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ABSTRACT

An overview is presented of select research performed under a project entitled "Education, Delinquency Prevention, and the Search for Youth Policy: An Historical Inquiry." This overview contains two discrete essays that synthesize the main findings of seven key writers in the field of juvenile delinquency between 1900 and 1930 and examine state policies in delinquency prevention in the early 20th century. The first essay examines the writings of Henry Goddard, William Healy, Lewis Terman, Ben Lindsey, Thomas Eliot, Miriam Van Waters, and Frederic Thrasher. The discussion emphasizes the new approaches to social control developed by these writers. The second essay examines state policies for delinquency prevention in early 20th century California and Ohio. It focuses in particular on the development of new rehabilitative programs for delinquents in juvenile reformatories and the creation of new methods to advance scientific knowledge on the causes and treatment of juvenile crime. The analysis highlights the remarkable faith in science which motivated state policy initiatives in delinquency prevention and the myriad difficulties that frustrated governmental efforts in translating scientific knowledge into social policy and concrete programs. (RM)

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STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY 20TH CENTURY DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

Steven Schlossman

January 1983

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PREFACE

This Note provides an overview of select research performed under a project sponsored by the National Institute of Education entitled "Education, Delinquency Prevention, and the Search for Youth Policy: An Historical Inquiry." This Note indicates the scope and nature of the research, highlights particularly interesting or unexpected findings, and relates each inquiry to the broader themes of the project.

Able assistance in completing archival research on this project was provided by Hamilton Craven, Michael Sedlak, Geraldine Clifford, Lynn Gordon, William Reese, J. Rounds, Stephanie Wallach, and Michael Meranze.

SUMMARY

This Note is divided into two discrete essays that form part of a larger study on the historical antecedents of modern-day ideas, practices, and policies in the field of delinquency prevention.

The first essay examines the writings of seven of the most prominent commentators on juvenile delinquency in the early 20th century and links their ideas to broader currents in American social thought. These individuals are Henry Goddard, William Healy, Lewis Terman, Ben Lindsey, Thomas Eliot, Miriam Van Waters, and Frederic Thrasher. The discussion focuses especially on the new approaches to social control that these writers developed in order to revitalize "community" as a visible, personal, authoritative moral presence in the eyes of urban youth.

The second essay examines the emergence of state policies for delinquency prevention in early 20th century California and, more selectively, in Ohio. It focuses in particular on the development of new rehabilitative programs for delinquents in juvenile reformatories and the creation of new methods to advance scientific knowledge on the causes and treatment of juvenile crime. The analysis highlights the remarkable faith in science which motivated state policy initiatives in delinquency prevention, and the myriad difficulties that frustrated governmental efforts to translate scientific knowledge into social policy and concrete programs.

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I. DELINQUENCY PREVENTION AND AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

This section synthesizes the main findings of a collective biographical survey of key writers in the field of delinquency prevention between approximately 1900 and 1930. During this time period, belief in the possibility of delinquency prevention grew as never before among scholars, government officials, and lay civic reformers and substantially influenced responses to children's antisocial and illegal behavior by schools, courts, police, and mental health facilities. To investigate the origins and content of this new set of beliefs, we selected seven authors whose work, we felt, embodied the most significant strands of thought in the field. Of these individuals--Henry Goddard, William Healy, Lewis Terman, Ben Lindsey, Thomas Eliot, Miriam Van Waters, and Frederic Thrasher--some are very well remembered, while others have been wholly forgotten. For none of them (save, perhaps, Lindsey) was there a scholarly biography which, in our judgment, adequately portrayed the individual's ideas and career, particularly in the area of delinquency prevention. Our objective consequently was to pursue original inquiry on each individual, with the intention of publishing separate scholarly articles as the originality of findings warranted.¹

To guide our inquiries, we initially advanced a rather grand, tentative hypothesis regarding the significance of ideas on delinquency

¹ Our success in gaining access to new data varied. We could not predict that data would be most plentiful on individuals who seemed clearly the most historically important. Thus, we were disappointed in our search for new data in Chicago and Boston concerning William Healy, but happily surprised at locating rich veins of archival data on Henry Goddard in Ohio and on Frederic Thrasher in New York.

prevention in the history of American social thought and social policy. The hypothesis derived from interest expressed by the National Institute of Education in the origins and ambivalence of modern-day youth policy.² We suggested that the most systematic and sustained efforts to articulate youth policy in our history were largely derivative from early 20th century innovations in the theory and practice of delinquency prevention. Delinquency prevention programs, we further suggested, highlighted an unresolved tension in public policy toward youth, namely, the uncertainty of whether to concentrate policy on the shared characteristics of youth or on the apparent differences among them.

As our research proceeded, we began to feel that this focus was not entirely appropriate--not anachronistic, but insufficiently rooted in the historical data to warrant imposing contemporary meanings ("youth policy") upon them. The field of delinquency prevention, we came to believe, had made its chief contribution to social thought by providing interesting new perspectives on the meaning of community in modern urban America. Thus our thematic focus shifted from delinquency prevention as precedent for "youth policy" to delinquency prevention as "search for community."³

² *Non-Federal Determinants of Youth Policy*, National Institute of Education, RFP No. NIE-R-79-0024, July 10, 1979.

³ Many historical works influenced our decision to focus on this theme, especially Paul Boyer, *Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978; and Thomas Bender, *Community and Social Change in America*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1978. Scholars often assume that a search for community is a prerogative of disaffected intellectuals, utopians, and aristocratic elites out of tune with their times--the Thoreaus, Bellamys, Olmsteds, Jameses, Burnhams, Mumfords, and Goodmans. As manifested in delinquency prevention, however, the search for community was no abstract mind-game but a daily reconnaissance mission run by social control agents to ferret out nonconforming behavior in homes, schools, and city streets.

Accordingly, we increasingly interpreted delinquency prevention in the context of America's maturation as an urban-industrial nation in the early 20th century. Throughout most of the 19th century, American cities had embodied unrefined capitalist values; growth and expansion were their own imperatives, regardless of attendant human costs. Our cities "just grew." Voices of protest were certainly not absent beforehand, but only in the early 20th century did they become politically powerful and coalesce into a variety of reform movements seeking basic changes in the fabric of urban life. Urban growth and expansion for their own sake, or, rather, solely for the benefit of individual entrepreneurs would no longer be tolerated, the proponents of reform confidently asserted. *Social* control would now regulate city development to better serve human needs.

In this context, we suggest that innovative approaches to delinquency prevention in the early 20th century should be viewed as part of a broader protest against socially disintegrative, dehumanizing forces which unchecked urban-industrial development had set in motion. To those who sponsored prevention programs, juvenile delinquency became a potent symbol not merely of urban disorder, but of wholesale collapse in the structures and sentiments by which communities traditionally defined normative behavior and socialized the young. Spiraling rates of juvenile crime, in their view, reflected the disintegration of community; and without community, they felt certain, vast stretches of urban territory would rapidly become uninhabitable, impersonal moral jungles. Fear of crime became a springboard in the early 20th century for the invention of new approaches to social control designed to

revitalize community as a visible, personal, authoritative moral presence in the eyes of urban youth.⁴

Did our collective biographical inquiry confirm the basic thrust of our reformulated hypothesis? The fairest answer, we believe, is both yes and no, as the following summary analysis shows.

Henry Goddard

Our comprehensive analysis of Henry Goddard led to some unexpected results, to say the least. We chose Goddard as the most famous exponent of popular eugenicist views on social reform generally and delinquency prevention in particular in the first two decades of the 20th century. His best-known work, *The Kallikak Family* (1912), has long represented for historians the apotheosis of popular scientific opinion about the potential of society to perfect itself via planned human breeding.⁵ Nothing we have learned from additional research about Goddard's early career at Vineland (New Jersey) Training School has altered this view: He believed faithfully, as a result of his own research and that of his good friend Charles Davenport, in biological causation as the principal explanation for delinquency, and he recommended permanent institutionalization and/or sterilization of alleged "feeble-minded" individuals as the key to eradicating future crime.

Historians, however, have not examined the evolution of Goddard's ideas on delinquency prevention as a function of his changing career pattern. Goddard left Vineland in 1918 to direct the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research, where he came into frequent contact with large

⁴ Sociologists will easily recognize the Durkheimian roots of these formulations.

⁵ The standard work remains Mark Haller, *Eugenics*, New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964.

numbers of delinquents who clearly were not feeble-minded. Moreover, he became seriously disillusioned with the accuracy of mental tests as predictors of delinquency: He no longer believed that low mental ability necessarily translated into antisocial behavior, or even that mental tests adequately measured intelligence. Gradually Goddard shifted his concern away from inherited defective mental ability as the principal cause of delinquency to psychopathology--of indeterminate cause--as the principal explanation of juvenile crime. The more he studied psychopathology, furthermore, the more he became convinced of its environmental causes, until his work became not dissimilar from that of his old archrival, William Healy. Goddard, in short, traveled a remarkable intellectual road from eugenicist to clinical psychologist. Our research has led to a revisionist portrait of Henry Goddard that also sheds new light on the evolution of the eugenics movement after World War I and its diminishing impact on public attitudes toward delinquency prevention.

Did Goddard view delinquency prevention as central to a broader "search for community" in modern urban America? Clearly not, at least in the current sense of the term. Goddard's focus as a scientist was on the individual, not on urban social problems. In his own way, though, Goddard was very much concerned with the fate of community--the human community, whose long-range "efficiency" he considered largely in the hands of social and behavioral scientists. After his decision that psychopathology was more responsible for delinquency than inferior genes, Goddard viewed delinquency prevention mainly as the filtering out, isolation, and cure of seriously abnormal individuals. Delinquency prevention signified to Goddard less a "search for community" than a

purification of the human race of its alien, sick, and substandard elements.

Lewis Terman

Lewis Terman is best known for his invention of the I.Q. score, his studies of gifted children, and his conflicts with Walter Lippmann on "nature versus nurture." What has gone almost entirely unrecognized, however, is Terman's strong early interest in the causes and prevention of juvenile delinquency, and his key role as mentor to those trying to transform California juvenile reformatories and public schools into more effective crime prevention agencies. Before we examined Terman's private papers at Stanford University, we did not realize the extent of his involvement in California juvenile justice, both as a teacher of many leading figures in juvenile corrections and as a lobbyist whose opinions carried considerable weight with state legislators.

For all that our research revealed about Terman's active role in delinquency prevention, however, we found him to be perhaps the least interesting of our seven authors on the links between prevention and urban community. In his mature work, Terman presented an even more extreme case than Goddard of a scientist so committed to the precise determination of inherited individual abilities that the social determinants of group experience received almost no attention whatsoever. Terman's meteoric rise to international prominence from 1916 onward was based almost entirely on the I.Q. score; he apparently never saw much reason to *analyze individual experience in social context*, even when trying to explain the causes of crime.

To many modern-day critics of Terman's work and influence, none of ~~this will seem particularly surprising.~~⁶ ~~What was most surprising to~~ us, though, was that the range of factors Terman considered important in explaining children's behavior, including their antisocial behavior, actually seemed to grow narrower as his career matured. Before he became a true believer in "mental deficiency" as the prime cause of juvenile delinquency and in the I.Q. as the best tool for diagnosing "feeble-mindedness," his research interests had centered on broader issues of physical and mental health in determining school success. He had also been an avid proponent of a wide range of child-welfare reforms. Health, nutrition, and even differences among teachers, he argued early in his career as an assistant professor at Los Angeles State Normal School (which later became UCLA), were crucial in explaining differences in pupil achievement.

By the late 1910s, however, Terman had abandoned these views entirely. "All kinds of supposed causes of retardation are emphasized except the one important cause--inferior mental ability," he wrote in 1919. "Assumptions about the importance of physical defects, irregular attendance, late entrance, overly high standards--all emphasized by such experts on school retardation as Leonard Ayres--are contradicted by the findings of all who have investigated the subject by the use of mental tests."⁷ Thus, Terman's growing faith in tests preempted his earlier interest in the social sources of children's failures and, perforce, in the communal context of delinquent behavior.

⁶ See, for example, Clarence Karier, *Shaping the American Educational State*, New York: The Free Press, 1975; and Stephen Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man*, New York: Norton, 1981.

⁷ Lewis Terman, *The Intelligence of School Children*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919, pp. 115-116.

William Healy

~~Our research on William Healy, the world-famous psychiatrist whose~~
pioneering studies of "the individual delinquent" made him easily the preeminent scientific authority on the subject of delinquency prevention, was unfortunately the least fruitful in generating either new data or interpretations. The Judge Baker Foundation in Boston, which Healy directed for more than a quarter-century, did not deposit its records in the medical history archives of Harvard University in time for us to use them. Perhaps the most interesting result of our extensive reading of Healy is that it led us to take issue with a leading historical authority, David Rothman, whose book, *Conscience and Convenience: The Asylum and Its Alternatives in Progressive America* (1980), was published while our project was under way.*

Healy's ultimate research goal was to lay an empirical base for a "science of conduct," or, as he also phrased it, a science of "characterology." He was equally committed to research on both the causes and treatment of children's misbehavior. "The prime motive for our research into beginning and causative factors we have ever felt to be the establishment of scientific laws of predictability upon which all sorts of treatment could be rationally planned," Healy insisted. "If

* We have no quarrel with Rothman's critique of Healy's early classic volume, *The Individual Delinquent* (1915), as the epitome of aimless, atheoretical, eclectic empiricism, largely uninterpretable and irrelevant to treatment. But in books and articles published shortly after *The Individual Delinquent*, Healy did, in fact, attempt to incorporate Freudian theory to provide greater structure for his research. Moreover, Healy was not the preeminent champion of juvenile courts but, on the contrary, doubted their rehabilitative capacity. Rothman leans too heavily on Healy to generalize about reformers' beliefs. For elaboration, see Steven Schlossman, "Equity, Education, and Individual Justice: The Origins of the Juvenile Court," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 52, February 1982, pp. 77-83.

there is practical value in this deeper investigation it must be evidenced by positive, determinable, therapeutic results."⁹

In fact, though, Healy devoted far more time to determining causal sequences than to devising rehabilitative methods, on the assumption that appropriate treatment would become apparent once patterns of causation were fully understood. Amid a wealth of detail, a few key ideas stood out. Healy asserted over and over again that the causes of delinquency were complex, and that the causes differed in every case. He considered general theories of delinquency causation useless because they downplayed individual differences and were imprecise in specifying cause-effect relationships:

Nothing is shown by our data more convincingly than the predictable inadequacy of social measures built upon statistics and theories which neglect the fundamental fact of the complexity of causation, determinable through study of the individual case. Many of the works on social misconduct deal with what is often denominated 'general causation,' and attempt to establish geographics, climatological, economic and many other correlations. Much of this is interesting and even seductive, intellectually, and it is true that there are some relationships, such as that between alcoholism and crime, well enough verified to justify social alteration. But that many of these suggested correlations contain only half-truths, one is constrained to believe after prolonged attempt to gather in all available facts in many individual cases.¹⁰

Healy was especially chagrined at the popular view that a simple, predictable relationship existed between poverty and crime. This viewpoint was, to him, pure sentimentalism: Social factors were relevant to delinquency only insofar as they induced a particular mental image in a youngster's mind that compelled his antisocial behavior. As

⁹ William Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1915, p. 15; William Healy, *Mental Conflicts and Misconduct*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1917, p. 6.

¹⁰ Healy, *The Individual Delinquent*, p. 23.

Healy argued: "Poverty, and crowded housing, and so on, by themselves alone are not productive of criminalism. It is only when these conditions in turn produce suggestions, and bad habits of mind, and mental imagery of low order that the trouble in conduct ensues."¹¹ As Healy's research progressed in the pre- and post-World War I years, the role of mental imagery grew more central, and the role of environmental factors less so. Thus Healy--though not nearly as narrow in his range of concerns, or as fixed in his method of analysis as Goddard or Terman--had little original to contribute to understanding of the community's role in causing or preventing delinquency. Healy centered attention on the treatment of the child in the artificial setting of the psychological clinic; his goal was to cure sick children, not to revitalize sick neighborhoods.

Analyses of the work of Goddard, Terman, and Healy obviously did little to buttress our hypothesis that delinquency prevention has been a source of unusually creative thinking on the place of community in modern-day urban America. Much more positive results came from our inquiries into Lindsey, Eliot, Van Waters, and Thrasher.

Benjamin Lindsey

No concern was more central to Ben Lindsey, Denver's world-famous juvenile court judge in the Progressive Era, than enhancing "community" responsibility to promote optimal child development and thereby (he felt) to prevent juvenile delinquency. At first glance, Lindsey perfectly exemplifies our central hypothesis on the significance of delinquency prevention in American social thought. Lindsey was a prominent champion of citywide and nationwide campaigns to ensure clean

¹¹ Ibid., p. 284.

government, to regulate child labor, to expand school-based social services, and, overall, to vastly expand "communal" (i.e., governmental) intervention into all phases of social life that directly affected children. But when Lindsey argued the need to revitalize "community," he tended to refer less to particular neighborhood environments that disproportionately bred juvenile delinquency than to cities and, indeed, to the nation as a whole. In this he was quite different from such equally famous "child-savers" as Chicago's Jane Addams and New York's Lillian Wald. Lindsey's prime concern was the "community" writ large, not specific local urban neighborhoods.

Having said this, however, we must correct a common historical misconception about how Lindsey conceived of the juvenile court as an agency of delinquency prevention in the larger Denver community. Several of Lindsey's contemporaries, like many later historians, accused him of being a supreme egotist who ran a one-man show and assumed that by force of his dominant personality and boundless energy, he could make the juvenile court a social panacea.¹² Lindsey's methods and influence over children in court were indeed unique, but it is clear that he, unlike many more conservative judges, viewed crime and its prevention as a communitywide responsibility and not the exclusive concern of courts or police. The juvenile court would realize its promise, Lindsey argued, only when it was integrally bound "into a system of co-operation between those forces dealing with the children in the city."¹³ Or as he argued before the National Education Association in 1909: "All the

¹² Most recently, David Rothman, *Conscience and Convenience*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1980, pp. 215, 240.

¹³ Ben Lindsey, "Saving the Citizenship of Tomorrow," *Charities and the Commons*, Vol. 15, March 3, 1906, p. 758.

courts or probation schemes on earth can never effectively correct the faults of the child as long as there remain the faults of those who deal with children in homes, in schools, in neighborhoods--in the community itself."¹⁴

Lindsey's flair for the individually dramatic act should thus not distract from the systematic interest he displayed in meshing the work of the court with that of a larger configuration of urban child-serving institutions in Denver. Perhaps the truer view of Lindsey, we suggest, is that he actually attempted to exert a moderating influence over many of his more narrowly focused followers, who *did* tend to view the juvenile court by itself as a savior of children and a panacea for juvenile crime. Lindsey's views on the links between delinquency and community were complex and multifaceted, even if more general in nature than those of equally prominent social reformers who lived in cities with more heterogeneous populations and starker slums than Denver's.

Thomas Eliot

Probably no one in the country was more knowledgeable than Thomas Eliot about the operations of the juvenile justice system *nationwide* between 1910 and 1940. Through his own research and the surveys he conducted for the National Probation Association, Eliot attempted to see the system whole and analyze its general characteristics. To be sure, Eliot was not a particularly skilled empirical researcher. The data he collected were often superficial, he generally shunned statistical analysis, and the extent to which he understood the operations of any single juvenile justice system in depth was always in doubt. Eliot's

¹⁴ Ben Lindsey, "The Child and the Community," National Education Association, *Proceedings and Addresses*, 1909, p. 742.

forte lay instead in theory and criticism. Sound social theory, he insisted, should guide public policy, not, as was commonly the case, politics, convenience, historical accident, or sheer happenstance.

Eliot practiced what he preached. Throughout his career, he leveled a wholesale attack on prevailing institutional arrangements in juvenile justice--particularly as they overlapped with the responsibilities of public schools--and he grounded his criticism in contemporary theories of "social economy." As Eliot extrapolated from these theories to advance a new agenda for public policy in delinquency prevention, he developed many of the basic philosophic and organizational premises that underlay the movement in the 1960s for "diversion" of youth from the juvenile justice system.

We initially expected Eliot to be the most intellectually exciting of the thinkers we had selected to analyze in depth. We felt that his work might well constitute the most systematic effort ever made in this country to integrate programs in education and delinquency prevention to form a comprehensive youth policy. After reading nearly all of Eliot's published work, we have little reason to change this assessment. At the same time, however, we found him a far less complex and exciting thinker than we had expected. That he used delinquency prevention as a springboard for reassessing the nature of communal responsibility for promoting optimal child-rearing is undeniable. His work helps to validate our central hypothesis very well. Yet, we somehow expected more from Eliot and were disappointed by his failure as a mature scholar to elaborate the innovative ideas on delinquency prevention he had developed in his pioneering 1914 doctoral dissertation, *The Juvenile Court and the Community*.

Part of our disappointment stems from our knowledge now that Eliot's critical vantage point on the court was not quite as unique as we had originally supposed. Previous scholars have assumed that virtual consensus existed on the merits of juvenile courts from their creation in 1899 until the 1960s and the *Gault* decision. In fact, Eliot's voice was only one of many in a concerted critical evaluation by scholars and civic leaders of court structure, organization, and practice in the early 1900s. Indeed, Eliot's own Dean at Northwestern University, Willard Hotchkiss, was one of the most prominent commentators on the subject as a result of his work with the Citizens' Committee to Investigate the Juvenile Court of Cook County, Chicago (1912).

More central to our disappointment, though, is our judgment that Eliot's opinions early assumed a formulaic quality--once you learned his basic line of argument, as articulated in *The Juvenile Court and the Community*, you knew fairly well everything he would say on the subject of delinquency prevention for the rest of his life. This redundancy and rigidity, we believe, derived from Eliot's lifelong infatuation with "social economy"--a Progressive Era invention which academicized popular interest in "efficiency" and "scientific administration", and attempted to garner for itself the intellectual prestige long associated with the discipline of political economy. "Social economy," Eliot argued, stressed the rational distribution of municipal institutional responsibilities along lines of maximum efficiency rather than, as was generally the case in major cities, inherited practice or political chicanery. "Social economy" embodied the period's pragmatic faith in function over form and drew its devotees into all variety of urban reform campaigns in the early 20th century.

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Eliot early became a doctrinaire advocate of "social economic" theory to guide policy and practice in delinquency prevention. As he stated time and again, his prime interest was "the economizing of social resources," and his approach was unalterably "functional." Social economists considered "agencies as instruments or means, not as ends" and viewed "social structures [as] merely tools or channels for social functions." To further distinguish his approach to municipal welfare from that of amateur social reformers, Eliot elaborated the worldview he and other "social economists" shared:

As humanitarian he may pity misery and seek to relieve it; but as economist he views maladjustment as waste: waste of energy, waste of money, waste of human material. He asks how social resources may be more effectively deployed to reduce these wastes; or how they occur, that he may see how they may be prevented. He observes the trends of previous activities, strives to control them by warning or encouragement. He subjects social welfare to a sort of job analysis: what is there to be done, what is there to do it with, and what agencies can best do it or do it best.¹⁵

This approach may have convinced Eliot that his work was truly scientific, but at a cost, in our judgment, of promoting rather abstract, airy, and canned recommendations for actually improving practice.

In a nutshell, Eliot's argument was grandly simple: "Juvenile courts should not themselves carry on the treatment of children," he stated plainly, to the consternation of probation officers. "The educational system should be conceived as including all special efforts to educate or reeducate and rehabilitate the unusual or maladjusted--

¹⁵ Thomas Eliot, "Case Work Functions and Judicial Functions: Their Coordination," National Probation Association, *Yearbook*, Vol. 31, 1937, pp. 252-253.

from the superior to the imbecile, from the too docile to the neurotic or delinquent."¹⁶ Insisting that an unfortunate stigma invariably attached to all children who appeared in juvenile courts, he called for the abolishment of those courts and the assumption of all their treatment responsibilities by the public schools. Schools rather than courts, he urged, should be the repository of the state's equity power over children in need of special, extraparental care. The school should be viewed as every community's social service institution *par excellence*, dispensing "educational case work" and "educational group work" to children and their families as needed. What Eliot meant by these terms never became very clear, but he remained startlingly confident that scientific knowledge and techniques already existed to dispense these services, that schools would easily be able to administer them, and that communities would readily accept their broadened responsibilities in the area of delinquency prevention.

For Thomas Eliot, in sum, delinquency prevention served as a starting point for expanding and reorganizing urban institutions in dramatic ways, all built on a foundation of scientific expertise. In retrospect, the scientific base upon which Eliot proposed to build "educational case work" and "educational group work" appears a good deal less substantial than he thought it was. Nonetheless, Eliot remains of interest to us as a representative of a broader group of thinkers who increasingly turned to institutions other than social control agencies to innovate in the field of delinquency prevention. For Eliot, delinquency prevention did indeed serve as a springboard for redefining the nature of urban communal responsibility for youth.

¹⁶ Thomas Eliot, "Should Courts Do Case Work?," *Survey*, Vol. 60, September 15, 1928, p. 601.

Miriam Van Waters

Along with Ben Lindsey, Miriam Van Waters became rather infamous in the 1920s for her frank discussions of the "new morality" among youth, especially among female adolescents. Later in her life, she achieved a certain notoriety again, as the controversial superintendent of a women's prison in Framingham, Massachusetts. Van Waters' interest to us, though, lies primarily in the writings that flowed from her work in the 1910s and 1920s as a social worker in Boston, a judge of the juvenile court in Los Angeles, and a superintendent of a model reformatory for "predelinquents," El Retiro, in California. Her writings constitute one of the few sustained efforts to explain distinctive problems in girls' transition to adulthood and to explore the relation of major economic, social, and cultural changes in the early 20th century to perceived increases in female delinquency.

Unlike Ben Lindsey, Van Waters placed great faith in the power of new discoveries in the therapeutic sciences--especially psychiatry and clinical psychology, which she grouped together under the rubric of "mental hygiene"--to treat and, ultimately, to generate principles to eradicate delinquency from modern society. And, unlike Thomas Eliot, she retained great faith in juvenile courts as institutions to rehabilitate delinquents and educate the public on the range of its responsibilities toward youth. So, for example, she described the juvenile court as "the instrument which the state has created to fulfill the duties of socialized parenthood...like a super-parent, it can obtain obedience of child and community. The instrument it uses is knowledge, rather than force."¹⁷ Van Waters' faith in applied

¹⁷ *Youth in Conflict*, New York: Republic Publishing Co., 1925, pp. 11, 46.

scientific knowledge was virtually unbounded:

We must in truth turn to science for our deliverance....Science, with all its mistakes and false values, still remains the fittest instrument with which to delve into secrets of human behavior. It alone possesses requisite impersonality and far-sightedness: advance cannot be made by science, however, until the public mind is prepared to face the truth without fear. In the meantime there will be increasing conflict.¹⁸

In discussing the sources, nature, and possible remedies for "increasing conflict," Van Waters addressed the issue of community responsibility in novel ways. While she, like Lindsey, blamed lax enforcement of laws and inadequate, selfish parents for much delinquent conduct, she placed equal responsibility on broader cultural changes (particularly in sexual mores) over which no individual could easily exert control. Modern-day juvenile delinquency (including teenage sexual improprieties), she ultimately concluded, reflected the values of a mechanized, consumption-oriented, business-dominated society which idolized wealth, leisure, and comfort and ignored children's needs for love, play, and meaningful integration into the social and economic life of the adult community. Her social critique often sounded radical indeed: "Many evils from which youth suffers in the industrial world are so enshrined in our economic civilization that to remove them would be to rebuild it entirely," she wrote. "Profit-economy would have to be replaced by a system based on respect for human life."¹⁹ To prevent delinquency, she went on, would require both vast expansion of the state's power to intervene in family affairs and

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 283.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 122.

a radical adjustment of public opinion. Certain homes we now break up would be subsidized by the state; certain very respectable homes, undoubtedly, would have to be smashed for the good of the children. Some parents would be locked up for life, many schools put out of commission, innumerable new institutions built to house trouble-makers, and many present inmates of institutions taken out.²⁰

To these sweeping suggestions for change, Van Waters added a host of more specific, proximate, and politically viable recommendations, such as the establishment of special bureaus in schools to treat childhood "maladjustments," sex-education programs, careful placement of foster children, and expansion of church and business interest in child welfare. More controversially, she called for the creation of community committees to persuade newspaper editors to eliminate "lurid stories of crime, sex-delinquencies, divorce and personal scandal" and to delete stories of "lust, blood, robbery and other anti-social impulses."²¹

While Van Waters' ideas applied to both males and females, she centered her professional life on delinquent girls, the great majority of whose "crimes" involved sexual misconduct. Changing cultural standards, she believed, affected girls' behavior--and societal perceptions of their behavior--more than boys', because more rigid social and moral codes had historically applied to girls. Van Waters did not advocate radical reshaping of gender roles. She did insist, however, that it was as natural for adolescent girls as for boys to experience sexual desire and to indulge in sexual experimentation. "A generation or two ago [the adolescent girl] would have been flirting, more or less innocently, at husking parties and church socials," Van

²⁰ Ibid., p. 176.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 274-275.

Waters observed. "The automobile, modern hotel and city have merely enlarged her opportunities."²² While Van Waters did not condone teenage sexual promiscuity, she suggested that the teenagers' "fun" attitude toward sex might "be less harmful than that of some of their critics."²³ She also insisted that social ostracism of sexually precocious girls was unrealistic and self-defeating. Her tolerance of teenage sexual transgressions seems striking even today, as do the sensitive, nonpunitive means she employed to deal with them in her capacities as juvenile court judge and correctional institution superintendent:

[Sexual] lapses which occur for the most part are caused by ignorance or lack of clear ideas and standards. Such offenders are benefited enormously by simple, understanding treatment, promptly administered... No matter what the offense has been, unless there is a danger of physical infection, or it has been the decision of court to remove the young person from the community should he or she be excluded from school.²⁴

In short, Van Waters' numerous popular writings go far to confirm our hypothesis that delinquency prevention served as a springboard for original thinking on the contours of communal responsibility for youth in the early 20th century.

Frederic Thrasher

Of the seven individuals we investigated, Frederic Thrasher was by far the most enigmatic, in both his professional career and intellectual development. We did not initially plan to search for original archival data on Thrasher, but in the course of pursuing other research, we located a substantial set of his personal papers. We can now pinpoint

²² Ibid., pp. 31-32.

²³ Ibid., pp. 46-47.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 109-110.

in detail the history of a fascinating delinquency prevention evaluation which Thrasher directed in New York in the 1920s and 1930s and which focused on the impact of a famous boys' club in East Harlem on juvenile crime rates. Suffice it to say that various tragedies befell the evaluation, and that monitoring the project exacted enormous emotional and health costs for Thrasher. The entire episode marks a unique event of general interest in the history of applied social science research.²⁵

Our comments on Thrasher's intellectual contribution will be brief, inasmuch as his work on delinquency prevention incorporated many of the premises we have examined in a related essay.²⁶

Like his prime mentor at the University of Chicago, sociologist Ernest Burgess, Thrasher emphasized that delinquency was a social, not an individual or ethnic/racial phenomenon. Its roots lay in the particular forms of social organization--or, rather, disorganization--that characterized communal life in urban slums ("interstitial areas"). To cope with social disorder in the slum, Thrasher argued, children and young adults formed gangs. Gangs satisfied basic human needs--the need for friendship and the need to have a sense of control over one's daily environment--as well as serving the purposes of self-defense and criminal activity. Thrasher insisted that within the context of the slum communities, delinquency and gang membership were normal, the end products of socialization in deviant communal values. The slum itself was crimogenic; to prevent delinquency, new values and new sources of moral authority were necessary to supplant delinquent behavior codes.

²⁵ Because of the highly sensitive nature of the data, however, we have chosen not to report our findings in full until we have the opportunity to discuss the data with Thrasher's former colleagues and, if possible, with surviving family members.

²⁶ Steven Schlossman and Michael Sedlak, *The Chicago Area Project Revisited*, The Rand Corporation, N-1944-NIE, January 1983.

Clearly, Thrasher linked delinquency³ to theories of urban community in novel ways. His classic book, *The Gang* (1927), represented a major contribution to early 20th century social thought. None of this is particularly surprising, given what scholars already know about the unique contributions of members of the Chicago School of Sociology.²⁷ Most interesting to us, though, were, first, how Thrasher's views embodied tensions in the ideology of applied social science to an extreme; and second, certain differences between how Thrasher and Burgess applied the Chicago School's perspective to concrete social action in the field of delinquency prevention.

Ernest Burgess was closely involved with Clifford Shaw in sponsoring the Chicago Area Project, an innovative, community-based delinquency prevention experiment begun in three high-crime Chicago communities in the early 1930s.²⁸ Though Burgess insisted that his main role was that of a scientist seeking to elaborate, refine, and apply his general social theories, he openly allied himself with the causes of diverse popular reform organizations in Chicago, including the controversial Area Project. Like Burgess, Thrasher worked closely with various social reform organizations in New York (after he left Chicago to become professor of educational sociology at New York University). Much more obtrusively than his mentor, however, Thrasher made a fetish of his purported objectivity and lack of interest in or bias toward the outcomes of reform efforts. "It is better to understand the world just

²⁷ See Robert Faris, *Chicago Sociology: 1920-1932*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967; and James Carey, *Sociology and Public Affairs: The Chicago School*, Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1975.

²⁸ Schlossman and Sedlak, *The Chicago Area Project Revisited*.

now than to reform it," he commented. "Science cannot be moralistic."²⁹

In his writings in the 1930s, Thrasher insisted on his Olympian scientific objectivity to the point of self-caricature, viewing as mutually exclusive attitudes and roles which Burgess saw as perfectly compatible in scholars' efforts to apply social science knowledge in the real world.

Not unrelated were the differences that separated Thrasher from Burgess in their approaches to community organization as a strategy of delinquency prevention. Both emphasized the need for coordinated community action as the key to eradicating crime in slum neighborhoods. Thrasher, however, pinned his hopes primarily on the services that coordinated professional social agencies could provide slum youth, whereas Burgess, like Shaw, stressed the self-help, voluntaristic, explicitly anti-professional ethos of the Chicago Area Project. In retrospect, Thrasher seems to have been less of an archetypal representative of the Chicago School of Sociology than historians have credited him with being.

These points notwithstanding, our research on Frederic Thrasher clearly confirms the thrust of our central hypothesis and has resulted in the discovery of unique data which promise to add significantly to knowledge on the history of applied social science research.

Concluding Comments

Our collective biographical inquiry has provided evidence for and against our central hypothesis concerning the contributions of commentators on delinquency prevention to American social thought in the

²⁹ "The Study of the Total Situation," *Journal of Educational Sociology*, Vol. 1, June 1928, p. 606.

early 20th century. Goddard, Terman, and Healy had little to say on the links between delinquency and urban community, whereas Lindsey, Eliot, Van Waters, and Thrasher--each in very different ways--had a great deal to say. Where does one go next to "test" the hypothesis?

We suggest that future research should center not on writers of renown, but on the hundreds of anonymous civic leaders who spearheaded neighborhood campaigns in the 1920s and 1930s to combat juvenile crime, mainly as participants in the so-called "coordinating council movement," but also independently, in response to wholly local experiences and sentiments. At present, policy analysts know virtually nothing about these innovative popular responses to perceived "crime waves" in the interwar decades. But we suspect that in the process of galvanizing local support for anti-crime activities, civic leaders in cities large and small were compelled to rethink the nature of public responsibility toward youth. We further suspect that these efforts resulted, with varying degrees of success, in a number of social inventions for youth which have since disappeared. Future investigations of these forgotten civic crusades should do much to enhance our understanding of how delinquency prevention contributed to a broader "search for community" in early 20th century urban America.

II. STATE POLICY IN DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

This section synthesizes the main findings of an inquiry into the emergence of state policy in delinquency prevention in the early 20th century. Our focus was on California and, very selectively, on Ohio. We examined three institutional expressions of growing governmental interest in delinquency prevention: (1) attempts to revamp California's reformatory for boys at Whittier in order to rehabilitate delinquents more effectively than was done in the 19th century; (2) attempts to do the same in California's reformatory for girls at Ventura; and (3) the establishment in both California and Ohio of state-sponsored research bureaus to analyze the causes of delinquency and to recommend measures for prevention and treatment. A fourth area of inquiry, the establishment of state-sponsored programs in parent education to combat childhood "maladjustments," proved impossible to investigate because of a lack of suitable data.¹

There is no scholarly publication that adequately portrays the origin and development of any of these institutions. Indeed, most scholars, policymakers, and practitioners in California tend to assume that state governmental interest in delinquency prevention emerged only after the creation in 1941 of the California Youth Authority. Until that time, it is widely believed, the state's correctional facilities for youth had pursued purely punitive goals.² Our research demonstrates

¹ We documented this difficulty periodically during the study; we still find it hard to believe that all pertinent records were destroyed.

² See, for example, Jane Bolen, "The California Youth Authority: 1941-1971. Structure, Policies and Priorities," Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, 1972.

that these assumptions are simply mistaken (although, of course, the content of state efforts in delinquency prevention did change in the intervening decades).

While we uncovered a wealth of new data on each institution, we were able to find precious little information on daily operational realities or the results of therapeutic efforts.³ Nonetheless, the data are more than adequate to retrace broad outlines of early state policies and thereby to place modern-day efforts (or the lack thereof) in sharp perspective. Brief synopses of our major findings follow.

The Whittier State School for Boys and the California State School for Girls

Our study of early 20th century correctional institutions in California is particularly intriguing because it reveals that what prevention theorists today label, somewhat begrudgingly, "tertiary prevention" was then considered very much in the vanguard of "secondary prevention." This was certainly not the case everywhere in the country. A strong anti-institutional flavor characterized most public commentary on the treatment of delinquents in the Progressive Era. But the widely publicized innovations in juvenile corrections in California played a significant role, in our judgment, in revitalizing confidence elsewhere in the capacity of correctional institutions to rehabilitate delinquents--indeed, in their language, to "prevent" the emergence of criminal careers if antisocial children could be identified and incarcerated early enough.⁴

³ These are common difficulties in research on institutional history. For attempts to overcome them, see Gerald Grob, *The State and the Mentally Ill*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966; and Steven Schlossman, *Love and the American Delinquent*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977.

⁴ David Rothman deals with the reemergence of optimism regarding

We examined data on the period from approximately 1890 to 1930 for both the Whittier State School for Boys and the California State School for Girls. The principal focus, however--due to variations in strength of available data--is on the years 1912 to 1920, when the most substantial innovations in both institutions took place.

The infusion of preventive aims and new treatment methods into the Whittier State School was part of a larger effort by the recently elected, reform-minded Governor Hiram Johnson to both humanize and make more "efficient" all state functions. Under Johnson's prodding, most of the reformatory staff was removed in 1912 and replaced by a new staff headed by Superintendent Fred Nelles, an idealistic young Canadian businessman who had been persuaded to give up a profitable business career in order to work with delinquent boys (much as William "Big Daddy" George, founder of the George Junior Republic, had done two decades earlier). Nelles and his staff literally rebuilt the facility from the bottom up in order to make its architectural format compatible with his treatment aims. Nelles eliminated brutal punishments from the institution's daily regimen, changed the program emphasis from make-work and institutional maintenance to academic and especially vocational education, recruited psychologists and psychiatrists for treatment advice, employed social workers to inquire into inmates' eventual return to the community, and incorporated inmate self-governance into the institution in order to build a spirit of "citizen participation."

In short, Nelles introduced into the reformatory many of the aims and methods associated at the time with the "progressive education"

juvenile reformatories in the Progressive Era (*Conscience and Convenience*, Chap. 8).

movement in the public schools. To him, the reformatory was providing special education for unusually needy "students," not punishing legally processed criminals. Under his direction Whittier State School inmates competed in athletics and visited regularly on a social basis with local public school students. Nelles' conception of Whittier was that of a "24-hour school" for unfortunate youths. Confident that Whittier was serving preventive goals, he strongly encouraged the legislature to liberalize commitment procedures in order to admit "predelinquents," and to tighten procedures so that boys who were either "mentally defective" or confirmed young criminals would be sent elsewhere. A "purified" clientele, he felt, was essential to fulfill the state government's objective of transforming the Whittier School from a punitive into a preventive institution.

The transformation of the California School for Girls was in some ways more dramatic, in other ways less so. Since the opening of the Whittier State School in 1891, girl and boy delinquents had been housed in the same facility--rigidly separated, of course, but nonetheless under the same management. This situation displeased many prominent women in Los Angeles, who argued that girl delinquents' distinctive problems were being overlooked by the all-male staff, that the nature of most female delinquencies (sex offenses) required the complete isolation of the girl delinquents from all contact with males, and that the institutions' male board of trustees was incapable of presenting the girls' needs adequately to the state legislature. Their pleas went unheeded, however, until Hiram Johnson became Governor. Shortly thereafter, a separate, autonomous, all-female board of trustees and a woman superintendent were appointed to oversee the girl delinquents, and

the section of the Whittier School that housed the girls was renamed the California School for Girls. Three years and much politicking later, the girl delinquents were finally removed from Whittier to their own facility in Ventura, built in accordance with the most "progressive" architectural principles so as to enhance "motherly" relations between the inmates and their caretakers.

For all the changes that occurred in the treatment of girl delinquents in California, however, much also remained the same. While the evidence is not as precise as we would like, it seems clear that fewer efforts were actually made in Ventura than in Whittier to reeducate and retrain the girls for productive occupational futures. It was assumed that if the girls did not marry and become full-time homemakers after leaving the institution, they would enter domestic work, and therefore little vocational preparation--other than practice at institutional upkeep--was necessary. Fewer efforts were also employed at Ventura to allow the girls to practice self-governance, or to integrate them into the social activities of girls in nearby public schools. Fear of "contamination" very much characterized the Ventura staff and administration (and doubtless, too, those who ran public schools in the vicinity). The best thing the facility could do for the girls to prevent future misconduct, it would seem in practice, was to keep them wholly isolated from boys and under close female watch until they became old enough to marry.⁵

Thus, the introduction of "progressive," preventive ideals into California juvenile corrections appeared to change policies and programs

⁵ Our findings in California fit nicely into the broader context sketched in Steven Schlossman and Stephanie Wallach, "The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era," *Harvard Educational Review*, Vol. 48, February 1978, pp. 65-94.

for girls a good deal less substantially than for boys. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the state of California did make a concerted effort to transform punitive institutions into rehabilitative institutions for both boy and girl delinquents in the early 20th century. The extent to which these efforts were representative of broader trends in state policies throughout the country can only be determined through further research.

The California Bureau of Juvenile Research and the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research

The California Bureau of Juvenile Research (1915-1941), housed for 17 years at the Whittier State School and for short periods at the University of Southern California, Claremont College, and Stanford University, was one of three pioneering efforts by states in pre-World War I America to utilize new social science knowledge to reshape social policy for youth, especially delinquents (the other experiments were in Ohio and Michigan). Curiously, the very existence of the Bureau seems to have been forgotten, even by authorities in the California Youth Authority, who took over and expanded upon many of the responsibilities that the Bureau had long exercised. Our research on the Bureau broke down into two key periods, 1915-1923 and 1929-1937. In this study, our focus is on the former period, which parallels the years of greatest interest to us concerning the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research.

Social policy for delinquent youth in the period before and after World War I was dominated by two concerns: first, the scientific identification of "defective" inmates for whom there was no reasonable chance of rehabilitation, and second, the scientific diagnosis and classification of inmates whose antisocial behavior pattern was

considered to be remediable. The work of the California Bureau of Juvenile Research was crucial to Nelles' attempt to make Whittier's mission "preventive." Only by eliminating inmates identified as constitutionally "defective" from Whittier's care and transferring them to appropriate custodial facilities could his "progressive" educational ideas be implemented for all remaining inmates. Only by clarifying the nature of each boy's difficulty and individualizing treatment, Nelles believed, could the institution truly be said to be serving the cause of prevention rather than punishment.

Under the direction of J. Harold Williams, a leading proponent of mental and personality tests and a student of Lewis Terman, the Bureau of Juvenile Research worked diligently to help Nelles achieve his goals. At the same time, it initiated a broader program of research on youth development designed, ideally, to guide state policy in public education. We shall not attempt to describe in detail the Bureau's work; suffice it to say that the Bureau appeared to be a good deal more effective in isolating "defective" inmates for transfer from Whittier than in diagnosing the source of behavior problems in the remaining inmates, in prescribing effective plans for treatment, or in generating a new, scientific knowledge base to guide broader educational policies.⁶

⁶ In its second most active period, 1929-1937, the Bureau was under the leadership of another Terman student, Norman Fenton. By the time Fenton took over, the notion of preventing delinquency by institutionalizing all of the nation's "feeble-minded" was fairly well discredited. Fenton thus discarded this Bureau service (although he did make final decisions as to which inmates at the various state facilities were so severely retarded by inheritance that, because their offspring represented a future public danger, they should be sterilized). Soon after taking over the Bureau, however, Fenton came to believe that the organization could serve the state more effectively by teaching local communities, especially personnel in public schools, how to incorporate the latest behavioral science knowledge on "mental hygiene" into their educational and social service programs. He therefore moved the Bureau

As in its sister institution in California, concern at the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research (1914-1930) was focused primarily on inherited "mental defect" as the most fundamental cause of juvenile delinquency. True, the Bureau's first director, Thomas Haines--formally trained as both a physician and a psychologist--was equally comfortable with clinical and experimental research, and, much more than his California counterparts, he devoted serious attention to development of new therapies. Further, the Bureau in Ohio had broader administrative responsibilities vis-a-vis the state's entire network of custodial/rehabilitative facilities than did the California Bureau, where J. Harold Williams focused his attention primarily on the youngsters in the state reformatory for boys. Nonetheless, in both states the main impetus for research was the a priori assumption that biology held the key to delinquency prevention and that mental tests provided the simplest, quickest, least expensive, and most reliable means to identify "mental defectives" (by definition, potential delinquents).

Thus, the focus of Haines' research, not unlike Williams', was on testing inmate populations for evidence of "feeble-mindedness." "Such use of science," he confidently predicted, "will enable us to correct social, biologic, and economic conditions, which are producing anti-

out of the Whittier State School and housed it in several different universities. Most of his effort, though, went into traveling from locality to locality demonstrating the principles of "mental hygiene," urging community leaders to adopt them, and teaching key individuals about optimal methods of implementation--all, of course, in the name of delinquency prevention. Though a Terman student, Fenton's knowledge base was actually drawn more from the dynamic psychology of such pioneers in child guidance and orthopsychiatry as Thomas Salmon, William Healy, Bernard Glueck, and Lawson Lowrey.

social acts, and thus prevent the occurrence of the anti-social behavior."⁷ On a grander scale, he urged the state to support social surveys of the population throughout the country "so as to map out the tainted stocks."⁸

Haines was never given the funds or staff to carry out the Bureau's full mandate. He could only conduct surveys of inmates of state institutions, write up his results, and make policy recommendations. Eventually he found his position tiresome, and he resigned late in 1916. The Bureau's directorship went unfilled for over a year. But in 1917--with a promise from the Governor that he would receive unprecedented levels of financial support--Henry Goddard, the nation's leading eugenicist, agreed to leave his New Jersey post and replace Haines in Ohio.

Three themes dominated Goddard's administration of the Bureau of Juvenile Research from 1917 to 1921. First, in his initial years in office Goddard did indeed receive additional funds (though not nearly what he had been promised), and the Bureau substantially expanded its activities. In practice, it served as both a filtering system for the state's institutional system as a whole and as a site for conducting individual examinations, therapy, and systematic research on select delinquent, mentally ill, and mentally retarded juveniles. Juvenile courts and social agencies throughout the state now sent youngsters in serious trouble directly to the Bureau before recommending placement elsewhere.

⁷ Thomas Haines, "The Feeble-Minded Situation in Ohio," *Ohio Bulletin of Charities and Corrections*, Vol. 23, 1917, p. 35.

⁸ Thomas Haines, "The Ohio Plan for the Study of Delinquency," *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. 86, 1915, p. 580.

Second, Goddard's experiences at the Bureau provided the impetus for his decision to abandon biological explanation as the key to understanding juvenile delinquency (see the earlier discussion of Goddard). In this he was strongly influenced by the pioneering clinical research of his colleague at the Bureau (also a former student of G. Stanley Hall), Florence Mateer. Goddard's experiences with a wider range of troubled youth than he had previously dealt with convinced him, like Mateer, that psychopathology, not inferior inheritance, was the principal cause of delinquency. The success or failure of delinquency prevention efforts in the future, he argued in the 1920s and after, would hinge on the development of appropriate psychiatric remedies.

Third, Goddard's tenure was controversial from the beginning, but especially after it was revealed, in the politically and fiscally conservative atmosphere of the early 1920s, that he was the highest paid government official in the state. The Bureau under Goddard created enemies on several fronts, not only in the economy-minded legislature but also among the directors of many state institutions. These individuals resented Goddard's (and especially Mateer's) attempts to centralize decisionmaking on diagnosis, treatment strategies, and placement of all inmates in state institutions (in part, these conflicts stemmed from different disciplinary orientations--Goddard and Mateer were psychologists, while most of their critics were physicians). Whatever the sources of conflict, by the early 1920s, Goddard found himself occupied more with politics than with scientific research. Though he remained very enthusiastic about the Bureau's potential contributions to delinquency prevention and publicized its achievements

in his book, *Juvenile Delinquency* (1921), he had little choice but to resign after the legislature cut his salary in half and to accept an academic appointment at Ohio State University. Shortly after Goddard's resignation in Ohio, interestingly enough, the California Bureau of Juvenile Research also began to come under attack from a similarly conservative, budget-conscious legislature, forcing the resignation of its director, J. Harold Williams (who then became a professor at UCLA).

Concluding Comments

Beyond the wealth of detail we have uncovered and synthesized on the origins of state initiatives in delinquency prevention, perhaps the most significant contribution of our history is the reminder it provides ~~of how difficult it is to translate scientific knowledge into social~~ policy and concrete action. Recognition of this fundamental point has been largely absent in the writings of recent historians of education and the social sciences, who stress how readily new knowledge was incorporated into governmental policies and programs in the Progressive Era. Their focus has been disproportionately on the intellectual origins of new scientific viewpoints, not on the critical process of implementation. Between the intention to implement delinquency prevention as a strictly scientific process and the reality of the daily routines of institutional life in California and Ohio fell a shadow that has darkened relationships among social and behavioral scientists, administrators, and elected public officials ever since. In this case, history provides a prototypical example of conflicts that remain at the heart of most inquiries on the future of applied social research.