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ABSTRACT

Intended as a resource for students in their study of the issues and arguments pertinent to the 1979-80 National High School Debate Resolution, "What should be the future direction of the foreign policy of the United States?," this publication is organized into five units. The units are: definitions, including the problem area and the three debate resolutions; the first resolution, trade; the second resolution, arms; the third resolution, aid; and potential solutions. An extensive bibliography is appended. (E1)

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ERIC First Analysis: U.S. Foreign Policy

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1979-80 National High School
Debate Resolutions

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*In memory of a teacher and friend of debate, Dick Tame,
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Foreword

The ERIC *First Analysis* of the 1979-80 National High School Debate Resolutions is published by the Speech Communication Association in cooperation with the Educational Resources Information Center Clearinghouse on Reading and Communication Skills (ERIC/RCS). The ERIC/RCS Clearinghouse is supported by the National Institute of Education which has as one of its missions the dissemination of knowledge to improve classroom practices. This ERIC information analysis paper is unique in that it is intended for direct use by high school students as well as by their teachers.

ERIC *First Analysis*, published annually since 1973, provides debaters with guidelines for research on the debate resolutions selected by the National University Extension Association's Committee on Discussion and Debate. Periodic surveys of teachers of debate have indicated that *First Analysis* has proved to be an excellent resource for students in their study of issues and arguments. It incorporates an instructional approach designed to avoid "pat" cases and "canned" evidence.

This year the resolutions center on the problems of United States foreign policy. Through the study of Bill Henderson's analysis, students will become aware of the breadth and depth of the issues involved in the debate resolutions. Teachers will also find the resource useful in planning debate workshops and in teaching students about the processes of research in argumentation. Individuals studying the problems of foreign policy in social studies classes or in other contexts not related to debate will find *First Analysis* to be a valuable guide to issues and resources.

To be a "first" analysis, the manuscript must be prepared in a period of six weeks after the February 1 announcement of the national debate topic. The author's thorough analysis of issues and sources in so short a time and his adaptation of the analysis to the needs of high school debaters are tributes to his experience and excellence as a forensics educator.

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v

National High School Problem Area, 1979-80

What should be the future
direction of the foreign
policy of the United States?

Debate Propositions

Resolved: That the United States should significantly change its foreign trade policies.

Resolved: That the United States should significantly reduce public and private distribution of weapons to foreign countries.

Resolved: That the United States should significantly reduce its foreign assistance programs to totalitarian governments.

Preface

The following material is designed to introduce you to both the substance and theory of the 1979-80 high school debate resolutions. Last December a committee of the National University Extension Association (NUEA) met in Tampa, Florida, to choose the final three problem areas and resolutions to submit to the debate community. The various state and national forensic leagues voted on a ballot which specified the three subject areas and included the exact problem area statements. Thus the problem area was decided by democratic selection, as were the debate resolutions. In February, after the referendum, the NUEA announced that foreign policy had been selected for 1979-80.

As a debater, the future direction of United States foreign policy will occupy a great deal of your time in the coming months. This year, there is an enormous amount of material to digest. As you begin your work I encourage you to be careful in the use of your time. The debater who reads without choosing what to read will simply not get finished this year. The analysis that follows should assist you in being selective.

The material in this book is organized into five units: (1) definitions, including the problem area and the three debate resolutions; (2) the first resolution, trade; (3) the second resolution, arms; (4) the third resolution, aid; and (5) potential solutions. At the end of the text you will find notes and the bibliography, which will provide another starting point for your research.

This text is not intended to be either a definitive statement of what the problem area or debate resolutions mean or an exhaustive consideration of the subject. This text does not reflect the personal views of the author or the official position of the Speech Communication Association, the group which commissioned this work. Just as the NUEA publication *The Forensic Quarterly* is merely advisory, so is this material. This writer agrees with the textbook authors who argue that the actual definition of terms emerges within the context of a specific debate.

In college debate, the topic wording committee prepares a "Parameters of the Topic" statement. This statement is distributed along with the various resolutions for balloting by the debate community. In high school the problem area serves a similar purpose. But the judgment regarding the appropriateness of a particular interpretation of a particular resolution in a particular round has to be made in that particular round.

No work of this type can be done without substantial help from others. Members of the debate class at the University of Northern Iowa dedicated uncounted hours to the development of the material included within their specialties. They are, in a real sense, coauthors of this first analysis. Their names and specialties are Kevin Caster, Dennis Doyle, and Cindy Schmidt (trade); Craig Bittick and Jeffrey Rinkel (arms); and Doug Rehak and Kathy Lundberg (aid). In addition, Kathy Peters provided much secretarial assistance. Members of the University of Northern Iowa Department of Speech faculty and staff deserving special recognition are Jon Hall, Mark Schmidt, Becky Burns, and Diane Juel.

The debater working on this problem area will develop a much better understanding of how our foreign policy actually operates. One wonders whether or not the thousands of participating high school debaters ever let their associates and relations know how much substantive knowledge the activity affords them. I encourage you to tell your parents, teachers, and people in the community about the benefit of this debate activity.

Bill Henderson

1 The Problem Area and the Debate Resolutions

*What Should Be the Future Direction of the Foreign
Policy of the United States?*

Defining the Problem Area

Why define so obvious a statement when its meaning seems clear? Even if it weren't so clear, what difference does a careful definition make? Any experienced debater will tell you that the ambiguity of such a statement could complicate debates, and since debate resolutions "spring from" the statement, careful effort should be expended in interpreting that statement. Definition opens the problem area for further investigation. If an interpretation is not problematical, students have no reason to investigate that area. At best, the investigation would be limited to discovering ways to prove that the area is *not* problematical. The "foreign policy of the United States" seems a straightforward phrase. But experience belies our accepting any statement at face value, so a debater must study the language carefully.

Three additional reasons for carefully defining the problem area are (1) you can reduce your research time; (2) your debating can be more exact; and (3) you can pay respect to the experts by seeking exact definitions. Careful definition reduces your research load. By discovering areas which are inside the problem area, you identify those outside of that area. The payoff to knowledgeable debaters is that the only research done on those areas outside the problem area is in developing ways to prove that those cases are not part of the proper business of debaters this year. Defining the problem area permits more exact debating. Neither substitution nor omission should be permitted. Consider the impact of substituting "would" for "should" within the problem area or omitting the word "future." Finally, experts who know the field of debate selected the language of the problem area. They deliberated

carefully upon the word choices, and you can benefit by study of their selections.

There is much presumptive weight for a problem area selected by a democratic process. Further, commitment to definition should derive from the need for well-founded investigation, precise analysis, and respect for the experts who framed the statement.

Words, phrases, and history provide clues to the meaning of "What should be the future direction of the foreign policy of the United States?" What does the word "direction" imply? Does the phrase "foreign policy" lend any additional specificity to the subject? Have we any historical clues from recent public policy regarding foreign nations? These and other questions may lead us to a better understanding of the problem area. Four phrases in all will require our attention. Each interacts with the others to provide us with a general conception.

"What should be. . . ." is the first phrase of the problem area. The word "what" when used interrogatively or relatively generally refers to "which, or which kind of."¹ The problem area points to something tangible. Whether or not the "what" incorporated into the problem area is a single subject might be worthy of additional consideration, even though the grammar of the statement suggests singularity.

The second word, "should," deserves considerable theoretical attention. We debate the merits of a policy. Whether or not the policy might be adopted is ignored by traditional debaters. The merits of the *policy* being debated rather than the potential *passage* of the policy should be clearly at issue. "Teams debate propositions which include the word 'should,' not the word 'would.' The implication is that the teams will debate whether the policy should or should not be adopted, not whether the policy will actually become law as a consequence of balloting in the appropriate legislative body."² Thus the activity revolves around the desirability of a proposed action, not the actualization of the action.

"Should" may have either a factual or value orientation. "If *should* is defined in terms of means-ends interests (we would increase our gross national product, we would win the war, etc.), then the issue becomes one of fact, revolving around considerations of whether or not the stipulated ends would occur. If *should* is defined in terms of intrinsic ethical considerations (it would be morally good to do this, men of good will ought to behave this way, etc.), then the issue becomes one of value, revolving around

the goodness or badness of these moral precepts."³ Whether one or both dimensions are appropriate remains to be seen.

Debaters can use the problem area to exclude a great number of issues from the actual debates this coming season. Constitutionality, court sanction, even enabling clauses of the policy may be irrelevant issues if the affirmative team carries the argument that the problem area excludes questions related to "would," so that the "should" questions can be considered fully.

Jon M. Fitzgerald noted that "the concept of 'should' as 'ought to, but not necessarily will' occupies a middle ground."⁴ That middle ground is between "should" meaning *must* or *could possibly*. That middle ground seems to conform to current debate practice. The moral imperative implied by *must* is not often used in debate rounds, nor would most affirmative teams succeed with cases having very little in common with our attitudes, belief structures, and conditional behavioral preferences. As a consequence of this middle-ground definition of "should," debaters need to seek clear policies which "ought" to be adopted. The debates will then proceed toward a judgment about the policy that will revolve around the probity of the plan, not the morality of the approach.

"What should be" in this sense implies the notion that attitudes reside within individuals and that their behavior is intentional. Thus, while the policy debate focuses on what is to be done, questions related to what *can* be done remain important. The mood and power of the various governmental units, as well as powerful lobbies outside of government, must be considered.

The phrase also admits into the debate the notion of *fiat power*. This convention, which permits a team to claim "adoption" of a proposal, prevents debate from focusing upon whether or not particular legislators would vote for a policy. The convention is applied equally: when either team proposes a policy, it is given fiat power, i.e., the other team will not argue that the policy would not be adopted. It would be a total waste of time to do so, since the judges would ignore the argument.

However, "fiat power does not mean that a team is unable to argue that a policy might be circumvented. Clearly, the policy must be such as to warrant continuance."⁵ Nor should debaters assume that fiat power means that a team may include any provision in a plan. Only topical provisions are appropriate. If a provision can not be defended as being part of the system defined by the resolution, it must be jettisoned from the debate. Once a provision is eliminated, the judge can still consider the remaining

portion of the policy. Eliminating a provision for a particular kind of funding, for example, does not mean that a plan would not be funded. When the judge considers the remaining portion of the policy, if it is worthy of adoption, he or she may vote affirmative.

Finally, fiat power should not permit a team to claim benefits merely by the right of fiat. To claim that passing the law is impossible "in the real world" and that that is the reason to "vote for the law" is circular reasoning. Yet this sort of argument prevails in some debates.

"*The future direction . . .*" is the second phrase of the problem area. What is the present direction? How do we know what the future may hold for us? Can "direction" be usefully defined as meaning leadership? These questions generate more questions. But then, any first analysis does that.

Philosophical treatises consider the implications of "future" in detail. Some argue that defining the word is useless, since that to which it refers is inscrutable. Others say that definition predisposes the actor and so determines the future. All would agree that the future is bound to the present and the past, and most agree that our interpretation is culture-bound.

Defining the term requires a handle by which we may grasp the concept. One can begin by breaking the future into manageable periods. Short-term, long-term, and intermediate-term concepts may be useful. Another approach for examining the future considers its connections to the present and the past.

One dictionary defines "future" as "that [which] is to be or come . . . indicating time to come; as, *future* tense."⁶ This definition is for the word when it is used as an adjective. In the problem area statement the word is an adjective modifying "direction." Therefore the focus for the noun "direction" would be on a time to come, a direction not yet reached.

"Direction" can also have many meanings, each lending a different shading to the sentence. To direct is to manage and control. "Direction" can mean giving instructions for using or doing, the point toward which one is moving or facing, or the line leading to a place, as in the direction of Berlin.⁷ Which would appear to be the most acceptable meaning? A first analysis considers the broadest meaning possible, since the future is part of the phrase and calls for latitude because of its ambiguity. But others might prefer the opposite approach of specificity.

Being reasonable in defining "direction" would be a laudable goal. But must debaters provide the *most* reasonable definition?

In previous years, most people would provide some latitude. The debate judge who would accept only one definition wasn't very highly regarded. A tendency within the debate community seems to be emerging, however, to require more than "a" reasonable interpretation. The objection to that sort of license can be stated as follows: If "a" reasonable interpretation is good enough, then the topic is totally delimited. Total delimitation is contrary to the very process of selecting a topic and therefore can not be a valid interpretation of what should be done. It unreasonably reduces the breadth of the problem area.

Consider the following when attempting to define "direction." Is the problem area suggesting that we consider our relations with China as the future direction? Western Hemispheric conditions? Middle East policies? These possible directions represent a narrowing based on an interpretation of the noun "direction." Looking east, north, south, or west from the United States may be the frame within which you might wish to debate this year's resolutions.

Consider, also, the frame for "direction" which would relate to leadership: telling others what to do. Should the future direction be related to energy policies of other states? Should our foreign aid be conditional on proper energy programs? These are also viable approaches for the contest of the definition of terms in the resolutions (see below).

"Of the foreign policy. . . ." is the third term of the problem area. Some analysts might not want to contest the definition of this phrase since its reference is so broad. The prepositional phrase modifies the noun "direction" and clearly indicates that the subject relates to international policies. From the perspective of legal, contextual, and historical use of the phrase, we can assume that the problem area relates to things beyond the borders of the United States.

Hearings are held by various congressional committees on many subjects. That the Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered normalization of relations with China and the practical implications of that normalization is prima facie evidence that this issue represents a question of United States foreign policy. Whether or not relations with mainland China are a proper area of investigation for the problem area would also seem to be answered. It is within the scope of the problem area. Note that the answer emerges from concrete information—Congress spent deliberative time on the subject—not speculative judgment by the student.

A cursory glance at the Congressional Information Service listing of hearings of last year shows reference to detente, scientific technology and American diplomacy, international trade policy, human rights and U.S. policy, space exploration, a perspective on Mozambique, and Korean influence inquiry. All are subjects fit for investigation. Thousands more might exist.

Another approach to defining "foreign policy" would be to examine the budget for fiscal year 1978. In the budget, international affairs allocations are identified as one category and foreign aid as another. Within the foreign aid category, two general headings exist: the national defense function and the international affairs function. Examining the budget authority and actual outlays provides information about the "direction" of our "foreign policy." If grant military assistance has decreased between 1976 and 1979, the trend (or direction?) would seem to be away from this type of assistance.

Tables 1 and 2 provide the debater with some concrete data upon which a definition might be built. Clearly, additional data is necessary, but from such information a series of well-supported assertions can be developed. The task of the analyst at the early stage of investigation is to discover other such tables which can, in concise form, provide key insights into the problem area.

Consider for example the implications of Table 1. As noted above, trends emerge by considering the outlays over three years. For example, when one compares the amount provided for foreign information activities with amounts for international financial programs, substantial differences appear. Should tax dollars be directed into foreign education in more substantial percentages rather than into foreign financial programs?

The historical dimensions of the problem area emerge when one considers Table 2. For many years the United States has maintained a very large national defense commitment in the form of military assistance. Has the time arrived when this commitment should be substantially reduced? Another equally important question can be raised about the bilateral development programs of the United States. The channel currently used is the Agency for International Development. AID might be restructured were United States development assistance redirected. A third question, concerning the Food for Peace program funding, can be derived from Table 2. If the United States committed more money to this program, what would the results be for our own economy?

Table 1

International Affairs¹

Program or agency	Recommended budget authority for 1978	Outlays			
		1976 actual	1977 estimate	1978 estimate	1979 estimate
Foreign economic and financial assistance²	6,250	3,568	5,059	5,221	5,389
Conduct of foreign affairs:					
Administration of foreign affairs	714	411	614	685	749
International organizations and conferences	400	291	386	375	401
Other	32	24	30	31	31
Subtotal, conduct of foreign affairs	1,146	726	1,030	1,091	1,180
Foreign information and exchange activities:					
Foreign information activities	336	317	326	342	357
Educational exchange activities	83	65	68	80	88
Subtotal, foreign information and exchange activities	420	382	394	422	446
International financial programs:					
Export-Import Bank ³	1,622	856	899	964	1,091
Balance of payments loan for Portugal (proposed legislation)	130		300	130	120
Offsetting receipts	-20	-20	-20	-20	-20
Subtotal, international financial programs	1,732	836	1,179	1,074	1,191
Off-budget Federal entity: Exchange stabilization fund					
	()	(-74)	(-58)	(-58)	(-58)
Subtotal, including off-budget	(1,732)	(762)	(1,120)	(1,016)	(1,133)
Other deductions for offsetting receipts	-527	-446	-512	-527	-579
Total, international affairs	9,021	5,067	7,150	7,281	7,627
Total, including off-budget Federal entity	(9,021)	(4,992)	(7,097)	(7,223)	(7,569)

¹ Information on budget authority for 1976, 1977, and 1979, and data for the transition quarter are shown in tables 14 and 15 of Part 9.

² Detail shown in foreign aid table on the following page.

³ By law, the Export-Import Bank was excluded from the budget totals from Aug. 17, 1971, until October 1, 1976. Under terms of Public Law 93-646, the Export-Import Bank transactions are now included retroactively in the budget totals.

From: *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978* (Washington: D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 88.

The focus of this analysis thus far has been on the *foreign* policy of the United States. What happens when the analyst focuses on the foreign *policy*? Policymaking, both public and private, consists in building institutions, changing those institutions through policies and personnel to confront new challenges, developing international consensus and relationships with allies, as well as engaging in rivalry and conflict when necessary.⁸ John T. Dunlop makes a penetrating comment on policymaking: "Decisions largely flow from the relatively short-term pressures of necessity and the clash of conflicting interests, not from the ideas of intellectuals, their voices in the air, or from their memoranda."⁹ A policy, then, is something other than a law. Policy involves implementation by people, the policymakers, whose activities are directed by a given policy objective. Levitan and Belous note

Table 2
Foreign Aid
(In millions of dollars)

Assistance programs	Budget authority		Outlays			
	1977 estimate	1978 estimate	1976 actual	1977 estimate	1978 estimate	1979 estimate
NATIONAL DEFENSE FUNCTION						
Military assistance:¹						
Grant military assistance.....	262	230	367	415	300	260
Foreign military training.....	25	36	25	31	31
Foreign military credit sales.....	698	710	280	575	560	520
Offsetting receipts and other.....	-311	-310	454	-300	-314	-317
Subtotal, military assistance ¹	<u>674</u>	<u>666</u>	<u>1,101</u>	<u>715</u>	<u>577</u>	<u>494</u>
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FUNCTION						
Foreign economic and financial assistance:						
Security supporting assistance.....	1,735	1,459	601	1,457	1,431	1,542
Middle east special requirements fund.....	23	25	35	36	38	43
Indochina assistance.....	65	11
Multilateral development assistance:						
International financial institutions.....	1,285	1,985	902	868	1,059	1,089
International organizations.....	244	226	143	217	223	239
International Fund for Agricultural Development.....	2	12	32
Subtotal, multilateral.....	<u>1,529</u>	<u>2,211</u>	<u>1,045</u>	<u>1,086</u>	<u>1,294</u>	<u>1,360</u>

Table 2 (Continued)

Assistance programs	Budget authority		Outlays			
	1977 estimate	1978 estimate	1976 actual	1977 estimate	1978 estimate	1979 ^a estimate
Bilateral development assistance:						
Agency for International Development.....	1,116	1,280	1,001	1,187	1,206	1,244
Overseas Private Investment Corporation.....		150	-48	-35	-8	-45
Inter-American Foundation.....			7	8	8	7
Sahel development program (proposed legislation).....		50			5	19
Subtotal, bilateral.....	<u>1,116</u>	<u>1,480</u>	<u>960</u>	<u>1,161</u>	<u>1,211</u>	<u>1,225</u>
Other foreign economic and financial assistance:						
Food for Peace.....	1,159	923	693	1,091	1,094	1,051
Migration and refugee assistance.....	30	40	42	51	39	40
Peace Corps.....	81	68	69	87	71	66
Other assistance.....	68	44	58	80	42	61
Subtotal, foreign economic and financial assistance.....	<u>5,761</u>	<u>6,250</u>	<u>3,568</u>	<u>5,059</u>	<u>5,221</u>	<u>5,389</u>
Other deductions for offsetting receipts ²	-497	-533	-353	-497	-533	-573
Total, foreign aid.....	<u>5,938</u>	<u>6,382</u>	<u>4,316</u>	<u>5,278</u>	<u>5,264</u>	<u>5,309</u>

¹ Excludes trust funds.
² Loan repayments.

From: *The Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 89.

in passing one major problem this characteristic makes in our analysis: the possibility of "poor timing by government policy-makers."¹⁰

The development of foreign *policy* includes the historical background and evolution of the major institutions involved.¹¹ The policy mix must also be considered. To understand these elements of policy formation should be a primary goal of teams researching the implications of the problem area statement.

"Foreign policy" then can be defined by considering the government's interests as they appear in congressional debates and hearings and in the federal budget. The definition will include a recognition of the impact of the policymaker upon the policy. And the definition and understanding of foreign policy become

sharper as the total mix of government and private actions is considered by the competent researcher and analyst.

"*Of the United States?*" is the last of the phrases in the problem area statement. Since the present system of foreign policy is generally a consequence of action (or inaction) by the federal government, the phrase, in its usual meaning, appears to be a reference to the government constituted by the several states with headquarters in Washington, D.C., and called "The United States of America." As noted in a previous *First Analysis*, an important distinction occurs when the word "the" is used: "The phrase uses the word 'the,' not the word 'a.' . . . Few would doubt that the federal government being discussed was situated in Washington, D.C."¹²

Reference to a generic agent of change, "the United States," rather than a specific agent of change, "the president," or some other agent makes the problem area broader. But identifying the particular agent, at least by authority, remains important. Whether or not an existing government agency can establish the specific policies envisioned by the propositions will remain to be seen, but this in no way reduces the affirmative burden to demonstrate practicality.

In summary, the problem area may be interpreted to mean *What should be* (which kind of . . . ought we) *the future direction* (short or long term . . . leadership and geographic direction) *of the foreign policy* (actions which interrelate with other nations; both public and private; by our government or its representatives) *of the United States* (Congress, president, and people).

The Debate Resolutions

Resolved: That the United States should significantly change its foreign trade policies.

Resolved: That the United States should significantly reduce public and private distribution of weapons to foreign countries.

Resolved: That the United States should significantly reduce its foreign assistance programs to totalitarian governments.

Each of these three resolutions represents a specific territory within the problem area discussed in the previous section. Experience leads this writer to believe that you will most likely debate the first resolution. However, this first analysis must consider

each of the potential topics. Besides, greater emphasis on the first topic is really unnecessary, since the breadth of the resolution admits almost all interpretations which might be developed for the other two resolutions.

A 1979 editorial in the *Des Moines Register* noted that "even if Iranian oil exports resume in the near future, the United States needs to reduce its reliance on imported oil."¹³ The trade policy of the United States is inextricably bound to international politics. Weapons policies also are affected by conditions in other nations. Consider, for example, the implications of Mideast peace talks upon sales of United States arms. Similarly, the killing of the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan in early 1979 triggered strong reactions from President Carter's administration.¹⁴ The reactions took the form of recommended cuts in aid to Afghanistan.

The subjects which will occupy your time are very current. For good or ill, this year you will debate about events recorded daily in the newspapers. The odds are that your case might be seriously affected by events across the globe as recent as the past few weeks. Indeed, this morning's newspaper may call your interpretations into question. Research will be important, but the immediacy of the subject being debated will influence the kind of research you will do.

The Trade Resolution

The first general observation about the trade resolution is that the *direction of change is not indicated*. Although there is no requirement that a debate resolution indicate which tendency of policy should be defended by the affirmative team, this is usually a part of the resolution. But this is not the case this year with the trade resolution. *Change* is the only mandate required of the affirmative. The nature of the change is modified by the other terms, but either isolation or free trade could be defended under this umbrella resolution. And a great number of other options would also fit. Debaters and coaches will need to develop skills of synthesis and generalization if they are to avoid simply defending the status quo.

The second general observation about this resolution is that opportunities for counterplan debating on the negative are less viable than on most resolutions. If change is defined broadly by the affirmative, then the options for negative policies incorporating change as a central feature would appear to be limited. Certainly, "significant" changes are affirmative prerogatives, but sophisticated negative teams may well counter with policies which

are less than significant in policy change. The focus of the argument between the two teams would then become whether or not the change was significant. No negative team can expect to win this argument without careful analysis of the word "significant," and the affirmative teams will have a similar need.

Three phrases will be considered below. These phrases interact with each other and should be considered within the context of the problem area. The phrases represent the acting agency, the proposed modification, and the area in which the change will occur.

"Resolved: That the United States should. . . ." identifies the agency and formulates the standard criterion for narrowing the debate to issues of desirability of the proposal. The resolution states that the action should be that of the United States; since only one organized body represents "the United States," the federal government can be assumed to be the agency. Federal law, whether constitutional or statutory, seems the appropriate avenue for the act being debated. As noted in earlier discussion about the problem area, the word "should" lends emphasis to the fact orientation or the value orientation, depending on the debaters' views. The middle ground of "ought" also would be acceptable, because the term does require a justification of the action.

The change agent is the federal government, but the best specific mechanism within the government for effecting change may be selected by the affirmative. Even nonfederal actions might be incorporated, if these actions were somehow related to the basic federal system.

"Significantly change its. . . ." is the second phrase in this resolution. The change is to be significant. The change is to be in the policy of the United States, as suggested by use of the pronoun "its." The proximity of the adverb "significantly" and the verb "change" also influences the meaning. Were the words separated, the implications might be less certain. Given the proximity, a team would seem committed to demonstrating that the change they advocated was clearly significant.¹⁵

A question emerges from the previous discussion concerning what is to be significantly changed. If the change is in "its" foreign policy, how does one measure the significance of the change? Given the total absence of any trade policy toward mainland China, would normalization through opening a few trade doors be fairly described as a significant change? Does the dollar flow between the United States and another nation provide a potential measure? Or would the changing percentages of a particular ex-

change relationship represent such a measure? These possibilities are offered as points of departure for developing instruments for measuring *significant* change.

The problem of "significantly" in the resolution is related to its frequent use by debaters to specify how important an issue can be considered to be in a debate. Good debaters ask: How harmful, really, is the condition opposed by the affirmative? In breadth? In intensity? What measure can the affirmative introduce to clarify the importance of the problem being discussed?

Another way to define "significant" is to see what politicians say. A Texas politician commented that "the reduction in energy consumption of 2% in the 1973 base period is . . . as significant as the trend during the 60s and early 70s was for energy consumption to grow annually by about 4%."¹⁶ When the politician used "significant" he meant *almost half*. This would be one determination of the word.

"Change" implies a difference. To develop a concept of change necessitates knowing current conditions. Thus substantive comment regarding the specific changes must await more extensive discussion of the present foreign trade policy of the United States. Nevertheless, the resolution does seem to call for making conditions different, whether through alternation, substitution, or variation. If an affirmative team does not meet this requirement, one can anticipate strong argument from the negative regarding topicality.

The final phrase in the first resolution, "foreign trade policies," identifies the policy area where the change is expected to occur. To clarify: not just any change would be resolutive, but only a change which relates to foreign trade policy. The argument will be joined, then, by the affirmative and negative in a dispute about our trade policies.

One law dictionary defines "foreign" as "pertaining to some other country."¹⁷ The same source defines "policy" as "the general purpose of a statute or of a whole body of legislation, or the general purpose followed by the executive branch of the government or by some administrative board."¹⁸ Trade relates to an exchange, swap, carrying on a business, or having business dealings.¹⁹ The conduct of business, distribution of goods, and exchanges that exist between nations are usually thought of as being the foreign trade aspect of United States policy. The distribution of goods, defined from the perspective of economics, is "the system of dispersing goods throughout a community."²⁰ The

combination of this meaning with the generally accepted meaning of foreign policy suggests that the subject being debated will have to be concerned with the dispersing of goods between the United States and foreign countries.

One way to develop this line of argument is to examine trade statistics. Trade between the United States and oil-producing states is large. Less trade exists between the United States and Cuba, certain Mideastern nations, and China. Foreign aid and economic assistance both influence our trade. Our trade is also limited by our multilateral and bilateral agreements. In short, the distribution of goods influences our trade pattern.

In summary, the first resolution can be restated, juxtaposed with the original language. *Resolved: That the United States* (the affirmative will argue for a federal program) *should significantly change its* (ought to alter to a large degree whatever current commitment exists within the present system) *foreign trade policies* (the way commerce is conducted between the United States and other nations as a statutory procedure).

The Weapons Resolution

The weapons resolution does indicate a specific direction of change. The policy mandates reduced weapons flow. Thus, to be topical a team must produce arguments for reduced weapons flow.

A second observation: this resolution may describe a state of affairs anticipated after the adoption. In other words, this resolution may describe a benefit and *not* indicate a policy. If this is true, different debating might emerge along the lines of college CEDA (Cross Examination Debate Association) debates, which foster value debating. If reduced weapons distribution is a valuable condition, then the policy mechanism which causes this reduction may be quite indirect yet topical. For example, limiting private company sales, though indirectly related to the terms of the resolution, might be an acceptable topical approach.

Finally: the policy called for must limit *both* public and private arms sales. Why else would both terms appear in the resolution? If each word in a resolution must be justified, then some measurable reduction in both public and private arms sales must be argued for.

"Resolved: That the United States should. . . ." begins the weapons resolution. Since the terms have been defined above, there is no need for further comment here. The change agent is identified and "ought" is implied.

“Significantly reduce. . . .” provides clear direction for the change. The difficulty imposed upon the affirmative, of course, is choosing a policy which will “significantly” reduce distribution. If the affirmative wishes to avoid conflict from opponents, then the quantitative reduction must be substantial. Numbers best define “reduce.” “To cause to lessen in size, number, or amount”²¹ is one of its meanings. Context makes other meanings less pertinent. For example, reducing price is not as appropriate a meaning because the next phrase in the resolution mentions “distribution,” not price policies.

“Public and private distribution. . . .” determines the focus of change called for by this resolution. The affirmative team must argue for modification of U.S. policies in ways which would reduce both public and private distribution. Considerable controversy could develop here for debaters attempting to distinguish between public and private. Careful analysis can reduce the difficulties.

Public distribution can be defined in several ways. Legal and standard dictionaries help. *Black’s Law Dictionary* gives the adjectival meaning of “public” as “pertaining to a state, nation, or whole community; proceeding from, relating to, or affecting the whole body of people or an entire community. Open to all; notorious. Common to all or many; general; open to common use.”²² The *American Heritage Dictionary* defines the word as “connected with or acting on behalf of the people, community, or government, rather than private matters or interests.”²³

If public matters pertain to the nation, private matters pertain to individuals. The *American Heritage Dictionary* defines “private law” as “the branch of law which deals with or affects the right of, and the relations between, private individuals.”²⁴ “Private” means “belonging to a particular person or persons, as opposed to the public or the government; *private property*.”²⁵ The *Black’s Law Dictionary* definition of “private” is “affecting or belonging to private individuals, as distinct from the public generally.”²⁶

“Distribution” is the act or process of apportioning. The context of this resolution would suggest an economic meaning for the word. “Distribution” may occur through sale, grants, or other ways. Distribution represents the physical marketing or circulation of goods as part of the exchange process. The *Random House Encyclopedia* gives the following definition of “distribution”:

[The] portion of the total amount of the goods and services a society produces that each individual or group receives. Some-

times called personal distribution or income distribution in order to distinguish it from the marketing of commodities (physical distribution), it has been an important aspect of economic analysis since Adam Smith focused on the issue in the 18th century.²⁷

Black's Law Dictionary gives the following general definition, "The giving out or division among a number, sharing or parceling out, allotting, dispensing, apportioning."²⁸ Thus one can define this phrase as incorporating both government and individual physical distribution.

"Of weapons to foreign countries," the final phrase in the weapons resolution, identifies the place of argument. The mandate will act upon all or part of a broad class—weapons which might be sold, given, loaned, or otherwise distributed to nations outside the United States.

What class of weapons? Nuclear, conventional, tanks, ships, rifles, or what-have-you must be the first concern of the analyst. But this first concern is not a simple matter. For example, since munitions must be transported, ships and planes may come under the term. Several approaches can assist in determining what must be included. First, the classification provided by study of the current government budget allocations for military purposes sets some limits on the subject. Since the subject being debated will be acted upon by the United States, the current interpretation by that government should be definitive. A second approach through dictionary explications should also aid us in a search for an adequate definition. Finally, information from current periodicals might augment our knowledge of the current use of the term.

The budget for 1978 indicates substantial funding for the "national defense function." Here, military assistance, in the form of grant military assistance and foreign military credit sales, is outlined. *The Budget for Fiscal Year 1978* notes: "Defense materiel and services are provided by the United States to friendly developing countries for their internal security and self-defense and to support their participation in regional or collective security arrangements."²⁹

A dictionary definition of "weapon" admits all the defense materiel and services noted above: "Any instrument used for fighting. . . . any means of attack or defense."³⁰ This general definition is perhaps the most comprehensive for the topic.

Looking at an article in a respected journal reviewing government-to-government arms transfers of the United States is also

useful. Here, foreign military sales and military grant aid indicate the dollar levels of sales between 1950 and 1977:

- Aircraft (including spare parts), \$11.78 billion
- Ships (including spares), \$765.4 million
- Vehicles and weapons (and spares), \$4 billion
- Ammunition, \$2.18 billion
- Missiles (including spares), \$3.46 billion
- Communications equipment (with spares), \$1.06 billion³¹

The items in this list represent part of our arms transfers to other governments. The article noted that grant aid over the same twenty-seven-year period had been distributed as follows:

- Aircraft, \$9.2 billion
- Ships, \$2.25 billion
- Vehicles and weapons, \$9.54 billion
- Ammunition, \$11.14 billion
- Missiles, \$1.35 billion
- Communications equipment, \$2.66 billion³²

Clearly, these two items support the view that “weapon” is a broad term.

The definition of the latter portion of the above phrase, “foreign countries,” requires very little attention. We note the term is plural, not singular. Although stopping arms shipments to only one nation might conceivably prevent transshipments to all other countries, this interpretation might be considered too limited. The absence of any qualifier identifying the *kind* of foreign country that is to be denied weapons would seem to force an affirmative team to defend such a limitation in its plan, on pains of extratopicality charges. Finally, the use of the word “foreign” makes the distinction between United States and other states. *The International Relations Dictionary* discusses “foreign aid” as aid rendered to a country by another government or international institution.³³ This appears adequate.

In summary, the weapons resolution can be restated, juxtaposed with the original language of the resolution—*Resolved: That the United States should* (the affirmative supports that the federal government with headquarters in Washington, D.C., ought) *significantly reduce* (to make a very substantial cut) *public and private*

distribution (sale, grant, or aid by both government and non-government means) of weapons to foreign countries (munitions and supporting equipment to other nations).

The resolution proposes to shift the emphasis of United States policy regarding weapons. Whether or not we currently provide a great deal of the world's weapons, the proposition suggests that the figure be significantly reduced.

The Aid Resolution

President Carter is Niebuhr's "moral man in immoral society" according to David Rudnick.³⁴ Carter's moralistic human rights stand prompted the aid resolution. American aid to foreign governments has political strings:

Mr. Carter's new priorities were spelled out in a speech at Notre Dame University, when he spoke of the need for the United States to gain a new confidence, overcome its obsessive fear of Communism, and cease supporting the status quo when this took an unjust, dictatorial form. So the United States has moved some way towards reconciliation with Vietnam and Cuba, and applied pressure, not always discreet, but certainly unprecedented in scale, on countries, from Thailand to Chile, where human rights are being infringed.³⁵

Beginning analysis of this topic suggests two questions: What is the foreign assistance program? What is a totalitarian government?

"Resolved: That the United States should significantly reduce . . ." has been previously defined. The change agent is our federal government. "The" identifies the government headquartered in Washington, D.C. The resolution asks for debate over the desirability of policy by using "should." The resolution demands that the direction of change be substantial, qualitatively or quantitatively. The change must minimize aid to certain nations. The debate team ignoring these clear mandates will debate about topicality.

"Its foreign assistance programs. . ." refers to United States programs by repeating the pronoun "its." The phrase identifies generic assistance programs to other nations by using "foreign."

The U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs for 1979, as submitted by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, provide one source of definition. The administration's assessments state that (1) less-developed countries are growing in importance; (2) the developing countries are central participants in our quest for peace; (3) special consideration was given to the condition of political, economic, and civil

rights of the recipient states; (4) a reorganization of our aid programs might be undertaken; and (5) a number of special problems must be considered in allocating our assistance.³⁶ Taken in context, "programs" suggests that the affirmative policy cut "some" of the "several" programs which currently exist.

"To totalitarian governments," the final phrase of the resolution, specifies a group of nations. Totalitarian is defined in *The New Columbia Encyclopedia* as a "modern form of autocratic government in which the state involves itself in all facets of society."³⁷ A similar approach appears in another dictionary: "A form of government or state in which the lives and actions of every individual, and every enterprise, are controlled by a dictator or dictatorial caucus."³⁸ One dilemma faces a debater on this resolution. Is the issue the extreme suggested above—a government involving itself in *all* facets of society—or is a less restrictive definition reasonable?

In summary, the aid resolution can be rephrased in juxtaposition with the original resolution, as follows: *Resolved: That the United States should significantly reduce* (the affirmative proposes a policy of action by the government of the United States which ought to be adopted for the purpose of cutting down a substantial number of) *its foreign assistance programs* (the many programs, both military and economic, that currently exist to provide training, security, economic support) *to totalitarian governments* (nations which foster less humanitarian practices for the population of those nations).

2 The Trade Resolution

Resolved: That the United States should significantly change its foreign trade policies.

"It is important for this nation's economic vitality that both the private sector and the Federal government place a higher priority on exports."³⁹ With these words, President Jimmy Carter announced on September 26, 1978, a series of measures designed to implement that higher priority. You and the other high school debaters in 1979-80 will debate the nature of the changes. To answer the vital questions requires a thorough understanding of current trade policies; the implications of those policies upon the three "E's" of our nation's interests: energy, economics, and environment; and, finally, consideration of some potential changes which might be mandated in the near future.

President Carter's comments were previewed at mid-year by Assistant Commerce Secretary Frank Weil who said, "What we need is a higher, government-wide national priority for trade, particularly for exports."⁴⁰ A more complete shopping list was included in a speech made before the Iowa State Bar Association in Des Moines on June 22, 1978, by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher:

The issues of this new agenda are bread-and-butter, pocket-book issues. They arise from the increasing impact of events abroad on prices, on jobs, and on the conditions of day-to-day life here in the United States.

Some of the issues are new and unprecedented, such as energy prices, allocation of ocean resources, and environmental impacts. Others involve traditional concerns of international economic policy. . . . All have a common origin in the increasing interaction between the United States and the economies of the world.⁴¹

One would conclude from these remarks that the policy which existed in 1978 was, indeed, in need of revision. Woe be unto defenders of the present system, for representatives of the Executive branch and members of Congress were calling for modifica-

tions. Continued decline of the American dollar, increases in dependence upon foreign oil, and general economic instability put us in troubled waters. And politicians know that calls for action (be they token or substantive) are essential to survival during troubled times.

In late 1978 Christopher outlined five foreign policy concerns of the Carter administration. Heading the list was East-West trade.⁴² As you begin to analyze this or any problem, you must ask two questions: "What are the conditions?" and "How do we now respond to those conditions?" Then you attempt to evaluate the potential responses.

The Present System

The United States is a leader in exporting and importing. Tables 3 and 4 support this statement and, upon closer examination, yield much more information. But to understand the nature of the present trade system requires more than simple tables which indicate our rank as importer and exporter. We must look to the public and private trading structures, the laws of the United States, the agreements between the United States and other nations, and the multilateral structures to which we belong.

Unilateral Actions: Laws of the United States

In 1979 the international affairs function of the United States is expected to have an outlay of \$7.6 billion.⁴³ The focus of our laws isn't limited to spending money, of course. We will be active in various programs to stimulate sales of our goods and reduce purchases of other nations' goods. We will pay lip service to free trade and continue to limit the importation of goods which threaten our industry. And we will continue to involve ourselves in programs which, in our view, provide for our security. All of these things occur as a consequence of laws adopted by our government. Henceforth, the focus will be upon the laws relating to trade restrictions.

Restrictions on imports. The first type of law places price limits on imported goods. We can put foreign producers at a price disadvantage by imposing tariffs (taxes). For example, a foreign bicycle manufacturer might be required to pay a tariff of ten dollars per bicycle. Result? The foreign bicycle costs the consumer ten dollars more, giving the domestic model an advantage. Another

Table 3
Exports and Imports
Indexes of Total Value, Unit Value (Average Price), and Quantity
1966 to 1977

1967 average=100. See headnote, table 1513. See also *Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970*, series C 235-248)

INDEX AND ECONOMIC CLASS	EXPORTS OF U.S. MERCHANDISE ¹						GENERAL IMPORTS ²					
	1966- 1970, AVG.	1971- 1973, AVG.	1974	1975	1976	1977 ³	1966- 1970, AVG.	1971- 1973, AVG.	1974	1975	1976	1977 ³
Total value	112.3	175.2	315.0	344.7	369.1	384.7	120.3	211.5	375.6	360.4	452.9	549.8
Foods: Crude.....	99.9	195.4	400.2	454.8	440.0	363.6	112.2	152.1	187.8	183.8	263.7	356.6
Manufactured.....	107.2	164.4	262.0	264.5	298.5	335.6	113.4	179.1	245.8	236.4	249.2	268.2
Materials, crude.....	108.5	178.5	338.5	330.5	358.5	424.4	107.0	157.9	539.5	633.5	863.6	1099.1
Manufactures:												
Semi.....	118.6	156.6	316.2	285.5	310.7	314.2	115.9	190.5	394.8	309.8	366.5	447.9
Finished.....	113.7	177.3	303.2	353.0	381.3	401.8	128.5	250.9	369.5	354.5	441.3	521.2
Unit value	103.0	123.1	174.5	195.1	202.1	211.8	103.2	130.7	223.3	241.2	248.8	269.2
Foods: Crude.....	98.0	123.2	242.7	242.5	219.0	189.5	106.3	131.3	173.0	168.0	250.0	371.1
Manufactured.....	101.8	136.6	209.4	200.5	184.1	201.4	103.6	132.2	204.5	216.2	187.4	178.5
Materials, crude.....	101.5	135.6	227.5	250.7	256.2	284.3	102.8	118.4	349.1	364.8	393.7	424.5
Manufactures:												
Semi.....	99.2	109.2	195.6	198.7	188.0	196.3	103.2	128.0	275.4	280.0	275.8	302.9
Finished.....	105.1	123.3	149.3	176.4	192.0	204.1	102.8	133.5	186.1	211.4	215.7	226.2
Quantity	108.7	140.9	180.5	176.7	182.7	181.7	116.0	160.8	168.2	149.4	182.1	204.2
Foods: Crude.....	101.7	149.2	164.9	187.5	200.9	191.9	105.5	115.8	108.6	109.4	114.7	96.1
Manufactured.....	105.2	120.1	125.6	131.9	162.2	166.6	108.9	134.7	132.2	109.2	133.0	150.3
Materials, crude.....	106.7	129.9	148.6	131.8	139.9	149.3	104.1	131.4	154.5	174.3	219.4	258.9
Manufactures:												
Semi.....	119.6	141.8	161.6	143.7	165.3	160.1	112.1	147.0	143.4	110.7	132.9	147.9
Finished.....	107.6	143.2	203.0	200.3	198.5	169.9	124.1	186.3	198.6	167.7	204.6	230.4

¹ Excludes military grant-aid. ² Preliminary.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Indexes of U.S. Exports and Imports by Economic Class, 1919-1971*, and unpublished data.

From: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1978* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 875.

way to give the American manufacturer a price advantage is to establish minimum prices below which foreign producers may not sell. In December 1978, President Carter applied this kind of rule to imported steel. The Treasury Department has this discretion under our "antidumping" statutes.⁴⁴

A second type of law restricts the quantity of imported goods. This restriction, generally eliminated by the multilateral agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, is called a *quota*. For instance, the United States may limit the number of television sets brought into the United States, either from a single country or from the world. The effect is, given sufficient demand within the United States, to insure a market for American producers of television sets.

A third kind of law imposes quality control on imported goods. For example, we restrict the importation of pharmaceutical products based upon the reports of the Food and Drug Administration. We also restrict the flow of goods based upon recommendations of the Consumer Product Safety Commission.

A fourth restrictive law is political. Our Trading with the Enemy Act blocks imports from *and* exports to Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, North Korea, Rhodesia, and, as a result of recent legislation, Uganda. Until 1972 the law blocked (embargoed) trade with the People's Republic of China.⁴⁵ An interesting sidelight of this law is that U.S. firms, wherever they are located, are forbidden from exporting goods, even those not of U.S. origin, to those nations. Some Canadian grain deals have been stopped as a result.⁴⁶

The U.S. Constitution grants the power of regulating foreign commerce to Congress. In some instances Congress has ceded that power to the Executive. The Trade Act of 1974 grants the president wide authority to negotiate new reductions in tariffs and other barriers to trade and to grant relief to any firms thought to

Table 4

Exports of Leading Commodities
Value, by Areas: 1976 and 1977

In millions of dollars, except percent. Includes silver ore and bullion

COMMODITY	1976					1977				
	Total ¹	Canada	American Re- publics	West- ern Eu- rope ²	Far East ³	Total ¹	Canada	American Re- publics	West- ern Eu- rope ²	Far East ³
Total	111,992	21,106	15,487	32,396	20,495	120,163	25,749	16,346	33,752	21,391
Percent	100.0	21.0	13.5	28.2	17.8	100.0	21.4	13.6	28.1	17.8
Agricultural commodities:										
Grains and preparations ⁴	10,911	135	916	2,997	3,213	8,755	110	880	2,416	2,426
Fruits, nuts, vegetables ⁴	1,535	505	82	545	284	1,597	549	94	510	293
Tobacco, unmanufactured	922	3	25	437	343	1,094	4	30	485	415
Soybeans	3,315	87	76	1,901	882	4,593	97	127	2,508	1,240
Cotton, excl. linters and waste	1,049	47	4	103	865	1,530	68	4	219	1,160
Nonagricultural⁵:										
Ores and scrap, metal	1,285	171	81	636	387	1,197	169	71	531	406
Coal, coke, and briquettes	2,988	760	192	941	1,059	2,730	792	212	709	938
Petroleum products	968	118	158	383	165	1,276	348	157	418	178
Chemicals	9,959	433	2,165	3,527	1,715	10,427	1,539	2,350	3,737	1,952
Machinery ^{6,7}	32,051	6,792	5,460	8,460	4,671	33,343	6,927	5,588	9,213	4,562
Agricultural machines, tractors, parts ⁸	2,930	1,085	525	510	122	2,780	1,012	562	527	133
Other nonelectrical ⁹	19,823	4,152	4,330	5,453	2,478	20,278	4,300	3,295	5,907	2,508
Electrical apparatus	9,278	1,555	1,615	2,497	1,971	10,285	1,615	1,731	2,779	2,121
Road motor vehicles ¹⁰ , Automotive parts, non- military	9,950	6,413	1,250	571	273	10,690	7,143	1,326	630	286
Aircraft, civilian, and parts for all aircraft	4,213	3,094	484	254	93	4,673	3,461	535	291	95
Pulp, paper, and manufactures	5,134	165	496	1,488	859	4,680	201	392	1,408	980
Metals and manufactures	2,621	499	460	927	386	2,564	430	489	871	429
Iron and steel mill products ¹¹	5,181	1,524	916	1,184	582	5,149	1,627	918	1,069	447
Textile yarn, fabrics, and made- up articles	1,833	571	427	296	189	1,608	605	354	201	122
Other (incl. Special Category)	1,971	520	257	792	142	1,950	518	296	649	137
	25,142	4,906	2,969	7,594	4,769	28,379	5,227	3,412	8,379	5,542

¹ Includes areas not shown separately. ² Includes Greece and Turkey. ³ Asia, excluding Near East.
⁴ Includes shipments for relief by individuals and private agencies. ⁵ Excludes "Special Category."
⁶ Includes parts for tractors. ⁷ Excludes parts for tractors. ⁸ Excludes pig iron.

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Industry and Trade Administration, *Overseas Business Reports, U.S. Trade with Major World Areas*, periodic.

From: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1978* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 875.

be suffering injury from imported goods.⁴⁷ Of the nine cases brought to the president's attention by 1977, however, he granted relief in only one instance. Therefore, this fifth law granting specific benefits to American firms has not altered the trade picture substantially.

A sixth law deals with responses to the Arab trade boycott against Israel. Arab nations have boycotted Israel for thirty years. In 1965 we passed the Export Administration Act, and an amendment required that all U.S. exporters report to the Commerce Department the receipt and nature of any request having the effect of furthering or supporting the Arab boycott.⁴⁸ As our relationship with the Arab nations has grown more important to us, however, the difficulty of opposing Arab boycott actions has increased.⁴⁹ In any case, many American companies have been limited in their foreign sales by the boycott. Coca-Cola, Ford Motor Company, Miles Laboratories, and Xerox are but a few of the firms affected. As with many other aspects of the Middle East conflict, we have been placed in the middle.

Restrictions on exports. Just as we have established laws responding to another nation's boycott, we have laws limiting our own exports to some countries, such as the Trading with the Enemy Act. This limit was political in its inception and is political in its modification. Thus, in 1972 we modified the law to permit trade on a limited basis with the People's Republic of China.

The Export Administration Act regulates the exportation of goods from the United States. According to some, the law is "written totally negatively—nothing can be exported unless specifically granted the right."⁵⁰ However, President Carter is working to change this situation. He vetoed protectionist measures relating to meat and textile imports.⁵¹ In September 1978 he announced actions which suggest his liberal trade attitude. These included measures to aid U.S. exporters, reduce domestic export barriers, and reduce foreign export barriers.⁵² The program aims at loans to small exporters, short-term export credits to agricultural producers, and trade offices in importing nations.⁵³

The International Trade Commission regulates U.S. exports. The commission must deal with conflicting government policies related to finance, tax, environment, antitrust, and government priorities, as well as the writing of guidelines for the acts mentioned below on foreign bribery, antitrust, and environmental matters.⁵⁴

Multinational restrictions. Many of our laws apply to the multinational corporation. The multinational corporation extends its business operations to two or more countries, and it frequently has relationships that are "dependent, symbiotic, and sometimes suborning, with the modern government."⁵⁵ Their size and resources give multinational corporations massive power which may be even greater than that of the nation-states in which they operate.⁵⁶ If U.S. multinationals are to play the game at all they must be given both "a freer hand and more effective support, especially on financing, tax policy, and in exerting economic pressure to help spur U.S. sales and guard investments."⁵⁷ Otherwise, higher costs of operating abroad could force U.S. multinationals to invest in the U.S. and withdraw from overseas.⁵⁸

The U.S. Export-Import Bank is a federal bank where money is loaned, but not as efficiently as possible: "Most countries have better export financing than American industry. And most foreign governments have ways of providing tax relief for exports,"⁵⁹ according to W. Paul Cooper, an American tool company executive.

The multinationals are restricted by antibribery, antiboycott, and taxation laws. The principal laws which affect the multinationals abroad relate to bribery. In the wake of the 1977 Lockheed Corporation scandals, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act was adopted, making improper payments to foreigners to win business illegal. The Arab boycott led Congress to prohibit U.S. companies from complying with the boycott; the Export Administration Act amendment subjects violators to civil fines; the 1976 Reform Act taxes Americans living abroad; and the 1974 Trade Act prohibits the Soviet Union from receiving most-favored-nation tariff treatment.⁶⁰ The situation is not one-sided, of course. The multinationals are powerful. According to one view illicit payments, exploitation of host countries, demands of special treatment, and disregard for legislation of host countries are problems which developing countries must face from the transnational corporations.⁶¹

The United States, in accord with Jimmy Carter's foreign policy, is attempting to cooperate with the multinationals. Antitrust legislation is not enforced unless a major question emerges. Carter aims at a foreign policy which has three basic purposes: an improved trade balance, a strengthened dollar, and better trade partner relationships. All three benefit from helping the multinational corporations.

The Problem

U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown may have overstated the case regarding U.S. policy reaction to a complete cutoff of Middle East oil. He provided the "blunt warning that the U.S. would intervene with military force in this event."⁶² But even if this saber-rattling is exaggerated, war is not out of the picture. The problem, then, is whether or not the United States can supply its energy needs. This question can be answered only by considering the total energy picture. Three interrelated categories of problems must be discussed when analyzing the trade picture of the United States. Energy, economics, and environment are critical to our future. The *déjà vu* you may be experiencing when you see material on the energy crisis may subside when you realize that the emphasis this year will be upon the trade links; thus you must consider the implications of the energy shortage when debating this year's topic.

Energy

Getting Oil from the Arabs

The danger is that if we don't have energy there will be a "vast, global shift in political alignments."⁶³ The United States needn't be the leader, but should the power shift to hostile interests serious problems will emerge for us. And under any circumstances, the United States must have world trade to survive: "Nearly 10 million American jobs depend on our exports. Two-thirds of our imports are raw materials that we do not or cannot readily produce. One out of every three dollars of U.S. corporate profits is derived from international activities."⁶⁴ But we currently worry about the power to produce the items to export. We may have to discover how to use energy differently and more wisely. The alarm has been sounded; the days of plentiful energy are over. And yet, according to *Business Week*, "The nation's international economic woes are compounded by continued failure to adopt policies that will reverse the growing reliance on imported oil—a major factor in the decline of the dollar."⁶⁵ When we are discussing a capital investment of \$31.7 billion in 1978 by United States investors we are not talking minor matters.⁶⁶

The energy coming from oil is costing more money. "Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Libya, Kuwait, and Venezuela have already announced price increases of as much as 14%, and more bad news is

expected when the cartel assembles in special session on March 25 in Geneva."⁶⁷ The price may reduce the amount we demand. "Crude oil imports from the Middle East made up 22% of our total petroleum consumption and nearly half of our imports in 1977 (versus 7% and 29% respectively in 1973)."⁶⁸ This increase has made the Arab states a growth market for a wide range of services, capital, and consumer goods: "The rapid increase in investable surplus which the Arab governments hold—now approximately \$140 billion—has added a new dimension to our interests in the area."⁶⁹

We have long recognized the importance of the major Arab countries, whose oil has been important to our allies. Now the wealth of these states has added a new degree of interdependence between the United States and the Arab nations. Our concern goes far beyond the former strategic questions of their proximity to the U.S.S.R.: "A repeat performance of 1973, even in a minor key, would have enormous consequences for a U.S. economy that many economists see as teetering on the brink of recession."⁷⁰ *Time* chimed in with the potential results of increased oil prices: "Higher oil costs are bound to filter into the Consumer Price Index and complicate the Administration's tough task of slowing inflation."⁷¹ Even an Administration figure, Assistant Commerce Secretary Frank Weil, noted that the U.S. trade deficit is "negative" in terms of economic growth. He added, "As this process goes on it adds to inflation in the U.S."⁷²

The days of picturing the Arabs as a group of playboys in the rooftop casino of the M.G.M. Grand Hotel in Las Vegas are also past. Trading partners, possessors of fuel for the world, occasional rebels—these are the pictures we must develop of the Arabs. Our trade policies have not yet gotten control of the energy which runs industry; and without control, the dollar, the economy, and our well-being are in jeopardy. "The longer we run an excessively large deficit the more dollars foreigners must hold—and the dollars will be worth less and less. That means more inflation in the U.S. and greater financial instability overseas."⁷³ The words of economist and businessman Herbert E. Neil, Jr., echo those of many American businessmen.

The Iranian Problem

"To many in the international oil industry, the Iranian revolution is beginning to look disturbingly like a replay of the 1973 Arab oil boycott."⁷⁴ Iranian oil represented only 3 percent of the total

domestic consumption imported by the United States in 1977, but the overall importance of their oil is emphasized in Table 5.

Consider the impact of a permanent shift of political commitment by Iran. Would oil be sold to Japan? To Western Europe? And at what price in terms of political concessions? As *Business Week* noted: "Western Europe, while not as dependent on Iran for oil as Japan, is still feeling the pinch."⁷⁵

Of equal importance to the United States is that continuing problem, the dollar: "The dollar's recovery in recent months has proved extremely fragile, and Iran's turmoil may have far deeper significance for the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit and inflation rate than anyone has yet estimated."⁷⁶

The Saudi Problem

To a significant degree, Saudi Arabia holds the fate of the world economy in its hands. With 20 percent of the noncommunist world's oil reserves, the Saudis can determine prices established by OPEC.⁷⁷ How and to what degree Saudi Arabia asserts independence from the rest of the world will be of particular import to those analyzing the oil question. For example, takeover of the Arabian-American Oil Company marks the end of an era when private companies could exercise the power of ownership. Now the political interests of Saudi Arabia will determine, to a very large extent, the future oil supplies available for sale to us.

Table 5

The Importance of Iranian Oil

Countries	Percent of Total Daily Domestic Consumption
Britain	15
France	10
Israel	67
Italy	14
Japan	17
South Africa	90
United States	3
West Germany	12

From: *Business Week*, 19 February 1979, p. 23.

Given this sort of condition one can expect more occasions such as the spectacle of the Mexican President lecturing the President of the United States and general discussion of our declining power.⁷⁸ The issue which is behind this talk may well be the key to the debate topic, *What foreign policy moves are available to the United States?* There are few moves we could make, beyond the sword-rattling variety, which would influence world policies regarding energy. And the steps which we can take domestically (as last year's debate resolution proved) will not have much impact on the overall U.S. energy situation. If, as President Carter has stated, "A major cause [of our trade deficits] has been our excessive reliance on imported oil,"⁷⁹ maintaining a good relationship with Saudi Arabia will be a critical part of our foreign policy to insure oil supplies and minimize our trade deficits, unless and until we can reduce our reliance on imported oil.

Getting Out of the Nuclear Field

"One by one, the lights are going out for the U.S. nuclear power industry. Reactor orders have plummeted from a high of 41 in 1973 to zero this year. Nuclear power stations are taking longer to build, and the delays are tacking hundreds of millions of dollars onto their costs. Waste disposal, which was supposed to be solved by now, is not. The export market is already glutted and shrinking fast."⁸⁰ The president of Westinghouse Power Systems commented that antinuclear sentiment at home has "taken us from 100% of the world market to practically zero."⁸¹ This antinuclear sentiment, coupled with the reduced demand for electrical power and fear based on the dangers of storing nuclear waste materials, has further shrunk the demands for nuclear power.

These concerns about nuclear power have generated another concern: the consequences of returning to greater use of coal. "Mining and burning a lot more coal, however, presents multiple economic and environmental problems."⁸² To itemize the industrial and environmental harms associated with coal seems a waste of time. Refer to the *First Analysis* of last year's topic, or to your own files, to aid your initial research.

Some debate teams will discover a way to incorporate materials related to use of nuclear energy into their cases. While coaching advice is outside the scope of this book, debaters are advised that in the analysis of the topic, both sides could use a strong brief entitled "Nuclear power is not part of the policy defended by this

team." Using the argument a few times in select rounds will probably reduce the need to use it. Teams which fail with attacks based upon spurious connections eventually learn not to use those attacks.

One closing remark about nuclear power. Fusion power, the technology that can wring limitless energy from hydrogen, may become a standard power-generating resource. But most estimates see that as occurring well after the turn of the century. Thus, fusion is not relevant to current policy debates.

Economics: Current Conditions

In 1946 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, the dollar became the commonly accepted reserve currency, but since 1971, the dollar has been in decline. One reason would appear to be the changing status of our balance of payments. *We now purchase more goods than we sell.*

This trade deficit is probably a consequence of two developments: high energy bills and a faster rate of United States economic growth as compared to other nations. Explained one way, we look at the energy imports of \$45 billion and contrast that with the rest of our trade picture, where we find "for non-energy trade, our relatively rapid recovery from the world recessions has sucked in imports much faster than sluggish growth abroad has stimulated our exports."⁸³

A further explanation of the deficit is that it reflects the acceleration of the U.S. inflation rate relative to other major industrialized countries. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) noted that consumer prices in the U.S. rose at an average annual rate of 6.7 percent. Compare this with 6.1 percent in Germany, 11.5 percent in Japan, and 7.7 percent in Switzerland between 1971 and 1975. Since 1975, however, "the rate of consumer price inflation in the U.S. has remained near the high average of 1971-1975, while inflation has decelerated sharply in the three strong-currency countries."⁸⁴

The overall picture is reflected in a comment by Melvyn B. Krauss, a professor of economics at New York University:

The economies of the Western industrialized nations have shown themselves unwilling to adjust to the changed realities of the international marketplace. The reality is that Japan and certain less developed countries can now outdo us in a number of areas—steel, color television sets, textiles, and shipbuilding, to name a few.⁸⁵

The result of all this is summarized by Walter E. Hoadley, chief economist for the Bank of America: "Virtually all nations except the U.S. are pursuing aggressive policies to expand exports and decrease imports—which, of course, is not possible in the aggregate. Something has to give."⁸⁶ That something may be the domestic economy of the United States.

Trade and the Changing Market

In 1977 the United States had a \$31 billion trade deficit. The fundamental problem would appear to be slow export growth and a deteriorating U.S. share in world trade, particularly in manufactured goods. The volume of American manufactured goods exported has fallen steadily since 1974. In 1976 the United States had a \$12 billion trade surplus in manufactured goods; in 1977, the surplus level had fallen to \$3 billion.⁸⁷ Small businesses are finding it especially hard to keep up. In the past, machine tool manufacturers were exporting their goods to countries all over the world. As we establish stronger protective rules, less export capability exists for these tool manufacturers.⁸⁸ On the other hand, other industrial countries have been increasing their export rate.

But this is not all bad. The gyrations of the international currency markets are surface manifestations of a growing trade rivalry among the leading capitalist nations. The sinking dollar "has the obvious advantage of strengthening U.S. export opportunities in the affected countries, and at the same time weakening the competitive status of the latter's exports to the United States."⁸⁹ Furthermore, the dollar's value is sinking only in relation to a few of our trading partners.

Since world trade has multiplied more than tenfold in past decades, the position of the United States should have moved upward more rapidly than it has. But the plus signs exist. Our gross national product has risen from less than \$500 billion to more than \$1 trillion in real terms. Our total employment has increased by more than 50 percent since the early 1950s while our population has increased by less than 45 percent. Much of that growth has been a result of exports.⁹⁰

Other positive signs exist. The Federal Reserve Board finds "a competitive edge in exports" for the United States.⁹¹ Retaining this competitive edge will be important; otherwise, some say, we will experience sudden jumps in the dollar value and the volatile ups and downs in the foreign exchange markets that hurt international trade.

There are other bright spots in our economy related to trade, such as agricultural products.⁹² A Waterloo, Iowa, firm representative noted, "In Waterloo, 20% of the tractors and parts manufactured by Deere & Co. are shipped abroad, and company officials estimate that nearly 2,800 employees owe their jobs directly to foreign trade."⁹³ Metal prices are booming. One metals trader in New York said recently, "We're looking at the biggest bull market in metals since early 1974."⁹⁴ This is thought to be due to investors who are seeking "hard assets." And finally, "Japanese, German, and British investors are among those who continue to pour money into U.S. bricks and mortar."⁹⁵ These examples demonstrate that positive economic signs do exist.

A final word. Overall conditions may seem to require a return to the era of protectionism. Clearly, *this direction of change is acceptable for affirmative teams*. The negative teams will need, therefore, to consider the implications of ending the competitive economy and giving the government "much more of a say in economic decisions."⁹⁶

Trade and the Carter Policy

President Carter has been active in trade policy changes. He has used dollars, regulations, and negotiations to further the interests of the United States.

Carter used dollars in late 1978. On November 1, 1978, Carter anted up a \$30 billion intervention fund and initiated a sharp tightening of monetary policy to stop the dollar's dramatic decline. The biggest impact of this action was to prove that the United States was willing to take risks with domestic monetary policy in order to defend the dollar.

Carter also used regulations. The Carter administration used the antidumping law to protect the U.S. steel industry from foreign competition. "Steel imports are blamed for massive layoffs of steelworkers and for contributing to the nation's rising trade deficit" read one report, and Carter acted.⁹⁷

Carter also proposed modification, within his discretionary powers, of current policies. He wanted to reduce domestic barriers to exports and so proposed to modify executive regulation, to reduce use of restrictive laws regarding exporting to "enemies," and to use the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act sparingly.⁹⁸

Carter also continued the five-year round of negotiations for a new multilateral trade agreement. The president called for international agreements:

I hope that our major trading partners will see the importance of reaching more widespread agreements on the use of export finance to avoid a costly competition which is economically unsound and ultimately self-defeating for all of us. These international agreements are essential to assure that American exporters do not face unfair competition, and this Administration intends to work vigorously to secure them."⁹⁹

Obviously, changes in the present system can be expected, but what are the outward signs of the present system? Are there any signs of the world impact of our current policies? As any direct overview of the situation would indicate, the economic status of the United States has substantial impact on the entire globe.

World Trade

Problems related to our economy and its interrelationships with other nations will be the basis for many affirmative cases this year. China, Africa, Europe, and others represent prospective case areas. As noted earlier, the OPEC nations clearly deserve case attention.

China has a population equal to one-quarter of the earth's total population. When the United States officially recognized China on January 1, 1979, it merely acknowledged the obvious. But the normalization provided for commercial and cultural relations, as well as enhanced the prospects for the stability of Asia. President Carter hoped to shift our trade relations in that direction as well.¹⁰⁰

When China entered into regular trading partnership with the United States, conditions for the states surrounding her changed. "China has entered the arena with a massive, well-disciplined work force that earns only one-fifth of what Hong Kong workers make."¹⁰¹ But the economy of Hong Kong is not the only one which may suffer. The implications extend to Indonesian petroleum; Philippine textiles; Singapore's garments; Thailand's rice, tapioca, sugar, and rubber; and Malaysia's manufactured products.

How could China have developed quite so rapidly? Beyond having a massive population, China has an authoritarian government that has engaged in "confiscation or expropriation [which] appears to have been a valuable tool for such countries as the Soviet Union and China, in helping to develop and industrialize at a faster rate whilst other countries, strongly influenced by Western ethics, are lagging behind."¹⁰²

Africa is another part of the world involved in trade with the United States. The fastest growing market for the U.S. is the developing world. "Africa alone provided a market for well over

\$1 billion in U.S. agricultural produce.”¹⁰³ Our major interest must be African minerals. Four strategic minerals—chromite, manganese, vanadium, and platinum—come from South Africa. Were that supply cut off, our prime supplier would become the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁴

Cyrus Vance, in a speech made before the U.S. Jaycees in mid-1978, expressed how broad our interest in Africa is. He noted that African nations play a key role in international affairs and are directly involved with such issues as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, conventional armaments, famine, and world resources. He continued:

Africa is increasingly important to us in even more immediate ways. Some of you buy and sell goods that require copper, manganese, cobalt, or potash. You have coffee and cocoa in your kitchens. Africa supplies us with between a quarter and one-half of our imports of these and many other raw materials, including 40% of our petroleum imports.¹⁰⁵

The political stability of African states is essential to healthy trade relations. Unfortunately, political turmoil is widespread on the continent. Zaire, for instance, faces economic collapse according to Secretary Vance: “That nation is still threatened by severe economic problems and the prospect of territorial fragmentation.”¹⁰⁶ Rhodesia, faced with the burden of escalating guerrilla warfare, the political uncertainties of black-majority rule, and tightening economic blockage by the West, may not survive. Despite the trade restrictions, the U.S. still has economic interests in Rhodesia. Union Carbide Corporation, an American firm, has mining interests operated by the Rhodesian government since the blockage began.¹⁰⁷

South America is another part of the world where our trade interests are threatened. Many of the South American states are asserting political independence. For example, our chemical producers are quite upset because Colombia has adopted a law requiring that 50 percent of its exports and imports be hauled on Colombian-flag or associated ships.¹⁰⁸

Environment: Famine

In the Horn of Africa conflicts have diverted material and human resources from serious economic and social problems. The prospect? “A grave famine now threatens over a million Ethiopian people with starvation. The food situation throughout the region—and as far away as Tanzania and Pakistan—could be worsened

by large swarms of locusts which are not being adequately controlled."¹⁰⁹ Secretary Vance has noted that the United States contributed \$1.5 million for relief operations in the famine area and assistance to deal with the locusts.

The problem boils down to a single issue: population is still expanding too rapidly:

In 1975 there were some 750 million people living in absolute or relative poverty.

It is estimated that there are four births and two deaths every second. The 3,700 million people in the world in 1972 had increased to 4,000 million by 1975 and are expected to exceed 7,000 million by the year 2000.

The zones of the earth that are naturally fertile, with robust soils and equable climates, are very largely occupied. There are only limited new lands to cultivate, and the gains from that source are balanced, and may even be exceeded, by the loss of farmland through erosion, aridity, salinity and urban encroachment.¹¹⁰

This 1976 estimate, based on World Bank figures, is tempered by indications that some optimism is justified. It is a qualified optimism, because (1) intensive agriculture would require a lot of energy; (2) fertilizers and pesticides have unwelcome side effects; (3) distribution is costly; (4) technology requires training of farmers; and (5) transport and storage of foods generate wastage (for example, "In Africa, the annual losses in storage are equivalent to food requirements of 250 million people. In the United States the losses cost \$100 million per annum."¹¹¹).

The fact is that over much of the world environmental problems are still those associated with poverty, such as poor housing, bad public health, malnutrition, and inadequate employment. Our trade policies will have substantial impact upon these problems.

3 The Arms Resolution

Resolved: That the United States should significantly reduce public and private distribution of weapons to foreign countries.

While President Carter shuttled between Egypt and Israel, a State Department announcement of March 10, 1979, noted that he had signed a waiver which would allow the delivery of warplanes, tanks, and armored personnel carriers to North Yemen without congressional review. A provision of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 says that Congress has the veto power on such transactions *unless* "the president states in his certification that an emergency exists which requires such sale in the national security interests of the United States."¹¹²

Whether by government-to-government sales, grants, or loans, the transfer of arms from the United States to other countries has played a large role in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. And the power of the president to invoke the mystical words "national security" is a reflection of the apparent necessity to provide great flexibility to our leaders when dealing with questions of national defense.

For many years the main objective of our collective security system has been to maintain an overall military balance with the Soviet Union. Other important foreign policy issues—the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, nuclear power, conventional forces—have been seen in terms of the question, How do they affect U.S.—U.S.S.R. relations?

The following material is a first analysis of this debate resolution. The material available on this topic is as massive as that discovered on our trade policies. Briefly discussed here are: (1) the present system, (2) the major issues, (3) a survey of the various geographic trouble spots, and (4) nuclear vs. conventional forces. As with the previous topic, materials related to solutions are included in chapter five.

Arms Transfer System

Since the end of World War II, the United States has maintained a program to assist other nations in developing their armed forces. The background of the program is provided in an excellent document, *United States Arms Transfer and Security Assistance Programs*:

Postwar American aid, both military and economic, was extended to areas and nations devastated by war and threatened by Communist subversion or aggression. In the postwar period, this great effort in defense, economic, and political recovery was, to a great extent, a triumph of American leadership and initiative, especially in Western Europe.

As the nations of Western Europe completed their economic recovery, the military assistance programs in that area were reduced and arms began to be provided through cash sales. In recent years, trends in U.S. arms transfers have continued to reflect the declining use of military assistance and an increasing reliance on arms sales.¹¹³

The means the U.S. now uses to facilitate arms transfer are varied. The most substantial program, the *military assistance program* (MAP), involves the loan or outright grant to foreign countries of military equipment, facilities, technical assistance, repair and rehabilitation, logistics assistance, and administrative support. This program is carried out under authority of part two of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended. Each year Congress must reconsider the act, and at that time funds to carry out the program must be authorized and later appropriated.

MAP is a product of the Cold War. The stated purpose of the Foreign Assistance Act is to strengthen the mutual defense and collective security of the noncommunist world. As the needs and original rationale receded, Congress has relied upon the program less and less: "This program is likely to continue on a reduced and annually authorized basis for specific countries for some years to come in order to provide military assistance to countries with which the United States has concluded base rights in exchange for, *inter alia*, multiyear military assistance commitments."¹¹⁴

To receive MAP a country must agree that it will not, without consent of the U.S. government, permit the use of U.S.-supplied arms by anyone who is not an officer, employee, or agent of that country; permit the transfer of such articles to another nation; or use or permit the use of such articles for purposes other than those for which they were furnished. These provisions are in Section

505(a) of the act. The level of aid which may be granted under this act is set at a maximum of \$3 million per country.

To receive more than \$3 million, the president must certify that (1) the country conforms to the purposes and principles of the U.N.; (2) the defense articles will be used to support free world defensive strength; (3) the country is taking all reasonable measures to develop its own defense capacities; and (4) increased ability of the country to defend itself is important to U.S. security.¹¹⁵ Another important condition for MAP aid is assurance that basic human rights are respected in countries participating in the program. In FY 1978, MAP countries were Greece, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Jordan, Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand.

The president does have discretion in the granting or terminating of military assistance, including situations where U.S. property within a country is threatened, narcotics control is ineffective, or bribery is involved in sales. Executive flexibility in other respects is also a feature of the program:

Flexibility is provided the Administration in the conduct of the military assistance program. The ceiling amounts specifically established for the eight countries concerned may be increased by not more than ten percent (10%) if the President deems such increase necessary (Section 504[a] [1]). Funds may be used for the winding up of military assistance programs or for other costs incurred in loans of defense articles to countries no longer eligible for military assistance (Section 515[b]). Section 614 authorizes the President the sum of \$250 million, plus \$100 million in foreign countries, "for the use . . . without regard to the requirements of this Act."¹¹⁶

The *foreign military sales* (FMS) program is carried out under the provisions of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), formerly the Foreign Military Sales Act (FMSA). The act provides for the transfer of arms, other military equipment, and various services through government-to-government agreements. Under the program the Department of Defense (DOD) purchases military equipment or services from U.S. firms, or, under some circumstances, takes equipment from U.S. stocks, and sells the equipment or services to a foreign government or international organization. This program is not considered assistance since there is no cost, per se, to the U.S. government. The bulk of U.S. arms transfers are carried out under this program.

As noted in chapter one, foreign military sales fall into consistent categories: aircraft; ships; vehicles, weapons, and spares; ammunition; missiles; communications equipment; construction;

repair and rehabilitation of equipment; supply operations; training; and technical assistance. Between 1950 and 1977, sales handled through the DOD amounted to \$27.86 billion (Army), \$15.4 billion (Navy), \$27.39 billion (Air Force), and \$344 million through other agencies.¹¹⁷

All of this was translated by *New Times*, Moscow edition, as an indicator of our national arms commitment: "The United States dominates the market. According to Pentagon data, between 1950 and 1977 the U.S.A. sold or gave 126,000 million dollars' worth of material to other countries. Last year it accounted for roughly one-half of the world arms trade."¹¹⁸

The *Arms Export Control Act* (AECA) gives the president authority to finance sales of defense articles and services or to guarantee financing to friendly foreign countries or international organizations. The developing countries are expressly aided in making the transition from grant aid to sales by this act.

In 1974 Congress enacted section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (later to become the Arms Export Control Act). This provided congressional veto power over individual arms sales, but, as noted earlier, there is a proviso to respond to emergency circumstances which limits the veto power.

Commercial arms sales do not constitute a government program as such. Payments are arranged privately with the purchaser for the direct transfer of arms, equipment, and services. However, the export of arms and services sold through commercial channels is controlled by export licenses issued by the Department of State.

In FY 1977, U.S. commercial exports of items on the munitions list were valued at an estimated \$1.2 billion; this amount is in addition to the government arms transfers. The leading arms purchasers in the past have been Germany, Japan, Canada, and Israel, each having purchased more than \$675 million. Fifteen countries have purchased arms commercially from U.S. companies in amounts of more than \$100 million each.¹¹⁹

The Arms Export Control Act places a limit on the size of a commercial export sales contract, requiring that any purchase by non-NATO countries amounting to more than \$25 million cannot be licensed for commercial sale but must be handled by the federal government under the foreign military sales program.¹²⁰

The *ship transfer program* involves the sale, grant, lease, or loan of U.S. naval vessels to foreign governments. Except for new construction sales, ships granted or sold to friendly foreign countries have been deemed unnecessary to the Navy and have been stricken

from the U.S. Naval Vessel Register. Specific congressional authorization is required for the transfer of all capital ships and for all ships less than twenty years of age or in excess of 3,000 tons.

Security supporting assistance is designed to promote or support economic or political stability. Historically, countries whose economies are burdened by major defense programs have been aided under this program. Through this flexible program, aid has gone to Western Europe, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and, most recently, Africa.

The *International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976* (Public Law 94-329) overhauled the statutory framework governing the above programs. As a result, the administration is more responsive to the congressional will on arms sales and transfers:

To some extent, the procedures established in Public Law 94-329, combined with greater sensitivity on the part of the administration to the desires of Congress to be consulted in the formulation of arms sales policies and in the conduct of U.S. security assistance programs, have been successful in achieving greater congressional control over these programs. However, the Congress has expressed its concern that much remains to be done to insure effective congressional oversight.¹²¹

The laws mentioned above should provide some insight into the status of the present system regarding weapons transfers.

Treaty laws regulate the sale of nuclear weapons. In 1968, the United States, along with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Since ratified by over 100 nations, the treaty binds the signatories to a policy of non-transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. In addition to this provision, treaties exist establishing a limited test ban, threshold test ban, and underground PNE ban; prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America; controlling seabed arms; and enacting accident measures and measures for the prevention of nuclear war.¹²² Rationale for the limitation of nuclear weapons is provided in the preface to the *Nuclear Proliferation Factbook*:

The ultimate reason why nuclear proliferation is to be avoided lies in the enormous destructive power of nuclear explosions. Even the smallest weapons can release energy equivalent to that of an explosion of many hundreds of tons of TNT, while the largest can have the devastating force of millions of tons, or megatons, of TNT. Nuclear weapons produce blast, heat and ionizing radiations. The blast can destroy structures, the heat can start fires, and the radiation can kill or injure living things.¹²³

The *International Military Education and Training Program* (IMET) trains foreign troops in the United States. By some standards, this training program might be considered a form of weapon. Clearly, experts are willing to include such expenditures as part of the overall weapons policy of the United States.

In summary, U.S. weapons programs must be based on a comprehensive study of the defense policy of our nation. That defense policy, in turn, is a part of the overall U.S. foreign policy. When the United States provides military assistance to another country in the form of sale, credit, or grant, that assistance must be based upon the interests of the United States foreign policy. Military assistance may be given to maintain regional military balances, as in the Middle East, Spain, and the Philippines; or the aid may compensate for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from overseas positions, as in Korea. Finally, aid may be granted to strengthen bilateral political relationships.¹²⁴ Ever since the withdrawal of the U.S. from Southeast Asia, over 60 percent of U.S. defense exports have gone to the Middle East. About one-third of our defense exports have gone to NATO, South Korea, and Japan.¹²⁵ The U.S. has a continuing commitment to increase the strength of friendly nations. This strength is intended to fit within the overall defense policy of the United States.

The Major Issues

Looking at the question of weapons transfer from a broad perspective permits us to conclude that the outlook is for a new guns-and-butter debate in the United States. If the decline in U.S. power is to be arrested, the trend toward spending a smaller share of the federal budget on defense must be reversed, and economic policy must change in a way that encourages investment at the expense of consumption.¹²⁶ The major issues to be considered here are arms negotiations and missile agreements.

Arms Negotiations

In 1961 Congress created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the purpose of advising the president, the secretary of state, and Congress on arms control. President Carter has referred to the agency as "the focal point of my Administration's efforts to reach arms control agreements through negotiations and to develop policies which will lead to reduced worldwide reliance on weaponry."¹²⁷ Some of the critical questions studied by the

ACDA are: (1) the impact of arms control measures on foreign policy and the economy; (2) issues and positions in arms control negotiations; (3) means for monitoring agreements that come into force; (4) the impact of new weapons and military policies on arms control; and (5) the development of safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. achieved their first broad arms-control agreements in 1972, when the antiballistic missile treaty and the interim agreement were signed at the conclusion of the first round of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I). Since that time the two superpowers have been involved in the second phase of the talks (SALT II).¹²⁸

The SALT negotiations succeeded in severely restricting the deployment of antiballistic missile systems by either the United States or the Soviet Union. SALT I also placed limits on the number of offensive weapons. Secretary Vance, speaking about his SALT II negotiations, noted these ways an agreement would aid U.S. security: (1) it would establish equal limits for both sides on the overall number of strategic missile launchers and strategic bombers; (2) it would reduce the number of strategic weapons below the number the Soviets now have; (3) it would establish sublimits on those systems we see as most threatening and destabilizing, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with MIRVed warheads; (4) it would impose restraints on the improvement of existing weapons; (5) it would permit the U.S. to preserve essential options for modernizing our forces; (6) it would protect the interests of our allies; and (7) it would have independent verifiability.¹²⁹

Negotiations of SALT II may well hinge upon questions of qualitative advantage rather than quantitative issues. "It has been clear for some years that the strategic-arms race is driven primarily by the continuous quest for technological improvement and advantage rather than by the mere desire to increase numbers."¹³⁰ Now, according to the August 23, 1978, speech of the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chairman of the delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, "We are close to the full development of a detailed, comprehensive agreement that will break new ground in arms control. Agreement has been reached on verification measures, on new ceilings, and on subceilings for particular categories of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles."¹³¹

One further concern is the limitation of conventional arms. The international traffic in conventional arms may need to be con-

trolled. Slowing the traffic of arms, however, may not be achieved by the United States alone. Regional agreements limiting arms competition may be necessary.

Another concern is the control of the spread and use of new weapons systems whose impact on the civilian populations is particularly deadly. Biological, chemical, and environmental weapons treaties have been or are being negotiated. As Secretary Vance has noted: "The indiscriminate and random character of many weapons in these categories is so great that virtually all nations agree that they be forsworn forever as instruments of war."¹³²

Missile Agreements

Many lessons have been learned as we have negotiated with the Soviet Union in the SALT talks. We have learned that we can negotiate successfully about strategic arms. "The antiballistic missile limitation treaty did, in fact, limit the deployment of ballistic missile defenses."¹³³ We have also learned that we can verify agreements without substantial risk to our security.

Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, noted in the report for FY 1979 the impact of SALT upon missile development:

While the United States would have preferred a more far-reaching agreement, the one that is now beginning to take shape will constitute a significant step toward meeting our strategic objectives through arms control, and could lead to further mutual restraint, both qualitative and quantitative. The reductions in Soviet launchers, coupled with the sublimits on MIRVed ballistic missiles in general, and MIRVed ICBMs in particular, will help to preserve perceptions of essential equivalence and will contribute to military equivalence and stability. Mobile ICBM research and development can continue on a schedule that will not inhibit our present plans. Work can go forward on ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles.¹³⁴

As *The Economist* noted, "The Russian concessions in Mr. Carter's proposed deal, few as they are, lie in the new concept of sublimits: of the 1,320 MIRVed launchers, only 1,200-1,250 (undecided) can be missiles; the other 70-120 have to be bombers (a bomber with cruise missiles is counted as a MIRVed launcher)."¹³⁵

Geographic Trouble Spots

Europe, the Far East, the Mideast, and Africa each represent a potential trouble spot for the United States. Consequently, we

must be concerned about our existing weapons transfer system. As Secretary Vance has said, "Arms control will not by itself resolve the regional tensions that threaten peace. But by lessening the level of military confrontation and regulating the diffusion of new weapons technologies, we can enhance regional stability and free resources for the task of improving the human condition."¹³⁶ Following is a discussion of the problems and issues concerning each of the four potentially troublesome areas.

NATO

Western Europe has traditionally represented a vital cog in the defense structure of the United States. After World War II, the nations which fought against Germany in the war formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to remain independent from the gathering storm of communism. As a counterbalancing force, the U.S.S.R. pressed the development of the Warsaw Pact. The communist states organized military drills and maneuvers and provided the U.S.S.R. with the balancing force against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The United States sharply increased the emphasis on NATO defense in the 1978 defense budget. NATO plays an important role in the U.S. defense plan by serving as part of its deterrent force against conventional attacks: "As recently as May, 1977, the Alliance affirmed that while modern collective security would require a spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, the strengthening of NATO's conventional forces must be given first priority."¹³⁷ The reason for this strengthening deserves attention here. Since nuclear equivalence now exists between the Soviet Union and the United States, use of nuclear weaponry would be the last step in the application of military power. Thus we must assume that conventional forces would be the first line of defense.

The Soviets, along with their Warsaw Pact allies, have massive ground forces, tactical air forces, and naval forces. These capabilities give them a number of military options. Each of these military options serves as a rationale to *retain* our present weapon strengths, for these options are threats to the security of the United States. One contingency would be an attack against the northern and southern flanks of NATO. Another contingency would be to deny the United States and its allies access to the resources of the Persian Gulf. A third contingency would be a clash between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of

China. Despite the settlement of the recent PRC invasion of Vietnam, the prospects of continued dispute can not be ignored.

When one balances the assets of NATO nations against those of the Warsaw Pact nations, as did the Department of Defense in their 1979 budget requests, the NATO nations are clearly capable of sustaining themselves against their opponent states. The issue may well be one of will, determination, prudence, and efficiency rather than feasibility or even of great sacrifice. It can be seen from the data in Table 6 that NATO can serve as a credible conventional deterrent.

Because Europe is of vital interest to the United States and the Soviets deploy so much of their conventional military power in this area, the United States must regard an attack on Western Europe as the appropriate major contingency against which to design our conventional forces.

Deterrence conditions. In order to further understand the U.S. defense policy, a consideration of the key elements involved in deterrence of conventional warfare is necessary. Modern warfare requires quick victories so that nuclear intervention will be avoided. Thus, it would appear that the major deterrence would come from proof to potential attackers that there would be no quick victory. Seven elements contribute to deterrence with our conventional forces. The elements are: (1) forward defense in critical areas; (2) firepower consisting of forces and attack aircraft; (3) prospect of rapid reinforcement; (4) combat readiness; (5) sustainability; (6) sea control; and (7) power projection (as seen by others).¹³⁸ Based upon forecasts, Harold Brown, Secretary

Table 6

Total NATO and Warsaw Pact Assets

	NATO ¹	Warsaw Pact
GNP (\$ billions)	3,367.0	1,240.0
Population (millions)	554.8	365.7
Military manpower (millions)	4.8	5.2

1. Includes France.

From: Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2 February 1978), p. 73.

of Defense, noted that the NATO alliance required strengthening in the deployed forward defense forces, initial combat capabilities, and reinforcing capabilities.¹³⁹

Neutron bomb. A key strategic question for the future relates to the prospect of the neutron bomb, a device which would kill people but do a minimum of damage to property. The possibility of such a bomb is a bargaining chip which will be played at the highest diplomatic level. The notion that conventional forces must stand alone, without the support of either existing nuclear or undeveloped weapons, is clearly false. As things now stand, we can expect the United States to "do its share to insure that NATO has the capabilities—conventional as well as nuclear—to maintain the independence and territorial integrity of Western Europe."¹⁴⁰

Political aspects. No discussion of the NATO alliance could be complete without reference to the continuing turmoil of the Western European nations. The oil and energy crisis will undoubtedly affect the politics of these states. Furthermore, the kind of presence the United States maintains in Western Europe is of great importance. For example, one current proposal is to supply Europe with more air firepower. To do this through the stationing of American airmen would give one impression, and to sell, loan, or grant equipment would clearly give another.¹⁴¹

In viewing the political aspects of the Western European situation, it is also necessary to consider the effects of West Germany's growing power on the rest of NATO. As Philip Windsor notes, "The Federal Republic is economically and geographically fitted to assume many of Britain's responsibilities. As the most powerful military nation on the Continent, and as the dominant economic power in the EEC, the Federal Republic would, one might argue, find it sensible and logical to assume a commanding position in both the Alliance and the Community."¹⁴² German leadership, however, might well antagonize its partners or alarm its opponents. The politics of NATO could be threatened with a new instability.

Another political issue is the complex process of making decisions regarding Western Europe. The United States can make unilateral judgments, but they must be made to conform to the views and actions of the various nations in NATO. The same is not quite so true of Soviet judgments. An article in *Orbis* points to the essential difference: "With respect to strategic arms problems, specialists participating in the decision-making process come from the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, the military

section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the scientific institutes. Their documents and proposals, after careful screening, are transmitted to the Secretariat and Politburo of the Central Committee, where the final decisions are made. The various participants in this process, however, do not possess equal rights and influence."¹⁴³ One would suspect that the judgments expressed by the Warsaw nations are less important than those of the Politburo and the Central Committee.

In summary, many political factors influence the NATO situation. Both the United States and the Soviet Union must be recognized as leaders in the balance of power in Europe, but the influence of the other members of NATO is important.

The Far East

On January 1, 1979, the United States officially recognized the People's Republic of China (PRC). The price paid for recognition and "normalization" of the relationship between the two nations was: (1) withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Republic of China (Taiwan); (2) cessation of diplomatic relations with Taiwan; (3) dissolution of the Mutual Defense Treaty which committed the United States to the defense of Taiwan. However, the recognition improves prospects for trade with the PRC, acknowledges a condition which has been a *fait accompli* for many years, and fulfills a commitment made by the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972. It also brightens the U.S.'s prospects for a peaceful relationship with the largest population mass in the world.

The PRC has not had stable leadership. That instability is highlighted by the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung, the purge and subsequent reinstatement of Chou's protégé, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and the arrest and purge of Teng's chief adversaries—the notorious "gang of four" led by Politburo members Chang Chung-chiao and Chiang Ching.¹⁴⁴ Many Americans questioned normalization based upon this instability.

Some also questioned the legality of the recognition. Firm treaties had existed between the United States and the Republic of China. However, hearings conducted in 1977 affirmed that "legal obstacles to normalization can be overcome provided a firm political decision has been made by the U.S. administration in close consultation with the Congress to proceed toward the establishment of United States-People's Republic of China relations."¹⁴⁵

Mainland China hopes that one result of the recognition will be help from the United States in blocking Soviet involvement in Far Eastern affairs. Becoming more active in countering the Soviet Union's efforts to expand its sphere of influence may well be a way the United States can reduce arms transfers. Withdrawal from South Korea might be a possibility. So, indeed, might other reductions in our military arms assistance programs.

One way the United States currently helps Mainland China is by her Pacific Fleet presence. Its presence in the western Pacific is "less oriented toward countering a specific military threat than it is toward preventing such a threat from developing, and . . . both China and Japan feel this form of an American role is indispensable to stability in the area."¹⁴⁶ Michael Pillsbury, a member of the Senate Budget Committee staff, suggests that we might even *encourage* selected military sales to the People's Republic of China, perhaps acting first through Japanese and PRC allies in Europe. He feels that "past American thinking on defense policy has tended to treat the Far East in isolation from issues such as SALT or European defense. That perspective is no longer tenable."¹⁴⁷

As part of the Far Eastern military picture, one must consider the final prospects for an American withdrawal from South Korea. American forces have been stationed there for twenty-seven years. Those opposed to their withdrawal and South Korea's reliance on arms transfers argue that (1) U.S. troops reduce the likelihood of radical changes in Japanese foreign policy; (2) they provide support for the ruling political party in Japan, the replacement of which, given the alternatives, would not be in our interest; (3) they inhibit the expansion of Soviet influence in Asia; and (4) they reduce the probability of challenges to our relationship with China.¹⁴⁸ Currently the major portion of the U.S. Army Second Division remains deployed in Korea. The Seventh Fleet, a Marine amphibious force with its air wing, and three USAF tactical fighter wings are stationed in the western Pacific, with one wing stationed in Korea.¹⁴⁹

The United States' military view of East Asia is summarized as follows:

We believe that we can most effectively contribute to peace in Asia by maintaining forces deployed forward in the Western Pacific. These forces enhance the political constraints on potential adversaries and provide an important element of security to friendly countries. We are also working to improve U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation, and have been discussing with the Japanese

government ways to reduce the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Japan.

Effective relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) are important not only because China is a strategic counterweight to the Soviet Union, but also because such relations will strengthen the interest of the PRC in regional stability. Accordingly, the normalization of U.S.-PRC relations in accordance with the principles of the Shanghai Communique remains a major goal of this administration.¹⁵⁰

Over the past fifteen to twenty years we have significantly altered our views of Asia in response to a number of major developments in East Asia. The Sino-Soviet dispute and the continued threats of the North Koreans have caused much concern and affected many foreign policy decisions. Any abrupt reversal of policy may trigger undesirable effects. Therefore, the arms transfer policy of the United States must be carefully considered with regard to the Far East.

Yassir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, has said that the People's Republic of China is "the biggest influence in supporting our revolution and strengthening its perseverance."¹⁵¹ Although somewhat muted, there is still a substantial supportive but less public relationship since late 1974 between these two groups.¹⁵² The next trouble spot to be discussed here, clearly the one capturing the public interest in mid-1979, is the Middle East.

The Middle East

Harold H. Saunders, assistant secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, commented on June 12, 1978, about the United States interests in the Middle East:

It is imperative that the United States seek to prevent conflict in the Middle East from again becoming a flashpoint and that helping strengthen the independence of Middle Eastern countries will contribute to stability in the region and make war less likely.

Since the mid-1960's, the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 have demonstrated to us in the heat of crisis that the Middle East is an area where U.S. and Soviet forces could confront each other in the context of a local war. Now, with estimates of the Soviet Union's own changing energy needs, a new dimension has been added to the traditional Soviet interest in a strong position in the area.¹⁵³

Our interests include preserving peace between Israel and the Arab states, limiting Soviet influence in the area, and generally main-

taining interests of world harmony. In the thirty years since the war in 1948, the United States has become increasingly involved in the Mideast as a negotiator, arms supplier, business partner, and military overseer.¹⁵⁴ One of our most important interests is to maintain the military capabilities of the conservative anti-Soviet states at levels which allow them to counter threats from pro-Soviet states in the region. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are the main targets of this policy since the Iranian revolution. Highly sophisticated weapons have been sold to Saudi Arabia. Disagreement on the role of the United States as a major arms supplier to these states centers on several concerns:

In the case of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, critics contend that the weapons are more likely to be used against Israel than against the Soviet Union or its clients. Not only may Egypt again declare war against Israel, but the Saudis may again transfer arms to the Arab confrontation states, as they did during the 1973 war.¹⁵⁵

The current military balance is still heavily in Israel's favor. Most estimates suggest Israeli military capability is approximately 30 percent higher than it was in 1973.

The issue of U.S. arms transfers to the Middle East depends on political competition within the U.S. foreign policy establishment—the Defense Department, the State Department, the Treasury, the National Security Council, and Congress:

Substantive policy issues are often subordinate to the question of control of foreign policy. The Defense Department and, to a lesser degree, the State Department have been strong proponents of arms transfers, and the assumption that arms suppliers acquire leverage and can wield political influence. Officials in both of these agencies, for example, have urged the transfer of United States arms to Egypt to encourage President Anwar Sadat to maintain his moderate position in the Arab-Israeli negotiations. Treasury officials often support this position because the arms transfers help to meet balance of payments deficits.¹⁵⁶

Another aspect of the Middle East arms question, often overlooked due to overriding interest in the Arab question, is the shift in our policy toward Turkey. On August 1, 1978, the president spoke about lifting the arms embargo on Turkey. His view was that lifting the embargo would be a "crucial step toward strengthening the vital southern flank of NATO."¹⁵⁷ The long-standing rivalry between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus has caused much difficulty for the United States over the years. Seeing progress in this part of the world would be beneficial to our foreign policy. And the need to provide arms to this part of the world is also of interest to the United States.

Conflict between nations in the Middle East has existed since the time of Christ. The key to peace may be in arms transfer, but negotiations between the Israelis and the Arabs must take into account the demands of both groups:

For Israel, this means peace based on normal relations among the parties to the peace. It also means borders that are recognized and secure. Adequate security arrangements are, in fact, crucial to a nation that has fought for its survival in each of the last four decades. The commitment of the United States to Israel's security is unquestionable.

For the Arabs, it means withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967, and the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must be recognized, and they must be able to participate in the determination of their own future.¹⁵⁸

The interests of President Carter, and those of the United States as a whole, include maintaining Israel as a free state and forming friendly relationships with the Arabs, who supply much of our oil.

Africa

Clearly, foreign policy interests extend beyond the Middle East. The Carter administration has gotten the United States deeply and seriously involved in the affairs and the fate of the African continent. *Fortune* notes, "The White House has assigned an unprecedented priority to African problems with an evident resolve to define a policy where none had really existed before."¹⁵⁹

Most of our foreign policies concerning Africa center on the issue of human rights. The United States' interest in human rights has raised many questions about weapons transfers to Africa. It would seem unthinkable for the United States to ship arms to countries that violate human rights. Given the nationalism of African countries, it would seem that independence would be the only available policy for the United States to pursue. However, President Carter notes a serious problem in a comment made in July 1978 in Spokane, Washington:

Now, the Soviets are obviously trying to use their influence in Africa and other parts of the world. In many instances when they have come into a nation that has a changing government, their major input has been weapons, and they are much more easy to buy weapons from than we are. They will supply excessive weapons to countries like Somalia and Ethiopia—in the Horn of Africa—resulting in this instance in an attack on Ethiopia by Somalia with Soviet weapons. Both countries got them from the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁰

The best course for the United States may be to aid in resolving the problems of African countries which lead to external intervention, whether the intervention is by another African state, China, Cuba, or the Soviet Union. Many of these problems are endemic to the continent. Some are a consequence of the almost arbitrary boundaries drawn in the colonial era. Others are the results of governmental corruption, weak civil services, and personal rather than constitutional rule. But the economic stakes, as noted in the first section about the trade resolution, are clearly the most important. The increasing importance of Africa as a trading partner must be balanced with the human rights issues as we decide about how we can help preserve "Africa for the Africans."

Nuclear vs. Conventional Arms

The military sales agreements made by the United States with other nations in the world amounted to over \$13 billion in FY 1977, with no end in sight.¹⁶¹ This figure includes over \$8 billion to the Near East and Southeast Asia. None of these sales represent any nuclear capability, although nuclear weapons might be carried by many of the vehicles involved in these sales. By agreement, as discussed earlier, the United States and other nations of the world do not participate in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. We do, however, provide our allies with sufficient strength for deterrence from conventional attacks. Our nuclear power guarantees their defense. The United States has improved its strategic nuclear deterrence by modernizing the triad of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers.¹⁶²

Another aspect of our nuclear strategy is the protection of Western Europe. Were we to totally rely upon conventional arms, we might be less secure from military advances from nations outside the Western Alliance. "Our European allies supply the major portion of NATO's conventional combat capability, and they have not been standing still either. Non-U.S. NATO antitank guided missile launchers in Central Europe will increase next year by almost 2,000, and stocks of the missiles themselves by 14,000."¹⁶³

Negative teams may wish to pursue the varied aspects of nuclear proliferation when responding to affirmative cases for the reduction of weapons transfer. The fact is that almost any nation can produce nuclear arms. The issue becomes whether or not the

absence of conventional weapons will stimulate the smaller nations to produce those nuclear arms. Behind many of the transfers within recent history stands the belief that adequate strength with conventional weapons will reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.

The following tables will help you understand the dimensions of U.S. military aid programs. Since one of the most important aspects of the work debaters must perform is generation of argument from statistics, you should carefully consider the balance between economic and military aid programs shown in Table 7 and the country-by-country grants and aid shown in Table 8.

Table 7

U.S. Foreign Economic and Military Aid Programs
1946 to 1977

In millions of dollars. For years ending June 30 except, beginning 1977, ending Sept. 30. Economic aid shown here represents total U.S. economic aid, not just aid under Foreign Assistance Act. Major components in recent years include AID, Food for Peace, Peace Corps, and aid in subscriptions to international financial institutions, such as IBRD, and IDB. Cumulative totals for 1946-1977 are true totals net of deobligation; annual figures, however, are gross unadjusted program figures. Military aid includes Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants, foreign military credit sales, service-funded programs, and excess defense articles.

PERIOD OR YEAR	Total economic and military aid	ECONOMIC AID			MILITARY AID		
		Total	Loans	Grants	Total	Loans	Grants
1946-1977, total	199,609	120,891	41,257	79,634	78,718	9,137	69,581
1946-1952	34,988	31,186	8,518	22,668	3,801	-	3,801
1953-1961	48,296	24,053	5,850	18,203	24,243	164	24,079
1962-1965	25,602	17,039	8,346	8,693	8,564	436	8,127
1966-1969	27,114	16,353	7,075	9,279	10,761	1,184	9,577
1970	6,787	3,678	1,389	2,288	3,111	70	3,041
1971	8,078	3,442	1,299	2,143	4,635	743	3,892
1972	9,243	3,940	1,839	2,301	5,303	530	4,773
1973	9,875	4,117	1,391	2,726	5,758	550	5,208
1974	8,978	3,906	1,150	2,756	5,073	1,396	3,677
1975	7,239	4,908	1,679	3,229	2,331	750	1,581
1976	6,605	3,878	1,759	2,119	2,727	1,462	1,265
1976, TQ 1	2,642	1,931	840	1,091	711	494	217
1977	7,946	5,591	2,083	3,508	2,355	1,411	944

- Represents zero. Transition quarter, July-Sept.

Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance From International Organizations*, annual; *Operations Report*, annual; and unpublished data.

From: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1978* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 871.

Table 8

**U.S. Foreign Military Aid, by Selected Countries
1970 to 1977**

In millions of dollars, except percent. For years ending June 30 except, beginning 1976, ending Sept. 30. Military aid data include Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants, foreign military credit sales, service programs, and excess defense articles.

REGION AND COUNTRY	1970-1977		1975 total	1976 total	1977 total	REGION AND COUNTRY	1970-1977		1975 total	1976 total	1977 total
	Total	Percent grants					Total	Percent grants			
Total	32,004	76.9	2,331	2,727	2,355						
Near East and So. Asia¹	9,625.9	48.2	600.5	1,795.8	1,438.7	East Asia¹	10,391.1	92.9	1,233.6	622.4	352.9
Greece.....	801.7	35.9	86.0	136.6	156.0	Cambodia.....	1,260.1	100.0	256.0	-	-
Iran.....	18.7	100.0	-	-	-	China, Rep. of.....	986.6	55.4	82.7	81.1	35.5
Israel.....	6,685.2	44.3	300.0	1,500.0	1,000.0	Indonesia.....	231.3	75.7	21.0	46.0	48.8
Jordan.....	591.1	61.5	104.6	138.3	131.5	Korea.....	2,952.4	80.2	144.7	188.6	155.0
Lebanon.....	51.5	12.6	.1	.1	25.0	Laos.....	1,119.5	100.0	19.9	-	-
Saudi Arabia.....	15.2	12.2	0	-	-	Malaysia.....	101.1	3.8	5.0	17.3	36.3
Turkey.....	1,414.2	69.2	109.1	-	125.0	Philippines.....	264.5	77.3	36.3	24.0	38.1
						Thailand.....	627.2	88.1	42.5	65.4	47.2
						Vietnam.....	11,041.9	100.0	625.1	-	-
Latin America²	816.8	24.0	157.2	140.1	49.4	Africa³	488.8	25.0	70.5	92.9	115.4
Argentina.....	137.9	6.5	30.1	34.3	.7	Ethiopia.....	122.4	70.6	37.6	7.4	2.7
Bolivia.....	47.4	64.1	7.4	3.4	3.1	Kenya.....	31.2	23.9	5.0	15.9	15.2
Brazil.....	214.2	6.6	63.4	41.6	.1	Liberia.....	8.2	26.8	1.9	1.8	.6
Chile.....	50.4	15.9	.7	20.3	.7	Morocco.....	122.7	4.8	14.9	30.8	30.8
Colombia.....	56.1	25.5	.7	-	-	Togo.....	78.4	33.9	7.2	15.6	25.4
Dominican Republic.....	13.5	81.5	1.6	.8	1.5	Zaire.....	92.0	7.2	3.8	19.3	30.4
Ecuador.....	29.0	13.8	.4	10.4	15.4						
El Salvador.....	10.4	66.3	5.5	1.0	.6	Europe²	435.8	72.5	3.0	3.2	170.5
Guatemala.....	22.2	53.2	2.9	2.1	.5	Italy.....	11.6	100.0	-	-	-
Honduras.....	13.9	42.4	4.2	3.4	3.1	Portugal.....	48.6	100.0	.4	2.4	33.5
Mexico.....	6.9	100.0	.1	.1	.1	Spain.....	374.6	68.0	2.6	.8	137.0
Nicaragua.....	20.1	60.2	4.3	3.6	3.1						
Panama.....	10.1	70.3	.6	1.2	3.1	Oceania	2.8	100.0	-	-	-
Paraguay.....	17.8	94.4	1.6	2.4	.7	Interregional	2,042.3	100.0	266.3	273.3	228.0
Peru.....	72.1	9.2	21.4	.8	10.9						
Uruguay.....	38.5	53.2	9.2	1.0	(2)						
Venezuela.....	49.0	18.4	.7	10.6	.1						

¹ Represents zero. ² Less than \$20,000. ³ Includes transition quarter, July-Sept.
⁴ Includes amounts not shown separately. Regional totals include and do not include regions or sub-regions.
 Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations*, annual.

From: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1978* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 871.

4 The Aid Resolution

Resolved: That the United States should significantly reduce its foreign assistance programs to totalitarian governments.

Is the Ayatollah Khomeini responding to human rights in ways which our government should support by continuing our assistance programs to Iran? For example, do the executions carried out by Iranian revolutionary courts justify more than diplomatic protests? And whether we do or do not support Khomeini's domestic actions, should our foreign assistance programs be based upon other nations' commitments to the kind of policies we support?

The foregoing are typical of the questions generated by this resolution. The discussion here will incorporate two general categories: (1) What is our current policy? and (2) Are there serious problems?

At the outset, this writer would like to point out that little advantage will be gained from claiming that foreign assistance programs can change the behavior of foreign governments, whether totalitarian or not. We may be tempted to claim, for example, that our policy will coerce another state into accepting our views of humanitarianism for a time, but there can be little verification of this claim. Nor is there much to gain from examining the philosophical correctness of the concept of human rights. Few negative teams will argue there is merit in starvation, nor will they argue any merit for denying human rights. The Malthusian argument is receding into the Valhalla of old debate cliches.

On the other hand, the negative may argue that the question is beyond correct use of U.S. power. Or the issue may narrow to whether philosophic or pragmatic merit should prevail. Conservative William Buckley comments from this point of view on Carter's policy: "He has used no sanction against the Soviet Union, only against relatively impotent Latin American nations. In the course of doing so—of ruling, say, against Uruguay, but not

against the Philippines—Carter has stressed quite candidly the necessity of superordinating the national interest."¹⁶⁴

Because the issue of "appropriateness" may be quite difficult to win and the issue of "problem" may revolve closely around a value which is indisputable, this debate resolution may not be very debatable. Nevertheless, we will discuss the aid resolution as a policy question.

Current Aid Policy of the United States

Cyrus Vance said recently that we have a profound stake in our relationships with other nations and peoples of the world. Our response to their problems, needs, and aspirations must be based not only upon our own interests, but also upon our belief in economic and social justice.¹⁶⁵ The secretary reviewed our policies and noted three basic approaches to world assistance: bilateral aid, financial aid, and multilateral aid. He also acknowledged several views which question the present aid policies: our aid is not well controlled; there may not be enough strings attached to the distribution of our aid; some who receive our aid might not deserve it; and we may be spending more on foreign aid than our economy can afford. Table 9, from the *Department of State Bulletin*, indicates the level of commitment actually made by the United States in the various forms of foreign aid.

Philosophical generalities can sometimes lead to unworkable policy, but at times such considerations are inescapable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the United Nations approved in 1948, emphasizes three rights: (1) the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of the person (cruel, inhuman, degrading treatment or punishment); (2) the right to the fulfillment of the vital needs of food, shelter, health care, and education; and (3) the right to enjoy civil and political liberties.¹⁶⁶ With these considerations in mind, our aid policy responds to the economic needs of our international associates: "Our economic aid, as well as that provided by other developed nations, . . . makes a crucial contribution to [other nations'] well-being. For some countries—particularly the low-income nations—it is the principal source of foreign exchange and technical assistance."¹⁶⁷

One way the United States works to channel aid to stimulate economic growth and alleviate poverty is bilateral economic assistance. The U.S. State Department refers to the programs as

"a strategy which targets our resources directly on the needs of the poor. Called the 'basic human needs' approach, this development strategy seeks to help people meet such basic needs as nutrition, shelter, education, and health care."¹⁶⁸ Aid in Tanzania, for example, helps that government establish a seed multiplication project. A health care program in West Africa helps people recover from disease so that they may resettle in areas which have been

Table 9
Foreign Aid Items¹
New Budget Authority
(\$ Millions)

	FY 1977 Actual	FY 1978 Appropriation	FY 1979 Request
Multilateral	1,385	2,157	3,787
International financial institutions	1,141	1,926	3,505
International organizations and programs	244	231	282
Bilateral- AID	2,879	3,505	3,505
Security supporting assistance	1,735	2,211 ²	1,854 ³
Middle East Special Requirements Fund	23	8	(5) ³
Development assistance	1,121	1,286	1,651
Other Bilateral	193	216	236
Peace Corps	80	88	96
Migration and refugee assistance	47	69	71
International narcotics control	34	37	40
Inter-American Foundation	---	---	8
Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial Research and Development Fund	30	---	---
Department of Transportation	2	22	22
Military Assistance	989	926	838
Grant military assistance	265	220	194
Foreign military training	25	30	32
Foreign military credit sales	699	676	673
Total Foreign Assistance Appropriations	5,446	6,804	8,366

1. Included in foreign assistance and related programs appropriation act—appropriation to Commodity Credit Corporation as required for the P.L. 480 program will be requested with the Department of Agriculture appropriation.

2. Includes \$300 million balance-of-payments loan to Portugal.

3. FY 1979 Middle East Special Requirements Fund has been included in the security supporting assistance account.

From: *Department of State Bulletin* 78 (April 1978): 25.

virtually abandoned. Education is fostered through local radio in Guatemala.

A second program, coordinated through the World Bank and the regional development banks, permits us to channel a significant amount of our foreign aid into large, capital-intensive programs, such as dams and roads as well as smaller-scale programs. For example, funding from the Inter-American Development Bank relocated slum dwellers in Buenaventura, Colombia; the African Development Fund provided for rural health service improvement in the West African country of Benin; and in Burma, an Asian Development Bank loan helped improve fish production.¹⁶⁹

Programs of the United Nations are also supported. These finance technical assistance to poor countries and provide direct humanitarian assistance to children, refugees, and other groups in need of particular relief.

Our bilateral assistance generally goes to what we call the *less-developed countries* (LDC's). But the developing world is really several worlds: (1) the OPEC nations with substantial financial surpluses and the ability to pay in full for technical assistance; (2) rapidly industrializing "upper-tier" countries such as Brazil and Mexico with access to private capital but with large pockets of poverty; (3) the "middle-income" nations like the Dominican Republic or Tunisia which still require some concessional assistance to help the poor; and (4) the low-income nations which rely heavily on concessional aid to finance their development programs.¹⁷⁰

Our Policy in Action

The first step in our policy, according to Warren Christopher, deputy secretary of state, is to apply diplomacy: "The primary ingredient of human rights diplomacy has a seeming simplicity: We frankly discuss human rights in our consultations with foreign diplomats and leaders."¹⁷¹ Christopher suggests that at times the United States has gained explicit understandings. He outlines the later steps: public comment, appropriate action, international support, and, finally, gathering of a human rights data base. Each provides us with a direct means to rally support against governments which act in ways to reduce human rights. With regard to "appropriate action," we had, during 1977-78, "deferred bilateral economic assistance to certain countries; opposed loans by the World Bank and the other international financial institutions to countries that engage in flagrant violations of human rights; and

taken steps to insure that food aid provided to countries with serious human rights problems will reach the needy."¹⁷² Christopher also notes improvements in Africa, the Near East, South Asia, East Asia, Latin America, and Europe.

Edwin M. Martin identifies five types of human rights that deserve U.S. support:

1. Laws protecting rights such as movement, speech, political organization, etc.
2. Methods of enforcement of all laws which ensure a rational process for the fair and prompt determination of guilt or innocence.
3. Institutional arrangements which permit adult citizens to play a role, directly or indirectly, in policymaking by their government.
4. Absence of discrimination for reasons of race, religion, wealth, sex, etc., in the formulation and application of laws or public programs, or in significant human relationships of a non-governmental character.
5. Provision of basic human needs without which "life" is endangered, "liberty" is a fraud, and "happiness" cannot be pursued but only starvation and disease postponed a bit.¹⁷³

His judgment about whether the U.S. should give aid to totalitarian states is broken into two parts. First, economic aid should be given to improve the economic, social, and political conditions of peoples, whether or not their state is totalitarian. Second, military aid should be given only when a state is providing liberty to its citizens. These are important distinctions since, as Deputy Secretary of State Christopher notes: "In all quarters of the world, too many people are still subject to torture and are suffering in squalid prisons, uncharged and untried. Too many people are hungry, have inadequate shelter, and lack medical care and educational opportunity. Too many people are living under martial law or are otherwise barred from political participation. Too many are denied the right to emigrate or even to travel freely within their own country."¹⁷⁴

Our policy, as mandated by Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, states that "a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries."¹⁷⁵ Other laws, such as PL 95-45, Section 109 authorizing State Department funding for FY '78, direct the secretary of state to report annually to the Congress on proposals that would strengthen human rights.

U.S. Aid Programs and Human Rights

A quick global survey reveals that the United States responds to many serious problems with aid programs. Whether in Indochina, in dealing with the refugee problem; in Latin America, responding to the threat of closed elections; or in Africa, where nations are now under military rule, the foreign policy of the United States faces serious problems which involve the human rights of many millions of people. The survey here will touch upon a few general problems and those peculiar to Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Southeast Asia.

At a White House ceremony on December 6, 1978, commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, President Carter made the following statement: "As long as I am President, the Government of the United States will continue, throughout the world, to enhance human rights. No force on Earth can separate us from that commitment."¹⁷⁶ Through our aid program we provide a means to demonstrate that commitment. Political killings, tortures, arbitrary and prolonged detention without trial or without a charge are real events in the lives of many peoples. Eighty-three nations have ratified the genocide convention, demonstrating their commitment to stop the ultimate form of inhumanity. The United States, however, has not ratified that convention.

Our commitment to aid refugees is also lagging. The boat people of Southeast Asia epitomize the continuing problem. To help these refugees is a simple human duty, and Americans, descendants of refugees, might well feel that duty with special awareness. Indochina, Lebanon, Cuba, or wherever refugees might languish represent places where the United States might wish to channel its aid.

But the effort may have to be bilateral. One international publication asserted that "international collaboration, on a scale not seen in the history of the world, is essential if mankind is to meet basic human needs while safeguarding the environment for future generations."¹⁷⁷ Just as a solution for world poverty may hinge upon international efforts, so might solutions for other general problems like refugees and genocide.

Another aspect we must consider when responding to the general problem is that international and domestic issues have begun to merge in the United States. "Lines between foreign and domestic policy decisions have become blurred; domestic interest

groups now take great interest in issues that once would have been considered purely in the foreign domain. In the 1970s, American ethnic groups, for example, have plunged into foreign policy involvements—American Jews on the Middle East; Greek-Americans on the Cyprus issue; Irish-Americans on Northern Ireland; Cuban-Americans; and others.¹⁷⁸ This clearly complicates the sort of responses which can be made, and also delays those responses.

Human Rights Problems in Africa

The present system has improved conditions in Africa. Nigeria, Mali, and Ghana have pledged elections to reestablish majority rule. Nigeria has called for the creation of an African human rights commission. And Upper Volta has returned to a multiparty and civilian democratic system.¹⁷⁹ But problems remain.

The Horn of Africa, as noted in the trade resolution analysis, is facing the prospect of famine, yet military adventures continue. The war between Somalia and Ethiopia, the latter aided by Cuban troops, poses particular difficulties for our aid program. In South Africa, the growing crisis of apartheid disturbs us. Because of the enormous value of the mineral trading we do with this part of the world, further deterioration of our relationship with South Africa would have serious risks. As Secretary Vance has noted, "We understand the difficulties involved in change within South Africa. We are not seeking to impose a simplistic formula for South Africa's future. Rather, we have urged the South African Government to begin to take truly significant steps—such as talking with acknowledged representative black leaders—away from apartheid and toward a system in which the full range of rights would be accorded to all inhabitants of South Africa, black and white alike."¹⁸⁰ Progress has occurred since the secretary made that statement in 1978, yet no peaceful, comprehensive solution is in sight. The same may be said for Rhodesia, where the black majority is denied real power but also where "farms are being abandoned as martial law spreads to 90 percent of the country. Spreading hoof-and-mouth disease and tsetse fly infestations are cutting down herds of cattle. And there is deep concern over the harvesting of this year's crops."¹⁸¹ Once again, the U.S. must balance various aspects of "human rights" as they apply to our aid policies.

And yet another factor generates interest for the United States, a factor which may tip the scales toward pragmatism rather than

philosophical virtue. *Fortune* comments, "Without South African platinum for catalytic converters, the emission-control program would have to be abandoned, and a recent study by the National Research Council showed that a prolonged embargo on South African and Rhodesian chromium would have a greater impact on the U.S. than an oil embargo."¹⁸²

In 1979 Jimmy Carter's foreign policy goals included "supporting Third World calls for greater economic equality and black African aspirations for self-rule."¹⁸³ This might help to explain the "hands-off" policy regarding a boycott against the Ugandan regime of Idi Amin. As Secretary Vance noted: "The Administration has expressed its strong views with respect to the situation in Uganda in terms of human rights and the failure to respect the dignity of individuals. We have, however, refused to go along with a proposal that there should be an economic boycott with respect to Uganda."¹⁸⁴

If there is any "bottom line" to our relationship with Africa, it may be, as Herman Nickel writes, that "while Africa is of increasing importance as a trading partner and as a field for U.S. investment, it is crucial to the U.S., Europe, and Japan as a source of strategic minerals."¹⁸⁵ If the value of human rights is more important than the economic incentives noted here, then the commitment is stronger than current policy has suggested.

Human Rights Problems in the Middle East and Latin America

Other areas are equally troublesome. Despite the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the Palestinian question remains. Among other difficulties, many accuse Israel of practicing racial discrimination against Palestinians.¹⁸⁶ One must wonder whether or not the issue can be resolved after so many years.

In Latin America, the United States remains interested in the continuing campaign for human rights. Some advances have been made: the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru have all conducted democratic elections recently; prisoners have been granted more rights in both Bolivia and Haiti; and the Organization of American States has passed a resolution in support of the advancement of human rights.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand, conditions in Chile have improved only slightly since the violent end of the Allende regime. The political transformation since the overthrow of leftist President Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973, has been sharp, rapid, and intense. The military regime has imposed very severe controls, and "perhaps the most serious charge against

the present government is that the denial of human rights is widespread and continuing and that Chile has become the symbol of repression throughout the Western Hemisphere."¹⁸⁸

In mid-1977, El Salvador experienced intense internal disorders: "In May the government unleashed a military operation, with tanks, planes and troops, against the region of Aguilares, which was considered a hotbed of peasant activity (and was the parish of Rutilio Grande, a highly respected Jesuit priest who had been murdered). A White Warriors Union was threatening to assassinate all Jesuits. In fact this bizarre threat served to put El Salvador on the map of human rights violators."¹⁸⁹

Human Rights Problems in Southeast Asia

While the United States does not recognize Cambodia, this did not prevent us from speaking out over the apparent terror persisting there. Warren Christopher remarked of the conditions in 1978:

No one outside Cambodia can know the full dimensions of the systematic terror and grinding down of the Cambodian people which has taken place under those who have seized power there. The many detailed firsthand reports from the stream of refugees fleeing that country provide a picture of a regime bent on destroying virtually every vestige of the existing society in order to impose its will upon the population. Hundreds of thousands of human beings—not only supporters of the former regime but people from all elements of society—have perished under this regime.¹⁹⁰

President Carter underlined our commitment to oppose these acts on numerous occasions. He outlined actions by others—the Canadian House of Commons, a Norwegian committee, the U.N. Human Rights Commission—and our own government's condemnations in a statement made on April 21, 1978. His comments noted summary executions, mass killings, inhuman treatment of the supporters of the previous government and the general population's deprivation of food and health care.¹⁹¹ The overthrow of the government responsible for these crimes by no means assures the end of human rights violations in Cambodia. As a client state of Vietnam, the population may again be subject to political killings and will certainly live under a system of tight government control that denies rights considered basic by the United States. The status and treatment of refugees, including Cambodians and the "boat people" of Vietnam, may also be essential issues in U.S. aid policies concerning Southeast Asia.

5 Debate Plans

Developing a plan for debating one of the three NUEA resolutions this year will require careful attention to details. Whether your plan spells out each and every detail or you have those details at your fingertips when your opponents ask about them is unimportant. What is important is this: *to successfully debate a policy you should have an in-depth knowledge of that policy.* A debater can not expect to gain the approval of the judges for a policy that is not clearly identified; therefore, the debater must be aware of all possible questions that could be asked about his or her policy and develop answers to them.

The following material discusses (1) the general plan, (2) the trade plans, (3) the arms plans, (4) the aid plans. There are also many other plans that could be added to this year's resolutions. In fact, several of the following plans could be challenged on the basis of topicality, but as an initial exercise in analysis, they may stimulate thought.

General Plan Provisions

The debater should incorporate certain mechanics into the plan. The introductory paragraph, for example, should include five elements: (1) an assertion that establishes the topicality of the policy; (2) the identification of its framers; (3) identification of the elements of the policy; (4) evidence that the plan is but one operational definition of the resolution; and (5) the authorization for necessary constitutional, statutory, and other modifications of codified law. An example:

To institute meaningful investigative procedures through legal controls in the area of heroin addiction, the University of Houston proposes the following four-plank proposal as one of many possible interpretations of the 1977-78 debate resolution, to be implemented through any and all necessary legislation: . . .¹⁹²

As can be observed, each of the five steps is contained in the plan. If it were applied to each of the three resolutions, it should also

incorporate these steps. The affirmative plan for the trade policy should advocate *significant change in foreign policy*. If the statements that followed this opening did not seem pertinent, then one would suspect that the debater had developed a case that was not within the scope of the resolution. On the arms policy, the affirmative plan would be *to significantly reduce public and private distribution of weapons to foreign countries*. Again, a rough-and-ready test of the pertinence of the affirmative plan would be whether there were any discrepancies generated by the material that followed this opening remark. Finally, the affirmative policy on aid *should advocate the reduction of United States foreign assistance programs to totalitarian governments*. Consider the following: if the plan increased domestic hog prices, wouldn't that mandate sound strange following the statement "reducing foreign assistance programs to totalitarian governments"? If so, the first test of pertinence would be failed.

The second general paragraph of this resolution should deal with the body administering the policy. Whether or not the full details exemplified below are included is not as important as that the debater be aware of the details. One sample, taken from the speech previously used, is as follows:

Creation of an independent, self-perpetuating, well-salaried, affirmatively appointed and philosophically imbued clinical heroin board. The board shall be provided with all necessary funding, manpower, information channels, and other resources required to carry out its mandate. Personnel subject to mandatory retirement at age 65 with a generous pension plan. The board shall implement and oversee the following mandates for law enforcement agencies to be phased in over a two-year period.¹⁹³

These details are incorporated to avoid debate over the type of details mentioned. In past rounds, each of these elements generated team problems of the sort that make it necessary for debaters to "spend three words to avoid spending thirty in the rebuttals."

In the above example, inclusion of the words "self-perpetuating" eliminates negative arguments related to whether or not the solution will have board commitments beyond a few days. Circumvention may be argued, but not from the framework of the position that says "your planning board will be replaced by Congress immediately after its adoption." Your plan automatically permits the board to replace itself. Similar rationales exist for each of these details.

The final general remark relates to "topical provisions." The burden of the affirmative team will be to defend each plank of the policy on the grounds that it is *part of the total system which is defined by the resolution*. Unless the affirmative can prove this, the plan provision should be eliminated from consideration in the round.

Policy for the Trade Resolution

There are many ways the affirmative can significantly "change the foreign trade policy." Consider Tables 10 and 11, noting that were the policy to modify by one-half the amount of either importation or exportation of any of the items included, a significant change might be made in our foreign policy.

The commitment of the United States to the concept of freer trade has been long standing. Were we to shift to a protectionist policy, a significant change would be made in our foreign trade policy. But could the affirmative hedge and thereby justify a

Table 10
Exports and Imports
Value, by Broad End-Use Class
1967 to 1977

[Data are adjusted to balance of payments basis, excluding military; for details, see source. Exports include re-exports. See also *Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1870*, series C749-263.]

END-USE CLASS	TOTAL (100 DOLLARS)							PERCENT				
	1967	1970	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1967	1970	1975	1977
Exports, total	30.7	42.5	49.4	71.1	98.3	107.1	111.7	120.6	100	100	100	100
Foods, feeds, and beverages	5.0	5.9	7.5	15.2	18.6	19.2	19.8	19.8	16	14	18	16
Industrial supplies and materials	10.0	13.9	14.1	20.0	30.6	30.8	32.5	34.5	33	33	29	29
Capital goods, except automotive	9.9	14.6	16.8	21.8	30.4	35.8	38.7	39.8	32	34	33	33
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines	2.8	3.9	5.5	6.9	8.6	10.6	12.1	13.0	9	9	10	11
Consumer goods (nonfood), etc.	2.1	2.8	3.6	4.8	6.4	6.5	8.0	8.9	7	7	6	7
All other	.8	1.5	1.9	2.7	3.6	4.1	3.6	4.5	3	3	4	4
General imports, total	28.9	39.9	35.8	70.5	103.7	98.0	124.0	151.7	100	100	100	100
Foods, feeds, and beverages	4.6	6.2	7.3	9.1	10.6	9.7	11.6	14.0	17	15	10	9
Industrial supplies and materials	12.0	15.4	21.1	28.2	34.7	51.4	64.7	81.0	45	39	52	53
Capital goods, except automotive	2.5	4.0	5.8	8.1	9.5	9.7	11.1	13.5	9	10	10	9
Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines	2.4	5.6	8.8	10.3	12.1	11.8	16.4	18.9	9	14	12	13
Consumer goods (nonfood), etc.	4.2	7.6	11.4	13.2	14.8	13.7	18.4	22.4	16	19	14	15
All other	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.5	2.0	1.7	1.3	1.9	4	3	2	1

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Survey of Current Business*, June 1978.

From: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1978* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 880.

retrenchment, with little substantive change in trade barriers, as a significant change? One would suspect not.

Rather, a proposal for a definite change might be more successful. Consider the implications of an enhancement of our trade policies toward Africa. Were we to develop such a policy and foster heightened interdependence between South Africa and the United States, most people would probably consider this a significant change in our trade policy. Similarly, substantial reduction in reliance upon OPEC petroleum would seem to respond to the demands of the resolution.

In many ways, plans for debating the trade issue will be quite difficult to formulate. Some of the problems relate to (1) gath-

Table 11
Imports of Leading Commodities,
by Areas (F.A.S. Transaction Value Basis)
1976 and 1977

In millions of dollars, except percent. Includes short ton and billion. "F.A.S." means free alongside ship.

ITEM	1976					1977				
	Total	Canada	Amer- ican Repub- lics	West- ern Euro- pe ¹	Far East	Total	Canada	Amer- ican Repub- lics	West- ern Euro- pe ¹	Far East ²
(1) Total imports, total	120,677	36,237	13,227	22,784	30,152	146,917	29,356	16,335	27,417	36,405
Percent	100.0	21.7	11.0	18.9	25.0	100.0	20.0	11.1	18.7	24.8
Imports for consumption	120,014	36,141	13,110	22,587	29,925	146,047	29,156	16,226	27,321	36,217
Meat and preparations	1,447	82	337	285	9	1,278	74	276	281	5
Fruits, nuts, and vegetables	1,146	39	694	180	262	1,551	61	839	185	332
Coffee	2,632	7	1,784	6	135	3,801	70	2,646	6	269
Sugar	1,134	10	904	5	322	1,079	29	533	11	292
Alcoholic beverages	1,174	245	30	878	7	1,282	294	33	930	7
Pulp, paper, and manufactures	3,367	3,110	41	139	50	3,631	3,312	49	173	64
Dress and scrap metal	2,231	991	47	73	90	2,234	995	444	77	55
Petroleum, crude and partly refined	26,384	2,273	2,192	371	2,568	33,714	1,612	2,705	732	2,985
Petroleum products	3,411	278	1,788	350	240	7,412	343	2,343	994	428
Chemicals	4,772	1,287	183	2,295	462	5,432	1,451	2,212	1,465	554
Machinery	35,416	2,347	1,111	1,803	6,754	15,935	3,011	1,218	5,519	8,015
Transport equipment	14,328	7,574	146	3,284	4,326	17,556	7,607	307	3,928	5,758
Automobiles, new	8,428	3,477	2	2,548	2,994	10,628	3,735	(b)	2,940	3,890
Iron and steel mill products	3,809	406	72	1,057	2,232	5,281	554	99	1,959	2,468
Nonferrous base metals	2,941	1,107	297	679	456	3,368	1,227	416	722	2,076
Textile yarn, fabrics, and mill-made-up articles	1,633	32	141	464	884	1,772	49	162	541	622
Fish, including shellfish	1,833	378	473	339	416	2,056	418	506	428	425
Other imports	30,825	8,796	2,411	7,656	11,013	36,975	8,192	3,847	4,576	13,439

(a) Represents zero. (b) Less than \$500,000. (c) Includes areas not shown separately.
 1 Includes Greece and Turkey. 2 Asia, excluding Near East and Communist areas.
 3 Machinery includes, and transport equipment excludes, parts for tractors. The Bureau of the Census reports tractor parts with transport equipment. 4 Excludes pig iron.

Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Industry and Trade Administration, *Overseas Business Reports, U.S. Trade with Major World Areas*, periodic.

From: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstracts of the United States, 1978* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 880.

ering information, for the data relate to the internal affairs of other nations; (2) planning properly for the implementation of such programs, because there are so many variables involved in the trade picture; (3) providing for the numerous contingencies within the plan, for the varied problems of the Middle East, for example, must be treated differently from the problems of Latin America; (4) using too much discretion, since significant administrative discretion could result in little or no certainty of achieving the supposed benefits from a proposal; and (5) controlling lobbying, because the trend for international interests to be supported by powerful lobbyists has grown substantially in the recent past.

An affirmative plan that fails to consider all five of the above issues may be entrapped in the standard solvency-inherency dilemma—either the present system can solve it or the affirmative can't. Worse yet, the affirmative may be the victim of many disadvantages if its plans are *too* precise. Consider the example of a strong trading partner, Japan. Were the proposal to increase restrictions on trading with the Far East, Japan would be hard pressed. Its economy might not respond positively to the imposition of new regulations that are based upon the trade needs of the United States.

Another series of potential plan provisions relates to the financial aspect of our trade. For example, plans might well incorporate foreign tax credit provisions. Modification of our energy requirements might significantly change our foreign trade policy. Similarly, reevaluation of our posture toward the European Monetary System (EMS) might be a trade policy change of great import. Or, the way we deal with multinational corporations might be changed substantially. Our agricultural export policies, affected by the European Economic Community's barriers, might be modified, and thereby make large changes in our trade policy.

Regardless of the direction in which the affirmative plan may move, there remain a thousand more. The burden, therefore, will be on the negative team to synthesize arguments against changing our foreign policy. Otherwise, the team will be facing the age-old definitional question of which change is significant, and which change is not.

Two final observations about plans for the trade resolution are necessary. First, defining terms may be much more significant than you might like. Defining the issues within the context of the resolution may be simple for an affirmative team, but to defeat

that team, the negative team may have to be very adept at definitions and win through extensions related to extratopicality. The second observation on this resolution relates to the importance of the proposed administration of the plan. The issues of independence, accuracy of data fed to the administrators, and ability to resist the multinational influence peddlers will be critical to debaters supporting the resolution.

Policy for the Arms Resolution

This plan can be made to respond to the required mandate in any number of ways. First, *weapons* distribution may be the stress point. An affirmative plan that would dramatically alter the type of weapons to be distributed could also claim topicality in most rounds. However, if such an alteration did not reduce the number of weapons, the claim of topicality might be challenged by negative debaters. The second area of stress available to the affirmative side of the arms resolution debate is the source of the weapons. The resolution calls for the reduction of "public or private" distribution. If the source is "public," then the exchange would be government-to-government. This type of exchange can be modified by a plan mandate without much attention to enforcement. However, when the reduction is from a "private" source, the plan mandate must be reinforced by inspection systems, verification, and the like. Further difficulties may lie in the effect of sales by private firms in the United States to private individuals in foreign countries with subsequent benefits to totalitarian states.

"*Distribution* of the weapons" may be the phrase that will call for a change in this resolution. If the United States instituted a transfer system for arms sales that differed substantially from the method currently employed, it might be assumed that topicality could be established for that term. However, the system of distribution would, in this writer's opinion, have to reduce the absolute number of weapons transfers to fulfill the resolution mandate. And once again, the connection between distribution and the rationale for reduction of sales to totalitarian states would have to be established, thus raising the perpetual problem of information.

A key concern in arms transfer is *recognition of national differences*. Linda Brady notes this problem in the *International Journal*: "A framework that applies to one type of nation may be

less suitable for another. All of this suggests that as the scope of the inquiry is broadened to include nations with a wide range of attributes, so also must the framework be expanded to include variables that describe different political regimes and economic systems."¹⁹⁴

Finally, the plans developed for the arms resolution must recognize that decision making in the U.S.S.R. is determined by a power structure. And in arms transfer, the Soviet equivalent of our military-industrial complex is most influential.¹⁹⁵ Such political questions must be considered when developing a policy for debating the arms resolution.

In summary, many plans are possible for debating on the arms resolution. The identification of the weapons that are to be reduced in number, to whom they are to be sold, the method of transfer, and for how long, would all appear to be possible variables. One plan might reduce missile transfers, another might reduce arms shipments to specific nations—and each might respond to the mandate of the arms resolution.

Policy for the Aid Resolution

The plan question is "*in what way can the U.S. reduce foreign assistance?*" Cut tax credits? Cut military assistance programs? Cut economic assistance? Cut financial support for international lending institutions? Reduce multilateral assistance? To all these possibilities, this writer would say yes, each could reduce foreign assistance.

Clearly, a team must do more than propose the reduction of the absolute number of foreign assistance programs if it is to respond positively to this resolution. That we have, let us say, fourteen programs today, and under the hypothetical plan of an affirmative team we would have ten programs tomorrow would not seem a very meaningful way to define terms. Therefore, *what* will be reduced would appear to be the prerogative of the affirmative.

Might an affirmative team reduce *all* foreign assistance and still observe the requirement for topicality? This writer would answer yes. But at the same time, debaters should be aware that (1) the advantage yielded could not be measured without identifying those nations that were being denied aid *topically* and (2) negative demands that the plan be narrowed only to reduction for totalitarian governments would appear proper.

The aid resolution apparently responds to such issues as famine, inhumane treatment of prisoners, denial of fundamental rights,

and economic issues so long as they relate to the denial of human rights. Therefore, one would suppose, an affirmative plan that applied pressures on those nations that deny persons political rights and basic human needs could be topical. For example, denial of military aid to Nigeria until prisoners' rights are recognized might be topical. Foreign aid "with strings attached" would seem a very reliable index of topicality.

A separate issue is verification of the behavior of a nation. A start exists. In 1978 the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Mark L. Schneider, submitted what is known as the *1978 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*.¹⁹⁶ Schneider noted that these reports were based on checks by U.S. embassies, regional bureaus, and functional bureaus, such as the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. The policy proposed in the aid resolution might require similar kinds of verification of totalitarian governance.

Consolidation of the various foreign assistance programs into a much more tightly controlled single foreign assistance program does remain as an option for the affirmative. The standard caution, however, must be given: What real benefit can a team claim from "efficiency"? Without very careful verification, such plans would probably fail.

In summary, affirmative teams debating the aid resolution will probably need to consider which programs they wish to reduce, how they will check to determine which nations are truly totalitarian, and how they plan to measure the benefits of the programs they propose.

Final Remarks

Those of you beginning to debate the new topic will want to broaden your reading, consider the implications of this first analysis, and discuss the potential implications with others. A debater should never rely upon a narrow base of information, whether it be a compilation of viewpoints similar to *First Analysis*, a single news source such as a news magazine, a debate quote handbook, or the coach of a debate squad. Instead, the debater must broaden her or his understanding of the political context within which the subject is being debated, and then exhibit that understanding to the reasonable, prudent, thinking individual who serves as judge for the debate.

Thank you for your commitment to this activity. Best wishes as you begin an adventure.

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