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ABSTRACT

The structural aspects of ritual in a modern university and the way that ritual operates through the use of tenure at Stanford University is assessed, based on an ethnohistorical analysis of the firing of a tenured professor, H. Bruce Franklin. Mr. Franklin actively opposed the Vietnam War and Stanford University's alleged involvement with the war, and was charged and dismissed for his activities and speeches, and disruption of a speech by Henry Cabot Lodge. Attention is directed to how people socially construct their own reality and the following factors: (1) the positioning of the actors in the drama, (2) the historical forces that are at work within the symbolic representation of time, and (3) the place of ritual as a process in a period of conflict in a modern organization. It is suggested that the cognitive and social mechanisms that are at work in simple society are also evident in modern institutions, such as a university. The current case of Mr. Franklin is also contrasted to the firing in 1900 of Edward A. Ross, a young Stanford University professor with liberal views. It is noted that understanding of time and the social and historical processes contextualize the ritual. However, a sacrifice occurs that follows set patterns that are influenced by the actors and the larger social world. (SW)

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The Tenure Drum

An Investigation of Ritual Violence in the Modern University

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Abstract

This paper investigates the structural aspects of ritual in a modern university, and explores how ritual operates through the use of tenure at a large university in the Western United States. The study is an ethnohistorical analysis of the firing of a tenured professor - H. Bruce Franklin. The paper considers how people socially construct their own reality and discusses: a) the positioning of the actors in the drama, b) the historical forces that are at work within the symbolic representation of time, and c) the place of ritual as a process in a period of conflict in a modern organization. A synthesis of the interplay of ritual structure and function is explained so that a more integrative understanding of ritual in a modern educational organization will be understood.

(Ritual, Symbolic Anthropology, Conflict, Higher Education)

I had arrived then at the conclusion that in fashioning a work of art we are by no means free, that we do not choose how we shall make it but that it is pre-existent to us and therefore we are obliged, since it is both necessary and hidden, to do what we should have to do if it were a law of nature, that is to say to discover it. But this discovery which art obliges us to make, is it not, I thought, really the discovery of what, though it ought to be more precious to us than anything in the world, yet remains ordinarily for ever unknown to us, the discovery of our true life, of reality as we have felt it to be, which differs so greatly from what we think it is.

Marcel Proust The Past Recaptured

Few studies have investigated the role of ritual in periods of conflict and violence in modern society. Mary Douglas (1973) and Suzanne Campbell-Jones (1980) showed how ritual functions in the Catholic Church, and Deal and Kennedy (1982) considered ritual in the organization of a modern corporation. Most studies of ritual's multiple roles and forms, however, focus on simple societies that presumably have a structural need for rituals that modern societies have either lost or replaced. Roy Rappaport argues that "abandonment of ritual, widespread in the contemporary world, is contributing significantly to social and environmental problems, as well as to failures of meaning" (1979:142). Rene Girard, on the other hand, whose work examines ritual violence and sacrificial texts, believes that in the modern world, the written law and the courts have replaced the ritual violence of earlier societies: "For us the circle has been broken. We owe our good fortune to one of our social institutions above all: our judicial system, which serves to deflect the menace of vengeance" (1977:15). Although Rappaport, Girard, and others (e.g. Gluckman 1962; Turner 1968) point to structural and psychological differences between modern and simple societies' uses of ritual, virtually no anthropologically-oriented work has been done on rituals in modern organizations.

I have sought here a framework for discussing a specific form of ritual in a modern organization. The study centers around what I term ritual violence. In The Drums of Affliction Turner states: "There are in Ndembu culture many kinds of ritual which may be termed collectively 'rituals of affliction' or 'drums of affliction' for Ndembu often use the term 'drum' as a synonym both for a type and an actual performance of ritual" (1968:15). This paper considers a particular 'drum of affliction' in a modern university. Modern organizations, like small bands or tribes, or small units of larger groups, must have ways of resolving conflict that threatens the body. These resolutions often come

through non-personalized means and by public means, so that there is no single person who has to take responsibility for the execution or sacrifice of the victim.

I begin with an analysis of tenure and academic freedom at a large western university, using a case within the last twenty years in which the university fired a tenured professor. I create the historical context for those actions and relate them to the social climate of the time. In the second part of the essay I provide a framework from which we can view the ritual aspects of tenure and a discussion of how actors in these events socially constructed their own reality. I consider: a) the positioning of the actors in the drama, b) the historical forces that are at work within the symbolic representation of time, and c) the place of ritual as a process within a process in both simplex and multiplex communities. The third part of the paper interprets the activities at the university through this framework, suggesting that our misunderstanding of modern ritual may be related to the technological underpinnings of modern professional organizations.

A caveat to the reader: because I concentrate on how a group socially constructs and gives meaning to itself, and how social reality exists within that profane and sacred world view, I do not deny that individual processes and actions are possible. The focus on this paper, however, is on one group's social construction of reality. Indeed, the intent of this paper is not to generalize about all professional organizations or all of modern society. This paper illustrates the limitations of the universalist assumptions of recent theorists that ritual conflict operates in a particular way for all societies (e.g. Girard 1977), or that ritual conflict exists only in a particular form of community (e.g. Rappaport 1979; Gluckman 1962, 1965). The in-depth study of one organization over a long time span, and a clear

explication of how one ritual works--albeit under extraordinary circumstances--will point the discussion of ritual away from a linear continuum model of ritual in simplex-multiplex societies, and toward a more integrative understanding of the 'drums of affliction.'

I Tenure and Academic Freedom at Stanford: The Franklin Case as Ritual

It is generally acknowledged that Edward A. Ross of Stanford University planted the seeds of tenure in the American professoriate; in 1900 Stanford President Jordan fired the young Economics professor for views that were too liberal for the university. Ross's case sparked a national and local outcry, for many people felt that a young man had lost his job for speaking his mind. Initially, as a professor hired in 1893, Ross had the respect and admiration of the president, faculty and students. President Jordan said of him: "I do not know a man in this department in whose future I have more confidence. I think, of all the younger men in the country in this line of work, Dr. Ross is the most prominent. He shows himself entirely free from either political prejudices or the prejudices of books" (Elliott 1937:331). Ross, for his part, also thought Stanford and California were the best place to be. "President Jordan, his heart in higher education and the advancement of pure science, had gathered about him four score men 25-40 years of age who shared his ideals" (Ross 1936:54). Jordan and California were, "everything I could desire" thought Ross; Stanford was a young institution imbued with the Germanic concept of Lehrfreiheit, a dedication for academic excellence, and a zeal to make the university the "Harvard of the West" as Governor Stanford had demanded of President Jordan. Lehrfreiheit, the forerunner of academic freedom, was the belief

that the professoriate must enjoy a freedom of teaching and a freedom of inquiry so that the foundation of the university was the concept of the free assertion, discussion, and development of ideas.

From 1896 until his dismissal in 1900, Ross increasingly tested the ability of the university to allow for the free discussion of ideas, while at the same time allow the institution to remain true to Governor Stanford's dictum that the professoriate stay away from political maneuverings. It is not surprising that the storm over *Lehrfreiheit* should descend upon a Professor of Economics and Sociology, in that the period from 1870 onward saw the central focus of intellectual inquiry move from that of theology and religion to the social and economic sciences.

By 1900 Ross had embraced several controversial subjects in the administration's view: the free coinage of silver, the municipal ownership of public utilities, the railway union strike of 1898, and a public forum about the power of the "ruthless capitalists." He also spoke out vehemently against Asian immigration because Asian laborers took jobs away from the working class. These causes were Socialist in nature, decidedly political, and definitely aberrant for a professor at Stanford University. The university, financed by the sole trustee, Mrs. Leland Stanford, could not withstand such attacks from one of its own. For the wife of a railroad baron who had made countless millions by employing Chinese laborers to build a privately owned railroad, the words of Ross were no less than heresy; his ideas threatened the health, well-being and virtual stability of the entire institution. By November 12, 1900 Mrs. Stanford demanded and received President Jordan's concurrence that Ross must be fired.

Ross's dismissal provoked an outcry against the meddling of an old woman, the impotence of a university president to defend academic freedom, and the harmful effects the dismissal had on a dedicated professor's

career. In general, the faculty supported the President and Mrs. Stanford, but seven professors resigned in protest. While the student voice was nil, the reports of the press were shrill in condemnation: "Universal is the sentiment of reprobation of Mrs. Stanford's course" "No name on the faculty list has brought greater glory to the institution than Professor Ross's" (Ross 1936:73). The American Economic Association became the first professional organization in the country to investigate an institution's firing of a professor.

As mentioned, most students of higher education look to this incident as planting the idea that the professoriate needed a formalized system-tenure-to protect academic freedom. Since then, over eighty-five percent of the institutions of higher education in America have created some form of tenure. While tenure systems differ from institution to institution, one general form is that a department hire an assistant professor into a tenure-track position for three years. After three years the tenured faculty members of the department, along with student evaluations and an assessment by the dean, vote to renew the individual's contract for another three years, or let him/her go. The department's vote, with the dean's assessment, becomes the property of the provost's office where a decision is recommended to the president and Board of Trustees. By the end of the sixth year a similar process occurs at which time either the individual becomes an Associate Professor and receives tenure, or loses his/her job. At a research university like Stanford, tenure committees take into consideration factors such as publication record, research projects underway, student evaluation of teaching, and dissertation advisee load. Generally, after a faculty member has been granted tenure an arbitrary time period is set up for another review to see if the individual's rank should be moved from Associate level to full Professor.

Various cases occur where a university denies tenure and an investigation happens. Most recently, Stanford University and the University of California at Santa Cruz have denied two feminist faculty members tenure on the grounds that their research is not scholarly. A review of their cases by outside committees is underway. While formal investigations of tenure denial are not widespread, many cases can be

discussed since the days of Edward Ross. What is more rare is to consider a professor who has been granted tenure and loses his job. The case of H. Bruce Franklin provides one of the first instances where the American professoriate decided to fire a tenured faculty member for activities that sorely tested the university's dedication to academic freedom.

By 1970, the battleground for academic freedom was not to be tried on a "cross of gold" or on immigrant ships bringing economic doom to the American worker as it had in Ross's time; rather, free speech centered upon a country thousands of miles from the Stanford campus and battleships that delivered American soldiers onto the shores of Vietnam. Stanford's alleged involvement with the war, ranging from Board of Trustees investments, to computer simulation models of American invasions of Laos, demanded action, thought Bruce Franklin, on the part of the university community.

The events of the time, centering around the war, and the situation on the campus, were filled with discord and near-chaos. The presidency, after a long reign of Wallace Sterling, was first left vacant, and then filled by Kenneth Pitzer for a brief eighteen months, beginning in 1969. President Pitzer, unaware of, and unable to cope with increasing tension on campus, stayed away at Rice University until he finally arrived into a virtual witches' brew of troubles, anxieties, and increasing campus unrest. The provost's position had also been left vacant for a short time, so that for a critical few years the university was without consistent leadership in the two top positions. By 1970 the external factor of the war in Vietnam, combined with the lack of top leadership, a faculty that increasingly demanded a voice in the governance of the institution, and a student body that reacted against the perceived indifference of an administration, provided for a situation that many thought was close to disaster. Buildings had been pillaged, and lives had been threatened when the new president -Richard Lyman- assumed office. Lyman's immediate energies went to restoring calm to the university. His appointment of a trusted faculty member, William Miller, to the post of provost, created a feeling among the professoriate that their voices would be heard in the administration. The newly created Faculty Senate also provided a forum for scholarly discourse about faculty concerns.

If President Lyman thought his actions ealed the university waters, then his perception of H. Bruce Franklin was that he poured oil on, and was ready to light a match to, those same waters. Professor Franklin, a noted Marxist scholar of Herman Melville, was a founding member of the Venceremos Brigade - a Marxist, third world group that called for the active overthrowing of the capitalist system. As an early outspoken opponent of the war, Franklin originally had embraced liberal causes whose purpose was to bring about a peaceful solution in the Vietnam war. He had tried peaceful means-sit-ins, demonstrations against napalm producing companies in a nearby town, and countless teach-ins to help students debate the pressing concerns of the day. By 1968 he and others, however, had concluded the university needed to be brought to its knees if the war were to end.

The act that instigated Franklin's dismissal proceedings was a speech given-or attempted to be given-by Henry Cabot Lodge at Stanford University on the night of January 11, 1974. The president asserted that Franklin had sought to disrupt the speech and not allow Lodge to speak. Franklin's response was, "It is criminal not to take action against the murderer of the Vietnamese people. I would argue that the action I and others did on January 11 constitute inappropriate behavior. The appropriate response to war criminals is not heckling, but what was done to those at Nuremberg: they should be locked up or executed" (Franklin Files 1/12/71).

To a man dedicated to gentile discourse such as Lyman, statements such as the above, and subsequent comments by Franklin did little to clear the air of the problems that beset the university. Prior to the Lodge incident, Lyman had taken the position that Jordan had with Ross; Palo Alto business people had protested to the president about Franklin's disrupting normal business activity. He responded: "The university cannot be held accountable for extracurricular actions of its faculty. At the same time such activities can be relevant in determining an individual's fitness to teach. The difficult question is, when do such activities constitute conduct which would warrant dismissal" (Franklin Files 9/7/70). By January 29, after the Lodge incident, Richard

Lyman had decided when such activities were inappropriate. By then his comment was: "The time for rhetoric about the need to protect essential rights while enforcing essential responsibilities is over. The task is upon us" (Franklin Files, 1/29/71).

Like Mrs. Stanford during the Ross episode, he saw the university on the brink of possible disaster - buildings had been trashed and lives threatened - and he somehow had to restore order to the impending chaos. A picture of a tyrannical president out to crush faculty and student voices is not accurate; Lyman was an opponent of the Vietnam war, but he had had no radical conversion as had Franklin. He applauded free speech, but not at the expense of others. His split with Professor Franklin was that where Franklin wanted action, Lyman wanted discourse. Lyman expected the university to act in the way that Jordan had proposed after the Ross affair: "I will deny freedom for men without experience in life, for men who live in a visionary world, for men whose ready eloquence takes the place of science. Men with the PhD were not always prepared for the freedom a grown man must take. Their fitness to speak usually dates from the period in which they make the discovery that they are not yet quite ready" (Veysey 1965:398-9). Franklin the visionary, was clearly unfit to speak.

After the Lodge incident Franklin succeeded in having three more charges brought before the Advisory Council. On February 10, 1971 he gave a speech in White Plaza where he said that students should march on the computation center and disrupt the "Gamut-H" program that had been on the computer. Gamut-H was the acronym for a computer simulation model of an armed invasion from Vietnam into Laos by American soldiers. Franklin and other revolutionaries felt this insidious duplicity on the part of the "neutral" university and decided that stopping the war machine - in this instance, the computer center - was the only appropriate response to an administration that was unsympathetic and unwilling to listen to their needs. Franklin stated at the conclusion of his speech: "What we're asking for is for people to make that little tiny gesture to show that we are willing to inconvenience ourselves a little bit and to begin to shut down the most obvious machinery of war, such as, and I think it's a very good target, that Computation Center" (Franklin Files 2/10/71).

Students subsequently marched on the center, took it over, did minimal damage (eight hundred dollars worth) and milled around until police arrived. The police ordered everyone to leave the premises, and the two faculty observers that had been sent there by the administration began to leave. What actually occurred in the ensuing moments is unclear; what is certain is that Franklin urged the faculty members to stay, to observe, so that violence against the students did not happen. For these actions the administration charged him with inciting to riot and seeking to foment trouble during a dangerous situation.

Finally, on the same night he gave another speech advocating a complete shutting down of the university; after the meeting violence ensued. Whether Franklin's speech caused the violence, or even if people of his persuasion participated in the violence, is still a matter of question. On the one hand there are those who say he "incited" people to riot and incitement to riot is grounds for dismissal. On the other hand, the American Civil Liberties Union contended that he "advocated" for people to disrupt activities and that advocacy of an action is protected under the law. The decision about these charges: 1) the Lodge incident, 2) the speech about the computation center, 3) the activities at the Center, and 4) the night speech about closing the university, was to be decided by the Advisory Council to the President.

President Lyman wrote to Franklin that he wanted the Advisory Council to review the matter rather than a lesser body, "because the sanctions against you, as a faculty member, are most serious in this Council, rather than a lesser one that can only impose a warning" (Franklin Files 1/29/71). Seven men - all tenured and all full Professors - in the fields of: Biology, Theology, Psychology, Sociology, Engineering, Business, and Computer Science, comprised the Advisory Council. The Chair of the Council was the future provost for Richard Lyman, and present president of the institution - Donald Kennedy.

The Advisory Council collected over two thousand pages of testimony during the fall of 1971. They listened for six hours a day for over six weeks to testimony given by Franklin, university officials, and countless witnesses. Everyone absolved Franklin of any wrongdoing in the Lodge affair.

On the speech about the computation center, everyone agreed upon his guilt surrounding the charge of inciting people to riot. On the speech and his actions at the computation center there was a split decision 5-2, with the Chair and theology professor casting the dissenting votes. Finally, the vote concerning punishment for these offenses was also 5-2; again Professors Kennedy and Brown dissented. President Lyman accepted the Council's verdict that tenure should be revoked and Franklin let go; Lyman presented the case to the Board of Trustees, they concurred, and Franklin lost his job.

Thus, within a year's time of trial and conflict, a tenured English professor lost his job for actions judged undignified for a professor. While the Council had considered lesser penalties, in their final judgment: "We are highly dubious whether rehabilitation is a useful concept in this case. Professor Franklin's announced convictions about the guilt of the university are deeply held and his opposition to the institution in the present form seems implacable" (Franklin 1975:39).

There had been an outpouring of sentiment about Franklin's case both nationally and locally. The American Civil Liberties Union and AAUP demanded a legal investigation. In the Stanford Archives over seven boxes of newspaper clippings exist that represent a wide range of faculty opinion in support of the president's decision, or demanding that the Advisory Council dissolve and let Franklin return to teaching. The most vocal supporters of Franklin were the group who were most silent during the Ross affair - the students. Many students attended the hearings of the Advisory Council, and many of them appeared as witnesses in support of Professor Franklin. Nevertheless, the assessment by Mayhew of community sentiment was probably most closely representative of the truth: "There were some on campus decidedly critical of the entire process. However, the larger preponderance of campus opinion accepted the referral of the matter to the Advisory Board, the Board's recommendation, and the final Board of Trustees decision to terminate the appointment" (1975:34).

We have, then, an individual who lost his job from a modern university because the community perceived his ideas and actions as aberrant. The historical precedence for such an event comes from a similarly prosperous

and eventful time in higher education - 1900. Both periods were times of rapid growth, institution building, and an increasing bureaucratization of procedures. Ross and Franklin had similarly high marks from students and faculty as intelligent and industrious, with an excellent record of scholarly research. Both individuals were married men, under forty, who had children. The academic community had always been their livelihood and after their firings they both found teaching positions elsewhere: Ross at Nebraska and later at Wisconsin, and Franklin at Rutgers University.

Their dismissals centered around problems external to the university-Asian immigration and the Vietnam war-and they created much discussion nationally and locally. The majority of the faculty stuck by their president, but there was also a sizable minority of the faculty who dissented in favor of Ross and Franklin. The context of the situations were one of conflict and discord, of potential, actual, and symbolic violence within the university and against one individual. What remains to be seen is if these acts were rituals of affliction, what similarities they have, if any, to the structural and functional qualities of ritual in primitive society, and finally, what can be learned from their analysis.

II Framework

Society is not a haphazard collection of individuals that construct their reality individually. Rather, society is a group of individuals that construct their meaning not only from individual consciousness, but also from a life-world that has order and structure prior to the individual entering it. In this light, society entertains a structural dialectic between the objective structure and subjective interpretation that is mediated by history, time, and the positioning of the actors within the social drama. Berger and Luckmann comment on how we create our collective knowledge:

Institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an institution. What must be stressed is the reciprocity of institutional typifications and the typicality of not only the actions but also the actors in institutions. The typifications of habitualized actions that constitute institutions are always shared ones. They are available to all members of the particular social group in question, and the institution itself typifies individual actors as well as

individual actions. The institutions posits that actions of type X will be performed by actors of type X. For example, the institution of the law posits that heads shall be chopped off in specific ways, under specific circumstances, and that specific types of individuals shall do the chopping (1966:54).

To translate: a net, a web of social relationships exists, and how people interact with, and in, that net is determined by the web itself as well as the multitude of individuals that mark their existence in that web. This interpretation rejects the idea that individuals are mechanistic pawns who can do nothing to determine their own history, and the idea that individuals can create their own reality. People create meaning for their lives, make sense of their world, by a collective ideology that allows the individual a freedom of interpretation and action within a set of boundaries defined by collectively shared patterns and symbols.

Ritual conflict exists within this net. It can be viewed from several perspectives: as an institutionalized system, it acts cathartically in order to preserve and restore order to the organization; as a device for the profane world, it allows communication with elements of the sacred world; as a structure for the community, it distances virtual from actual violence; and as a symbol, it invokes individual meanings in accordance with the actors' relationship to, and knowledge of, the collective structures and functions of ritual violence. As stated, most theories of ritual focus upon the assumption that ritual is structurally deep, or that ritual is time-free. An alternative way of understanding ritual is to ask how the particular society wherein ritual resides was created, how it operates today, how it has changed over time, and how ritual has worked within that institution. When we speak of ritual and look to the individual structure we frame our questions so that our answer depends upon ritual's relationship to society, rather than the reciprocal interaction of the social and structural relationships within society.

A better understanding of the perspective of ritual within a socially constructed and mediated reality can be gained by a discussion of: a) the positioning of the actors and their roles, b) the time frame

in which these actors function, and the specific set of ritual events that take place, and c) the place of ritual within societal reality.

Actors and their roles: The actors for whom we concern ourselves are the sacrificers, the high priest, priest-officiants, and the victim. Hubert and Mauss call those people whom receive the benefits of the victim's sacrifice the sacrificers. The sacrificer can be either an individual or a group of individuals bonded together in a common interest. Within this collectivity exists an individual or small delegation of individuals who will officiate as priests during the sacrifice. It is the priests responsibility to perform the sacrifice, defined as, "A religious act, which, through the consecration of the victim, modifies the condition of the moral person who accomplishes it or that of certain objects with which he is concerned" (Hubert and Mauss 1908:13). Generally, the sacrificers attribute to the priest(s) a unique power of defining the form the ritual will take, when it will take place, and who the victim will be. The priests are the upholders of social morality, as well as the physicians who heal diseased social relationships. Turner (1968) argues that the attribution of this power to an individual is vital for societies without centralized political institutions. I will argue later that attributed power is as powerful in organizations with a centralized political hierarchy.

The priest can be seen as the guide to the sacrifice; the one who will be both of the sacred and profane worlds, and who will have a distinct relationship with the victim, high priest, sacrificers, and the gods. Within the priest resides the power to direct the ritual expulsion of the victim from the profane world into the sacred. The priest's knowledge of how to perform the act ensures that errors will not happen, and that the victim's disease will not spread throughout the collectivity. Dress, masks, preparation, the time of the sacrifice, become focal points for special consideration that only the priest may resolve. Thus, as the priest-officiant increases his sacredness, he makes safer his travel with the victim to the world of the sacred. This serves the double function of allowing the priest to return to the community, and resume life within the world of the profane.

A distinction can now be made between the priest-officiants and the leader (or high-priest) of the collectivity. The high-priest may or may not officiate during the ceremony. An attributed social power resides in this individual so that he/she is generally the one in the profane world who acknowledges that a crisis exists within the community, and that a form of ritual is needed to quell this crisis. The high-priest can either appoint those people who will be priests, or the leader can take on the sacred qualities for himself. As leadership exists within a specific set of spatial and temporal planes, so the leader's designation of the ritual is also structured by those planes. The high priest is of the profane world and recognizes the necessity for the group to create a generative transformation to the world of the sacred. It should be noted that the leader is not necessarily of the sacred world, but rather, one who leads in the everyday mundane affairs of the community. When the high-priest feels those affairs threatened it is through the attributed social power of the group that this individual can start the sacrificial process in motion.

The victim provides the channel of communication between the sacred and profane world. This being can take on many different shapes and forms: as an animal that is immolated as an offering during the course of a sacrificial rite, as a scapegoat who carries the communal pollution out of the community, thereby purifying the profane world, as a surrogate victim that embodies an idea, or truth, that the community may cherish, and at the same time fear.

The question remains why society chooses one victim and not another; is the selection of the victim merely arbitrary? We have a social desire for a sacred object that the community-at-large, or through the attributed social power of the high-priest, believes resides in the victim. It is at this point that we must draw into play the positioning of the actors, and an understanding of how the historical processes interconnect with those actors. That is, to fully understand why a particular actor is transformed into a victim, as a scapegoat, a surrogate offering, or otherwise, we cannot decontextualize the ritual itself, but instead need to understand the history from which

these actors and structures have arisen, as well as the present climate and tenor of the community, and larger society. To decontextualize a ritual, or to describe the ritual event void of its immediate, circumscribed influences and climate is to paint ritual as a static process, unchanging; it then becomes a universal model which can be applied to all communities.

As stated, the search for universals is not now helpful if we are to work within the framework of a socially constructed and mediated world by which people create - and recreate - their collective reality. Because society seeks a sacredness which appears in the future victim, that individual becomes a sacrificial object of the collective desire. The victim, then, is an object endowed with a sacredness designed to save society. The community, working within the larger framework of its history and structural positioning, creates a generative transformation of victimage that is structural movement from the world of the profane to that of the sacred.

Within the actual ceremony of expulsion, society defines the victim as both of, and outside of, the community. Some form of distancing must take ^{place} during the ceremony, so that the victim appears different from the ordinary, but not so different that the individual has no relationship with the community. In this light, the victim is not merely an object of exchange, or a gift, to the gods of the sacred world. We can neither predict who society will precisely choose as its victim, nor can we say that its selection is arbitrary. The sacrificers, the community and beneficiaries of the sacrifice, have a high-priest and priest-officiants who translate the actions of the victim as the individual moves from the profane to sacred world. The victim has a sacred character because of a collective representation of that which is the cause of communal pressure. The influence of history and the force of time come into play so that the ritual is not a predictive mechanism that is solely structural in nature, but is directly influenced by its contextualized history and representation of time.

Time: One aspect that needs to be considered when we discuss ritual violence is the concept of time. That is, the repetition of an act, the entropy of the organism, and the rate at which the organism repeats the act and/or dies, all provide markers for an understanding of ritual. I am troubled by an analysis of a structure that is time-free. If we take into account the idea that individuals, groups, institutions, have distinct histories by which they define themselves, then we necessarily need to account for the life history of the organization under study when we consider the ritual aspects of a situation. Berger and Luckmann support this view when they say, "Institutions further imply historicity and control. Reciprocal typifications of actions are built up in the course of a shared history. They cannot be created instantaneously. Institutions always have a history, of which they are the products. It is impossible to understand an institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced" (1966:54-55).

At the same time, a linear model of reality, which places acts within set chunks of demarcated periods, strikes me as bereft of a sense of how change takes place. Within this view, we are forced to see time, and the acts that occur within it, as a continuous movement, as a succession of epochal durations, advancing in a unilinear movement. Instead of cyclic or unilinear, I view time as a pendulum, discontinuous, with a succession of alternations and full stops. We distinguish intervals not as time zones set in hours or days, but as periods created in social life by society. The western idea that we fill in blocks of time, that a particular day or time period is when we must fulfill a given act, ritual or otherwise, has confused the matter so that we see time ordering life rather than viewing a community's life as a series of interconnected - and freewinging - pendulums. That is, an organization, whether primitive or modern, exists not only by the internal structures and cycles of itself, but also by its connection to, and intertwining with, the larger societal political, social, and economic structures. When we investigate ritual conflict it is critical to consider how these different pendulums interconnect and overlap with one another. To continue the metaphor: a grandfather clock has a wide swinging mechanism, and it is only at the most extreme ends of the

of the community pendulum that ritual conflict appears. Yet we must also take into account that ritual conflict - the movement from the world of the profane to the sacred - is tempered and mediated by the larger society. With this view, ritual conflict does not begin merely because a community is in crisis, but depends also on individual actions and the larger societal context.

Victor Turner (1964, 1969) has posited that ritual is a "liminal" period, one that is timeless, unstructured, a process within a process. Edmund Leach, on the other hand, looks at these liminal periods not as unstructured, but as that which orders time. "The interval between two successive festivals of the same type is a 'period', usually a named period, e.g. 'week', 'year'. Without the festivals, such periods would not exist and all order would go out of social life. Until we have done this there is no time to be measured" (Leach, 1968:135).

There is much to be admired in the analyses of Turner and Leach for they have broken free of a western definition of time that is unilinear. We need to push the analysis further, however, and recognize the larger historic processes within which ritual functions. To ask if a system reaches the point of ritual conflict every week or year is not helpful; we must think of the epochs themselves and understand how they order time. To believe that ritual conflict is a universal that will always take place when the internal pendulum reaches its most extreme endpoints is to deny the complex interplay and interrelationships among the organization, the larger social history, and the placement of the actors within this drama.

If we take the pendulums to be the macro view of a life cycle, we must also investigate the micro time-world, the liminal period, of the ritual itself. When we speak specifically of this liminal period, we can divide the ritual into sections: there is a preparation for the sacrifice, a symbolic death, a period of seclusion, and finally, a symbolic rebirth. The preparation of ritual violence is the naming of a victim by the priest and the intensification of the victim's guilt by placing upon the victim the image the sacrificers have produced. The sacrificial preparation creates the proper distance for the victim

within the community. It will be remembered that a victim may be either too foreign for the community, or too closely identified with the group. The preparation creates the proper distance so^o that the community can carry through with its sacrifice. The priest needs to prepare in a variety of ways so that pollution does not take place, and so the priest can correctly translate the dialogue that will occur between both worlds. This preparation can be the time of the ceremonial dressing, the time for anointing, and a host of other ablutions that will protect the priest(s) as they enter the actual sacrifice.

Merely because the priest and victim are both sanctified and prepared for ritual violence in no way necessitates a beginning for the sacrifice. Hubert and Mauss claim, "It cannot take place at any time or anywhere. For not all times of the day or year are equally propitious for sacrifice. . . . The place of the ceremony itself must be sacred" (1981:25). To proclaim this does not run contrary to our discussion of time; we note that there are specific places contingent upon specific times for proper sacrifice to occur in both the profane and sacred worlds. This is not to say that the sacrifice begins at a prescribed time or that the denotation of western time is what Hubert and Mauss meant. The sacrifice does not take place haphazardly, without reference to time or highly rule-governed structures; indeed, the ritual occasion is highly specified, yet it is not in reference to a particular time, but to the continuity of the sacrifice and the swing of the pendulums themselves.

What follows the preparation is the symbolic death of a victim - a representational movement from the profane world to the sacred. The nature of the victim is forever changed at the culmination of the sacrifice. Once the sacrifice is over a cleansing process begins so that the priest and community are purified from any pollution they may have encountered from the victimage as well as from any errors that may have taken place during the sacrifice. Often this purification will take place in seclusion, until there is a symbolic rebirth that returns the society from the world of the sacred to that of the profane.

We have, then, a view of time acting not as an objective demarcation of events, but as a socially constructed marker for those events. The

ritual event has a set structure of activities which prepares the individual for sacrifice and insures the community against pollution by victimage. We must now address precisely what types of community possess such rituals. Modern communities? Only simple societies? Or is ritual violence exclusive to people of a specific mentality or social structure?

Place of Ritual Violence: Various anthropologists have posited reasons as to why modern society does not have a structural or cognitive need for ritual. The assumption has been that traditional society has functionally sacred uses for ritual because simplex society is of a smaller scale and complexity than modern society. The function of ritual in modern society, say these theorists, is now otiose because of alternate structures that take the place of ritual. Instead of looking at ritual as an imbedded deep structure in a simplex society, however, we need to consider ritual within a contextual process that has interconnecting links to other segments within the system. That is, the actors in the various social dramas of modern and traditional society do not necessarily have to have a singular unified role relationship to the rest of society in order for ritual conflict to appear.

Max Gluckman, for example, felt that tribal life appeared distinctly different from modern society because of a highly industrialized technology in multiplex communities. "If one follows the development of rituals through from tribal stages to the modern industrialized state, there is first a decline, and then a drop, in the ritualization of social relations" (1962:25). Modern society, in Gluckman's eyes, had created a plethora of roles for the individual. As the greater segmentation of role differentiation increased, ritual use and practice decreased. Conversely, the greater the community relied on the individual for all of its 'undifferentiated and overlapping' roles, the greater the need for ritual.

To carry the point further, Gluckman, followed by Turner (1968) expressed the idea that as modern technology forced simplex society into the modern world, structural "cleavages" arose that produced divisiveness, and therefore the rituals that once served as a protection against disorder no longer were of any real use. This sort of cleavage provided a clue

as to the disfunction of ritual violence within multiplex society. Again, because the structure had begun to crack (as opposed to the individuals within the structure) ritual was incapable of effectuating any catharsis for the community. Simple societies are ones, therefore, wherein the political structure goes unquestioned and ritual conflict occurs. This does not happen in modern society because the rituals are 'inappropriate.' "They are inappropriate in the state because we have revolutionaries as well as rebels. All other groups have voluntary and not compelled membership. And many differentiated secular institutions, with great freedom of movement, allow for the temporary solution of personal and sectional conflicts" (1965:135).

Various problems arise with the above analysis when ritual is considered within the social construction of reality. One assumption is that all simple societies, all preindustrial peoples existed in small units such that all individuals coexisted on a face-to-face basis. If we consider, however, various works on ritual in large cities (Crapanzano 1973) or similar analyses of preindustrial cities (Sjoberg 1960) we can see that countless societies existed in pre-technological society that were not ordered on the face-to-face relationships that Gluckman deems as vital conditions for ritual conflict. That is, we can safely assume that ritual conflict was as likely to happen with the Hamadsha of Meknes in the nineteenth century as it was with the Ndembu. To state that urban situations do not allow for conflict does not appear to take into account ritual conflict in preindustrial cities.

Role differentiation does indeed exist to a greater degree in modern society than primitive ones. Yet it is not helpful to paint a dichotomous distinction so that we see people with a unified ideology and belief system on the one hand, and a highly segmentalized, differentiated people on the other. Close-knit networks exist in both modern and traditional society so that a common ground does exist on which individuals are able to share more than that defined by their formally assigned productive tasks. The factory worker relates to another factory worker not simply as a worker, but also as a friend, an ethnic compatriot (or enemy), a sexual partner (or rival) and a host of other social relationships. We carry with us a multiplicity of roles

and while the relations of production may have changed in modern society, the production of those relations, and the forces that relate to those relations remain.

A basic problem with a view that traditional society had a need for ritual relations is to account for why - and how - those needs have changed. That is, one is hard-pressed to account for change and how those structural cleavages have come about if one believes that simple society existed in a close-knit network without anyone who questioned the moral order. All societies, however, have marginal people of one form or another; oftentimes these people will question the structural order and possibly bring about change. Revolutions and revolutionaries surely have occurred not only in the twentieth century, but throughout time. There have been rebellions not only against the emperor, but also the empire. One need only to read about the cargo cults of New Guinea (Lawrence 1964; Harris 1975) to find individuals who questioned the socio-political order of the time and so as to foment change. That few people questioned the moral order is not to be debated; to think, however, that none prior to modern society revolted against structural forms appears mistaken.

When one approaches the study of ritual, of necessity we must look at the larger societal context; to do otherwise presents the problems that have just been considered: a singular conception of how people structured and lived their lives, rather than an acceptance of the multiplicity of codes and forms that have always existed in the world. If we are capable of looking at the reciprocal relationships of these various structures we will gain a different understanding of ritual than is normally done.

An interim summary is in order: If we understand how people socially construct their life-world, then three points become central to consider in a study of ritual: the actors and their positions, history and time, and the place of ritual in multiplex-simplex society. To study ritual structures divorced from time relies on the belief that history does not temper or alter societal reality. To accept that role segmentation did not appear in traditional society denies the multiplicity of paradigmatic changes at work throughout societies.

To point toward a theory of universal victimage relies far too heavily on a belief that the infinite complexities of life can be reduced to one simple mechanistic formula whereby individuals have little, if any, freedom of movement. Yet each point, when considered not in opposition to one another, but of interconnected significance, points toward a more integrative understanding of ritual's relation to a society than is commonly considered.

This section has sought to define ritual violence and place it within the time and spatial arrangements of a broader framework than is normally done. We now need to turn to Professor Franklin's case at Stanford University for data which we will be able to interpret through the framework of the social construction of reality.

III Ideas as Victims

Place: The Modern Organization Most definitely, distinctions exist between a modern organization and simple societies. Modern organizations are voluntary; members do not enter the organization at birth, and it is highly likely that they will not be in the organization at death. The organization has neither a structured geographical setting nor generational-kinship similarities to simple societies. At the same time, there are characteristics of some modern organizations that parallel those of simple society. Erving Goffman (1961) describes total institutions as organizations where all aspects of life occur in the same place and under the same authority; each member's daily activity is carried out in the same proximity as a large group of members; the day's activities are highly scheduled and coordinated; and there is a single script designed for the organization. Prisons, boarding schools, and residential universities are examples of total institutions.

Another similarity of a modern organization to that of a simple society is found in institutions with a unique history and background that sees itself as having a distinctive purpose. That is, many organizations have a distinctive history and traditions, a series of emblematic symbols by which people define themselves. Even Max Gluckman admitted that some modern institutions have similarities to tribal life. He felt that pockets of social relations existed where one set of roles influenced the actors

performance in other roles. He, too, pointed to a university as an example (1962:43) of one of these pockets.

I propose, then, a more systematic investigation of a university culture in relation to ritual violence. Institutions have a life, a saga, a belief system, that relates to the framework of society as a whole insofar as the interplay among individuals is codified by both this larger social, and more community-specific, framework. This interpretation lends itself to an understanding of the sacrifice of whom I will term a modern-day victim of a multiplex community - H. Bruce Franklin - for surrounding his trial we shall see a sacrifice centering around an idea that is the lifeblood of the university - the idea of Academic Freedom. In short, were Academic Freedom to be destroyed, so would the university. Stanford, a residential institution with a particular tradition and history, is the place for which we discuss ritual conflict. With a sacrificial victim the university moved from the world of the profane to that of the sacred in order to kill - and thereby preserve - that which it held most high - Academic Freedom. Various other examples of kings acting as paupers, or sacrilegious action toward holy objects during a ritual moment, are akin to how we view the victimage of the idea of academic freedom through the trial of a tenured faculty member.

Actors: President, Advisory Council, Professor, Academic Community As stated, Professor Franklin is the victim of this drama. The leader and high-priest is the president of the institution, Richard Lyman. I view the priests of the rite to be the Chair of the Advisory Council, and the other tribunal members. The university community - students, administration, and most importantly, faculty - were the sacrificers. The sacrificers were the chief beneficiaries of the act. They resided in the profane world, and it was this world that was threatened, that contributed to the ritual taking place.

The Stanford victim possessed the dual qualities of being within and outside the community. Franklin was a Humanities professor in a scientific community, a Marxist in a conservative institution. Professor Franklin had tenure, but when his promotion to full professor came up, it was denied on the grounds that it was premature (Franklin 1975:29). The victim's dress, style, and demeanor were decidedly different from

that of other tenured faculty members. He wore work-shirts and combat boots, lived off campus, and saw his role with students not as a tutor or learned pedagogue, but as that of a friend and compatriot (Franklin, 1975). Before the dismissal proceedings began the high-priest placed Franklin on academic probation, and disallowed him from setting foot on the campus. Thus, Franklin took on the needed exterior and interior qualities necessary for a sacrificial victim of this sort: he looked and acted differently from other tenured faculty, the administration relieved him of any responsibility prior to the trial, he lived away from the university community, and the university denied him the full participation and status of becoming a full professor. Finally, when the community - via the tribunal - revoked his tenure appointment the comments made concerned the impossibility of 'rehabilitation' (see page 10).

The secular leader and high-priest of the sacrifice was the president of the university. A full professor of the faculty, and administrative member for a short time, this man had the right balance of power, and was in a position at a particular moment in time whereby he could accuse someone of a crime so that a sacrifice could be effected that would move the victim from the profane to the sacred world and thereby save the university from destruction. It is imperative to note the position of the actors within this drama. Normally, a president would neither have the need to invoke a sacrificial trial, nor would any individual be in the position to gain such tremendous attributed power. Furthermore, an individual who was not at all of the faculty, but simply an administrator, or someone from outside the community whose service to the institution was minimal - such as was the case with President Pitzer - would have undoubtedly encountered the hostility and suspicion of the sacrificers. President Lyman, it should be iterated, succeeded in unifying the community to the point that the vast majority of the faculty coalesced around the president and viewed the victim as the cause of their troubles (see page 10).

The Advisory Council was also a fitting tribunal - the ancient god of theology was balanced by the new paeans of academia: engineering, science, sociology, business and psychiatry. These præests were highly respected men and enjoyed a long affiliation with the university.

All but the theologian wore the garb of the university - suits - and they donned the juridical masks of a courtroom in order to carry out what was to become the sacrificial process. The testimony heard by the professors reads like any courtroom proceedings: "due process, out of order, overruled, objection sustained" etc, and yet, curiously, not one of these men was a lawyer or a judge. They had taken on new roles and masks for this sacred occasion.

We have, then, the positioning of actors within a drama that allowed for attributed power to the leader, and social victimage to a deviant. Power was given to the priests so that they could define the form and time of the sacrifice as well as act as guards to the victim on his journey from the profane to the sacred. The high priest named the victim, announced that a crisis existed and a ritual would take place. Further, he appointed the priests (see page 9) to ensure that these individuals were powerful and sacred enough to perform the needed transformation. To believe, however, that the leader or high-priest always has this power, to consider that any professor of Franklin's persuasion will be chosen as a victim, is to disregard this positioning at different moments in history. The ability of an individual to appear as a threat to the empire has existed relatively rarely in the history of any institution or community. What now needs to be considered is the historic and structural processes at work that surround this ritual.

Time: Pendulums and Structures Ritual violence - in any social system - is extra-ordinary. It is that moment when the pendulum of the community has swung to its most extreme point, and the larger social-historical process is also in a state of enervation and change. In Professor Franklin's case, the instability of the university came about because of a void of top leadership, the activities of an institution that many deemed wrong, and the larger social context of a war that posed chaos for the entire social order. The sacrificers, led by the high-priest, saw the violence abroad and at home escalate, and they perceived that this violence would bring about the virtual destruction of the institution. The expulsion of Professor Franklin brought about a cathartic euphoria and freedom from an impending pollutant.

Perhaps most complex within the discussion of time is the notion

that Franklin was an offering of that which the University held most high - academic freedom - from their profane world to the sacred. Let us remember the core of the modern university, the early concept of *Lehrfreiheit*, which we now discuss under the generic heading of academic freedom. All people of the university give verbal support to the idea, and the free assertion and discussion of ideas is allowed a broad range. Emile Durkheim, an academician writing in the heyday of *Lehrfreiheit*, stated: "There is at least one principle which those the most devoted to the free examination of everything tend to place above discussion and to regard as untouchable, that is to say, as sacred: this is the very principle of free examination" (1915:244). In October of 1982 two Stanford authors echoed that sentiment in an article in the university newspaper saying: "No issue, except possibly salary, is of more enduring concern to the Stanford faculty than intellectual freedom" (Stayer and Calabrese, 1982:4).

Yet a contradiction exists that in order to save that which a society perceives to be most sacred, it will expunge from its system during periods of crisis that same sacred object or idea. During this 'liminal' period, a profane community discovers what is most sacred and sets about to offer it to the sacred world so that the profane can again apotheosize its core beliefs. The history from which the organism has come - its forces and drives - the perception of time as a series of interrelated pendulums, and the activity of the individuals within the system come together and set in motion a structural pattern bent on creating movement from the profane to the sacred in order to save the community.

It is important to point out that only twice in the history of the institution has its destruction seemed imminent - during the Franklin case, and in 1900, with Professor Ross. The similarities attested to in the first part of this paper point to the institutionalization of a code for ritual violence in the university. Our misunderstanding of ritual violence in modern organizations is inexorably due to the radically different nature of the forms of written and oral discourse within modern organizations. If we accept the Franklin case as a potentially destructive 'drum' and view this drum within the complex

net of social relations we can understand the structure itself, and the similarities to ritual violence in other communities - either traditional or modern. Appendix I points out the structural similarities and contextual differences of the two cases of ritual violence at Stanford University.

While the time of the ceremony was not prescribed by any individual, the order of events did follow a set pattern. A form of ritual tends to occur while the university is in session. Edward Ross lost his job during the fall quarter of 1900, and Bruce Franklin's trial took place during the fall term of 1971. Each member of the Council worked six hours a day, every day, for most of the quarter, not on teaching or research but on the sacrificial proceedings.

The preparation for the sacrifice took place from the time that Lyman accused Franklin of misconduct, and named the form the sacrifice would take. Throughout the summer term the Advisory Council prepared documents, and the victim became further distanced from the community. Franklin lost his job, resulting in the symbolic death of the victim, and the university returned to normal and discussions about academic freedom ceased. The president took a sabbatical to Europe and cleansed himself in seclusion from the community of the impurities he had received throughout the proceedings.

What may be termed the conscience of the sacred idea, the role occupied in double fashion by the theologian and Chair of the Advisory Council, issued a minority report whose purpose was to create - and recreate - a new moral order. "The university has many champions at work defending its interests. The individual, particularly if he espouses unpopular beliefs, is not so amply blessed with supporters. Stanford University will be less a true university without (Franklin) and more a true university with him. We may do untold harm to ourselves and to the cause of higher education unless, by imposing a penalty short of dismissal we seek to keep him as a very uncomfortable, but very important part of what this university or any university is meant to be" (Franklin Files Advisory Report:146).

Thus began the symbolic rebirth of the victimized idea - academic freedom. The voice for Academic Freedom, the Advisory Council Chair,

eventually was elevated to the position of Provost, and finally, President of the university. His elevation signified the symbolic restoration of the university's affirmation and belief in academic freedom. Calm had been restored to the university; the atmosphere of chaos had abated.

Conclusion

The argument can be made that I have pushed the analogy of ritual violence in a modern organization too far. I have described a modern system where the actors within a socially constructed reality act differently from those in primitive society when dealing with conflict. Indeed, the 'violence' of a faculty member's expulsion from a university can seem trivial to the anthropologist who has watched ceremonies or ritual initiations where young boys go through a series of physically harmful and violent episodes. My intent, however, is not to show that the same forms of ritual take place in all societies; it is to point out that the cognitive and social mechanisms that are at work in simple society are also evident in modern institutions which have defined parameters, such as a university. I have also sought to describe ritual not as an isolated event divorced from societal reality, but instead have shown how the wider societal context and the acts within that context directly influence the ritual structure.

We have seen how ritual violence operates in a modern setting, with a distinct set of actors, what functions it serves, and in what forms the conflict occurs. In times of crisis, a group of people with a common ideology and belief system, for a variety of reasons, see their world threatened. In a situation of perceived chaos a leader/high-priest has attributed social power so that he/she can set in motion a sacrifice in order to save the community. The priests, appointed by the leader, enact the ritual so that the victim is moved from the world of the profane to that of the sacred.

The ritual violence that occurred with Ross in 1900 and with Franklin in 1971 also has differences - and so they should. As society is not static, neither is ritual. Again, ritual acting with and in a net of complementary forces, changes because of these forces. While

the structural elements and symbolic aspects will be similar, the codes vary due to the period in which the ritual takes place, and the individual actors within the ceremony. Thus, the increased bureaucratization and institutionalization of the university called for a greater amount of written documents during the Franklin case, than in Ross's day. The role of the high priest who perceived the chaos in Ross's time was the owner of the university, while it was the president for Franklin. The vocal sacrificers in Ross's time were the faculty, yet the student role had increased by Franklin's time so that they too were beneficiaries of the sacrifice.

The similarities between the Ross and Franklin cases afford us an understanding of how the actors within their structural roles have different positions within the stage of the drama, thereby creating change within the drama itself. The understanding of time and the social and historical processes that are entirely out of the hands of the community - Asian immigration and a war in Asia - contextualize the ritual so that we see another factor at work that builds toward the needed sacrifice. The sacrifice itself, however, follows set patterns, again influenced by the actors and the social world in which it operates.

To paraphrase a nineteenth century philosopher: "Organizations make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past." Students of ritual need to reckon with what these circumstances are and how they intrude into the structural of ritual in the here-and-now. The life of Stanford University - and no doubt other modern organizations - demands a symbolic understanding of its actions, the individuals within those actions, and the history from which it has come.

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Table I: Structure of Ritual

<u>Structural element</u>	<u>Stanford I Ritual Detail</u>	<u>Stanford II Ritual Detail</u>
High priest	Trustee/Owner	President
Priest(s)	President	Advisory Council
Sacrifier(s)	Academic Community Faculty	Academic Community Faculty/Students
Victim	Professor: Scholar/teacher	Professor: Scholar/teacher
Symbolic victim	Academic Freedom	Academic Freedom
Societal Pressure	Asian immigration	Vietnam war
Community Pressure	Growth/Institution Building	Growth/Institution Building
Preparation	a) Trustee to President: letters/conversations b) Victim on sabbatical	President to Victim: letter of suspension
Sacrificial Form	Letter of Dismissal	Tribunal and Report
Seclusion	Trustee goes abroad	President goes abroad
Symbolic Rebirth	Tenure as a system	Chair of Advisory Council becomes President
	<u>Ross Case:1900</u>	<u>Franklin Case:1970</u>