ABSTRACT
              The purpose of this paper is to investigate the
relationship between psychological traits and voting behavior.
Investigated is the thesis that psychological traits are useful
concepts for political scientists as predictors of consistency in
behavior. Contending that previous trait theory research has been
generally unimpressive, the author hypothesizes that traits may be
specific to individuals as well as situations. This reform of trait
theory is applied to six politically relevant traits:
tendermindedness, radicalism-conservatism, F-scale, social
desirability, locus of control, and machiavellianism. The criterion
variables include 18 measures of electoral and non-electoral
participation, ideology and partisanship, including: votes in campus,
local, state and national elections, anti-war activity, party
identification, political discussions, and attempts to persuade
others. Findings indicate that segregating the sample into
trait-relevant and trait non-relevant groups is meaningful since
predictive power is distinctly enhanced in the trait-relevant groups.
In addition, the analysis shows that the 18 criterion items cluster
according to trait-predictability in highly interpretable ways.
References relating to personality types, psychological studies, and
political participation are included. (Author/DB)

INSTITUTE FOR BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH

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PERSONALITY ANTECEDENTS OF THE VOTE

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The idea that certain identifiable personality traits can be found to explain inter-situational consistency in behavior has attracted political scientists from the times of Plato. Surely, if we could only develop reliable and valid measures of these traits, we could introduce new levels of predictive regularity into the study of politics. Unfortunately, in spite of our intuitive convictions that behavioral consistency should emerge, it rarely has in empirical investigations by political scientists. The following analysis is therefore a continuation of a dialogue. We expect to succeed where others have failed because of a recasting of the theory of trait influence on behavior. Trait theorists generally concede that traits are situationally specific. That is, a trait can be expected to produce regularities in only a certain selected set of situations. However, that set has often been imposed a priori by the investigator. We shall attempt to allow our respondents to determine for themselves the relevant situation set.

A second reform which we shall propose for trait theory is that traits are not only situation-specific, but are also person-specific. This view rejects the traditional assumption that all individuals possess a particular trait, in favor of the idea that for some, a trait may simply have no meaning. We should expect consistency in behavior only for those who organize their world views according to a relevant trait.

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This paper explores new theoretical ground in political science, and its main contribution should be the assessment it makes of the fruitfulness of the paths it follows. If the substance of our results can be seen as a contribution to our knowledge of attitude and behavior in the area of political participation, then the success of our effort will have been two-fold.

Trait Theory

Trait theory rests on a simple and intuitively attractive postulate: There are certain elements of the personality, called traits, which are relatively stable, highly consistent, and which exert widely generalized causal effects on behavior (Mischel, 1973). We all find in our day-to-day affairs that we tend to form expectations about our friends and colleagues in terms of certain traits which we have assigned to them. We can expect one individual to deprecate our achievements because we think he is deficient in self-esteem and has difficulty accepting the notion that others are doing quality work. We predict that another individual will typically be the one to take the initiative in organizing social activities because we have assigned to him the trait of compulsive orderliness. These sorts of informal observations have led to the fundamental assumption of this theoretical approach to personality: "Personality comprises broad underlying dispositions which pervasively influence the individual's behavior across many situations and lead to consistency in his behavior" (Allport, 1937).

One can easily understand how trait theory arose before the Depression. Freud's work formed a dominant part of the thinking on personality and led to a view which reduced the personality to a very few, or even to one,

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dimension. Moreover, the intuitive factor reinforced this view. Bem and Allen (1974; p. 506) note that for our intuitions "the assumption of cross-situational consistency is virtually synonymous with the concept of personality itself. There are few other beliefs about human behavior which are as compellingly self-evident."

The great misfortune of trait theory has been that, as increasingly sophisticated measurement techniques have been applied to the various trait concepts, empirical research has consistently failed to find much cross-situational predictive power. Mischel (1968), in reviewing both past and current research, observes that the cross-situational correlation coefficients reported generally fail to exceed .30. That is to say, individuals who are scored as helpful or persistent (Hartshorne and May, 1928), introverted (Newcomb, 1929), or punctual (Dudycha, 1936), for instance, fail to behave consistently across a variety of situations in which these traits are expected to be manifested.

The fact that behavior varies from situation to situation is certainly not denied by anyone, not even the classical trait theorists. Quite to the contrary, numerous sensitive analyses appear to have isolated two basic reasons why traits, which "ought" to determine behavior, do such a poor job of it. These we may label "specificity of the situation" and "specificity of the person."

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Figure 1 about here
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Of these two factors, by far the more familiar is the specificity of the situation. Psychologists have long recognized the value of the Lewinian paradigm:

$$B = f(OE)$$

Figure 1

The Interaction of Situation and Person in
the Expectation of Trait-Consistent Behavior

Person

	Trait is Relevant	Trait is Not Relevant
Trait is Engaged	Behavior is Consistent	Behavior is not Consistent
Trait is Not Engaged	Behavior is not Consistent	Behavior is not Consistent

Situation

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That is, behavior is a function of the interaction of the organism and its environment (Davies, 1973; Greenstein, 1975). An example of one of the more popular traits in the literature, and one which we discuss at length below, is authoritarianism. This trait is generally found to predict hostile and aggressive behavior in situations of interpersonal interaction, but only in the case where the authoritarian individual occupies a superior position. That is, the trait is not served by a certain typical behavior in all cases. In the instance in which the authoritarian individual encounters someone who is superior to him, his typical behavior pattern will be submission. In sum, a trait may be served by different behaviors in different situations.

The specificity of situation concept continues beyond this, however. It is clear that a trait is simply not engaged in many, if not most, of the situations encountered by the individual. This may be true even though the investigator may have good reason to think that, in theory, a situation ought to be trait-related. Bem and Allen (1974) maintain that much of the failure of empirical work in trait theory to show the expected correlations arises from this problem. The investigator determines a priori which situations he will test, ignoring the fact that he may be forcing situations on his subjects which they do not feel are relevant to the trait in question. The result is a deflated correlation. In their own work, these authors discover that the trait "conscientiousness" predicts rather well to getting school work in on time, but fails miserably to predict who will maintain the most orderly room.

The second factor which appears in Figure 1 involves the specificity of the person. The idea that traits cannot be expected to determine

behavior in all situations is generally well-established (although less well in political science than in psychology). A much more unusual idea is that traits may not determine behavior in all individuals, either. The influence of Freud, who spoke of personality universals, has perhaps preempted our thinking in this particular area. Nonetheless, it appears reasonable to think that while certain individuals may be very authoritarian or very non-authoritarian, certain others may not organize their world view along those lines at all. The dimension of authoritarianism may simply not be relevant to their behavior in any situation. This will be true regardless of the fact that these latter individuals may be perfectly capable of generating a score of the F-scale.

These two factors must each be taken into account, therefore, if we are to expect behavior to be consistently related to traits. As Figure 1 indicates, both are necessary but not sufficient conditions.

The Use of Trait Theory in Political Science

The use of the trait concept to explain consistencies in the political behavior of individuals has a long, if not particularly crowded, heritage. Plato, the source of so much of the inspiration in our discipline, included personality traits in his study. His three types of leaders, the aristocrat, the timocrat, and the tyrant, were each identified in terms of a central motive. These individuals acted in pursuit of honor, wealth, or power, and from those underlying traits, the characteristics of the rule of each could be predicted.

Among the later classics, a number can be viewed as the outline of the governmental form which would be expected to follow if a single psychological orientation is made the premise. "Thus, Hobbes Leviathan

may be considered as a discussion of the society and government which would follow if human beings were sadomasochistic and paranoid; Machiavelli's The Prince may be considered as a discussion of government where the elite is competitive, anxious and possessed of psychopathic personalities, and J. S. Mills' On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government represent a Utopia where men are assumed to have democratic personalities, are thought to have their libidinous drives well under control, and are guided by reason" (Lane, 1963; p. 467n).

It is perhaps more typical to identify three contemporary names with the use of trait theory in political science: Lasswell, Greenstein, and Davies. Lasswell, in fact, is generally acknowledged as the father of this approach within the discipline, Plato et al. notwithstanding. "He was the first to insist successfully on the need to bring psychology into political analysis. He, more than any other person, insisted that unconscious forces which so significantly determine how people behave must be subjected to analysis" (Davies, 1973; p. 20).

The basic statement of Lasswell's position on the role of personality in political life takes the form of the following equation:

$$p \} d \} r = P$$

That is, political man is produced by the displacement of private motives onto public objects, and their subsequent rationalization in terms of the public interest.

The key element in this formula from our perspective is of course the p, or private motives. These are shared by all men; political types arise when certain motives are displaced and rationalized. Lasswell's analysis focuses on three basic types of political man. The "agitator" is animated by a "drive to obtain prompt indulgence from large audiences

in terms of values such as affection and respect." The "administrator" is identified with a need to keep destructive impulses under control, and is generally seen as a "power-centered" rather than a "permissive" type. Finally, the "theorist" stresses "enlightenment and skill values," and is identified with frustrations met early in life. In spite of the fact that these characteristics would not be immediately recognized as traits by many classical personality psychologists, it is not difficult to see in them the core of the "pervasive predispositions which have a generalized effect on behavior" which lie at the center of the standard definition.

Both Davies and Greenstein have taken up Lasswell's crusade to have personality included in the study of politics, a crusade which had not made much headway in the thirty years following the publication of Psychopathology and Politics. Davies (1973) takes a particularly aggressive position, seeking to "compensate for what I regard as a hypertrophy of research in epiphenomena, phenotypes, and other evidences of the sometimes self-evident or long since demonstrated . . ." (p. 27). He deplores the study of political behavior for concentrating on the "precise validation of the self-evident in each of its infinite nuances." More fundamentally, his position is that the truly basic questions which political scientists ask (or ought to ask), cannot be answered without a grounding in political psychology. The question of why men institute governments or why they seek to alter or abolish them must be approached, says Davies, through a systematic knowledge of psychology.

Although he shares a common belief about the validity of the political personality concept, the thrust of Greenstein's work (1969) is in a

direction quite different from Davies'. Here, the primary concern is not
to attack the empirical study of political behavior for its neglect of
the personality, but to strike down whatever logical arguments may have
been raised to defend that neglect. In a review of five of the major
objections which have been brought to the study of personality in politi-
cal science, Greenstein concludes that there is no reason why, in principle,
we should not focus more precisely in this area in our attempts to under-
stand political man (1969; chapter 2). He then presents a schema of the
personality which was originally developed by Smith (1968), laying out
the various elements and processes upon which research into this realm
must focus.

So we find that Lasswell has laid the modern foundations for the
study of personality and politics, Davies exhorts us to make more use
of personality concepts, and Greenstein assures us that personality
is in fact relevant in the study of political behavior. We are left,
in this brief review, with a consideration of the shock troops, those
scholars who have attempted to collect data and to demonstrate empirically
that some link exists between personality traits and political behavior.

Even if we restrict ourselves to studies with some bearing on
politics, we face a bewildering variety of work in this area. Fortunately,
Greenstein has recently completed a magistral review (1975), to which all
can refer, and which relieves us of the necessity of attempting one here.
(Other compendia are Greenstein and Lerner, 1971; Knutson, 1973).

It is perhaps worth a moment, nevertheless, to point out the basic
details of Greenstein's organization, so that the main features of the
landscape in this subfield will be clear. The studies treated in
Greenstein's review are divided into three groups. The first involves

case studies of individual political actors. Here we find two major
areas of focus. The first is the familiar technique of psychobiography.
The lives and actions of major political figures have been variously
dissected, usually from a heavily psychoanalytic perspective. Thus,
we find Erikson's two works on political and religious leaders, <u>Young Man
Luther</u> (1958) and <u>Ghandi's Truth</u> (1969); George and George's analysis of
Woodrow Wilson (1956), and Tucker's analysis of Stalin's formative years
and rise to power (1973).

Not all case studies have dealt with political elites, however. Of
much greater interest for our own analysis are the case studies carried
out in the general population by Smith, Bruner and White (1956), and
by Lane (1962). In both of these studies, extraordinarily long interviews
(on the order of 30 hours in the former case) were conducted with 10
or 15 men. The main service performed by this work has been to demonstrate
the complex and contingent nature of the relationships between personality
characteristics and political behavior. If nothing else, these studies
suggest that "there evidently are connections 'in the real world' between
personal disposition and political behavior that are too segmental and
varied to be trapped in the form of measured general relationships" (Green-
stein, 1975; p. 35).

The second major grouping of personality and politics work in Green-
stein's review centers on the political typology. Here we focus most
directly on the subject of the present paper, for by typology, Greenstein
means "syndrome classifications that identify interdependent constellations
of traits with distinctive origins, dynamics and behavioral links . . ."
(p. 44). Since we will deal at greater length with certain traits in a

later section, we will simply mention here some of the studies which fall under this rubric.

Perhaps the most well-known study of a politically-relevant trait is the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, et al., 1950). Designed originally to study the psychological correlates of anti-Semitism, the principle trait developed by this work -- the F-scale -- has come to be applied to all manner of political behavior as well. This effort has met with indifferent success, as we discuss below.

Another example of the application of trait psychology to political behavior is Rokeach's The Open and The Closed Mind (1960). This typological formulation was an attempt to isolate the dogmatism trait in a way which would be free from ideological contamination. Rokeach hoped to escape the criticism leveled against the F-scale which held that it was a measure only of right-wing authoritarianism. Although the scale is weakened somewhat by Rokeach's validation procedure, which is limited to a sample of 13 English Communists, the general potential of the dogmatism trait should continue to attract the attention of political scientists.

A third prominent attempt to construct a politically-relevant trait involves the Machiavellianism scale. This, too, was an effort to escape the problems of the F-scale and to develop an ideology-free measure. The scale was designed "to identify individuals disposed to fill manipulative social and political roles -- individuals low in affect invested in interpersonal relationships, concern with conventional morality, and intensity of ideological commitment and sufficiently lacking in 'gross psychopathology' to use these permissive proclivities to act as 'operators'

or manipulators" (Greenstein, 1975; p. 50).

The final main division of Greenstein's review incorporates aggregative analyses. The best known part of this literature, though not always the most respected, is that which deals with national character. These studies, which have subsequently been roundly criticized, generally identified a linkage between some aspect of child-rearing practices and personality structure, and between personality structure and the behavior of whole cultures. During the Second World War and the cold-war period, these analyses were studiously applied not only to the explanation of our enemies (Benedict, 1946; Dicks, 1950; Gorer and Rickman, 1949), but also our friends (Mead, 1942).

On the more reputable side, a number of studies have attracted attention. McClelland (1961), for instance, has sought to demonstrate the link between the level of need-achievement in a population, and the rate of economic growth. And Talcott Parsons' (1947) essay on the sources of aggression in international affairs hypothesized that private tensions which arise from the strain of trying to learn occupational roles, are displaced outward and lead finally to aggressive impulses in the international sphere.

While Greenstein has assembled a truly impressive list of work, when we look down to consult the bottom line, the empirical demonstrations of trait-behavior links in politics have failed to impress. Milbrath and Klein (1962), for instance, conclude: "We are not aware of any study which has isolated a personality trait which drives people specifically into politics." McClosky (1958), while he finds an extraordinary number of links between clinical measures of personality (such as rigidity, hostility or contempt for weakness), and conservatism, goes on to conclude

that people do not seem to make political judgements on the basis of
their liberalism-conservatism. Schneider (1973), speaking of psychological
research more generally, concludes that "there has been no research
attention to relatively stable inferential relationships between behaviors
and traits. Finally, the authors of the American Voter (1960) review
personality factors in voting behavior. Their research on the effect of
authoritarianism on the prediction of attitudes about public policy
reveals that for the 80% of the population which lacks a college education,
"results stand at a dubious trace level." Similar findings were made in
the area of partisan choice.

While we fully intend to close this section on a negative note,
it would perhaps be circumspect to point out that the effort to link
personality traits with political variables has by no means fallen into
neglect. A major on-going project is being sustained by McClosky, who has
now passed this interest on to his students. Of specific note in this
context are Sniderman (1975), and Sniderman and Citrin (1971), who
focus on the link between self-esteem and democratic politics.

Specification of Person and Situation

Throughout this review of applications of trait theory in political
science, we note a marked lack of sensitivity to the concept of
specificity. Our earlier review observed that psychologists have generally
conceded that no personality trait will be manifest in all behavioral
situations. In many cases, the trait will simply not be engaged, and in
others, the trait may be served by inconsistent behavior (as in the
authoritarian's dominance of subordinates and submission to superiors).

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Conscious even of this `imitation of trait theory and selecting situations with great care, a ceiling of +.30 seems to exist for cross-situational correlation coefficients (Mischel, 1968). Indeed, Mischel concludes that "the predictive utility of a trait-based approach to personality still remains undemonstrated and that situational specificity of behavior appears to be the rule rather than the exception" (Bem and Allen, 1974; p. 507).

Bem and Allen (1974) refuse to accept this indictment. In spite of the several reasons to accept at face value the failure of empirical studies to produce correlations in excess of +.30, these authors believe that this lack of cross-situational consistency arises from an error which was pointed out forty years ago by Gordon Allport (1937). The fallacy resides in the fact that this entire research tradition is predicated upon nomothetic rather than idiographic assumptions about the nature of individual differences. That is, nearly all the research in the area of trait theory has assumed that a given trait is relevant for all individuals and that individual differences can be identified with different locations on that trait (or set of traits). What Allport proposed was that "individuals differ not only in the ways traits are related to one another in each person, but that they differ also in terms of which traits are even relevant" (Bem and Allen, 1974; p. 509). Thus, the nomothetic impulses of the behavioral scientist result in the imposition of a set of equivalence classes, determined by the choice of behaviors and situations to be sampled. Inconsistency in behavior, then, does not necessarily arise from the irrelevance of the trait but from the fact that a nomothetic structure has been forced upon an

essentially idiographic situation. Bem and Allen summarize as follows

(1974, p. 510):

> . . . traditional trait-based research study
> will yield evidence of cross-situational
> consistency only if the individuals in the
> research sample agree with the investigator's
> a priori claim that the sampled behaviors and
> situations belong in a common equivalence
> class and only if the individuals agree among
> themselves on how to scale those behaviors and
> situations . . . The traditional verdict of
> inconsistency is in no way an inference about
> individuals; it is a statement about a dis-
> agreement between an investigator and a group
> of individuals and/or a disagreement among
> the individuals within the group. The fallacy
> is a direct consequence of the traditional
> nomothetic assumptions about individual dif-
> ferences.

In its pure form, Bem and Allen allude to a totally idiographic sort

of investigation. We are instructed to observe each individual and note

in what ways his behaviors are consistent. One subject might always

do his schoolwork early, be meticulous about his personal grooming, and

be always punctual. We might be tempted to ascribe the trait "conscientious"

to this person. What of the second individual, however, who is con-

scientious about his schoolwork but neglectful in the other two areas?

Should he be described as inconsistently conscientious? No, say these

authors. Here is a student for whom conscientiousness is not the relevant

trait at all, but who is instead highly dedicated as a student and has no

time for anything else.

This is not the forum to debate the relative merits of the idiographic

and nomothetic approaches to the study of behavior. Suffice it to say that

we are in no position to study large samples in the idiographic manner

described above. What we do propose is to back off from what we have
characterized as the nomothetic position; that is, the assumption that
certain traits are relevant to everyone, at least in certain situations.
If we can come up with an operational definition of "relevant trait,"
then we will be in a position to limit our investigations to the upper
left-hand quadrant of Figure 1. That is, we will be able to specify,
to a degree at least, not only the situations in which a trait is
relevant, but also, that subset of individuals for which the trait is
relevant. This latter step constitutes a major departure from earlier
trait research and has high potential for yielding greater inter-
situational consistency in behavior.

Thus the compromise between the nomothetic and idiographic centers
on an id   phic assessment procedure which allows us to use each
individu   unique characteristics to determine the relevance of a
set of traits. This procedure, as developed by Bem and Allen (1974),
centers on the calculation of an ipsatized variance ratio, a statistic
which is intended to capture the meaning of the idea of trait relevance.
Unless an individual is cross-situationally consistent on a trait dimension
(that is, unless he responds in a similar manner to the various items
which constitute the trait scale), then by definition he cannot be
meaningfully characterized by the investigator's construct. The ipsatized
variance ratio is simply a measure of the extent to which an individual's
variance on a particular trait relates to the amount of variance present
in a larger pool of items. "It reflects the degree to which an individual
'extracts' the particular trait-scale items from the total pool of items
and 'clusters' them into an equivalence class" (Bem and Allen, 1974; p. 515).

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Returning to Figure 1, the use of the ipsatized variance ratio allows a two-pronged attack on the problem of increasing the predictability of political behavior from psychological traits. First, we are now able to separate a sample of individuals into trait-relevant and trait-irrelevant groups. That is, we can restrict our investigation to those individuals in the left-hand column of Figure 1 through the application of the ipsatized variance ratio.

The second step is a purely empirical one. Once we have determined whether a trait is relevant, we are able to turn our attention to the array of political behaviors which we hope to predict. We may find, for instance, that certain classes of political behaviors respond very strongly to prediction by traits, but that others are not so affected. This methodology will thus allow a mapping of these criterion variables, determining whether they are relatively more trait-related, as opposed to being socially determined.

A Short Review of the Selected Traits

We should reiterate at this point that this study is highly exploratory in nature. Therefore, we make no claim that the set of scales which we have used constitutes the exhaustive listing of politically-relevant traits. Quite to the contrary, it would be most surprising if this were true. Nor do we present extensive theoretical arguments that all of these six traits which we have included should be found to be politically relevant. Our goal in this analysis is simply to apply the idiographic approach proposed by Bem and Allen to the political sphere. Our selection process has been based on the writings of earlier scholars (reviewed briefly below), who have suggested in

more or less rigorous ways that the traits which we have finally selected
should bear some fruit when cultivated in the political realm.

The first two scales employed in our analysis were developed by
Eysenck (1954) specifically for the purpose of explaining why radicals
of the right (fascists) and left (communists), seem to resemble each other
in identifiable ways. Strictly speaking, these measures were not intended
to be specific personality variables, but rather emerged as the result
of an attempt to construct the dimensions which underlie people's social
attitudes and beliefs (Robinson and Shaver, 1969). Eysenck's proposal is
elegant in its simplicity. He conceives of modern politics as a two-
dimensional arena. One of these dimensions is the familiar radical-
conservative one, which seeks to persuade us that communists are funda-
mentally different from fascists. In order to correct this error (as
he perceives it), Eysenck proposes a second, orthogonal dimension of
tendermindedness. On this scale, fascists and communists supposedly appear
as very similar personalities, both at the tough-minded end.[2]

Conceptualizing these two traits presents something of a problem.
An examination of the items in the radical-conservative cluster reveals
only one "concept." That is, conservatism is attached to a preference
for things as they are or used to be, while radicalism is characterized
by a taste for change. The items of this scale treat such topics as the
nationalization of industry, the return to religion, the power of Jews,
and the inferiority of colored people. Eysenck found, not surprisingly,
that this factor differentiated Socialists rather well from Tories.

The second scale, tendermindedness, does not offer even this meager
conceptual content. Here we find items referring to the death penalty,
flogging of criminals, and treating conscientious objectors as traitors.

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They suggest that an opposition of humane and inhumane is present here,
which is of course suggested by the words "tender" and "tough." This
is also reminiscent of the "hard-soft" dimension isolated by Weisberg
and Rusk (1970) which differentiated Wallace from Rockefeller and McCarthy
in the 1968 presidential election.

The third scale which we have included is the well-known authoritarianism,
or F-scale (F for fascist). The monumental work which presented this
scale (Adorno, et al., 1950) has attracted so much scholarly attention
that the concept of trait has practically become synonymous with author-
itarianism (Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967; Christie and Jahoda, 1954).

The critical difference between the F-scale and Eysenck's scales
lies in the intellectual nature of their respective origins. Recall
that the Eysenck scales were not conceived a priori, but rather emerged
as the dimensions which best describe the clustering of 40 items. (It
should be noted that Eysenck claims that his tendermindedness scale is in
fact an ideology-free authoritarianism scale.) Robinson describes the
approach used in the construction of the F-scale (1969, p. 224). "The
F-scale was not constructed by the method of selecting items from a
large pool on a statistical basis; rather, eacn one was written specifically
for the original scale on the basis of the authors' previous experience
and theoretical considerations. Each item was meant to be related to
both prejudice and one or more of nine personality variables . . . In
addition, each item had to be indirect and had to reflect a balance between
irrationality and objective truth."

What the authoritarian personality is, or what the authoritarian
individual is actually like, is not immediately apparent from the original
volume. However, Kirscht and Dillehay (1967, pp. vi-vii), in their review

of The Authoritarian Personality, do present a reasonably comprehensive

composite of the syndrome.

> Authoritarianism characterizes the basically weak
> and dependent person who has sacrificed his capa-
> city for genuine experience of self and others so
> as to maintain a precarious sense of order and
> safety that is psychologically necessary for him.
> In the type case, the authoritarian confronts with
> a façade of spurious strength a world in which
> rigidly stereotyped categories are substituted for
> the affectionate and individualized experience
> of which he is incapable. Such a person is
> estranged from inner values and lacks self-
> awareness. His judgments are governed by a puni-
> tive conventional moralism, reflecting external
> standards towards which he remains insecure since
> he has failed to make them really his own. His
> relations with others depend on considerations of
> power, success, and adjustment, in which people
> figure as means rather than as ends, and achieve-
> ment is valued competitively rather than for its
> own sake. In his world, the good, the powerful,
> and the ingroup merge to stand in fundamental
> opposition to the immoral, the weak, the outgroup.
> For all that he seeks to align himself with the
> former, his underlying feelings of weakness and
> self-contempt commit him to a constant and em-
> bittered struggle to prove to himself and others
> that he really belongs to the strong and good, and
> that his ego-alien impulses, which he represses,
> belong to the weak and bad.

The fourth scale included in our analysis is the Crowne-Marlowe scale

of social desirability (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960; 1964). This measure

was developed initially to be applied as a methodological corrective in

the area of personality testing. One of the early failures of this metho-

dology was the fact that subjects seemed "miserably uncooperative" (Crowne

and Marlowe, 1964, p. vii). Subjects simply failed to respond to test

batteries as was theoretically anticipated. It soon became clear, of

course, that the reason underlying this recalcitrance was that subjects

were responding not only to the content of an item, but also to its

form. In particular it was feared that respondents were displaying a tendency to "fake good," to answer questions in ways which appeared acceptable, rather than in ways stemming from their true views.

To attack this problem, Crowne and Marlowe developed a set of 33 items which they felt, from a conceptual perspective, would reveal a tendency to respond in socially desirable ways. Two types of statements were created; one culturally acceptable but probably untrue ("I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble.") and the other true but undesirable ("I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way."). These items were winnowed from 50 to 33 by a set of judges, and 15 were then keyed false.

Although the origins of this scale are in the realm of methodology, the scale has considerable interest in the area of motivation as well. The authors present it, in fact, as a scale which measures the need to present oneself in a favorable light (Crowne and Marlowe, 1960). It reflects the need of the subject to obtain approval by responding to questionnaire items in a culturally appropriate manner.

This scale, unlike the three previously presented, has no obvious application in the political realm. At second glance, however, a number of reasonably cogent expectations may be generated. The need-for-approval motive may well lead individuals down certain paths of political belief or behavior. We would expect, specifically, that the more visible and consensually approved aspects of participation, such as voting, would be significantly related to this need, while controversial participatory behaviors, such as demonstrating, would be eschewed.

The fifth trait employed in this analysis is Rotter's scale of locus of control (1954, 1960, 1966). The concept which underlay the development

of the measure is the "degree to which individuals perceive the events in their lives as being a consequence of their own actions and thereby controllable, or as being unrelated to their own behaviors and therefore, beyond personal control" (Lefcourt, 1972). This perception is seen by Rotter to constitute a generalized expectancy, grounded in social learning theory. A 29-item scale to measure this trait was developed after several revisions based on item-analysis, social desirability controls and studies in discriminant validity (Robinson and Shaver, 1969; p. 143).

Lefcourt (1972), in a recent analysis, has detailed five major areas in which the locus of control has been shown experimentally to have discriminating ability. Those whose locus of control is internal (who feel they are masters of their fate) tend to be more resistant to coercion. They tend to display greater cognitive activity, engaging more in data gathering, which is in turn seen as leading to a greater probability of task success. Internals show a greater ability to defer gratification if they are white, although experimental evidence indicates that all blacks tend to prefer immediate reinforcement. Internal control is associated with high academic achievement among children. Fainlly, internals respond more appropriately than externals to success and failure, adjusting more appropriately to past experience to ensure future success.

To our knowledge, the political relevance of locus of control has not received much attention. Lefcourt cites only one study in his review (Ritchie and Phares, 1969) which borders on the political world. This study was primarily focused on resistance of subjects to changes in attitude. Externals were found to be more conforming than internals to suggested changes but only when the influence arguments were attributed to high-status sources.

There are reasons to believe, however, that the locus of control concept should have political ramifications. The resistance to influence has obvious relevance in the area of issue attitudes, which lie beyond our present scope. Focusing on participatory behavior and ideology, we might expect to find the typical internal to feel more politically efficacious, because of his greater ability to collect information about the system and to receive feedback which would lead eventually to effective behavior. Indeed, the very core of the locus of control concept, that events are the consequence of one's own actions, must certainly include things like the election of candidates to office. We would therefore expect a relationship to exist between voting turnout and locus of control.

As to the measures of political ideology, the locus of control trait provides fewer cues. The external individual might tend to prefer the "hard" candidate, like Wallace or Reagan, who dictomizes societies' problems and proposes simple solutions. In this, however, we are really moving into the areas covered by the F-scale and the tendermindedness scale. At least one study has shown the relationship between locus of control and F to be near zero (Wrightsman and Cook, 1965). We therefore entertain no expectations as to the relationship between this trait and political ideology.

Finally, our sixth measure is Christie's Machiavellianism scale (Christie and Geis, 1970).[3] Not surprisingly, this scale is derived from an extended analysis of items drawn from the writings of Machiavelli. Unlike the F-scale, which leans heavily on the irrational components of human behavior (thus revealing its debt to Freud), the Mach scale is concerned, as was Machiavelli, with overt behavior, and the "how" of interpersonal relations, rather than the more Freudian "why."

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Machiavellianism, in essence, refers to a lack of concern with conventional morality, an emotional neutrality in interpersonal relationships, a lack of commitment to ideological goals and a willingness to engage in the manipulation of others. In sum, it encapsulates the idea that an individual is willing to do whatever is necessary, in the interpersonal arena, in order to achieve (usually his own personal) ends (Kraut and Price, 1976). Christie hastens to point out, however, that machiavellians are not necessarily hostile, viscious, or vindictive. A better summary phrase might be "cool detachment" which makes them freer to act where others would be bound by emotional involvement or conventional morality (Robinson and Shaver, 1969; p. 508).

This role model appears to be more readily applicable to the political leader than the political follower, and indeed, Christie reveals that his first work with the scale was stimulated by just such people (Christie and Geis, 1970; p. 2). Nonetheless, by examining the major dimensions of the machiavellian profile, certain expectations about the political behavior of the mass electorate do emerge.

We recall that earlier, the notion was advanced that those scoring high on social desirability would be more likely to vote, because voting is seen as "the right thing to do." By this same token, we would expect the Machiavellians to turn out to vote at a lower rate because of their lack of sensitivity to the conventional morality. On the ideological side, we find that machiavellians are conceived as low on ideological commitment of any kind. They are seen, rather, as striving for more short-range and concrete ends, rather than for an ultimate idealistic goal. This means that if ideologies are to be found, they should arise from those who score low on the scale of Machiavellianism.

Data and Method

The data from which the present analysis arises were originally collected in 1968 from male members of the freshman class at the University of Georgia.[4] We have drawn the tendermindedness scale, the radicalism-conservatism scale, the F-scale, the social desirability scale and the locus of control scale from this study.

In 1970, a subset of these subjects was reinterviewed in a study conducted in the Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia.[5] At this time, the Machiavellianism scale (Mach IV) and all the political items used in this analysis were collected. Of the 1037 males responding to the 1968 study, 857 valid targets were selected for reinterviewing in 1970. These 857 individuals were contacted in three separate waves at the time of the 1970 elections. Response rates of 52%, 72%, and 51%, and the deletion of any missing data cases yield a usable N of 300 for the present study.

Following Bem and Allen (1974), the ipsatized variance ratio was calculated for each individual, for each of the six scales. This was done by calculating the total variability produced by the pool of items which constituted all six scales (a collection of 144 items in all). This was expressed as an average variance (total variance over all six sets of items, divided by six), and was divided into each of the variances produced by the six subsets of items, one for each scale, to produce the ipsatized variance ratios.

The basic analysis reported below is simply the intercorrelation of the trait score with a number of political criterion variables, with a control for the magnitude of the ipsatized variance ratio. For the 100 cases with the smallest ratios on a given trait, that trait is

considered to be relevant. For those 100 subjects with the largest

ratios, the trait is not considered to be relevant.

The choice of dependent variables was dictated primarily by empirical

criteria. We sought to present our subjects with a variety of types of

behaviors in which they might engage in the political world. We have,

accordingly, tested a fairly wide variety of political attitudes and

behaviors. These are split into four main categories. First are those

which measure the frequency of habitual voting. This is ascertained by

questions of the "do you usually vote" kind, asked for different levels

of government from local to national.[6]

The second category of criterion variables is really a subset of

the first. Here we have placed questions which ask whether the respondent

has voted in a specific election.

The third category is a catch-all which we have labeled "non-electoral

participation." Here we have included anti-war activity, as well as the

more conventional measures of opinion leadership and attempted political

persuasion.

Finally, the fourth category includes measures of ideology and

partisanship. Ideology is measured by a simple five-category scale,

and partisanship is derived from the familiar party identification item

and the 1968 presidential choice.

Results

The first step in the examination of our data involves the display

of the simple correlation coefficients between the six trait measures

and the criterion measures, divided into the four categories mentioned

above. (Appendix 1 contains the wording and direction of coding of all

variables.)

Table 1 presents what must be a familiar profile to students of
trait psychology. Of the 108 correlations presented in this table, only
16 achieve significant levels (p < .05). And of these 16, only six
exceed .20, and only three achieve the .30 level which Mischel observed
to be the ceiling for trait-behavior associations.

Looking at Table 1 in a bit greater detail, it becomes clear quite
quickly why authoritarianism has attracted so much attention among political
scientists. Six of the significant correlations are produced by this
trait, inlcuding one (with political ideology) of -.35. The radical-
conservative scale of Eysenck also produces significant associations;
more impressive, in fact, than those produced by the F-scale. Fully nine
of the 18 correlations associated with the radicalism-conservatism trait
are significant, including one of .32 (with anti-war activity), and one
of .46 (with political ideology).

In spite of these occasional salient points, the landscape of
Figure 1 remains rather dreary. And even a correlation of .46, we remember,
means that only 21 percent of the variance in political ideology can be
attributed to the radicalism-conservatism trait.

Bem and Allen would confront this table with observations something
like the following. The reason that we do so poorly in unearthing strong
trait-behavior relationships is because we are forcing a preconceived set
of equivalence classes on our subjects. That is, we expect that all
subjects will behave in ways which are consistent with their measured
position on each trait, and furthermore, we expect that this consistency
of behavior will generalize over the 18 particular behaviors and attitudes
which we have chosen as our criterion variables.

Table 1

Correlations of Six Traits with Four Sets of Political Variables

Set Trait	Habitual Voting					
	Vote in Campus Elections	Vote in Local Elections	Vote in State Elections	Vote in National Elections	Never Vote	Vote in Recent Elections
Tendermindedness	.07	.06	.05	-.03	-.00	.05
Radicalism- Conservatism	.04	.11	.19***	.13*	-.03	.08
F-Scale	-.05	-.12*	-.14**	-.12*	.05	.01
Social Desirability	.05	.03	.09	.04	-.04	.05
Locus of Control	-.14**	-.07	-.11	-.05	.06	-.04
Machiavellianism	.06	.11	.05	.07	-.06	.07
N	299- 300	299- 300	299- 300	299- 300	299- 300	299- 300

Table 1 (Continued)

Trait	Voting in Particular Elections			Non-Electoral Participation			
	Voted in 1970 Primary	Voted in 1970 General Election	Voted in 1968	Anti-War Activity	Opinion Leadership	Political Discussions	Attempt to Persuade Others
Tendermindedness	-.10	-.02	.00	.04	-.02	-.10	.05
Radicalism-Conservatism	-.04	-.12*	-.10	.32***	-.15**	-.06	.02
F-Scale	.05	-.01	-.10	-.25***	.02	.04	-.00
Social Desirability	-.00	-.07	-.10	-.11	-.09	-.07	.02
Locus of Control	.01	.10	.07	.03	.10	.05	-.10
Machiavellianism	-.09	-.11	-.07	-.09	.08	-.04	.00
N	223-224	298-299	297-298	299-300	248-249	248-249	299-300

Set   Voting in Particular Elections / Non-Electoral Participation

Table 1 (Continued)

Set Trait	Ideology and Partisanship			
	Political Ideology	Party Identification	Party Identification (Independents omitted)	1968 Presidential Choice
Tendermindedness	.00	-.08	-.13	.04
Radicalism-Conservatism	.46***	.15*	.22**	-.24***
F-Scale	-.35***	-.09	-.13	.14*
Social Desirability	-.02	.05	.07	-.03
Locus of Control	.02	-.01	-.01	.03
Machiavellianism	-.09	-.03	-.06	-.02
N	249-250	238-239	118-119	274-275

Levels of Significance

    * = p < .05
  ** = p < .01
*** = p < .001

H_i: $r \neq 0$ (two-tailed test)

We know, from our earlier discussion, that these are hasty conclusions,
derived perhaps from the canons of nomothetic theory, but ill-suited
to reveal patterns of relationship in which are embedded important idiographic
elements.   Therefore, we proceed with two ameliorative steps. First we
calculate the ipsatized variance ratio for each of the six scales, for
each individual. We then recalculate the trait-behavior correlations
for those for whom each trait is most relevant and those for whom the
trait is least relevant.

The second step in our procedure involves the inspection of these
correlations in an effort to sort out the domain of behaviors over which
a trait appears to hold sway for those who hold it to be relevant. By
identifying such clusters, we move toward a position of judging whether
certain classes of participator, behavior are alike or different in
terms of the motives which underlie them.

- - - - - - - - - -
Table 2 about here
- - - - - - - - - -

The first set of criterion variables to be examined in Table 2 involves
questions which relate to habitual voting patterns. The typical form of
the question is "Do you generally vote . . .?" Of the 36 trait-criterion
correlation paris displayed, 24 show that those individuals with low
variability on the trait in question had a higher direct correlation than
those with high variability, ten showed lower correlations, and two were
tied.

While this ratio of confirmations to failures is reasonably satisfactory
from the point of view of the hypothesis that specification of persons is
both relevant and meaningful, a glance at the magnitude of the correlations
displayed fails to generate much excitement. While trait-relevant individuals

Table 2

Correlations of Six Traits with Four Sets of Political Variables,
Controlling for Trait Relevance

et / rait	Habitual Voting					
	Vote in Campus Elections	Vote in Local Elections	Vote in State Elections	Vote in National Elections	Never Vote	Vote in Recent Elections
endermindedness	.12/.13	.12/.08	.09/.06	.04/-.03	-.07/.05	.07/.07
adicalism-onservatism	-.02/-.01	.10/-.04	.18/.15	.11/.12	-.04/.07	.07/.12
-Scale	-.04/-.08	-.05/-.24	.02/-.30*	.01/-.26*	-.02/.12	.19/-.09*
ocial esirability	.13/.07	.14/-.06	.17/.13	.12/.12	-.15/.00	.21/-.12*
ocus of Control	-.15/-.06	-.08/-.10	-.03/-.18	-.04/-.00	.05/.00	-.15/.11
achiavellianism	.03/.01	.09/.03	.00/.02	-.03/.15	.09/-.16	-.09/.08
N	99-100/100	99-100/100	99-100/100	99-100/100	99-100/100	99-100/100

Table 2 (Continued)

t	Voting in Particular Elections			Non-Electoral Participation			
	Voted in 1970 Primary	Voted in 1970 General Election	Voted in 1968	Anti-War Activity	Opinion Leadership	Political Discussions	Attempt to Persuade Others
lermindedness	-.09/-.07	-.10/.02	-.16/.02	.00/-.10	.02/.09	-.12/-.14	-.03/.13
calism-ervatism	.14/-.15	-.15/-.13	-.04/-.06	.41/.25	-.13/-.08	-.02/.05	-.04/-.03
ale	-.07/.15	-20/.07*	-.06/.22*	-.23/-.17	.10/.21	.09/-.01	-.11/.14
al rability	-.19/.12*	-.23/.15**	-.28/-.03	-.10/-.04	-.11/-.05	.07/-.13	-.05/-.06
s of Control	.17/-.25**	.27/-.08*	.12/-.03	.15/-.09	.05/.10	.04/.03	-.14/.06
iavellianism	.06/-.13	.06/-.14	.12/-.14	-.27/-.03	.03/.16	-.09/.04	.01/-.12
N	68-83 / 70-80	99-100 / 99-100	98-100 / 98-100	99-100 / 100	75-89 / 78-86	76-89 / 79-86	99-100 / 100

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Table 2 (Continued)

Set	Ideology and Partisanship			
Trait	Political Ideology	Party Identification	Party Identification (Independents omitted)	1968 Presidential Choice
Tendermindedness	.18/-.26**	.01/-.08	.01/-.12	.00/.03
Radicalism-Conservatism	.62/.23**	.28/.08	.43/.10	-.44/-.14*
F-Scale	-.35/-.31	.09/-.14	.12/-.21	.14/.09
Social Desirability	.01/-.09	-.03/.13	-.05/.19	.00/-.18
Locus of Control	.03/-.05	-.01/-.09	.07/-.17	.05/.09
Machiavellianism	-.26/-.15	-.13/.04	-.22/.07	-.03/-.12
N	$\frac{76-89}{79-86}$	$\frac{69-86}{76-84}$	$\frac{33-45}{32-46}$	$\frac{86-96}{88-95}$

Key

Trait-relevant group/Trait-irrelevant group

Significance

    * = p < .05
  ** = p < .01

$H_i : r_1 - r_2 \neq 0$ (two-tailed test)

do tend to show higher correlations, in only one case does this exceed .20.
Fully 22 of the 36 coefficients produced by trait-relevant individuals fail
to reach .10. From the point of view of prediction, this is far from
satisfactory.

Some interesting inferences regarding the motivational profile of
these attitudes may be made from the patterns of association, however.
Most importantly, we note that the strongest direct correlations, as well
as the largest relevant-nonrelevant differentials, are produced by the
scale of social desirability. As we discussed in an earlier section, this
scale is meant to tap the extent of the respondent's social conformity
and the extent to which his appearance in the eyes of others is important
to him. The success of this trait in conforming to our expectations leads
us to infer that a good deal of motive underlying voting turnout is socio-
centric. This view is bolstered by the fact that the radical-conservative
scale shows no discrimination among these situations whatsoever, an
indication that voting turnout is not ideology-based.

The F-scale, which has attracted so much of the attention of political
scientists, presents a most puzzling pattern. It is true that the
correlation for the trait-relevant group is higher in all of these pairs,
in the sense that their correlation is closer to +1.0 than is that of the
trait-irrelevant group (the "Never Vote" item reverses the sign). This
pattern is counted as a confirmation of the hypothesis by Bem and Allen.
It is our feeling, however, that a good deal more circumspection should be
applied to the matter. What we are observing is a case where the trait-
rele ant group shows little or no correlation between authoritarianism
and voting in local, state and national elections. The trait-irrelevant
group, on the other hand, shows significant negative correlations (the
less the authoritarianism, the greater the likelihood of having voted).

There are a number of explanations for these inversions of expected patterns which might be considered. First, we should not dismiss the possibility that the ipsatized variance ratio does not succeed in measuring the concept of "relevance" as we have used it. This possibility is diminished, however, by the fact that in several other instances, the division of our sample according to the relevance of the traits produces quite satisfactory results.

This leads to a second possibility, that authoritarianism does not relate directly to these behavioral indicators, but instead interacts with some third factor. In particular, those for whom authoritarianism is relevant may not exhibit consistency in their voting turnout behaviors. For those for whom the trait is not relevant, there may exist some mediating factor which is unmeasured here, which produces the associations which we have observed.

!n sum, no explanation of the patterns generated by the F-scale can be made very satisfactory by the information currently available. Evidently, the results which emerge in the first section of Table 2 do nothing to dispel the confusion which the F-scale has produced for earlier waves of political science analysis (Campbell, et al., 1960).

The second set of criterion variables to appear in Table 2 also involves voting turnout. It differs from the first set only in that it refers to voting in particular elections: the 1968 Presidential election, the 1970 Georgia primary, and the 1970 general election. Overall, the expected pattern of higher correlations for the trait-relevant group is sustained here. Fifteen of the 18 pairs display this outcome.

In general, the patterns observed in the first section of the table are continued here. The radicalism-conservatism dimension fails to produce

much differentiation in two of three cases. The F-scale, once again,
displays the theoretically uninterpretable results of higher correlations
for the trait-irrelevant group than for the trait-relevant group in two
of the three instances at hand.

As before, the social desirability scale produces the most consistent
positive results. The higher the score on the social desirability scale,
the more likely is the trait-relevant individual to vote. For the trait-
irrelevant group, the effect is negligible or slightly negative. Once
again, we have a strong indication that the underlying trait which is re-
flected in the participatory behavior of voting has to do with a need
to conform, rather than with radicalism-conservatism, or authoritarianism.

There are other patterns worthy of note in this second segment of
Table 2. Most notably, the locus of control scale shows nearly the
same result as the social desirability scale: those for whom this trait
is relevant are more influenced than those for whom it is not (the more
internal the control, the greater the likelihood of voting). This con-
forms entirely with the conceptual meaning of locus of control. Those
who feel they are the masters of their fates are more likely to attempt
to control the political environment by voting than those who are not.

Here too, the relevance of the trait is shown to be meaningful. Those
for whom the locus of control trait is not relevant, in two of three cases,
show very little tendency to link their trait scores with voting turnout,
while the trait relevant group displays one correlation (with a vote
in the 1970 general election) of .27.

In sum, we feel that this evidence regarding the contribution of
traits to turnout produces   a significant increment to our understanding
of the latter phenomenon. The link with the locus of control trait ties

in with a good deal of prior work which links feelings of efficacy with political behavior (e.g., Campbell, et al., 1960). Also of interest in this regard is the finding that of the six traits tested here, the social desirability motive appears to predominate. This leads to the idea that voting turnout, far from being an ideological act for the aggregate of the electorate, is instead a socially-motivated one. We tend to vote if that is seen as the thing to do within the relevant group. This view is corroborated once again by the failure of the radical-conservative trait to differentiate voters from non-voters.

Moving to the third segment of Table 2, we encounter four measures of non-electoral participation. Three of these involve the standard items of opinion leadership and political persuasion. The fourth determines whether the individual ever participated in anti-war activities. Twenty-four correlation pairs are produced by these variables. The pattern expected by the application of the Bem and Allen criteria, that trait-relevant correlations will be stronger than trait-irrelevant correlations, occurs in 14 of these 24 cases. However, these confirmations are concentrated in an intriguing way. Six of them are produced by the measure of anti-war activity. For the remaining 18 pairs, ten fail to conform to expectations. Furthermore, for these 18 pairs, the highest trait-relevant correlation is -.14. In sum, the attempt to link political discussion and opinion leadership to underlying traits does not produce satisfactory results. This may be because these measures deal with the interaction of individuals with others. To the extent that this interaction arises from the behavior of those other individuals, it will tend to be random from the perspective of the tested subjects. Whether this behavior is indeed idiosyncratic, or is socially, rather than trait determined, it seems reasonable to conclude

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that our analysis has failed to show interpretable links between the six tested traits and these three criterion measures.

The anti-war activity measure presents a different profile entirely. Here, not only are there satisfactory patterns of association in the case of all six pairs, but we find two traits in which the trait relevant group relates to the two variables reasonably strongly. These two traits are radicalism-conservatism and machiavellianism (the F-scale is also strongly related, but there is not much difference between the trait-relevant and the trait-irrelevant groups).

It is immediately apparent that these are not the same traits which we found to be most relevant in the case of voter turnout. Rather, we discover that the individual who takes the side of change on the radicalism scale is, not surprisingly, the one who tends to report anti-war activity. A similar tendency can be seen among those who reject the manipulative posture of the typical machiavellian. These results indicate that the sort of behavior embodied in the act of protesting the war differs in its basic motivational profile from the measures of turnout. We feel intuitively that this should be true; these results provide an empirical demonstration of the case.

The final segment of Table 2 collects three variables which fall under the rubric of ideology and partisanship. They include an index of political ideology, two measures of party identification (the second omits Independents), and the presidential preference in 1968. Among these 24 pairs of correlations, 21 satisfy the requirements that the trait-relevant correlation be direct and stronger than the trait-irrelevant one (although the latter may be stronger in the inverse direction).

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Although the number of acceptable pairs is high in this final segment of Table 2, a glance at the magnitude of the coeffic.ents shows that the actual results are less impressive. Numerous of these are so low as to be meaningless and others (as, for instance, the pair involving social desirability and 1968 presidential choice) yield the questionable pattern of a stronger, but inverse, correlation for the trait-irrelevant group.

In spite of these difficulties, two traits do emerge with great clarity which predict the behavior of the trait-relevant group far more strongly than for the trait-irrelevant group. They are radicalism-conservatism and machiavellianism. The success of the former trait scarcely comes as a surprise, of course. Although this scale is not intended to measure political ideology directly (but rather contrasts taste for change with a preference for things as they are), the sorts of items which make up this scale do smack of the political issues of the day. References to the death penalty, capitalism, socialism and abortion all appear. While these items may well tap some general personality trait, it is clear that at a more superficial level, they are bound to be highly correlated with ideological position.

This point does attenuate the interest which we might otherwise show in the very large correlation coefficients of the trait-relevant group between radicalism-conservatism and the variables in segment four of Table 2. There is a more meaningful datum here, however; the fact that large differences in the correlations' magnitudes exist within each pair. We have here the clearest evidence of the entire table that the division of the sample into trait-relevant and trait-irrelevant groups is a meaningful and indeed, a necessary procedure. In terms of variance explained, the radicalism-conservatism trait is between seven and 18 times more

successful for the trait-relevant group than for the trait-irrelevant
group.

The machiavellianism scale also displays highly satisfactory patterns
of correlation with the ideology and party identification variables,
although the magnitudes are not as great as they are in the case above,
for reasons already discussed. We find that the machiavellian tends
to be a conservative and a Democrat. This is particularly interesting
and puzzling because, unlike the case of the radicalism trait, here there
is no outward link between the scale items and these dependent variables.
We note also that the trait-relevant group is decidedly more influenced
than the trait-irrelevant group, with the exception of the 1968 presidential
choice variable.

Summary and Conclusions

To bring together the threads of the discussion which have flowed
from Table 2, we present the following figure.

- - - - - - - - - -
Figure 2 about here
- - - - - - - - - -

This figure is intended to give a summary indication of which traits
were on the one hand most strongly related to the group of criterion
variables in question, and on the other hand, showed the greatest
differentiation between the trait-relevant and the trait-irrelevant
groups.

What conclusions can be drawn from these results? We recall first
one of the studies cited earlier in this paper. Milbrath and Klein
(1962) have written that they are unaware "of any study which has isolated
a personality trait which drives people specifically into politics."

Figure 2

A Schema of the Relevance of Traits to Four
Areas of Political Participation

	General Voting	Voting in Specific Elections	Non-Electoral Participation (anti-war activity)	Ideology and Partisanship
Tendermindedness				
Radicalism-Conservatism			X	X
F-Scale			X	
Social Desirability	X	X		
Locus of Control		X		·-
Machiavellianism			X	X

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Our most basic substantive finding, perhaps, is that there <u>are</u> personality
traits which can be linked with various measures of political participation.

The most significant theoretical finding of this paper arises from
the application of the concept of specification of person in the political
realm. Working from Bem and Allen's basic statement (1974), we have
demonstrated the error of believing that traits can be applied to <u>all</u>
members of a group. The idea that a trait may be relevant to only some
people represents a fundamental departure from the thinking of earlier
trait psychologists. Nonetheless, in repeated examples we have shown
that this process of specifying persons for whom a trait is relevant
reveals far stronger levels of association than are obtained for the
entire group, or for those who do not find the trait to be relevant.

As to the patterns of association observed, we have revealed informa-
tion both about traits and about the various measures of political
behavior. Regarding traits, we see that the tendermindedness trait, over
the entire range of tests, contributes rather little to our understanding
of political participation. Since this scale was intended to score
extreme radicals and extreme conservatives together (Eysenck, 1954; 1956),
it is no surprise that no discrimination on the ideological and partisan
measures is uncovered. Perhaps this same argument can be applied to
turnout as well. In any case, we have found that such trait elements
as rationalism, intellectualism, idealism, or optimism, which are subsumed
in the tenderminded-toughminded scale, do not appear to provide a guide
to citizens regarding voter turnout.

The F-scale must also be included as a trait which fails to contribute
greatly to our understanding of these areas of political behavior. We

make this statement not on the basis of the initial correlations shown in

Table 1, which are, in fact, relatively high. Rather, when we examine

Table 2, we find that the F-scale has consistently failed to reveal results

which are interpretable from the theoretical framework which we have

adopted. In Table 1, six F-scale-criterion correlations reached the level

of significance. We can see in Table 2 that the first three of these

are produced by the situation where the trait-relevant group shows no

correlation with the criterion variable, and the trait-irrelevant group

shows a relatively strong inverse correlation. As we have discussed above,

this pattern has no ready interpretation.

The second triad of the significant correlations produced by the

F-scale in Table 1 shows another deviant pattern. In these cases, both

the trait-relevant and the trait-irrelevant groups show relatively strong

correlations with the criterion variables. While the trait predicts at

significant levels, the relevance factor once again fails to produce

meaningful patterns.

We naturally hesitate to reject the F-scale from the family of

politically-relevant traits. We have argued, after all, that it is some-

times valuable to follow our intuition rather than the results of

empirical research, and our intuition certainly tells us that a measure

of authoritarianism ought to relate to politics. We cannot, however,

present an explanation of the failure of the relevance concept to

differentiate. Discovering the reasons underlying the strong correlations

produced by the trait-irrelevant group must await future work.

Figure 2 shows that four of the six tested traits do produce

theoretically-satisfactory patterns, in varying combinations with the

four groups of dependent variables. These varying patterns allow us

to focus on the differences which exist between the attitudes and behaviors

measured. One of the salient contributions provided by Verba and Nie (1972) is the discovery of four distinct modes of political participation. Their methodology employed factor analysis, which ultimately relies on arbitrary naming of factors in order to draw substantive significance from the findings.

The present work provides a complement to that approach. We have presented an alternative way of classifying measures of political behavior. It has one distinct potential advantage over the factor analytic method, however. Once the criteria are satisfactorily grouped according to the trait profiles, there exists a very rich conceptual and experimental background which can be drawn upon to attach meaning to the clusters.

The present results display a high level of crudity, although even here, an interesting detail or two emerges. The clear division of the criterion measures into a turnout class and an ideology class merely corroborates past work, to be sure. The inclusion of the anti-war activity measure with the ideology and partisanship cluster is likewise self-evident. On the other hand, the fact that the trait which underlies turnout is predominantly the scale of social desirability is one which speaks a bit more strongly to problems of democratic theory. Is the primary motive to vote one of approval seeking? If so, what can we predict about the future levels of participation in the American polity, and what steps will be most effective in maximizing those levels?

The refinement of the present procedures and the pursuit of these trait profiles constitutes the primary objective for future work. We must turn our attention as well to the area of issue opinions, for it seems clear that traits should be found relevant in that area as well

(cf. Sniderman and Citrin, 1971). Both in the realm of theory, and in the realm of new information about political behavior, the study of traits has a contribution to make. The attention of political scientists should be rekindled, for this area has been too long ignored, and holds much potential.

APPENDIX

Text and Coding for All Variables

Item Text	High Code is:	Low Code is:
Tendermindedness	tenderminded	toughminded
Radicalism-Conservatism	radical	conservative
F-Scale	authoritarian	non-authoritarian
Social Desirability	high approval motive	low approval motive
Locus of Control	external	internal
Machiavellianism	high	low

Below is a list of some social and political activities seen on campus. Please place a check mark beside those activities in which you participated.

Voted in campus elections	did vote	did not vote
Took part in anti-war activities (marches, rallies, demonstrations)	took part	did not take part

Which of the following kinds of elections have you voted in, in the past? (check all correct responses)

Local	have voted	have not voted
State	have voted⁻	have not voted
National	have voted	have not voted
Never Vote	have never voted	have voted

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Please check all the ways you
were involved in the recent
political campaigns.

Discussing politics with
friends   have discussed   have not discussed

Voting   have voted   have not voted

Attempting to persuade others
to vote for someone   have attempted   have not attempted

Did you vote in the primaries
in Georgia last month?   No   Yes

Did you vote in the 1970
general election?   No   Yes

Did you vote in the 1968
Presidential election?   No   Yes

Compared with the people you know,
are you more or less likely than
any of them to be asked about your
views about politics by people
you know?   Less likely   More likely

In dealing with most political
issues, would you say that you are
an ultra-conservative, conservative,
moderate, liberal, or radical?   Radical   Ultra-Conservative

Generally speaking, do you usually
think of yourself as a Republican,
Independent, or Democrat?   Democrat   Republican

Who was your choice for President
in 1968 (whether you voted or not)?   Wallace   Humphrey

FOOTNOTES

[1]It should be noted, however, that Lasswell did not select the title of his book inadvertently. He felt that the impact of the personality on behavior could be most easily seen in those individuals who displayed a "pure" personality type. These individuals, Lasswell reasoned, would be most readily found in mental institutions, hence the stress on pathology.

[2]Whether the tendermindedness scale actually clusters Communists and Fascists is a matter of lively debate. See Christie (1956 a,b); Rokeach and Hanley (1956).

The items in this scale and all others with the exception of the Machiavellianism scale are taken from W. A. Owens (1968).

[3]This scale is located in Christie and Geis (1970; pp. 17-18).

[4]The director of this study was William A. Owens, Department of Psychology, University of Georgia. The data were collected under a grant from NIH (Grant Number HD-10135).

[5]The director of this study was Robert T. Golembiewski, assisted by Keith R. Billingsley, Department of Political Science, University of Georgia.

[6]Remember that the minimum voting age in Georgia has been 18 since the 1940's. All respondents are Georgia residents.

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