more Federal support?

Mr. LILLY. This is. To continue its support. It is Congress, and not the administration, that has been responsible for WSIN to con-

tinue to exist and to continue to make drug arrests and to support law enforcement in the five Pacific States.

So, I commend Congress for its effort to continue to replace the funds for WSIN in the Department of Justice, and I recommend certainly that one of the things that this body does is continue to support the regional agencies, of which WSIN is one, and I think WSIN is the most effective of the four or five agencies like this in the country.

WSIN is the most effective regional agency. This is one that's looked at as the model for how a regional agency is to be run.

Mr. AKAKA. You also reported that cocaine has been on the increase in Hawaii.

Do you have an idea of where this is coming from?

Mr. LILLY. It's coming from the mainland, mostly. South America and the mainland, coming on the planes.

Mr. AKAKA. You also mentioned that the No. 1 way of exporting marijuana out of the State has been through the U.S. mail.

Mr. LILLY. We suspected that, and I think Operation Pele has confirmed that that is the case.

Mr. AKAKA. Second, you mentioned that the commercial airlines was possibly the second way.

What's being done on that second method of exporting?

Mr. LILLY. Well, we have the airport detail, and they have drug sniffing dogs down there. Certainly, they cannot, with their limited resources, their limited dogs, they cannot even begin to hit all of the baggage that's going out of the airport.

But, we know there's a lot of marijuana that's going out through the baggage, going out of the planes and the airport.

We have our dogs and our task force at Honolulu International Airport. We don't have the support, we don't have the means, to do the same thing on the other islands. Out of Kona, for example, or out of Kahului, on Maui.

Mr. AKAKA. I know, Mr. Lilly, that you have been instrumental in the activities of eradicating drugs in Hawaii.

What has your office been most effective in narcotics interdiction?

Mr. LILLY. I think we were really effective in the statewide narcotics task force, and dedicating a prosecutor to prosecute drug offenses in the Federal courts.

I think we were effective this year in passing the look-alike drug legislation. We have not, generally been very effective in getting local legislation, strong legislation, through the legislature.

I suppose if you were to ask me if I were to assess what I thought how effective I'd been in my effort, because I have taken a personal interest in drug abuse in Hawaii, it is in attempting to be instrumental in helping to bring law enforcement together.

That's really been my effort, primarily my effort, as well as trying to get legislation passed. But, that's not been too effective.

Mr. AKAKA. You also reported about paraphernalia being sold in the marketplace.

Is there any possibility of any law being passed in the State?

Mr. LILLY. I see no possibility.

Mr. AKAKA. No possibility.

Mr. LILLY. None whatsoever. I think 37 States have passed that legislation. And, paraphernalia is being advertised nationally. It's being advertised in Hawaii, and it's a legal commodity in Hawaii.

It's something that ought to be eradicated nationwide. It's not just a local problem because it's imported. It's not manufactured locally. None of these things are made in Hawaii. They are made in some other State and brought in.

Mr. AKAKA. Well, maybe the committee might be able to take that into consideration.

Finally, Mr. Lilly, what do you think of the Federal Government relationship with the State and the local government and the kind of assistance they have given you? Have you been satisfied? Would you expect more assistance than they have given you?

Mr. LILLY. I've been very satisfied with U.S. Attorney Dan Bent in the support that we've received from him. I have been very satisfied with the local Drug Enforcement Administration, in particular Les Thompson, help that they provide with their resources.

But, those areas that I mentioned earlier, I'm not satisfied with. I'm not satisfied with the local DEA being pulled out of our task force.

And, I suppose I could understand the bureaucratic reasons from the national level, but I don't agree with them. I think that here is an innovative, creative program set up by local law enforcement.

We got together on our own. It wasn't in the book anywhere. We just sat down and we formed it together, and created a body that didn't exist before, and pooled together all of our resources to create an organization that was remarkably effective.

We've got the statistics. We've got the convictions. I don't think you can find anywhere where somebody was given 6 years in Federal prison for cultivating marijuana, and the reason why that guy went to prison for 6 years is that the U.S. attorney went into court and really hammered home in the sentencing phase the nature of the marijuana problem, how serious it is to our community, how serious it is to our kids, how it's growing, and how we've got to put a stop to it now.

This was a program that was effective.

Mr. AKAKA. You mentioned earlier about the task force being pulled out, that you received a letter from DEA on that.

Mr. LILLY. Yes; I did.

Mr. AKAKA. May I ask you to submit that letter for the record?

Mr. LILLY. I will send it to you.

Mr. AKAKA. Lieutenant Wakita, you particularly spoke on enforcement here, and you mentioned in your testimony Operation Wilt.

Mr. WAKITA. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKAKA. What is that? What did you use?

Mr. WAKITA. We sprayed marijuana in our canefields. We used a diesel oil emulsion.

Last year, the sugar planters association approached Hawaii County Police Department and their supervisors were being threatened, the workers threatened, their field equipment was being vandalized, and they had a hunch it was because of marijuana growers in the canefields.

They requested assistance. We worked with them. They developed the herbicide, that killed the marijuana plants— I'm sorry. It's not considered a herbicide. It killed the marijuana plants and will do nothing to the cane.

Mr. AKAKA. How long have you been using that compound?

Mr. WAKITA. We started about 2 months ago, and we have sprayed approximately one-fourth on the cane lands in the county.

Mr. AKAKA. Have you received any complaints yet?

Mr. WAKITA. No, sir; people complain about it if somebody picks it up and smokes it.

It's private land, plantations tell me they are not supposed to be growing on our land anyway, and if you're growing on our lands and we spray it, you smoke it, that's your problem.

The plantation is funding this entire project because we don't have enough funds to do it. They are hiring the special helicopters to do the spraying; they are providing the so-called herbicide.

Mr. AKAKA. Do you use any paraquat?

Mr. WAKITA. No, sir.

Mr. AKAKA. Now —

Mr. WAKITA. If I may, what this is is 20 gallons of diesel, 80 gallons of water, with an emulsion in it that mixes it all up so that it will blend, and that's all it is.

Mr. AKAKA. Do you use any coloring?

Mr. WAKITA. No, sir; it's almost instantaneously. Within hours, the plants will start shriveling up and you know it's been treated. The diesel oil color on the plant will show this, and it's highly effective.

Mr. AKAKA. How do you apply this?

Mr. WAKITA. From a special broom in a Hughes 500-D helicopter. We have a police officer sitting in the doorway that's strapped in. The helicopter will hover right over the patch, and the police officer will spray it, and then he'll hover over to the next patch.

Mr. AKAKA. Since you have been using it 2 months, what would you say the effect of it has been?

Mr. WAKITA. 100 percent of what we sprayed is dead.

Mr. AKAKA. What would you say the cost of that —

Mr. WAKITA. The helicopter runs \$500 an hour. I don't know exactly the amount of hours flown. I would say in the area of 50 hours.

Two hundred and fifty gallons of this solution costs \$120. So, it's not that expensive. If we were to go in manually and eradicate these fields, it would take about 5 or 10 times the flying hours that we've used so far. And, more manpower.

Mr. AKAKA. Is this being used in any other place?

Mr. WAKITA. No, sir; we have permission from Bishop Estate to go into their private lands and spray, if we wish. We have permission from Campbell Estate to go into their lands for marijuana control, any type of marijuana control we feel is necessary. We have approached the State, and we are waiting for an opinion on whether we can go into the State lands.

As of yet, we haven't gotten anything back.

Mr. CUSACK. Could you tell us this concept of using diesel oil and water in an emulsion, was that an original idea of some technicians out in Hawaii?

Mr. WAKITA. Well, sir, when the plantations approached us, they were worried about the sugar cane. It had to be something that would not damage the sugar cane.

So what we did is we went out in the fields and we brought back about 80 to 100 plants, and we started raising them on our roof.

The chemists that were hired by the plantations came up on a regular basis to try different solutions on the plants. Solutions that would not damage the cane, and they came up with this, through their experiments. The experiments lasted about 4 or 5 months.

Mr. LOWE. Lieutenant, have you shared this process, this development, with DEA?

Mr. WAKITA. Yesterday morning, sir.

Mr. LOWE. I'm sorry?

Mr. WAKITA. I shared it with them yesterday morning when I met with them.

Mr. LOWE. Could you tell us of their reaction or if they expressed an interest? I mean, obviously, the point that we're making here is that if this has been successful, you have developed a method of crop eradication or marijuana eradication which can be aerially utilized without any kind of pesticide, and that would seem to me to solve the major objection to aerial spraying in this country and that perhaps can be suggested worldwide.

Mr. WAKITA. DEA is right now experimenting, I believe, with several other herbicides, and the people I talked to said they didn't even consider diesel oil because it's not a herbicide. They are interested in it right now, and they are doing run studies on it, the soil absorption of the diesel, et cetera.

Mr. LOWE. Now, as I understand it, this is effective in its destruction capabilities and it does not leave any negative residual to the soil or to the crops—to other crops; is that correct?

Mr. WAKITA. Not to sugar cane, no, sir. It doesn't bother the sugar cane at all or the plantations wouldn't have come up with it and let us use it in their sugar cane.

Mr. LOWE. I would strongly suggest that there be some effort on your part to publicize this. I mean, this is a very exciting prospect.

Mr. WAKITA. It's been in the papers all over the State of Hawaii.

Mr. LILLY. We're still experimenting with it. It looks like it's effective. There is some suggestion that some of the marijuana can survive it, but on balance it has been most effective.

Mr. CUSACK. In addition, at \$120 for 250 gallons, that's relatively low cost.

That enables you to increase the ratio of 20 gallons to 80 gallons when you run into a marijuana plant that the 20 to 80 ratio fails to destroy.

Mr. WAKITA. Let me—if I may? Right now, it's our early growing season for the long-range season. The plants that we are spraying now are very small. We don't know what effect it has if these plants are 6 or 8 feet. We are spraying everywhere from seedlings up to 3 or 4 feet, and it's killing them.

Now, if we have a fully developed tree sitting there, we don't know what it will do to it. I do believe it would be just as effective, however.

Mr. LOWE. May I make one more point, Mr. Akaka?

I would think that Mr. Akaka and the rest of this committee would be very interested in learning the results of your attempts to spray the more mature plants, and might I suggest that you let us know of the results—

Mr. WAKITA. I will.

Mr. LOWE [continuing]. On the more mature plants? We'd be very interested in that obviously because what we would then do is try to ensure that DEA carefully considered this approach.

Mr. WAKITA. They are very interested in it.

Mr. LOWE. OK. Thank you.

Mr. AKAKA. Lieutenant, we really are grateful for this information. We hope that you will continue to experiment with it on the more mature plants.

Mr. WAKITA. We will.

Mr. AKAKA. And, see how it works out as well as lending an ear to the community and see what reactions we get. This committee is very, very interested in what you have done.

We also know, Lieutenant Wakita, that you were a key person in Operation Pele.

Mr. WAKITA. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKAKA. This has been publicized nationally, and we know that you've stemmed some of the flow of marijuana out of the State as exports.

Mr. WAKITA. Yes; sir.

Mr. AKAKA. Do you have any idea of what's happening now? Are the growers exporting it by other means?

Mr. WAKITA. They are still using the post office. We have 32 post offices on my island, and we targeted 10, 5 on the west side of the island, 5 on the east side.

During the operation, we found out that when they found out we were doing this, they just moved to different post offices.

We had two phases; one was an intelligence gathering phase, and this was supposed to run from October to the Christmas break. We were inundated with packages by 2 weeks into November. We had to stop. We had so many packages we couldn't handle the volume.

The second phase was the investigative phase which we have just completed. And, this was building cases against people to take to the grand jury. We are about to go to the Federal grand jury on several cases, and the State grand jury on the rest.

The third phase is to choke off that island, to hit every post office, and let people know that we're there and you don't mail off the island of Hawaii.

If we don't find another means, it's going to take too much manpower, we estimate 150 people, to shut off an entire island. All 32 post offices.

We are trying to work around it and figure out a means for obtaining this manpower.

Mr. AKAKA. How have the growers on a big island reacted to Operation Pele?

Mr. WAKITA. There are a lot of people leaving my county and going elsewhere.

There are people we are looking for to investigate that are no longer in Hawaii County.

Mr. AKAKA. Now, what kind of people are these that you suspect to be growers? Are they what you might call local people or people who have lived in Hawaii?

Mr. WAKITA. No, sir; these are people from the mainland. On the most part. The people from the mainland come out there and cultivate marijuana for 3 or 4 years, get their little nest egg and then move back to the mainland, and go into, I would imagine, a normal business.

We have some of these people that because it's so lucrative, they have stayed there. They are there for 5, 6, 7 years. But, they are, on the most part, from the mainland.

We do have local people that are growing. We found that the local people don't have the contacts on the mainland for the exportation of marijuana.

Mr. AKAKA. Do you suspect that some of the local growers have worked with mainland growers?

Mr. WAKITA. Yes.

Mr. AKAKA. To market the marijuana?

Mr. WAKITA. Yes.

Mr. AKAKA. Is there any possibility of Operation Pele being used again?

Mr. WAKITA. We are looking for a commitment from the Postal Service to implement phase 3. If we have the commitment and manpower, we need the Postal Service. They are the only people that can take mail out of the post office.

When we have their manpower commitment, DEA gives their manpower commitment, we're going into phase 3. When will they make this commitment available, we don't know.

If this committee has any influence over the Postal Service, it would be a great help.

Mr. AKAKA. Well, we do work with the Postal Service here in Congress. Being a member of this committee, as well as a member of the Subcommittee of Treasury and Postal Services Appropriations, this is something I think that we need to followup on, and I feel that is the reason why I'm asking questions about Operation Pele, this might be considered by the States as a method of stopping growers using the post office.

Mr. WAKITA. Yes, sir.

Mr. AKAKA. As an operation in the States, and I hope we can make the information available so the States may be able to use it.

Mr. WAKITA. If I may add, sir, we knew we had a problem. We definitely knew we had a problem with the mail, marijuana in the mail.

When we started this operation, we got blown out of the water. We didn't realize the problem was that great. And, neither did the Postal Service.

That is why we went into a 3 week intelligence gathering and we had to stop. We were so inundated with marijuana parcels that we had to stop.

Mr. AKAKA. The report was that 80 percent of the mail coming out of your island—

Mr. WAKITA. I'd like to—we've heard that.

Mr. AKAKA. Of marijuana?

Mr. WAKITA. Eighty percent of the packages coming out of one post office.

Mr. AKAKA. Out of one post office.

Mr. WAKITA. One post office, not the entire island.

Mr. AKAKA. Now, have there been any post offices—where more than 80 percent contained marijuana?

Mr. WAKITA. No, sir; not that I know of.

Mr. LILLY. If I may, there was one story about one post office that wasn't setting any suspected packages aside, and we were getting a lot of them from all the other post offices. What we did was we gave them a profile, and they were supposed to set-aside all the packages that fit the profile.

And, the first 132 we set-aside had a 100-percent hit, they all had drugs in them. And, this one post office had no packages, and the Postal Service called up and asked them why they weren't setting any packages aside, and the postal agent down there said, well, if I set-aside all the packages that fit the profile, I'd have to set them all aside. They all fit. And, she said that's all she would be doing, is setting packages aside. She wouldn't be doing anything else.

Mr. AKAKA. Well, it sounds to me like almost 100 percent.

Mr. LILLY. Almost.

Mr. AKAKA. Well, I want to commend you, Mr. Lilly, and you, Mr. Wakita, and the people you represent for your fine work in eradicating and interdicting narcotics in Hawaii.

And, as was mentioned by the chairman, we want to learn all we can so that we can help as much as we can what you are doing out there.

Are there any other questions?

[No response.]

Mr. AKAKA. Well, thank you, thank you very much.

Mr. LILLY. Thank you very much.

Mr. AKAKA. At this time, I thank all the witnesses for your testimony, your presence here, and I'll adjourn this hearing until 1:30 p.m.

[Whereupon at 1 p.m., the select committee recessed, to reconvene at 1:30 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Mr. ORTIZ. The Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control will now come to order. We are very happy to have our colleague and friend, Tom Lewis, and his panel here today. Whenever he's ready, he can go ahead and introduce the members of his panel.

TESTIMONY OF HON. THOMAS LEWIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Mr. LEWIS. Thank you much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, there is probably no greater threat to the quality of life for all Floridians today than the pervasive drug trade. Due to Florida's easy access from Latin American and other drug-producing countries in the Caribbean, this problem will only grow worse in coming years as long as the

demand for the drugs remains high and the traffickers continue to profit from this criminal adventurism.

While many steps have been taken over the past years to interdict and arrest some of the smugglers and traffickers, it seems as though we are only able to stop the little guys, and even these arrests and seizures are somewhat sporadic and haphazard.

I requested that the committee hold hearings in south Florida last fall to assess the efforts of the South Florida Task Force, State and local law enforcement, and State and local treatment programs. So much of the emphasis on drug interdiction in south Florida in the past has centered around the city of Miami. However, now that the task force is in place, smugglers have pushed their operations north, up the coast of Florida, and west to the open rangelands and wilderness in the central part of the State.

Perhaps one of the most poignant moments during the October hearing was the testimony of Mayor Askren of Everglades City, who described the devastating impact illicit drug trafficking had on this community.

This sleepy fishing village changed almost overnight to a bustling port of business, where citizens who got involved in the illegal drug trade experienced a sharp upturn in their annual income. Such a disruption was felt by whole families, who had been used to "just getting by" and now were enjoying the financial benefits of such a lucrative but illegal business.

Mayor Askren was followed by representatives from the South Florida Task Force who not only described their program as one that is working well, but also one that communicates regularly with State and local law enforcement.

However, when local law enforcement officials testified, the committee learned that this was not the case. There were serious gaps in cooperative communication and effort in combatting the drug trade in Florida.

Therefore, in an effort to more accurately assess the specific concerns of local law enforcement in drug interdiction and recommend areas where communication and cooperation between the Feds and locals can be enhanced, the committee will be holding a follow-up conference next month in West Palm Beach.

Mr. Chairman, it is quite clear that unless our efforts to combat this enormous problem of drug trafficking in Florida are effectively coordinated, the results after years of operation will be far from desirable.

I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that Sheriff Jim Holt of Martin County, and his assistant, Lt. John Murphy, head of the narcotics division, are here today. Sheriff Holt provided good testimony before the committee in October, noting some of the gaps in radar coverage, the need for improved communication with the Feds, and the need for more officers on duty to catch the increasing number of drug smugglers in Martin County.

It was clear from his testimony that some smugglers' operations seem to be moving northward from Miami. But, since the focus of south Florida's task force still seems to be south of areas like Martin County, the smugglers are profiting from the lack of adequate Federal, State, and local resources to make the necessary interdictions and arrests.

However, Sheriff Holt and his department are to be commended, for they are responsible for the seizure of hundreds of tons of illicit drugs. This amount includes one of the largest seizures of marijuana in the United States, 57 tons, Mr. Chairman.

Last October, the committee also examined some of the prevention and treatment programs in south Florida. I am delighted to welcome back Gary Frechette, who is with the Palm Beach County school system and who presented such lively testimony before the committee last fall.

With the full support of the Palm Beach County School Board, Gary initiated a unique and successful program to reach out to children of all ages and provide them with accurate information about drugs, as well as build a positive peer group of support for them to live drug-free lives. It's important to reach children early, before they make their first decision about taking drugs. How early? Gary generally starts working with youngsters in kindergarten, although I understand that he very recently has begun working with 4 year olds, Mr. Chairman.

Although the children have responded enthusiastically to Gary, he testified last October that the parents of students seemed less involved with drug prevention efforts in the schools. The committee can recall Gary's description of a typical evening parents' meeting at a local school where only one parent showed up. Since the well publicized Chemical People project last November, I am sure the committee will be interested to learn if there has been any increase in attendance and interest among parents in Palm Beach County.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the committee has a second opportunity to hear from these very dedicated public servants, and I look forward to hearing their comments and analysis of what steps have been taken recently to bolster their local efforts and programs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lewis appears on p. 118.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you very much.

Would you like to introduce the members of your panel?

Mr. LEWIS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

We have with us Sheriff Jim Holt, and the chief of his narcotics division, Lt. Murphy, and Mr. Gary Frechette, from the Palm Beach County School Board, who has the drug program with the Palm Beach County School Board.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you very much. Again, welcome to the committee. We are very happy to have you with us. Who would like to begin with the testimony this afternoon?

TESTIMONY OF SHERIFF JAMES HOLT, MARTIN COUNTY, FL

Mr. Holt. Well, being that the sheriff is always under the gun, I might as well just start off.

Gentlemen, first, let me say again thank you. It's a great honor for me to come to Washington to be before this committee again here in the great Capital of our United States.

I am afraid I don't have too much good news to bring to the committee. I haven't been able to notice any difference as far as the

task forces are concerned or cooperation is concerned since our last meeting down in West Palm Beach.

We still have the problem that we had in south Florida. As a matter of fact I think we've had just recently, within the last month, one large major bust of marijuana coming into the area that has moved from the Pompano Beach area, which is down closer to the Fort Lauderdale area, had moved into our area, and was operating there.

We do have some suggestions that maybe some time in the near future, that we can get better cooperation, better communication between all of us that are trying to combat this problem.

The problem is not going to go away. I think it's here, it's here for a long time, and I think we're all just going to have to pull together more, work harder, try to combat it in a more effective effort than we have in the past.

We have seen quite recently on television that Colombia made a big bust down there and destroyed a large factory of cocaine. There was another interdiction process there in, I believe it was our port in Cuba, where there was a large amount of cocaine, something like 22,000 pounds of cocaine that was stopped before it reached our shores.

Although we are stopping some and we are seeing some of the other countries that are destroying some, we feel in the business of law enforcement that there is still an enormous amount of cocaine, marijuana and the methaqualudes in our areas. It is still coming into our country, and the best barometer that we have to measure this is the price of the drug, and we have seen cocaine go down considerably in the wholesale market from what it was just a very few years ago, 2 months ago. It continues to drop.

So, this only tells us that there is more available. We are seeing people now involved in cocaine that just a little while ago could not afford it. It's now becoming more of an effective drug, and the people that didn't have the money to afford it when it was such an expensive drug, are now becoming involved with it.

We're seeing more and more of this in the younger people that are not in the higher income categories, that are now involved in the cocaine use. So, it is still a major problem. I still say that we need to cooperate more among all of us in law enforcement to try to combat this.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. Do you have a Federal task force? I am sorry I did not make the hearings that were held in Florida, I had other commitments. How is the task force working out?

Mr. HOLT. Yes, sir. I'm quite sure there is a task force in south Florida. I've seen it on television, and I've also read it in the newspapers.

I have never met with anyone from the task force. No one from the task force has ever been in our area, to my knowledge. No one has ever sat down and talked with me.

In my 20-some-odd years in the field of law enforcement, I am no better than the people that I work for make me, and why I'm saying this is I have to gather intelligence from the street or the area which I am working to effectively do my job.

If I say so, I think maybe if we did have a task force that would come in and maybe get intelligence from the locals or assist the locals, I think they could pick up a lot more intelligence, and we have had instances where they would follow an airplane from down around Cuba some place, and follow it all the way to the coast of Florida, fly over us in the sky, then lose the airplane and call us at that time and say we've lost an airplane at certain coordinates.

By the time we get there, of course, if there ever was any drugs on the airplane, it's gone, and everybody is away and gone. We did find one abandoned airplane one time.

But, if they would just give us this information that we got an airplane that we are suspicious of, it's flying low, there's no lights, it is coming all the way from down south, within 20 minutes, I can cover every airstrip or where a plane can land within my county.

And, I can also pretty safely say that the counties north, west and south of me can do the same thing, if we just knew they were coming in that direction.

I would love to cover these airstrips, I would love to cover these drop zones, and be there and catch these people, prosecute them, and then let the sentence fall where it may. Follow it in and then lose it in an area and the people are gone and the drugs are still on the street, I don't think has done any good whatsoever.

We are finding through our intelligence and just the county that I am responsible for, that more and more drugs are being flown to the offshore islands of the Bahamas, dropped into the ocean where smaller boats are then picking it up out of the ocean, what we call in terminology in law enforcement, shotgunning it across, which would be several boats coming into different locales of the east coast of Florida and one gets caught, maybe three makes it through.

We are getting more and more of this, where they are—and this airplane never comes across our defense zone. It stays well west of our defense—I mean east of our defense zone when it drops this stuff out into the ocean. The boats then pick it up and bring it in. We're having more and more of this all the time.

We feel there as a local that there is a mass amount of information and intelligence on aircraft that are loading in other countries that are known to be drug related. There are boats that bay off in the Bahamas that I feel sure that some of our Federal agencies know about that we never get this information.

There is another at the Epic Center, which is out in El Paso, TX. There is no way a local can get information out of this. If I have a high speed ocean racer within one of my areas, my marines, that I am very suspicious of, to get this information, if there was ever any information on this person, I have to go into a system in south Florida or in Florida known as BENA, which then is supposed to be able to get into Epic to get this information back.

This sometimes takes 3 days, and at night now there is no way, at night, that BENA can get into Epic. So, here, we are bogged down on information. This ocean racer can be out over to one of the offshore islands and be back in a matter of 3 hours with a load of narcotics, and I still wouldn't have any information on him later in the day.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

What would be the wishes of the members? Would you like to go ahead, vote first, and come back? We will recess for about 10 minutes. We have a vote to cast, and then we will be right back and we will continue with your testimony.

[Recess.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Committee will come back to order again, and we will continue with our testimony.

Sheriff, would you like to add anything else to your testimony or would you like for somebody else, Lieutenant Murphy or Mr. Frechette, to go ahead and testify?

Mr. HOLT. Yes, sir; I think I have said enough. I can yield to any one of the others.

Mr. ORTIZ. Lieutenant Murphy?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir; I'd just like to add basically, the same thing the sheriff said. I'm on the front line working with my crew, which consists of three other investigators in my county.

I would like to see the manpower that I think is in south Florida put in the county on a one to one basis. In other words, the task force within the county, with a task force agent working there in customs or what have you because we have in a coastal, we have an inlet, we have the St. Lucie Canal, which goes all the way across the State, that comes right through our county.

We are a prime area for drug smuggling, I think if we had a task force within the county, that would make my knowledge of the county available to this task force because we are familiar with all the landing strips, the offloading sites for boats, and, plus, we would have access at this time through BENA and we would have intelligence that I think is out there in the Federal Government, accessible to the counties, to the men working there.

If you eat and sleep with a guy and you work with him all the time on stakeouts and all, you know that man and I think getting to know each other is the problem.

I think there is a lot of mistrust between the Federal Government and the locals. I think we're all out there for one goal, to stop drug smuggling.

I think if we work jointly with them in the county, break it down on the county basis, that we'd see a lot of improvement in drug smuggling.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Frechette, would you like to—

Mr. FRECHETTE. Yes, I would.

TESTIMONY OF GARY FRECHETTE, PROGRAM SPECIALIST, DEPARTMENT OF SCHOOL BOARD SAFETY, PALM BEACH COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD

Mr. FRECHETTE. First of all, again, I'd like to thank the committee for the opportunity of being here to testify, and thank Congressman Lewis and his staff who helped to arrange this and selected me to be here this afternoon.

My concerns, of course—surprisingly enough, the students in Palm Beach County know of Sheriff Holt more than they do of our own sheriff because of his reputation in trafficking in narcotics. The kids in Upper Jupiter, the cluster area, know about Martin County.

And, I think that's very important. I think the efforts that the committee has been making and the steps in the area of narcotic trafficking is very important.

I'm coming at it from a different side, as I did in West Palm Beach, in October. I'm coming from the prevention and education side, and in a way, the treatment side. We realize and we have, since the committee hearing, we had the Chemical People Program, and you asked in your questions what really has taken place as far as what are we doing to—educating parents.

The Chemical People project, we had excellent support from the staff. Some of the committee members gave public service announcements, and it was a massive campaign by several members of the county. That night, at 32 different locations, we only had 1,900 people show up. We have over 80,000 students in our school system alone, and only 1,900 people showed up.

The second night of the Chemical People showing, that figure dropped to less than 700. The Chemical People task force now at 32 locations all broke down into 4, and most of those committees only contain 4 or 5 people. And, we're still pushing, and we're still striving.

When I do my PTA or PTO presentations at schools, I have to make it mandatory that the principals do not or the presidents do not tell the parents what I am going to talk about because if they do, and they listened to Chemical People and all the mass media about substance abuse, I still get 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 parents out of a school that usually gets 400 people to show up at PTA meetings.

It's gotten so bad that principals now have to raffle off hams and turkeys to get the parents to come, and, again, I surprise them with the drug programs.

And, also, principals have to do like maybe a fifth or sixth grade little show or dance, and people—the parents will come and listen to the kid's sing and dance, but they won't come and give us an hour of their time to listen about what this problem is doing.

And, before I go to a school to spend 3 days to do my drug program "Naturally High," I mandate that at least some of the parents from the school come and listen. And, to this date, I still don't really have a solution on how to bring that apathy or that wall of denial to home with some of these parents.

But, what we are still doing, which I know that you wanted to hear about again, is the efforts of the program "Only Sick People Need Drugs." I want to tell you that that program is still going very strong, even though I am alone, with over 102 schools in Palm Beach County.

I'm not going to be able to hit all the schools this year, but the "Only Sick People Need Drugs" works. Because of that, the children at one of our elementary schools colored a giraffe for each one of the members on the committee, and they would like you to hang your giraffe in your office so that you will also be remembering that only sick people need drugs.

The most important part about this program is I didn't develop it. The Drug Enforcement Administration did in 1977, and they made this lovely coloring book called Katy's Coloring Book.

Congressman Lewis and his staff dug me up the last 100 copies that were in Washington, so I could hand these out to these chil-

dren. These children are 5 and 6 years old, and they understand because they see substance abuse. They see it at home. And, we can't wait until they get into junior high school.

So, we work with them at that point. And, because, I think—I mean, it's long term, and we're looking down the road, I think we will start to finally see a young generation believing that they don't have to take drugs to change the way they feel. That we like them just the way they are, and it's OK to say no to drugs, and be drug free, and nobody is going to think different of you because you are.

So, I think that we've really got a good hold on something, and I know my superintendent and my board members stress the fact that these children are M&M's. They are militant midgets, and that you can use brainwashing or behavior modification to get them to understand that we like them, they are cute, and they will embarrass you in public if they see—of course, we tell them alcohol and cigarettes are drugs, too, so that kind of gets them a little bit excited.

But, we're just getting a simple message across, and that's all, and that's something we have to look at. I know Sheriff Holt again, his efforts are very important, and to have eradication and to stop the smuggling, especially into Florida.

But, we're going to do the best that we can from an education and prevention standpoint to educate these children at a younger age. High schools, high school students, they want the giraffes, too, and why do they want it? Well, they have to deal with a lot of peer pressure. They have brothers and sisters. They have nieces and nephews. And, we realize that the program will work.

I'd like to shake the hand of the person at DEA who conceived this, Katy's Coloring Book, because it's the best thing I have seen in years to teach children what drugs are and how to really stay away from drugs and how to help other people think about drug use.

So, I think really that's what I wanted to get with you again to emphasize what I said in October, to tell you that it's still moving, the M&M's are kind of on the move in Palm Beach County, and they will start spreading out, we hope.

Thank you.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. Frechette, how long does it take for you to get to the different schools? How many students did you say you have now?

Mr. FRECHETTE. We have 102 public schools with over 80,000 students. But, the school board and the superintendent also requires me to do the private schools because those people pay school tax.

Mr. ORTIZ. This is by yourself?

Mr. FRECHETTE. By myself, right.

Mr. ORTIZ. They don't have any type of curriculum or any type of drug education program in the schools at this point besides—

Mr. FRECHETTE. At this point, no, sir. The State of Florida has not mandated a curriculum per se of what should be taught.

Our school district took it upon ourselves to develop our own drug curriculum, and kindergarten and first grade, their drug curriculum will be this program.

One of the biggest things that's helped me is now I'm training guidance counselors in elementary schools to do my program or to help me with it. So, after I leave the school, that positive reinforcement about what I have said stays with them. You know, they see someone there every day to keep on their backs.

Mr. ORTIZ. Why do you think it's necessary to get to the 4- and 5-year-olds?

Mr. FRECHETTE. Well, I think it's very necessary because again, first of all, it's twofold. They are cute and they have a message, even at 4 and 5. When they see somebody that seems to be healthy and there's nothing wrong, and they are taking some type of drug, then they can only believe one thing, that they are sick, and only sick people need drugs is something very simple for them.

And, they like it. They understand what it is. I can't wait till they get to fifth or sixth grade because, believe it or not, they start to form their own morals and their values about substance abuse, and a lot of these children, too, are faced with the sixties generation that are using drugs that are probably drug users themselves.

So, I really don't feel that we can wait. That 4- and 5-year-olds are cute and they understand what this coloring book says, and they understand what it means, and it's really no big conflict for them.

The conflict comes in when they go home and they start saying to mom and dad only sick people need drugs, and some children have been beaten, some children are not allowed to say that in their homes.

But, of course, we have a lot of good parents that are very effective.

Mr. ORTIZ. Don't you feel a need for a curriculum, some type of education, because we have to be realistic now? We do have a captive audience when we have these youngsters in school.

Do you see a need of going into some type of curriculum just like we teach the English language and math and some of the other subjects in the schools?

Mr. FRECHETTE. Definitely. The State legislature has just passed what we call the raise bill, which is now mandating school districts to teach health education in schools.

Under health education comes everything, and one of those is substance abuse. The biggest problem is you mandate something like that and you tell the school district to teach it, who is going to do it. I mean, we look at a lot of teachers that are just getting out of college, they don't know anything about substance abuse or how to teach it in the classroom.

So, we are kind of mandating things for teachers and educators to do, and we haven't even effectively trained them to do it. But, I think it's necessary, and I think it's needed that every school district, that every school have a school based curriculum for substance abuse period, and have people that are trained to do it.

Mr. ORTIZ. One of the reasons I asked you this is because I was a sheriff for many years in my county, and I was shocked, you know, when I traveled with the committee. I hear that we're losing a battle, and I tend to believe that through the educational process, maybe we can change this world around to our side.

Would you like to ask any questions?

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions for Mr. Frechette and for Sheriff Holt.

Mr. Frechette, why do you feel that we have such apathy among our parents when we talk about there being at total 80,000 students in Palm Beach County and but only 1,900 come out during "Chemical Week" and that sort of thing? Especially since the majority of the members of the committee, at that time, appeared on television in the local area explaining the need for attending these drug abuse prevention sessions so that people can recognize when there is a drug problem before it becomes a very serious problem. I was very discouraged to hear you say that only one parent showed up at your program. That has happened before, but you're saying the ratio continues to be almost the same.

Mr. FRECHETTE. It's true. The parents that come out to these programs, you know, you can really tell when you talk to them, look at their children, that maybe they are not the kind of parents that really should be there.

The ones that don't show up feel that they have no problem or they are going to ignore the problem, or maybe the problem is there and it's going to go away. And, they are sometimes afraid to come and hear about substance abuse, afraid of what they are going to hear.

So, they just write it off as well, I don't have to worry about it. I had one parent say my child is only 6 years old. So, I really don't think I'll be there tonight. And, I asked her, well, what night do you want to come? Do you want to come when your daughter is 16 or 17 and you're now coming to me looking for treatment?

Six years old is not a bad time to come on out and find out what you can do as a parent to help your child through this crisis, and it is a crisis. It's an epidemic.

Mr. LEWIS. I see. How many other counties out of the 67 in Florida have the type of a program like the one in Palm Beach County that you're supervising at this time?

Mr. FRECHETTE. Well, the unique part about our program is this is based out of the security department. Our district has their own police force, and we are more toward prevention and diversion, and my sole responsibility for that department is to do drug prevention education to all the schools.

And, what we are doing right now is our Naturally High Program, this drug program that goes from kindergarten all the way up to 12th grade. I'm not aware of any other school district that has it like that. There are several other districts that utilize a lot of outside agencies, treatment facilities, that come in with guest speakers and something like that.

But, this is the first in-house program, I believe, in the State of Florida.

Mr. LEWIS. What efforts are being made, if any, to educate the public as to the dangers of drug abuse?

Mr. FRECHETTE. Well, again, we use the adult and community education classes at night, the adult and community ed holds seminars and classes at several locations in Palm Beach County, and we bring in professionals from all different fields to have panels to help educate.

But, again, it's like the Chemical People project, and we get excellent support from the media. I mean, if I don't talk to two or three reporters a week to try and get parents to come out, I don't know what else to do.

The best captive audience that I have is I now go to churches on Sunday, and I'm now giving the sermon, and it was a first for me to go into a church and actually give a sermon on drug abuse.

I had a very captive audience. They weren't going anywhere. They couldn't go anywhere until I was done. That's what the pastor said.

So, I felt pretty good. I mean, we had 150 people, and I got kind of nervous because I'm not used to speaking to large groups.

But, I think—see, I have to get the captive audiences, but they don't come out at night. They just don't come out. They blame it on the weather, they blame it on the traffic, they will blame it on not having babysitters, but they can't use that because I tell them to bring the kids with them. I don't care if they are 8-months old and they are crying, bring them.

Sit there, I can talk over them. It won't hurt me.

Mr. LEWIS. Do you feel that the apathy which, again, you're describing, is—are an indication that the public is basically accepting this drug problem and that they don't care whether our children go down the tubes, our politicians become corrupted, our police become corrupted, and other innocent people are dragged into this criminal activity like those I mentioned in Everglades City?

Is this a situation that we're not going to be able to turn around?

Mr. FRECHETTE. I don't think we're going to turn it around as quickly as we would like to. I think it's going to take a long time and a long process.

Parents do come to me when they have a problem. You know, they want help. Where can I send my child for help? But, I think the biggest problem that we have is education—see, parents are not educated. They don't understand what, say, marijuana, cocaine, is and what their children are being subjected to. They don't understand it. Some of them have no idea what is really going on with trafficking and smuggling. I know if Sheriff Holt would go in front of a large group and explain his operation and what is going on in Martin County, he would shock a lot of people because they just wouldn't believe that it's going on.

They are just not educated. Parents and the public are just not educated enough to know what is going on.

Mr. LEWIS. Do you think there's a possibility that the various civic and service clubs could get together and start unifying in this effort from the national level down to the State level and the local level in promoting public awareness through efforts such as during Crime Week or something like that, or National Drug Week. Sheriff Holt and all his colleagues throughout the country start talking in this direction. I mean, bring out the bad, bad elements of this situation, and not just sit back and say "Yeah, we have a drug problem," so that they will become caring.

Mr. FRECHETTE. I think that's neat, and I think that's very important. I think we'll start to see more of it.

We got a lot of exposure and because of your commitment, this committee's commitment to come to West Palm Beach, by you gen-

lemen coming to West Palm Beach, it rose the awareness level up. It really did. I mean, people were talking about the hearings.

A lot of focus again was on that the local people were not cooperating with the Federal people, and I know that in the afternoon, we lost a lot of the people, a lot of the public left, and that's when prevention and treatment came on. And, that's usually what happens. They are all gone for probably just an important part as the enforcement.

Mr. LEWIS. In following up what the chairman pointed out, with the raise program and the new legislation passed in Florida, do you see any hope to provide a good curriculum on drug abuse in the schools?

Mr. FRECHETTE. I think what is going to happen is the State will not say get involved in mandating a per se curriculum.

What we are going to see, I believe, from our State department of education is they will mandate it, and then they will leave it up to each individual school district to implement their own program, which fits that county. Some counties may not have the problem that we have in Palm Beach County, and, so, we would want to direct our curriculum and education efforts in that area.

Mr. LEWIS. I see. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions for the sheriff.

Mr. ORTIZ. Go right ahead.

Mr. LEWIS. If I may. Sheriff, you mentioned that you do not even have anyone from the South Florida Task Force stationed in Martin County. Did I understand that statement correctly?

Mr. HOLT. We have no Federal agents in Martin County, except for the ones that come from another office into that area to work a specific thing.

I don't believe any of these are even connected with the task force in any way.

Mr. LEWIS. We do not even have any DEA drug enforcement agents?

Mr. HOLT. Not stationed in Martin County, no, sir. They do have an office in West Palm Beach, and they have an office in Fort Pierce, Customs does.

The DEA office at West Palm Beach, the r officers come up to Martin County.

Gentlemen, if I might, I would like to say in incorporation, I do have on an individual basis officers with the Federal Government that do cooperate with us and we cooperate with them, but it's mostly on an individual basis per officer level.

Mr. LEWIS. How about the Customs Service? I know they are stationed in Fort Pierce, just to the north, but do they cooperate with you as far as the smugglers' dropping stuff off the coast and then running it in from the mother ships or running it in from scavenging bales?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir; not very much. And, to tell you the truth, I don't even know if the customs office in Fort Pierce would know that there is an airplane coming. I don't know that they even know this.

Now, we have listened to them on what we call a scanner on the customs frequency, and we have picked up information this way, that customs are working a particular thing in an area.

Mr. LEWIS. I see.

Mr. HOLT. I don't know the cooperation they have there with the—

Mr. LEWIS. Do you have any use of the intelligence of the South Florida Task Force at all? Do they provide you any intelligence?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir; never have.

Mr. LEWIS. Do they provide you with any briefings as to what the task force is doing, which way it's going, what have you, or the DEA, or the customs, for that matter?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir; never have.

Mr. LEWIS. How about the military services? Have they in any way briefed you as to their part in the South Florida Task Force?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. Sheriff, if I remember correctly, if you drew an arc with the center of that arc or the point of that arc just north of Bogotá, Colombia, and drew it in a semicircle, wouldn't it pretty much cross between Martin County and Okeechobee County and over in the tailend of Highlands County, identifying pretty well the range of aircraft flying into Florida to unload drugs?

Mr. HOLT. Used to be, sir. At one time, we were right on the fuel tank, you might say. Our intelligence more recently, we find that they are gassing and we do have some people that have told us they have gassed in Cuba. We do have intelligence that they have gassed in some of the offshore islands.

But, they are getting on beyond us now. I think maybe the task force can take credit for this, that they are getting gas somewhere down there to fly further into the United States rather than in that arc you're talking about.

Mr. LEWIS. So, you feel there's a possibility that they are refueling in Cuba? How about the Bahamas?

Mr. HOLT. Yes, sir; we have intelligence, and when I'm saying intelligence, people we have arrested that have told us this information, that they can get gas in Cuba and they can get gas in the islands for the proper amount.

Mr. LEWIS. How about Jamaica?

Mr. HOLT. Well, Jamaica, we're still right on the borderline of a gas tank from Jamaica. We seize quite a few drugs that come from Jamaica. But, still, we would be on the borderline of the gas tank there in the area that we're in if they didn't refuel somewhere.

Mr. LEWIS. Sheriff, I don't know whether for security reasons or not you would want to discuss with the committee how your department by itself made this 57 ton bust of marijuana, which is a mountainload of marijuana when you consider it sells for an ounce or less on the street. That is how you came to set it up and were able to do this. Would you want to explain that to the committee?

Mr. HOLT. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure to be back before you.

Mr. RANGEL. Good to see you again, Sheriff, and I'm glad that Mr. Lewis was able to make arrangements as he probably explained that we just don't want to go into parts of the country and saying that we understand the problems without following through with it.

So, we're glad that you took the time out to revisit with us.

Mr. HOLT. Thank you again.

Yes, sir; there was a boat that was stopped in our county by our personnel. The boat was searched and quite a bit of marijuana residue was found on the boat. But, in the process, there were Latin males operating this particular boat.

In the process, there was a handwritten instruction in Spanish which I did have an officer that could read Spanish, and he read the instruction and it was a game plan of how to obtain marijuana from a mother ship at sea. We quickly notified DEA because it was completely out of my jurisdiction, it was way out past the 3-mile limit, quite aways out in the ocean, contacted DEA.

They came up, we made arrangements for a pleasure type fishing boat there in the area, and I believe two or three DEA agents plus the captain of this vessel took this game plan, went out to this freighter, using the frequency that was marked and what to say on this particular piece of paper that we had obtained.

They offloaded then 20 bales of marijuana from the freighter down to the pleasure craft, and actually posed for pictures while the agents were taking pictures of them. They were hanging over the side waving to them.

As they pulled out of the area, of course, the Coast Guard moved in 2 hours later and seized the ship and brought it in, and it had 57 tons.

Mr. LEWIS. The reason, Mr. Chairman, I was bringing up this matter is that this is an example of where we're finding that the Federal Government, members of the South Florida Task Force, are lacking cooperation with the local law enforcement.

In this case, you see where the sheriff made an apprehension, their intelligence officers went aboard, read the documents, found out that there was a mother ship out there, turned around and notified the members of the South Florida Task Force---

Mr. HOLT. No, sir; this is prior to the task force. I'm sorry, sir. This was prior to the task force. We notified the local DEA office.

Mr. LEWIS. Well, the local DEA, who, in turn, had to naturally notify the task force that this was taking place.

Mr. HOLT. This was prior to the task force.

Mr. LEWIS. Oh; it was prior to the task force. OK. But, it still is relevant to the fact that they were working with the Federal Government.

So, I think if we're going to continue this war on drugs and be successful, we have to continue to pursue this.

Sheriff, would you want to tell the committee anything further? Do you feel that better cooperation with the Federal task force and the Federal agencies has improved? But before I ask you that question, let me ask, how is your relationship and cooperation with the State of Florida, as far as working in the narcotics area, and also working with the sheriffs of other counties?

Mr. HOLT. Yes, sir; we have good cooperation with all other local agents. We have to because we are bound by a line, a jurisdiction line. When it comes to county lines, we finished. These drug people do use the county lines because they know this, they know that I'm working on one radio frequency just across this imaginary line, there is another radio frequency.

They land in one county, hop over the line into another one, they know that takes time. All they want is just a few minutes to get out of there.

We do have very good cooperation from everybody surrounding us, and even to the south. As a matter of fact, just last night, I called back. We were in—right now, in an investigation with Broward County Sheriff's Office and the Pompano Beach Police Department.

The Department of Law Enforcement, they have always assisted when we would call and ask for help. As far as an agent right in the area, no, sir, we haven't had this from the Department of Law Enforcement. But, they have always assisted if we would ask for assistance.

Mr. LEWIS. Do you have access to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement frequencies?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. You do not. How about with the use of frequencies used by the South Florida Task Force?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir.

Mr. LEWIS. In other words, if you were on a drug bust, and working in cooperation with the South Florida Task Force, basically you have no way of communicating with them by radio?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir; the only thing I could do would be to go into my communications center. They could either teletype or use a mainline telephone to call their communication center would be the only communication we would have.

Mr. LEWIS. This is incredible. It's absolutely incredible, not only for the apprehension of drug smugglers, but also for the protection of life and limb of your own officers.

What if they got into a problem and in trouble, how are they going to call for assistance, especially if the only contact they have is with the members of the task force is with those members they have with them? How about on the hand-held units during your busts?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir; as a matter of fact, I testified in West Palm Beach, we did have an incident where we had stopped a truck in a suspicious area where there were several of them on one of our causeways. We obtained a radio from one of the trucks on that frequency, it was on a certain frequency. I was listening to this frequency, heard someone whistle, I whistled back, and then we got to communicating with each other, and finally I determined he was sitting in our inlet at this time with a load of contraband.

Our boat proceeded slowly to this area. As his approached this boat, the boat rapidly proceeded back to the east out to the ocean. Our boat come over our frequency, says that there are shots being fired. At this time, I thought they were shooting my officer. He was there alone in this one boat. I called our station and got them to get as much help as we could. Both sides, plus we also notified customs, DEA and everybody else, at this point, thinking that these people had fired upon us.

But, later, come to find out it was my officer that had fired at the boat. He was notifying us that he had fired at the engine of the boat to stop it. We did catch them, I got the planes up, and we

caught them and brought them back in, and they are charged, waiting for prosecution at this time.

But, this is a very serious problem. Now, once they would have got out past the 3 miles there, we would have had no communications with the Coast Guard or customs or anyone else. I just can't communicate unless I go back to a base station—a base station to these people that are out there working. There is no communication among us out in the field.

Mr. LEWIS. Mr. Chairman, I thought we were all in this thing together. And, here, local law enforcement cannot even communicate with the members of the task force regardless of what branch of the task force were talking about. I guess, is what you're saying, sheriff.

Mr. HOIT. I don't know what branch the task force comes under. I don't know whether it's DEA or whether it's customs or whomever. I don't know who's in charge. I don't even know who to contact, as a matter of fact, to talk with them.

Mr. LEWIS. Lieutenant Murphy, would you like to make any comments?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir, I think that if you will check with the aircraft that customs has, they do have the capability, Congressman Lewis, of communicating with us. They have a programmable radio of a military type and I think they will be capable of communicating with the locals if they so desired.

I think it's a mistrust all the way down the line causing our problem. I think all of us in law enforcement should either be trusted or we should be kicked out. Put in jail, as the sheriff said.

But, the mistrust, I think, is the problem, in law enforcement at this time, and the people that are smuggling marijuana know this. It's common knowledge and they use this against law enforcement, that there is a problem between different agencies, whether it be county, State, local, Federal; they use it, they use the county lines and they use this problem between agencies to smuggle their marijuana.

We would love to get the equipment that we seize because we operate off of this to try to fight drug smuggling, but we have no problem sharing this equipment, sharing our information, to try to stop drug smuggling.

If we didn't survive off of our equipment that we sell on catching smugglers, we wouldn't be able to fight that crime. So, we do depend on it; am I correct, sir?

Mr. HOIT. That's correct, and it has been a big help.

I think this probably has caused some of the mistrust that—through the Forfeiture Act. They say that sheriff wants all the glory, he wants these things, and this boat, but I don't mind sharing with any of them.

We cooperate down the line. I think it should be split down the line. Any proceeds that come from it should be divided among whoever worked in it. I think everybody likes to see their own thunder and I think probably this is a big problem, that one agency says we want to take credit for this, another agency says they want to take credit for it, and it's a problem among us.

Mr. RANGEL. But, it's not a big enough problem that professionals can't work out.

Mr. HOLT. That's correct.

Mr. RANGEL. With an equitable solution.

Mr. HOLT. That is correct,

Mr. RANGEL. We're only one country and we've got these people playing one part of government off against the other.

Mr. HOLT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, we intend to revisit your county and as I said to the police chief of New York, that it's a darn shame that we don't have that many people of your candor testifying about how rough your job is.

We hear down here that the Federal Government is doing all that it can, and working in close cooperation with local law enforcement, yet every place we visited we didn't find that. I mean, we didn't find any abuse, but we didn't find any resources, and I assume that cooperation means that you are assisting them in getting violators.

And, so, I don't know the date offhand that we're coming back, but Mr. Lewis has been kind enough to make the arrangements for us, and we hope that this time we'll be bringing the Federal officials. We're not doing this for a lot of publicity or for a press conference or press release; what we hope to do is being representatives of the Federal Government to ask what do you need to make your job easier and for you to be more effective.

Mr. MURPHY. We can help them and they can help us all for a common cause. That's all we're asking.

Mr. RANGEL. And, it shouldn't take a congressional committee to have to bring you people who have taken the same types of oaths together, but we do hope that because of the sincerity and the good work that is being done by you and all the fanfare that has focused around our Federal task force, that we might be able to set some type of a model for other communities that are going through this same type of problem in getting these resources to be working more in a partnership.

So, Mr. Lewis has taken a leadership role in this issue, as you well know, and any time he can get a congressional committee to go to Palm Beach in the spring instead of the summer, you can see the sincerity of our mission rather than the location.

Mr. Ortiz?

Mr. ORTIZ. The only other question that I would like to ask is how you penetrate. I know there's an abundance of narcotics, but it takes money, flash money, just to make a buy to get your evidence.

How do you go about it, sheriff?

Mr. HOLT. We don't have it. We have borrowed flash money from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and I believe on maybe one or two occasions the DEA had loaned us flash money.

Normally, what we have to rely on is arresting someone. Getting him and then work from there up the ladder, and we do once we get someone, we try to go all the way to the top.

Some of our investigations have been as far as Canada. As a matter of fact, we've got a case going now internationally with Canada on a case that we started right there in our county. We had a big one, at least from us, down in Lauderdale up to South Carolina. We seized a lot of drugs in South Carolina.

So, it does—it works up the ladder, but, normally, to buy someone, we have to arrest a smaller pea in the pod down in that area and we work up the ladder from there.

Mr. ORTIZ. What's the size of your department?

Mr. HOLT. One hundred sworn personnel.

Mr. ORTIZ. Have they tried to give you some radio equipment or a frequency where you could communicate with DEA and the State police; where you could call for help in case you do need it?

Mr. HOLT. No, sir; this involves quite a bit more than just money. You've got to have the authority or the go ahead from someone to even get onto these frequencies.

Mr. ORTIZ. I see.

Mr. HOLT. That would be where the larger rub would come in. Of course, you are talking of money. My entire narcotics team is four people. Lieutenant Murphy and three others. The investigative money for each year is \$8,000.

So, we have to find other means. Now, we do—a lot of the airplanes that we seize, we trade them for stuff we can use, the boats that we seize, we trade them for stuff we can use. This helps out, but as far as flash money or something like this, no, sir, it's just not there, unless we borrow it from somebody.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. HOLT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you very much, and you can count on a commitment from this committee to follow through. Thanks for making the trip.

Yes, sir?

Mr. FRECHETTE. Can I make one comment? I have to—the children at this elementary school that is going to give each one of the Congressmen a copy of the giraffe, Mr. Lowe, Mr. Cusack, and Mr. Brown, the children have made you honorary Congressmen. So, on your giraffe, it says to Congressman Lowe and Congressman Brown.

So, you can hang it up and say that you finally made it. Thank you.

Mr. RANGEL. If that helps. It may not help. Thank you, Mr. Frechette. Thank you very much.

Mr. HOLT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and if I might say so, I have a much better feeling. I just feel like that this is going to work. I credit you gentlemen really, that I feel like we are going to make great strides here, and I would like to put the credit there behind that table because I think that's where it's going to come from.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, if we can't give you that confidence, then we should be out of business. We applaud you, too, for some success in this area. Thank you for your dedication and commitment.

Mr. HOLT. Thank you.

Mr. RANGEL. The Chair will recognize Mr. Solomon Ortiz, one of the hard-working members of this committee. We—this is his congressional district, his county, where he was able to point out some of the problems that law enforcement was facing, and we've asked Congressman Ortiz to be kind enough to bring back some of the people that we had talked with in an effort to see whether anything has changed before we make our final recommendation.

For these reasons, the Chair now yields to Congressman Ortiz and the next panel.

TESTIMONY OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished colleagues, it is a pleasure to appear before the committee today. I would like first to commend the chairman, members of this committee, and the committee staff for the outstanding work done last year and for its excellent initiatives for 1984.

The hearing held in my district on December 12 and 13 of this past year was the first of its kind in the history of south Texas.

We had the opportunity to hear from 27 witnesses who presented us with a wealth of information on the nagging and persistent problem of drug smuggling and the enforcement efforts to curb illegal drug production and trafficking.

In addition, we heard of the growing addiction not only to heroin but of dependency on other drugs, including a serious abuse of inhalants by Mexican-American youth. This seems to be a unique problem facing Hispanic youth throughout the Southwest.

The committee also reviewed the drug treatment and prevention activities in the region. Finally, we examined the need for comprehensive drug education.

We also met and discussed drug smuggling and enforcement efforts with officials of the Mexican Government in an informal meeting. If nothing else, this meeting initiated a dialog between our Federal enforcement officers and Mexican officials.

The committee made a series of excellent findings in south Texas, which are succinctly outlined in your briefing package today.

These are as follows:

There was indeed a shifting pattern of illicit drugs importation from the Florida coast to the Texas gulf coast as a result of the South Florida Task Force.

It was uncovered that there is an increase in the smuggling of high quality heroin from Mexico. Approximately 34 percent of the heroin in the United States comes from Mexico and Texas is a prime transshipment point.

As a result of the increased access to high grade heroin, Colombian cocaine and marijuana there is a growing drug addiction to illicit drugs in Brownsville, Corpus Christi, and the remainder of southwest Texas.

It was disclosed by our State senator, Carlos Truan, that because of a lack of financial resources, the State of Texas has not been able to implement a statewide drug abuse education program in the State of Texas.

Smuggling of drugs across the Mexican border is almost unstoppable under the present system in effect by the border patrol and INS.

Because of the lack of funds, local law enforcement efforts against drug traffickers are at their lowest. There is a great need for better communication and cooperation between local and Feder-

al law enforcement officials. Local officials admitted that they were fighting an international narcotics problem with local resources.

Based on testimony, the committee was informed of a big gap in drug abuse treatment services in Texas. An example is that there is an abuse problem in Brownsville and there are no detoxification facilities in the area for abusers who may seek such treatment.

There are other findings which I believe are significant, and I will briefly discuss.

First, there is the issue of inhalant abuse which I mentioned earlier. This is an old phenomenon which has never been researched, therefore, data is lacking.

The south Texas hearing, however, revealed that while the incidence and prevalence of inhalant abuse may be lower than other categories in the past year, over 6 percent of admissions to treatment programs in Corpus Christi alone were for inhalant abuse. This is about six times the rate reported by the National Institute of Drug Abuse.

It is my strong belief that this is an issue the committee must carefully examine in 1984.

Second, the hearing more than adequately documented the need for a strong and viable drug education program in our schools. A program that starts at the elementary school levels.

In this vein, I introduced H.R. 4851. This bill, which authorizes \$30 million over 3 years, will provide grants to States to assist local educational agencies in establishing and improving drug, alcohol, and tobacco education programs for elementary and secondary students.

The bill requires that State educational agencies apply to the Secretary of Education for a grant and establish procedures to ensure that the money used by local educational agencies is spent in accordance with the purpose of this bill.

It also requires that the State educational agency contribute 20 percent of the cost of each program approved by the State and mandates that the State agency ensure autonomy for local educational agencies.

Such local educational agencies that desire to receive an allocation must file an application with the State educational agency. The local educational agency must develop a drug, alcohol, and tobacco education program that:

One, contains an assessment of local drug, alcohol, and abuse problems and the current educational programs, if any, designed to address such problems;

Two, outlines specific plans for providing or improving instruction on drug, alcohol and tobacco use;

Three, describes the programs and procedures the local education agency will use to ensure a drug education program that involves the participation of a wide range of local officials and citizens concerned about drug education;

Four, describes local, specific, objectively measureable goals that are to be achieved through the program and an annual report on the progress in obtaining these goals;

Five, estimates the cost of the program and gives assurance that the local educational agency will pay 5 percent of the total program cost, in cash, or in services, equipment or facilities;

Six, contains a plan for cooperation and coordination with local and Federal law enforcement officials;

Seven, contains assurances that the program will meet any special needs of low income and minority students; and

Eight, provides procedures to ensure a proper accounting of Federal funds paid to the applicant under this act.

Education, in my opinion, is the key to preventing our children from becoming involved in drugs. I believe this bill presents a workable and effective approach to educating our children about the hazards of drug abuse and misuse.

Mr. Chairman, now I would like to introduce the two people from southwest Texas who are here to testify on the current status of the problem, Mr. Andres Vega, chief of police for the city of Brownsville, representing law enforcement. Mr. Vega has been in law enforcement for over 20 years and has been the chief of police for the last 12.

Representing drug abuse treatment and prevention is Mr. David Pollard. Mr. Pollard has over 7 years experience in prevention, intervention and treatment of substance abuse.

I sincerely appreciate the opportunity presented to my constituents and me to appear before this committee. Hopefully, some solutions will come out of these hearings.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ortiz appears on p. 119.]

Mr. RANGEL. Thank you, my friend, and the committee once again welcomes the testimony as a followthrough to our visits to Brownsville and Corpus Christi. And, we are confident that we will continue to work together to get a better handle on this.

Mr. Vega.

**TESTIMONY OF ANDRES VEGA, JR., CHIEF OF POLICE,
BROWNSVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, BROWNSVILLE, TX**

Mr. VEGA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Ortiz, and the rest of the panel.

It certainly gives me great pleasure to be here and being selected to come before you today and present additional testimony, and perhaps to reiterate some of the things that I said in Corpus Christi back in December.

I feel strongly about the manner of the things that I testified to at that time. What I will do now is summarize some of the things that I had said not be so specific as I was back in December.

I will not bother you with the statistics that I'm sure were given to you; the fact that we are close to Mexico and have to deal not only with the population of our community but with the criminal activity of those who come across the Rio Grande River to work in our city.

I would like to remind you, if you don't recall, that 350,000 people that live in the Matamoros area. Some of the specific issues that I mentioned at that time, gentlemen, is the decline in the sales tax revenues which creates the problems that we are facing as far as the border areas are concerned.

I think that I can speak for a number of the cities along the border simply because they face the same general problems that we do in Brownsville.

The decline in the sales tax revenues, additionally the Mexican peso devaluation, has caused a serious reduction in the general trade, much of which was dependent upon the Mexican economy.

The result of this is a reduced operating budget for the police department. We addressed those problems that have direct impact on the general public. These are issues in which we have a complaining party, and here I refer to burglaries, robberies, thefts and things of this nature. The point that I'm trying to make is that many times, we don't have the time to sit out on surveillances watching the drug traffickers, the drugpushers that we have on the streets.

We maintain, as I mentioned in December, excellent cooperation with the local office of the Drug Enforcement Administration. However, I may point out that they only have four field officers to cover a two county area, and hardly enough to begin or conduct an intensive narcotics investigation.

In addition to the four agents, they have one supervisor. State grants for law enforcement programs are distributed on the basis of population density, uniform crime reports statistics of each region.

What is the problem? Specific consideration should be given to narcotics enforcement, and especially to the United States-Mexico border areas. Law enforcement agencies in those areas must act as a front line for us in combatting the illicit importation of narcotics and dangerous drugs from Mexico into the United States.

We are there trying to maintain a line to prevent these people from coming across and bringing their illicit cargoes that eventually will be spread out throughout the country, not just the city of Brownsville or the State of Texas.

Cities located on the United States-Mexico border must not only address crime problems generated at the local level, but also criminals that traffic into the United States from Mexico. Some of these individuals have been, some of them have been, identified as members of organized drug trafficking units, both in Mexico and the United States.

We must address this problem at the international level. I don't think that I have a specific answer as to how we are going to deal with this question, but certainly the proper dialog must be initiated at the Federal level to address the problem that exists between the two countries.

Late last year, I proposed four ideas which I feel will assist law enforcement in effectively addressing the narcotics trafficking. I would like to reiterate them again since I feel that if implemented, they could be a definite beginning to the reduction of narcotics and dangerous drug traffic.

No. 1, Federal financial assistance must be provided to border cities in order that a community can develop and implement a good narcotics enforcement program.

This community should consider the formulation of regional task forces and specifically program the target areas. I feel that local law enforcement can be more effective since the officers have full

and complete knowledge of the people and the amount with which they will be working with.

When an agency has limited resources to do a job, its effectiveness subsides accordingly.

Second, Federal agencies with drug enforcement responsibilities must assign sufficient personnel and equipment to the United States-Mexico border in order to increase their effectiveness and produce a substantial reduction of narcotics traffickers and reduce the chances of them getting through with their illicit cargoes.

In the same instance, mutual cooperation between Federal, State and local agencies is a must. Although we do have this cooperation, in many, many instances this cooperation has subsided not only in the border areas, but up further inland from where we are located.

Without cooperation, we in law enforcement feel that the war against the narcotics traffickers is going to be lost.

Third, I feel that the U.S. attorney's officers and State district attorney officers, must also be provided with the necessary resources in order for them to vigorously prosecute the violators. Arrest and timely prosecution, go hand in hand and should channel the violators to the criminal justice system in a timely manner.

Fourth, the narcotics and drug abuse program should be developed at the elementary level in order that youngsters will begin to understand the problems that they will be faced with should they be exposed to this type of activity.

This is the only item that I addressed in the area of education. I'm a law enforcement officer, although I feel that there is something definite that has to be done in our society to try to turn this trend and I will address that particular issue later on in this testimony.

Gentlemen, on February 11, 1984, only 2 months ago, State and Federal officers seized 365 pounds of high grade level cocaine, worth several million dollars on the illicit market.

The seizure was made in Brownsville. It was labelled the largest seizure in the history of the State of Texas. Seven Colombians were arrested, ranging in ages between 19 and 51. Within hours after the arrests were made, high powered attorneys were ready to set the hearings on the suspects.

The problem of posting bonds of several hundred thousand dollars was surmounted with no big effort on their part. My point is that their lawyers have no limits on their financial resources. They can be back on the streets and trafficking in order to continue with their illicit profitable business, yet our local narcotics agents cannot effectively handle and continue an investigation at times simply because of the lack of resources. Financial resources, equipment and manpower are not available.

Federal, State, and local governments must collectively face the realities of this problem. We must direct the necessary amount and type of resources needed to fight this multimillion dollar business.

Ironically, our Government, and this is my personal opinion, approves billions of dollars to be spent to support and improve our Armed Forces. I have nothing against this. I think the security of this country is a priority, certainly it is.

Additionally, billions of dollars are appropriated toward the continuation of our space programs, yet the appropriations for the drug abuse and control problem is minimal, and we all realize that this problem continues to erode our society from within.

I propose to you that the social and physical well-being of the citizens of the United States is just as important, if not more so, than any space program.

That we must defuse the narcotics and drug trafficking in this country, that law enforcement is ready and willing to meet the problem head on, but we must have the necessary resources.

It is going to cost the taxpayers in this country a substantial sum of money, but it will be spent to address a social problem that directly impacts on them.

In summary, let's provide law enforcement with adequate financing, adequate manpower, and adequate equipment. These three things, along with full cooperation among Federal, State, and local agencies, can effectively control the narcotics traffic and abuse problem.

Additionally, complete well organized drug programs should be implemented at our school levels.

Finally, negotiations at the Federal levels must be continued between this country who has the so-called demand for narcotics and dangerous drugs, and those countries who supply the demand.

At our level, we must attempt to defuse the continuing demand, and abroad, we must cut the supply line through the proper political process.

These are some of the things, gentlemen, that I feel are of primary interest. I see this situation as a two prong effort.

I have read the report that was submitted by this committee as a result of the interviews, the hearings that have been set, and there are a number of things that I agree with and some things that I perhaps don't.

But, I think the major thing, No. 1, earlier today somebody said something about education, educating the people, educating the public, that this is not the thing to do. Certainly, I think we're talking about social trends. We're talking about a segment of society that has turned from one ideal to another. The values have changed, and this is well and good.

I think this is eventually the only way we're going to be able to change the demand, so-called demand for narcotics and dangerous drugs in this country.

But, first of all, I think that we need to do something now. We have got to have resources; we've got to have the manpower, the equipment, the things that are necessary to go out there and put these people in jail, and do something about the drug trafficking.

Ironically, about 2½ years ago we were going through a crunch, so was the Federal Government. But in Brownsville, we had a situation where the border patrol was not able to go out and conduct their own daily duties simply because they didn't have the funds to carry them out -- to purchase the gasoline to put in their vehicles to go out and patrol the areas.

An ATF agent that came into my office asking if I would be willing to loan him a car battery because his was down and they didn't have the funds to purchase a battery.

And, about the same time, we had drug enforcement agents riding double in their vehicles because of the shortage of revenues.

It is stressing to see a problem that is pervasive throughout the border, and again I'll reemphasize that this is not only a problem that we're facing locally, this is something that comes through our jurisdiction in order to get to Houston, in order to get to Dallas, Chicago, New York, and to Washington, DC.

This past year, as I mentioned last December, we have had an organized crime task force. We have an organized crime task force whose primary duties are to enforce the narcotics laws of the State. We have had excellent cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration.

We had to have cooperation. There have been only five people working out of that office for a number of years. There are three people working out of the narcotics organized crime unit in my office. Subsequent to that, we had a district attorney investigator that was working with the organized crime unit. As a result of county participation, we were able to work countywide.

We had the jurisdiction to do it. This past year, the DA's office was unable to fund the investigator. The sheriff's department refused to provide an additional deputy to help us continue with the organized crime unit, and as of September 30 of this year, we will no longer have an organized crime unit because we are only operating with personnel from the Brownsville Police Department.

Yet, this unit had been effective for 10 years. We do have problems at the local level. We need all the help we can get, not only to help ourselves, but to help the citizens of the country.

I'll entertain any questions that you may have

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vega appears on p. 121.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Chief Vega.

If we may, we shall just go ahead with Mr. Pollard and hear his testimony, and then we'll go into the questions.

TESTIMONY OF DAVID POLLARD, DIRECTOR, KLEBERG COUNTY ALCOHOLISM OFFICE, KINGSVILLE, TX

Mr. POLLARD. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz. Committee members, thank you for this opportunity to talk to you all again.

I am from Kingsville, about 45 miles past Corpus Christi. I have worked in the substance abuse hospitals in Corpus for about 5 years.

I work in the county by myself. There are over 30,000 people in the town of Kingsville alone. I'm trying to cover a couple of other counties, too. I went in working with the prevention program, and I go into the schools and work in drug and alcohol education.

I do treatment, I treat people for cocaine, alcohol, inhalants, heroin abuse. Everything, you know. Everywhere I go, I try to determine if there's a problem or not.

For 7 or 8 years I've seen it, and it's all I see everywhere. Everybody I see is addicted in some way. I see the people on the other end of the big business, men making all the money.

I see the people, the children that are suffering, that are withdrawing from the addiction. A lot of the people I treat die, and there's very little treatment in Texas for people.

A few years back, with all the cuts a lot of people were laid off where I was working, and some of the best people got out of the field. The salaries are so low. Not just young people just out of college working are in the fields. There are a bunch of people running around with broken legs and there's just a few people who know how to fix them.

Most people don't believe we even know how to fix them. You wonder yourself. Then you see that people can actually be cured from their addictions and start over and have a normal life.

I remember reading the Bible when I was young and I didn't know why the generations of people were going to pray. Now I know why.

It's like a family disease. It's handed down to the kids and they grow up and they hand it down to their kids. The only way you could stop it is to go in with the young people. Not only treating and helping them when they don't use the drugs themselves but helping them with the personality disorders they are developing before they get to the point of using drugs themselves. A lot of times, even if they are in a family with a lot of alcohol addiction and drug addiction, their personality disorders can be treated in the earlier stage to stop the addiction.

I think you can, try to stop all the trafficking. People are always going to get drugs in jails and prisons and everywhere. If you go to the person and you train them, educate them, or detox them or try preventive measures like that, you'll stop the circle of the events that are happening.

The inhalant problem is very prevalent all the way from San Antonio down through Mexico. Younger kids that can't afford more expensive drugs. They smell anything they can to try to get high. It's one of the biggest tragedies. You have brain damage very quickly; it goes straight up through your nose. Instead of going through your blood system, it isn't filtered out.

So, you have a lot of kids that are real highly brain damaged. They don't show up too much in treatment, usually there's different family troubles and things like that; you just find them. They will be hanging out in somebody's backyard somewhere, and they won't be any part of the system or school or anything. They are just somewhere - when they can find something they'll breathe anything. There is a small colony of them now that are just like vegetables. They are very young. Some of them have been put up in Austin in a little colony. Most of the guys are very violent with their families and things.

Some of them keep using the inhalants on up through their twenties. There's a lot of guys in their twenties that are still heavy inhalant users. They use anything from gasoline and glues to, of course, gold and silver paint. They put it in a bread bag and breathe it. Brain damage occurs very quickly, a lot more than with alcohol and things.

There's a lot of cocaine. I'm starting to treat a lot more people on cocaine. However, people don't come to the meetings because there is so much denial in the society. I'll go to a school, and the school won't let me in to talk.

I had to learn how to get into schools to talk. I think it is so important to have the education program coming out of the schools

where it's part of that system. The children are inaccessible to the people that know how to treat them sometimes.

So, before you can ever start your work you have to learn to get the school system to understand that you're there to help the children.

Now the next problem is what most people are doing, just the one shot thing. You go in there and you stir a lot of things up, and there's a lot of people with a lot of problems. There's incest going on within their family, heavy drug addictions in their family, and a lot of the kids are addicted themselves.

When you leave, it's very hard for the kids to get into your office. It's very hard to treat them anyway. The parents won't bring them if the problem is with the parents, and they want to hide from it. They don't want it to come out, but they don't know what to do about their addictions. They have been involved with them a long time.

It's very hard to get to the people to treat them. There have been second graders that are using heroin and amphetamines, and completely strung out in the second grade. When you go into a junior high school room in south Texas, there's a whole spectrum of the kids in there surprisingly enough, I thought a lot more would be using marijuana, but a lot of the junior high kids were all on pills, and use all different kinds of prescriptions for pills.

I don't know if the pills are coming in from Mexico or where they are getting so many of the pills, but all those junior high kids are on pills. Of course, they are smoking pot and drinking, too. It's a real bad problem.

Drug usage used to be limited to college; then it went down to high school, and now it's down to like the junior high level. Their personalities haven't developed and their bodies haven't developed, and it's really, you know, a serious problem in their personality development.

It is estimated there's 700,000 people in Texas trying to get treatment. Right now, if you—

Mr. ORTIZ. Pardon me. I hate to interrupt at this point, but we have two votes. We have this vote and then a 5-minute vote later on.

If we could recess for about 20 minutes, we'll be right back.

Mr. POLLARD. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.

[Recess.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Why don't we come to order again, and we will proceed with the testimony that Mr. Pollard was submitting to before we had to recess,

Go ahead with your testimony, Mr. Pollard.

Mr. POLLARD. Thank you, Mr. Ortiz.

We're bordered by Mexico and the Gulf of Mexico, and I don't know if our area—how bad more it's getting than others, I know all the drugs are coming through there, and you know, a big proportion of drugs like, for instance, a lot has to do with money.

One guy I worked with, he came down from Houston, and he could drive down in an old station wagon to Mexico and pick up marijuana, drive back to Houston, and sell it and make about \$9,000 in just a few hours.

And, he could, you know, whenever he wanted to make \$9,000, he could do that. And, until he got caught, when he got caught, it just cost him a few thousand dollars and, you know, there's no telling what he made.

He probably didn't even have a job and he could make \$9,000 a day. That's the kind of things that we're up against, you know, down there. Just such quick fast money, and I would imagine, you know, that this large wealthy, wealthy, wealthy people, that make money off this, that's what's going on a lot.

All different kinds of people, you know, not just organized crime, it's all different kinds of people that can make money and are making money.

One of the things wrong is that all our jails and our prisons are so full of the people that go there and they are not treated to rehabilitate, and they come back and they go right back to drinking or drugs, and then they go back again. It's like a cycle, and the cycle can't be broken and our prisons are going broke and our—it's just kind of like an endless cycle. It seems to me if there could be more education and treatment going on with these people and their families, that it could break the cycle.

A lot of times, they are not cured in any sort of way by what—all the money going into helping them that way. It's not helping them.

A lot of the people don't have any political power. Nobody wants to be associated with them. Their families don't even want to be associated with them, and they are addicted to heroin or alcohol or cocaine or they have a lot of brain damage and there is no one that's trying to help them, and there's just hundreds and thousands of them, and a lot of the crime is related, and the violent things is related.

And, they don't know how to become unaddicted and how to get away, how to change the cycle they are caught in.

Most of these people don't want treatment. Now, I'm starting to get some people that are getting mandatory treatment from DWI, and it's kind of amazing when you see them because a lot of the people respond. They don't want to stop drinking, but when they stop and they try for a period of time, they become healthier, start thinking better and develop better relationships with their family, it's kind of amazing to see how the mandatory DWI treatment is working.

There is no drug treatment like that, you know, that I know of where if someone is caught with drugs or anything like that, where they could get some kind of—they have to go to some kind of a treatment and study some of the educational processes.

It's the same with the schools. If a person—in a lot of the schools, if they are caught with drugs, they are just kicked out of school, and then they are on the streets. And, then, the schools don't know how to handle them, and—but, the people themselves, if they are having a problem, aren't helped in any way. And, where I'm from, they have let me go into the day center where you get in trouble with the school, you go to like a center and you go do your homework and everything.

They let me come over there and do group therapy and drug education and alcohol education. And, some of these students went back to the high school and they wanted to try to do—either there

was trouble in their families or there was trouble with their own drug usage, and a counselor at the high school arranged it through the school board, they wrote a letter to the school board and they let me come and the counselor and I do like group work with them once a week.

And, it's kind of a breakthrough from what I have seen in the area of what's being done. But, you know, like I just have been real fortunate to go down through different cycles. There's not really a system set up, you know, to do anything like that.

I go to the jail and do counselling, and referrals, and there's not really a system set up like that, and the counties don't pass me. There's ever—there's not anything at all.

Some of the counties have asked me to come up over and help them some, but I haven't been able to do very much. Most of the people don't know what to do. Their awareness is getting higher now, but most of the people, they don't know what to do.

A lot of the people I treat need some type of a detox center. They are going into medical convulsions, and off alcohol, barbiturates and Valium, and heroin, where you can go into convulsions, and I don't have the facilities to put them in where they could be detoxed, and the neighboring counties, where they have more facilities, won't take out of county people.

It's real hard to get them into the county hospitals, and I have some people, they have to wait up to 5 weeks, and they'll be like laying on the floor, going into convulsions, they are seeing things all over the house, little children hiding under the bed, and there I am trying to figure out what to do to help them.

There's no system set up to help these people. Their family doctor won't help them. They have just given up on them. They have been in the hospital, pulled their IV's out, hallucinated, and the staff of nurses is so small and the hospitals aren't equipped to take care of them. We need a specialized unit to take care of them.

And, so, they are just insane, and actually, you know, near the point of death, and there's nothing to help the people, you know.

The problem is growing a whole lot faster than the treatment, and it's going down to younger ages. Many—you know, this just trying to help identify the addict and the families of the addicts need the treatment, too. It's a family disease, usually the spouses are really bad affected psychologically, and the children are, and a lot of the children will, you know, become alcoholics and addicts, and a lot of them are.

And, a lot of the heroin families, the heroin usage is done right in the home, and the people shoot up right there and the younger children start doing it, and it's just—it's like a way of life.

The same with the other drugs, the alcohol, marijuana and things where the children don't know the problems of becoming addicted and what can happen to them. The problems of your lifestyles and what the end results are is usually death or you go to prison or some real bad things, and they don't know what to do.

There's a lot of teenage suicides and a lot of runaways. And, the teenagers don't have any place to go to. If there is trouble like that in a home, the teenager doesn't have any place to go to.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pollard appears on p. 122.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Let me ask you a question.

Now, how many addicts are in the county jail where you say there is no treatment whatsoever.

Can you estimate, more or less, how many addicts are incarcerated?

Mr. POLLARD. In my county?

Mr. ORTIZ. In your county.

Mr. POLLARD. I have asked the different people I've treated of how many heroin users there are in Kingsville and Kleberg County. That's how I found out a lot of the things, and from what I can tell, there's some 300 in the county—there's probably around 300,000 heroin users in that area.

I don't have any statistics off the top of my head for marijuana. However, its use is very prevalent and there is a whole lot of cocaine usage.

Mr. ORTIZ. And, most of these are residents of your county?

Mr. POLLARD. That's just in Kleberg County, which is a neighboring county, a larger metropolis. The whole area is somewhat similar. There's a lot of drug addiction in the area that I live in; it's everywhere.

All different kinds of drugs. Most people aren't aware of the heroin, the high heroin, because everything is such a secret, but that's not counting the tranquilizers and the street, you know, street tranquilizers, et cetera.

Mr. ORTIZ. What happens to the young person, let's say, 16 or 17 years old, who is caught? What do you do with him?

Mr. POLLARD. If the probation and parole department work with me, if they are put on probation and parole, then they have to come to treatment. My best chance is when their parents are making them part of the probation or parole. The schools can't make them.

Then, you have a chance. Usually they don't want treatment, and what I've learned to do is how to help people that don't want it. That's one of the skills I've tried to develop, and after awhile, the addiction reverses. Once they become unaddicted and once they have been detoxed and they start getting their bodies back and their minds back and their own thoughts back and they see the difference and everything, then you have a chance of starting in on your educational long-term treatment. If they can't do it on their own in detox they have to be sent to Harlingen for a 2-week period. This isn't long enough, though.

I tell most of my people to try to talk the therapists into letting them stay a month because 2 weeks isn't long enough to even get them started. With a month, they have a little chance. When they come back into the family setting and the setting they are from, you have to work with the whole family and bring in anybody you can to try to get assistance set up for them.

If they can make it maybe 2 or 3 weeks on their own, they have a chance of getting it going. Then you look at a year or two of your training and other education. There's a whole lot of different things you do to get it to work, depending on what they're thinking about, what their life is like and, how you work.

Mr. ORTIZ. Does the staff have any questions?

[No response.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Once again, any questions?

[No response.]

Mr. ORTIZ. Do you have any other material that you all might like to include for the record?

Mr. POLLARD. I think most of my major points were in my paper.

Mr. ORTIZ. OK. You can submit it for the record. I would like to ask Chief Vega a question.

Don't you feel that you are fighting an international war with local resources? I know that a lot of crimes are tied into drug abuse and narcotics trafficking. How far at a disadvantage are you?

Now, how does that have an effect on your commitments?

Mr. VEGA. In answer to your first question, definitely. I feel that we are using local funding, and that is—I will qualify that by saying that to a certain extent, simply because up to the end of this fiscal year, we will have State assistance that amounts to about \$60,000 to \$65,000 from State funds that we normally utilize for the enforcement of drug laws.

In addition to that, we not only have to deal with the addicts for example, they tend to go out and commit burglaries or robberies, thefts, and things of this nature in order to be able to obtain their funds to purchase the illicit drugs.

These are problems that I have to deal with locally.

On the other hand, we are dealing with a situation in which, as I mentioned earlier, we are trying to curtail the importation of the drug trafficking from Mexico into the United States. We are working in conjunction with other agencies, and to an extent with Mexican officials in trying to identify those who are bringing drugs from Mexico into the United States.

Not necessarily for use by certain individuals in the Brownsville area, but certainly to take it in bulk form into the United States to a station from which they will take it on into other parts of the country.

So, in essence, yes, I feel that we are using local funds to do this. That is one of the main reasons that I'm here providing you this information, so that you will be totally aware of what the situation is and what our problems are.

Mr. ORTIZ. Go ahead.

Mr. CUSACK. We have reports of increasing marijuana cultivation in the State of Texas.

Is that a problem in your area of Texas?

Mr. VEGA. We are qualifying this by saying that we have about 30 square miles in the city of Brownsville. There's a lot of area that is vacant at this time, and we have made it a point to try to identify or determine whether we have cultivation within our jurisdiction.

In answer to your question, no, we don't. During the time that we have had the organized crime task force, we have also tried to identify areas in the county. As far as I can recall, there was a patch probably no bigger than a city lot, that was located in the county. At that time, the marijuana plants were very small, and they were destroyed.

I don't think that we were able to make a case on anybody that particular time.

Mr. CUSACK. Another problem which we hear about generally in the State of Texas is the existence of methamphetamines and amphetamines, clandestine laboratories, bootleg laboratories.

Is that a problem in your part of the State?

Mr. VEGA. The intelligence information that we are gathering reveals that these labs are located further inland, located geographically close to colleges and universities.

We don't find these down in south Texas. We have had information of an illicit lab south of us in Mexico, about 60 miles south of Matamoros that was taken care of by the Mexican authorities.

Mr. CUSACK. You mentioned your work with other Federal agencies, U.S. Federal agencies, and the Mexican authorities in attempting to suppress the smuggling of bulk quantities of drugs from Mexico into the United States, including heroin.

We also have reports in the last year from U.S. Federal authorities, State authorities, and even Mexican authorities, that there seems to be an increased availability of the Mexican brown heroin in the Southwest part of the United States.

Has that been your experience? Can you tell us anything about that? Your impression?

Mr. VEGA. I don't know if I mentioned this before, but we have found that as a result of the increased enforcement in Florida, we have had a trend, an upturn in the number of violators coming into the lower gulf coast, south of Corpus Christi and that general area. Also, we have had an increase of trafficking across the Rio Grande River from Brownsville all the way up to and beyond Rio Grande City, which is about 130-140 miles.

Yes; we have had an increase of heroin, brown heroin, from Mexico. To give you an idea of what we have had—in combination with Drug Enforcement Administration fiscal year 1981-82, we picked up approximately 21 pounds of heroin.

Mr. CUSACK. 1981-82?

Mr. VEGA. 1981-82, yes; and, that's about the time that we started to experience the increases. We also had about 4,000 pounds of marijuana that was confiscated. In 1982-83, we had 6,200 pounds of marijuana.

Mr. CUSACK. Just one other question I'd like to ask you.

As you may know from your position in the Brownsville area, there is under consideration a proposal by the Federal Government to shift border control responsibility whereby they are considering giving what they call the primary inspection and control function or the southwest border to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, border patrol, and their inspectors.

This would be in lieu of maintaining a separate customs presence for the primary function. In other words, combining two separate functions into one function where one officer would receive the person coming across and examine them for both their immigration or entry credentials into the United States and also as to whether it was felt they needed a secondary or further customs or immigration inspection.

In other words, he could clear them for both immigration and customs formalities or before secondary examinations. And, we understand that it is causing some confusion and possibly some morale problems down on the border with both the immigration

and the customs personnel, not with each other, because I think basically, at least we are told, that most of the customs personnel prefer to continue to do their work as they do it, and the immigration people prefer to do their work as they do it.

Have you heard anything about this, and do you have any thoughts on the judgment of the people on the scene down there with experience on the border, if this is a good thing or you would consider it a counter productive thing?

Mr. VEGA. I'm not familiar with that proposal, Mr. Cusack. I have not had feedback from either Customs or the Border Patrol concerning this proposal.

As far as my personal opinion is concerned, I think considering what is going to be done or not going to be done with customs and border patrol, I think the consolidation effort in law enforcement is a good process. I feel we have done some of these things ourselves within our own organization and it's proven to be effective.

However, definitive guidelines and procedures need to be set out, including the training and the information should be given directly to the people that are going to be involved in the transition because if you simply make a decision to make the change and not get down to the nuts and bolts of what's going to be done, well then there's going to be chaos in the sense that the people don't understand what's going on and, subsequently, you're going to have a backblast because the officers are not going to be conducive to the change simply because they do not know what they are supposed to be doing.

This is an administrative problem, you know.

Mr. CUSACK. Of course I think if the decision is made, the regulation and the arrangement will be put into effect, and I think they will be able to handle that fairly effectively.

The objection on the part of some of the customs and immigration people is this, they say, as an experienced immigration inspector, when you—with your years of knowledge and ability to focus on people and profiles, when a person comes across in a cursory examination, you can quickly screen out or pick out the people who are suspect or who may not have the proper documents or notice something about them.

And, they say that to have a customs man do that is not as effective as having an immigration man do that. At the same time, the customs people are saying they have their own effective profile system for smugglers. When such a person comes through the customs man, after he's been through the immigration man, the customs people say we have the expertise to ask him certain questions, to look at him and his car and his people and so forth, and say this fits a certain profile or this is the individual we have been waiting for or something, and they pull him over for what they call a secondary or indepth search.

That's the only argument against the consolidation. It's an argument that makes a lot of sense but opponents say immigration people can be trained to learn the customs screening skills. That's what we're hearing, and I was just interested if you had some thoughts on it.

Thank you.

Mr. VEGA. Well, one of the things that is in regard to that particular assumption, that you've got to—you know, in law enforcement, you have to have a keen sense of identification.

I think whether you're on the Border Patrol, Customs, FBI, local police or whatever, you've got to be able to develop that sense of suspicion because if you don't have that, well, then, you as the law enforcement officer are not going to really succeed and be able to do an acceptable job.

So, perhaps that is an argument; but, on the other hand, if it's for the good of the country, so to speak, and that that is going to be an effective change, well, then, the change should be made.

Mr. CUSACK. Well, we don't know if it's going to be effective or not because there's always a reservation on the part of some professionals that administrations are pressured to speed the movement of people and cargo through seaports and airports and border crossings. Travel and trade people want movement without delays that is what is behind the one stop check instead of the two stop check.

There is some question as to whether it will be more efficient, immigration and customs control system. It probably will be faster and cost slightly less. That question has to be weighed, I think.

Mr. ORRIZ. Mr. Brown, do you have any questions?

Mr. BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. POLLARD, you mentioned the apathy regarding the dangers of drug abuse. It's a theme that we heard earlier today from the witnesses from the State of Florida.

Could you elaborate on that for us? That is why the apathy in the first place?

Mr. POLLARD. It's a lot more than apathy, I think. Each person is going to be different in the way they are going to respond. When you first like take a client I'm working with, say that's addicted, and I'm trying to get him unaddicted, he's going to have denial that he even has it or that it's hurting him or anything.

You take that on out to his family, say, it's a male and his wife is denying, you know, this isn't a problem in our family, we're not interested in this or, you know, they want to protect themselves just like a protective thing, you know, where they can keep their status quo. It's so hard to change.

You can spread it on out into like a school system that don't want to be identified with the drug problem or jail or it's more than an apathy, I think. It's a fear, too.

Like where I come from, people are murdered. There's a whole lot of different reasons people don't respond, you know.

Mr. BROWN. You say people are murdered.

Mr. POLLARD. People are murdered, you know, every few months over drug deals or over heroin or marijuana or, you know—and people don't want to be involved when you're talking about drugs or they are afraid.

Mr. BROWN. What I find alarming—I'm sorry. What I find alarming is the lack of perhaps the leadership within the community to recognize that a problem exists, whether it be the schools, the civics groups, the leadership, the political leadership within the community to recognize that we do have a problem, an' to go

about in educating the public regarding the dangers of drug abuse, and the willingness to combat it.

In other words, are there any drug awareness programs? Where is the media in the State?

Mr. POLLARD. All that's in the process, and it's a lot slower process, you know, than it should be. And, a lot of the community leaders don't understand, you know—I was chairman of the Lions War on Drugs, and we were right in the middle of the big fundraiser and a lot of things going on and some of the older gentlemen around town, they didn't understand what we were even doing or what the advertisement was for or why the—what the effects were from people, you know, gradually becoming exposed to hearing about drugs and alcohol and being educated to what the problems were.

And, a lot of the community leaders just—they don't really understand what it all is either, you know. It's more psychological or something. It takes a long time to go through that process in a community for the leaders as well as the children a lot of times have to be educated to what is really going on.

What the need is and what the apathy is, you know.

Mr. BROWN. All right. Could you estimate for us what the addict population is in the State?

Mr. POLLARD. In Texas?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Mr. POLLARD. I don't know if I could or not. Maybe I could get you some figures later.

Mr. BROWN. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, we would welcome it.

Mr. ORTIZ. We'll get it for the record.

Mr. POLLARD. OK. It's real high.

Mr. BROWN. Do you have an estimate, a ballpark?

Mr. POLLARD. I couldn't right now, I don't think, for Texas. Sorry.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you.

Mr. POLLARD. I have the figures where there is 700,000 that are trying to get treatment.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, if I could elaborate on that point.

We did hear at our hearing some time ago, and we were in Corpus Christi, a figure of 700,000, and, that, quite frankly, is what alarms me.

I think, of course, that's quite high, but I find that to be alarming in the sense that there is very little by way of either drug education programs or there is very little in terms of recognition of the problem.

And, apparently from the Federal level, our information isn't reaching out as well, our publications aren't reaching out.

Mr. POLLARD. Well, it's like if you have two prominent businessmen in the town and one wouldn't understand what was going on and he'd be in the same business, and another guy in that business would know that maybe three people in that company whose children were addicted, through people through wives or husbands were in each church.

It's the same way like you have the two officers. It's kind of an amazing thing to see where they will be right by each other and

one will completely just be in the denial syndrome or whatever you call it. They won't be---

Mr. BROWN. Notwithstanding when it's your child that's addicted.

Mr. POLLARD. Well, even if it is your child, I think it's part of it. It's like not being able to recognize, you know, the facts when they are happening around you. I guess it's the defense mechanism or something, but it's a funny awareness thing where it can be happening all around and you don't see it.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. We really appreciate your testimony today, Mr. Pollard and Chief Vega. It was very, very enlightening to us, and I hope that we can learn something from your testimony. Hopefully we can convince other Members of Congress that we do have a very, very serious problem that we are just going to have to address.

Do we have any further business?

[No response.]

Mr. ORTIZ. There being no further business, this committee stands adjourned.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

[The following was received for the record:]

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BENJAMIN WARD, POLICE COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Good morning gentleman. Please allow me to convey my thanks for the opportunity to appear before you today and describe first-hand the problems of narcotics trafficking facing authorities in New York City and the steps we are taking to deal with them. I believe, you will see upon conclusion of these hearings, that New York as well as other cities, does not possess the capability of combating the availability of illegal drugs throughout the country.

In the mid 1970's, department strategy shifted from massive street arrests to the pursuit of mid level and major drug dealers. At the same time, international agreements between the U.S. and opium-producing countries reduced the flow of heroin into the city. The combination of these actions resulted in a significant diminution of heroin trafficking in the city and for a brief period it appeared that inroads were being made. Unfortunately, this phenomena was short lived and it was not long before heroin could once again be freely found.

On June 20th of last year, a representative of the NYC Police Department, appeared before this body and described narcotics enforcement efforts for the previous calendar year. It was reported at that time, that we expected our arrest figures to exceed those of 1982 and they did. In 1984, as a result of the continued availability of drugs on the street, our arrest activity will again show a significant increase.

During 1983, our narcotics division, a single entity of the department comprised of 600 investigators was responsible for over 19,000 arrests, the seizure of \$1,700,000, 548 guns and 29 vehicles. The department as a whole made approximately 40,000 drug related arrests.

Despite these enormous efforts, as evidenced by the arrest data, I found upon being sworn as police commissioner, that the narcotics trade in the city was flourishing. Heroin, cocaine, marijuana and pills were more readily available than ever.

In view of these findings, I directed development of plans to return the streets to the people of the city of New York. On January 19th of this year, I instituted the first of these plans, known as Operation Pressure Point I, in the lower east side of Manhattan.

In Pressure Point I, undercover officers were sent into the lower east side to make drug buys and conduct observations. Immediately following such buys, the sellers were arrested and a uniformed police officer posted at each location in order to pre-

vent re-occupation by other drug dealers. This neighborhood, nicknamed, "Alphabet City", had become a supply point for the purchaser of narcotics by people from out-of-State as well as those from within the metropolitan area. Home addresses and intelligence gathered from police departments in New Jersey, Connecticut, Long Island and Pennsylvania supported this fact. Pressure Point I, to date, has resulted in 3,860 arrests. This undertaking has proven so successful it is being applied to a second area where a serious narcotics condition exists.

The second operation, Pressure Point II, in the West Harlem area of Manhattan, follows a similar enforcement concept and has yielded 593 arrests since its inception on March 1st. As a result of this effort, a visible reduction in street trafficking has been noted.

The third and most recent enforcement action, Operation Closedown, commenced just last Friday, in a target area in Brooklyn. Unlike the pressure point operations, "Closedown" is designed to combat off-street smoke shop locations which have become a vocal point of community concern.

It is my intention to stress "quality of life" within this city and operations such as the above will be continued and expanded city-wide. It must be emphasized that this effort although extremely costly and labor intensive, is necessary if we are to succeed in achieving our goal of safety for our citizenry.

I must remind you again that none of the circumstances outlined are a consequence of a product developed within our country. With the exception of a small percentage of marijuana, all of the "drugs of choice" utilized in the United States are brought in through clandestine and illegal operations.

A thorough evaluation of Government policy concerning drug enforcement must be undertaken at the highest levels, involving both the executive and legislative branches. International narcotics control must be evaluated in priority when formulating foreign policy, keeping in mind the frequency stated strategy to attack the source of supply abroad by eradication in the fields. A re-examination of the role the intelligence gathering community plays in narcotics control should be conducted and a greater percentage of Federal funds allocated for domestic enforcement, treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts.

Specifically, I offer the following recommendations for an effective national war on drugs. Destruction of the source plants in the country of origin under pressure of both diplomatic and economic sanctions. Interdiction of drugs at the importation level by the Federal Government. Enforcement against major and mid level traffickers at the Federal, State and city level. Enforcement against street level traffickers by local governments. Education and treatment of addicts at all levels of government to eliminate the demand.

As indicated, the New York City Police Department, has initiated programs to lessen the fears of those who live and work within our boundaries and those who simply come to visit. We do however, need help if we are to return the streets to their rightful owners. We do not shun our mandated responsibility of enforcing the law at the local level. I cannot however, over-state the importance of intense Federal participation in areas beyond our jurisdiction. It is time to acknowledge past mistakes and take bold innovative action to correct them. I recommend a total take-over of high level drug enforcement by the Federal Government, thereby allowing municipal governments to concentrate on the preservation of "quality of life" conditions. That a special 100 man task force be funded by the Federal Government to concentrate solely on street level enforcement with New York City. That the Drug Enforcement Administration be called on to increase their response to problems which result from a failure to interdict drugs at our borders. That funds be made available in the amount of two million dollars earmarked specifically for buy money and other investigative expenses by the New York City Police Department in connection with narcotics enforcement.

Thank you

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JULIO A. MARTINEZ, DIRECTOR NEW YORK STATE DIVISION
OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Committee members and staff, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to provide you with an update of the continuing drug crisis in New York State, as well as some specific recommendations on how the Federal government can play a more effective role in assisting us in our efforts to battle this widespread and serious problem.

New York State continues to have the most severe drug problem in the Nation. More than three million State residents (3,231,000--22 percent of the population)

are recent abusers of such substances as cocaine, heroin, marijuana, PCP, and pills. Of these recent users, more than one million (1,179,000)—10 percent of the population—are regular users of narcotic and nonnarcotic drugs. The number of nonnarcotic abusers is projected to increase by 20 percent by 1988, while the number of narcotic abusers will increase by 10 percent.

The ready availability of drugs and staggering use of these drugs is fueled by New York City's position as a major port of entry for illicit substances from foreign sources. Over the last five years, New York State has been facing the greatest influx of heroin since the late 1960s and an uncontrollable spread of cocaine dealing and use. Blatant drug dealing and use on the street characterizes many of our urban metropolitan neighborhoods and communities; "copping areas," where flagrant drug sales and purchases are routine, are commonplace.

Drug abuse today is unquestionably becoming a problem of ever-increasing magnitude. Drugs may be found literally everywhere; from the corporate offices to the tenements.

While we in human services and, in particular, the substance abuse treatment field, have been well aware of the extent of the drug problem for some time, the private sector has only recently begun to feel its effects. Whether out of ignorance or a basic lack of awareness, many companies have in the past overlooked the potential damage drug use can cause among their employees. Now, however, businesses are taking a closer look at the problem and its effects, and beginning to attack the problem.

For example, the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company conducted a study that suggested that drug users were 3.6 times as likely to be involved in plant accidents, 2.5 times more likely to require more absences per week than employees who did not use drugs, and 5 times as likely to file a worker's compensation claim. Overall, Firestone found that drug users were functioning at only 67 percent of their work potential. No estimates were made about other damaging aspects of drug abuse at the work site, such as thefts of property or funds, or breakage of products or equipment.

Our agency's survey of drug use in lower Manhattan's Wall Street district graphically details the extent to which substance abuse has permeated all levels of society. We found that, at 10 of the 12 public locations we investigated, marijuana and cocaine were easily available. In fact, at 12 of the 15 buildings and building lobbies we observed in the financial district, dealers were blatantly hawking marijuana, cocaine, heroin and pills.

I cite these studies only because the results are representative of industry in general. It may very well be that the decline in the American workers' efficiency and productivity stems from the easy availability and growing acceptance of drugs. This is a new and horrifying aspect of the drug impact on our country as a whole, and representative of the wide-ranging effects of this problem.

Yet, as drug activity has been increasing during the past several years, the Federal response has been to reduce funds and other support. While the Federal share of fiscal support for drug treatment/prevention has always been very small in comparison to the New York State share, the impact of Block Grant funding has been particularly devastating. The Administration's response to the drug abuse problem has been a series of loosely coordinated single initiatives with a disproportionate focus on enforcement. This policy fails to recognize that, as supply reduction efforts are put into place, the demand for treatment services is increased. The Federal government has the responsibility of helping, not hindering, the States in their efforts. Treatment, prevention and law enforcement can, and must, work hand-in-hand. Coordination is paramount as our subsequent recommendations illustrate.

BLOCK GRANT

Implementation of the ADM Block Grant in FFY 1982 has resulted in an \$8.5 million cut in the previous levels of annual Federal support for substance abuse services in New York State. On top of this, millions more have been lost due to Federal cuts in food stamps, CETA and other entitlement monies. By comparison, New York State has continued to maintain more than its share. During 1981-85, for example, approximately \$96 million in State funds will be used to support our network of programs and services. This decline severely limits our ability to maintain services at current levels, and totally precludes the ability to meet the rising demand for such services.

As the Block Grant comes up for reauthorization in FFY '85, Congress has the opportunity to restore the commitment of the Federal government in treating the casualties of drug abuse. The President's recommended national appropriation of ADM funds in FFY '85, however, continues and perpetuates the current intolerable

financial situation. The Administration has proposed a national appropriation of \$172 million which, in view of the seriousness of our Nation's drug problem, is a less than modest increase over the current level of \$462 million. In order to increase Federal support to the level prior to block grants (\$636 million), we recommend that ADM funds be authorized and appropriated at the following minimum national levels: FFY '85—\$566 million; FFY '86—\$601 million; and FFY '87—\$636 million.

In addition, we recommend that no changes be made in the present formula used to allocate ADM funds to States. Several proposed changes in the distribution formula, which are currently under active consideration by Congress, such as the proposal being considered by Congressman Waxman's Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, will be particularly damaging and will result in a further reduction of support for drug program services.

HIGH IMPACT DRUG USE AREAS

While we endorse the ADM Block Grant mechanism, the program does not address regional differences in the magnitude of drug use and severity of the problem. For example, most of the nation's narcotic abusers are in New York State, where there were an estimated 190,500 in 1983. We strongly urge Congress to consider the special targeting of additional Federal funds, separate from the Block Grant, to States to support drug program services in areas of high drug use, such as New York City.

The immediate need is for Federal funding, separate from the Block Grant allocation, targeted for high-impact drug areas to deal with those on the waiting list and the increased demand for treatment as a result of law enforcement efforts. It is paramount to treat and rehabilitate these individuals. The money saved now by not serving the addict or abuser will result in far greater costs later.

INCARCERATION

The drug barons and the armies of the pushers that surround and protect them deserve no sympathy. However, we must be concerned about the drug abuser, the individual in need of help for his drug problem. The drug abuser who enters the criminal justice system will be hard-pressed to find needed and necessary treatment services.

Several opportunities to intervene in the lives of individuals exist while they are in custody or as a condition of release to parole or probation status. However, reductions in Federal funding severely limit the full application of these opportunities.

While a former addict is in sentenced status in jail or a prison, considerable rehabilitative benefits can be provided. Detoxification under careful medical supervision can and should be provided to all prisoners who are substance dependent. Detoxification as a pre-treatment process can also prepare an inmate for entry into treatment either in prison or in the community, and staff can make an appropriate referral after diagnosis. Short-term treatment measures can be taken for inmates expected to stay only short times. Pre-discharge preparation and treatment referral for drug users who were not necessarily drug dependent can occur in jails. In New York, a considerable proportion of state prison inmates were dependent heroin users prior to conviction, but the current fiscal situation does not permit much in the way of resources to be allocated for treatment. Those inmates who were participants in methadone treatment upon arrest, should have the opportunity to continue treatment while in custody rather than be detoxified, especially if they are likely to be released or placed on probation after a brief misdemeanor sentence. The continuity of treatment would, therefore, not be interrupted and they would presumably be less likely to return to heroin use upon release.

As I mentioned earlier, the drug problem in New York State, with particular regard to New York City, is serious. In addition, statistical indicators and field observations continue to demonstrate an increase in the availability and use of drugs. I would like to briefly outline a recommended framework for addressing the problem that stresses the need for drug treatment services, strengthened criminal justice and law enforcement efforts, and drug prevention and education.

The provision of substance abuse treatment services is important, for not only does it restore the abuser to a productive life, but it is extremely cost-effective considering the alternatives when the abuser is not in treatment. At a treatment cost of less than \$3,200 per year, the abuser can be diverted from:

Criminality. --It is estimated that an active narcotic addict commits crimes worth over \$50,000 per year to support his habit. Based upon that estimate, the more than 1,000 persons currently on the program waiting lists could be responsible for

\$75,000,000 in crime over the next 12-month period if they are not engaged in treatment.

Welfare.—An unemployed and unemployable abuser costs approximately \$7,000 per year in welfare and lost taxes, while a rehabilitated and employed former abuser earns approximately \$12,000 per year and pays about \$1,500 in Federal and State income taxes.

Prison.—Over 60 percent or about 20,000 of New York State's prisoners have a history of serious substance abuse. For every person who avoids prison through treatment, the State saves nearly \$20,000 per year.

Community-based drug treatment programs can also play a vital role in providing needed treatment services to drug-involved offenders at various stages of criminal justice processing. For example, diversion to a community-based treatment program can be utilized as a conditional discharge or release alternative for appropriate individuals, particularly in cases of minor or first offenses, or as an alternative to incarceration for others. In addition, for inmates who have a history of serious drug use and who are nearing their parole date, pre-release to a community facility can prepare them for successful re-entry into the community.

Thus, while a variety of possibilities exist to use the period of arrest and custody as a fulcrum for rehabilitative change, the lack of financial resources prohibit their extensive application.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

While drawing up a master plan for law enforcement is best perhaps deferred to the experts in this field, such as U.S. Attorney Rudy Giuliani, New York County District Attorney Robert Morgenthau, and New York City Police Commissioner Benjamin Ward, it is clear that we must maintain, if not expand, the current Federal, State and local pressure on drug trafficking, both at our borders and on the streets, and to better coordinate these efforts.

The prime responsibility for halting the flow of illegal drugs through our national borders and into New York City rests with the Federal government. The combined Drug Enforcement Administration—Federal Bureau of Investigation, together with the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Internal Revenue Service, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, as well as elements of the Department of Defense, comprise the Federal arm of enforcement. While the Federal interdiction effort has been often correctly characterized as uncoordinated and fragmented, the recently established Federal Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force for the New York/New Jersey region can act as a springboard for effective interdiction and prosecution, and in developing genuine working relationships with urban law enforcement agencies. This initiative represents an opportunity to pull together all of the Federal agencies involved in the control of drugs and to make best use of their particular areas of expertise. The Task Force is starting to make some inroads. It is important to continue to make significant seizures and investigate, apprehend and indict members of major drug trafficking networks and organizations. Additional financial support for these efforts is needed.

Concentrated enforcement measures to curb the level of street dealing, such as Operation Pressure Point on New York City's Lower East Side, are also important ingredients in a coordinated law enforcement scheme. The Drug Enforcement Administration, whose agents are well trained and most experienced in the area of drug enforcement, together with operatives from the New York City Police Department Narcotics Unit, can form an effective team for attacking other city locations of high drug traffic. The key to the success for such an operation is to be dependent upon the sharing of intelligence and analyses, and joint crediting of arrests and prosecutions. Resources for such an undertaking should be provided for buy money, overtime, additional equipment and for forensic laboratory enhancement.

The adverse by-products of this action, however, must be considered and addressed. In addition to creating an increased demand for drug treatment services, this concentrated action may cause other existing coping areas to flourish, or new ones to be generated. Likewise, provisions should be made for the day after, when the enforcement surveillance and street sweeps stop.

The law-abiding and concerned neighborhood resident can provide the strength needed to protect the gains made against the drug problem. The State's work with community action groups and other volunteers from the Lower East Side, and the vigor and energy these neighborhood people have expended in developing and conducting a variety of drug prevention and education projects, is encouraging.

PREVENTION AND EDUCATION

Prevention and education activities at the community level are critical to the overall effort, particularly those for youth, as new substance abuse often begins in the teenage years and further contributes to the problem. A comprehensive public awareness campaign is needed to alert all segments of the community, dealers and addicts included, to the existence and location of available drug program services and the potentially severe consequences of continued dealing. As a component of the campaign, addicts would be encouraged to voluntarily enter into treatment rather than continue to joust with the police.

At the same time, the community residents themselves can play a major role in this effort by reporting neighborhood dealers and drug abuse activity to law enforcement officials. Existing civic and community organizations can recruit volunteers, conduct drug awareness and education sessions and distribute information. Local businesses and merchants can provide working space and telephones as well as display and distribute public awareness information. Churches can supply referral services, organize community efforts to support the project and provide valuable educational services. To effectively mount a citywide awareness campaign of this type will require additional funding.

While such voluntary efforts have already been initiated in the Lower East Side, and other sections of the City, more is needed and they must be carefully nurtured and developed to the point where they may continue to function independently and effectively when intensified law enforcement efforts cease. In the long run, the ordinary citizen will be the backbone of this effort, however, I must ask that the Federal government willingly accept a more equal portion of the burden initially so that these efforts can be mounted.

We consider our recommendations to be of considerable merit and worthy of the Administration's every possible consideration. We have done our best to cope with several budget reductions in the face of staggering increases in the importation of illegal drugs over the past few years. The time has come for the Administration to admit to its failure and heed the advice of those whom have suffered the most for this inaction. In closing, I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Committee and will be glad to answer any questions you may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STERLING JOHNSON, JR., SPECIAL NARCOTICS PROSECUTOR
FOR THE CITY OF NEW YORK

I appreciate the opportunity to return to this committee to give you an update of drug conditions in New York City since June 1983, the month I last testified before you.

Intelligence reports indicate all forms of drugs are still available and drug abuse continues to remain a problem.

There have been several major seizures of heroin since last June, yet the quality of heroin at the street level remains constant while prices have declined slightly.

In February 1984, almost two dozen persons in Connecticut died as a result of heroin overdoses. Intelligence sources indicate that the high quality heroin that caused these deaths came from New York City.

Cocaine is so plentiful it is sometimes referred to as "nose candy." In some neighborhoods, getting the "candy" is as easy as buying a newspaper.

Recently the Drug Enforcement Administration confiscated almost 500 pounds of cocaine from a ship in Brooklyn. Several weeks later, another 1600 pounds was confiscated in Long Island.

As late as March 1984, the Colombian government reportedly seized more than 12 tons of cocaine in that country.

The significant fact about all these seizures is that it has not had an impact on the cocaine market in New York. There was no panic after the seizures. Coke prices are still declining and purity is rising.

In January 1983, the price for a kilo of cocaine cost as much as \$60,000. By September 1983 the price plummeted to as low as \$18,000.

During these difficult and frustrating times, the New York City Police Department has admirably continued to maintain pressure on all drug sellers.

On January 19, 1984, "Operation Pressure Point" was commenced on the Lower East Side of Manhattan. In addition to assigning narcotic Squad officers to a target area (5th, 7th, and 9th Precincts) uniform personnel were also committed.

After two months, the streets once clogged with sellers and buyers became deserted. Users rushed to get into drug programs. Dealers from out of town went back

home. Others went to other drug neighborhoods. The police are keeping up the pressure. They vow to address any drug condition that exists in the City.

Statistics compiled over these two months disclosed some startling results. In the targeted area of "Operation Pressure Point", robberies decreased an average of 51%, burglaries 35%, and grand larcenies 8%.

In the surrounding precincts (6th, 10th and 13th) robberies decreased an average of 24% and burglaries 19%. Grand Larceny was the only crime to increase. This rose a mere 4%.

The narcotics problem still exists in New York City. To make any meaningful impact, the federal government must demonstrate its commitment and send resources, not only to law enforcement, but to treatment, prevention, rehabilitation and education.

Thank you.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANDY ROSSI, SPECIAL AGENT, BUREAU OF NARCOTIC ENFORCEMENT, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING (CAMP)

I appreciate being invited to appear before the Select Committee.

California Attorney General Van de Kamp submitted a prepared statement to the Committee during the hearings which were held in Redding, California, on July 27, 1983.

Chief S. C. Helsley of the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement testified before the Committee on that date and described the evolution of California's cannabis eradication program and plans for the 1983 Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP) Program.

With your permission, I would like to submit for the record a copy of the final report for the 1983 effort, draft proposal for the 1984 program, and a report prepared by the Butte County Sheriff's Office concerning their marijuana growing prevention program.

I would like to briefly describe the CAMP Program.

Since 1977, the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE) and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have worked together to develop training courses to provide local jurisdictions with the expertise necessary to eradicate commercial marijuana growing operations. As law enforcement put added pressure on the marijuana cultivators, their cultivation techniques changed. The commercial marijuana cultivators moved their operations to the more remote areas of California. Growers went to great lengths to camouflage their crops through the use of greenhouses, camouflage nets, and other techniques. The rugged terrain, the bulk of the crops, and the time that investigative techniques require, placed a tremendous demand on the resources of the Sheriff's departments.

Cultivation of marijuana continued to increase dramatically as did the violence associated with cultivating marijuana. During the 1982 growing season, over 500 firearms were confiscated; 77% of the cultivators were armed or employed the use of booby traps to protect their crops; over 50% of the cultivations occurred on public or private lands without consent of the owners. It became apparent that the problem required a coordinated effort of a federal, state, and local program.

In March 1983, the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement invited the principal federal and state agencies to meet and plan a unified program. These were the federal agencies of Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Forest Service (USFS), and Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the California agencies of Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE), Office of Emergency Services (OES), California Department of Forestry (CDF), and Western States Information Network (WSIN).

As the program developed, additional agencies became involved—the U.S. Marshal's Office, U.S. Customs Service, California Army National Guard, California Highway Patrol (CHP), as well as 14 sheriff's offices. The number and diversity of agencies providing the needed resources dictated that they be brought together in a highly structured and coordinated manner.

This coordinated multi-level, multi-agency operation became known as the "Campaign Against Marijuana Planting" and is referred to as "CAMP". CAMP operates under the direction of an Incident Command System (ICS) which effectively directs the manpower and equipment of this major operation. Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) were developed which identified the roles and responsibilities accepted by each of the participating agencies.

CAMP conducted 524 raids and seized over 270,000 pounds of cannabis plants worth in excess of \$130 million. CAMP combined the technology, training, and resources of 27 federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The key to the success of the CAMP program is the tremendous coordinative effort put forth by all of the agencies involved.

On November 1 and 2, 1983, a two-day "CAMP Critique" conference was held to evaluate the program's effectiveness and to make suggestions for the 1984 program. (Mr. Chairman, the details of the critique are contained in the 1983 CAMP Report which I have already requested to be submitted for the record.) It was the unanimous conclusion of the agencies participating in CAMP that the program must be expanded to support additional sheriffs who feel they need the support of CAMP.

CAMP has been expanded—36 California counties have expressed an interest in participating in CAMP 1984. The 1984 program is even more ambitious than the 1983 program and will necessitate increased manpower, resources, finances, and management commitments by all the participating agencies.

CAMP has received international recognition as a model marijuana eradication program. Through the United States State Department, command level law enforcement officials from Peru and the Ivory Coast recently visited California to obtain information on the CAMP program. Additionally, CAMP is at the forefront in proposing new legislation and new means of detection, destruction, and deterrence. CAMP staff have drafted legislation which establishes minimum sentences for cultivation and prohibits the use, sale, and manufacture of injurious devices to protect the marijuana crops.

CAMP staff are working with the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management in evaluating new techniques in detecting marijuana from the air that would be more cost-effective than traditional techniques.

Marijuana destruction has always been a problem. CAMP raid teams seized up to ten tons per day during the 1983 season. The CAMP staff are exploring new techniques in destruction from portable burning systems to new sprays that would render the marijuana useless.

CAMP is developing a public awareness program on the marijuana cultivation problem as well as supporting prevention programs such as the Butte County Growers Awareness Program. This program is a high visibility, helicopter patrol program designed to deter and prevent the cultivation of marijuana on public and private lands.

Domestic cultivation of marijuana diminishes the quality of life where it occurs by damaging the environment and potentiating violence. CAMP is the most visible domestic cannabis eradication program and its successes have been widely reported in both the national and international media. The importance and efficacy of the program has also been addressed in the recently released "Attorney General's Commission on Narcotics—Final Report". (Mr. Chairman, I request that pages 23-26 be included for the record.)

In spite of all the goodwill, planning, and coordination that has come from the CAMP program, the program is in serious jeopardy.

Helicopters with lift capability are essential so that remote crops can be accessed. In past years, this support has been provided by the California Army National Guard, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and U.S. Customs Service. Because of the summer Olympic Games and other demands, these resources will not be available.

We have been working to find a solution since last fall when Attorney General Van de Kamp and Chief Helsley came to Washington to meet with Special Assistant to the President, Dr. Carlton Turner to discuss the problem. Chief Helsley also described the problem during the Roundtable Discussion on the Use of the Military in the Control of Illegal Drugs which was cosponsored by the National Governor's Association, U.S. Department of Justice, National Criminal Justice Association, National Guard Association of the United States, and State Drug Enforcement Alliance on November 9 and 10, 1983 in Washington, D.C.

Since that time, we have been working with Dr. Turner's staff and the Department of Defense to obtain helicopters and other equipment for training and enforcement operations.

I would like to submit for the record a copy of a letter dated March 6, 1984 sent by Attorney General Van de Kamp to Secretary of Defense Weinberger requesting military support. We are now working with Lt. General Tice and others at the Department of Defense to determine what level of support is available and expect a response very soon.

This concludes my prepared statement. I will be happy to answer any questions the committee has

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ZANE G. SMITH, JR., REGIONAL FORESTER, PACIFIC SOUTHWEST REGION, FOREST SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Committee to provide information regarding the illegal cultivation of Cannabis (marijuana) on National Forest System lands in California.

Professional land management agencies have become increasingly concerned about the apparent increase of Cannabis cultivation on public lands, including the National Forests. It is a problem of considerable magnitude that has endangered the safety of employees, contractors, and the public. This unauthorized use of public land for Cannabis plantations constitutes trespass and interferes with the manager's ability to accomplish the objectives for which the Federal lands were established.

The growing of Cannabis on public lands is a serious challenge. Public lands are a favored location for illegal Cannabis cultivation due to the remoteness of the sites with limited access and few visitors or permanent residents. Confrontations between growers, Forest Service employees, and Forest visitors unfortunately continue. We expect the effort to use Federal public lands for illegal Cannabis cultivation will continue. We believe, however, that over time such efforts as those we previously discussed will result in a substantial reduction in this illegal activity.

Increasingly, growers are using a variety of dangerous methods to protect their illegal operations. These methods include booby-trapped roads and trails, armed guards, guard dogs, fishhooks hung at eye level, entanglement devices, and many other techniques. Personal threats to employees, of land management agencies, working in areas containing illicit operations continued through 1983.

Illegal Cannabis operations include use of extensive irrigation systems, and uncontrolled intensive applications of pesticides and fertilizers. These substances are applied without consideration of normal safeguards, which can threaten other vegetation and wildlife, and can contaminate waterways.

A variety of corrective and preventive programs have been undertaken by the Federal agencies involved, particularly in the last 2 years. We believe that these efforts have acted as a general deterrent to Cannabis cultivation on public lands in California, and we expect to continue, even expand, our efforts during 1984.

The seriousness of Cannabis cultivation on National Forest System Lands in California began to be recognized in 1980. By early 1982 an indepth study was completed and an interagency group consisting of local, State, and Federal agencies drafted an action plan. The action plan focused on efforts to eradicate existing plantations and prevent future plantings, with the safety of employees and the public of foremost concern.

During the 1982 campaign, State and local law enforcement agencies provided the "on-the-ground" leadership with personnel and financial assistance from other agencies including the Forest Service. We supplied approximately 2,400 person days to supplement a similar involvement invested by State and local law enforcement agencies, and we contributed more than \$290,000 of Cooperative Law Enforcement funds to local law enforcement units. During the 1982 season more than 400 illicit operations were discovered resulting in 55,000 Cannabis plants being confiscated.

A multiagency coordinated campaign, called "CAMP," was organized in 1983 by the California State Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement, with its headquarters in Sacramento, California. "CAMP" stands for Campaign Against Marijuana Planting.

This was a formal association of 27 local, State, and Federal units including such non-law enforcement agencies as Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management.

We believe that the interagency nature of the action plan and the resulting CAMP program has contributed substantially to the success of our efforts in California.

Four geographic regions within California were selected for intensive eradication efforts by multiagency teams on private and public lands. During the 1983 campaign, 64,000 plants were removed from over 500 sites in the 14 county area and 138 arrests were made.

The decision to continue and expand the campaign during 1984 was made after a detailed evaluation of CAMP 1983. Detection and eradication activities will be increased from 14 to 36 counties, in six geographic regions in California. The Forest Service will participate by supplying administrative assistance to CAMP headquarters in Sacramento, providing supplementary personnel during field operations, and

contributing a variety of other skilled personnel to support administrative, public information and education, aircraft operation, and other logistical activities.

In addition to the CAMP program, the Forest Service continued its regular law enforcement efforts throughout the Pacific Southwest Region. More than 48,000 plants were confiscated on National Forests outside the CAMP regions and 95 arrests were made. We estimate that a total of eight person years and \$570,000 were invested in 1983, of which \$250,000 were for CAMP.

This year we plan to attack the Cannabis problem on three fronts: through regular cooperation with local law enforcement officers, by continuing our involvement with an expanded CAMP, and with a new initiative called "The New River Project".

The New River Project is a cooperative effort with Trinity County in north central California. The Forest Service and the Trinity County Sheriff's Department will concentrate on preventing Cannabis plantations in the remote New River drainage. This 115,000-acre area of the Shasta-Trinity National Forests has become a place where shootings, arson, and physical violence are commonplace. Cannabis growing underlies much of the problem. Indeed, the Forest Service has been forced to withdraw and virtually cease management of this land. Consequently, public use of this area is almost non-existent.

This month we have begun to reestablish law enforcement presence in the New River drainage. Eight Forest Service officers and two County deputy sheriffs will intensely patrol the project area in an effort to discourage illegal use of this public land. As we regain control, these same crews will be used to provide normal management activities such as trail maintenance, fish and wildlife habitat enhancement, and forest visitor contacts. We expect the project may last as long as 3 years with a total cost of \$1.6 million. The project is receiving national attention. Local, public, and press have expressed strong support.

The interagency cooperative CAMP program in California is having a positive effect, but much more remains to be done and the Forest Service will continue to carry out its role. We believe the role of the Forest Service is to cooperate with appropriate local, State, and Federal agencies to aggressively reduce the number of successful Cannabis growing operations on National Forest System lands. The leadership role should continue to be with the appropriate law enforcement agencies. We will continue to work aggressively in this interagency effort.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. Some additional information is included in the packet of materials supplied to Committee members earlier in this hearing. I would be pleased to answer questions you may have or furnish additional information.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRUCE CONRAD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT, CALIFORNIA STATE OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee this morning to discuss the control of marijuana cultivation on public lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management in California.

The adverse impact from the illegal cultivation of marijuana on public lands is well known. It has a direct negative impact on public land resources, on the user public, and on our employees. The indirect impact of increased crime in the small local communities is also well known.

The California State Office of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) has participated in the Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP) Program and has cooperated with local law enforcement officials in an effort to prevent and eradicate marijuana cultivation on public lands.

The CAMP Program brought together numerous Federal, State, and local agencies with a common goal: to eradicate marijuana cultivation on all lands within the State of California. This would be accomplished through a task force effort which would permit both the consolidation of funding, manpower, and equipment from all of the participating agencies and the concentration of forces in known marijuana growing areas of the State.

The scope of the participation consisted of BLM; Drug Enforcement Administration; U.S. Forest Service; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; United States Marshals Service; Federal Bureau of Investigation; U.S. Customs Service; California Department of Forestry; California Highway Patrol; California Office of Emergency Services; California State Sheriff's Association; and the individual county sheriff's offices in Butte, Del Norte, Humboldt, Lake, Mendocino, Monterey, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Siskiyou, Sonoma, Trinity, and Yuba Counties.

In 1983, the effort was regionalized by establishing four separate regions in 14 counties with regional teams consisting of 14 peace officers to each team. Each raid operation consisted of personnel being airlifted or driven to the raid location, securing the site, investigation of the scene, the cutting of the marijuana plants (some ranging to 20-foot tall), sling-loading of the accumulated marijuana, and transportation of marijuana to a central location where it was burned.

The total eradication effort for all lands, public and private, resulted in the cutting of 64,100 plants at 208 locations where 595 gardens had been discovered. Total weight of the marijuana was 271,286 pounds. There were 76 arrests made on site.

Field operations began on August 15, 1983, and continued through October 19, 1983. On BLM lands, the CAMP Operation eradicated 8,402 marijuana plants at 113 locations, which resulted in the burning of 32,254 pounds of marijuana taken from those lands.

Total funding of the entire operation, through the participating agencies, was \$1.1 million. This provided 114 team days in the field, with the cost of each day set at approximately \$14,000.

The breakdown of funding by the participating agencies was as follows:

	<i>Dollars</i>
DEA.....	271,000
BNE.....	235,200
USFS.....	225,100
California National Guard.....	160,000
U.S. Customs.....	97,900
BLM.....	64,350
OES.....	25,500
CHP.....	18,200
CDF.....	12,650
U.S. Marshal.....	8,500
ATF.....	7,900
Total.....	1,126,570

Marijuana is now estimated to be a \$2 billion per year crop in California. Perhaps 40% of it is grown on Federal lands. BLM eradicated 113 known marijuana cultivations on lands under its jurisdiction with the result that 8,402 plants were destroyed. Other Federal agencies whose eradication efforts proved successful were the Forest Service which eradicated 16,400 plants weighing 64,870 pounds, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which eradicated 970 plants weighing 1,580 pounds.

All officials involved, from California's Attorney General on down through the CAMP program, declared the eradication effort "highly successful" and urged that it be continued during the next few years.

Plans are already underway for the 1984 version of the program. Estimated costs for 1984 have been set at approximately \$2.4 million, excluding helicopter costs. If helicopters are provided by the U.S. Army, the maintenance costs for the helicopters alone will be \$1.4 million, bringing the total to \$3.8 million.

The 1984 CAMP effort has already been expanded to 36 counties in California, almost tripling the number of counties to be involved in this second year of the task force. BLM's contribution will remain approximately the same as in 1983.

The FY 1985 President's Budget includes \$300,000 which would be used to fund an additional 15 cooperative agreements with local law enforcement agencies, including five more in California, most of which will address the marijuana eradication effort.

In 1983, the illegal cultivator of marijuana was given a message from the CAMP Program, and that message was that growing marijuana on the public lands was not going to be tolerated. The task force hit them hard, but in only 14 northern California counties. In 1984, we hope to hit them even harder in 36 of the 58 California counties.

The marijuana growers felt the impact of our presence in 1983, and they fear what we have planned in 1984. We hope that will not disappoint them, because we would like to hit them where it really hurts--in their pocketbooks.

I will be glad to answer any questions the Committee may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. LILLY, FIRST DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL,
STATE OF HAWAII ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE ILLICIT DRUG ABUSE PROBLEM IN
HAWAII

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, I am pleased to have been invited to appear before you today to report on the current status of illicit drug problems in Hawaii.

Drug trafficking is considered, by most law enforcement agencies in Hawaii, as well as throughout the nation, to be not only the number one crime problem, but also one of the primary causes or contributory factors in many other crimes. Steps have been initiated at all levels of law enforcement in Hawaii to combat illicit drug sales and use. But, as this committee has correctly perceived, the problems of illicit drug use abuse—and their impact on the well-being, health and security of our citizens—are on the increase.

The availability of illicit drugs has reached epidemic levels. Making matters far worse for law enforcement officials in Hawaii and elsewhere is the fact that drug abuse is not just a local problem amenable to local solutions. As Carlton E. Turner, Special Assistant to the President for Drug Abuse Policy, told this committee on November 1, 1983, "[i]t is a national problem and must be the target of a national program."

Yet, that does not adequately address the problem because of its global implications. It is not enough to fight the war against drug abuse on the home front; strong efforts must be taken at all levels of law enforcement, at home and abroad, to curb our flourishing drug trade.

What I have to offer today, however, is an overview of the drug problem, and some of our efforts to combat it, and its current status in Hawaii.

MARIJUANA

I can say without reservation that the cultivation and sale of marijuana is Hawaii's most serious drug problem. In 1976, Hawaii Governor George R. Ariyoshi inaugurated an ambitious "Green Harvest" program, with the use of National Guard troops and materiel. This program has become the prototype for similar programs throughout the country, many of which began only in the last three years.

To give you some idea of the magnitude of the problem, I have submitted to the committee a copy of the recently published 1983 Marijuana Assessment by the Western States Information Network (WSIN), which is a federally funded drug information sharing organization of the five Pacific states. Hawaii is not only the nation's number one producer of illicit marijuana, but it accounts for over half of the marijuana confiscated in the five Pacific states—over 636,000 pounds in 1983.

The confiscated crops represent but a small portion of the actual crop cultivated. Hawaii County Police Chief Guy Paul estimates that in 1982, his department confiscated 101,000 pounds of marijuana, which represented 15-20% of the actual crop. In the first 10 months of 1983, he confiscated 163,000 pounds—a 63% increase—but that represented only 10-12% of the actual crop. 1983 seizures statewide were up 185%, but the growers are getting away with more and more marijuana. In other words, law enforcement is confiscating more marijuana than ever before, but having less of a total impact on the growers.

PROTECTING MARIJUANA CROPS

To make matters worse, Hawaii's undeveloped mountains and valleys are being taken over by growers. This is happening today. In 1981, conservation workers observed guerrilla-type fighters, carrying guns and wearing camouflaged fatigues, who were protecting their plots in the mountains of Kauai. Citizen hikers have been accosted and threatened by gun-toting growers. There are incidents of growers themselves having disappeared either because they had raided someone else's marijuana or were killed defending their own plots.

I have personally observed grotesque spring-loaded shotgun shell booby traps confiscated from our public lands near marijuana operations. These are designed to kill or maim trespassers. I have also seen a .45 calibre submachine gun which was also confiscated.

Last year WSIN estimated that the incidence of armed growers and booby-trapped patches in the five Pacific states was 76%. In the past three years there have been at least 12 murders in 14 California counties which were directly linked to marijuana cultivation.

It is appalling that life threatening tactics are being employed to protect the cultivation of an illicit crop. The reason for it is clear. Money.

THE VALUE OF MARIJUANA

The value of marijuana varies greatly from place to place. But new strains of Hawaiian sensimilla now sell for up to \$3,000 to \$4,500 a pound. This is apparently due to the extremely high THC—i.e., the narcotic content of Hawaiian marijuana—as opposed to that which is grown in our sister states.

But marijuana everywhere in the West is becoming more valuable. 1983 seizures in the five Pacific states had an estimated street value of \$1 billion. If the seizures account for only about 10% of the crop, the value of the crop harvested by the growers may be as high as \$10 billion.

For small growers, the potential profits are high. In 1981, one individual on Kauai was arrested for the cultivation and possession of \$300,000 worth of tax-free marijuana. Dealers have paid otherwise law-abiding citizens handsome sums to cultivate marijuana for them. When watercress wholesalers for only 27¢ a pound, one can easily see how small growers can be enticed into this illicit trade.

A couple of years ago, my cousin on Maui, for example, was offered \$80,000 cash a year for the rental of his two lath houses. No questions asked. He turned them down, but the inducement makes a hard choice for our citizens in these financially uncertain times.

ANTIMARIJUANA STATE LEGISLATION

In 1982, Governor George R. Ariyoshi's Conference on Crime—which represented every law enforcement agency in the State—proposed two controversial bills, both of which failed in the State legislature. One would have provided a mandatory prison term for the cultivation of one kilo or 20 or more marijuana plants. The other would have authorized the forfeiture to the State of real property used by an owner to grow any controlled substance.

Bills such as these are necessary to create an effective deterrent to the proliferation of marijuana. The experience in the national parks teaches us that we can be successful.

STATEWIDE HAWAII NARCOTICS TASK FORCE

Nearly two years ago, state, county and federal law enforcement agencies formed the Statewide Hawaii Narcotics Task Force to combat marijuana and other drug offenses. We "donated" a deputy attorney general who was cross-designated as a special assistant U.S. attorney.

Growers in Hawaii Volcanoes National Park on the island of Hawaii were targeted by the Task Force. A number were arrested and, instead of the anticipated "slap on the wrist," were sentenced to lengthy prison terms.

In November of last year, for example, a 34-year old University of Hawaii agriculture student was given six years in federal prison for growing marijuana.

Needless to say, marijuana cultivation in Hawaii's national parks has all but stopped. Unfortunately, this Task Force was disbanded last year when the Drug Enforcement Administration withdrew its vital support to the program. Conflicting priorities at the national level apparently overruled an effective program supported by all state, county and federal law enforcement in Hawaii.

USE OF THE POSTAL SERVICE

Marijuana—and other illicit drugs grown or manufactured in Hawaii—are transported from Hawaii principally through the U.S. Postal Service.

Law enforcement has asked the Postal Service to begin using sophisticated means to stop this mode of drug transshipment. In February of this year, we were able to make public, for the first time, a pilot project—called "Operation Pele"—which confiscated drug shipments in the mails. It was enormously successful and the representative of the Hawaii County Police Department will have more to say on this.

The success of the project demonstrates the need to encourage the Postal Service to implement a nationwide program to identify, through the use of profiles and drug-sniffing dogs, suspected drug packages.

MARIJUANA SPRAYING

Paraquat is not suitable on Hawaii's marijuana, which is largely grown in small clumps on precipitous hillsides where gusty tradewinds prevail.

But we are watching Arkansas' and California's experimental use of a red compound that, when sprayed on marijuana, leaves a putrid odor and an indelible red color which kills the plant. In one operation, 11,000 plants at 11 locations were eradicated in 1¼ manhours, instead of the normal 50 to 60 manhours. A helicopter equipped with a crop dusting apparatus could have done the job in 10 minutes. We are also experimenting with the use of a diesel spray.

WSIN

WSIN, which is funded by a congressionally-supported grant from the Department of Justice, was formed in 1981. Its goal is to promote the exchange of confidential narcotics information on individuals who are involved or associated with major illicit narcotics traffickers through the collection, analysis and dissemination of narcotic intelligence.

WSIN operates in this fashion. A member agency may ask WSIN about suspects in a narcotics investigation it is conducting. WSIN immediately checks its computers and, within minutes, provides the member agency with the name of a member agency that has information on the suspects. It is up to the individual member agencies whether to share the actual intelligence.

As a result of WSIN's assistance, member agencies have since 1981, seized narcotics valued in excess of \$192 million and property in excess of \$10 million. It has been involved in over 1,300 narcotics arrests, of which over 900 resulted in convictions.

In addition to providing an exchange of narcotics information, WSIN provides financial and surveillance and communications equipment support to member agencies. Its team of experts help diagnose and diagram complex narcotics investigations. It provides toll-free communication patches between member agencies. And it conducts training for member agency personnel in link analysis, visual investigative analysis, informant management, and, on request, other crime subjects, such as marijuana eradication, motorcycle gangs and organized crime.

WSIN exemplifies how well law enforcement can operate through cooperation and the exchange of information. Since drug crime is not just a local problem, the exchange of interstate narcotics intelligence information is a vital part of the war on illicit drugs.

ORGANIZED CRIME

According to the Honolulu Police Department, there is no evidence that Hawaii has the more traditional mafia-style organized crime network. Rather, organized crime in Hawaii consists of loosely-knit splinter groups engaged in the common enterprise of crime.

Organized crime in Hawaii is involved generally in gambling, massage parlors, drugs, prostitution, and burglary. There is very little linkage between the different groups, other than that which results from the mere fact that each group engages in similar criminal activity. There is no evidence to date, despite much speculation, of an organized crime czar or godfather in Hawaii.

Additionally, while there is Yakuza activity in Hawaii, its activities are principally aimed at Japanese tourists. There seems to be some linkage between the Yakuza and local Hawaii organized crime, but that linkage itself does not appear to be well-organized.

There is also some infiltration of the Korean, Vietnamese, and Chinese organized crime elements in the islands, but such infiltration is common at all entry ports in the United States and, in particular, where a large tourist trade flourishes.

HEROIN

The use of Hawaii as a transshipment port of entry from the Golden Triangle and the Golden Crescent is on the increase. In 1983, the Federal-State Airport Drug Task Force confiscated approximately 50 pounds of 90% pure heroin from Asian couriers.

The estimated street value of one pound of heroin cut to 3% purity amounts to over \$8.5 million. That means that the heroin confiscated last year in Hawaii had an estimated value of over \$425 million.

According to the Honolulu Police Department, Hawaii has a very real potential to become another Miami. Hawaii is not as convenient as Miami, but it does not have the law enforcement capabilities enjoyed by Miami.

There are only about 2,000 police officers in our State. The Airport Drug Task Force—which is responsible for the investigation of drug smuggling at all of the State's airports—consists of six Honolulu police officers and three DEA agents.

Now that the air carriers are flying directly to and from the islands of Maui and Hawaii, as well as Oahu, the capabilities of the airport detail are extremely limited.

We expect Hawaii to become, if it has not already, a major international drug transshipment port of entry.

LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Our local U.S. Attorney has organized a Hawaii Law Enforcement Coordinating Committee (LECC) which is composed of all law enforcement related organizations in the islands.

One of the primary needs identified by our LECC was training of prosecutors. As a result, our U.S. Attorney for the District of Hawaii convinced the Department of Justice to hire a special assistant U.S. attorney for four months to provide prosecutor training to the Hawaii Attorney General and the four county prosecutors.

In December 1983, Stephen Mayo, at that time Director of the Hastings College of Advocacy, was hired and he trained prosecutors throughout the State until March 1984.

From all accounts, this was a successful example of federal-state cooperation that resulted in a significant improvement of our prosecutors' capabilities to combat crime in our State.

LOOK ALIKE DRUG LEGISLATION

In 1984, Hawaii may become the 40th state to pass the Model Imitation Controlled Substances Act. The bill has passed the State House and is virtually assured of passage in the State Senate.

The vending of look-alike drugs has become a major nationwide drug abuse problem and their sales are on the increase in Hawaii. The Primary targets of this new multimillion dollar industry are college, high school and junior high school students. Numerous deaths and strokes and overdose misdiagnoses, particularly among young adults, have occurred because of the ingestion of high quantities of look-alikes.

More insidious is the growing climate of acceptance of these substances by students as their sale and use become widespread. And they are often bought, not because the buyers want a look-alike, but because they think they are getting the real thing. They become an introduction to the drug culture or are used in the periphery of the drug culture.

There is no justification for look-alikes. Currently, there are no effective laws to control them. The Model Act will serve as an effective tool to combat their proliferation in our islands and wherever it is enacted.

DRUG PARAPHERNALIA LEGISLATION

The manufacture and sale of drug paraphernalia is a burgeoning new industry in Hawaii. It is easy to acquire in the islands—in head shops, on street corners, even in otherwise legitimate stores.

In a recent legitimate purchase of paraphernalia in a Honolulu head shop, an undercover officer was sold a book and given a kit by which he could "safely" freebase cocaine. The saleswoman told him that otherwise he might "end up like . . . Richard Pryor." In selling the book, she said, "Yeah, this is the one I recommend. The book, I mean the directions are to the T."

When a legitimate wholesaler found out about the sale of paraphernalia in this store, she told the owner of the store that she would no longer sell to him. The owner swore at the wholesaler and told her that he didn't care, that if a drug paraphernalia law were passed, he'd move to another state and continue making lots of money.

This is the sort of people with whom we are dealing in the paraphernalia trade. They are mercenary entrepreneurs who care not a bit for the health and welfare of their clientele. They openly advertise the uses to which their paraphernalia may be put and even sell instruction booklets for them.

Drug paraphernalia are sold all over our community. They are attractively designed to appeal to our children, as well as to adults. They enhance the motion that drug use is the "in thing" to do. This is the "head shop message."

Drug paraphernalia must be stopped.

CONCLUSION

On behalf of Governor George R. Ariyoshi, Attorney General Tany S. Hong, and the law enforcement agencies in Hawaii, I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you and to express our views on the problem of illicit drug trade in Hawaii.

OVERVIEW OF MARIJUANA CULTIVATION IN HAWAII COUNTY

ISLAND OF HAWAII (COUNTY OF HAWAII)

The Island of Hawaii consists of 4,038 square miles in total land area and a population of approximately 90,000 people.

During the last five years, the County of Hawaii has experienced a marked increase in the amount of marihuana being cultivated on the island. Because of the year-round planting season and the ideal climatic conditions, the cultivation of marihuana can be found in every district and every type of terrain within Hawaii County, making marihuana cultivation one of the largest agricultural industries on the island. The fast and high monetary gain obtained by growers has attracted more people from the mainland to Hawaii for the primary purpose of growing marihuana.

We currently estimate our recovery of marihuana growing within the Hawaii County to be approximately 10% of the total amount planted on the island. This percentage is based on aerial reconnaissance of major growing areas.

Along with the increase in the amount of marihuana being grown on the island, there has been an increase in threats of violence, assaults and other acts of violence that accompany the illicit drug trade.

ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS

The enforcement of all drug, gambling and morals laws in the county is the primary responsibility of the Hawaii County Police Department's Vice Section. The Vice Section consists of nine (9) investigators—five (5) of the investigators work out of the Hilo station while the remaining four (4) from the Kona station.

In an effort to put a dent into the marihuana production on the island, the Hawaii County Police Department has undertaken regular marihuana eradication missions. Supplemented by uniformed patrol personnel, the Vice Section goes on frequent raids into marihuana growing areas and recover as much marihuana as possible for destruction. In this effort, we have found that a helicopter is the most essential tool in attaining any measure of success. These missions, however, have caused the growers to seek out more and more remote areas for marihuana cultivation and have developed a method of planting that minimizes the effect of the eradication mission on their overall crop.

Marihuana plots are now being found two miles away from the end of the nearest four-wheel drive road, in forests so thick that the airlifting of police personnel into the plots is impossible. To make matters more difficult, the marihuana plants are cultivated in plots consisting of not more than 20 plants per plot scattered along winding trails that have been found to extend for approximately one mile. This causes eradication efforts to be time consuming and expensive.

In an effort to counteract this strategy, the Hawaii County Police Department, with the assistance of the FBI and Hawaii Volcanoes National Park, has trained officers to rappel from helicopters into marihuana patches. The harvested plants are then airlifted out of the area.

In attempting to place as much pressure on marihuana growers as possible, our department has gone to as many sources of support as possible. However, we have found that no one source has the ability or resources to contend with the requirements of a successful marihuana suppression program in our county.

At present, the bulk of the suppression program is being carried by the Hawaii County. We have obtained invaluable support from the Drug Enforcement Administration in the form of monetary grants and support from the state government with the use of National Guard helicopters during our Green Harvest Operations.

The county, in addition to supplying four-wheel drive and other required vehicles, has made available the county-owned Hughes 500D helicopter. While playing a very important role in our eradication and suppression missions, the use of this helicopter is restricted. The helicopter is under the control of the Fire Department, and as such, we have had to cancel many reconnaissance flights and actual eradication missions when the helicopter has been diverted to fire rescue use or other county department operations.

Through the state government, we have obtained the use of National Guard OH-58 and Huey helicopters. While being an invaluable asset to our program, this too, has its limitations. Due to financial restraints, the number of aircraft available to us has been steadily decreasing, and at this point we have obtained the use of three (3) OH-58s and one (1) Huey. We are now granted 30 hours of flying time per aircraft each year. This allows us approximately six (6) days of operation per year.

The OH-58 observation helicopters are of an early 1970 vintage and are used strictly for observation. They can only carry the pilot and one observer. This restricts their use to only the most accessible portions of our island as all marihuana must be carried out of the field by ground personnel.

The use of the Huey helicopter allows us to penetrate some of the most inaccessible areas of our island. Rappelling into marihuana patches from the Huey is allowed, and this helicopter is also capable of sling loading large amounts of harvested marihuana out of the growing area.

Use of the National Guard choppers, however, is dependent on the Guard's training schedule. As a result, these helicopters are usually available after the major harvest season is over.

With the cooperation of the sugar companies on the Island of Hawaii, we have started a herbicide spraying operation in sugar cane fields. "Operation Wilt" is conducted with the use of a Hughes 400D helicopter.

Our greatest need presently is access to helicopters with rappelling and sling loading capabilities.

EXPORTING

From information developed through interviews of arrested persons and documents recovered during the execution of search warrants, we have found that most of the marihuana produced in Hawaii County is for export. Large amounts of marihuana are sent to Honolulu on the Island of Oahu with an increasing amount being shipped to the continental United States. Local drug rings have also found connections with Alaska, the entire west coast, Colorado, Wisconsin, New York, and South America.

The primary means of export has been found to be the United States mail. In conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Postal Service, the Hawaii County Police Department implemented "Operation Pele". This operation intercepted over 1,000 "profile" parcels in the mail of which 441 Federal search warrants were served on said parcels. Seized during the operation were approximately 700 lbs. of processed marihuana with a value of \$1.3 million, other narcotic drugs having a value of \$375,000, 45 vehicles with a value of \$170,000, and \$14,800 in cash.

The second most used means of export has been the commercial airlines—both inter-island and overseas. Close working relations with the U.S. Agricultural Inspectors and the implementation of a drug detection canine program are working toward discouraging this avenue of export.

OTHER DRUGS

Over the past two years, we have noticed an increasing connection between cocaine and marihuana. In some of our covert operations, we have found cocaine dealers willing to trade locally grown marihuana for cocaine and refusing cash payments. An increasing amount of cocaine is being found during the execution of marihuana search warrants, and we have also come across the cultivation of coca plants in our county. The Vice Section is presently beginning to develop information on the marihuana/cocaine connection and expect to see a great increase in the use of locally grown marihuana as payment for imported cocaine.

CONCLUSION

Attached are totals of marihuana recovered and arrests made for the years 1981, 1982, and 1983. Also included is a list of reported threats made by marihuana growers to individuals who have ventured into major marihuana growing areas. It should be noted that this list of threats covers only a one-month span and includes only those incidents reported to the Hilo Vice Section and not reported threats made to other police divisions.

MARIHUANA ERADICATION - HAWAII COUNTY
 JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1983

(Revised 09-01-83)

<u>(Month)</u>	<u>(No. of Plants)</u>	<u>(Net Weight Lbs.)</u>	<u>(Height)</u>	<u>(Dry Weight)</u>	<u>(Search Warrants)</u>	<u>(Pro Detri Arrests)</u>
January	21,520	1,760.41	seedlings - 5'	30.54 lbs.	21	44
February	15,878	705.69	seedlings - 5'	88.54 lbs.	38	88
March	41,570	2,376.53	seedlings - 7'	15.63 lbs.	35	43
OGH 13 - W.H.	30,580	1,881.00	seedlings - 6'	-	0	0
April	4,967	2,063.99	seedlings - 10'	1.54 lbs.	28	42
May	9,955	3,069.00	seedlings - 13'	182.05 lbs.	11	50
June	116,502	29,642.12	seedlings - 14'	76.36 lbs.	9	21
OGH 14 - E.H.	27,163	6,254.00	seedlings - 12'	0	0	0
July	26,726	14,148.80	seedlings - 15'	29.30 lbs.	13	22
August	78,946	50,261.60	seedlings - 16'	51.50 lbs.	11	34
September	81,479	45,198.00	seedlings - 16'	222.00 lbs.	23	36
OGH 15 - E.H.	62,013	23,928.00	seedlings - 16'	166.00 lbs.	0	2
October	37,822	14,437.60	seedlings - 20'	59.50 lbs.	15	27
OGH 16 - W.H.	30,020	11,532.00	seedlings - 20'	-	-	-
November	5,459	1,482.80	seedlings - 10'	85.90 lbs.	15	35
December	9,228	483.45	seedlings - 6'	69.46 lbs.	7	52
TOTALS:	450,052	165,629.99	SEEDLINGS - 20'	894.32 LBS.	226	494
		(82.81 TONS)				

Regular Maint. - 300,270 122,064.99 (61.03 tons) 728.32 lbs.
 Green Harvests - 149,778 43,575.00 (21.78 tons) 166.00 lbs.

TOTAL VALUE - WET & DRY WEIGHTS: \$34,020,318.00

Regular Maint. - \$24,410,998.00 \$ 728,320.00
 Green Harvests - \$ 8,715,000.00 166,000.00
 \$33,125,998.00 \$ 894,320.00

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MARIHUANA ERADICATION - HAWAII COUNTY
 JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1982

(Revised 06-23-83)

<u>(Month)</u>	<u>(No. of Plants)</u>	<u>(Wet Weight Lbs.)</u>	<u>(Height)</u>	<u>(Dry Weight)</u>	<u>(Search Warrants)</u>	<u>(Pro Detri Arrests)</u>
January	8,204	161.76	seedlings - 5'	17.26 lbs.	17	33
February	6,124	318.04	seedlings - 6'	12.85 lbs.	11	22
March	43,805	7,316.39	seedlings - 8'	375.63 lbs.	10	29
OGH 10 - E.H.	17,457	3,064.00	seedlings - 8'	5.00 lbs.	0	0
- W.H.	20,957	3,804.00	seedlings - 7'	-	0	0
April	4,605	133.68	seedlings - 7'	64.78 lbs.	14	19
May	57,452	9,135.14	seedlings - 10'	13.51 lbs.	8	18
OGH 11 - E.H.	12,079	1,983.00	seedlings - 8'	-	0	0
- W.H.	15,690	2,350.00	seedlings - 7'	-	0	0
- E.H.	6,511	1,220.00	8" - 7'	-	0	0
- W.H.	22,363	3,476.00	seedlings - 10'	-	0	0
June	24,831	4,936.88	seedlings - 12'	4.98 lbs.	17	26
July	5,572	2,026.92	seedlings - 12'	15.60 oz.	9	15
August	49,928	20,233.18	seedlings - 14'	6.98 lbs.	23	31
September	22,223	14,420.42	2" - 22'	13.27 lbs.	10	38
October	111,879	39,625.39	seedlings - 18'	481.95 lbs.	7	32
OGH 12 - E.H.	24,974	13,017.00	seedlings - 18'	280.00 lbs.	0	0
- W.H.	81,204	23,838.00	seedlings - 18'	38.06 lbs.	0	0
November	7,797	2,573.67	seedlings - 18'	32.25 lbs.	17	35
December	7,094	57.97	seedlings - 14'	11.90 lbs.	12	35
TOTALS:	349,514	100,939.44 (50.5 TONS)	SEEDLINGS - 22'	1,035.36 LBS. 15.60 oz.	155	333

Regular Maint. - 148,319 48,220.44 (24.11 tons) 712.30 lbs. 18 oz.
 Green Harvests - 201,195 52,719.00 (26.36 tons) 383.06 lbs.

TOTAL VALUE - WET & DRY WEIGHTS: \$21,224,185.50

Regular Maint. - \$ 8,844,088.00
 Green Harvests - 10,543,800.00
 \$19,387,888.00

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\$ 712,337.50
 383,080.00
 \$1,095,417.50

MARIHUANA ERADICATION - HAWAII COUNTY
 JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1981

INVESTIGATION

(Month)	(No. of Plants)	(Net Weight Lbs.)	(Height)	(Dry Weight)	(Search Warrants)	(Pro Detri Arrests)
January	3,159	170	seedlings - 5 1/2'	8.18 lbs.	5	18
February	679	58	seedlings - 5'	23.57 lbs.	7	32
March	12,928	1,625	seedlings - 6'	21.70 lbs.	11	37
April	7,103	884	seedlings - 7'	11.36 lbs.	22	30
May	104,400	21,005	seedlings - 14'	11.21 lbs.	18	38
OGH B - E.H.	63,866	18,006	seedlings - 14'	-	9	17
- W.H.	37,478	3,208	seedlings - 8'	-	0	1
June	10,084	1,772	seedlings - 18'	13.52 lbs.	17	29
July	3,337	1,175	seedlings - 12'	88.48 lbs.	16	62
August	5,157	5,299	seedlings - 15'	13.48 lbs.	13	36
September	17,732	14,419	seedlings - 18'	7.54 lbs.	16	45
October	39,105	10,668	seedlings - 18'	65.69 lbs.	7	29
OGH B - E.H.	12,781	6,648	seedlings - 17'	-	0	0
- W.H.	22,084	2,640	seedlings - 18'	-	0	2
November	50,560	15,697	seedlings - 12'	708.20 lbs.	13	62
OGH B - E.H.	19,843	5,606	seedlings - 12'	226.00 lbs.	0	0
- W.H.	10,828	8,188	seedlings - 18'	-	0	0
December	13,819	1,821	seedlings - 18'	67.03 lbs.	9	23
TOTALS:	268,063	74,593 (37.3 TONS)	SEEDLINGS - 18'	1,039.96 LBS.	154	441

July 26 to October 1 = mini harvest : 17,868 plants/ 18,066 lbs. recovered.
 December = mini harvest in Ka'u : 10,508 plants/ 1,870 lbs. recovered.

Regular Maint.	- 73,429	11,818 (5.9 tons)	814.86 lbs.
OGH B & D	- 188,470	43,060 (21.6 tons)	226.00 lbs.
Mini Harvests	- 26,164	18,728 (9.9 tons)	-
TOTAL VALUE - WET & DRY WEIGHTS:	\$15,958,560.00		
Regular Maint.	- \$ 2,283,800.00		\$ 814,860.00
OGH B & D	- 8,610,000.00		226,000.00
Mini Harvests	- 3,845,000.00		-

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REPORTED THREATS MADE BY MARIHUANA GROWERS
(Reported to Hilo Vice Only)

(Date)	(Location)	(Incident)	(Weapon)	(Confirmed Marihuana By Police)
7-19-83	Royal Kelepana Gardens, Kelepana, Puna (Volcano National Park)	Male adult male picker confronted by male adult; ordered out of forest.	No	No
7-21-83	Hohea/Kupono Street, Leilani Estates S/D, Puna (Private Lands)	Juveniles walked into marihuana patch. Confronted by male adult; ordered out of forest.	No	Yes
7-26-83	North Glenwood Road, Puna (Private Lands)	Male contractor inspecting roadway confronted by male; ordered out of forest.	Yes/rifle	Yes
7-29-83	Steinback Hwy, Kulani, Hilo (State Lands)	Adult male male pickers heard gun fire, found 30-30 caliber round in vehicle; received threatening phone call following day.	Yes	Yes
8-01-83	Steinback Highway, Kulani, Hilo (State Lands)	Juveniles confronted by adult male in forest near home; ordered out, threatened with harm if they returned.	Yes/rifle	Yes
8-03-83	Moku St., Leilani Estates S/D, Puna (Private Lands)	Juveniles confronted by male adult; ordered out of forest.	Yes/rifle	Yes
8-11-83	Steinback Hwy, Kulani, Hilo (State Lands)	Adult male hunter confronted by male adult; ordered out of forest.	Yes/rifle	Yes
8-12-83	Camp Pow, Hilo (State Lands)	Adult male hunter confronted by adult male; ordered out of forest.	Yes/rifle	No
8-10-83	H.O.V.E. S/D, Ke'u (Private Lands)	Police on rip mission found booby traps near marihuana.	Yes/rat traps with live round	Yes
8-12-83	Peanuheu, Hemakua (Private Lands)	Police on rip mission found spikes (punji sticks) in ground near patch.	Yes/punji sticks	Yes

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GREEN HARVEST & MAINTENANCE STATISTICS

	<u>OAHU</u>		<u>HAWAII</u>		<u>KAUAI</u>		<u>MAUI</u>		<u>STATE</u>	
	<u>(PLANTS)</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>								
1976		6 T								
1977		2½ T								
1978		2,052#		14,548#		6,124#		15,183#		37,907#
Maintenance		25,530#		33,060#		1,834#		6,039#		66,403#
TOTAL		27,582#		47,608#		7,958#		21,222#		104,310#
1979										
JUNE		19,064#		22,455#		5,411#		3,872#		87,592#
OCTOBER		1,272#		33,418#		2,100#		none		47,416#
Maintenance		13,683#		20,378#		9,075#		3,680#		135,008#
TOTAL		34,019#		76,251#		16,586#		7,552#		
1980										
GREEN										
HARVEST	(20,544)	9,475#	(90,574)	28,414#	(7,705)	4,230#	(8,902)	3,949#		
Maint.	(34,899)	19,125#	(55,575)	23,261#	(8,295)	2,651#	(9,951)	5,855#		
TOTAL	(75,443)	28,599#	(146,149)	51,675#	(16,000)	6,881#	(18,853)	9,804#	(259,436)	97,161#
1981										
GREEN										
HARVEST	(40,281)	17,860#	(87,219)	50,499#	(12,982)	14,361#	(34,500)	15,592#	(180,984)	98,292#
Maint.	(100,529)	38,115#	(32,270)	36,735#	(19,006)	13,412#	(9,082)	6,112#	(160,817)	94,574#
TOTAL	(140,812)	56,155#	(119,489)	87,234#	(31,988)	27,773#	(43,523)	21,704#	(341,821)	192,866#
1982										
GREEN										
HARVEST	(28,132)	13,600#	(201,175)	53,042#	(5,290)	9,655#	(10,389)	4,696#	(245,306)	80,931#
Maint.	(11,194)	6,107#	(181,612)	49,162#	(9,642)	7,636#	(10,160)	3,970#	(212,578)	66,855.5#
TOTAL	(39,326)	19,707#	(382,787)	102,184#	(14,914)	17,291#	(20,549)	8,666#	(457,884)	147,848.5#
1983										
GREEN										
HARVEST	(2,600)	2,610#	(149,776)	43,575#	(42,927)	4,124#	(22,034)	12,949#	(217,337)	63,258#
Maint.	(93,557)	54,902#	(300,276)	122,054#	(14,750)	8,267#	(10,564)	5,769#	(419,147)	190,992#
TOTAL	(96,157)	57,512#	(450,052)	165,629#	(57,677)	12,391#	(32,598)	18,718#	(636,484)	254,250#

1978= 52 Tons (\$21 million)
 1979= 68 Tons (\$27 million)
 1980= 49 Tons (\$19 million)

1981= 96 Tons (\$38 million)
 1982= 74 Tons (\$30 million)
 1983= 127 Tons (\$51 million)

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MEDIA RELEASE, HAWAII POLICE DEPARTMENT

(By Lt. Charles Wakita, PH: 961-2253)

The Hawaii County Police Department, in conjunction with Mauna Kea Sugar Company, has implemented an aerial application program to eradicate marijuana from sugar canefields.

In keeping with our efforts to "dry up" the source of revenues from the marijuana industry the spot spray program encompasses the use of a diesel oil emulsion for post emergence application in sugar cane areas.

The diesel oil emulsion (DOE) is a 20% non-toxic mixture which acts as a non-selective weed control agent. DOE has no EPA restrictions for use in sugar canefields.

U.S. GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM

Date: November 18, 1983.

Reply to Attention of: Michael L. Walker, S/A Pilot.

Subject: Trip Report; Hawaii—October 11, 1983, to October 26, 1983—Domestic Marijuana Eradication Program, Aviation Support.

To: Mr. Thomas Burn, Chief, Marijuana Section, DEA Headquarters, Washington, DC.

Through: Chris Bradley, Deputy Chief Pilot, Addison Air Wing.

On October 11, 1983, I travelled to Honolulu, Hawaii, at the request of the Marijuana Desk, to ascertain the aviation capabilities available to the ongoing Green Harvest Operation in that State. Please find in the following narrative a brief history of the operation, present assessment, and projected requirements relative to the aviation support of this program.

Briefly, the Green Harvest Operation is a multi-agency enforcement program directed at the field eradication of domestically grown marijuana in the State of Hawaii. Eight islands comprised the territory of the State, seven are inhabited and three have been identified as primary source islands, with Hawaii presenting the greatest problem.

Although Green Harvest is a multi-agency operation, the single most significant contribution is provided by the Hawaiian National Guard, which has been functioning under a State of Emergency provision activated by the Governor. The National Guard has historically provided almost all of the rotary winged aircraft for this operation. Consequently, the entire operation has been planned around the National Guard's schedule and limited in scope by the types of aircraft and the number of available rotor hours. In order to properly evaluate the success, failures or future requirements for air support of this program, it is necessary to first clearly define the specific eradication problems to which Green Harvest has been addressed.

There are several things we know at the present time. The first is that we do not know the entire scope of the problem in Hawaii, there have never been enough assets available to either gain the intelligence or to complete eradication. At the conclusion of each Green Harvest Operation, there has always been more marijuana identified and plotted than was eradicated and there have always been highly suspected areas of cultivation which were never searched. This is not a criticism of the operational portion of this program. The application of available resources is as efficient as any I have ever seen anywhere in the United States. It is simply a function of running out of those resources long before the work is completed. When there is not enough to work with, no amount of management or manipulation will solve your problems. The problems in field eradication in Hawaii are unique. Geographically, Hawaii is a chain of relatively small islands, volcanic in origin, and covered alternately by jagged mountains and three-tier jungle. A significant portion of the islands' flatter areas are given over to agriculture, specifically, sugar cane and pineapple. Marijuana is being cultivated in all of these areas.

The success of the Green Harvest Program in Hawaii is directly proportional to the availability of rotary wing support. The reasons for this will be obvious in the discussion of the operational environment which follows.

MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

The north shore of the island of Kauai is called the Nepali Coast. It goes from sea level to 3,200 feet in altitude in less than one horizontal mile. It is comprised of canyons, about 1,000 feet deep with walls normally thirty degrees from the vertical. That part of the range that is not barren rock is heavily foliated. This terrain is so

forbidding that it can take a man one hour of exhausting and dangerous labor to go several hundred yards. There are a number of trails that wander through the range but unless you know which trail connects with the others, a man could wander around within a hundred yards of a marijuana plot all day and never find it. The height and density of the foliage here precludes him from seeing it until he is six or seven yards away.

Eradication in this area and similar areas on the other islands is performed exclusively by vertical insertion and extraction, helicopters. There is no other reasonable approach to eradication in this kind of terrain.

JUNGLE

Hawaii is a tropical island, much of the flatter areas are classic three-tier jungle, with tree tops around 100 feet high. The ground layer is a combination of brush and vines that form a wall of wood and fiber. Often it is easier to move along the tops of this first layer, about 30 feet up, supported by the innerwoven vines, than it is to crawl or cut your way through at ground level. The humidity is always at a hundred percent and the temperatures in the 80's and 90's. Simple breathing is difficult and often unpleasant (everything on the ground is rotting). Any physical labor in this environment is exhausting.

If it were not for the fact that marijuana needs sunlight and must be planted in small clearings, it would never even be found. A clearing in this kind of jungle is a cylinder about twenty feet in diameter and 100 to 120 feet deep. The trees are too close and too thick to allow even effective observation with anything other than a helicopter. Again here, vertical insertion and extraction are the only feasible means of eradication.

AGRICULTURAL AREAS

I know of no gardens having been located in pineapple fields, the rows are too neat and the bushes are too short to hide marijuana plants.

Sugar cane fields, however, are ideal locations for marijuana gardens. The soil is perfect, the marijuana plants respond to the same fertilizers and are protected by the same insect and rodent controls that feed and protect the sugar cane. As important as these factors are, probably the most important is the fact that the cane grows to about twelve feet in height and the stalks and leaves interweave to form a wall. A man can see about six feet into a field of sugar cane looking from the side.

Eradication in these fields is in many ways easier than in the mountains or the jungles. The area is flat, the fields are crisscrossed with roads, and in most cases, you can drive to within 60 to 100 yards of the marijuana gardens. Eradication in sugar cane fields is essentially a problem of navigating the last few hundred yards. It is possible to push your way through growing cane. It takes slightly less effort than cutting a path. The problem is knowing where to go. The gardens are not visible from the ground and it is extremely difficult to see a man from the air, once he is in the sugar cane field. It is even more difficult to try to direct him. A two or three degree error in a true line at a hundred yards means that a man would walk past a marijuana garden and never see it. In a sugar cane field there is no such thing as a straight line. You must force your way through the point of least tanglement and growth. When a man gets into the cane about twenty yards, the only direction he is sure of is up and down. There are no cues or landmarks to guide him. The eradication process here involves hovering a light observation helicopter directly over the garden. A man can then walk toward the sound of the helicopter until he is close enough to see it and then walk beneath it to find the garden. A man can use this system to move from garden to garden, heavy loads are slung out for him. The only limitations in this procedure are personal stamina.

OPERATIONAL MANAGEMENT

This is a situation where no one is in charge. The single most important asset, helicopters, do not belong to or are in any way under the direction of the local DEA office or any other law enforcement organization. They are provided "as available" during the National Guard's yearly schedule. They are not available on demand. The National Guard publishes a schedule and the local agencies involved on the various islands, work around that schedule. The schedule has traditionally followed the normal summer operations of all the other State National Guard Units throughout the country. Once a local police department receives its dates of helicopter support, it organizes a ground operation based on the number and type of aircraft provided and the amount of air time allotted to that activity. To my knowledge, there

has never been a Green Harvest Operation that was based on a thorough evaluation of the scope of the problem. These operations have always been planned around the application of the less than sufficient assets.

AIR PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

The air program within its quantitative limits is operationally very effective. Prior long term scheduling allows for the most efficient use of limited rotor time. Problems in logistical support have been worked out and the system runs very smoothly.

There simply is not enough rotor time available and the scheduling of this rotor time severely limits the effectiveness of the overall program. As mentioned above, the entire operational phase of this program takes place during the last months of summer. This time frame coincides with the traditional summer training program of the National Guard. It also coincides with the normal marijuana harvest cycle throughout the rest of the country. Hawaii, due to its temperate climate and ample year-round rainfall has no real growing season. Marijuana can be and is successfully grown year-round. This means that nine or ten months out of the year, marijuana cultivators in Hawaii can operate with no fear of enforcement activity being directed against them. A good example of this was presented during my visit to Hilo, where the Hilo Police Department acquired the services of a County Emergency Service helicopter to fly me over cultivation areas on two separate days. The first day was an overall observation flight which covered a large area of known cultivation. The second was an enforcement operation involving field eradication. These flights took place two to three weeks after the last "official" Green Harvest Eradication Activity. What we found the second day was enlightening. Many of the gardens harvested that day were the same gardens which had been previously harvested during the normal operation earlier in the summer. The growers, knowing that Green Harvest had terminated just weeks before, had re-planted the same gardens with seedlings, knowing that they would be safe until the next summer.

As an option to possibly improve the efficient use of air support funding, I investigated the possibility of using fixed wing aircraft instead of rotor wing for observation in plotting missions. The fact is that except in the sugar cane fields fixed wing is impractical. In the mountains and jungle areas, the terrain is too confined and the gardens too protected by natural foliage to warrant the effective use of fixed wing aircraft, in lieu of the maneuverable and slower helicopters.

There is a potential future use for fixed wing aircraft in the areas of cane field eradication, but not now. At the present time, finding gardens to eradicate is not a problem. The first gardens appear almost fifteen minutes from the end of the runway at Hilo Airport, and they continue far beyond the limits of fuel and daylight. The ability to locate and return to gardens will not be a problem until marijuana cultivation is under much greater control than it is now.

POTENTIAL PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

Hawaii presents a unique opportunity for domestic marijuana enforcement that is not available anywhere else in the United States. Typically in the United States, we have found growers simply moving to the next state or to the next county as a result of concentrated enforcement activity. In Hawaii, there is no place else to move.

As you know, Operation Pele is making a substantial impact on the distribution of cultivated marijuana from Hawaii. Few of these growers can survive more than two or three plantings without realizing a profit from their efforts. It is possible, by applying increased year-round pressure on the cultivation in the field and halting or disturbing the distribution process, to essentially eliminate marijuana cultivation in Hawaii.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Substantially increase the amount of rotor time available to local departments.
2. Schedule year-round air support for their eradication efforts.
3. Enlist the U.S. Military to at least police their own areas of responsibility. The Military controls large amounts of land in Hawaii, which has never been overflowed or included in any enforcement operation.

OPTIONS

1. Increase the amount of rotor time available

a. The National Guard should not be seen as a source for increased rotor time for the next two years. They have been forced by the National Guard Bureau to decrease (by 25% since FY-82) the flight hours available to Green Harvest. Based on their participation in Green Harvest, they have been able to dramatically increase the number of pilots, aircraft and maintenance personnel. The problem for FY-85-86 is that these people must be trained. This training process will require the expenditure of rotor time, maintenance time, and instructor flight hours which were previously available to Green Harvest. The Hawaii National Guard will be doing very well, indeed, to simply maintain their activity in Green Harvest at its present FY-84 level.

b. I believe there are a few changes in their mission format which would increase their effectiveness.

(1) Spread their available flight hours throughout the calendar year, instead of the three months during the summer.

(2) Schedule only trained personnel for those missions. In the past, the Guard has assigned pilots and crew chiefs to this operation, who because of internal regulations, are not allowed or are not capable of performing at the full range of mission requirements.

(3) Use the helicopter which is presently assigned photo duties as a swing unit to take the place of operational helicopters down for maintenance.

(4) Allow for some flexibility in scheduling which would provide for a shift of flight hours not used in one particular location to be applied to another location where more flight hours are needed.

c. Sun Air Copters, Inc., located on the island of Maui, has been utilized in the past in Green Harvest Operations. Tom Hauptman, the Hughes 500 Pilot for this Company, has worked closely with the local departments in developing the skills and techniques required in this kind of eradication effort. This includes repelling and sling loading, as well as other techniques of vertical insertion and extraction. This Hughes 500-D is powerful enough to perform these tasks without pushing the limit of the aircraft performance envelope and is equipped with a Wolfsberg 9600 radio, which is capable of handling all of the various law enforcement frequencies used on the islands. This helicopter rents with pilot and fuel for \$450.00 an hour. At present there is no option to rent this helicopter without the pilot. This helicopter also now fits the standard equipment and performance criteria for OAS Contracting.

d. Manuiva Air Way, Inc., is located in Honolulu and has recently acquired a Hughes 500-D helicopter, which is available for lease. The lease options include helicopter, helicopter with pilot, helicopter with pilot and fuel. Mr. Richard Okita of that company is presently working up a cost per hour schedule covering these various options. This company has also acquired a support vehicle which carries 300 gallons of jet fuel, which could also be included in any lease arrangement.

e. U.S. Army Long-Term Loan Equipment, it is possible to acquire helicopter through a 90-day renewable loan from the Department of Defense. In the past this has been an extremely expensive procedure, mainly due to some ambiguities in the loan agreement.

These could be worked out prior to any future agreement with DOD. One of the biggest problems that arose during our prior experience was the kind and caliber of maintenance available and/or required by the agreement. I contacted personnel at the Twenty-fifth U.S. Army Aviation Unit located at Wheeler Air Force Base on Oahu and enquired about their maintenance capabilities. This unit supports in excess of 100 helicopters throughout the islands and I was told that adding two or three additional helicopters to their maintenance schedule would present no problems for them whatsoever. A long-term loan of equipment could be arranged in one of several ways. DEA could take delivery of the helicopters in the Continental United States and make any equipment additions or training flights necessary in the United States before transporting them to Hawaii with fully operational training crews. There is a possibility that this transportation could be accomplished by the Army at no cost to DEA. Another option is to take delivery of the helicopters from the present inventory already stationed in Hawaii. Arrangements would then have to be worked out for configuration and crew training in Hawaii.

f. U.S. Army Short Term Loan, there is a short-term loan arrangement agreement available which would allow for the loan of Army helicopters to DEA for a specific number of days or a specific number of flight hours. For example, three days or 16 flight hours. An agreement like this precludes any special arrangements for maintenance. The draw backs to this kind of arrangement is i.e., no multi-frequency radios, Loran equipment or load cells. Second, the cost per hour would be much higher than the long term arrangement.

g. DEA Helicopters, as an option, it may be possible to transport the one DEA Hughes 500 D presently stationed in Los Angeles to Hawaii for a determined period of time. At present, the cost of air transportation by U.S. Military is prohibitive, \$4,000 per flight hour. There is a possibility that we would be able to arrange for Military Sea Transport at a substantially reduced cost. Matson Shipping Line will ship the Hughes 500 from Los Angeles to Honolulu for approximately \$4,000. This arrangement would require approximately thirty days lead time and two weeks in transit. Exercising this option would also mean that this helicopter the only one that DEA owns that is functional at higher elevations, would be unavailable for use in the rest of the country during that time period.

h. DEA Permanent Placement, DEA should consider acquiring and permanently stationing a helicopter and a pilot in the Honolulu District Office. In polling the various police departments now involved in the Green Harvest Operation, I was able to determine that it would be possible to utilize a properly configured helicopter from 18 to 20 flight days a month on Green Harvest alone. The secondary benefits of having a helicopter stationed in the Honolulu District Office are obvious.

2. Fixed Wing Aircraft.

a. The only use at present for a fixed wing aircraft in the Green Harvest Operation would be in the limited situations where some helicopters are now used as airborne command/communication platforms. This would release a few hours of rotor time to missions where only a helicopter can provide the service.

b. As operation Pele is part and parcel of the overall Marijuana Eradication Program in Hawaii, I would like to address the use of fixed wing operations in support of that program. The first phase of Operation Pele is essentially an intelligence gathering operation designed to identify the magnitude of the use of U.S. Mails in marijuana distribution, to identify the particular Post Offices involved and to identify the individuals and organizations using them. The next phase, scheduled for early Calendar Year 1984, will be an enforcement operation that will include extensive moving surveillances. This is a classic application of fixed wing aircraft. Agents will be involved in the surveillance of defendants from Post Offices to their residences and/or locations of criminal activity and in development of probable cause for warrants to be served at those locations. The vast majority of these locations are in rural areas where ground surveillance alone would be ineffective or would be compromised. The employment of fixed wing aircraft in this phase of the operation would greatly enhance the capabilities of the surveillance agents and would make a significant contribution to the numbers and quality of seizures and arrests resulting. In discussions with Honolulu SAC Les Thompson, it became apparent that the Pele Operation is only one area where the assignment of a fixed wing aircraft would be beneficial to that office. There is no full time air surveillance capability available to the law enforcement community in Hawaii. In addition to the standard uses of aircraft, i.e. surveillance, search and undercover missions, the aircraft could be used in emergency transport of men and equipment between islands. At present, the DEA response to enforcement activities on other islands is limited to the commercial inter-island carriers, whose schedules are programmed to support the movement of tourists between islands.

Looking at the long term requirements of Green Harvest, Pele and the daily needs of the Honolulu DEA Office, it would be to DEA's advantage to consider the permanent placement of a fixed wing aircraft and pilot in the Honolulu District Office.

MICHAEL L. WALKER, S/A Pilot.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TOM LEWIS, MEMBER OF CONGRESS

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, there is probably no greater threat to the quality of life for all Floridians today than the pervasive drug trade. Due to Florida's easy access from Latin America and other drug-producing countries in the Caribbean, this problem will only grow worse in coming years as long as the demand for the drugs remains high and the traffickers continue to profit from this criminal adventurism.

While many steps have been taken over the past years to interdict and arrest some of the smugglers and traffickers, it seems as though we are only able to stop the little guys--and even these arrests and seizures are somewhat sporadic and haphazard.

I requested that the Committee hold hearings in South Florida last fall to assess the efforts of the South Florida Task Force, State and local law enforcement, and State and local treatment programs. So much of the emphasis on drug interdiction

in South Florida in the past has centered around the City of Miami. However, now that the Task Force is in place, smugglers have pushed their operations North—up the coast of Florida—and West to the open rangeland and wilderness in the central part of the State.

Perhaps one of the most poignant moments during the October hearing was the testimony of Mayor Askren of Everglades City, who described the devastating impact illicit drug trafficking had on this community.

This sleepy fishing village changed almost overnight to a bustling port of business, where citizens who got involved in the illegal drug trade experienced a sharp upward turn in their annual income. Such a disruption was felt by whole families, who had been used to "just getting by" and now were enjoying the financial benefits of such a lucrative but illegal business.

Mayor Askren was followed by representatives from the South Florida Task Force who not only described their program as one that is working well but also one that communicates regularly with State and local law enforcement.

However, when local law enforcement officials testified, the Committee learned that this was not the case. There were serious gaps in cooperative communication and effort in combatting the drug trade in Florida.

Therefore, in an effort to more accurately assess the specific concerns of local law enforcement in drug interdiction and recommend areas where communication and cooperation between the Feds and locals can be enhanced, the Committee will be holding a follow-up conference next month in West Palm Beach.

Mr. Chairman, it is quite clear that unless our efforts to combat this enormous problem of drug trafficking in Florida are effectively coordinated, the results after years of operation will be far from desirable.

I am pleased, Mr. Chairman, that Sheriff Jim Holt of Martin County and his assistant, Lt. John Murphy, Head of the Narcotics Division, are here today. Sheriff Holt provided good testimony before the Committee in October—noting some of the gaps in radar coverage, the need for improved communication with the Feds, and the need for more officers on duty to catch the increasing number of drug smugglers in Martin County.

It was clear from his testimony that some smugglers' operations seems to be moving northward from Miami. But since the focus of South Florida's Task Force still seem to be South of areas like Martin County, the smugglers are profiting from the lack of adequate Federal, State and local resources to make the necessary interdictions and arrests.

However, Sheriff Holt and his department are to be commended, for they are responsible for the seizure of hundreds of tons of illicit drugs. This amount includes one of the largest seizures of marijuana in the United States—57 tons.

Last October, the Committee also examined some of the prevention and treatment programs in South Florida. I am delighted to welcome back Gary Frechette, who is with the Palm Beach County school system and who presented such lively testimony before the committee last fall.

With the full support of the Palm Beach County School Board, Gary initiated a unique and successful program to reach out to children of all ages and provide them with accurate information about drugs, as well as build a positive peer group of support for them to live drug-free lives. It's important to reach children early—before they make their first decision about taking drugs. How early? Gary generally starts working with youngsters in kindergarten, although I understand that he very recently has begun working with four-year-olds!

Although the children have responded enthusiastically to Gary, he testified last October that the parents of students seemed less involved with drug prevention efforts in the schools. The Committee can recall Gary's description of a typical evening parents' meeting at local schools where only one parent showed up. Since the well publicized Chemical People Project last November, I am sure the Committee will be interested to learn if there has been any increase in attendance and interest among parents in Palm Beach County.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that the committee has a second opportunity to hear from these very dedicated public servants, and I too look forward to hearing their comments and analysis of what steps have been taken to recently bolster their local efforts and programs.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, MEMBER OF CONGRESS

Mr. Chairman and distinguished colleagues, it is a pleasure to appear before the Committee today. I would like to first commend the Chairman, members of this

Committee and the Committee staff for the outstanding work done last year and for its excellent initiatives for 1984.

The hearing held in my District on December 12 and 13, 1983, was the first of its kind in the history of South Texas. We had the opportunity to hear from 27 witnesses who presented us with a wealth of information on the nagging and persistent problem of drug smuggling and the enforcement efforts to curb illegal drug production and trafficking. In addition, we heard of the growing addiction not only to heroin but of dependency on other drugs, including a serious abuse of inhalants by Mexican American youth. This seems to be a unique problem facing Hispanic youth throughout the Southwest. The Committee also reviewed the drug treatment and prevention activities in the region. Finally, we examined the need for comprehensive drug education.

We also met and discussed drug smuggling and enforcement efforts with officials of the Mexican Government in an informal setting. If nothing else, this meeting initiated a dialogue between our federal enforcement officers and Mexican officials.

The Committee made a series of excellent findings in South Texas, which are succinctly outlined in your briefing package—but which I will reiterate. These are as follows:

1. There was indeed a shifting pattern of illicit drugs importation from the Florida Coast to the Texas Gulf Coast as a result of the South Florida Task Force efforts.

2. It was uncovered that there is an increase in the smuggling of high quality heroin from Mexico. Approximately 34 percent of the heroin in the United States comes from Mexico and that Texas is a prime transshipment point.

3. As a result of the increased access to high grade heroin, Colombian cocaine and marijuana there is a growing drug addiction to illicit drugs in Brownsville, Corpus Christi, and the remainder of Southwest Texas.

4. It was disclosed by State Senator Carlos Truan that because of a lack of financial resources the State of Texas has not been able to implement a statewide drug abuse education program.

5. Smuggling of drugs across the Mexican border is almost unstoppable under the present system in effect by the Border Patrol and INS.

6. Because of the lack of funds local law enforcement efforts against drug traffickers are at their lowest. There is a great need for better communication and cooperation between local and Federal law enforcement officials. Local officials admitted that they were fighting an international narcotics problem with local resources.

7. Based on testimony the Committee was informed of a big gap in drug abuse treatment services in Texas. An example is that there is an abuse problem in Brownsville and there are no detoxification facilities in the area for abusers who may seek treatment.

There are two other findings which I believe are significant and I will briefly discuss. First, there is the issue of inhalant abuse which I mentioned earlier. This is an old phenomenon which has never been researched, therefore, data is lacking. The South Texas hearing, however, revealed that while the incidence and prevalence of inhalant abuse may be lower than other drug categories in the past year over six percent of admissions to treatment programs in Corpus Christi alone were for inhalant abuse. This is about six times the rate reported by the National Institute on Drug Abuse. It is my strong belief that this is an issue the Committee must carefully examine in 1984.

Second, the hearing more than adequately documented the need for a strong and viable drug education program in our schools. A program that starts at the elementary levels. In this vein, I introduced H.R. 4851. This bill which authorizes \$30 million over three years, will provide grants to States to assist local educational agencies in establishing and improving drug, alcohol and tobacco education programs for elementary and secondary students.

In sum, the bill requires that State educational agencies apply to the Secretary of Education for a grant and establish procedures to ensure that the money used by local educational agencies is spent in accordance with the purposes of the bill. It also requires that the State educational agency contribute 20 percent of the cost of each program approved by the State and mandates that the State agency ensure autonomy for local educational agencies. Each local educational agency that desires to receive an allocation must file an application with the State educational agency. The local educational agency must develop a drug, alcohol and tobacco education program that:

1. Contains an assessment of local drug, alcohol, and abuse problems and the current educational programs, if any, designed to address such problems;

2. Outlines specific plans for providing or improving instruction on drug, alcohol, and tobacco use;

3. Describes the programs and procedures the local education agency will use so as to ensure a drug education program that involves the participation of a wide-range of local officials and citizens concerned about drug education;

4. Describes local, specific, objectively measurable goals that are to be achieved through the program and an annual report on the progress in obtaining these goals;

5. Estimates the cost of the program and gives assurances that the local educational agency will pay five percent of the total program cost, in cash or in services, equipment or facilities;

6. Contains a plan for cooperation and coordination with local and Federal law enforcement officials;

7. Contains assurances that the program will meet any special needs of low income and minority students;

8. Provides procedures to ensure a proper accounting of Federal funds paid to the applicant under this Act.

Education, in my opinion, is the key to preventing our children from becoming involved in drugs. I believe this bill presents a workable and effective approach to educating our children about the hazards of drug abuse and misuse.

Mr. Chairman, now, I would like to introduce the two persons from South Texas who are here to testify on the current status of the problem. Mr. Andres Vega, Chief of Police for the City of Brownsville, Texas representing law enforcement. Mr. Vega has been in law enforcement for over 20 years and has been Chief for the last 12 years.

Representing drug abuse, treatment and presentation is Mr. David Pollard. Mr. Pollard has over 7 years experience in prevention, intervention and treatment of substance abuse.

I sincerely appreciate the opportunity presented to my constituents and I to appear before the Committee. Hopefully, some solutions will come out of these hearings.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANDRES VEGA, JR., CHIEF OF POLICE, BROWNSVILLE, TX

In my testimony provided to this committee in December of 1983 at Corpus Christi, Texas, I outlined a general description of our geographical area including our proximity to Mexico, population, general crime and economic problems.

There were a number of specific issues that were addressed before this committee in December of 1983. Issues and problems that we, at the local level, experienced in trying to effectively control drug abuse and drug trafficking within our jurisdiction. Very briefly they were:

(1) The decline in sales tax revenues. Additionally the Mexican peso devaluation has caused a serious reduction in general trade much of it dependent upon the Mexican economy.

Results: Reduced operating budgets for the Police Department. We are addressing those problems that have direct impact on the general public. Issues where you have a complaining party.

(2) We maintain excellent cooperation with the local Office of the Drug Enforcement Administration. However they only have four (4) field officers and a supervisor. Hardly enough to begin or conduct an intensive narcotics investigation.

(3) State grants for law enforcement programs are distributed on the basis of population density and uniform crime report statistics of each region.

Needs: Specific consideration should be given to Narcotics Enforcement and especially to the U.S.-Mexico border areas since law enforcement agencies in those areas must act as a front line force in combating the illicit importation of narcotics and dangerous drugs from Mexico into the entire United States.

(4) Cities located on the U.S.-Mexico Border must not only address crime problems generated at the local level. They must also address criminals that reside in Mexico. These individuals may be members of organized drug trafficking rings who conspire in Mexico and carry out their criminal activity both in Mexico and the United States.

Needs: We must address this problem at the international level. I do not have an answer to this question, but certainly the proper dialogue must be initiated to address this problem between the two (2) countries (U.S. and Mexico).

Late last year, I proposed four (4) ideas which I feel will assist law enforcement in effectively addressing the narcotics trafficking and I would like to reiterate them again since I feel strongly that if implemented they could be a definite beginning to the reduction of narcotics and dangerous drug traffic.

I propose that we collectively must do the following:

(1) Federal financial assistance must be provided to border cities in order that a community can develop and implement a good narcotics enforcement program. These communities should consider the formulation of regional task forces and specifically program the target areas. I feel that local law enforcement can be more effective since the officers will have full and complete knowledge of the people and environment they will be working with. When an agency has limited resources to do a job, its effectiveness subsides accordingly.

(2) Federal agencies with drug enforcement responsibility must assign sufficient personnel and equipment to the U.S.-Mexico border in order to increase the effectiveness and substantially reduce the chances for narcotics traffickers getting through with their illicit cargoes. In the same instance the mutual cooperation between federal, state, and local agencies is a must. Without cooperation between law enforcement agencies we stand to lose the "war" against narcotics traffickers.

(3) United States Attorneys Offices and state District Attorneys must also be provided with the necessary resources in order for them to vigorously prosecute violators. Arrests and timely prosecution go hand-in-hand and should channel the violators through the criminal justice system in a timely manner.

(4) A Narcotics and Drug Abuse Program should be developed at the elementary level in order that youngsters at a very early age begin to learn and understand the problems they will be faced with should they be exposed to this type of activity.

On February 11, 1984, state, federal and local officers seized 365 pounds of high grade cocaine worth several million dollars in the illicit market. The seizure was made in Brownsville, Texas—labeled the largest seizure in history in the State of Texas—seven (7) Colombians were arrested ranging in ages between nineteen (19) and fifty-one (51). Within hours after the arrests high powered attorneys were ready to set hearings on the suspects. Posting bonds of several hundred thousand dollars was no big effort on their part.

Gentlemen, my point is that violators have no limits on their financial resources. They can be back on the street and trafficking in order to continue with their, although illicit—profitable business. Yet, our local narcotics agents cannot effectively continue their investigation at times because of the limited amount of financial resources, equipment and manpower. Federal, state, and local governments must collectively face the realities of this problem. We must direct the necessary amount and type of resources needed to fight this multi-million dollar drug business.

Ironically our government approves billions of dollars to be spent to support and improve our armed forces. Additionally, billions of dollars are appropriated towards the continuation of our space programs; yet the appropriations for the drug abuse and control problems are minimal and we all realize that this problem continues to erode our society from within. I propose to you, gentlemen, that the social and physical well being of the citizens of the United States is just as important if not more so, than any space program; that we must defuse the narcotics and drug trafficking in this country. That law enforcement is ready and willing to meet the problem head on but we must have the necessary resources. It is going to cost the taxpayers in this country a substantial sum of money, but it will be spent to address a social problem that directly impacts on them.

In summary, let's provide law enforcement with adequate financing, adequate manpower and equipment. With these three (3) things, along with full cooperation among federal, state, and local agencies, we can effectively control our narcotics trafficking and abuse problem. Additionally, complete, well-organized drug programs must be implemented at our school levels.

Finally, negotiations at the federal level must continue between this country which has the so-called "demand for narcotics and dangerous drugs" and those countries that supply the demands. At our level we must attempt to defuse the continuing demand, and abroad we must cut the supply line through the proper political process.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID M. POLLARD, M.A., CERTIFIED ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE COUNSELOR, LICENSED PROFESSIONAL COUNSELOR, KINGSVILLE, TX

Thank you for this opportunity to share my experience and ideas with you. I pray they may help some with the "epidemic" that has spread through our nation and the world.

In the area I am from, South Texas, I am treating people for addiction to alcohol, cocaine, inhalants, heroin, amphetamines, prescription pills, and marijuana. The main drug people are treated for is alcoholism. Cocaine usage seems to be prevalent among the more affluent, but is now being used with greater frequency by younger

people with less income. Then there are the heroin users who have their own circles. Some of these people have been addicted for twenty years. Marijuana usage is high and usually accompanies other drug usage. Junior High students are using many prescription drugs. The lower socio-economic groups are using inhalants, such as paint and cleaning substances.

Inhalants are especially prevalent among Mexican-American adolescents, and there is a common and growing cause for alarm throughout our State because of its serious physiological and psychological consequences.

Each of these drugs causes brain and physical damage. It is very hard to get these people into treatment as they deny having a problem and want to continue using the drug.

Currently, it is estimated that over 700,000 Texans are in need of drug abuse treatment. As many as 14,000 people aged 12-17 may be added to that figure each year as they reach drug-abusing age. In addition, over half a million young people age 12-17 are at risk of becoming dependent on drugs and require prevention services. Each year an increasing proportion of treatment admissions are referrals from the criminal justice system.

Narcotics usage in our young people has dropped from occurring primarily at the high school age down to the junior high age and, tragic as it is, we are now finding the problem in our elementary children. Marijuana has even been found among our first graders.

In South Texas drugs are very predominant. We are bordered by Mexico on one side and the Gulf of Mexico on the other. There are steady supplies of drugs moving constantly through our area. Prices are cheap and drugs are plentiful. Our children cannot mature or develop properly while being raised in an environment of this sort. The prisons are so full that narcotics officers see no point in arresting more. More emphasis needs to be placed on treatment of these addicts so they can escape their own demise. However, most people don't want treatment. They are forced to undergo treatment by their families, their schools, the judicial system, or their physical and/or mental condition. Each of these must be given more power legislatively to send people into treatment. Treatment must be increased by more counseling in jails, schools, and prisons. Many of these need to withdraw in a medical environment as convulsions and death could occur on withdrawal from alcohol, barbiturates, valium, etc. A protected environment is needed to protect the addict from his own disease for a period of time until the compulsion to use has left. He may then relapse but he will be physically withdrawn. The psychological past must then be placed into his hands as he gains more responsibility. If he uses the drug once he will relapse almost to the point of when he entered treatment, but due to the educational process and experience he has gone through his chances of recovery again are higher. Just as you progress into the disease you can progress out of it with the guidance and help of others. Social fellowships, family support, Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, prayer groups, follow-up treatment, physical activity, and family education and treatment have been most successful in producing longevity in treatment success where the addict or alcoholic has a sincere desire to stay clean. Organizations of this sort are starting to develop but cannot cope with the large number of people needing help.

The problem is growing faster than the treatment. The larger the treatment grows the more families are identified that need help. These illnesses are a family disease. The spouse of the addict, co-alcoholics, and the children have all been affected. Personality development in the child is greatly affected. In treatment you find the "invisible child," where he has learned to hide and not respond. Many of the teenage suicides are related to drug abuse by parents as well as the teenagers. In some families you also find the "acting out child" where he uses drugs and gets in trouble at school, the "overcompensating child" where he achieves high grades in order to cover up problems in his family. Alcohol statistics show that one out of every ten people are becoming alcoholics and these statistics don't even consider other drug users. (The downfall of the American Family; "latchkey" children-raised without discipline or instruction; husband abuse; the undermining of our culture). Are we going into a platonic era or is it possible that big businessmen are making such large profits off drug sales that they ignore the children suffering and the brain damage caused by this profit. Is it possible that communist countries profiteering from drug sales could be undermining our culture?

There is much denial from the individual, the families, the school, and the communities of even having a drug or alcohol problem. Until this denial is broken and awareness occurs, treatment cannot take effect. The first you do in treatment is break down the delusional system and overcome the denial. Reality is a big help in this area. Individuals state they do it just for fun or to relax, much as the cancer

patient smoking through his larynx as his lips have been removed. Families hide members with problems and protect them from help. Schools deny drug usage on their campuses to protect their image. Sheriffs and police departments are unable to cope with feelings of "why arrest them, they'll just do it again" or "we are infringing upon their inalienable rights," "they are just trying to make some money," or "what good will it do?" People are afraid of losing their jobs so they put off getting treatment. Towns and cities deny having these sorts of problems, and through this denial process the problem grows to epidemic proportions. Some deny it out of ignorance and just don't realize the extent of the problem as others conceal it from them. Dependence on drugs is taboo in our society.

Having been to the state hospitals in Nueces County and San Antonio I have seen businessmen, doctors, lawyers, and skid row bums as they withdraw from drugs. For example, a prominent figure in South Texas was placed on the mental ward, rather than the alcohol ward as his "water broke," that is what they call his brain. He was sitting on the side of the bed in diapers, unable to tie his shoes. He could not recognize his family. The doctor thought that he would be a vegetable permanently. However, he began to recover, his brain began to repair itself and in three months, he was moved to the alcohol ward.

Most cases do not recover. I have seen Junior High kids with circles under their eyes, improper diets and sleeping patterns, and "high" in class. They are taking prescription pills they buy for a dollar each. After a drug presentation at an elementary school, a young girl came up and asked what to do about the incestuous activity of her alcoholic father. The young have no place to go, no education, they are unable to communicate properly, are overlooked, punished rather than treated, kicked out of school or out of the house, beaten, abused sexually, and they usually refuse treatment if they get it. There is no place for skidrow bums or addicts that are unable to function. They have no political support and are considered criminals, many suffer from severe brain damage. Funds need to be set up where they run minimum expenses.

Negative treatment by society increases illness. Nurses and doctors become frustrated as the addicts pull out their I.V.'s and run delirious down the halls. Understaffed nurses are unable to cope with them. Doctors try to detox without proper psychological treatment. Families give up on them, reject them, and do hostile acts to them. Schools expel them. Criminal justice systems sentence them and fine them. Psychological treatment is sometimes too confrontive and negative and clients just deteriorate more from the system that is supposed to help them. The treatment needs to be balanced and not overreactive. More training of personnel is needed where feelings of anger toward addicts are dealt with and do not come out in the treatment process and must be protected from staff and treatment ideas that are damaging psychologically to the client. Being ridiculed or belittled by staff members only destroys the self image and ability to recover. Sometimes this is done with large groups observing the victim. Unless treatment becomes more positive, less frustrated staffs and workers educated with more tools and understanding, the client is injured by treatment. Unless this minority class—which is damaged physically, spiritually, and mentally—is given a way to become rehabilitated, it will grow. This is a family disease handed down through generations by personality disorders in children. A communicable disease related to peer pressure and reverse peer pressure. Co-alcoholics, co-junkies, all suffer and it grows to be a school disease, a community disease, and the largest disease in our nation.

Where it used to be politically unpopular, it is slowly changing to a popular cause. Although the people I meet don't know exactly what to do or completely understand it, they want to help create a change as almost every local business, church, school or family is being affected by the tragedy.

There are very few facilities for treating drug abuse and most of these facilities are basically alcohol treatment. They are not near enough for just alcohol treatment. Nueces County has a methadone treatment facility, MHMR substance abuse center, a halfway house, and detox center. Memorial County Hospital, and private hospitals. Entry is nearly impossible to the public facilities, especially if one is out of the county. In neighboring Kleberg County, clients are referred to Harlingen where several counties are served by one facility. Sometimes it takes weeks to get a client admitted. This is not very responsible treatment for a heroin addict that decides to quit and you tell him he has to go on a waiting list, or an alcoholic who is having hallucinations while his children are terrified by his behavior.

Many of the programs are concentrated in Corpus Christi, and the rural areas have little or no facilities or knowledge of how to handle these problems. Many of the medical problems of the addicts can't be treated due to county hospitals not accepting this expense. Drug abuse centers will not accept out of county addicts due to

lack of room. Psychological expertise is at a minimum and there is a lack of family treatment.

More advanced employment skills and training are needed. Many of the programs are alcohol related and will release an addict after detoxing rather than sending him through the psychological program. Addicts with psychological troubles or schizophrenia will not fit in programs for schizophrenics or drug programs. They are bounced back and forth and usually denied treatment when they most desperately need help. When addicts try to get help, they do not have insurance and it is sometimes up to five weeks before they can get into residential treatment. Many of the children that are addicted cannot be reached. There is much denial in the schools and it is hard to approach the schools to help the children there.

I would recommend instead of conglomerating all treatment in cities, placing individuals in rural counties where referrals, interaction, and prevention could be set up and gradually detox. Community organizations, treatment centers, and halfway houses formed by Civic Organizations and Federal effort must all be involved.

Drug abuse treatment was just starting to build networks and collapsed with the Reagan Administration strategy. When the funding changed, nearly all drug treatment came to a halt. I could not believe it was true, as so many people would lose their treatment. However, some of the drug people are co-addicted and can be treated under alcohol money. I feel that heroin addiction is overwhelming but usually their addiction is covered up. Many of the people coming into treatment for alcoholism are heroin addicts. They are afraid of being discovered. They switch back to alcohol when they cannot get heroin or morphine.

There are rumors that many of the wealthiest families are involved in heroin trafficking. Marijuana has become a big business. It's on the same level as oil companies. With marijuana no taxes are paid and small amounts are sold for thousands of dollars. The alcohol industry spent millions on advertisement last year. More public advertising and educational materials are needed.

There are rumors that so much profit is being made that some of the wealthiest and most influential citizens of our country are involved in this trafficking. So many drugs are available on our streets today that they are accepted and the battle seems to be lost. Offices of the law could tell you where drugs are and all they have to do is arrest the people. Citizens feel that nothing can be done.

Due to the paperwork, lack of pay, and cuts in support, much expertise is lost in the treatment process. However, there is enough expertise left where it could be rebuilt and hope for these millions of people could again be bolstered.

To begin this rebuilding process, we need to restore the funding that has been cut from treatment over the past few years. In my view, one of the best vehicles for accomplishing this goal is through the legislation introduced by Congressman Ortiz. I wish to commend the Congressman for his efforts. The Drug and Education Act of 1984 will go a long way toward resolving this devastating problem.

Again, I thank the Committee for this opportunity to share information about drug use and abuse in South Texas. I also thank you for the time and effort you have put into this most important matter.

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

CAMP



1983

CAMP

CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING

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Firearms, San Francisco

CAMP FINAL REPORT 1983

Prepared by:

CAMP Headquarters

For additional copies or further information, contact Jack Beecham, Incident
Commander, CAMP Headquarters, P.O. Box 13327, Sacramento, California 95813
or by telephone at (916) 739-CAMP

CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING

SUMMARY 1983

The 1983 Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP) was an overwhelming success with \$130 million worth of marijuana kept off the streets of California. This year's effort was the culmination of six years of development by law enforcement and resource agencies from local, state, and federal jurisdictions. Details of previous years' efforts are available in Attachment A.

The goal of CAMP was the establishment of a task force through a cooperative effort by federal, state and local agencies to significantly diminish the cultivation of cannabis (the marijuana plant) and the trafficking of marijuana in the state of California. CAMP combined the technology, training and resources of twenty-seven federal, state and local law enforcement agencies and an additional eighteen agencies sent volunteers to assist in the eradication.

The local county sheriffs had the primary responsibility of marijuana enforcement and were supported by the many state and federal agencies involved in CAMP. Each member agency outlined its participation in a formal Memorandum of Understanding. The key to the success of CAMP was the cooperation among all the concerned agencies and the commitment of time, money, manpower, and equipment that was given by each. A complete cost breakdown is located in Attachment B.

Some of the major objectives of CAMP were to reduce the availability of marijuana in California through eradication of plants, arrest and prosecute the offenders, deter potential cultivators, and to promote the safe use of public and private lands by removing the criminal element that uses those lands illegally. A complete list of CAMP 1983 objectives is available in Attachment C.

The following federal and state agencies took part in CAMP:

Federal Agencies

Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice (DEA)
 Bureau of Land Management, Department of Interior (BLM)
 U.S. Forest Service, Department of Agriculture (USFS)
 U.S. Marshal's Service, Department of Justice (USMS)
 Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Department of Treasury (ATF)
 U.S. Customs, Department of Treasury (USCS)
 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice (FBI)
 Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of Interior, (BIA)

State Agencies

Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, Department of Justice (BNE)
 Western States Information Network, Department of Justice (WSIN)
 Office of Emergency Services (OES)
 California Department of Forestry (CDF)
 California Highway Patrol (CHP)
 California Army National Guard (CANG)

Raid Team Members

A total of more than 250 police officers participated in CAMP raids. Team members included sheriff's deputies from the county in which the team was working, law enforcement officers from USFS, BLM, ATF, reserve deputies hired as temporary state employees with DEA funds and volunteers from 16 Northern and Southern California police departments, one sheriff's department, and one District Attorney's office. The reserve deputies, although paid by the state, were given full peace office powers by their county sheriffs and were then able to enforce laws wherever the raid team was working.

More than 80 police officers came from Northern and Southern California to assist in the eradication effort. These "volunteers" were recruited by BNE and were sent by their agencies because their department heads understood the importance of addressing the problem at its source.

The program also provided valuable training and experience for the officers involved. The officer's salaries and overtime were paid for by their agencies and transportation, food and lodging were provided by CAMP. The agencies sending officers included:

Benicia P.D.	San Jose Airport Police
Culver City P.D.	San Jose P.D.
El Monte P.D.	Santa Barbara S.O.
Gilroy P.D.	Santa Clara P.D.
Inglewood P.D.	Solano Co. D.A.'s Office
Los Altos P.D.	Southgate P.D.
Montebello P.D.	Sunnyvale Dept. of Public Safety
Pomona P.D.	Torrance P.D.
Redondo Beach P.D.	Ukiah P.D.

CAMP Member Counties

Fourteen Northern California counties, some of which were determined to be the major marijuana producing counties in the state were selected, based on data from 1981 and 1982 collected by the Western States Information Network (WSIN). Four regions were established covering the fourteen counties and each region had its own raid team. The regions and participating counties are as follows:

<u>Region I</u>	<u>Region II</u>	<u>Region III</u>	<u>Region IV</u>
Humboldt	Mendocino	Butte	Santa Cruz
Trinity	Lake	Yuba	Santa Clara
Del Norte	Sonoma	Sierra	San Mateo
Siskiyou			Monterey

Seizures

The planning stages of CAMP began in early 1983 with the formation of a Steering Committee comprised of representatives from the participating federal and state agencies, and included the California State Sheriff's Association. The actual raids began on August 15 and continued for ten weeks, ending on October 19, 1983. A total of 524 sites were raided resulting in the seizure of 64,579 plants with a total weight of over 271,000 pounds. Seventy-eight persons were arrested and at least

seventy persons have since been taken into custody or are pending arrest. More than 80 weapons were also confiscated.

The largest single marijuana eradication effort on record in California occurred in a Glenn County cornfield where local authorities seized more than 60,000 plants valued at nearly \$50 million and arrested three persons. CAMP officials assisted in the destruction of the plants, but this seizure was not counted in CAMP's final tally since Glenn County was not one of the fourteen county participants.

Incident Command System

CAMP Headquarters were located at the Department of Justice, 4949 Broadway, Sacramento, 95820, phone (916) 739-CAMP. An Incident Command System (ICS) was established to efficiently utilize manpower and equipment during fires and other major operations. The structure of that system included the Steering Committee, a Deputy Incident Commander, Public Information Officer, Planning Section Chief, Operations Chief, Air Operations Chief and a Logistics and Finance Chief. Members of the ICS directed the activities of strike force teams and handled problems encountered by CAMP personnel that could not be solved in the field. Duties of the Incident Command System members are further outlined in Attachment D.

A Regional Coordinator (BNE agent) was assigned to each region with the responsibility of planning raids, arranging for lodging transportation for team members, preparing reports and reporting raid team activities to the Operations Chief. A strike force team leader (also a BNE agent) lead the team on the actual raids and reported directly to the Regional Coordinator.

Raid Operations/Air Support

Potential raid targets were identified through intelligence data and aerial observation. Specific sites were then selected and confirmation flights were conducted by fixed wing aircraft. This information was relayed to the Planning Section Chief and was also used to obtain search warrants for sites on private lands. Search warrants normally are not required on federal lands.

Federal law enforcement officers from U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management provided expertise in the area of federal lands and team members from Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and U.S. Marshal's Service were able to give advice and assistance in their specialized fields. Lead deputies had the monumental task of writing search warrants, collecting evidence, writing reports and filing cases for prosecution, while still participating in the raids.

UH-1 (Hueys) helicopters were utilized to provide air transportation for strike teams to remote and isolated marijuana gardens reducing ground travel time. Raid teams were inserted into the marijuana gardens where they arrested any suspects, collected evidence, chopped down the plants and removed cultivation equipment such as irrigation pipes, fertilizer bags, pumps, generators and even motorcycles. These items were then loaded into nets, hooked to a steel cable suspended from the helicopter and then flown to a landing zone.

The California Army National Guard provided three helicopters for the ten weeks of CAMP and the U.S. Customs Service provided one helicopter for eight weeks of the program. A helicopter from the FBI also took part for two weeks, and a CHP helicopter

was available for assistance as needed. A total of more than one hundred National Guard members, U.S. Customs, FBI and CHP personnel were involved in the operation and maintenance of the helicopters.

Although scheduled to work 4 day, 10 hour work weeks, raid team members often worked 15 hour days beginning with early morning briefings and ending with the destruction of plants seized during the days raids. This was accomplished with the use of a portable burn machine provided by Butte County or by using the burners at local lumber companies.

Inherent Dangers of Conducting Raids

One of the major concerns of CAMP personnel was the level of violence and lawlessness in marijuana growing counties. CAMP personnel encountered homemade booby traps, some designed to kill, others designed to warn intruders and law enforcement officers. Although there were instances when CAMP personnel were fired upon, no shots were fired by any CAMP officers.

Despite safety precautions taken by all members such as mandatory wearing of ballistics vests, there were two injuries to raid team members. One Culver City officer sustained a broken ankle while hiking through the rugged terrain and a BNE team leader broke an ankle leaving a hovering helicopter. No civilian personnel or suspects were injured during the many encounters with CAMP officials and every effort was made to protect the rights of both suspects and uninvolved citizens.

High Altitude Photo Mapping

It was hoped that the high altitude photo mapping (using U-2 or similar type aircraft) funded by Drug Enforcement Administration, United States Forest Service, United States Department of Interior, would provide the CAMP operation with additional information regarding the location of marijuana gardens and an overall assessment of the extent of the cultivation problem. Unfortunately, it appears that those flights provided no operational information and that aspect of the program will require further analysis before inclusion in future CAMP programs. The highly publicized flights may have had some deterrent effect on potential cultivators.

Media/Public Information Operation

A needed function in this year's program was a strong media/public information operation. The results were exemplified by the outstanding press and media attention that the program received thereby increasing public awareness. It was not unusual to attract 30 or more media representatives at a designated "media raid" and to respond to as many as 30 or more daily media inquiries ranging from live taped interviews to requests for daily statistics. The media was consistently supportive and positive throughout the program. Media coverage came from local, state, national and international sources.

Although the public information operation was coordinated at CAMP Headquarters, the local county sheriff was the key decision maker in determining how much information was made available to the media and how involved the press was allowed to become in the raids themselves.

CAMP Critique

On November 1 and 2, 1983, a two day "CAMP Critique" conference was held at the Holiday Inn in Sacramento. More than 200 participants evaluated the program's effectiveness and made suggestions for improving the campaign in 1984. Participants were assigned to one of eight committees and written reports were submitted by the chairman that covered the successes and failures of each.

The following areas were covered and are discussed in further details in Attachment E.

- Intelligence Data/Dissemination
- Air Operations
- Equipment
- Finance
- Training
- Field Operations
- Incident Command System
- Media Relations/Public Awareness

Impact of Marijuana on Environment, Economy and Crime

An informal survey was also conducted at the end of the growing season in an effort to determine the extent of impact marijuana growing has on the environment, economy and crime in the 14 CAMP counties. It was determined that methods used by cultivators are very damaging to our precious natural resources as well as to wildlife. Claims by commercial marijuana growers that they contribute to the overall economy of their communities also appear to be false, and the increase in threats and assaults in these counties are directly related to marijuana cultivation. Attachment F gives complete details of the survey.

Conclusion:

It was the unanimous conclusion of the agencies participating in CAMP that the program must be expanded, begin earlier in the year and investigation should continue past the growing season. The number of raid teams should be expanded to support additional sheriffs who feel they need the assistance of CAMP. Efforts will be made to recruit more federal and state agencies to participate in 1984.

Alternate approaches of eradication such as a red dye process being used in Arkansas, are being investigated in an effort to find other means of reducing successful harvests. Investigation of major organizations involved in marijuana cultivations will be conducted with emphasis on vigorous prosecution. This will also include enforcement of California's new asset seizure laws (SB 1121) which allows law enforcement officials to seize the assets of certain convicted narcotic offenders when it is proven that those assets were obtained through illegal means. In 1984, teams specially trained in this complicated issue will be assigned to CAMP full-time.

Based on the experiences of CAMP personnel who encountered numerous "booby traps" in marijuana gardens this year, a bill regarding injurious devices will be presented to the Legislature. This legislation will hopefully provide sufficient deterrence to marijuana cultivators with whom these injurious devices are becoming increasingly popular.

The 1983 CAMP effort was a complex multi-agency program. It was accomplished with a high degree of success and professionalism and is a tribute to those who participated. The approach and cooperation has set an example for other states to follow and CAMP looks forward to even greater successes in 1984.

ATTACHMENT A

FEDERAL AND STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT SUPPORT EFFORTS

Marijuana cultivation in the United States is a multi-billion dollar industry and domestic growing has increased dramatically over the past years. California is no exception. Illegal cannabis cultivation is occurring in nearly every county in the state but commercial cultivation generally occurs in the more remote areas of the state. Northern California is particularly well suited for cultivation of the high grade marijuana known as "Sinsemilla" and some areas are famous for their crops.

The California marijuana eradication program began in 1977 when it became apparent that marijuana cultivation was increasing at an alarming rate. Because marijuana can be grown and concealed with relative ease in remote areas of the state, this type of criminal activity posed unique and serious problems for law enforcement. The problems included the difficulty of detection, the time intensive nature of physical eradication, the extensive investigation which must precede prosecution and the specialized training and equipment needed for large scale eradication operations in isolated areas. The difficulties were compounded by the fact that illegal cultivation is most prevalent in the same areas where law enforcement resources are most limited.

In 1979 the California Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE) obtained a federal grant to assist the sheriffs in four Northern California counties with their eradication efforts. As a result of their combined efforts nearly 30,000 plants were seized weighing over 26 tons.

Public seminars were also conducted where citizens and local officials were made aware of the seriousness and extent of the problem. Training materials were developed and disseminated to police agencies and data collection procedures were instituted in order to assess the statewide problem.

In 1980 the program was expanded. BNE conducted 2 two-week Sinsemilla observer schools in order to train local police officers in the specialized field of marijuana eradication. Equipment such as 4-wheel drive vehicles and chain saws were purchased by BNE and both the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and BNE committed fixed wing aircraft to assist local agencies in spotting crops in Northern California. By the end of the 1980 crop year, 43 California counties had reported seizing a total of 156,000 plants and the arrest of over 1000 suspects.

The following year BNE once again coordinated with DEA and sheriff's departments for an even greater effort. More observer schools were conducted and other state narcotic agencies such as Texas, Arizona, Mississippi and Louisiana requested places for their officers in the school. In June, a BNE agent, at the request of DEA, went to Florida to help State and Federal authorities assess Florida's problem and develop a training program. Here in California, BNE, DEA, and the Attorney General's Special Prosecutions Unit (SPU) conducted a training seminar for prosecuting attorneys from 20 counties concerning the specialized problems involved with marijuana eradication cases.

Also in 1981 the U.S. Customs Service provided helicopter support which allowed a safe and more cost effective access to large crops in inaccessible areas of California's central coast.

During 1982 BNE assigned 10 special agents and two aircraft to support the efforts of local sheriff's departments. One prosecutor's seminar was conducted as well as an observers school, both which were jointly sponsored by BNE and DEA.

During June 1982 BNE sent an agent to the Federal Training Center at Glynco, Georgia, to help develop a regional training course for law enforcement agencies in the Southeast United States. Additionally, the Western States Information Network became the sole collector of seizure data. WSIN also continued to support the efforts of law enforcement agencies through intelligence gathering, dissemination, and developing graphic presentations for display during trials.

A significant change occurred in the overall effort with the involvement of the United States Forest Service (USFS) and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) resource management agencies. Additional funding and a new perspective--that of the damage to the environment from illicit cultivation activities--was gained.

The 1982 effort was a qualified success. While the number of crops seized rose from 1,040 in 1981 to 1,152 in 1982, the total number of plants seized dropped to 90,367. New aspects to the cannabis cultivation problem also became apparent. First, in that reporting of crop seizures by sheriff's departments is voluntary, it is very difficult to measure the representativeness of statistics. More important though, as more agencies became involved in the program, coordination of efforts was more difficult. Based on the four-years experience, BNE felt that a new approach was necessary because the overall effort was not as efficient or effective as it could be. The key reasons were:

- Regardless of the amount of financial support, most sheriff's departments in high density cultivation areas lack sufficient staff to allow diversion of their full-time staff to eradication functions and still carry out essential policing operations.
- The lack of coordination of those specialized resources which are necessary for an effective eradication effort; i.e., fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters with support equipment, trained observers, and crop destruction methods and facilities.

In September 1982 BNE approached DEA and requested a \$25,000 grant to test a new approach. Reserve sheriff deputies and minimum wage work crews would be used on raids to replace high paid, full-time sheriff's deputies. Strike teams would be formed and raid on a regional basis instead of stopping at county lines.

The DEA grant was obtained in late September. The lateness of the planning precluded accessing state or federal work crews but BNE was able to hire as temporary state employees, reserves from three different Northern California sheriff's departments. The enforcement operations sponsored by DEA funds were conducted between October 11 and October 20, 1982 under the supervision of BNE special agents.

During the ten days of raiding in Del Norte and Humboldt Counties, 15 raids were conducted which resulted in nine arrests, the seizure of 2,227 plants (7,144 pounds) and 1,186 pounds of dried and processed marijuana. Based on this experience, the regionalized strike force approach seemed viable.

In March 1983 BNE at the direction of the Attorney General, invited the principal state and federal agencies to meet and plan a unified program. Those agencies were the Bureau of Land Management, United States Forest Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, Office of Emergency Services, and Department of Forestry. The Western States Information Network identified the high density growing areas in California so that a regionalized approach could be developed.

As the program took shape, additional agencies became involved--the United States Marshal's Office, U.S. Customs Service, California National Guard, and California Highway Patrol. When the program was finalized, it was presented to and approved by fourteen sheriffs in four regions.

The approach was to provide the governmental response necessary to control the illegal growing of cannabis in California, Federal, State and local resources had to be brought to bear on the problem through the concept of mutual aid. Due to the scope of the effort required, these resources had to be provided, in some cases, by agencies not normally involved in such activities. The very number and diversity of the agencies possessing the needed resources dictate that they be brought together in a highly structured, coordinated manner.

To provide the vehicle for the focusing of multi-level, multi-agency resources on the problem, a jointly operated local-state-federal organization was conceived and titled the "Campaign Against Marijuana Planting" and is referred to by the acronym "CAMP".

ATTACHMENT B

CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING PARTICIPATING AGENCY CONTRIBUTIONS

Agency	Grants	Aircraft	Photography	Salaries	Overtime	Per Diem	Vehicle	Other	Total
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement (BNE)		\$18,000	\$1,700	\$125,500	\$36,000	\$40,000	\$14,000	0	\$235,200
Bureau of Land Management (BLM)		17,200	1,300	22,000	15,000	5,300	1,150	1,600	64,350
United States Forest Service (USFS)	\$30,000	12,600		120,000		44,000	8,000	10,500	225,100
California Department of Forestry (CDF)				7,000		500	5,000	150	12,650
Office of Emergency Services (OES)				6,000			16,500	3,000	25,500
California Highway Patrol (CHP)				18,200					18,200
United States Customs (USC)		53,500		29,000	300	10,900	4,000	200	97,900
United States Marshal (USM)				4,000	3,000	1,200	300		8,500
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)	215,000	15,000		41,000					271,000
California National Guard		66,000		68,000		26,000			160,000
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms (ATF)				4,000	3,000	600	300		7,900
TOTAL	\$245,000	\$182,300	\$3,000	\$445,500	\$57,300	\$128,500	\$49,250	\$15,450	\$1,126,300

ATTACHMENT C

Objectives of CAMP 1983

Most of the objectives which were established for the 1983 CAMP program were met and these objectives will become an integral part of the 1984 program. These objectives include:

1. Reduce the availability of marijuana in the State of California through the eradication of illegally cultivated plants.
2. Arrest and prosecute those who cultivate and traffic in that drug.
3. Seize and forfeit assets and proceeds derived from the cultivation of cannabis and the trafficking of marijuana.
4. Determine the extent of cannabis cultivation throughout California on public and private lands.
5. Promote the safe use of public and private lands by the removal of lawless elements who illegally use those lands to cultivate cannabis.
6. Reduce associated criminal activity in areas where cannabis cultivation occurs.
7. Reduce the environmental impact on public lands caused through the uncontrolled introduction of substances harmful to the environment by illegal cannabis cultivation.
8. Deter potential cannabis cultivators.
9. Develop a public awareness and crime prevention program to inform the public of the inherent dangers associated with the cultivation of cannabis and the trafficking of marijuana.
10. Evaluate, at the end of the growing season, the task force's effectiveness at accomplishing these objectives.

ATTACHMENT D - Part 1

ICS DUTIESDeputy Incident Command - Bob Elsberg, BNE

Handled the day-to-day management needs, supervised BNE employees, responsible for operational command decisions during those times the steering committee was not meeting. Also, handled any unusual occurrences such as the lawsuit initiated by NORML against CAMP.

Public Information Officer - Al King, BNE

Responsible for program interface with the news media and civic groups and coordination of program related news releases. Maintained close liaison with the deputy incident commander and operated from CAMP headquarters. During the height of the program, an experienced public information officer, Lynn Engles from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, also assisted with the media.

Planning Section Chief - Bill Ruzzamenti, DEA

Developed weekly field operations plans based on intelligence data. Responsible for the collection of intelligence, statistics and their dissemination. Assisted by a DEA analyst.

Logistics Section Chief - Chuck Fike, U.S. Forest Service

Responsible for the coordination of logistics in support of field operations.

Finance Section Chief - Ed Machado, BNE

Handled program fiscal control and accounting. Authorized emergency purchases by regional coordinators, evaluated spending needs of BNE and other involved agencies.


Operations Sections Chief - Dave Howard, BLM

Responsible for implementing the approved weekly field operations plans. Ensured an information flow between regions and CAMP headquarters regarding weekly operations plans.

Air Operations Chief - Dan Rominger, CDF

Coordinated air support for field operations which included scheduling of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.

ICB ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



ATTACHMENT E

CAMP CRITIQUE

At the conclusion of the 1983 CAMP program a 2-day conference was held on November 1 and 2 in Sacramento for a critique of the program by those involved.

Subcommittees were formed to identify issues and problems that arose during the campaign. The subcommittees were made up of federal, state, and local agency representatives. These committee members discussed problems and proposed recommendations that would assist CAMP personnel in the planning of the 1984 CAMP program.

Included in this attachment are summaries of the subcommittee reports.

Overall, the one conclusion drawn by all of the subcommittees was that CAMP was a success. The committees felt that the highly qualified personnel and the application of experience and innovation by those dedicated professionals, coupled with the spirit of cooperation made the program a winner.

Intelligence Data and Dissemination

This committee examined such issues as prioritization of raid target areas, detection and overflights, the role of WSIN and the reporting system of all information to CAMP.

The committee recommended that each region have the coordinator and the lead deputies prioritize the target areas within the region and submit the target list far enough in advance for headquarters coordination.

The overflight and detection problems discussed included the lack of communication between the lead deputies, the regional coordinator and the incident command system. The differences in the maps used and the reporting of targets to the ICS became confusing to the DEA analyst assigned to CAMP.

The committee recommended that a standard set of maps be used by all participating agencies including BLM, USFS and local sheriffs.

The committee further recommended that upon completion of an overflight of a target area, the regional coordinator, lead deputy and pilot discuss the flight and assign that overflight a specific number. That number would be forwarded to the ICS where it would be logged and placed on a priority list.

WSIN's role was discussed in detail. The committee recommended that WSIN remain as a vital liaison for CAMP. The WSIN representative should take a more active role in the intelligence gathering and follow-up analysis, and a WSIN representative should be assigned to CAMP permanently. The committee felt that if the numbering system mentioned above was implemented and the information was received and forwarded to WSIN it would simplify all reporting difficulties.

Air Operations

The air support for the 1983 CAMP program consisted of four helicopters and five fixed wing aircraft. The fixed wing aircraft, used primarily for aerial observations, were furnished by the California Department of Justice and local law enforcement agencies. The helicopters along with pilots, crew chiefs, medics and fuel crews were furnished by the California Army National Guard and United States Customs Air Support. The use of helicopters proved to be the most safe, efficient, and successful means of operating. The helicopters were also used for reconnaissance, to insert personnel into the garden sites and to extract the heavy loads of marijuana with nets.

The critique of the CAMP air operations by the subcommittee developed specific issues and problems for consideration. Each issue was discussed relative to the associated problems with recommendations.

The first issue and recommendation met by the committee was the role of air operations director within the frame work of the incident command system. The ICS was basically designed to assist in the management of large and complex disasters, such as floods and fires. The committee recommended that the ICS continue as the command structure, but with the needs of CAMP taken into consideration. The ICS should specify a detailed format on the role of the air operation director.

The second issue faced by the committee was concerning helitack and its safety and efficiency factors during the program. The committee recommended that the helitack concept continue to be an integral part of all CAMP helicopter operations, but to assign only helitack personnel that have been trained and qualified by an agency that has a permanent and full-time helitack organization, one that subscribes to Federal Inter-agency Helicopter Training Guide, such as the U.S. Forest Service.

The third issue discussed by the committee was communications. The main problem reported during the campaign was that the four regions operated with different communication systems. The problems that arose with this type of system were that some aircraft did not have common frequencies with the ground crews and strike teams. The portable radios provided to the aircraft were frequently unreliable.

The committee recommended that a communications system be implemented that will unify all regions in operation. The purchasing of portable radios that have multi-range and multi-frequency capabilities would be a tremendous asset to the communications between aircraft and ground personnel.

The issue concerning aircraft navigation was discussed briefly. Navigational aids, specifically Lorans, were used only in fixed wing aircraft. The committee recommended that all aircraft including helicopters be equipped with Lorans. This would provide the helicopters with the ability to locate the garden sites within a minimal amount of time.

The air operations committee also discussed the facts of too few aircraft and the shortage of jet fuel on the Northern California coast line. The committee recommended that research be done on the use of smaller helicopters for reconnaissance of garden sites, such as Hughes 500 models. The cost to operate the smaller helicopters is considerably less than the large utility Huey models.

The final recommendation from the air operations committee was to have the air operations director start the planning, coordination and problem solving prior to the start of the 1984 program.

Equipment

The objective of this subcommittee was to evaluate the suitability and effectiveness of the equipment used during CAMP and the methods for disposal of marijuana in field locations. The committee, after reviewing the major issues on equipment, made the following recommendations on vehicles, clothing and equipment used on a day-to-day basis.

There were several types of vehicles utilized during the program. Three of the four regions operating used trailers to transport equipment for the strike teams. The large trailers were pulled into the field every day. The committee recommended that the cumbersome and sometime dangerous trailers not be used in the future.

One region was lucky enough to use a utility truck donated by Sierra County Sheriff's office for transportation and storage of equipment. This type of vehicle provided safe and orderly maintenance of equipment and provided inside seating for strike team members. This type of vehicle was proven to be the safest and most practical, and should be put in operation in all regions. In addition to the other vehicles used, the committee recommended that 3/4 ton 4x4 trucks be provided for the strike teams along with either large dump trucks or stake side trucks for the transportation of marijuana to destruction sights.

On the issue of defensive equipment, the committee recommended that CAMP continue with the safety policy of mandatory wearing of ballistic vests. However, some models are too heavy and much too hot for the strenuous day-to-day activities. Heat stroke was a major concern to the strike team members. With this in mind, the committee recommended that light weight, vital area protection, "Level II Threat" vests be provided.

Polyester clothing that was provided to raid team members in CAMP 1983 should be strictly avoided. In case of fires such as often occurs during helicopter crashes, polyester melts, adhering to the skin and causing severe complications. Polyester fabrics also promote the spread of skin rashes such as the poison oak that afflicted approximately 50% of raid team members.

Cotton material clothing or cotton treated with Nomex is a mandatory requirement for resource agency personnel subjected to helicopter flight duties. This is an aircraft fire safety requirement. The extensive use of helicopters in the CAMP project subjects CAMP personnel to the same aircraft fire risks, thus all CAMP personnel should be provided with cotton clothing.

The one cutting tool primarily used by the strike teams was the swedish brush ax or "sandvik". This tool was found to be the safest and most practical tool for use by team members. Sandviks as well as machetes should become part of the permanent equipment issued to raid teams.

Disposal by burning on site is effective, but time consuming. The committee recommended that portable burners like the ones the U.S. Forest Service uses to burn brush be issued to every strike team.

The red dye solution shows a lot of promise. The committee strongly recommended that a study be conducted on the effectiveness of the legality of this product.

Finance

CAMP 1983 was completed within budget but certain recommendations were made that should make future programs run more smoothly. Funding needs to be provided for local expenses associated with CAMP such as costs for film developing, aircraft rental and evidence storage and these needs must be identified prior to the operation. Additional funding may also be needed to assist local district attorney's offices with the additional expenses they incur while prosecuting CAMP related cases.

Studies should be made to determine where savings can be made in the areas of lodging for team members, getting contracts for best rates, asking private companies to help support the program and acquiring legislation to provide a source of income.

Training

The training program for the 1983 CAMP program was unique in that the Department of Justice, with the support of allied federal agencies, took on the task of organizing not only the annual two-week aerial observation and commercial eradication course, but also for the first time, 5 two-day training courses for strike team personnel. These training courses were conducted in the four regions of the CAMP operation and also in Southern California, with a total of over 120 participants.

The issues and problems which are inevitable with this type of first year program, focused primarily on the two-day training courses, the prescreening of all strike team members, and safety and proficiency related courses.

Upon reviewing the issues of the four regions, the committee found that the two-day training course was standard for all strike team members, but recommended the course be lengthened in the health and safety portions. Booby traps, first aid, survival and helicopter landing zone procedures should be covered in greater detail.

The day-to-day activities of the strike team members which consisted of long hours and very physical work brought out the issue of prescreening the personnel. Two regions reported having strike team members that were overweight and generally in poor physical condition. Also, as part of the prescreening, special skills, experience and training should also be identified in order to make each team more self-sufficient.

The committee proposed training in rappelling, rope ladders and billy pugh nets. The use of such equipment would discontinue the practice of jumping from the helicopters which could prevent injuries.

Finally, the committee suggested that all training should be POST certified. This certification allows agencies to be reimbursed for the cost of their personnel attending the training, and also allows for the governing authority to certify such training.

Field Operations

The field operations subcommittee examined numerous issues from day-to-day duties of the regional coordinators and the strike teams, to the role of the incident command system and the deputization of U.S. Marshals. The subcommittee felt that roles and responsibilities of the coordinators team leaders and lead deputies should be well defined and strictly adhered to. The committee recommended that the regional coordinators should have an assistant as the duties during the campaign became too overwhelming for one person.

The committee also recommended that the incident command system chiefs establish a time-table for the program. The earliest preparation for the program would assist in the establishing priorities for the 1984 campaign.

The committee recommended that Humboldt County be placed into a region of its own with a minimum of two strike teams. The additional time in Humboldt County would be well spent.

The next issue discussed by the committee was a very critical one. Special agents of the Bureau of Land Management and U.S. Forest Service do not have police powers on private lands. This causes a hardship on the strike team since BLM and USFS agents are a valuable asset to the team. The committee recommended that the U.S. Marshal's Office deputize BLM and USFS personnel for the duration of CAMP. The deputization of the federal agents would give them police powers on public and private lands throughout the state.

Incident Command System

An example of its effectiveness was the speed in which the system reacted when on August 24, 1983 a customs helicopter assigned to the CAMP program went down in a remote area of the Santa Cruz mountains. Within hours of going down, the helicopter, helicopter crew, and CAMP crew were removed from the site. (This was accomplished through the ICS coordination between the team leader/regional coordinator/incident commander/air operations chief/ and allied agencies such as the Office of Emergency Services and California National Guard).

Although communications were generally good between regional coordinators and ICS members it was occasionally difficult to make contact with each other due to the remote locations of most raid sites and the late hours worked by raid teams. It was determined that coordinators be equipped with portable telephones and that the ICS chiefs be assigned to CAMP full-time by their agencies and available 24 hours for emergencies.

The duties of the deputy incident commander were too numerous and included supervising the 12 special agents assigned to CAMP, reviewing case work, and handling unexpected events such as federal law suits. It is recommended that a special agent supervisor be assigned to the CAMP BNE crew during the enforcement portion of the CAMP program to supervise the agents while the deputy incident commander oversees the CAMP operation at headquarters.

Additional personnel are a necessity. At least 2 additional secretaries should be assigned to CAMP with additional personnel assigned to assist the public information officer and the finance chief.

It was recommended that more training occur prior to operations as to the duties and responsibilities of each of the roles in the ICS, that the training not only be given to those in the ICS command roles but to all those involved in the operation. Everyone in the CAMP operation should know the proper flow of communication.

Media Relations/Public Awareness

The 1983 CAMP program attracted and received major media attention. The subcommittee that discussed the media issues made recommendations involving public awareness, media relations and training on how to deal with the media.

The public awareness campaign should be developed and initiated prior to any raids and continued throughout the entire CAMP program. The public awareness support for marijuana eradication is fundamental to the program, and one cannot assume that it will be there automatically. The support must be developed not only with the media but also through schools and community relations.

The committee recommended that adequate staff trained to handle the media should be assigned to CAMP on a full-time basis. It was noted that the Bureau of Indian Affairs assigned a media trained person who provided excellent background and support during the height of the media coverage.

It was suggested that raid team members, as part of their required training, receive instructions on how to deal with the media. It was further recommended that press personnel be equipped with CAMP "press passes" or badges while in the field with CAMP personnel in order to provide security for both the press officials and raid team members.

ATTACHMENT F

IMPACT OF MARIJUANA ON ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY AND CRIME

The following report describes some of the problems caused by marijuana growing such as the violence associated with cultivation and the environmental damage caused by the carelessness of growers. Also covered is how cultivation affects the economics of the major marijuana growing counties in California and the extent of the involvement of the organized criminal element.

Due to the violence and lack of resources available to local law enforcement agencies the 1983 Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP) was formed, combining the resources and technology of 27 federal, state and local law enforcement agencies to eradicate marijuana gardens in 14 Northern California counties. The 14 counties, Humboldt, Trinity, Del Norte, Siskiyou, Mendocino, Sonoma, Lake, Butte, Yuba, Sierra, Santa Cruz, Santa Clara, San Mateo, and Monterey were selected based on previous years crop seizure data revealing them to be the major marijuana producing counties in California.

Violence continued to be a factor in marijuana cultivation in 1983. It was documented that on several occasions CAMP members were fired upon and numerous booby traps and weapons were seized at garden sites.

Violence has become a way of life in marijuana growing communities. Authorities estimate that at least 80% of marijuana growers are armed during early summer and nearly all carry guns at harvest time. Reports of hundreds of threats both on public and private lands are received every year. Citizens who happen to be on marijuana gardens are often threatened by growers and assaults among the growers themselves are increasing. This has placed an added enforcement burden on local authorities in the 14 major marijuana cultivation counties where sheriff's departments are traditionally understaffed and not able to handle the increase in violent crime.

In Humboldt County this year at least a dozen threats were made to citizens by marijuana growers who were apparently afraid they would be discovered by authorities. One off duty Humboldt sheriff's deputy was confronted while hunting by subjects carrying automatic weapons who warned him to stay out of the area. In Santa Cruz County where most of the land is private authorities received at least 20 reports from hikers and horseback riders who had been threatened by growers. Several landowners received threats on their own property from trespassers who were using the land for cultivation.

U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management personnel have received threats while performing their duties on public lands and some employees have expressed reluctance to enter some areas of the forest due to fear of being assaulted.

Although most confrontations between growers go unreported, in the past 3 years there have been at least 12 murders in the 14 major marijuana growing counties which can be directly linked to marijuana cultivation. Numerous "rip offs" (thefts of money, plants, equipment) occur between growers, including an incident in Mendocino County where 3 persons were shot while attempting to steal marijuana plants. A patient in a Eureka hospital admitted having been shot with rock salt while trying to "rip off" a grower.

This year in Yuba County where 4 armed growers were arrested while protecting a 4,000 plant garden, the subjects expressed relief that it was the police who had raided their garden and not "bikers". The guards had been warned that should bikers find them they would not only steal the marijuana but kill the guards as well.

More than 80 handguns, rifles, shotguns, and automatic weapons were confiscated by law enforcement officials during the 1983 CAMP program. In addition to the guns, marijuana growers often train guard dogs such as dobermans, or pit bulls, to protect their gardens. But perhaps the most dangerous items found in the gardens are booby traps ranging from electric fences to trip wires, pungi sticks and rat traps with shotgun shells attached. Over 20 such booby traps were confiscated by authorities in the 14 CAMP counties this year alone.

There are many problems associated with marijuana growing which can be attributed to the carelessness of growers. During the past 3 years over a dozen fires have been started accidentally by growers.

Clear cutting, the removal of large areas of trees and shrubs to facilitate the cultivation of marijuana is present in 80% of marijuana gardens, both private and public lands. The trees are removed to allow more sunlight to reach the growing plants and to make room for large gardens, causing serious erosion problems.

Other areas of concern include the use of chemical fertilizers, organic fertilizers, misuse of delicate sources such as lakes and streams, use of rodenticides and items left in the environment by the growers at the end of the season.

The most often recommended fertilizers for the marijuana farmer are the high nitrogen types which act quickly because all the nutrients are in soluble form. They are usually more concentrated than organic fertilizers and are more convenient and easily transported to remote areas. A high nitrogen compound is most often used because the availability of nitrogen is the factor most likely to determine the growth of marijuana.

According to a report in December 1981 by the U.S. Forest Service, chemical fertilizers can leach into ground water and end up in downstream water supplies. The over-balance of nitrogen in streams can have an adverse effect on invertebrates which may not survive in a highly oxygenated environment. Wildlife biologists from the California Department of Fish and Game have reported finding significant problems with Marine life due to over oxygenated water. This has occurred downstream from greenhouses in which high nitrogen fertilizers are used.

During the 1983 CAMP program nearly all of the fertilization systems found were the high-nitro types. Fertilizer was either dumped into large doughboy pools and fed to the plants through a series of pvc pipes and emitters or applied in-line through mixers. Often the bags of fertilizers were left lying on the ground open with the contents spilled and no effort made to clean up the mess caused by them. Once the fertilizer is exposed to moisture such as rain or dew the highly concentrated mixture is absorbed into the ground burning both the soil and nearby plant life, as well as leaching into water supplies.

Also used in some areas in the urea type (turkey, chicken manure) fertilizer. This has become popular, particularly in Trinity County as a more natural "organic" fertilizer and is advertised in most marijuana growing publications. The U.S. Forest Service states that urea type fertilizers are applied at a rate of 250 pounds per acre. These types also leach into streams damaging water supplies and fisheries.

Bat Guano from the caves of New Mexico is often advertised as the "world greatest fertilizer". As well as causing the usual damage to water supplies, proponents of bat guano admit that breathing bat guano is dangerous. According to "Sinsemilla Tips" magazine, bat guano is an "incredible microbial stimulator causing congestion and coughing".

Of all the types of fertilizer found by CAMP members there was none which, according to U.S. Forest Service, is not harmful to the environment.

Types Used:

Chemical fertilizer only	85%
Organic only	5%
Both chemical and organic	8%
No fertilizer used	2%

Method of Application:

Mixed into doughboy type pools or containers.	40%
In-line mixes	30%
Mixed and applied manually	10%
Any combination of above	20%

Types of Water Sources:

Doughboy type pools or other large collectors (water usually pumped from lake or stream to pool and fed back to gardens through drip irrigation) 40%

Fed directly downhill to gardens from water source by gravity using drip irrigation or hoses 15%

Water is pumped uphill from water source using electric pump or gasoline powered generator, then allowed to feed back downhill thru pipes or hoses to gardens..... 35%

Plants grown in swamp lands or river bottom requiring no additional irrigation 5%

Conventional sources such as hose from residence 5%

Marijuana growing manuals identify the following as potentially harmful to marijuana plants:

insects	rabbits
rats	cats
mice	deer
moles	squirrels
birds	groundhogs

"D-Con" type rat poisons and other chemical rodenticides are common on marijuana plantations. According to the U.S. Forest Service, marijuana growers use as much as 300 lbs. per acre of rodenticides usually in riparian (stream side) areas which not only eliminate rodents, but birds and other small wildlife as well. Animals up the food chain are often affected and some poisons, if ingested by deer, could eventually harm humans if the deer is killed by humans and later eaten.

Large rat traps are also used to control pests. Hundreds of such traps have been found by law enforcement and the most common bait used, peanut butter, attracts not only rats but groundhogs, squirrels, mice, rabbits and birds.

As a deterrent to deer and other larger animals, chicken wire fencing is placed around marijuana gardens. The fences are sometimes as high as ten feet and often small shrubs, branches and slash are used as camouflage. Because of the difficult terrain it is easier for the growers to leave fencing materials behind when they harvest. In gardens that law enforcement found had been harvested prior to their arrival, no effort had been made to remove these items from the environment, particularly on public lands.

The following percentages apply to the frequency - the below listed items were encountered:

Chemical rodenticides	75%
Rat traps	65%
Fencing	90%
Deer repellent	20%

Items found in gardens or left behind by growers:

1. Drip irrigation or hoses.
2. Doughboy pools.
3. Bags of chemical fertilizer.
4. In-line fertilizer systems.
5. Plastic bags used for growing.
6. Chicken/turkey manure fertilizer.
7. Open bags of fertilizer dumped on ground or into streams.
8. 1 gallon and 5 gallon containers.
9. Makeshift cabins.
10. Stoves, tents, sleeping bags.
11. Garbage, human waste.
12. Tools such as shovels and rakes.
13. Vehicles, motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles.
14. Electric fencing, chicken wire fencing.
15. Various booby traps.
16. Weapons.

The extent of marijuana cultivation can usually be determined by large sums of money being placed in banks or spent in the principal marijuana growing communities. However, due to IRS requirements that cash deposits/withdrawals of \$10,000 or more be reported to them, growers are more likely to keep money in safe deposit boxes or send it out of the area.

Advocates of marijuana growing claim that cultivation keeps their economy going and that money earned by growers stays within the community.

A portion of the marijuana growers proceeds is spent on land, marijuana cultivation equipment, four wheel drive vehicles and supplies such as fertilizer but the largest percentage is taken out of the marijuana growing community.

In Humboldt County it is believed that 60-70% of money earned from marijuana cultivation goes out of the county. The remaining 30-40% is often reinvested by growers in larger plots and additional acreage, usually in cash transactions.

Growers sometimes spend 3-4 times what a plot is actually worth just to obtain prime marijuana growing land and land prices have sharply risen in the past few years.

Many marijuana advocates also believe that marijuana growing is done by local residents in an effort to supplement their incomes. Although this may be true in part, the majority of marijuana growers are transient and stay only for the growing season taking more of their earnings with them when they leave.

In Butte County approximately half of the growers come from areas outside Butte and at the end of the season they return to areas such as Southern California or the San Francisco Bay area. In Santa Cruz County it is believed that only 30% of the marijuana produced income stays within the county. Most of the money goes elsewhere since the majority of the large growers are not local.

Growers come to Humboldt County from Arizona, Southern California and as far away as Oklahoma to cultivate. The post office in Humboldt County receives a tremendous influx of "change of address" forms at the beginning and end of the marijuana season indicating that many persons migrate to the area for the marijuana season only.

U-Haul type trailers could not be found in Humboldt County at the end of the 1983 harvest as they had all been previously rented, presumably by marijuana growers for transportation of the crops out of the area. The rental trailers were not returned to the Humboldt County area but were rented one-way only and according to information obtained from rental dealers were often turned in with marijuana debris scattered throughout.

Most of the other major marijuana growing counties believe that a large portion of the income from marijuana growing does not stay within their local area, with the exception of Monterey County. Due to the small size of most of the Monterey County gardens it is believed that most of their growers are local and harvest the crops for local use and distribution. Monterey County authorities did confiscate some processed marijuana from a suspect who claimed that it had been imported to Monterey from Humboldt County.

More intelligence data is needed to determine the extent of the involvement of organized crime in marijuana cultivation. In the past few years information regarding the background and activities of marijuana growers was not routinely kept by local agencies. In Humboldt County, however, intelligence has been gathered regarding several large families who are buying more and more property every year increasing their production in an effort to monopolize the marijuana market.

This year several persons were arrested who were part of organized groups, such as two subjects who are documented members of an outlaw motorcycle gang. A sophisticated growing operation in Yuba County worth \$8 million was financed and being run by persons in Southern California. This same group is presently under investigation by U.S. Customs for marijuana smuggling.

Other persons arrested were found to be members of various Co-Op organizations dedicated to the growing of marijuana and the relaxing of marijuana laws. Information is still being collected to determine the backgrounds of criminal records of all those arrested this year.

It is true that the cultivation and sale of marijuana does contribute to the economy in the form of tax-free earnings for the marijuana farmer who may spend a portion of his earnings in the area where his garden is located. However, the increase in violence, misuse of precious natural resources, damage to the environment, disregard for the rights of other citizens and the general lawlessness of the marijuana growing community overshadows any positive aspects of marijuana cultivation.

DRAFT

**PROGRAM PROPOSAL
FOR THE
CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING (CAMP)
1984**

Prepared by
California Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement
February 1984

PROGRAM PROPOSAL FOR THE
CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING (CAMP) 1984

PROGRAM SUMMARY


The planning and preparation for "CAMP 1984" is well underway. We anticipate CAMP to be greatly expanded for the 1984 "season". Already, 36 California counties have indicated an interest in participating compared to the 14 counties that committed to CAMP in 1983.

"CAMP 1983" was the largest marijuana eradication program in the history of the State of California with the destruction of \$130 million worth of marijuana weighing over 215,000 pounds, and the arrests of 78 persons with warrants for approximately 50 more. 524 sites in the 14 counties were raided resulting in the destruction of approximately 64,579 plants.

"CAMP 1983" proved that the 27 various participating agencies could cooperate and pool resources against a common problem. In so doing, we made a significant impact against the cultivation of marijuana in this state. However, "CAMP 1983" also clearly illustrated the need for an expanded "CAMP 1984". We must start working earlier in order to destroy the sophisticated irrigation systems which the growers have established in remote areas and destroy the marijuana seedlings before they become the "green monsters" of the summer.

"CAMP 1984" is even more ambitious than its predecessor and will necessitate enhanced manpower, resource, financial, and management commitments by all of the participating agencies. The CAMP Steering Committee is attempting to develop and refine a specific strategy for 1984. In this regard, various subcommittees are being established to analyze how resources can best be utilized.

This proposal contains staffing and aircraft requirements for the enforcement component and a proposed organization chart including functional statements. We have also included a proposed implementation schedule which outlines the program and stresses the need for timeliness in carrying out the many remaining tasks. The support of you and your staff during this formative period is very much appreciated.



REGIONAL STAFFING REQUIREMENTS

Based on the number of counties indicating interest in the 1984 program, we are proposing six regions which would be made up of these various counties. The following breakdown identifies the regions and counties, and the number of teams, personnel, and aircraft that would be required to effectively support each region. Also shown are two "floating" teams that would spray the red dye compound throughout all of the regions.

<u>Region</u>	<u>Counties</u>	<u>Teams</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	
				<u>Helicopter</u>	<u>Fixed Wing</u>
1	Del Norte Humboldt	2	32	2	½
2	Mendocino Sonoma Lake Napa Marin	1	17	1	½
3	Alameda San Mateo Santa Clara Monterey San Luis Obispo Santa Barbara Santa Cruz	1	17	1	1
4	Siskiyou Trinity Shasta Modoc Lassen	1	17	1	½
5	Butte Tehama Glenn Plumas Sierra Yuba Placer El Dorado	1	17	1	½

<u>Region</u>	<u>Counties</u>	<u>Teams</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Aircraft</u>	
				<u>Helicopter</u>	<u>Fixed Wing</u>
6	Amador	1	17	1	1
	Calaveras				
	Tuolumne				
	Stanislaus				
	Merced				
	Mariposa				
	Madera				
	Fresno Yulare	—	—	—	—
	Region Totals	7	117	7	4
Spray	All Counties	<u>2</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-</u>
	Totals	9	135	9	4

STRIKE TEAM STAFFING REQUIREMENTS

The strike teams are assigned to regions and carry out the eradication raids. The number of strike teams in a region are based on previously identified individual needs of a specific region. The following breakdown identifies the minimum staffing requirements for a strike team to effectively carry out the eradication raids.

<u>Title</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Personnel Requirements</u>	
		<u>Raid Teams (7)</u>	<u>Spray Teams (2)</u>
Coordinator	1	6	1
Logistic Assistant	1	6	1
Team Leader	1	7	2
Helitack	1	7	2
Lead Deputy	1	7	2
Backup Deputy	1	7	2
Sponsored Officer	6	42	-
Reserve Deputy	5	35	10
Helicopter Personnel			
Pilot	1	7	2
Co-pilot	1	7	-
Mechanic	1	7	-
Fuel Person	1	7	2
Fixed Wing Pilot	*	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>
	Totals	149	24 = 173

*Regions 1 and 2 and Regions 4 and 5 will share a pilot.

COMMITTEES

We have identified a need for six independent committees which will perform in an advisory capacity to the Steering Committee, identifying needs and developing recommended solutions. Following are the six committees and some of the functions they will perform.

Training Committee

- . Organize and redevelop a two-week sinsemilla observer school(s).
- . Develop and organize a three-day school for reserve employees and volunteers.
- . Develop a seminar for prosecutors.
- . Develop observation instruction for Sheriff's aero squadrons and Civil Air Patrol.
- . Develop a safety instruction course for USFS, BLM and CDF employees.

Intelligence Committee

- . Evaluate last year's Intelligence Unit.
- . Analyze Strike Team arrest information and suspect debriefing process.
- . Analyze informant and citizen information.
- . Evaluate data analysis hardware.
- . Review WSIN crop reports.
- . Formulate intelligence.
- . Equip and implement Intelligence Unit.

Public Awareness/Media Affairs Committee

- . Develop articles for publication.
- . Prepare handouts/flyers.
- . Conduct law enforcement and legislative briefings.
- . Design "crop signs".
- . Make presentations to civic groups.
- . Identify training needs for Training Committee.
- . Identify publicity issues.
- . Schedule media participation with Strike Teams.
- . Answer media requests for information.

Air Operations Committee

- . Determine fixed wing and helicopter needs.
- . Identify fixed wing contract aircraft source and prepare contract(s).
- . Identify utility helicopter (leased) sources and prepare contract(s).
- . Identify utility helicopter pilots within law enforcement.
- . Determine fixed wing pilot needs.
- . Determine pilot training needs; i.e., Loran, instrument certification, cameras.
- . Prepare air ops communications plan.
- . Establish aircraft flight-following plan.
- . Establish air ops training schedule and coordinate needs with ATC as appropriate.
- . Improve flight scheduling system.
- . Determine aircraft support equipment needs; i.e., fuel trucks, safety equipment, etc.
- . Identify aircraft support equipment sources.
- . Establish standardized garden site reporting format.
- . Determine aircraft storage needs and identify areas.
- . Identify jet fuel sources.
- . Establish a plan to provide dedicated reconnaissance support to public lands.
- . Establish air ops plan for April for public lands enforcement.

Equipment and Destruction Committee

- . Obtain 4x4 off-road vehicles, dump/stake side trucks, vans, etc.
- . Evaluate defensive equipment (ballistics vests, handguns, shotguns, long guns).
- . Determine needs for cutting tools (brush axes, Sandvik, chainsaws, ELT).
- . Evaluate feasibility of portable burners.
- . Determine availability of existing burners from USFS, CDF and BLM.
- . Check into pallets if burner not feasible.
- . Coordinate red dye related activities.
- . Coordinate equipment and destruction activities with Finance and Air Quality Assurance.

Legal Advice Committee

- . Provide advice on search warrant preparation when requested to do so.
- . Identify cases for federal prosecution.
- . Review "Memorandums of Understanding" for legal issues.


INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

This section identifies the organization of the Incident Command System and describes the components which make up this system. Immediately following are the Incident Command System organization chart and functional statements for the major components.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST MARIJUANA PLANTING

(CAMP)

INCIDENT COMMAND



FORM I 100

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Steering Committee

This committee consists of one representative from each of the participating federal and state agencies. Jointly, the Steering Committee is responsible for determining overall incident objectives, selecting strategies, insuring that tactical planning activities are coordinated and that integrated tactical operations are conducted, and assuring maximum use of all assigned resources.

Incident Commander

The Incident Commander is responsible for incident activities and the administration of headquarters functions. Duties include working directly with the Steering Committee, conducting briefings to staff, activating elements of the Incident Command System, approving and authorizing the implementation of an Incident Action Plan, coordinating staff activities, managing incident operations, insuring the Incident Status Summary is completed, approving plans for demobilization, and reviewing and approving administrative reporting of field agents.

Deputy Incident Commander

This position is responsible for incident activities including the development and implementation of strategic decisions and approving the ordering and releasing of resources. Duties include assessing situations, briefing command staff and section chiefs, insuring planning meetings are held, determining information needs and informing command personnel of such needs, coordinating staff activities, directing incident operations, approving requests for additional resources or release of resources, authorizing release of information to the media, and performing the duties of Incident Commander in his absence.

Press Information Officer

This position is responsible for the formulation and release of information on incidents to the news media and other appropriate agencies and organizations. Duties include obtaining briefings from the Incident Commander, contacting jurisdictional agencies to coordinate public information

activities, establishing an incident information center at DOJ Command Center, complying with constraints imposed by the Incident Commander and Steering Committee on the release of information, attending briefings to obtain updated information, arranging for meetings between media and incident personnel, and providing escort service to the media and VIP's.

Intelligence Chief

The Intelligence Chief is responsible for providing a means of tracking a detection site from initial observation through eradication/spraying. Duties include obtaining briefings from the Incident Commander, planning and implementing the organization of the Intelligence Unit, coordinating activities with air operations, photographer, interpreters, and analyst, compiling/displaying intelligence information, maintaining a status file for site locations, and preparing monthly intelligence status report to the Incident Commander.

Air Operations Commander

This position is responsible for the air operations of the Incident Command System and provides technical assistance to the Incident Command staff. Duties include obtaining briefings from the Planning/Logistics Chief, organizing air operations, requesting/cancelling restricted air space (FAR 91.91), participating in the preparation of the Incident Plan, coordinating air activities with FAA, reporting special incidents/accidents, and arranging for accident investigation teams when necessary.

Operations Commander

The Operations Commander is responsible for the management of all operations directly applicable to the primary mission of the task force. Duties include obtaining briefings from the Incident Commander, developing the Operations portion of the Incident Plan, briefing and assigning personnel, supervising operations, determining needs for and requesting additional resources, and reporting information on special activities, events, and occurrences to the Incident Commander.

Finance Chief

The Finance Chief is responsible for all financial and cost analysis aspects of the Incident Command System. Duties include obtaining briefings from the Incident Commander, attending briefings and planning meetings to gather information on overall strategies, identifying support needs for the Finance Section, developing an operating plan, meeting with various agency representatives on finance matters, participating in demobilization planning, insuring that obligation documents initiated at the incident are properly prepared and completed, and briefing agency administrative personnel on all incident-related business management issues needing attention and follow-up prior to leaving incident.

Planning/Logistics Chief

This position is responsible for collecting, evaluating, and disseminating information about the development of the incident and status of resources. Duties include obtaining briefings from the Incident Commander, activating the Planning/Logistics Unit, establishing information requirements and reporting schedules for use in preparing the Incident Plan, compiling and displaying incident status summary information, preparing/distributing Incident Commander's orders, providing incident document control, providing and updating organization chart with phone contacts, providing a clearing house of information for cooperating agencies with the Press Information Officer.

Asset Seizure Team Commander

The Commander is responsible for providing personnel, equipment, and expertise necessary to conduct asset seizure investigations. Duties include obtaining briefings from the Incident Commander, activating the Asset Seizure Unit, identifying service and support requirements for planned and expected operations, assembling, briefing and deploying asset seizure teams, advising Incident Commander on Asset Seizure Teams' status, estimating future service and support requirements, and participating in demobilization planning.

Regional Coordinator

The Regional Coordinator is responsible for the implementation of that portion of the Incident Plan appropriate to the regions and reports directly to the Field Operation Manager. Duties include obtaining briefings from the Field Operation Manager, attending planning meetings, developing region operations, reviewing region assignment lists and modifying lists based on effectiveness of operations, assigning specific work tasks to Strike Teams, resolving logistical problems, reporting to Field Operation Manager when Incident Plan is to be modified, additional resources are needed or surplus resources are available, and when hazardous situations or significant events occur, approving accident and medical reports, and maintaining a Unit log.

Strike Team Leader/Assistant Strike Team Leader

This position is responsible for performing tactical assignments given to the Strike Team, reports work progress, resource status, and other important information to the Regional Coordinator, and maintains work records on assigned personnel. Additional duties include obtaining briefings from the Regional Coordinator, reviewing assignments with subordinates and assigning tasks, monitoring work progress, coordinating activities with adjacent Strike Teams, insuring Helicopter rules and regulations are complied with, submitting situation and resource status information to Regional Coordinator, maintaining a Unit log, and preparing reports.

BLM, USFS, U.S. Marshal

These agents are responsible for coordinating with the Regional Coordinator the preparation of all legal and logistical items in support of task force action in his area of jurisdiction. In conjunction with the Regional Coordinator, these agents are responsible for keeping local agency heads informed of actions pending and possible problem areas. They are also responsible for keeping the Command Center informed of proposed actions and possible alternatives; they provide liaison with local news media and are responsible for all follow-up action when a Strike Team is finished in his area. In conjunction with the Regional Coordinator, they report the accomplishments of the Strike Team.

Lead Deputy

A Lead Deputy is responsible for conducting raids in his jurisdiction in cooperation with the Strike Team Leader and is a member of the task force. He serves as a Sheriff's representative, provides legal documents and serves same on raids, makes arrests and seizes property as appropriate, and assists the Strike Team Leader and Regional Coordinator in making changes in plans due to unforeseen circumstances.

PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE/PROGRAM OUTLINE

January 23	Preliminary review and staffing proposals for "CAMP 1984".
January 25	Status report to Steering Committee.
January 27	Steering Committee representatives report back to agencies.
February 14	CAMP staff brief agency heads.
February 21	Steering Committee status briefing/subcommittee assignments.
March 1	Begin interviews of Reserve Deputies/team members.
March 7	Steering Committee status briefing/subcommittee reports.
March 14	Interagency agreement on objectives and scope of program.
March 16	Interagency resource commitments
March 19	Begin status briefings for Sheriffs.
March 21	Identify Team Leaders, Assistant Team Leaders, Lead Deputies, and Reserves.
April 2 - 13	Spring Training for raids.
April 7	Steering Committee status briefing/final subcommittee reports.
April 14	Finalize all interagency agreements.
April 30	Individual training begins.
May 1	Identify staff for Incident Command System (ICS).
May 2	Steering Committee status update.
May 28	ICS center operational.
May 29	Begin air search program.
June 6	Steering Committee status update.
July 9 - 20	Two week school.
July 11	Steering Committee status update.
July 30	Raids begin.
October 6	Raids end.
November 7 - 8	"CAMP Critique".
December 19	Final report.

EXCERPTED FROM "ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION
ON NARCOTICS - FINAL REPORT - FEBRUARY 1984"

5. DRUG SUPPRESSION EFFORTS WITHIN CALIFORNIA

DISCUSSION:

In addition to the serious problems associated with heroin and cocaine abuse resulting from their importation from foreign source countries, we are now beginning to see a major change in the nature of California's illicit drug market. While historically a drug importing state, California has now taken on the role of a producer of illicit drugs. Over the past few years, California has become a major source of domestically-grown cannabis, drugs produced by clandestine laboratories, and the illegal diversion of prescription drugs into the illicit marketplace.

As it is the federal government's responsibility to control the supply and importation of heroin, cocaine, and cannabis produced by foreign countries, we have a commensurate responsibility to address the supply of those drugs produced in California. Such an enforcement emphasis is in recognition of law enforcement's ability to be most effective in suppressing drugs at their source of production.

Intensive enforcement efforts jointly conducted by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies on drug supplies for which California has become a source have resulted in some encouraging success. Specifically, inter-governmental enforcement efforts aimed at eradicating domestically-grown marijuana, the diversion of pharmaceutical drug supplies into the illicit marketplace by medical practitioners, and the reduction of clandestine laboratories have proven to have a promising long-term potential impact. It is this cooperative spirit which has materialized between the various levels of government that holds the key to the success of our future enforcement efforts against drug abuse.

A good example of the success of this inter-governmental rapport and coordination is California's recently completed pilot project entitled Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP) which has been viewed as a model program for other states in an effort to crack down on domestically-produced marijuana. This successful 1983 prototype project brought local, state, and federal law enforcement and natural resource agencies together to address a common problem. Through the development of a single operational plan and command structure, over 40 agencies combined forces in a well-planned and executed enforcement operation which resulted in the seizure and destruction of an estimated \$130 million worth of illegal marijuana. This command structure, which reduced any potential duplication of effort, was able to maximize its limited available resources.

While local law enforcement has attempted to fulfill its primary responsibility for drug control through concerted street enforcement activity, there has been increasing support for an expanded number of regional task forces to deal with the multi-jurisdictional nature of criminal drug activity.

These task force operations are viewed as a key to maximizing the effectiveness of this state's limited narcotic enforcement resources. In addition to their effectiveness in interdicting heroin and cocaine, such joint task force operations have proven especially important in those rural areas of the state which while suffering from the greatest lack of narcotic enforcement personnel, find themselves viewed as prime sites for the illegal cultivation of marijuana and the production of illicit drugs by clandestine laboratories because of their rural characteristics and sparse populations.

Task force operations have been found to be successful in reducing jurisdictional issues and focusing limited manpower in a manner which achieves maximum results. For smaller counties, a narcotics task force may be the only trained and equipped unit capable of performing intensive specialized enforcement duties.

As part of their responsibilities, it is important that such task forces give increased attention to the financial aspects of drug trafficking. This involves the stockpiling and laundering of the large amounts of illegal profits normally associated with drug trafficking. With the state's recently expanded *asset forfeiture* law, the potential for fatally crippling a particular drug network may be enhanced through the possible confiscation of all monies and assets which can be traced to illegal drug activities. While dealers may have been able to survive the financial consequences tied to the loss of a particular drug shipment in the past, a criminal's entire financial assets are now open to possible confiscation. Data measuring the results and impact of this new law should be collected and analyzed over the course of the coming year to specifically determine the true potential of this financial weapon. In addition to this new enhanced state law, local law enforcement agencies should also become more conversant with similar existing federal regulations.

In addition to inter-governmental programs and increased task force operations, increased communication and contact between narcotic enforcement unit managers is also viewed as an important factor in the overall success of California's narcotic suppression efforts. The establishment of a forum and communication network through which task force managers and narcotic unit supervisors can interact and exchange ideas can serve many important functions, including: 1) information and intelligence exchange; 2) help break down any jurisdictional conflicts that may arise in enforcement operations; 3) help ensure our overall state strategy is being carried out by our local law enforcement community in a uniform manner; and 4) possibly serve as a forum through which requests for the funding of special projects could be funneled in the future.

Public sentiment against the illegal production, sale, and use of controlled substances has never been stronger. This increased intolerance toward illegal drugs has been demonstrated in many ways. Specifically, news editorials have displayed an increased conservatism in this area. In addition, the public's support for increased drug suppression efforts, the passage of increased penalties for drug violations by our state legislators, and the opinion of the law enforcement community all support this conclusion. Whatever support had existed in the past regarding the legalization or decriminalization of marijuana or any other controlled substance has been significantly diminished. This current public sentiment against illegal drugs serves as a solid foundation for needed and desired increased drug enforcement efforts.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. Drug activity has continued to increase over the years, exceeding the capabilities of existing enforcement resources to deal with it.
2. California has acquired more of a source country profile over recent years with the production and distribution of marijuana, prescription drugs, and clandestine produced controlled substances.
3. California, due to its coastline, unique geographic and topographic characteristics, border access, and its large and diverse population base, has become a major entry, distribution and marketing location within the United States for internationally produced drugs.
4. Drug enforcement and eradication efforts in California are important not only in addressing domestic drug concerns, but also in that they serve as an example of our domestic resolve to address illegal drug activity. This, in turn, has a positive impact on our diplomatic drug suppression efforts throughout the world.
5. Task force operations are viewed as a key to maximizing the effectiveness of this state's limited narcotic enforcement resources and for responding to the multi-jurisdictional nature of criminal drug activity.

6. California's clandestine lab problem includes not only the production of illicit drugs which cause serious abuse problems, but also safety hazards resulting from potential fires, explosions, and the illegal dumping of toxic wastes.
7. California has made a concerted effort to control the illicit flow of precursor chemicals used to manufacture controlled substances. While this effort has been very effective, drug producers can still gain easy access to these source chemicals through purchases from border states that have no such controls.
8. Ecological damage is occurring on our public lands from the illegal cultivation of marijuana. Specific types of damage include use of pesticides and herbicides, development of dirt access roads, increased threat of fire, reductions in limited wildlife habitats, pollution of natural water sources, clear-cutting, and the loss of accessibility and use of the areas by the public.
9. Increased communication and contact between California's narcotic enforcement unit managers is viewed as an important element in the overall success of any statewide narcotic enforcement effort.
10. Due to the widespread and expensive drug networks that exist, local governments can find themselves unable to effectively deal with drug problems affecting their communities through a localized effort alone.
11. Law enforcement agencies involved in drug control have had mixed opinions regarding the compilation, access, quality, and exchange of drug intelligence information.
12. Financial and manpower resources are presently at insufficient levels to have a significant impact through drug interdiction.
13. The recently enhanced state *asset forfeiture* law provides law enforcement with an expanded enforcement capability by impacting criminals where it hurts the most - in their pocketbooks. Data on the impact of this legislation (e.g., dollars collected, disbursements, number of cases, length of time between confiscation of assets and its disbursement to law enforcement, etc.) should be monitored and evaluated.
14. Federal asset forfeiture laws, due to their far more encompassing nature can provide local law enforcement with another valuable drug enforcement tool. Efforts should be taken to become thoroughly familiar with these federal provisions.
15. The California law enforcement community, as well as the general public, is clearly opposed to the legalization or decriminalization of marijuana or any other illegal drugs.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. State drug enforcement efforts should be enhanced and expanded to address those drug supplies for which we are the source (domestically-grown cannabis, prescription drugs, and substances manufactured by clandestine laboratories).
2. The Commission strongly endorses the continuation and expansion of the Department of Justice's inter-governmental Campaign Against Marijuana Planting (CAMP) program. This program has also served as a message to foreign source countries that we are seriously involved in the eradication of our own domestic drug supplies.
3. The Commission advocates the use of defoliants and herbicides within the United States and in foreign countries where adequate safeguards can be provided. A decision on their use should be based on an analysis of the costs involved, possible health concerns, environmental problems, and constraining topographic characteristics of the proposed target sites.

4. The Attorney General should take the lead in approaching environmental groups to educate them in the ecological damage occurring on our public lands due to illegal marijuana cultivation and clandestine laboratories and to solicit their support in returning these areas to the safe recreational use of our citizens.
5. Additional controls should be enacted to deal with precursor substances commonly used in the production of illegal drugs, including the initiation of federal efforts to impose upgraded and standardized national regulations governing the purchase and distribution of these precursor materials. Other legislative improvements are also needed to assist in the detection, interdiction, and prosecution of drug traffickers (see "Legislative Recommendations" section).
6. Encourage the continued formation of regional task forces to best deal with the multi-jurisdictional nature of criminal drug activities. These task forces should be structured in such a manner to most effectively respond to the unique narcotic enforcement needs of each particular area.
7. Additional training should be provided to local law enforcement personnel to assist them in becoming more conversant and knowledgeable about the ever-changing illegal drug trafficking industry.
8. The Attorney General should undertake a comprehensive review of all narcotic information systems having a potential impact on California's narcotic enforcement activities. This survey should identify the systems available (interstate, intrastate, regional, and local); numbers and names of member agencies in each system; types and quality of information retained; its timeliness; access and exchange guidelines; unnecessary duplication of information; linkages between systems; and the extent of use by California's law enforcement community.
9. Solicit the expanded involvement of state National Guard and federal military resources to supplement limited local/state manpower in appropriate enforcement operations.
10. The Attorney General should take the lead in establishing a forum and communications network for narcotic unit managers through which task force managers and/or narcotic unit supervisors can interact with one another, exchange ideas, and coordinate activities.
11. Local law enforcement agencies should acknowledge the value of meeting their respective community's demands for drug control through concerted street enforcement activity.
12. The illegal accumulation of financial assets through drug trafficking activities should be a primary focus of many major drug trafficking investigations.
13. The Attorney General's Office shall educate local law enforcement agencies on the specific provisions of the recently enhanced state narcotic *asset forfeiture* bill. Specific data regarding its operation (e.g., number of cases, dollars involved, types of reimbursement claims made against the fund, elapsed time between actual confiscation and eventual disbursement, administrative procedures, etc.) shall be monitored and evaluated. Based upon its analysis of these data, the Attorney General shall develop appropriate legislative revisions to respond to any perceived needed changes.
14. Local law enforcement agencies should become more aware of various federal asset forfeiture provisions that exist. By becoming familiar with the far more encompassing nature of these federal statutes, they will find themselves with another valuable enforcement tool.