ABSTRACT
               There are a number of constraints on administrative
leadership in today's university. This paper argues that the
decision-making theory of March, Simon, and Cyert gives the
administrator a good framework for advancing the university toward
meeting societal needs and demands, while allowing for
faculty-student freedom and discretion. Some alternative theories are
reviewed and corresponding advantages of the decision-making view are
introduced. Decision theory contributions to our understanding of
models of reality, conflict, and coalitions are discussed. The
relationship between the business firm and the university is also
considered along with some suggestions for practitioners that derive
from the decision-making perspective. (Author/LBH)

Decision-Making Theory and University Advancement

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Introduction

Today's university is in a serious predicament. On the
one hand, it is generally understood that the destiny of the
university must be purposefully determined if it is to establish
that it is needed - yet on the other hand, as Gerald F. Else
points out in "Some Ill-Tempered Reflections on the Present
State of Higher Education," there is "Increasing uncertainty
about the essential purpose of higher education."[1] Likewise,
on the one hand it is generally understood that the university
must exercise authority to respond to new and increasing societal
needs and demands, and, moreover, that "Higher educational in-
stitutions cannot wait for the demand to manifest itself and
then respond...," as Stephen R. Graubard tells us in "Thoughts
on Purposes and Goals";[2] yet on the other hand, it is generally
perceived that the authority to respond to those changing needs
and demands is retarded by internal constraints on the decision-
making process. Those constraints result from limited resources,
from inconsistency in goals between faculty, students and adminis-
trators, and from the degree of faculty and student discretion.
The constraints on the exercise of authority are so great that,
as Charles Frankel points out in "Reflections on a worn-out model,"
there is even "... an indisposition to exercise authority and
lead."[3]

How can we encompass the predicament the university is in

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in ways that enhance purposeful and workable decisions - decisions
that meet societal and internal needs? Use of relevant theory
is one way. Relevant theory helps us see patterns within the
university which contribute to the predicament, and it helps us
pinpoint essential features we must consider in making decisions.
We can then act systematically, defining problems and objectives
to meet those problems. Moreover, in the case of our besieged
university, relevant theory is theory which recognizes both the
current conflict, inconsistency, uncertainty, and inertia that
exists in the university, as well as the need to exercise authority.
Further, relevant theory is theory which provides a framework
for drawing inferences for practical decisions.

I will argue here that the "decision-making" or "organizational"
theory as first defined by Herbert Simon in Administrative Behavior,
then by Simon and James March in Organizations, and later by March
and Richard M. Cyert in A Behaviorial Theory of the Firm, is relevant
theory. Its usefulness goes beyond the "bureaucratic theory," the
"scientific management theory," the human relations school, and the
utilitarian precepts inferred from the concept of "economic man."

We learn from the decision-making theorists that organizations
demonstrate "bounded rationality": the organization is limited
by the unavoidable subjectivity of its members, and by limited
ability to attend to all contigencies. Further, we learn that
conflict and controls are reciprocal and that controls are variable.

prescriptions often found in other "theories" and schools of
thought. So prescriptions would rely on our own inferences drawn
from the reality that the decision-making theory provides. At
the end of this paper I will provide a few such inferences, cen-
tering on how we can still act to advance the university toward
meeting societal needs.

Principally, what I will do is explain the decision-making
theory and show how that theory fits the reality of today's univer-
sity.

In order to fully understand decision-making theory we must examine the theories that the decision-making theorists were reacting to: namely, the "scientific management" school represented by Frederick Taylor, the "bureaucracy" of Weber, the Human Relations school, and the utilitarian precepts involved in the concept of "economic man." We will find these other theories of limited use to our understanding of the university's current predicament, and we will see the genesis of the decision-making theory.

Taylor, offering advice designed to lower the unit cost of production, saw effective management as consisting of thirteen steps. These steps include (1) the distribution of "minute, specialized tasks, which taken together would get the job done,"[4] and (2) coordination or "ordering of these numerous small tasks to accomplish the entire job."[5] This approach led in practice to "rigid discipline on the job and concentration on the tasks performed...."[6] At best scientific management meant "the end of arbitrary power on the part of management: science would decide."[7] One problem of applying scientific management to the university is that scientific management assumes that the mission of the organization is certain. Further, scientific management is of limited use because it is obvious that the destiny of the university will not be determined simply by breaking the university into small tasks. It is also obvious that the university is not conducive to rigid internal discipline, and it is obvious that often conflict

within the university forestalls measured steps to an objective.

March and Simon point out that scientific management in-
volves a limited perspective because in it "There is very little
appreciation of the role of organizational behavior..., the con-
straints placed on the human being by his limitations as a complex
information-processing system...[and the problem of] unanticipated
consequences."[8] The recognition of the role of organizational
behavior, cognition, organizational constraints on action, uncer- '
tainty, and conflict, makes the decision-making theorist's view
of broader use to our understanding of the university's burden,
as it attempts to respond to societal needs.

Weberianism, like Taylorism, entails the belief that manage-
ment's use of rationality would determine the destiny of the or-
ganization. Weber believed that a "well run bureaucracy would
become fairer, more impartial, and more predictable...than organ-
izations subject to the caprice of powerful individuals."[9] Avoiding
the caprice of powerful individuals is an important consideration:
however, Weber's ideal organization would come through a division
of labor, a well definde hierarchy, rules, regulations, and pro-
cedures. Although these practices may decrease capriciousness,
the basic limitation in using scientific management applies to
Weber's bureaucracy. That is, the destiny of the university cannot
be determined by rules and regulations alone. Also, as we shall
see later, in some areas in the university, the hierarchy and
division of labor are not clearly defined. Furthermore, the rela-
tionship between the university bureaucracy and the university
membership is often one of conflict.

March and Simon point out that although Weber goes beyond
the "machine" model by analyzing in detail the "relation between
an official and his office,"[10] Weber "... is not attentive to
the character of the human organization,"[11] "Weber ignores impor-
tant grounds for unanticipated consequences,"[12] Weberianism
ignores, with Taylorism, the "wide range of roles which the partici-
pant simultaneously performs..."[13] and the associated problems
with coordinating roles. These comments also relate to organizational
conditions relevant to conditions in the university, and we will
later see how March and Simon's reaction here is incorporated in
their decision-making theory.

The Human Relations school, as represented by Hawthorne,
Barnard, and others, responded to Weber's bureaucracy and to
scientific management by underscoring the importance of the human
element in our organizations: the "nonrational" behavior in
organizations, including psychological and interpersonal factors.
However, although individuals are "nonrational" under the Human
Relations perspective, the organization is still seen as rational -
and on the terms of management ("leaders"). Of the process variables
that Human Relations people note, "cooperation" stands out. It
is the lack of cooperation between rational leaders and nonrational
labor that the Human Relations school wants leaders to eradicate.
Organizations are seen as small groups which skillful leaders
put together. Labor, organizing outside of the chain of command,
is matched against the system. Management is part of the system.

On the surface the recognition of nonrationality may appear
to reduce bureaucracy and scientific management's condescension
toward labor; however, as many critiques have indicated, the
Human Relations view still involves the assumpt on of the rational
superiority of management. Needless to say, in the university
it is not the administration's presumption of rational superiority
that will place the administration in leadership.

When the Human Relations school talks of cooperation,
it is a reminder of the passing collegial model of the university.
The collegial model, like the Human Relations school, understates
the enduring existence of conflict. We need a model that assumes
that there will always be some conflict in the university. Only
then could we realistically seek cooperation toward meeting
societal needs.

March and Simon point out that within the Human Relations
school "...human actors were endowed with feelings and motives,
but relatively little attention was paid to their properties
as adaptive, reasoning beings."[14] Indeed the university's adminis-
tration, in seeking change, would be quite remiss in overlooking
the "adaptive" and "reasoning" properties of students, faculty,
and others.

Simon and March believe also that efforts at cooperation
will never completely re olve conflict in the organization. Later
we will see how they describe the role of conflict as a feature
reciprocal with organizational controls, and how they describe
the properties of human beings in the organization.

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First, however, we need to look at the reaction of the
decision theorists to the concept of "economic man." According
to Donald Taylor in "Decision Making and Problem Solving," "Economic
man" is presumed to have three properties. He is: (a) completely
informed, (b) infinitely sensitive, (c) rational."[15] The in-
correctness of this view in describing any organization is obvious.
Hence Simon points out in Administrative Behavior that "Traditional
economic man has little or no place in the theory of organizations."[16]
March and Simon point out that the difficulty with the concept of
economic man is that "It assumes (1) that all the alternatives of
choice are "given": (2) that all the consequences attached to each
alternative are known...; (3) that the rational man has a complete
utility-ordering (or cardinal function for all possible conse-
quences)."[17] Likewise, Cyert and March put it this way: the assump-
tion of rationality in the theory of the firm can be reduced to
the proposition that firms operate with perfect knowledge - both
assumptions, they argue, are wrong.[18] All the reactions against
the concept of "economic man" noted here center on what actually
happens in organizatins, and certainly these descriptions of what
actually happens can be applied to the university. However, I
think that attention should be given to Mouzelus's critique of
this "reductionist treatment" of economic theory.[19]

According to Mouzelus, the decision theorists consider
economic assumptions as "propositions about concrete reality" but
"...in economics, such assumptions have mainly an analytic character."[20]

That is, they are not meant to constitute a realistic account of
how an organization behaves, "but they are logical constructions
which are used as means for generating inplications and explanations
about broader market phenomenon."[21] My example, developed from
Burns and Chiswick's "Analysis of the Effects of a Graduated Tuition
Program at State Universities,"[22] is this. A university, in consi-
dering a tuition increase, can consider a number of helpful alterna-
tives, employing assumptions involved in the concept of "economic
man." For example, if the president wants solely to increase profit,
he can consider the elasticity of the price increase: presumably
the president would hope that it would be inelastic. That is,
that there would not be a reduction in demand for the credits to
the point of no actual additional profits. He would consider, for
one thing, the competitiion with other colleges in his market.
Further, he can profitably consider the impact of the decision on
the characteristics of the student body: does the college plan
to complement the decision with a corresponding grant to poor students'
And what about the effect on academic quality? Of course, reasoning
regarding price and demand entails assumptions entailed in the
concept of "economic man": nevertheless, it is a useful analytical
tool in university decision-making, as long as one recognizes that
utilitarian precepts must be understood within the context of real
organizational dynamics, and as long as we recognize that utilitarian
precepts do not tell us what we should do.

In examining the reactions of the decision-making theorists
to Weber's bureaucracy, Taylor's scientific management, the Human

relations school, and the utilitarian precepts involved in the concept of "economic man," we have already reviewed the fundamentals of decision-making theory. According to decision-making theory, these other theories (1) involve false assumptions about objective rationality, certainty, and consequences of choice, (2) entail a narrow view of human cognition, and (3) overlook the existence of conflict and organizational constraints. Decision-theory tells us that the organization demonstrates "bounded rational   the organization is limited by the unavoidable subjectivit   members, by uncertainty and conflict, and by limited ability to attend to all contingencies. We will learn from them later how conflict and controls are reciprocal, and how controls are variable. Their emphasis on the limits of the organization on the one hand, and the variability of controls on the other, both helps us under-stand the current predicament of the university as well as gives us assurance that the administration can still fulfill its responsibility to exercise authority and leadership needed to continuously direct the university toward meeting societal needs. We will see later that this can be done without destroying a place for faculty and student discretion.

To expand on certain features of the organization seen
by the decision-making theorists, I will first discuss a basic
pro m in decision-making and introduce the decision-making
concept of "simplified models" of reality. Then I will present
the useful terminology they provide for talking about organiza-
tional behavior. Finally, before applying the decision-making
understanding to areas of apparent differences between the
university and the business firm, and before discussing some
practical suggestions regarding administrative action, I will
discuss the decision theorist's brilliant contribution regarding
conflict, coalitions, and control.

An illustration from Feldman and Kanter in "Organizational
Decision-Making" will show crucial limits on our decision-making
capacity, and usher in the idea of "simplified models" of reality.
According to Feldman and Kanter, "The decision problem is that
of selecting a path which will achieve the most preferred terminal
state."[23] However, "The only procedure which can guarantee that
this 'best' path will be found is one which generates the entire
decision three, i.e., all alternative paths and the consequences
of each terminal state 'or all relevant goals..e.g., ticktacktoe."[24]
But "For even moderately complex problems..., the entire decision
tree cannot be generated."[25] Furthermore, "...the amount of search
required exceeds the physical capacity of any available decision
system, human or artificial."[26] This is a principal decision pro-
blem which March and Simon also discuss. It does not only involve
the observation that people make mistakes, but that the process of

human choice is forever "bounded." It is bounded by virtue of
a limited "decision tree" (i.e. Simon's "unanticipated consequences")
and human rationality per se is "bounded." Choice is not objective
but subjective. According to Simon,

> ...the notion of objective rationality assumes
> that there is some objective reality in which
> the 'real' utilities exist, [but what actually
> occurs is that] choice is always exercised
> with respect to a limited, approximate, sim-
> plified model of the real situation...[and the
> model of the situation is made up of] elements
> which are themselves the outcome of psycholo-
> gical and sociological processes, including the
> chooser's own activities and the activities of
> others in his environment.[27]

The empirical reality of divergent "simplified models" is
explored in a study by Dearborn and Simon. In Dearborn and
Simon's "Selective Perception: A note of the Department Identi-
fication of Executives" they test the proposition that "each
executive will perceive those aspects of the situation that relate
specifically to the activities and goals of his department."[28]
Twenty-three executives were told to play the role of top execu-
tives and to discuss the major problems of the firm from a top
executive's viewpoint. Five out of six sales executives singled
out sales as the most important problem whereas only five out
of seventeen other executives selected sales as the most important
problem. Also, four out of five of the production people mentioned
"clarify organizations" while only four cut of eighteen other
executives selected this as the most important problem seen.
Although the instrument for classification of answers the authors
got is unclear, and although the association between "clarify or-
ganization" and "production" is unclear, their results seem to

prove their intuitively plausible hypothesis.

An example of simplified models of reality in the university may be found in looking within the administration itself. I am referring to "administration" in this paper with the recognition that the administration is not the homogeneous body that many outsiders presume. The administration is not of one mind, subsumed under clear cut, unchanging, and common perceptions of organizational reality. The administration is at least differentiated by diverse simplified models of reality. Rourke and Brooks in The Management Revolution in Higher Education make reference to how the computer center's perception of what is important heavily affects preference orderings: decisions about which "agencies of the university would do their work slowly,"[29] for example. Also, Rourke and Brooks point out that "In one multi-campus university, a conflict between the centralized data-processing system and a local registrar" existed, based on the registrar's values regarding "the principle of centralized authority."[30] Here the factual premise of computer efficiency and the value premise of centralization informed the conflict. The dynamic impact of the department of institutional research, often understood in studies of the firm, has its counterpart in higher education: simply put, the department of institutional reseach has its own particular model of what the priorities of administration are and should be. There are numero other examples, of course. Unfortunately, often negotiation with students and faculty results in those at the top of the administrative hierarchy simply imposing new premises without regard for the divergent models of reality within the administration.

March and Simon go on to outline some important concepts
that relate to their view of the organization. As a result of
individual and organizational constraints there is necessarily
a limited search for alternatives. Rather than an optimal
alternative we find satisfactory alternatives, i.e., we satisfice.
Further, we cannot regard our standards as "given" by objective
universal truths but "In making choices that meet satisfactory
standards, the standards themselves are a part of the definition
of the situation."[31] In certain circumstances the search and
choice processes are abridged by prescribed performance programs,
which specify either means or ends. According to Simon and
March, "the further the program goes in the latter direction the
more discretion it allows for the person implementing the program
to supply means-ends connections."[32] They point out that traditional
theories of rational behavior do not seem to leave much room for
discretion at all (with decision-theorists there is slack that
leaves room). This point about discretion is especially pertinent
to the discretion that faculty and students enjoy in the university.
It is generally thought desirable for faculty and students to
have as much discretion as possible without destroying organizational
goals. Decision-theory allows the administration to maintain and
open areas of discretion without, as we shall see in the next section,
sacrificing avenues for administrative control. Other concepts
decision theorists employ include the observation that members of
an organizatinal unit evelute action only in terms of subgoals (e.g.
their models) "...even when they are in conflict with the goals
of the larger organization."[33] This latter process is reinforced

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by the individual's <u>selective perception</u>, the content of in-group communication, and the selective exposure to environmental stimuli (<u>uncertainty absorption</u>).[34] All this is effected by the division of labor in the organization and habitual <u>repertories</u> of action.[35] The division of labor, other structural features, and the goals of the institution are ways that management can control the <u>premises</u> of decisions by others in the organization. The above mentioned concepts provide us with a useful language for talking about and understanding certain features of organizations, the university not withstanding.

III

References have been made to the conflict between the goals of the organization and individual and subgroup goals. In Simon and March conflict arises as a natural consequence of their understanding of the basic features of organizational premises, and the characteristics of human problem-solving and rational choice. Recall that Taylor's scientific management and Weber's bureaucracy ignored conflict, and that the Human Relations school assumed that it could be annihilated. Because of March and Simon's more realistic assumptions about the organization and about man, we can expect only "quasi-resolution" of conflict. And so we should learn how it emerges.

How is conflict treated in March and Simon? After tracing conflict up from the individual's level, they talk about conflict in terms of its relationship with organizational controls, sources, and organizational reaction to conflict. Controls and coordination

exist side by side with, and to handle, conflict. The principal sources of conflict have to do with resource allocation, a notion particularly pertinent to higher education today, and scheduling. An organization reacts to conflict through problem-solving, persuasion, bargaining, and politics, which in terms of inter-group conflict center upon "probable and stable coalitions."[35] Later they point out that the major factors involving intergroup conflict are factors affecting the differentiation of goals, factors affecting the felt need for joint decision making, and factors affecting the diffentiation of individual perception. This last point is akin to the idea of "simplified models" of reality.

Mouzelus criticises March and Simon for jumping, in their analysis of conflict, "from the individual to the organizational level"[36] to explain conflict, and their use of "...exactly the same vocabulary in order to portray the whole organization as an equilibrium between the aggregate of contributions and inducements of all the participants."[37] Mouzelus points out that "from this perspective decision theory does not differ much from human relations theory. The same psychological and reductionist bias is evident in both of them."[38] This seems like a plausible critique. As Parrow says, "Theory should see conflict as an inevitable part of organizational life stemming from organizational characteristics rather than from the characteristics of individuals."[3]

Cyert and March start by viewing the organization as a coalition rather than from the point of the individual and interpersonal conflict. According to Cyert and March the organization "...is

a coalition of individuals, some of them organized into sub-coalitions."[40] Further, "Basic to the idea of a coalition is the expectation that the individual participants in the organization may have substantially different preference orderings (i.e. individual goals)...[and consequently] any theory of organizational goals must deal successfully with the obvious potential for internal goal conflict inherent in a coalition of diverse individuals and groups."[41] How does the organization deal with different preference orderings? Controls are needed: "The goals of a business firm are a series of more or less independent constraints imposed on the organization through the process of bargaining among potential coalition members...[and they] arise in such a firm because a firm is in fact a coalition of participants with desperate demands, changing foci of attention, and limited ability to attend to all organizational problems simultaneously."[42] However, "...because of the form of the goals and the way in which they are established, conflict is never fully resolved in the organization."[43] At most there is "quasi-resolution" of conflict.[44] With "quasi-resolution of conflict, how is the firm able to make decisions? The firm is able to make decisions with inconsistent goals because of the "decentralization of decision-making..., the sequential attention to goals, and the adjustment in organizatinal slack..."[45]

The decision theorists have presented us with an understanding of conflict, coalitions, controls and decision making all in the same breath. Of course this is because they are interrelated.   19

The university, as I have mentioned throughout this article, likewise has conflict, coalitions, and controls.

Conflict in the university manifests itself in the same basic ways revealed by the decision theorists: through interdependency, inconsistent goals, and often because of resource allocations. Faculty, students, and administrators are interdependent in several respects. For example, students depend on teachers to teach, and on administrators to charge feasible tuition and provide student services; administrators depend on faculty to make the "best" use of their time and faculty depend on administrators for financing. Inconsistent goals between faculty, students, and administrators abound - often centering on what the premises or structure of interdependency should be.

March and Simon hit on a predominant reason behind much of today's conflict in the university squarely in pointing out the centrality of resource allocation and scheduling. Blau points out the increasing degree to which "budgetary requirements conflict with optimum service to clients."[46] Intuitively, in talking about divergent perspectives regarding how money should be allocated, we are led to the recognition of power relationships. Selanik and Pfeffer in "The Bases and Use of Power in Organizational Decision Making: The Case of a University" find that "Subunit power accrues to those departments that are most instrumental in bringing in or providing resources which are highly valued by the total organization...";[47] and in Pfeffer and Salancik's "Organizational Decision Making as a Political Process: The Case

of a University Budget" they discuss the way in which "power, rather than what is optimal for achieving some organizational objective, becomes an important decision variable...":[48] they find that "Measures of departmental power in a university are found to be significantly related to the proportion of budget received."[49] Of course there are other resources (e.g. number of students enrolled) which also represent important decision variables.

The structural changes with respect to unionization are worth attention. Kemerer and Baldridge in Unions or Campus point out that "Collective bargaining assumes that there is conflict between employees...[and] that individual negotiations will be subsumed under group bargaining."[50] Since unionization assumes conflict, it formalizes an organizational reality.

Changing structural phenomena have suggested that the administration is not really in control of the university; however, as Allison points out in The Essence of Decision regarding the comparable decision-making that we find in the national government, "In spite of the limits on the leadership's ability to control changes in a particular organization's goal or SOP's many important issues of government action require that these leaders decide what organizations will play out which programs where."[51] Hence we have here an example of how March and Simon say managers can vary the premises of decisions.

Ability to affect goals or premises, is a structural advantage administrators have. Shae and Fresch in Presidents Confront Reality present "considerable evidence that dispite the perception of

administration, power flows toward, not away from administrative groups."[52]

I have expanded on the organizations"bounded"_rationality, discussing simplified models of reality, helpful organizational terminology, the role of conflict, the "quasi-resolution of conflict, the reality of divergent coalitions, and control and decision-making variables. Further I have demonstrated the relevancy of this decision making view to an understanding of the organizational realities of the university. Moreover, I have discussed how the administration (particularly at the top, i.e., the president) can , in spite of the constraints, direct and advance the institution, with a means for having faculty and student discretion.

Before I move more directly into more specific ways the university can be directed, in all fairness I should speak to some apparent differences between the business firm and the organization. As I see it, these differences do not obviate, significantly, the usefulness of the decision-theory view.

IV

One area of apparent difference between the firm and the university involves the status given those peculiar groups we call faculty and students. Faculty, although employees of the the university, do not have an identical counterpart in the firm. There is a mystique of professionalism applied to faculty. For example, Blau states that "Bureaucratic authority [i.e. adminis-

trators] has its source in superior official position..." whereas
"professional authority [i.e. academics] has its source in expert
knowledge."[53] Although I think that it should be pointed out that
administrators, to be effective, must have expertise, this does
speak to a difference from the firm in terms of how these groups
are perceived. Further, students represent a peculiar clientle.
They are not employees at all yet they are considered members
of the university, and students have the added distinction of
planned extinction from membership (i.e. they receive a degree
and their "membership," if we can realistically say that, changes
in form). I do not see how the distinctiveness of faculty and
students from the members of a firm obviates the usefulness of
decision-theory in describing their roles.

We find that deans and department heads are often associated
with both the administration as well as their respective academic
areas, and this also may be considered an apparent difference
(although not a real difference) from members of a business firm.
One way decision-making theory is useful is considering this role
dilemma is that decision-theory could point out how the two frame-
works, or models, are necessarily in conflict. Rourke and Brooks
discuss the demands that "...require the department to operate
with uniform, programed criteria in admitting or rejecting students
in their courses..."[54] and now those demands conflict with the
demands regarding individual faculty or departmental judgements
about "intangible" factors.

Another area of apparent difference between the business
firm and the university organization centers around goals. Popularly,
the goals of the firm are seen as more explicit (e.g. profit) in

contrast to the idea that the university's goals are more ambiguous.
If there is a difference it is only a matter of degree, and hence
it does not obviate the usefulness of the decision-making theory.
We have seen that firms do not act in a way to maximize profit (Cyert)
and that there are constraints and competing goals within the firm.
Also, the university in several senses has "profit" as its goal (e.g.
increased enrollment).

It seems to me that the distinction that is made between
the "explicit" goals of the firm as opposed to the "ambiguous"
goals of the university, can also be understood in terms of the
degree of routine tasks (performance programs) as opposed to
nonroutine tasks.

Allowing for the apparent differences cited in this section,
I stand behind my advocacy for the decision-making view.

V

In the introduction to this article I described a serious
predicament that the university is in. On the one hand the univer-
sity is burdened with numerous internal constraints, yet on the
other hand the university must respond to changing societal needs
and demands. I have laid this responsibility on the administration,
particularly at the top (i.e. the president), and I believe I
have shown, through the decision-making theory of March, Simon, and
Cyert, that this can be done: the controls are available.

In this section I will offer more specific suggestions re-
garding how the administration can act to advance the university
toward societal needs and demands. My suggestions involve the use

of a comprehensive model of reality, "unobtrusive controls,"
participation in decision-making, "repertoire overload," and
purposeful leadership.

We have learned that there are diverse simplified models
of reality in the university. The administration needs to
continuously foster a comprehensive model of reality. Baldridge
says in Power and Conflict in the University regarding New
York University that "...administrative dominance [was the
result of] the wholistic perspective of the central administration
as constrasted with the provincial viewpoints of the individual
and school faculties."[55]

Another reason to foster a comprehensive model of the
university is that it helps others in the university to see
the interdependency that exists. Administrators should work
toward trying to get other members of the university to
share, or at least understand, the comprehensive view. Since
other members are "reasoning and adaptive beings" administrators
should not assume that administrators are the only ones who can
attempt the comprehensive view.

We have learned that there is a reciprocal relationship
between control and conflict. The administration needs to under-
stand the impact of controls or conflict and use, when possible,
the more "unobtrusive controls." I have borrowed this term from
Cohen and March in Leadership and Ambiguity. They point out that a
" central tactic in high-inertia systems is to use high-leverage
minor actions to produce major effects - to let the system go
where it wants to go with only minor interventions that make it
go where it should go."[56] Granted the "major instruments of un-

obtrusive management are bureaucratic"[57] but an understanding

of the dynamics of the organization that we have discussed in

this paper puts the "tool" of bureaucracy in its proper perspective.

We need not keep these controls secret - risking a lost of trust.

But such things as "selected accounting rules," and "accounting

facts with respect to student activities, faculty activities,

and space," are effective premises, yet operate unobtrusively.[58]

Another thing that the administration can do is to

"overload the system ith repertories for decision-making."[59]

This is another thi.   have borrowed from Cohen and March.

We have learned that h e is, as Allison puts it, a "gap be-

tween what leaders choose and what leaders implement."[60] Cohen

and March say that "... it is a mistake to become absolutely

committed to any one project."[61] To do so would constitute a

naive perception of organizational constraints. However, "Someone

with the habit of producing many proposals, without absolute

commitment to any one, may lose any one of them... but cannot

be stopped on everything."[62] Thus "overloading the system" with

a "repertoire of projects" will increase the chances of directing

the university toward positive change.

Another thing the administration can do is to increase

participation by faculty and students in the decision-making

process. As Adam Yarmolinsky points out in "Institutional Paralysis,"

"...no one group in the university has all the factors necessary

for institutional change."[63]

Polly, Taylor, and Thompson point out in "A Model for Horizonal

Power Sharing and Participation in University Decision Making" that

participative managerial styles lead to increased supervisor
effectiveness, teacher satisfaction, decreased student alienation,
and improved student achievement."[64] These benefits add strength
to the need for participation. Pollay, Taylor, and Thomson
also point out that "One of the positive features of participatory
decision-making (power sharing) is its ability to reduce complexity
by synthesizing the contributions of individuals with various
organizational perspectives."[65] Room for faculty and student
discretion, discussed earlier, emerges: "Participation can be
instrumental in democratizing a rigidly hierarchical organization
and providing all levels of employees with some element of control
over their own fates, especially when participation is used to
establish goals."[66]

We need leadership in the university. This is fundamental.
In some respects leadership is an art. However, we can speak
more concretely about the prerequisites of leadership: negotiation
skills, and purposefulness.

We have learned that there are coalitions within the university.
Bargaining, therefore, is a constant phenomenon. Consequently,
it is essential that negotiation skills be attained.

Although the purpose of the university is in many respects
in doubt and dispute, especially as to what the university's role
should be in serving societal needs, leadership requires acting
with purpose. For example, unsettled purpose in the president's
mind constitutes negligance regarding the values that are inextricably
attached to decisions. People make decisions. As Simon says,

"...ethical propositions are not completely reducible to factual terms..."[67] So, for example, hiding behind the assumption that decisions are made for us by the economics of the situation, a popular cop-out today, constitutes negligence. As Charles Lindblom says in "The Science of 'Muddling Through'," "One chooses among values and among policies at one and the same time.[68]

I have attempted to explain the decision-making theory of Simon, March, and Cyert, and to apply their theory to an understanding of the university as an organization. Also, I have pointed out how, in spite of the constraints on the university, it can still advance to serve changing societal needs.

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