

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 238 124

EA 016 217

AUTHOR Jessup, Dorothy K.
 TITLE Teacher Unionism and Its Impact: A Study of Change Over Time. Final Report.
 SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (ED), Washington, DC.
 PUB DATE [81]
 GRANT NIE-G-9-0165
 NOTE 217p.
 PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC09 Plus Postage.
 DESCRIPTORS Arbitration; *Collective Bargaining; Elementary Secondary Education; *Employer Employee Relationship; Labor Demands; *Labor Relations; Negotiation Agreements; Professional Autonomy; Teacher Administrator Relationship; *Teacher Associations; *Teacher Militancy; Teacher Strikes; Teacher Welfare; Teaching Conditions; *Unions

IDENTIFIERS American Federation of Teachers; New York

ABSTRACT

An intensive two-phase study of teachers' unions in three small school districts in southern New York State over a 10-year span investigates the changes within the union movement and assesses the impact of unionization on the school systems. The study discloses that teachers' organizations and the collective bargaining process are subject, over time, to internal and external constraints that restrict the scope and direction of union activity to teacher welfare issues, despite the sincere interest of leaders and members in substantive professional concerns. Internal constraints include the need for membership unity and for support from statewide labor organizations, while external constraints range from budgetary limitations to school board opposition to encroachment on their sphere of authority. These constraints may be counteracted by a strong commitment to professional goals by the union leadership, along with rank and file involvement in such issues. The impact of unionization in these school districts is generally beneficial: (1) greater teacher participation in decision-making facilitates workable solutions to problems; (2) administrators' fears about the union protecting incompetent teachers are largely imaginary; (3) although it limits administrators' flexibility, a contract clarifies rights and responsibilities; and (4) communication is enhanced among teachers, administrators, and school boards. (TE)

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ED238124

FINAL REPORT

Grant No. NIE 9-0165

TEACHER UNIONISM AND ITS IMPACT: A STUDY OF CHANGE OVER TIME

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The preparation of this report was made possible through National Institute of Education grant number 9-0165. The opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in the report are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the Institute or of the Department of Education.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This research inquires into the development of teacher unionism in three school districts over the past decade, analyzing its emergence, changes, and impact, within the context of larger, external changes in the school system and the society.

Since the early nineteen sixties, when the first major teachers' strike occurred in New York City, teacher unionism and other forms of teacher militancy have become increasingly widespread in the country as a whole. Most states now have collective bargaining legislation mandating a labor-management relationship and a negotiated contract between local school boards and public school teachers. The number of union chapters affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and organized labor has increased, nationally, from 71 in 1962 to 444 chapters in 1974 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1975). Teacher strikes have also proliferated -- increasing from only five in 1965 to 138 in 1976 (National Center for Education Statistics, 1978). In addition to all of this, teachers' organizations affiliated with the National Education Association (NEA) and not identifying themselves as "unions" have begun to act more and more like their union counterparts, using the mechanisms of bargaining, contracts, and strikes, to attain similar goals.

In spite of what appears to be an extensive literature addressing these trends, our understanding of them is in fact still very limited. The bulk of the literature addressing the teacher movement consists of impressionistic accounts or polemics reflecting strong biases for or against it, while research-based inquiries into the nature of the movement have been few. Furthermore, most research studies have addressed questions primarily related to factors operating to motivate teacher support for unionism, and/or militancy in the formative period of the movement, and the social correlates of such support (Cole, 1969; Rosenthal, 1969; Corwin, 1970; Jessup, 1971, 1978; Waganarr, 1974; Ritterband, 1974; Fox and Wince, 1977). Research on the development of the movement has been mainly limited to studies of legislation affecting collective bargaining for teachers and public employees (e.g., Perry and Wildman, 1970) or studies of the economic impact of collective bargaining upon teacher salaries (Kasper, 1970; Thornton, 1971; Baird and Landon, 1972; Balfour, 1974; Brown, 1975). Some studies such as Ravitch (1974)

and Grimshaw (1979) have considered unionism in its relation to other historical and political developments within school systems, but their focus has been upon analysis of these broader developments, and not on understanding the dynamics of the union movement. Kerchner and Mitchell (1981) have systematically analyzed the development and impact of collective bargaining relationships, but they do not examine changes in or impact of the union as an organization, in respect to its goals, leadership, or other activities. There has been no systematic research to date investigating changes within the union movement or of its organizational impact upon school systems.

My interest in analyzing changes in the teacher union movement derives from the observation that there may be inherent contradictions in the forces motivating and sustaining the movement (see Lortie, 1975). These contradictions are evident in much of the research cited above. For example, research by Corwin (1971) and Rosenthal (1969) suggests the importance of substantive educational concerns and teachers' desire to strengthen their professional authority within school systems as important factors helping to mobilize teacher support for militancy. Yet research by others (e.g., Perry and Wildman, 1970) indicates that collective bargaining settlements have generally not given such issues priority. Such contradictions between claims of teacher concern for educational issues and actual contract provisions have led some critics (e.g., Dreeben, 1977) to conclude that teachers were either not genuinely concerned with such issues or that these concerns bore no significant relation to their militancy.

My own, earlier work (see Jessup, 1978) suggested that teacher expressions of concern for educational and authority-related issues may indeed have been genuine and relevant to their militancy, but that both the teacher organizations and the collective bargaining process are subject to internal and external constraints which restrict or alter the direction of union activity. Such constraints include, for example, the political necessity for the organization to build and sustain a large, supportive membership and to develop membership solidarity in order to enhance its power. The need to establish solidarity may have the effect of relegating complex educational issues (on which teachers tend to differ widely) to lower levels of organizational priority simply because economic issues provide a clearer basis for common agreement. Lortie (1973) has suggested that economic issues may represent the relatively narrow "common denominator" on which all teachers can agree, given the tremendous variety of occupational roles and interests represented within their ranks.

Another constraint restricting what teachers' organizations can accomplish is the fact that School Boards have generally refused to acknowledge educational program or policy issues as legitimate matters for negotiation. They have staunchly defended their own ultimate authority over school system decision-making against any inroads by teacher groups (see Kerchner and Mitchell, 1981). These attitudes within School Boards serve to discourage teachers' organizations from assigning priority to educational or authority issues since to do so inevitably leads to impasse. Because teacher organizations require some measure of success in negotiations to justify their survival, leaders find their energies may be more effectively devoted to the kinds of issues where bargaining is likely to yield tangible results.

As a consequence of conflicting goals and constraints such as those identified above, it is plausible to assume that there will be shifts in organizational activity and goals. However, the educational and professional concerns identified by Corwin, Rosenthal, and myself would be expected to remain viable among at least some members of the organization, especially if these were an original impetus to teacher militancy. Teacher organizations may therefore be subject to continuing demands from within their own membership to respond to these concerns.

These observations concerning probable contradictory pressures affecting teacher organizations raise a number of questions concerning the development of the teacher movement over time. Have teacher organizations modified their goals? If so, in what ways, for what reasons, and with what outcomes? Have underlying issues changed? For example, do teachers continue to express concern over educational and authority issues within the framework of their organizations, and if so, under what conditions and with what outcomes? What has been the impact of organized teacher militancy upon the actual operation of school systems? Have there been changes, for example, in authority relationships between teachers and administrators? Lortie (1973) has stressed the need for intensive research addressing such questions. Research into these kinds of questions can contribute not only to improved understanding of the dynamics of teacher organizations, but also to a better general understanding of problems teachers face and of school organizational processes.

Data and Methods:

The research is based upon intensive study of teachers' organizations in three small school districts located in southern

New York. The study was conducted in two phases: initially, in 1968-69, with a more detailed follow-up in 1978-79. My original choice of these districts was based upon the presence of union chapters (affiliated with the AFT) in each of them as early as 1967, when unionization outside of large city school districts was still uncommon.

Data were drawn from several sources. Parallel surveys were administered to teachers in all three districts in 1969 and 1979. The 1969 survey sample consisted of 270, representing over 50% of the teaching staff in each district. The 1979 sample consisted of 207, representing over 50% of all teachers in two districts, and 39% in the third.*

Interviews were conducted at both phases of the study with leaders of teachers' organizations, rank-and-file members, and significant informal teacher leaders. Twenty-one such interviews were conducted in 1968-69. In 1978-79, an additional 82 interviews were conducted: 37 with formal and informal teacher leaders, 20 with school administrators, and 25 with School Board members.** Interviews were in-depth and semi-structured, utilizing probing techniques. Most lasted from one to two hours, with a few as long as five hours. The research also included examination of pertinent union documents, including contracts, mediators' reports, and various memoranda pertaining to contract negotiations. Findings are organized into three comparative case studies.

Names of the school districts and principal actors have been changed in order to protect anonymity.

A Theoretical Framework:

We will be focussing attention in the case studies upon changes in the unions in three general areas: (1) the nature of organizational goals, (2) the nature of leadership and, (3) the union's role in the school system. In a later chapter, we shall also address questions related to the impact of the unions upon the school system.

* 1979 response rates were: Cedartown, 54%; Middlebury, 39%; Oakville, 55%. The lower response rate in Middlebury is attributed to the greater sensitivity of that staff to investigation, due to a generalized atmosphere of insecurity, described in the case study.

** Four outside respondents (2 attorneys and 2 NYSUT representatives) were also interviewed in 1979.

The analysis of change and impact presented in the chapters that follow draws upon a theoretical framework which views local unions within the context of their organizational, social and economic environments -- i.e., in terms of external and internal pressures exerted upon them beyond their own members' control. In comparing the three unions, I will attempt to show how such pressures interacted with deliberate organizational choices, to produce sometimes similar, other times different, outcomes.

The theoretical framework upon which I shall be drawing is described in detail below. It considers: (1) description of the teachers' union as an organizational type, (2) its external environment, (3) organizational goals, (4) internal structural constraints, and (5) its potential impact upon the school system in which it exists.

1. Description of the teachers' union as an organizational type:

A teachers' union is an occupational association attached to an institution (a school system) where relatively highly trained, semi-professional personnel constitute a majority of the staff; but it is also linked either informally or by formal affiliation to a state and national labor organization (AFL-CIO) in which, traditionally, most members have not had professional or semi-professional status. In this respect (and perhaps mainly in this respect), it differs from traditional teachers' associations, which were affiliated with the NEA -- an organization opposed entirely of professionally trained educators. As a labor union, members are by definition employed by the host institution to which it is attached (the school system) and issues relating to conditions of employment in the school district are the central reason for the union's existence. Its main function is to mobilize employees within the workplace in order to exert pressures on school managers to improve unsatisfactory conditions and to maintain those which are satisfactory. The labor union is thus an organization which stands essentially in opposition to management -- i.e., in a conflict relationship. Such a relationship represents a distinct departure from what had been established in the older, "professional" teachers' associations (such as the NEA), where teacher-administrator relationships were traditionally defined as sharing common concerns.

2. The external environment: Of central importance in analysis of the teachers' union is the local school system, as the occupational site where union members are employed, including its administration, with whom the union must deal in the handling of

routine activities, and its school board, as the agent with whom it negotiates to attain its goals. Also important is the community which contains the school system, whose residents raise taxes to support it and elect school board members to manage it.

Significant external organizations directly influencing the union include state legal structures, the union's "parent" organizations at the state and national levels, parallel organizations, and competing teachers' groups. State legal structures pass legislation which can be viewed as both influencing the goals and activities of the teachers' unions and resulting from them. Of key importance here is New York's "Taylor Law," enacted in 1967, which mandated collective negotiations for all public employees, established grievance and mediation mechanisms, and prohibited teacher strikes. This legislation was an outcome of lobbying by major public employee organizations within the state. It also influenced the content of bargaining by setting guidelines for the content of negotiations. Parent organizations -- the AFT and its state affiliate, New York United Teachers (NYSUT)-influenced the emergence of the unions we shall be examining by offering an alternative to the NEA. They also influenced local teachers perceptions of what constituted legitimate union goals, and provided direct support in handling grievances and in negotiations. Parallel organizations -- other local unions -- provided supportive and informal networks. Competing organizations -- usually, local teachers' associations maintaining affiliation with the NEA -- exerted pressure on local unions to justify their goals and activities, in competition for membership.

The relationships of each local union to these various outside groups are also importantly affected by broad social trends. These include economic conditions, population shifts, attitudinal changes in the larger society. An atmosphere of economic scarcity threatens teachers' job security and constrains school boards to grant fewer benefits in bargaining. Population shifts affect the growth and stability of the school system. In New York State, population mobility out of the state combined with a declining birth rate produced declining student enrollments leading to substantial retrenchment of teacher positions -- an important circumstance in two of our districts.

Changing public attitudes also have special significance, in view of the high vulnerability of school systems to public pressure arising from local community control (Selzneck, 1949; Sieber, 1967). Changing perceptions of the adequacy of school programs and competency of the teaching faculty exerts pressure on school

boards to conduct more stringent evaluations, to be more cautious in granting tenure, and in some cases, to press for dismissal of tenured teachers. Such actions raise teacher sensitivity and are likely to produce tensions between teachers, administrators, and school boards.

Within the more immediate school environments, special problems arise in respect to authority relations between administrators and teachers, both in terms of creating pressures towards teacher unionization or other forms of militancy and new tensions arising from such militancy. One such problem relevant to this study is the decreased accessibility of administrators to teachers that accompanied school system expansion during the sixties. Ambiguity and conflict also arise in authority relations between administrators and teachers in part, from the fact that teaching is a partially, but not completely, professionalized occupation which takes place in a partially bureaucratized organization where spheres of authority have not been clearly defined. (See Blau and Scott, 1962; Gouldner, 1954; Corwin, 1965, 1970; Dreeben, 1973). Such tensions contribute, as Corwin (1970) noted, to increased teacher dissatisfaction and militancy. We may also expect to find new tensions produced in some instances as a result of increased teacher militancy, arising from the more adversary stance of unionized teachers towards administrators.

3. Organizational goals: Since the major, original purpose of the union is to mobilize workers to maintain satisfactory, and change unsatisfactory conditions related to their work, an understanding of the nature of the goals for which they believe they mobilize becomes central to understanding the organization. Two traditions influence members' definitions of legitimate goals for a teachers' union: (1) the labor union tradition, having an ideology emphasizing broad social goals, particularly stressing the importance of raising worker consciousness and energies collectively press for improvement in their own work situations (Cole, 1969) and (2) the professional tradition, having an ideology stressing the importance of client service and responsibility of the occupational group for the quality of this service (Goode, 1973).

Historically, workers in professional and semi-professional occupations have in fact pursued goals associated with both these traditions (Carr-Saunders and Wilson, 1933). Nevertheless, the two sets of goals are at times incompatible, since the pursuit of ends associated with self-interest in contradictory to norms emphasizing service to others (Parsons, 1951). On the one hand,

teachers are particularly vulnerable (and sensitive) to public criticism for pursuing self-interested goals, due to their marginal status as professionals. Furthermore, they have real, client-centered concerns associated with the strains in the teaching situation (identified in the preceding section). On the other hand, they have only recently come to the collective realization that their economic status lags relative to other occupational groups having similar levels of training, and that the economic differential can in large part be attributed to other workers having claimed more for themselves (Cole, 1969). Thus, a new ethic at times conflicts with the service ethic, which emphasizes client welfare.

The teachers' union is therefore faced with pressures from within its own ranks to emphasize both teacher welfare and client-service types of goals. Contradictions between these goals are less easily resolved than in professional associations which govern their own affairs (such as the AMA or American Bar Association) due to the fact that the teacher union's success in achieving its goals depends ultimately upon convincing "management" of the desirability of these goals under circumstances where public distrust and budget exigencies severely limit the possibility of working out arrangements where various interests are satisfactorily balanced. The union is therefore forced into a defensive position in dealing with inherent contradictions in goals. This defensive position becomes an important factor in the union's determination of priorities.

There are also other reasons why organizational goals tend to be conflicting (Perrow, 1970). In addition to fulfilling organizational purposes of the types just identified, unions must concern themselves on the one hand with establishing and sustaining relations to external organizations (such as engaging in negotiations, attending state conventions) and on the other, with maintaining the stability and continuity of the organization itself (such as building and sustaining membership). These different sets of goals often tend to come into conflict: for example, goals related to maintaining the organization (e.g., avoidance of dissension among membership ranks) may constrain leaders to be cautious, avoiding risks which may be necessary for attainment of stated organizational goals (e.g., strengthening teacher voice in policy making). Conflicts may also arise simply because of limits to time and energy. Differences in how such conflicting goals are handled by union leaders will be an important theme in our inquiry.

4. Structural Constraints: Special problems arise for the union because on the one hand it is a voluntary, democratic and independent association and on the other, it has to establish a power base and long-range stability in order to achieve its goals. These imperatives impinge upon it in ways that can be expected to ultimately transform the organization, both in terms of its structure and goals, to an entity considerably less democratic, more conservative and narrow in focus than that originally envisioned or even currently desired by its members.

As in all voluntary associations, membership enrollment and participation are routinely problematic for the organization (Barber, 1950). Unions, however, have a further problem in this respect, in that membership support is interpreted as a sign of its potential to mobilize employees within the occupational site to strike or otherwise collectively oppose management. Since the union's bargaining power in negotiations with management rests ultimately on management perceptions of its potential to strike, the relative size of the membership base is a crucial factor, and building membership takes on major importance as an organizational goal, often taking priority over stated goals (Michels, 1962).

The principle of democracy has a special tradition in the labor movement. Yet in practice, most labor unions (like most voluntary associations) tend towards oligarchy in their top leadership (Michels, 1962; Barber, 1950). This tendency arises initially from difficulties in recruiting members to leadership roles and from the organization's need to maintain leaders who have developed experience and expertise in handling its affairs (Michels, 1962; Barber, 1950). Leaders who develop such expertise come to enjoy special status within their occupational group and are thus motivated to maintain their positions. In order to maintain its legitimacy as a democratic organization, the leadership must respond to its membership on issues of importance to the latter. Both the semblance of democracy and membership solidarity are of crucial importance because the union leadership is particularly vulnerable to criticism from "management" and from competing employee organizations. However, because union members have other (family and occupational) primary role obligations (Gouldner, 1947) and because their participation in the union is voluntary, attendance at meetings is always problematic. In fact, decisions are generally made by a small leadership group and only presented on occasion to the membership for ratification. Furthermore, mechanisms for the expression of dissenting views are not encouraged because of the importance of maintaining a semblance of unity on ideological issues. Membership input in determining union activity and goals therefore tends to be low.

In principle, the local teachers' union has a high measure of autonomy in determining its goals and activities in accordance with district problems. It may, in principle, be chartered as an independent union or it may affiliate with the AFT, its parent organization, the AFL-CIO, and the state subsidiaries of these two organizations. Since union locals exist within "hostile" environments (Michels) 1962, almost all elect to affiliate with these larger unions to develop external supports in building their power. In doing so, however, their autonomy is eroded. Local union leaders tend to lean upon state and national "expert" advisors in determining their goals, tactics, and the legitimacy of issues brought to the bargaining table. These "experts" have generally earned their status through experience in organizing industrial labor unions -- not in teaching. Thus, they have little familiarity with classroom and authority related problems peculiar to teaching, and tend to take a perspective emphasizing features of the teaching situation held in common with industrial workers (Cole, 1969). This perspective not only minimizes the importance of problems specific to teachers, thus diverting the local union from attending to such concerns in setting priorities among goals; it also emphasizes the differences in interest between teachers (envisioned as "labor") and administrators (as "management"). In fact, teachers and administrators share many common interests and concerns, by virtue of their training, their occupational purposes, and their common status as public employees in the communities they serve. However, the perception of labor-management dichotomy imposed by a traditional labor perspective overlooks this commonality of interest.

These constraints -- the need to build membership, the tendency towards oligarchy in leadership, and ties to larger labor organizations -- combine to limit the union to those activities and goals where membership unity and parent organization support can be most easily achieved. There is thus a tendency for the teachers' union to give most emphasis to conservative goals -- i.e., those which have traditionally been accepted as legitimate labor union goals -- especially where teachers' job security is at stake. Such goals can also be expected to be accorded greater legitimacy by school boards in collective bargaining, because they encroach less than professional goals on what school board members perceive to be their exclusive sphere of authority in formulating school district policy (Gross, 1958). As a result, goals which have not traditionally fallen within the prerogative of labor (e.g., decisions over policies affecting teaching processes) will tend to be neglected.

Such conservative tendencies may be reduced by other features in the organization's informal structure. These include:

- (1) unusual qualities in leadership (e.g., a charismatic leader with strong personal commitment to professional goals may be able to sustain membership support for such goals even in the face of the above tendencies);
- (2) unusually strong commitment to professional norms among members of the union, influencing the degree of internal emphasis on professional goals;
- (3) mechanisms within the occupational community (Lipset, et.al., 1956) for reinforcing professional commitment and/or clarifying issues of common concern (e.g., opportunities for informal gathering of union members permitting extensive discussion of occupational problems or the formation of factions which mobilize support for particular issues within membership ranks). Such mechanisms enhance more democratic membership participation in the union because of the opportunity for more complete discussion of organizational issues.

Interplay among the factors identified above can be expected to influence both the types of goals granted priority within the union and the extent to which goals related to sustaining the organization are given priority over stated organizational goals.

5. The union's impact upon the school:

The successful achievement of union goals may have both positive and negative consequences for the school system, as the "host" organization in its environment to which it is so closely tied. Positive consequences may result not only from achievement of educational (or professional) goals, but also from achievement of teacher welfare goals. Desirable effects of the latter may be unanticipated and unrecognized (Merton, 1936). For example, a possible positive effect of union efforts to protect job security may be that these efforts help to preserve small class sizes and certain specialized services. Protection of job security may also be important in terms of sustaining teacher morale. In these ways, the union may contribute to maintaining organizational stability -- an important function in view of the school's vulnerability to public pressure. Achievement of union goals may also have negative consequences for school systems. Union contracts designed to protect teacher rights may include reduced

flexibility in staff arrangements and thereby interfere with optimum program planning.

Questions arise concerning the impact of teacher unionism per se upon administrator and school board relations with teachers. Regardless of the union's success or failure in achieving stated goals, the degree to which it has been successful in establishing itself as an organization within the school system will in itself have an impact upon such relationships. For example, the effects of the union's adversary relationship to school management needs to be considered further. How does this relationship affect teacher-administrator relations in day-to-day encounters? On the one hand, an organizational adversary relationship might be expected to increase hostility and distrust in personal relations. On the other hand, it might contribute to smoother relations in that it encourages teachers and administrators to clarify their respective spheres of authority. The presence of the union may also serve to constrain administrators to listen and attend more carefully to teachers' suggestions and complaints, since they (administrators) wish to avoid confrontations with the union over teacher grievances.

Questions also arise as to the impact of the union upon the school where the union has been unsuccessful in achieving its stated goals. If formation of unions and collective bargaining procedures represent mechanisms through which the teaching staff may resolve unsatisfactory school conditions, what is the effect upon the staff where such mechanisms have not been effective? Do they continue to press for recognition of these issues as legitimate union goals, or do they develop alternate mechanisms for coping with such issues outside of the union? How do unresolved issues affect teachers' support for the union, and how do they affect teacher-management relations -- do they intensify hostility?

What the Case Studies Will Show:

In the case studies that follow, we shall see how each of the teachers' organizations studied began as an undemanding "Association" having rather limited purposes, and how these "Associations" began, during the nineteen sixties, to initiate compliant, informal talks with their local School Boards in order to convey their wishes concerning salaries and fringe benefits -- in what Kerchner and Mitchell (1981) have called the "Meet and Confer" era. We shall then see how various external circumstances -- proliferating bureaucracy, a hostile School Board, and rising teacher expectations

induced Association leaders to press more aggressively for substantial negotiating rights. We shall see how all three School Boards resisted this pressure, insisting on maintaining "management prerogatives," and how School Board resistance to negotiations was a major reason, in all three cases, for the rise of a teacher "Union." The enactment of state legislation mandating collective bargaining for teachers and specifying, to some degree, its content eased Board resistance to bargaining in only one of the three case studies; in the other two, the confrontation over bargaining resulted in an extended period of conflict between teachers and the Boards. In the one case where initial bargaining relationships were better, conflict intensified over time, as the composition of the School Board changed.*

The period of conflict, in all three districts, included a teachers' strike -- although the strikes varied in duration and intensity. A common theme in reasons for teachers striking was their desire to be recognized as equal partners in negotiating processes. In each case, the major strike issue was not economic, but a struggle over the scope of bargaining -- again, consistent with Kerchner and Mitchell's (1981) findings.

In all three cases, the strikes were followed by a period of increased polarization between teachers and School Boards. At various points in time, before or after the strikes, teachers' groups polarized from administrators, as well. By the late seventies, we find, in all three, new patterns of greater accommodation emerging, with variations in degree and style.

* The parallels to Kerchner and Mitchell's "generational" phases are at times striking -- especially in respect to the evolution of the teachers' organizations in their early stages, and to alternating patterns of accommodation and conflict between teachers and Boards. However, my findings do not indicate a high degree of consistency in the sequence of phases. In one case, for example, the first high conflict phase occurred several years after the onset of serious negotiations. In another case, the Union moved gradually from one form of accommodation into another, without an intervening period of conflict. Leadership philosophies, as well as School Board and community receptivity to the Unions appear to have contributed to varying patterns of accommodation, and account for the differences between my findings and Kerchner, et al.

We shall see how in all three cases, the unions themselves changed in response to external and internal pressures and circumstances. A particular focus of interest will be contrasting patterns of change between two of our districts -- Cedar-ton and Middlebury -- in respect to leadership, organizational goals, and definitions of the union's role in the school system. While both these districts were subject to fairly severe economic pressures (budget cuts and teacher retrenchment), we shall see in the case of Middlebury (our second case study) how professional and educational concerns emphasized by the Union in the sixties were eroded by economic pressures, internal organizational conflict, and community antagonisms, transforming what started out as an idealistic and professionally-oriented Union into a fairly traditional, protective labor organization by the late seventies. By contrast, in Cedar-ton, (our first case study) we shall see how different leadership patterns and a more receptive community environment enabled the Union to more effectively balance educational and other professional concerns with teacher welfare concerns, so that by the late seventies, the Union had established itself as an effective force contributing to district stability and aiding the articulation of teacher concerns with other, educational concerns in school district planning.

The third case study, Oakville, diverges somewhat from the first two in that it is a smaller (rural) school system, which underwent less drastic population changes. Teacher vulnerability to a hostile School Board initially motivated their unionization. Therefore, protective concerns were always paramount in Oakville. We shall see how, as School Board hostility gradually subsided, the Union, administrators, and School Board worked out informal patterns of accommodation in which Union-management boundaries became less distinct.

We have noted that organizations develop, change and act in interplay with forces in their environment. The stories of the three teacher Unions that follow -- of how they emerged and changed over time -- portray a dynamic interaction between these three, small organizations and three sometimes recalcitrant, sometimes responsive school communities. Each story takes place against a backdrop of broad social developments -- economic, demographic, and ideological -- which seem at times to powerfully pervade individual, localized actions and events. To some extent, therefore, these appear to be stories of individual teacher leaders, administrators, and community leaders playing-out their historic roles in response to a changing world beyond their control. On the other hand, however, we shall also see how each of the three Unions responded quite differently to external

situations, on the basis of deliberate, organizational choices. Differing styles of leadership and differing definitions of union functions and goals led to different patterns of union interaction with the school and community environment. Thus, in spite of many broad similarities in the development of these Unions over time, we shall see that by the late seventies, each also developed its own, distinct shape and direction.

CHAPTER II

CEDARTON *

The story of the Cedarton teachers' union is a story of teachers' struggle for recognition. This struggle took place within the context of rapid school district expansion, in which a small, informally run school was transformed within a fifteen year period into a large, complex school system. Multiple problems accompanied the district's rapid transformation, along with increased public demands for budget tightening and teacher accountability. On the one hand, increased problems and pressures combined with reduced avenues of communication with administration to frustrate the teaching staff. On the other, teachers' rising consciousness of issues related to their own welfare -- accelerated by the union movement elsewhere within the state and nation -- sensitized them to the need for effective organizational representation.

This case study will show how School Board resistance to recognizing the legitimacy of elected teacher representatives and their right to negotiate pushed a relatively conservative teaching faculty towards increasing militancy. It will show how a bitter strike that failed in terms of gaining its immediate objectives succeeded in terms of gaining community respect for the union, and ultimately, in gaining School Board recognition of the union. The study will also show how the development of better relations between the School Board and teachers' union following the strike allowed for the emergence of an ongoing dialogue between union, administrators, and the Board. Despite severe budgetary cutbacks, population decline, and teacher retrenchment in the seventies, this dialogue became the basis for resolution of numerous district problems.

By contrast to the Middlebury study, the Cedarton case study will show how the union matured gradually and in a consistent direction from an organization having a fairly traditional definition of purpose at the outset into a highly respected, effective and professionally responsible organization which was able to successfully integrate teacher welfare functions with educational and professional concerns. The broader scope in effectiveness of this union can be attributed in part to its ability to sustain high calibre leadership, and in part to leaders' ability to recognize and handle some basic problems neglected by leaders in Middlebury.

* Names have been changed to protect anonymity.

Today, apart from effectively fulfilling its labor union functions, the Cedarton Faculty Congress plays a major informal role in the successful operation of the school district.

BACKGROUND:

Cedarton, until the mid-nineteen fifties, was a small, stable rural community lying beyond the suburban region surrounding New York City. A single school building accommodated all of its pupils, from kindergarten through high school. In 1950, the school district had a total staff of between 30 and 40 teachers and a graduating class of 27 students. Through the early fifties, the school system operated under a single administrator, a supervising principal named Victoria Long. As the district expanded in size during the fifties and sixties, additional administrators were hired (mainly as building principals) but Long continued as chief school administrator through the late sixties.

Respondents recalled Long's administration as a period when a spirit of mutual cooperation and sense of common purpose ("educating children") prevailed. Many characterized Long as an "educator" -- in contrast to later administrators whom they viewed as more "management" and "cost" oriented. They reported her to have been highly respected within the community and the school, and therefore able to exercise considerable personal authority while at the same time allowing for extensive involvement of community and staff in school decisions. As one respondent put it,

Ms. Long was at the helm. She ran the district, but ... she knew her teachers. To use a cornball expression, it was like a family. Everyone knew (everyone else) ... She involved you ... You felt you were part of something.

Long maintained good informal contact with teachers, and was thereby well informed as to school problems; she was also generally responsive to teacher concerns.

As long as the community remained stable, Long was in a position to deliver School Board support for meeting school needs as she perceived them. Until the sixties, few Board members had more than a high school education, and those who did, acknowledged Long as a "professional educator," so deferred to her judgment in educational matters. Some respondents also noted that during most of

Long's administration the importance of what was considered "educationally sound" could be taken for granted with minimal concern for either costs or community reaction. Money for schools was relatively plentiful through the mid-sixties; the district's tax base, relative to expenditures, was favorable and real estate taxes were low. Interest groups opposing Long's progressive educational philosophy had yet to emerge.

During the fifties and early sixties, new waves of suburban expansion in the New York City region caught up with Cedarton. Its large parcels of undeveloped land and location near a major highway made it ideal for mass real estate development. As several large, cheaply constructed developments were built during the late fifties, the resultant influx of young, growing families struck the school system hard. "We just started to explode," stated one respondent. A new school building opened in 1955 to house the elementary grades, and was already on double session by 1957. By 1958, an annex had been constructed to this building and an additional elementary building opened. In 1961, a third elementary school and a high school building opened. Three more buildings were opened by 1969. Within a fifteen year period, the school system expanded from one to seven buildings and from a student population of less than 200 to over 2000.

With this rapid expansion, the district added many new teachers each year. Since teachers at that time were generally in short supply, many of those hired were young, inexperienced people who entered teaching only briefly, with the intention of leaving to enter another career or, among women, for marriage and children. Thus, during the sixties, the district experienced an additional problem of high staff turnover. An administrator respondent noted that he sometimes wondered how anything else got done -- so much time was spent simply in hiring new personnel. Between 1954 and 1969, the total number of full time teachers employed in the Cedarton schools, exclusive of administrative and specialized personnel, rose from 40 to over 250.

With a larger faculty and more buildings, there were accompanying changes in district administration, not only in terms of a larger administrative staff, but also in the nature of administrator-teacher relations. It was no longer possible for administrators, including Long herself, to maintain the kinds of personal contact previously established with the teaching staff: added divisions between administrators and teachers became more pronounced. Another problem arose from the fact that during this period administrators also were in short supply. Rapid expansion of the district's administrative staff therefore resulted in a

number of administrators being hired at the middle-management levels (e.g., as building principals) who not only had little administrative experience but also little background in classroom teaching. Furthermore, there was considerable turnover among principals in this period, especially in the high school. These factors appear to have contributed to less effective management of school problems during the sixties and early seventies than might have been the case under more experienced and stable administrative leadership at the building levels.

Population changes in the district affected the School Board during the sixties. High status, well-educated residents became increasingly dominant on Cedarton school boards. As an administrator put it, "You saw . . . (more) lawyers, IBM-ers, and less of the guy who worked for the Water Company." The School Board was by this time also subject to new kinds of pressure from various segments of the community. The district's class composition underwent further changes in the sixties. An influx of blue-collar families began to move in to the early residential developments which the middle class were vacating as newer, more desirable housing became available. The new working class residents were in many ways similar (in income, education and attitudes) to the "old guard" residents who pre-dated district expansion. By the late sixties, these two working class groups, combined, made up about half the district's population, with middle class residents making up the other half. Clearer divisions in community attitudes towards the schools began to emerge. A teacher respondent explained:

You had two very different factions of people starting to play with this whole thing. People who were well-educated, who wanted very, very high performance -- great expectations, great accountability, very business oriented. And you had a lot of other people who were very down to earth, in many cases less educated, less expectations . . . Nuts and bolts people . . . A lot of different attitudes about what education is or where it should be going, what it should cost, and what it should do.

Pressures from working class segments of the community increased, especially in respect to reducing school expenditures. During the sixties, school budgets rose sharply and were reflected in higher property taxes. While middle class residents tended to be generally supportive of rising school expenditures as necessary for maintaining high standards, working class residents became

increasingly vocal, criticizing what they regarded as "frills" and "featherbedding" in school programs, staffing and salaries. Working class sectors also became more openly critical of the content of educational offerings, in a wave of what some respondents referred to as "conservative backlash" against some progressive offerings. While these critical sectors never dominated either the School Board or even audiences at open Board meetings, they had sufficient representation and were vocal enough that the Board could not ignore them.

Middle class residents, while generally more supportive of both school budgets and programs, had criticisms also, and on certain issues were even more vocal than the working class -- e.g., on problems related to administration and student discipline in the high school. During the late sixties therefore, School Board members were far more subject than their predecessors to community pressures to hold down school expenditures and to assume accountability for what took place in the schools.

These changes appear to have profoundly affected the ways in which the School Board had traditionally operated. Board members began increasingly to question Long's decisions. They were critical of her informal administrative style as inappropriate for a large district -- outmoded in terms of modern management principles. Several apparently viewed the district as "...out of control, needing direction," and felt that they, as a Board, should exert more authority in running the district.

Several respondents who worked under Long commented on how these changes affected her ability to effectively administer the school system. One commented:

Towards the end, I think the growth of the district was overwhelming to her. She found it very tough... The system was larger, less personalized, couldn't be a one-man show any more.

Another said:

Victoria was terribly effective at doing what she did the way she did it, but ... things were definitely getting out of hand for her, out of control. She no longer could do what she did so well. She knew she couldn't keep it together. There were bigger forces than she wanted to deal with or was able to deal with. It was very obvious to those who had been there that it was no longer her game, her place.

Long retired early, by choice, in 1968.

The School Board deliberately sought to replace Long with a superintendent who had extensive formal training in school administration and "scientific management." They hired a young man named Andrew Wilson who had relatively little previous administrative experience, but who held far better credentials than Long in terms of the appropriate professional training and degrees. Wilson introduced "management objectives" to the school system. In direct contrast to Long's informal style, Wilson emphasized efficiency, coordination, organizational planning and more cost-oriented budgeting -- in short, a more formal, businesslike approach. A respondent described Wilson's administration as follows:

He was very much a business manager. He represented the new breed....It was a larger district, there were more teachers, more people concerned. He wanted to run it in a different way... It was a drastic change. He tried to establish more firm and clear channels of communication, rules, evaluative procedures ... accountability and all of that.

Many teachers appear to have viewed Wilson and the changes he brought with considerable resentment. They viewed the application of management principles to running the schools as inappropriate, preferring Long's more personal style and what they perceived as her greater availability, responsiveness and more purely educational focus. Several respondents, however, pointed out that many changes associated with Wilson's administration were essentially related to the general direction of change in the district at that time -- the fact it was so much larger, that costs were rising, that informal communication between teachers and administrators had begun to break down -- so that introduction of a more formal administrative system was at this point in time probably necessary. Respondents also noted this transition period, when Wilson took over, to have been a time of great turmoil in the school system, meaning he was faced with exceptionally difficult problems. No groundwork had been set for a change in administration -- Long had never delegated much responsibility. When she left, mistrust rapidly built between teachers, administrators and the School Board. Numerous problems also arose within the buildings related to the district's continued rapid growth (e.g., turnover in the teaching and administrative staff, problems related to curriculum changes and discipline, especially in the high school). Two new school buildings were opened during Wilson's

first year. Finally, the district suffered its first school budget defeats (wherein the public voted down proposed school budgets) for two successive years right after the new superintendent arrived. This latter fact, alone, imposed severe limitations on his administration, forcing a greater concern with the tax rate. In Andrew Wilson's second year, after a period of tremendous growth, the School Board initiated some cuts in programs, services and personnel.

TEACHERS' ORGANIZATIONS:

The Teachers' Association:

For as long as any respondent could recall, Cedarton had had a Teachers' Association, which, until 1973, was affiliated with the NEA. Prior to the mid-sixties, this had been primarily a social organization, to which administrators as well as teachers belonged. It sponsored occasional speakers, but had little involvement in local, district affairs, and did not attempt to represent teacher interests per se except in the matter of salaries. Respondents pointed out that prior to the sixties, there had been little need for a strong teachers' organization, since most personnel problems were resolved on an informal, personal level. While there were a few instances reported where respondents felt individual teachers had been treated unfairly, such problems do not appear to have arisen frequently at that stage.

The officers of the Association changed often -- almost annually. While leadership positions circulated among an active group within the teaching staff, there was little stability either in the leadership group as a whole or in the occupants of particular positions.

Starting in the early sixties, the Association had a salary committee which met annually with representatives of the School Board to "discuss" teacher salaries for the following year -- a privilege granted the Association by the Board as an extension of good will, and not in any sense formalized as a "right." In the same vein, salary committee proposals were offered by way of "suggestions" -- not as "demands." Still, according to respondent recollections, salary discussions were at times quite heated.

The manner in which salaries were settled in those meetings clearly illustrates the authority Victoria Long exercised with the

Board, A former Association officer who had served on the salary committee described her role as follows:

The critical stage always came at the end... Victoria never entered (the discussion) until the eleventh hour. Her timing was always perfect. She'd come in at the last hour and she'd say, "You're here, and you're there, and I'm telling you, this is fair...This is how its going to be."

There were written contracts in the early sixties, but they were quite informal, containing little beyond salary schedules. Apart from those, the contract had little tangible value, for details in respect to teaching duties and working conditions (e.g., lunch duty, hall duty, playground duty, length of school day) were not included -- they were simply "understood" to be what they had been in previous years. At this point in time, Board policy was regarded as more important than a contract, and Boards set their own policy, under Long's direction.

Changes in the Teachers' Association during Sixties:

A number of changes took place in the Teachers' Association during the sixties. The organization began to involve itself more directly in school district affairs. The constitution was revised, on several occasions. In the mid-sixties, administrators were excluded from membership in the Association in recognition of increased disparities between teacher and administrator interests. Provisions were made to improve teacher representation and communication within the organization and the district through more frequent membership meetings, by the establishment of "building representatives" as officers of the organization, and by the institution of monthly meetings to be held between Association officers, the supervising principal, and Board president. Simple, still informal "grievance" procedures began to be established, whereby teachers who felt in some way offended could present their cases to Association officers who, in turn, would bring these cases before the School Board. The Association still had no grievance committee; at this stage, what constituted a "grievance" was not clearly defined, and the final decision in resolving teacher complaints lay strictly with the School Board.

The Association also attempted to play a more forceful role in contract negotiations, even prior to 1967 when formalized negotiations were mandated by the New York State Taylor Law.

Particularly in connection with negotiations, the Cedarton Teachers' Association (CTA) began to establish stronger ties with the state-wide branch of the NEA, its parent organization. The state branch (NYSTA) began to provide advisory services regarding contract negotiations to local teacher associations as early as 1965. Starting in the mid-sixties, NYSTA representatives were invited by the CTA to sit in on some of their negotiating sessions with the Board as consultants

Long found these developments distasteful. As the Association pressed for more formal contract provisions, particularly after the Taylor Law, she left negotiations more and more to the School Board. However Association activists involved in negotiations after the enactment of the Taylor Law complained that even then, School Board representatives did not seem to take negotiations seriously. A respondent active on the Association negotiating team in the late sixties reported:

They still had not made the transition from 'This is what I'm offering you and if you don't like it that's tough' to 'Now we have to talk about it and arrive at some kind of consensus.' ... They really dug in, constantly shot us down. (Their) lawyer constantly said, 'Why should you think you have anything to say about that? You're just a teacher.'

Several areas of conflict began to develop between the Teachers' Association and the School Board. A major area of conflict focussed upon protection of non-tenured teachers. In the words of a former Association officer:

People were being dismissed for what we would have to challenge in terms of fairness...I remember being in at least two or three major hassles over people who had been released, and by their records, had been treated unfairly....And the Board was always the final point. The best you could do with the Board at that time was to get a reconsideration of the dismissal. They usually were quite good about re-examination, but they never reversed a decision.

Teacher respondents believed several of these dismissals to have been based on personality conflicts with administrators, (particularly building principals). The problem, essentially, appeared to be that reasons for dismissal were never clearly spelled out, leaving ample room for discriminatory treatment. Though formal

evaluation procedures were followed for all probationary (non-tenured) teachers, in several cases, teachers who had consistently received good evaluations were denied tenure. In two cases respondents reported, teachers regarded as fine teachers by their colleagues were denied tenure with no clear explanation. The Association pushed hard to get more specific protective "language" for non-tenured teachers into the contract, but without success.

Salaries began to constitute a second major area of conflict, since salary increases for the school district were not keeping pace with increases elsewhere in the county, in contrast to earlier salary levels in Cedar-ton, which had been relatively high.

A third conflict area was the question of class size. Teachers wanted to negotiate clear restrictions on class size, while Board members strenuously resisted this, claiming that since class sizes crucially affected school budgets, the Board must reserve the flexibility to raise class sizes if necessary. To some teacher respondents, the Board's attitude on class size was an indication of a shift in priorities from a primary concern with setting sound educational standards to a concern for saving money.

This was a period of growing dissatisfaction among the teaching staff, reflecting the problems associated with rapid growth and deteriorating teacher-administrator relations in the district. It was also a period when teacher organizations elsewhere were gaining strength. New York City and other school districts in the metropolitan area had already greatly improved their ability to protect and advance teacher interests through successful collective negotiations. Hence, the Cedar-ton Teachers' Association's inability to negotiate effectively to resolve key local issues became the focus of increasing criticism from within the organization's own ranks. Newer teachers, some of whom had actually taught in districts having stronger teachers' organizations prior to coming to Cedar-ton, were especially critical. A former Association officer explained:

They were critical, basically, because of the ineffectiveness of the traditional system. . . . The fact that you couldn't really negotiate anything that was worth a damn, or make changes that were dramatic enough to do anything for yourself. You literally were still at the mercy of someone's final say. . . They knew there was another way.

Some of these critics began to "talk union," perceiving the central factor in New York City teachers' success to have been their affiliation with organized labor. Most Association members, however, were still resistant to the idea of union affiliation as unbecoming to their professional status. In 1967, a small group of Cedarton teachers decided to break away from the CTA to form a union chapter affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers (AFT).

The Early Union:

None of the teachers involved in founding the Cedarton Federation of Teachers (CFT) had actually been active in a teachers' union elsewhere, though all had been active, for at least a short while, in the Cedarton Teachers' Association. The influence of unionism from outside the district was therefore mainly felt through union literature they read and contacts they deliberately sought out.

In 1969, at the time data was first gathered for this research and two years after the founding of the union, the CFT had 33 members, out of a teaching staff of over 250. Most members were male and concentrated in the high school; many were relatively new to the district. It was, however, an active membership. Attendance at meetings generally ran at about thirty -- almost the equivalent of typical attendance at Association meetings, though the latter group had about eight times the membership.

Those who assumed leadership roles in the union were, from the time of its founding, articulate people, highly respected by their colleagues. This characterization was offered by a wide range of respondents, including administrators and Association officers as well as their own members. An administrator commented in 1969,

"The people who organized the union were extremely capable people, and they had ... a strong feeling for what they thought was important in their profession."

An Association officer maintained,

"They were sharp people. They had good heads. They knew how to do what they were going to do."

The Cedartron union's ability to maintain highly respected, able teachers in leadership positions later became a key factor in its gaining broader support. At the time of its emergence, however, Long, most of her administration, and the School Board were offended by it, and refused to give it credence.

Union Issues:

When I asked union activists I interviewed in 1969 their reasons for founding the Cedartron union chapter, they provided a wide variety of answers. However, there were important common themes. Central to these was their perception that they needed a stronger teachers' organization.

They had two major criticisms of the Association: Its inability to negotiate what they regarded as an adequate contract and its inability to protect teachers against arbitrary treatment and unfair dismissal. Union respondents attributed the weakness of the Association's contract not only to its leaders' inability to effectively negotiate, but also to the fact that they relied on outside advisors (from NYSTA) who themselves had virtually no prior experience in negotiations, leading to their having made a number of important tactical errors. Furthermore, they believed most Association leaders (at both local and state levels) maintained too close ties with administration, in terms of old loyalties, and were too steeped in "paternalistic attitudes" to permit them to stand firmly in opposition to administration in cases where teacher and administrator interests diverged.

By contrast, they felt affiliation with the union had two major advantages: first, that it would provide them access to advisors experienced in labor negotiations, and second, that it would permit them to stand in opposition to administrators, where necessary -- because the union was free of the traditional ties that limited the Association, and because differences in employee and management interests were more openly recognized in the union.

Most union activists I interviewed in Cedartron in 1969 openly expressed a strong "welfare" orientation in their discussion of union goals -- meaning that they saw the central purpose of the union as being to improve teacher welfare through provision of better benefits, working conditions, and job protection.* These

* See Table , Appendix. Note especially the contrast to Middlebury, where activists were less highly oriented to welfare issues.

respondents, however, also reported other kinds of concerns to have been important to the formation of the union, and in fact, all union activist respondents spent far more time and spoke with more intensity on these other concerns than they did on welfare types of issues.

The non-welfare types of issues union respondents raised centered mainly on problems related to school administration (as they perceived them) including the following:

- 1) Ineffective administrative leadership, particularly in the high school, where there had been a high level of turnover in the principal's position.
- 2) Inadequate channels of communication through which teachers might bring school problems at the classroom or building level to the attention of the superintendent and School Board.
- 3) Insufficient input by teachers in determination of school district policies due to inadequate consultation with teachers on the part of administrators, and/or tendencies to ignore teacher recommendations.
- 4) Lack of appropriate supervision and support for new, inexperienced teachers by administrators.

Union respondents attributed ineffective administrative leadership in part to inexperience and turnover in administrative personnel, but also, in larger part, to other factors: they felt most building principals were out of touch with classroom problems because they lacked adequate background in classroom teaching, were too far removed from the classroom, and were too subject to the authority of central administration and pressure from parents and School Board members. They believed that a major key to improving administrative leadership, therefore, lay in making administrators more accountable to teachers, both through increasing teacher input in their initial selection and through improving communication and teacher input in school decision making.

It was evident from the frequency with which similar explanations regarding such administrative problems were offered by union respondents that the points listed above had been extensively discussed within the union. This critical perspective on administration constituted a strong motif appearing in all my interviews with union activists in Cedarton. Their goals were not, therefore, simply to improve teacher benefits and job protection: they wanted to change the structure of relations between teachers, administrators,

and School Boards. Many CFT activists identified themselves with an ideological current within the AFT at that time, emphasizing the importance of collegiality, or "democracy in the workplace." The first president of the CFT explained to me in 1969:

"The average teacher who was involved in founding the union also was very much concerned with having a voice -- you must have heard this a thousand times -- having a voice in actually running the school and helping to make policy decisions. This is to me the major issue. This is the reason why we came into existence....We want to elect our principals. We want to start gradually by electing our department chairmen; we finally want to elect our principals."

During the late sixties and early seventies, the union offered many specific proposals to the faculty and the school administration for meeting problems their members identified. In addition to specific suggestions for strengthening the contract in terms of improving teacher benefits, union proposals included suggestions for election of building principals, and establishment of a council composed of teachers, administrators, School Board members and students to formulate school district policy. For new teachers, the union advocated clearer evaluation procedures (to strengthen due process) and an internship program. In addition, it advocated reductions in class size and made suggestions for improvements in educational programs.

Period of Organizational Conflict:

Shortly after the formation of the Union in 1967, the new organization "challenged" the Association by petitioning for a collective bargaining election.* On the first challenge, the Union won approximately 30% of the vote, with its supporters appearing to have been mainly concentrated in the high school. From 1967 to 1972, the two organizations engaged in bitter conflict. During these years, the Union initiated additional challenges, each time increasing its percentage of the vote, though

* In accordance with provisions of the Taylor Law. The law provides that the organization receiving a majority of votes cast by employees in the "bargaining unit" shall represent the entire unit for purposes of collective negotiations.

the Association continued to retain a clear majority of the teaching staff, therefore remaining the official bargaining agent. The Union also continued to be sharply critical of Association leaders for their weakness in negotiating contracts and in protecting teacher rights.

During these years, Association leaders were, however, able to successfully negotiate many things the Union pushed for, particularly in teacher welfare areas. An Association officer reported,

Their presence, arguments, weight literally often became the Association's position.

Between 1967 and 1972, they were able to obtain an improved salary schedule and clearer delineation of teachers' duties in the contract. They were still, however, unable to obtain a satisfactory grievance procedure. Association leaders reported feeling frustrated at being unable to negotiate what they regarded as a satisfactory contract. They claimed the Board continued to resist any real "give and take" during negotiations and refused to negotiate many items which districts elsewhere were beginning to include in their contracts. On those items Board members did negotiate, they insisted on so many qualifying phrases in contract wording (e.g., "wherever feasible," "insofar as possible") that the matters spelled out continued largely to be within Board discretion.

Association leaders perceived their problems in negotiations as based upon inability to negotiate from a position of strength, due to divisions within the teaching staff. On the one hand, Association members were divided as to how strongly they should "push" the Board in negotiations, with many "old timers" still reluctant to challenge traditional authority relations. On the other, increasing numbers of Association members were defecting to the Union because they claimed the Association was not militant enough. An Association officer explained,

Any time it came to a crisis in negotiations,-- of whether you were going to accept the Board's offer or whether you were willing to go the next step, to reject the Board's offer -- always, what it came to, when it came to a total show of forces we could never go the next step... It was an extremely difficult thing to marshal any kind of militancy, any kind of force which

would have had any real teeth to it...The Board knew the internal struggle that we had... They knew we couldn't marshal the strength at any point to put our foot in the door and make it stick.

Association leaders also reported dissatisfaction with the quality of support provided by NYSTA in that period:

NYSTA was totally ineffectual...NYSTA representatives sat in on negotiations...but they were totally unprepared. They didn't have bargaining experience. There weren't many people around who did.

Organizational merger:

Teachers' Association leaders began to talk among ~~themselves~~ about the possibility of inviting their Union opponents to join with them, for it was becoming increasingly obvious to some that the conflict between the two organizations was self-defeating. A representative of this viewpoint explained,

I saw that was the only direction that could help the district at that point...It was not a hard decision for me. I felt their (Union leaders) heads were pretty solid. These people were well-organized, respected members of the staff...and I saw the two (organizations) as having the same goals.

But others in the CTA strongly resisted making overtures to the Union. A 1972 Association officer reported:

It was a tough time for certain personalities because of their philosophical commitments...Embracing a philosophy that had anything to do with unionism was very, very difficult to accept It was a blue collar type thing, a working man's role, and how could you possibly equate yourself as a classroom teacher and a professional with an ordinary labor union?

In the winter of 1972, the Union challenged the CTA again for collective bargaining representation, and this time came within eight votes of winning the election. The close vote apparently shook Association leaders badly. They now had to face the possibility of losing in a subsequent challenge. This motivated many who had previously resisted the idea of merger with the Union to change their position. The close vote also put the Union in a difficult position, for under the Taylor Law it was restrained from making a further challenge for several years.

Around this time, the statewide affiliates of the NEA (NYSTA) and the AFT (ESTF) announced plans to join forces to form a single state teachers' organization. Anticipating the probable merger of their parent organizations, resistance to merger at the local level dropped substantially on both sides, and the memberships of both organizations voted to endorse consolidation.

Representatives of the two groups met to write a new constitution and to nominate a new slate of officers, deliberately drawing strong candidates from both former organizations. A resistant faction within the old Association ran an opposing slate, but the merged slate won overwhelming faculty support in the election. The new organization was named the Cedarton Faculty Congress (CFC).

The man chosen as president of the CFC, a high school science teacher named James Nelson, had formerly served as vice-president of the Union. Other Union officers, including its former president, assumed key leadership positions within the new organization from the outset. By contrast, those who had assumed active roles within the Association for the most part retired from leadership positions, with the result that the officers recruited for the merged organization from the Association were apt to represent newer faces than those recruited from the Union. Those identified with the Union were therefore more visible to outsiders than those recruited from the Association. Because of their greater experience in leadership positions and the fact that most Union people came from the high school, Union activists may also have exerted a dominant influence within the new organization. Some outsiders -- former "resistant" Association supporters and some administrators -- referred in our interviews to the change in leadership as a "Union take-over." This criticism was at no time offered by any respondents from within the new organization, however. Both organizational activists and rank-and-file members pointed out that the leaders had been democratically elected with overwhelming teacher support. Respondents also indicated that the strength of teacher support for these leaders reflected the esteem in which the Union officers were held by their colleagues.

THE STRIKE:

The 1973 Contract Negotiations:

Negotiations for the next teacher contract began in January, 1973. (The existing contract was due to expire on August 31st.) CFC leaders were determined to obtain the best possible contract, in part because former Union activists now representing the CFC had been outspoken in their criticism of previous Association contracts and in part because they felt their new organizational solidarity mandated a show of teacher strength. Also, CFC leaders at this point in time were optimistic about the organization's potential for protecting and enhancing the professional lives of rank-and-file teachers, and they perceived the contract as the vehicle for achieving these ends.

After soliciting suggestions from its membership, the CFC negotiating team compiled a thirty-page document detailing proposals for changes in virtually every article of the existing contract. Major proposed changes were geared essentially towards strengthening contract provisions in the following areas:

- 1) Improved financial benefits, including substantial increases in salaries and fringe benefits to bring these to a level commensurate with surrounding districts.
- 2) Strengthening provisions for due process in areas of teacher grievances, teacher evaluation, and the granting of tenure.
- 3) Assurance of job protection for all teachers, specifically through a "no reduction in force" clause.
- 4) Clarifying job-requirements and reducing workloads, including setting limits to class sizes, elimination of non-teaching duties (e.g., playground duty, hall duty), limits to the number and length of required after-school meetings, and clarifying duties of non-teaching personnel (e.g., guidance counselors, department heads).
- 5) Professional involvement of teachers in decision-making in a number of areas, including selection and evaluation of administrators, development of curriculum, determination of criteria for teacher evaluation, and programs for new teachers.

- 6) A "Matters Not Covered" clause, in which the CFC sought School Board agreement that it would make no changes in existing practices in areas not covered by the contract without prior negotiations with union representatives.

The Cedarton School Board, however, was under both external and internal pressures to take a firm stand in 1973. Recent budget defeats and criticism of the school system from conservative community sectors put pressure on the Board not only to curtail school expenditures, but also to seek greater staff "accountability" to school managers. An administrator in close contact with the Board during this period explained,

Teachers had made tremendous strides with the beginning of the Taylor Law. Now...five years later, it was time to balance those gains and to take a strong position... There was a good deal of that sentiment in the community, and it was represented... on the Board."

A majority on the Board at this time could be described as "pro-education" but conservative and business-oriented in their philosophies of education and school administration. According to School Board respondents, most members at that time believed strongly in maintaining "management prerogatives" in the hands of the Board -- a view strongly supported by the district superintendent.

The School Board presented the CFC negotiating team with a series of counter proposals before even considering the teachers' demands. The Board's proposals were less extensive than the CFC's; but were hard-hitting in that they aimed not only to limit spending, but also to tighten controls over several areas of teachers' professional lives. Key Board proposals included the following:

- a) Limiting existing teacher benefits -- providing no across-the-board salary raises, eliminating automatic increments, reducing personal leave, and reducing sabbatical leaves.
- b) A "merit pay" proposal -- wherein previously automatic annual salary increments would become dependent upon the quality of teaching performance as determined by administrative evaluations.
- c) Making teachers accountable for preparation periods -- requiring them to report to building principals regarding their utilization of time during what were currently "free" periods

and empowering principals to assign teachers extra "professional duties" during these periods.

- d) More required meetings -- specifying more frequent after school faculty meetings, of longer duration than had been current practice.

The union was represented during negotiations by a seven-member negotiating team, including most major officers of the CFC, along with a representative from New York State United Teachers (NYSUT). The NYSUT representative served mainly in an advisory capacity to the CFC, taking a back-seat role during actual negotiating sessions. Board members did not meet directly with the CFC team, except on one or two occasions. Neither did the district superintendent. Instead, the Board was represented by two intermediaries: a New York attorney specializing in labor relations and a member of the district's central administrative staff. Dealing through these intermediaries, the Board rejected a large number of the union's proposals as falling outside the scope of mandatory negotiations under the Taylor Law, stating that it would not negotiate anything it was not compelled to.*

The Board proposals both angered teachers and put them in a defensive position, at a time when they had hoped to negotiate a contract which extended teacher benefits and rights. They were particularly upset with the "merit pay" recommendation, for they felt that it could not be administered fairly, given the limitations generally inherent in evaluating teacher competence, and especially given the district's existing evaluation procedures which they had already suggested revamping. They also believed "merit pay" would introduce an undesirable element of competition into their ranks.

The Board's refusal to negotiate many key teacher demands further angered them. Finally, lack of direct access to Board members was frustrating to members of the CFC negotiating team, who

* The Taylor Law specified employee's wages, hours and other conditions of employment as areas subject to negotiations between public employers and employee organizations. However, questions as to what constituted "other conditions of employment" and where negotiations over these conditions intruded on powers granted to the Board under other state laws left specific negotiating areas open to interpretation. (Court decisions and further legislation somewhat clarified these ambiguities in later years.)

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reported they felt Board members neither heard nor acknowledged their demands. A teacher respondent offered this perception:

It was really a refusal to deal with the union as a legitimate force, representative of teachers in the district, with legitimate concerns.

Teacher respondents often expressed the belief that the Board took a deliberately hard-line position during the 1973 negotiations because it did not want to deal with a "union" affiliated with organized labor. A member of the CFC negotiating team described his view of the Board's position as follows:

The union had just gotten in and the Board believed....that we didn't really represent teachers....because in the collective bargaining election, the union had lost.... They felt the union was a bad element they wanted to keep out of the county and out of Cedartron. I believe they pushed us because they believed if push came to shove, the teachers would not support the union.

Several respondents who had been on the 1973 School Board admitted to having held an anti-union bias on the Board at that time. This was influenced in part by the business and managerial perspectives Board members brought from their own occupational backgrounds.. The 1973 Board president explained,

Because of the work I do in dealing with management and seeing labor able to exert strong pressures on management, I suspect I brought to the Board an anti-labor prejudice....I think I view it more philosophically today, in that I recognize no rights and wrongs in the situation.

From School Board respondents' viewpoint-, the central issue, however, appears to have been more the protection of "management prerogatives" than a desire to break the union. One 1973 School Board respondent articulated his position as follows:

A school should not be run as a democracy or by consensus....It's more akin to a business where you have an authoritative management and employees who perform according to the dictates of that management....

Our superintendent described to us some of the demands by the Union as interfering with the authority -- taking away management prerogatives...At that point I thought he was right.

In February, the CFC withdrew some demands from the negotiating table, but none were items the Board regarded as significant. The Board did not withdraw any of its own demands. Board representatives asked the CFC at this point to join in a request for outside mediation, but the CFC refused on the grounds that a satisfactory agreement depended upon mutual cooperation between the two parties, and that intervention by a third party would only delay negotiations. Nevertheless, the Board, unilaterally requested the state Public Employee Relations Board (PERB) to provide mediation. Two negotiating sessions were held in March with a PERB mediator who determined mediation could not be fruitful and referred the dispute to "Fact-Finding."*

During March and early April, the Board publicly announced first, a decision to reorganize certain staff positions in the high school and shortly after that, a decision to eliminate seventeen teaching positions and certain supplementary positions from the budget for the 1973-74 school year. Both of these actions were taken without prior consultation with either Union representatives or teachers at large. These actions further angered both Union leaders and rank-and-file teachers. In the first place, for the Board to have made such decisions unilaterally (without consultation with teachers) was a clear departure from the way in which things had been handled under Long's administration. Secondly, Union leaders interpreted the announced changes as affecting "terms and conditions of employment" and therefore subject to negotiations. In view of the fact that these changes undercut specific Union proposals for the 1973 contract, teachers viewed the Board announcements as a clear indication of its unwillingness to negotiate in good faith.

A PERB-appointed fact-finder held hearings in April, but due to time constraints, was able to make only limited recommendations. Neither side found these satisfactory as a basis for a settlement.

* PERB-appointed "fact-finders" are empowered under the Taylor Law to inquire into the causes of the dispute and to recommend bases for settlement.

Too many issues were left outstanding and there was insufficient pressure at this point on either side to make concessions.

Following the release of the fact-finder's report, the Board conducted hearings for the purpose of "legislating a contract" -- a right granted school boards under the Taylor Law at that time. At this point, teachers withdrew a substantial number of their demands, eliminating almost a third of their proposals. It had become clear to the CFC that the Board would not negotiate anything which it was not compelled to by law and that it was determined to make inroads upon the existing contract. Perceiving themselves as forced into a defensive position not only in respect to defending existing contract rights, but in respect to their right to negotiate at all, they were under pressure to focus upon only those demands that were clearly negotiable under the law. Therefore, at this stage they dropped their demands related to "professional involvement" along with a number of other items the Board had insisted were "non-negotiable."

After hearing revised proposals from both the union and the district superintendent, the Board determined simply to extend the existing contract for one year without changes. Although the Board had the legal right to make such a determination, the union found it unacceptable in view of the Board's continued unwillingness to engage in any further negotiations. The School Board then issued a memorandum stating it would be willing to retract its extension of the current contract, providing a three-year contract instead, if the union would accept "merit pay" as a condition of the new contract. While this was a clearly unacceptable offer to the CFC, union leaders saw it as an opportunity to re-open negotiations.-- for Board and CFC representatives had not met in a negotiating session since they sat down with the mediator in March. The CFC requested the Board to have its representatives meet with theirs. However, the Board did not respond to the CFC's request until the middle of September, by which time the current contract had already expired. The Board withdrew its demand for merit pay at this meeting, but under conditions the union still felt it could not accept.

Two weeks after the opening of school in September, 1973, the CFC held a membership meeting in which the Cedarton teachers determined to go on strike. The vote was overwhelmingly in favor of the strike action. While some teachers abstained, over 95% of those voting supported a strike.

The Strike:

Some respondents thought the Board deliberately provoked the strike. Others thought union leaders wanted a strike as a means of strengthening their organization. What seems more likely is that the strike occurred as an outcome of the determination of both groups to dig in and assert their respective positions -- i.e., the Board's desire to establish its authority in managing the school district clashed with teachers' desire to firmly establish their right to negotiate a solid contract. The following comment by the President of the 1973 School Board supports this interpretation.

"Most of the Board members were strong personalities who felt confident in their own abilities....Most had the strength to follow through on their conclusions, despite the fact that it would generate controversy.... We took specific issues, and we said, "Will we take a strike if the union doesn't agree to this issue? And on certain issues, we decided yes, we would take a strike."

Teachers, on the other hand, were angry -- because they perceived the Board as refusing to negotiate in good faith, about the merit pay proposal, and over what seemed to them arrogant attitudes toward teachers, evident at Board meetings and in the press. A rank-and-file union member explained, "the spirit was, we're going to band together and not take this kind of treatment." For the first time, the teachers' organization had a unified membership to support a strong stand.

Over 90% of the teaching staff actually stayed away from work, and most also walked the picket line. A former Association president commented,

"The Board was putting us under tremendous pressure at that time. It had been such a frustration, for so many years, to see ourselves so divided....To me, the most significant thing was to see teachers work collectively. We saw people who were part of the Old Guard who never would have embraced the merger support the strike.

Once the strike was under way, the issues changed on both sides. Taking full advantage of the Taylor Law's prohibition against strikes, the Board acted quickly to halt it. They not only imposed two-for-one salary penalties,* but in addition, served twenty-two teachers, including the CFC leaders and many rank-and-file members with injunctions to appear in court. Ten days later, all twenty-two were sentenced to jail, with terms ranging from fifteen to thirty days. Teachers were escorted out of the courtroom by armed guards, fingerprinted, and taken away in paddy wagons to the county jail. This was the harshest treatment ever given rank-and-file teachers for striking within New York State. A New York Times report on the Cedarton case, dated October 4, 1973 notes that until this occasion, school boards had been reluctant to utilize the courts in their disputes with teachers. Nevertheless, in this case, the School Board declined the opportunity to make a plea to the court for leniency. A 1973 School Board member commented,

We were asked by the judge if we wanted to make a statement to him before sentence was imposed. We went around the room and we considered the possibility of jail sentences. It was surprising to me -- people that were on the Board elected on pro-education platforms....-- some of them felt that if jail sentence was a possibility, the Board should strive for the harshest possible sentence... The final decision taken was that we shouldn't ask for a jail sentence, but that we should not do anything to weaken our position.

NYSUT attorneys providing legal assistance to the twenty-two teachers appealed the sentences as imposing "excessive" penalties and were successful in having them substantially reduced. Nevertheless, the fact of the initial jailing served to dramatize the Board's stance towards teachers as highly punitive. This action, rather than having the intended effect of cutting the strike short, heightened teachers' anger and boosted rank-and-file determination to hold out at a point when financial and other pressures might otherwise have induced many to return to work.

* The law imposes a fine of two days' pay for every day a public employee is on strike.

In addition to invoking the penalties available under the law, Board members publicly denounced the union at meetings and in the press. A rank-and-file teacher explained,

They accused us of having the union heavies running the show...We tried to get some of the Board members to meet, to talk, but ... it was always 'the union, the union, the union,' as if it was some kind of five-headed monster. It turned out the Board president was going to save the district from the ... unionization that was going to ruin public education. That's really what the issue came to. It didn't matter about us. Instead of trying to negotiate, what they did was to see what they could do to wreck us.

In contrast to the image of its leaders as "union heavies" almost all teacher and administrator respondents commented on the quality of leadership exercised by CFC as exceptionally responsible. The union president, James Nelson, was described as a strong, level-headed leader who communicated very well with the membership. One rank-and-file union member explained,

You couldn't get a more clear-cut individual. You knew exactly where he was, exactly what he was doing. He involved his organization every step of the way....You know, in any organization, there are hotheads and people who will be unreasonable....So you had people suggesting crazy things. But Jim was always clear. He was intelligent and very articulate. So we knew we were in good hands.

Nelson's leadership appears to have enhanced union solidarity and a sense of clarity among members regarding the issues; there is no evidence, however, that he encouraged teachers into taking more militant positions than they themselves were willing to undertake.

Nor was there evidence that NYSUT representatives encouraged or prolonged the strike, as some Board and administrator respondents charged. In contrast to Board claims regarding "outside" union influence, union respondents indicated that the decision to strike and to continue the strike were strictly internal. Some union member respondents were actually indignant at the suggestion that NYSUT influenced the strike. One said,

Maybe there were people up in Albany who hoped we would go on strike, but no way were they in that room. No one from the state (union) even spoke to us, and Jim Nelson made no reference to them...Jim stood up and said, "This is what they have offered us. What do you want to do about it?" It was the merit pay thing...He said, "How do you want to deal with it?" It was our decision, our vote. We didn't have to go on strike.

The district superintendent, Andrew Wilson, kept a low profile during the strike. Respondents reported him to have been non-communicative with teachers and at Board meetings. Teachers took his silence to mean approval of the Board's position. Other administrators appear to have been divided in their loyalties during the strike. Some actually handed out subpoenas to picketing teachers and several testified against strike activists in court. Only a few were genuinely supportive of teachers or made efforts to mediate between parties. Most, like Wilson, played passive roles. Many teachers were embittered by administrators' passivity and instances of outright compliance with the School Board's position. Teacher respondents reported they believed administrators, especially Wilson, could have done far more to promote dialogue between teachers and the Board during the strike, and to help bring about an earlier settlement. This bitterness became an important factor affecting teacher-administrator relations after the strike was over.

Community residents were mainly in support of the Board early in the strike. As the strike progressed, however, community support shifted to be far more favorable towards teachers. Several factors accounted for this change. First of all, union leaders deliberately sought channels for informing people in the community as to the issues and CFC positions during the strike. They released statements to the press regularly and received favorable coverage by one local paper. In addition, the union held numerous community meetings and "coffee-klatches" -- sometimes more than five such meetings per day -- so that residents could directly meet with and talk to teachers. Rank-and-file members even canvassed residents on a door-to-door basis. All of this exposure to teachers' views strongly influenced community attitudes towards the strike. According to several respondents from the community,*

* People interviewed because of their later status as School Board members, who were only residents at the time of the strike.

the Board's position began, increasingly, to strike community people as unreasonable and arrogant. The jail sentences, especially, aroused their sympathy for teachers.

In addition to arousing sympathy for teachers, teachers' strike activities had the effect of heightening community awareness of school affairs. According to the same community respondents, many people began to "sit up and take notice" of what took place in the school system for the first time during the strike. People began attending official School Board meetings and reading school news more regularly. Parents and other residents for the first time became aware of aspects of the school system that went beyond budgetary concerns or the immediate types of school activity that children reported to them.

Towards the end of the strike, therefore, attitudes in the Cedartown community shifted conspicuously to a point where respondents estimated at least 50% to have been "pro-teacher", and where residents were far more cognizant of problems and issues within the school system than they had been before the strike.

The strike lasted for twenty-eight days -- far longer than either side expected. Teachers had fully expected the Board would quickly come to terms when confronted with their own determination, and Board members didn't expect teachers would hold out for long. However, intense feelings, mounting on both sides, lent fire to issues on which one side or the other might earlier have been ready to yield. A member of the 1973 union negotiating team explained,

You can be close to a settlement, and the minute you have a strike, all of a sudden the teachers are saying, 'No way. We're not going to give an inch. Boy, they're going to give us this, and this --' You can be very close together and suddenly you're miles apart. It takes a long time to get back together again. We had gotten closer together (at one point) and all of a sudden the Board of Ed jailed teachers. Then we flew apart again.

Events such as the jailing of teachers also gave rise to new teacher demands. Following the jailing incident, a "no reprisals" clause became a key union demand; teachers feared many could lose their jobs as a consequence of strike activities, a possibility

allowed by the Taylor Law, though still unprecedented in the state.* Based on the Board's vindictiveness in permitting the heavy jail sentences, further penalties seemed plausible.

As the strike progressed, however, pressures mounted on both sides to settle -- pressures on the union from rank-and-file teachers and pressures on the Board from parents. The same union respondent quoted above explained how time and pressure affected the negotiating climate:

Time had to go by and pressure had to be applied until finally the settlement was easy....Pressure had been applied. We knew we had to give on some dear items, the Board of Ed. had to give on dear items, and we got a settlement that wasn't outstanding. We got pretty much the kinds of things we should have gotten without a strike.

According to a local newspaper report dated October 6, 1973, a parents' group petitioned the State Commissioner of Education to intervene in the strike and to use his influence to end it. Respondents report that both parties were called to a meeting in New York City and that settlement was reached in a matter of hours. A contract agreement between the CFC and the Cedarton School Board was ratified on October 13th. To that date, the Cedarton teachers' strike had lasted longer than any in the state outside of New York City.

The Strike Settlement:

Based on teachers' initial demands, the strike settlement provided them no significant gains. They were granted a small across-the-board salary increase, but it was far below the Consumer Price Index that year and came nowhere near making up for the heavy financial penalties imposed on striking teachers. (Teacher respondents reported having lost an average of several thousand dollars apiece.) In addition, playground duty was eliminated as a regular obligation for elementary teachers and some slight improvements were made in fringe benefits. Finally, the

* The law provided the Board the right to fire tenured teachers for participating in a strike. Teachers could also lose tenure.

settlement agreement included a "no reprisals" clause to protect teachers who had participated in the strike against further penalties. In respect to the issue of teacher evaluation, the settlement agreement stipulated that a joint CFC-administration committee be established to review existing evaluation procedures and to recommend revisions.

While teachers were far from satisfied with the settlement, they felt it was the best they could gain at that time. Teacher respondents indicated, on the whole, that they felt they had "made their point" in striking, for none of the "regressive" measures originally sought by the Board were included in the settlement. While salary increases were minimal, they were increases, across the board, and not tied to any "merit" plan.

Impact of the Strike:

As indicated earlier, the events associated with the strike had two major effects: 1) they enhanced teacher solidarity and 2) they woke up the community. Both these effects had important long-range implications for the district in that they positively influenced later negotiations and better relations between community, School Board, administrators and the teaching staff.

In the period immediately following the strike, however, effects were more negative. Many teachers were embittered by the severity of penalties imposed upon them, over administrators having cooperated with the Board during the strike, and by colleagues who had crossed their picket lines. A rank-and-file elementary teacher explained,

The district sunk, and it was in pretty sad shape for a hell of a long time....Under the Taylor Law, we didn't receive our regular paychecks until February or March, so ... you're trying to pick the pieces up, and you're not getting paid... You saw a Board of Education and an administration that really didn't value what we'd been doing. That was crushing. ... The teachers had a wonderful sense of being together and of being pitted against this Board. A lot of crazy humor went on, it kept you going. But in terms of the business of the day, well, you taught the kids, because that's what you were there for -- I never felt the kids were penalized... Teachers picked up for their kids

and went back to teaching. -- But when it came time for committees, there were no volunteers. That district was on strike for years afterwards, in spirit, and that broke it. The district sunk, and was in pretty sad shape for a hell of a long time.

Respondents reported, also, that administrators were unable to deal effectively with teacher resentments, for most were afraid to take initiative to turn things around. A 1974 School Board member explained the situation at the time she came on the Board:

We found....the administrators were afraid to do anything. They were afraid to get in trouble with the superintendent.... and they were afraid of the Board. They were always looking over their shoulders, which made them almost impotent.

In summary, for a period of time, tensions within the staff were high, communication between teachers, administrators and the Board were poor, and important details were frequently neglected.

Teacher solidarity shown during the strike had important long-range effects in that it gave the union clout. An administrator commented,

Materially, they didn't gain a lot, but they gained a lot of power...Almost, if you will, a psychological type of power...I think teachers had the feeling, 'look, we showed our strength' and it gave them a cohesiveness that wasn't there before. I'm not saying power where they feel they can run the district, but (that) they realize they have a lot of strength.

And a former Association officer remarked,

Prior to that (the strike) every time we got to a crisis situation, we didn't deal from power...We felt so ... frustrated by anything we wanted to accomplish. The point was we finally could deal from a unified position. It was remarkable...what we were all looking for, the solidity. The strike was bitter, tough, but it was like a

very healing situation. That unity, strength is still there -- can be depended upon, called upon.

Evidence of having strong teacher support was an important factor influencing Board and administration willingness to listen to the union and to take seriously its positions in later negotiations.

The fact that the strike sensitized community residents to teachers' concerns had further long-range implications. During the spring following the strike, a group of residents launched a campaign to oust every School Board member up for re-election -- three out of a total of seven members were up. They ran an opposition slate on a strong pro-education platform in which School Board non-responsiveness and poor staff relations were key campaign issues. (Incumbents emphasized budgetary issues more strongly.) All incumbent candidates were soundly defeated -- an outcome which teacher respondents interpreted as a "moral victory" and "vindication" for the Board's actions during the strike. A few months later, another member of the strike Board resigned for personal reasons; he was replaced by a fourth, new, strongly pro-education person, strongly sympathetic to teachers. These changes in School Board composition meant that a majority were now new people who came onto the Board highly sensitized to issues involving staff relations and in a mood to make significant changes. Their spirit appears to have carried over to remaining incumbents, as well.*

THE POST-STRIKE PERIOD:

Respondents who served on the 1974 School Board were struck by the intensity of tensions within the staff at the time they took over. One of these respondents reported,

* Not that Board members were unified in their attitudes or ideas about what should be done in the district. 1974 Board respondents often referred to tensions and conflict among Board members as to what course to follow on a given issue, and attribute much of their success in terms of outcomes to the human relations skills of their president, a man who had served previously on the strike Board. What they shared in common, however, was their concern for improving relationships with the staff and the need to listen to the staff.

We felt we needed to take a deep look at the district -- where we were and where we could go...We decided that the undercurrent of feeling in the district had to be turned around if we were going to do anything towards improving the (school system)...We laid down a policy of communication....We called people to come to us. We went out into the schools. We talked to teachers. We listened to people, we did a lot of listening, and we learned a lot of things.

Another said,

What we tried to do was first sit down with everybody. We used to meet three days a week until two or three in the morning, talking to everybody, just to listen....It wasn't a stroke of genius on our part. It was simply a matter of what precipitated the strike. The teachers felt isolated, they felt that nobody was listening to them.

A third commented,

The Board went over backwards to being open and communicating with everybody. Interestingly enough, we may have over-reacted.

In later years, the frequency of Board meetings and hearings was greatly reduced and direct contacts between teachers and Board members less frequent. However, many respondents pointed out that once Board acceptance of the union and lines of communication had been established, there was less need for frequent contacts.

The Board's openness to communication and its responsiveness to teacher concerns was encouraging to teachers and seemed to them a further vindication for the bitterness of the strike. However, this was an uncomfortable time for administrators, especially since criticism of administrative policies and practices headed the list of teacher complaints at Board hearings. During this period, administrators were often by-passed in Board dealings with teachers, since Board members approached teachers directly and encouraged teachers to consult directly with them. Several respondents indicated they felt some Board members were "out to get" certain administrators, especially Wilson, the superintendent; they claimed Board members were openly disrespectful of Wilson at public meetings.

This situation added to the tension already existing between administrators and teachers, for now administrators felt they were being treated like second-class citizens. "Respect" and job security became issues for administrators during this period, and administrators formed their own union chapter.

External conditions, in the community, were problematic during the post-strike period. Two factors combined to severely limit public willingness to finance the schools. The first was an unexpected, rather sudden decline in school-age population. Respondents note that projections made in the sixties as to future district growth were way out of line with actual developments in the seventies. As residential expansion slowed down, and housing costs rose, new young families were no longer moving into the district, those who had moved in during the sixties now had children in high school. As a result, numbers of children enrolling in the elementary grades dropped dramatically. By the mid-seventies, an elementary school had been closed and a second was closed shortly thereafter, accompanied by heavy cuts in teaching positions.* At the time this research was conducted, additional closings and staff cuts were anticipated.

A second factor influencing school financing was inflation and the accompanying public resistance to increased school taxes. This resistance was less extreme than in some neighboring districts and elsewhere in the county -- Cedar-ton residents never voted down a school budget after the year of the strike, for example. Nevertheless, district tax rates were already high relative to the county, taxpayers were vocal, and the School Board was under considerable pressure to hold expenses down. Because of inflation, the only way to accomplish this was to cut services, and the area in which cuts in services could be most broadly applied was to increase class size, thereby further reducing the teaching staff.

In a period of less than five years, between 1974 and 1978, over 20% of the teaching staff lost their positions for budgetary reasons, mostly at the elementary level.

* Since state aid to a school district is based on per-pupil costs, and since district financing is heavily dependent upon state aid, losses in enrollment literally forced most of these cuts upon the district.

Issues During the Post-Strike Period:

Teachers were, naturally, distressed by the extensive cuts and the prospect of their continuing indefinitely. However, the union was powerless to prevent them. There was no basis on which it could challenge cuts based on declining enrollments, in any event; and, since the union had been unsuccessful in negotiating limitations to class size for the 1973 contract, there were no grounds on which it could legally challenge cuts based on increasing class size. The most the union could do was to ensure fair, predictable procedures as to how cuts were to be exercised, insisting on administrative adherence to a strict seniority system.

School Board respondents claimed they had been reluctant to increase class sizes and had anguished over having to dismiss additional teachers, but because they were accountable to the community, and because their school budgets rose annually in spite of staff cuts, they were under pressure to demonstrate their "fiscal responsibility" to taxpayers. A post-strike Board president explained,

What it comes down to...is a class size of, say, 20...justified in terms of education? Does a teacher teach differently with twenty in a class instead of twenty-three?...From a community point of view -- and this is not a wealthy community -- taxes are quite high, so we try to consider the fact that...if (maintaining a low) class size doesn't do anything educationally -- and there's no strong evidence that it does -- then we'll make the cuts.*

Class size had already been an important issue to teachers, even prior to the strike, and continued to be a teacher concern on its own merits, apart from its implications regarding staff cuts. Teacher respondents contended that class size limits had been increased by one or two each year, and that some elementary and many high school grades were now over thirty. Prior to the strike, the class size issue focussed on teachers' concern for

* Board members and administrators often cited this argument during interviews: i.e., that research on class size did not indicate smaller classes made much difference educationally and that increases were therefore justified.

maintaining an optimum teaching-learning environment. In the post-strike period, these concerns continued to be significant, as teachers actually witnessed their former standards eroding.* Now, however, their original concerns were compounded by a further concern for protecting job security. Both these related issues continued to be of primary importance to the union through the seventies, though the union was virtually powerless to strongly protect either.

A third important issue during the post-strike period was that of teacher evaluation. Like class size, this had been a strike issue -- in this case, related to the Board's "merit pay" proposal. Agreement to establish mutually satisfactory evaluation procedures had been a part of the strike settlement. The 1973 Board had wanted tenured teachers routinely evaluated, with rewards and penalties linked to quality of teaching performances.** Members of the post-strike Board also wanted tenured teachers evaluated, though they were more sensitive than their predecessors to teacher resistance to the concept of merit pay. Several Board respondents remarked on having been "shocked" to learn that few Cedarton teachers had been formally observed by administrators since the time of their receiving tenure, and that most teachers' files contained no records of their teaching performance for periods of ten to fifteen years. The Board took the position that more routine evaluations were necessary for all teachers, for purposes of "improving instruction."

Teacher concerns focussed upon how evaluations would be conducted and how written evaluations would be utilized. A major concern, dating back many years prior to the strike, was that evaluation procedures were so poorly defined that they could be arbitrarily manipulated by administrators to single out teachers unjustly for differential treatment, as they believed had occurred in respect to the dismissal of some non-tenured teachers in years prior to the strike. In the post-strike period, teachers anticipated the possibility of arbitrary application of evaluations in the dismissal or harassment of tenured teachers.

* Some elementary teacher respondents reported that some sections in the first grade had as many as twenty-eight pupils in the late seventies, in contrast to twenty-two or twenty-three in the late sixties.

** Only probationary teachers had been regularly evaluated until this time.

There was extensive discussion within the union as to how the issue of teacher evaluation ought to be handled. Members were agreed as to the importance of developing clearer, more specific and objectively based evaluation procedures. However, what these procedures ought to be, who ought to do the evaluating, and how often were open to debate.

Teacher participation in school planning and policymaking also continued to be a union issue in the post-strike period. This, too, had been an issue prior to the strike -- an area stressed both by the early union prior to merger with the Association, and included in the CFC's original 1973 contract demands. It was an issue which appears to have concerned high school teachers considerably more than teachers in the lower grades, for reasons which I have discussed elsewhere.*

Union respondents linked high school teachers' desire for more influence in school decisions in part to reported teacher feelings that the school was not being well run. Respondents located both in and out of the high school, including administrators, confirmed that severe problems had existed in that school during this period, with key problem areas identified being student discipline, ineffective administration, and high turnover among administrative staff. High school teacher respondents reported frequent changes in administrative policies with insufficient consultation with the faculty. They wanted to see structural changes in administrator-teacher relationships which would assure greater teacher input into decisions pertaining to the operation of the building -- e.g., changes in the basis of departmental governance, greater administrator accountability to teachers.

See Jessup (1971). Reasons offered for greater interest of high school teachers in school policy are as follows: (1) The departmental structure of the high school made for more complex institutional arrangements affecting teachers' daily work lives and over which they had relatively little control, in contrast to the more self-contained classroom situation of elementary teachers, (2) Student problems, especially discipline, took on greater magnitude at the high school level because students were older, got in bigger kinds of trouble and were less easily controlled, (3) Differences in the characteristics of teachers themselves, as documented by survey results which show high school teachers to be more ideologically oriented towards professional autonomy (apparently based on their higher levels of advanced training).

Changes in Administration:

Effectiveness of administrative leadership in the district continued to be a teacher and community concern during the post-strike period. The district superintendent (Wilson) had been a controversial figure, particularly due to his passive role during the strike and immediately after the strike. Many respondents defended Wilson on the grounds that he had been forced into a difficult position because of the Board's stance during the time of the strike. He was also apparently well liked, personally, in spite of some teacher resentment concerning his "management" approach to school matters. Union leaders, however, viewed him as having exercised very weak leadership during an extended period of crisis, and inconsistent in respect to consulting them prior to making important decisions. They therefore asked for Wilson's resignation, shortly after the post-strike Board took office.

Most post-strike Board member respondents confirmed union claims that Wilson exercised little direction over the district during their tenure, reporting that many decisions were made and carried out almost exclusively by the Board in consultation with union leaders. Neither Board members nor union respondents viewed this as having been a desirable situation, and both groups were in agreement that the superintendent ought to be replaced. In addition, union leaders asked for the resignation of the high school principal on grounds of ineffective administration, which they had carefully documented. Within the next two years, the Board replaced first the superintendent and then the high school principal.

Many teachers wanted to elect the high school principal -- reflecting another early union concept. School Board members, however, were less receptive to this idea for they viewed the principal, as they did the superintendent, as their administrative representative. The Board did, however, permit teacher representatives to serve with administration and community representatives on screening committees established to select the new administrators. Criteria set by the Board in selecting both the new superintendent and the new principal specifically included a demonstrated ability to work in consultation with teachers and acceptance, in principle, of teacher unionism.

The new superintendent, Matthew Crane, was hired in September, 1976. Crane was a strong administrator -- a capable manager and a man with firm convictions regarding educational goals and how the district ought to be run. Many rank-and-file teacher respondents described Crane as too "impersonal" and "management oriented"

for their taste, expressing a nostalgic desire for the more personal, informal administrative style they had experienced under Long. Griping about administrators' "management mentality" and "depersonalized attitudes" were strong themes recurring in interviews with teachers and in comments written on questionnaires. Union leaders, however, were more apt than rank-and-file teachers to acknowledge that the district had changed in ways that virtually precluded its successful operation in Long's style.

School district administration by this time was clearly larger, more complex, more bureaucratic in nature -- in part because of the district's earlier growth, and in part for other reasons.* Union leaders were more apt than rank-and-file teachers to acknowledge this, and to recognize the nature of constraints upon central administration. They were therefore more appreciative than the rank-and-file of Crane's skill as an administrator and of his reasonable, direct treatment of them. They were able to establish a good working relation with Crane. They insisted upon a policy of routine administrative consultation with teacher representatives in reference to any changes the superintendent or building principals considered making, and they found Crane generally supportive of such a policy, though building principals were sometimes resistant. Gradually, as union leaders and top district administrators were able to more clearly define necessary differences in their positions, much of the post-strike bitterness and tension between administrators and teaching staff began to subside.

Organizational Structure and Leadership:

The formal structure of the CFC differed only slightly from the old Association. As in the Association, the major officers were the elected officers (president, vice presidents, secretary and treasurer) and appointed committee chairpersons (for grievance committee, negotiating committee, welfare, etc.). These elected and appointed officers together formed the Executive Council --

* For example, state and federal regulations tied to funds allocated for special programs mandated local district accountability, limited flexibility and increased record-keeping; innovations in curriculum, specialized programs required greater administrative coordination, etc. Factors related to the union -- e.g., the contract, grievance procedures -- forced administrators to be more systematic, and therefore more formal, in their dealings with teachers.

a body of about nine members -- which was the organization's top decision-making body. The only significant difference between the CFC Executive Council and the Association's executive body was the former's expansion (in 1975) to include division vice presidents, each representing one of the major school divisions -- secondary, middle, and elementary. These positions were devised to improve liaison between top union leaders and rank-and-file.

Another carry-over from the Association was the position of "building representative," with the difference that instead of one representative for each building, as in the Association, the CFC constitution provided for one representative for every ten teachers (about thirty representatives altogether) and for a "Representative Council" which met bimonthly, alternating with full membership meetings, to discuss and take action on presidential and Executive Council recommendations.*

A third, major structural difference from the Association was the inclusion in the CFC of non-teacher groups (aides, clerical and service workers). This change, in keeping with practices in local teacher unions throughout the state, was reportedly instituted by the CFC for the purpose of providing unified union representation for all groups within the staff (with exception of administrators) thereby reducing potential competition among them. Non-teacher groups were represented on the Representative Council, but operated under separate contracts, separately negotiated. No evidence was provided to indicate that inclusion of these groups in the organization significantly altered its activities or direction. By virtue of their greater numbers, teachers continued to dominate the organization.

In discussions of organizational change, respondents gave far more emphasis to changes in the nature of organizational leadership than to any formal structural changes in the organization. Important informal differences in the nature of leadership were evident in respect to (1) degree of continuity or stability in top leadership positions, (2) the type of teacher who tended to be active, and (3) style of leadership.

* These formal structural changes paralleled developments in teacher union locals elsewhere in the state and in the other districts studied.

1. Continuity in office: Under the Association, people assuming leadership roles had changed virtually every year. By contrast, most top officers in the CFC in 1979 had been active since 1973, and several, including the president, had been active members of the early union during the late sixties.* While officers were duly elected and re-elected by democratic procedures, CFC leaders made a deliberate effort to maintain continuity in key positions such as president, division vice presidents, and chairpersons of the negotiations and grievance committees. This was done on the assumption that experience gained by an individual continuing for many years in the same office was too valuable an asset to the organization to be sacrificed for the sake of circulating offices more. Nelson commented on his own situation, as president:

I can say -- and all the others say it, it isn't a question of egotism -- right now I'm too goddamn valuable not to run. I have too many state contacts, I've been through bargaining, I've been through arbitrations, I've been to court...My experience is invaluable...I've worked with Michael Crane and the assistant superintendent week by week, for years. It's taken me years to develop all those contacts, to have the experience. When I go into a meeting and B _____ comes with me, Crabe (the new superintendent) can say something and we say, "No, that's not true, because we agreed in 1973 to this." And he'll say, "Well, I'll have to go check..." and he'll come back, and say, "Yup, you were right."

A former Association officer had this to say in comparing conditions in the Association to the current situation:

Every year, you had a new series of faces, and this worked to our discredit. I see the strength

* Among the most active core of union officers in 1979, a majority were former members of the Cedarton Teachers' Federation, rather than the Association. Few officers from the old Association continued to be active after the merger, in spite of deliberate efforts at the time of the merger to recruit candidates equally from both former organizations. Interest in serving in the organization appeared to be the major factor accounting for differences in activism.

of the new organization as far superior... but you have to have some very dedicated people. There's no question but that experience and continuity is a tremendous asset. When you go in and start to negotiate and you've had the same negotiator for 6-7 years, there isn't a line he hasn't heard, there isn't a game he hadn't played, there isn't any nonsense he hasn't experienced. And he can, like a good card player, read the cards so much...more effectively.

2. Type of teacher assuming leadership: Under the Association, top leadership positions had been concentrated mainly among elementary teachers. The calibre of people serving varied from year to year, with some presidents commanding considerably more respect from both staff and administrators than others.

Following the merger, leadership positions in the new organization were concentrated mainly in the high school. Furthermore, activist respondents explained that a deliberate effort was made to recruit candidates who were highly respected by their colleagues. The CFC was successful in sustaining a stable, active core of about fifteen teachers regarded by one another and by less active respondents as an unusually competent and principled group. To compensate for the difficulty of sustaining activism among so many, some lesser leadership positions were rotated among a cadre of people who served for a few years, took time off, and then resumed an active role.

Respondents from among all categories interviewed generally spoke very highly of CFC leaders. Those few who were more critical fit into no special pattern and appeared to have no special information, but rather seemed to be random individuals having their own axes to grind. Some typical representations of CFC leaders are offered in the excerpts below:

Comments by union members:

I think we've got some damned good people... That's always going to be the real strength -- the people we have that are running that show. We have very effective leadership... Jim (Nelson) is a very effective person.

Very bright, very sharp on his feet, very logical. He won a great deal of support because of his whole manner, the way he handled himself.

The people who are the leaders are people who are respected...They are good teachers. People realize this, and it helps to get the union's points across. They're not people who take days off and so on. They're there. They're hardworking, they're interested in kids.

A lot of it is the people...people like Jim Nelson and B _____ (an early union president, still active) who, when they talk, make a great deal of sense and therefore people follow them.

Comments by administrators:

The union officers...are strong teachers, good teachers concerned about their classes, concerned about their kids. ..They are some of the best teachers we have in this building. It's not the way you find in some school districts, where the...union officers are not the best teachers...I think that's a major thing.

I've always felt the union leaders in this district have been the hardest working and most dedicated teachers. I know in some other districts, the leadership tends to be indifferent to goofing off and absenteeism -- a lot of rhetoric. But here, people in the union leadership are really professionals.

I think it's the most responsible union I've worked with....In comparison to the group I worked with in _____ (school district where respondent previously served as principal) this group is head and shoulders above them, in integrity and honesty and also in effectiveness.

Comments by School Board members:

In Cedarton, we're particularly fortunate.
The (union) leadership has been good.
(Current member)

We have very responsible union leadership.
A lot of other districts around don't.
The whole group of them, not just Nelson.
(Current member)

I certainly had a great deal of respect for...
Jim Nelson and many of the other people on
the Executive Board....I felt these were among
our best teachers, and when they spoke, ...I
felt I really had to listen. (Former member)

3. Leadership style: Continuity in office allowed for the development not only of expertise among top leaders, but also of a leadership style not possible when there had been continual turnover. Top union officers in Cedarton exerted active, strong leadership roles.

The presence of a stable, active core of officers provided Nelson with a cadre of people whom he could trust, consult, and rely upon for sharing leadership responsibilities. Members of this group (fluctuating in size from the four most active to about fifteen, depending upon the situation) met almost daily in informal consultation. Nelson commented:

We'll hash things out, develop positions.
You see, most of the clarity in our thinking comes informally. I have a pretty good group of people I can talk things over with...(We) mutually criticize each other....We make a decision as to where the union should go, than it's my job to sell it. I've never gone into a meeting not knowing what to do.

An official from the state organization, NYSUT, commented as follows upon the CFC leadership style:

They are without question the greatest joint decision-making body around. It is done jointly. I'm talking about the top leadership...Generally, it works this way: the

officers will talk over a proposal or problem and make a recommendation...They make sure their building reps are well aware of what's going on...Their competency as leaders, and their ability to analyze a situation (are unusual). It's one of the few organizations I know of that takes hard positions which the teachers would oppose, saying, "Hey, we did it for a reason..." There is a real honesty, trust that the top officers have carefully evaluated the situation, and so they (the membership) will generally support.....

This style of leadership, in which a small group actively led the rank-and-file in developing union positions, represented a change from both the old Association, in which leadership styles were generally weaker (largely due to leaders' lack of expertise) and the early Union, in which decision-making processes were more fully democratic. Some respondents who had been members of the early Union were critical of the current leadership style, contrasting it to the pre-merger Union philosophy, which had emphasized more internal democracy. In the early Union, there had been greater circulation in union offices and more extensive, open discussion of issues at membership meetings. Important decisions were based upon fuller member participation. It should be noted, however, that in the pre-merger period, the small size of the Union permitted fuller membership involvement, and the fact that the Union did not at that time officially represent the entire Cedartron staff meant issues could be dealt with on a more theoretical plane, subject to pressures associated with the need for immediate, practical application.

During the course of an interview with Nelson, I commented on the resemblance of CFC (1979) leadership patterns to oligarchy. Nelson replied,

Yes, ...but it's elected...The democratic process requires professionals, I believe that...I believe most strongly in representative democracy. I don't believe in pure democracy...Then you have ignorant people making rash judgments, at the moment. That may be callous, but I think it's the truth. We've talked about this with all the representatives.

Other activist respondents commented on the difficulty of sustaining rank-and-file involvement in the organization as a factor contributing to the exercise of strong leadership by the active core. A union officer commented,

It's easy to say, "Run a democratic union."
But you can't get people....That's the biggest difficulty, just getting people involved. The major portion of the work is done by a few people, and it's becoming less democratic for that reason...

Membership participation and support:

Activists commented almost unanimously upon the difficulty of sustaining rank-and-file involvement in the organization. One remarked,

It's a lot of work, and it's hard...You have to...get everyone involved. That's a difficult problem. We have meetings, and (people don't show). We try, because we have to make sure everyone is involved who wants to be...

Another commented,

This is our biggest problem right now, I think...just getting people involved. They're not showing up at meetings, and there are few issues now to make them show up...The major portion of the work is done by a few people, and...if you do a good job, people tend to think, "Fine, let them do it..."

A third,

They're happy that you do the work. They feel that things are running pretty smoothly, somebody must be doing the work. As long as it's not them, they're happy...They'll occasionally stop me in the hall, and ask, "What's happening? How should I vote? Should I get upset...?"

Other respondents, however, including both activists and rank-and-file members, commented that in spite of low membership participation, rank-and-file teachers were generally very supportive of leadership positions. One rank-and-file respondent explained,

- The leadership always feels they're not getting quite the support they need from everybody. But (they) know that the whole group out there is responsive and that if there's a problem, they can call upon them, and they'll be available, ready. So it's more relaxed support, but the base is there.

Leaders used a variety of techniques to maintain lines of communication with the rank-and-file. A major line of communication was through the vice presidents and the building representatives, who disseminated information at the division and building levels. Another was based on a policy of calling ad hoc meetings on issues of particular, widespread concern. These meetings focussed on the issue at hand, and were generally more successful in attracting attendance than regular membership meetings. An activist respondent gave the following example:

Take, for example, our idea of teacher coordinators. We had an awful lot of teacher involvement in that...The first thing I remember is that we called a meeting of the entire high school faculty...The administration, typically, had come out with a bulletin saying, "This is what we're going to do." We went down to the faculty room and everybody was in an uproar. They wanted to know all the details. So, we had a meeting of the whole faculty. We presented what our solution to the problem would be, but we didn't have any idea whether the administration would accept it. I can't remember exactly -- but we spent a lot of time on it. We had a variety of meetings. When we finally got to the point where there was a certain number of teachers interested...in this position, we met with them a lot. Then we would meet with the whole high school staff, tell them how far we'd gotten, and would involve them in the middle of the fight...We'd call meetings to give progress reports...

Degree of Organizational Solidarity:

Respondents consistently reported that solidarity within the union was strong. While disagreements occurred, these were not strong enough to cause rifts among members or within the activist core. There were, therefore, no real factions within the CFC. The only reported major divisions were along secondary vs. elementary lines, appearing to be based mainly on the inability of each group to understand the other's problems.

While no factions were reported within the union, there was a small group who pulled out of the union in 1976 to form a separate, competing organization affiliated with the NEA. This occurred shortly after the NEA and AFT, which had merged on a statewide basis in New York in 1972, announced their decision to again separate. The dispute at the local level centered on the question of which of the larger organizations the CFC should maintain affiliation.*

The new NEA affiliate challenged the CFC in a collective bargaining election during the winter of 1979 to gain representation rights. Cedarton teachers, however, gave their overwhelming support, by a vote of 210 to 30, in favor of maintaining the CFC as their bargaining agent. This solid victory served to confirm respondent claims as to the solidity of rank-and-file backing for CFC leadership.

Relationship of the CFC to the Statewide Organization:

The CFC maintained loose connections to their statewide affiliate, the New York State United Teachers (NYSUT). Union respondents reported NYSUT connections to have been invaluable at the time of the strike, in terms of legal and financial assistance the state organization provided. NYSUT also provided information and advisory services pertaining to contract negotiations on a continuing basis, and it served as a central base for political lobbying to influence state legislation.

* Respondents who were officers in the new NEA affiliate in 1979 tended also to be highly critical of CFC leaders in respect to lack of success in negotiating better job protection, salaries and fringe benefits. However, these criticisms were not offered as the major reason for separating from the union and thus appeared to be more on the order of campaign issues than of real differences in organizational priorities.

Access to NYSUT was maintained both through a well-staffed area headquarters and a local field representative. The Cedarton field representative, an experienced labor negotiator, was available to the local organization for consultation on a continuing basis, but, both by his own testimony and according to local district respondents, he played a "back seat" role. In respect to contract negotiations -- the area in which the field representative was most strongly involved -- he provided suggestions as to phrasing of contract demands and advice as to when to hold out or yield at the bargaining table, but final decisions were always made by the local leadership and/or membership. A CFC officer explained,

K _____ (the NYSUT field rep) doesn't pressure us. He gives us his opinion and his advice and then we weigh it and go the way we want... We may disagree. It's always ultimately our decision.

A few respondents who were administrators and School Board members during the strike period charged NYSUT with having influenced the local union to take certain positions and to have ultimately "caused" the 1973 strike, but there was no evidence to bear out such a charge. A member of the CFC negotiating team from 1973 commented,

The first year, the Board thought we were going to have a strike because of the NYSUT (representative) we were given...They thought Al Shanker was telling us what positions to take...But...the only input we get from the state is stuff we request...Our NYSUT rep...doesn't tell us what to do. He's invaluable, will give suggestions, but it's never that he'll tell us what to negotiate or how.

THE LATE SEVENTIES

Negotiations: 1976 and 1979

Negotiations for the next contract, to take effect in September 1976, began in February, 1976. The CFC negotiating team and Board representatives met in many sessions spread out over a period of several months. The CFC contract proposals fell

essentially into the same categories as those offered in 1973: increased salary and benefits, strengthening provisions for due process in respect to grievances and teacher evaluation, job protection, limiting workloads (especially in respect to class size and extra duties) and professional involvement.

The Board's response to teacher proposals differed little, essentially, from that of the 1973 Board, with the post-strike Board members expressing concerns for protecting "management prerogatives" and their obligations to the community. The major differences in 1976 were in the form of negotiations and Board members' attitudes towards the union. Four Board representatives met face-to-face with union representatives, thus allowing for far more dialogue and mutual clarification of proposals than had been possible in 1973. While Board proposals were not wholly satisfactory to the union, the Board made no extreme contract demands comparable to the "merit pay" proposal in 1973. While respondents report that negotiating sessions were difficult and often tense, an atmosphere of mutual trust and genuine desire to resolve outstanding issues prevailed.

The negotiations continued through June of 1976 -- longer than either side had anticipated -- and a number of issues were still left unresolved. By mutual agreement, the outstanding issues were referred in late June to "Fact-Finding." These were eventually resolved, however, by the two parties themselves, without intervention of a Fact Finder.

Neither union leaders nor rank-and-file members were happy with the 1976 settlement. The union made no significant contract gains, being successful only in protecting gains made in previous years against erosion from Board demands. Even salary increases were below the inflation level. Union leaders explained they were not in a position to press for more, given current economic conditions, declining enrollment, and taxpayer resistance to spending. It was clear that any further union gains would have required the CFC to have made concessions in some other areas.

1979 negotiations went more smoothly and far more quickly. Essentially, the settlement was an extension of the existing, 1976, contract with a small salary increase. In addition, for the first time in 1979, the union gave up some benefits included in previous contracts, the most significant being sabbatical leaves. These were yielded in exchange for protection of some faculty positions.

The major issues in both 1976 and 1979 contract negotiations were job protection and class size. The Board continued to refuse to include class size limitations in the contract, claiming they didn't want to "handcuff" future Boards. Board members did, however, agree to specify in a side letter of agreement that a committee composed of teachers and administrators be established to determine guidelines to weighting class sizes to adjust to problems created by special classroom situations (e.g., shop) or students requiring special attention. That agreement was subsequently honored.

In respect to job protection, the union offered the Board a proposal for creating retirement incentives, on the assumption that if some older teachers could be induced to retire early by the offer of a lump cash sum, jobs of young teachers low on the seniority list could be saved. The Board agreed to such a provision for teachers over fifty-five years of age having over twenty years of service in the district. However, the cash sum was too small to provide sufficient inducement for many teachers to agree to retire. Thus, between 1973 and 1979, the union made no significant contract gains, and there were some losses.

Negotiations went quickly in 1979 because they were far more direct than in previous years. A Board representative participating in the negotiations explained,

They came in with proposals they felt were realistic, could be accepted, and we went to them with things we felt were reasonable acceptable...So, essentially, what we did was to take the game-playing out of it. There was still compromising to be done and there were a couple of issues we (questioned) but you didn't have all this back and forth game playing...each side coming in with 172 proposals, bargaining off things that really don't matter. We said, "Let's skip this whole thing. We trust each other. Let's get to the issues." So that's what happened.

Union respondents pointed out that the greater ease with which negotiations took place could be attributed in large part to the post-strike Board members' greater acceptance of the legitimacy of the negotiations process, and also to the fact Board members realized the union had strong teacher support. The union's chief negotiator explained,

Now they know we're talking with a united voice. They accept that, and it makes all the difference in the world. I suspect our next negotiations are going to be just as easy....It's completely different. It's a friendly coexistence now, whereas before, ...we were always fighting.

Non-Contractual Gains:

While the CFC was unsuccessful in negotiating any significant contract gains after 1973 and actually incurred some contract losses in 1979, it made several important non-contractual gains between 1973 and 1979. These included: (1) establishment of alternate means of clarifying guidelines delineating teacher rights and obligations and conditions in the work environment, outside the contract; (2) smoother operation of both formal and informal procedures for handling teacher grievances; (3) establishment of the practice of ongoing consultation between union leaders and district administration on all matters of concern or potential concern to teachers. These gains were supported by the atmosphere of mutual trust and respect which developed first, between Board members and union leaders, and later, between union leaders and central district administrators.

1. Alternate guidelines: Prior to the strike, both association and union activists regarded the contract as the only vehicle for specifying guidelines regarding teacher rights and obligations or conditions in the work environment. Where the Board was unwilling to negotiate on certain issues -- e.g., class size and teacher evaluation, which Board members claimed as their "prerogatives," there was no possibility of establishing even a common basis of agreement as to their handling. Board members simply maintained they would make the decisions in these areas, passing instructions downwards to teachers, through administrators. Over the years following the strike, however, the Board indicated increased willingness to develop some guidelines (e.g., on detailed procedures for teacher evaluation, class size) in written memoranda of agreement outside of the contract. Such memoranda, while not subject to outside arbitration if violated (as with violations of the contract) served to formalize and clarify district policies in many areas of routine concern. Once clarified, they had the effect of being morally binding upon the various parties concerned.

Memoranda specifying guidelines pertaining, at first, to teacher evaluation and discipline policy, and later, class size and retirement incentives, were developed by committees having both administrator and teacher representation in consultation with both the Board and the union. Respondents from among Board members, administrators and union leaders reported consistently that use of these extra-contractual agreements greatly improved the flexibility of the contract, for it allowed for ongoing discussion and exchange pertaining to particular issues, as they arose, rather than limiting such discussion within the constraints imposed by formal negotiations.

In addition, from the union viewpoint, such memoranda enhanced its meager contract gains, insofar as the Board committed itself in writing on some issues it would not include in the contract -- as in the case of class size. Union respondents noted that the Board had not violated its memorandum of agreement specifying limits to class size, although that memo was not legally binding.*

2. Smoother operation of grievance procedures: Grievance procedures had been developed mainly during the years prior to the strike through negotiations by the Association and in accordance with developments elsewhere in the state, some of which were mandated by law. Hence, as far back as 1971 the Cedarton teachers' contract had a detailed grievance procedure providing for binding arbitration on all matters relating to violations of the contract. The Union had wanted to include violations of Board policy and administrative regulations in the 1973 contract, and this had been a strike issue. The 1973 settlement did include a clause permitting teachers to grieve violations of policy and regulations, but such grievances were specifically excluded from binding arbitration, with the district superintendent assigned the power to make the final decision in such matters. In 1976, the union again demanded that violations of Board policy and administrative regulations be grievable subject to binding arbitration, and the Board again, while agreeing in principle that such violations were grievable, refused to make them subject to outside arbitration. The 1976 Board was, however, willing to allow grievances based on policy or regulations to be appealed beyond the superintendent, to the Board itself.

* Union respondents still complained that class size limits were too high. Nevertheless, the formal assurance that they would not be increased further had some positive value.

Contractually, therefore, the union did not achieve what it sought in this area. Non-contractually, however, the provision for bringing grievances to the Board had two important effects: First, it served to increase Board members' awareness of teachers' problems and concerns. A union activist respondent pointed out that even in cases where teachers lost a specific grievance, the act of having brought it before the Board could have the effect of influencing later changes in policy that were in the long run beneficial to teachers. He cited the following illustration:

That grievance had to do with teacher aides. (The CFC also represents aides.) It had to do with seniority problems. The principal had a neighbor whom he wanted to work -- he gave her a special job, ahead of all the other aides...They (the Board) listened, and they rejected the grievance, because they said there was nothing specifically in the contract that said an administrator couldn't do that, But then they said they thought it was unfair, and directed the principal to come up with a policy that guaranteed that sort of thing didn't happen in the future.

Secondly, this provision put moral pressure on both administrators and the Board to be reasonable in their treatment of teachers. The same activist respondent cited above explained it this way:

If the Board takes a position which is adamantly against us, and we lose (the grievance) we actually win, because we involve a lot of teachers in this...It gets people to our meetings. At the end, people say, "Those damn jerks..." -- They're completely behind us, then. So the Board loses on a thing like that...They're beginning to realize this. So now, the position they follow is, "All right, we're going to listen, to try to be reasonable with these people."

Teacher, administrator and Board respondents all reported that by 1979, most teacher grievances were settled easily and amicably at the informal level. By contrast, prior to the strike, few had been settled without resorting to outside arbitration,

with the result that a large number of unresolved grievances were pending at the time post-strike Board members took office. Between 1974 and 1979, only one grievance was taken to arbitration.

Board and administrator respondents tended to believe this greater ease in the settlement of grievances reflected their own increased sensitivity to teacher concerns, (in contrast to previous Boards and administrators). Union activists, however, pointed out that the level of cooperation finally achieved did not come without a struggle, that it was only after union leaders had applied considerable moral pressure, and after administrators or Board members suffered embarrassment from having lost grievances that had been taken to outside arbitration, or after having been exposed to the faculty or community as seeming "unreasonable" or "unfair" that these groups appeared motivated to settle grievances amicably.

3. Consultation: The extent to which teachers were consulted by administrators and the Board on matters of school district policy and planning, and the extent to which administrators and the Board were responsive to teacher suggestions pertaining to such matters, had been union issues since prior to the merger, as well as strike issues. The union had been unsuccessful in negotiating any contract changes pertaining to this issue in 1973, 1976, or 1979. As in pre-strike contracts negotiated by the Association, later contracts simply acknowledged the value of Board and administrator consultation with teachers in regard to the development of educational policy and provided for regular meetings between district administrators (the superintendent and building principals) and representatives of the CFC.

Yet, union respondents claimed that by 1979, in actual practice, teachers had considerably more input into school district policy and planning decisions than they had had in the past, their input being channelled primarily through union leaders in consultation with top district administrators and building principals. While few claimed they had as much input as they would like, union respondents were virtually unanimous in maintaining that their level of input had improved, especially with the district superintendent and in the high school.

Some administrator respondents at both elementary and high school levels denied "consultation" to have been a legitimate issue, maintaining teachers had always been consulted and listened to in Cedarton. Other administrators, at both levels, however, point to differences in individual administrator styles and to

the difference between an administrator consulting with a few individual teachers and consulting more generally. As one administrator explained,

Principals always had individual teachers whom they respected and listened to, but I think... teachers' impact as a group is certainly greater than it was ten, fifteen years ago...The people in central administration, the building principals, and certainly the Board are listening more...Also, with a strong union, you have a more defined channel of information and opinion, and if the people who are in leadership are people you respect, and you know they're speaking for a large group, then the result is that it has more impact.

A union building representative commented:

The old ideal was ... arbitrary and at the whim of individuals...In a large institution, there have to be (ways) of formalizing the input...You just can't depend on good will. You have to have a more formal channel and a recognition that there are legitimate concerns - a necessity for input. It's very different now...For example, last year a new discipline policy was devised -- not by the administration, it was a cooperative effort. It's a new ball game.

Some respondents attributed improvement in the level of consultation mainly to a more responsive central administration and School Board. While this interpretation may be partially valid, data provided by this research, from both interviews and the survey, suggest that the union played a key role in bringing about this improvement. First, survey data indicated that rank-and-file teachers in Cedarton perceived their union to have given more emphasis to the goal of teacher participation in educational policy than was the case in the other districts studied.* Survey data also indicated rank-and-file teachers perceived their union to have been more effective in meeting this goal than was the

* See Appendix, Table 3.

case in the other two districts.* Furthermore, consultation at both building and at district-wide levels was usually either channelled directly through union representatives or granted in response to union pressures. A union activist explained,

It isn't done without a struggle...Once in a while, the best administrators will revert back to the good old-fashioned dictatorial self...Like, the superintendent had this pet idea regarding two-hour faculty meetings where we were going to discuss "real issues,"... claiming he had the right to do it and he was going to do it (without having consulted teachers). He said, "We are going to have after school meetings of two hours each, four of them per month."...Well, we had one hell of a fight on that!...There was this big reaction on the part of faculty, and we all got together and told him exactly what we thought of the idea and where it was going to lead him. We said, "Did you (propose) these meetings because you wanted to discuss things that are bothering you, or did you want to have this meeting to prove that you're the boss and we're the peons? Because if you did, you succeeded, because now we're going to dis-whether or not you have the right to do this. We're going to go back and find something in the contract that will snag you, and we're going to fight you on this. But we're not going to discuss what you really wanted to call these meetings for -- the problems of the school." We hit him like this. He didn't give up, he still wanted these meetings, but as a result, we came up with something that was mutually agreeable.

Improvement in the level of consultation was greatest in the high school, where teacher participation in policy formation had been a union issue since the late sixties. Teacher respondents from the high school claimed that by 1979, teachers had considerable input into almost every area of school policy and planning. Some areas, for example, curriculum decisions, were handled mainly through the departments. Areas such as the scheduling of hall duty

* See Appendix, Table 7.

and other non-teaching assignments were handled chiefly through union representatives in conference with building administrators. Decisions concerned with overall building policies, such as changes in departmental structure, discipline policy, and even the selection of new administrators were determined by committees having administrator, faculty, and union representation. Union representatives acted as "watchdogs" to ensure that committee recommendations did not violate the contract, that administrators fully attended to and responded to these recommendations, and that administrators brought their own ideas to the faculty for discussion prior to any enactment. A union leader in the high school offered the following example to illustrate how the union informally exerted influence over administrators in the latter case:

The principal had worked with us on a committee to work up a grievance program (in the high school). He had worked with us, everyone was pretty well satisfied. But at the faculty meeting, the principal came up with six additional things he was going to lay upon us. There had been no prior discussion of any of them. One of the good things about the union is that teachers are now amazed if anybody does that...His position was extremely rigid, and when we attacked him, the guy was upset...But he did react. He called me after the meeting and apologized for the position he had taken. Formerly, when administrators came in and said something -- for example, "You know, there aren't enough contacts between students and teachers outside the classroom. I'm going to institute a program" -- people would have said, "Okay, try it. I'm not going to bother debating it." The program would have failed ... because you can't force things like this. But the administrator would have felt good, that he had authority. With the union, they can't get by with this any more. People say, "You've had no previous discussion. You haven't shown the need for this kind of program." So I think the union forces administrators to be less sloppy about things like that.

This improvement in consultation had nothing to do with the contract -- contract provisions in this area were too vague to have had a binding impact. It reflected, rather, a change in expectations by teachers in the high school regarding their relationship

to administrators, and sanctioned by informal pressure existed under union leadership. The respondent cited above explained further,

It's really an attitudinal thing, on the part of teachers and administrators both...It has to do with the feeling of unity that we have. If he makes a statement like that (referring to statement cited above) and somebody from the union gets up and starts attacking him, he has the feeling that the entire faculty is behind that person, and he can't take it lightly. This feeling of unity has been built up slowly and painfully by all kinds of things... we have done.

Respondents believed the greater degree of consultation achieved in the high school, as compared to the lower grades, to have been mainly attributable to differences between high school and elementary teacher characteristics, with those at the elementary level less prone to questioning the legitimacy of strong administrative authority. As indicated in the example offered above, the union's ability to demonstrate strong rank-and-file support for their position.

Discussion and Analysis of the CFC Position in the Late Seventies:

Because external economic conditions created pressures for budgetary cuts, the union was forced into giving overt emphasis to protective concerns (related job protection, teacher welfare, and the protection of teachers' rights). At times, however, such concerns came into conflict with other teacher concerns related to maintaining professional standards and good relations with administrators and the community. Such conflicts arose, for example, in respect to teacher evaluation, grievances, and faculty participation in school decisions. Union leaders, for years, had thrashed out the issues surrounding such conflicts among themselves, with the result that by the late seventies, they had a clear, consistent view of their position -- a position in which the union's protective functions were carefully balanced with leaders' desire to foster high professional standards and good external relationships. Three specific cases illustrate how union leaders handled issues where concerns for teacher protection came into conflict with professional and other considerations. These are described below.

1. Grievances and the retroactive pay issue: The CFC placed moderate, qualified emphasis upon pursuing teacher grievances. The Grievance Chairperson defined his role as one which emphasized a sense of what was fair or reasonable, rather than serving as teacher advocate without regard to the nature of the complaint. He was, by reputation, a "fighter" with a strong sense of justice -- respondents cited important cases he had pursued and won on behalf of teacher grievants. At the same time, however, he had been known on many occasions to dissuade teachers from filing grievances which he regarded as unreasonable or trivial, even when these involved technical violations of the union contract.* The most conspicuous example of such a grievance involved a claim for retroactive pay for "longevity" on behalf of a group within the Cedarton staff.

The Cedarton teachers' contract provided that after fifteen years of teaching -- ten of which were to have been in Cedarton -- a teacher was entitled to additional compensation for longevity. During the mid-seventies, a teacher elsewhere in New York State, working under a similar contract clause, sued his Board of Education for full longevity credit for prior teaching experience outside the district, and won the case. Many Cedarton teachers had extensive prior experience, due to Long's hiring policies. Some chose to file a grievance demanding retroactive longevity pay based on this prior experience.

The Union took the grievance as far as Level III (the Superintendent), at which point union leaders learned the amount of money potentially involved. If teachers won, this grievance could have cost the district as much as \$750,000, at a time when the budget was already tight. At this point, union leaders discussed among themselves what course to pursue. The Grievance Chairperson explained,

Besides thinking the grievance was not totally legitimate, we wondered what it would do to the negotiating atmosphere and what we have in the district...It became obvious to us that if we won all that money, the district would get the money out

* Note that the Grievance Chairperson is under obligation to file grievances which are technically legitimate, where the grievant insists upon pursuing these -- even when these should not, in his judgment, be pursued.

of our hides in getting rid of younger teachers. The administration has a lot of power -- For example, if we come up with an idea for using a new teacher, they will sometimes go along with it, so we save a job that way, and we work very hard on things like that. We didn't want to ruin all that by demanding this money for the old timers who have been here and will stay here...So we did not go ahead with that grievance. I would have re-signed rather than go ahead with that grievance.

Union leaders met first with the building representatives and then the general membership to explain their position and to ask for membership authorization to seek a settlement. The Grievance Chairperson went on to explain,

We had a lot of meetings on this, argued pro and con. We encouraged people who disagreed to present their arguments, and they did. We explained our position. We took a vote, and then went by the vote...We were successful in getting...a settlement...a difficult settlement...In order to get this agreement, we had to supply the Board with waivers. People signed away their right to sue -- for \$6000, \$5000. We got 72% of those involved to sign waivers. But there are a number who didn't sign, and are quite aggravated.* But...we made a decision we thought was right. To pursue (this grievance) would be very harmful to our relationships in the district.

This case illustrates where union leaders placed priorities and how they handled themselves in a grievance case where grievants' technical rights were not in accord with what leaders considered reasonable and fair. They took a hard position with their membership, pursuing the course of action they deemed to be more

* A fraction of those who did not sign waivers did sue independently and won retroactive pay through the courts. The Union's failure to support this grievance lost it some members to the rival, NEA -- affiliated teachers' organization, and was thus a factor in that organization's growth.

reasonable, because they saw this course as better serving long-range teacher interests in terms of maintaining good relations with the School Board and community.

2. Teacher evaluation: A second case illustrating how union leaders balanced the union's protective function with other, professional considerations was its position in respect to the issue of teacher evaluation. As indicated earlier, teachers had been concerned in the early seventies as to how administrative evaluations would be conducted and how written evaluations would be utilized. Prior experience with colleagues whom they felt had been unfairly dismissed on the basis of arbitrary application of such evaluations made them suspect of Board proposals to evaluate tenured teachers. On the other hand, many teachers, including most union leaders, felt that improved evaluation procedures could be an important aid to teachers' professional development and, moreover, that it should not be the union's role to protect teachers from honest professional criticism.

Discussion of this issue had been taking place within the union dating back several years prior to organizational merger. Questions had arisen within the union as to what extent leaders could protect members and enhance membership solidarity without violating their professional integrity, as teachers. Many felt strongly that the union should not protect members who were demonstrably poor teachers, especially in view of the fact many, capable young teachers were being "excessed" on the basis of seniority.* Questions had also been raised as to whether poor teachers could be helped to improve teaching skills through the use of evaluations. Lack of administrator support for new, inexperienced teachers had been an issue back in the last sixties. By the mid-seventies, many teachers had been teaching for over a decade with virtually no feedback as to teaching problems or guidance in correcting these.

Intensive internal discussion of these questions enabled union leaders to clarify the issues surrounding evaluation and to

* Some even wanted to go so far as to have colleagues evaluate one another, thus providing a basis for determining which teachers deserved protection, since administrators' evaluations were not generally trusted. This position was rejected by the larger group on the grounds that for teachers to evaluate one another would introduce a competitive note that should be avoided in interests of maintaining solidarity.

develop a position in which their protective obligations were clearly balanced with professional considerations. In response to an interview question in which I asked whether union's goals of protecting jobs and strengthening solidarity ever conflicted with professional standards for teaching, union leaders in Cedarton responded, without exception, that it did not. The following two statements illustrate leaders' positions.

None (i.e., no conflict) whatever in my mind. I think an incompetent teacher should certainly be fired and I think an incompetent teacher should have due process of law, just as I think a criminal should be punished but a criminal should have the protection of due process of law.

I don't think so in our district. We've talked about it, among the leaders. We feel that if the administrators do their job and they can prove that a teacher is incompetent, then that teacher should be let go.

Key components in their position were (a) clear separation of administrative functions (in this case, conducting evaluations) from union functions (assuring due process) and (b) clear conceptual separation between guarantees to due process and outright protection. Based on these distinctions, the union leadership developed the following guidelines specifying the union position on teacher evaluation:

- (1) That teachers should not themselves formally evaluate colleagues, but that the union should support and encourage more extensive, careful administrator evaluation of all (including tenured) teachers.
- (2) That the union should play an active role in developing procedures and guidelines for administrator's evaluations and should act as watchdog to assure that administrators adhered to these.
- (3) That guidelines should emphasize specific, objective criteria for basing evaluations and that written evaluative reports should adhere to these.
- (4) That where teachers' weaknesses were identified, administrators should be held accountable to provide the teachers with direction and assistance in correcting these.

(5) That the union's role was to protect teachers' right to due process -- but not to protect incompetent teachers; that, in fact, if administrators could document that a teacher was performing ineffectively and if that teacher failed to respond to genuine administrator efforts to correct his/her performance, that teacher should be dismissed.

Because union leaders had clearly thought through the ramifications of their position on evaluation, they were able to easily obtain rank-and-file support for the position. In their dealings with administrators and the School Board, they were thus able to present solid reasoning and a united front. As a result, when members of the post-strike School Board approached union leaders for the purpose of formulating evaluation procedures, as specified in the 1973 contract, the union was in a strong position to offer criticisms of existing evaluation procedures and suggestions as to their revision. Development of a set of procedures that satisfied all concerned parties -- the union, administrators and the School Board -- took over a year. The end result, however, was a carefully prepared, workable plan that all parties could abide by.

Thus, union leaders' ability to recognize potential conflicts between their protective and professional concerns enabled them to develop a plan which acknowledged both sets of concerns, separating them in such a way that the union's ultimate position did not jeopardize one set of goals at the expense of the other.

3. Departmental governance in the high school: A third case illustrating how the union resolved contradictions between protective and professional concerns focussed upon the structure of departmental governance in the high school. Teachers perceived this as key to their gaining more influence in ongoing school decision-making: they had been highly dissatisfied with existing arrangements.

The position of department chairman had been abolished by the central administration in 1973, just before the strike. An alternate plan for administering departments under a more centralized system had been imposed, then modified and decentralized, without consulting the faculty. Neither the alternate plan nor the modifications had operated well, and by 1975, the superintendent wanted to reinstitute the department chairmen. At this point, many teachers, including those designated to be the chairmen, opposed the plan on several grounds. A major basis for opposition was that the role of chairman had never been clearly defined.

It was a quasi-administrative role in which the chairmen stood in authority over teachers in the departments and yet had very little autonomy in exercising decisions affecting the departments, being accountable mainly to central administration. Many teachers were interested in creating greater departmental autonomy and wanted to establish more collegial relationships with the chairmen, to make them accountable to the faculty within their departments and to permit them to represent department concerns to central administration rather than merely conveying administrator's instructions downwards to faculty.

These ideas had been discussed within the union, as with the other issues, for several years prior to the organizational merger. At this point in time, however, union leaders also had a further concern, which was to avoid confusion within the staff as to the identification of personnel in respect to administrative vs. teaching positions. This became important in view of the union's protective role. Since administrators made decisions affecting staff assignments which teachers might find objectionable or which might threaten job security, they were at times in a clearly adversary relationship to the union. Union leaders did not want any members of the teaching staff placed in a position where they formulated decisions in conjunction with administration, but not with colleagues, since such decisions could be divisive to the staff and therefore threatening to union solidarity. Furthermore, they did not want department heads evaluating colleagues, for reasons discussed earlier. The problem, therefore, was to devise a system whereby teachers could achieve better professional leadership within their departments without introducing adversary relationships into the departments.

A proposal for departmental governance was developed by union leaders based on extensive consultation with the entire high school teaching staff. It met both union concerns and teachers' professional concerns as a result of conscious efforts on the part of union leaders to devise a plan which reconciled potential conflicts between these two areas of concern. The proposal was to create a position called "Teacher Coordinator" to act as a professional leader for each department. It was to be an elected position, with the faculty in each department electing their own coordinator for two-year terms, thus making them accountable directly to the faculty. The coordinators' role was carefully defined so as to separate those types of administrative duties which could lead to adversary or competitive relations (such as staff assignments and evaluations) from more strictly collegial types of responsibilities. Thus, in respect to teacher evaluation, the proposal suggested that only administrators

conduct formal observations and write official evaluations of teachers, but that once evaluations had been completed, those teachers designated by the administration as in need of help would be referred to the coordinator for providing the help. It was believed that within such a framework, the coordinator could work with colleagues in a more supportive fashion than would be possible under circumstances in which he/she made any formal judgment of colleagues. A high school union activist explained,

We felt very strongly...that in order to improve instruction, we would have to have someone who was in a non-evaluative capacity. So we said that the teacher who was in need of improvement would be identified by administration...The administration would then call in the teacher coordinator and say, "Look, this person is in need of improvement in instruction and I'd like you to work with him." The teacher coordinator would then work with that person. There would be no evaluations, no notes, no communication -- I should say, no evaluative communication -- between the teacher coordinator and administration. The teacher would be fully aware it was not evaluative. In that case, the teacher is more likely to communicate with the coordinator and say, "These are my weaknesses; I'll work with you." Because it's an elected position, they (the teacher coordinators) have to be respected ...trusted people.

As with formulation of the evaluation policy, it took well over a year for the development of the plan for departmental governance. The plan finally developed by the union grew out of extensive consultation with both administration and the teaching staff, and was therefore broadly acceptable to all concerned parties. Board members, who had been made aware of teachers' concerns in the high school through channels established at the time the post-strike Board took office, were receptive to the union proposal for department reorganization,* and the plan was instituted along lines teachers, under union leadership, had developed.

* Board members were less receptive to a companion plan for administrative reorganization, involving an elected principal.

In 1979, high school teacher respondents spoke with satisfaction regarding the successful operation of this plan, as providing a structure within which teachers could essentially administer internal department affairs (such as curriculum planning). This case, again, illustrates how careful consideration of conflicting teacher interests permitted their resolution by the union through a balancing, yet separation, of teacher and administrator functions. The union's direct participation in formulating the plan for departmental reorganization ensured development of a plan wherein teachers' interest in administering their own affairs would not clash head-on with the union's protective concerns -- as occurred in Middlebury.

In respect to potential conflicts between professional and protective concerns relating to other kinds of issues -- e.g., the development of discipline policy -- union leaders openly employed a practice of having union representatives nominated to serve on all teacher committees. The respect union leaders commanded ensured acceptance of their candidates by colleagues. This tactic enabled the union to keep abreast of issues developing within the district so that any bearing potential relevance to union concerns could be openly addressed from the outset.

CEDARTON IN 1979

Respondents were in strong agreement that Cedarton was a better school district in 1979 than it had been ten years earlier. Although pressures to limit school spending continued, community-school relations were considerably more harmonious. Parent complaints had dropped substantially, and taxpayer groups were quieter. In spite of some reductions in educational programs and increased class sizes, School Board, administrator, and teacher respondents were proud of their school system in 1979. There was greater stability in both administration and teaching staff, and relations between the two were basically good. Student achievement levels had improved, and discipline problems reduced. In spite of substantial faculty retrenchment, in the late seventies, with more cuts predicted for the eighties, teacher morale appeared to be generally high.

Many respondents reported the Union to have been an important factor contributing to improved district conditions. The CFC was a strong organization in 1979 -- a power within the district, respected both locally and outside Cedarton as a responsible and unusual teachers' Union. Its effectiveness as a protective,

welfare organization was limited on the one hand by severe external economic pressures and a declining student population, and on the other hand, by Union leaders' desire to weigh professional, educational, and community considerations against its protective concerns. The latter, self-imposed restraints roused some opposition to the Union from within teacher ranks, and was a factor contributing to the emergence of an opposing (NEA-affiliated) teachers' organization within the district. Yet the opposing organization failed to win substantial membership away from the Union.

The relationship of the Union to both administrators and the School Board was far better in 1979 than at the time of its recognition as collective bargaining agent, in 1973. In 1979, the three groups had developed good, working relationships. A major gain for the Union was administrator and School Board acceptance of its legitimacy as a formal teachers' organization, and of the principles of collective bargaining and the Union contract. An administrator who had served in advisory capacity to Cedar-ton School Boards since prior to 1973 had this to say in 1979:

I believe that the Union has...become more sophisticated...As we have, too...Not only in bargaining, but in employee relationships and in relating to a Union. If you always resist the idea of a Union and it's an anathema to you, you're hardly going to relate well to the spokesmen for the majority of the teachers...

If I learned over the years that the Union serves its purpose, that its leadership is not irresponsible -- and I think it's very responsible in this district --(breaks off)...They're more sophisticated,...we're more sophisticated as an administration, and ...the Boards have grown -- even though you have turnover in Board membership, the Boards, collectively, have become more aware of the need for compromise, conciliation, consultation, sensitivity, and so forth...There appears to be better communication.

A teacher moderately active in the Union also commented positively on the quality of Union-administrator-School Board relationships:

There's no question that they (Union leaders) feel that they are able to communicate with these people now. They may have legitimate disagreements, but they don't have the kind of arrogance --

they don't have to deal with this entrenched suspicion, or entrenched annoyance and anger that a Union exists. They've accepted us, and they deal with us....

...We can disagree, and we can argue, but at least there is an ability to talk and a respect for one another. The Union respects what the administration must do, what its obligations are; it respects the fact that the School Board has to reflect community views and has to have a concern for money. But they also have respect for teachers' legitimate concerns and input.

A 1979 School Board member commented:

In talking to people from other School Boards, I get the impression our relations with teachers are better, -- there's a better give and take.

A Union activist, commenting on the change in relationships between the Union and administrators had this to say:

It's completely different now. There's trust on both sides, openness. We feel we can go to them with all kinds of questions. The CFC president meets with the superintendent regularly. Many times, administrators speak to representatives of the Union before they try new things...It's completely different, a friendly coexistence now, where before it was always an adversary position.

In 1979 the Union was a significant force promoting teacher input in all areas of school decision-making. It served as spokesman for teacher welfare interests and it facilitated consultation between administrators and teacher groups in respect to professional and educational interests. With Union influence, exercised through informal channels, often behind the scenes, teachers were able to contribute substantially to important school system decisions in areas of program, discipline, department structure, and appointment of administrators.

The Union drew its strength from high quality, experienced leadership, a spirit of unity among membership ranks, and a realistic recognition of the reciprocal nature of the Union's

relationship to administrators and the community. Union recognition of community and administrative constraints and concerns contributed to a spirit of informal cooperation between these three groups, in spite of their formal, adversary roles. The cooperative atmosphere so engendered, coupled with a dogged insistence by Union leaders on teacher rights to due process, the Union to contribute effectively to ensuring fairness and predictability in the areas of teacher evaluation and retrenchment. Thus, in spite of its powerlessness to protect objective job security, it was apparently able to mitigate teachers' subjective sense of insecurity.

In 1979, the CFC therefore appeared as a significant, stabilizing force in the school district, contributing teachers to a sense of well-being in spite of threatening, external pressures. A Union member and informal leader, on the teaching staff in Cedarton for over twenty years, observed:

There are many things...today that are making it (teaching) not an easy and relaxed place to be. The classroom is tougher...External things...(like) attrition -- (breaks off)...It's a tougher time for everybody. But our situation makes us more ready for this new era. I think the (teachers)...here are able to cope, to handle, able to survive, better than in some other districts, where there is a lot of confusion and chaos...The reason I say that is not because of the administration, not because of the Boards. It's because of our own make-up...as a faculty, in terms of (our) organization...We have an awful lot going for us that the rest...out there can't match.

CHAPTER III

MIDDLEBURY

The story of the Middlebury Union is the story of a teachers' group primarily concerned at the outset with obtaining professional input on matters of school policy, and secondarily with issues of teacher protection and salary. This union was unique in terms of its leaders' vision in the sixties of an organization blending professional, social, and teacher welfare concerns. By the end of the seventies, however, the organization had reversed its priorities to place far greater emphasis on teacher protection and welfare concerns. This transformation was a result of a complex combination of circumstances.

Middlebury is a racially mixed school district having a strong liberal and pro-education tradition. As in Cadartton, the Union emerged in the mid-sixties as a result of changes related to school district expansion and a lowering of public commitment to education, but it developed more rapidly, at an earlier stage. Strains related to these changes in the school system motivated teachers to seek more formal, organized input into school decision-making through negotiations, even prior to the enactment of state laws mandating collective bargaining for teachers. School Board refusal to recognize teachers' right to formal input, through negotiations, or in any other form, led teachers to change their organizational affiliation from the NEA to the more militant AFT. Widespread rank-and-file acceptance of unionization at this early stage is attributable to Middlebury's highly liberal, socially aware teaching staff.

This is in some ways a disillusioning story. This case study will show, on the one hand, how a highly supportive School Board, committed to both educational improvement and liberal, social integrationist goals became increasingly fragmented by changing economic conditions and community pressures. On the other, it will show how a teachers' group initially unified by common ideals and professional concerns became similarly fragmented as a consequence of both external changes and internal organizational pressures. It will show how mounting tensions between teachers, administrators and the School Board led to a strike which resulted in further polarizing these groups,

The study will also show how early leaders' inability to find avenues for sustaining their professional goals in a changing, less

supportive environment led to their own disenchantment and withdrawal from union activism, and furthermore, how the union's emphasis on democratic, grass roots staff participation appears to have undermined its ability to sustain strong leadership. In contrast to Cedarton, leaders' inability to recognize certain inherent contradictions between teachers' professional goals and welfare goals led to the union's inability to resolve these, resulting in greater factionalism within the union than might otherwise have occurred, and eventually, to diminished collective involvement with professional and educational issues.

The local union's increased reliance in the seventies on the parent, statewide organization (NYSUT) helped to strengthen the local in terms of bargaining power and political clout. However, this alliance, coupled with the union's strong defensive posture appears to have reduced its sensitivity to professional issues and further contributed to polarization from the community. In 1979, the Middlebury Federation of Teachers was a strong, traditional labor union, respected as a power in the district, having a diminished role in educational decision-making.

BACKGROUND

Middlebury is an amorphous, suburban district lying in the region between several "older" suburban towns in the New York City metropolitan area. As in Cedarton, the district underwent considerable population growth following World War II, with accompanying expansion of the school system, during the 1950's and 60's. But in Middlebury, the expansion was less extreme, occurring at a slower rate over a longer period of time. Until the early sixties, Middlebury was an elementary school district only. Grades K through 8 were housed in three school buildings which pre-dated the war. Students attended high school in a nearby town.

Historically, the district had a diverse population -- racially, ethnically, and socio-economically. Dating back to the twenties and thirties, Middlebury had a sizeable Black population, including middle class professional, working class and poor Black groups. Altogether, Blacks comprised about one-third of the school population from the fifties through the sixties and seventies. Also historically, the district contained a large Jewish population--- mainly middle class professionals. Jews constituted another third of the school population from the fifties through the seventies. The balance was composed of a mixture of various white ethnic working and middle class groups, including a large number of Catholic families who utilized parochial, rather than public, schools.

Middle class, liberal Black and Jewish parents were the only segments of the population especially vocal in school affairs until the mid-sixties. These were people who placed high priority on educational values; though at times critical of specific school practices, they could be counted on to provide solid support for school budgets, staffing, and expanding programs. These two groups also tended to be in the vanguard of those concerned about the race problem in the fifties. Starting in the early fifties, they formed a pro-integrationist, educationally progressive coalition which dominated the Middlebury schools and school boards through the late sixties.

Respondents report the district during this period to have had unusually supportive school boards -- supportive of the teaching staff, of educational programs, and of a "social philosophy" of racial integration. During the fifties, Middlebury earned a reputation as a model school system for its approach to racial issues. Long before the problem of de facto segregation was widely recognized as a problem in northern schools, the Middlebury School Board abandoned the neighborhood school concept and traditional grouping practices, moving to a plan which provided for completely heterogeneous grouping and extensive interracial contact among students in all elementary grades. The grouping policy appealed to liberals in the community and to the teaching staff on two counts: one was the social ideology it reflected (racial integration) and the other was an educational ideology, placing emphasis upon teaching the "individual child" and the "whole child," in terms of the goal of developing each to his "full potential."

Teacher respondents who had been on the staff during the fifties and early sixties recall this period as a time when staff morale was high. They felt themselves to have been part of a school system moving in a positive direction to find solutions to problems plaguing members of the educational establishment elsewhere. A teacher who came to Middlebury in the late fifties described the excitement teachers felt in that period:

There was a creative ferment and an atmosphere that went with it...We were there to change America -- to solve America's social problems through education, to prove that all children could learn in more-or-less the same way, that racial differences and socio-economic differences could be overcome -- And, I think, we did damn well...before the Black movement overtook us and outside pressures started polarizing people.

They did not perceive their task as easy; in some ways, heterogeneous grouping accentuated academic and social problems associated with economic and racial disadvantage. They were optimistic, however, because they felt supported by their administrators and School Board. When it became evident that heterogeneous grouping and attention to "individual" children were not enough to close significant gaps in academic achievement between disadvantaged and advantaged students, the Middlebury School Board did not blame teachers (as happened elsewhere). Rather, it was among the first to apply for funds from outside sources to initiate special compensatory education programs, such as "Headstart" and "Project Able" and brought in university consultants to lead workshops on new approaches to teaching or curriculum. Thus, teachers, administrators, and School Board members perceived themselves as working together "as a team" to meet a common challenge.

Respondents did not recall particular administrators as having been especially important or charismatic figures in the history of the district (as was the case in both Cedarton and Oakville). The positive school atmosphere in Middlebury was more often attributed to "admirable School Boards," and to the spirit of mutual supportiveness that derived from meeting a common challenge. However, teachers consistently reported their relations with administrators to have been good during the fifties and early sixties. Prior to the construction of the high school in 1961, teachers had easy, informal access to administrators. Respondents reported communication to have been good, and administrators to have been responsive to teachers' ideas and concerns.

Due to its reputation, Middlebury attracted many highly-qualified, strongly-committed teachers during the fifties and sixties. Teachers applying to the district tended to be disproportionately liberal in both social and educational philosophy. Still, the district had its "old guard" -- teachers who had come in an earlier era ("...a lot of stiff-necked teachers, who didn't smile until Christmas..."). Furthermore, not all those hired during the period of district expansion were highly-committed, highly capable, or liberal in philosophy, for large numbers were added to the staff in the late fifties and early sixties.

During the sixties, the district began to be affected by a number of problems, internal and external. In 1962, the district opened its own high school. This change brought a number of unanticipated problems. First, it meant accelerated expansion of the school system at a time when the student population was already growing. As in Cedarton, rapid increase in district size brought about tensions and instability within the staff.

Administrator-teacher contacts were reduced. School administration became more formal, less flexible and less responsive to teachers. As the staff expanded, turnover among both teachers and administrators increased.

Secondly, the addition of an older student population brought about a host of student-related problems the district was not prepared to handle. Older students presented far more complex needs and problems than elementary students -- academic problems, discipline problems, social problems all took on more urgency. Policies reflecting the district's "social and educational philosophy" developed and applied at the elementary level were often unsuited at the secondary level, and there was no appropriate model from outside the district which offered better ways of meeting the problems presented.

Furthermore, only two years after the opening of the high school, the district's supervising principal -- a man committed to liberal, integrationist goals -- left for another position. Although he had served also as high school principal, he was replaced by two administrators -- a new supervising principal and a high school principal -- both from outside the district, and less committed to the district philosophy. Substantial turnover in the high school principalship continued after that, throughout the 1960's. Thus, the high school lacked stable, effective leadership in developing programs, policies and staff relations during its initial period of establishment. This appears to have been an important factor leading to rising dissatisfaction among high school faculty during the mid-sixties.

Respondents reported that during this period elementary teachers, also, were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the quality of educational services provided by their school system. Changes taking place in the district outside the schools were beginning to have their impact. New, upwardly mobile families, both Black and White, in predominantly blue collar or lower white collar occupations were moving in to new housing developments in the district in large numbers. These were people who came to the district primarily because housing was less expensive than in neighboring towns, and who had little awareness of the district's integrationist philosophy. Furthermore, at about this time, the district merged with a smaller, neighboring middle class school district, bringing in a more conservative middle class element, as well. These shifts in population meant a restructuring in public social attitudes, and especially in attitudes towards education. As a former school board member put it, up until the late sixties, "this community divided clearly into two camps: pro and con school.

But now the pro-school people divide into many factions." People who were willing to support the schools by voting for higher taxes by no means uniformly supported the philosophy of integration, nor did they support a common philosophy of education. Sharper divisions began to emerge between Blacks and Whites, and there were splits within both racial groups as well.

While the liberal Black-White coalition continued to maintain a majority on the School Board for some time, more conservative candidates of both races began to gain seats. The Board as a whole began to take a more moderate approach towards resolution of school problems, in response to increased pressures from conservative members and their constituencies. The district also began to suffer problems related to school financing. A rising tax rate aroused portions of the anti-school faction that had previously remained silent. In response, the Board began to initiate cuts in school programs and personnel.

The net effect was a feeling of frustration among members of the teaching staff. Respondents I interviewed in 1969 claimed that obvious needs were not being met, that there were shortages of needed specialized personnel, e.g., reading specialists, that building facilities were becoming overcrowded. In addition, they felt that the school district lacked direction, that adequate programs were not being developed to meet student needs, and that teacher suggestions for improvements in the school system were no longer taken seriously. Teachers perceived these problems as reflecting a slackening of commitment on the part of the School Board and top administrators to the district's "philosophy." Some saw them specifically, as reflecting changes in personnel occupying key administrative or School Board positions; others saw the problems in a larger perspective, as reflecting new pressures on the Board and administration from external sources. In both cases, however, the effect was to reduce teachers' role in determining school district policies, and to heighten their frustration with administrators.

Teachers reported administrators and School Board members continued to give lip-service to the concept of faculty participation in decision-making, and that faculty committees were often set up to look into various problems for purposes of making recommendations, but that such committees seemed little more than forums for discussion, an "outlet for faculty feelings." They claimed administrators screened committee suggestions, and used only those that supported their own ideas. This particularly bothered them when professional issues were at stake, as indicated in the following statement made by a high school teacher in 1969:

We used to make up lengthy reports. They would take the reports, read them, then write up their own report with a few things that we had mentioned -- you know, never consult us on this kind of thing -- and then come out with a beautiful document stating, "This is a summary of the faculty and administrative report on evaluation of teachers."

I remember they did this on in-service programs, and we did a complete flip. We'd go in and say, "But look, this is a half of what we said." They would say, "Well, we're compromising." But we didn't have a chance to say that's where we wanted to compromise. Then they would say, "Well, we felt that's fair enough. Now, don't you think that's fair enough?" What were you going to do? You knew you were weak, you knew you were really powerless, and so you backed off.

TEACHERS' ORGANIZATIONS:

Changes in the Teachers' Organization:

The first teachers' organization in Middlebury was a Teachers' Association formed in the late 1930's, affiliated with the NEA and later also with the New York State Teachers' Association (NYSTA). As in Cedarton, respondents recalled the old Association as a kind of social club, to which both teachers and administrators belonged. While the Association made annual recommendations regarding salary and fringe benefits to the school Board, it did not, as an organization, engage in or press other issues, and it did not conduct negotiations with the administration or School Board in any formal sense.

In the mid-sixties, as teacher dissatisfaction began to mount, several Association leaders began to suggest the organization play a stronger leadership role in representing other kinds of teacher interests and in influencing school policy. As a first step, they launched an attempt to reorganize their Association chapter in hope of strengthening its membership base and power in the district. Proponents of reorganization claimed that the Association as it was then structured neither allowed for adequate communication among teachers nor adequately

represented teacher concerns. As in Cedar-ton, a major target was to eliminate administrators from the organization, in recognition of a growing dichotomy between administrator and teacher interests, and in the belief that the presence of administrators at meetings hindered teacher discussion of certain issues. Another target was to broaden teacher participation in the organization through a more complex structure, wherein meetings would be held within the individual buildings to provide more member access to the organization and a system of building delegates to a central assembly would be instituted to improve communication between buildings. A new constitution incorporating these proposals was overwhelmingly approved by the membership.

Reorganization did not accomplish as much as teachers had hoped, but it did help in some respects -- for example, it improved staff communication between buildings. What it did not accomplish was to increase teacher power to any substantial degree. According to respondents interviewed in 1969, when teacher representatives went to the building principal or superintendent to present their case on a particular issue, the reply was still, as before, "Well, we'll take it into consideration." Hence, teachers continued to perceive their role in decision-making as weak, in the face of an accompanying perception that top administrators were not making progress towards resolving educational problems in the district.

Attempts towards Professional Negotiations

Middlebury teachers expected far more of their Association and their School Board at this point in time than did most teachers in either of the other districts studied. In the fall of 1966, the Teachers' Association decided to request the School Board to grant a "Professional Negotiations Agreement." This was prior to the enactment of the Taylor Law, granting teachers the right to negotiate, although that legislation was passed shortly thereafter.* Based on their perception of the local School Board as liberal and friendly to teachers, they expected to easily persuade Board members of the advantages to the district of establishing formal negotiations.

* However, Middlebury teachers were highly aware of precedents from other school districts having gained the right to formal bargaining, with the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) in New York being the most conspicuous.

Association leaders drew up a proposal for a negotiations agreement which members ratified overwhelmingly (by a vote of 142 to 17). Central to their proposal was the concept of establishing a "structure" which would ensure greater teacher input in educational decision-making. An early activist explained,

The teachers' demand for a voice in curriculum probably represents the main key. But you can't negotiate complex problems. You can negotiate procedures.

The essence, therefore, of what they were seeking through negotiations was the establishment of a set of procedures through which continued participation of teachers in formulating school policy could be ensured over time. The set of procedures or "structure" which the Teachers' Association proposed was based on principles advocated at that time by the American Federation of Teachers -- recognition of the teachers' organization as the official representative of the teaching staff, regular negotiating sessions, and some form of mediation to be adopted in the event of impasse.* In addition, they wanted to establish the relevance of both teacher welfare and educational policy items as legitimate negotiating areas. It is to be noted that at this point in time, Middlebury Association leaders were far more aggressive in insisting on negotiating in areas other than teacher welfare than were leaders in either of the other districts studied.

The School Board was willing to meet with Teachers' Association representatives to discuss the proposal, and several meetings were held over the next few months.** It is important to

* All of these principles were established in the following year by enactment of the Taylor Law.

** Evidence of the nature and content of discussions between the two parties is contained in a tape recording of their first session dealing with the Professional Negotiations Proposal in 1966. The taped discussion and copies of documents exchanged between the two parties provided the basis for the ensuing discussion. The taped discussion serves to support respondents' later assessments of the situation. Points covered in the following paragraphs are based upon this and documents exchanged between the teachers' group and the School Board.

emphasize that both parties appear to have met together in a spirit of "good faith" -- a clear contrast to teacher-Board relations in both Cedartown and Oakville. From the teachers' viewpoint, however, good faith was not enough. They hoped to obtain a commitment from the Board that a "new seriousness" would be attached to teacher proposals -- some kind of guarantee that their role in decision-making would be extended beyond that of mere consultation. For this reason, they viewed the principle of mediation as crucial. A member of the committee elected to meet with the Board in 1966 explained:

We wanted some recourse beyond the Board, so that if total disagreement should develop, it wouldn't just die, automatically. And that's where the major hang-up came with the Board. We wanted recourse to outside mediation -- and we used the word advisedly; that somebody versed in education would come in and listen to both sides and at least offer an objective viewpoint as to the possibility of implementing what we were suggesting.

In retrospect, several teacher leaders involved in pressing for the Professional Negotiations Agreement recognized their approach as having been naive. In effect, they were asking the School Board to voluntarily agree to submit its decisions to teacher review. Their appeal to the Board was based overtly on the argument that such action would improve teacher participation and teacher morale, thus benefitting the operation of the school district. Underlying the appeal, however, was a feeling on the part of many teachers that they were better equipped than Board members to make certain types of decisions, and that a "negotiations" situation, with recourse to mediation, would help to strengthen faculty influence.* Mediation, while not legally binding, might have the effect of exerting more pressure upon the Board to give more serious consideration to teacher recommendations than had been given in the past.

Board members were unable to accept the desirability of creating a "negotiating" situation between themselves and the faculty. In the first place, members of the Board took the

* A point of view was expressed by many teacher respondents. Teachers in Middlebury felt themselves better equipped to make educational decisions by virtue of both their training and their direct contact with students in the classroom.

position that if all parties concerned -- faculty, administrators, and School Board -- were dedicated primarily to the education of children in the district, there should be no cause for conflict, and therefore all issues should be resolvable within a framework of "mutual interest" and "mutual trust."* While teachers perceived the Board as susceptible to pressure from non-educationally oriented interests in the community, Board members simply would not acknowledge this perception as valid. Secondly, while faculty members viewed administrators as being "under the thumb" of the Board, Board members regarded administrators as fulfilling a role close to that of impartial expert. They could see no reason, therefore, for not continuing under the old system whereby faculty recommendations were brought to them through "administrative channels" and with "appropriate administrative comment." Finally, the Board was simply not prepared to relinquish its ultimate authority as "trustee" of the school system.**

The net result was that discussions between teacher representatives and Board members ultimately broke down. This occurred principally on two key issues: (1) the establishment of mediation procedures, and (2) the degree to which teachers were to be accorded a voice in policy on any educational matters beyond what could be concretely defined as "welfare items," i.e., salary, fringe benefits, and physical working conditions.***

* There were several references to this position in the tape-recording of the first negotiating session between teachers and the Board. Board members showed little awareness of the possibility that legitimate differences might arise between themselves and teachers as a result of differing perspectives between the two groups.

** Resistance to voluntary acceptance of Professional Negotiation by school boards was a common pattern elsewhere. See Wollett (1967) for explanation.

*** Note, first that the Board defined the scope of "welfare" items more narrowly than teachers did, and secondly, that on educational policy items, the Board continued to define teachers' role as purely advisory.

The Move Towards Unionization

Activists I interviewed in 1969 expressed little doubt that had the School Board accepted their proposal for a Professional Negotiations Agreement, with mediation provisions, the move to unionize Middlebury teachers would not have occurred. According to their reports, the desire to establish mechanisms for strengthening teacher voice in policy was the primary, immediate motive. This argument is supported by the fact that the impasse between teachers and the Board did not occur over welfare items. Undoubtedly, there were discrepancies between what teachers sought and what the Board was willing to grant on bread-and-butter items, and undoubtedly many teachers saw advantages of establishing a negotiations setup vis-a-vis those items. Nevertheless, the School Board did grant teachers the right to participate more fully, with collective representation, in decisions related to teacher welfare -- specifically, salary and fringe benefits -- prior to the time the union chapter was formed. Hence, it appears that teachers had less cause for frustration in the bread-and-butter area than in broader policy-making areas.

In the early spring of 1967, the first step towards formation of a Union chapter was taken. An officer of the Teachers' Association, who had been active on the committee which met with the School Board, began on his own to circulate a petition, gathering names of teachers who would be willing to join with him in obtaining a charter for an AFT local. His success in obtaining signatures was unexpectedly dramatic, with over sixty teachers signing in a brief period of time. Other officers of the Association, many of whom were sympathetic to his move, feared that the formation of a second teachers' organization would have the effect of splitting teachers down the middle, and ultimately weaken their position in relation to administration and the School Board. The officer who had initiated the petition was persuaded to withdraw it, in favor of an alternative plan to hold a referendum among members of the Teachers' Association on the question of whether the organization as a whole should change its affiliation with NYSTA and NEA and join AFT. Notices were sent out and teachers given three weeks to debate the matter. When the vote was held, affiliation with the Union was supported by almost two to one.

The question arises as to why joining the Union (i.e., the AFT) was considered a relevant response in terms of the concerns identified in the preceding analysis as prevalent among Middlebury

teachers at that particular time. The following statement, made to me by one of the original proponents of unionization, helps to clarify the relevance:

Affiliating with the Union would in effect be telling the Board of Education that not only do we represent the feeling of the faculty in these discussions -- that a negotiations situation should exist -- but the faculty feels strongly enough to affiliate with a group allying itself with an approach that stresses collective bargaining.

Some teachers also felt that alliance with the Union would have the effect of bolstering membership morale, in the sense that their new identification would be with a more militant organization. Furthermore, they hoped it would bring some outside support to their demands, in terms of organizational and legal assistance available from the state affiliate of the AFT (then known as Empire State Federation of Teachers).

A factor of crucial importance in accounting for the success of the move towards unionization in Middlebury is that it was strongly supported at the elementary level as well as at the junior and senior high school levels.** This pattern deviated noticeably from that observed by others, elsewhere,*** and from the pattern in Cedarton, where early Union members were concentrated almost entirely in the high school.

* This was not, however, a motive of major importance in Middlebury, since teachers there perceived the strength of their Union as dependent mainly on their own activity, according to interview reports.

** Respondents claim that the vote in favor of union affiliation was as strong at the elementary level as at the junior and senior high school levels. Questionnaire results tended to confirm this observation. Out of the entire Middlebury sample, 63 percent of elementary teachers (N = 40) and 67 percent of secondary teachers (N = 60) were Union members.

*** Findings reported from other studies indicated that the common pattern in the sixties was for union membership to be far more heavily concentrated in secondary schools than in elementary schools. See Cole (1969) and Rosenthal (1969).

Greater support from the elementary staff for the early Union in Middlebury can be attributed in part to Middlebury teachers' greater liberalism -- i/e., to their more favorable attitudes toward the labor movement in general and to identification of teachers with labor in particular. This factor appears to have been influential not so much in predisposing teachers towards affiliating with the Union as in that it did not serve as a deterrent against it. In other words, unionization was more generally perceived as an appropriate means for expressing teacher dissatisfactions at an earlier point in time than it was in Cedar-ton or Oakville.

Union Leadership and Factionalism:

Although support was strong for the Union, from its conception, among elementary teachers, its top leadership was initially concentrated mainly in the high school. The presidency circulated among several high school teachers until the 1970's. The active high school core who dominated the Union during the late sixties had a ~~strongly idealistic vision of the organization's purpose.~~ It was they, particularly, who viewed the Union as a mechanism for changing the structure of administrator-staff relations. They sought to increase teachers' professional autonomy and participation in all decision-making areas -- program, selection and retention of staff and administration, as well as decisions affecting teacher welfare and working conditions. They viewed "professional autonomy" and "teacher welfare" as inseparable, complementary goals ultimately related on the one hand to enhancing teacher dignity and morale, and on the other, to benefitting the schools through improved staff participation.

This view of the Union was most clearly articulated by a high school social studies teacher named Martin Landau. Landau had been active in founding the Union, and many considered him its "spiritual leader" through the sixties. He did not actually serve as president except for two years between 1969 and 1971, but he was an active member of both the Union Executive Council and negotiating team from the time the Union was founded. Landau was a controversial figure, viewed as too "ideological" by some Union respondents, but highly respected within a large segment of the teaching staff, and by School Board members who knew him through negotiations. His supporters described him as

a highly intelligent, sensitive, and principled person, with a strong commitment to improving education. A respondent who had been on the School Board while Landau was Union president described him as follows:

I have great respect for him...Marty is very professional. He is interested in schools and teachers doing a better job --- always. He's very competent...and...he remains true to his inner self.

Another School Board respondent commented,

Marty is my ideal of what a teacher...should be. (But he) is more than just a teacher... he's an ideologist,...an institution unto himself...Marty is a charismatic leader...who excites strong feelings in other people -- of admiration, and of dislike.

Landau and the "professional-idealist" leadership core tended to be highly liberal teachers who not only believed strongly in the district's social philosophy but who also espoused principles of "grass roots participation" and "democracy" for their organization. They were ideologically "pro labor" but critical of the American labor establishment. Trends towards "oligarchy" in labor organizations were especially abhorrent to them. They envisioned their own organization, therefore, as needing to operate completely according to democratic principles. In addition, they advocated cooperation -- rather than competition -- with community groups.

The Middlebury Teachers' Federation was, however, more prone to factionalism than either of the other Unions studied. While professional-idealists dominated the executive council through 1971, there was also a vocal group on the council who espoused a more traditional and labor-oriented view of the Union's purposes -- believing that it should limit its goals to "welfare" functions, i.e., improving salaries, benefits, working conditions, and protecting teachers' personal rights. A member of the Union's executive council in 1969 made this observation:

There is split...We haven't allowed it to become a divisive split, but there is a faction (on the Council). And it's the old-type Union people against the new-type Union people.

...You see, we're not primarily Union people per se. We're primarily school people who are looking for the best mode. Whereas the others are primarily Union people.

A group of former Association activists who openly opposed affiliation with the Union as "unprofessional" initially split away from the MTF to form a new Association chapter. But when the new Association was unsuccessful in gaining substantial membership, it folded. Its leaders joined the Union and gained representation on the executive council. This group tended to be more conservative and more accepting of administrative and School Board authority than the professional idealists, while at the same time less "bread-and-butter" oriented than the traditional unionists. Reasons for the greater factionalism occurring in Middlebury, relative to the other districts studied, are not clear. Middlebury respondents almost universally attributed it to the "type of teacher" recruited to Middlebury -- "strong, independent people." Such an explanation does not hold up, however, in view of the fact that the leadership group in Cedar-ton also contained many strong, independent people. More probably reasons are as follows:

- 1) First, the fact that the transition from the Association to the Union as the majority organization took place far more rapidly in Middlebury than in Cedar-ton, with the result that neither leaders nor members had the opportunity to informally "hash over" goals and iron out differences among themselves before the organization was faced with formal obligations to be carried out -- e.g., involvement in negotiations, grievance procedures.
- 2) Secondly, since the majority of teachers joined the Union right after its formation, the new organization was larger and had greater diversity in opinion to contend with within its own ranks at the outset than it would had the majority remained with the established organization. The greater initial size of the new Union group (relative to Cedar-ton) made internal differences more difficult to resolve informally, and it meant individuals holding different positions on Union issues could more easily muster different support groups to back their positions.
- 3) Thirdly, because the group who openly opposed the Union, forming an NEA-affiliated chapter in Middlebury, lacked strong leadership and significant membership support, there was no real period of conflict between the two organizations as in

Cedarton. This conflict in Cedarton served to motivate both sides at first to clarify differences and later to work more consciously towards compromise.

4) Finally, the belief in democratic organizational processes as basic to the philosophy of the Union (including grass roots membership participation and circulation in the office of president) made Middlebury professional-idealists reluctant to exert as strong leadership and direction as they might have during the formative period of their Union.

In spite of the fact that professional-idealists successfully dominated the Union for several years, factions within the Union and the tensions they generated were important factors contributing to later changes in leadership and Union goals. The ideal of democratic, grass roots participation also contributed to a diffusion of the Union's initial focus, as we shall see, in the seventies, since leaders of the more traditional factions and a large proportion of rank-and-file teachers neither shared nor fully understood professional idealists' vision.

THE LATE SIXTIES AND EARLY SEVENTIES

Negotiations in the Late Sixties:

The Public Employees Fair Employment Act (the "Taylor Law") enacted by the New York State Legislature in the spring of 1967, only months after the formation of the Union chapter, settled the conflict between the Middlebury Teachers' Federation and the School Board over negotiations, by mandating collective negotiations between public employers and duly elected employee representatives. The law specified wages, hours, and "terms and conditions of employment" as the areas subject to negotiations. Differences in interpretation of "terms and conditions of employment," however, left some ambiguity on the types of issues to be negotiated.

Representatives of the MTF and the Middlebury School Board held their first formal negotiating sessions under the Taylor Law in the spring of 1967. Interpreting "conditions of employment" as including a broad range of conditions in the occupational setting, the MTF presented the Board with a list of 128 contract proposals compiled from rank-and-file teacher suggestions. The list ranged in substance from salary, fringe

benefits, and working hours to class size and involvement of teachers in curriculum, program development, teacher evaluation and the hiring of administrators. Board members adamantly refused, however, to negotiate in areas other than those strictly pertaining to teacher welfare or benefits. A respondent active on the 1967 MTF negotiating committee explained,

Within the proposal there was as much dealing with policy and curriculum and larger teaching conditions -- there's probably as much of that, if not more, than bread-and-butter issues. But the bread-and-butter issues may seem more important because that is what the Board of Education wanted to talk about... What happened was that whenever they came to anything vaguely concerned with policy, they said "Not negotiable. This is not a condition which has been defined by the Taylor Law -- salary, fringe benefits and working conditions."

School Board respondents confirmed the Board's opposition to discussing policy issues. A Board member active in negotiations during the late sixties said:

As a Board member, I started out very much with the feeling -- and I think this was common for most Board members -- that really we did have the power and the right to decide what was done in regard to the teachers... On certain items, we just responded that they were not negotiable, and they would argue some about it, but we, for the most part, just stuck to our position, saying they were not negotiable.

While the School Board refused to yield on any of the broad, policy-related demands, they were quite generous in this first negotiating period in respect to salaries, fringe benefits, and other items pertaining to teacher welfare. Ironically, teacher appeals based upon their own economic interests appear to have struck a sympathetic chord with liberal School Board members while their appeals for participation in larger programs which would affect students did not. A School Board member active in negotiations during that period explained:

Teachers said that they worked very hard and they didn't get enough money and they should have more benefits...I always felt, being liberal, you know, that the teachers were not paid as much as they should be paid, and it was very responsible work, and so on...

In contrast to negotiations held by the old Teachers' Association before the Taylor Law, respondents report these sessions to have been more businesslike, though still informal by comparison to what they were to later become. Negotiations were conducted directly between School Board and teacher representatives, without intermediaries. Martin Landau and other professional-idealists among the Union leadership played a prominent role in negotiations during this period. Teachers invited a representative from NYSUT to attend some sessions, but this representative remained largely in the background. The School Board employed no outside negotiators and relied upon those among their own members who were attorneys to provide legal counsel. The superintendent of schools was no longer involved in negotiations, although he had been, initially.

Both Board and Union respondents report informal relations between the two sides to have been good during this period, in spite of differences over the content of negotiations. Formal negotiations took many long hours, but generally went smoothly because participants on both sides of the table held one another in mutual respect. Difficult issues tended to be hashed out in informal discussions away from the negotiating table and were frequently resolved on this basis. Respondents from both sides reported having learned a great deal about the perspectives and problems of the other during this period. A Board member explained,

In the course of collective bargaining, over many hours, many things are discussed, there's a lot of give-and-take. School Board members are bound to get a lot of information...that they would otherwise not get and not solicit...It cannot effectively take place in the course of a formal School Board meeting and it doesn't have official sanction where a faculty member just calls up a School Board member...In the course of bargaining, it has the sanction of state law. If, for example, teachers are demanding fewer supervisory periods, as a matter of collective

bargaining, you are bound to get into the question in negotiations of how students are supervised. What happens in the lunch periods? What happens in hall duty?... There's always discussion of these subjects and one subject leads to another. School Board members were given a great deal of insight into how schools were being run.

The establishment of this avenue of communication accomplished one of the major purposes of the professional-idealists, even though the School Board turned down their demands for formal participation in decision-making. As a School Board member put it,

It was important from their point of view to have access to the decision-makers -- direct access, without being accused of being insubordinate, disloyal or unprofessional... Collective bargaining gave them that context. It was very important to them to maintain that relationship and have that avenue of communication.

The major contractual gains made by the Union in 1967 negotiations included the following: improvements in salary and fringe benefits, a grievance procedure with binding arbitration, teacher aides for cafeteria duty (releasing teachers from supervision) and the right of appeal to the School Board for probationary teachers denied reappointment.

The next negotiating period was in 1970, when the contract negotiated in 1967 expired. In 1970 negotiations, the Union was able to obtain further reductions in teachers' workload through eliminating other supervisory assignments and gaining teachers the right to a free "preparation" period during the school day. In addition, in 1970 the Union made some gains in areas not strictly limited to teacher welfare. Most noteworthy among these was teachers' right, written into the contract, to have "advisory" input in selection of future administrators.

Union leaders interviewed in 1969 had been far from discouraged regarding the issues they wanted to negotiate which were left pending. They saw each contract as a step in which they made important gains, and they believed they would continue to make further gains in future negotiating periods.

Changing External Conditions:

By the early seventies, several external conditions began to affect the Union and its relations with the School Board and community. First, national changes in Black attitudes toward integration, especially following the death of Martin Luther King, began to be reflected in lowered support for the district's integrationist philosophy from middle class Blacks locally. Some respondents who were on the School Board in the late sixties reported a noticeable shift in attitude among Black colleagues, who became more openly critical of schools, programs, and teachers. Many went so far as to withdraw their children from district schools, enrolling them in private schools. These changes seriously eroded the liberal Black-White coalition on the School Board.

Secondly, the New York City teachers' strike of 1968 had a profound impact upon teacher-community relations in Middlebury. The hostile confrontation between Black community leaders and White, liberal, mainly Jewish teachers in New York threatened the integrationist spirit which had previously nurtured local staff-community relations. Many teacher respondents reported being caught in an ideological bind -- on the one hand, feeling sympathy with the Black community control movement whose goals in many ways paralleled their own; on the other, feeling loyalty to Union "brothers" under an attack having anti-semitic and anti-professional overtones. Other teacher respondents, including Landau and his followers, were openly critical of the New York Union leaders' handling of their strike. Under Landau's leadership, the local Union had already sought to strengthen teacher-community relations, so they attempted to utilize previously established channels to communicate their concerns to the Black community, especially. Anti-Union sentiments were aroused among Blacks at this time, however, and many mistrusted local Union leaders. Some went so far as to personally attack Landau's motives for having shown interest in their concerns. The New York strike appears to have heightened a general awareness of potential conflicts in interest between teachers and community groups, so that an image of the Union as pursuing goals for the common good of teachers, students, and community became less credible to many people, especially within the Black community.

Thirdly, population changes which had begun in the mid-sixties were now coalescing in a more conservative political climate in the district, along with rising tax rates, which aroused people who had previously remained detached from school

affairs. Various community groups began to more vigorously oppose school budgets, and in the early seventies, the district suffered the first in a long series of annual budget defeats. Community groups were becoming less supportive of educationally progressive and integrationist school policies. Black working class residents were beginning to play a more active role in school affairs during this period, and in many cases joined conservative White residents in supporting more pragmatic, budget-minded candidates for School Board positions, thus further weakening the liberal coalition. The above conditions combined to create a more hostile public within both Black and White communities, and to encourage more open public criticism of teachers. While liberals continued to retain some Board seats, these changes resulted in a more divided School Board, less supportive of teachers.

Changes in Union Goals and Leadership:

Increased public criticism and greater austerity in school budgets forced Union leaders into a more defensive position in the early seventies than they had been in the sixties. There was increased pressure, both from without and from within the Union to emphasize protection of teachers over broader, more idealistic professional goals which Martin Landau and his supporters wished to pursue. Furthermore, lack of success in negotiating any substantial teacher gains in the professional and policy-making areas made it difficult for the professional-idealists to persuade a divided executive committee and membership that energies expended on such goals paid off.

"Protection" fell into three main areas: protection of contract gains in negotiations--- especially of gains in salary and fringe benefits -- protection of jobs, and protection of individual teacher rights (through grievance procedures). Since worker protection has traditionally been a primary function of labor unions, this was not a goal Union leaders could afford to ignore. Professional-idealists, however, were not prepared for the extent to which teacher protection began to dominate organizational attention.

The more hostile community environment, the beginnings of budgetary "crunch," and the greater emphasis upon teacher protection led local Union leaders to turn more frequently to their statewide, parent organization (NYSUT) for advice and support. In addition to providing advisory services pertinent to particular local problems, NYSUT had also, by this time, established

itself as a strong, centralized political action group acting on behalf of teacher interests on a centralized statewide level. Establishment of stronger ties to NYSUT was distasteful to professional-idealists, for these were inconsistent with their conception of their Union as a grass roots, locally-based organization, and because they felt such an alliance would contribute to widening the gap between teachers and community. However, pressures on leaders to protect teacher interests led them to feel they must utilize available resources for strengthening the organization.

The necessity of increased emphasis upon teacher protection and strengthening the organization led to disenchantment with the Union among idealists, who began to drop out of the active leadership roles. By 1971, no one from the professional-idealist group was willing to serve as Union president. The leadership fell, more by default than design, to an elementary teacher not strongly identified with any faction. While the welfare-oriented faction never actually gained control over the organization, this group was able to make its influence more strongly felt on the executive council and in the negotiating committee as professional-idealists drew from leadership positions.

From the early seventies on, the presidency and top Union leadership stayed with a group mainly composed of elementary teachers not strongly identified with either faction. While this group continued to give lip service to some professional goals, their energies were concentrated mainly on building organizational solidarity and in fulfilling the Union's protective functions, and in building and sustaining ties with NYSUT (e.g., attending statewide meetings and conferences, involvement in statewide political activity).

THE STRIKE PERIOD

Contract Negotiations in 1972 and 1973: Underlying Issues:

Negotiations for the next contract were conducted in the spring and summer of 1972, under new Union leadership and with a largely new School Board. The Board was under external and internal pressure to resist teacher demands in areas where it had previously been more lenient. Conservatives had by this time gained sufficient representation on the Board that liberals no longer claimed a clear majority. Many Board members felt earlier Boards had "given away the shop" and that it was time for belt

tightening. In addition, the district had experienced budget defeats in 1971 and again in 1972, clearly indicating public sentiment against continued high school taxes. In this atmosphere, Union leaders reluctantly agreed to an eleventh-hour settlement, in August 1972, for a one-year contract they considered unsatisfactory, making a promise to themselves and their membership that they would do better in 1973.

In September, 1972, after a period of turnover in the superintendent's position, the Board appointed a man named Milton Avery as new superintendent. Avery had been serving as Assistant Superintendent for business affairs in the district, and had a reputation as a "business management man" in contrast to the more humanistic orientation of his predecessors. This appointment was made in spite of strong objections raised by teachers -- a clear indication that their advisory input on selection of administrators, won in 1970 contract negotiations and repeated in the 1972 contract, had no binding power. Board members themselves were divided over Avery's appointment, but he was supported by a close majority on the grounds that he would be a "strong administrator." His appointment aroused great animosity among the teaching staff, both because of his administrative orientation and because teacher recommendations had been disregarded. Furthermore, teacher respondents reported that Avery was not trusted by his staff -- he was reportedly inconsistent in his treatment of teachers, inclined to show favoritism, and undependable in keeping his word.

Teachers' anger over Avery's appointment, combined with their dissatisfaction with their 1972 contract, were important contextual factors underlying 1973 negotiations. Issues teachers wished to press focussed especially upon job protection this time, though salary was also an important issue, district salaries having slipped considerably relative to others in the county on the basis of the poor 1972 contract.

Job protection issues were included in 1973 teacher contract demands in the following forms:

- 1) "No reduction in force" -- meaning that teachers demanded assurance that no positions would be cut during the life of the contract.
- 2) A "Just cause" provision to protect probationary teachers, meaning that no teacher could be denied tenure or reappointment except where unsatisfactory teaching performance or conduct had been documented.

3) Limits to class size, meaning that the total number of teaching positions, as well as teaching conditions, would be protected.

Reductions in staff positions had not been a threat prior to this time, for until the early seventies, positions had expanded. Neither had job security for non-tenured teachers been a widespread issue prior to 1973, for most probationary teachers had received tenure, and unlike Cedarton, Middlebury respondents did not report dramatic cases where teachers felt colleagues had been unfairly dismissed. However, the threat of possible reductions in staff positions due to economic tightening, combined with teacher mistrust of the superintendent and School Board sensitized them to the especially precarious position of the probationary teacher at this time.

Furthermore, the "Just Cause" provision reflected broader teacher concerns surrounding teacher evaluation in respect to tenured as well as non-tenured teachers. Ultimately, teachers wanted to establish more systematic procedures for the conduct and use of evaluations as protection against all types of arbitrary, external judgments about their professional lives. A 1973 School Board member explained her understanding of these concerns:

(Teachers were)... "placed in a position of having to constantly defend their methods of teaching, their whole demeanor in the buildings, et cetera, without having any standards established for them. So it created an unfortunate situation, where they were constantly in conflict with... administrator(s), which they saw as a detriment... and personally threatening.

Class size had always been an issue for teachers in contract negotiations, but prior to 1973 the Union's rationale for maintaining low class size had been that smaller classes provided a more desirable teaching and learning environment. Now, it was becoming a job-protection issue. Furthermore, inclusion of class size limitations in earlier contracts had had little urgency, since previous School Boards had shared teachers' belief in the importance of small class sizes, and in practice, small classes had been maintained. Now, with a less supportive School Board, concerned with economizing, the threat of increased class size was real.

In 1973, projected staff cuts were very limited. Neither the Union nor the Board had any conception at that time of the drastic cuts that were to take place later in the seventies. Teacher concern for job security at that time was based more upon a decline in teacher faith in their administration and School Board than on a perception of significant change in external economic conditions.

The Conduct of Negotiations in 1973:

Membership anxiety and anger over changes in the School Board and administration, together with dissatisfaction with the 1972 contract, put the Union negotiating team under pressure to take a "tough stance" in the 1973 negotiations. The School Board, on the other hand, was subject to pressures from its own constituencies, and in a mood to demonstrate that they, not teachers, were running the district.

Respondents from both the Union negotiating team and the 1973 School Board characterized the Board's attitude as not so much hostile or arrogant (as found in Cedar-ton) as simply resistant to teacher demands. A member of the 1973 Union negotiating team commented,

The Board of Education had taken a position, "We beat them down once, we can beat them down again." They were not trying to negotiate in good faith.

A School Board respondent who came onto the 1973 Board a few months after the start of negotiations observed:

I think that the Board...had really not been interested in negotiating...It seems ridiculous, but they really were not interested in negotiating. They felt they were in a position to say "take it or leave it": and attempted to do just that...They had not really looked at the demands of the teachers, had not developed a list of demands or even alternatives, had not even talked to one another in terms of what they were willing...to address....It was as if the Board members didn't want to deal with it. It was a thorn in their side, it was taking a lot of their time. They didn't like the kind of flack they

were getting from teachers... It was a pain in the neck.

The School Board's failure to respond to teacher concerns further angered and frustrated Union negotiators, heightening tension and further polarizing the two parties.

Added to this situation was the fact that 1973 representatives for both the Union and the School Board were relatively new to the negotiating process. The Union was operating under another new president -- a second elementary teacher who had assumed office only a few months earlier -- while the former president now served as chief negotiator. Only a few members on the Union negotiating team had participated in any prior negotiations. The Board also had a new president, with a former president serving as its new chief negotiator. The presence of inexperienced new leadership on both sides aggravated existing tensions between the parties, in that participants lacked skills which could have helped to expedite the negotiating process.

Based on their desire to take a firm stand and because of their own lack of experience, the MTF negotiating team began to rely more heavily upon NYSUT for advice during negotiations and the local NYSUT field representative participated more extensively in actual negotiating sessions than had been the case in prior years. While this change benefited the Union in terms of adding the NYSUT representative's knowledge and experience, it also had the effect of antagonizing some members of the Board. Old Board members who had participated in previous negotiations resented this intrusion by an outsider into the "personal" relationship that existed when Board members and teachers negotiated directly. They also correctly read the Union's greater utilization of the field representative as an indication teachers had little faith in the School Board.

Thus, as a consequence of the above conditions, 1973 contract negotiations were pervaded by far more tension and hostility and greater polarization between parties than had existed during any previous negotiations. Negotiations also took on a more formal character than in the past, for informal channels of communication had been disrupted both by changes in leadership on both sides and by the breakdown in trust between parties. Respondents from both sides reported that little real communication took place across the bargaining table. A teacher respondent on the 1973 Union negotiating team commented,

It was a feeling that everybody was playing games...There was a lot of posturing, a lot of fist-shaking.

A 1973 Board member reported,

Neither side was making any kind of offer at all...It wasn't, "Let us make a proposal to you" or "Let us give you two or three proposals and...talk about whichever one you're interested in"...It was just a stating of "We don't want this, we don't want that, and waiting (for the other side to respond). And, of course, nobody was responding.

In the spring of 1973, both parties mutually agreed to request outside mediation under the auspices of the state's Public Employee Relations Board (PERB).* The mediator was unable to bring about a resolution and the case was referred to a second procedural level provided within the PERB structure, known as "Fact-Finding."** The Fact Finder's recommendations, however, were not acceptable to either party.

In June, just before the close of school, the Union membership met for the purposes of determining whether the negotiating committee should be authorized to call a strike at the opening of school in September in the event a contract had not been obtained by that time. The meeting was heavily attended and membership sentiments strongly favored taking a firm position. Union respondents claim that the vote taken at that meeting was over 90% for strike authorization.

Negotiations continued through the summer, but with little progress towards resolution during July. A participating School Board respondent reported that it was not until August that the parties began to seriously "whittle down" their demands and to identify essential differences. By the end of August, outstanding issues had been substantially narrowed. In fact, respondents who served on both the Board and Union negotiating teams reported

* Agency created under the Taylor Law to facilitate public employee negotiations..

** A process in which an appointed "fact-finder" investigates factors in the dispute and makes a recommendation for settlement. The Fact-Finder's recommendation is not binding on either party.

that in terms of substantive positions, the two parties were close to resolution. However, the atmosphere of distrust and recrimination had become so intolerable they were unable to reach a settlement.

Board members perceived teachers as having been "hostile" and "aggressive" while teacher representatives perceived the Board as "unreasonable." The degree to which any remaining spirit of "good faith" had deteriorated during the 1973 negotiations is illustrated in the following incident, reported by a Board member who was not part of the 1973 negotiating team, but who attended some sessions.

At the last point after an all night session, after they thought they'd worked everything out, one of the Union representatives came charging into the room where a couple of Board members were, and he said something...absolutely had to be changed, that it was different from what they had agreed to. One of the Board members immediately said that that was the way it was going to be and there was not going to be any change, no matter what -- that was it. The person responding had not even looked or considered or heard anything other than "It's got to be changed..." When finally the Union member left, I discussed it with the Board member, and I said, "Whatever was agreed to, what he wants to do to change it seems better for the Board. What are you objecting for?" And the response was, "He just gets me so angry."

Issues that both sides, in retrospect, claim ought to have been possible to resolve, given a better negotiating climate, were therefore not resolved prior to the opening of school, and in September, 1973, the MTF leaders called a strike.

The Strike:

Rank-and-file teacher support for the strike appears to have been quite strong. Activist estimates as to the percentage of teachers who stayed out of school during the strike ranged from

70% to 90%.* Some non-Union teachers refused to join the strike on the grounds it would be harmful both to children and to teacher-community relations.** Nevertheless, by all counts, a strong majority in the teaching staff were active strike supporters, including all major Union factions.

Reasons for rank-and-file support were not clear-cut. An open-ended questionnaire item asking rank-and-file teachers their reasons for supporting the 1973 strike yielded a wide variety of answers, ranging from specific issues like salary, job security, and class size to general statements about the "arrogance" of the School Board, feeling the School Board wanted to "dictate" the contract, and feeling teachers were not being given "humanistic treatment." Interviews helped to explain this apparent variety of reasons for the strike by clarifying common undercurrents. A teacher respondent active during the strike period pointed out,

Actually the strike had nothing to do with what was on the negotiating table. Money, job security, things like that were so-called strike issues, but had the tone been different at the time, we might have gone through those issues without getting into a strike...Underlying everything was attitude.

Another teacher activist from the strike period explained,

I don't think you can say that any one issue was the issue that caused the teachers to go out. Everyone had their own reason. I think what happened, essentially, was that the entire package -- the things that were important

* Survey data indicated 79% of respondents to have supported the strike, with 64% having been active supporters, as compared to 99% of Cedartown respondents indicating support and 82% indicating active support. (See Appendix, Table 11). These data are only suggestive, however, due to uncertainty as to the representativeness of the Middlebury sample, based on its size.

** These sentiments were reportedly strongest among Black teachers, many of whom had resigned from the MTF following the 1969 strike in New York City because they perceived the interests of the teachers' union as diverging from those of the Black community.

to me, the money that was important to other people -- kind of coalesced into a total package the staff as a whole found unacceptable... And I think the climate was ripe for everyone putting their foot down and saying, "It's time to take a stand."

Negotiations continued during the strike, but they were tense. Three or four days into the strike, the Board's chief negotiator resigned due to "exhaustion." Only a few days later, the Union president announced that he would resign as soon as the strike was over, because he had "had it." These resignations further indicate the emotional intensity of the strike atmosphere in Middlebury. They also appear, however, to have reflected the existence of strains within both the Union and School Board, since there is no evidence that the conflict between parties placed unusual pressures on those in top leadership positions.*

Union respondents from Middlebury made few comments during interviews that directly indicated tension or divisiveness within the Union during the strike period. In fact, most recalled the strike as a time of strong organizational unity -- a period when internal factions pulled together in the face of external conflict. Yet there were subtle indications of continuing internal division, which respondents may have either forgotten due to more vivid recollections of member solidarity in most areas, or which they chose not to reveal in their desire to protect the image of organizational unity during the strike. For example, several School Board respondents reported the Union negotiating team to have taken unusually lengthy breaks for internal deliberation during negotiations. Some Union activists interviewed -- though careful to avoid open criticism of colleagues on the strike negotiating team -- disclosed undercurrents of dissension by their hesitation in responding to questions about internal Union issues.**

* In fact, in Cedarton, where the polarization between negotiating parties was far more extreme than in Middlebury, there were no indications that pressures on top leaders were unmanageable, although members of both the School Board and Union negotiating teams were as inexperienced in contract negotiations as in Middlebury..

** By contrast, Union activists from the strike period in Cedarton spoke candidly and without hesitation about internal Union deliberations during that period.

Furthermore, some Union respondents in Middlebury openly criticized certain aspects of leaders' positions during the strike, indicating these to have been the basis of some disagreements at the time. This last point will be addressed in more detail shortly.

School Board respondents were more open about their internal disagreements. Some felt others were not sufficiently understanding of teachers' concerns. Others objected not so much to the substance of the Board's position as to members' tones and postures during negotiations (e.g., colleagues taking "moralistic," "patronizing" or "inflexible" attitudes which they felt antagonized teachers). Thus there were, within the Board, pressures by some members to be more conciliatory while others exerted pressures towards taking a "tough" stance.

After the Union president announced his intention to resign, the vice-president assumed a more active leadership role. The vice-president was another elementary teacher, a woman named Jenny Abrams, who at that time had had little experience in either Union leadership or negotiations. By her own admission, she wouldn't have become active in the Union had others not pushed her to do so, and she certainly had not anticipated assuming the presidency. In her words,

"When he announced that (he would resign) I nearly fainted...My choice was to call for a new election, or -- But, I guess I'm not one to run away."

Thus, the top Union leadership was determined virtually by default -- another indicator that the Union lacked cohesiveness during this period.

The Board negotiator was replaced by an attorney and ex-Board president who had negotiated an earlier Union contract in 1969 during Martin Landau's presidency -- a period when the Board and Union had had good informal relations. The new Board negotiator attempted to utilize connections to broach a settlement, approaching Landau informally with a tentative proposal. Since Landau no longer had formal status as a Union officer, he could do no more than pass the proposal on to existing Union officers, on the assumption they would take it into consideration in their deliberation. However, Union officers rejected the informal proposal, apparently more for tactical than substantive reasons. In fact, substantially, both Landau and a Board respondent reported that this proposal was not only "reasonable," but more

favorable to the Union than what Union officers later accepted as the basis for the strike settlement. On the one hand, in their mistrust of the Board, Union leaders had difficulty in accepting an informal, behind-the-scenes proposition; they wanted everything "open" and "on the table." On the other, they had difficulty working a response to the Board proposal into open negotiations without seeming to have yielded in their own position. Thus, in the next negotiating session, the Union's chief negotiator ignored cues offered by the Board negotiator to move in the direction of the proposed settlement, laying out instead substantially the same position the Union had taken on the previous day. At that point, the new Board negotiator, surprised and annoyed, walked out of the session. This development further polarized the two parties, and negotiations remained at impasse for another week.

Administrator reactions during the strike:

As in Cedarton, administrators' sympathies appear to have been divided, but most kept a low profile during the strike. The district superintendent remained in the background, preoccupied with attempting to keep schools open without adequate staff. In any event, the superintendent was not in a position to play an active role in either the negotiations process or in bringing about a settlement, due to his poor relationship with the Union.

Community relations during the strike:

Community sentiments towards striking teachers were divided at the outset of the strike. Liberal residents were reportedly predisposed to be sympathetic to teacher concerns -- particularly to the "just cause" issue -- while more conservative residents were predisposed to be more hostile. Hostile community elements were angry about disruptions in school programs, and exerted pressure on Board members to take a "hard line."

Few residents appeared to have had sufficient information to fully understand the strike issues, for communication between teachers and community residents tended to be fragmented. Both the School Board and the Union attended to public relations through news releases and the distribution of "fliers" but there was no organized attempt on the part of Union leadership to communicate directly with residents as was attempted in Cedarton. This failure in communication disturbed professional-idealists, such as Landau and other former Union leaders, who claimed new

leaders failed to understand the importance of community relations. Noting that Middlebury had a history of very supportive relations, which former leaders had worked to sustain, they maintained that new leaders could have far more effectively utilized sympathetic community groups. By adequately informing such groups as to the issues, former leaders maintained, community pressures on the Board towards cooperation with teachers could have been enhanced, and dangers of long-term polarization between teachers and community reduced. In view of the racial composition of the district and racial tensions already mounting, idealists reported having been particularly concerned that Middlebury not follow the course taken by New York City teachers in 1969, where the UFT strike antagonized both Blacks and liberal Whites. Landau commented,

When New York City had the strike, we went up... along with a few other locals...and fought Al Shanker, (because) we didn't think...the strike...was run right. And here we were, in my view, being forced to go through a similar thing, without concern about the community response.

Former leaders also perceived new leaders as emphasizing a "confrontation" spirit in their relationship to the School Board, in cases where they felt a more positive, cooperative stance would have been possible and more effective. Since former leaders had worked directly with some Board members still holding office, they were aware that Board sympathies were not entirely antagonistic to teachers; furthermore, they noted that Board members, though stubbornly resistant to teacher demands, were not expressing the kind of open arrogance and hostility towards striking teachers that had been witnessed elsewhere (e.g., in Cedarton). A former "professional-idealist" activist reported the following incident, which took place at a public School Board meeting during the strike, as illustration:

There was one public meeting where a community member stood up and yelled that they should fire all the teachers and hire new people. The President of the Board, ...who was taking a very hard-nosed position during negotiations...and who was considered Enemy Number One by the teaching staff, ...stood up and screamed at this person, "We may be having our differences now, but we have the best teaching staff in the county, and don't you dare even suggest such a thing,

because this will pass"...A lot of people chose not to hear that, but I did. To me, it was a vindication of the position (we'd) taken earlier, about informal contacts being very important.

Former leaders attributed new leaders' failure to perceive and utilize potential community supportiveness in part to new leaders' inexperience and principally to their heavy reliance on NYSUT, claiming that NYSUT, as a statewide organization, lacked a community-based perspective and that NYSUT representatives, trained at the state level in urban areas or in labor-organizing activities other than teaching, failed to understand the importance of developing good teacher-community relations. Landau and other former leaders went so far as attempting to organize meetings on their own with community residents, for purposes of explaining the Union position. Without the full participation of current leaders, however, these were neither as comprehensive or as effective as comparable Union efforts in Cedarton.

The Strike Settlement:

The strike lasted thirteen days -- longer than participants on either side anticipated. Union respondents reported some discontent within their ranks as the strike dragged on without apparent progress towards settlement. However, in spite of weaknesses in Union leadership and dissension among leaders over tactical issues (such as the handling of negotiations and community relations), all leaders shared common convictions about the significance of the strike, thus enabling them to sustain fairly strong public solidarity. Ultimately, the most basic, unifying factor appears to have been their desire to demonstrate to the Board and central administration that they wished to be taken seriously in negotiations. On a secondary level, was their common sense of loyalty to the idea of a union and the feeling that striking was a legitimate response to School Board resistance in negotiations.

The initiative for eventual settlement of the strike came from within the Board, encouraged by pressures from community residents. Both School Board and Union respondents reported that the final settlement was, in fact, no better than what the Board had offered informally during the early days of the strike.

Teacher respondents reported that it was, nevertheless, in many respects a good settlement. Salaries -- which had not been the main issue -- were the area in which the Union made the major gain, since the settlement provided for salary increases based upon the cost of living for a three-year period. These later proved to be substantial, as the rate of inflation rose markedly during that period of time.* The Board also agreed to a contract clause specifying limitations to class sizes.**

The settlement included a compromise on the issue of "just cause" for non-tenured (probationary) teachers. Teachers had wanted a contract statement indicating that no teacher would be dismissed without "just cause,"*** with the burden of proof being upon the administration. The Board refused to grant such a statement. What was finally agreed to, instead, was a compromise specifying detailed procedures for evaluating and recommending probationary teachers for tenure. The agreement specified that two administrators and one outside professional (selected by the teacher) would observe and evaluate the probationary teacher's performance, submitting written evaluations to a "Review Panel," composed of teacher representatives, and to the superintendent. The Review Panel was to make a recommendation for (or against) tenure to the superintendent, prior to the superintendent making his own recommendations. Both the Review Panel's recommendation and that of the superintendent were to be purely advisory, still

* The Consumer Price Index rose to double-digit figures within the following year, and continued at a high rate for several years thereafter.

** It is to be noted that Board respondents did not view specifying class size limitations as a concession to teachers. Some Board members favored such a clause as a protection for the district against possible later changes in existing policy as public resistance to school spending tightened.

*** Meaning that reasons for dismissal would have to be documented and based on unsatisfactory performance of teaching duties, along the lines later provided in the state Education Law (Sec 3020a) specifying grounds for dismissal of tenured teachers (i.e., insubordination, incapacity to teach, incompetence, immoral character or conduct, or neglect of duty).

leaving final discretion in tenure decisions up to the School Board.* However, Union leaders hoped that the panel's recommendation would have morally-binding power.

Impact of the Strike:

The costs of the strike for both sides were high. For teachers, the economic costs were enormous. Under the Taylor Law, striking public employees were subject to penalties equivalent to two days pay for every one day on strike. The School Board refused to suspend financial penalties in their settlement, meaning a loss of several thousand dollars for most teachers. For the School Board, costs were not economic, but political and organizational -- public embarrassment and a state of confusion within the school system. Antagonisms between the affected groups -- ~~teachers, administrators, and School Board~~ were heightened by hostilities shown during the strike and by teacher resentment against the Board for their strict imposition of penalties.

~~Respondents were in agreement that the strike increased both Union and School Board internal solidarity for a period of several years, blurring earlier, internal divisions, but also polarizing them. A Board respondent explained,~~

If the strike...pulled teachers together, it also pulled Board members together, developing new poles within the district...There was a taking-off to the corners of the ring. Everybody was in his own corner. The Union was in one place, the Board was in another... And I don't think just the teachers and the Board pulled apart, but I think the principals...(and) top administration did, so you had these separate groups. The result was... there was really no line of communication up and down, no line of authority...I mean, technically, the lines were still there, but the loyalties were...(different).

* Under the Education Law, (Sec. 3013) School Boards must review the superintendent's recommendation prior to making their decision, but they need not follow it. (See Hageny, 1976, p. 69.)

The impact on the community was mixed. Respondents report some segments of the community remained sympathetic to teachers and became more critical of School Board and administration. A citizen's group, formed to inquire into causes of the strike was a direct outcome. On the other hand, the strike appeared to many respondents to have aroused anti-teacher sentiments among many previously neutral residents.

Respondents representing all three parties made frequent references to the strike as "unnecessary," "a waste" or, in the words of a member of a pre-strike School Board, "a symbolic battle that didn't ... really answer anyone's needs." Others claimed, however, that while this "symbolic battle" may in the short run have yielded far greater costs than benefits to all concerned parties, that it did have some long-range benefits. Most importantly, it served the purpose of bringing both Union and School Board to a sharp realization of the costs of failing to recognize the others' point of view. This realization had an important impact upon the atmosphere in later negotiations.

THE POST-STRIKE PERIOD

Following the strike, community antagonisms, towards teachers intensified. It is not clear to what extent intensified antagonisms were a direct outcome of the strike, as there appear to have been other contributing factors. Lower middle and working class residents -- both Black and White -- were becoming far more vocal and more critical of the schools in general. The presence of a large, politically-sensitive Black population was undoubtedly a factor. Increased public criticism appears also to have reflected a national trend of greater conservatism, uneasiness and impatience with the liberal "experiments" of the sixties, which had been so much more dramatic in Middlebury than in Cedarton.* On the other hand, some respondents believed criticisms of teachers, specifically, became more intense immediately after the strike. In content, the criticisms appear to have reflected taxpayers' resentment over improved teacher benefits (at their expense) in the fact of their perceptions of increased failings in the school system. Resentment focussed on the Union for protecting teachers from accountability for these failings. Thus, it would appear that

* Comparable to the backlash against progressive education in Oakville, as will become evident in the next chapter.

resentment intensified more in consequence of greater community awareness of the Union during the strike rather than because of strike activities per se. As was indicated earlier, some respondents also pointed out that Union leaders neglected efforts to rally community support through direct, personal contact, or to create a forum for dialogue with residents about teacher concerns, Union activities, and reasons for the strike.

In the post-strike period, liberal community residents were less active in school district affairs than they had been in the past.* Their withdrawal from activism was significant in that this generally more educated group had earlier been better able to understand the complexities and difficult issues underlying school district problems. They had also tended to be more sympathetic to teachers and to the concept of teacher unionism than less well educated residents. With the liberal group less active, teachers had fewer articulate, supportive allies to assist in interpreting their concerns to others in the community. Aside from the small citizens' group which was formed to inquire into the causes of the strike no concerted initiative was taken on the part of community residents to improve community-teacher relations, as was the case in Cedarton and, as we shall see, in Oakville.

Without unified community leadership, heightened public antagonisms toward teachers and schools began to manifest themselves more clearly on the School Board. Respondents characterized middle and late seventies School Boards as, in the aggregate, more limited in "vision" and in "educational commitment" than in the past. While liberal professionals continued to have some representation on the Board, reactionary, educationally conservative community factions gained more positions. Increasing differences in philosophy among Board members, combined with increased economic restrictions upon the district led to a lack of predictability in Board decision-making. This lack of predictability contributed to teacher and administrator perceptions of an inconsistent, often arbitrary and highly politicized body. The presence in the same period of some individuals on the Board prone to making inflammatory critical comments about teachers, often in public, further contributed to teacher perceptions of the School Board as a hostile adversary.

* Reasons respondents gave for the decline in liberals' activism were related to overall changes in the district population, and lowered optimism about the future of integrated education (based on withdrawal of Black support in the seventies).

Union leaders, as well as individual teachers, began taking a more militant, aggressive stance in their relations with both administrators and the School Board immediately following the strike. Jenny Abrams, the Union president in the post-strike period, commented,

"Before (the strike) there was a more relaxed kind of relationship with the Board...and administration...We were not as sharply defined, Since then, we are A UNION, in capital letters, and a power respected in the community. We began to understand that it's not a gentleman's agreement relationship. It's definitely labor-management."

Administrators, already subject to increased pressures from both parents and the School Board in this period, report having felt especially vulnerable to teachers' more hostile, adversary attitude.* Even prior to the strike, several principals had been targets of parent and teacher criticism, and two, in the high school, had been "eased out" of their positions as a consequence. Principals, therefore, were far more cautious in their treatment of teachers following the strike, and, according to several respondents, cautious to the point of near immobility. A School Board respondent commented,

People...walked very warily. I think... principals, more than anybody, had the feeling...they were unloved by everybody. I think they feared to do very much with teachers...They weren't going to do anything that was unpleasant to teachers. Therefore, they would be forced into positions that seemed to put them at odds with central administration. And, by the way, they also feared central administration...Central administration seemed to have nowhere to look. Nobody loved them.

Avery, the superintendent, had not been popular with any groups in the district. In 1975, the Board removed Avery and appointed another assistant superintendent in his place. Respondents characterized the new superintendent (Richard Roberts) as

* Note that at this point in time administrators had not yet formed their own union, and were often literally insecure in their positions.

"a consensus man," "conciliatory," and "humanistic." Teachers liked Roberts and he had far better relations with the staff than his predecessor, but most respondents did not perceive him as exercising strong administrative leadership.* For both of these reasons, however, he was viewed less as an adversary by Union leaders than his predecessor, and staff-administrator relations appear to have improved somewhat under him. On the other hand, whether because of personal limitations in leadership ability or because of the contradictory pressures on him, Roberts was unable to effectively insulate his staff from community or Board antagonisms. Thus, teachers' insecurity and, therefore, sense of dependency on the Union for protection in a volatile environment appears to have increased during his administration.

In the mid-seventies, the district began to experience declining student enrollments. Between 1974 and 1979, over forty teacher positions were cut, including many held by tenured teachers. Some had been in the district as long as ten years. Three elementary school buildings were closed. Cuts in federal and state budgets particularly affected Middlebury, due to its reliance on outside financing for special programs geared towards low income, minority children. These cuts meant further reductions in staff. Meanwhile, local budget defeats sensitized the School Board and central administration to even greater financial caution. Class sizes were pushed to the limit, special programs and services eroded.

Actual teacher cuts were less extensive in Middlebury than in Cedarton, due to the sharper decline in student enrollment and a smaller tax base there. Still, the antagonistic climate in which the cuts occurred and the sense of relative deprivation teachers experienced due to School Board departure from earlier district policies and practices appears to have influenced teacher morale and insecurity more adversely than in Cedarton.

* Several respondents observed that given the extent of community and Board factionalism, no superintendent could have exercised strong leadership in any given direction because of the contradictory pressures exerted by various factions from within the community, Board, and teaching staff.

THE UNION IN THE SEVENTIES:

Organizational Structure and Leadership:

As in Cedar-ton, the MTF changed its formal structure, very little since the old Association was reorganized in 1967. Structurally, the two organizations were similar. The major officers were the elected officers (president, vice-presidents, secretary and treasurer) and the appointed committee chairpersons for a grievance committee, a negotiating committee, and welfare committee. The elected and appointed officers formed the executive council. Another carryover from the Association was the central representative assembly, in which delegates from each building met regularly to discuss and take action on presidential and executive council recommendations.

The major structural change from the Association and early Union, was the inclusion of non-teacher staff members (teacher aides, clerical and service workers) in the Union in the seventies. As in Cedar-ton, and in keeping with similar practices elsewhere, this change was instituted by the MTF for the purpose of providing unified Union representation for all groups within the staff, with the exception of administrators, in order to reduce potential competition among various employee groups. Non-teacher groups were represented on the Executive Council and in the central delegate assembly, but operated under separate contracts, separately negotiated. No evidence was provided to indicate that inclusion of non-teaching employees in the organization significantly altered its activities or direction. Teachers continued to dominate the organization by virtue of their greater numbers.

Respondents were close to unanimous in reporting the Union in 1979 to be a far stronger, better organized group than it had been a decade earlier. Officers' formal spheres of responsibility were more clearly defined and better coordinated. Routine, procedural problems relating to teacher grievances and negotiations were more systematically managed. In discussions of organizational changes during the interviews, respondents generally gave more emphasis to changes in organizational leadership, to the Union's relationship to NYSUT, and to changes in Union goals than to formal structural changes.

Changes in the nature of Union leadership followed a distinctly different pattern in Middlebury than in Cedar-ton. For comparison purposes, we shall examine patterns of difference in respect to the following aspects of leadership: (1) degree of

continuity or stability in top leadership positions, (2) the type of teacher tending to be active in the Union, and (3) leadership styles.

1. Continuity in office: Jenny Abrams, having assumed the presidency of the Union on the day the strike was over, was still president six years later, in 1979. Abrams was the first in the Middlebury Union to even run for this office more than once. This was in contrast to the leadership situation in the late sixties and early seventies, wherein the presidency was deliberately rotated. In contrast to the leadership pattern in Cedarton, where continuity in office was deliberately sustained, Abrams' continuity in that position was, however, more by default. In her own words,

My becoming president was accidental, in a sense, because I don't think I would have had the self-confidence -- by myself -- to say "I'm going to run for president." But I was first vice president, and I guess I'm not one to run away...When I got active (originally) it was...because people encouraged me to do it. There was nobody on the... (executive council) who represented the primary school. So I became involved mainly because of that.

Other respondents repeatedly indicated that her continuity in office occurred mainly because others abdicated. Typical comments were as follows:

No one else has wanted to get involved in that sort of thing...

No one else is willing to do the amount of work that she does...

It's a very difficult job which requires a tremendous amount of work, and no one... sees how they can add it to the workload they already carry and do an adequate job...

While Abrams continued in office and succeeded in gaining considerable expertise in the president's role, other leadership positions turned over more frequently. Other than Abrams, few teachers in Middlebury sustained a Union leadership position for very many years after the strike. Only one teacher who had been

active in the sixties was still active in the late seventies, and he was a traditional unionist. None of the professional-idealist group remained active in the Union after 1973, although several from this group were still referred to as significant informal leaders in the district in 1979.

Active participation in the Union dropped most substantially in the high school. Jenny Abrams explained,

This has been a source of great concern to me...Because the leadership had been there before, many of them now say "I've done my bit. I'll support you, but I'm tired." And they've gone off to other interests. They're still good Union members, and they'll come out for...(support) but it's hard to get leadership out of them.

Reference to a deliberate rotation of leadership positions and the notion that former leaders were "tired" were frequently offered as reasons why professional-idealists were no longer active in the Union. While there may have been validity to both these reasons, they do not, however, constitute an adequate explanation of why professional-idealists withdrew so completely from Union leadership roles in such marked contrast to Cedarton. We shall address this matter in more detail at a later point.

2. Type of teacher assuming leadership: We have noted that the leadership of both the Association and early Union had been concentrated in the high school in the sixties, and that it shifted from the high school to the elementary level in the seventies. This shift indicated more than a mere rotation in leadership positions. The early leaders -- the teachers who had pressed for reorganization of the Association, for professional negotiations, and then, for affiliation with the AFT -- mainly the professional-idealists -- had been among the most highly educated and respected teachers in the district. They were the "influential," informal leaders. When these teachers withdrew from Union activism in the early seventies, it not only became more difficult to fill major Union positions, but also positions tended to be more often filled by teachers of lesser status in the eyes of their colleagues.

Teacher respondents indicated considerable ambivalence about both Abrams and the rest of the leadership group. Most characterized Abrams as a "good" president -- hardworking, pragmatic, strongly committed to the Union and to her membership. Yet further

comments were often evasive, even in response to direct questions. The following excerpt from an interview with a Union member was typical:

Question: In another district, people will volunteer...(that) the leaders in the Union are "the best people in the school." Would you say that was true of your Union?

Answer: Well, it's very difficult for me to say...That's a very difficult question for me to answer.

Question: Would you say that was true in the past?

Answer: Yes.

Other Union members commented as follows:

It's difficult for me to criticize people who work as hard as the people in the Union. They are committed people, they work long hours with pretty good results in terms of negotiating contracts...But -- I know there are people who have discussed among themselves...alternative (candidates).

Generally, I think the Union leadership is respected, with one or two exceptions.

Teachers that are involved with the educational concerns of the school system, teachers viewed as the intellectuals...are more on the outside of the Union.

One current Union activist was more direct:

The quality of our leadership in the Union... is a problem, I have to be frank...With very few exceptions, the executive group of our Union now is probably some of the weakest leadership that we have.

Administrators and School Board members also tended to be evasive or qualified in their comments, in marked contrast to the

open praise such respondents volunteered in discussing Union leaders in Cedar-ton. The following were typical of Middlebury administrators and School Board members:

As far as the Union leadership -- it's very hard for me to judge. I've had very little contact with (them)...because we've had few problems...Jenhy Abrams seems to be tempered, pretty middle-of-the-road. She seems to be fair. (School principal)

She (Abrams) has been a reasonable person... I assume she satisfied the staff. From nobody do I get negative vibes. (Second principal)

I think she's a strong Union leader dedicated to her role. (Third principal)

She's fair, and I think for a Union leader to be fair requires a certain amount of courage -- not to be inflammatory and not to play to the audience. She's not a firebrand, ... but she's responsible and hardworking. (Current Board member)

Jenny's strength is that she...reflects the average person, for whom teaching is a living. (Former Board member)

3. Leadership style: In Middlebury, the Union president assumed the major weight of responsibility for carrying our Union functions. While certain functions were delegated to others, difficulty in sustaining capable people in key Union positions did not permit the extent of shared responsibility that occurred in Cedar-ton. Thus, Abrams carried out many functions herself that were performed by others in Cedar-ton -- e.g., composing the monthly newsletter. Furthermore, there was no evidence in Middlebury of an informal, supportive network among Union activists comparable to that in Cedar-ton. While Union officers met often in the executive council, these formal meetings did not permit the kind of thrashing-out of Union positions on difficult issues that occurred in Cedar-ton.

By contrast to Cedar-ton, where Union officers exercised active, persuasive leadership roles, Abrams played more of a coordinating and sustaining role in the organization, attempting to pull together diverse points of view through compromise. A School Board member commented,

I think Jenny represents somebody who can talk to both sides in the Union and who can be voted for by enough Union members so that she represents a consensus.

In the sense that she represented membership views held in common and in the sense that she took direction from membership (rather than setting direction and persuading members to follow) Abrams' style was more democratic than the Cedar-ton leaders' style, more in keeping with the earlier "grass roots" Union orientation. On the other hand, her orientation towards sustaining organizational consensus appears to have resulted in what some Union members viewed as an avoidance of difficult, controversial issues. One commented on this as follows:

The prevalent note is caution, always caution. Caution is important, but there are ~~times~~ when -- (drops off)...Jenny's concern is, "Don't separate, don't divide...Don't cause splits among the teachers"...Which means you have to avoid anything controversial.

Membership Participation and Factionalism:

Virtually all Middlebury teachers (96%) belonged to the Union in 1979. As in Cedar-ton, activists complained about the difficulty of sustaining rank-and-file involvement in the organization. One remarked,

There has not been as much participation in... the Union as there should be...There are too many teachers who remain uninvolved -- teachers who are dues-paying members, but don't involve themselves in Union activities...I think it's called "Let George do it."

Another commented,

They join, pay their dues, but don't want to assume responsibility.

While active participation on the executive council was more difficult to sustain in Middlebury than in Cedar-ton, survey data indicated Middlebury respondents to have been more likely to

attend membership meetings. Their better attendance, possibly reflected their stronger orientation to "grass roots" participation.*

Unlike Cedar-ton, there were no external challenges to the Middlebury Union for collective bargaining rights. Nor were there any organized efforts from within the organization to challenge the top leadership in an election. Internal factions were also less clear-cut in 1979 than in the sixties. Professional-idealists no longer debated their position strongly within the Union, and external pressures fostered greater unanimity on monetary and protective goals as Union priorities. Still, a diffuse factionalism appears to have pervaded the Union, making internal discussion of issues more difficult and less focussed than in Cedar-ton. Respondents reported colleagues as "continually fighting," "in constant disagreement," "always yelling at each other." Many respondents attributed internal dissension simply to the mixture of strong personalities on the staff. An activist commented,

Six...or seven individuals square off at each other at a meeting that has, say, twenty people. They make all the noise and they monopolize all the attention...Certain individuals will fight about anything.

Another hypothesis is that internal dissension reflected members' general disenchantment with the Union and frustration at being unable to formulate a clear organizational direction, in the face of shifts in district policy away from its earlier educational commitments.

Relationship of the MTF to the Statewide Organization:

Due, initially, to her own inexperience and the lack of a supportive informal network within the Union, Jenny Abrams relied heavily on NYSUT for guidance and advice in the early days of her presidency, immediately following the strike. Abrams explained,

* Better attendance at meetings may also have reflected Middlebury teachers' greater freedom from responsibilities for young children after school, since the Middlebury sample was, on average, 7-8 years older than the Cedar-ton sample, and 10 years older than the Oakville sample.

They've certainly educated me, and I've made it my business to utilize them (NYSUT advisors) ...They are as close to me as the telephone... The first year, I utilized...the local Center more than I do now...As I become more involved on the state level, I know exactly which office to call (in Albany) and who to speak to on whatever issue I need information.

Over time, Abrams became increasingly active within the state organization in several capacities -- as did the presidents of the Cedarton and Oakville Unions. As in Cedarton and Oakville, and contrary to the claims of some administrators and School Board members, Union respondents in Middlebury made it clear that NYSUT representatives in no way instructed or pressured local activists as to what positions they should take. Abrams explained,

There is no interference at all in local affairs or local negotiations...We get guidance...I can call them for advice on something,...(but) they will never interfere.

However, the frequency with which references to NYSUT came up in conversations with both activists and other respondents in Middlebury suggested they relied more heavily on NYSUT for such advice than did Union leaders in the other two districts.*

This closer affiliation with the state organization also represented an important change in the local Union's orientation. Landau commented,

Even in the heyday of our push for unionization, I wasn't very interested in national and state affiliation. I thought it was necessary, helpful in the bigger scheme of things, but I didn't think it meant very much to us. We put very little energy into it. Jenny and her people put a lot of energy into that. They see it as very important.

A school principal also noted a stronger affiliation with NYSUT as a significant change:

* A more stressful environment in Middlebury may have been a factor in the MTF seeking more outside support.

At one time I think the organization was more independent...Over a period of years, it got so enmeshed within the state that really they don't move now without someone from the state sitting in.

Landau and other early Union activists I interviewed believed the MTF's closer affiliation with NYSUT contributed to a major shift in the local organization's emphasis. Landau explained:

I'd always been very contemptuous of...going to conventions and resolutions...That was a failing on my part, because there are larger issues. But I'd hoped there was room enough in our local organization for people who were interested in that sort of thing to deal with that...I thought the leadership should concentrate on local, grass roots issues dealing with major educational programs and problems, because that would provide a base for community contacts, for a sense that we're all in the same boat...

What began to happen was that it began to switch. Bread-and-butter and statewide, broad, national issues and exposure became very important to the Union leadership. To be fair, I suppose they could argue that planning things on a local level is dangerous, especially in the kind of economic conditions in which we're operating, and that you have to provide statewide guarantees and support. But I think it's wrong...Statewide support is not strengthening us in areas we want.

Union Issues in the Middle and Late Seventies:

Economic and survival issues took precedence as Union concerns in the later seventies. As in Cedarton, protection of teacher jobs became a central concern. Because of declining enrollment, and budgetary cutbacks, there was little the Union could do to prevent massive staff cuts.

Although there were fewer actual teacher layoffs in Middlebury than in Cedarton, they appear to have engendered more bitterness

and internal dissension in Middlebury. In part, this appears to have reflected teachers' greater sense of relative deprivation, juxtaposing their present circumstances against their earlier situation. Also, layoffs produced more internal dissension due to the interracial character of the staff. Black teachers -- most of whom had been hired in the late sixties and early seventies -- challenged the use of a seniority system as the basis for making cuts on the grounds that the district's integrationist philosophy required preservation of Black faculty. Black, and many White, residents strongly supported this claim. Liberal White teachers -- torn between commitment to racial equality and anxiety to preserve their own jobs -- found themselves defending a strict seniority system as the only predictable basis for determining cuts.* The seniority system was generally followed, in keeping with state regulations and Union practices elsewhere, but, the resulting disproportionate cutting-off of Black teachers raised Black antagonisms to the Union -- within both the staff and community.

Also as in Cedarton, more emphasis was placed on maintaining class size as a means of protecting teachers' jobs. Class size was a less central issue in Middlebury, during the seventies, due to the fact the Union contract set upper limits. Class size did become a contract issue in 1976, however -- a point to be discussed shortly.

Other Union issues in the seventies dealt mainly with teacher protection and benefits. Few respondents claimed the Union any longer gave emphasis to educational goals, and no concrete evidence of such emphasis was provided. Many teacher respondents noted the shift towards nearly complete emphasis upon welfare goals, and away from educational goals, with regret. Teachers in Middlebury consistently expressed far more concern than in either of the other districts regarding "problems" related to educational programs and policies; they were divided, however, on whether the Union should or could become actively involved with educational goals. A rank-and-file elementary teacher complained:

Some of us...have serious concerns about the kinds of programs that are being run...What is

* Yet even the seniority system wasn't always predictable. Individual teachers' rankings changed often, due to frequent revisions in state rulings, as well as to teacher re-training to obtain certification in additional subject areas, to protect themselves against program cuts.

the Union doing?...Enough about our benefits.
Where are we involved in the educational
process?

A high school teacher commented,

Our Federation has accomplished quite a few things for teachers' welfare. My disappointment -- and it is a major disappointment -- is that we spend no time on learning...There's no time even for conversation about it. Meetings and all of the get-togethers have to do with teacher welfare...It's a dilemma -- I don't blame the Federation. Perhaps it's in the nature of the beast...But in being concerned so much with teacher welfare... they seem now to have moved a great deal away from what's good for kids...I just don't see it any more.

Jenny Abrams remarked,

I wish we had more time to devote to purely educational issues, but in this district there's a crisis every minute.

THE LATE SEVENTIES

Negotiations: 1976 and 1979:

Negotiations for the 1976 contract began in January 1976, for a contract to become effective on July 1st. MTF proposals focussed essentially on maintaining existing contract provisions, strengthening teacher protection, and improving salaries and benefits. The Board sought to cut back on some contract provisions -- most notably, to delete the limitation on class size.

A major difference from 1973 was the involvement of an outside professional, a specialist in education law, hired by the Board as its principal negotiator. Board representatives continued to sit in on negotiating sessions, thus maintaining some direct contact with the teacher committee, but actual negotiations were conducted through the outside professional. The Union negotiating committee was smaller in 1976 than in 1973 (restricted to

four members). A NYSUT representative continued to advise Union representatives and to play a direct role in actual negotiations, along with the Union's principal negotiator.

In spite of increased tensions between Board members and teachers, negotiations went more smoothly in 1976 than in 1973. Respondents from both the Board and the Union reported the negotiating atmosphere to have been more tempered, due mainly to the Board's reliance on the outside negotiator, who was able to present Board positions in a more objective, less patronizing tone than Board representatives had conveyed in 1973.

Teacher respondents noted that Board members continued to insist upon maintaining "management prerogatives," but seemed more accepting of the legitimacy of negotiations as a process in 1976 than in 1973. A member of the Union negotiating team commented:

The Board's attempt is always to maintain Board prerogatives, management prerogatives...to limit (negotiations) to wages and conditions of employment...They still maintain that posture, more or less. But they've come to realize if we're going to live together, they'd better think in terms of other things.

The Board wanted to eliminate class size guidelines from the contract, claiming it wanted more flexibility in determining class sizes due to budget constraints. Board members also claimed class size did not constitute a condition of employment, and was therefore non-negotiable. Increases in salaries and fringe benefits were also in dispute. Teachers wanted substantial increases because of inflation; Board members wanted to hold them down. The parties declared impasse over these issues, and the dispute went first to mediation, then to "fact-finding." The fact-finder supported the Union position on class size on the basis of its inclusion in the previous contract, and he recommended small annual salary increases of 5% per year. Both sides agreed to accept the fact-finder's report and a settlement was reached in mid-June, 1976. Thus, neither side made substantial gains or losses, but a better negotiating relationship prevailed, in which the Union was able to protect existing contract provisions.

Negotiations for the 1979 contract began in the early winter of 1979. Teachers made lesser demands than in 1976, but the Board made more. Town taxes had just been increased by over 20% and Board members felt pressure to keep school taxes down. Again, the

Board wanted to eliminate class size limitations from the contract. They also wanted a salary freeze, and they wanted to cut teacher benefits. Teachers were therefore on the defensive.

A NYSUT representative again assisted the Union's principal negotiator. The Board used an outside professional negotiator, as in 1976, and that contributed to maintaining a moderate negotiations atmosphere, in spite of some expressions of open hostility toward teachers from Board members, and some evidence of dissension among Union representatives -- reported by Board respondents. Union negotiators reported the initially tense atmosphere to have improved as negotiations progressed. A member of the Union team explained,

We were apprehensive, because they kept saying, "No, no, no."...Suddenly, it fell into line. Nobody wanted a strike, and it just got to be more of a talking kind of thing...They realized we were very upset, very angry, and that we weren't planning to give on these major issues...class size, a freeze on salary...

The two parties spent about two months paring down their lists of demands, on both sides. In June, a settlement was reached in which the Board agreed to small salary increases and to maintaining the class size limitation clause in exchange for Union concessions on some teacher benefits. Teachers lost sabbatical leaves and a "tenure bonus" amounting to \$300 per year. The outside evaluator's role in teachers' evaluations was also modified.

Neither Board members nor teachers were completely satisfied with the settlement. Several Board members wanted teachers to yield more, and voted against the settlement, so the contract was approved by a split vote on the Board. Teachers agreed to making concessions, but with reluctance, feeling their only choices were to give in on some items in order to protect those which had greater priority -- such as class size.

Respondents were in agreement that in spite of Union concessions in 1979, the MTF still had an excellent contract. Except in the areas of salaries, sabbaticals, the tenure bonus and a few minor changes in other areas, the 1979 contract was essentially the same as in 1973. Respondents called it a "strong contract," and a "thick contract." In comparison to Cedarton, terms and conditions of employment were spelled out in more detail (e.g., guidelines for teacher transfers, assignments, and evaluations).

Teacher salaries were substantially higher than in Cedarton, and the MTF had a better welfare fund. In comparison to other school districts in the region, the contract was better than most.

Non-Contractual Developments:

In spite of a mere detailed, stronger contract, Middlebury teachers lost ground in several areas during the seventies, in contrast to Cedarton. The Middlebury contract specifically provided for teacher input in two important kinds of decisions: (1) the selection of administrators and (2) teacher tenure decisions. Although the input in each case was specified as only advisory, teachers expected that stipulations in the contract would have morally binding power on the School Board to take their input seriously.

1. Selection of Administrators: In 1970, teachers gained a contract provision for "advisory" input in the selection of administrators. Initially, this input was apparently taken seriously by Board members. Teacher representatives participated on "search committees" (along with Board and student representatives) to screen potential administrative candidates and to make recommendations to the Board. Respondents reported a high degree of internal consensus between teachers and representatives of other groups on the committee, and reported that the School Board followed committee recommendations. In 1973 -- the year of the strike -- however, the appointment of Avery as superintendent was contrary to teacher recommendations.

A system by which teachers on "search committees" screened and recommended a pool of candidates, leaving the final selection to the Board, often resulted in teacher preferences being ignored from that time on. Note the contrast between the situation in Cedarton (wherein teachers elected their own department "coordinators" and the following description of the process for selection of a department chairperson in Middlebury. This example was offered by a high school teacher in 1979:

We have a case in hand right now -- the department chairperson for the English Department. It has been going on now for a year-and-a-half. They had some excellent people, which the Board just threw away. This is the real process: they make you come up with about

five choices and then they pick the one they want out of the five...

Thus, teachers appear to have had less real input into selection of administrators in 1979 than they did in 1971.

2. Teacher tenure decisions: The settlement of the "Just Cause" issue at the end of the 1973 strike provided elaborate procedures by which a "review panel," on which teachers were represented, made recommendations to the Board for or against the granting of tenure to probationary teachers. Panel recommendations were made following its review of extensive evaluation reports, filed by two administrators and an outside evaluator, and prior to the superintendent making his own recommendation.

In the second year after this settlement was made (in 1975), the Board denied tenure to a teacher in spite of positive recommendations by both the review panel and the superintendent. As a consequence of strong teacher protests, and a Union demonstration, the Board withdrew the negative decision and reinstated her. In 1978, the Board denied tenure to three probationary teachers, all of whom had been favorably recommended by both the review panel and the superintendent. This time, however, teacher protests and demonstrations did not influence a change in the Board's position.

While technically within Board prerogatives, teacher respondents reported they felt this action violated the spirit of the strike settlement. Jenny Abrams reported,

Our cry to them was "What good is the procedure if you're not following it?"...It was a different Board...There was only one member of that Board who was on during the strike, and she maintained our position...because she was there, and she knew what the intent of that clause was. Other Board members have said to me, "I wasn't there...What you did and what you said doesn't mean anything... It's still within our power."

A 1978 Board member said,

Their (teachers') memory of the strike was that they thought they got it (Just Cause). I've had people tell me with tears in their

eyes that this was what they had struggled for...They put all their energy into something that was an illusion.

We shall be addressing the reasons for this outcome in more detail, shortly, examining in more detail and from a School Board viewpoint how a lack of clarity in the evaluations -- in spite of complex evaluation procedures -- combined with the Board's own desire to assert authority in this area led to the negative decisions.

Aside from formal contract provisions, many respondents reported a decline in informal teacher input in educational decisions. Widely different respondent perceptions, apparently based on differences in individual activities and in contacts with administrators or School Board members, made assessment of actual changes in teacher input difficult. Board members and administrators reported they consulted with teachers through ad hoc curriculum committees and public hearings. Teachers frequently reported during interviews, however, that they felt teacher participation on committees had declined since the early seventies, and that committee recommendations tended to be ignored by administrators and the Board. A high school teacher referred to

...a tremendous number of meetings where I'm asked for my input as a member of the staff by administrators at a variety of levels. And...(what) we've done is essentially not used. So you become cynical, tired.

Another, referring to teacher proposals for curriculum changes, reported:

After all that work teachers put into thinking up programs on their own time,...not one single plan was accepted...Do they listen?... They don't care.

A questionnaire item asking for teachers' perceptions of changes in their participation in educational decision-making indicated a higher proportion of Middlebury respondents thought it had become worse, relative to Cedarton and Oakville, where higher proportions reported it had improved.*

* See Appendix, Table 10.

Teacher, administrator and Board respondents interviewed were generally in high agreement that teacher input in educational decision-making was not channelled through, or successfully enforced, by the Union (as it was in Cedarton).* A Union member commented on this as follows:

Our administration is freer to create an edict and see it be effected now, without Union activity impairing...It seems to me the early Union was stronger (in this respect) than it is now...In the late sixties and early seventies, the teachers' Union was more...affirmative, and action-oriented...Now it seems to be in a more defensive...reactive posture...ignoring many of the issues it once addressed. So the administration has, in effect, a freer hand at ruling its own ship, for better or worse.

An important non-contractual gain, on the other hand, was the improvement in access of teachers to the School Board through the mechanisms of collective bargaining and grievance procedures. This was a gain initially made in the late sixties when Landau was Union president, negotiating with a more sympathetic Board. As in Cedarton, the improvement in teacher access and the resulting higher visibility of Board members to typical school problems provided Board members with information contributing, on at least some occasions, to their making better decisions about the operation of the schools. A respondent on the School Board in the early seventies gave this example:

In...collective bargaining, teachers...were able to explain their positions and views with respect to how schools were being run, what the curriculum was, how administrators were functioning -- all of their gripes, their perspectives, their suggestions, and so forth, they could communicate directly to the School Board members without going through the administration...It was direct access.

* See Appendix, Tables 6 and 7 on perceptions of Union effectiveness. Note the declines in the percentages of Middlebury teachers, indicating Union effectiveness in promoting teacher participation in educational programs and educational policy, compared to the increases noted in Cedarton, between 1969 and 1979.

Increased informal contacts between Union leaders and Board members, deriving from their increased formal contacts, appears also to have had a moderating effect on Board hostility towards teachers.

Discussion and Analysis of the MTF Position in the Late Seventies:

As in Cedar-ton, external conditions exerted pressures on the Union to give more overt emphasis upon protective concerns in the late seventies than a decade earlier. Unlike Cedar-ton, the Middlebury Union leadership defined their organizational roles as more purely protective. They did not, as in Cedar-ton, deliberately moderate their protective stance in terms of other considerations -- such as maintaining good relations with administrators and the community, or concern for specific professional and educational goals. Rather, viewing their relationship to both administrators and the community as more strictly adversary, MTF leaders took a tougher, "confrontation" stance. While they did not discount professional and educational concerns, they regarded these as mainly outside the Union's province. It is important to emphasize that the differences in leadership orientation being noted here reflected different group definitions of the Union's role in the school district -- not differences in personal character. As individuals, respondents viewed Jenny Abrams and most other MTF leaders as reasonable, fair and professionally responsible. Reasons for the differences between the districts in leadership orientation are not entirely clear. This will be the subject of further discussion in the next chapter. Here, we shall examine some further evidence indicating the MTF's narrower, more strictly protective approach in contrast to the broader, more balanced approach of the CFC.

In parallel to the Cedar-ton study, we will examine Union positions on issues arising in three specific areas where protective concerns were in potential conflict with professional and other considerations. These areas include the handling of grievances, teacher evaluation, and staff governance in the high school.

1. Handling of grievances: The MTF followed a strict grievance policy, to ensure administrator and Board adherence to the contract.* Jenny Abrams explained,

We've had a lot of grievances...This district knows we don't let grievances go by...We will file grievances wherever we deem -- it can be on the smallest issue. We watch that contract carefully. We have to, because if we allow a comma to be violated, then we might as well throw out the whole thing. And that does, unfortunately, take a lot of time. The Grievance Chairperson works very hard,... (and) that takes up, obviously, a lot of my time.

The Grievance Chairperson commented, along similar lines:

Any contractual issue to me is the same, whether it's a locked desk for the teacher or a teacher being fired...

According to some respondents, this policy resulted in an overemphasis upon trivial concerns. A building principal complained,

It gets down to, "Don't make a mistake -- I'm going to file a grievance." Or, "Gee, you can't do that. You haven't given me enough...notice.!" There is a lot of nit-picking, frustrating kinds of things that are thrown in your path.

A rank-and-file Union member said of Abrams:

She will fight for any teacher who has a

* Note the higher percentages among both activists and Union members reporting the Union places "much emphasis" on grievances in Middlebury, as compared to Cedar-ton. (Percentage differences are 25% for both categories of respondent.) See Appendix, Table

grievance. She doesn't care what the grievance is, unless it's blatantly outrageous..."

A School Board respondent claimed that during his term on the Board (ending in 1978):

Every damn action would be contested. And the Union would play a role in every one of them... The Union's track record was bad, because it was taking cases it shouldn't take. From my point of view, this was bad for school relations, and bad for the Union. It caused anti-Union feelings on the Board. It distracted from other things.

These comments are in clear contrast to comments made about the Union policy on grievances in Cedarton, where the Union leadership appears to have been more selective in bringing grievances, and where the need, at times, to confront administrators or the Board was more carefully weighed against the value of maintaining good relations. The difference in approach reflects clear philosophical differences between the two Unions, wherein Middlebury Union leaders assigned priority to defending the contract through grievances, as the key to protecting its members. A rank-and-file member explained,

She (Abrams) feels she must emphasize the protective role of the Union...I've argued about that with her, and of course,...(she believes that) that is the job of a Union.

* While it would appear from the above comments that many grievances of debatable importance were taken to the Board level (Step III in the grievance procedure) it should be noted that Union leaders were apparently more cautious in their selection of cases taken outside of the district, to arbitration (Step IV). A NYSUT representative, commenting on the MTF's grievance practices, maintained that few "political" grievances were taken to arbitration by the Middlebury Union, in contrast to some other Unions. A Union officer explained,

"There are many grievances that we'll go up through the Board level with, but we will not take further, if we don't think it's a good case..."

The Grievance Chairperson went even further, maintaining that protection of members required a strong, adversary stance:

People call upon you when they're in a time of conflict, looking for...resolution. We can (sometimes) resolve the conflict...(without) confrontation at the immediate building level. After that, it's total confrontation...That's what a grievance is all about. That's how conflict is resolved in our district.

2. Teacher evaluation: The Middlebury contract contained an elaborate procedure for teacher evaluation, including evaluation of both probationary and tenured teachers. Abrams maintained,

We probably have the most difficult evaluation procedures for probationary teachers in the state.*

In contrast to Cedarton, where evaluation procedures were developed over a period of more than a year by a committee of teachers and administrators, Middlebury procedures were hammered out in a matter of days, as part of the 1973 strike settlement, by Union negotiators and School Board representatives. Consequently, certain aspects of the system devised in Middlebury appear to have been less carefully thought out. While procedurally thorough, the emphasis was upon who should evaluate and how often. Some previously existing problems in respect, for example, to substantive criteria for observation and evaluation, were overlooked. Certain new problems also arose in respect to the inclusion of an outside evaluator.**

* The procedures specified that probationary teachers were to be observed fifteen times per year, five times each, by three separate evaluators -- two administrators, including department chairpersons, in the high school, and an outside evaluator selected by the candidate. Tenured teachers were to be evaluated once per year. In addition, each evaluation was to be written and presented to the teacher by the evaluator in individual conference. Then, written evaluations were to be examined by a "review panel" composed of teachers and administrators, who made a recommendation -- for or against reappointment -- to the superintendent and School Board.

** Since the outside evaluator was selected by the probationary teachers, several respondents (from among both teachers and Board members) pointed to potential conflicts of interest.

Many respondents were therefore critical of the procedures. A teacher and early Union activist commented:

This was a patchwork system, designed to end the strike...It was then carried forward for another three years. This system created a case where there would be votes held as to whether or not a teacher was adequate...And the people who were really responsible for the quality of teaching...namely, the administrators -- I feel that their efforts were vitiated.

Administrators were faced with having to fulfill quantitatively elaborate procedures with little direction as to their substance. Furthermore, most administrators had never developed strong evaluative skills. During the period of district expansion, in the sixties, when staff turnover was also high, almost all teachers who wished to remain in the district were recommended for tenure and approved by the Board. Evaluation procedures had not, therefore, been taken very seriously.* Even after the 1973 procedures were spelled out, the major changes were in the number of evaluations -- not in their substance.

Teacher evaluation became an increasingly important concern to School Boards, however, under circumstances of budget tightening and declining enrollment which generated teacher surpluses. Thus, during the later seventies, they began to scrutinize tenure cases more carefully. Board respondents report having been frustrated by ambiguities in the administrative evaluations they reviewed. Referring to the evaluations for tenure in 1978, a Board member explained,

Supervisors'...evaluations were ambivalent. There were negative criticisms in there. What would happen was, the evaluation would say the person did blah, blah, and blah well. However, they did blah, blah, blah badly. Therefore, the recommendation is for reappointment...So...the internal inconsistency of the document showed it to be a pro-forma exercise... (indicating) the unwillingness of the supervisor to commit himself.

* In fact, in the late sixties, it was the Union leadership who exerted pressure on administrators to conduct more thorough and regular evaluations.

As indicated earlier, in 1978, the Board acted on their frustration with such evaluations by reversing several administrative recommendations for tenure.

From teachers' viewpoint, this was an arbitrary action, violating their expectation of due process. From a School Board viewpoint, it was an action not only within its power (according to state law) but an action exercised out of concern for improving the quality of teaching in the district. The same Board member quoted above provided the following details:

We had several people working in remediation areas...These teachers were involved in education for the handicapped. They were people without proper training, who had been pulled out (of other positions) -- people who were not sufficiently interested, and who didn't know how to respond to criticism...We thought they were incompetent,...so we didn't give them tenure.

Thus, based on an inadequate system of teacher evaluation, the Board exercised subjective judgment based upon informal sources of information, in determining the outcome of these cases. Failure to rely on predetermined, formal, and more objective procedures aroused teacher anxiety and anger.

The Union position on teacher evaluation changed between the sixties and the late seventies. In the sixties, early Union activists debated the position the Union ought to take on issues of teacher competence and tenure much as early Union members did in Cedarton. Many professional-idealists felt teachers ought, themselves, to exercise control over the maintenance of professional standards among their colleagues. Also as in Cedarton, questions arose as to whether teachers could evaluate or otherwise hold colleagues up to such standards while at the same time maintaining a sense of mutual unity and supportiveness. Unlike Cedarton, these issues were not resolved in Middlebury in terms of solutions which recognized the validity of both sets of concerns. In 1979, some professional-idealists continued to take the position that teachers ought, as a group, to be more concerned with professional accountability, while current Union leaders maintained that in an adversary system it was not their role to question teacher competence, but rather, to protect teachers against potentially arbitrary treatment. The following segment from an interview with a 1979 Union activist illustrates the current Union position:

Q: Take the case of a person coming up for tenure who you know is a borderline case.

A: Borderline on whose part?

Q: Borderline as a teacher, in your judgment.

A: I don't make those kinds of judgments about teachers.

The respondent went on to say:

The person is given evaluations...by people paid to do the job...the principals, assistant principals, the department chairpersons...If they can't do their job, if they let that person squeak through year after year...(with) good evaluations, then the person...has a right to that job.

Union respondents claimed that they did not defend all teachers -- that they could only do so where they had a basis in the law or contract. Thus, they reported they would not oppose administrators giving poor evaluations or making negative recommendations as long as they could document these and as long as they didn't harass teachers. Several administrator respondents confirmed this claim, noting that in a few cases teachers had been "let go" on the basis of poor evaluations, and that the Union had not grieved or otherwise protested these actions. Thus, it cannot be claimed that the Middlebury Union leadership took an irresponsible position in respect to teacher evaluation. The point is, rather, that they defined their role strictly in terms of their protective function, in an adversary relationship to administration. A School Board respondent explained,

Since I've been on the Board, we've had one case where the superintendent did not recommend for tenure, and (then) the Union was quiet...But, given the slightest opportunity ..I think that the Union...would protect an incompetent teacher...I get the feeling that feels she has no choice, that this is what

they expect of her. I think she would do it on a tenure case for a person who has any leg to stand on.*

The difference between the Union position in Middlebury and the Cedar-ton position is a subtle one. In Cedar-ton, Union leaders took a similar position -- that it was up to school administrators to adequately evaluate and document the cases of teachers they sought to dismiss, and that it was the Union's role to protect teachers' rights to due process in the evaluation proceedings. However, Cedar-ton Union leaders also assumed an active role in determining guidelines for the substantive bases of evaluations. Furthermore, in their creation of the "Teacher Coordinator" position in the high school, they built into the system a mechanism for helping to improve teacher performance in a way that did not objectively threaten teacher security. In Middlebury, Union leaders took the position that all problems related to assessing and improving teachers' competence were strictly management problems.

3. Staff governance in the high school: Another significant development in Middlebury, reflecting both changes in the Union itself and a situation in contrast to Cedar-ton, was the creation of the Staff Council in the high school in 1977. Some detail on its background will be necessary prior to discussion of its relation to the Union. Student discipline problems in the high school had increased sharply -- vandalism, harassment of some student by others, truancy, defiance of school regulations and authorities. Students and parents, alike, complained that school administrators weren't effectively responding to these problems. In 1976, therefore, the School Board demanded replacement of the high school principal. The principal (tenured) was quickly transferred to an administrative post, and the assistant principal -- a man on the verge of retirement and in poor health, temporarily assumed the position until a more permanent replacement could be found. Teacher respondents report having voiced, at the time, concerns about the assistant principal's ability to manage the school; nevertheless, he was appointed, creating what some respondents referred to as a "leadership vacuum."

* Non-Union respondents in Middlebury frequently referred to Union leadership in the singular, as "she." This reference is indicative of the greater isolation of the president in Middlebury in contrast to Cedar-ton, where leadership was more often referred to as "they."

Martin Landau, the former union president who led the "professional-idealist" faction saw this "leadership vacuum" as presenting an opportunity to re-introduce some ideas held in the early Union about staff governance. Encouraged by an initially enthusiastic teacher response, Landau convened a teacher committee to formulate a plan to present to the high school staff, central administration, and School Board. Teachers active in the early Union and other professional-idealists dominated this committee.

Proponents of the Council envisioned it as a policy-making body within the high school which would make decisions in all areas related to management of the school and its programs -- including school organization, curriculum, and discipline -- consistent with principles of both professional and worker self-management models. Structurally, the plan they proposed for the Council included elected representatives from all groups on the staff, including administrators, paraprofessionals, secretaries, and others, as well as teachers. Respondents emphasized that representation on the Council was intended to rotate among various individuals, to maximize broad-based staff participation -- another carryover from the early Union.

The responses of both the superintendent and School Board to the idea of a Staff Council were initially lukewarm. Both groups feared it would place too much power in the hands of teachers and confuse authority relations. The high school's acting principal was clearly opposed. Over a period of months, however, as problems in the school worsened, it became apparent that someone would have to assume control, and a new principal had not yet been found. Under these circumstances, both Roberts and the School Board warmed to the notion of a Staff Council. Martin Landau explained,

Roberts and the Board attempted to get the word "advisory" in -- and, I don't remember the last time so much blood was spilled over a word...Big, big conflict about this thing. The Board wanted all the things we were prepared to deal with on an advisory basis. We said, "Absolutely not."...We finally (agreed) it was "decision-making." It was very clearly spelled out -- the Council would make policy decisions. Decisions. If necessary, by vote.

It was understood that the School Board would continue to have final authority. However, teachers hoped that Board members would tend to support Council decisions in the manner they usually

supported administrative ones. Landau went on to explain the teachers' interpretation:

In other words, what we've done is, through a Council, upgraded the role of the staff to being at least equal to the (building) administration. The Board can veto the administration or Council recommendations (but is not likely to do so)...If a principal wanted something and could not convince the Council, and it was for a policy decision, then it would not be...Neither did the principal have blocking power over policy. The principal would implement (Council decisions).

Council founders claim they had envisioned the Council as having a working partnership with the Union, each organization focussing on different kinds of problems and issues. Union reactions to the Council were initially mixed, but most Union activists were favorable to it. As its role became clearer, however, Union opposition to the Council rose. The opposition was based mainly on some Union leaders' belief that direct teacher participation in school governance would obscure the distinction between management and employees and divide teacher loyalties. A Union officer commented:

I personally see it (the Staff Council) as at odds with the Union, because it creates certain kinds of problems, conflict of interest... They're serving an administrative purpose, and it's just not their function...I like to see things in terms of categories (or responsibility). If I know this is what this person is supposed to do, then I can deal with it. If I don't know what a person is supposed to do, then I have trouble...I think there should be a division of power, clear-cut responsibilities on each party.

Another Union officer explained the importance of maintaining clear distinctions between "management" and staff for purposes of assigning accountability and maintaining staff solidarity:

The thing that frightened me about the whole thing was that you would have a group of people who were supposed to have a collegial,...Union, relationship, who now were going to be in an

evaluative, supervisory relationship to each other. Because what does a group of people who work together do when somebody doesn't show up for hall duty? Who do you go to? How does a Union handle a matter like that? How do I report J _____ for not showing up...when she's the Grievance Chairperson and I'm active in the Union?

Council proponents acknowledged some conflict of interest between the Union and Staff Council, but claimed opponents exaggerated potential problems, and maintained these could be resolved through mutual cooperation. One founding Council member claimed,

I don't think these people (Union opponents to the Council) really understood how this group was going to function. I think they thought we would be giving away things that were in the contract, and we couldn't do that, because a contract is a legal document. And, it just so happens that all of us (teachers on the Council) were Union members anyway, and...we weren't going to break the contract.

Council proponents assured Union leaders they would instruct the Council not to make any decisions that would violate the contract, and invited the Union to send a representative to sit on the Council as Union "watchdog."

Union officers, however, refused to cooperate, for they viewed the Council as an inappropriate investment of their energies, and organizationally in competition with them. The extent of their philosophical disagreement with Council proponents is indicated by the following comments by two respondents who were officers in the Union at that time:

Obviously, if we wanted to, we could work out something...But we didn't see our role as that. As a matter of fact, we saw them as attempting to usurp our position...

I don't think we need a Staff Council. We have the input as a Union. As a Union we say what teachers need. And anything beyond that is just a lot of talk, a lot of hot air and a waste of time. I've been asked to serve (as liaison person). I wouldn't even attend a meeting.

The fact that early Union activists -- the professional-idealists -- were strongly concentrated among Council proponents and that later activists were concentrated among those opposed to the Council is indicative of the Union's major shift towards more traditional goals during the seventies.

In spite of opposition from the Union and the high school acting principal, the Council operated successfully through its first year (1976-77). Landau and another early Union activist served as co-chairpersons. Respondents who served on the Council were enthusiastic about its apparent success in that year and its future potential. A major focus of Council activity in the first year was on student discipline. Council members cited numerous instances where discipline problems that had been plaguing the staff for years were quickly and imaginatively resolved through interchange among members in different positions on the staff. Teacher respondents believed their greater proximity to students enabled them to provide administrators with fresh insights as to both the nature of particular problems and possible solutions; they also claimed that through Council participation, teacher representatives gained a greater appreciation of difficulties administrators face in running a school. Due to improved communication with the high school staff, the Council was more readily able to gain staff support for changes in policy than administrators. Landau remarked,

As far as I'm concerned, I think the Council saved the school for that year.

Council members reported having invested tremendous amounts of time and emotional energy in the Staff Council in the first year. They wanted to assess high school problems openly, in dialogue with the principal and superintendent. Debates were often emotionally laden, and this appears to have threatened administrators. They report the acting principal, however, to have resisted cooperation with the Council, making it difficult to enact their decisions. Thus, as a Council member put it,

The lines between policy and implementation got kind of blurred....

when the principal failed to carry out their directives. In more than one case, according to teacher respondents, the acting principal openly contradicted and undermined Council efforts. Council members were angry, but had no recourse in enforcing their directives other than to complain to the superintendent, who tended to back off from these confrontations. A Council member remarked,

On the one hand, he (the superintendent) was paying lip-service in support of the Council, on the other, he was saying, "Well, the administrator is still the administrator."

These kinds of frustrations strongly discouraged some Council members from continued, active participation.

In the second year, Landau and his co-chairperson stepped down from leadership of the Council to allow for democratic rotation of the position. At the same time, a new principal -- a woman, and a stronger personality -- was appointed to the high school. While a condition of the principal's appointment had been that she "work with" the Council, respondents reported that she "paid obeisance to it" but did not treat it "seriously," and "sidestepped" it. Furthermore, the new Council Chairperson, less assertive than Landau and his partner, was not, as a Council member regretfully put it, willing to

"pound the table, and demand and direct and push in various areas..."

to ensure administrative consultation and compliance with Council decisions. Thus, the Council's sphere of authority, initially ambiguous, rapidly eroded in the second year.

By the end of the third year, when most of the interviews were conducted, Council proponents and opponents consistently reported the Council to be a weak and ineffective body, dealing with only (in a Council member's words) "relatively silly, innocuous problems." Three respondents active in creating the Council commented on it in 1979 as follows:

The Council still exists, but nobody really cares. They're just a debating society. They don't handle any matters of substance.

My feeling is the Staff Council is impotent now.

It's still alive, but far from the healthy institution which I think it should be by now, with lots of golden opportunities... missed.

The case of the Staff Council illustrates both persistence and change in Union goals in Middlebury -- persistence, in that early Union activists attempted to re-assert early Union goals in a new and far-reaching form; change, in that later activists strongly objected to and separated themselves from realization of these goals. The polarization of these two groups on the issue of staff governance made it impossible to arrive at mutually acceptable resolution of key issues. A divided faculty also made it virtually impossible to sustain a viable Council, given administrator and School Board ambivalence towards it. In contrast to Cedarton, where the Union, teaching staff, and administrators worked in cooperation to resolve internal issues and to develop a more modest form of staff governance, the inability of diverse groups in Middlebury to effectively cooperate left teachers frustrated and powerless, and left the high school without the benefit of systematic teacher input in helping to resolve continuing problems.

* * * * *

One area in which the Middlebury Union did involve itself with professional and educational concerns should be given at least brief attention. In the late seventies, the MTF collaborated with four other local Union chapters in the region to create a Teacher Center -- an institute for in-service teacher training and professional support. The Teacher Center was operated by a group of teacher only marginally active in the local Union, but it was established under Union auspices and funding.

It is noteworthy that this venture was institutionally independent from the local school district. Thus, in the one area where the Union did engage in activities of an educational, professional nature, the activities were clearly separated from the school system. This was consistent with the Union's adversary role within the district, in that it kept the organization's boundaries clear. This separation is also in contrast both to the early Middlebury Union philosophy and the Cedarton philosophy, wherein Union activists sought direct involvement in educational and professional affairs internal to the district.

MIDDLEBURY IN 1979

Middlebury, in 1979, was a school district in conflict -- conflict both within and between community and teacher groups. Program cuts, increases in class size, and retrenchment of teaching positions due to declining student enrollments occurring in

the late seventies were projected to continue in the early eighties. While these changes were objectively no more drastic than in Cedar-ton, Middlebury teachers perceived them as more threatening. While external economic conditions in Middlebury were no worse than in Cedar-ton, the political climate was more controversial and stressful. Community residents and School Board members were far more openly critical of the schools in general and teachers in particular than in the late sixties. Anti-liberal, anti-union, and anti-semitic themes in residents' criticisms put teachers particularly on the defensive. Problems of poor student achievement and discipline continued to plague the district. However, sensitivity to public criticism and frustrations with inconsistent Board policies led many teachers to withdraw from active participation on school committees directed towards resolving such problems and to insulate themselves more in their classrooms.

The Union, by 1979, had earned a reputation in the county and state of being a strong, well-organized, successful teachers' union. The MTF was by this time a part of the district "establishment" -- an active force in the district. This, according to most respondents, proved an important advantage to its members, in that it provided them with a basic, a much-needed measure of stability and job-security in which would otherwise be a highly precarious environment. Union leaders had developed a good, fairly stable relationship with most administrators in the district by 1979, and its relationship to the School Board had improved somewhat since the mid-seventies. Union-Board relations were less mutually satisfactory, however, than in the late sixties and early seventies, when School Boards had been more supportive of teachers and programs. A key component in improved relations between the Union and both administrators and the School Board was the greater acceptance by the latter two groups of collective negotiations and the contract, as "facts of life" in the district. A NYSUT representative commented in respect to Middlebury,

The chemistry between the union and the Board now is basically good. There are groups and individuals on the Board that we can't talk with, but the general institutional relationship between the superintendent and the Union and the Union and the Board of Education is far better than it was in 1973...The Union and the superintendent can agree to disagree, and the Union and the Board can agree to disagree, and fight one another, at least on an institutional basis, without getting shrill about it.

The Union's posture in 1979 was largely defensive, however. The MTF did not play an active role in district planning in respect to educational policies, professional arrangements, or student discipline in the way the CFC did in Cedarton. The Union membership in Middlebury was also more divided than in Cedarton. Disagreements arose over both Union goals and strategies. Many early Union supporters expressed disenchantment with the organization's shift in emphasis away from educational, professional, and community-related concerns. Other members maintained the Union did not go far enough in protecting teachers -- as in the case of the three denied tenure in 1978 -- and these advocated an even stronger, more militant protective stance.

Many Union respondents, including several active in the early Union, commented that, given the nature of external pressures on the organization and the diversity of staff perspectives, a narrowing of Union goals and a more moderate, less militant approach were probably necessary, in order to maintain unity. Feeling attacked, they felt it essential that the Union now emphasize protection of teachers and the contract, and pointed out this left little time for other kinds of concerns. A teacher identified with the professional-idealists and moderately active in the Union in the later seventies remarked:

I try to think of who might have done it differently, and I don't know that anybody would have. On the one hand, though we've been successful, we've had some pretty glaring defeats, and that has made everybody more reactionary... (Those things) put everyone in a much more sensitive frame of mind, the they're just not going to risk -- (breaks off).

An early Union activist explained in 1979 why he thought changes in Union goals were necessary:

There are diverse points of view (within the staff) as to how the school should be conducted... Now, the Union is the unifying force for teachers, and I think this unifying force should stick to the contract -- to protect the teachers, protect their contract, and to de-emphasize things not stated in the contract... Because then it is on safe ground. Then, everybody unites. We all face west, so to speak... When it comes to other things, we face in different directions.

And since we're under so much attack, I think we all have to face west together. That's why I feel the Union (must) narrow its focus.

Undercurrents of regret, disillusionment and frustration ran through many of my interviews with both Union activists and School Board members in Middlebury. Many viewed district problems in the context of larger social and economic patterns in the nation, and therefore, beyond local control. The economic crisis, lowered community support for liberal, integrationist programs, and the routinization of leadership and goals of the teachers' Union were all themes evoking expressions of regret. Respondents often speculated as to whether it might have been possible, given different leadership in either School Board, administration, or Union; for the district to have followed a different course. But most also noted (sometimes inadvertently) the limitations on leaders posed by overwhelming external forces and an internally divided population. A respondent who served on the Middlebury School Board in the late sixties and early seventies, still residing in the school district, commenting on her own sense of frustration and powerlessness in effecting change during her term on the Board, had this to say:

In all honesty, I don't know, at this point in time, how you run a heterogeneous school district, given all the factions in the Union, among administrators, the community and on the School Board, and now, with inflation and the budget, and the terrible problems with children not accomplishing what they should...

I think that in Middlebury, as much as anywhere in the United States of America, where people are concerned and idealistic -- good, decent, educated people want to make something like this work, and it doesn't -- (breaks off)...Because, in the end, when it shakes down, people have different values,...different perceptions. It's too heterogeneous. So the decision-making process becomes a soccer game...(comparing it to) a homogeneous district, where people do understand what their goals are, more or less... What the answer is, how you make good decisions for the kids -- I don't know...I don't know how you can be a good superintendent, a good principal,... a good School Board member...I don't know how you can be a good Union leader.

CHAPTER IV

OAKVILLE

The Oakville story is about a group of fairly conservative teachers pressured to unionize by unreasonable School Board actions. Oakville is a rural community, which, until the seventies, consisted of one elementary school. Although in a conservative area, the Oakville school was remarkably advanced, well-staffed and well equipped through the early sixties, due to the leadership of an unusually progressive, supportive school administration and Board during a period when conservative community elements remained uninvolved.

Growth in the district was slow by comparison to the other case studies. However, some population changes, moderate school expansion, and rising taxes contributed to changing the complexion of the School Board. A conservative community backlash against the school in the late sixties resulted not only in budgetary reductions for staffing and programs, as in the other districts studied, but also in gross Board interference in school operations and harassment of both principal and teachers. As a consequence, Oakville's rather conservative teaching staff, at the time more anti- than pro-union, were pressured towards greater militancy and unionization in efforts to protect themselves. School Board refusal to negotiate what teachers perceived as a reasonable contract led, in the early seventies, to a one day teachers' strike, which the Board quickly settled. This demonstration of teachers' power was an apparent turning point in the Board's eventual recognition of their right to collective bargaining. Other factors contributing to this recognition were the Board's wish to avoid the bitter divisions witnessed in neighboring districts following long teacher strikes, and informal teacher-community communication facilitated by the district's small size. Greater community acceptance of teacher rights, in the late seventies led to further change in the Board and more harmonious School Board-teacher relations.

This case study will highlight the vulnerability of a small public school system to community pressures. It will show, on the one hand, why teachers perceived formal, organized militancy as necessary in protecting themselves against community hostility and how, on the other, the union leadership later operated successfully through informal, personal channels in a more conciliatory environment. By contrast to both Middlebury and Cedarton, and in

keeping with the smallness of the district, the study will show how union leaders operated in a personal, informal style, in close cooperation with administrators. It will also show how polarization between teachers, administrators, and the School Board was reduced through the appointment of a respected union leader to a key administrative position in the late seventies. Maintenance of this spirit of cooperation was in part sustained by School Board recognition of teachers' power.

BACKGROUND:

Oakville is a predominantly rural district, lying just beyond the commuter zone from New York City. Its central school, built in the thirties, housed kindergarten through the eighth grade until the early seventies, when a new building for the junior high school was constructed. High school students have been bussed to a neighboring district, even today.

Prior to the sixties, a large proportion of the area's population was seasonal, while the year-round population -- largely blue collar -- remained relatively stable. Due to the large summer population, the ratio of taxable real estate for every child educated in the district was unusually high, relative to other districts in the state. Thus, while taxes were low, money for education was plentiful. Furthermore, many summer residents were professionals, sympathetic to the improvement of local educational services and supportive of large annual school budgets. Those who were unsympathetic seldom bothered to vote in either School Board elections or budgetary referendums.

During this period, with a plentiful money supply, a dedicated and supportive School Board, and imaginative administrative leadership, the Oakville school district was able to develop programs and facilities unusually advanced for that time and geographic location. A 1948 State Department of Education evaluation report cited Oakville's Central School as offering

"a type of education far richer than that provided in the average public elementary school."*

The program included, for example, foreign language instruction and instrumental music as early as third grade; school services included ample remedial programs in reading and speech, staffing

* Quoted in local newspaper, February, 1948.

included both a psychologist and a social worker. In addition, respondents report teachers' salaries to have been, on average, the highest in the region, attracting and maintaining an unusually competent staff. Classes were small, and by all reports, administrator-teacher-School Board relations were excellent.

Between 1935 and 1971, two principals, successively, supervised the school. Both were characterized by respondents as "educators" *having progressive educational philosophies (in the Deweyan tradition). The second principal, August Roditi, had been a teacher in the local school for many years prior to his appointment as supervising principal in the late fifties. Roditi was regarded as something of a "maverick" by local residents, for his progressive ideas, to them, represented a departure from traditions they identified with his Italian, Catholic background. Like his predecessor, however, he was highly respected by his teaching staff and School Board.

Teachers, on the one hand, and School Board members, on the other, granted both Roditi and his predecessor virtually complete authority over school matters. Relationships between each principal and these two groups tended, therefore, to be paternalistic, although informal, comfortable, and mutually supportive. Through the mid-sixties, a majority on the School Board remained sympathetic to maintaining high quality educational programs and supportive of the principals' recommendations.

During the sixties, the district's population expanded and changed. More commuters moved into the area, bringing a larger year-round population and an accompanying growth in the school population. This necessitated some expansion of school facilities and considerable expansion of the teaching staff. Large numbers of new -- often young and inexperienced -- teachers were hired during the sixties. Due to lower levels of experience, many dropped out of teaching, and staff turnover increased; so did problems related to administrative supervision of staff.

Expansion of the school, along with general increases in the costs of education, brought an annual rise in taxes. While both tax rates and rates of increase per year were still far below

* Meaning that they showed profound understanding of children and of educational theories and processes, in contrast to later administrators, who were characterized as "management men" (good administrators who showed little understanding of children or educational processes) or "politicians" or "incompetents."

those of surrounding districts, property owners began to register complaints, paying closer attention to public educational spending, and voting in School Board elections. The Oakville School Board, for many years dominated by a liberal, education-oriented faction in the community, began to change after 1962, when conservative elements in the community succeeded in gaining positions on the Board. A major issue was made over rising taxes. From 1963 through 1965, the district suffered annual budget defeats, placing the school on "austerity" budgets. By 1967, a conservative faction committed to reducing school expenditures and espousing a "narrower" educational philosophy, gained a majority on the five-member School Board.

The new School Board openly opposed non-traditional school programs as expensive "frills" which "wasted children's time." They cut personnel in a number of specialized areas, including enrichment programs such as art, music, and foreign languages and support services, including library, the school psychologist and social worker. Class sizes were increased. Since the Board initially opposed construction of a new building to accommodate the rapidly growing student population, existing facilities became severely overcrowded. Teacher dissatisfaction began to mount.

A major objective of the new School Board -- openly stated by the president at a public meeting in the late sixties -- was to replace Roditi, the supervising principal, in reaction to his progressive educational policies. Since Roditi was tenured, he could not be openly dismissed. Teacher, School Board, and administrator respondents consistently reported the Board president to have subjected the principal to severe harassment, and to have treated him with open contempt at Board meetings. Such treatment represented a drastic departure from the deference granted Roditi by the Board in preceding years.

Respondents also reported numerous instances involving Board harassment of teachers, particularly in cases of teachers who had been particularly active in sustaining the school's progressive tradition or active in the teachers' organization. Types of harassment reported included the arbitrary cutting of a teacher's salary, refusal to grant sabbatical leave to an eligible teacher, denial of tenure to apparently qualified teachers, and charging an apparently capable tenured teacher with incompetence, thus posing a real threat to job security for other teachers. Board criticism was also directed, publicly, against teachers' use of certain classroom materials (such as films) widely used elsewhere in the state. Board members even attempted to sit in some classes, to observe teachers.

This pattern of harassment and encroachment on the internal operation of the school aroused teachers' anger -- particularly since they perceived elements of vindictiveness in the Board's behavior. Several respondents claimed some Board members appeared to capitalize upon school-related issues to gain public attention, a perception that further heightened teacher hostility.

TEACHERS' ORGANIZATIONS:

Until 1967, most teachers on the staff belonged to the Oakville Teachers' Association, affiliated with NYSTA. The supervising principal, also a member, attended meetings regularly. Organizational goals related to school matters were essentially accomplished via the principal: member "positions" on various matters (ranging from salary to facilities and curriculum) were reported to the School Board by the principal, along with his own recommendations, and, as in Cedarton, the Board generally accepted the principal's recommendations. Occasionally, Teachers' Organization representatives met directly with Board members to talk over some matter, but these informal talks never approached anything resembling negotiations until after it became obvious the Board had changed in character. The last year before the passage of the Taylor Law (mandating collective bargaining for teachers), Oakville teachers did attempt to negotiate a contract of sorts with the Board. As an Association leader interviewed in 1969 explained,

"That year, instead of just talking, we made demands. It just seemed to evolve into negotiations, and we got a few things written down...It was really a matter of losing faith, I guess."

A small union chapter had been formed in the district during the early 1960's, but this remained small (representing less than 10% of the teaching staff) until 1967. Teachers active in forming the chapter acknowledged that their alignment with the AFT had sprung principally from a unionist ideology, rather than from local issues. Their original concerns had focussed more upon state and national issues.

As an increasing number of "incidents" with the School Board began to build, Association leaders turned to their state organization -- NYSTA -- for assistance. NYSTA offered some suggestions, but respondents reported they simply did not get the level of support from their state organization they needed. They had expected NYSTA officials to exert moral pressure on the School

Board in pointing out teacher rights, and to assist them in spelling these rights in a better contract. They were especially irritated by what they reported as a neutral attitude on the part of NYSTA representatives to their local crisis. An Association activist explained,

Where we needed assistance they sent somebody down and gave us big talks about how you needed to understand the community and work with the community....

On another occasion, a NYSTA representative was reported to have said,

Well, if things get too bad, you'll just sell your houses and move out of the community.

After the passage of the Taylor Law, Association leaders were particularly anxious to negotiate a more adequate contract when their current, two-page contract expired in 1968. This concern, coupled with earlier events, led them to begin to discuss the possibility of union affiliation. A major impetus to unionization in Oakville was the appeal of identification with an organization having a "militant" reputation. This was in part related to their frustrations in obtaining the kind of support they felt they should have received from NYSTA, accompanied by assurances from their union colleagues that the Empire State Teachers' Federation* would provide them with more concrete assistance. The appeal of the Union was also related to their feeling that such an identification would have the effect of serving notice to the School Board that teachers were prepared to fight, perhaps even going so far as to strike.** They felt that Board awareness of their potential of striking would put them in a far stronger position during negotiations.

The actual decision to affiliate did not come easily, however. While on the one hand Association leaders saw advantages of affiliating with a more "militant" organization, old loyalties and a generalized perception of unions as "unprofessional" deterred them. One respondent pointed out that long after New York City teachers unionized, attitudes of most Oakville teachers towards the AFT remained negative:

* The parent statewide organization, affiliated with AFT.

** The word "strike" came up more frequently in 1969 interviews with activists in Oakville than in any of the other districts, indicating it was a real possibility in their minds at that stage.

If you even mentioned the word 'union' -- well, you were immediately thought of as being some kind of communist.

Negotiations with the Board for the 1968 contract proved to be extremely difficult, however, and unpleasant "incidents" continued to build. Finally, in the words of the man then president of the Association (William Mandryk), Association leaders went "hat in hand" to the local union chapter to discuss possible affiliation. Mendryk explained,

It was a very emotionally upsetting incident for me. I had been very active in the state organization (NYSTA) and I was committed to their way of thinking. Also, I was interested in administration, and I knew that where I would stand the best chance of entering administration was through NYSTA.

This man, nevertheless, exercised personal leadership in bringing about a change in organizational affiliation. Within a few days, he called a meeting of the Association. With virtually 100% membership attendance, and better than the two-thirds vote needed to amend their constitution, Oakville Teachers' Association supported the decision to separate from NYSTA and the NEA and to affiliate with the American Federation of Teachers.

The only major formal change in the organization, other than state and national organizational alignments, was that administrators could no longer belong or attend meetings, in accordance with AFT regulations. In spite of personal loyalties to Roditi, both the principal and teachers saw some advantages in this arrangement -- in that they believed their separation might allow teachers more clout.

In spite of virtually unanimous shared concerns regarding cutbacks in educational programs and the need for teacher protection, a sizeable minority of Oakville teachers withdrew from the teachers' organization on the basis of its affiliation with organized labor. Thus, in the 1969 survey of Oakville teachers, only 61% of respondents reported being union members; the remaining 39% had no local organizational affiliation.

An important, though temporary, informal organizational change was that the president of the existing union chapter assumed presidency of the new, larger union for the following year. In 1969, however, Mandryk was elected president of the new organization. Mandryk was a young, highly respected fifth grade

teacher who exercised strong personal leadership. Continuing as president for the next five to six years, he played a principal role in contract negotiations as well as all other major union activities.

NEGOTIATIONS AND BARGAINING ISSUES, 1968-1973:

Following their affiliation with the AFT, teacher organization leaders took on a more militant approach in negotiations with the Board. An activist who had participated in informal negotiations with earlier Boards for several years prior to unionization put it this way:

We became more stiff-necked, intractable... Everything was done according to rule. We'd have a (union) representative with us...Hard-line negotiations...Less give and take, more 'If I do this, what will you do for me?'

From that point on, everything had to be printed in a contract...Everything was done according to rule. We became more stiff-necked, intractable.

With assistance from Empire State representatives, they developed a more comprehensive set of demands. A representative from the state union also sat with them during negotiations, in an advisory capacity.

Union goals in negotiations emphasized, above all, obtaining a contract that would protect existing teacher rights and working conditions. Since most of these had never been written down, the act of formally defining them in a written contract was viewed as a major step to enhance teacher protection. Inclusion of grievance procedures (mandated under the Taylor Law) offered a means for redressing contract violations. These goals -- i.e., the defining of teacher rights and responsibilities, and some rudimentary grievance procedures -- were successfully accomplished, largely due to the knowledge and skills of the state union representative on the one hand and the legitimating force of the Taylor Law on the other.

Other Union goals in negotiations during the late sixties included improvement of salaries and fringe benefits, improvement in school resources and staffing, and greater teacher input in determining educational programs -- all areas where teachers felt the school district had slipped backwards since the early sixties.

Union leaders were somewhat successful in obtaining better teacher salaries and benefits, mainly on the basis of comparisons they were able to make to salary scales in adjoining districts. They were not, however, able to gain improvements in resources or any firm commitments to teacher input in program decisions.

In later negotiations, through the mid-seventies, Oakville teacher negotiations continued to press for improvements in school resources, staffing, and curriculum participation, but met with continued Board resistance in these areas, both on the grounds of cost and Board "prerogatives" in making such decisions unilaterally. The most teachers were able to obtain in terms of staffing was a stipulation that teacher aides would be provided in cases where classes rose over thirty pupils -- but not a commitment to limit class size or to provide additional auxiliary services. In respect to program, they obtained an agreement to teachers having "advisory" input, via a curriculum committee, but after such a committee was formed, its recommendations to the Board were not generally followed.

Improvement of contract provisions for job protection and guarantees of "due process" continued to take priority through the early seventies. In 1969 and 1970, two apparently capable teachers were denied tenure by the Board over positive administrator recommendations, and without explanation. Such denial was, at that time, within Board prerogatives. The Union wanted a contract clause specifying that tenure could be denied only on grounds of incompetence, to protect teachers against arbitrary dismissal. The Board wanted the power to dismiss some tenured teachers, and, in fact, attempted to initiate charges against a tenured teacher who had been Oakville's first Union president. Here, again, teachers wanted guarantees of due process for teachers so charged.

Until that time, however, no objective bases for determining teacher competence (or incompetence) had ever been specified. Such determination had been left to the subjective judgment of the chief administrator, and generally accepted by earlier School Boards. During the sixties when large numbers of teachers were hired annually, neither the supervising principal nor assistant principals had engaged in making routine observations or evaluations. Teachers had been so desperately needed during that period that, except in cases of obvious negligence, most were given tenure anyway. Thus, most teachers had been granted tenure without formal evaluations having been conducted, and no criteria for making such evaluations had been established.

As the school population stabilized in the district, therefore, it served the interests of both parties to spell out procedures for evaluating teacher competence, providing the Board with a clearer basis on which to make decisions concerning future teacher retention, and providing the staff with greater assurance of due process.

Improvements in grievance procedures and specific clauses providing for due process in tenure decisions were significant contract gains made by the Union in the early seventies. Clearer specification of evaluation procedures for tenured and non-tenured teachers, alike, was a significant gain for the Board.

Money items -- salaries, fringe benefits, and bargaining areas affected district spending (such as class size or special staffing) always presented sticking points in negotiations. During the seventies, teachers wanted salary increments commensurate with rises in cost of living, while the Board wanted to hold the line. Compromises were generally reached at the level of 4-5% increases on the basis of comparison with neighboring districts and county averages. As for class size and specialist staffing, the School Board consistently held out for staff reductions, so that some positions were cut and class sizes increased, frequently to over thirty, even in the primary grades.*

Both School Board and teacher respondents reported that negotiations continued to be extremely difficult through the mid-seventies, always lasting into the early morning of the first day of school in September. In 1970, negotiations for the second contract moved especially slowly. So many issues had been outstanding in the late spring that Union leaders had begun to consider the possibility of a strike. In June, the membership voted (almost unanimously) to authorize the negotiating committee to call a strike for the first day of school in September if a satisfactory contract was not reached. With no progress occurring during the summer, the leadership went so far as to rent office space for strike headquarters, and to begin preparations for a lengthy strike. The Board refused to bend on a number of outstanding issues, and none were resolved by the first day of school. Teacher representatives on the negotiating team at the time reported Board members as having "very negative" attitudes towards them.

* Class size increases did not directly cause teachers to lose jobs. Most position cuts were by attrition. Specialist cuts, however, did result in dismissal of some teachers.

On the opening day of school, Oakville teachers went on strike. Activists report virtually total staff support for the strike. Many teachers simply stayed away;* about one-third actively picketed the school. In accounting for the high proportion of teachers who voted to strike and actually stayed out, activist respondents explained that the background of bad experiences teachers had had with the School Board was probably a far more important factor in their support than any contract issue per se. One Union activist reported,

Teachers were angry...There was enough feeling (about the Board.) to keep everyone out -- to rally the troops.

Before the first day was over, the School Board offered the Union a contract settlement satisfactory in respect most of the issues at stake, including provisions for reasonable salary increases and some guarantees for due process in protecting teachers.

THE EARLY SEVENTIES:

Relations between the Oakville School Board and teachers remained strained through the next five years. In 1971, the supervising principal, Roditi, finally resigned, due to continuing personal harassment from Board members. The Board replaced Roditi with Thomas McNally -- a man whose ideas were more in keeping with their own, conservative educational philosophy. McNally tended to remain aloof from the staff. In contrast to Roditi, respondents found him inflexible, lacking understanding of their concerns, and difficult to work with. Some also questioned his administrative competence.

McNally's administration lasted two years, until 1973. All respondents interviewed reported this to have been a period of

* Staying away may represent an attempt to accommodate to peer pressures, on the one hand, and fear of Board reprisals, on the other. Oakville appears to have had lower active participation in its one-day strike than the other two districts had in their longer strikes. This observation is supported by the response to a survey question on strike participation. Oakville responses yielded fewer active participants. (See Appendix, Table 2.)

great tension in the district -- continuing tensions between teachers and the School Board, and new tensions arising between teachers and administration. This was also a period of high internal teacher militancy. Union activists report having utilized grievance procedures to the hilt. One commented,

When we thought there was a violation of the contract, we would grieve anything we saw... I remember having as many as eleven or twelve grievances on the table at one time.

Respondents from all parties (teachers, administrators, and School Board) also report a high level of personal militancy. As another Union activist put it, "voices were pretty loud during (McNally's) reign."

The Union also began to become politically active in the community during the early seventies, in the hope of rousing public sentiments to pressure for improvements in school programs and resources and to replace incumbent Board members. School Board seats held by educational conservatives were contested several times, with close election results, but the conservative faction, unsympathetic to teachers, maintained its majority through 1975.

McNally was not well liked in the community, either, and after two years, the Board replaced him with a man named Daniel Johnson. Johnson, who came in 1973, is reported to have been generally better liked than McNally. Personally, he was more outgoing, and made himself more accessible. Respondents also reported him to be a more competent administrator than McNally, and, in terms of management capabilities, more skillful than Roditi. He was not, however, fully accepted by teachers. Teacher respondents referred to him as a "management man" or a "politician" -- not an "educator," like Roditi, who understood their educational objectives or their problems as teachers. Several reported that Johnson, like McNally, was more concerned with accommodating Board interests and saving taxpayers money than in representing teacher concerns to the Board. Several Union activists pointed out, however, that most teachers had little conception of the political pressures to which the supervising principal was subject, noting that Johnson came to the district at a time when tensions were high, appointed by a Board teachers distrusted, to replace an administrator who had apparently let many things slide.

In the fall of 1973, two neighboring school districts experienced lengthy teacher strikes. One of these was the district where Oakville students attended high schools, and the other was

Cedarton. Local administrators, Board members, and residents were all sharply aware of events surrounding these strikes and of their bitter aftermath. These districts underwent an almost complete breakdown of trust between teachers, administration and community. Oakville Union leaders, in contact with leaders of the striking unions through their mutual state affiliation, were also aware of how costly these strikes had been, personally, to striking teachers, and how slight their concrete gains. References to strikes in nearby districts came up many times during interviews with School Board members, administrators and Union activists in explaining a gradual mellowing in relationships between these parties in the mid-seventies. All three parties, while continuing to hold strong local antagonisms, wished to avoid further escalation of these antagonisms to the point where they could be forced into a similarly devastating strike in which no party could expect to make significant gains.

In the spring of 1976, two candidates ran for the Oakville School Board on platforms of wanting to improve Board-teacher relations. One of these candidates, explained in a 1979 interview,

I refused to look at the whole situations as a black-hat, white-hat type of thing. I would not consider the Union or the faculty as "they" and us as "we." I said that as elected representatives of the school district, our concerns were for the best possible educational system within our means. I made very clear that among our faculty, almost half were residents of this community, and certainly had a vested interest in this school system, so how could we possibly construe them as enemies.

Both candidates won Board seats. Their victories now gave liberals and moderates a 3-2 edge on the Board, and re-opened opportunities for dialogue about school policies within the Board.

THE UNION IN THE SEVENTIES:

Mandryk resigned the Union presidency in about 1973, at which time a young sixth grade teacher, Nancy Drusten, assumed the position. Drusten had already been active in the organization for several years, having been vice-president since 1970. Both Mandryk and Drusten were described by respondents as strong leaders, with dynamic personalities and having the respect of teachers and administrators. Both appear to have exercised strong

personal leadership in the president role. Although some rank-and-file respondents maintained Drustén to have been a "weaker" president, the evidence (to be presented) suggests differences lay more in Drustén's more personal style and in changes in external circumstances than in forcefulness.

Union activism was concentrated within a very small group in Oakville. While close to one-third of teacher respondents on both the 1969 and 1979 surveys identified themselves as having been Union officers within a period of three years prior to the survey, only six to seven individuals indicated they had been very active in the Union in either period -- by contrast to much larger numbers in both other districts. Interview data confirmed this finding. Activists reported much difficulty in recruiting new people to allow for more sharing of responsibility and rotation of leadership positions. The small size of the district and the lack of a high school faculty were identified as contributing reasons.

Union activists also reported some difficulty in maintaining active member participation in other respects -- especially, attendance at meetings. Due to poor attendance at meetings dealing with routine matters, the Union discontinued regular monthly meetings, holding on the average, only three annually in the later seventies. While this somewhat improved membership attendance, it reduced the potential for leadership communication with membership in respect to ongoing union activities and issues. While informal word-of-mouth transmission of information was a moderately satisfactory alternative in this small district, both activists and members complained in 1979 that the union was becoming less democratic than they would like. An activist commented,

I do feel that we tend to be somewhat closeted...People feel, I think, reasonably free to bring their problems to us, but I think they have a sense that decisions are made privately, over a cup of coffee, and I think indeed that is the way things are done.

This respondent went on to explain, however, that such separation of leadership from the rank-and-file reflected a lack of membership interest in becoming more involved in Union affairs.

In 1979, 94% of Oakville respondents were Union members, in contrast to 61% in 1969.* There was no competing local organization. Respondents also reported little internal dissension within the Union. While there was a small, vocal "critical" rank-and-file group, who claimed Union leaders were "lax" in contract negotiations and relations with administrators, or too independent in making organizational decisions, this group did not constitute a real faction, in the sense of advocating different Union goals or strategies (as in Middlebury). Criticisms were based more on differences in perceptions of what constituted realistic goals.

Another important change in the Union in the late seventies was the degree of leader involvement in the state organization." During the sixties and early seventies, Oakville Union leaders relied strongly on the state organization for assistance in negotiations and handling of specific grievance cases, but were not directly involved in any broader activities on the state level. As the seventies progressed, the president -- especially Drustan -- became far more involved in external Union activities. These included regional or statewide conferences, political lobbying, and informal meetings with Union officers in neighboring districts for purposes of exchanging information. Thus, the local chapter was in far greater communication with other locals in the late seventies.

MIDDLE AND LATE SEVENTIES:

Changes in Administration:

By the mid-seventies, an additional school building was finally completed to house the upper elementary grades (6-8), taking some pressure of crowding off the older building. Each school now had its own principal, and the supervising principal's officers were located in a separate building, further removed from direct contact with the teaching staff. These changes increased the influence of the building principals and decreased the influence of the supervising principal over teachers' daily lives.

Johnson appointed a former teacher who had been moderately active in the local Union as principal in the new middle school.

* Now called New York State United Teachers (NYSUT) following the 1973 merger of the Empire State Federation of Teachers with the New York Teachers' Association.

The elementary principal, since 1972, had also been a former teacher who respondents described as a "survivor." He had remained uninvolved with the Union prior to his administrative appointment, and after his appointment, avoided controversial issues. He did not, for example, conduct classroom observations of teachers eligible for tenure, even after such evaluation procedures had been detailed in the Union contract.

In the late seventies, Johnson asked the elementary principal to resign, reportedly because he wanted someone who could exercise stronger leadership in that school. In spite of a pool of over two hundred applicants for the position, Johnson urged Bill Mandryk, former Association and Union president to apply. Mandryk, who by this time had been in the district for about fifteen years, had earned a degree in school administration ten years earlier. He had already applied for the principalship, but had been openly turned down by the Board on the basis of his Union activism. It was with some hesitation, therefore, that he accepted Johnson's invitation to apply again. Johnson then had to convince the School Board to support Mandryk's appointment. A favorable Board respondent explained,

There was some reluctance on the part of other Board members to appoint him, because they were concerned about whether he could be impartial, to represent the other side.

However, on the basis of Johnson's strong recommendation and supported by liberal members on the School Board, Mandryk was appointed elementary principal, in the fall of 1977.

Mandryk was the only administrator, in all three districts studied, who had been a high Union officer prior to his appointment. Some other principals had been former Association officers in their districts or elsewhere, but only in Oakville -- in the middle school -- had a principal or even assistant principal been appointed who had been even somewhat active in a Union. Mandryk had been very active, and had even led his Union out on strike.

In the 1979 survey, Mandryk was more highly rated by his staff than any other administrator in this study. He was also one of only two administrators included in this study to whom teacher respondents referred as an "educator." One commented,

He's the first supervisor I've had who understood what I was doing.

A few teacher respondents voiced some resentment of Mandryk, commenting that he had "forgotten what it was like" to be a teacher. Their criticisms, however, tended to cluster around administrative behaviors essential to the fulfillment of his new role -- e.g., conducting classroom observations, holding teachers to obligations specified in the contract. School Board respondents also registered highly favorable judgments of Mandryk as an administrator, noting that his Union background proved a strong asset, not only because he understood teachers and had their confidence, but also because he understood the Union contract.

Mandryk's success as an administrator is significant for purposes of this research because it suggests that Union activity need not preclude successful entry to a "management" position in education, and that in fact, it may provide the administrative candidate with a perspective important to understanding teachers' viewpoints, thus enhancing his/her potential for playing a mediating role in the school system.

Administrator-Staff Relations:

Most Union respondents and all administrator respondents reported a great improvement in administrator-staff relations in the late seventies. For example, the number of grievances filed by teachers dropped dramatically. Only two were filed between 1977 and 1979, and both of these were easily resolved at the district level. Union activists explained a major reason for the reduction in grievances to have been greater administrator sensitivity to the contract. The president, Nancy Drusten, commented:

We have been on them (administrators) and they know that contract as well as we do...

Other Union activists commented,

Bill and Dave (the principals) are not going to violate the contract.

You can't say anything to him (Mandryk) about the contract. He wrote our contract.

Since he (Mandryk) had a hand in writing the contract, he knows it well, and he does not tend to violate it.

Administrators acknowledged that they tried to anticipate potential grievances, to avoid needlessly upsetting teachers.

Both administrator and Union respondents also explained that when teacher complaints did arise, they were generally resolved informally at the building level. Union building representatives played an important role in such informal resolutions, bringing potential grievances to the building principal's attention as soon as they developed. Broader problems were handled in a similar fashion through informal cooperations between the Union president and supervising principal. The accessibility of administrators to Union representatives and their motivation to avoid formal grievance procedures appear to have been important factors contributing to the relative ease with which most teacher complaints were locally resolved in the late seventies.

A few Union respondents were critical of the apparently relaxed relationship between Union leaders and administrators in Oakville. One attributed the reduction in grievances to Union leaders having "let things slide." Another felt it reflected a "weak" Union leadership. Several Union activists acknowledged that there was some truth in the charge that they let some things slide. "We get tired, washed out" one explained, noting that their small activist pool did not permit rotation of leadership responsibilities. Administrators unanimously disagreed, however, that the Union leadership was weak. All three perceived Nancy Drusten to be a strong leader, who, if anything, was overprotective of teachers and their rights. Johnson, the supervising principal, commented,

If an administrator, or I, or the Board attempts to do something that doesn't sit well with them, they'll come in strong.

Drusten's leadership style may have been a factor accounting for some rank-and-file teachers attributing easy conflict resolution to leadership weakness. A Union activist explained,

I think Nancy is an intensely strong person. Stronger than Bill Mandryk was in that position...She will sit down in a head-to-head with Dan Johnson and ... work things out, but she'll do it on an individual, person-to-person basis. Bill was more visible (to the membership)...She will go in there and she will know what she has to do and it will get accomplished.

Negotiations in the Late Seventies:

In spite of friendlier relations between teachers and the School Board, negotiations continued to be difficult in this period. Previously existing pressures on the Board to minimize school budgets and taxes were heightened by the national mood of resistance to public spending. These pressures towards frugality were accompanied by further pressures, also supported by nationwide sentiments, to regain more management control over teachers in general. Thus, in 1976 negotiations, both sides were faced on the one hand with difficulty in negotiating money issues, while on the other, issues of teacher "accountability" and "productivity" more strongly entered the picture. In respect to money issues, teachers wanted substantial salary increases to meet the rising cost of living, and to hold a lid on class sizes; the Board wanted no increases. In respect to accountability and productivity issues, the Board wanted to specify how teachers would use existing preparation periods, to have them account for use of "personal days,"* to take on additional supervisory duties, and even to teach additional classes; teachers resisted these proposals as significantly increasing already heavy workloads and infringing upon hard-earned teacher freedoms in respect to their use of time.

The influence of surrounding districts again had its impact locally. Boards elsewhere were demanding more and Unions forced to yield more -- the beginning of what Union leaders referred to as the period of "give-backs." In such an atmosphere, Union leaders' major goal in Oakville, as in Middlebury and Cedarton, was to prevent erosion of earlier contract gains. Thus, they settled (as usual, in the final hour, in the early morning of the first day of school) for a three-year contract involving no changes except for a clause providing a temporary suspension of sabbatical leaves which the Union yielded in exchange for a small annual increase (4-5%) in teacher salaries.**

* The concept of "personal days" -- to allow a certain number of unexplained teacher absences for purposes other than illness (e.g., legal business, illness or death in the family) -- was a now widely accepted contract provision throughout the state, originally sought in the contract to protect teachers against administrator arbitrariness in approving absences.

** Note that salary increases were far below the inflation rate for that year.

In 1978, utilizing an approach already utilized elsewhere -- including Cedarton -- Nancy Drusten suggested to Johnson, the supervising principal, the possibility of extending the existing contract for another three years, to avoid another round of lengthy, difficult negotiations. Johnson referred this proposal to the Board, and within a matter of days, a settlement was completed, involving only a few minor changes to the existing contract. These included, once again, a small salary increase for teachers, this time in exchange for a tightening of controls over teachers' use of "personal days," and the assignment of some supervisory responsibilities to teaching specialists.*

As in Cedarton, Board members, administrators and Union leaders referred to this "easy" settlement as an indication of improved relations between them. Also as in Cedarton, some rank-and-file teachers complained that Union leaders had "given away" the opportunity to negotiate a new contract in which teachers could have fought for significant gains. Critics complained especially about the low salary increases, loss of sabbaticals, and increases in specialists' workload. Union leaders, however, pointed out that to have negotiated a new contract would probably opened the door to greater potential losses than gains in teacher rights and benefits. If, as they believed, the best they could hope for was to maintain existing rights and benefits, it hardly made sense to spend great amounts of time and energy on negotiations, when an extension served the same purpose.

OAKVILLE IN 1979:

By 1979, respondents were in general agreement that Oakville was a quiet, harmonious place to work. The student population, administration, and teaching staff were all relatively stable. Teacher turnover was, once again, minimal and most teachers had been in the district for over ten years. School budgets and taxes still represented major School Board concerns, but with the difference that in 1979, as a Union activist put it,

"...teachers visualize them (Board members) as being at least somewhat reasonable at all times."

* Teaching specialists had not been assigned supervisory duties prior to that point, thus having fewer hours of assigned responsibilities than regular teachers. Union respondents explained that since this change represented greater equalization in assigned workloads, they did not strongly resist it.

The School Board was also quieter and less intrusive in school affairs than it had been in 1969. Board members maintained lower profiles and put more faith in their appointed administrators. While respondents from all three parties reported occasional disagreements among them, Board-administrator-teacher relations appeared far more comfortable and cooperative than they had been five to ten years earlier, indicating greater mutual respect and trust. Bill Mandryk commended,

"Everybody's voices have gone down a few octaves since that time...We don't seem to shout as much at each other -- teachers shouting at administrators or administrators shouting at the Board. Everybody's lowered their voices considerably,...which, I suppose, is good for the district...If you look at the districts around us, they're going through all kinds of hell. Oakville...has been going quietly along."

The 1979 Oakville School Board president offered this perception:

I think we have a better understanding of each others' positions, a better interchange of ideas. I think the Union has a better appreciation of the district (problems) and I think the School Board and the administration have accepted the fact that we have a teachers' Union.

Board acceptance of the legitimacy of the Union represented a major major change in its relationship to teachers.

Much of the harmony found in Oakville in 1979 can be attributed to its small size, making for frequent personal contact and mutual accessibility of the various concerned parties. By parallel reasoning, much of the discord found in 1969 could be attributed to tensions resulting also from the district's small size, making for low insulation of school activities and staff from personal intrusion by hostile Board members. Thus, improvement in the quality of staff-Board relations in the late seventies must be credited in part to efforts by particular Board members, administrators, and Union leaders to change the nature of these relations, in the context of their heightened awareness of problems to be incurred had they allowed earlier tensions to mount.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS: CHANGES AND IMPACT

In this chapter, I will attempt to pull together some major themes emerging from the case studies, focussing first upon patterns of change observed in the three unions during the period of study. We shall then turn our attention to questions of the unions' impact upon their respective school systems.

In respect to changes, we have observed similarities in structural change in all three districts. Between the mid-sixties and early seventies, all three unions developed common organizational forms. During the seventies, all three underwent substantial membership growth, so that by 1979, almost all teachers in each district were members. Table 1 (see Appendix) indicates the increases in teacher enrollments in the unions between 1969 and 1979. We have also noted that all three unions expanded during the seventies to include non-teaching employees.

Another common pattern of change was the development, in all three cases, of stronger connections of the local unions to the state organization -- NYSUT. Although we have noted that Middlebury union leaders relied more heavily on consultation with NYSUT, all three unions utilized the state organization's advisory services on questions pertaining to negotiations and grievances. In addition, local activists, in all three cases, became increasingly involved in NYSUT-sponsored statewide activities, including conferences and legislative lobbying.

We also observed common patterns in respect to changing relationships between the unions and district school boards and administrators. While there were significant variations in the timing and sequence of stages in these relations, all three districts started with a history of good relations which deteriorated markedly during either the sixties or early seventies. In all three districts, tensions between school boards and teachers were generated by conflict over teachers' insistence on their right to collective bargaining, and in all three, this conflict culminated in a teachers' strike. In all three, the strike was followed by a period of intensified antagonism and polarization between teachers, school boards, and administrators. Although in two of the districts the antagonisms were later more effectively reduced than in the third, in all three, teacher-board relations improved somewhat in later years following the strikes. By 1979, school boards in all three districts had accepted the legitimacy

of the union as the official representative of teacher interests, and the legitimacy of collective bargaining processes in which teachers and board members negotiated in a spirit of mutual give-and-take.

Of particular interest to this research were changes in union leadership and goals. In respect to goals, we anticipated in Chapter I that external pressures, associated with an atmosphere of economic crisis, demographic changes, and changing public attitudes, were likely to have pressed unions to taking more defensive postures during the seventies. We also noted that internal constraints, -- especially the need to build a broad membership base to enhance organizational power -- would have the effect of narrowing union goals to focus upon those which members supported in common. We pointed out member consensus on goals was more likely to be reached in areas related to teacher protection and welfare than on educational and professional issues. Finally, we noted that school board definitions of "legitimate" issues for collective bargaining would constrain unions to emphasize those acceptable to school boards and to de-emphasize those which were not, in order to attain some measure of success in negotiations.

In keeping with these predictions, the case studies indicated, in all three cases, that unions placed greater priority on teacher welfare, relative to other types of goals, in 1979 than in 1969. Each of the factors identified -- external pressures, internal organizational constraints, and school board definitions of legitimacy -- played a part in shifting union emphasis away from professional and educational issues. The strength of school board opposition to negotiating educational issues -- in fact, the boards' initial resistance to negotiating with teachers at all -- was found to be especially important in producing this change. Since state legislation supported teachers' right to collective bargaining in the areas of salary and working conditions, these areas became focal points in the struggle over bargaining rights.

This does not mean, however, that union leaders' expressions of concern for professional and educational goals in the sixties were insincere -- as some critics of teacher unionism have charged. We found, in fact, considerable evidence of continuing interest in such concerns among early union activists studied again in 1979. What has occurred, however, is that such concerns have, on the one hand, been overshadowed by preoccupation with protective concerns and on the other, been separated from other union activities.

In one case (Cedarton), the separation of professional/educational as opposed to welfare types of issues took place through careful union monitoring of potential conflicts of interest between professional and union concerns. Thus, while the CFC's major focus in 1979 was upon teacher welfare, this focus was moderated by a concern for the professional and educational implications of union positions on teacher welfare. In addition to protecting teachers' personal, economic interests, the Cedarton union acted as "watchdog" to ensure that teachers are consulted and otherwise appropriately involved in formulating school programs and policies. While actual program and policy planning was conducted through teacher committees (separate or joint with administrators and community representatives), union leaders were active in establishing such committees, participating on them as teacher representatives, and in making sure administrators followed through on committee decisions.

In Middlebury, where in the late seventies the union placed almost exclusive emphasis on teacher welfare, divorcing itself from professional and educational concerns, we found that former union activists -- those who had stressed professional and educational goals in the late sixties -- had withdrawn from union leadership roles. Early activists sought other channels, outside the union, for pursuing professional/educational original goals. The illustration provided in the case study of such an outside channel was the establishment of the Staff Council in the high school. In Middlebury, in contrast to Cedarton, current union activists deliberately removed themselves from either monitoring or direct participation in such attempts by other teachers to collectively air professional and educational issues, or involvement in school governance.

In the case of Oakville, protective concerns had always been significant union priorities, due to the vulnerability of teachers in such a small school system to school board antagonisms. Yet even in Oakville, we found some continuing attention to educational concerns within the union.

Tables 3 and 4, in the Appendix, compare the three districts in 1979 in respect to union emphasis on various issues, as perceived by rank-and-file union members and activists. While issues related to teacher welfare (salary, workload, grievances, protection) are shown to receive most emphasis in all three districts, the comparisons indicate a less extreme emphasis on these areas in Cedarton than in Middlebury and Oakville. At the same time, we note a somewhat greater emphasis reported in Cedarton on non-welfare types of issues -- educational programs, educational policy, and student discipline.

Table 5 (see Appendix) contrasts union activists' 1979 perceptions of goals they emphasize to their 1969 perceptions. Here, the shifts in union emphasis in Middlebury can be observed. Note, especially, the increased percentages reporting emphasis on salaries and grievances, between 1969 and 1979, and the decline in emphasis on educational programs.*

Analysis of Different Union Patterns in Middlebury and Cedarton:

The marked shift in union goals in Middlebury deserves special comment. While external and internal constraints identified earlier were clearly factors accounting for changes in union goals, questions arise as to why the Middlebury union, initially less welfare-oriented than either the Cedarton or Oakville unions, and whose emergence was initially motivated by professional and educational concerns, should have developed in so much more a traditional direction than Cedarton.** Since both Cedarton and Middlebury unions were forced into defensive positions by economic tightening and teacher retrenchment, why do we find more substantial changes from early union goals in the Middlebury case?

The inability of the union in Middlebury to sustain a highly respected group of teachers in the leadership positions was clearly a major factor contributing to its failure to sustain early goals. We have already noted, in the case studies, the importance of leaders' personal commitment to professional and educational goals in setting union goals and particularly, in

* The perception indicated in Table 5 of continued union emphasis on teacher voice in educational policy is puzzling, since interviews indicated the MTF did not continue to emphasize this area in the seventies. The same puzzling response pattern holds true for Oakville. These responses could reflect an interpretation of "education policy" other than we intend -- e.g., a concern for class size. In any event, it is to be noted that response patterns on union effectiveness in this area were more in keeping with the finding in the case studies -- with greater percentage differences between Cedarton and the other two districts emerging. (See Tables 6 and 7, Appendix.)

** Consideration of Oakville is omitted from the comparison which follows. As a small, informal union in a small, rural school district, both the problems it faced and their resolution did not follow patterns which lend themselves to fruitful comparison with the larger districts in areas we are now considering.

moderating the potential for union preoccupation with teacher welfare concerns. Assuming quality of union leadership to have been a major factor determining the nature of organizational goals, we should be asking, therefore, not why did goals change, but why was the Middlebury union unable to sustain high quality leadership?

Respondents were always ready with personal, individual explanations. "You get tired..." or, "Marty's kids were growing up." But we must ask why similar personal pressures did not appear to interfere with continuity in leadership within the original Cedar-ton group, or why other potential leaders in Middlebury, who shared the professional-idealist vision for the union, did not assume the presidency when Landau withdrew. We find ourselves left with larger institutional and organizational questions: Why was the union in Cedar-ton able to sustain a leadership group committed to professional and educational goals, while the union in Middlebury was not?

Four major factors appear to account for differences in the ability of the two unions to sustain a professionally committed leadership group:

- 1) The initial greater idealism of the Middlebury union leadership and membership, in contrast to Cedar-ton.
- 2) The Middlebury union's early rapid growth, in contrast to the more gradual development of the Cedar-ton union.
- 3) The greater factionalism within the Middlebury union.
- 4) The presence of a sizeable, angry Black population in Middlebury.

These factors should be considered in interaction with one another and with other, previously identified constraints upon union goals and activities (external pressures, internal organizational constraints, and school board definitions of "legitimate" union concerns).

The initial greater idealism of teachers in the Middlebury union meant not only that their initial vision of the union was more far-reaching, but also that their ideals for the union meshed with their social, educational, and professional ideals. As we noted in the Middlebury case-study, many early union supporters were teachers committed to a liberal, integrationist philosophy, and they saw the union as a mechanism for not only strengthening

their own influence in the school system, but to change the schools, in keeping with their idealistic vision of a better society. When external economic pressures and school board resistance to changes they proposed made early union goals difficult to achieve, the gap between leaders' (and members') idealistic vision and what they could realistically realize was therefore greater in Middlebury than in Cedar-ton.

The rapidity with which the Middlebury union moved from a formative stage to assuming major responsibility as the organization representing teachers, under the new Taylor law, meant that not only did it grow quickly in size, absorbing external factions before differences could be clarified, but also, that leaders did not have time to explore issues confronting them in depth. By contrast, Cedar-ton union leaders had several years in which to explore and resolve internal differences and to clarify differences with external groups. This period of time appears to have facilitated the development in Cedar-ton of, on the one hand, a mutually supportive leadership group and, on the other, of clearer union positions on issues involving conflicts of interest between professional and welfare goals.

The greater factionalism in the Middlebury union may have resulted in part from its rapid growth and lack of opportunity for clarification and resolution of conflicting interests. It may also have been, in part, related to the greater idealism and liberalism -- even radicalism -- of the leadership group. Middlebury teachers were, on the whole, more liberal in general orientation than were teachers in either Cedar-ton or Oakville. However, union leaders in 1969 were considerably more liberal than the rank-and-file. Note that 65% of union activists identified themselves as "strongly liberal" or "radical" in 1969, in contrast to 30% of the staff as a whole. (See Tables 11 and 12, Appendix). Factionalism meant that more decisions had to be reached by compromise in Middlebury as opposed to Cedar-ton, for it permitted less sustained discussion of difficult issues. Compromise meant, to the professional idealists, further obstacles to the realization of original goals. Yet, compromise was necessary, because only with a unified membership could the organization realize any goals.

While early union leaders in Cedar-ton were also highly liberal, so was their early membership. Because of the long time period prior to their eventual merger with the more conservative Association membership, they were also able to develop more internal unity. This internal unity and mutual support was undoubtedly a factor in Nelson's ability to sustain his commitment to professional idealism in his union leadership role, over time.

Finally, the presence of a sizeable Black population, increasingly dissatisfied with the school system and increasingly antagonistic towards teachers meant that the external pressures union leaders in Middlebury had to contend with were different in tone -- if not in substance -- than those in Cedar-ton. An antagonistic school board, in Cedar-ton, unified teachers. Black hostility, in Middlebury, divided them. The open expression in the Black community of suspicion of union leaders' motivations as self-interested raised further internal questioning of union purposes, in an atmosphere of mistrust that further hindered resolution.

The Black criticism -- influenced in part by feelings about the 1968 New York City teachers' strike -- raised new conflicts within the Middlebury union. On the one hand, teachers' liberal, egalitarian sentiments predisposed them to sympathize with Blacks' own struggle to assert themselves. On the other, they were deeply offended by anti-teacher, anti-union, and anti-semitic overtones in the Black charges. This situation not only created internal, personal conflicts for union members, but also divided them. By contrast, blatant public criticisms of teachers by community or school-board members in Cedar-ton and Oakville engendered a greater spirit of unity within the teaching staff.

Thus, the different character of external pressures, coupled with the greater initial idealism of Middlebury teachers for their union contributed to greater internal factionalism. A less unified membership and more rapid movement of the union to a position of power made it more difficult to resolve problems in the attainment of organizational goals.

These tendencies, combined with external economic pressures, appear to have led to a disenchantment with the union and union leadership roles among the professional-idealists. Without continuing presence of a supportive leadership group sharing professional commitments, it would have been extremely difficult for any individual on his or her own, to have effectively integrated an even more pragmatic orientation to professional goals with teachers' welfare goals, given the external pressures on the teaching staff. Thus, it becomes understandable why teachers who had a professional vision for the union withdrew from leadership roles in Middlebury, and why routinization of the union presidency and goals appears to have been prerequisite for sustaining occupancy of that role.

By contrast, the Cedar-ton union's ability to sustain professional/educational goals and a strong, professionally committed leadership group derived from their having initially set their

sights on a different -- perhaps more attainable -- vision of what the union could accomplish. More gradual organizational development, a unified leadership group who mutually explored and resolved troubling issues and problems, and (eventually) a more supportive community environment contributed to sustaining professional and educational goals within the union. This is not to say Cedarton leaders do not deserve personal credit for their own persistence and commitment -- for they certainly do. I am simply pointing out that larger, social forces play a part in inhibiting or sustaining such persistence.

Impact of the unions upon teachers:

The major, stated purpose of the teachers' union has been to improve and protect teachers' economic welfare, working conditions, and job security, and to protect teacher rights. Assessment of the impact of the three unions studied in these areas is complicated by the presence of several external conditions which on the one hand enhanced, and on the other, constrained, what local union leaders could accomplish. These external conditions included: (1) the teacher union movement elsewhere, especially in New York State, (2) demographic changes in the county, and (3) the national atmosphere of economic crisis.

(1) The union movement elsewhere enhanced the union's bargaining power in the early seventies by raising standards for teacher contracts throughout the state on the basis of major gains made in a few key localities, such as New York City. Since local standards -- e.g., for salaries and fringe benefits -- had been traditionally based on comparisons to trends in neighboring districts, gains in the city influenced standards in surrounding districts. Since comparisons to conditions elsewhere tended to serve as a basis for determining what constituted "reasonable" improvements in teachers' economic status, teacher gains elsewhere in the New York City vicinity raised local standards, in each case, in respect to salary offerings in the time period studied. Similarly, other contract features benefitting teachers, such as the inclusion of a duty-free lunch period and preparation periods in the late sixties, reflected changing standards elsewhere at least as much as it did the efforts of local association or union leaders in negotiations. Furthermore, union lobbying at the state level contributed to the enactment of legislation which protected certain teacher rights -- in respect, for example, to procedures strengthening "due process" in the school district's handling of grievances and tenure decisions.

(2) Demographic changes in the county and in the local district, including both reduced local in-migration and lower birth rates, restricted the union's bargaining power in respect to improving and preserving teachers' economic welfare and job protection in the middle and later seventies. Lower school enrollments directly affected teachers' job security by justifying massive teacher cuts; a decline in residential and commercial expansion within the district affected teachers' economic welfare and working conditions (especially, class size) by restricting the tax base, thereby limiting residents' ability and willingness to support school expenditures. Just as teacher salary schedules elsewhere served as standards for determining appropriate local salary levels, so was the local district tax base, relative to other districts, assessed by both parties in negotiations in determining a "reasonable" financial settlement.

(3) The national atmosphere of "economic crisis" and inflation further encouraged and legitimized taxpayer resistance to increasing school expenditures and discouraged the local unions from pressing for continued improvements in teachers' economic welfare and working conditions after 1973. In deference to their concern for maintaining good community relations, Cedarton union leaders were especially sensitive to taxpayer pressures on the School Board to cut budgets in the late seventies. Thus, both economic realities and a perceived atmosphere of "economic crisis" influenced union leaders to make some significant concessions during contract negotiations in 1976 and 1979 (e.g., giving up sabbaticals).

Thus, while both gains and slippages in respect to stated union goals undoubtedly reflected local union positions and activity, success or lack of success in attaining stated goals reflected constraints imposed by external conditions, and cannot be attributed solely -- or even mainly -- to the effectiveness of the local union.

In all three districts, teachers reported salary levels to have been better in 1979 than in 1969 (see Table 8) and in all three, they perceived their unions as effective in having improved salaries (Table 9). In Middlebury, salary levels had, in fact, improved substantially, due to a negotiated cost of living increase earned in the strike settlement and lasting through 1976.* In

* Since gains made at any one time become the floor upon which future percentage increases, however small, are based, the benefits of the 1973 contract in Middlebury continued through 1979.

Cedarton and Oakville, however, negotiated salary increases remained consistently below the inflation rate from 1973 on. The insignificant differences between Middlebury and the other two districts in teacher perceptions of salary improvement and union effectiveness in this area therefore represents an anomaly. The anomalous pattern may reflect, in part, respondents' perception of cumulative improvement in their absolute incomes between 1969 and 1979, coupled with the perceptions that their unions had done well to have obtained even small increases, given taxpayer resistance in their districts.

In respect to job security and working conditions, respondents tended to perceive their situation in all three districts as having deteriorated since 1969. Table 8 indicates that in both Cedarton and Middlebury, close to 60% perceived job security to be worse, while in Oakville, 35% perceived it as worse. In all three districts, substantial percentages perceived class size as worse, with the Cedarton percentage perceiving it as worse being by far the highest. (74% of Cedarton teachers reported class size as worse in 1979.) Teaching loads (hours of assigned work) were also perceived as having become worse in Cedarton and Oakville.* Cedarton union members perceived their union as less effective in the areas of job security, class size and workload in 1979 than did union members in the other two districts. Comparison of the members' perceptions of their organization's effectiveness between 1969 and 1979 also yielded a lower rating for union in 1979 as compared to the association in 1969, in respect to class size and workload

At this point, we are faced with another surprising anomaly. In Cedarton, where the greatest teacher retrenchment had occurred, where salaries and benefits had only slightly improved, and where teachers gave the union relatively low ratings in areas of job protection, class size and workload, respondents reported substantial improvement on teacher welfare, other than salaries and job security. In fact, the 85% of Cedarton respondents reporting improvement in this area of general teacher welfare was significantly higher than the percentages indicated in either Middlebury or Oakville -- where 70% and 73%, respectively, reported improvement in general teacher welfare.

The substantial overall percentages reporting improvement in general teacher welfare suggest that the teachers' unions, in all three cases, had an important impact in improving teachers' general

* Teachers' perceptions of changes in salaries and working conditions are presented in Table 8.

sense of well-being, in spite of external economic pressures. Information provided in the case studies supports this finding in that teacher respondents were virtually unanimous -- in all three districts -- in reporting a feeling of being better protected, by their unions, against arbitrary, administrative actions of the kind 1969 respondents had complained about. Given the severity of external pressures accompanying retrenchment (and, in Middlebury, increased public criticism) respondents perceived union mechanisms for ensuring due process as especially important.

In view of the lower degree of emphasis placed by the Cedar-ton union on teacher welfare issues, by contrast, especially to Middlebury, the significantly higher perception of improvement in teacher welfare would seem to indicate more than literal economic welfare or protection. This data, in combination with what our case studies have revealed, suggests that Cedar-ton teachers experienced a greater sense of stability in their daily work lives due to a more predictable school system and better relations with their school board.

Turning our attention to areas other than teacher welfare, a comparison of response patterns indicated in Tables 9 and 10 also indicates some important differences between Cedar-ton and Middlebury, at the high school level. Percentages reporting improvement in staff relations with administrators and school board, in the overall quality of staff, and in teacher participation in decisions concerning the educational program and discipline are all substantially higher in Cedar-ton by contrast to Middlebury. In fact, the only area listed in Tables 9 and 10 where Middlebury high school respondents reported greater improvement than Cedar-ton was teacher participation in decisions affecting teacher welfare.

The comparison of high school responses on improvement in the overall quality of the teaching staff in Cedar-ton and Middlebury is especially interesting. Note that while 44% of Cedar-ton respondents reported the staff to have become better, only 12% of Middlebury respondents perceived their staff as having become better. On the other hand, only 3% in Cedar-ton perceived the teaching staff as worse, while 35% in Middlebury perceived it to be worse. These differences are especially important in that persons on the teaching staff in high school have mainly remained the same over the past ten years. Thus, it would appear that we are observing ratings of teachers as a faculty -- not as individuals. This pattern would appear to reflect different levels of staff participation in the affairs of the high school, indicated in the case studies and borne out by accompanying data (in Table 9)

referring to teacher participation in school decisions affecting programs and discipline. Teachers apparently view a non-participating staff as a worse staff. This finding is especially relevant to our research in view of the different roles played by the unions in the two high schools. In Cedar-ton, we found that the union actively promoted collective teacher participation in the affairs of the high school. In Middlebury, the union separated itself from such participation. Thus, we find in the Cedar-ton case, that the union has had a positive impact on staff quality. We cannot say in Middlebury that it has had a negative impact -- only that it has not had the same positive impact.

Impact of the Union on the School System:

These findings lead us to several important questions: (1) To the degree that a union enhances teacher participation in school decision-making, how does this participation benefit the school system? (2) If unions are effective in protecting teacher rights -- has this adversely affected school systems -- e.g., by protecting incompetent teachers? and (3) How have unions affected communication between teachers, administrators and school boards? and (4) What are the effects of operating under a contract on school administration? Data obtained from this research can provide only tentative answers to these questions, since it is based upon respondents' subjective impressions and judgments. Nevertheless, the questions warrant at least brief attention.

1. Teacher participation in decision-making: The data presented in the previous section suggests that teachers believe a participating faculty is a better one. The interview data shed some further light on this question. Teacher respondents who believed participation in school decisions to be important cited two major advantages to be gained for the system. First, because of teachers' direct involvement with students and teaching, they believed teachers could offer substantive information unavailable to administrators helpful in resolving many school problems, and that they would be more likely to identify workable, (as opposed to unworkable) solutions to problems. Secondly, they believed that teachers, generally, were more likely to cooperate with school decisions in which they participated. Administrators interviewed in the Cedar-ton high school bore out these claims in noting the effectiveness of a discipline policy developed by a joint committee composed of teachers, administrators, and students.

2. Union protection and incompetent teachers: A question that frequently arose concerning a possible negative impact of the unions was whether, in protecting teacher rights, they prevented administrators from dismissing teachers they judged to be incompetent.

Union leaders consistently claimed that they would not oppose a teacher's dismissal -- even a tenured teacher -- provided administrators sufficiently documented the grounds for dismissal. Administrators generally claimed it was virtually impossible to document teacher incompetence. Union leaders also claimed, however -- and school board respondents did also -- that administrators' inability to document poor teaching was more a reflection of an overcautiousness in writing teacher evaluations than of union defense of teachers. Both union and school board respondents cited instances of typical administrative evaluations, avoiding direct, specific language documenting teacher weakness.

Administrator caution in making negative teacher evaluations appeared to reflect an unfounded fear of potential union criticism, rather than any direct influence of the unions. This situation was particularly evident in Cedarton, where union respondents indicated that they had actually told administrators they would not oppose their dismissal of certain tenured teachers on grounds of incompetence, provided administrators adequately documented the evidence of incompetence. Yet, administrators continued to exercise caution in writing the evaluations out of an apparently imagined fear of union reprisal.

Thus, we may say that the existence of a union protecting teacher interests is perceived by some administrators as threatening to them, and thus indirectly affects their administration of the schools. This is not, however, a real impact of the unions. In each of the case studies, by the end of the research period, at least one administrative action had been initiated to remove a tenured teacher, and in each case, union leaders defended only the teacher's right to due process.

3. Communication between teachers, administrators and school boards: As noted in the case studies, negotiations, and grievance procedures had the unanticipated effect of opening up new avenues of communication between school boards and teachers in all three school districts, providing boards with greater insights into the daily operation of the schools. In addition, particularly in the Cedarton case, the union provided a new channel of communication between administrators and teachers. Since union meetings and

building representatives were channels for communication within the union, these also became mechanisms by which teacher opinion could be channeled upward, through leadership, to administrators.

Some administrators bemoaned the "good old days" when teachers would "drop in and chat" with them on a personal basis. Other administrators claimed that teachers still dropped in to chat with administrators with whom they felt comfortable, but that the larger size of the school systems limited the frequency of informal contact. From the second perspective, it would appear that the unions provided new, more formal mechanisms for communication within the school systems as they expanded and informal mechanisms became outmoded.

4. Operating under a contract: Administrators were consistent in reporting two main effects of operating schools under union contracts. The first, on the negative side, were limitations imposed by contracts on administrator flexibility in operating the schools. Common administrator complaints in this area were their inability to shift staff assignments around to meet changing situations -- e.g., to assign extra teachers to hall duty on certain days, or to shift teachers from hall duty to study halls, due to contract restrictions. Another common administrator complaint having to do with flexibility was a restriction upon the time allotted for staff meetings. Both the duration and number of meetings were limited by contract in all three districts. Most administrator respondents noted, however, that constraints to flexibility did not pose a serious problem.

On the positive side, administrators often reported the advantages of working under clear guidelines, which everyone understood. Since the contract clearly spelled out teacher rights and responsibilities in a number of areas, it made it easier for administrators to obtain teacher cooperation in fulfilling those responsibilities.

* * * * *

Most administrators and school board members interviewed, in all three districts, were at least somewhat sympathetic to teachers' need for protection of the type a union contract offered, noting that on balance, the benefits of having a more secure teaching staff outweighed possible disadvantages associated with limits to administrator flexibility. In none of the districts did the majority of board members or administrators view the union as

destructive to the educational system. In two of the districts -- Middlebury and Oakville -- they viewed the presence of teacher unions as neither good nor bad, but a "fact of life". In Cedarton, however, many noted the union as a positive force in the school district.

We have noted in these three case studies the importance of leadership in determining union positions on various matters. It is to be further noted that in the three districts studied, the union leadership was, in spite of certain important differences, viewed by administrators and school board respondents as basically responsible leadership. The observation that respondents did not note significant negative effects of unionization in these three districts obviously reflects this common quality.

A major conclusion to be drawn from this study is that the impact of teacher unionism will vary, depending upon the nature of union goals and leadership. It would also appear that communities and school boards exert some influence over the direction in which unions develop. These case studies suggest that where communities are reasonably receptive and responsive to their unions, the participation of professionally committed, educationally concerned teachers is more readily sustained.

APPENDIX

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TABLE 1 : MEMBERSHIP IN TEACHERS' ORGANIZATIONS:
CHANGES FROM 1969-1979

<u>Organization:</u>	<u>1969</u>			<u>1979</u>		
	<u>Cdtn</u>	<u>Mdby</u>	<u>Okvl</u>	<u>Cdtn</u>	<u>Mdby</u>	<u>Okvl</u>
Union (AFT)	9	66	61	88	82	89
Assn. (NEA)	75	6	12	5	0	0
Other/None	31	28	27	7	18	11
TOTAL:	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N=	(134)	(103)	(33)	(111)	(61)	(35)

TABLE 2 : TEACHER PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT FOR STRIKES IN
EARLY SEVENTIES: Comparisons by School District.

Type of activity or support:	Cdtn	Mdby	Okvl
Negotiating team:	10%	10%	23%
Organized demonstrations:	18%	28%	12%
Participated in demonstrations:	70%	36%	29%
Inactive, but supported strike:	1%	5%	18%
Did not support strike:	1%	21%	18%
TOTALS: *	93 100%	58 100%	27 100%

* Totals represent only respondents who were in district at time of strike.

TABLE 3 : MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EMPHASIS
ON VARIOUS ISSUES: (Percentages reporting
"Much Emphasis" in 1979)*

Issues:	Cdtn Union	Mdby Union	Okvl Union
Salaries:	73	72	78
Grievances:	58	83	78
Job security:	61	86	59
Teaching Load:	25	37	12
Class size:	42	64	18
Improvement in educational resources:	131	18	0
Changes in educational program:	7	11	0
Teacher voice in educational policy:	38	23	17
Student discipline:	27	14	11
Union solidarity:	54	55	6
Total Number	71	36	18

* Comparisons on "much emphasis" are not possible with 1969 since the earlier survey only asked respondents to indicate whether their organization "emphasized" certain issues, and did not distinguish degrees of emphasis.

TABLE 4 : ACTIVISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EMPHASIS ON VARIOUS ISSUES: (Percentages reporting "Much Emphasis" in 1979.)*

Issues:	Cdtn Union	Mdby Union	Okvl Union
Salaries:	79	89	85
Grievances:	75	100	100
Job security:	75	100	92
Teaching load:	50	50	31
Class size:	75	78	46
Improvement in educational resources:	21	22	223
Changes in educational programs:	39	11	23
Teacher voice in educational policy:	57	50	39
Student discipline:	46	11	23
Union solidarity:	68	67	46
Total number	46	11	23

* Comparisons on "much emphasis" are not possible with 1969 since the earlier survey only asked respondents to indicate whether their organization "emphasized" certain issues, and did not distinguish degrees of emphasis

TABLE 5 : ACTIVISTS' PERCEPTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL EMPHASIS ON VARIOUS ISSUES. (Percentages reporting emphasis on each issue, 1969 and 1979)*

Issues:	1969				1979		
	Cdtn Assn	Union	Mdby Union	Okvl Union	Cdtn Union	Mdby Union	Okvl Union
Salaries:	100	100	89	100	100	100	100
Grievances:	94	100	78	100	100	100	100
Job Security:	**	**	***	**	96	100	100
Tchng Load	71	100	82	82	89	78	92
Class Size:	68	100	78	82	96	100	100
Improvement in educational resources:	52	83	67	82	79	61	85
Changes in educational programs:	48	83	70	73	75	56	85
Teacher voice in educational policy:	94	100	82	91	93	89	85
Union solidarity:	**	**	***	**	100	100	85
Total Number:	31	6	27	11	28	18	13

* Responses of "much emphasis" and "some emphasis" combined for 1979 to permit comparison with 1969, where degree of emphasis was not asked for.

** Variable not included in 1969 survey.

TABLE 6 : ACTIVISTS' PERCEPTION OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
IN VARIOUS AREAS: (Percentages reporting own
organization as effective, 1969 and 1979.)*

Area:	Cdtn	<u>1969</u>	Okvl	Cdtn	<u>1979</u>	Okvl
	Assn	Union	Union	Union	Union	Union
Salaries:	90	95	100	93	100	100
Grievances:	83	100	80	100	100	100
Job Security:	**	**	**	64	89	100
Tchg Load:	47	65	40	71	89	92
Class size:	42	53	20	50	89	85
Improvement in educational resources:	**	**	**	68	56	77
Changes in educational programs:	39	70	70	71	44	69
Teacher voice in educational policy:	73	71	80	85	65	69
Union solidarity:	**	**	**	96	78	92
Total number:	31	27	11	28	18	13

* Responses of "very effective" and "somewhat effective" are combined for purposes of this table.

** Variable not included in 1969 survey.

TABLE 7 : MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
IN VARIOUS AREAS: (Percentages reporting own
organization as effective, 1969 and 1979.)*

Area:	1969			1979		
	Cdtn Assn	Mdby Union	Okvl Union	Cdtn Union	Mdby Union	Okvl Union
Salaries:	96	100	89	96	97	100
Grievances:	82	92	100	94	97	88
Job Security:	**	**	**	68	81	76
Tchng Load:	62	67	89	57	86	58
Class size:	59	61	44	44	83	61
Improvement in educational resources:	**	**	**	51	63	47
Changes in educational programs:	64	67	67	55	47	41
Teacher voice in educational policy:	51	69	67	73	59	47
Union solidarity:	**	**	**	91	79	47
Total Number:	70	40	9	71	36	18

* Responses of "very effective" and "somewhat effective" are combined for this table.

** Variable not included in 1969 survey.

TABLE 8 : TEACHER PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGES IN WELFARE AND
 WORKING CONDITIONS SINCE 1969 -- BY SCHOOL DISTRICT.
 (Percentages indicating changes in each direction.)

Area of Change:	Cedarton	Middlebury	Oakville
Teacher Salaries:			
Better	77	84	73
Same	16	13	17
Worse	7	3	10
Job Security:			
Better	21	17	24
Same	20	17	41
Worse	59	66	35
Teacher Welfare other than salaries and job security:			
Better	85	70	73
Same	8	16	23
Worse	7	14	3
Teaching Load (Hours of assigned work):			
Better	9	12	10
Same	53	69	58
Worse	38	19	32
Class Size:			
Better	2	5	3
Same	24	55	45
Worse	74	40	52
Total Number:*	99	55	27

* Total includes only respondents in school district ten years or more.

TABLE 9 : TEACHER PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGES IN RELATIONS WITH ADMINISTRATORS AND SCHOOL BOARDS SINCE 1969 -- BY SCHOOL DISTRICT AND GRADELEVEL TAUGHT.
(Percentages indicating changes in each direction.)

Type of Relations;	Cedartown		Middlebury		Oakville
	Elem.	H.S.	Elem	H.S.	Elem*
Staff relations with building principals:					
Better	17	64	24	40	37
Same	36	30	43	34	42
Worse	47	6	33	26	21
Staff relations with district superintendent:					
Better	18	39	35	23	11
Same	22	32	43	53	41
Worse	60	29	22	24	48
Staff relations with School Board:					
Better	42	52	16	6	44
Same	37	39	27	39	44
Worse	21	9	57	55	12
Total Number:**	65	34	37	18	27

*"Elementary": including primary, intermediate, and junior high school grades. Cutoff points vary among the districts. For Cedartown, these include 1st through 8th grades; for Middlebury, 1st through 7th; for Oakville, 1st through 9th. "High School" includes all remaining grades.

**Total includes only respondents in school district ten years or more.

TABLE 10 : TEACHER PERCEPTIONS OF CHANGES IN QUALITY OF STAFF AND STAFF PARTICIPATION IN SCHOOL DECISIONS SINCE 1969 -- BY SCHOOL DISTRICT AND GRADELEVEL TAUGHT* (Percentages indicating changes in each direction.)

Area of Change	Cedar-ton		Middle-bury		Oakville
	Elem	H.S.	Elem	H.S.	Elem
Overall quality of teaching staff:					
Better	36	44	32	12	41
Same	58	53	57	53	48
Worse	6	3	11	35	11
Teacher participation in decisions about educational program:					
Better	26	46	24	22	41
Same	52	39	33	44	37
Worse	22	15	43	34	22
Teacher participation in decsns. about student discipline:					
Better	13	72	22	28	33
Same	74	16	49	44	48
Worse	13	12	29	28	19
Teacher participation in decsns. affecting teacher welfare:					
Better	65	52	44	61	48
Same	29	45	42	28	52
Worse	6	3	14	11	0
Total Number**	65	34	37	18	27

* "Elementary": including primary, intermediate, and junior high school grades. Cutoff points vary among the districts. For Cedar-ton, these include 1st through 8th grades; for Middle-bury, 1st through 7th; for Oakville, 1st through 9th. "High School" includes all remaining grades.

** Total includes only respondents in school district ten years or more.

TABLE 11 : IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS OF UNION ACTIVISTS: COMPARISONS
 1969 and 1979 (Percentage distributions on a liberalism-
 conservatism scale.)*

ORIENTATION:	1969			1979		
	Cdtn	Mdby	Okvl	Cdtn	Mdby	Okvl
Strongly Conservative:	0	0	0	0		0
Moderately Conservative:	0	5	0	18	0	25
Middle of the Road:	0	0	20	12	12	50
Moderately Liberal:	33	30	50	52	59	25
Strongly Liberal:	67	45	30	18	6	0
Radical:	0	20	0	0	23	0
TOTALS:	20	6	10	17	27	12
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Rankings are by respondent self-identification.

TABLE 12 IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS OF DISTRICT TEACHING STAFFS
 COMPARISONS 1969 and 1979 (Percentage distributions
 on a liberalism-conservatism scale)*

ORIENTATION:	1969			1979		
	CDTN	MDBY	OKVL	CDTN	MDBY	OKVL
Strongly Conservative:	2	1	0	1	0	0
Moderately Conservative,	20	9	22	23	20	32
Middle of the road	21	16	28	20	11	36
Moderately Liberal:	40	44	38	47	46	32
Strongly Liberal	16	24	12	8	15	0
Radical	1	6	0	1	8	0
TOTALS:**	132 (100%)	93 (100%)	32 (100%)	109 (100%)	61 (100%)	34 (100%)

* Rankings are by respondent self-identification

** Totals represent all teachers in sample, including union
 activists (except for missing answers).

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