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ABSTRACT

In order to discover whether--and what--intercultural communication problems persist in businesses with headquarters in the United States and branches in another highly developed country, 12 Americans affiliated with Paris branches of United States businesses and two French executives of American firms were interviewed in Paris. This paper discusses the findings regarding motivation for working in France, spouse and family concerns, distance from United States headquarters, geographical location of Paris residence, disparate degrees of formality of the French and the Americans, impressions of salient differences in French and American styles of communication in oral discussions and in report writing, and perceived differences in French and American advertising strategy. Responses to questions indicated that few of the 12 Americans find their communication problems exacerbating but that the two Frenchmen are considerably exercised about certain differences between the two nationalities. (JM)

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Intercultural Communication Problems of American  
Expatriate Businessmen in Paris

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In a recent publication by Harvard University Press--Financing Anglo-American Trade: the House of Brown, 1800-1880--Edwin J. Perkins chronicles the history of an international banking firm. Part Two of this book, a careful analysis of the main economic function performed by the partnership, is designed for specialists in financial history. But Part I, an overview of the firm's growth and internal struggles, should be of particular interest to students of business communication and cross-cultural management quarrels.

This part of the book traces the various stages of a ten-year struggle between the American and English partners over control of administrative and fiscal policy. And it reveals that much of the strife had its origins in national attitudes toward expansion, administration, and even social customs.

Although the House of Brown started as an American family business, it began as early as the 1810's admitting non-family members as partners-- in particular two Englishmen, Francis A. Hamilton and Mark Collet. While partners on both sides of the Atlantic were quick to recognize the advantages of a network of offices coordinated by the newly invented telegraph and cable, neither faction seems to have acknowledged that styles of communication, as well as modes, contribute to the success or failure of a business. In 1852, when one of the Browns wished to divert company funds into permanent American investments, the English Hamilton and Collet warned in a tactless advisory letter that "the Americans are an extravagant and wasteful people and inclined to forestall all legitimate advance."<sup>1</sup> They then added the rhetorical question: "After all, is

not our business already as large as likely to be or as we desire it to be."<sup>2</sup>

Twelve years later the difference in attitudes toward expansion and diversification had reached the point that Hamilton and Collet asked the American partners to consult their lawyers about the possible terms of dissolution. The American partners, piqued over their English partners' want of confidence in them, acceded to demands for negotiations over partnership--whereupon the Englishmen proposed that the senior Brown, James, either retire or become a special partner with no claim on earnings beyond the minimal 5 or 6 per cent paid yearly on the capital accounts of retired partners. In an effort to mollify Hamilton and Collet, James Brown stopped letting his earnings accumulate in the business, and this gesture, coupled with other circumstances, ultimately produced a death of capital that forced the firm to admit to partnership a young man with substantial capital but only desultory interest in the business. The result was that the ultra-conservative Hamilton and Collet were given a relatively free hand to impose upon the English branch, and to a great extent, the American offices, a policy of extreme caution and limited growth. In time, the firm entered a gradual decline. In the words of Perkins:

For several decades the Browns were unable to detect the signs of their own relative decline. The volume of business activity and profits continued to expand. Nevertheless, the House failed to keep pace with the phenomenal growth of the American economy and the increasing number of international transactions.<sup>3</sup>

Eventually, John Crosby Brown perceived the consequences of the restricted policy and observed in a letter to an associate, that, "in our fear of dealing with so-called Trusts such as Standard Oil & Sugar, managed by able & rich men, we have in the past lost good customers & much good and safe business."<sup>4</sup>

After the strain of the First World War brought about the long-threatened dissolution of partnership, the London office operated for a period as Brown, Shipley & Co. Limited, then, in 1972, merged with the largest American brokeragehouse to form Merrill-Lynch-Brown-Shipley Bank. The American partners eventually merged with the Harriman family's investment house to form Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Thus, although vestiges of the original firm survive in eminent modern companies, the famed House of Brown no longer exists, having foundered on the shoals of conflicted interests and intercultural communication problems.

Much of the strife is understandable if viewed in terms of the men involved. The American Browns were descendants of an Irish emigrant who had emigrated to Baltimore in the late 1700's and founded a farflung business based on tobacco, cotton, foreign exchange, Irish linens, and a fleet of sailing ships. His sons, living on the economic frontier of a developing nation, were quick to spot opportunities to invest in daring but usually well-founded new enterprise.

Hamilton and Collet, on the other hand, as denizens of a settled and venerable country, shared none of the American Browns' penchant for trailblazing ventures. Hamilton's limited residence in the United States had been in the South, where he found conventions very much in accord with his British notions of propriety, and his chagrin at the outcome of the Civil War helped engender his opinion that "the Americans are an extravagant and wasteful people and inclined to forestall all legitimate advance." Mark Collet had lived through the English panic of 1857, and he viewed with alarm any investment less conservative than Bank of England stock. The financial derring-do of the American partners

(whose preceptor had ventured grandly abroad) was anathema to men nurtured on caution and habitude. --Indeed, even American gregariousness and sociability offended Hamilton and Collet, who never ceased to complain about the obligation to mix business with pleasure by entertaining the eternally visiting customers from across the sea.

#### THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

The purpose of this paper is to present findings from a preliminary survey for a study of inter-cultural communication problems of American expatriate businessmen in Paris. Frankly inspired by the House of Brown history and Herbert W. Hilderbrandt's study of "Cultural Communication Problems of Foreign Business Personnel in the United States,"<sup>5</sup> I took advantage of a visit to Paris last summer to try to discover: 1) whether, in an age of Telex and transAtlantic flights, intercultural communication problems persist in businesses with headquarters in the United States and a branch in another highly developed country, and 2) specifically what such problems are.

My definition of an American expatriate businessman in Paris was "a natural-born American, employed by an organization with headquarters in the United States, who worked in his company's Paris office for a period of at least one year." My definition of cultural was "of or pertaining to the total system of values and habits stored up implicitly and explicitly by a native of a particular country." My definition of a problem was "a difference in style of communication that causes surprise, readjustment, or perturbation in the expatriate."

#### METHODS OF RESEARCH

To discern and identify strategic differences in intercultural

communication, I interviewed twelve Americans who were presently affiliated with a Paris branch of a United States business. Like Hildebrandt, I tried to ascertain in every case the expatriate's motives for working in France, his wife-family concerns, his perception of the effect of being at a considerable remove from headquarters, his attitude toward the geographical location of his French residence, his perception of disparate degrees of formality in the French and the Americans, and his impression of salient differences in French and American styles of communicating in oral discussions and in report-writing.

I made a point of touching on all these questions in the first hour of the interview, but in the second I allowed the interviewee to hold forth on whatever aspect of his French business experience most engaged him. As a consequence of the un-structured interview (during the second hour), I added new subject to my list: perceived differences in French and American advertising strategy. I also relegated to secondary focus the motives for working in France, wife-family concerns, attitudes toward distance from company headquarters and the geographical location of the French residence.

All of the people I interviewed were employees of firms concerned with:

- 1) aircraft manufacture, 2) banking, 3) business machines, 4) camera manufacture, 5) chemicals, 6) data processing, 7) farm machinery, 8) investment banking, 9) the manufacture of electronic parts, 10) nuclear engineering, 11) pharmaceuticals, and 12) a sporting goods company.

I also interviewed two Frenchmen serving as executives with American firms which no longer employed Americans abroad. These interviews came

about in this way. --To arrange appointments, I called the contact person listed in the directory issued annually by the American Chamber of Commerce in France and asked to speak to an American executive. Repeatedly I was told--and often with vigor--that the firm I had called was a French firm, that it had no American employees. When I pointed out that the firm was American-based, the person I was talking to would concede this fact but still insist that this was a French company--adding, perhaps, that the company had at one time employed Americans in French management but did so no longer. On two occasions, however, I was routed to a French executive who was so intrigued with the subject of my study that he volunteered to make an input to the data I was collecting. I interviewed these two men on perceived differences in American and French formality, styles of oral and written communication, and advertising requirements. I am most grateful to the Frenchmen for the different perspective they gave me on my subject.

#### FINDINGS

##### Motivation for Working in France, Wife-Family Concerns, Distance from Headquarters, and Geographical Location of Paris Residence

The reply to the question of why the American had wanted an assignment in Paris was always one of the following: 1) to travel and live in what is often regarded as the cultural capital of the world, 2) to learn more about the affiliate company and thereby enhance one's value to the parent company, and 3) to comply with a company request. The wife-family concerns were--not surprisingly, when one considers the city to which the American had been assigned--negligible. One executive observed that he and his

wife were less than satisfied with their ten-year-old son's progress in his international school but that, "all things considered," the experience of living in Paris would undoubtedly eventually compensate the child for his temporary sense of dislocation. Several interviewees jokingly expressed apprehension about the day they must return home: their wives had found life as Parisiennes highly satisfactory, what with an abundance of household help and cultural opportunities, and every member of the family enjoying a greater sense of freedom and safety than he or she might in a large city in the United States. One man, in describing his wife's contentment, resorted to quoting Ernest Hemingway. "And why shouldn't she be happy?" he asked rhetorically. "Paris is truly a moveable feast!"

Few of the men I interviewed were inclined to comment at length on the disadvantages of being at a remove from the home office. Some simply shrugged in response to the suggestion that distance might mean exclusion from decision-making and opined that one couldn't have everything. Others mentioned semi-annual returns to the States as a satisfactory way of maintaining contact.

Virtually all of the interviewees expressed satisfaction with the proximity of their residences to their office. Their situation seems to be diametrically opposite to that of many of Hildebrandt's German employees working in an American daughter company near a metropolitan area. Whereas all of the Hildebrandt interviewees commuted--with one who lived in Manhattan driving over one hour to work--only two of my interviewees did, and those two were admittedly indulging a preference for country living. In general, the American expatriates were gleeful over the fact that they had found an attractive apartment in a good neighborhood within walking distance from the office.

### Formality

Without exception, interviewees commented voluntarily on the difference in the degree of formality practiced by the French and Americans in everyday business encounters. The average French businessman, observed two Americans who had worked in both England and France, perfectly fits the image most Americans now hold of the British--that of a scrupulously polite, aloof, rather serious individual. The French are, most American interviewees agreed, punctilious in forms of address, desirous of maintaining a hierarchy of authority, and--unlike the modern British businessman--not given to relaxing barriers even on convivial social occasions.

At the conference table, the Americans found their French associates following the American custom of using first names, regardless of rank, but back in the normal business routine, reverting to the use of titles of "monsieur," especially for their French colleagues. Only with close friends of many years standing or with former schoolmates, said the American interviewees, would the French use the personal tu instead of the more formal vous.

Like the storied Hamilton and Collet, the average French executive is averse to mixing his business life with his family and social life. For the Americans, used to fraternizing with business associates outside of office hours, the French reticence to exchange cocktails and dinners with colleagues seems "clannish" and his reluctance to invite fellow executives to visit the sacred precincts of his walled home downright anti-social. Few of the Americans I talked to, however, spoke with resentment of the French separation of private from business life, accepting it, like the formality of address, as a national idiosyncrasy rather than impediment of efficiency.

The compartmentalization of business and private life extends, according to one of the French volunteers, even to lunchtime, when Americans frequently transact business over a meal or a sandwich served on a tray in the office but Frenchmen put aside their workaday concerns for complete concentration on food and conversation on subjects unrelated to the office. For the average Frenchman, moreover, the lunch hour usually begins at 12 and lasts till 1:20, a fact noted by several of the American interviewees but followed by assurances that their French associates usually make up for the long lunch hour by working until 6 or 7 in the evening--long after the Americans have gone home.

One of the Frenchmen interviewed spoke with dismay of the freedom with which Americans of all ranks in the company hierarchy speak their minds in a company meeting. When questioned closely about his objection, he attributed his aversion for such *lese majeste* to an early education inculcating respect for authority and his own inability to maintain sang froid in arguing for a particular bias. He regretted the French tendency to gesticulate and express reaction by moue, saying he thought it "ill-advised" inasmuch as such mannerisms might be misconstrued as evidence of hostility rather than Gallic ardor.

Another French interviewee voiced amazement at the way American colleagues, after opposing a measure proposed at the conference table, will--once a decision has been made--conscientiously and efficiently implement the decision. The Frenchman admitted to a sense of being obligated to continue to carp at a decision he felt unwise and to agitate for review.

Predictably, the Americans saw the French as both less democratic and more rebellious than themselves. They were quite aware of their French opposite numbers' disapproval of the give-and-take between American subordinates and their superiors and attributed this response--accurately,

in view of the French interviewee's remark--to a difference in educational systems and the French love of hierarchy. According to one American interviewee, the French rigidly observe boundaries of power and the average Paris executive is affronted when forced to negotiate with someone of lower rank, even when the junior person is authorized to make significant decisions. Indeed, according to the Americans, the French executive is himself loath to exercise power not usually vested in him, and he will consume much time and energy in securing concurrence from many people who were not involved in the initial decision but whose managerial domains are periphally affected by the new policy. (The Americans were more exercised about French "procrastination" than any other cultural difference.)

#### Styles of Written and Oral Communication

The Americans interviewed mentioned as a salient difference in communication style between the French and themselves the formats of reports. While professing admiration for the French capacity for taking pains, the Americans bemoaned the amount of time the French spend in presenting the statement of a problem and its history and background, the infinite detail in which they present data, and their delay in arriving at conclusions and recommendations.

The two Frenchmen also observed a contrast between American report-writing customs and French. They complained that the American approach to making a report was "pragmatic" whereas the French was "logical." As Frenchmen, they said, they had been brought up in the Cartesian method of examining causes--that is, beginning with simple, easily understood statements and gradually and by degrees reaching complex evaluations: First dividing difficulties

into as many parts as possible; then classifying problems according to common denominators; and finally reaching a conclusion that is inevitable in light of all the evidence presented beforehand. They were guided, they claimed, by DesCartes's injunction to "make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that one could be sure nothing had been omitted." The Americans, on the other hand, the French contended, had had too much "training" and not enough general education--for example, in methods of reasoning. (As nearly as I could determine, there are no French business communication courses outside of secretarial schools.) In a final salvo at the Americans' report-writing practices, one of the Frenchmen claimed that Americans, in reaching a decision, search, not for the best, but for the least bad. The second found the number of reports he had to send back to the parent company excessive by French standards.

One American characterized his and his compatriots' decision-making style as "trial-and-error," defending it on the grounds that less time and money were lost in choosing a merely expedient solution--and then modifying it--than would be the case were the company to take the time necessary to devise the most elegant fit possible between problem and solution.

Another American spoke of the adverse reaction of the French to the Administrative Plan for feasibility reports--that is, one in which only the abstract, introduction, factual discussion, and conclusions and recommendations occur in the body of the paper and the detailed discussion is relegated to the annexes. The Administrative Plan, said the American interviewee, affronts the French with its precipitate revelation of conclusions and arouses suspicions that it is an American scheme for either limiting discussion or stampeding the audience into an ill-considered decision. He

believed that the French executive enjoys superimposing detail upon detail until he has built an imposing edifice of Cartesian logic culminating in a dramatic disclosure to which the author may point with a final flourish, declaiming, "Voilà--la resolution!"

Few Americans spoke of the language barrier per se as a problem. Many observed that their company required facility in English for all its French employees (from telephone operators and receptionists on up) and that, therefore, conferences were held in English or else translated for the Americans, as were all non-English written communications. Several Americans spoke of the necessity of using standard English in transactions with the French, of avoiding terms derived from American sports--for example, a "ball-park estimate,"--of using simple, direct sentences, and of speaking clearly and distinctly. One man, with over twenty years of residence in Europe emphasized the importance of using complete sentences and avoiding idiom as much as possible. About half of the twelve American interviewees either had developed or were developing some facility in French.

The French rolled their eyes to Heaven and clucked over the language incompetence of most American expatriates. They lowered their voices as they deplored the failure to learn French before accepting a Paris assignment but seemed to want to go on record as reproving the United States for not teaching its people foreign languages. They felt that American language incompetence is due more to a sense of national superiority and general self-sufficiency than to the incapacity to learn.

One Frenchman deplored the American use of imperatives in written instructions--for example, "please expedite"--maintaining that only suggestions, not commands, should be used in communications with peers or

superiors. And both Americans and French commented on the folly of trying to participate in a multinational meeting immediately after a transAtlantic flight. The inevitable jet-lag, they claimed, made mental adjustment for differences in language and customs particularly difficult.

#### Advertising

Inasmuch as the men I interviewed were often directors of public relations or the head of departments of communications, cross-cultural advertising was frequently mentioned as a communication problem. In the view of one American, few advertising campaigns cross borders successfully and an effective, worldwide campaign--exclusive of logos and trademarks--is almost impossible. He attributed the difficulty in transplanting campaigns from one country to another to: 1) differences in the use and dependence on various media, and 2) differences in cultural nuances and taboos.

In America, television is a dominant medium, but in France, it is subject to restrictive laws governing the wording of competitive messages. Hence, in France--and especially in Paris--the cinema is a more popular medium. Similarly, newspapers, upon which U.S. agencies place great reliance, are fewer and smaller, with correspondingly less space for ads. It is therefore incumbent upon an agency preparing an advertising campaign for France to rely on the cinema, the magazine, and the poster--and to devise messages that are easily grasped visually and are more flamboyant than subtle. It is also a requirement of an agency preparing a French campaign that it be willing to settle for a smaller margin of profit than that usually reaped in television advertising.

Repeatedly, American and French interviewees mentioned the necessity for an advertising agency to be thoroughly familiar with both the ethos and

language of the population for which it prepares ads. Humor and metaphor they agreed had best be avoided in ads prepared outside ones active country inasmuch as one nationality's whimsy may be another's dirty joke--for example, a kitchen appliance advertised by an American company as the Spanish housewife's noveo. (The denotation of the Spanish word is friend, but its connotation is sweetheart or lover.)

A French directeur des affaires exterieures lamented the expectations of the New York office that he use a series of photographs prepared by the U.S. agency handling the firm's advertising. These pictures featured a sleek, high-fashion, very thin, thirtyish model garbed in diamonds and chiffon. The ads were not suited to France, the directeur said, because, in the first place, they suggested that the product being advertised--actually a medium-priced accessory--was within the reach of only wealthy and sophisticated women, and, in the second place, they flouted French standards of beauty. (The French prefer a more natural, less glossy, and younger look.) He pointed to the ad of a rival company as the disideratum: a vibrantly healthy, bikinied teenager with sturdy though shapely legs, somewhat irregular teeth, freckles, and tousled hair.

One American program manager justified his preference for an international advertising campaign with a quotation from Jacques Coup de Fréjac on the universality of basic advertising principles: "The soup is exactly the same. Only the flavoring is different." He amplified his reasons for preferring a worldwide campaign by ~~citing the cost of duplication of~~ services necessary when national, rather than international agencies were used.

## DISCUSSION

The observations reported in this paper fulfill the purposes for the preliminary survey of intercultural communication problem of American expatriate businessmen in Paris. They confirm that, even in an age of Telex and trans-Atlantic flight, communication problems persist in businesses with headquarters in the United States and a branch in another highly developed country. And they indicate that differences in degrees of formality, as well as styles of oral discussion, written reports, and advertising approaches are preminent communication concerns with Americans assigned to branch offices in Paris. The addition of the French interviewees, though accidental, did much to deepen the perspective of the study and suggests that the design of further research should have as an objective the comparison of expatriate perceptions with those of nationals, all on the same subjects.

The responses to questions indicate that few of the twelve Americans find their communication problems really exacerbating but that the two Frenchmen are considerably exercised about certain differences between the two nationalities. Thus I infer that the Americans' problems are more serious than they recognize.--It behooves the expatriates to ascertain the precise degree of perturbation the French feel and to work at reducing the salient points of friction.

Since both American language incompetence and insistence upon a pragmatic approach to problem-solving evoked real indignation from the Frenchmen, it might tentatively be concluded that Americans desiring assignment in France should not only acquire facility in French while still in the States, but also familiarize themselves with the Cartesian method of

reasoning months before sitting down at the conference table with French colleagues. Such measures might go a long way toward maintaining at least a sprinkling of American managers in the Paris offices at a time when the French political climate militates strongly for management by nationals or, at least, by third-country managers, who usually blend unobtrusively into the background.

The French, the interview led me to infer, might also benefit from a less ethnocentric attitude and a greater awareness of the bases for the communication differences between themselves and the Americans--for example, the homogeneity of language in the United States compared to the heterogeneity in Europe, an area of similar size--or, for the Americans, a recent history of pioneering, which nearly always dictates improvisation and reliance upon the expedient--rather than the elegant, solution--or, again for the Americans, an educational system which stresses equality and thereby encourages free, though not necessarily disrespectful, discussion between supervisors and subordinates.

Both countries have much to lose if intercultural communication problems become serious impediments to French-American collaboration, for, just as the House of Brown was diminished by the dissolution of its Anglo-American partnership, so many contemporary international companies would be diminished by the repatriation of American managers. Employees from both the headquarters company and the host country have uniuely valuable talents and viewpoints.

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

<sup>1</sup> Edwin J. Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade, the House of Brown, 1300-1380, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 64.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p. 80.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 91.

<sup>5</sup> Herbert W. Hildebrandt, "Cultural Communication Problems of Foreign Business Personnel in the United States," Journal of Business Communication, Vol. 13, Fall 1975, pp. 13-24.

<sup>6</sup> Directory: 1975-1976, Edited by Martine E. Cosson, Paris: The American Chamber of Commerce in France, 1975.

<sup>7</sup> Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, New York: the Liberal Arts Press, Inc., 1956, p. 12.

<sup>8</sup> The Frenchmen's version of cultural differences and their genesis closely parallels Theodore D. Weinshall's description of the origin of American and French management styles:

. . . The difference between the French approach and that of the United States can be described by saying that one is dogmatic and the other is pragmatic. The French approach is Cartesian, and stands for the most systematic and quantitative assault possible on every problem, while taking into consideration all factors which may influence it. The Americans, on the other hand, are more interested in the usefulness of the result than in the theoretical side of the method used to approach the problem.

Thus, if the same problem is presented to a French and to an American businessman, the former is liable to discover, say, twenty factors which influence it, think of about fifty alternative solutions and attempt to find the connection between them. Each alternative would be weighed in the light of the conditioning factors. The American, by contrast, would probably look for the three main factors which influence the problem and take these into consideration. He would then decide on, say, five alternative solutions and evaluate them in the light of these factors. This simplified description points, to a certain extent, to two different ways of thinking; but first and foremost it shows that there is a basic difference of approach to problem analysis, which has its source in the differences in the social, cultural, and educational values of the two peoples. Many Frenchmen regard the Americans as efficient and successful economically, but they despise them for what they consider to be their superficiality. Many Americans, on the other hand, regard the French as being highly cultured and educated, but despise them for their supposed inefficiency, disorder, and uncleanness. It is

precisely their tendency to specialise--which is so often incompatible with a broad outlook--which seems to enable the Americans to attack their business problems so efficiently. A broad outlook, on the other hand, and a knowledge of the culture of the world, while they may confer an ability to see the whole picture, also give rise to a tendency to include more and more factors in the analysis of the problem.

See: The Multinational Company in Europe, edited by Michael Z. Brooke and H. Lee Remmers, London: Longman, 1972, pp. 115-116.

<sup>9</sup> Kenneth Houg and Thomas Pearsall, Reporting Technical Information, Beverly Hills: Glencoe Press, 1973, p.