Six articles in this volume focus on anthropological diplomacy—the study and practice of peace and conflict resolution among societies, based on knowledge of a society's fundamental cultural premises. The first article, by Ronald Cohen, considers questions pertinent to anthropological diplomacy, including the impact of diverse cultures on the diplomatic process, the importance of cultural symbols in negotiation, and the supranational character of international agencies. Next, Vivian J. Rohrl addresses the anthropological study of international law. Comparison is made between the international community of states and a tribal society. The Fulbright Program's effect on Philippine-American cultural and educational exchanges is discussed by J. R. Francisco in the third article. Next, Marc S. Micozzi focuses on the diplomacy of international medical assistance. The importance of cultural context to effective medical care and the medical drawbacks of currently offered health care programs to underdeveloped nations are discussed. The impact of ethnicity on politics within and between states is considered in the fifth article, by Paul J. Magnarella. The pro-Israel lobby's effect on U.S.-Middle East policy is cited as an example. In the final paper the use of coercion in international affairs is addressed by Walter L. Williams, Jr. Among the issues considered are the current U.S. foreign policy practices that ignore violations of human rights in friendly states. Notes on contributors conclude the volume. (LP)
STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES

is devoted to the study of cultures and of the Third World. Each publication contains papers dealing with a single theme or area, addressed to scholars and laymen as well as to teachers, students and practitioners of social science; the papers should be of value also to applied social scientists, population demographers, community development workers, and other students of human cultures and societies.

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Communications concerning editorial matters, including requests to reprint or translate, and correspondence about subscriptions, change of address, circulation, and payments should be addressed to:

The Editors
STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES
Department of Anthropology
College of William and Mary
Williamsburg, Virginia 23185 U.S.A.
Phone: (804) 253-4522
C. von Furth-Haimendorf (London School of Oriental and African Studies, England), Dante Germin (University of Virginia), Walter Goldschmidt (University of California, Los Angeles), Nancie L. Gonzalez (Boston University), W.W. Howells (Harvard University), Francis I.K. Hsu (Northwestern University), Charles C. Hughes (University of Utah Medical Center), Erwin H. Johnson (State University of New York, Buffalo), Victor T. King (University of Hull), Koentjaraningrat (University of Indonesia), T.A. Lambo (World Health Organization, Switzerland), Gottfried O. Lang (University of Colorado), Peter Lawrence (University of Sydney, Australia), Diane K. Lewis (University of California, Santa Cruz), Dapen Liang (Asiamea Research Institute, California), Abdoulaye Ly (University of Dakar, Senegal), Robert A. Manns (Brandeis University), Jamshed Mavalwala (University of Toronto, Canada), Eugenio Fernandez Mendez (Universidad de Puerto Rico), Alfredo T. Morales (National Research and Development Centre for Teacher Education, University of the Philippines), Gananath Obeyesekere (Princeton University, N.J.), Gottfried Oosterwal (Andrews University), Morris E. Opler (University of Oklahoma), Alfonso Ortiz (Princeton University), Akin Rabibhada (Thammasat University, Thailand), V.J. Ram (United Nations, Beirut, Lebanon), M.S.A. Rao (University of Delhi, India), J.P. Romain (CRESHS, Haiti), Renato I. Rosaldo (Stanford University), Irving Rouse (Yale University), Miguel Acosta Saignes (Caracas, Venezuela), Kurnial S. Sandhu (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore), Spiegel-Rosing (Rhur-Universitat Bochum, Germany), Rodolfo Stavenhagen (El Colegio de Mexico), Akira Takahashi (University of Tokyo, Japan), Reina Torres de Arauz (Instituto Nacional de Cultura y Deportes, Panama), Donald Tugby (Queensland University, Australia), Victor C. Uchendu (University of Illinois and Kampala, Uganda), Lionel Vallee (University of Montreal, Canada), Mario C. Vasquez (National Office of Agrarian Reform, Peru), L.P. Vidyardi (Ranchi University, India), R.M. Villanueva (United Nations, New York City), Hiroshi Wagatsuna (University of California, Los Angeles), Wong Soon Kai (Kuching, Sarawak), Inger Wulff (Danish National Museum).
FOREWORD

This issue of STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES is dedicated to former Senator J. William Fulbright for his solid achievements in international education and in public service. Senator Fulbright was the distinguished speaker and recipient of the 1982 Thomas Jefferson Award in International Education by the Association for Anthropological Diplomacy, Politics, and Society. The award was conferred on him in Washington D.C. in 1982, in conjunction with the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association.

In addition to the award/dinner program, the Association for Anthropological Diplomacy, Politics, and Society also held a scientific session on the contributions of anthropology to diplomacy. The papers in this issue by Professors Paul J. Magnarella, Vivian J. Rohrl, and Marc Micozzi were read during the symposium while Prof. Walter L. William's article served as the Distinguished Lecture during the banquet/program. Prof. Ronald Cohen, who was the discussant of the symposium, amplified on his oral presentation with his provocative paper in this issue. Juan R. Francisco's article was reprinted from the Occasional Papers Series of the Philippine-American Educational Foundation in Manila, with the author's written permission.

I would like to thank my co-editors of STUDIES IN THIRD WORLD SOCIETIES, Prof. Vinson H. Sutlive Jr. and Prof. Nathan Altshuler, for their significant assistance and cooperation in the publication of this issue. We thank Dr. Paul J. Magnarella for being guest editor, Jean Belvin of the Department of Anthropology, College of William and Mary, for her speedy and accurate work of production, and Sharon Haegele for her excellent proofreading of this manuscript. Finally, we thank the American Anthropological Association for giving us a forum to explore new ideas.

MARIO D. ZAMORA

10 November 1983
College of William and Mary
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ANTHROPOLOGICAL DIPLOMACY:
CASE STUDIES IN THE APPLICATIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Paul J. Magnarella  Guest Editor

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INTRODUCTION

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

PAUL J. MAGNARELLA
University of Florida

The word "diplomacy," meaning the theory and practice of conducting negotiations between governments, derives from the Greek diploma, meaning something written on parchment and folded. The Greek word, which designated the written instrument exchanged by negotiating governments, entered the English language only in the 18th century when intercourse between European states became formalized. Informal diplomatic practices, however, most probably predate the neolithic period. By the 14th century B.C., the Egyptian dynasties engaged in a system of diplomacy with various Mesopotamian states, and later both the Chinese states and the Indian kingdoms had developed patterns of diplomatic relations with their neighboring political entities.

Modern diplomacy developed primarily out of the historic practices and agreements of Western peoples. Its roots go back to the Greek city-states and the Roman Empire. Some subsequent increments and modifications are attributable to the clerical diplomacy of Medieval Europe and the dynastic diplomacy of Europe's monarchies. Much of the ostentation of contemporary diplomacy is a carry-over from this last period when a foreign envoy was the symbolic equivalent of his sovereign abroad. Many of the current rules of diplomacy, especially the order of ranks, were determined by Western states at the 1815 Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. Today, Western
culture and history continue to dominate the rules and ritual of formal diplomacy. Of the original five official languages of the United Nations (English, French, Russian, Spanish, Chinese), for example, just one is non-Western. Only recently, has the UN added Arabic, thereby raising to diplomatic status (for some purposes) a language spoken by more than 120 million people in over 20 Middle Eastern and African states.

Because modern diplomacy consists of a series of symbolic, ritual, rank, and procedural patterns constructed with values and norms rooted in Western history, the post-World War II emergence of a majority of today's Third World states created a kind of international cultural crisis. Having gained political independence from Western imperial dominance at home, these states were being permitted to join an international community whose terms of discourse had already been set by their former imperial rulers. Third World diplomats had little choice but to accept this state of affairs and participate in formal international discourse on the basis of cultural precepts foreign to their own. Those who completely accepted the Western dictates of their role most probably alienated themselves culturally from some of their own people. Many, I am sure, felt culturally alienated themselves as they participated in the diplomatic process. Of the Third World state leaders, Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini is one of the few who has rejected the rules of Western diplomacy as the contrivances of imperialist infidels (see Magnarella 1980).

The anthropological study of diplomacy is a new approach to this most interesting and culturally rich field of human activity. The first collection of papers devoted to this topic appeared in Studies in Third World Societies (1980) under the title Culture and Diplomacy in the Third World. The present issue complements that earlier collection.

In the first paper that follows this Introduction, Professor Ronald Cohen of the University of Florida offers a general discussion of some of the questions an anthropology of diplomacy might consider. These involve the impact of diverse cultures on the diplomatic process, the importance of cultural symbols in negotiations, and the supra-national character of various international agencies and their professional staffs. These and other topics delineated by Cohen can be fruitfully examined anthropologically.
In the next paper, Professor Vivian Rohrl of San Diego State University addresses the anthropological study of international law. She argues that conflict resolution between political entities of varying levels of complexity can be reduced to common denominators. She also maintains that the international community of states, lacking as it does, a universally recognized chief, is analogous to a tribal society. Hence, well established anthropological understandings of less complex societies can be usefully applied to the study of legal behavior among modern states.

In his contribution, Professor J.R. Francisco, the Executive Director of the Philippine-American Educational Foundation, discusses the Fulbright Program as it relates to the diplomacy of Philippine-American cultural and educational exchange. He describes the program's historic background and development, and assesses its political-cultural-educational impacts on the states and peoples involved. Francisco also raises a series of pertinent questions that governments engaged in such exchanges should consider.

Dr. Marc Micozzi of the University of Pennsylvania takes up the topic of the diplomacy of international medical assistance. Specifically, he deals with the political strategies and medical drawbacks of health care programs as currently offered by richer countries to poorer ones. Micozzi notes the importance of the cultural context to effective medical care, and calls for greater involvement by medical anthropologists in the planning, delivery, and evaluation of such aid programs.

In my own contribution, I discuss the significant impact of ethnicity on politics within and between states. U.S. policy in the Middle East, for instance, is prejudiced by the existence of a well-financed and threatening (to congressmen) pro-Israel lobby. That lobby's hold on congress is so strong, that senators and representatives often support Israel's demands and actions without carefully considering the implications of such support for America's own interests. I also list a series of research questions in the area of ethnopolitics.

In the final paper, Walter Williams, Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary, expresses his concerns over the unprincipled use of coercion in international affairs. He warns that our world community may be "rushing down a slippery slope towards the traditional, nineteenth century rule of no legal
Restraint over major armed force. Williams also criticizes current U.S. foreign policy practices that ignore human rights violations by friendly or non-threatening states, but dramatize violations committed by adversary states.

Throughout his excellent paper, Williams stresses the need to appreciate the sociocultural contexts of international law and diplomacy. "Culture, diplomacy, and legal process are highly interdependent," he writes. "By helping government officials to have an improved understanding of their own and other cultures, anthropologists can assist in providing governments with a better "frame of reference" for the development and implementation of international law." Williams also maintains that "international lawyers and diplomats could mine many a gold nugget from the knowledge and studies of anthropologists." These words by a noted international lawyer offer anthropologists more than gracious encouragement. They also alert anthropologists of their responsibility to apply their craft, either by working alone or in conjunction with colleagues from other disciplines, to the international arena.

Reference

ANTHROPOLOGY AND DIPLOMACY: New Wine, or New Bottles?

RONALD COHEN
University of Florida

In what is to follow I have tried to examine the appropriate thrusts, questions, and parameters of contributions to an anthropology of diplomacy. Let me begin by defining terms so that we can look not only for new wines, but new bottles; i.e., new conceptions of the problem. Diplomacy does not per se deal with cultural variations. Diplomatic relations may, and again they may not, occur within contexts of cultural distinctions. Canadian-U.S. relations have very few cultural distinctions beyond the spelling of a few words and the sense of continuity with a mother country in one case, (ostensibly) broken in the other. More precisely, diplomatic relations refer to contexts in which autonomous political units must interact as corporate entities through their representatives. The interaction is special because there is no overarching authority whose power to settle disputes is acceptable to all parties concerned. There may be customary rules governing the interactions, but no automatic procedures for enforcing compliance exists, should one or more parties to the interaction decide to break the rules or the terms of agreements.

In this sense the anthropology of diplomacy refers to a particular form of political relationships, not necessarily intercultural. It includes, for example, relations among politically autonomous segments of
a single ethnic group which occurred among societies living in pre-colonial segmentary social formations. In the contemporary world all such societies are parts of one or more nation-states such that diplomatic relations are subordinated to recognized administrative structures. This means that contemporary diplomacy is restricted to interstate relations given the legitimate sovereignty of all parties in the interaction.

The anthropology of diplomacy then deals with the quality, ingredients and meaning of these diplomatic relations and with factors determining such relations. Stated more formally, diplomatic relations are interactions amongst autonomous corporate units who recognize no sovereign power beyond their own. Such relations are a function of the actors, differences and similarities of interests, cultural backgrounds, power, economic competition and exchange, physical distance, political socialization, and ideology. Let me go over some of the main ingredients of this theory briefly in order to illustrate directions of research implied in this conception.

Many years ago, Lord Acton is supposed to have said countries have neither friends nor enemies - only interests. The strong element of truth in the statement - it doesn't cover sentiments - refers to the notion that scholars like Dumont (1970), who wish to treat collectivities as individuals, are lacking in "sociological imagination". Nations interact almost entirely in rational ways. That is to say, given their assumptions of what constitutes their own interests, they try to maximize their own goals in situations where they are only one among two or more sovereign units.

Anthropology is important within this context because rationality varies according to the assumptions upon which a means-ends schema works. Given the validity or believability of Mein Kampf, the Holocaust is "rational". Newspaper articles, political analysts, and others try to explain Libya's moves in North Africa and into the Sudan with Libyan influences rumored to reach into Niger, Mali and Nigeria. Like many leaders before him, Khadaffi has clearly written out and published his assumptions and logical derivations of Libya's and Islam's interests in the Middle East and Africa. His expansionism may not be a scientifically valid function of his own assumptions - indeed, I believe he must be understood on quite different grounds, but his actions follow logically from his own statements.
about the interests of Islam and Arabism in world affairs. In general, political scientists tend to isolate the interests of sovereign states and to show how these affect their international relations. Deeply laden differences in the ways national goals derive from differing logics, i.e., arguments following from different assumptions about what is worthwhile, what is morally proper, what are the most desired relations among states, require many of the skills of cultural analysis generally associated with social anthropology.

One of the best examples of such work is that of Handler (1984) writing on the ideology of contemporary separatism in Quebec. By analyzing the writings of Rene Levesque, the leader of Parti Quebecois, and adding material from his own fieldwork, Handler is able to show us how the logic of separatism works, and why people who espouse this ideology feel they must have a new and separate state of their own outside the Canadian Federation, but linked to it by ties of tradition, location, and diplomacy. The article fails to discuss or analyze how successful the ideology is, and whether or not the people are actually willing to accept diplomatic rather than incorporated provincial status with Canada. However, a semiotic analysis of the ideology of separatism is a useful contribution to our understanding of ethnic-based separatism as a form of potential state formation, creating diplomatic rather than encapsulated or incorporated relations between one group and another.

This does not imply cultural relativism. Just because anthropological analysis can lead to a much needed understanding of Kadaffi's expansionist interests, or Boukassa's or Idi Amin's replacement of state interests with a monarchical one of personal power through the use of atrocity or public policy in no way means we ought to condone such interests. To understand distasteful foreign activities should lead to improved strategies for dealing with them, never to tolerance.

In today's world cultural differences and similarities are many times more complex than those traditionally associated with cultural research. Representatives of countries of strikingly different cultures may all belong to an emergent social formation of international bureaucrats to be found in most capitals of the world. Organizations like the United Nations, FAO, Agence Culturelle et Technologie, the Olympic
Games, the Commonwealth, O.E.C.D., SEATO, the Comintern, ILO, UNESCO, and hosts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) demand common forms of language, behavior, personal commitments, and values. People from widely differing cultural backgrounds have learned to live in this international environment either as diplomatic representatives, or supra-nationals, ones whose personal interests are supposed to have shifted to those of the organization itself and to its goals. How much and under what conditions this emergent culture and its demand can actually replace or submerge national or regional interests and concerns and how much the concerns of a specific international organization color the participation of individuals in these new diplomatic and, ideally, supra- or non-diplomatic levels of activity are not fully understood. Certainly the World Council of Churches, UNESCO, and many other international agencies are much different today than they were when third world representatives had little or no influence on their policies. Majorities of the members are now non-Western in origin and new international bureaucratic social relations are much influenced by this fact. At this level, where international agencies may involve diplomatic interactions among representatives of national interests, cultural differences in proxemics, symbolic interpretations, language usage, dress patterns, religion, and unconscious reaction to status distinctions, and most especially means and goals need much more research. How independent are quota-filled representatives on international bodies? How much do their own cultural backgrounds and their reaction to, and perception of, other cultures affect their behavior as "international civil servants"? To what extent do such international organizations comprise a newly emergent international community whose members are in a sense more at home in Geneva, Rome, New York, or Paris than they are in their own birthplaces? If such an emergent community exists as a sociocultural entity, what are its commonly shared beliefs and behaviors? What factors influence and change such patterns? Is the widespread attribution of malevolent outcomes to "Western imperialism", or the CIA, based on access to more accurate information or is it a variant of the logic of witchcraft (a culturally diagnosed and personalized cause and explanation of misfortune made after the facts or events)? Clearly the community of international bureaucrats and diplomats forms a more or less integrated and bounded community. They can and should be understood in the same way we have come to know the Hopi or the Eskimo. If, indeed, the world is getting smaller, and the "global
village" exists as anything but metaphor, then possibly a wider audience should know what behaviors are more and less appropriate in this emergent and increasingly inclusive set of social relations.

When fully diplomatic relationships are involved, we need to know much more of the impact of cultural differences upon the deliberations and the outcome. A North American says, "Oh boy! That's a tough set of demands to start off with." His African listener hears him say, You are a boy, not yet fully mature either as a person or a country, how dare you be so audacious and inappropriate as to make such demands, given your inferiority (i.e., boy-like status). The North American (in this case, me) used colloquial language hoping to be seen as friendly and more egalitarian. His listener interpreted the words to mean that this American was asserting his own superiority and putting the African down. In terms of religion, where possible countries may try not to react, but there are times when not noticing would be "undiplomatic". Thus Nigeria contains Christian, Muslim, and indigenous West African religions. Its chief representative to OPEC has always been a Muslim. When Nigerian policy runs counter to OPEC agreements, it is then clear that the only possible differences in viewpoint are those of national interest.

Cultural differences originating with regional and local traditions are, however, only part of the problems of understanding and communication associated with diplomacy. A thoroughgoing anthropology of diplomacy must accept the fact already hinted at above. Early socialization into differing cultures does not mean that mutual understanding across those of differing cultural background, communication and even common biases cannot develop in a single diplomatic context. Ever since Easton and Dennis (1969) did their important study on political socialization, we have known that socialization to political issues and viewpoints continues developing throughout individual life spans, responding to changing conditions as well as being the result of early training.

For diplomatic relationships, this means that participants may be from very different cultural backgrounds, yet bring to the bargaining table a common set of understanding of the conditions and cultural niceties necessary for communication and agreement. Under these circumstances other features of today's cultural worlds help to explain problems that emerge.
Let me start with an example. Anthropologist Koch (1978) has analyzed the symbolic qualities of table shapes which engaged and deterred Vietnamese and U.S. diplomats from starting serious peace talks. Both sides had similar cultural understanding of the symbolic qualities of a round vs. a rectangular or a square table. Cultural differences of upbringing had no effects on these interpretations. However, power differences between the participants and most importantly the attempt to portray the outcome of the war - as a U.S. defeat (the Vietnamese position), or a draw (the American position), made each side favor a differently shaped peace table. Furthermore, each side had different views about who could or should be represented – i.e., how many sides or parties there were to the discussions. And this again affected the proposed shape of the table. Power and bargaining positions – fully understood by both sides were turned into mutually intelligible grounds for negotiation - the shape of the conference table. Anthropology enters here to show how significant such symbols can be. A table is not just a table, it is a declaration and determinant of the way people confront each other for some mutual task of eating, working or coming to an agreement.

In more general terms, what is the symbolism of diplomatic interchange? Why, for example, do diplomats "present credentials," wear certain types of dress, use specific language forms? What is the history and evolutionary patterning of such developments? How are they determined by differences of power, cultural backgrounds, regional groupings, frequency of interactions and so on. Here is a fertile field that should produce an array of studies on the "culture of diplomacy"!

A fascinating new development in international affairs is the growth of cross-national pluralism. In third world countries it is widely accepted that colonialism imposed boundaries which reflected major power competition and agreements. The process did not necessarily give much heed to local ethnic boundaries. This has produced problems of group interests among ethnic units distributed among several sovereign states, each of which has the right to treat the same ethnic group as citizens or residents within its own laws. Or quite possibly (as with Somalia) the same ethnic group (Somali) can be a major political force in one country and a minority group in the neighboring ones (Ethiopia and Kenya). The results can be irredentist
movements and repressive actions that mar peaceful relations among the states involved.

The problem is much less well-studied or understood among older nations. Certainly as Magnarella points out (see his paper in this volume), Greek-Turkish relations in Cyprus use relations between their respective mother countries to resolve or exacerbate their problems. Switzerland's varying ethnic groups and their differing national locations make for an interesting test case of how ethnic-national relations can be resolved within international and intranational contexts. Possibly the most fascinating new example is that of the circumpolar Inuit peoples. They have now held several meetings of Inuit peoples from Greenland, Canada, and Alaska. USSR-based Inuit have not, so far, attended. Common problems, issues, needs and an international Inuit organization have evolved.

What effect, if any, will this international ethnic association have on the relations among the states involved? And the international community as a whole? Native North Americans have asked to attend and speak at the United Nations about their grievances with home governments. Since their relations were established by treaties, they feel they have a right to appeal to an international body to resolve or comment on their problems and their demands. In the Inuit case, it is only a matter of time before demands are made at international meetings for the Soviet government to allow Siberian-based Inuit to attend international Inuit meetings.

The Generalization and general explanations to be made about pan-national ethnic organization and diplomatic relations among host nations? Related to this, but structurally distinct is the problem of ethnic communities, tourists, refugees, migrant laborers, and pilgrims, who form themselves into more or less united groupings of foreign nationals living abroad. They vary enormously. There are, for example, the Middle East and elsewhere with wide and varied histories of a people whose central mission is to be without a dispossessed homeland. Foreign nationals and all corporations have produced small ethnic groups in quite different developed countries from Africa, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and provinces of the third world. They have produced quite different reasons. All such communities involve relations between nationals
of different and autonomous states. All such relations involve visas, entry permits, currency matters, and diplomatic relations among the states whose citizens are involved. What kind of diplomatic problems are posed by such enclaves? How and why do such problems emerge and what factors determine the outcomes? As the world shrinks, or people move more widely for differing reasons, ranging from oppression to tourism, enclaves of foreign nationals will involve an ever more visible set of issues.

Most importantly, economic interests and differences affect the nature and ease or difficulty of diplomatic relations. Although this dimension is the traditional arena for political and historical analysis of international relations, there are significant aspects that come more within the purview and research skills of anthropologists. For example, Mintz (1983) has shown how changing food tastes in England towards a raging demand for tea and sugar affected the direction of, and motives for, English colonial expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries. Similarly of course for rubber in the 20th century. Recently-world energy needs and oil resources have had unparalleled effects on international and intranational development and policies. Many years ago Innis (1950) showed how the craze for beaver hats in Europe helped determine the path of European expansionism and competition in North America.

In many third world countries today urbanization rates far exceed population growth. This fact plus Western-style education and the spread and indigenization of specifically Western-style cultural modes have meant rapidly expanding changes in dress patterns, food tastes, home architecture and furnishings to name only a few of the most obvious effects. In food, African urbanites have taken up bread and rice at a rate far outpacing national capabilities to change over to such grains from sorghums, millet, and maize. The effect internationally is an alarming increase in the importation of these new foods, and many attempts to obtain international capital, technology, and expertise to expand home production. Changing food tastes create new diplomatic relations, new interdependencies and new national goals. How and why these new tastes emerge, what new needs are on the horizon and how they will affect international relations is a job best done by anthropologists already skilled in the analysis of tastes, or more generally, culturally determined needs.
These newer needs are related to international tensions based partly on attempts by the newer nations to control international exchange rates in their favor. And the spin-off effects create quite fascinating new forms of international relations. Let me explain. Foreign exchange controls are widely practiced means of attempting to control unfavorable trade balances, especially in third world countries whose need for hard currencies is only partially elastic, given their requirements of petroleum products and manufactured goods. This means it is almost impossible to obtain sufficient foreign exchange for many normal needs. Nations who have foreign commitments, or who wish to keep some of their wealth in hard currency find it almost impossible to do so using normal bureaucratic applications and permissions along with local banking institutions. Response to this kind of stringency varies across techniques ranging from secret Swiss bank accounts to kickbacks in foreign currency, often called consultant's fees but given in hard currency to an overseas account. Some people ask their friends to let them deposit money in the friend's foreign bank account—thus showing no record anywhere of overseas deposits. Others trade money and hospitality in the home country for similar privileges when they are abroad. These informal diplomatic relationships are now a commonplace basis for international linkages among people whose work demands require access to foreign currencies, especially internationally recognized ones such as the U.S. dollar. Studies of UN personnel, and other diplomatic and international-oriented people who must get around such restrictions through interpersonal linkages thereby creating selective pressures for such linkages as an emerging area of study.

Older economic relations continue. The needs of industrialized countries for the resources found in LDCs continue. What factors in this world interdependence are beneficial to all concerned, and which ones are more costly or less beneficial, especially to the poorer nations? Total independence and self-reliance is impossible, the "myth of merrie pre-colonial non-Western society" is modern anthropology's functionalist form of "the noble savage". But terms of relations, indigenization or nationalization of multinational corporations, all require some notions if dispassionate awareness and understanding of what is best for whom in the short and in the long run. And this leads to my final point, that of ideology which seems central to today's tensions from the cultural point of view.
For present purposes I would define ideology as a social theory explaining how and why present conditions in a collectivity have evolved. It also delineates what goals should be achieved in future if conditions are to improve. It is thus a statement of a people's hopes and fears, and a theoretical explanation of the forces that both facilitate and restrain the achievement of a better life for a particular collectivity. All societies, but most importantly those that are committed through their leaders to change, possess ideological bases for action, for desirable means and ends. Such bases legitimize and specify policies and programs. At the same time ideology explains why other means and goals are false roads to progress.

Looking at ideology in Africa north of the Zambezi, Young (1982) has isolated three ideological positions which exemplify paradigms operating in the international arena: market-oriented capitalist regimes, popular socialist, and Marxist-Leninist ones. Each sets somewhat different goals and each advances different means for getting there. In analyzing the impact of ideology on international relations Young (1982) concludes that ideology is only partly responsible for what happens. The rest is determined by interests. The USA and the Soviet Union are attracted to, or well received by, countries whose beliefs are closer to their ideology. However, the needs and long-term interests of all concerned make for many cross-ties not predictable on the basis of ideological factors alone.

By itself ideology does not accurately predict the nature of international relations. As noted, regimes espousing similar ideologies tend, in general, to be more sympathetic to one another. However, when needs and interests interfere, linkages crosscut ideologies even if formal antagonism based on ideology is the rule. Thus Congo-Brazzaville blamed its economic failure on collusion among Western capitalists who hoped to strangle their Marxist-Leninist revolution (Young 1982:42). At the same time, the very same government was developing policies more favorable to international capitalist investment than other less market-oriented economies.

What then is the actual relationship of ideology to action and policy implementation in the international sphere? Do real world needs and the actual association of diplomats and negotiations overcome ideologically
induced conflicts? Contrarily, among those with similar ideological positions, what factors create conflicts, and how are those responded to in small group situations such as International meetings?

The question is even more interesting, it seems to me, at the NGO (non-governmental organizational) level. When journalists, academics, church leaders, professionals in law, medicine, and science meet internationally, how much of their agreement and disagreement can be attributed to ideological factors? In other words, when people meet to achieve common goals, how much of what occurs is ideologically induced? How and why do such groups overcome ideological differences, if at all? Ideology is associated with different meanings for similar terms. Words, ideals, values, often using exactly the same terms can mean completely different things to those within opposing camps.

For example, to people espousing one view, "democracy" means equitable treatment and results for all groups in a population within a country, or among a set of sovereign nations. To others it means the rights of minorities and of majorities to compete for power under the rule of law to which all, including the highest authorities, are subject. In one, democracy stresses results; in the other, it is a concern for the means by which any and all results are achieved.

People using these two differing concepts, and interacting diplomatically see each other as naive, misguided, even dangerous to the improvement of the human condition and to one another's hopes for progress. The differences in meanings for similar terms may be superficial or influential. But they can produce serious impediments to conflict resolution, thereby affecting international meetings and relations.

Conclusion

Anthropology has a role to play in the understanding and the improvement of diplomatic relations. Cultural differences among peoples are only one small facet of the problem. I have tried to point to others, many still remain untouched. What we need are leadership and recognized programs, possibly even separate funding sources to encourage anthropologists to tackle the micro-interactions of diplomacy through which relations among nations are expressed.
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The application of anthropology to international law can be seen as a newly developing discipline. It has been said that "international law, so-called, is but primitive law on the world level." No matter how we differentiate the "primitive" from the "civilized," close study of legal systems, or methods of conflict resolution, in all types of human-society, reveals many common denominators. In order to understand what we mean by this statement, let us consider a number of seemingly diverse incidents that encompass behavior in a wide variety of cultures:

A Cheyenne Indian borrows his friend's horse without asking, leaving his bow as a sign that he has done so. After a year, he does not return it, and when asked, he explains that he had forgotten. He offers the horse back with two of his own for the creditor to choose from, as well as his bow that he had left at his friend's home.

A Jale tribesman, of New Guinea, invites his friend for a walk. Accidentally, the friend falls off a cliff. Everyone expects the host to compensate the family of the friend. The reasoning is, that if he had not invited his friend for a walk the mishap would not have occurred.
After World War I, Germany, having surrendered, had to compensate the Allied nations, giving up large amounts of territory.

The state of California puts before the voters a measure that would provide for compensation of victims of crime. If the criminal has not been found, community funds would compensate.

A cow has been stolen in a traditional agrarian village, and the thief cannot be found. The entire community contributes to the victim's restitution.

A Nuer African tribesman kills another in a rage. His clan raises 40 cows for the clan of the slain man as compensation.

Israel bombs a nuclear reactor in Iraq. It is suggested that Israel compensate Iraq for the damage.

An automobile accident has occurred. Without determining fault, the insurance company pays for the repair.

What do all these situations have in common? Which solutions were most lawful, or lawless? Should the proper emphasis be on deterrence, reprimand, punishment of the wrongdoer, compensation by the miscreant to the victim, or by the community to the victims? Or are there still other ways?

First, let us look at some common denominators. The first, and most basic, common denominator is that all societies, no matter how primitive or how civilized, seek non-violent solutions to conflict. As Hoebel put it, all societies have some set patterns of behavior to resolve conflict in ways other than by feud, to check potential killing and counter-killing. No matter what the mechanisms are, the goal is the same. Law is created to obviate feud and its annihilating consequences. Thus, "war between societies is comparable to retaliation and feud within societies."

Recognition of the above has led to the establishment of a number of "world bodies," including the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the World Court. Each of these organizations is coping with a world situation that is analogous to the primitive society: There are no enforcement mechanisms, and not all nations recognize one and the same head. Furthermore, members
of the World Society, such as it is becoming, do not mutually recognize one common set of values.

There is no one answer to the diverse examples of conflict resolution that were just stated. In order to make a meaningful statement that encompasses the diversity of possible human solutions to the same problems, anthropologists must first work with a theory; for example, in societies with frequent face-to-face relationships among its members, and where certain other conditions, to be detailed later, hold, compensation can be an alternative to blame or punishment. Anthropological theory can help us to predict and possibly prescribe consequences of certain actions once we understand how things "work," we can apply the theory to a variety of situations, simply changing the content of the constant variables.

The main contribution of anthropology to this study includes the comparative perspective—understanding the common denominators through the comparison of the same variables in many societies—and the idea of relativism, that is to say, rather than judging a custom out of context and in terms of our own behavior, to view it relative to the entire culture pattern of which it is part.

Analogies between our American society and other societies have been published, but such literature with regard to the international situation is rare. Why is this so? Why have more comparisons between international encounters and tribal relationships not been made earlier? A partial answer is that this is the first time in human history that the diverse peoples of the world have been in such constant communication. Secondly, never before have nations had such powerful weapons and the capacity to take such quick action to inflict injury on other nations. Thirdly, the economic interdependence of nations is greater than ever before, both in terms of trade and flow of capital. Consequently, there is an emerging notion of the world community analogous to the tribal communities of primitive societies.

This constant communication without one universally recognized chief makes the world community analogous to tribal society; in contrast to the national situation, where there is one recognized leader and there can be one overarching legal mechanism, the members of a tribal society deal more frequently with problems that consist of a complex web of interactions such
as long-standing neighborhood or family disputes. In such situations, wherever they occur, certain dispute resolution mechanisms that are alternatives to feuds may succeed, such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration, compensation, and community courts. Before developing the requirements for successful use of such alternatives as compensation, in order to explore a wider perspective I would like to briefly discuss an anthropologist’s view of American history in the last century, and a complementary comment of an economist on the world situation during the same time span. This discussion will show how compensation re-emerges as an increasingly used mechanism for resolving disputes. First, Eric Wolf’s description of three phases in America:

From the end of the Civil War into the end of the 19th century can be called the period of Capitalism Triumphant. Industry was constructed by untrammeled entrepreneurs. Rugged individualism, competition, and assertion seemed to constitute the majority model for behavior, justified with the concept of the survival of the fittest.

This period gave way to the movement towards reform, as expressed, for example, in the New Deal, which asserted the claims of society as a whole against the rights of the untrammeled and individualistic entrepreneur. It also sponsored the social and political mobility of groups not hitherto represented in the social and political arena; this included decolonization and continuing emerging, of new, independent nations in the world. A pluralistic and cooperative diversity was envisioned in America in contrast to the earlier image of the “melting pot.”

"The period of the present is marked by the extension into all spheres of public life of a set of civil and military bureaucracies, connected through contract to private concerns" (Wolf 1975:299). Anthropologist Eric Wolf believes that in order to understand the world situation better, one needs to understand the processes of power that created the present-day systems and the linkages between them.

In 1920, J.M. Keynes published certain criticisms and predictions with regard to the Paris Peace Treaty signed at Versailles after World War I. He described the various demands that the allies agreed to make on Germany as compensation for the "wrongs, it did to France and the other allied nations." The primary
problem, as this economist perceived it was that the conditions imposed on Germany could not be met. Furthermore, the treaty contained provisions that were ambiguous and that involved "long, protracted payment over a number of years." Instead, he believed, "It would have been a wise and just action to have asked the German Government at the Peace Negotiations to agree to a sum of ten-billion dollars in final settlement, without further examination of particulars." He added: "This would have provided an immediate and certain solution, and would have required from Germany a sum which, if she were granted certain indulgences, it might not have proved entirely impossible to pay..."

Could such conduct have averted World War II, which he almost predicted? That is something we will never know. What we do know is that the model that the peacemakers and treaty signers held of the world was obsolete: The world would never again be in the old state of equilibrium. Rather than a polarization of allies and aliens, or some other configuration, nations were becoming interdependent for staples; resources were not unlimited. And that situation is even more so in the world today. To give an example of this from the Washington Post (Dec. 5, 1982): "The diplomacy in this [Iran-Iraq] war is extremely confused," one political analyst commented. "The Iraqis are buying Soviet arms with money from the anticommunist gulf states, and the Iranians get weapons from both Libya and Israel."

A second important point that Keynes raised is the question of compensation without the necessity of assigning guilt or blame, another common denominator of all the diverse examples of conflict resolution that I mentioned earlier. Elsewhere, I have hypothesized a set of circumstances under which such compensation is likely to succeed as a method of conflict resolution. Such circumstances include:

1. Situations where there is sufficient accumulation of wealth in the society.
2. Extreme inequalities of wealth do not develop.
3. The informational cost of determining guilt is substantially higher than the cost of determining that a wrong has been done under certain circumstances.
4. Both parties know the exact liability and it is established that all liability is ended after the compensation/restitution has been made. Obviously, that condition was not met in the earlier-mentioned treaty after World War I.

As a corollary to the above, it can be added that:

5. The compensating party should be able to pay, and

6. both parties feel they would benefit from such a solution.

One example in our own society that meets these criteria is "no-fault" automobile insurance. It appears less costly, for both parties, to establish a strict determination of liability without trying to assign guilt, intention, and the like.

Thus, there are comparable situations in the world that may be at least partly resolvable with such a concept of compensation. According to the legal scholar D'Amato, one such possibility was the situation where Israel destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor. In that particular case, such an assessment was not made, and one party was simply reprimanded.

Some other relevant questions have been raised, for example, the possibility of a number of nations together compensating victims of crimes or perhaps "compensating" to prevent conflict, as in giving assistance to developing nations. An interesting parallel to this occurred in traditional agrarian India, where, when a person's property was stolen, for example, livestock, and the thief could not be found, the entire community contributed sufficient amounts to restore the victim to his former state. Although the practice is rarely found in its original form today, the principles and values of community that are involved are found in victim compensation boards, referred to in my introductory illustrations. A number of our states appear to implement the value to society implied in compensation of crime victims by creating experimental programs in this direction. Recently, such a board in Virginia awarded $20,000. to the family of a homicide victim. Can such principles be applied in international situations? How could compensation be offered to an injured representative of a nation? Injurer to victim? Government to government? Would such behavior mitigate retaliatory
attempts? These are some questions that bear further research. There do exist arrangements in some countries to provide the equivalent of insurance funds to protect against expropriation of foreign investment.

In a number of traditional societies, not only compensation and contract but also continuing reciprocity and exchanges of various kinds serve to maintain peaceful relationships between individuals, tribes, and nations. In the Trobriand Islands, feasting and reciprocal gift-giving always accompany regular trading. It may be that modern businessmen are still following the time-honored and perhaps universal practice.

There appears to be a tacit recognition of the value of reciprocal contact and exchange between national representatives in many capacities. The international business community and the Fulbright Fellowship Exchange Program are continuing means of contact, communication, and education between nations of the world today. The Chinese-American ping-pong team exchanges preceded the development of diplomatic relationships between the United States and mainland China. One question that can be raised here is: Do the battles fought in the sports arena, such as the Olympic Games, serve as an outlet for energies and symbolic confrontation that might otherwise result in combat or violence? Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat were less formally drawn together before the establishment of Egyptian and Israeli diplomatic relationships and peace talks; and Russia and Western Europe cooperate in the oil pipeline--it is noteworthy that the United States has lifted its sanctions against nations who cooperate in this endeavor. The cooperation of the United States and the Soviet Union in such matters as the sale of wheat is yet another example.

The question may arise, "Can there ever be a system of world law--conflict resolution with enforcement possibilities?" As Hoebel indicates, after many different cases, and resolutions, and compromises, step by step it may occur. "The emergence of world law waits on the coalescence of a genuine sentiment of world community."

In the light of the brief examples noted earlier, the anthropological approach recognizes the critical importance of reciprocity and exchange in primitive societies for encouraging peaceful resolution of disputes through compensatory modes, and sees the potential for laying a similar groundwork in the international arena. Further research may suggest and reinforce
additional avenues for the continued growth of communication, understanding, and resolution or avoidance of conflict among national and international entities of today's world.

This is not to say that today's nation-states are in all senses isomorphic with tribes. It is hoped that the present work contributes to the explorations of common human denominators. I would like to conclude this statement with an observation of one anthropologist: "With due recognition of all dimensional discrepancies is it not so that tribal structures without an integrative political superstructure represent a microcosm of the international scene? If anthropology cannot provide the answers, it may at least suggest the directions in which to look for the appropriate questions" (Koch 1969:21).

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PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES:
The Role of the Fulbright Program

J. R. FRANCISCO
University of the Philippines

I. INTRODUCTION

Historical Background. From a historical perspective, the earliest Philippine-American occupation occurred during the first decades of the 20th century. The encounter was between the Filipinos and the "Thomasites," and between the pensionados and the Americans. The "Thomasites" were a group of American teachers who came to the Philippines to teach in the newly established educational system under the aegis of the new colonial rule. The pensionados were hand-picked Filipinos sent to the U.S. to be trained in the art of teaching and to begin the intensive absorption of American values evident in the curriculum into which these pensionados were brought. This encounter lasted till the Pacific War in 1941, during which there was a complete break of that contact. Although the break lasted for only over four years, it was a situation in which the Filipinos at that time were deeply concerned with survival, but which was, however, glossed over by the faith that the Americans will return to the Philippines. This was to happen towards the end of 1944, four years after which came the birth, rather the re-birth of that cultural and educational encounter, more systematic and more wide ranging. This time,
It came to be known by another name - The Mutual Educational Exchange Program - or more popularly known as the Fulbright Program, named after its principal sponsor in the U.S. Congress, former Senator J. William Fulbright.

Faced with large stocks of war materials and supplies that were left unused in the Philippines at the end of the Pacific War in 1945, the United States, rather than ship these surpluses back to America, sold these stocks with the view of utilizing the proceeds at a later date. In the 79th Congress, Senator J. William Fulbright proposed that a portion of the foreign currency funds accruing from the sale of U.S. military surplus property be used to finance the study, research, or teaching of American citizens abroad and to provide for the transportation of foreign scholars desiring to study in the U.S. Thus on August 1, 1946, Congress enacted the proposal into law, which came to be popularly known as the Fulbright Act (P.L. 584).

On March 23, 1948, the Philippines and the United States of America signed an executive agreement establishing the United States Educational Foundation/Philippines (USEF/P) also known as the Fulbright Foundation. Earlier funds which the Fulbright Foundation administered were derived from the sale of surplus war materials. When these funds were used up, proceeds from the American Surplus Commodities Sales Agreement (1961) were allocated for the program. For the succeeding seven years, funding was provided annually under provisions of PL 87-256 or the Fulbright -Hayes Act. In 1968, however, the Philippine Government started to contribute to the administrative and program expenses, thus the USEF/P became the Philippine-American Educational Foundation (PAEF).

Since the establishment of the Foundation in 1948, there had been about 2,000 Filipinos and 1,000 Americans, in all categories (lecturers, researchers, students), who were funded under the Fulbright program. The resources of the PAEF have somehow been expanded with the development of consortium programs as well as cost-sharing arrangements, like the Fund for Assistance to Private Education-Philippine-American Educational Foundation (FAPE-PAEF) joint funding of grantees generally from the private education sector, and the expanded National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) assistance in the form of travel grants for qualified candidates from the public sector.
In 1961, the Foundation was designated to represent the East-West Center programs in the Philippines. Since then, there had been about 2,000 Filipinos who went to the Center to undertake various activities of research, study and training. In 1978 the PAEF was designated to administer the Hubert Humphrey North-South Fellowship Program in the Philippines. PAEF has sent ten fellows since the program started.

The Fulbright Program in the Philippine Educational System: Role and Function. Perhaps the most important single contribution of the Fulbright program in the Philippine educational system is the sponsorship of Filipino grantees in the United States for training and study after the first half of the 1940's during which the country underwent the most devastating war. As such, therefore, the Foundation was founded at the time when the Philippines was rebuilding a war-shattered educational system and the education level of the people had gone well below acceptable standards. Hence, heavy emphasis was laid on teacher-educator grants during the early years of the program. This was designed to upgrade teaching competence. Looking back to those years, the Foundation, since 1948, gave the largest number of grants to teacher education, involving teachers, teacher-educators, educational administrators/supervisors, university/college professors.

A very important component of the program was the improvement of teaching English, the quality of which declined radically due to the chaos in the educational system brought about by four years of Japanese occupation. Hence, the Foundation worked out a program where American Fulbright professors were placed in each of the eight public teacher-training schools to help train elementary and high school teachers in English. This project complemented the efforts relative to the upgrading of the teaching of English in the universities. The Fulbright English professors' program was further complemented by sending Filipino teachers and scholars to train in the teaching of English and in the field of linguistics.

Earlier, the fields administered by the Fulbright Program covered practically the entire spectrum of the academic disciplines. It also included area studies, like Asian Studies, and American, as well as Philippine Studies. However, as more and more grantees were supported by the program, there was a very thin spread of fields to the extent that the program became devoid of any
focus. Hence, at a certain point in the planning of the programs, the Board of Directors of the Foundation laid emphasis on relevant programs within the context of national and international perceptions.

The Program, as one of the many mechanisms that contributed immensely to the rehabilitation of the Philippine Educational System, has certainly devoted the greatest bulk of its funds to the development of the top and mid-level staff of the then Department of Education and Culture. The Bureau of Public Schools, according to our latest listings, was the recipient of the most number of grants in the Department of Education and Culture, while the Bureau of Private Schools registered only a few.

In the earlier part of this section, mention was made of the grants being awarded to teacher educators and teachers of English. These grants were given to the state teacher-training institutions. The rationale behind these rather extensive grants was to rehabilitate the educational system, particularly the teaching force which was decimated during the past war, to increase teaching competence as well as competence in the medium of instruction. Side by side with these grant categories, was a full blown faculty and staff development of the University of the Philippines. Records show that of all the institutions of higher learning, both state and private, the U.P. chalked up the greatest number of grants in all fields/disciplines. At this juncture, it is worthwhile mentioning that on one occasion, this writer was invited to read a paper before the Arts and Sciences faculty. As he stood before the group, he was pleasantly surprised to see that about one third of the number, from the near-retiring to the younger members of the faculty, has had training abroad under the Fulbright program.

It is not the intention of this paper to give undue emphasis on the U.P., but it brings to focus one of the most systematic developmental programs attempted to increase faculty competencies. Of course, it should not be discounted that all other state institutions of higher learning do not have their own developmental programs. It may be ventured here that perhaps these developmental programs may well be consummated and implemented in collaboration with the U.P. system which at the present, and in the years to come, has the capability. Perhaps, the PAREF in its small way may be able to assist.
A. Some General Views. Like all former colonies, the Filipino people had the experience of being educated in a milieu culturally different from their own. The educational system devised for them by their colonial masters contained values and value orientations not of their own, but that of the intrusive culture. To propagate such values and value perceptions, the Filipinos, who were chosen from those who had been identified by the Americans were sent to the U.S. to be trained according to their fields—primarily as teachers. As such, therefore, there is continuity of the values absorbed from the system they have trained in. At the same time, they were alienated from their own culture to a point where they may have developed a feeling of deprecation of their traditions and culture. This resulted in a state of conflict, if initially they recognized the value of preserving their cultural heritage and national identity.

That is certainly one point of view, perhaps too narrow a perspective, and rather negativistic. As the encounters of culture become more widespread and more intensified, there developed an attitude in which such phenomenon is no longer considered "destructive" of the cultural orientations of both interacting cultures. In very precise terms, J. William Fulbright (1965) the father of the program which was named after him, wrote:

... I believe, that man's struggle to be rational about himself, about his relationship to his own society and to other peoples and nations involves a constant search for understanding among all peoples and all cultures—a search that can only be effective when learning is pursued on a worldwide basis. The educational exchange program is built on this premise, which stated in another way, holds that America has much to teach in the world but also MUCH TO LEARN, and that the greater our intellectual involvement with the world beyond our frontiers, the greater the gain for both America and the world.
The implications of the citation are far-reaching in the context of the interconnection of educational with cultural exchanges. Teaching and learning as mechanisms for education in a given society are essentially part of the total process in the acquisition and preservation of culture and tradition. But over a wider situation, viz., international interactions, the broadening of a people's perspectives and perceptions cannot be overemphasized. Robert Garfias (1981) was very expansive in terms of his reference to the Fulbrighter's experience abroad. He wrote:

The Fulbrighter, like others who have spent a period overseas studying or teaching, has gained a breadth of perception that is essential to the vitality of his homeland. Like Goethe, who insisted that a man could not really disentangle himself from the limitations imposed on him by the thought patterns of his language unless he learned more than one language. I find it hard to imagine any human endeavor which would not be enriched and advanced by understanding the same idea from the perspective of another culture . . . .

Using the same views expressed in the citations just made, they can be equally valid for peoples other than the Americans mentioned above. For it cannot be denied that a given people, or any segment of that people who have been exposed to other cultures will certainly expand their intellectual, spiritual and cultural horizons. For in the process of their interactions - the internalization of some of the new values and value perceptions encountered will certainly take place; and this will constitute one of those that he will certainly bring back to his home country; and which, if these will not conflict with the values of his own society, may also find their validity and value. Hence it will be accepted and internalized as part of his native culture orientation.

B. The Philippine Experience. The Philippine experience is perhaps expressed in very succinct terms by Salvador P. Lopez (1963) in his address during The Fifteenth Anniversary of the Philippine-American Educational Foundation (PAEF) and the Fulbright Program in the Philippines. In part he said:
an intelligent Filipino (and I am quite sure the Foundation would not send anybody else), who was on a cultural or educational grant to the United States, generates a three-way benefit: (1) He enriches his own experience, education and personality; (2) He adds to the cultural, artistic, scientific and philosophical wealth of his country of origin; and (3) He not only gives something of himself to America by the mere fact of his visiting that country; where he meets and comes to know Americans, who, in turn, come to know him and learn something of his country and people, and after his stay in the United States, he helps to enhance the prestige of the American people by his understanding of, and respect for, the American people and their institutions – an attitude which he inevitably propagates when he returns to the Philippines and in any country he may visit thereafter.

In the same manner, an American who participates in the Program, would open himself to the same magnitude and quality of experience in the Philippines as a Filipino would. Given that situation and in the context of the Filipino's academic perspicacity as well as his cultural flexibility, he becomes a dynamic contribution to the expanding cultural and educational relations with the U.S. and the world.

C. IMPLICATIONS ON PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The Fulbright Program, as well as the EWC and the USAID Programs in education in the Philippines, has contributed immensely to the broadening and intensification of Philippine-American relations. The educational programs have been recognized as the most important investments in filling up the existing reservoir of friends of the U.S. when they return to the Philippines (USAID Discussion Paper on Philippine Education, p.7, dated 21 June 1982). The benefits acquired on the cultural level as internalized through the educative process both for the American and the Filipino in the Philippines and in the U.S. at a given time cannot be overemphasized.
The same USAID Discussion paper (ibid.) was very explicit in expressing such benefits. However, the paper does not perceive such programs as the sole contribution, but includes other programs directly or indirectly, singly or jointly, funded by both Philippine and American governments. The Philippine educational system was a direct beneficiary of the programs. This American involvement in education developed a corps of Filipino educators, teachers and professors familiar with American educational and technological competence and expertise. Such being the case, these have been translated within the context of the Philippine society and culture. The increasingly refined understanding of the American system and the deeper perceptions of the nuances of American history and social institutions contributed to a better interphasing of both societies on all levels — personal, institutional as well as national. Particularly, the Fulbright and EWC grantees, who spend an average of 2 years in the American social and cultural milieu, develop the deepest insights into all institutions within these milieu, that upon their return to the Philippines they constitute the most perceptive and unbiased interpreters, if not critics, of American values. These human resources, for whom expense in monies has been made, are without any equivalent in terms of other resources. The multiple effects of their training and education are beyond the actual expenditures to support them in acquiring such expertise and competence. Perhaps the most important competence of the Filipino acquired through long association with the American system and refined through undergoing programs in the U.S. by means of the Fulbright-Hayes, East-West Center, USAID and recently the Hubert H. Humphrey North-South Fellowship programs is the competence in the English language, which has become the universal tool for world understanding, extending beyond the very "parochial", sometimes tepid U.S.-Philippine relations. No doubt Filipino scholars undertaking various educational programs in the U.S. are interphasing with other nationals from other countries under similar programs, thus increasing their (the Filipinos) understanding of the world through the English language.

In an assessment of the Fulbright Programs in terms of benefits accruing to American life and culture, particularly at a time when public support to the program was at its lowest level, Arthur P. Dudden (1981:28-29) wrote in strongest terms:
the Fulbright Program is an essential element for educating Americans by means of the international exchanges of scholars, students, and teachers, that its downward slide must be halted and reversed, and that it must be maintained at its optimum strength while being improved in whatever ways become possible.

Indeed, the value laid upon the Fulbright programs by recipients of grants, not only on the personal level, but on the broader effect upon American society and culture, is demonstrated in what Dudden (ibid.) further described as "the importance of having Fulbrighters and other exchange persons at the local level, who after living, teaching, and working abroad, bring enrichment home with them. The benefits may be global perspectives to be shared, international networks to be spread, or experienced advice and counsel to be supplied on demand concerning the great big world lying beyond America's shores." And this could also be said of the Filipinos, who as Fulbright scholars in American educational and cultural environment, "serve as resource persons to add realism to (American) foreign language teaching and ... international slated courses. To invite them (Filipinos) systematically to tell the Americans more than they now know about their culture, languages, and themselves might very well elevate the Americans' level of understanding about the land and the peoples of the Philippines. Dudden (ibid.) in his conclusion wrote "it would certainly bring the Fulbright Programs' benefits much closer to home than ever before."

To conclude this section, the following is an excerpt from the final report of a Fulbright grantee after spending two academic years (1975-1977) in the U.S.:

"... I learned about the country, the people, the culture ... But more enlightening, more interesting, and to my surprise, I learned about America. I saw America, from a perspective not possible in America, as a great, huge, rich, powerful country. Sometimes too rich, and too powerful. But a country filled with proud people, individuals filled with more guts and spirit than I ever realized existed. America is a land of so many peoples and cultures and histories, it's amazing it continues to function."
Sometimes it almost doesn't. America can be a land of fear, especially in the big cities. A land of crazed people, a land of shameful people; each and every one very proud to say exactly what he thinks, and to stand behind it... All things considered, I have a lot more love and respect for my country than I did before I came over. I certainly understand it more. I'm left feeling Fulbrighters and Peace Corps people are the only armies we should have (Artist grantee, 1975-77 in Yang 1981).

Emphasis is, however, made on the last portion of the report, "All things considered, I have a lot more love and respect for my country than I did before I came over. I certainly understand it more. I'm left feeling Fulbrighters (and Peace Corps people) are the only armies we should have." This gives more meaning to the Fulbright program not only for the Philippines but for the Americans also, and for the world in general.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In very few pages, we have outlined, in broad strokes, the role of the Fulbright program (including, in brief, that of the EWD, Hubert H. Humphrey Fellowship and USINID) in Philippine-American cultural and educational exchanges. Both countries recognize the value of these exchanges as practical mechanisms for fostering closer understanding of each other's national aspirations and objectives. On the part of the Philippines, it was and is still perceived as a very important component of the continuing upgrading of the educational system of the country, as well as a resource for the development of manpower of all types—scientists, technocrats, teachers and professors. It is also perceived as a culturally enriching experience, whose participants generate benefits for both themselves and their countries (see citation from S.P. Lopez above), whose "intellectual involvement with the world beyond our frontiers" means "the greater the gain for both American and the world." (see citation from J. W. Fulbright, above).
"Education is a slow-moving but powerful force. It may not be fast enough or strong enough to save from catastrophe, but it is the strongest force available," thus wrote the father of the Fulbright Program himself, who indeed recognized the far-reaching implications of the program. But the deeper implication is the broadening of cultural perspectives and the enrichment of cultural experience.

Seen in that light of official American Policy, however, it has become more an instrument of foreign policy than merely an educational program for less developed countries. Questions may be raised at this point, considering the long history of the program in the Philippines and since the Philippines officially contributes to it, namely, (a) has the Philippine Government taken the program as merely a cooperative program with the U.S., or at an earlier period just an assistance program? (b) has the Philippine Government ever considered to use the Program as an instrument of national/foreign policy considering its contribution in monies to support the maintenance of the program? (c) would not the Philippine Government consider the education/development of precious manpower resource a prime component of its national/foreign policy, thereby utilizing it as a part of its total developmental efforts? (d) taking these three issues together, would the Philippine Government increase its contribution to the program to give it greater control of its direction and thrust of the program for its own benefit? If these questions were pursued with vigor so that national interests are served, then it shall become a very important component of its foreign policy; an instrument by which the U.S. would have had the singular honor of having engendered and contributed to.
The basic materials used in the preparation of this paper are found and are available for examination in the files of the Philippine-American Educational Foundation and the Education Office, USAID. Other sources are the following:


THE DIPLOMACY OF HEALTH CARE STRATEGIES:
Bridging Traditional and Western Approaches

MARC S. MICOZZI
University of Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania Hospital

INTRODUCTION

Conflict between different models and systems of health care is one consequence of current contact between industrialized nations and the Third World. This paper will attempt to broadly map out the relationship between diplomacy and health care, and define their appropriate field of interaction. The applied role of anthropology in this process will be discussed and possible health outcomes will be evaluated using examples from successful community health programs in the Philippines. The Philippines, like other Southeast Asian countries, is an assemblage of diverse ethnic groups and communities widely differing in economic and social development (Lieban 1967). A balance of traditional Malay, overseas and Chinese and Indian, old Spanish, and modern American cultural heritages influences care choices in a socioeconomic setting which is becoming increasingly politicized.

POLITICIZATION OF HEALTH CARE

Providing the Third World nations with greater access to the benefits of western technology is now recognized as a vital component of international diplomacy.
The provision of primary health care, or what may be defined as "basic health services", has currently become an important aspect of the struggle for human natural resources between industrialized nations and the Third World. Traditional diplomatic efforts have focused on the East-West geopolitical axis. However, this new field of confrontation requires a reorientation of direction to the North-South axis.

In some parts of the world, a political dimension has recently been added with the introduction of 1,500 Cuban physicians into developing countries, representing 13% of Cuban medical manpower. These health care personnel have been directly dispatched by the Cuban government on one-to-two year assignments to deliver primary health care services to indigent populations in Africa, Asia and South America (Grundy and Budetti 1980). Nicaragua has recently followed the Cuban example. By comparison, a smaller proportion of U.S. physicians deliver health services directly to the Third World. There are approximately 1,000 U.S. physicians deployed by church-based groups for religious-ideological reasons. Others are employed directly by oil-rich Saudi Arabia (and formerly Iran) to provide relatively high technology medical care to their populations. Americans also provide primary health services on short-term assignments to refugee camps in Southeast Asia. A small number serve overseas under contract between U.S.A.I.D. and various U.S. medical agencies and institutions, but none of these delivers routine medical services directly to the general population. With the exception of a small number of Peace Corps physicians, no physician is employed directly by the U.S. government to provide primary health care services to the Third World.

What is the appropriate role of U.S. and Cuban physicians in diplomatic efforts involving health care programs? Although neo-colonial competition to place physicians overseas in the Third World may seem healthier than does competition to develop more nuclear weapon systems, in the long run, it is also inefficient and generally ineffective (Yankauer 1980). An exported Cuban system of health care may seem on the surface to be more appropriate to the needs of the Third World than does the fragmented and unplanned system of U.S. medical assistance. However, colonialism is not limited to capitalist countries, and recent diplomatic efforts in health care by non-capitalist countries may be no more successful or appropriate.
Cuba accomplished its medicalization primarily through increased output of its medical school (a national resource in place since 1728), and by establishing new schools, similar to the Czechoslovakian model. This relatively high technology strategy is in contrast to that of the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C., for example, whose initial expansion of health care to underserved domestic areas relied heavily on the feldscher and "barefoot doctor", respectively. Even prior to the Castro regime, the health status of Cubans was already the highest of almost any Latin American country. Cuba's stage of resource development then is in no way comparable to that of the Third World countries in which Cuban physicians now serve. The Cuban focus on direct provision of service and heavy primary medical input, together with promotion of its own system of health care, is reminiscent of traditional colonial efforts and more recent U.S. efforts. The long-term effects of Cuban intervention in Africa, for example, are likely to be negligible (Mesa-Lago and Belkin 1982).

DIPLOMACY OF HEALTH CARE

Diplomatic issues of medical technology transfer remain constant for all sides (Williams 1980), although, for example, the Cuban ideology behind health care initiatives may differ from that of the U.S. In most of the Third World, current efforts at implementation of health care strategies by diplomatic means face the dual difficulties of ethnocentrism, on the one hand, and the necessity of confronting a three-tier medical system, on the other. Both ethnocentrism and the three-tier medical system are part of the structural heritage of the recent colonial past.

The conceptual and practical limitations of ethnocentrism imply a unidirectional flow of medical technology transfer, with a gradient relationship from western countries to the Third World. The three-tier medical system, another aspect of the colonial heritage, persists in much of the Third World. There are: (1) elite, western-based, high-technology medicine for high socioeconomic, (2) "company" medicine for middle socioeconomic, and (3) traditional medicine for low socioeconomic groups. The high level diplomatic exchange of medical technology that occurs between the upper classes of all nations is often not directly relevant to the indigent population. A western-trained "native" physician may in fact become more entrenched in the western-based
Given the existence of a three-tier system in the Third World, technology transfer may be perceived to occur either on a multilateral, bilateral, or even unilateral basis. A multilateral effort (e.g., through the U.N. and its agencies, the World Bank, etc.) may often be carried out on a complex and heroic scale removed from the realities of everyday community health care. Assistance programs may also occur on a bilateral basis between one nation and another, as with the sending of Cuban physicians overseas, or the health related activities of the U.S. government and its agencies, such as U.S.A.I.D. Finally, technology transfer may also occur on a unilateral basis with three-tier medical systems as medical technology transferred diplomatically through the upper classes eventually reaches lower social strata. Table 1 indicates the dimensions of multilateral, bilateral, and unilateral medical technology transfers.

**TABLE 1**

Dimensions of Medical Technology Transfer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider</th>
<th>Acceptor</th>
<th>Mechanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>United Nations, World Bank, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Third World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nations</td>
<td>U.S.A.I.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral</td>
<td>Upper SES</td>
<td>Lower SES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third World</td>
<td>Three-tier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third World</td>
<td>System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Diplomatic efforts at conflict resolution are often considered effective in bridging the colonial three-tier medical system. In this manner, some of the technological advantages of Western medicine may reach lower socioeconomic strata. Conversely, the culturally appropriate aspects of traditional medical technology may become more widely disseminated among the entire populations of Third World nations.

APPLICATIONS OF ANTHROPOLOGY

Anthropological theory, methodology, and principles may be applied to the implementation of appropriate technology transfer in international health (Foster 1982), while confronting the issues of ethnocentrism and conflict resolution within multi-tier medical systems. Ethnocentrism is found in the language, paradigms and conceptual grids of Western medical technology. At its extreme expression, technical assistance programs have been limited by the assumption that Third World nations have no indigenous health care systems at all. Anthropology has a role in recognition of traditional beliefs, practices and personnel which participate in what may be broadly defined as "health care" or "health" (Weinman 1978). Efforts at the description and classification of ethnomedical technology (Fabrega 1978), may be helped by the further perception of what I will call levels of efficacy in traditional health care.

In traditional herbal medicine and ethnomedical technology, for example, the use of natural products may be described as pharmacologic, non-specific or symbolic. These three levels may be loosely-defined as follows: 1) Pharmacologic effect: The herb or natural product has specific pharmacologic activity which has otherwise been medically documented to treat the intended disorder directly. The traditional use of quinine from chinchona bark to treat malaria in South America is an example. 2) Non-specific effect: The herb or natural product has non-specific pharmacologic activity which enlists the "placebo" effect via stimulation of general physiologic pathways. An example is the systemic effect of caffeine which produces mental and physical arousal and a subjective feeling of well-being, but without specific therapeutic action. 3) Symbolic effect: the herb or natural product possesses no direct pharmacologic effect, but has a culture-specific meaning which enlists the placebo effect. The symbolism of natural products and the placebo effect have been considered in ethnographic
description (Simoons 1961; Moerman 1980). Natural products are not generally used in isolation by health care practitioners, but as part of complex healing rituals. Without ethnographic description, it may be difficult to detect the specific effect of any one component in the overall assemblage of traits.

The health beliefs of traditional societies are conditioned by their perception and conceptualization of illness and health (Murdock 1980). The conceptualization of health and illness occurs along emic lines, as with the hot/cold and four humors classification system (Harwood 1971). These health beliefs generally provide motivation for specific health behaviors which may be objectively observed. Finally, health beliefs and behaviors have associated health outcomes which may be objectively evaluated by an etic system. Health outcomes may also have a feedback effect on the formulation of beliefs and behaviors. Table 2 offers a schematic representation of health systems together with a model for the role of anthropology in the study of such system. Health beliefs and actual behaviors may not always concur. Studies on key informant data have revealed the differences between behavior and people's reports of their behavior (Young and Young 1962; Poggie 1972). On the other hand, in traditional ethnography and "ethnoscience", the most reliable representation of culture has been taken to be that agreed upon by everyone. The sampling problems of observational representation ("spot" techniques) make a case for consideration of cognitive representation as "true culture". Theories of culture-sharing may be used to construct an index of the extent to which culture traits, either as reported or observed, are constant among the members of a community.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONCEPTUAL PARADIGM</th>
<th>HEALTH SYSTEM COMPONENT</th>
<th>METHODOLOGY</th>
<th>MODEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>emic &quot;social reality&quot;</td>
<td>Health Beliefs</td>
<td>interview survey</td>
<td>cognitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>etic &quot;scientific reality&quot;</td>
<td>Health Behavior</td>
<td>participant observation</td>
<td>observational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1) health practices</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>wellness maintenance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(prevention)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) care-seeking</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>illness perceived</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(therapy)</td>
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<td>Health Outcomes</td>
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<td>Health Outcomes</td>
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<td>technical evaluation analytical</td>
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<td>health &amp; nutrition</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
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HEALTH BELIEFS, AND BEHAVIORS

The emic/etic constructs developed in the field of anthropological linguistics (Goodenough 1970) may be useful in the study of health care systems for implementation of appropriate technology transfer. Anthropological linguistics has both a practical and theoretical role in application of the emic/etic distinction to health systems. The provision of dictionaries and language training and instruction are important in the overall effort to detect and interpret the emic (and etic) implications of health-related beliefs. Theoretical advances have also been made in studying systems of disease terminology and classification. Frake's (1964) work on Subanun skin disease in the Philippines illustrated that informants agreed on the classes of disease as part of an emic system, but not on the classification of specific cases of skin disease. This finding again points out the intra-cultural variation in key informants first illustrated by Dorsey (1881-1882) with famous footnote, "But two Crows denied this," and alluded to in the previous section. Marked intra-cultural variability has also been recently recognized for the hot-cold concept of illness (Weller 1983). Ethnolinguistic studies of medical terminology have conversely been used to address wider semantic issues in lexicographies, as with natural clusters in Kalinga disease terminology in the Philippines (Gieser and Grimes'1972). In addition to emic implications, traditional health beliefs may vary considerably from modern medical classifications in that certain common conditions may be considered quasi-normal, or even beneficial, as with intestinal parasites in the Philippines (Micozzi et al. 1978).

Health behaviors associated with traditional health beliefs may be partitioned into (1) health practices, such as daily hygiene, nutrition, maternal-child health care, etc., and (2) care-seeking behavior when illness is perceived to occur (see Table 2). Health behaviors and care-seeking may be conditioned by a number of factors, particularly in multi-tier medical systems. Medical anthropologists have recognized a distinction between care-seeking behavior that results on the basis of cultural beliefs, versus what I will call "functional access" to health care. Functional access may be limited by communication, documentation, economic or geographic accessibility, language and/or transportation, regardless of the influence or expression of primary health beliefs per se. Thus, both prevention (relating to health practices) and treatment of illness
HEALTH OUTCOMES

The final step for health care implementation consists of evaluation of the health outcomes resulting from beliefs and behaviors. There has been a recent, "anti-ethnocentric" tendency to assume that all traditional health practices indiscriminately are associated with positive health outcomes. Although such may often be the case, some traditional health practices are associated with negative health outcomes, as with certain breast-feeding (Cruz et al. 1970) and other maternal-child health care (Jocano 1970) beliefs and practices in the Philippines. Medical anthropology has a role in identification of health beliefs and behaviors associated with objectively defined negative outcomes, as well as positive outcomes. Although objective indicators of health outcome have long been known to physical anthropologists, this final step of objective evaluation has usually been omitted from anthropological studies of health systems.

Gross morbidity and mortality, especially neonatal, is an index of biological stress in the traditional sense of human population biology. Statistics may be used to reconstruct mortality curves over time, as illustrated in Figure 1. The relationship between age and annual death rate (per cent dying each year) is shown for 1850, 1900, 1940 and 1970 in England. In the third world, the demographic response of human populations to the western colonial system during this period led to increased population size and density as related to increased productivity. Western medical technologic intervention brought about declines in infant mortality, with subsequent geometric population increases in demographic response to demands for labor and markets. Self-regulation of fertility is a recognized factor in human populations (Nardi 1981). Human societies have a range of traditional health practices which related to fertility regulation, including abstinence, contraception of various types, abortion, infanticide, and even differential neglect (Cassidy 1980). However, the post-colonial emergence of cyclical famines, as a result of contact with western technology, can not be well regarded as representing a self-regulatory
Figure 1

The relationship between age and death rate (per cent dying each year) in England for the periods 1850, 1900, 1940 and 1970.
mechanism for population size. The demographic distribution of mortality in a famine does not lead to an equilibrium system for population size (Nardi 1981).

Health outcomes as dependent variables may be seen as relatively objective social indicators. These objective dependent health outcomes may in turn be associated with independent social variables for which only subjective measurements are otherwise available. Concepts used in anthropology and archaeology, such as demographic transition theory, may help provide relatively objective measurements for independent social variables by considering health outcomes. Demographic parameters, such as population size, density and rate of growth, may be used as indices of the level of psycho-social stress as well as biological stress within a complex society. Other factors may be considered after demographic parameters are established. Demographic transition theory may be extended outside the traditional bounds of Western Europe into the Third World (Teitelbaum 1975).

A view of human health as part of a biological and social system relates to traditional anthropological concepts of environment, adaptation, evolution and cultural ecology. Paleodemography, paleopathology and archaeology may provide the diachronic perspective critical to reconstruction of human pattern of health over time and space. Figure 2 shows the distribution of ages at death for Romans and Saxons at one point in time for a burial site in Ancient Britain. The age distributions of all deaths in England for 1850 and 1972 are compared to the distribution of the ages of skeletons found in two Mesolithic burial sites in Britain dating to 10,000 B.C. in Figure 3. Although anthropologists have carried out traditional ethnographic studies of health belief systems begun observational and survey studies of health behaviors with respect to both health practices and care-seeking, technical evaluation of objective health outcomes using health and nutritional status indicators have generally been beyond their scope.

TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Diplomatic efforts are currently taking place in the health care arena (Taylor 1978), involving multilateral, bilateral and unilateral technical assistance initiatives. These interventions are either focused on health care per se, or are part of larger development
The distribution of per cent ages at death is shown for Romans and Saxons in a burial site at one point in time in ancient Britain.
The age distribution of all deaths (excluding infant mortality) in England in 1850 and 1972. These lines are compared to the distribution of all the ages of skeletons in two Mesolithic burial sites dating from approximately 10,000 B.C.

programs. Evaluation of health outcomes is important to the measurement and analysis of the results of these programs. Evaluation is also useful in assessing the efficacy of traditional beliefs and behaviors as a baseline for prevention and treatment of disease. Evaluation of unilateral programs may be a more appropriate test of the technology in overseas efforts. The role of anthropology in providing an ethnomedical perspective is important in determining the utility of medical technology in the context of culture (Fabrega 1978; Kleinman 1978).

Evaluation of health outcomes involves identification of the features of health care programs that are associated with objectively defined success. Identification of the success of individual providers and consumers within a health care program is part of the overall effort. The telescoping of these evaluation processes allows assessment of individual features, even where overall effects may be ambiguous or negligible. The definition of health outcomes is not always self-evident. For example, in a medical cooperative clinic in the "barrios" of Davao, Mindanao, Philippines, a self-employment workshop was initiated for women who used the clinic (Micozzi et al. 1978). The newly-employed women stopped coming to the clinic after some time. It was assumed that they were now going to private physicians in town since they now had money and could afford to pay for their care. In fact, since the women now had money to afford decent housing, food and other requirements, they and their families were no longer getting sick at all.

The World Health Organization has identified those features of health care programs associated with what is defined as a successful health outcome (Alma Ata Conference on Primary Health Care 1978). These features are consistent with our own experience in Southeast Asia in 1976-77. Developing countries should not import personnel to deliver health care services or try to copy systems of health care that have originated elsewhere. The original Tom Dooley and Good Ship Hope approaches may be considered to have run their useful course, and may even be considered counter-productive for these purposes. International health professionals seem to agree that former approaches of transferring medical technology to the Third World have been counterproductive and capitalistic (Taylor 1978). Development must come from within, and primary health care is not the prerogative of the physician. "Health for all by the year 2000" can not be attained.
by the health care sector alone, and efforts must extend to housing, employment, sanitation and waste-management (Micozzi et al. 1978).

THE PHILIPPINE EXAMPLE

The dynamic relationship between traditional and western-based approaches in health care is properly perceived as one of overlap, rather than competition. A.L. Kroeber (1943) wrote that the Philippines "furnishes an interesting story to the student of the development of civilization. Layer after layer of culture is recognizable, giving a complete transition from the most primitive [sic] conditions to full participation in the western system of civilization." The growth of modern medicine in the Philippines has been rapid following colonization by the U.S., but there is strong persistence of folk medicine as an alternative (Lieban 1967).

The success of community health care programs in the Philippines depends largely on whether they are truly community-based, i.e., drawing resources as well as consumers from the community which the program is intended to serve. A prior knowledge of the ethnographic history of traditional health beliefs, behaviors, practices and practitioners in the community will help to define this resource base. Identification of individuals perceived by members of the community as having a role in traditional health care delivery within that community helps to define indigenous health resources. There is a relatively sophisticated hierarchy of traditional health care personnel for maternal-child health care in the Philippines. For example, a mananawilor massages the abdomen of pregnant women to ensure that the fetus is properly placed for delivery, or alternatively, performs abortions for self-regulation of fertility. A managabang (midwife) is concerned with the art of actual delivery, as well as pre- and post-natal care.

Folk medical practice is culturally defined as a role of service to the community (Lieban, 1967). Traditional health practitioners are not supposed to profit from the provision of health care. The concept of fee-for-service in health care is foreign to many traditional societies (although very much at home with modern western medicine). Therefore, the success of individual subprofessional personnel within a community-based health care delivery program
is dependent upon their having an outside or additional source of income. This economic support in the Philippines includes marriage or self-employment activities, such as seamstress or sari-gari (variety) store owner. These low technology positions also facilitate contact with the community at large. Income derived from health care activities acts only as a supplement to base income (Micozzi et al. 1978). A middle-level education, as well as limited but specific technical training, on the part of health care providers is also helpful to their role of interfacing two or more medical systems in the same community. The goal of bridging traditional and western health care strategies can be met by using native resources. Bilateral assistance programs that provide money but little else, for health care initiatives are often not successful abroad, although they may be successful in Washington. Money in most cases is not the limiting factor; recognition of traditional health resources is the key.

CONCLUSION

The health care problems of the Third World did not arise in a vacuum. The poverty and poor health associated with the development of "great cities" (Ginsberg 1955) and creation of the surrounding "barrio" setting bordering them are the results of historical and documented contact between western and traditional technologies. Specific health care problems result among the disenfranchised individuals who populate this setting on the fringes of technology. They have lost—and are lost to—their traditional cultures. The interrelated problems of poor health, malnutrition and overpopulation are not logical extensions of traditional societies whose technologies were adapted to their environments. These problems are a result of the impact of western technology on traditional societies. These problems do not arise from an intrinsic lack of western technology per se, but from a lack of appropriate technology transfer in the health care setting. Entitlement to health care and provision of primary health services may ultimately be based upon concepts and theories of justice (Bryant 1977).

The real challenge engendered by WHO's slogan of "health for all by the year 2000" should be seen as an opportunity for development of the ethnomedical perspective critical to effective health care. Through the application of diplomacy and appropriate technology, with the guidance of the ethnomedical perspective,
health care in the Third World may not only become as good as, but better than, that in the western world.
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ETHNOPOLITICS IN THE PRESENT:
Topics for Anthropological Study

PAUL J. MAGNARELLA
University of Florida

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

During our present century, the power of ethnicity as a political force in international and internal state affairs has repeatedly evinced itself around the world, in countries old and new. Because ethno-political movements involve the mobilization of people on the basis of cultural characteristics (such as language, tradition, religion, homeland, selected physical traits) they demand the attention of anthropologists.

The importance of ethnopolitics to the world order is significant. In 1973, Walter Connor wrote:

In a world consisting of thousands of distinct ethnic groups and only some one hundred and thirty-five states, the revolutionary potential inherent in self-determination is quite apparent. All but fourteen of today's states contain at least one significant minority and half of the fourteen exceptions are characterized by that so-called irredentist situation in which the dominant ethnic group extends beyond the state's borders (1973).
He added that about 40% of the world's states contain more than five sizable ethnic groups (p. 17). These demographic facts coupled with the existence of a legitimized ideology of national self-determination have created a world situation of ethnically-based coalitions and conflicts. About half of the world's states have recently experienced inter-ethnic strife, and it has often been more violent than class or doctrinal conflict (Rothschild 1981:20). In a recent article on ethnicity and the world refugee problem, Clay has written that most of today's 12 to 15 million refugees "fled their countries as a result of ethnic, tribal or religious persecution" as dominant ethnic groups attempt to maintain their political and economic power at the expense of less dominant ones (1982:57). We can expect that future population growth, resource scarcities, and natural disasters will exacerbate ethnic and religious strife, causing even more refugees.

In the twentieth century, unlike most previous eras, ethnonationalism or politicized ethnicity represents a major legitimating and delegitimizing of regimes. A government's legitimacy rests, in significant degree, on its ability to convince the governed that it shares and represents their ethnic identity. Today, most people want to be ruled by their own kind. Ethnicity is a major organizing principle for peoples in the first, second and third worlds. But while the truth of ethnional self-determination now appears self-evident, scholars trace its origins back only to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Kohn 1961).

Although the cultural components of ethnicity (common language, culture, homeland, religion, etc.) are as old as humankind itself, the politicization of ethnicity into the ideology known as nationalism was initially a late eighteenth century European phenomenon. Its historic development is intricately related to the doctrines of self-determination and popular sovereignty, and its intellectual seeds are found in the writings of John Locke (1632-1704); government's duty is to protect the inalienable rights of the individual and of Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1712-1778; the general will). The roots of these kindred doctrines took hold during the French Revolution, whose famous Declaration of the Rights of Man (1791) declared that "The source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation; no group, no individual may exercise authority not emanating expressly therefrom."
Despite the nationalist appeals of Napoleon, the linkage between ethnicity and politics in Europe remained weak until the 1848 revolutions, which were largely unsuccessful. By the end of the First World War, nationalism had swept Europe, transforming its political map in the process. It received further impetus from U. S. President Woodrow Wilson, who promoted the idea of "self-determination of nations" at the Paris Peace Conference. Most of the states created as a result of nationalist pressures were not true nation states, however, because they incorporated multi-ethnic populations. Consequently, many of these states have themselves experienced internal inter-ethnic friction.

Today many countries are wrestling with two conflicting universal principles: 1) the right of self-determination of national peoples, and 2) the inviolability and political integrity of sovereign territory, regardless of how that territory may have been acquired or how ethnically diverse its resident population may be. There is probably no state, society or political system that does not feel the pressures of politicized ethnic assertion. Political entrepreneurs from different corners of the globe have been able to mobilize loyal followings by appealing to primordial ties. Successful national movements in one part of the world have become the models and justifications for similar movements elsewhere. The ideology of ethnonationalism has validated itself with pragmatic results. According to Rothschild (1981), its ubiquity and generality, in terms of its symbolic, organizational, and political dimensions, suggest that modern humankind has failed to find an equally satisfactory alternative to it.

Although many anthropologists and other social scientists have examined various aspects of ethnicity, comparatively few have studied its implications as a political force on the state and interstate levels (e.g., Geertz 1963; Holloman and Arutinov 1978). Enloe (1973) and Rothschild (1981) both argue that Western Liberal and Marxist ideologies have influenced political scientists to dismiss politicized ethnicity as merely an epiphenomenal, dependent or secondary variable. Liberalism, with its primary focus on the relationship between the autonomous individual and the state, rejects the notion that primordial groups have corporate legal or political rights. Marxist research strategies advocate analyzing societies in terms of class interests. Materialists in general regard ethnicity as a mask for socioeconomic class
consciousness and interethnic conflict as a form of class strife.

In addition, most of the theories of modernization assume that the strength of the ascriptive criteria upon which ethnic identity is based will become attenuated and eventually overpowered by the achievement criteria presumed so functionally integral to the modern industrial-bureaucratic process. Yet the Twentieth century has witnessed a number of political ideologies, such as African Socialism, South African Apartheid, Fascism, and Zionism, all of which elevate ethnicity, while differing from each other in other respects.

Ethnicity is not independent of socioeconomic structures, but neither is it simply epiphenomenal to them. Ethnic identity cuts across class boundaries. Daniel Bell writes that "ethnicity has become more salient [than class] because it can combine... an affective tie" (1975:169). And Rothschild (1981:173) has argued that the emotionally most intense type of international solidarity is today anchored in ethnic, rather than in class or formal ideological, affinities, though these are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This writer assumes that in order for ethnopoliical movements to be successful over the long run, they must accommodate themselves to infrastructural constraints. But because such movements are so emotionally driven, they tend to defy infrastructural constraints in the short run and may even lead societies along paths which exhibit negative cost-benefit outcomes (witness Iran under Ayatolláh Khomeini).

Even a cursory examination of the literature reveals how diverse are the phenomena glossed by the ethnicity label (see especially Suhrke and Nobel 1977; Cohen 1978; Glazer and Moynihan 1975; Isaacs 1975; Young 1976). In some cases, scholars have regarded the emergence of ethnic consciousness as an attempt to return to a primordially-based precondition—an attempt to counter the presumed disintegrating and atomizing forces of modernization by structuring a set of secure relationships sanctified by deep cultural values. In other instances, observers have interpreted it as a novel response to new sets of challenging circumstances.

This writer assumes that the cultural bases of ethnic identity are ever present. In order for ethnicity to be politicized, however, people sharing ethnic traits
must be mobilized and inspired to work for some common
goals. Such "plucking of the ethnic cords" is the
work of political entrepreneurs, who may or may not
be members of the ethnic groups involved. In actual
history, they have been foreign agents seeking allies
(e.g., Lawrence of Arabia) or colonial officials promoting
a divide and rule policy. Or they have been authentic
culture heroes committed to the achievement of greater
economic and political power for their followers (e.g.,
Malcolm X) or devoted to the reconquest of lost homelands
(e.g., Ben-Gurion and Yasar Arafat).

THE ANALYSIS OF ETHNOPOLITICS

The analysis of ethnopolitical movements raises
a series of research questions: What were the conditions
under which the ethnic population was mobilized into
an action group? What are the personal characteristics
of its leaders? Is the leadership charismatic or
has it become routinized? What are the group's immediate
and long-term goals? What are the size and organizational
characteristics of the group? What are its economic
and political strengths and weaknesses? What is its
position within the broader socio-political context?
Does it relate to other political groups? What
particular shared cultural traits were chosen for
purposes of identification? How were these traits
chosen, and what are their ideological and symbolic
significances? How have the bases of ethnic identity
been maintained? Do ethnic symbols extend across
state borders? If so, how were they conveyed and
sustained?

Once ethnic groups have been set into motion,
they may be analyzed with reference to a number of
crosscutting dimensions, three being: 1) the nature
doing demands; 2) the nature of interstate linkages;
and 3) the extent of foreign involvement.

The nature of ethnic demands. With respect to
a single state, an ethnic group's demands may range
from a larger share of economic resources and political
power within the context of the existing political
system to demands for revolution or semi-autonomy
(Kurds of Iran) or complete secession (Ibo of Nigeria).
With respect to multiple states, ethnic demands can
be even more varied. They may include attempts to
unite all people sharing a selected ethnic trait
(Pan-Arabism, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Slavism) or the intention
to retake a lost homeland (Armenian irredentism) or
the struggle to create a nation-state (Kurds, Basques, Baluch) or the lobbying pressure by ethnic minorities or a powerful multi-ethnic state to support weaker "mother countries."

The nature of interstate ethnic linkages. Examples of this category are: the case of divided national populations with two or more states (East and West Germany, North and South Korea, the Arab States); the case of divided national populations with dominant status in one state and minority status in others (Turks of Turkey and Greece; Greeks of Greece and Turkey; the dominant ethnic populations of most states and their corresponding populations in the U.S.); and the case of national populations with no states of their own (Kurds, Baluch, Gypsies, Palestinians).

Because most states have multi-ethnic populations that are dispersed over two or more countries, politicized ethnicity is a major ingredient of international politics. This is especially true for the United States, the most ethnically diverse of all countries. Glazer and Moynihan (1975:23-24) have written:

Without too much exaggeration it could be stated that the immigration process is the single most important determinant of American foreign policy. This process regulates the ethnic composition of the American electorate. Foreign policy responds to that ethnic composition. It responds to other things as well, but probably first of all to the primal facts of ethnicity.

The evaluation of these foreign policy responses to ethnic pressures often shows they are more emotional than rational, more costly than beneficial to the state as a whole. For example, in a recent Foreign Affairs article, U.S. Senator Charles Mathias (1981) described how Greek-American organizations, spearheaded by the largely foreign-supported American Hellenic Institute successfully convinced Congress to embargo arms to NATO ally Turkey after the latter's 1974 Cyprus "intervention" (Turkish term) or "invasion" (Greek term). On most issues involving the U.S. with Greece and Turkey, the three million Greek Americans easily out lobby the 45,000 Turkish Americans.

Although the executive branch strongly opposed the embargo, and five former supreme allied commanders of NATO spoke out against it, the embargo remained
in force for over three and a half years. It totally failed to drive Turkish forces out of Cyprus, its stated purpose. But it did have the "undesired effects of alienating Turkey from the United States, impairing its armed forces, denying the United States intelligence on missile tests and troop movements in the Soviet Union, and thus seriously weakening the southeastern flank of NATO" (Mathias 1981:989).

The ethnic lobby that far outdistances all others in its ability to pressure the U.S. Congress and the Executive to supply resources to its ethnically-linked "mother country" is the Israel lobby, supported by a significant proportion of America's six million Jews. Working primarily through the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and affiliated Jewish organizations, this lobby has mobilized its ethnic backers and exerted political pressure so successfully, that about one-third of all U.S. overseas economic aid goes to Israel -- a country with less than one-tenth of one percent of the world's population. Since 1948, the U.S. has supplied Israel with over $10 billion worth of its best military equipment on the easiest of terms. Moreover, Congress has forgiven Israel nearly half of its debt for the "purchase" of that equipment (Christian Science Monitor July 30, 1982, p. 3). In addition, during the 1967 - 1982 period the U.S. had given Israel approximately $6 billion in economic aid and $14 billion in military aid (Lustick 1982/83:393).

Yet, according to the assessments of a number of knowledgeable and objective scholars, "Israel is not a strategic asset to the U.S. and the two countries' interests often diverge widely" (Zartman 1981:167; also see Curtiss 1982; Tillman 1982). American support for Israel's recent invasion of Lebanon both in terms of its military aid and its U.N. Security Council vetoes further alienated Islamic and Third World peoples from the U.S. If Israel is the economic and political liability that it appears to be, why does the U.S. government give it overwhelming support? A large part of the answer is ethnopolitics -- the ability of the pro-Israel ethnic lobby to exert intense pressure on American politicians. Once more, Senator Mathias (1981:992-993):

With the exception of the Eisenhower Administration, which virtually compelled Israel's withdrawal from Sinai after the 1956 war, American Presidents, and to an even greater
degree Senators and Representatives, have been subjected to recurrent pressures from what has come to be known as the Israel lobby. For the most part they have been responsive, and for reasons not always related either to personal conviction or careful reflection on the national interest. When, for example, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) mounted its 1975 campaign to negate the effect of a Ford-Kissinger "reassessment" of policy toward Israel, initiated following the breakdown of Sinai disengagement talks in March, it chose as its medium a letter from Senators strongly endorsing aid to Israel. Seventy-six of us promptly affixed our signatures although no hearings had been held, no debate conducted, nor had the Administration been invited to present its views. One Senator was reported to have candidly expressed a feeling that in fact was widespread: "The pressure was just too great. I caved." Another was reported to have commented, "It's easier to sign one letter than answer five thousand."

There are many other examples of governments following ethnically based foreign policies with detrimental results. Certainly the Greek junta's decision to overthrow Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios in 1974 as a prelude to annexing Cyprus with its 80% Greek and 18% Turkish population was a blunder. Inspired by the Megali Idea (the recreation of Greek Byzantium) the generals in Athens failed to calculate how Turkey would react to a threat to the Turkish Cypriot minority. Shortly after the junta-engineered coup took place, Turkey landed its own forces on Cyprus and secured about 36% of the island for its kinsmen. As a consequence, the Greek junta fell from power, Makarios was reinstalled, and Cyprus will most probably remain permanently divided into a Greek and a Turkish zone.

The nature of foreign involvement in the ethnic matters of other states. The current situation of immigrant workers -- government relations in Western Europe exemplifies this dimension well. The extent of West Europe's labor importation during the past several decades has been unprecedented in its history. Large numbers of Pakistanis, West Indians, Indonesians, Indians, and Cypriot Greeks went to England. Turks, Greeks, Yugoslavs, Southern Italians, and North African
Arab-Berbers combined to make up almost one-third of the labor force of Switzerland, one-eighth the work force of West Germany, and substantial portions of the work forces of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. The periphery has invaded the center, and the result has been rich cultural mosaics and deep ethnopolitical dilemmas.

The intra-state labor and immigration policies of any one Western European industrial country become the concern of many other countries in the region. Turkey, for instance, which has over two million of its citizens working abroad, devotes much of its foreign ministry's effort to its people in the diaspora. With high levels of unemployment at home and a critical need for the hard currency remitted by emigrant workers, Turkey diplomatically opposes any effort on the part of employing countries to send Turks home, tighten visa requirements, control the export of currency, or limit Turkish resident's prerogatives in any way.

In addition to these interstate concerns, anthropologists are interested in the challenges of sociocultural, economic, and political adjustment faced by foreign workers in situ. The strategies devised to meet these challenges offer fascinating topics for study.

Given the diffuse nature of ethnopolitical movements, their analysis can fruitfully involve the application of a variety of theoretical orientations, which address different, but overlapping, topical and temporal levels of inquiry. Symbolic analyses may be employed to interpret the symbolic and ideological dimensions of ethnic identity. They provide strategies for understanding the internal logic of these cultural codes. Structural-functional strategies aid in the determination of an ethnic group's position within its broader socio-political context. These approaches are complemented by conflict theories which help uncover the interactional dynamics of a system's socio-political components, especially as they compete for limited economic, political, and other resources. Both of these orientations should be employed diachronically and synchronically.

For purposes of short-run analysis and prediction, conflict theories with psycho-teleological (individual, goal-oriented) components should prove especially useful in cases involving charismatic leaders, who determine the direction of their movements. Long-term analyses and prediction, however, are usually better
served by more materialist research strategies (e.g., cultural materialism and dialectical materialism), which emphasize the importance of infrastructural constraints over the long run.

The preference of this writer is for the development of a general system approach (cf. Sutherland 1973) which views ethnopolitical movements as open systems interacting with parallel systems as well as with successively more encompassing systems. Such an approach would integrate inductive - deductive modalities with etiological and individual-level teleological forms of explanation. It would treat both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the phenomena under study within a single framework. The framework would consist of causal and descriptive components and would facilitate both definition and measurement while allowing for the treatment of individual cases as well as for comparison and generalization. Although such a general systems approach is not currently available, its development is well within the realm of reality.

CONCLUSION

The empirical pervasiveness of ethnicity and its potential as an objective of research are tremendous. This paper's discussion of the topic was very incomplete. Many aspects of the problem were only touched tangentially; others were omitted. In the Introduction of the excellent book, Ethnicity, editors Glazer and Moynihan (1975:25) write that "ethnic identity has become more salient, ethnic self-assertion stronger, ethnic conflict more marked, in the past twenty years." However, even the most basic facts about the topic are disputed. "Little in this field has been resolved. We are all beginners here" (Ibid.). Consequently, the field offers us the attractive combination of relevance and space for originality.
NOTE

1 In his relevant book, *The Quest for Self-Determination*, Ronen has written that:

   the quest for self-determination has appeared since the French Revolution in five analytically distinguishable forms, the archetypes of which are nineteenth-century (German, Italian) nationalism, Marxist class struggle, minorities' self-determination associated with the ideas of Woodrow Wilson, anticolonialism, and today's "ethnic" quest for self-determination. (1979:ix-x).

   Ronen goes on to say that "the idea [of ethnic self-determination] has spread throughout the world, unifying peoples into nations, prompting revolutions, crumbling empires, freeing colonies, and threatening modern states..., and the end is not yet in sight." (Ibid. 6).
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I. INTERNATIONAL LAW TODAY

My comments here, in scanning over the broad, complex field of international law, are highly selective and, perforce, general. I deal with: (a) regulation of the use of armed force; (b) economic cooperation to promote unhindered trade, and (c) promotion of the improvement of the human condition.

A. Regulation of the Use of Armed Force

Legal regulation of the use of armed force is the subject to which I give principal emphasis here, because I perceive that it has been, and continues to be, the overriding issue in contemporary international law. Appropriate regulation of the use of armed force is a hallmark of a stable community. As regulation over the use of armed force progresses toward, or regresses from, the optimum, so does a community become more, or less, stable. In international relations, in the absence of a specific, limiting agreement, traditional customary international law permitted a State to use armed force against another State for
whatever objective the user State chose, without regard to legal regulation.

Some might ask, "But what of the regime of reprisal?" Under traditional international law, if a State was willing to subject its decision to use armed force to a system of legal justification, the State did so under the concept of reprisal. The rubrics of reprisal were that the target State had injured the user State through alleged violation of international law; that reasonable attempts at settlement of the dispute had failed or were useless to initiate under the circumstances; and, that the force used in reprisal was proportionate under the circumstances. The absence of any organized system of review in the decentralized international legal system obviously provided much room for biased judgement of the State using force in reprisal (e.g., as to an actual, prior violation, as to "reasonable" settlement attempts and as to "proportionate" use of force). Further, the reprisal regime provided much opportunity to use force for ulterior motives, especially where the target State was substantially less powerful. However, the acceptance of the regime of reprisal did require the State using force to show that its actions fell within at least a broad range of reasonable perception and reasonable conduct, and the regime inherently envisioned relatively minor, low levels of armed force. Of course, the target State in turn could disagree, under the law of reprisal, as to the lawfulness of the conduct of the State initially using force and, in its turn, use force in reprisal. Thus, as is the case in using the remedy of "self-help" in any community, the risk was that a process of escalating force might ensue, resulting eventually in major armed conflict. Further, at any time a State was free to declare that a "state of war" existed and thereby discard any international legal regulation over its decision to initiate use of armed force international relations. Operationally, then, the outcome was that traditional international law did not regulate a State's decision to use substantial armed force against another State.

Only in this century, due primarily to the frightful experiences of World Wars I and II and the enormous increase in destructive capability of military technology, especially nuclear technology, has the customary law of our global community changed to prohibit the use of at least substantial armed force in international relations, unless required for self-defense or collective self-defense. The United Nations Charter, in Articles
2(4) and 51, both expressed and further reinforced this new customary rule by restating the rule in specific treaty provisions that eventually bound nearly every State in the world community as a matter of treaty law. The Charter, in Article 2(4) and Chapter VII, made additional major progress by creating a centralized community agency, the Security Council, to determine the appropriate instances for, and the quantum of, the use of armed force in international relations. Thus, the Charter prohibited use of armed force in reprisal prior to Security Council authorization, and subjected alleged use of armed force for immediate self-defense or collective self-defense to Security Council review and determination of appropriate future action.

We see today the shambles of the Charter system for regulating use of armed force in international relations. This outcome is due primarily, to the failure of the more powerful States to accept an international system based upon the high degree of toleration, accommodation, and cooperation that the Charter envisions. Secondarily, however, one may say generally of most Member State governments that their intensely parochial and short term perceptions of interests have resulted in gross failure to support regulation of armed force by the Security Council. Also, with few exceptions, States have failed to commit national resources unilaterally or in alliance outside global or regional community structures to prevent or terminate unlawful uses of armed force. The legal outcomes of this pattern of parochial perspective in the post World War II period — a pattern that seems to have intensified as the horrors of World War II grew more distant in time — are most discouraging. First, as a matter of customary practice, States have removed relatively low level uses of armed force from the regulatory scheme of the Charter. Now, under customary law, each State feels free at its unilateral decision to use low levels of armed force as sanctions in reprisal in situations where armed force is a proportionate remedy. Thus, for minor uses of armed force, we have returned to the traditional international law system of reprisal with all of its regulatory imperfections and its risk of escalation into major armed conflict — a risk far more perilous than in the past, due to modern military technology. What of major, substantial uses of armed force? Are we still keeping a "cap" on armed force by regulating the use of major or substantial armed force? Again, the regulatory regime of the Charter, under which the Security Council would authorize
initiation of use of substantial armed force, or would determine if a prior use of armed force had been justified in self or collective self-defense and determine appropriate future action, clearly has failed to function. This failure to function has been caused, first, by the veto or threat of veto of one or another of the Permanent Members of the Security Council, and secondly, by the lack of will, generally, of those or other Member States to be prepared to support Security Council decisions by committing personnel and material resources to a combat situation.

Does the basic Charter prohibition, or the underlying customary law prohibition, against use of substantial armed force except for self-defense or collective self-defense continue to exist? The prohibition *does* continue to exist, but this observer must note a continued erosion of commitment to the rule. First, in the past fifteen years especially, we have seen various justifications offered under the concept of self-defense that stretch that concept to the breaking point. We have seen major uses of armed force that go far beyond permissible "anticipatory self-defense," to become impermissible "preemptive strikes" to ward off some alleged possible danger that may arise at some uncertain future date. Indeed, we have recent, and current, instances of substantial armed conflict in which States have either initiated conflict without even token obeisance to the excuse of self-defense, or else have continued to use major armed force after any reasonable self-defense objective clearly had been achieved.

Wishing not to engage in a lengthy jeremiad, I say shortly and plainly, that I see our world community rushing down a slippery slope toward the traditional, nineteenth-century rule of no legal restraint over major armed force. If the world community does not act now, we may find ourselves in a situation of "Von Clausewitz revisited," with the world again, as Von Clausewitz said, viewing armed force amorally, as simply another, permissible means to conduct foreign policy. This trend occurs in the context of enormous destructive capability of current nuclear military technology, and of drastic increase in destructiveness and costs of conventional military technology. For governmental officials around the world to allow international regulation of resort to armed force to retrogress even to its present condition, much less, to allow eventual termination of such legal regulation, suggests awesome irrationality; it is parochialism rampant.
This is the road to chaos, and in the words of the poet Yeats, I feel the "center breaking up."

B. Economic Cooperation Promoting Unhindered Trade

In the 1930s the world community witnessed rampant economic protectionism and the serious national and international consequences of that approach. During the post-World War II era, until recently, a strong, fundamental commitment to economic cooperation to promote unhindered trade has existed. Despite much progress, however, we still have principally an international, competitive economic system rather than a mutually cooperative system. The economic "pie" in world trade is still seen unduly as a fixed value, with the question being who gets a bigger slice at the expense of another, rather than as a potentially expanding value as transactional flows and cooperation increase. Further, in recent years we have seen a mounting progression of forms of State action constituting significant covert protectionism. Most disturbing have been the protectionist actions by industrialized States, which have the largest stake in and the largest impact upon international trade. Now, in a period of worldwide recession, in defiance of lessons supposedly learned in the 1930s, we are witnessing much more blatant acts of protectionism and threats of more to follow. This trend is not only short-sighted and injurious to international economic well-being, but also, serves to raise levels of ideological attacks that worsen international political relations. We are today presented with the spectre of a breakdown in free trade at a time when the world community is intensely more interdependent economically than in the 1930s.

C. Promotion of the Improvement of the Human Condition

1. Economic development

In their provision of aid for economic development governments of the developed, industrialized States have historically evidenced ambivalence. Pursuant to a great number of bilateral and multilateral international agreements, they have given aid to underdeveloped States, but much like the wealthy person's token tithe to a church, the giving appears like "conscientious money". Having given something, albeit extremely
de minimus when compared with the giver's gross national product, standard of living, or wealth possessed, the giving States have felt they have fully satisfied any moral or legal obligation that may exist and have adequately demonstrated their commitment to helping the "have-not" States.

Further, much of the economic aid, and here I choose to restrict my remarks to U.S. aid only, has been:

(a) highly selective as to the nature of the donees, based on such criteria as historical or cultural affinities or political or economic benefits the donee could provide the donor in return;

(b) short-term in value, not calculated to develop substantially the donee's technological, agricultural, and general economic base, and

(c) increasingly in the form of military aid or as an ancillary aspect of military aid.

Finally, U.S. economic aid has been steadily decreasing as a percentage of its gross national product and at a time of increasing, enormous need.

2. Promotion of Human Rights

One of the most striking and encouraging aspects of international relations in post-World War II era has been the recognition of human rights as a proper and serious concern. Under international agreements at the global and regional levels, many States have adopted major bodies of human rights policy and law. The number of State parties to current international agreements grows daily, and the process of further expansion of human rights law continues. Unfortunately, at present, formal international law here appears to be well in advance of the will and capability of many national governments to comply with their obligations, or even to move substantially toward effective compliance. Many States have yet to establish the social, economic, and political features requisite for a national public order amenable to compliance with human rights obligations assumed by their governments. In some States, gains in protection of human rights have been reduced or
destroyed due to a continuing series of domestic crises or external crises in international relations. In other States, the perspective and objectives of those exercising governmental control simply are opposed to honoring human rights obligations for some or all of those subject to their control. Thus, the fact that news reports and information reports of reliable fact gathering groups are replete with widespread, major deprivations of human rights in violation of international law should be no cause for surprise. The world community has a long and difficult road ahead in achieving the goal of global, effective protection of human rights.

The widespread and, in many instances, terrible deprivations of human rights suffered today is indeed tragic. However, I suggest that the cause for most immediate serious concern as regards the international law of human rights is not so much the human suffering that occurs, but the decreasing will of governments of States enjoying substantial protection of human rights to press for performance of international obligations or at least for best efforts at performance. Without energetic, continuing effort by those States that have been in the forefront of the struggle to create and expand international protection of human rights, the obstacles to future progress are rendered intensely more difficult to surmount. Currently, this flagging interest is illustrated, first, by the use, at most, of minimal coercive sanctions, in situations where other, more coercive, sanctions are readily available that would be still appropriate under international law and significantly more effective. Secondly, the trend seems to be for many States to be reluctant to use even minimal coercive strategies (e.g., diplomatic protest), or even beneficial strategies (more social and economic development aid, military support, etc.), to motivate recalcitrant governments to maintain or improve protection of human rights. With regret, I must say that the recent conduct of the U.S. Government well illustrates this discouraging trend.

A source of perhaps the greatest influence that the United States exerts in the perspectives of persons around the world is the basic ideals expressed in our Declaration of Independence and Constitution. We are not speaking of a specific form of government, or even of a specific doctrine, but rather, of those universal human aspirations perhaps best summed up in the phrase "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. These are ideals that we shall never fully attain.
in American society, precisely because they are unattainable in their totality this side of perfection. However, those ideals have always been a beckoning light before American society, toward which we have made significant progress: halting, erratic progress, when in view of two hundred years of American history, but progress nevertheless.

The point is that the United States has symbolized the yearning for, the attainment of those ideals not only for our citizens, but for humanity everywhere. However, American society may fail at any particular moment to struggle to attain those ideals for itself or for others, the underlying belief, embedded in the core of American nationhood, that those ideals should be attained by all persons has made of the United States a symbol of hope around the world and has been a powerful ideological source of support for the United States in foreign relations. In recent decades we seem to have learned some valuable lessons about the difficulties in altering perspectives or conduct in foreign societies. The United States has, I trust, undergone a beneficial loss both of naivete and of arrogance in its efforts to promote expanded protection of human rights in the world community. Policies based on a better understanding of difficulties and of limitations of U.S. capabilities not only would be more sensible, but also, should result in more effective U.S. efforts to protect human rights.

However, better understanding and humility in efforts to protect human rights is not at all to be confused with downgrading or abandoning those efforts. Under the current U.S. Administration, perhaps due in part to backlash from disappointments suffered in past international human rights activities, the United States has for the first time announced an explicit aspect of our foreign relations policy: an approach that, at bottom, shows a moral disregard for human rights elsewhere. The United States has, in effect, communicated the message that so long as the government of another State is against communism, or more to the point, will not cooperate with the Soviet Union in the global U.S.-Soviet competition for power, and is otherwise not seriously inimical to the United States, the U.S. Government either will not express concern with the deprivation of human rights suffered by those subjected to that State's control, or, if concern is expressed, no negative actions will be taken that might in any way interfere with optimum cooperation in resisting communist influence domestically or internationally. Therefore, unless
forced to act by Congress, as illustrated by the El Salvador situation, significant U.S. actions seeking protection of human rights appear to occur only in the case of human rights deprivations by governments or other political groups (e.g., the PLO or the rebel factions in States where the U.S. supports the government) seen as opposed to the U.S. in the U.S.-Soviet power competition or seen as otherwise inimical to the U.S.

Thus, the current U.S. approach basically reduces concern for international human rights to being a pawn in the global power contest with the Soviet Union. The hypocrisy of this approach, and the immorality of so using the tragic suffering of human beings, when contrasted to the historic moral position that formed the foundation for American concern for human rights elsewhere, would seem readily apparent. Indeed, one well might ask how different this approach is from that long taken by the Soviet Union in its use of human rights as an instrument for partisan political advantage in international relations — for which we have continuously castigated the Soviet Union. However myopic the U.S. Government may have been in the past in dealing with human rights shortcomings of States to which it had close ties, and no matter how keen the U.S. Government historically has been to note human rights deprivations of the Soviet Government or of Soviet allies, human rights policies in American foreign relations did evidence basically a fundamental concern universal in its application. At heart, albeit imperfectly, past governmental policy was true to the ideals that the United States has symbolized to others. This observer much fears that the current policy will, if continued, destroy a vitally important basis of influence in U.S. foreign relations, to the immediate and the long-term detriment of the United States and of international law for protection of human rights. One devoutly hopes that the current policy will change.

D. Summary and Appraisal

I have briefly and broadly sketched a dangerous, potentially tragic picture of our international legal system. The picture shows the community agencies of the U.N. Charter and regional agreements operating at minimal levels of political and legal authority in regulating the use of armed force, while national governments operate with increasing will to use armed
force without legal restraint. It shows the international law of economic cooperation as seriously threatened by a trend toward economic warfare through protectionism. Finally, the picture portrays a crisis in international law promoting the improvement of the human condition, as international support for economic development and for the protection of human rights dwindles even as economic hardship and deprivation of human rights increase for the overwhelming majority of national societies in the world community.

What is the reason for this deteriorating trend? This observer suggests that around the world today government officials and private elites evidence increasingly suspicious, parochial perspectives that see not our commonality, but areas of difference. These perspectives see not our mutual interest in seeking minimum use of armed force and other serious coercion and in seeking maximum development of our human potential, but rather, see only selfish interests in aggrandizing power and wealth. These parochial perspectives see not our interdependencies in attaining security from transnational coercion and security from devastation of mind and body from starvation, malnutrition, disease, illiteracy and lack of opportunity to develop to the fullness of human capability. I suggest this problem of perspectives is at the core of present difficulties in maintaining and improving the present state of international law. With this in mind, I now raise my plea for help from anthropologists.

II. A PLEA FOR HELP FROM ANTHROPOLOGISTS

In this crisis period for international law, lawyers must look to other disciplines, many in the social sciences, and assuredly, anthropology. Culture, diplomacy and legal process are highly interdependent. At the international level we need recognition and appraisal of that interdependence. First, by helping government officials to have an improved understanding of their own and other cultures, anthropologists can assist in providing governments with a better frame of reference for the development and implementation of international law. Second, I suggest that international lawyers and diplomats could mine many a golden nugget from the knowledge and studies of anthropologists. Recently, from a series of writings on culture and diplomacy, published in Studies in Third World Societies
(No 12, 1980), I was able to draw some exciting applications for international relations and international law. From an article by Professor Paul Magnarella, "Iranian Diplomacy in the Khomeini Era", I extrapolated six aspects of perspective or conduct of representatives of a traditional society caught up in radical social change that were directly contrary to what a negotiator of a stable, modern State might ordinarily expect in international negotiations. From another article by Dr. Lincoln Landis, "Soviet Perspectives; Soviet Motives", came an emphasis on broad and deep inquiry into national culture as an aid in better understanding the perspectives and motives of a nation's leaders. As a final example, in his book, Law Without Sanctions: Order in Primitive Society and the World Community, Professor Michael Barkum describes the operational legal system -- much of it implicit, without formal, centralized institutions or agencies -- functioning in segmentary lineage societies in Equatorial Africa. Professor Barkum makes some compelling comparisons of similarities (and differences) with the international legal system, which in turn help to explain the operation (and possibilities for improvement) of international law as a legal system largely lacking the formal enforcement mechanisms found in national legal systems. I suggest that anthropologists have far more to offer than they realize in aid to the world community in its continued efforts to minimize the use of armed force in international relations and to establish a stable world public order system committed to human dignity and the optimal social, economic and political well-being of all peoples.

There are other, more specific tasks for which I also plea for aid from anthropology. These tasks are not once prelude to the foregoing long-term objectives for our world community and yet intimately intertwined in the on-going process of attaining those objectives. Senator Fulbright in his book, The Arrogance of Power speaks of the need of renewed dedication of American foreign policy to "an idea that America can hold on to." This observer's view is that the principal reason for the present American national malaise, one that has existed for far too many years is precisely that American society, a polyglot mixture of peoples, has for some time not had a unifying national goal -- a picture of what it wants to become as a society and what is to be its future role in the world community. The United States needs that goal, that inspirational vision, around which its people can rally and mobilize their efforts. That goal must
come out of the national psyche, out of the national culture, and anthropologists could be of much aid in that task. Likewise, the world community, a community incredibly rich and diverse in cultures, also needs "an idea that mankind can hold on to." Anthropologists around the world surely have valuable contributions to offer concerning that common theme needed to mobilize efforts for international tolerance, accommodation and cooperation. Are these not noble tasks for our time?
NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Ronald Cohen is Professor of Anthropology, University of Florida. He was awarded the Ph.D. by the University of Wisconsin in 1960. Dr. Cohen has researched and published extensively on the topics of political anthropology, ethnicity, and Africa. Two of his many works are Dominance and Defiance (1971) and Origins of the State (1978, co-edited by R. Service). Dr. Cohen's recent research interests include rural development in Africa and the state's proneness to war.

J. R. Francisco is the Executive Director of the Philippine-American Educational Foundation (PAEF), and is concurrently Professor of Indology at the University of the Philippines. He was a Fulbright-Smith-Mundt grantee in Asian Studies (Oriental Languages and Literatures) at the University of Chicago in 1954-1956, which launched him into specializing in Indian Studies in the Department of Sanskrit, University of Madras, India, culminating in a Ph.D. degree in 1964. His academic research and publication activities are in the area of Indo-Philippine studies. His works include INDIAN INFLUENCES IN THE PHILIPPINES (1964), MAHARADJA LAWANA (1969), THE PHILIPPINES AND INDIA (1971), PHILIPPINE PALAEOGRAPHY (1973). A collection of his essays on Mindanao and Sulu are being published by the Mindanao State University Research Centre scheduled to be released by mid-1983.

Paul J. Magaravela is a Professor of Anthropology at the University of Florida. A Ph.D. graduate from Harvard University in 1971, Magaravela has authored numerous articles in scholarly journals and has written...
three books: *Tradition and Change in a Turkish Town* (1974, rev. 1981), *The Peasant Venture* (1979), and *Town and Village Life in Turkey* (in press). His research interests fall into the broad areas of political anthropology and Middle East studies.

Marc Miccozzi is Associate Medical Examiner, Metropolitan Dade County, Miami, Florida. He finished his M.D. degree in 1979 from the University of Pennsylvania and his M.Sc. (epidemiology) also from U. P. He expects to obtain the Ph.D. degree in Anthropology from the University of Pennsylvania in 1984. As Associate Editor (for Health Care) of *Human Organization*, Miccozzi did field work in the Philippines; he is the author of several papers published in the U.S.A. and abroad in his field of expertise.

Vivian J. Rohrl is a Professor of Anthropology at San Diego State University. She was awarded the Ph.D. by the University of Minnesota in 1967. Dr. Rohrl has authored *Change for Continuity: The People of a Thousand Lakes* (1981) and a number of articles appearing in academic journals. Her current research interests include the study of dispute processing cross-culturally.

Walter L. Williams is Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, the College of William and Mary in Virginia. He was conferred the B.A., M.A., and LLB degrees by the University of Southern California and the LL.M and J.S.D. by Yale University. A leading scholar in international law, Prof. Williams has published several monographs, papers, and reviews in his field of expertise in the U.S.A. and abroad. He has lectured extensively in the U.S.A. and abroad on a broad range of subjects in the general field of international law.