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**ABSTRACT**

Mainstream social science attempts to separate scholarship and citizenship. However, John Dewey's exceptionally coherent life of scholarship combined with social and political activism demonstrates that it is both possible and desirable to integrate the two. According to Dewey's philosophical pragmatism, the purpose of inquiry is to deal with "the problems of men." His theory of inquiry and his social theory lead directly to social action. For Dewey, once we know how to go about developing intelligence, we ought to try to do it. Thus, philosophers and social scientists have a special responsibility to act as public educators, engaging in intelligent political action to demonstrate to others how it is done. Moreover, social scientists have a uniquely compelling reason to exercise civic virtue, in order to test theory through practice. Therefore, Dewey's philosophy makes social and political action mandatory for scholars in general and social scientists in particular. Dewey carried his own ideas into action in an exemplary way of integrating scholarship and citizenship. He thought through the problems of his time sensitively and seriously and then did what he could to remedy them. (Author/KC)

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PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY AND CIVIC VIRTUE:

AN APPRECIATION OF JOHN DEWEY\*

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## Introduction

"The Obligation of Scholars to Their Work and to Public Life" is a broad topic. I propose to treat it as a question about a mode of life: Can the social scientist combine scholarship with citizenship, or do the two comprise separate and perhaps incompatible spheres of existence?

There are only two possibilities here; either one can practice both harmoniously together or one can't. On the whole, mainstream social science holds that one can't. It adopts a policy of containment,<sup>1</sup> defining the business of the social scientist as a business separate and distinct from the public business. This may be in part a tactical maneuver to protect scholarly autonomy from public invasion; if scholarship and citizenship are set sharply enough apart from one another, then neither can make claims on the other, and the scholar should be able to go about his business undisturbed--and undisturbing. More significantly, however, containment reflects an epistemological position which severs facts from values, and it endorses what Richard J. Bernstein calls "a categorical distinction between theory and practice," according to which the task of the social scientist "is to describe and explain the facts" but not to make prescriptive claims about what ought to be--not to advocate a normative position."<sup>2</sup>

In building on the fact-value dichotomy, the policy of containment gives a domain of objective facts to the social scientist as social scientist and a domain of subjective preferences to the social scientist as citizen; and it prohibits interaction between the two. It requires the social scientist-citizen to exercise professional integrity and civic virtue in isolation from one another, first in one domain, and then in the other.

Containment seems to me a costly and a mistaken policy. It requires a bifurcation of the person which is probably psychologically impossible to maintain successfully in practice. Moreover, it defies common sense to hold that a social scientist

should not, or cannot, bring scholarship to bear on public issues, or that scholarship can thrive without critical attention to and involvement in public affairs. The ivory tower can easily turn into an ivory prison, and a social science which cuts itself sharply off from social and political action can easily become empty scholasticism: "the organization of knowledge rather than its pursuit and discovery."<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, the fact-value distinction is considerably fuzzier than social science orthodoxy holds. I believe, contrary to Hume, that it is possible to move logically from an "is" to an "ought" because descriptive statements often and unavoidably carry with them evaluation, criticism and prescription. Insofar as description is normative, there is no secure epistemological basis for the policy of containment.

I therefore prefer the second possibility: that social scientists can combine scholarship with citizenship. How can one integrate them? To suggest an answer, I propose to paint a picture of a life of scholarship and social activism, using John Dewey as my subject.

Dewey is well worth our attention here. Throughout his career he fought doggedly against what he regarded as an artificial and pernicious separation of intellectual from practical activity. His philosophical position may not be altogether satisfactory, but I believe it can be amplified by the way he lived the ideas he professed, to provide a model worth emulating. I believe there is something genuinely admirable about the coherence of Dewey's life, and I hope to be able to say what that is.

### Philosophical Pragmatism

Dewey was an ardent opponent of dualisms, and Morton White has suggested that Dewey's entire philosophy is contained in a "garden of versuses" found in the index to his Democracy and Education under the heading "Dualisms, educational results."<sup>4</sup> One of the dualisms listed is "Practice vs. theory." But Dewey's pragmatism would anyway have made it impossible for him to separate theory from practice.

Philosophical pragmatism is much deeper than the popular sense of the term

suggests. Nevertheless, Dewey wrote, "the popular impression that pragmatic philosophy shall develop ideas relevant to the actual crises of life, ideas influential in dealing with them and tested by the assistance they afford, is correct."<sup>5</sup> He argued that philosophy and indeed all inquiry, justifies itself only insofar as it deals with "the problems of men." His pragmatism thus constituted a broad demand for scholarly relevance, which made him, as White puts it, "a renegade philosopher, an academic agitator," who "urged the philosopher to survey his society and judge it good or bad. And if he found it bad, he was to change it or at least persuade others to change it."<sup>6</sup>

Dewey's philosophy begins with a conception of man as an active agent in a universe with no fixed structure and no final end. For Dewey, man is a part of the natural order, to which he reacts, with which he interacts, and which he acts upon. Therefore, although the universe is one "in which there is real uncertainty and contingency," it can "be made this way or that according as men judge, prize, labor and love."<sup>7</sup> Men are linked to the natural order through experience, which "includes what men do and suffer, what they strive for, love, believe and endure, and also how men act and are acted upon, the ways in which they do and suffer, desire and enjoy, see, believe, imagine--in short processes of experiencing."<sup>8</sup> Experience is a reciprocal relationship between man and environment. We are changed and we make changes as we go about our natural lives, and as we reflect upon our experiences we give the world meaning and our own lives grow in meaning. Our intelligence, if properly developed, enables us to play a creative role in the world, controlling it to serve human purposes.

For Dewey, therefore, the uncertainty of the universe was not a source of meaninglessness or anxiety but an exciting opportunity to create meaning through the exercise of intelligent social control. If the world is a certain way, if people are a certain way, then, he thought, all we can do is adapt to how things are, and this he held to be "the most depressing and pessimistic of all possible doctrines"--a doctrine of predestination, which tells us that nothing we do really matters.<sup>9</sup>

If the basic principle of the universe is change, then Dewey thought, a new

epistemology is necessary. He rejected the traditional idea that we come to know the world by "looking at it, getting the view of a spectator."<sup>10</sup> As a participant in the world, man is "a factor in generating things known...."<sup>11</sup> It is a mistake, then, to think of knowledge as a body of truths corresponding to an external world. Rather, knowledge is a series of "warrantable assertions" which we derive from our reflective manipulation of our environment. The problem of understanding, Dewey thought, "should be approached not from the point of view of the eyes, but from the point of view of the hands. It's what we grasp that matters."<sup>12</sup> We learn by doing and making, and as we make the world, we make it knowable. Knowledge therefore is not of permanency but of change; and what we know is subject to change as we change and the world changes.

To say that we can know what we make is not to say that we will know it. We have to reflect on our experiences in order to understand them, and we have to give them direction. Knowing for Dewey is always directed to the future. It is a guide to what to do and an instrument for doing it. It originates out of action and is oriented to action. Thus theory and practice intermesh.

We need knowledge, Dewey tells us, because we need security from the perils of the world; and we have traditionally sought security through knowledge in two ways:<sup>13</sup>

One of them began with an attempt to propitiate the powers which environ him and determine his destiny....If man could not conquer destiny he could willingly ally himself with it....The other course is to invent arts and by their means turn the powers of nature to account....This is the method of changing the world through action, as the other is the method of changing the self in emotion and idea.

The first course is intellectual; the second is practical. The second is clearly the more effective of the two, but men have always elevated thought over action, theory over practice. Why? Because, Dewey thinks, action is risky, and on the principle of "Safety first" men have chosen the certainty of ineffective abstract thinking to the uncertainty of effective doing and making. As a result, we have inherited "the idea of a higher realm of fixed reality of which alone true science

is possible and of an inferior world of changing things with which experience and practical matters are concerned," as well as "the notion...that the office of knowledge is to uncover the antecedently real, rather than, as is the case with our practical judgments, to gain the kind of understanding which is necessary to deal with problems as they arise." Fortunately, the rise of experimental science now enables us to substitute "search for security by practical means for quest of absolute certainty by cognitive means"<sup>14</sup>--to substitute genuine knowledge for a seductive but false pretender.

In sum, the uncertainty Dewey celebrated as an opportunity for human creativity he also regarded as a source of peril; but he saw peril as beneficial because in confronting us with problems it forces us to think about how to act. The human being for Dewey is ideally an imaginative and efficient solver of problems. With no problems we would have no need for solutions and therefore no need for inquiry and, indeed, nothing to know. We would be creatures of habit and impulse, unguided by reflection, incapable of deliberate innovation, and above all not distinctively human.

A philosophy concerned with the problems of men will need a theory of inquiry to inform us how best to deliberate about what we ought to do, as well as a social theory to inform us how best to foster that kind of deliberation. Such a philosophy will be in the deepest sense a philosophy of education.

### The Theory of Inquiry

For Dewey, science was the paradigm of effective thought or inquiry. White remarks that Dewey was one "of science's loudest cheerleaders,"<sup>15</sup> and it is well known that Dewey advocated the application of scientific method to all aspects of human life. But his concept of science was very broad. At one point he said simply that science is thinking.<sup>16</sup> At another he contrasted science to theology as alternative bases for belief: science meant free inquiry, involving method, attitude, weight of evidence, while theology meant dogma.<sup>17</sup> Still, science as practiced by



scientists stood as a norm for inquiry in certain important and more specific ways. It was, to begin with, experimental. It produced "beliefs about the actual structure and processes of things" to be held as hypotheses to be modified or discarded in the light of future experience.<sup>18</sup> Also, science was a shared activity, practiced by communities of persons engaged in common inquiry, and it could therefore provide a model for society at large to use in organizing social intelligence.<sup>19</sup> Dewey regarded knowledge as a social product with a social function, used ideally by a self-critical community of inquirers: by a democratic community. For Dewey the scientific method, or the method of intelligence, was an essential ingredient of the democratic way of life.

The point of major importance for us is that Dewey saw science as bringing facts and values together in the process of inquiry. "If ever we are to be governed by intelligence," he insisted, "science must have something to say about what we do, and not merely how we may do it most easily and economically."<sup>20</sup>

Inquiry, as Dewey analyzed it, begins with the perception of a problem--with a sense that something in a situation is out-of-joint. The next step is the construction of hypotheses to eliminate the difficulty. The process culminates with a solution which reconstructs the problematic situation: "...we know with respect to any subject-matter whatsoever in the degree in which we are able deliberately to transform doubtful situations into resolved ones."<sup>21</sup> As we move from problem to solution, we move along a "continuum of means-ends" in which "means are constituents of the very end-objects they have helped to bring into existence"<sup>22</sup> and ends in their turn become means to further ends. The difference between means and ends is one of perspective, not of kind.

We do not for Dewey first choose ends and then cast about for the most effective way to achieve them, as two separate activities. Ends and means both develop out of the process of problem-solving and must be evaluated by their usefulness in solving the problem at hand. They must also be evaluated by their consequences for our ability to solve other problems, immediately and in the long run. One problem solved generates



another; and each solution, in settling into the flux of human life, has effects beyond itself. Dewey recommends that we "frame our judgments as to what has value by considering the connections in existence of what we like and enjoy,"<sup>23</sup> so that we can maximize our enjoyment of the things we prize. By this, he does not mean the maximization of pleasure, but a heightened appreciation which comes with greater understanding of how things fit together in the world.

The ultimate test of value, however, is not a tangible achievement, nor is it even the achievement of a more comprehensive understanding. What we learn is always less important than how we learn it; and "the value of any cognitive conclusion depends upon the method by which it is reached, so that the perfecting of method, the perfecting of intelligence, is the thing of supreme value."<sup>24</sup> What really counts is developing habits of mind which will enable us to come up with innovative solutions to new problems when we cannot fall back on old knowledge. Consequently, it turns out that for Dewey science or the method of intelligence is both the process of inquiry and its objective.

If the really important thing about inquiry is that it teaches us how to inquire, the next thing we need to know is how to nurture inquiry. This question leads directly to social theory--and to social action, because, for Dewey, once we know how to structure society to develop intelligence, then we ought to try to do it.

### The Social Theory

For Dewey, the individual is a product of society, but the good society maximizes individuality, and individuality is exercised within society. Therefore people can act together to control the institutions which make them what they are, to enable them to become what they ought to be. The good society is a democratic society: a way of life rather than a narrowly political system. It brings people together in an atmosphere of openness and cooperation--and shared intelligence. Because education is the key to the goal of human growth, the school is the most important social institution

for the cultivation of intelligence and individuality. Dewey believed the school should be a small society, in which children learn how to learn so that they can cope with the more complex society outside the school; and at the same time it should be an environment in which children use shared intelligence for social ends. The ideal school therefore reconciles individualistic and institutional values--a reconciliation that must be carried into adult life so that competent persons can work together, animated by a common spirit and common aims.

If the school ought to be a small society, then it seems to me reasonable to think of society as a large school, in which the habit of inquiry continues to be developed and supported by social institutions. Dewey thought of learning as an unending process, in which "the purpose of school education is to insure the continuance of education by organizing the powers that insure the growth."<sup>25</sup> However, adults do not need the direction necessary to stimulate inquiry in immature children. They can collaborate in social decision-making on an essentially voluntary basis, each contributing his or her point of view and personal experience to the solution of common problems, and all learning and growing actively together.

Unfortunately, our society has become too large a school, and the educational process does not work. Dewey notes that as our technical capacity for collective decision-making has increased, our institutional structures have become so complex that "men feel that they are caught in the sweep of forces too vast to understand or master. Thought is brought to a standstill and action paralyzed."<sup>26</sup> Society needs to be reorganized; it is necessary somehow to unify the "inchoate public." People who are affected by events need to see that they have common interests and to organize and act to control the conditions of their lives. But mere organization is not enough: "the prime condition of a democratically organized public is a kind of knowledge and insight which does not yet exist."<sup>27</sup> The Great Society produced by technological interdependence must, Dewey tells us, be transformed into a Great Community held together by shared experience and genuine communion.

Community, however, requires an intimacy which has been destroyed by industrialization and must be recreated in a new form. Dewey proposes the revitalization of the local community. Then, he thinks, the close attachment neighbors have to one another can be expanded into wider relationships which will eliminate the past parochialism of the small town and create a dynamic participatory democracy all across the social board.

The prescription, however, seems paradoxical. Dewey wants social reformation from the bottom up. The public must create itself, and it can only do so through inquiry. How does inquiry occur when there is no inquirer? "Democracy," Dewey said on his ninetieth birthday, "begins in conversation."<sup>28</sup> How does a conversation begin when people are unused to conversing--especially when the ties among them have been severed by the dislocations of modernity?

### The Integration of Scholarship and Citizenship

Although Dewey always believed that philosophy should deal with the problems of men, he did not provide a program for social reconstruction, except perhaps in the schools. His positive proposals are often exasperatingly vague. This was no doubt partly due to his antipathy to the dogmatism of fixed ends and his commitment to social experimentation. I believe it was also because he saw the job of philosophy, not as telling people what to do, but as helping them to work out what to do. That meant providing "the intellectual instrumentalities which will progressively direct inquiry into the deeply and exclusively human--that is to say, moral--facts of the present scene and situation."<sup>29</sup> But if philosophy is used for good, he insisted, "that achievement is the work of human beings as human, not of them in any professional capacity."<sup>30</sup> Philosophy should deal with the problems of men, but that did not mean for Dewey that philosophers should become kings.

Similarly, the social scientist's findings must be used by "human beings as human"; and the social scientist no more than the philosopher ought to rule. The

philosopher's knowledge is too general and the social scientist's too narrow; but in any case, "a class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all."<sup>31</sup> Genuine knowledge is social: built of bits and pieces from diverse sources, over time; no one has it all, and everyone can contribute to the whole.

Experts, then, can provide people with (some of) the information they need to make decisions, but decision-making is the job of the people generally. Dewey had an egalitarian faith in the capacity of the average man "to respond to and to use the knowledge and the skill that are embodied in the social conditions in which he lives, moves and has his being."<sup>32</sup> He also believed that the capacity of the average man is enlarged when he engages in decision-making and that opportunities for democratic participation should therefore be as wide as possible. He believed, too, that popular decision-making produces the most socially beneficial results, because it taps a broad spectrum of experiences and allows people of all kinds to contribute to the common good. For Dewey, democratic participation was not an individual right based on the need to protect self-interest nor even at bottom a means of self-realization; it was rather an opportunity and responsibility to use social intelligence for social ends, and so to do one's share as a citizen of a democratic political community.

This brings us forcibly back to the pivotal role of the schools--and of teachers--in developing an intelligent citizenry. The teacher who knows how to make mature adults out of immature children does seem to combine expertise with authority. Teachers, moreover, have for Dewey a special responsibility to take sides on social issues. Particularly when times are out of joint, "teachers cannot escape, even if they would, some responsibility for a share in putting them right. . . . Drifting is merely a cowardly mode of choice." Only when "teachers are aware of a social goal" can we develop an "intelligent understanding of the social forces and

movements of our own times." But the teacher's function is to demonstrate intelligence, not to do what is right:<sup>33</sup>

If a teacher is conservative and wishes to throw in his lot with forces that seem to me reactionary and that will in the end, from my point of view, increase present chaos, at all events let him do it intelligently, after a study of the situation and a conscious choice made on the basis of intelligent study. The same thing holds for the liberal and the radical.

Even teachers, then, ought not to rule. Classroom teachers should be exemplars of civic virtue for the child--and for society. Similarly, it would seem that philosophers and social scientists ought to act as public educators, participating in social and political action to demonstrate how it is done. Knowledge and position confer responsibility rather than authority. By engaging in political education, experts may be able to initiate the conversation with which Dewey says democracy begins. But it is not their business to control the discussion.

Scholarship and citizenship thus meet not in unison but in harmony. There is a line between the social scientist as scholar and the social scientist as citizen. On the other hand, it is only a line and not a barrier. The method of intelligence characterizes both scholarship and citizenship, and scholars and citizens play complementary roles in decision-making. Social scientists and other experts discover and make known the facts on which intelligent public policy must be based, and then, acting as citizens with other citizens, they use those facts in making policy. Insofar as social scientists are especially/<sup>competent</sup> in inquiry, they have a special responsibility to engage in politics for the sake of political education. However, as the public improves in its capacity for inquiry, the special educative role of experts will fade away. The only real and continuing difference between social scientists and other citizens lies in the kinds of experience and knowledge they can bring to the solution of common problems.

This is a quite unexceptional picture of the relationship between scholarship and citizenship, except that it unites the "is" and the "ought" which social science orthodoxy wants to keep neatly isolated. It does so in two ways. First, the social

scientist deliberates with other citizens in making policy, examining ends and means in the light of the available facts. Second, and more significant, the facts the social scientist provides are themselves critical and prescriptive. The initial fact is the delineation of the problem which must be solved. To describe a situation as a problem is to criticize. Then the suggested solutions combine present and future facts as possible prescriptions for eliminating the difficulty. Each suggested solution must be evaluated as means-to-end and as means-in-itself; and the broad impact of each suggested solution must be appraised. It is this entire bundle of description-prescription which the social scientist provides as facts for the public to judge and to use as it deems best on the basis of rational deliberation. Finally, a policy will be chosen and put into practice, providing a test of the adequacy of the facts on which the choice was based. Moreover, the entire process is normative, because its aim is the elimination of a human difficulty and the achievement therefore of human goods--including the good of human growth through development of the capacity for inquiry, and the good of increasing human control.

Dewey's theory of inquiry, however, gives the social scientist as social scientist an additional and compelling reason to exercise civic virtue, so that there is a fusion of professional integrity and civic virtue at least at one point. Insofar as social and political theory arises out of the problems of men, as hypotheses to be tested by their usefulness in improving social and political practice, the construction of social theory must be grounded in a sensitive and critical immersion in public affairs.<sup>34</sup> If human beings are not spectators on the world but active agents in it, participants in generating meaning, the social scientist cannot stand outside his subject-matter as a detached observer and hope to understand it. From Dewey's point of view, the social science ideal of detachment is an evasion of civic virtue and is also professionally self-defeating.

### Social and Political Activism

Dewey's professional and civic activities formed an extraordinarily consistent

whole. His first and central concern was always educational theory and reform, but he was engaged in almost every major issue of his time. As he grew older, his concerns broadened and he became more radical; when he was almost ninety he remarked that he thought he was more radical now than he had ever been before, "because he had had more experience in explaining why existing conditions had to be changed."<sup>35</sup> But he seems never to have moved out of fairly orthodox channels for political participation.

His citizenship, like his scholarship, was a battle against dualisms. He opposed the kind of self-interested competition which separates people and proposed to substitute the value of individuality, or distinctiveness, for individualism. He wanted people to stand out yet not apart from one another. He opposed the division of higher from elementary and secondary education, of the liberal from the practical arts and sciences, of intellectual professions from manual labor. He saw these divisions as barriers to communication, mutual understanding, and the social utilization of the uniqueness of different kinds of people who all, he believed, could make valuable contributions to the common stock of social knowledge and social decisions. His attempts to bring different kinds of people together in cooperation centered primarily on the schools. But he also advocated the unionization of teachers, to provide them organizational effectiveness as workers within the labor movement. He was a founder, member, and officer of a New York teacher's union, formed in 1913, which in 1916 became an AFL local.

Similarly, Dewey supported civil liberties. He insisted upon the value of discussion, including dissent, "as the manifestation of intelligence in political life. . . by its means sore spots are brought into light that would otherwise remain hidden."<sup>36</sup> Discussion--and dissent--also are necessary to overcome barriers and bring people together in mutual understanding. Dewey was particularly concerned with the vulnerability of teachers in the public schools and universities to governmental and private constraint. During World War One he spoke and wrote widely on the issue of academic freedom, and he helped to organize the American Association of University



Professors in 1915, serving as its first president and working diligently on its committee of inquiry into cases of academic freedom. He also participated in organizing the American Civil Liberties Union. At the same time, he supported women's suffrage--and he marched in at least one New York parade, carrying a notable banner proclaiming "Men can vote! Why can't I?"

Dewey was active until the end of his life in numerous organizations and causes, including the League for Industrial Democracy, the People's Lobby, and the League for Independent Political Action. The last of the three made an unsuccessful bid in the 1930's to create "a strong united radical new party" in the United States.<sup>37</sup> In 1937 Dewey, then seventy-eight years old, traveled to Mexico as chairman of a committee to hold hearings on charges which had been brought against Leon Trotsky and his son at the Moscow trials. He came to the conclusion that Trotsky and the other defendants were right; but he did not agree with their political views. Shortly thereafter, he supported his philosophical opponent Bertrand Russell, when Russell was denied a position at the City College of New York.

The most controversial episode of Dewey's public career may have been his support of World War One. Dewey argued that war was inevitable but that if intelligently directed it could be used to achieve worthwhile ends. A pacifistic stance, he thought, meant removing oneself from the opportunity to be effective in guiding the war. Randolph Bourne's eloquent dissent in "Twilight of the Idols" was a devastating critique of Dewey's excessive optimism. "Evidently," Bourne wrote,<sup>38</sup>

the attitudes which war calls out are fiercer and more incalculable than Professor Dewey is accustomed to take into his hopeful and intelligent imagination, and the pragmatist mind, in trying to adjust itself to them, gives the air of grappling, like the pioneer who challenges the arid plains, with a power too big for it. It is not an arena of creative intelligence our country's mind is now, but of mob psychology.

But Dewey at least never gave himself wholly over to the conduct of the war; he did what he could to stem its excesses; and as he became increasingly disillusioned with its outcome he grew to recognize the strength of the pacifist position. When he finally supported World War Two he said, "You know, if I hadn't been so wrong about

that First World War, I'd be a lot wronger about this one."<sup>39</sup>

(This is a very incomplete sketch of an unofficial political career, combined for the most part with full-time teaching and continuous writing. How, one might ask, did Dewey manage it? "Well, for one thing," explained his student, philosopher John Herman Randall, Jr., "he used to give us the advice--he said, "What you want to be sure to do is to get the reputation of being a very bad man on a committee. Then they won't put you on any university committees." He kept off them."<sup>40</sup>)

### Professional Integrity, Civic Virtue, and Political Education

Dewey's blend of professional integrity and civic virtue, in scholarship and active citizenship, was aimed at the improvement of society through the improvement of its members. It was based upon a consistent respect for individual persons combined with a vision of a human ideal which could only be achieved through the exercise of respect.<sup>41</sup>

To 'make others happy' except through liberating their powers and engaging them in activities that enlarge the meaning of life is to harm them and to indulge ourselves under cover of exercising a special virtue. Our moral measure for estimating any existing arrangement or any proposed reform is its effect upon impulse and habits. Does it liberate or suppress, ossify or render flexible, divide or unify interest? Is perception quickened or dulled? Is memory made apt and extensive or narrow and diffusely irrelevant? Is imagination diverted to fantasy and compensatory dreams, or does it add fertility to life? Is thought creative or pushed to one side into pedantic specialisms? There is a sense in which to set up social welfare as an end of action only promotes an offensive condescension, a harsh interference, or an oleaginous display of complacent kindness. It always tends in this direction when it is aimed at giving happiness to others directly, that is, as we can hand a physical thing to another. To foster conditions that widen the horizon of others and give them command of their own happiness in their own fashion, is the way of 'social' action. Otherwise the prayer of a free man would be to be left alone, and to be delivered, above all, from 'reformers' and 'kind' people.

One can draw a parallel here between Dewey's mission to America and Socrates' mission to Athens. Dewey had a general idea of the nature of the good society but no blueprints or absolute standards to measure it by. Socrates, in contrast, did believe in absolute measures of right and wrong and in fixed ends. But Socrates, like

Dewey, insisted that each individual must work out moral questions for himself. Socrates as a midwife was an educator in Dewey's sense. Both knew that giving people answers does not give them understanding and that telling people what virtue is does not make them virtuous. Gregory Vlastos is critical of Socrates for not telling Euthyphro what piety is, on the ground that Socrates showed a lack of love.<sup>42</sup> But Socrates was surely right that to tell Euthyphro would not improve him; what could Euthyphro do with a truth he did not comprehend?

Yet the trial and death of Socrates clearly show that Socrates' attempt to reconstruct Athenian society through the moral reformation of Athenians had failed; and Plato then adopted the alternative method of attempting to reconstruct Athenians through the moral reformation of Athens.<sup>43</sup> If one thinks of individual and society as two sides of a coin, each dependent on the other, it must be very difficult to refrain from seeking to impose one's vision of the good society on less perceptive persons for their own good. Perhaps one can refrain only if one's vision of the good society is a vision of intellectually growing individuals. Certainly that was so for Dewey, for whom the means to the good society was constitutive of the end. Presumably it was in some sense so for Socrates as well.

Socrates ended his life as a martyr to his particular combination of professional integrity and civic virtue. It was his last and lasting lesson to the Athenians. Dewey, in contrast, lived out his life fully to the end, honored and esteemed and continuing to teach and to learn. Ironically, Socrates, who wrote nothing, still has a powerful hold on our minds through Plato's evocation of his life and thought. Dewey, who wrote so voluminously and influentially for so many years, now seems philosophically old-fashioned, with even his demand for relevance somehow irrelevant, perhaps because of the apparent naivete of his call to reason. Yet Dewey has much to say to us about the place of man in the world, the need for criticism and reform, the connection between theory and practice, and the necessity of evaluation in our deliberations about what we ought to do.

If we tried to evaluate Dewey's life by his own pragmatic criterion of its consequences for human improvement, it would be hard to reach a definitive judgment. Certainly we have not gotten any better at using intelligence in human affairs than we were when Dewey began his program of political education. Nevertheless, his example should, as White so bitinglly puts it, "serve to encourage those social scientists who are more interested in achieving a good society than in measuring attitudes toward toothpaste."<sup>44</sup> Dewey often said that the alternatives to the use of intelligence in human affairs are drift and violence. Drift and violence both have a certain appeal, and in their different ways they enable people to avoid making choices. Given these options, Dewey's method of intelligence is clearly to be preferred, even if it is difficult, uncertain, and frustratingly ambiguous.

### Conclusion

I believe Dewey is generally right to emphasize the purposiveness of human action and the individual and social value of intelligence. But to force all inquiry into the mold of problem-solving is too narrow. It omits, for example, the elements of play and sheer joy which so often predominate in speculation--and in other human activities as well. And I doubt that human control is quite the fundamentally important objective Dewey thought it was. On the other hand, we are surely better off when we know what we are doing and so can act "well" in the moral as well as the practical sense of the world. However, as far as social science is concerned, Dewey's problem-solving picture of inquiry seems to me illuminating, as does his account of how we can best deliberate about social problems and their solutions.

Similarly, I find Dewey's social theory both appealing and elusive. His advocacy of social deliberation and social decision-making is particularly unsatisfactory. Neither the concept of shared intelligence<sup>45</sup> nor the important analogue of the scientific community of self-critical inquirers is concretely explicated in social or political terms. Dewey's belief that it is possible for people to surmount--or

harmonize--their individual and group differences and to cooperate in the use of creative intelligence for the sake of the common good, is inspiring; but it expresses an essentially religious faith in the brotherhood of man<sup>46</sup>--and that is a weak reed on which to build a political philosophy. And again, the mechanisms for the achievement of cooperation are left vague. I do find Dewey's vision of a participatory democratic society attractive, however, and I would like to see institutional arrangement devised to create and sustain it. Perhaps Dewey's lesson is that if we want democracy, we have to achieve it for ourselves.

My primary purpose in this paper, however, has been neither to criticize nor defend Dewey's philosophy, but to depict what I believe to be an exemplary way of integrating scholarship and citizenship. Dewey, I suggest, exercised professional integrity and civic virtue together in at least these two important ways: He thought through the problems of his time sensitively and seriously and then did what he could to remedy them. And he acted out of a deep respect for persons, and always with the knowledge that he might be wrong.

# FOOTNOTES

1. I have borrowed the term "containment" from Morton White, who speaks of it as one of three anti-intellectual strategies: "Containment would permit intellectuals to operate, but only if they were properly fenced in or reined in, limited in their influence and allowed to express nothing more than curiosity--and the idler the curiosity the better." See Pragmatism and the American Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 79-80. In the case of social science, the strategy of containment is self-imposed.
2. Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (New York and London: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 44-45.
3. John Herman Randall, Jr., Hellenistic Ways of Deliverance and the Making of the Christian Synthesis (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 184.
4. Morton White, Science and Sentiment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 287.
5. John Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," in John J. McDermott, ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, Vol. I: The Structure of Experience; Vol. II: The Lived Experience (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1973), p. 93.
6. Morton White, Social Thought in America (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), pp. 129 and 142.
7. Dewey, "Philosophy and Democracy," in Joseph Ratner, ed., Characters and Events: Popular Essays in Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. II (New York: Henry Holt, 1929), p. 851.
8. Dewey, Experience and Nature, Ch. 1, in McDermott, Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 256-257.
9. Dewey, "Human Nature and Scholarship," in Dewey, Problems of Men (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 191.
10. Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," in McDermott, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 75.
11. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1960), p. 212.
12. Corliss Lamont, ed., Dialogue on John Dewey (New York: Horizon Press, 1959), p. 95. Cf. Richard J. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 219.
13. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 3.
14. Ibid., pp. 16-17 and 24-25.
15. White, Pragmatism and the American Mind, op. cit., p. 96.

16. Dewey, "Science and the Education of Man," in Ratner, op. cit., p. 774.
17. Dewey, "Science, Belief and the Public," in ibid., p. 459.
18. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., pp. 18 and 192.
19. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1963), pp. 72-73.
20. Dewey, "Science and the Education of Man," in Ratner, op. cit., p. 775.
21. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 251. It should be noted here that, as Bernstein says, "no philosopher has emphasized more than Dewey that man is an active, experimenting creature. He does not wait for problems to arise, he can actively seek them out. The active search for genuine problems is the mark of a scientific intelligence. . . . Our task is to discover what precisely are the problems to be investigated." See: John Dewey (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 105-106. But see also Israel Scheffler's criticism, that Dewey's theory of deliberation "provides no psychological basis for the continuous critical surveillance of action which is so central to Dewey's general philosophy." Four Pragmatists (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), p. 239.
22. Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939), pp. 49 and 47.
23. Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, op. cit., p. 265.
24. Ibid., p. 200.
25. Dewey, Democracy and Education, in McDermott, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 492.
26. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (Denver: Alan Swallow, n.d.), p. 135.
27. Ibid., p. 166.
28. Lamont, ed., Dialogue on John Dewey, op. cit., p. 88.
29. Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. xxvii.
30. Ibid., p. xli.
31. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, op. cit., p. 207.
32. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, op. cit., p. 52.
33. Dewey, "The Teacher and His World," in Dewey, The Problems of Men, op. cit., pp. 71-72.
34. Scheffler quite rightly says that Dewey overstates the case for the unity of theory and practice. He holds that Dewey is correct "in relating theory to practice or observation through the mediating category of activity" but that his doctrine of experience goes too far "in the direction of absorbing theory wholly into activity and construing science as concerned solely with observable change," Four Pragmatists, op. cit., pp. 204-206.



35. Harold Taylor, Introduction to George Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), p. xx.
36. Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, op. cit., p. 70.
37. Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, op. cit., p. 254.
38. Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," The Seven Arts, II (October, 1917), 688-702.
39. Lamont, ed., Dialogue on John Dewey, op. cit., p. 84.
40. Ibid., p. 71.
41. Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1930), pp. 293-294.
42. Gregory Vlastos, "Introduction: The Paradox of Socrates," in Vlastos, ed., The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1971), pp. 1-21.
43. See Alexander Sesonske, "Plato's Apology: Republic I," in Sesonske, ed., Plato's Republic: Interpretation and Criticism (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 40-47.
44. White, Social Thought in America, op. cit., p. 246.
45. See, e.g., Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, op. cit., pp. 67 ff.
46. See John Herman Randall, Jr., "The Religion of Shared Experience," in Ratner, ed., The Philosopher of the Common Man (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), pp. 106-145.