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ABSTRACT

Data on the characteristics and labor market experiences of illegal aliens in the U.S. work force were collected by voluntary interviews with 793 apprehended illegal immigrants who had worked at least two weeks in the U.S. From the resulting diverse collection of case histories, it was concluded that (1) illegal workers in the U.S. are likely to be disadvantaged persons with little education and few skills and employed in low-level jobs (Most reported employment as the primary motive for migration and sent an average of \$105 a month to their homeland to help support an average of 4.6 people); and (2) since illegal workers are successful in finding low-level jobs due to work experience in their own countries, and appear to be highly motivated and productive, an increasing supply of illegal aliens is likely to depress the educational and skill level of the workforce, depress labor standards in the secondary sector, cause displacement of low-skill legal resident workers, and create a new class of disadvantaged workers. Data are provided for the survey respondents on demographic characteristics, work experience, backhome socioeconomic conditions, reasons for migration, and on their contact with various governmental systems. U.S. immigration policy and practices are discussed, as well as the role and impact of illegals on the U.S. labor market. Appended to the report are results of another survey of illegal immigrants and the interview schedule. (NJ)

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The Characteristics and Role of Illegal Aliens in the U.S. Labor Market:

An Exploratory Study

by

David S. North
Marion F. Houstoun

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

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ABSTRACT

Objectives, Methodology, and Limitations of the Study

The purpose of this study was to gather, for the first time, information on the demographic characteristics, country of origin, employment history, wages and participation in public services of illegal aliens in the U.S., and to examine the manpower policy implications of an analysis of the data on illegals.

This report does not purport to be a study representative of all illegals in the labor market or in the U.S. Because the number, distribution, and characteristics of illegals in the U.S. labor market are not known, and because random sampling from that population is not possible, a representative sample could not be drawn.* With the cooperation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), 793 apprehended illegal aliens, 16 years of age or more, who had worked for wages at least two weeks in the U.S., were interviewed in May-June 1975. The study group consisted of 481 Mexican illegals, 237 illegals from other nations in the Western Hemisphere (WH respondents), and 75 illegals from nations in the Eastern Hemisphere (EH respondents). The respondents were interviewed in 19, primarily metropolitan, sites across the nation; only a minority of the interviews were held at the U.S.-Mexico border. No attempt was made to estimate the number of illegals currently in the labor force. The tentative conclusions suggested in this report are based on the data collected in this survey as well as on other studies of legal and illegal aliens.

Survey Findings

Most of the 793 illegals were young disadvantaged adults who came from less developed countries to find employment here, primarily in low-wage, low-skill, and low-status jobs.

Three-fourths of the respondents reported that they had come to the U.S. to get a job. Almost 9 out of 10 Mexican respondents, as compared with 6 out of 10 of the WH and 2 out of 10 of the EH respondents, reported employment as their primary motive for migration. Though all were required by INS to leave the U.S., a majority (52%) planned to return, generally to find employment again.

More than 1 out of every 2 respondents had been in the U.S. for two or more years. The illegals were young (an average age of 28.5 years) males (91%), who helped support (81%) at least one relative in their homeland. Less than half (47%) were married; 17% reported a spouse in the U.S.

The 793 respondents sent an average of \$105 a month to their homeland, which supported or helped support an average of 4.6 persons. As a group, the Mexican respondents reported significantly more dependents in their home country than respondents from other regions of origin. Although the Mexican respondents reported the lowest earnings of respondents from any region of origin, they sent more money home (\$129 a month) than either WH (\$76) or EH (\$37) respondents.

*The population of interest in this study is the population of illegals in the U.S. labor market. Note that this is equivalent to neither the population of illegals in the nation (a presumably larger group, with possibly different characteristics) nor the population of apprehended illegals (a presumably smaller group, which includes illegals neither working nor seeking employment). Further, the sampling strategy was designed to include selection of 300 Mexican and 300 non-Mexican respondents apprehended away from the border; the distribution of the respondents' country of origin cannot be used to construct a statistically valid estimate of the corresponding distribution of illegals in the labor market or in the nation.

The illegals had much less education than the U.S. civilian labor force (6.7 as compared with 12.4 years of schooling). Respondents from Mexico had substantially less education (4.9 years) than WH respondents (8.7 years), who had, in turn, considerably less schooling than EH respondents (11.9 years). Almost two-thirds of the respondents could not speak English. Less than one-quarter of the Mexican respondents spoke English, in contrast to almost half of the WH and more than four-fifths of the EH respondents.

The respondents had been primarily low-skilled workers in their country of origin. Of the 628 who had been employed there since 1970, 18% had been white-collar workers (a majority had been sales or clerical workers), 42% had been blue-collar workers (more than half had been operatives or laborers), 36% had been farmworkers, and 5% had been service workers. Homeland occupation differed significantly, however, according to respondent's region of origin; e.g., 49% of the (407) Mexican respondents had been farmworkers, as compared with 13% of the (173) WH and 2% of the (48) EH respondents.

Most illegals were unskilled or semi-skilled workers in their most recent U.S. job. Although almost half the respondents who had been farmworkers in their homeland moved into nonagricultural work in the U.S., the net effect of the U.S. labor market upon the occupational status of the respondents was a depressive one. The occupational distribution of the study group in the U.S. was even less comparable to that of U.S. workers than the occupational distribution of illegals in their homeland. Almost half (49%) of U.S. employed persons in 1974 were white-collar workers, as contrasted with 5% of the 788 illegals in their most recent U.S. job; 34% of U.S. workers and 55% of respondents in the U.S. were blue-collar workers; 13% of U.S. workers were in service occupations as compared with 21% of the respondents; and 4% of U.S. workers were farmworkers, as compared with 19% of the respondents.

Participants in the study group had been employed in the U.S. for an average of 2.1 years. Of the 782 illegals responding to this question, 44% had worked for wages in the U.S. for less than 1 year, 27% had worked here from 1 to 3 years, 21%, from 3 to 6 years, and 9%, from 6 to 20 years.

The average hourly wage of the 793 illegals in their most recent U.S. job was \$2.71. The respondents from Mexico earned, however, significantly less an hour than respondents from other regions: \$2.34 as compared with \$3.05 for WH and \$4.08 for EH respondents. Working an average of 42.4 hours a week, the 23 illegals employed as domestics had an average hourly wage of \$1.60 (which is below the minimum wage). The 134 respondents employed in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries (most of whom were Mexican farmworkers) worked a 53.6-hour week, with an average hourly wage of \$2.07.

Respondents employed in other industrial divisions (mining-1, construction-124, manufacturing-259, transportation-10, trade-152, finance-6, and nonhousehold services-57) earned a substantially lower average hourly wage than all U.S. production and non-supervisory workers: \$2.66, as compared with \$4.47. In addition, those 609 respondents worked an average of 8.6 more hours a week than U.S. workers in those industrial divisions but earned considerably less (an average of \$117.03 as compared with \$160.47 a week).

More than a fifth of the 766 respondents who were wage workers and for whom complete data on their most recent U.S. job were available appear to have been paid less than the minimum hourly wage (roughly defined for this study as \$1.80 for respondents employed in farms, forestry, and fisheries; \$2.00 an hour for those in sales, services, or private households; and \$2.10 for those in other industries).

Only 10% of the study group had belonged to a labor union in their homeland, but 16% had joined a union in the U.S.; almost half (62 respondents) had belonged for two or more years.

This group of illegal alien workers were significantly more likely to have participated in tax-paying systems (many of which are automatic) than to have used tax-supported programs. For example, while 77% of the study group reported that they had had social security taxes withheld and 73% reported that they had federal income taxes withheld, only 27% used hospitals or clinics, 4% collected one or more weeks of unemployment insurance, 4% had children in U.S. schools, 1% participated in U.S.-funded job-training programs, 1% secured food stamps, and 0.5% secured welfare payments.

Conclusions

Illegal workers in the U.S. are likely to be disadvantaged persons, with significantly less education and fewer skills than the U.S. labor force. Most are likely to be employed in low-level jobs. Illegals therefore appear to be increasing, to an undetermined degree, the supply of low-wage, low-skill, and low-status workers in the nation.

Illegals are probably quite successful in obtaining low-level jobs. On the one hand, apart from any consideration of their illegal status, they appear to be like immigrant workers: highly motivated and hard-working employees, whom U.S. employers apparently regard as very productive workers, despite the fact that many do not speak English. On the other hand, current immigration law makes it illegal for most aliens without immigrant status to work in the U.S., but specifically exempts employers from violation of those laws.

Depending upon their numbers, the degree to which they cluster in specific labor markets, and such non-market factors as the presence of unions, an increasing supply of these apparently highly productive, experienced, but generally low-skilled illegal workers is likely to have the following adverse effects on the labor market:

- it may depress the educational and skill level of the labor force;
- it may depress labor standards in the secondary sector, which in some cases would create an underground market of illegal wages, hours, and workers;
- it may cause a displacement of low-skill legal resident workers;
- it may create a new class of disadvantaged workers, one that inextricably conjoins national origin and illegal status in the U.S.

PREFACE

The objectives of this study were to gather heretofore unavailable data on the characteristics and labor-market experiences of illegal aliens in the U.S. work force, to present those data within the context of current information on illegal immigration, and to examine the resulting policy implications, with special reference to the question of the role and impact of illegals in the U.S. labor market.

With the financial support and intellectual encouragement of the Office of Manpower Research and Development, of the Department of Labor, and the cooperation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), of the Department of Justice, 793 apprehended illegal aliens who had worked at least two weeks in the U.S. were interviewed in 19 sites across the nation. In addition, with the assistance of the Catholic Migration Service and the law firm of Fried, Fragomen, and del Rey, supplemental interviews were conducted of 51 unapprehended illegals working in two of those sites. In order to achieve as high a level of cooperation and honesty as possible, a common procedure used with such surveys has been followed; all interviews were voluntary, and neither the name nor the address of any respondent were recorded.

The sampling strategy used in the survey, while resulting in selection of a diverse collection of case histories of apprehended illegals with work experience in the U.S., was not designed to produce a representative sample of either the population of illegal aliens in the U.S. labor market, or of the population of apprehended illegals in that market. Because random selection from either of those populations is not physically possible (even with strata based on characteristics of interest), and because the distributions of those characteristics are unknown (and are not a focus of this study), it is not possible to construct statistically valid estimates of the characteristics of either population from the survey data. The reader must remain aware that extrapolation of the quantitative survey results to the universe from which the sample was drawn requires judgment. Generalizations reached by such a procedure may therefore be in error.

With the above proviso in mind, when the authors choose to go beyond the survey results and make inferences about the characteristics and role of illegals in the labor force, as opposed to the characteristics of illegals in their sample, they do so by drawing upon their own knowledge of and experience in the study of aliens, both legal and illegal. In such instances, which are noted as such and which occur primarily in the final chapter, the reader is free, of course, to draw his own conclusions, on the basis of differences in underlying assumptions about that population. The survey data remain, however, a valuable input into any such process.

In order to lay the groundwork for an understanding of the complexities of illegal immigration, the first chapter of this report focusses upon American immigration policy and practices and the legal, economic, and social context in which illegal immigration is occurring today. Chapter II describes the objectives and limitations of the study and the survey methodology. The third chapter discusses causes of illegal immigration, examines the region of origin of illegals, and presents comparative socio-economic data on the United States and a selected group of nations which are major sources of illegals. Data on the backhome socio-economic conditions of the survey respondents and their motivations for coming to the U.S. are also included. Chapter IV examines the characteristics of the interviewed illegals: age, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, education, fluency in English, and the duration and frequency of visits to the U.S. The fifth, and central, chapter describes the respondents' work experiences, occupations, wages, and working conditions in the U.S. labor market. Chapter VI describes their contact with various governmental systems and discusses the degree to which these illegal workers pay taxes and use tax-supported services. The final chapter discusses the role and impact of illegals on the labor market in light of the authors' interpretation of the survey results and the major objectives of U.S. manpower policy. Appendix A reports the results of a survey of 250 members of another group of alien workers, the some 60,000 "green-card commuters," aliens with a unique kind of immigrant status who live in Mexico or Canada but work in the U.S. These interviews took place in three sites at the Canadian and seven sites at the Mexican border, and were carried out in May-July of 1975, during the course of the interviews with the apprehended illegals.

This study is a spin-off of an ongoing major study of the role of immigrants in the American work-place, funded by the Office of Manpower Research and Development. Throughout this study we have been grateful for the continuing interest and cooperation of Dr. Howard Rosen and Ms. Ellen Sehgal of that Office, and for the help of the staffs of the INS Central and field offices; we also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of other researchers in the field, including Charles Keely, William Weissert, and our late colleague, John Delaplaine. John McCarthy and his associates at the Catholic Migration Service were particularly helpful; as was Austin Fragomen of the law firm, Fried, Fragomen, and del Rey. Ms. B.J. Warren and her troupe of TransCentury interviewers gathered the interview data for us with skill, and Phil Loiterstein, Owen Sondergaard, and David Halem of Group Operations, Inc. provided us with statistical expertise in preparing the data for analysis and solicitously nursing them through the computer. We are also grateful for the continuing assistance of our research associate, Lili Wilson, and to Robin Wagner and Charlene Johnson, who produced the pages, tables and charts which follow. Finally, we owe a major debt of gratitude to the hundreds of illegals, without whom this study would have been neither possible nor necessary, who graciously answered a long series of questions for us. The views expressed and the conclusions made (along with the errors) are our own responsibility and do not necessarily reflect those of our sponsors or associates.

THE CHARACTERISTICS AND ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE
U.S. LABOR MARKET: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Objectives

The primary objective of this small study, an offshoot of a longitudinal study of the role of recent immigrants in the labor market, was an exploratory one: to secure heretofore unavailable empirical data on the characteristics and experiences of illegal aliens in the U.S. labor market. To provide a framework for understanding those data and some perspective on this complex phenomenon, other often widely scattered and unanalyzed information relating to illegal immigration, especially as it concerns the labor market, is also presented. In addition, a preliminary analysis of the labor-market role and impact of illegals, and their manpower policy implications, is offered.

Methodology

With the cooperation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of the Department of Justice, a survey instrument was administered by bilingual interviewers unaffiliated with INS to 793 apprehended illegal aliens, both Mexican and non-Mexican, 16 years of age or more, who had worked for wages at least two weeks in the United States. The interviews were conducted in 19 sites across the nation, primarily in INS District Offices in Los Angeles, New York City, San Antonio, Chicago, Miami, Newark, San Francisco, Detroit, Seattle, and Washington, D.C. A limited number of interviews were also held in INS Border Patrol offices in various sites at the Mexican and Canadian borders. In addition, a small number (51) of unapprehended illegals were interviewed in New York City and Washington, D.C. to provide some insight into possible differences between apprehended and unapprehended illegals. To secure as high a level of cooperation and honesty as possible, all interviews were voluntary, and neither the name nor the address of respondents was recorded.

The non-response rate was unexpectedly low (around 5%), and most respondents answered detailed questions about their experiences in the U.S. labor market, the amount of money they had sent home, the number of trips they had made to the U.S. in the last five years, the amount of money they had paid a smuggler, if they had been smuggled, and the number of times they had been apprehended by INS. The completeness of the interviews and the frequency with which the respondents gave answers contrary to their self-interest suggest that the survey results can generally be regarded as reliable.

The survey data were analyzed according to the 793 apprehended illegal alien respondents' region of origin (Eastern Hemisphere [EH respondents]; Western Hemisphere, excluding Mexico [WH respondents]; and Mexico); location of most recent U.S. job (East Coast; Mid- and Northwest; Southwest, excluding California; and California); cumulative duration in the U.S. (less than two years; two or more years); type of employment in the U.S. (agriculture; nonagriculture); entry technique (EWI;* visa abuser); English-speaking ability (spoke English; did not speak English); and age (16-24; 25-34; 35+). Data on the 51 unapprehended illegals were handled separately. Cross tabulations were also run for selected groups of apprehended respondents: those whose most recent U.S. job had been in the New York City, Los Angeles, San Antonio, or Chicago standard metropolitan areas (SMSAs), and those whose most recent U.S. job had been in one of the 23 U.S. counties that border Mexico.

Respondents' region of origin and the location of their most recent U.S. job, which was in some instances different from the location of their apprehension and interview, were as follows:

Distribution of Region of Origin of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents, by Location of Most Recent U.S. Job

<u>Region of Origin</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>California</u>	<u>South-west¹</u>	<u>Mid- and Northwest</u>	<u>East Coast</u>
Mexico	481	181	222	66	12
Western Hemisphere, exc. Mexico	237	41	1	18	177
Eastern Hemisphere	75	9	0	20	46
TOTAL	793	231	223	104	235

¹Defined in this study as the states of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Colorado.

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

*An INS term referring to aliens who illegally enter the nation (i.e., "enter without inspection"), as contrasted with aliens who abuse a nonimmigrant visa by taking unauthorized employment or by remaining in the nation beyond the always temporary period permitted by their visa.

It is important for the reader to note that because the number, distribution, and characteristics of illegals are not known, and because random sampling from that population is not possible, a representative sample could not be drawn from it. Thus, although the sampling strategy used in the survey resulted in selection of a diverse collection of case histories of apprehended illegals with work experience in the U.S., it was not designed to produce a representative sample of illegals, or of apprehended illegals, in the U.S. labor market. Extrapolation of the quantitative survey results to the universe from which the sample was drawn thus requires judgment, and the reader must remain aware that generalizations reached by such a procedure may be in error. The researchers have therefore made no attempt to estimate the number of illegals currently in the nation or the distributions of their characteristics; however, in considering the role and impact of illegals on the labor market, they have drawn upon their studies of alien workers, both legal and illegal, to develop tentative conclusions that are consistent with, and sometimes strongly indicated by, the survey results.

Background

Illegal immigration is not a new phenomenon. Nevertheless, despite only minimal growth in INS resources, the number of deportable aliens located by that agency has risen rapidly. In the decade ending in FY 1974, the annual number of apprehensions of illegal aliens steadily increased from 86,597 in FY 1964 to 788,145. Thus, in recent years, the number of apprehended illegals has exceeded the number of aliens annually admitted as immigrants, which has been roughly 400,000 since the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration & Nationality Act closed U.S. borders by extending to the Western Hemisphere numerical restrictions placed earlier upon the Eastern Hemisphere.

Historically, illegal immigration has been largely confined to Mexican wetbacks, i.e., to EWIs who crossed the southwestern border illegally. INS has therefore consistently concentrated most of its law enforcement resources near that border, where most apprehensions continue to be made. In FY 1974, for example, 90.1% of all apprehensions were of Mexican illegals; most were EWIs located near the Mexican border by INS Border Patrol staff.

Unlike Mexican apprehended illegals, most non-Mexican apprehended illegals enter with nonimmigrant visas, in particular tourist visas, which they subsequently abuse by remaining in the nation or by finding unauthorized employment (Most nonimmigrant visas specifically proscribe employment in the U.S.; with few exceptions, only aliens who are immigrants may legally work in the nation.)

In FY 1974, almost as many apprehended illegals came from the Caribbean or from Central or South America (34,948) as came from the rest of the world, excluding Mexico. Although the number of apprehended illegals from that region is small in comparison with the number of apprehended Mexicans, it has progressively increased and indeed doubled in the last decade. Further, during that same period, there have been explosive increases in the annual number of mala fide nonimmigrant visa applications, as well as in the annual number of nonimmigrants (in particular, tourists) and legal immigrants admitted in the U.S. from that region. Taken together, those data suggest that illegal immigration is increasingly a Western Hemisphere phenomenon. More generally, the explosive increase in the number of nonimmigrants admitted annually into the nation (in FY 1974, almost 7 million nonimmigrants entered the U.S.; more entered New York City [1.8 million] that year than entered the nation in FY 1964); the lack of post-admission controls over their departure or activities while here; and the allocation of most INS law enforcement resources to staff and offices near the Mexican border suggest that INS apprehension statistics are more likely to indicate the number and national origin of the flow of illegal immigration across that border than the number and national origin of the stock of illegals in the nation.

Survey Findings

1. Motivation in Coming to the U.S. Almost three-quarters (74.2%) of the 793 respondents reported they came to the U.S. to get a job. The 481 Mexican illegals were more likely to have come to the U.S. for economic reasons than were the 237 illegals from other nations in the Western Hemisphere (WH respondents) or the 75 illegals from the Eastern Hemisphere (EH respondents): 88.9% of the Mexican, 60.4% of the WH, and 23.0% of the EH respondents reported that they came to the United States in order to get a job. Other reasons reported by the respondents were "to see U.S." (8.9% of the study group), "to study" (7.5%), "to visit relatives" (4.4%), and "other" (4.8%). In addition, though all respondents were required by INS to return to their country of origin, a majority (414 respondents) said they planned to come back to the United States, primarily 283 reported, to get (or, in a few instances, to keep) a job here.

2. Entry Technique. A substantial majority (70.7%) of the 785 respondents to a question concerning their status at entry were EWIs. In addition, 21.3% had entered the U.S. with a tourist visa; 4.5%, with a student visa; and 1.7% had

been crewmen. The remaining 1.9% had entered with other kinds of visas. Thus, most respondents (555) were EWIs, though a substantial minority (238) were visa abusers. As predictable, virtually all (95.4%) of the Mexican respondents reported that they had been EWIs. The majority (55.5%) of the WH respondents had entered as tourists; an unexpected 37.6% of all respondents from this region were EWIs. Only 17.3% of the EH respondents had been EWIs, as compared with 34.7% who had entered with student visas, 26.7% who had been tourists, and 13.3% who had been crewmen.

3. Duration in the U.S. Respondents in the study group had been in the U.S. for an average of 2.5 years. The majority (53.4%) had been here two or more years; those 423 respondents had been in the U.S. for an average of 4.2 years. The 370 respondents who had been here less than two years had been in the U.S. for an average of .5 years. EH respondents had been in the nation an average of 3.1 years, as compared with 2.5 and 2.4 years for the WH and Mexican respondents, respectively.

4. Age. Most respondents were young adults. The average age of the study group was 28.5 years, as compared with 39.0 years, the average age of males in the U.S. labor force. More precisely, 40.1% of the respondents were 16-24 years of age; 38.0% were 25-34, and 21.9% were 35 or older.

5. Education. The study group had about half the education of the U.S. civilian labor force 18 years or older: an average of 6.7 as compared with 12.4 years of schooling. Respondents from Mexico had substantially less education (4.9 years of schooling) than WH respondents, and WH respondents had significantly less (8.7 years) than EH respondents (11.9), who came close to the U.S. norm.

6. Sex and Marital Status. The respondents, like apprehended illegals generally, were predominantly male (90.8%), and were less likely to be married than U.S. men of the same age. For example, 36.9% of the 318 respondents who were 25-34 years old were single, as compared with 15.9% of U.S. males the same age. Less than half (47.4%) of all respondents were married at the time of the interview.

7. Dependents in Country of Origin. Despite the relatively low incidence of marriages in the study group, respondents reported substantial family responsibilities in their country of origin. Almost 80% of all respondents reported that they supported or helped to support at least one relative in their country of origin. As a group, respondents supported or helped support an average of 4.6 persons in their homeland.

The Mexican respondents were more likely than WH or EH respondents to report country of origin dependents, and they were more likely to report more dependents.

Percentage of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents Reporting Country of Origin Dependents and Average Number of Country of Origin Dependents, by Region of Origin

<u>Dependency Indices</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Eastern Hemisphere</u>	<u>Western Hemisphere exc. Mexico</u>	<u>Mexico</u>
Percentage of respondents reporting 1 or more country of origin dependents	79.7	43.7	72.1	88.9
Average no. of country of origin dependents of total no. of respondents	4.6	1.8	3.6	5.4
Total no. of respondents	793	75	237	481

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975

8. Remittances to Homeland. With an average gross weekly wage of \$120, as a group, respondents reported that they sent an average of \$105 home a month. Mexican respondents, who reported the lowest earnings of respondents from any region of origin, also reported the highest monthly remittances to their country of origin.

Average Weekly Wage and Monthly Remittance to Homeland of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents, by Region of Origin

<u>Region of Origin</u>	<u>Average Weekly Wage</u>	<u>Average Monthly Remittance</u>	<u>No. of Respondents</u>
Mexico	\$106	\$129	481
Western Hemisphere, exc. Mexico	127	76	237
Eastern Hemisphere	195	37	75
TOTAL	120	105	793

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

9. Relatives in U.S. Seventeen percent of the study group (135 respondents) reported that their spouse lived in the U.S.; 12.7% reported they had one or more children here. Respondents here two or more years were five times as likely to have a spouse in the U.S. as those here less than two years (27.4% and 5.1%, respectively). WH respondents were more likely to report spouses in the U.S. than either EH or Mexican respondents (27.8% as compared with 21.3% and 11.0%, respectively). More generally, 33.8% of the study group reported the presence of at least one relative (spouse, child, parent, or sibling), whose legal residence here may permit respondents to legalize their status. WH respondents were the most likely to have one or more such relatives here (38.4%), followed by EH respondents (33.3%), and Mexican respondents (31.6%).

10. Number of Trips to Homeland. The Mexican respondents were substantially more likely to visit their homeland than respondents from other regions. Since 1970, the Mexican respondents had averaged 4.5 trips to their country of origin, as compared with 1.8 and 1.4 trips for the EH and the WH respondents, respectively.

11. Apprehensions by INS. All respondents in the study group were in the custody of INS at the time of the interview. Mexican respondents were, however, eight times more likely to report a previous apprehension than non-Mexican respondents, though respondents in the latter group had been in the U.S. for a slightly longer period of time than the former group (2.4 years for the Mexicans; 2.6 years for the non-Mexicans).

12. The Illegal Network. Respondents were least likely to answer questions relating to other illegals. Nevertheless, almost half (48.1%) of the 621 illegals who responded reported they knew at least one illegal from their hometown; more than half (60.9%) of 604 respondents reported that they had met at least one illegal in the U.S., and 41.4% of 688 respondents reported that they lived with at least one other illegal in the U.S. As a group, respondents knew an average of 17.1 illegals in the U.S. The Mexican respondents were more likely to be involved in an illegal network than respondents from other regions; e.g., 53.9% of the Mexican respondents, but only 27.5% of the WH and 14.1% of the EH respondents reported that they lived with other illegals.

13. English-Speaking Ability. Fully 63.9% of the respondents could not speak English. Those who could, usually had learned it in school in their country of origin. The Mexican respondents were the least likely to speak English: only 23.6%

of that group spoke any English, as compared with 46.8% of the WH and fully 83.8% of the EH respondents. As expected English-speaking respondents were less likely to have been previously apprehended by INS and were more likely to have had higher wages and higher status jobs in the U.S. than non-English speaking respondents.

14. Work Experience in Home Country. Despite their relative youth, few respondents were new entrants to the labor market when they entered the U.S. Less than 10% of the study group had worked for wages less than one year. As a group, respondents had worked for wages in their home country an average of 9.4 years. WH respondents had been employed in their homeland for an average of 10.7 years, as compared with 9.4 years for the Mexican and 5.8 for the EH respondents.

15. Unemployment. Respondents appear to have had an unemployment rate of 10.2% since 1970 -- that is, on average, 10.2% of the respondents were both without jobs and looking for work during the period 1970-1975.

16. Participation in the U.S. Labor Market. The 793 respondents had been employed in the U.S. for an average of 2.1 years. Respondents in the U.S. less than two years (46.6% of the study group) had been employed for an average of only .5 years. Respondents in the U.S. two or more years had been employed for an average of 3.4 years. More precisely, of the 782 illegals who responded to the question, 43.5% had worked for wages in the U.S. for less than 1 year; 12.7% had worked for from 1 to 2 years; 14.2%, for from 2 to 3 years; 20.8% for from 3 to 6 years; and 9.0%, from 6 to 20 years.

In addition, 40.1% of the study group had held one U.S. job for at least one year, and 25.7% had held that job two or more years. Respondents working in the Southwest, those employed in U.S. agriculture, and those from Mexico were the least likely to report long job tenure of any of the subgroups of respondents considered.

17. Occupation in Country of Origin. Respondents were substantially more likely to have been low-skilled than skilled workers in their homeland. The 628 respondents who had been employed in their country of origin since 1970 were twice as likely to have been farmworkers (35.7%) as white-collar workers (17.6%), and they were even more likely to have been blue-collar workers (41.5%). Few, however, had been service workers (5.2%). Respondents' occupation in their country of origin since 1970 was highly correlated with their region of origin and education. For example, the 407 Mexican respondents (4.9 years of schooling) were the most likely to have been farmworkers in their homeland (49.3%) and the least likely to have

been white-collar workers (6.8%). The 48 EH respondents (11.9 years of schooling) were the most likely to have been white-collar workers (47.9%) and the least likely to have been farmworkers (2.1%). The 173 WH respondents (8.7 years of schooling) were less likely than EH respondents to have been white-collar workers in their homeland (34.1%) and were more likely to have been farmworkers (12.7%).

18. Comparison of Country of Origin and U.S. Occupations. Almost half the respondents who had been farmworkers in their home country moved into nonagricultural work in the U.S., and two-thirds of the respondents who had been white-collar workers in their country of origin became blue-collar or service workers. Thus, as the following table suggests, though the U.S. labor market tended to homogenize the occupational status of these 628 respondents, its net effect was a depressive one. Their occupational distribution in their most recent U.S. job was significantly less like that of U.S. employed persons than it had been when they were employed in their homeland.

TABLE V-3
Distributions of Occupation of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their Country of Origin
and in Their Most Recent U.S. Job, and of U.S. Employed Persons

(as percent of group)

Occupation Group	Illegal Aliens Employed in Country of Origin	Illegal Aliens Employed in Most Recent U.S. Job	U.S. Employed Persons, 1974
<u>White Collar</u>	<u>17.8</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>48.7</u>
Professional, Technical & Kindred			
Managers	5.6	1.8	14.6
Owners, Managers & Administrators, except Farm	2.9	1.3	10.4
Sales Workers	5.3	1.1	6.3
Operative & Kindred Workers	3.8	1.4	17.4
<u>Blue Collar</u>	<u>41.5</u>	<u>35.2</u>	<u>35.3</u>
Craft & Kindred Workers	14.8	15.3	11.3
Operatives	17.6	25.1	20.1
Nonfarm Laborers	9.1	14.8	4.8
<u>Farm Workers</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>22.6</u>	<u>11.3</u>
<u>Unemployed</u>	<u>35.7</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>3.6</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>99.0</u>

Source: Columns 1-2: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; column 3, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974, Table 568.

*Data for 128 respondents; 143 respondents were not employed in country of origin, 1970-1975, and 57 respondents did not provide this information. These respondents were excluded from data on respondents' most recent U.S. job for comparative purposes.

Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

19. Occupation in U.S. Since the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration & Nationality Act went into effect, aliens can become immigrants only if they are qualified relatives of U.S. legal residents, political refugees, or needed workers. Aliens applying for immigrant status as needed workers are automatically denied labor certification by the Department of Labor if they are seeking U.S. jobs in "Schedule B" occupations, e.g., assemblers, cleaners, clerks, kitchen helpers. Three-quarters (575) of the 788 respondents who reported their most recent U.S. occupation were employed in a Schedule B job; 8 had been self-employed, and 205 did not have Schedule B jobs, though a number were employed in low-skilled jobs, e.g., were working as waiters or dry-cleaning operatives. The occupational distribution of these 788 respondents was as follows: professional, technical and kindred (1.8%); owners, managers, and administrators, except farm (1.5%); sales workers (1.5%); clerical and kindred (1.6%); craft and kindred (16.0%); operatives (27.5%); nonfarm laborers (13.7%); farm laborers (15.6%); service workers (20.7%).

20. Wages. The average hourly wage of the 793 respondents in their most recent U.S. job was \$2.71. Average hourly wages differed substantially according to respondents' region of origin and the location of their U.S. job. The Mexican respondents earned an average hourly wage of \$2.34, as compared with average hourly wages of \$3.05 for WH and \$4.08 for EH respondents. The 223 respondents employed in the Southwest earned an average hourly wage of \$1.98, as compared with \$2.60, the average hourly wage of the 231 California respondents; \$3.18, the average hourly wage of the 104 respondents employed in the Mid- and Northwest; and \$3.29, the average hourly wage of the 235 respondents employed on the East Coast. In addition, the 136 respondents employed in U.S. agriculture earned a lower average hourly wage than the 657 respondents employed in nonagricultural work: \$2.11, as compared with \$2.83.

The low hourly wages of most respondents in the study group are consistent with the results of an INS survey of the wages of almost 48,000 illegals who were employed when apprehended in January-March 1975. The lower wage levels in the INS study group are probably a consequence of the very high proportion of agricultural to nonagricultural and southwestern to nonsouthwestern respondents in the INS group, as compared with the L&Co. group.

TABLE V-9

Distributions of Hourly Wage in Most Recent U.S. Job of Apprehended
Illegal Alien Respondents in INS and L&Co. Study Groups

(as percent of group)

Hourly Wage	INS Study Group	L&Co. Study Group ¹
Less than \$2.50	65.2	51.2
\$2.50 - \$4.49	30.2	41.5
\$4.50 - \$6.49	3.5	5.5
\$6.50 or more	1.1	1.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0
No. of Respondents	47,947	779

¹Source: Column 1, unpublished INS data for apprehended illegal aliens employed when found, January through March 1975; column 2, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

²Hourly wage data unavailable for 14 of the 793 respondents.

21. Average Hourly and Weekly Earnings and Hours. Respondents (excluding those in agriculture and private households) earned substantially less than U.S. production and nonsupervisory workers: an average hourly wage of \$2.66 as compared with \$4.47. As the following table indicates, the 609 respondents earned between 35% and 81% of the average hourly wage of these U.S. workers in each of the seven industrial divisions. In addition, respondents worked longer hours but consistently earned significantly less per week than U.S. workers.

TABLE V-11

Average Hourly and Weekly Wage, and Weekly Hours, of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents
by Major U.S. Industry Sector and U.S. Production of Nonsupervisory Workers (PNW), by Industry, in 1975

INDUSTRIAL DIVISION	AVG HOURLY WAGE		AVG WEEKLY WAGE		AVG WEEKLY HOURS		No. of Illegals ¹
	Illegals	U.S. PNW	Illegals	U.S. PNW	Illegals	U.S. PNW	
Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries	\$1.57	*	\$110.57	*	53.6	*	110
Manufacturing	2.00	\$5.73	110.00	\$264.92	60.0	42.3	1
Construction	2.98	7.15	126.39	265.27	42.8	37.1	124
Wholesale and Retail Trade	2.92	4.73	121.22	184.47	41.2	39.0	256
Transportation & Public Utilities	2.77	5.75	134.00	216.28	48.6	39.7	19
Finance, Real Estate & Insurance	3.32	4.28	117.00	148.10	36.0	36.3	6
Services, except Private Household	2.79	3.98	121.75	134.13	45.0	33.7	57
Private Household Services	1.63	*	65.30	*	47.4	*	23
All Industries (excluding Agriculture & Private Household)	2.66	4.47	117.03	160.47	44.5	35.9	609

* Not Available

¹Source: Column 1, 3, 5, and 7, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study; columns 2, 4, and 6, U.S. Department of Economic Research and Statistics, Volume 21, No. 12 (June 1975), Tables C01, C02.

²Data for 17 of the 115 respondents who were self-employed or omitted industry, wage, or hours are excluded. For comparative purposes, the total number of illegals excludes 136 respondents in agriculture and 23 in private households.

³Note that average hourly wage times average weekly hours may not equal average weekly wage. In fact, for these data, that product is consistently greater than the average weekly wage, indicating a tendency for respondents with lower wages to work longer hours.

22. The Question of Exploitation. Four sets of factors were regarded as indicators of exploitation of respondents in their most recent U.S. job:

- minimum wage violations;
- respondents' perceptions of their working conditions;
- respondents' reports of the presence of other illegals in their workplace; and
- payment of wages in cash.

Minimum Wage Violations. More than a fifth (23.8%) of the 766 respondents who were wage workers and for whom complete data on their most recent U.S. job were available appear to have been paid less than the minimum hourly wage, which was roughly defined for this study as \$1.80 for respondents employed in farms, forestry, and fisheries; \$2.00 an hour for those employed in sales, services, or private households; and \$2.10 for those employed in other industries.

Respondents employed as domestics or farmworkers were more likely to be paid illegal wages than respondents employed in other industries (almost two-thirds of the 23 respondents employed as domestics and one-third of those employed as farmworkers (136 respondents) appear to have been paid less than the minimum wage). In addition, respondents employed in the Southwest, but particularly respondents employed in the 23 counties bordering Mexico, were significantly more likely to be paid less than the minimum wage than respondents employed in other regions in the U.S.

Respondents' Perceptions of Their Working Conditions. Although approximately one-sixth of all respondents were unwilling to make judgments about the practices of their former U.S. employers,

- 17.9% of the entire study group (142 respondents) reported that they had been hired because they were illegal. Respondents employed in the Southwest were two to three times more likely to report they had been hired because they were illegal than respondents employed in California, the Mid- and Northwest, or the East Coast.

- 16.0% (127 respondents) reported that they had been paid less than legal coworkers;
- 11.7% (93 respondents) reported that they had been paid less than the minimum wage; and
- only 3.5% (28 respondents) reported that they had been "badly treated" by their employer.

Other Illegals in the Workplace. Although almost 30% of the study group refused to answer questions relating to other illegals or claimed ignorance concerning the matter, a slight majority of the respondents to this question (306 illegals or 38.6% of all respondents) reported that there was at least one other illegal in their workplace. As a group, respondents had worked with an average of 8 other illegals. The Mexican respondents were three times more likely to report the presence of illegal coworkers as WH or EH respondents. Respondents employed in California, the Southwest, and the Mid- and Northwest were roughly twice as likely as illegals in the East Coast to report illegal coworkers.

Cash Wage Payments. More than one-fifth (22.1%) of all respondents reported that their wages had usually been paid in cash, an obvious means of avoiding the documentation of wages that payment by check would entail, and hence an indicator of possible exploitation. The 68 illegals employed in the counties bordering Mexico were most likely to report payment of wages in cash (63.3%) of any subgroup considered, and respondents employed in the Southwest were more likely to report cash wages (36.0%) than respondents employed in the East (21.0%), in California (14.8%), or the Mid- and Northwest (10.7%).

23. Union Membership. Only 10.2% of the study group reported that they had belonged to a labor union in their country of origin, but 130 respondents (16.4% of the study group) had joined a union in the U.S., and almost half (62 respondents) had belonged for two or more years. Membership in a U.S. union tended to be negatively correlated with low wages as well as the indicators of exploitation described above, e.g., the extremely low-paid respondents employed in the counties bordering Mexico were the least likely to belong to a union in the U.S. -- though they were most likely to have belonged in their country of origin (1.5% belonged to a U.S. union as compared with 17.7% who had belonged to a union in Mexico). Further,

only 1.4% of the low-paid respondents employed in the Southwest reported membership in a U.S. union, as compared with 15.6% of those employed in California, 23.8% of those employed in the Mid- and Northwest, and 29.0% of those in the East Coast.

24. Participation in Tax-Paying and Tax-Using Programs. The respondents were more likely to have participated in tax-paying systems (many of which are automatic) than to have used tax-supported programs.

Extent of Participation of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents
In Tax-Paying and Tax-Supported Programs

<u>Program Activity</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondent Participation</u>
<u>Input</u>	
Social Security taxes withheld	77.3
Federal income taxes withheld	73.2
Hospitalization payments withheld	44.0
Filed U.S. income tax returns	31.5
<u>Output</u>	
Used hospitals or clinics	27.4
Collected one or more weeks of unemployment insurance	3.9
Have children in U.S. schools	3.7
Participated in U.S.-funded job training programs	1.4
Secured food stamps	1.3
Secured welfare payments	0.5

The Characteristics, Role, and Impact of Illegals in the U.S. Labor Market: Preliminary Conclusions of the Researchers

1. Illegal aliens are probably disadvantaged persons, but they do not appear to constitute a homogeneous group. Most respondents in our study group were young disadvantaged adults who came from underdeveloped nations to find employment here. There were, however, significant differences between respondents from Mexico, those from other nations in the Western Hemisphere, and those from the Eastern Hemisphere: in their level of education, occupational status in their native land, ability to speak English, and once here, in the extent of their continuing ties to their homeland and their contact with U.S. governmental agencies, including INS.

Though Mexico is a more advanced nation than most nations sending illegals to the United States today, the Mexican respondents were substantially more likely than non-Mexican respondents to have come from rural areas, to have been farmworkers in their country of origin, to have had less than a primary education, and to speak no English. The non-Mexican respondents, but in particular those from the Eastern Hemisphere, were more likely to come from urban areas, to have had at least some secondary education, to have been employed in white-collar jobs in their homeland, and to speak English. In brief, the socioeconomic status at entry of EH respondents was close to the U.S. norm; WH respondents clustered well below that norm; while the Mexican respondents fell below the norm of this nation's most disadvantaged peoples, its blacks and Chicanos.

The Mexican illegals were also considerably more likely than respondents from other regions to report that they had come here explicitly in search of a job. Once in the United States, they remained more closely tied to their country of origin than did the other respondents: they were more likely to have a spouse and children in their home country, to visit their homeland, and to send money home to relatives. The non-Mexican respondents were, on the other hand, more likely to have a spouse and children here, and to use public services in the U.S., such as schools and hospitals. They were also considerably less likely to be apprehended by INS.

It is reasonable to suppose that these differences between Mexican and non-Mexican respondents are principally the result of the unique physical accessibility of the U.S. to Mexico, which enables Mexicans of a lower socioeconomic class to become illegal aliens and enables Mexican aliens, legal or illegal, to maintain ties to both nations. And, in fact, most Mexican respondents were EWIs who crossed the southwestern border surreptitiously, on foot -- an entry technique that requires more in the way of physical endurance, native intelligence, personal ambition, and social contacts with an illegal network than it requires in the way of either money or education. By contrast, a large majority of the non-Mexican respondents were tourist visa abusers, which presupposes a socioeconomic status that will provide a prospective illegal with access to a U.S. consular office abroad, convince a State Department official that the alien's application for a nonimmigrant visa is a bona fide request, and that the alien has the means to travel to his destination and to return to his native land. Further, almost half the EH illegals had entered the U.S. with a student visa, which in most cases presupposes a secondary education and requires an alien to show that he or she has the means to support himself while a student in the U.S.

More generally, however, it seems reasonable to suppose that aliens become illegal workers in the United States only if they have more to gain than to lose by engaging in this illegal business. If that is indeed the case, the low socioeconomic status of most respondents in our study group is likely to be typical of most illegals in the U.S. work force. In particular, aliens who are skilled (and therefore, by implication, more likely to be established) workers in their country of origin are unlikely to become illegal workers in the U.S. The presence in the U.S. labor market of the young but substantially more educated student visa abusers is similarly explained: they, too, are unestablished, with relatively little to lose. Further, like students generally, they are likely to be employed in low-skilled jobs, as were most respondents.

2. Illegals probably cluster geographically. INS and other experts in the field agree, and there are some INS and Visa Office data to support the claim, that illegals are no longer almost exclusively a phenomenon of southwest agriculture, but are increasingly an urban phenomenon, both within and without the Southwest. We suggest that illegals are likely to cluster in the nation in the same manner as legal immigrants. In particular, EWIs crossing the southwest border (who are predominantly but not exclusively Mexican illegals) increasingly appear to migrate to metropolitan areas in that region or to the industrial centers of the Mid-West, as legal Mexican immigrants have historically tended to do. In addition, as immigrants have done since the turn of the century and as immigrants do today, increasing numbers of illegals from other nations in the Western or the Eastern Hemisphere (who are usually visa abusers) cluster in major metropolitan areas in the nation, especially in its principal ports of entry along both coasts, where the supportive ethnic communities they need and the employment opportunities for low-skilled workers they seek, generally coincide.

3. Illegals are probably clustered in the secondary labor market. Most of the respondents in our study group were employed in the secondary sector of the U.S. labor market; i.e., most were employed in low-wage, low-skill, low-status jobs. Less than a quarter were employed in white-collar or skilled blue-collar jobs, and most who were so employed were crafts workers (16%). Further, though respondents generally worked significantly more hours per week than did U.S. production and nonsupervisory workers, their wages were substantially below the average weekly wage of such workers in each of the seven major industrial divisions for which there were comparable data. In addition, a significant minority of respondents

in the study group (more than 20%) were apparently paid less than the minimum wage, particularly domestics, (Mexican) respondents working in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, or Colorado, and especially those working in the 23 counties that border Mexico.

Respondents' concentration at or near the bottom of the U.S. labor market, with more than three quarters employed in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, contravened the heterogeneity of the study group. Despite the fact that respondents from Mexico, other nations in the West, and in the East tended to have different characteristics as individuals and workers in their country of origin, their roles in the U.S. labor market were markedly similar. Like recent legal immigrants, the few respondents who had been white-collar workers in their homeland exhibited a strong downward occupational movement upon entry in the U.S. labor market. Respondents were, however, significantly less likely to be employed in farmwork in the U.S. than in their country of origin. Hence the American labor market apparently tends to homogenize at a low level an otherwise more heterogeneous but still predominantly low-skilled work force.

In general, it is reasonable to suppose that if most illegals working in the nation have little education, few skills, and speak little or no English, their employment patterns are likely to resemble those of our survey respondents, i.e., they are likely to be employed as laborers, service workers, or, to a lesser extent, as operatives.

4. Illegals appear to increase the supply of low-wage labor and compete with disadvantaged U.S. workers. If most illegal workers in the U.S. are disadvantaged persons employed in low-level jobs, illegals are of course increasing, to an undetermined degree, the supply of low-wage workers in the nation. It follows, then, that the subgroups of the U.S. labor force with which illegals are most likely to be competing are disadvantaged U.S. workers: the young, the old, members of minority groups, women, immigrants, and the handicapped, who, in some instances, tend to be clustered in the same parts of the nation, e.g., the Spanish-speaking in the Southwest, and minority groups generally and immigrants in major urban centers.

Further, illegals are likely to compete quite successfully in the secondary labor market. On the one hand, current immigration legislation, which makes it illegal for most nonimmigrant aliens to work in the U.S. but specifically exempts employers from any violation of those laws, makes illegals attractive to employers of cheap labor. On the other hand, apart from any consideration of their illegal status, illegal workers appear to be like immigrant workers: highly motivated and hard-working employees, whom U.S. employers generally regard as exceptionally productive workers, despite the fact that few speak English.

5. The major immediate impact of illegals in the U.S. today is probably on the labor market. Most respondents came to the United States explicitly to find employment. We suspect that most illegals who establish a residence in the U.S. similarly came to find jobs, and that those who did not are unlikely to remain in the nation without entering the labor force. Further, if the survey respondents are typical of illegals working in the nation, illegals in the U.S. labor force are substantially more likely to pay taxes than to use tax-supported systems and to support relatives in their country of origin than to have a spouse or children here. Apparently, then, illegals are also likely to have a significant impact on the balance of payments. Almost 80% of all survey respondents sent an average of \$151 a month to relatives in their homeland. The Mexican respondents were less likely than the non-Mexican respondents to have a spouse or children in the U.S. or to use public services, but they were more likely to send money home, and to report higher remittances. (We estimate a balance of payments loss of \$1.5 billion a year from that source alone, if we assume that there are 1 million Mexicans illegally working in the U.S. and that the Mexican respondents in our study group are representative of that population.)

It is important to note, however, that if illegals settle permanently in the nation -- a question which this study does not address -- their impacts, both direct and indirect, will of course be both more far-ranging and profound. In particular, if illegals working in the U.S. tend to become permanent residents, they can be expected to acquire a U.S.-based spouse and children, to have an impact on population, and to make more use of public services as they become more integrated into the society.

The Impact of Illegals on the U.S. Labor Market

Impact of Illegals. Depending upon the degree to which illegals cluster in specific labor markets, their numbers, and the pre-illegal entry conditions of those markets (e.g., the presence of unions), an increasing supply of highly productive, experienced, but generally low-skilled illegals, who are willing to work in low-level jobs at low wages for long hours, is likely to produce some particular combination of the following five kinds of interdependent impacts upon the markets they enter:

- illegals will maintain or increase productivity;
- they will maintain or increase profits;

- they will maintain or increase the use of labor-intensive work structures;
- they will maintain or depress labor standards in the secondary sector; and
- they will compete successfully with low-skilled legal workers.

Congruence With Manpower Policy. The nation has been making manpower policy decisions for years, but only recently has it regarded them as such. As it evolved within the framework of a society which stresses both the virtue of productivity and the value of the individual, U.S. manpower policy can be viewed as having four principal objectives, with a fifth appearing on the horizon more recently:

- to upgrade the skills of the work force;
- to protect the welfare and rights of the work force;
- to provide employment opportunities for all members of the work force;
- to provide equal employment opportunities for all members of the labor force, regardless of race, color, creed, national origin, or sex; and
- to increase the level of job satisfaction.

The Adverse Effects of Illegals in the Labor Market

If one accepts this broadbrush description of the nation's manpower policy, a continuing influx of illegal aliens into the U.S. labor market will have the following adverse effects:

- it will depress the educational and skill level of the labor force;
- it will depress labor standards in the secondary sector, which in some cases will create an underground market of illegal wages, hours, and workers;
- it will cause a displacement of low-skill legal resident workers;
- it will create a new class of disadvantaged workers, one which inextricably conjoins national origin and illegal status in the U.S.; and

- it will inhibit efforts to improve job satisfaction in the secondary sector.

Given the inherent conflict between what the nation has been, for generations, trying to do in the work place, and the apparent direction of the impact of illegal aliens, we believe that it is important to preserve both the direction and the momentum of the nation's manpower policy, by decreasing the flow of illegal immigration into its labor market.

Recommendations

On the assumption that illegals are for the most part disadvantaged persons whose adverse socioeconomic costs to the U.S. outweigh their benefits as productive low-level workers, we recommend that the Government adopt a more restrictive policy towards illegal immigration and implement more effective means of controlling it, primarily by discouraging their entry into the labor market, which appears to be their principal goal. Further, we recommend that the Government emphasize the prevention of future illegal immigration rather than the removal of illegals currently in the nation. There are three general reasons for advocating the latter approach: administrative (it is more cost effective to prevent the entry of prospective illegals than to apprehend and transport them home again); humanitarian (illegals whose entry is prevented are less badly hurt than those who are apprehended after establishing residence in the U.S.; the possible infringement of the civil liberties of minority-group members associated with the identification and apprehension of illegal residents are similarly avoided); and substantive (illegal immigration appears to set off a chain migration and to come primarily from underdeveloped nations with high population growth rates; i.e., illegal immigration appears to beget more illegal immigration). In the opinion of the researchers, it is the likelihood of continuing generations of disadvantaged aliens attempting illegal entry into the U.S. labor market that poses the most serious threat to the nation, and calls for the adoption of a more restrictive immigration policy as well as for more adequate enforcement of current restrictions.

Within the framework of a restrictive policy and a preventive approach, strategies that discourage the employment of illegals and inhibit their movement into the nation appear the most effective. The recommendations have been divided into three categories: those requiring only agency policy changes, those that also require budgetary decisions, and those that require statutory revisions as well.

Agency Policy Recommendations

- Recommendation 1: The Government Should Create Illegals' Employers Strike Forces.
- Recommendation 2: The Immigration and Naturalization Service Should Focus More Attention on Visa Abusers.
- Recommendation 3: The Government Should Develop Strategies to Discourage the Growth of Illegal Immigration from Specific Regions of Origin.
- Recommendation 4: The Labor Department Should Deny Labor Certifications to Employers of Illegal Aliens.
- Recommendation 5: Steps Should be Taken to Increase the Prosecution of Document-Abusing Illegal Aliens.

Recommendations Involving Policy and Budget Considerations

- Recommendation 6: The Government Should Allocate More Resources, and the State Department Should Allocate More Resources and Prestige, to the Visa Issuance Function.
- Recommendation 7: The Government Should Allocate More Resources to INS.

Recommendations Involving Policy, Budget, and Statutory Considerations

- Recommendation 8: The Congress Should Enact a Work Permit Program.
- Recommendation 9: The Congress Should Remove Elements in the Immigration and Nationality Act Which Facilitate the Legalization of Illegal Aliens.

CHAPTER I: ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION IN THE 1970S: THE BACKGROUND
AND THE PROBLEM

Introduction

Under current immigration law, there are four kinds of people present in the nation at any given time. Most are citizens, either native-born, or aliens who have become naturalized; a minority are aliens, who are grouped into three classes. First, there are immigrants or "permanent resident aliens," to use the parlance of INS: aliens who may stay here for life, live and work where they wish, and become citizens if they so choose; they have, with minor exceptions, the rights of citizens, except they cannot vote or hold elective office. The next group are nonimmigrants, aliens who are authorized to be in the U.S. for a limited period of time and for a specific purpose (e.g., as a student, a representative of a foreign government, or simply as a tourist); most nonimmigrants are explicitly barred, by the terms of their visas, from working in the American labor market. Finally, there are illegal aliens, aliens who either entered the nation without any authorization (those who "entered without inspection" (EWI), to use the INS term), or those who violate the terms of their nonimmigrant visa, by overstaying their allotted time or by working contrary to the conditions of that visa.

Before examining the characteristics and U.S. labor market experiences of our sample of apprehended illegal workers, it is useful to review the context within which this underground but increasingly publicized phenomenon is now occurring. We begin, then, with a discussion of the nation's current immigration policy and its evolution, particularly as it relates to the issue of alien labor. We then describe the recent escalation in the apprehension of illegal aliens, increasing public interest in the subject, and the need for a well-articulated federal response to the issue, based upon more reliable data and a more comprehensive assessment of the policy implications of this issue than have been available.

Current American Immigration Policy: The Legal Framework of Illegal Immigration

U.S. Policy Toward Alien Labor. American immigration policy has historically been founded upon the often unstated but nonetheless fundamental principle that no distinction is to be drawn (at least since the Civil War) between being a member of the American labor force and being a member of its society. Thus, aliens who enter the nation to perform a role in its economy acquire the right to reside permanently in the nation, the right to move at will in its economic and in its social structure, and the right to become a member of the body politic. In a word, they acquire the right to become citizens; they enter the nation as immigrants. Many other nations do make that distinction: aliens are admitted as workers but as neither permanent residents nor prospective citizens; their movements within the labor market are therefore generally highly regulated, and their participation in the social and political fabric of those nations is usually even more severely restricted. Most of the some six million guestworkers in the European Common Market are in this situation; they have been granted only temporary entry, their status in those nations is usually limited to their role as wage workers, and they are generally employed as unskilled laborers.

Once, during World War II, we initiated such an arrangement: the bracero program. Mexican males were admitted as temporary (nonimmigrant) workers, primarily to perform unskilled farm labor in the Southwest. The braceros could neither seek other employment nor could they stay in the nation (without changing their nonimmigrant status), and they were sent home when their employer no longer needed them. Although the Department of Agriculture (first) and the Department of Labor (later) made an effort to guarantee their working conditions, these alien workers had few rights, and if they displeased their employer, they could be deported. The bracero program violated our longstanding policy against the use of alien contract labor; although its advantages to growers are obvious, with or without the labor shortage generated by that war, it became increasingly difficult, over time, to justify its continuance. Controversial from its beginning, the program was finally terminated in the mid-sixties.

It is because we have traditionally proscribed the use of alien nonimmigrant labor, with the historic major exception of the generation-long bracero program and some minor and little-noticed explicit exceptions to it today,* that a discussion of our immigration policy is so integral to an understanding of the recent influx of illegals and the manpower policy issues that it raises. Excluding that narrow band of exceptions, only citizens or aliens who are admitted as immigrants can lawfully participate in the American labor market. What laws, then, govern the admission of aliens as immigrants to the nation, and how do they relate to its labor market and the increase in the apprehension of illegals in the last decade?

Immigration Policy Before 1965. One might imagine that anything as central as the admission policy of a modern nation -- its criteria and methods of selecting its newcomers -- would be made with some foresight and continuing attention to their relationship to national goals, particularly its manpower policies. One would be mistaken. Since the turn of the century, when American immigration policy first came into being, it has been revised about once every other generation, with some tinkering or one-shot adjustments in between. And when immigration policy has been formulated, its principal objective has usually been the elimination of the errors of the previous generation.

Up until the 1880s we did not have a formal immigration policy; ours was an empty land, and the frontier needed people. In 1884 we decided that it was not a good idea to admit the Chinese, and we passed the Chinese Exclusion Act; the Japanese were subsequently excluded, first by an international agreement, and subsequently by legislation.

* Under current legislation, temporary workers admitted under Sections 101(a)(15)(H)(i), (ii), and (iii) of immigration law, and Intra-Company Transferees, admitted under section 101(a)(15)(L), are the only clearcut and deliberate exceptions to this statement; other kinds of nonimmigrants, such as Exchange Visitors and Students are allowed to work, but only under highly specified conditions, and always for a limited period of time.

Immigration from Europe continued at a rapid pace, and by the first decade of this century we were absorbing as many as a million a year; by then it was clear that the flows of immigrants were coming more from Southern and Eastern Europe than from the rest of that continent, which had previously been our principal source of immigrants. The highly ethnocentric Immigration Commission, created during the Taft Administration, reacted adversely to this phenomenon. Its multi-volume report set in motion the racist immigration legislation which occurred in the twenties and coincided (by no means accidentally) with rejection of the League of Nations and the arrival of "Normalcy." A spate of immigration legislation then produced the nation-of-origin quota system: if you lived in one of the blond-haired, blue-eyed, European countries -- or the relatively unpopulated New World -- you could immigrate to the United States with ease (but few came); if you lived in Southern or Eastern Europe you could apply (but the waiting lists were long); if you were from Asia, you knew you were not wanted.

There the matter rested for a long time. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy all found the country-of-origin restrictions noxious and sought to change them, but all they secured were a few adjustments for post-war displaced persons, and a reconfirmation of the country-of-origin system in the McCarran Act, passed by the 80th Congress in 1952.

The 1965 Amendments. The 1965 Amendments finally put an end to the blatantly discriminatory immigration policies instituted more than forty years earlier. Although the intention of this legislation was primarily negative (and was in this respect very much an expression of the social policies of the 1960s, which sought to reverse all earlier policies that discriminated between persons on the basis of their race, color, creed, sex, or -- as in this case -- their national origin), it simultaneously created, without much debate, a new immigration policy, which is with us today. And it is this policy which supplies the legal framework that all aliens encounter when they enter the U.S., and which defines their status in the nation as either legal or illegal.

Despite the obvious merits of this legislation, one of the principal problems with the 1965 Amendments was their negative intent. Those interested in reforming immigration law were so incensed with the ethnocentrism of the laws of the past that they spent virtually all of their energies seeking to eliminate the country-of-origin provisions, and gave very little attention to the substance or long-range implications of the policy that would replace them.*

What did the struggle produce? It produced a totally new and complex preference system for screening would-be immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere, and set an annual ceiling of 170,000 immigrants from that part of the world. It set an annual ceiling of 120,000 immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, and in so doing extended the concept of numerically limited immigration to the New World, for the first time in our history. In addition, it attempted both to protect and to assist the U.S. labor market by creating the immigrant category of needed worker and a positive, rather than a merely negative, labor certification program, i.e., it gave the Secretary of Labor the power to certify (though not to nominate nor to admit) immigrants applying for admission as needed workers.**

* In particular, the Administration's bill had continued the traditional nonrestrictive policy towards immigration from the Western Hemisphere, as did the bill which passed the House. In conference, however, a Senate proposal to restrict Western Hemisphere immigration to an annual ceiling of 120,000 was accepted, as was the appointment of a Select Commission to study that limitation. Although the Commission subsequently recommended a year-long delay in the imposition of the ceiling, Congress ignored the recommendation, and the limitation went into effect on July 1, 1968.

** The notion of needed worker was not new to immigration legislation, but it had been only a minor, and little used component of the 1952 country-of-origin preference system. The labor certification program which those amendments had created was likewise rarely utilized, and it was negatively defined; i.e., the Department of Labor did not routinely screen applications for visas, but the Secretary was empowered, should he so decide, to intervene in specific cases in which he deemed that the admission of an immigrant, or a group of them, would adversely affect U.S. workers. The 1965 Amendments, on the other hand, made it mandatory that all immigrants seeking admission as needed workers submit their applications to the Department (or one of its agents) for review.

As the new immigrant category of needed worker implies, the restrictions placed upon immigration by the '65 Amendments were not simply numerical ones. Since the positive as well as the negative goal of those amendments were essentially humanitarian -- in particular, the new legislation sought to enable the unification of families, which the earlier ethnocentric immigration policies had often made difficult, if not impossible -- the new qualitative criteria for selecting immigrants reflect that explicitly humanitarian aim. Nevertheless, these criteria of admission are at bottom more exclusive than inclusive, for the '65 Amendments restricted aliens who could enter the nation as immigrants to three classes: (1) aliens with family ties to American citizens or immigrants; (2) political refugees; and (3) aliens with occupational skills needed by the U.S., as determined by the Secretary of Labor. Aliens who do not meet any one of these three criteria can neither become immigrants nor can they lawfully work nor reside permanently in the nation.

Aliens who seek immigrant status on the basis of family ties do so only with the consent of some American relative, who must initiate the alien's petition for an immigrant visa. Those who are immediate relatives of adult U.S. citizens (i.e., their spouse, parents, or unmarried children under 21 years of age) are admissible outside the annual ceiling placed upon immigration from each hemisphere. Beyond the personal inclinations of the individual American relatives, current immigration policy towards aliens with close family ties to U.S. citizens is thus a wholly unrestrictive one, though by its very nature, immigration of this kind is self-limiting, and tends to favor relatively new citizens, since they are more likely to have immediate relatives who are citizens of other nations.

All other prospective immigrants must be admitted within the confines of the annual numerical restrictions, and must belong to one of the three classes of aliens described above. Aliens who are not accepted as relatives are admissible as immigrants only if they qualify as political refugees or needed workers. But both categories are rigorously defined; refugees are eligible only if they are from the Middle East or Eastern Europe;* and labor certifi-

* Haitians, for example, who constitute an often-discussed and frequently debated subgroup of the illegal population of New York City and Miami, have not been granted this status; nevertheless, these definitions are, in fact, subject to rapid and large-scale changes, when a President decides the nation should play host to such defeated foes of Communism as the Hungarians, Cubans, and the Vietnamese.

cations are issued only if the Department has determined that the applicant will neither compete with nor endanger the prevailing wages and working conditions of U.S. workers. In addition, in many but not all cases, the alien can undertake his quest for employment or residence in the nation only under the aegis of an American employer who is willing to offer him a job and to petition that he be admitted as an immigrant.

Ironically, however, one of the paradoxical consequences of current immigration policy is that its method of applying labor-market controls to immigration renders its effort to protect the U.S. labor market largely futile.

In the first place, since the three qualitative criteria for admission are independent rather than interdependent criteria (as, for example, in Canada's selection procedures), and since the application of two of those criteria are subject to a number of restrictions, the great majority of the aliens who are admitted as immigrants enter on the basis of family ties to U.S. residents.* Most immigrants are therefore selected independently of labor-market considerations, and, as one might expect, immigrants admitted as relatives have considerably less to offer in the way of skills and education than immigrants who are admitted as needed workers.

Secondly, since there is a long waiting list of prospective immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, which has no preference system, the rejection of a labor certification request filed on behalf of a Western Hemisphere resident -- who is, say, an auto mechanic -- produces a result which surely Congress did not intend. The auto mechanic is denied entry because the Department rules that he is not a needed worker; there are plenty of auto mechanics in the city where he wants to work; he therefore does not secure the right to stand in line for a visa; and his place is taken by a farmworker whose wife gave birth to a child in the United States (who thereby became a U.S. citizen). Thus, in this not unusual circumstance, a system that was created to protect the labor market produces a worker with an even lower level of skills.

* The 1970 cohort of immigrants was comprised of 76.2% relatives, as compared to 16.2% labor certification beneficiaries, 6.0% refugees, and 1.6% members of other, smaller classes. See U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Administration, Immigrants in the American Labor Market, by David S. North and William G. Weissert (Springfield, Va: National Technical Information Service, 1974), p. 9.

In sum, more by accident than by plan, Congress replaced the detested country-of-origin quotas with a set of unrelated qualitative criteria which, when applied within the constraints of its new system of numerical restrictions, has generated an immigration policy equivalent to a national policy of nepotism -- one that is practiced today on a large scale. Despite the restrictions to which we have referred and excessively complex and frequently bizarre differences between the screening procedures governing immigration from the two hemispheres, most immigrants to the nation today are selected apart from any consideration of their contribution to society,* and their role in or impact upon its labor market. In effect, then, in 1965 Congress decided, more by omission than by commission, not to construct an immigration policy explicitly related to some positive definition of the public interest; instead, it created a policy aimed primarily at fulfilling the private interests of its legal residents and their alien relatives -- and it simultaneously delegated to those individuals (and to a limited number of its employers) much of its power to select future citizens and workers in the nation.

Further, as time has passed, it has become evident that there are more legally admissible prospective immigrants from the Western Hemisphere than from the Eastern Hemisphere, though more visas are available for the latter than the former. This imbalance is reflected, in mirror-like fashion, by statistics on apprehended illegal aliens, virtually all of whom came from the Western Hemisphere.

In short, the immigration system now in place excludes the very kind of person who is most likely to want to immigrate to the United States, the kind that flocked to our shores at the turn of the century: the young, self-selected male, with more ambition than training, and with no family ties to the nation. It is no wonder, then, as we shall presently show, that most of the illegals we interviewed turned out to be young, self-selected males, with more ambition than education, and in most cases, without the kinds of relatives needed to secure a visa.

* Negative screening persists, however; for example, would-be immigrants must be judged not to be likely to become public charges.

A Dual Immigration Policy: Alien Labor in the Southwest

What we have described in the preceding pages is the nation's progressively more restrictive de jure policy toward alien workers, which has governed most of the nation, but not the Southwest. For generations, a quite different immigration policy has been in effect in that region, where almost ten times as many Mexican nonimmigrant workers and apprehended illegals were reported to have crossed its 1,945-mile land border, as compared to the number of Mexican immigrants, between the years 1870-1970 (see Figure 1).

This regional policy grew out of a unique background of historical, geographic, economic and cultural factors, which has no real parallel elsewhere in the continental United States. Historically, the Southwest had been a possession of Spain, and then a major portion of Mexico before its conquest by the Anglos in the mid-19th century. Hence, unlike other parts of the American West, which we acquired from the English and the French, there was a substantial resident population enmeshed in the culture and physically close to its former countrymen. Thus the movement of a worker across the Rio Grande was not an international journey until the middle of the last century, and even after the creation of this political boundary, the Mexican migrant who crossed it faced few cultural or social barriers and no legal impediments or formalities until the mid-1920s. In addition, the Mexican Revolution led to a surge of Mexicans into the U.S. in the second decade of this century, which served as a precedent for later work-related migration and laid the groundwork for the support system that facilitates the movement of peoples from one region to another.

For generations, then, there were no bars to the northbound movement of Mexican nationals, and, as the Southwest began to be developed, for generations there has been a large surplus of unskilled labor on the southern side of that border and a long history of demand for it on the northern side. To some extent that demand related to the nature of the terrain, to the kind of labor-intensive agriculture that was profitable in the Imperial and Lower Rio Grande Valleys, for instance; and to some extent the abundant supply of unskilled labor attracted labor-intensive light industry to the area. As these activities flourished, over time, on both sides of the border, news of the opportunities for employment and good

FIGURE I-1

Mexican Immigration to the United States
1870 - 1970

The history of Mexican immigration to the United States is related to the rise of great regional and national industries, i. e., agriculture, railroads, and mining, as well as the corresponding demand for a reservoir of cheap labor; the special administrative and legislative consideration given to immigration from the Western Hemisphere, particularly from Mexico, and the internal developments and changes in Mexico.


- 1850-1889 Undesirability of Mexicans for labor or settlement corresponded to the importation and utilization of European and Oriental laborers and settlers.
- 1900-1909 Continued economic development, particularly in the Southwest, and the decrease in the importation and utilization of Oriental labor due to the application and enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Laws and the Gentleman's Agreement with Japan, led to a moderate increase in the volume of Mexican immigration.
- 1910-1919 Increased use of Mexican laborers was related to: the decreasing volume of European immigration, World War I mobilization, rise of defense industries, completion of railroads linking the interior of Mexico to the U.S., and the revolutionary conditions in Mexico.
- 1920-1929 Quotas established. European and Asiatic immigration continued to decrease. Mexican immigration increased, reaching a peak in 1924. Increased restrictions affect immigration which decreases in late 1920's. Illegal Mexican aliens average 4000 per year.
- 1930-1939 Effects of Great Depression, Mexicans repatriated. Mexican immigration continues to decrease. Illegal Mexican aliens increase and average 10,500 per year. Mexican emigration increases.
- 1940-1947 World War II. Tremendous increase in demand for labor U. S. and Mexico make agreement for temporary contract labor (Bracero Program). Illegal Mexican aliens greatly increases. Mexican immigration increases slightly.
- 1948-1951 Illegals legalized to become Braceros. "Braceros" increase. Mexican immigration remains stable. Public Law 78 enacted. Mexican illegal aliens greatly increase.
- 1952-1959 Korean War. Demand for labor. Braceros, illegals, and Mexican immigration increase dramatically. Illegal Mexicans constitute a high of 1,075,168 apprehensions when Operation Wetback inaugurated. Illegals expelled by the thousands.
- 1960-1970 Bracero Program terminated (1964) due to public pressure. Illegal Mexican aliens on a dramatic increase again. Mexican immigration steadily increasing. New immigration law (Public Law 86-236, passed in 1965, effective July 1, 1968) restricts immigration from Western Hemisphere.

SUMMARY OF MEXICAN MIGRATORY MOVEMENTS TO U.S.*

Type	Period	Total
Mexican immigration	1869-present	1,540,000
Temporary contract labor from Mexico	1942-present	5,050,000
Illegal Mexican aliens reportedly located	1924-present	5,630,000**

* Table does not include non immigrants, i. e., visitors, transients, students.
** Includes duplication where same person located more than once.

Taken from "Map Study of Mexican Americans," with permission of the publishers, Hearne Brothers. The chart was prepared by Dr. Julian Samora, Jorge A. Bustamante, Gilbert Cardenas, and Carmen Samora.



Source: Julian Samora, Los Mojados: The Wetback Story (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1971), Appendix II, pp. 195-96.



(by Mexican standards) wages traveled back to campesinos in the interior of Mexico, and workers came north to the border provinces, which have had a remarkable record for population growth. Thus the supply of unskilled labor has continued to expand at a much faster rate than job opportunities in the area -- a situation which has created substantial levels of unemployment on both sides of the border, as discussed in Appendix A of this report. In brief, given the developing labor-intensive economy in the north and the pool of unskilled labor in the south, a historic precedent of northbound migration, the Spanish-speaking culture which bridged the border, and the political insignificance (for so many years) of the border itself, workers moved easily from their homes in Mexico to jobs in the States, as those jobs came into being.

In 1925, some formalities began to intervene in this easy flow of workers; movements which had previously been extralegal became either sanctioned, legal ones, or equally sanctioned, but illegal ones.

The formally sanctioned movements of alien workers were three in number; first, there was the arrival of immigrants who came to the United States to live and work. This process was considerably less of a barrier to Mexican workers than it was to, say, Italian ones, because there were no quotas; most young, healthy Mexican nationals who wanted an immigrant visa (and were willing, as many were not, to wade through the required red tape) could secure one.

The second movement, one we deal with more extensively in Appendix A, was a specialized segment of the first: the use of the immigrant visa to legitimate the daily or weekly movement of Mexican nationals, who had secured the right to be permanent resident aliens, from their homes in Mexico to their jobs in the States. While the permanent movement of immigrants, noted above, is analogous to that of Eastern Hemisphere immigrants, this "green-card commuter" phenomenon is a unique, if minor, southwestern variation on how the nation acquires alien workers.

The third of these legally sanctioned movements of alien workers was that of the braceros. Although some of the braceros seeped into the Mid West (and were used in Michigan's cucumber harvest as recently as 1964), the bracero program was essentially, as we noted earlier,

created and, for a quarter of a century, valiantly defended, by southwest agricultural interests. The program was a large one; in many years more than 400,000 braceros were annually admitted to work in the United States. But it produced more than temporary alien workers: it created patterns of explicitly work-related movements of aliens, from South to North; it created the braceros' expectations of higher wages than were possible within the Mexican economy; it provided them with U.S. job contacts and job skills; it exposed them to the Anglo demand for their labor; and it armed them with an acquaintance with the English language and Anglo customs -- including the work habits of INS. For many rural Mexican males, the bracero program was an eye-opener; they learned about American jobs and American wages; many responded to their U.S. employers' interest in bypassing the federally regulated program during its existence; and many kept traveling north after the program ended, despite the fact those trips were illegal ones. Thus, unlike the rest of the nation, where one generally had to be an immigrant to work in the U.S., there were, over many years, substantial numbers of sanctioned, semi-immigrant (green-card commuters), nonimmigrant and illegal aliens available to do the region's least attractive work.

But green-card commuters are not much good to a grower 200 miles from the border, the bracero program was not always in operation, nor was it always the preferred method of finding either workers or work; "undocumented workers" (the charming euphemism of the Chicano militants, recently adopted by the U.N.) have been the historic answer to the Southwest's need for low-skilled labor; with their incidence rising and falling with varying economic and governmental conditions. When times are good, illegal workers are de facto sanctioned, though de jure proscribed. When times are bad, such as during the thirties, or when the federal government cracks down on illegals (as it did during "Operation Wetback" in the mid-fifties), the number of illegals are decreased.

Thus the Southwest has instituted a sui generis immigration policy* with respect to its use of alien labor -- a policy which, when it affected federal policy, led to the bracero program, and to the notorious Texas Proviso in the Immigration & Nationality Act, which explicitly defines employment of or employment-related actions toward illegals as non-harboring activities, which exempts employers of illegals from the criminal penalties attached to the harboring of illegals. Hence it is not illegal for an employer to hire aliens who are not legally authorized to work in the U.S., though it is illegal for those aliens to work.

The foregoing discussion of the Southwest has largely ignored the role of INS, though most of its resources are concentrated along that border; this was not accidental. Two points should be made about its role in this region. First, it is an alien force in that part of the country. Unlike the employers of illegals, who are tied to the area by their investments and families, and the illegals, who are often tied to the region by family connections and inertia, the Immigration Service has no such bonds. It has been dispatched to the border to do what needs to be done, as determined by the Government-in-Washington. It is lonely business, for there is precious little support for what they have to do: the Chicanos do not like "La Migra," as INS is called, because they apprehend Mexicans, and the Establishment does not like it, because it apprehends its workers.

Secondly, the Immigration Service has been largely a static and limited force; its resources remain relatively the same (and until recently its tactics and techniques varied little as well), and it had little flexibility to cope with the rise and fall of flows of illegals. The only major exception to this rule was during "Operation Wetback," when substantially increased resources were made available to the Service.

* See, for example, Ellwyn R. Stoddard, "Illegal Mexican Labor in the Borderlands: Institutionalized Support of an Unlawful Practice," paper presented at the American Sociological Association, 26 August 1975, to be published in the April/July 1976 issue of the Pacific Sociological Review, in revised form.

INS, in short, is a factor but not a major variable in the alien worker equation in the Southwest; although its mission is to uphold federal immigration policy, forces that produced its de facto alien worker policy have kept it a small enough element so that it does not unduly threaten the felt needs of the southwest Establishment. As Ellwyn Stoddard has recently argued, illegals are so much a part of the socio-economic structure of the Southwest, that INS provides more of a peace-keeping operation than a law-enforcement role in that part of the nation.*

Illegal Immigration in the 1970s

Numbers. The 1965 Amendments went into full effect in 1968. Since then, about 400,000 aliens have been annually admitted as immigrants within the framework of the immigration policy outlined above. In recent years, however, the number of illegal aliens apprehended by INS has annually exceeded the number of aliens admitted as immigrants.

In FY 1974, for example, almost twice as many illegal aliens were located than immigrants were admitted: 788,145 deportable (i.e., illegal) aliens; 394,861, immigrants. In fact, INS apprehensions of illegal aliens have increased enormously since 1964, despite only a minimal increase in its staffing, shown in Figure 2.

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, illegals are aliens who are either present in the nation without any authorization at all (EWIs), or they are aliens whose activities or continued presence here violate the conditions of their nonimmigrant visa (visa abusers).


Some illegal aliens are only technically illegal; that is, they have valid claims to reside here, but either they have not bothered to legitimate their status, or they are waiting for that sometimes lengthy and complicated procedure to be completed. Ironically, however, immigration law is such that the longer an illegal is here, the better his or her chances of becoming a legal resident. "Close family ties," for example, can be acquired by marrying a U.S. citizen or a resident alien, or by becoming the parent of an American-born child. A friendly employer, or certain

* Stoddard, "Illegal Mexican Labor," p. 15.

FIGURE I-2

Percentage of Change in Border Patrol Apprehensions of Illegal Aliens and Staffing of the Border Patrol, 1964-1974

(1964=100%)



————— Number of reportable aliens located by the Border Patrol (which was 43,993 in FY 1964 and 640,913 in FY 1974) Source: INS Annual Reports, Table 30.

----- Number of funded Patrol Agent positions (which was 1,434 in FY 1964 and 1,718 in FY 1974) Source: Unpublished INS data.

Note: Border Patrol staffing and apprehensions are compared, rather than total INS apprehensions and staffing, because the Border Patrol, which apprehends the great majority of illegals, is strictly an enforcement organization, while INS, as an entity, performs both enforcement and other functions.

needed occupational skills -- and therefore labor certification and adjustment from illegal or nonimmigrant status to immigrant status -- can be similarly acquired. Technical illegality can therefore often signal the former presence of a "real" illegal, as well as the future presence of a "real" legal. This ambiguity is one instance of what soon becomes apparent in the course of a study of illegals: the phenomenon of illegal immigration, while clearly a function of space, since it takes place across international borders, must also be viewed as a function of time. Illegal aliens are the result of an interaction -- or series of interactions -- between an individual foreigner and the intricacies of American immigration policy and practices. As each changes over time, so, too, will their interaction, and hence the legality or illegality of the individual in question; for example, millions of nonimmigrant visas are issued each year and millions likewise expire, though the aliens who hold them may remain, enroll as students, marry, bear children, or work for a foreign embassy, with or without an appropriate change in their legal status.

As our sketch of the southwest border suggests, the "massive influx" of illegal aliens occurring in the 1970s is not, however, unique in U.S. history and cannot therefore be viewed solely as a consequence of the 1965 Amendments. Although its numerical restrictions to immigration were new, at least as they apply to the Western Hemisphere, the source of most apprehended illegals, a flow of large numbers of illegal aliens into the nation is not. Even before numerical limitations were extended to the Western Hemisphere, the number of illegal aliens found in the U.S. was often far in excess of the number of immigrants arriving then in the nation, as the following INS statistics reveal.

In 1941-50, 1,035,139 immigrants were admitted; 1,377,210 illegal aliens were apprehended by INS; during the bracero program, in 1951-60, when "Operation Wetback" took place in the Southwest over a two-year period, 2,515,479 immigrants were admitted; 3,584,299 deportable aliens were found. Presumably the success of that full-scale INS activity played a role in the considerable decrease of illegals apprehended in the following decade (1961-70), when 3,321,677 immigrants were admitted and 1,608,356 illegals were apprehended. Since that time, from July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1974, 1,550,086 immigrants have been admitted -- and 2,370,188 illegals were apprehended.

Geographic Distribution. Most apprehended illegal aliens are located at the southwest border, where INS resources are heavily concentrated. In FY 1974, for example, 88.4% of the 788,145 deportable aliens located that year were apprehended in that region;* the overwhelming majority (681,100) were Mexican EWIs; most (611,246) were located by that region's Border Patrol.** Table I-1 shows in more detail the geographic distribution of those apprehensions, which is typical of earlier years, and it also reflects the INS distinction between arrests made by the Border Patrol, the uniformed police force of the Immigration Service, and those by INS District Office staff, plainclothes officers routinely stationed away from U.S. borders.

As discussed in more detail in Chapter II, INS apprehension statistics are workload, not demographic, data; they record what the agency does, and where it does it. What INS does is, in turn, a reflection of the resources available to it and their distribution. Identifying and apprehending illegals at the southwest border is far more cost effective than in the interior of the nation. In the latter instance, there are practical and legal difficulties in identifying persons as illegal aliens, legal representation, which increases staff time, is more likely, and custodial costs associated with apprehensions are also higher (along the border, INS maintains its own detention facilities; in the interior, the agency rents prison cells, at motel rates). Further, and most significantly, illegals apprehended at or near the southwest border can be bused back across it; illegals located in Chicago, for example, must be flown back to their country of origin, often at INS expense.

Given these considerations and the fact that illegal immigration has historically been largely confined to Mexican illegal entrants, INS has consistently concentrated most of its resources at the southwest border, where most apprehensions continue to be made.

*The INS Southwest Region was at that time defined by INS as comprising Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. Early in 1976, INS rearranged its regional boundaries, to divide the Mexican border between the new Southern Region, headquartered in Dallas, and a new Western Region, headquartered at San Pedro, California. All references to INS regions in this report relate to the earlier set of boundaries.

**INS Annual Report, 1974, Tables 27B and 30.

TABLE I-1

Number of Illegal Aliens Apprehended by INS, by Apprehending Unit and
Place of Apprehension, 1974

NORTHEAST REGION	31,255 (4%)	SOUTHEAST REGION	27,757 (3.6%)
<u>Border Patrol</u>	6,012	<u>Border Patrol</u>	10,837
Buffalo, NY	1,156	Miami, FL	5,408
Houlton, ME	751	New Orleans, LA	5,129
Ogdensburg, NY	855		
Swanton, VT	3,250	<u>District Office</u>	16,920
<u>District Office</u>	25,243	Atlanta, GA	861
Boston, MA	1,696	Baltimore, MD	1,105
Buffalo, NY	502	Cleveland, OH	900
Hartford, CT	995	Miami, FL	3,505
Newark, NJ	3,446	New Orleans, LA	570
New York, NY	18,324	Philadelphia, PA	2,335
Portland, ME	249	San Juan, PR	5,010
St. Albans, VT	31	Washington, DC	2,634
NORTHWEST REGION	31,758 (4%)	SOUTHWEST REGION	690,221 (88.4%)
<u>Border Patrol</u>	6,682	<u>Border Patrol</u>	611,246
Blaine WA	1,007	Chula Vista, CA	196,981
Detroit, MI	1,639	Del Rio, TX	44,098
Grand Forks, ND	884	El Centro, CA	26,143
Havre, MT	1,714	El Paso, TX	112,432
Spokane, WA	1,438	Laredo, TX	30,061
<u>District Office</u>	25,076	Livermore, CA	39,640
Anchorage, AK	103	Marfa, TX	23,291
Chicago, IL	14,830	McAllen, TX	38,668
Detroit, MI	1,954	Tucson, AZ	50,108
Helena, MT	804	Yuma, AZ	49,824
Kansas City, MO	2,387	<u>District Office</u>	78,975
Omaha, NB	998	Denver, CO	8,916
Portland, OR	1,570	El Paso, TX	8,012
St. Paul, MN	324	Houston, TX	16,892
Seattle, WA	2,106	Honolulu, HI	543
		Los Angeles, CA	18,552
		Phoenix, AZ	4,748
		Port Isabel, TX	11
		San Antonio, TX	11,640
		San Francisco, CA	9,661
<hr/>			
TOTAL ALL REGIONS: <u>788,145</u> *			
Border Patrol		634,777 (81.3%)	
District Office		146,214 (18.7%)	
<hr/>			

Source: Unpublished INS data (Form G-23.18).

*Total all regions includes 7,154 crewmen on 29-day vessels (who are only technically illegal).

These factors suggest that INS arrest data are unlikely to reflect the geographical distribution of the stock of illegals in the U.S. In addition, INS officials and other experts in the field agree* that there have been significant changes in the geographical location of illegals in the last decade, which can be summarized as follows:

- Increasing numbers of Mexican illegals are moving into urban areas in the Southwest and entering nonagricultural employment; i.e., Mexican illegals in the Southwest are decreasingly an agricultural phenomenon;
- Increasing numbers of Mexican illegals are using the southwest border as a conduit to other parts of the nation, particularly the industrial centers in the Mid-West, where Mexican immigrants who left the southwest region have historically tended to go;
- Increasing numbers of aliens from other nations are entering other parts of the U.S., where they tend to concentrate in its major metropolitan centers and to abuse their nonimmigrant visas by illegally working or remaining in the nation.

Two sets of data are available which shed light on the geographical location of illegals in the United States, both of limited utility: INS apprehension statistics and data on other alien populations (legal immigrants and nonimmigrants). Despite the inadequacies of apprehension data, these three

*See, for example, the testimony of INS regional and central staff, regional administrators of the Department of Labor, and others knowledgeable in the field, in the 1971-1972 hearings on illegal aliens, held by Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, which have been summarized in Illegal Aliens: A Review of Hearings Conducted During the 92d Congress (Serial No. 13, Pts. 1-5) By Subcommittee No. 1, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973. The above-cited three changes in the distribution of illegals in the nation also represent the consensus of the subcommittee, whose general conclusion on this issue was that "the illegal alien problem is not limited to the Southwest border as had been originally anticipated, but extends to most of our major metropolitan areas. Related to this is the finding that the problem is no longer limited primarily to agriculture; considerable numbers of illegal aliens are now found in industry (p. 7)." See also subsequent reports on the subject issued by the General Accounting Office, cited on page 27.

trends outlined above receive some support from apprehension statistics. INS Southwest Region records show that the number of Mexican illegals employed in nonagricultural work when apprehended has steadily increased from 1967 (the earliest year for which these data are available), though the percentage has wavered, as the following table shows:

Type of Employment of Mexican Illegals Employed
When Apprehended in the INS Southwest Region,
For Selected Years

<u>Type of Employment</u>	<u>FY 1967</u>		<u>FY 1968</u>		<u>FY 1971</u>		<u>FY 1974</u>	
	<u>No. of Illegals</u>	<u>Percent of Total No.</u>						
Industry & Other	14,416	33.4	26,745	39.9	35,632	32.2	68,972	38.8
Agriculture	<u>28,757</u>	<u>66.6</u>	<u>40,236</u>	<u>60.0</u>	<u>74,995</u>	<u>67.8</u>	<u>108,970</u>	<u>61.2</u>
TOTAL	43,173	100.0	66,981	99.9	110,627	100.0	177,942	100.0

Source: Unpublished INS data from form G-23.18, for years cited.

Further, both the number and the percentage of Mexican illegals apprehended outside the INS Southwest Region have also increased in the last decade:

Location of Apprehended Mexican Illegals,
For Selected Years

<u>Location</u>	<u>FY 1964</u>		<u>FY 1968</u>		<u>FY 1974</u>	
	<u>No. of Illegals</u>	<u>Percent of Total No.</u>	<u>No. of Illegals</u>	<u>Percent of Total No.</u>	<u>No. of Illegals</u>	<u>Percent of Total No.</u>
Southwest Region	41,799	95.3	143,948	94.9	671,901	94.6
Other	<u>2,045</u>	<u>4.7</u>	<u>7,732</u>	<u>5.1</u>	<u>38,058</u>	<u>5.4</u>
TOTAL	43,844	100.0	151,680	100.0	709,959	100.0

Source: Unpublished INS data from Form G-23.18, for years cited.

In addition, though the percentage of non-Mexican apprehended illegals has fallen dramatically in the last decade, the number has steadily increased:

Nationality of Apprehended Illegals,
For Selected Years

<u>Nationality</u>	<u>FY 1964</u>		<u>FY 1968</u>		<u>FY 1974</u>	
	<u>No. of Illegals</u>	<u>Percent of Total No.</u>	<u>No. of Illegals</u>	<u>Percent of Total No.</u>	<u>No. of Illegals</u>	<u>Percent of Total No.</u>
Mexican	43,844	50.6	151,705	71.5	709,959	90.1
Non-Mexican	42,753	49.4	60,352	28.5	78,186	9.9
TOTAL	86,597	100.0	212,057	100.0	788,145	100.0

Source: INS Annual Report, Table 27B, for years cited.

We have previously advanced the hypothesis* that the successful illegals, i.e., those who establish a residence or find employment in the U.S., cluster where recently arrived legal immigrants from the same nation cluster. This hypothesis, which regards illegal immigration as a particular instance of the phenomenon of chain migration and the tendency of migrants to cluster according to national origin,** is widely accepted among people who work with illegals, and was supported by a small experiment we

*U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, "Illegal Aliens: Final Report Outlining a Rationale for and a Preliminary Design of a Study of the Magnitude, Distribution, Flow, Characteristics, and Impact of Illegal Aliens in the United States," by David S. North, 1975. Subsequently reproduced by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

**See, for example, Oscar Handlin, The Newcomers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959) for an overview of migration patterns in New York City and the formation of ethnic communities.

undertook in the District of Columbia last year, when we used the addresses of recent legal immigrants to locate unapprehended illegals. (Alejandro Portes* has convincingly argued a related point, that today's Mexican-born immigrant is yesterday's successful illegal -- and it could be argued that such an immigrant would be likely to settle in the same general area where he or she had lived as an illegal.)

Turning to the data available on other alien populations, perhaps the most useful is that derived from immigrant visa application forms, which indicate where an arriving immigrant intends to live. These data are annually available from INS, and they are presented for all states, for the major cities within the states, and on a rural-small city-big city breakout for each state. Another source of information on the geographical distribution of aliens in the U.S. are the alien registration cards filed annually by aliens (usually immigrants, though some nonimmigrants file as well). Unfortunately, INS tabulates geographical information from these cards, filed by aliens who have not been here long enough to become naturalized, as well as those who have chosen not to do so, by state only.

The former source shows that the percentage of Mexican immigrants arriving in the four border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico, and Texas), who selected rural areas of residence (under 2,500 population) fell from 19.8% in 1963 to 14.8% in 1966, and 12.0% in 1970. (A substantially different definition of rural areas drove the percent choosing rural areas to below 1% in 1973 and 1974; hence we have excluded more recent data on this subject.)

Regarding the second previously described trend, intended residence data show that recently arriving Mexican immigrants are increasingly settling outside the border states, with the numbers being 3,906 in FY 1964, 6,909 in FY 1968, and 11,259 in FY 1974. (In addition, the percentages of Mexican immigrants selecting non-border states increased, but not as dramatically.) Similarly, alien registration data point in the same direction: 70,071 Mexican immigrants filed outside the border states in 1964, 81,748 in 1968, and 109,076 in 1974.

*Alejandro Portes, "Return of the Wetback," Society, April/May 1974.

More generally, INS data on the slightly more than 4 million permanent resident aliens who filed registration cards in 1974 show that immigrants are not randomly distributed throughout the nation, nor is their distribution identical with that of the total U.S. population. As Table I-2 indicates, the 11 states with the greatest numbers of permanent resident aliens accounted for 82% of that population in 1974 (as compared with 58% of the total U.S. population). In fact, one-quarter of all permanent resident aliens live in California, and more than two-thirds (69.0%) live in six states: California, New York, Texas, Florida, New Jersey, and Illinois, as opposed to slightly more than one-third of the total U.S. population (36.5%).* (More than half of all Mexican permanent resident aliens live in California, and about one-fourth of them live in Texas, the two states where the largest number of illegals are apprehended, and where INS believes the largest number of unapprehended Mexican illegals live.)

Data on the intended residence of the almost 2 million immigrants who arrived in the U.S. in 1970-74, which are available on a more precise basis, provide some documentation of the claim that aliens do cluster in major metropolitan centers: one-third of those immigrants selected the nation's 10 most populous cities as their residence, as compared with 10.8% of the total U.S. population who resided there in 1970. (See Table I-3.)

Most apprehended illegals who entered the nation at points other than the southwest border enter with nonimmigrant visas. Although the number and geographic location of nonimmigrants who become visa abusers by illegally working or remaining in the nation is unknown, INS does collect data on nonimmigrants' port of entry.

In FY 1974, more nonimmigrants arrived in New York City than entered the nation in FY 1964: 1,865,145 came through New York's airports (and a handful through its harbor). Miami (726,828) was the second most active port, followed, in descending order, by Boston, San Juan, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. With the exception of Boston and San Juan (which is generally a stopover before entry at Miami or New York), those ports of entry were also the same cities most frequently selected by recent immigrants as their place of intended residence.

*Similarly, in 1972-1973, 57.4% of the 146,097 foreign students (the only group of nonimmigrants for which data on geographical distribution are available) resided in those same six states. See "Open Doors 1973," International Institute of Education, New York, 1973, Figure IV.

TABLE I-2

States With the Largest Numbers of Permanent Resident Aliens, by Region of Origin
(as indicated by the January 1974 filing of alien registration cards)

S T A T E	PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIENS					
	TOTAL NUMBER*	PERCENT OF TOTAL NO.	EASTERN HEMISPHERE	WESTERN HEMISPHERE		
				Total	Mexico	Other
California	1,015,379	24.8	382,464	630,083	455,066	175,017
New York	709,972	17.3	397,642	307,642	6,636	305,006
Texas	305,991	7.5	34,883	267,872	54,532	13,340
Florida	278,262	6.7	50,293	226,499	5,114	221,385
New Jersey	247,895	6.1	155,381	90,603	825	89,778
Illinois	243,190	5.9	148,975	93,091	58,623	34,468
Massachusetts	163,595	3.9	118,100	44,255	263	43,992
Michigan	129,710	3.2	82,230	46,404	6,371	40,033
Pennsylvania	97,565	2.4	82,095	14,647	408	14,239
Connecticut	95,750	2.3	85,573	29,754	224	29,530
Ohio	82,688	2.0	59,590	12,638	1,448	11,190
Subtotal	3,369,997	82.1	1,597,226	1,763,488	785,510	977,978
Other States	730,303	17.9	427,775	275,651	85,041	190,610
Total	4,100,300	100.0	2,025,001	2,039,139	870,551	1,168,588

Source: INS Annual Report, 1974, Table 34.

*Includes 36,160 permanent resident aliens who are stateless or of unknown nationality; numbers of aliens from the Eastern and Western Hemispheres therefore do not equal total number of permanent resident aliens.

TABLE I-3

Distributions of FY 1970-1974 Arriving Immigrants and Total 1970 U.S. Population
in the Ten Most Populous U.S. Cities

C I T Y	ARRIVING 1970-74 IMMIGRANTS		TOTAL 1970 U.S. POPULATION	
	Number	Percent of Total No.	Number	Percent of Total No.
New York	371,847	19.3	7,894,862	3.9
Chicago	84,526	4.4	3,369,359	1.7
Los Angeles	85,442	4.4	2,809,596	1.4
Philadelphia	17,864	0.9	1,950,098	1.0
Detroit	17,552	0.9	1,513,601	0.7
Houston	18,399	1.0	1,232,802	0.6
Baltimore	10,350	0.5	905,759	0.4
Dallas	7,645	0.4	844,401	0.4
Washington	15,607	0.8	756,510	0.4
Cleveland	<u>9,537</u>	<u>0.5</u>	<u>750,879</u>	<u>0.4</u>
Total	638,769	33.2	22,027,867	10.8

Total 1970-74 Immigration:

1,923,413

Total 1970 U.S. Population:

203,235,298

Sources: Immigration data report intended residence of arriving immigrants and are taken from Table 12A of the INS Annual Report for the years concerned; population data are from 1973 World Almanac, p. 136.

Note: The sum of the individual percentages do not equal total percentage because of roundoff.

Thus, even apart from the testimony of INS District Offices and the reports of local governmental agencies in major metropolitan areas in the nation that illegals are increasingly residing or working in those areas, it is reasonable to suppose that nonimmigrants who abuse their visas and become illegal aliens live and work near these same ports of entry, which have historically attracted immigrants in great numbers and which therefore offer newcomers an ethnic community that speaks the same language and a social network that helps them find a job and a place to live.

In sum, we suggest, then, that the geographic distribution of recent immigrants may be more representative of the distribution of illegals who establish a residence or find employment than the distribution of INS apprehensions. In any case, the increasing public concern about the presence of illegals in the nation, to which we now turn, stems in part from the now common thesis that illegal immigration is no longer a phenomenon of the Southwest.

The Problem of Illegal Aliens Today

A Subject of Increasing Concern. Though, as we have seen, the flow of large numbers of illegals into the nation is by no means unprecedented, its character and distribution appears to be changing, and apprehension rates have increased exponentially in the last decade, giving rise to questions concerning the adequacy of INS resources, the effectiveness of its law enforcement techniques, and the extent to which illegal immigration will increase over time, and hence increasingly strain INS ability to control it. These questions, in turn, have raised further questions concerning the adequacy of the law itself, particularly with respect to the sanctions contained within it: were there sufficient deterrents?

Beginning in 1971, when Congressional hearings of the subject were begun by the House subcommittee responsible for immigration legislation, what was initially examined as a law enforcement problem soon, however, came to be discussed in far broader terms. Questions concerning how illegal immigration can be controlled almost imperceptibly changed into related, but far more complex, questions concerning why it should be controlled. Thus, the focus of "the problem of illegal aliens" began to shift from a consideration of the impact of illegals upon INS and the adequacy of current immigration law in stemming the flow of aliens it defined as illegal, to a discussion of the impact of these aliens upon the nation, and the adequacy of today's immigration policy in meeting the national interest.

The extensive hearings held across the nation led the subcommittee to conclude that illegal aliens did indeed have a substantial and nationwide adverse impact on the domestic labor market, federal and state public assistance programs, and U.S. balance of payments.* In anticipation that the flow of illegals would increase in coming years, given the general belief that illegals are job seekers from nations with enormous population pressures and extreme poverty, the subcommittee recommended, among other measures, the imposition of sanctions against the employers of illegals.**

Since the initial hearings, public attention to the increasing apprehension rates -- and to increasing INS estimates of the number of unapprehended illegals, which progressively jumped over the next two years from 2 to 12 million illegals -- has itself escalated. Additional hearings on the subject were held by the House Committee on Government Operations, and rising Congressional interest led to a series of reports on illegals by the General Accounting Office.*** In 1973, the Special Study Group on Illegal Immigrants from Mexico, chaired by Roger C.

*U.S. Congress, House Committee on the Judiciary, op. cit., pp. 12,18.

**This is the well-known Rodino bill, which passed the House twice, only to die in Senate committee, which has considered no immigration questions in the last eight years. Current immigration law, as we noted earlier, specifically excludes employers from penalties for harboring illegals: while it is a federal crime to provide an illegal, who is your brother, a room for the night, it is not illegal to hire or house a dozen illegal farmhands.

***U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the Congress: Need to Reduce Public Expenditures for Newly Arrived Immigrants and Correct Inequity in Current Immigration Law (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975).

Report to the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives: Administration of the Alien Labor Certification Program Should be Strengthened (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975).

Report to the Congress: Better Controls Needed to Prevent Foreign Students from Violating the Conditions of Their Entry and Stay While in the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975).

Report to the Congress: More Needs to be Done to Reduce the Number and Adverse Impact of Illegal Aliens in the United States (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1973).

Crampton of the Department of Justice, released its final report, which similarly found that "this massive influx of illegal aliens creates a wide variety of social, economic, legal, diplomatic, political, and human difficulties in both countries (Mexico and the U.S.), and the existing situation seems likely to become worse unless effective countermeasures are taken.*

State legislatures, including Illinois and New York, but particularly California, have also given the issue high priority. And, most recently, in 1975 President Ford appointed a Domestic Council Committee on Illegal Immigration to consider the problem. Media attention has given prominent coverage to the issue, in New York City, Washington, D.C., and Miami, as well as in El Paso, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, and illegals were the subject of a nationwide television special early that year.

It is clear that the belief that there are now substantial numbers of illegals in the nation and in the labor market (and perhaps many more to come), mostly from ethnic groups that are minority groups in this nation, evokes a number of American economic interests and numerous social and political commitments. Those range from such diverse groups as INS itself, to cost-conscious growers, the traditional employer of aliens, both legal and illegal; and, more generally, employers of low-skilled workers, with an identical interest in cheap labor, and a similar tradition of employing aliens; organized labor, concerned with protecting the rights and interests of workers, including the newly organized farmworkers; civil libertarians, concerned with protecting the rights of aliens and minority-group members from undue and unconstitutional infringements upon their rights by INS and employers; minority groups themselves, particularly Chicanos, who are often torn between protecting their rights as citizens and responding to the overt social and economic needs of all Spanish-speaking persons; immigrant-serving groups, long concerned with protecting the rights of the foreign born; population-control groups, interested in limiting the size of the nation's population to ensure an ecologically balanced society; and manpower and social policymakers, concerned with the current high unemployment rates, the future structure of work in the nation, the rising issue of job satisfaction, and the general quality of life for its residents.

The diversity of those interests inevitably imply divergent opinions as to the significance of illegals and their socio-economic role and impact, as well as correspondingly diverse interpretations of the national interest, in terms of which the adequacy of current immigration policy is now being assessed. Nevertheless, the attitude of the public is in general one of increasing concern and, often, hostility.

*U.S. Department of Justice, "A Program for Effective and Humane Action of Illegal Mexican Immigrants: Final Report of the Special Study Group on Illegal Immigrants from Mexico" (1973) p. 1.

Increasingly adverse public opinion should not, however, be simply attributed to increasing adverse effects of this underground and therefore obviously unknown phenomenon. The public outcry against illegal aliens too closely resembles the 1930s, when similar ascriptions of their adverse economic role, under all too similar conditions, led to the "repatriation" of tens of thousands of Mexicans, with little regard for their real legal status, or their legal relatives. Public concern with the economic adversities brought about by illegals today likewise coincides with a time of scarcity, both real and perceived, when the interests of all groups seem threatened. And, in fact, the recent hostility expressed against the admission of the Vietnamese refugees, and the results of surveys conducted in Washington, D.C. by the Bureau of Social Science Research in 1973 and in the early spring of 1975,* give further evidence that a nativist movement is afoot.

The Need For a Federal Response. In sum, pressure, from within and without the government, for a federal response to significant numbers of aliens illegally present in the nation has mounted steadily in the 1970s, partly in response to public awareness of its increasing occurrence in areas beyond the Southwest, but also, it seems clear, partly in response to the economic insecurities that characterize the times. However inflated the estimates of their numbers, and the number of well-paying jobs illegals are taking from legal residents, the explosive increase in apprehensions suggests that there are "substantial" numbers of unapprehended illegals now in the nation and suggests even more strongly that there will be many more to come, unless additional measures are taken by the federal government.

Federal response to illegal immigration admits of three general policy alternatives: (1) a policy of neglect; i.e., a decision (by commission or omission) to effect no changes in current immigration policy, or in its enforcement; (2) changes in the degree to which, or ways in which, current immigration policy is now being implemented; or (3) changes in current immigration policy itself. Dismissing the first alternative, on the ground that there is no reason to suppose that a policy of neglect toward any rapidly growing population that remains defined as illegal can possibly be viewed as a policy of benign neglect, consideration of the two remaining alternatives reduces to a choice between changing the facts to fit current immigration policy or changing the law to accommodate the facts.

*Albert E. Gollin and Mary Eileen Dixon, Social Patterns and Attitudes in Greater Washington, 1973-75, (Bureau of Social Science Research, 1975).

In essence, escalating apprehension rates of illegals are a sign that there is a serious discrepancy between de jure and de facto immigration policy, and that this gap is widening. The fundamental issue thus confronting public policy makers is -- in which direction should this gap be closed? Are increasing apprehension rates to be regarded simply as a sign that current enforcement of immigration law is less than adequate in inhibiting a phenomenon that it has simultaneously proscribed? Or are increasing apprehension rates a sign that immigration policy is out of kilter with current (and future) social, political, and economic interests? If so, which interests are most congruent with current national goals? And which national goals (since these, too, conflict, as in the stress between a balanced budget and adequate social services) are to be addressed in formulating an immigration policy?

The complexities of the issues raised by illegal immigration, which are, of course, international in scope; the high degree of public concern it has recently evoked -- and the unhappy example of the Southwest, where two conflicting immigration policies do coexist, indicate the need for a federal response founded upon (1) more reliable information on its impact upon the U.S., particularly its labor market; and (2) an assessment of the long-range socio-economic implications of that impact, particularly as it affects U.S. manpower policies.

CHAPTER II: THE SURVEY METHODOLOGY: OBJECTIVES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Objectives and Limitations of the Study

The number, distribution, characteristics, and impact of illegal aliens in the nation are unknown. With the exception of data collected by INS, data on illegals are not available.*

INS statistics on illegals refer, however, only to illegals located by that agency. Further, the information they collect about apprehended illegals is inadequate and of limited use in a study of the role of illegals in the U.S. labor market.

Apprehension data are, as noted in Chapter I, essentially workload data, collected for law-enforcement and administrative purposes. They report the annual number of apprehensions, not the number of individuals who have been apprehended. Since some individuals may have multiple apprehensions, the number of illegals apprehended by INS in a given year is not known.** Further, INS data are clearly a function of the distribution of INS resources in addition to the distribution of illegals in the nation. INS allocates most of its law-enforcement resources at the Mexico-United States border. Most apprehensions occur near that border (see Figure I-1). The distribution of INS apprehensions cannot therefore be considered as representative of the distribution of illegals in the nation.

*See, however, sociologist Julian Samora's study, Los Mojados: The Wetback Story, which provides an overview of Mexican illegal immigration, particularly in the Southwest. That study briefly reports the results of interviews with 493 Mexican illegals apprehended in that region in 1969. For a review of the literature, see Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, "Illegal Aliens: An Annotated Bibliography of Recent and Related Literature on the Subject, 1968-1975," by Marion F. Houstoun (1975); subsequently reproduced by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

**For example, in FY 1974, INS reported that 182,351 illegals located that year had been "previously expelled," and 10,902 had previous criminal records. In addition, INS believes that a number of Mexican EWIs (who, unlike visa abusers, do not possess nonimmigrant visas that identify them) are frequent repeaters, and that this infrequently becomes a matter of record. See Los Mojados, pp. 86-88, for a discussion of this problem.

INS collects basic demographic data on illegals who are apprehended, but most data collected by that agency relate to immigration and law-enforcement matters. (See Figure II-1 for a copy of INS Form I-213, the source of all data on apprehended illegals.) Few data are tabulated; fewer are published. Beyond nation of origin, immigrant status at entry, employment status, and the location and branch of INS responsible for the apprehension (Border Patrol or District Office), data on apprehended illegals are generally not available.* Moreover, INS data are collected by a law-enforcement staff whose primary task is to locate deportable aliens, not to collect demographic or labor-market data. Apprehension data are often collected under conditions inimical to the requirements of research, and records are often incomplete. In addition, illegals have a vested interest in not telling the truth; e.g., admission of too many trips to the United States makes them vulnerable to prosecution; admission that they live in the interior of Mexico can lead to an unwanted trip home, which takes them far from another attempt at illegal entry. Much of the data that are collected are therefore of doubtful reliability, especially those relating to the illegals' experiences in the United States.

INS apprehension data consequently provide little information about the characteristics and experiences of illegals in the U.S. The primary objective of this study was therefore an exploratory one: to secure, through a small survey of illegal workers in the nation, otherwise unobtainable data on their characteristics, education, training, and family obligations; their motivations for immigrating, their movements, and their desire to return or stay here; their occupation, employment history, and experiences in the U.S. labor market; and finally, their interactions with U.S. public programs. To provide some perspective on this complex subject, other available but often widely scattered and unanalyzed information relating to illegal immigration is presented, and a preliminary assessment of the probable role and impact of illegals upon the labor market, and their implications for manpower policy, is offered in the concluding chapter of the report. The lack of data on illegals, and practical considerations, precluded, however, a sampling strategy designed to estimate the number, geographical distribution, or characteristics of illegals in the nation or its labor market. The study group cannot be considered a repre-

*Data on adult males and a combined category of women and children are also available for Mexican illegals. Data relating to employment are recorded under "status when found," entries for which include employment (agriculture, industry and other, seeking employment) and "other" (in institutions, in travel).

FIGURE II-1

RECORD OF DEPORTABLE ALIEN (See A.M. - 2790.31-34 for Instructions)						Sex	Hair	Eyes	Complexion			
Family Name (Capital Letters)		Given Name		Middle Name		PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLOCK CAPITAL LETTERS	Height	Weight	Occupation			
Country of Citizenship	Passport Number and Country of Issue		File Number				Scars or Marks					
Usual Street Address (Residence)							(Number)		(Street)	(City)	(State)	(Zip)
Date, Place, Time, Manner of last Entry							Passenger Boarded At		F.B.I. No.		Marital Status: <input type="checkbox"/> Single <input type="checkbox"/> Married <input type="checkbox"/> Separated <input type="checkbox"/> Divorced	
Number, Street, City, Province (State) and Country of Permanent Residence							Method of Location/Apprehension					
Birthdate			Date of Action		Location Code		(At/Near)		Date & Hour			
City, Province, State, and Country of Birth			Type of Action <input type="checkbox"/> Lifted <input type="checkbox"/> Not Lifted									
Visa Used At			Social Security Account Name				Status of Entry		Status When Found			
Date Visa Issued			Social Security No.		Send C.O. Rec. Check To:		Length of Time Illegally in U.S.					
Immigration Record							Criminal Record					
Name, Address, and Nationality of Spouse (Maiden Name, if appropriate)								Number & Nationality of Minor Children				
Father's Name, and Nationality and Address, if known						Mother's Present and Maiden Names, Nationality, and Address, if known						
Monies Due/Property in U.S. Not in Immediate Possession <input type="checkbox"/> None Claimed <input type="checkbox"/> See Form 1-43			Fingerprinted <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		Lookout Book Checked <input type="checkbox"/> Not Listed <input type="checkbox"/> Listed, Code _____		Deportation Charge(s) (Code Words)					
Name and Address of Last Current U.S. Employer						From		To				
Narrative (Outline particulars under which alien located/apprehended. Include details, not shown above, re time, place, manner of last entry, and elements which establish administrative and/or criminal violation. Indicate means and route of travel to interior.)												
If space insufficient, show front and back of visa here with Form bottom up.						Signature (Form 1-43)						
Date of Action						Received (subject and documents) (representative name)						
						Officer: _____						
						Inspection: _____						
						(Received Date): _____						

sentative sample of illegals in the nation or its labor market, and cannot be used to establish either the number of illegals currently in the United States or the distributions of their characteristics.*

Methodology

Sampling Strategy. The universe of interest in this study is the population of illegals in the U.S. labor market. Note that this is equivalent to neither the population of illegals in the nation (a presumably larger group, with possibly different characteristics), nor the population of apprehended illegals (a presumably smaller group, which includes apprehended illegals who are neither working nor seeking employment).

Since the number, distribution, and characteristics of the illegal alien labor force in the nation are not known, and since random sampling from that population is not possible, a representative sample could not be drawn from it.

A probability sample of apprehended illegals could in principle be designed, but it would be of limited interest. It would be inappropriate to make inferences from it about illegals who had succeeded in establishing a residence in the United States, about illegals in the labor market, about illegals living in areas beyond the Mexico border, or about illegals from nations other than Mexico. Yet those (overlapping) groups of illegals are considered by INS to be both the least likely to be apprehended and the most likely to have great impact. (In FY 1974, for example, 61.8% of all apprehended illegals were located within 72 hours of entry; 68.6% were not employed when found; 72.5% were apprehended in the nine border patrol sectors at the southwest border; and 90.0% were Mexican.**)

Practical considerations impelled us to select apprehended illegals for interview, and the focus of the research effort led us to design a sample that would result in selection of a diverse collection of case histories of apprehended illegals

*INS is planning to conduct a nation-wide study to determine the number, distribution, and impacts of illegals in the nation, but the results of this study will not be available until 1977. An interim estimate of the number of illegals currently in the U.S. was, however, released by that agency as this report was being written. See Chapter VII for a brief discussion of its merits.

**INS Annual Report, 1974, Table 27B, and unpublished INS data from Form G-23.18.

with work experience in the United States, rather than a representative sample of apprehended illegals.* In this way, the range of illegals' education and work skills, and their occupation, wages, and working conditions in areas of the nation where they are believed to be concentrated in large numbers could be explored within the framework of a limited budget, and could be used in formulating a preliminary assessment of the possible range of illegals' impact upon the labor market. In addition, it was anticipated that data acquired through such a survey would provide indications of the relationships between the characteristics of illegals and their experience in the U.S. labor market, which would be useful in future research on the subject.

A decision was therefore made to interview 800 apprehended illegal aliens, 16 years of age or more, who had worked at least two weeks in the United States. The interviews were to be held in INS offices in 20 sites: 200 illegals apprehended by the INS Border Patrol, primarily at the Mexican border, and 600 (300 Mexican and 300 non-Mexican) illegals apprehended by INS District Office staff (see Table II-1).** In addition, the survey of apprehended illegals was to be supplemented by interviews with 50 unapprehended illegals in one of those sites (New York City). Those interviews, to be held in the offices of immigrant-serving agencies, were undertaken to provide some data on ways in which unapprehended illegals might differ from apprehended illegals.

*Samora's universe of study was Mexican illegals in the United States. Though the researchers originally decided to interview unapprehended Mexican illegals, and were successful in locating them, all attempts at interview failed. Faced with the same sampling difficulties in selecting apprehended illegals for interview, the researchers spent three days in each of the three INS detention centers in the INS Southwest Region, and administered questionnaires to as many persons as possible. In this manner 493 men of an estimated 1,000 in the centers at the time of the interviews were interviewed. Only 51% of those respondents had been employed when apprehended. See Los Mojados, pp. 60-69.

**Despite the logistical attraction of using detention centers for interview sites (illegals are present in large numbers and have nothing to do), we avoided them on the grounds that they would give us a sample which would be all-male, very heavily Mexican, and biased towards repeaters and illegals with criminal records.

TABLE II-1

Number of Interviews by Interview Site and Source for
Linton & Company 1975 Illegal Alien Study

INTERVIEW SITE	TOTAL APPREHENDED ILLEGALS	BORDER PATROL	DISTRICT OFFICE		UNAPPREHENDED ILLEGALS
			Mexican	Other	
<u>East Coast</u>					
Miami, FL	60	10	-	50	-
New York, NY	123	-	2	121	50
Newark, NJ	30	-	-	30	-
Swanton, VT	8	8	-	-	-
Washington, DC	25	-	-	25	-
<u>Mid- & Northwest</u>					
Chicago, IL	72	-	48	24	-
Detroit, MI	19	7	-	12	-
Seattle, WA	8	-	8	-	-
<u>Southwest</u>					
*Chula Vista, CA	46	46	-	-	-
*El Centro, CA	9	9	-	-	-
Los Angeles, CA	131	-	107	24	-
San Francisco, CA	26	12	-	14	-
*Tucson, AZ	17	17	-	-	-
*Yuma, AZ	13	13	-	-	-
*Del Rio, TX	16	16	-	-	-
*El Paso, TX	58	30	28	-	-
*Laredo, TX	9	9	-	-	-
*Marfa, TX	8	8	-	-	-
*McAllen, TX	15	15	-	-	-
San Antonio, TX	107	-	107	-	-
Total	800	200	300	300	50

*Southwest Border Patrol Sector headquarters.

The sites and numbers of interviews allocated to each were selected for their high concentrations of illegal residents and workers, on the basis of apprehension data, and for their geographical diversity. Because the population of interest was not the flow of illegals entering the nation (who are apprehended primarily within 72 hours of entry by the Border Patrol), but rather the stock of illegal workers in the nation (who are primarily apprehended by the INS District Offices), most illegals selected for interview were those apprehended by area control staff of the INS District Offices.

The sites chosen to receive the most attention for illegals apprehended by INS District Offices were New York City, the major East Coast urban center and port of entry for all aliens, where large numbers of illegals from all parts of the world are believed to live, and where a substantial majority of all illegals apprehended in the INS Northeast Region are located; Los Angeles, the major metropolitan area and port of entry on the West Coast, where Mexican illegals are believed to reside in large numbers, and where a similar number of illegals are apprehended; San Antonio, a major southwestern city, also close to Mexico, whose considerably smaller and more depressed labor market is held to be heavily impacted upon by the presence of Mexican illegals, substantial numbers of whom are apprehended annually. More than 100 interviews were allocated to each of those three metropolitan areas.

Chicago and Miami were also selected for relatively large numbers of interviews, again for both large numbers of illegal aliens (presumed on the basis of apprehension data) and geographic diversity. For similar reasons, interviews were also allocated to Newark, San Francisco, Seattle, Detroit, and Washington, D.C. In addition, a small number of interviews were allocated to Border Patrol offices in two sites at the Canadian border, Detroit and Swanton, Vermont, and to each of the nine Border Patrol sector headquarters at the Mexican border. Interviews were also allocated to each of the four interview sites in which INS has both Border Patrol and District Offices (San Francisco, * El Paso, Detroit, and Miami).

Nation of origin was ignored in selecting unapprehended illegals and illegals apprehended by the Border Patrol. The proportion of Mexican to non-Mexican subjects apprehended by INS District Office staff was chosen to approximate the corresponding proportion of Mexican and non-Mexican illegals apprehended by INS District Offices. Interviewers were instructed

*The Border Patrol sector headquarters is located at Livermore, in an agricultural area near San Francisco.

to interview young and old, male and female, apprehended illegals in the same proportion as they were available for interview.

The Survey Instrument

A pre-coded questionnaire was designed and tested on unapprehended illegals by bilingual interviewers in Washington, D.C.; revised and retested with illegals apprehended at the southwest border, in Brownsville, Texas, and revised and retested again in Washington, D.C., this time with illegals apprehended by the INS District Office. (See Appendix B for a copy of the survey instrument.)

Because the routes to illegal alien status are diverse, and because illegals are migrants, we expected their experiences to vary widely and to be intermittent, both in and out of their home country, and in and out of different labor markets. Part of the survey instrument therefore consisted of a series of questions which were designed to obtain a capsule case history of the respondent, particularly with respect to the labor market, from January 1970 to June 1975, when the questionnaires were administered.

In addition to the difficulties inherent in any effort to collect data on migrants in a manner amenable to statistical analysis, we found, as expected, that few pre-survey respondents spoke English. Thus, the survey instrument was usually administered in the illegal's native language by bilingual interviewers. In a few cases, however (as had sometimes been the case when the survey instrument was tested), a translator was used, e.g., in an interview with an unapprehended Haitian, whose Creole proved impenetrable.

The pre-test venture in Brownsville revealed, however, that it was our subjects' lack of education, informal as well as formal, which rendered the collection of useful data particularly difficult. The conceptual niceties of census-takers proved even more foreign to some respondents than did the English language. And looming behind those obstructions to the kind of communication that permits precise codification, was the fact that we were probing into the illegal activities of aliens who were in the custody of INS because of their violation of immigration law.

We attempted to deal with the problem of comprehension by formulating questions as simply and as concretely as possible. For example, we translated abstractions like "filing an federal income tax return" to "mailing a federal income tax form to the U.S. government." As did Samora, we tried to reduce the problem of intimidation by instructing interviewers to stress

that neither names or addresses would be asked and that the interviews were voluntary. Further, respondents were instructed that they could refuse to answer individual questions, and could terminate the interview at any time. In addition, the questionnaire was structured so that non-threatening questions were asked first, in order to build a base for open communication. Checks for lying were also built into the instrument, e.g., we asked in several different ways how long respondents had been in the United States.

The Survey

With the assistance of INS, the survey instrument was administered by bilingual interviewers, unaffiliated with INS, to 793 apprehended illegal aliens located in 19 sites across the nation during the months of May and June 1975 (see Table II-2 and Figure II-2). During that same period, 51 unapprehended illegals were administered the same survey instrument in the offices of a New York City immigration law firm, Fried, Fragomen, and del Rey, and the Catholic Migration Service in New York City and Washington, D.C.

Quotas were met in all but four of the interview sites. No illegals were apprehended in Swanton, Vermont, during the (extended) course of the survey; hence that site was dropped. Similarly, few illegals were apprehended in McAllen, Texas. The number of INS interviews in Washington, D.C., New York City, and Miami were affected by the arrival of the Vietnamese refugees, which coincided with the survey. The lack of apprehensions in Swanton and McAllen and the influx of large numbers of refugees considerably lengthened the period of time in which interviews took place, in the latter case, because a number of INS staff were pulled away from their normal assignments, with a resulting drop in apprehensions. Since the effect of the refugees was more severe on Washington, D.C. than it was on New York, most interviews allocated to the former were completed in New York City. Some respondents in the latter site were, however, interviewed at the INS detention center instead of District Offices. The Miami District Office staff were similarly preoccupied with refugees; most interviews allocated to their office were filled by interviews with illegals apprehended by the Miami Border Patrol, which covers the same territory. An attempt to fill the McAllen quota with interviews in the nearby Port Isabel, Texas, detention center, near the border failed; additional interviews were finally held in Los Angeles. Interviews allocated to illegals apprehended by the Swanton Border Patrol were filled by illegals apprehended by the Miami Border Patrol. The arrival of the refugees also affected the location of the interviews of the unapprehended illegals, all of whom had been scheduled for interview in New York City; eleven were therefore held in Washington, D.C.

TABLE II-2

Number of Mexican and Non-Mexican Apprehended and Unapprehended
Illegal Alien Respondents, by Region and Interview Site


INTERVIEW SITE	APPREHENDED ILLEGALS			UNAPPREHENDED ILLEGALS ¹		
	Total	Mexican	Other	Total	Mexican	Other
<u>East Coast</u>						
Miami, FL	70	8	62			
New York, NY	132	2	130	40		40
Newark, NJ	30	-	30			
Washington, DC	5	-	5	11	3	8
Total	237	10	227	51	3	48
<u>Mid- & Northwest</u>						
Chicago, IL	72	48	24			
Detroit, MI	19	6	13			
Seattle, WA	8	8	-			
Total	99	62	37			
<u>California</u>						
*Chula Vista	46	44	2			
*El Centro	9	9	-			
Los Angeles	138	106	32			
San Francisco	26	12	14			
Total	219	171	48			
<u>Southwest</u>						
*Tucson, AZ	17	17	-			
*Yuma, AZ	13	13	-			
*Del Rio, TX	16	16	-			
*El Paso, TX	58	58	-			
*Laredo, TX	9	9	-			
*Marfa, TX	8	8	-			
*McAllen, TX	7	7	-			
San Antonio, TX	110	110	-			
Total	238	238	0			
Total No. of Respondents	793	481	312	51	3	48

¹Unapprehended illegals were selected without regard to nationality.

*INS Southwest Border Patrol Sector Headquarters respondents were selected without regard to nationality.

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

FIGURE II-2



Alaska included in Mid- and Northwest Region; Hawaii included in California.

The Survey Results

Though the voluntary aspect and research character of the interviews were emphasized by INS staff and the interviewers, the non-response rate was unexpectedly low, around five percent. We attribute this to a combination of three factors: (1) in the opinion of the interviewers, illegals felt unable to refuse the request, since it was made through the auspices of INS; (2) respondents may not have found fulfillment of that request threatening: they soon discovered that the requests for identification invariably associated with legal authority were studiously avoided in the interviews; and (3) to some, the interviews were probably a diversion from otherwise unoccupied time: respondents had already been processed by INS, their interaction with authorities was all but over, and they were waiting for transportation home.

Refusals to respond to specific questions and claims of ignorance occurred in only a minority of the interviews and for only a small number of questions. Most illegals answered most questions. A substantial minority, however, chose to protect other illegals by refusing to respond to questions that referred to them. Almost 30% of the apprehended illegals refused to answer a question about the number of other illegals in their U.S. workplace. Around 20% refused to answer similar questions, e.g., the number of illegals they knew from their hometown, or in the United States. No other questions evoked such large refusal rates. In a few instances, claims to ignorance ran as high as 25%, e.g., when respondents' opinions were asked, or when estimates of their annual earnings in recent years were requested. Such claims, however, appeared to be genuine, for they rarely concerned subjects that the respondents would wish to avoid, and almost every respondent answered more specific questions about their earnings.

Most respondents did not take advantage of their option to protect their own interests. With only a handful of exceptions, almost all apprehended respondents answered detailed questions about their experiences in the U.S. labor market, the amount of money they had sent home, the number of trips they had made to the United States in the last five years, the amount of money they had paid a smuggler, if they had been smuggled, and how many times they had been apprehended by INS. More than half claimed they had been in the nation for two or more years (and 10% reported they had been here between six and twenty years). This is information which is not collected by INS, and it can scarcely be regarded, under the circumstances, as a self-serving response. Additional evidence of the respondents' honesty was provision of such

potentially damaging information as the following. Even though all of the interviewed aliens were barred from working in the U.S., three-quarters of the 788 apprehended illegals who responded to the question "Why did you come to the United States this time?" answered "to get a job." They could have refused to answer the question, or selected more innocuous (and unverifiable) answers, e.g., "to visit relatives," "to see the U.S.," or "to study." Further, when asked if they planned to return to the United States, more than half of the apprehended respondents said that they did -- primarily, they reported, in order to get a job.

The unapprehended illegals followed the same pattern of responses. Most respondents answered most questions, though close to half refused to answer questions about other illegals. More than 90% reported that they planned to stay in the country, primarily, they explained, for economic reasons. Most unapprehended illegals available for interview were willing to be interviewed, probably because the requests for interviews were made in a supportive rather than an adversary environment, and the voluntary nature of the interviews was again stressed.

In sum, despite the fact that aliens were selected for interview because they had violated immigration law, few refused to be interviewed, and respondents usually ignored their right to refuse to answer questions, except when information about other illegals was requested. The respondents' willingness to give detailed information about their own illegal activities strongly suggests that data which might otherwise appear unreliable, e.g., their almost universal denial that they had used food stamps, or had been on welfare, can likewise be considered reliable.

Analysis of the Data

The survey results were analyzed according to respondents' region of origin (Eastern Hemisphere (EH), Western Hemisphere, excluding Mexico (WH), and Mexico); location of their most recent U.S. job (East Coast, Mid- and Northwest, Southwest, excluding California, and California);* (cumulative) duration in the U.S. (less than two years, two or more years); type of employment in the U.S. (agriculture, nonagriculture); entry technique (entered nation without inspection (EWI), visa-abuser); age (16-24, 25-34, 35 and older); and English-speaking ability (spoke English, did not speak English).

*See Figure II-2 for the boundaries of these regions, which were created for analytic purposes and do not coincide with INS regions.

Data on the 51 unapprehended illegals were handled separately, and are not included in the survey results of the 793 apprehended illegals. Cross tabulations were also run for selected groups of the apprehended illegals: those whose most recent U.S. job had been in the New York City, Los Angeles, San Antonio, or Chicago standard metropolitan areas (SMSAs), and those whose most recent U.S. job had been in one of the 23 border counties adjacent to Mexico, in the state of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, or California.

CHAPTER III: THE ORIGIN AND DYNAMICS OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION TODAY

The Origin of Illegal Immigration

The Sending Nations. Although migrants, with national or across international boundaries, can simply be pushed out of their region of origin by adversities (by a famine, for example) or pulled into their region of destination solely by its attractions (as in the California gold rush), most migratory movements are the result of some combination of both push and pull factors, and all migration occurs because of perceived (though sometimes only apparent) disparities between the region of a migrant's origin and that of his destination. In addition, since those disparities must come to the attention and be within the reach of migrants, most migration has been inversely related to the distance between sending and receiving regions.

As known through I.S. apprehension statistics, illegal immigration to the United States follows those general patterns of migratory behavior. The disparities between the sending nations and the United States are primarily socio-economic, and they are both radical and real. Modern communications have increasingly brought them to the attention of the campesino in the interior of Mexico, the school-girl in Honduras, and the cook in Hong Kong -- and the postwar availability and relative inexpense of international transportation have provided a way for that gap to be breached, albeit illegally.

Although apprehended illegal aliens in the United States today come from all over the world (in our survey of 793, nationals of 53 countries were encountered), most come from nations that are physically close to the United States but economically very different indeed. Thus Mexico has long been the source of most known illegal immigration, for the land border that it shares with the United States provides its residents with ready access to opportunities for employment, a standard of living, and a chance at upward mobility available to only a small minority of its now burgeoning population. In that respect it is very unlike Canada, which sends few illegals, and offers its residents opportunities and a standard of living comparably free from population pressures.

In FY 1968, when current immigration law went into full effect, Mexico was the source of more than 70% of all apprehended illegals. By FY 1974, INS statistics show almost a sevenfold increase in apprehensions of illegals, 90% of whom were Mexican nationals (see Table III-1).

Because INS is unlikely to apprehend illegals who do not cross the Mexican border and hence is unlikely to apprehend illegals who are not Mexican, what is of particular interest here is not only the phenomenal explosion in the apprehension of Mexican illegals, which is well known, but the fact that the number of apprehensions of illegals from the Eastern Hemisphere and from Canada has remained virtually constant, while the number of illegals from other nations in the Western Hemisphere has progressively increased, and more than doubled, between the years 1968 and 1974.

This increase in apprehensions of illegals from nations in the West, excluding Mexico and Canada, is a significant trend, particularly when placed within the context of a substantial increase in legal immigration from those nations and a substantial increase in their residents' use of nonimmigrant visas, in particular, tourist visas, to visit the United States.* That is, while the former indicates the existence of a new interest in or option of immigrating to the United States and lays the groundwork for the social network that generally supports all immigration, but in particular, illegal immigration, the latter opens up the possibility of a substantial amount of nonimmigrant visa abuse. And, in fact, a recent analysis of mala fide nonimmigrant applications showed that six of the seven nations with the highest nonimmigrant visa refusal rates were Western Hemisphere nations. In FY 1972, 35% or more of the applications for nonimmigrant visas in Guatemala, Ecuador, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Poland, and the Dominican Republic were determined by consular officers in those nations to be illegitimate requests. Similarly, three of the six nations with 25% to 35% nonimmigrant visa refusal rates -- Colombia, Haiti, Mexico, Bulgaria, Romania, and Portugal were in this hemisphere. Further, a survey of consular officers stationed at Jamaica, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Colombia,

*Legal immigration from Central and South America and the Caribbean, numerically unrestricted until 1968, accounted for 1.5% of all legal immigration in 1901-10; 3.2% in each of the following two decades; 5.5% in 1931-40; 12.7% in 1951-60; 22.2% in 1961-65; and 31% in 1966-70. These relative increases reflect numerical changes from 133,020 in 1901-10 to 581,478 in 1966-70. (INS Annual Report, 1974, Table 13) The number of temporary visitor admissions has likewise steadily increased from the Western Hemisphere: in FY 1965, 558,154 were admitted from North America and 138,117 from South America; by FY 1974, the totals had increased to 2,275,420 from North America, and 320,099, from South America (INS Annual Report, 1974, Table 15A).

TABLE III-1

Distribution of Region of Origin of Apprehended Illegal Aliens, for Selected Years, FY 1968-1974

REGION OF ORIGIN	FY 1968		FY 1970		FY 1972		FY 1974	
	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total
<u>Western Hemisphere</u>								
Canada	151,705	71.5	277,377	80.3	430,213	81.3	709,959	90.0
USA	11,056	5.2	11,323	3.3	11,012	2.2	9,362	1.2
Other West. Hemi.	16,196	7.6	23,320	6.8	28,119	5.6	34,948	4.5
<u>Total</u>	<u>178,947</u>	<u>84.3</u>	<u>312,020</u>	<u>90.4</u>	<u>469,344</u>	<u>92.8</u>	<u>754,269</u>	<u>95.7</u>
<u>Eastern Hemisphere</u>								
Other Nations	15,520	7.3	16,111	4.7	15,462	3.1	15,031	1.9
Other Nations	15,489	7.3	14,613	4.2	18,733	3.7	14,633	1.9
Other Nations	2,102	1.0	2,609	0.8	2,370	0.5	4,212	0.5
<u>Total</u>	<u>33,109</u>	<u>15.6</u>	<u>33,333</u>	<u>9.7</u>	<u>36,605</u>	<u>7.3</u>	<u>33,876</u>	<u>4.3</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>212,057</u>	<u>99.9</u>	<u>345,353</u>	<u>100.1</u>	<u>505,949</u>	<u>100.1</u>	<u>788,145</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Annual Report, Table 27B, for the years cited.

Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

and Guatemala indicated their belief that over 70% of all mala fide nonimmigrant applicants in those countries had some family members in the United States, and over 90% had friends or acquaintances here.*

Although the number of nonimmigrants admitted to the United States has increased exponentially in the last two decades, no controls are exerted on their activities during their stay in the country, nor on their departure from it. Thus the number and national origin of aliens who abuse their visas by working or remaining in the nation (in particular those who come as temporary visitors for pleasure or as students) can be documented directly only through INS apprehension statistics and indirectly only through the number of nonimmigrant visa refusals by the State Department, which have progressively increased from 100,597 in FY 1968 to 305,036 in FY 1974.**

In FY 1968, 2,042,666 aliens were admitted as temporary visitors for pleasure; 73,303 were admitted as students. During that same year, 57,114 aliens who had abused their tourist visa and 5,641 student visa abusers were apprehended by INS. In FY 1974, 4,732,536 temporary visitors for pleasure and 109,197 students were admitted; 55,485 tourist and 8,132 student visa abusers were apprehended. Thus, although the enormous increase in the number of nonimmigrants admitted into the nation parallels the increase in the apprehension of illegals in the nation, the escalation in INS apprehensions is primarily the result of its apprehension of EWIs, i.e., aliens who enter the nation illegally, without inspection. In FY 1974, for example, 88% of all apprehended illegals reported that they had entered the nation illegally, without a visa, mostly at the Mexican border. As predictable, almost all (681,100 of the 693,084) were Mexican. An increasing number of non-Mexican EWIs were apprehended, however, and most were illegals from the Caribbean or from Central or South America: 7,481 in FY 1974, as compared to 430 apprehended EWIs from those nations in FY 1968.

*U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, The Illegal Immigrant to the United States, by Loren E. Lawrence (Washington, D.C., 1974).

**U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Report of the Visa Office, Table XXII, for years cited.

In brief, as Table III-2 suggests, despite the widespread and common belief, and the considerable anecdotal evidence, that a substantial rise in the number of nonimmigrant visa abusers has accompanied the phenomenal rise in the number of nonimmigrant admissions, INS apprehension data do little to document that belief.

Most apprehended illegals who are not EWIs are aliens who have violated their tourist visas. Though INS apprehension data do not substantiate the claim that a phenomenal number of visa abusers now reside in the nation, they do support its corollary, that increasing numbers of tourist visa abusers are from nations other than Mexico, and in particular, come from nations in the Caribbean or from Central and South America. In fact, there has been a recent decrease in the number of apprehended Mexican, Canadian, and European tourist visa abusers, along with a significant increase in the number of apprehended tourist visa abusers from other nations in the Western Hemisphere, and from non-European nations in the East (see Table III-3).

In short, INS apprehension statistics show that most apprehended illegals today come as EWIs from neighboring Mexico, but that increasing (though proportionally minimal) numbers come as nonimmigrants from other nations in the West, excluding Canada, and, to a far lesser extent, from non-European nations in the East. In addition, the number of apprehended EWIs from other Western Hemisphere nations, excluding Canada, has increased even more rapidly than the number of apprehended Mexican EWIs, though their total number is small. In judging the usefulness of these findings in determining the national origin of illegals in the nation, it is important to note, however, that (1) the lack of post-admission controls on the millions of nonimmigrants annually admitted into the nation and (2) the allocation of most of INS law enforcement resources to the Border Patrol at the Mexican border strongly suggest that INS apprehension data are more likely to represent the number and national origin of the flow of illegal immigration across that border than the number and national origin of the stock of illegals in the nation. Thus it is not surprising that INS apprehension data do not document the claim that visa abusers are present in the nation in large numbers, though they do suggest that the nation of origin distribution of illegals in the United States is widening, to include increasing numbers of illegals from the Caribbean and from Central and South America and non-European nations in the East. Apparently, then, as Loren Lawrence has recently suggested, if substantial numbers of nonimmigrants are abusing their visas by working or remain-

TABLE III-2

Distribution of Status at Entry of Apprehended Illegal Aliens, for Selected Years, FY 1968 - FY 1974

STATUS AT ENTRY	FY 1968		FY 1969		FY 1972		FY 1974	
	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.
Admitted Without Inspection ¹	121,047	57.1	244,492	70.8	398,290	78.7	693,084	87.9
Admitted	57,114	26.9	64,163	18.6	64,547	12.8	55,485	7.0
Detained	5,641	2.7	5,238	1.5	5,495	1.1	8,132	1.0
Not Apprehended	28,255	13.3	31,460	9.1	37,617	7.4	31,444	4.0
Total	212,057	100.0	345,353	100.0	505,949	100.0	788,145	99.9

¹Source: INS Annual Report, Table 27B, for the years cited.

²U.S. term for aliens who enter the U.S. without authorization.

³Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

TABLE III-3

Distribution of Region of Origin of Apprehended Visitor Visa Abusers, for Selected Years, FY 1969 - FY 1974

REGION OF ORIGIN	FY 1969		FY 1970		FY 1972		FY 1973		FY 1974	
	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.	No. of Apprehended Illegals	Percent of Total No.
<u>Western Hemisphere</u>										
Mexico	25,943	45.4	27,481	42.8	27,487	42.6	22,912	36.0	17,817	32.1
Canada	7,138	12.5	7,514	11.7	6,345	9.8	5,988	9.4	4,707	8.5
Other West. Hemi.	11,915	20.9	17,143	26.7	19,220	29.8	21,798	34.2	19,652	35.4
Total	44,996	78.8	52,138	79.9	53,052	82.2	50,698	79.6	42,176	76.0
<u>Eastern Hemisphere</u>										
Europe	7,738	13.6	6,806	10.6	5,747	8.9	6,988	11.0	6,884	12.4
Asia	3,433	6.0	4,072	6.3	4,695	7.3	4,626	7.3	4,602	8.3
Other Nations	947	1.7	1,147	1.8	1,053	1.6	1,342	2.1	1,823	3.3
Total	12,118	21.3	12,025	18.7	11,495	17.8	12,956	20.4	13,309	24.0
TOTAL ¹	57,114	100.1	64,163	99.9	64,547	100.0	63,654	100.0	55,485	100.0

Source: INS Annual Report, Table 27B, for the years cited.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

ing in the nation, they are likely to come from nations in those regions, which are, for the most part, like Mexico, underdeveloped nations with high population growth rates and increasing legal immigration to the U.S.*

Illegal Immigration from Mexico. The widening distribution of nations sending illegals to the United States, which suggests that proximity and tradition are less the significant factors in illegal immigration than they once were, may parallel changes in illegal immigration from Mexico itself. On the basis of a trend indicated by the divergent findings of earlier Mexican immigration scholars, Julian Samora has recently suggested that the source of Mexican illegal immigration is becoming more widely distributed throughout that nation. That is, he notes, whereas Gamio found, in his classic study in 1930, that 60% of all Mexican immigrants came from the Mexican states of Michoacan, Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Nueve Leon; in 1951, Saunders and Leonard found that 70% of all wetbacks in their study came from those four states and San Luis Potosi. In 1969, however, Samora found that 37.5% of the 493 apprehended Mexican illegals in his study group came from those five states.** Similarly, in our 1975 study group of 481 apprehended Mexican illegal aliens, 38.3% of those respondents came from the same five states (see Figure III-1). In fact, as Table III-4 shows, the differences in the distribution of the state of birth of respondents in Samora's study group and the distribution of the state of residence of the Mexican respondents in our later study are consistent with his hypothesis.*** In general, more respondents in Samora's 1969 study group came from one state (18.5% were born in the border state of Chihuahua) as compared with respondents in our 1975 study (11.3% had homes in Jalisco, located in the interior of Mexico), and more respondents came from fewer states in the earlier study than in the later one.

*Lawrence, Illegal Immigrant to the U.S., p. 6-7.

**Samora. Los Mojados, p. 91-94.

***Unlike Samora, data collected on the migration of respondents in our study were gathered according to state of residence, not state of birth. Unless the internal migration of the respondents in these two study groups ran counter to the prevailing internal Mexican migration, which is generally a north-bound movement toward the more rapidly industrializing border states or a movement into Mexico City, any differences between the distributions of the state of birth of the two groups would be even more supportive of Samora's hypothesis.

TABLE III-4

Mexican State of Residence of 1975 Apprehended Illegal Alien Study Group, and
 Mexican State of Birth of 1959 Apprehended Illegal Alien Study Group

State in Mexico	1975 STUDY GROUP		1959 STUDY GROUP	
	No. of Respondents	Percent of Total No.	No. of Respondents	Percent of Total No.
Jalisco	56	11.6	37	7.5
*Chihuahua	54	11.2	91	18.5
Michoacan	49	10.2	41	8.3
Zaratecas	45	9.4	34	6.9
Guanajuato	39	8.1	41	8.3
*Coahuila	31	6.4	24	4.9
Durango	22	4.6	49	9.9
San Luis Potosi	22	4.6	36	7.3
*Baja California ¹	20	4.2	9	1.8
*Nuevo Leon	18	3.7	30	6.1
*Sonora	14	2.9	12	2.4
*Tamaulipas	14	2.9	25	5.1
Distrito Federal	12	2.5	5	1.0
Sinaloa	10	2.1	13	2.6
Guerrero	10	2.1	6	1.2
Aguascalientes	9	1.9	3	0.6
Mayarit	9	1.9	6	1.2
Colima	6	1.2	1	0.2
Veracruz	4	0.8	2	0.4
Hidalgo	3	0.6	0	0.0
Queretaro	3	0.6	4	0.8
Mexico	3	0.6	4	0.8
Puebla	2	0.4	1	0.2
Oaxaca	1	0.2	0	0.0
Yucatan	1	0.2	1	0.2
Morelos	1	0.2	0	0.0
Chiapas	0	0.0	1	0.2
Don't Know/No Answer	23	4.8	17	3.4
TOTAL ²	481	99.9	493	99.8


Sources: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; Julian Samora, Los Mojados, Table 11, p. 92.

¹Data combined for Baja California (Nord) and Baja Calif.

²Percentages may not add to 100 due to round off.

*Border states.

FIGURE III-1: Mexican State of Residence of 481 Apprehended Mexican Illegal Alien Respondents



Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

The Dynamics of Illegal Immigration: Socio-Economic Disparities
Between Sending and Receiving Nations

Macro Differences: Sending Nations and the U.S. INS collects data on the nation of origin of apprehended illegal aliens, but it tabulates those data for only a handful of individual nations. Apprehension data on specific nations sending illegals from the Western Hemisphere are, for example, limited to data on illegals from Mexico, Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and the British West Indies, and Belize, which are grouped together. All other apprehended illegals from the West are tabulated as "Other Western Hemisphere."

Thus, though INS data show that increasing numbers of apprehended illegals come from other nations in the Western Hemisphere and non-European nations in the East, it is not possible to identify, much less rank, leading sources of known illegal immigration by country of origin, once the obvious identification of Mexico has been made. In selecting other nations sending illegals for brief discussion of the causes of illegal immigration, we have therefore relied on the results of our survey, which was designed to interview 300 Mexican and 300 non-Mexican illegals apprehended by the INS District Offices, which are responsible for enforcing immigration law in the interior of the nation, and 200 illegals apprehended by the INS Border Patrol, where nation of origin was ignored.

As expected, most respondents apprehended by the Border Patrol were Mexican; hence 481 respondents in the study group were Mexican illegals. Most non-Mexican respondents came from other nations in the Western Hemisphere: 237, as compared with 75 respondents from the Eastern Hemisphere. As Table III-5 shows, although illegals from 53 nations were interviewed, more than a third of the non-Mexican respondents came from four nations in the West: El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Ecuador. Each of those nations is considered by INS to be the source of significant numbers of illegals in the nation, and Guatemala, Colombia, and Ecuador are among the seven nations with the highest nonimmigrant visa refusal rates, as noted earlier. To gain some understanding of the dynamics of illegal immigration at the macro level, we turn next to a brief comparison of socio-economic conditions in the United States with those in Mexico and those four nations.

TABLE III-5

Region and Country of Origin of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents

WESTERN HEMISPHERE			EASTERN HEMISPHERE		
<u>North America</u>	<u>No. of Respondents</u>	<u>Percent of Total No.</u>	<u>Europe</u>	<u>No. of Respondents</u>	<u>Percent of Total No.</u>
Antigua	2	0.3	Belgium	1	0.1
Bahamas	1	0.1	Germany	1	0.1
Barbados	1	0.1	Greece	19	2.4
Belize	4	0.5	Ireland	1	0.1
Canada	5	0.6	Italy	1	0.1
Costa Rica	9	1.1	Poland	1	0.1
Dominican Republic	5	0.6	Spain	2	0.3
*El Salvador	38	4.8	Sweden	1	0.1
Grenada	1	0.1	United Kingdom	1	0.1
*Guatemala	36	4.5	Yugoslavia	1	0.1
Haiti	7	0.9	Total	29	3.5
Honduras	10	1.3			
Jamaica	10	1.3	<u>Africa</u>		
*Mexico	481	60.6	Ghana	2	0.3
Nicaragua	6	0.8	Kenya	1	0.1
Trinidad	2	0.3	Nigeria	4	0.5
Total	618	77.9	Total	7	0.9
<u>South America</u>			<u>Asia</u>		
Argentina	6	0.8	Bangladesh	1	0.1
Bolivia	3	0.4	Cyprus	1	0.1
Brazil	1	0.1	Hong Kong	1	0.1
Chile	10	1.3	India	4	0.5
*Colombia	31	3.9	Indonesia	1	0.1
*Ecuador	28	3.5	Iran	3	0.4
Guyana	4	0.5	Israel	1	0.1
Peru	15	1.9	Japan	2	0.3
Uruguay	1	0.1	Pakistan	4	0.5
Venezuela	1	0.1	Palestine	1	0.1
Total	100	12.6	Philippines	4	0.5
			Republic of China	3	0.4
<u>Total Western Hemisphere</u>	718	90.5	Taiwan	3	0.4
			Thailand	10	1.3
			Total	39	4.9
			<u>Total Eastern Hemisphere</u>	75	9.3
			TOTAL	793	99.8 ¹

* Nations selected for comparative analysis.

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹Percentage may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

As Table III-6 shows, despite the fact that Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Ecuador are undergoing considerable economic development (Mexico, in particular, has experienced rapid economic growth, and has had the fastest rate of economic growth in Latin America in the last decade), their low level of per capita income, which ranged from \$286 in El Salvador to \$681 in Mexico, indicate their status as developing nations and signal the existence of extreme poverty, both absolute and relative to the United States, with its highly developed economy and widely different per capita income of \$4,981.

The validity of that conventional index of poverty is borne out and reinforced by the accompanying data presented in that table. Though the material standard of living is generally substantially higher in Mexico than in El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Ecuador, the five Latin American nations are markedly similar to each other and dissimilar to the United States in the lack of medical help and in the health conditions of their citizens, as measured by number of persons per physician, infant mortality rates, and years of life expectancy at birth. Housing conditions reveal comparable disparities between those nations and the United States (see Table III-7).

The material standard of living in those five nations is thus radically different from that in the United States, quite apart from any consideration of the equally disparate population pressures bearing upon them. The population growth rates of the five nations, which are typical of Latin America and most developing nations, are among the highest in the world, ranging in recent years from an annual growth rate of 3.5% in El Salvador to 2.8% in Guatemala and Colombia. Those rates contrast sharply with the U.S. population growth rate of 1%. Thus, not only do the rapidly increasing populations in each of the five Latin American nations have a depressive effect upon their economy, which serves to offset their recent gains, the relative lack of population pressure in the United States will, over time, do little to dispel the economic disparities between it and its Latin-American neighbors.

Taken together, those data indicate significant but still purely statistical differences between the level of poverty and standard of living in the U.S. and in those five nations, without regard to severe imbalances in the distribution of wealth and opportunities in the latter nations.

TABLE III-6

Socio-economic Characteristics of the United States and Selected Latin-American Nations

	United States	Mexico	El Salvador	Guatemala	Colombia	Ecuador*
Total National Income (billions)	\$1,040,190 (1972)	\$34,632 (1971)	\$1,076 (1971)	\$1,889 (1971)	\$3,573 (1972)	\$1,920 (1972)
Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (1960-73) (percent)	+	6.8	5.4	5.8	5.6	5.5
Annual GDP Growth Rate Per Capita (1960-73) (percent)	+	3.3	1.9	2.9	2.8	2.4
*Per Capita Income	\$4,581 (1972)	\$601 (1971)	\$266 (1972)	\$333 (1971)	\$426 (1972)	\$295 (1972)
Percent Change in Consumer Price Index in 1974	8.8 (1973)	16.6	13.5	9.4	22.2	14.3
Total Population (millions) (1972)	208.8	52.4	3.8	5.6	22.5	6.5
Annual Population Growth Rate, 1960-74 Average (percent)	1.0 (1965-73)	3.4	3.5	2.8	2.8	2.9
Birthrate (per 1000 inhabitants)	15.6 (1972)	43.4 (1972)	41.0 (1973)	44.4 (1973)	44.6 (1965-70)	44.9 (1965-70)
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 births)	18.0 (1972)	61.5 (1972)	59.4 (1973)	80.8 (1973)	67.9 (1971)	81.9 (1972)
Life Expectancy at Birth (years)	71.2 (1972)	62.0 (1971)	58.5 (1970-75)	51.8 (1971)	51.0 (1972)	56.6-59.6 (1975)
*Population Per Physician	634 (1971)	1,385 (1970)	3,950 (1972)	3,617 (1970)	2,161 (1971)	2,928 (1970)
Percentage of Urban Population (1974)	73.5 (1970)	62.3	39.8	33.6	63.8	41.3
Percentage of Literacy	99.0** (1969)	76.3 (1970)	59.5 (1971)	37.9 (1964)	78.5 (1971)	77.0 (1974)

SOURCES:

For Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, Inter-American Development Bank, Economic & Social Progress in Latin America, 1974 Annual Report; see Statistical Profile for each nation.

*U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1973, Table 197; Table 182.

**Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974, Table 189.

*Comparable data not available.

TABLE III-7

Characteristics of Households in the U.S. and in Selected Latin-American Nations

Household Characteristics	United States	Mexico	El Salvador	Guatemala	Colombia	Ecuador
Average No. of Persons per Household	3.2 (1970)	5.7 (1970)	*	5.2 (1964)	*	5.1 (1962)
Average No. of Rooms per Dwelling	5.1 (1970)	2.3 (1970)	1.7 (1970)	2.0 (1964)	2.9 (1964)	5.1 (1962)
Percentage of Households With Running Water	97.5 (1970)	38.7 (1970)	26.0 (1970)	11.3 (1964)	41.3 (1964)	12.3 (1962)
Percentage of Households With Electricity	*	58.9 (1970)	34.0 (1970)	22.0 (1964)	47.4 (1964)	32.3 (1962)

Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1973, Table 198.

*Comparable data not available.

Additional data presented in Table III-6 give indirect evidence of such maldistributions. The percentage of total population living in urban areas -- where medical facilities, educational opportunities, and work are far more likely to be available -- is much less in these sending nations than in the U.S., and it is often radically different. The percentage of the total population living in urban areas in Guatemala and El Salvador in 1974 was 33.6 and 39.8, respectively, while in Mexico (which has been undergoing rapid urbanization in certain areas in recent years), 62.3% of the population were reported to be living in urban areas in 1974, as compared to 73.5% in 1970 in the U.S. High illiteracy rates similarly give further evidence of significant differences within the populations of sending nations as well as between those populations and the U.S.

Despite increasing industrialization, the benefits of these developing nations still go primarily to the upper-income few. In 1972, for example, some 52% of the population of Ecuador subsisted largely outside the money economy and had an average annual income of \$76 per capita, obtaining less than 10% of the gross domestic product (GDP), while the upper 7% of its population received some 50% of it.* Similar radical discrepancies in income distribution in Mexico have often been cited, and are considered a significant factor in the escalating occurrence of Mexican illegal immigration in the U.S.**

Though labor-market data for Latin America are scanty, unemployment and underemployment are marked, indicating severe differences in economic welfare within the populations of these sending nations as well as between them and the U.S. Despite Mexico's dynamic economy and rapid industrialization, for example, the number of people seeking work far outnumber the

*Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1974 Annual Report, p. 273.

**See, for example, Vernon Briggs, Mexican Migration and the U.S. Labor Market; Ray Marshall, "Economic Factors Influencing the International Migration of Workers," a paper presented at a Conference on Contemporary Dilemmas of the Mexican-U.S. Border, San Antonio, April 15, 1975; Samora, Los Mojados.

jobs available.* -- with little prospect for immediate relief, given the youthfulness of its population (46.4% under the age of 15), and its high birth rate.** The other, far less industrialized, nations, similarly burdened by youthful populations and high birth rates, also confront considerable unemployment and inordinate underemployment rates. In Guatemala, for example, 56% of the economically active population still depends upon agriculture for its livelihood, and 42.4% of that population has been estimated to be underemployed.*** Though unemployment in the U.S. is currently high in comparison with recent times, it is neither indigenous to its developed economy, nor is it intensified by a young work force and a high birth rate.

In addition, the wage disparities between Latin Americans who have found employment and U.S. employed persons are enormous (see Table III-8). The average weekly wage in these five countries, which ranges from \$11.04 in Colombia to \$31.21 in Mexico, is one-fifth to one-tenth that of the average weekly wage of U.S. workers. A Colombian employed in industry, for example, earns in a week what a similarly employed American worker earns in less than half a day, and though a Mexican industrial employee earns about three times the weekly wage of that Colombian, he earns in a week no more than a U.S. worker earns in slightly more than a day. Similarly, in Chihuahua, Mexico, the source of substantial numbers of apprehended Mexican illegals, the minimum wage of \$10.00 a week is equivalent to the minimum wage for less than a day's work in the U.S., while the minimum weekly wage in Colombia is almost identical to the minimum wage for an hour of work in the U.S.

*The Mexican Ministry of Labor released an unemployment-cum-underemployment rate of 40% in 1974 (Excelsior, Mexico City, February 18, 1974).

**Economic and Social Progress in Latin America, 1974, p. 344.

***Ibid. p. 298.

Labor-Market Characteristics of U.S. and Selected Latin American Nations

Labor-Market Characteristics	United States	Mexico	El Salvador	Guatemala	Colombia	Ecuador
Economically active population (millions)	91,716.0	12,955.0	2,263.1	1,565.7	5,134.1	2,146.9
And age (years)	16+	12+	10+	10+	12+	12+
	(1974)g	(1972)b	(1971)c	(1973)f	(1964)d	(1973)e
Percentage in Agriculture	3.1	19.2	49.7	57.0	47.3	55.4
	(1974)g	(1972)b	(1971)c	(1973)f	(1964)d	(1973)e
Percentage in Industry	21.5	16.7	9.0	13.8	16.0	13.0
	(1974)	(1972)b	(1971)c	(1973)f	(1964)d	(1973)e
Percentage in Services	14.5	12.0	24.1	12.6	18.0	13.7
	(1974)	(1972)b	(1971)c	(1973)f	(1964)d	(1973)e
Average Wage (U.S. \$/week)	\$166.00	\$11.21	+	\$20.62	\$11.04	\$21.84
	(1971)a	(1972)a		(1971)a	(1971)a	(1972)a
In Agriculture (U.S. \$)	\$66.00	\$9.90	+	+	\$5.28	+
	(1971)a	(1972)a			(1972)a	
In Industry (U.S. \$)	\$154.00	\$19.15	\$18.00	\$18.00	\$13.60	\$21.50
	(1971)a	(1972)a	(1971)a	(1972)a	(1970)a	(1972)a
In Services (U.S. \$)	\$108.00	+	+	+	+	+
	(1971)g					
Minimum Wage (U.S. \$/week)	\$2.00-2.10 per hr. \$1.80 - 1971c	\$10.30 (1970)h	+	+	\$2.20 (1970)a	+
	(1971)h					
Unemployment Rate (Percent)	7	40	+	2.7	7	8-10
	(1971)h	(1972)		5.7*	(1971)h	(under several
		(includes under-		42.4***		ment several
		employment) i		(1973)h		times this
						figure) h

*In Chile, a major source of apprehended illegal.

**Under employment, urban economically active.

***Under employment, rural economically active.

+ Comparable data not available.

Sources:

- a. Americas en Cifras, 1974, Instituto Interamericano de Estadística, Organización de los Americanos, Washington, D.C., 1974.
- b. IV Censo General de Población, 1970, Resumen General, Secretaría de Economía y Comercio, Dirección General de Estadística México, D.F., 1972.
- c. Indicadores Económicos y Sociales, Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Coordinación Económica, Departamento de Programación Global, Sección de Investigaciones Estadísticas, San Salvador, 1974.
- d. VIII Censo Nacional de Población, 1964, Resumen General, 1964, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, D.F., 1967.
- e. Serie Estadística 1967-1972, República del Ecuador, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Quito, 1974.
- f. Boletín Informativo, Datos definitivos del VIII Censo Nacional de Población del 26 de Marzo de 1973, Ministerio de Economía, Dirección General de Estadística, República de Guatemala C.A., 1973.
- g. Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974.
- h. Economic Social Progress in Latin America, Annual Report, 1974, Inter-American Development Bank.
- i. Mexican Ministry of Labor, Excelsior, Mexico City, February 16, 1974.

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TABLE III-9

Characteristics of Household of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their Country of Origin

Household Characteristics	Total	Eastern Hemisphere Illegals	Western Hemisphere Illegals (exc. Mexico)	Mexican Illegals
Average No. of Persons per Household	6.4	5.0	5.9	6.8
Percentage of Households with Electricity	79.4	93.5	88.9	73.4
Percentage of Households with Running Water	70.4	91.8	87.2	60.5
Percentage of Households with Radio or T.V.	75.0	90.2	76.2	75.5
No. of Respondents	691	60	185	446
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	10	2	4	4
No Household in Country of Origin	92	13	48	31
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

In sum, the general income level, health and housing conditions, education, and opportunities for employment in Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Ecuador are minimal in comparison with those in the United States, and they signal the existence of real inadequacies as well as relative disparities. When looked at in terms of the added factors of inordinate population pressures and unequal distributions of that income and those opportunities, the current conditions and immediate prospects of large numbers of Latin Americans are grim. These push factors, which are typical of the socio-economic conditions in most Latin American countries and other developing nations, contrast sharply with the attractions of the United States and the myth of the American Dream, which portable radios and television sets now bring to the attention of increasing numbers of people throughout the world. That these circumstances combine with the post-war availability of international transportation to produce an increasing flow of illegal immigration from those nations is not surprising. Further, it is a phenomenon that is unlikely to subside until the imbalance between the demand for and the supply of goods that generally attends modern developing nations is adjusted, and the socio-economic disparities between nations sending illegals and the United States are diminished.

Micro Differences: The Study Group. In general, the socio-economic characteristics of the illegals interviewed for this study* reflect the generally depressed socio-economic conditions of their country of origin. There were, however, significant differences between respondents from Mexico, those from other nations in the Western Hemisphere (WH illegals), and those from nations in the Eastern Hemisphere (EH illegals). The Mexican illegals in our study group were significantly more disadvantaged persons and workers in their country of origin than were the illegals from other nations in the Western Hemisphere, though Mexico is generally a more economically advanced and urbanized nation than most countries in the Caribbean, or Central and South America. Further, respondents from the Eastern Hemisphere (who came primarily from Greece, Thailand,

*References to the study group or to respondents designate the 793 apprehended illegals interviewed for this study; references to the 51 unapprehended illegals who were also interviewed are always described as such in the text and tables.

India, Pakistan, and the Philippines) were consistently more advantaged than were respondents from the Western Hemisphere, excluding Mexico.)

The 481 Mexican illegals were substantially more likely to have come from rural areas and to have been farmworkers in their country of origin than were the 237 WH or the 75 EH illegals. A third of the Mexican respondents to the question came from towns with a population of less than 2,500, as compared with less than ten percent of the WH illegals, and slightly more than ten percent of the EH illegals. Viewed from the other end of the spectrum, the difference in degree of urbanization between the Mexican and the non-Mexican respondents was even more striking: 52.1% of the WH and 48.2% of the EH illegals reported a hometown with a population of 1 million or more, as compared with 9.0% of the Mexican illegals. Similarly, though the percentage of the labor force in agriculture is generally lower in Mexico than it is in other nations sending illegals from the Western Hemisphere (see Table III-8), almost half the 407 Mexican respondents who had worked in their home country since 1970 reported that they had been farmworkers there, as compared with slightly more than ten percent of the 173 WH respondents who had worked in their country of origin. Only one of the 48 EH respondents who had worked in their homeland since 1970 had been employed in agriculture.

The housing conditions reported by the Mexican illegals were also consistently inferior to those reported by the WH illegals, which were, in turn, inferior to those reported by the EH illegals (Table III-9). On average, the Mexican respondents reported that 6.8 persons lived in their home in their native land, as compared to an average of 5.9 and 5.0 persons in WH and EH households, respectively. Mexican respondents were also twice as likely not to have electricity, and three times as likely not to have running water in their homes, as were WH respondents. Similarly, the average monthly rent or mortgage payment, in cases where such payments were made, were substantially higher among the WH

*In discussing differences between Mexican and non-Mexican respondents, it is important to note that only 6.4% or 15 of the WH respondents came with student visas. Most (55.5%) had entered as tourists, but a substantial minority (37.6%) were EWIs. Almost all Mexican respondents were EWIs, though 7.3% or 35 were tourists, and 1.7% or 8 had entered as students. EH respondents formed a quite different group: 34.7% or 26 came with student visas; 26.7% or 20, with tourist visas; 17.3% or 13 were EWIs; the rest had entered with other types of visas.

illegals than among the Mexicans (\$47 and \$28, respectively). The dozen-EH illegals who reported on the cost of their home in their country of origin reported payments averaging more than \$100 a month.

Given the limited circumstances of most respondents, it is not surprising that almost three-quarters (74.2%) of all respondents in the study group reported that they came to the United States in order to find a job. Further, when respondents' motivation for coming to the United States are viewed in terms of their region of origin, the socio-economic differences noted between the three subgroups of respondents have their subjective analogue. As the following table shows, almost 90% of the Mexican illegals, as compared with 60% of the WH and less than a quarter of the EH respondents, reported they came to the U.S. to find employment.

TABLE III-10

Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents' Primary Reason
For Coming to the United States

(as percents of group responding)

<u>Reason for Coming the U.S.</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>EH Illegals</u>	<u>WH Illegals</u>	<u>Mexican Illegals</u>
To get a job	74.2	23.0	60.4	88.9
To see the U.S.	8.9	10.8	16.6	4.8
To study	7.5	45.9	7.2	1.7
To visit relatives	4.4	8.1	6.0	3.1
Other	4.9	12.2	9.7	1.5
Subtotal ¹	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0
No. of Respondents	788	74	235	479
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.6	1.3	0.8	0.4
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

Thus, the most disadvantaged of the three groups of respondents, the Mexicans, were the most likely to come to the United States for explicitly economic reasons, while the most advantaged, the EH illegals, were least likely to report that they had migrated in order to find employment. Though the majority of the WH illegals came explicitly in search of a U.S. job, a substantial minority of this subgroup of respondents and most EH respondents, apparently drifted into illegal status, i.e., remained in the nation and entered the American labor market more by chance than by design, more as a result of firsthand knowledge of the attractions of work in the U.S. than firsthand experience of economic adversities in their country of origin. To overstate but underscore this difference between these groups of respondents: while most Mexican, and a slight majority of the WH, illegals appear to have been primarily pushed out of their region of origin by adverse economic circumstances and to have come illegally in search of employment, most EH illegals, and a significant minority of the WH illegals, appear to have been primarily pulled here by the attractions of the United States, and to have become illegals because of its greater opportunities.

In sum, though macro data on nations sending illegals are virtually non-existent, and though our survey focused upon the characteristics of respondents and their experiences in the U.S. labor market, rather than the environment which they chose to leave behind them, the respondents' predominantly economic explanation of their reason for migrating, their characteristics as generally disadvantaged individuals and workers, and the generally depressed socio-economic conditions of the nations from which most came illustrate the adversities illegals face in their native land, both real and relative to the U.S. Given current restrictions upon immigration to the U.S., and its historic proscription of nonimmigrant alien labor, most aliens who wish to follow in the footsteps of the millions of earlier legal immigrants to the U.S. must do so illegally. Nevertheless, in recent years, the number of aliens who opt for this illegal alternative to a subsistence or otherwise limited way of life has increased, and their region of origin appears to have widened.

CHAPTER IV: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ILLEGAL ALIENS

Introduction

Before examining the labor-market experiences of the interviewed illegal aliens, the subject of Chapter V, or their experiences with governmental programs, the subject of Chapter VI, we describe their characteristics as individuals, as family members, and as migrants. Knowing something about these characteristics will provide some leads as to the respondents' impacts on society; such knowledge, once secured on a broader and deeper scale, would be helpful when considering alternative policies and strategies vis-a-vis illegal aliens (a policy appropriate if the population consists of floating groups of bachelors, who visit the U.S. from time to time, might not be appropriate if the population is deeply imbedded in the social fabric).

With this in mind, we will first examine the respondents as individuals, dealing with characteristics of age, sex, and education. We then turn to a description of the respondents as family members, their marital status, number of children, family obligations abroad, and family ties in the U.S. Finally, we will describe the respondents' ties with this country and their country of origin, covering such subjects as their entry techniques, the number of trips they have made between their homeland and the U.S., their past brushes with INS, their contact with the illegals' network, and their future plans.

Characteristics: Age, Sex, and Education

Age. The interviewed illegals* were young, younger than the average member of the U.S. labor force, but not as young as some might expect; the illegals' average age was 28.5 years, as compared to 39.0 for male U.S. workers generally. (Both figures are for the working population, aged 16 and older; the interviewers had been instructed to administer the survey to illegals who had worked in the U.S. for at least two weeks, and who were 16 years of age or older; no upper age limit was specified.)

*All references to interviewed illegals or to respondents are to the 793 apprehended illegals in the study. Any references to the smaller group of unapprehended illegals interviewed are specifically identified as such.

There were four 16-year olds among the 793 respondents, and a lone 65-year old at the other end of the age range; the most common age was 22, which was reported by 55 of the respondents, followed by 20, which was the age of 52 of them.

While there were some differences in the average ages reported by the different subgroups, the differences were not pronounced. Perhaps the most significant of these differences was between that recorded for the visa abusers, and that of the EWIs. The former averaged 30.9 years of age, while the latter averaged 27.5. (This is understandable, as an INS official told us, "because teenagers have difficulty securing visas, but are perfectly capable of walking across the border.")

In terms of origin, Mexican-born respondents were slightly younger (27.6 years of age on average) than those from the Eastern Hemisphere (EH illegals), who averaged 28.3 years. The oldest of the three region-of-origin groups were those from the Western Hemisphere, excluding Mexico (WH illegals), whose average age was 30.4 years. A comparison of the age distribution of respondents and the U.S. labor force is shown in Table IV-1.

Taking a closer look (Table IV-2) at the largest and youngest group of illegals in this study, those from Mexico, we compared the age distribution of these respondents with those in the only other recent study of illegals;* and with the legal Mexican immigrants who arrived in FY 1974. Although both groups of illegals have more representation in the 16-24 age bracket than do the legal immigrants, the distributions are otherwise remarkably similar.

Sex. Although the conventional wisdom that illegals are generally young adults is probably correct, we are less assured of the accuracy of its claim that illegals are young men.

INS apprehensions are primarily of men and, consequently, 90.8% of the interviewed apprehended illegals were male. INS apprehensions, however, reflect a mix of two realities -- the demography of the illegal population and INS practices. The INS enforcement staff is overwhelmingly male, and its members are likely to think along masculine lines as they plan their operations, and hence they tend to focus on situations where male illegals may congregate, such as at construction sites or in citrus groves. Further, there are serious logistical and

*Samora, Los Mojados, p. 90.

TABLE IV-1

Distributions of Age of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents by Region of Origin,
and of the U.S. Labor Force

(as percents of group)

AGE GROUP AT LAST BIRTHDAY	TOTAL	REGION OF ORIGIN			U.S. LABOR FORCE
		Eastern Hemisphere	Western Hemisphere exc. Mexico	Mexico	
16 - 24	40.1	30.7	30.0	46.6	23.1
25 - 44	53.6	64.0	63.3	47.2	42.5
45 & Over	6.3	5.3	6.7	6.2	34.3
No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	-
SUBTOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	-
Average Age (in years)	28.5	28.3	30.4	27.6	39.0
Standard Deviation	8.7	7.3	8.2	9.0	-

Sources: Columns 1 through 4, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; column 5, 1973 labor force data from Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974, Table 544; average age calculated from Employment and Earnings, April, 1975, Tables A-9 and A-19. (Data in first four columns is for a 90.8% male labor force.)

All averages in tables in this report refer to mean.

TABLE IV-2

Distributions of Age of Apprehended Mexican Male Illegal Alien Respondents in L&Co. and Samora Study Groups and of FY 1974 Arriving Mexican Male Immigrants

(as percents of groups)

AGE GROUP AT LAST BIRTHDAY	L&CO. STUDY GROUP ¹	SAMORA STUDY GROUP ²	FY 1974 ARRIVING IMMIGRANTS ³
16 - 24	46.6	51.2	43.0
25 - 44	47.2	45.3	48.4
45 & Over	6.2	3.4	8.7
No. of Respondents	481	489	36,124
SUBTOTAL ⁴	100.0	99.9	100.1
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	-	0.8	-
Total No. of Respondents	481	493	36,124

Sources: Column 1, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; Column 2, Samora, Los Mojados, p. 90; column 3, INS Annual Report, Table 9.

¹L&Co. study group included 33 females.

²Samora's age groups were expressed as "under 25, 26-45, and over 46," and are thus not precisely comparable to the others.

³INS data are presented by ten-year cohorts, thus the data on 16-24 year olds used here were secured by taking 40% of the 10-19 age group and adding it to 50% of the 20-29 age group, and so on.

⁴Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

humanitarian problems connected with apprehensions of women; INS maintains no over-night detention facilities for women, and an apprehended woman has to be lodged (at considerable expense) in the nearest jail or prison that has such facilities. Then there are the additional problems caused by an apprehended woman with one or more small children.

In addition to these operational considerations, there is also a definitional complication in that apprehension data reflect events that happen within the United States, and (usually) not at the ports of entry. If an INS enforcement officer encounters an illegal 100 feet, or 100 miles, inside the nation's borders, that is an apprehension; if, on the other hand, the INS immigration inspector on duty in a port of entry denies admission to an alien, that act is not counted as an apprehension. Since a substantial percentage of those denied admission, according to INS officials, are women, the noninclusion of alien denials in apprehension data suggests that these data understate the incidence of women in the illegal population.*

There are other indications that there are more female illegals in the U.S. than INS apprehension data reflect. For example:

- A Georgetown University graduate student, working with the 1960 and 1970 Mexican censuses, and using the residual method, calculated that 1.6 million people living in Mexico in 1960 were missing from the 1970 Mexican Census, and they could not be accounted for either by death or by legal immigration to the United States. He attributed the loss of this group, three-sevenths of which he estimated to be women, to illegal immigration to the United States.**

*For instance, in San Diego County (California), in FY 1975, the Border Patrol apprehended 182,002 Mexican illegals, of whom 89.2% were men 16 years of age and older, the balance being women and boys under 16; on the other hand, of the 17,697 aliens denied admission at San Ysidro, the principal port of entry in the county, INS officials estimate that 75% were women. See San Diego, Human Resources Agency, A Study of the Impact of Illegal Aliens on the County of San Diego on Specific Socioeconomic Areas (1975) p. 37.

Similarly, in a border-wide study of would-be fraudulent entrants, designed by one of the authors and conducted by INS, 54.9% of the 716 such persons identified by immigration inspectors in the course of the study were women.

**Howard Goldberg, unpublished paper written for the Center for Population Research, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1975.

- An earlier and informal survey, which we conducted for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, of unapprehended illegals in Washington, D.C., taken largely in buildings occupied by Central Americans, indicated a ratio of three men to two women among the illegals.*
- Of the unapprehended illegals interviewed for this study, 41% were female.
- Of the 344 married apprehended illegals interviewed for this study, 135 said they had a spouse in the United States. In answer to another question, 53 said their spouse was a citizen or a resident alien, leaving a balance of 82 spouses present in the country who were neither citizens nor resident aliens; presumably most of these 82 were women and illegal aliens. Had this group been added to the group interviewed, it would have doubled the number of women in the group.
- The female apprehended illegal respondents accounted for only 7.0% of the EWIs but 14.3% of the visa abusers, a group which is far less likely to be apprehended than the EWIs.

Education. Just as the allocation of INS enforcement resources, with a heavy emphasis on the Southwest and California, results in the apprehension of far more Mexican than non-Mexican illegals, and its practices probably result in the apprehension of more males than females, so it is probable that INS may capture a higher proportion of the least educated illegals than it does of those with more education.**

This speculation should be borne in mind in the following comparisons of the general level of the respondents' education with that of the U.S. population

*North, "Illegal Aliens: Final Report," pp. 66-77.

**The unapprehended respondents had an average of 11.3 years of schooling; hence, they were considerably more educated than Mexican or WH respondents, though slightly less educated than EH respondents.

Table IV-3 shows that respondents generally had half the education of the U.S. civilian labor force, and that there were remarkable differences among the levels of education reported by the illegals, depending on where they were from, and where they were located in the United States. EH illegals, with 11.9 years of education, were almost at the U.S. norm, 12.4 years; but illegals from Mexico and those in the Southwest were about 40% of that norm. WH illegals, with 8.7 years of education, had about twice the schooling of the Mexican illegals.

A more precise comparison of persons in the 25-34 age range shows that only a fraction over 1% of the U.S. population, and only about 2% of the nation's blacks, had four years of schooling or less, compared to 27.8% of the interviewed illegals as a group.* On the other hand, data for employed males of Mexican origin in the U.S. are fairly close to that of the illegals. Of the U.S. males aged 25-64 in this group (data for the 25-34 group are not available), there were 23.4% with four years or less of school.**

At the top of the educational spectrum, 8.9% of the interviewed 25-34 year old illegals said they had completed one or more years of college, compared with more than a third of the U.S. population generally and with more than a fifth of the blacks in the same age group. Most of the illegals with this level of education were born outside Mexico, and many of them were natives of the Eastern Hemisphere who first arrived in the U.S. with a student visa.

We also found that respondents who spoke English had about twice as much education as those who did not, 11.0 years compared to 5.6. Similarly, visa abusers, who have to be cosmopolitan enough to get a visa from the State Department in the first place, had twice the education of the EWIs.

With a few exceptions, most of the illegals had no contact with U.S. educational institutions. This was particularly true for EWIs, for illegals over 35, and for Mexicans. Only 9.4% of the latter group, for example, had been enrolled in a U.S. school. On the other hand, 25.0% of the WH illegals and 47.3% of the EH illegals had been to school in the U.S. The EH illegals were also more likely to be enrolled in U.S. schools for longer periods of time. Of the EH illegals, 20.4% had attended U.S. classes for three or more years, compared to 2.9% of the WH illegals and only 0.6% of those born in Mexico.

*U.S. data drawn from the Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1974, Table 188.

**Mexican origin data from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, P-20, No. 280, "Persons of Spanish Origin in the U.S.; March 1974 (Washington, D.C., 1975) Table 21.

TABLE IV-3

Distributions of Educational Attainment of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents, by Region of Origin,
and by Location in U.S., and of U.S. Civilian Labor Force

(as percents of group responding)

YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED	APPREHENDED ILLEGAL ALIEN RESPONDENTS								U.S. CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE (18 yrs. & over)
	TOTAL (16 yrs. & over)	REGION OF ORIGIN			LOCATION OF U.S. JOB				
		Eastern Hemisphere	Western Hemisphere exc. Mexico	Mexico	East Coast	Mid/ North- West	South- west	California	
0 - 4	30.0	4.1	10.5	43.5	11.1	27.9	46.6	33.9	2.1
5 - 8	40.2	21.6	41.8	42.3	40.2	37.5	42.6	39.1	12.9
9 - 11	14.5	16.2	20.7	11.2	17.9	15.4	8.5	16.5	19.2
12	6.3	10.8	13.1	2.3	13.7	1.9	1.3	5.7	38.7
13 - 15	5.4	25.7	8.9	0.6	9.4	10.6	0.4	3.9	13.6
16 +	7.5	21.6	5.1	-	7.7	6.7	0.4	0.9	13.6
No. of Respondents	791	74	237	480	234	104	223	230	85,410,000
SUBTOTAL ¹	99.9	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.8	100.0	100.1
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.3	1.3	-	0.2	0.4	-	-	0.4	-
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	235	104	223	231	85,410,000
Average Years of School Completed	6.7	11.9	8.7	4.9	8.9	7.5	4.6	6.2	12.4
Standard Deviation	4.3	4.6	4.0	3.1	4.3	4.8	3.0	3.8	-

Sources: Columns 1-8, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; column 9, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1973, Table 12.

¹ Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

The groups of respondents with the most education and the most contact with U.S. schools -- those speaking English, visa abusers, and those apprehended in New York City, to cite three examples -- tended to be among the most successful in the labor market.

Characteristics: The Respondents as Family Members

The factors which were just reviewed, age, sex, and, particularly, education, bear heavily on the kind of job a worker can obtain. The factors which are about to be described, marital status and family obligations, have relatively little to do with the kind of work that one does, but a great deal to do with the motivation that carries one into the work place. As will be shown, the respondents had substantial family obligations, rarely blunted by social insurance or welfare systems, which gave them great incentive to take chances, to migrate, and to work hard.

Marital Status. The respondents, a group which was 90.8% male, were considerably less likely to be married than the U.S. male population. In order to make meaningful comparisons (given the relative youth of the illegals), we examined the marital status of the illegals by three age groups, 16-24, 25-34, and 35 and over. (In the latter instance, we compared the illegals' marital status to American males between 35 and 54, since virtually all of the over-35 illegals in our sample were under the age of 55.)

As Table IV-4 indicates, the most dramatic contrast comes in the 25-34 age range; only 15.9% of the U.S. males of this age are single-never married, but 36.9% of the respondents were in this category.*

Typically, the percentage of illegals reporting marriage (combining formal and common-law marriages for this purpose) varied relatively little in most of our cross-tabulations; there were variations with time (about 43% of those here less than two years were married, compared to more than 51% who had been here two years or more), and even more so with region of origin (only 29.3% of the Eastern Hemisphere illegals were married, compared to roughly half of those from Mexico, and from elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere). A majority (56.9%) of the unapprehended illegals were currently married.

*An INS staff member reviewing this statistic commented that the lack of a spouse makes it possible for the single illegal to secure, either fraudulently or legitimately, an immigrant's visa through marriage to a citizen or to a permanent resident alien.

TABLE IV-4

Distributions of Marital Status of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents, and of United States Males, by Age Groups

(as percents of groups)

MARITAL STATUS	ILLEGAL ALIENS				U.S. MALES		
	Total	16 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 65	18 - 24	25 - 34	35 - 54 ¹
Married	47.4	25.1	54.8	75.2	31.7	80.3	88.7
Single, Never Married	47.0	73.9	36.9	15.5	67.1	15.9	6.6
Single, Formerly Married	5.5	0.9	8.3	9.2	1.1	3.7	4.7
No. of Respondents	793	318	301	174	-	-	-
SUBTOTAL ²	99.9	99.9	100.0	99.9	99.9	99.9	100.0
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-	-	-
Total No. of Respondents	793	318	301	174	-	-	-

Sources: Columns 1-4, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; columns 5-7, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974, Table 48. Data in columns 1-4 are for a group which is 90.8% male.

¹Since only 8 of the 174 respondents over the age of 35 were over the age of 55, data for U.S. males ages 35-54 were used for comparative purposes.

²Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

Children. The percentage of the respondents with children was slightly higher than the respondents who were married at the time of the interview. More than 48% reported one or more children under 18. Of those with children, about half reported three or more children under 18. The average for all illegals, including both the single and married ones, was 1.6 children.

Most of the illegals' children were not born in the United States; of the illegals who were parents, only about a quarter said that their children had been born in this country. (A majority (56%) of the unapprehended illegals had children, and most had been born in the U.S.)

Country of Origin Dependency Ratios. Though the apprehended illegals were less likely to be married than U.S. males of the same age, and although only about half of them had children, their family obligations were substantial.

The illegals were asked: "How many relatives living in your home country do you help support?" More than three-quarters (79.7%) said that they were supporting, or helping to support one or more relatives. Their responses were as follows:

<u>No. of Dependents</u>	<u>% of Respondents</u>
None	20.3*
One	5.5
Two	8.6
Three-Four	18.3
Five-Eight	33.3
Nine or more	14.0
Total	100.0

The next question was "About how much of that support do you provide?" The largest single group - 38.3% - said "all;" 13.1% said "more than half;" 28.9% said "about half;" and 19.6% said they provided less than half their families' living expenses.

*There were some slight discrepancies in answers to different questions on this subject. In reply to the question, "About how often do you usually send money home?" 25.5% said "never." In reply to the question, "How many relatives living in your home country do you help support?" 20.3% said "none."

With some exceptions, the respondents were workers with substantial dependency ratios; on average, they were helping to support 4.6 people in their home country (plus whatever obligations they had here), and 80% of those making such payments estimated that they provided at least half of that home-country support. Thus, these were workers who had strong motivations for taking the chances that they were taking.

The variations among the groups of apprehended illegals in the number of dependents in their home country and the degree to which illegals supported them were notable. Mexicans reported a dependency ratio of 5.4 persons per illegal, as compared to 3.6 dependents for WH illegals, and 1.8 for EH illegals. Respondents in the U.S. less than two years supported an average of 5.0 persons, as compared to 4.2 dependents for illegals in the U.S. two or more years. Illegals employed in farmwork in the U.S. supported more persons in their country of origin, 5.8, than illegals employed in nonagricultural industries, who averaged 4.3 dependents. (Our small group of unapprehended illegals shared the same dependency ratio as illegals from the Eastern Hemisphere: 1.8 persons.)

Payments Sent Abroad. One of the ironic findings of this study is that the Mexican illegals, who were the least educated and skilled of the respondents, not only were the most likely to report supporting one or more dependents back home, they were also supporting more family members, and sending home the most money, though they were also the poorest and most likely to be apprehended.

This is shown, in part, in Table IV-5, where four variables for seven groups of respondents are recorded: the average weekly wage; the average monthly support payment made by those who make such payments; the average payments made by each group (including those who made payments and those who did not), and the percentage of each group making these payments.

There is a substantial difference between the macro estimates of the Commerce Department, regarding these balance-of-payment outflows, and those that could be drawn from this study. The Department's estimate, a part of the ongoing balance of payments estimation process conducted by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, is for person-to-person remittances from individuals of all kinds in the U.S. (including U.S. citizens, legal immigrants, and illegal aliens, but excluding commuters, legal and illegal) to individuals of all kinds in Mexico (including U.S. citizens there). The estimate for 1974 was \$73.9 million.*

*Unpublished data supplied by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce.

TABLE IV-5

Payments Made to Homeland Relatives and Wages of Selected Groups of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents

Groups of Respondents	Average Weekly Wage	Average Monthly Payments ¹	Percentage of Group Making Payments	Average Monthly Payments ²	Total No. of Respondents
<u>REGION OF ORIGIN</u>					
Mexican Illegals	\$106	\$169	89	\$129	481
Western Hemisphere Illegals (excluding Mexico)	127	116	72	76	237
Eastern Hemisphere Illegals	195	104	44	37	75
<u>ENTRY TECHNIQUE</u>					
Entered Without Inspection ³	108	162	87	124	555
Visa Abusers	150	115	63	63	238
Illegals in SW Border Counties	74	186	89	129	68
ALL APPREHENDED RESPONDENTS	120	151	79	105	793

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹Average based on only those making such payments.

²Average based on all illegals, including those not paying.

³INS term for aliens who enter the U.S. without authorization.

One could draw a \$1.5 billion annual estimate from this study, with the flow of funds being defined more narrowly as monies sent by illegal aliens in the U.S. to individuals in Mexico.

The Department's estimates are based on a sampling of financial transaction records examined within this country. The estimate that could be drawn from our study would be based on two assumptions:

- that the average payments reported by the interviewed illegals from Mexico, \$129 monthly, reflected the average of all such payments, and
- that there were, at all times, 1,000,000 Mexican illegals working in the country.

This estimate of the size of the illegal Mexican work force is not inconsistent with the lower ranges of INS estimates, and more modest than the Lesko estimate of 5.3 million Mexican illegals (workers and non-workers) in the U.S., which is discussed on pages 153-154.

There are an array of reasons for differences in these balance-of-payment estimates which involve the Department's methodology and our own, as well as the likely human failing on the part of the illegals, who may have reported what they intended to do, which might have been better than their actual performance. In terms of the techniques used by the interviewed Mexican illegals, a quarter of them said they made these transactions through postal money orders, another quarter, through money orders bought at banks, and a third by purchasing money orders at other places of business. Other methods, such as carrying cash home, or sending it with friends, account for the balance.

Family Ties to the U.S. The location of the illegals' families has three facets pertinent to this study:

- to what extent were illegals tied to the U.S. by the presence of relatives? And what are the demographic implications of those ties?
- to what extent were illegals supporting relatives here (as opposed to abroad) and what are the economic consequences of this dependency?
- to what extent would their relatives in the U.S. enable illegals to become legal immigrants?

We are not able to answer all of these questions, but they are significant, and inseparable from questions concerning the role of illegals in the labor market.

One-sixth of our apprehended respondents had a spouse in this country, and an eighth had children here (presumably these two groups overlap substantially). The incidence of spouses and children was considerably higher among the unapprehended illegals; 53% and 47%, respectively.*

The distribution among the subgroups, in terms of families in the United States, was not expected. Given the nearness of Mexico, and its high birth rate, we expected respondents from Mexico to be among the ones with the most wives and children here. That was not the case.

As a group, 17.0% of the apprehended illegals reported that their spouse lived in the U.S., but 21.3% of the EH illegals and 27.8% of the WH illegals had spouses in the U.S., as compared to only 11.0% of the Mexican illegals. In general, visa abusers were high on this scale, with 31.1% reporting spouses present. Illegals in the Southwest were unlikely to have a spouse present, with only 10.0% of them indicating that this was the case, as compared to 12.5% of those in the Mid- and Northwest, 14.7% in California, and 27.7% on the East Coast. Further, there was a strong correlation between length of U.S. residence and the presence of a spouse; those who had been here for two years or longer were five times as likely to have a spouse in this country as those who had been here for less than two years (27.4% and 5.1%, respectively).

As in the case of spouses, a higher percentage of visa abusers reported the presence of children (21.8%) than did EWIs (8.1%). Similarly, 20.3% of the WH illegals, 10.7% of the EH illegals and 9.6% of the Mexicans said that they had children in this country. Of the whole group of apprehended illegals, 12.7% said that they had children in the U.S.

The relatives that the respondents were most likely to have in this country were not spouses or children, however, they were from their "families or orientation," to use the anthropologist's term, not from their "families of procreation." More than 29% of the apprehended illegals and 64.7% of the unapprehended ones told the interviewers that they had at least one parent and/or at least one sibling living in the United States. The apprehended respondents from Mexico were more likely to have these kinds of relatives here than either WH or EH illegals; 31.8%, as compared to 27.4% and 25.3%, respectively.

* Around 20% of the unapprehended illegals had come to the offices where we interviewed them to inquire about legalizing their status on the basis of marriage to a permanent resident alien or a citizen.

Altogether, and considering all the kinds of relatives described above (spouses, children, parents, and siblings) 33.8% of the apprehended respondents had one or more such relatives in the U.S. WH illegals were the most likely to have one or more relatives here, 38.4%, followed by EH illegals, 33.3% and Mexican illegals, 31.6%. Non-Mexicans among the respondents, in short, had more family ties in the U.S. than the Mexican respondents did, and were less likely to be apprehended. Should INS change its resource allocations, to concentrate on non-Mexican illegals, it might find itself apprehending a higher percentage of illegals with family ties in this country than it now does.

A prospective immigrant with relatives in the U.S. may be able to use the presence of the relative (the relative willing) to secure permanent resident status; whether this can be done, and how long it takes can depend on such variables as the nature of the relationship, the age and citizenship of the resident relative, and the place of birth and marital status of the would-be immigrant. Given the intricacies of the immigration law on the subject of family unification (see Chapter I), it was not possible to ask the full battery of questions needed to secure firm data on the immigration potential of the respondents, but what was secured suggested that a minority of them could secure an immigrant's visa under the current law.

Presumably overlapping groups among the respondents had the following family ties:

Citizen or resident alien spouses	6.7%
U.S.-born children (% of Mexican and WH illegals only*)	12.7%
Citizen parents or siblings	8.1%
Resident alien parents or siblings	19.8%

All the members of the first two categories could use the relationship to secure immigrant status; some of the members of the last two categories could also do so, depending on the variables cited above.

Characteristics: With Their Feet Planted in Two Societies

The role that illegal aliens play in the U.S. economy is governed by their relationships with two societies, the one into which they were born, and the one to which they subsequently migrated. As a result of these relationships, the illegals tend to act somewhat differently from the people with whom they are

*U.S.-born children of EH illegals are excluded because they cannot secure immigrants' visas for their parents until the children are 21.

competing. As workers in this society, their motivation levels are presumably raised by their obligation to support relatives in another society; as consumers, they presumably spend more money on travel and money orders than those born here; as illegal aliens, their options are more restricted than those of legal residents. To illuminate these aspects of the respondents' lives, we examine the duration of their stay in this country, their trips between their homeland and the U.S., their brushes with INS (which often leads to unplanned trips home), their entry techniques, the networks of illegals they encounter here, their command of English, and their future plans.

Arrival and Duration in the U.S. In the course of the interviews, in the late spring of 1975, the respondents were asked when they first arrived in the U.S. and how long, cumulatively, they had been here.

Most were not brand new arrivals; a majority (61.9%) had made their first trip to the U.S. before 1974; almost a quarter had first come (but not necessarily stayed) during the sixties. Eight of the 793, all Mexicans, had arrived in the 1940s, and another 34, all but two of whom were Mexican, had first come in the 1950s. These 42 old-timers were heavily concentrated in California and the Southwest (81.0%), and they were more likely to be in farm than non-farm work. (The current location of these illegals, concentrated as they are, might be viewed as a fleeting glimpse backwards at the distribution of illegals 15 years ago.)

Although the most senior members of the study group were Mexican-born, so too were its most junior members, as Table IV-6 indicates. In terms of duration of stay in the U.S., 8.9% of the Mexican illegals had been here for less than a month, compared to 1.7% of the WH illegals and none of the EH respondents.

The respondents, as a group, had been in the country for an average of 2.5 years; by region of origin, the duration of stay was longest for the EH illegals, and slightly longer for the WH illegals than the Mexicans. Visa abusers, illegals in California, and those working in non-farm jobs all reported longer stays than the average.

Perhaps the average is more significant than the variations. The respondents have spent a considerable amount of time in the U.S.; more than 36% of them, for example, have been here for more than three years. Presumably they were well on the way toward integration into the society when they were apprehended.

TABLE IV-6

Distributions of Duration of Stay in the U.S. of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents, by Region of Origin,
Entry Technique, Location in U.S., and Type of U.S. Employment

(as percents of group responding)

DURATION IN U.S.	TOTAL	REGION OF ORIGIN			ENTRY TECHNIQUE		LOCATION OF U.S. JOB				TYPE OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT	
		Eastern Hemisphere	Western Hemisphere		Entered Without Inspection ¹	Visa Abuser	East Coast	North-west	South-west	California	Agric.	Other
			exc. Mexico	Mexico								
Less than 1 month	5.9	-	1.7	8.9	8.1	0.8	0.4	1.9	13.9	5.5	12.5	4.6
1 to 7 months	17.4	4.0	10.5	22.9	22.3	5.9	8.1	17.3	27.4	17.3	29.4	14.9
7 months to 1 year	11.6	5.3	12.7	12.1	12.8	8.8	12.8	7.7	16.1	7.8	13.2	11.3
1 to 2 years	11.7	13.3	13.5	10.6	12.3	10.5	14.9	20.2	7.2	9.1	10.3	12.0
2 to 3 years	16.5	30.7	18.6	13.3	14.8	20.6	21.7	17.3	9.4	17.7	15.4	16.7
3 to 5 years	26.9	32.0	35.0	22.0	21.1	40.3	33.2	31.7	15.7	29.0	13.2	29.7
6 to 20 years	10.0	14.7	8.0	10.2	8.6	13.0	8.9	3.8	10.3	13.4	5.9	10.8
No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	555	238	235	104	223	231	136	657
SUBTOTAL ²	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.0
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	555	238	235	104	223	231	136	657
Average duration (in years)	2.5	3.1	2.5	2.4	2.2	3.2	2.6	2.0	2.0	3.0	1.8	2.6
Standard Deviation	3.3	2.6	1.9	3.9	3.6	2.5	1.9	1.8	3.3	4.7	5.3	2.7

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹This term for aliens who enter the U.S. without authorization.²Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

Both our data on respondents' first arrival in the U.S. and on their duration in the nation might appear to be in conflict with INS workload data on the subject, as reported, for example, in the INS 1973 Annual Report:

"...Aside from the 8,456 crewmen who technically violated their terms of admission because their ships were unable to depart the United States within the time specified, the time that elapsed in locating the other 647,512 aliens in illegal status was as follows: 55 percent within 72 hours; 19 percent within 4 to 30 days; 16 percent 1 to 6 months; and 10 percent more than 6 months."

There are three reasons for the disagreement in these figures; the first is because the study group deliberately included relatively few (183) illegals picked up at the U.S.-Mexico border; the annual catch of INS is dominated by this group. Secondly, and more significantly, we interviewed only illegals who had worked at least two weeks in the U.S. labor market at some time; hence we excluded all new arrivals. In addition, however, we did not ask the same questions. The INS question on the subject relates to the last time the alien crossed into the country; our questions (asked to secure information on potential impact, rather than for law enforcement reasons) were about the first arrival and how long the alien had been here, in all.

Number of Trips. The 793 apprehended illegals reported a total of 920 previous trips to the U.S. since 1970 (i.e., trips prior to the one that ended in the apprehension and the interview which followed it). Of these trips, 412 ended with INS apprehensions, which means that on 508 occasions the illegals successfully entered and left the U.S. without contact with INS; this could be expressed as a 55.2% success rate for the illegals (where success is defined as a trip into and out of the U.S. without apprehension). This is probably a conservative rendering of the data. Eight of the respondents said that they had been in and out of the country too frequently to estimate the number of trips; although their apprehensions are included in the 412 figure, their trips are not included in the total of 920 previous visits.

Understandably, the Mexican respondents were much more likely to travel in and out of the United States than those from other parts of the world. The Mexican respondents had averaged 4.5 trips, while EH illegals reported 1.8 and WH illegals, 1.4. Since the Mexicans had been here an average of 2.4 years, this indicates a trip home every six months or so.

INS Apprehensions. Most of the respondents (71.0%) said that the apprehension that led to the interview was the first that they had experienced. The respondents, as a group, reported a mean of .5 previous apprehensions, while subgroup means ranged from .1 for visa abusers and .1 for those on the East Coast, to .7 for EWIs, .9 for those working in the Southwest, and 1.1 for those working in agriculture. The two groups of non-Mexican illegals, EH and WH illegals, each reported an average of .1 previous apprehensions, which can be compared to an average of .8 previous apprehensions for the Mexican respondents.

Thus, the Mexican respondents in our study had, on the average, approximately eight times as many previous apprehensions as their non-Mexican counterparts, while having spent, on the average, approximately the same amount of time in the United States (2.4 years for Mexicans versus 2.6 years for non-Mexicans). This suggests that the ratio of apprehensions is an inappropriate estimate of the true ratio of Mexican to non-Mexican illegals in the U.S. A better estimator would reflect the difference in apprehension rates. From this study, we might suggest a multiplicative factor of

$$\frac{\text{Average Mexican Apprehensions}}{\text{Average non-Mexican Apprehensions}} \times \frac{\text{Average Mexican's time in U.S.}}{\text{Average non-Mexican's time in U.S.}}$$

$$.8 \times \frac{2.4}{2.6} = 7.4$$

which, when multiplied by the non-Mexican to Mexican ratio among apprehensions,* should provide an improved estimate of the non-Mexican to Mexican ratio in the illegal alien population.

Several considerations might, however, impugn the use of this specific figure. In addition to statistical variations, these include possible deceits of the respondents and possible lack of comparability of the study group vis-a-vis the illegal alien population. Thus, while we are unable to justify use of the specific factor derived, we can and do suggest that the proportion of non-Mexicans among the illegal aliens may be substantially higher than the proportion of non-Mexicans among the apprehended illegals.

*which was 1 to 9.08 in FY 1974.

In addition to the foregoing conclusion, the labor-market implications of these data are intriguing. For example, as shown in the following chapter, the groups of respondents least likely to be apprehended (non-Mexicans and non-agricultural workers on the East Coast) tend to make more money than those who are the most likely to be apprehended (Mexicans, agricultural workers, and those in the Southwest).

Entry Techniques. No matter how many times illegals have crossed the border into the U.S., it is always an event in their lives, and despite the rapid advances in transportation, a slight majority (51.9%) of the 588 respondents willing to talk to INS about it reported that they came on foot; 27.2% arrived by plane, 10.0% came by car, and the rest by other means.

A substantial majority (70.7%) of the 785 respondents to a question concerning their status at entry were EWIs. In addition, 21.3% had entered the U.S. with a tourist visa; 4.5%, with a student visa;* and 1.7% had been crewmen. The remaining 1.9% had entered with other kinds of visas. As predictable, virtually all (95.4%) of the Mexican respondents reported that they had been EWIs. The majority (55.5%) of the WH respondents had entered as tourists; an unexpected 37.6% of all respondents from this region were EWIs. Only 17.3% of the EH respondents had been EWIs, as compared with 34.7% who had entered with student visas, 26.7% who had been tourists, and 13.3% who had been crewmen.

As mentioned earlier, respondents from regions other than Mexico are better educated and more likely to make more money than Mexican respondents. The primary reason for this surely relates to the greater barriers that are raised to the arrival of a non-Mexican illegal who has no U.S. land border conveniently at hand. While the Border Patrol is likely to be a formidable foe to the would-be EWI, one's chances of crossing successfully rest more on endurance, native intelligence, and luck, rather than on money, education, and savoir faire.

*The respondents, in reply to somewhat similar questions asked by our interviewers, were more likely to admit their use of tourist and student visas, probably because the situation was somewhat less threatening. For example, 35 of the 793 were recorded by INS as abusers of student visas; in reply to our question, "Did you first come to the U.S. with a student visa?" 51 said yes.

To enter this country, without sneaking across its borders, one must secure a visa, which means one must convince a busy U.S. diplomat that you are not going to become an illegal; or one must buy a fraudulent document. Usually one must also buy an airline ticket. Both of these requirements (ticket and visa) are substantial barriers, and it is no surprise that the people who get over them are more educated, earn more money in this country, and are more likely to evade INS. A visa abuser is a good candidate for survival in this country; he has already passed a screening test, which is the illegal aliens' version of a civil service examination.

Entering the nation without authorization may be risky (in the sense that you may get caught), or dangerous (in the chilling way that Samora describes the physical dangers faced by wetbacks),* but for most, it is not a lonely business. We know from conversations with the Border Patrol, and from sensor-related apprehension data, that people moving across the border generally come in small groups,** often including some relatives, and often following paths used by others from the same hometown previously.

INS data generally do not shed much light on this subject but we did find one source of information; every time a busload of illegals leaves an INS detention center, it bears a manifest which lists the names, towns, and states of residence of the Mexicans on the bus; this list is given to Mexican authorities. A review of several manifests in the Port Isabel (Texas) detention center indicated that many people with the same last names, from the same town in Mexico, were traveling back together (presumably after being apprehended together on the road north). These communal ties are reflected, as we point out later, in residential patterns and labor-market behavior among the illegals.

The process of entering the country illegally can also have commercial overtones; the illegal may pay someone to smuggle him or supply documents. We wanted information on the subject, without spending too much time on it, or asking questions of threatening specificity. We asked, therefore, "During the last five years how many times did you pay someone to help you get into the United States?" And, if we got a positive response, we asked how much.

*Samora, Los Mojados, pp. 107-127.

**The average size of the groups of illegals in sensor-related Border Patrol apprehensions along the Southern border was 3.9 persons in FY 1975 according to calculations made from unpublished INS data (Form CBP-29).

About 21% of the illegals -- all from the Western Hemisphere (including Mexico) -- paid someone at least once. Illegals working in California (which usually means that they had to cross the tightly guarded border near San Diego) were the most likely to pay someone, with 38.5% saying that they had done so; only 5.4% of those working in the Southwest said that they had paid someone. Just under 25% of the illegals working in the Mid- and Northwest reported they had paid someone at least once, as did 16.3% of the illegals working on the East Coast. Only 3.0% of the visa abusers admitted such payments, as compared to 28.2% of the EWIs, presumably indicating a much greater incidence of smuggling than the use of fraudulent documentation. The average payment was \$234; the upper limit we encountered was \$1200.

The Illegal Network. Questions were asked about the extent to which the respondents knew about, and interacted with, other illegals. The illegals were asked if they knew people from their hometown who had been illegals in the U.S., if they had met illegals here after their arrival in the U.S., and if they lived in the U.S. with other illegals. The responses of those answering these questions in percentages are shown in Table IV-7.

These questions were among the most threatening ones in the interview; 21.7% of the respondents refused to answer the first question, or said that they did not know the answer; 23.8% reacted similarly to the second question. The third question, which would appear to be the most threatening, produced only a 9.5% rate of refusal, possibly because it was asked much later in the interview than the other questions, and by that time the respondents had become more relaxed.

Generally, about half the respondents admitted knowing illegals in their hometown; three-fifths admitted meeting other illegals in this country; and two-fifths said that they lived with other illegals. Presumably those not replying did so out of a desire not to harm fellow illegals, and hence the extent of these ties are probably greater than shown in Table IV-7. The most dramatic variations in the extent of these ties is along region of origin lines, with Mexican illegals consistently more likely to report ties to other illegals than WH illegals, who were consistently more likely to report them than EH illegals. Similarly, such ties were more often reported by farmworkers than non-farmworkers, and by EWIs, than visa abusers. Those not speaking English were also more likely to report such ties than respondents who did.

TABLE IV-7

Distributions of Responses to Questions Dealing With Admitted Contacts With Other Illegal Aliens of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents, by Region of Origin, Location in U.S., Type of U.S. Employment, and Entry Technique

(as percents of group responding)

QUESTION	TOTAL	REGION OF ORIGIN			LOCATION OF U.S. JOB				TYPE OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT		ENTRY TECHNIQUE	
		East. Hemi.	West. Hemi. exc. Mexico	West. Hemi. Mexico	East Coast	Mid-Northwest	Southwest	California	Agric.	Other	Entered Without Inspection ¹	Visa Abuser
<u>KNEW OTHER ILLEGALS IN HOMETOWN</u>												
YES -----	48.1	21.0	35.9	57.8	30.3	53.3	43.1	63.2	58.3	45.8	54.6	31.6
NO -----	51.9	79.0	64.1	42.2	69.7	45.7	56.9	38.6	41.7	54.2	45.4	68.4
No. of Respondents to the Question	621	62	170	399	155	90	167	209	115	506	447	174
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	21.7	17.3	28.3	19.1	34.0	11.5	25.1	9.5	15.4	23.0	19.5	28.9
Not Applicable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	235	104	223	231	136	657	555	238
<u>MET OTHER ILLEGALS IN U.S.</u>												
YES -----	60.9	30.5	39.9	75.1	35.3	59.2	67.1	77.2	83.9	55.7	71.4	33.5
NO -----	39.1	69.5	60.1	24.9	64.7	40.8	32.9	22.8	16.1	44.3	28.6	66.5
No. of Respondents to the Question	604	59	169	377	162	76	164	202	112	492	437	167
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	23.8	21.3	29.1	21.6	31.1	26.9	26.5	12.6	17.6	25.1	21.3	29.8
Not Applicable	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	235	104	223	231	136	657	555	238
<u>LIVED WITH OTHER ILLEGALS IN U.S.</u>												
YES -----	41.4	14.1	27.5	53.9	21.7	40.6	42.0	61.1	56.6	38.7	49.3	24.7
NO -----	58.6	85.9	72.5	46.1	78.3	59.4	58.0	38.9	43.4	61.3	50.7	75.3
No. of Respondents to the Question	688	71	218	399	212	96	169	211	106	582	469	219
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	9.5	4.0	7.2	11.4	8.5	7.7	15.7	5.2	15.4	8.2	10.6	6.7
Not Applicable	3.8	1.3	0.8	5.6	1.3	0.0	8.5	3.5	6.6	3.2	4.9	1.3
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	235	104	223	231	136	657	555	238

Source: Linton & Company Illegal-Alien Study, 1975.

Note: Table records responses to each question, e.g., 21.0% of Eastern Hemisphere illegals responding to the question, "About how many people do you know from your home town who are or have been illegal aliens?" said that they knew one or more such persons.

¹INS term for aliens who enter the U.S. without authorization.

The extent of the illegal network -- or the extent to which respondents admitted to being involved in it -- varied considerably from city to city, with the networks appearing most prominently in Los Angeles, and much less so in New York. For example, 75.3% of the LA respondents said that they had met other illegals in the U.S., and 58.2% of them said that they had lived with other illegals in the U.S.; only 2.1% and 6.7% of the New York respondents replied in the same manner to the same question.

We had hypothesized that illegals not only would be in touch with other illegals, but that they would settle in U.S. neighborhoods where other persons of the same nationality lived. The response to the multiple-choice question on this subject, "How many other people of your own nationality were in that (i.e., your) neighborhood?" was not particularly supportive of the hypothesis. Of those responding, 36.2% replied that most, many, or about half of the people were of the respondent's nationality. Mexican illegals were about twice as likely as non-Mexican respondents to answer in this manner, with 46.0% of them so responding, as compared to 21.5% of the EH illegals and 23.7% of the WH illegals. (Perhaps the WH response would have been different had the question been asked in terms of language, rather than nationality, there being numerous neighborhoods where Spanish is widely spoken, but by people from several different nations.)

English-Speaking Ability. Most of the respondents spoke English very badly or not at all; 63.9% so evaluated their linguistic abilities. Only 11.0% said that they spoke it very well, with 9.7% saying they spoke it fairly well, and another 15.5% saying that they spoke it, but not very well.

As Table IV-8 indicates, there were substantial variations in the linguistic abilities of the subgroups of the respondents, with the variation being particularly obvious along region of origin lines; almost half of the EH illegals said that they spoke English well, as compared to less than a fifth of the WH illegals, and only a handful of the Mexican ones. In terms of location in the U.S., East Coast illegals were the most likely to speak the language well (23.2%); and those who had been here more than two years were considerably more likely to speak it well than those here for less than two years. Similarly, visa abusers were more proficient than EWIs, and nonfarmworkers were more likely to speak English well than farmworkers.

TABLE IV-8

Distributions of Perceived English-Speaking Ability of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents, by Region of Origin, Location in U.S., Entry Technique, Years in the U.S., and Type of U.S. Employment

(as percents of group responding)

HOW WELL DO YOU SPEAK ENGLISH?	TOTAL	REGION OF ORIGIN								ENTRY TECHNIQUE		YEARS IN U.S.		TYPE OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT	
		East. Hemi.	West. Hemi. exc. Mexico	West. Mexico	Mid/ East Coast	North-west	South-west	California	Entered Without Inspection ¹	Visa Abuser	Less than 2	2 or more	Agric.	Other	
Very Well	11.0	47.3	18.8	1.5	23.2	17.5	1.8	4.8	2.6	30.9	3.9	17.0	1.5	12.9	
Fairly Well	9.7	18.9	12.7	6.8	12.5	9.7	8.7	7.9	7.3	15.2	4.2	14.4	2.3	11.2	
Not Very Well	15.5	17.6	15.3	15.3	15.6	15.5	15.1	15.7	14.5	17.8	10.9	19.4	6.9	17.2	
Very Badly (or not at all)	63.9	16.2	53.3	76.5	48.7	57.3	74.4	71.6	75.6	36.1	81.0	49.2	89.3	58.7	
No. of Respondents	775	74	229	472	224	103	219	229	545	230	358	417	131	644	
SUBTOTAL ²	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	2.3	1.3	3.4	1.9	4.7	1.0	1.8	0.9	1.8	3.4	3.2	1.4	3.7	2.0	
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	235	104	223	231	555	238	370	423	136	657	

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975

¹INS term for aliens, who enter the U.S. without authorization.

²Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

Respondents were divided, for analytical purposes, into two groups, a minority of about 20%, who had considerable ability with the language, and a majority that did not. The English-speaking illegals were less likely to be married, less likely to have children, and less likely to support people in their homeland than were the non-English speaking illegals. The English-speakers had managed to stay here longer (3.1 years as opposed to 2.3), and as we report in the next chapter, they were more likely to hold white-collar positions, and to earn more money than the other respondents. (In addition, understandably, their apprehension/exposure ratio was considerably lower than that of the non-English speaking respondents.)

Future Ties to the U.S. No matter how well they spoke the language, how many relatives they had in this country, or how many checks they had wanted to send back home, the people we were interviewing were, at the moment, on their way out of the United States. We asked about their future.

"Do you plan to come back?"

Slightly more than 60% (414) of the 685 respondents to this question answered affirmatively, with some interesting minor variations. Mexican illegals, for example, were somewhat less enthusiastic about returning to the U.S. than WH illegals or EH illegals (58.8%, as compared to 61.3% and 67.1%, respectively). Visa abusers (68%) were more positive than EWIs (56.7%), with a similar variation between those who spoke English and those who did not. Among the SMSAs, we found only one group which did not cast a majority vote for return, that was the one in Chicago.

For those who said they wanted to stay, we asked why. More than two-thirds (283 respondents) said that they wanted to return to get a job (with a few saying, precisely, "to keep current job"). Though Mexican illegals were the least likely to want to come back to the U.S., they were by far the most likely to want to come back for purely economic reasons: 80.6% of the Mexican illegals who said they wanted to return reported that they wanted to come back in order to get a job, as compared to 55.6% of the WH illegals, and only 18.8% of the EH illegals (who gave a scattering of reasons for wanting to return). As expected, illegals working in the Southwest were even more likely to report that they wanted to come back because they wanted to get a job (83.2%), and 87.1% of the illegals employed in U.S. farmwork gave a similar response to this question.

"Why not return?" we asked the others, in a multiple-choice question. The largest single grouping, 30.7%, chose a generalized "too much trouble." Very few (3.1%) responded to an economic sufficiency ("have enough money to live on now") response, and a relatively large percentage indicated that it was fear of INS, 26.8%. Mexicans were the most likely to report fear of apprehension as the primary reason they decided not to try to come back: 33% gave this response, as compared to 18.4% of the other WH illegals and only 9.5% of the EH illegals.

Conclusions. In sum, our data on a series of variables show that the Mexican respondents were consistently very different from the respondents from elsewhere in the world. In addition, however, they also show that this is particularly the case with those (Mexican) illegals who live in the Southwest, and, above all, with those living in the counties that border Mexico.

As more Mexican illegals move out of the Southwest and California, and into other parts of the nation, the geographical distance will probably generate social and psychological changes, and the ties of Mexican illegals to the homeland will loosen. But in the meantime, for many of the Mexican illegals, the Southwest and California serve as a kind of halfway house between the relatively undeveloped economy and closed society to the south of the Rio Grande and the highly developed economy and more open society to the north. The Mexican illegal need not seek to enter the mainstream of U.S. economic life; he has, in a sense, an option of moving into a quasi-Mexican existence, where he can make more money than he can in Mexico, while still speaking Spanish and living in a predominantly Mexican community. Given this situation, it should come as no surprise that the illegals who secure jobs in this environment should have substantially different characteristics than illegals working elsewhere in the nation.

CHAPTER V: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE LABOR MARKET

Since the labor-market status and role of all individuals are determined to a significant degree by their age, sex, and education, as well as their work experience, we begin our examination of the U.S. labor-market experiences of the 793 apprehended illegals interviewed for this study* -- each at least 16 years old, with at least two weeks' employment in the U.S. -- by briefly noting their characteristics, their varying length of stay in the U.S., and their previous work experience.

The average age of all respondents was 28.5 years, though illegals from the Western Hemisphere, excluding Mexico (WH illegals), were roughly two years older than those from Mexico or the Eastern Hemisphere (EH illegals). The great majority were male; slightly less than 10% of the illegals were women. As a group, respondents had completed an average of 6.7 years of schooling. The 75 EH illegals were very close to the U.S. norm, with 11.9 years of education; the 237 illegals followed with 8.7 years; and the 481 Mexican illegals had an average of 4.9 years of schooling. Further, 76.4% of the Mexican respondents, 53.2% of the WH respondents, and 16.2% of those from the Eastern Hemisphere did not speak English.

Respondents had been in the U.S. for an average of 2.5 years in all. EH illegals had been in the nation the longest, an average of 3.1 years, as compared to an average of 2.5 years for the WH illegals, and 2.4 years for those from Mexico. The majority of the illegals (53.3%) had been in the U.S. two or more years; respondents in that group had been in the nation for an average of 4.2 years. Illegals in the U.S. less than two years (46.7%) had been in the nation for an average of .5 years.

Work History

Experience. The illegals were therefore relatively young and poorly educated, if from the Western Hemisphere. They were not, however, inexperienced workers. At the time of the interviews, respondents had worked for wages, part-time or full-time, for an average of 11.6 years. Less than 10% had worked for wages less than one year. WH illegals, who were slightly older

*References to respondents designate only the apprehended illegals who were interviewed; references to the 51 unapprehended illegals who were also interviewed for this study are always described as such in the text and tables.

than EH or Mexican illegals, had worked for an average of 12.8 years; Mexican illegals had worked for an average 11.5 years; and EH illegals had worked for an average of 8.0 years (a difference that probably reflects their considerably longer years of schooling). Illegals between the ages of 16 and 24 (40.1% of all respondents) had worked for wages an average of 5.7 years; those between the ages of 25 and 34 (37.9%), for an average of 11.1 years; and those 35 and older (21.9%), for an average of 23.1 years. The 51 unapprehended respondents (41.2% of whom were women) had worked for wages, part-time or full-time, an average of 10.9 years.

Data on the number of years respondents had worked for wages in their home country were derived from data on the total number of years they had worked for wages, part-time or full-time, and data on the total number of years they had worked for wages in the U.S., part-time or full-time. As a group, illegals had worked for wages in their home country an average of 9.4 years. WH illegals had worked in their country of origin for an average of 10.7 years; Mexican illegals, 9.4 years; and EH illegals, 5.8 years. The unapprehended respondents had worked an average of 7.6 years in their home country.

Employment Status Since 1970. In view of the possibility of a wide range in illegals' employment, both within and between nations, no attempt was made to obtain employment data according to nation of employment; instead, data were collected on respondents' employment in any nation since 1970. Roughly one-quarter of the 777 respondents to questions concerning unemployment reported they had been employed continuously since January 1970. Half of the respondents reported they had been unemployed less than one year in all since that time; one-quarter reported one or more years of unemployment. Not surprisingly, illegals 35 and older were almost three times as likely to have been continuously employed since 1970 as illegals under the age of 25 (36.0%, as compared to 12.7%, respectively).

The majority (62.9%) of the 662 respondents who had not been continuously employed since January 1970 reported that they had been looking for a job when they were not employed; 17.3% had been students, and just under 10%, presumably women, reported that they had been taking care of their families during that time. Thus, not only was unemployment apparently relatively low and generally of brief duration, given the population under consideration, it was apparently also involuntary. Most respondents reported that they had been actively seeking work while unemployed; they were not, then, discouraged workers.

In comparing the unemployment rate of the group of illegals who were interviewed with that of legal workers in the U.S. labor market, two things should be considered: unemployment data for the study group were collected on a retrospective, longitudinal basis, from the reports of the respondents, which is neither a very reliable technique, nor is it the technique used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Thus, the data are tentatively offered, and they are only roughly comparable to unemployment data for legal workers. Secondly, we are dealing here with a labor force with some notable disadvantages: their careers have been interrupted from time to time by INS, and by voluntary movements from nation to nation; their command of English is slight, and, of course, their participation in the U.S. labor market is contrary to law.

Respondents had an average unemployment rate of 10.2%, that is, on average, 10.2% of the illegals were both without jobs and looking for work during that five-year period. Comparing that rate to unemployment rates in the United States for the first half of this decade, we find that this group of illegal workers did almost as well as blacks in the U.S. labor market, who had an average unemployment rate of 9.4% during that period; did considerably better than teen-agers, who had an unemployment rate of 15.8%; but suffered significantly more unemployment than did U.S. males, whose unemployment rate was 3.8%. (Data for U.S. workers of Spanish origin were available for only one year, 1974, when their unemployment rate was 8%.)

It appears, then, that though most respondents came from nations with high unemployment rates and had on average spent half the last five years in the U.S. (see Chapter IV), their rate of reported unemployment was only slightly higher than the unemployment rates of blacks and those of Spanish origin in the U.S. labor force, though somewhat lower than that of the least established group of U.S. workers, its youth.

Job Turnover Since 1970. Three-quarters of all respondents reported they had been employed at least four out of five years since January 1970, but respondents had had an average of 3.9 jobs during that period, in either their nation of origin or in the U.S. Job turnover for the different subgroups of respondents considered showed no significant variations, even where one might have expected them; e.g., respondents under the age of 25 had an average of 4.1 jobs; and those 35 and older, 3.6 jobs. Similarly, respondents in the U.S. less than two years had an average of 3.9 jobs; those here two or more years, 4.0 jobs.

Respondents working in the Southwest, who were the most likely to have been apprehended by INS more than once, were almost half as likely to report long-term employment in the U.S. as were respondents working in other regions in the nation. Only 23.1% of the illegals working in the Southwest reported one or more years of employment in a single U.S. job since 1970, as compared to 42.1%, 42.2%, and 53.4% of the illegals who had worked in the Mid- and Northwest, California, and the East Coast, respectively. On the assumption that long-term employment in a single job is a positive value, Mexican illegals fared more poorly than illegals from other sending regions: 20.6% of the Mexican respondents had held a single U.S. job two or more years, as compared to 24.6% of the EH, and 36.8% of the WH respondents. Measured according to this criterion, farmworkers were the least successful of all subgroups of respondents: only 11.8% of the 136 respondents employed in U.S. agriculture reported that they had held a U.S. job for a year or more, as compared to 46% of the 657 respondents in nonagricultural U.S. jobs.

Participation in the U.S. Labor Market. In general, respondents had been in the U.S. for an average of 2.5 years, and they had been employed in the nation for an average of 2.1 years. Respondents in the U.S. less than two years had been in the nation and its labor market for an average of .5 years. Those in the U.S. for two or more years had been in the nation for an average of 4.2 years, and they had been employed in the U.S. for an average of 3.4 years.

Not surprisingly, the oldest illegals were the most established in the U.S. work force, while the youngest group of respondents were the least established. On average, respondents 35 years old or more reported they had been employed in the U.S. for 3.4 years; those between the ages 25-34, for 2.2 years; and those 16-25, 1.2 years.

There were, however, minimal differences in duration of U.S. employment according to respondents' region of origin. EH illegals had been employed in the U.S. for an average of 2.0 years; Mexican illegals, 2.1 years; and WH illegals, 2.2 years. U.S. regional differences in the duration of the illegals' employment in the nation were more noteworthy. The 231 respondents in California had been employed in the U.S. (an average of 2.5 years) longer than respondents who worked in every other region in the U.S., and the 104 respondents working in the Mid- and Northwest had been employed the shortest time (1.7 years). Illegals working on the East Coast (235 respondents) had been employed in the U.S. for an average of 2.1 years; those employed in the Southwest (223 respondents) worked in the nation for an average of 1.8 years. (See Table V-1 for presentation of data on the range of respondents' duration of employment in the United States.)

TABLE V-1

Number of Years Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents Worked for Wages in the United States,
Part-Time or Full-Time, by Region of Origin, Location of Most Recent U.S. Job, Type of U.S. Employment, and Age.

(as percents of group responding)

YEARS	TOTAL	REGION OF ORIGIN			LOCATION OF U.S. JOB				TYPE OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT		AGE		
		West. Hemi. East. exc. Hemi.	Mexico	Mexico	East Coast	Mid/ North- west	South- west	Cali- fornia	Agric.	Other	Under 25	25-34	35 & Over
Less than 1 year	43.4	35.2	31.8	50.4	31.2	42.0	61.5	39.2	60.0	39.9	54.6	39.6	29.0
1 to 2 years	12.7	19.7	14.8	10.5	16.2	20.0	8.7	9.6	10.4	13.1	14.0	11.4	12.4
2 to 3 years	14.2	22.5	17.4	11.4	19.7	13.0	8.7	14.3	8.9	15.3	14.9	15.1	11.2
3 to 6 years	20.8	12.7	29.2	17.9	27.8	17.0	11.9	23.9	12.6	22.6	14.6	23.2	28.4
6 to 20 years	9.0	9.9	6.8	9.9	5.1	8.0	9.2	13.0	8.1	9.1	1.9	10.7	18.9
No. of Respondents	782	71	236	475	234	100	218	230	135	647	315	298	169
SUBTOTAL ¹	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	1.4	5.3	0.4	1.2	0.4	3.0	2.2	0.4	0.7	1.5	0.9	1.0	2.9
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	235	104	223	231	136	657	318	301	174
Average No. of Years	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.1	1.7	1.8	2.5	1.6	2.2	1.2	2.2	3.5
Standard Deviation	2.5	3.1	2.5	2.4	2.6	2.0	2.0	3.0	1.8	2.6	1.5	2.3	4.0

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

Illegals' movements in the U.S. job market, like the duration of their employment in the United States, are not only a function of their interaction with that labor market, they are also a function of the interaction of INS with those labor-market activities. As a group, respondents had had an average of 2.2 jobs in the U.S. since January 1970; those who had been in the nation for less than two years had an average of 1.5 jobs; those here for two or more years, 2.8 jobs. Despite the fact that slightly more than a third of all respondents were apprehended by INS before they had been in the U.S. a year, 40.1% reported that they had held a single U.S. job at least one year, 25.7% had held that job for two or more years, and 12.2% for three or more years. Thus, though a substantial minority of all respondents achieved some job tenure in the U.S., only one-quarter of them attained or came close to attaining the average job tenure of their American peers. That is, data from a longitudinal study of the U.S. labor market show that the average job tenure for young men between the ages of 20 and 28, out of school and in blue-collar, service, or farm work -- workers similar to the illegals who were interviewed for this study, as we will presently show -- is 3.1 years for whites, and 2.8 years for blacks.*

Occupation

Occupation in Country of Origin. Though even the youngest group of respondents were relatively experienced workers, only a minority of the 628 illegals who had worked in their country of origin since January 1970 had worked primarily in skilled white-collar or blue-collar jobs in their homeland.**

As predictable, respondents' occupation in their country of origin was highly correlated with their level of education, and the differences noted earlier between respondents from Mexico, those from other nations in the Western Hemisphere, and those from the Eastern Hemisphere remain pronounced and consistent within as well as without the labor market in their region of origin.

*Unpublished data from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS) of Labor Market Experience, Center for Human Resource Research, Ohio State University. NLS data for people of Spanish origin, which would be more germane to the present study, were not available.

**Around 18% (148) of all respondents reported that they had not worked in their home country in the last five years, and, in fact, 148 respondents independently reported that they had been in the U.S. from 5 to 20 years. Hence backhome occupation of those respondents are not available.

Less than 2% of the 407 Mexican respondents who had worked in their homeland since 1970 had held professional or managerial jobs, and only slightly less than 7% had been employed in any kind of white-collar work. Further, 15% had worked in craft and kindred occupations; less than 15% had worked as operatives. Almost two-thirds of all the Mexican respondents who had worked in their home country in the last five years had worked as laborers or service workers; most had worked primarily as farm laborers (see Table V-2).*

The occupational distribution of the 173 WH respondents who had worked in their home country in the last five years differed sharply. Slightly more than 15% had worked primarily in professional or managerial jobs; a third had been employed as skilled blue-collar workers; slightly more than a fourth had worked as operatives. Less than a fourth had worked as laborers or service workers, and only half of that latter group had been employed in agriculture.

The backhome occupational distribution of the 48 EH respondents was, however, much like that of U.S. workers (see Table V-3 for a comparison). A third of the EH illegals who had worked in their home country in the last five years had generally been employed in professional or managerial jobs; almost half had been white-collar workers. Less than 15% had been skilled blue-collar workers. Slightly more than a quarter had been operatives. Less than 15% had been employed as laborers or service workers. Only one EH illegal had been employed in farmwork.

Looking at the illegals who had worked in their country of origin in the last five years as a group, and viewing the same set of data in terms of the grossly defined categories of skilled (professional, managerial, and craft occupations), semi-skilled (sales and clerical workers, and all operatives), and unskilled (laborers and service workers) occupations, we find that even in their home country, where language is not the considerable barrier to employment and occupational advancement that it is for most aliens -- legal or illegal -- in the U.S.,** less than a quarter of these 628 illegals worked in skilled jobs. Only slightly more than a quarter were employed in semi-skilled jobs; and fully half were employed in unskilled work.

*In Samora's study, 57% of the 493 apprehended Mexican illegals, who were interviewed in the Southwest Region, had been employed in agriculture in Mexico; 12% had been employed in skilled work. See Los Mojados, p. 195.

**North and Weissert, Immigrants and the American Labor Market, pp. 42-43.

TABLE V-2

Distributions of Occupation of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their Country of Origin, 1970-75,¹
by Region of Origin, Entry Technique, Age, Type of U.S. Employment and Years in the U.S.

(as percent of group responding)

OCCUPATION GROUP	TOTAL	REGION OF ORIGIN			ENTRY TECHNIQUE		AGE			TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT IN U.S.		YEARS IN U.S.	
		East. Heml.	West. Heml. except Mexico	Mexico	Entered Without Inspection	Visa Abuser	16-24	25-34	35+	Agric.	Other	Less than 2	2 or more
Professional, Technical & Kindred Workers	5.6	20.8	10.4	1.7	1.7	16.9	2.4	7.9	7.0	0.8	6.0	3.9	7.5
Owners, Managers, Administrators, except Farm	2.9	12.5	6.4	0.2	0.4	10.0	0.4	5.4	2.8	-	3.6	1.5	4.4
Sales Workers	5.3	6.3	9.8	3.2	4.1	8.7	4.5	5.9	5.6	0.8	6.4	5.1	5.5
Clerical & Kindred Workers	3.8	8.3	7.5	1.7	2.1	8.7	4.0	4.2	2.8	-	4.8	3.0	4.8
Craft & Kindred Workers	14.8	12.5	15.0	15.0	15.6	12.5	16.6	15.1	11.3	5.6	17.1	15.8	13.7
Operatives, except Transport	13.5	27.1	22.0	8.4	10.9	21.2	13.0	15.9	10.6	6.3	15.3	9.6	18.1
Transport Equipment Operatives	4.1	-	4.6	4.4	4.5	3.1	3.2	5.4	3.5	3.2	4.4	4.2	4.1
Nonfarm Laborers	9.1	2.1	4.6	11.8	11.3	2.5	11.7	5.9	9.9	10.3	8.8	9.9	8.2
Farmers & Farm Managers ³	0.3	-	0.6	0.2	0.4	-	-	0.8	-	-	0.4	0.3	0.3
Farm Laborers & Supervisors ⁴	15.4	2.1	12.1	49.1	45.7	5.0	40.5	28.5	38.0	69.8	26.7	43.9	25.6
Service Workers, except Private Household	3.3	6.3	5.2	2.2	1.7	8.1	1.6	4.6	4.2	2.4	3.6	1.8	5.1
Private Household Workers	1.9	2.1	1.7	2.0	1.5	3.1	2.0	0.4	4.2	0.8	2.3	1.2	2.7
No. of Respondents	528	48	173	407	468	160	247	239	142	126	502	335	293
SUBTOTALS ⁵	100.0	100.1	99.9	99.9	99.9	99.8	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.1	100.2	100.0
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	2.1	1.3	2.5	2.1	2.0	2.5	3.1	2.3	-	2.9	2.0	2.4	1.9
Not in Country of Origin, 1970-75	18.7	34.7	24.5	13.3	13.7	30.3	19.2	18.3	18.4	4.4	21.6	7.0	28.8
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	555	238	318	301	174	136	657	370	423

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹ Data cover period from January 1970-June 1975 and report respondents' major occupation in country of origin.

² INS term for aliens who enter U.S. without authorization.

³ Respondents included only farmers.

⁴ Respondents include one supervisor.

⁵ Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

TABLE V-3

Distributions of Occupation of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their Country of Origin and in Their Most Recent U.S. Job¹, and of U.S. Employed Persons

(as percent of group)

Occupation Group	Illegal Aliens Employed in Country of Origin	Illegal Aliens Employed in Most Recent U.S. Job	U.S. Employed Persons, 1974
<u>White Collar</u>	<u>17.6</u>	<u>5.4</u>	<u>48.7</u>
Professional, Technical & Kindred Workers	5.6	1.6	14.6
Owners, Managers & Administrators, except Farm	2.9	1.3	10.4
Sales Workers	5.3	1.1	6.3
Clerical & Kindred Workers	3.8	1.4	17.4
<u>Blue Collar</u>	<u>41.5</u>	<u>55.2</u>	<u>34.2</u>
Craft & Kindred Workers	14.8	15.3	13.3
Operatives	17.6	25.1	16.1
Nonfarm Laborers	9.1	14.8	4.8
<u>Service Workers</u>	<u>5.2</u>	<u>20.6</u>	<u>13.3</u>
<u>Farmworkers</u>	<u>35.7</u>	<u>18.8</u>	<u>3.6</u>
<u>TOTAL²</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>99.8</u>

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Source: Columns 1-2, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; column 3, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974, Table 568.

¹Data for 628 respondents; 148 respondents were not employed in country of origin, 1970-1975, and 17 respondents did not provide this information. These respondents were excluded from data on respondents' most recent U.S. job for comparative purposes.

²Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

For the most part, then, the illegals interviewed for this study brought to the U.S. few of the skills congruent with and rewarded by a heavily industrialized economy and a technological society. Most respondents, but in particular those from Mexico, had not acquired the socio-economic characteristics associated with success, as opposed to simple survival, in the contemporary U.S. labor market. As Table V-4 indicates, these illegal workers were more like immigrants who entered the nation and its workforce in 1910 than they were like U.S. workers or immigrants today. Few can therefore be expected to prosper according to current American, as opposed to Latin-American, standards. And, as we will presently show, though respondents had been selected because each had succeeded in finding employment in the U.S., only a very small number did, in fact, prosper.

Occupation in the U.S. If employment in white-collar work (especially, of course, in professional or managerial positions) is the pinnacle of economic success and if employment in farm work is its nadir, the impact of the U.S. labor market upon the occupational status of the illegals who were interviewed was to render the most successful, less successful -- and the least successful, more successful.* That is, two-thirds of the respondents who reported white-collar jobs in their country of origin suffered a loss of occupational status in the United States, but almost half the far more numerous illegals who reported they had been farmworkers in their homeland achieved some measure of upward mobility as a result of employment in the States (see Table V-5). The percentage of respondents employed in white-collar work slipped from 17.6% in their homeland to 5.4% in their most recent U.S. job (including a slippage of professional and managerial workers from 5.6% to 2.9%) -- but the percentage of illegals employed as farm laborers decreased from 35.4% in their country of origin to 18.8% in their most recent U.S. job.

Illegals employed in white-collar work exhibited substantial downward occupational movement upon entry into the U.S. labor force, regardless of their region of origin. EH respondents, who were the most likely to have been white-collar workers in their country of origin, were, however, the least likely to lose that status in the United States. Mexican respondents, on the other hand, who were the least likely to have been white-collar workers, were the most likely to lose that status in the U.S.

*Similar occupational adjustments are exhibited by recent immigrants; e.g., immigrants who were professionals or managers in their country of origin often take lower status jobs in the U.S., while farmworkers and domestics often move into higher status occupations. See North and Weissert, Immigrants and the American Labor Market, p. 24, and Table 16.

TABLE V-4

Distributions of Occupation of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents, Arriving Immigrants,¹
and U.S. Employed Persons, for Selected Years

(as percent of group)

OCCUPATION GROUP	1975	FY 1974	1974	1970		1970		1950	
	Illegal Aliens	Arriving Immigrants	U.S. Employed Persons	Immigrants	U.S. Employed Persons	Immigrants	U.S. Employed Persons	Immigrants	U.S. Employed Persons
Professional, Technical & Kindred Workers	5.6	23.4	14.6	1.2	4.7	6.3	6.8	16.2	8.6
Owners, Managers, Administrators	2.9	6.0	10.4	1.9	6.6	3.4	7.4	5.1	8.8
Sales Workers	5.3	2.0	6.3	1.5	10.0	10.6	15.2	13.3	19.3
Clerical & Kindred Workers	3.8	8.7	17.4						
Craft & Kindred Workers	14.8	13.2	13.3	15.6	26.2	23.9	28.6	32.8	34.6
Operatives, except Transport	13.5	10.2	12.4						
Transport Equipment Operatives	4.1	1.7	3.7	27.7	12.0	13.3	11.0	4.5	6.6
Nonfarm Laborers	9.1	12.1	4.8						
Farmers & Farm Managers	0.3	0.2	3.6	1.5	16.5	6.2	12.4	14.0	7.3
Farm Laborers & Supervisors	35.4	4.6		37.0	14.4	10.1	8.8	3.1	4.4
Service Workers, except Private Household	3.3	12.0	13.3	1.1	4.6	5.0	5.7	3.9	7.8
Private Household Workers	1.9	5.8		12.4	5.0	21.4	4.1	7.0	12.5
TOTAL ²	100.0	99.9	99.8	99.9	100.0	100.2	100.0	99.9	99.9

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¹Occupation of illegal aliens is major occupation in their country of origin; occupation of arriving immigrants is stated occupation on visa applications.

²Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

Sources: Column 1, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; data cover period from 1970-1975 for 603 illegals who reported country of origin occupation (see Table V-5); column 2, INS Annual Report, 1974, Table 10A; column 3, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1974, Table 568; columns 4-9, North & Weissert, Immigrants and the American Labor Market, Table 13.

Nevertheless, EH illegals were also the most likely to become unskilled workers in the U.S., though they were least likely to have been unskilled workers (laborers or service workers) in their homeland (35.4% and 12.6%, respectively). Conversely, Mexican illegals were the only group of illegals to show any decline in the percentage of unskilled workers in the U.S. -- though they were the most likely to have been unskilled workers in their native land (61.8% in the U.S.; 65.3% in Mexico). WH illegals were more likely than EH illegals (but less likely than Mexican illegals) to lose white-collar status in the U.S. -- but they were also less likely to become unskilled workers in the U.S. than were EH illegals (41.1% in the U.S.; 24.2% in their home country).

The U.S. labor market thus tended to homogenize what were otherwise distinctly heterogeneous groups of illegals. Its net effect upon the occupational status of the illegals interviewed for this study was, however, clearly a depressive one.* In general, fewer respondents were professionals, managers, or white-collar workers in the U.S. than in their homeland, and more were employed in unskilled work, though the number employed in farmwork substantially decreased. In fact, the occupational distribution of these 628 respondents in their most recent U.S. job was significantly less like that of the U.S. labor force than it had been when they were employed in their homeland; its closest analogue is the backhome occupational distribution of the least skilled and the least advantaged of all groups of respondents, the Mexican illegals (see Table V-5).

*The 51 unapprehended illegals interviewed in New York City and the District of Columbia appear to have experienced a similar decline in occupational status in the U.S. labor market. These respondents, who came primarily from the Western Hemisphere (3 from Mexico, 36 from other nations in the Western Hemisphere, and 12 from the Eastern Hemisphere), had an average 11.3 years of schooling. Slightly more than three-quarters spoke English; slightly less than two-thirds had worked in their home country in the last five years. Two-thirds of the unapprehended respondents who had worked in their home country in the last five years reported that they had been primarily employed in white-collar work. Less than 10% had been craft or kindred workers; the same percentage had been operatives; and 15% had been service workers, including one private household worker. In their most recent U.S. job, slightly more than a fourth of all 51 respondents were white-collar workers, slightly more than 10% were craft and kindred workers; 16% were operatives. Almost half of this group of respondents were employed in unskilled work, almost all as service workers, including nine employed in private households.

TABLE V-5

Distributions of Occupation of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their Country of Origin¹
and in Most Recent U.S. Job, by Region of Origin

(as percents of group responding)

OCCUPATION GROUP	TOTAL		MEXICAN ILLEGALS		WESTERN HEMISPHERE ILLEGALS		EASTERN HEMISPHERE ILLEGALS	
	Country of Origin	U.S.	Country of Origin	U.S.	Country of Origin	U.S.	Country of Origin	U.S.
Professional, Technical & Kindred Workers	5.6	1.6	1.7	0.5	10.4	1.7	20.0	10.4
Owners, Managers, Administrators, except farm	2.9	1.3	0.2	-	6.4	1.7	12.5	10.4
Sales Workers	5.3	1.1	3.2	0.7	9.8	1.2	6.3	4.2
Clerical & Kindred Workers	2.8	1.4	1.7	-	7.5	4.1	8.3	4.2
Craft & Kindred Workers	14.8	15.3	15.0	14.3	15.0	13.3	12.5	31.2
Operatives, except Transport	13.5	24.5	8.4	21.9	22.0	16.4	27.1	4.2
Transport Equipment Operators	4.1	0.6	4.4	0.7	4.6	0.6	-	-
Nonfarm Laborers	9.1	14.8	11.8	17.9	4.6	11.6	2.1	-
Farmers & Farm Managers ²	0.3	-	0.2	-	0.6	-	-	-
Farm Laborers & Supervisors ³	35.4	18.8	49.1	27.0	12.1	4.6	2.1	-
Service Workers, except Private Household	3.3	17.4	2.2	13.5	5.2	21.4	6.3	35.4
Private Household Workers	1.9	3.2	2.0	3.4	1.7	3.5	2.1	-
No. of Respondents	628	628	407	407	173	173	48	48
SUBTOTAL ⁴	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.9 ³	99.9	100.1	100.1	100.0
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.5	2.5	1.3	1.3
Not in Country of Origin, 1970-75	18.7	18.7	11.3	13.3	24.5	24.5	34.7	34.7
Total No. of Respondents	793	793	481	481	237	237	75	75

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹Data cover period from January 1970-June 1975 and report respondents' major occupation in country of origin.²Respondents included only farmers.³Respondents included one supervisor in country of origin.⁴Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

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Only six of the 146 respondents who had not been employed in their country of origin since 1970 were employed in agriculture in their most recent U.S. job; 142 were employed in other work. Nevertheless, inclusion of these respondents, who reported they had been in the United States between 5 and 20 years, did not appreciably change the occupational distribution of the study group as a whole. As Table V-6 indicates, only 6.4% of the 788 respondents who reported their occupation in their most recent U.S. job were employed as white-collar workers; 16.0% were employed in craft and kindred occupations; 27.5% as operatives; and 13.7% as nonfarm laborers. Slightly more than 15% were farmworkers, and slightly more than 20% were service workers, including 3.2% in household services. Thus, roughly 20% of all respondents were employed in skilled occupations in their most recent U.S. job, generally in blue-collar work; 30% were employed in semi-skilled work, mostly as operatives; and half were employed in unskilled occupations, as laborers, both farm and nonfarm, or as service workers.

"Schedule B" Occupations. With few exceptions, only aliens admitted into the United States as immigrants can legally work in the U.S. labor market. Since the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration & Nationality Act went into effect, aliens who do not qualify as relatives of U.S. residents or as political refugees can become immigrants only if they qualify as needed workers.* In turn, aliens seeking immigrant status as needed workers are admissible only if the U.S. Department of Labor has determined that (1) qualified U.S. workers are not available for the type of employment the alien seeks; and (2) the terms of the alien's prospective employment in the U.S. will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed U.S. workers.

To facilitate the processing of labor certification requests from prospective employers of aliens who seek immigrant status,** the Department of Labor provides a list of occupations (Schedule B) for which labor certification of aliens is automatically denied, on the ground that there are U.S. workers available for those occupations. Schedule B, as

*See Chapter I for a discussion of immigration law as it relates to the U.S. labor market.

**Certification of most aliens as needed workers requires a U.S. job offer.

TABLE V-6

Distributions of Occupation of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their Most Recent U.S. Job,
by Region of Origin, Entry Technique, Location of Most Recent U.S. Job, and Years in U.S.

(as percents of group responding)

OCCUPATION GROUP	TOTAL	REGION OF ORIGIN			ENTRY TECHNIQUE		LOCATION OF U.S. JOB				YEARS IN U.S.	
		East. Hem.	West. Hem. except Mexico	Hem. Mexico	Entered Without Inspection ¹	Visa Abuser	East Coast	Mid-west	South-west	Calif- fornia	Less than 2	2 or more
Professional, Technical & Kindred Workers	1.9	8.0	2.6	0.4	0.5	4.6	2.1	4.8	0.9	0.9	1.9	1.7
Owners, Managers, Administrators, except Farm	1.5	10.7	1.7	-	0.5	3.8	4.3	-	-	0.9	1.1	1.9
Sales Workers	1.5	2.7	2.1	1.0	0.7	3.4	1.7	1.9	1.4	1.3	1.6	1.4
Clerical & Kindred Workers	1.6	6.7	3.4	-	0.5	4.2	3.4	1.0	-	1.7	0.5	2.6
Craft & Kindred Workers	16.0	22.7	12.8	16.5	15.8	16.5	15.4	4.8	23.2	14.8	13.1	18.5
Operatives, except Transport	27.0	8.0	40.0	23.6	25.2	31.2	28.6	33.7	16.4	32.6	23.2	30.3
Transport Equipment Operatives	0.5	-	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	-	0.5	0.9	0.3	0.7
Nonfarm Laborers	13.7	4.0	9.8	17.2	16.5	7.2	9.8	13.5	26.8	5.2	18.9	9.2
Farmers & Farm Managers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Farm Laborers & Supervisors ²	15.6	-	3.4	24.1	21.4	2.1	5.1	11.5	18.6	25.2	21.6	10.4
Service Workers, except Private Household	17.5	36.0	20.0	13.4	14.2	25.3	28.2	26.9	7.3	12.2	15.0	19.7
Private Household Workers	3.2	1.3	3.8	3.1	4.0	1.3	0.9	1.9	5.0	4.3	2.7	3.6
No. of Respondents	788	75	235	478	551	237	234	104	220	230	366	422
SUBTOTAL ³	99.9	100.1	100.0	99.9	99.8	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.1	100.0	99.9	100.0
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.6	-	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.4	0.4	-	1.3	0.4	1.1	0.2
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	555	238	234	104	223	231	370	423

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Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹INS term for aliens who enter U.S. without authorization.

²Respondents include only farm laborers.

³Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

it appeared most recently in the February 4, 1971 edition of the Federal Register, lists and then defines 48 occupational titles, of varying degrees of specificity (see Appendix C). Almost all refer to unskilled jobs (e.g., busboy), though a few refer to semi-skilled jobs (e.g., clerk typist).^{*} Whether unskilled or semi-skilled, however, labor certifications are denied to aliens seeking work in Schedule B jobs because placement of U.S. workers in those jobs requires little training that is not readily available or easily acquired, generally transferable from one low-skilled occupation to another, and inexpensive for employers to provide.^{**}

Predictably enough, three-quarters of the illegals interviewed for this study (575 of the 788 respondents who reported their most recent U.S. occupation) had been working in Schedule B occupations in their most recent U.S. job. Eight illegals had been self-employed; 205 respondents did not have Schedule B jobs, though a number were employed in low-skilled jobs, e.g., were working as dry cleaning operatives or waiters. (See Appendix D for a list of U.S. occupations reported by respondents.) Similarly, 260 or 81.3% of the 320 illegals who reported their occupation in a previous U.S. job had also been working in Schedule B jobs; none had been self-employed; 60 (18.8%) had not been holding Schedule B occupations.

^{*}Not all unskilled occupations, however, are listed in Schedule B; some are excluded because of a Department of Labor determination that there are shortages of applicants.

^{**}Employers and immigration attorneys often contend, however, that there are no resident U.S. workers willing to accept Schedule B jobs at the prevailing wages. The thrust of the Department of Labor's response, in this controversy, is that the admission of immigrants into Schedule B occupations perpetuates low wages and undesirable working conditions by interfering with the supply and demand relationships of the domestic labor market, which, if protected against the entry of low-wage workers, would tend to increase wages until a supply of workers for those jobs became available.

The argument over Schedule B thus boils down to one over wages and working conditions. The same set of issues, revolving around the relationship between the supply of labor and labor standards, is central to the ongoing controversy about the role and impact of illegals in the U.S. labor market (see Chapter VII).

Unlike the earlier generations of immigrants whom they resemble, unless eligible on the basis of family ties to the U.S. or refugee status, a large majority of the illegals interviewed for this study would therefore have been denied permanent residence in the U.S. and hence entry into its labor market, on the ground that they have no needed occupational skills and hence constitute a supply of workers who are, in principle, in competition with and thus adversely affecting the U.S. labor force.

Employment in the U.S.: Wages and Working Conditions

Industrial Distribution. At least one respondent was employed in each of major industrial divisions, but most were employed in manufacturing, sales, agriculture, construction, and services (see Table V-7). The high proportion of respondents in manufacturing, as compared to the relatively few in services, for example, is likely to be more a reflection of INS activities in our interview sites than of the employment patterns of the illegal population. Industrial sweeps, which offer the possibility of locating a number of illegals at one time, have been a common INS Area Control activity, though they have recently run afoul of the courts, for violation of Fourth Amendment rights.

For this reason, data on industries that employed the illegals interviewed for this study are not likely to be indicative of the industrial distribution of illegals in the U.S. labor market. Data on this subject are of little direct interest in this study, except insofar as they have been used to derive earnings and hours data, which are generally available for the U.S. labor force on an industrial, rather than an occupational, basis.

Since the very structure, wages, hours, and working conditions of farmwork are a law unto themselves, and labor statistics for agriculture are therefore tabulated quite differently than data on other sectors of the economy, data on respondents employed in U.S. agriculture have been set aside for analysis. Before turning to an analysis of the wages and hours of nonagriculturally employed residents, however, it is useful to discuss briefly this kind of illegal worker, who formerly accounted for most of the population of apprehended illegals employed in the nation, but does no longer.

TABLE V-7

Distributions of Industry (of Most Recent U.S. Job) of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents, by Region of Origin, Entry Technique, Location of U.S. Job, and Years in U.S.

(as percents of group responding)

INDUSTRY DIVISION	TOTAL	REGION OF ORIGIN			ENTRY TECHNIQUE		LOCATION OF U.S. JOB				YEARS IN U.S.	
		East. Hemi.	West. Hemi. exc. Mexico	Mexico	Entered Without Inspection ¹	Visa Abuser	East Coast	Mid/ North- west	South- west	Cali- fornia	Less than 2	2 or more
Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries	17.2	1.3	3.9	26.2	23.3	3.0	5.6	13.5	21.5	26.5	24.1	11.1
Mining	0.1	-	-	0.2	0.2	-	-	-	0.4	-	0.3	-
Contract Construction	16.3	14.7	7.7	20.8	19.7	8.4	10.7	4.8	39.0	5.2	17.9	14.9
Manufacturing	33.4	16.0	51.9	27.0	29.6	42.4	39.7	44.2	11.2	43.5	27.1	38.9
Transportation & Public Utilities	1.6	4.0	1.7	1.2	1.4	2.1	2.1	-	2.7	0.9	1.6	1.7
Trade: Wholesale & Retail	17.7	42.7	17.4	13.9	14.3	25.7	25.6	26.0	10.8	12.6	17.9	17.5
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate	0.5	2.7	0.4	0.2	0.2	1.3	0.4	1.0	-	0.9	0.3	0.7
Services, except Private Household	10.0	17.3	13.2	7.3	7.4	16.0	15.0	8.7	9.4	6.1	8.1	11.6
Household Services	3.2	1.3	3.8	3.1	4.0	1.3	0.9	1.9	4.9	1.3	2.7	3.6
No. of Respondents	791	75	235	481	554	237	234	104	223	230	369	422
SUBTOTAL ²	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.3	-	0.8	-	0.2	0.4	0.4	-	-	0.4	0.3	0.2
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	555	238	235	104	223	231	370	423

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹INS term for aliens who enter the U.S. without authorization.

²Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

Although 35.7% (224) of the illegals who were interviewed reported they had been farmworkers in their home country, only 17.2% (134) worked in U.S. agriculture in their most recent U.S. job. Almost all the illegal farmworkers were Mexican; only 1 EH and 8 WH respondents were employed in farms, forestry, or fisheries in the U.S. Less than half (46.3%) of the respondents in U.S. farmwork were employed in California; 34.3% were working in the Southwest; 9.7% were employed in the Mid- and Northwest; and 9.7%, on the East Coast. Most of the illegal farmworkers had been in the U.S. less than two years (65.7%); only slightly more than a third had been here two or more years in all. Like most Mexican respondents, virtually all illegals employed in U.S. agriculture were EWIs (128, as opposed to six visa abusers). Illegals in farmwork are generally considered to be young, and the range in the age of the respondents in U.S. agriculture was wider than expected: though 42.5% were under the age of 25, 32.8% were between the ages of 25 and 34, and 24.6% were 35 years old or older.

The interview sites in this study were primarily in urban areas, even in California and the Southwest, which obviously tended to bias the distribution of respondents toward nonagricultural employment. In seeking some indicator of illegals' employment patterns, it may therefore be useful to note that close to two-thirds of all respondents (494) reported that they had illegally entered the U.S. at the Mexican border, but only 108 respondents were employed in agriculture in the Southwest and California in their most recent U.S. job. Work experience often to the contrary, the majority of these predominantly Mexican EWIs therefore either chose not to avail themselves of the traditionally widespread opportunities for illegal farm employment in that region -- or those opportunities were no longer available, either in general, or for illegals, in particular. Given INS's belief, which is generally shared by southwest border scholars, that Mexican EWIs are deliberately leaving the notoriously back-breaking, low-paying, and unstable jobs offered in southwest agriculture for jobs in urban areas, where they are also less likely to be apprehended, even if they remain in the region, the former explanation seems the more likely. In addition, it receives some support from this study's finding that respondents in the U.S. two or more years were almost half as likely to be working in U.S. agriculture as respondents in the nation less than two years.*

*See, for example, Samora, Mojados, for a brief discussion of the role of employment in southwest agriculture as a socialization process for Mexican illegals.

Average Hourly Wage Differences Among the Illegals. The average hourly wage of all (apprehended) respondents was \$2.71 (see Table V-8). The EH illegals earned the highest average hourly wage of any of the subgroups considered, including the 51 unapprehended illegals: \$4.08, as compared to \$3.95. Mexican illegals earned an average of \$2.34 an hour; WH illegals, \$3.04. As expected, illegals employed in U.S. agriculture earned less than illegals employed in all other industries: averages of \$2.11 and \$2.83 an hour, respectively.

Predictably, respondents in the nation two or more years earned higher wages on the average than respondents in the nation less than two years: the average hourly wage of the former group was \$2.97; of the latter group, \$2.40. But the difference between those average hourly wages appears low, when the substantial difference between the duration of their employment in the United States is considered: illegals in the U.S. two or more years had worked here for an average of 3.4 years; those in the U.S. less than two years, for an average of .5 years. Apparently, then, continued employment in the U.S. labor market did not substantially increase the wage level of these illegal workers.*

The 68 respondents employed in the southwest border counties earned \$1.74, the lowest average hourly wage of any regional group of respondents considered. All were Mexican; 30% were farm laborers. Respondents employed in the Southwest earned an average hourly wage of \$1.98. All but one (a WH illegal) were Mexican; 21% were farmworkers. California respondents earned an average of \$2.60 an hour. Most (78%) were Mexican; 18% were WH, and 4% were EH illegals; 27% were farmworkers. Mid- and Northwest respondents earned an average of \$3.15 an hour. The majority (64%) were Mexican; 19% were EH and 18% were WH illegals; 13% were farmworkers. East Coast respondents earned an average of \$3.29 an hour. Three-quarters were WH illegals; 20% were EH and 5% were Mexican illegals; 6% were farmworkers.

*The average hourly wage of the 324 respondents who reported on a previous U.S. job was \$2.25. Wage patterns among the various subgroups of respondents in that job paralleled those in their most recent U.S. job.

TABLE V-8

Distributions of Gross Hourly Wage of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their Most Recent U.S. Job,
by Region of Origin, Entry Technique, Location of U.S. Job, Years in U.S., and Type of U.S. Employment

(as percents of group responding)

HOURLY WAGE	TOTAL	REGION OF ORIGIN			ENTRY TECHNIQUE		LOCATION OF U.S. JOB				YEARS IN U.S.		TYPE OF U.S. EMPLOYMENT	
		East. Hemi.	West. Hemi. exc. Mexico	Mexico	Entered Without Inspection ¹	Visa Abuser	East Coast	Mid/ North- west	South- west	Cali- fornia	Less than 2	2 or more	Agric.	Other
\$0.00 - \$0.79	14.0	1.4	5.2	20.1	17.7	5.2	3.9	4.9	33.7	9.7	19.2	9.4	33.1	10.0
\$1.80 - \$1.99	4.2	4.2	3.0	4.8	4.7	3.0	4.3	4.9	4.1	4.0	5.2	3.4	6.6	3.7
\$2.00 - \$2.09	13.0	5.6	8.3	16.3	15.3	7.4	10.4	6.9	17.3	14.2	17.9	8.7	15.4	12.4
\$2.10 - \$2.49	20.0	5.6	19.6	22.4	22.8	13.5	16.9	16.7	22.7	22.1	23.6	16.9	19.9	20.1
\$2.50 - \$2.99	18.9	16.9		17.6	19.1	18.3	19.0	14.7	16.8	22.6	17.6	20.0	13.2	20.1
\$3.00 - \$3.99	17.7	12.4	25.2	11.9	13.3	28.3	24.2	31.4	4.1	18.1	10.7	23.9	6.6	20.1
\$4.00 - \$4.99	8.9	12.7	8.7	5.2	4.7	12.7	9.5	13.7	1.4	6.6	3.0	10.4	2.2	7.9
\$5.00 +	5.3	21.1	7.8	1.7	2.4	12.2	11.7	6.9	0.5	2.7	2.7	7.5	2.9	5.8
No. of Respondents	779	71	230	478	549	230	231	102	220	226	364	415	135	643
SUBTOTAL ²	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.1	100.1	100.0	99.9	100.2	99.9	100.1
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	1.8	5.3	3.0	0.6	1.1	3.4	1.7	1.9	1.3	2.2	1.6	1.9	0.0	2.1
Total No. of Respondents	793	75	237	481	555	238	235	104	223	231	370	423	136	657
Average Hourly Wage	\$2.71	\$4.08	\$3.05	\$2.34	\$2.42	\$3.40	\$3.29	\$3.18	\$1.98	\$2.60	\$2.40	\$2.97	\$2.11	\$2.83
Standard Deviation	\$1.54	\$3.05	\$1.54	\$0.93	\$1.03	\$2.19	\$2.19	\$1.42	\$0.72	\$0.95	\$1.60	\$1.44	\$1.07	\$1.59

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹INS term for aliens who enter the U.S. without authorization.

²Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

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In short, though the wage levels of respondents varied in predictable directions according to the duration, kind, and location of their employment in the nation, interpretation of those variations is confounded by the different region-of-origin and industrial distributions of respondents in those subgroups. Not surprisingly, the variable most clearly associated with wage levels across those groupings was education, which ranged from a low 3.5 years of schooling for illegals in farmwork to a high of 8.9 years for illegals employed on the East Coast, and from 4.9 years for Mexican to 11.9 for EH respondents:

<u>Selected Groups of Resp.</u>	<u>Average Years Schooling</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Average Hourly U.S. Wage</u>	<u>Rank</u>
Employed in Farmwork in U.S.	3.5	11	\$2.11	10
Employed in Nonfarmwork in U.S.	7.4	6	2.83	6
Less than Two Years in U.S.	5.8	8	2.40	8
Two or More Years in U.S.	7.5	4.5	2.97	5
Employed in Southwest	4.6	10	1.98	11
Employed in California	6.2	7	2.60	7
Employed in Mid- & Northwest	7.5	4.5	3.15	3
Employed in East Coast	8.9	2	3.29	2
Mexican Illegals	4.9	9	2.34	9
WH Illegals	8.7	3	3.04	4
EH Illegals	11.9	1	4.08	1

On this dimension, the wage level of respondents was strongly associated with their region of origin, which was correlated with the most substantial differences in respondents' level of education. EH illegals, whose schooling and occupational skills most closely approximated those of the U.S. labor force, earned a significantly higher average hourly wage than did either the WH or the Mexican illegals. WH illegals, who had significantly less education and lower work skills than did EH illegals, earned a significantly lower average hourly wage. Mexican illegals, who had received substantially less schooling than had WH illegals and had acquired few occupational skills, were the most likely to have been farmworkers in the United States. That group of respondents earned significantly less than WH illegals, and almost half the average hourly wage of EH illegals, though these respondents also supported the most people in their home country, and sent the most money back home (see Chapter IV).

The Range of Illegals' Hourly Wages

Hourly wage data collected by INS in January through March 1975 for almost 48,000 illegals who were employed when apprehended provide additional information on the range of illegals' wages. Both INS data and data collected in this study place the majority of the illegals who were interviewed at the lowest end of the wage spectrum, defined by INS as "under \$2.50 an hour." The majority of both the illegals surveyed by INS (65.7%) and those interviewed for this study (51.2%) reported earnings less than \$2.50 an hour. At least 94% of the respondents in each study group had been earning less than \$4.50 an hour (see Table V-9).

The much larger INS survey, carried out in the course of ongoing apprehensions, included all employed illegals apprehended anywhere in the nation during that three-month period, as contrasted with the survey undertaken for this study, which selected for interview only a limited number of illegals with U.S. work experience in 19, primarily metropolitan, sites in different parts of the nation. Since INS allocates most of its resources to locations near the Mexico border, it is not surprising that most apprehended illegals are located in the INS Southwest Region (i.e., Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, Colorado, Oklahoma, and Hawaii).^{*} In fact, most (78.7%) of the illegals interviewed in the INS wage survey had been employed in that region (see Table V-10). In addition, more than half (53.1%) of the INS study group were farmworkers, and most farmworkers (90.3%) were employed in the Southwest Region (see Table V-11). Thus, almost half (48.3%) of the INS study group were farmworkers employed in that region.

Significant differences in wage rates between respondents employed in the Southwest Region and elsewhere in the nation, and between respondents in farmwork and those in other kinds of work suggest, however, that the INS finding that two-thirds of its respondents were earning less than \$2.50 an hour should be regarded to a great extent as a consequence of the agricultural-nonagricultural and Southwest-nonsouthwest proportions of that study group.

^{*}See Chapters I and III for a discussion of INS apprehension data.

TABLE V-9

Distributions of Hourly Wage in Most Recent U.S. Job of
Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in INS and L&Co. Study Groups

(as percent of group)

<u>Hourly Wage</u>	<u>INS Study Group</u>	<u>L&Co. Study Group¹</u>
Less than \$2.50	65.2	51.2
\$2.50 - \$4.49	30.2	41.5
\$4.50 - \$6.49	3.5	5.4
\$6.50 or More	1.1	1.8
TOTAL	100.0	100.0
No. of Respondents	47,947	779

Sources: Column 1, unpublished INS data for apprehended illegal aliens employed when found, January through March, 1975; column 2, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

¹Hourly wage data unavailable for 14 of the 793 respondents.

TABLE V-10

Distributions of Region of Employed Apprehended Illegal Aliens
Interviewed by INS, by Industry

(as percent of group responding)

INS Region	Total	Heavy Industry	Light Industry	Agri-culture	Construction	Services
Northwest	7.7	20.6	17.4	2.8	2.0	9.2
Northeast	4.6	6.7	9.2	0.1	3.1	15.3
Southeast	8.8	9.3	8.5	6.9	7.2	17.1
Southwest	78.7	63.4	64.9	90.3	87.7	58.4
Total ¹	99.8	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0
Total No. of Respondents	47,947	1,502	11,681	25,474	2,676	6,614

Source: Unpublished INS data for apprehended illegal aliens employed when found, January through March 1975.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

TABLE V-11

Distributions of Industry of Employed Apprehended Illegal Aliens
Interviewed by INS, by INS Region

(as percents of group responding)

Industry Group	Total	INS REGION			
		Northwest	Northeast	Southeast	Southwest
Heavy Industry	3.1	8.3	4.4	3.3	2.5
Light Industry	24.4	54.8	47.1	23.6	20.1
Agriculture	53.1	18.9	0.5	41.6	60.9
Construction	5.6	1.5	3.6	4.6	6.2
Services	13.8	16.4	44.3	26.9	10.2
Total ¹	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.0	99.9
Total No. of Respondents	47,947	3,705	2,281	4,207	37,754

Source: Unpublished INS data for apprehended illegal aliens employed when found, January through March 1975.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

That is, as Table V-12 indicates, INS respondents employed in the Southwest Region were two to three times more likely to have earned less than \$2.50 an hour than were respondents working in other regions in the nation. Close to 75% of all INS respondents apprehended in the Southwest Region fell into that wage category, as compared to between 26% and 39% of all INS respondents in each of the other regions.

Similarly, as Table V-13 shows, INS respondents employed in farmwork were considerably more likely to have earned less than \$2.50 an hour than were respondents employed in other industries, and their wages clustered toward the bottom of the wage scale to a degree not exhibited by illegals employed in any other industry. More than 75% of all farmworkers in the INS study group earned less than \$2.50 an hour, and 9% earned less than \$4.50. Though the majority of respondents in each industry were employed in the Southwest Region, only illegals employed in service work (who were least likely to have been employed in that region) came close to matching the low wage rate of illegal farmworkers. The majority of the respondents employed in all other industries (construction, light industry, and heavy industry) earned more than \$2.50 an hour (but less than \$4.50).

These wage differences are consistent with the findings of our own study. Almost two thirds (64%) of all respondents employed in the Southwest Region in our study group (i.e., California and the Southwest, as we have defined it) earned less than \$2.50 an hour, as compared to 36% of those employed on the East Coast, and 33% of those employed in the Mid- and Northwest. Similarly, 75% of the farmworkers interviewed for this report earned less than \$2.50 an hour, as contrasted with slightly less than half (46%) of all nonagriculturally employed respondents.

Thus both wage surveys of apprehended illegals found that respondents employed in farmwork and those employed in the Southwest Region were significantly more likely to be at the lowest end of the wage spectrum than were respondents employed in other types of work or employed in other regions of the nation. Nevertheless, the distribution of the two study groups differed substantially on those two dimensions, which helps explain the fact that two-thirds of the respondents in the INS study but only half the respondents in this study made less than \$2.50 an hour:

TABLE V-12

Distributions of Hourly Wage of Employed Apprehended Illegal Aliens
Interviewed by INS, by INS Region

(as percents of group responding)

INS REGION

Hourly Wage	Total	Northwest	Northeast	Southeast	Southwest
Less than \$2.50	65.2	23.6	39.2	38.6	73.7
\$2.50 - \$4.49	30.2	51.6	46.3	48.5	24.9
\$4.50 - \$6.49	3.5	16.1	9.3	8.5	1.2
\$6.50 or More	1.1	2.7	5.1	4.3	0.1
Total ¹	100.0	100.0	99.9	99.9	100.0
Total No. of Respondents	47,947	3,705	2,281	4,207	37,754

Source: Unpublished INS data for apprehended illegal aliens employed when found, January through March 1975.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

TABLE V-13

Distributions of Hourly Wage of Employed Apprehended Illegal Aliens
Interviewed by INS, by Industry

(as percents of group responding)

Hourly Wage	Total	Heavy Industry	Light Industry	Agri-culture	Construction	Services
Less than \$2.50	65.2	27.4	46.0	77.9	46.8	65.7
\$2.50 - \$4.49	30.2	53.9	46.5	21.1	40.0	27.1
\$4.50 - \$6.49	3.5	14.8	6.6	0.9	5.9	4.4
\$6.50 or More	1.1	3.8	0.9	0.1	5.3	2.8
Total ¹	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total No. of Respondents	47,947	1,502	11,681	25,474	2,676	6,614

Source: Unpublished INS data for apprehended illegal aliens employed when found, January through March 1975.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

	<u>L&Co.</u> <u>Study Group</u>	<u>INS</u> <u>Study Group</u>
% of Total No. of Respondents Employed in INS Southwest Region	57.2	78.7
% of Total No. of Respondents Employed in Farmwork in U.S.	17.2	53.1
% of Total No. of Respondents Employed in Farmwork in INS Southwest Region	13.6	48.3

Neither study group can be assumed to be representative of the population of aliens illegally working in the United States. In particular, it is highly likely that women and service workers, who are generally among the lowest-paid workers, whether legal or illegal, are seriously underrepresented in both study groups. Illegals in nonagricultural work and illegals employed outside the Southwest Region are also likely to be seriously underrepresented in the INS group. Though this study attempted to compensate for the bias introduced by the allocation of most of INS resources to the Southwest Region, there is no way of determining whether, or to what degree, the regional or industrial distributions of the respondents interviewed for this study more closely reflects the corresponding distributions of the totality of aliens working illegally in the nation. Further, if the substantial differences in education and skills between the Mexican, WH and EH apprehended illegals interviewed for this report are representative of those groups of illegal workers in the nation, it is reasonable to suppose that the substantial differences in their wage levels will similarly obtain. If that is the case, then distribution of national origin of illegals in the U.S. labor market will have a strong bearing upon the general wage level of that population. Finally, it is possible that unapprehended illegal workers are significantly more successful in the labor market than apprehended illegals -- though the apprehended illegal respondents who had been in the nation two or more years did not earn substantially higher wages than those who had been here less than two years, and the few unapprehended respondents reported earnings similar to those reported by apprehended respondents.

With those cautions in mind, we note that both studies on the hourly wages of apprehended illegal aliens are in agreement that (1) at least three-quarters of all respondents in farmwork earned less than \$2.50 an hour; (2) at least two-thirds of all respondents employed in the Southwest Region earned less than \$2.50 an hour; (3) at least three-quarters of all respor-

dents earned less than \$4.50 an hour, regardless of their type of employment, location in the U.S., or (with respect to illegals interviewed for this report), region of origin; and (4) at least 98% of all respondents earned less than \$6.50 an hour.

Average Earnings and Hours: Illegals and the U.S. Labor Force. Data collected from the 766 illegals who were not self-employed and responded to all questions concerning their wage, hours, and employer in their most recent U.S. job yield hour and wage data that permit comparison with the average hours and wages of comparably employed U.S. workers (see Table V-14).

The average hourly wages of the illegals interviewed for this study fell markedly below the norm in each of the seven industrial divisions for which there are comparable data on U.S. workers, and well below the average hourly wage of most of the U.S. workforce. As a group, the 609 respondents employed in those seven industrial groups* earned an average of \$2.66 an hour -- about 60% of \$4.47, the average hourly wage in 1975 of the some 50 million similarly employed production and nonsupervisory U.S. workers.

There were no exceptions to the disparity between the average hourly wages of the illegals interviewed for this study and those of comparably employed legal workers. Respondents in each of the seven industrial divisions earned between 35% and 81% of the average hourly wage of similarly employed U.S. production and nonsupervisory workers:

<u>Industry Group</u>	<u>Respondents' Hourly Wage</u> (as percent of average hourly wage in each in- dustry)
Mining	35
Contract Construction	42
Manufacturing	62
Transportation & Public Utilities	48
Trade	69
Finance, and Related Industries	81
Service, except Private Household	70
Total	60

*Respondents employed in agriculture and private households (134 and 23, respectively) were excluded for comparative purposes.

Average Gross Hourly and Weekly Wage, and Weekly Hours, of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their Most Recent U.S. Job and of U.S. Production or Nonsupervisory Workers (PNW) by Industry in 1975

INDUSTRY DIVISION	AVG HOURLY WAGE		AVG WEEKLY WAGE		AVG WEEKLY HOURS		No. of Illegals ¹
	Illegals	U.S. PNW	Illegals	U.S. PNW	Illegals	U.S. PNW	
Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries	\$2.07	*	\$110.57	*	53.6	*	134
Mining	2.00	\$5.79	120.00	\$244.92	60.0	42.3	1
Contract Construction	2.98	7.15	126.39	265.27	42.8	37.1	124
Manufacturing	2.92	4.73	121.22	184.47	41.2	39.0	259
Transportation & Public Utilities	2.77	5.79	134.00	229.28	48.6	39.7	10
Trade: Wholesale & Retail	2.57	3.71	112.69	124.66	43.4	33.6	152
Finance, Real Estate & Insurance	3.32	4.68	117.00	148.10	35.0	36.3	6
Services, except Private Household ²	2.79	3.98	121.75	134.13	45.0	33.7	57
Private Household Services	1.63	*	66.30	*	42.4	*	23
All Industries (excluding Agriculture & Private Household)	2.66	4.47	117.03	160.47	44.5	35.9	609

* Not Available

Sources: Column 1, 3, 5, and 7, Janson & Company Illegal Alien Study; columns 2, 4, and 6, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Earnings, Volume 21, No. 12 (June 1975), Tables C-1, C-2.

¹Data for 27 of the 793 respondents who were self-employed or omitted industry, wage, or hours are excluded. For comparative purposes, the total number of illegals excludes 134 respondents in agriculture and 23 in private household.

²Note: Note that average hourly wage times average weekly hours may not equal average weekly wage. In fact, for these data, that product is consistently greater than the average weekly wage, indicating a tendency for respondents with lower wages to work longer hours.

In addition, those respondents earned less per week than comparably employed U.S. workers, though they generally worked considerably longer hours. The average weekly wage of this group of illegal workers was \$117.03, roughly two-thirds that of U.S. production and nonsupervisory workers, who earned an average \$160.47 for a 35.9-hour work week. As a group, the 609 respondents worked an average 44.5 hours a week, 8.6 hours more than legal workers. Further, with the exception of the six illegals employed in Finance, Real Estate, and Insurance, respondents in each of the seven industrial divisions worked more hours per week than did legal workers, though their weekly wages were consistently, and sometimes appreciably, lower.

In short, comparison of the average hours and earnings of the illegals interviewed for this study shows that respondents earned significantly less than the bulk of the workers in the American labor market, i.e., those who, like most illegals in our study group are neither professional nor managerial workers. Nevertheless, wages within each of those industries and within the very broadly defined category of production or nonsupervisory worker range from the comparatively high wages of skilled construction workers and cabinetmakers in Los Angeles, for example, to the low wages of unskilled construction laborers or dishwashers in El Paso. Thus it would be incorrect to regard the considerable and consistent disparity between the wages of the illegal respondents and those of legal workers as proof that the illegals interviewed for this study are not simply low-paid workers in the United States -- which they are -- but that they are also underpaid workers, i.e., that they are paid less than legal workers in the same occupation, in the same sector of the economy, and in the same geographical location.

One would expect respondents' earnings to fall at the lowest end of the U.S. wage spectrum, for as discussed earlier, fully half the illegals in the study group were employed in unskilled jobs, 30% were employed in semi-skilled work (mostly as operatives), and roughly 20% were employed in skilled, generally blue-collar, occupations. Nevertheless, the little macro wage data available for a handful of occupations within the category of "production and non-supervisory worker" provide some perspective on the range of workers' wages, and suggest a considerable range in salaries for unskilled work. Most of the average hourly wages for unskilled workers in 11 occupations in all metropolitan-area industries in 1972 were considerably higher than \$2.66, the 1975 average hourly wage of all comparably employed illegals interviewed for this study. In 1972, skilled maintenance workers received the following wages: carpenters, \$4.75; electricians, \$4.96; machinists, \$4.89; auto mechanics, \$4.83; tool and die makers,

\$5.22; for unskilled workers (all Schedule B occupations): janitors, porters, and cleaners, \$2.79; laborers, material handlers, \$3.53; order fillers, \$2.62; truckdrivers, \$4.46; forklift truckers, \$3.81.*

In addition, a spot check of current listings** of job openings in San Antonio, Los Angeles, and New York City -- cities where a number of the illegals interviewed for this study had been employed -- shows that wages may vary considerably within the same occupation, and in the same metropolitan area. For example, in July 1975, janitors in San Antonio were offered wages ranging from \$2.10 to \$4.48 an hour; in Los Angeles, they were offered a straight \$2.10. Painters were offered \$3.00 an hour in Los Angeles, from \$2.50 to \$3.00 an hour in San Antonio, and \$4.37 in New York City. The wage offers for machine operators was \$2.10 in San Antonio, \$2.25 in New York City, and \$3.00 an hour in Los Angeles. It is apparent, then, that current wages for even low-skilled jobs vary to a degree which renders precarious any attempt to establish standard wages for legal workers, which could in turn be used to measure the degree to which the respondents received prevailing wage rates. One can refer to the few current wage data that are available, and apply the general rule of thumb -- that an adult U.S. male worker with no special skills earns about twice the minimum wage, which was \$2.00 to \$2.10 in 1975 for nonagricultural workers, and infer that some respondents are likely to have been underpaid as well as low-paid members of the U.S. work force. But in the absence of more precise data on prevailing U.S. wages, it is impossible to determine, by a comparative wage analysis, whether respondents received substandard wages, much less to establish that their low wages were related to their status as illegal workers.

The Question of Exploitation

The Fair Labor Standards Act does, however, define what constitutes substandard wages and hours for most jobs, and it is not unreasonable to assume that illegals who are paid less than the minimum wage are not only underpaid and hence exploited workers, but that they generally owe such exploitation to the fact that they are illegal workers. For, although illegals' jobs are covered by labor legislation, their participation in the U.S. labor force contravenes other laws; hence they are in no position to ensure that minimum labor standards are met.

*1974 Handbook of Labor Statistics, Table 107.

**These are from the ESARS listings (Employment Service Automated Reporting System), the computerized job bank of the Department of Labor.

Employers, on the other hand, may legally employ illegal workers, though they violate federal law if they employ anyone in jobs covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act that do not comply with those standards.

In addition to regarding earnings below the minimum wage as an indicator that illegals interviewed for this study were underpaid, we shall also take into account five other factors in considering the question of exploitation:

- illegals' perception that they were hired because they were illegal;
- their perception that they were paid less than legal workers;
- their perception that they were paid less than the minimum wage;
- their reports of the presence of other illegals in their workplace; and
- their employment in a cash economy.

Minimum Wage Violations. Minimum hourly wages in 1975 were applied in this study as follows: \$1.80 for respondents employed in farms, forestry, and fisheries; \$2.00 an hour for those employed in sales, services, or private households; and \$2.10, for those employed in mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, or finance. Measured according to those rough approximations of minimum wage regulations, 182 or 23.8% of the 76 illegals who responded to all questions concerning their most recent U.S. job apparently received less than the minimum wage (see Table V-15). That is, a third of the farmworkers, a quarter of the construction workers, slightly more than 10% of those in manufacturing, a quarter of those in sales, less than 20% of those in services, and almost two-thirds of those in household services reported illegal wages (as did one respondent in mining and one in finance and related industries).*

*Sixty-six respondents in the entire study group reported they had been given room or board in addition to wages, a group that was not separated out in the wage analysis. Thus, it is possible that if room or board had been included, some respondents may not have earned less than the minimum wage. Surprisingly, less than half (30) were farmworkers. Most of the nonagriculturally employed respondents who received room or board were domestics, though two were karate instructors.

TABLE V-15

Distributions of Hourly Wage of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their Most Recent U.S. Job, by Industry

(as percents of groups responding)

HOURLY WAGE	ASPI- CULTURE	MINING	CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION	MANUFAC- TURING	TRANSPOR- TATION	TRADE	FINANCE	SERVICES ¹	PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD SERVICES	NO. OF RESPONDENTS ²
\$0.00 - \$1.49	23.9	-	4.0	0.8	-	7.2	-	3.5	52.2	64
\$1.50 - \$1.79	9.7	-	4.8	1.5	-	9.2	-	8.8	8.7	44
\$1.80 - \$1.99	6.7	-	1.0	1.5	-	9.2	-	5.3	4.3	33
\$2.00 - \$2.09	14.9	100.0	14.5	8.1	-	15.8	16.7	22.8	8.7	100
\$2.10 - \$2.49	20.1	-	21.8	22.4	20.0	19.7	16.7	15.8	-	154
\$2.50 - \$2.99	13.4	-	19.4	26.3	40.0	12.5	-	14.0	17.4	145
\$3.00 - \$3.99	6.7	-	15.3	25.5	40.0	19.1	50.0	8.8	4.3	136
\$4.00 - \$4.99	2.2	-	8.1	10.8	-	2.0	16.7	12.3	4.3	53
\$5.00 - \$5.99	1.5	-	4.0	1.5	-	2.6	-	5.3	-	18
\$6.00 - \$6.99	-	-	1.6	0.8	-	1.3	-	1.8	-	7
\$7.00 - \$7.99	-	-	3.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
\$8.00 - \$8.99	0.7	-	0.8	0.4	-	-	-	1.8	-	4
\$9.00 +	-	-	0.8	0.4	-	1.3	-	-	-	4
TOTAL ³	99.8	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.1	100.2	99.9	
No. of Respondents	134	1	124	259	10	152	6	57	23	766 ⁰
Percent of Total No. of Respondents	17.5	0.1	16.2	33.8	1.3	19.8	0.8	7.4	3.0	100.0

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

⁰ = 1975 minimum wage level used to estimate extent of minimum wage violations (see text).¹ Excludes private households.² Data for 27 of the 793 respondents who omitted industry, wages or hours are excluded.³ Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

Further analysis of the hourly wages of respondents suggests that the closer respondents were to Mexico, the more likely their wages were to violate the Fair Labor Standards Act. The average hourly wage (\$1.98) of the 223 illegals employed in the Southwest was conspicuously lower than that of any other regional subgroup of respondents, and it is below the minimum wage of all nonagricultural workers. In fact, a third of the respondents in that region earned less than the minimum wage for farmworkers (\$1.80), though only slightly more than 20% were employed in agriculture. More generally, wages below the \$2.00 nonagricultural minimum were three to four times more likely to have been earned by respondents working in the Southwest than those working in California or other regions (see Table V-8).

Further, the average hourly wage of the 68 respondents employed in the southwest border counties (\$1.74) was the lowest wage rate of any subgroup of respondents considered, except that of private household workers, and it is below all minimum wage levels. Half the respondents employed in that area earned less than \$1.80, though less than a third were farmworkers, and 60% earned less than \$2.00 an hour. Earnings below the nonagricultural minimum of \$2.00 an hour were thus substantially more likely to be reported by those respondents than by any other subgroups of respondents considered, excluding domestics. Similarly, respondents employed in San Antonio were almost two to three times more likely to report hourly earnings under \$2.00 than were respondents employed in Chicago, Los Angeles, or New York City (20%, 13%, 12%, and 6%, respectively).

These findings, which suggest that illegals employed near the Mexican border are more likely to receive illegal wages than those employed elsewhere in the nation, are consistent with a recent analysis of INS wage data for 278 employed illegals apprehended in the border city of El Paso in February through March of last year. That study found that a number of respondents employed as bakers, bodymen, carpenters, and mechanics, as well as those employed as janitors, waitresses, and stable hands, received less than the minimum wage (see Table V-16).*

*Oscar J. Martinez, "Border Boom Town: Ciudad Juarez Since 1880" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1975), p. 258.

TABLE V-16

Selected Occupations and Wages of Illegal Aliens Apprehended
in El Paso, February-March, 1975

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>No. of Workers</u>	<u>HOURLY WAGES</u>	
		<u>Mean</u>	<u>Median</u>
Skilled			
Bakers	9	\$1.81	\$2.00
Bodymen	11	1.83	2.00
Butchers	8	2.40	2.50
Carpenters	4	1.98	2.00
Cooks	5	1.60	1.50
Mechanics	6	1.67	1.50
Molders	6	2.10	2.10
Painters	8	2.16	2.00
Roofers	90	2.04	2.00
Upholsterers	3	2.50	2.50
Service			
Barmaids	36	1.63	1.50
Gardeners	8	1.86	2.00
Maids	4	6.00	6.00 (per day)*
Janitors	9	1.63	1.90
Waitresses	3	1.63	1.50
Unskilled			
Foodhandlers	15	1.97	2.00
Laborers	38	2.04	2.00
Stable Hands	15	1.88	1.88

* It is difficult to calculate precisely the hourly rate for maids due to the varying arrangements made with individual employers. This figure of \$6.00 may include a working day of 4-8 hours. It is likely that bus fare, often part of the package, is not included in the \$6.00. While many maids work "by the day" for such rates (frequently in a different household each day), others prefer to "live in," taking one or one-and-a-half days off during the weekend. In such cases wages vary widely, from \$15-\$35 a week. This is "take-home" pay and does not include "fringe benefits" such as used clothes or toys and bus fare.

Source: Oscar J. Martinez, "Border Boom Town: Ciudad Juarez Since 1880" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Los Angeles, 1975), p. 258.

Illegals' Perceptions of their Working Conditions. Though a few respondents in our study group were less than enthusiastic about answering any questions that directly referred to their illegal status, that status rarely interfered with their responsiveness to the questionnaire -- except when questions concerning the illegal status of other aliens were raised, or when the questions required them to offer an independent judgment or take a critical stance. Thus a significant number of illegals chose not to respond to our attempt to ascertain if they had been exploited, which was expressed in a series of specific questions regarding their perceptions of the relationship between their illegal status and their working conditions in their most recent and previous job in the U.S.

Respondents were asked, for example, if they thought their employers knew they were illegal when they hired them. Just under 100 illegals (12%) refused to answer the question or claimed they didn't know -- although some illegals responded by saying that their employer knew they were illegal "just by looking," and it is unlikely that most employers did not know most were illegal, since few (particularly the Mexican illegals) spoke English. Nevertheless, only 304 illegals (38.3% of the entire study group) reported that their employer knew they were illegal. Illegals in the Southwest or in farmwork were almost twice as likely as illegals in other regions or in non-agricultural work to report that their employer knew they were illegal when they were hired. Mexican illegals were almost three times as likely as WH or EH illegals to report that their employer knew they were illegal, especially in the border counties and in San Antonio. In fact, more than 80% of the illegals who said their employer knew they were illegal were Mexicans who were working, with very few exceptions, in the Southwest or, to a lesser extent, in California. Almost 60% reported that they themselves had told their prospective employer they were illegals; close to 20% reported that one of the other workers had told their employer.

Slightly more than 43% (142 illegals, 111 of whom were Mexican) of the respondents who had reported that their employer knew they were illegal also reported that they had been hired because they were illegal. Thus 18% of the entire study group claimed they had been hired because they were illegal, and 78% of those respondents were Mexican. More precisely, 29.1% of all illegals working in the Southwest, 19.0% of those in California, 10.6% of those in the Mid- and Northwest, and 9.4% of those working on the East Coast reported they had been hired because they were illegal.

Most illegals who reported that they had been hired because they were illegal also claimed that their employer had paid them less than he paid legal workers. Thus, 127 illegals (16.0% of all respondents), 98 of whom were Mexicans almost all working in the Southwest or California, claimed that they were paid lower wages as a direct result of their illegal status. In addition, 93 illegals (11.7% of the study group)-- again mostly Mexicans working in the Southwest, particularly its border counties -- reported they had been paid less than the minimum wage because they were illegal. Very few respondents, however, reported that they had been "badly treated" by their employer because they were illegal -- 28 illegals (3.5% of all respondents), mostly Mexicans, responded affirmatively to that question.

In sum, 18% of the 793 apprehended illegal aliens reported they had been hired because they were illegal; and most also reported that their employers had, in their opinion, therefore paid them lower wages than they paid legal workers. In addition, the majority of that group (66% or 93 respondents) asserted that they had been paid not only lower wages, but less than the minimum wage, a claim that is certainly congruent with our own assessment of this issue.

An even greater percentage (30%) of the 351 illegals who reported on their previous job in the U.S. likewise reported that they had been hired because they were illegal; most also reported that they had been paid less than legal workers, and less than the minimum wage. As one would expect, in both cases, illegals who reported exploitation of this kind were almost twice as likely to have been in the U.S. less than two years than illegals who had been in the U.S. two or more years.

Although these reports of perceived, but objectively defined, instances of exploitation,* cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed, we are impressed by the fact that they came almost entirely from the southwest border states, where employers have historically had a surplus of available low-wage Mexican workers, both legal and illegal, and are well apprised of illegals' pressing need for work.

*Questions regarding this issue asked for respondents' opinions, but in no instance used the term "exploitation."

We are also impressed by the fact that very few illegals reported that they had been "badly treated" by their employers, as compared to the larger number who reported concrete instances of exploitation. This discrepancy suggests to us that our respondents' reports of exploitation are more likely to have been the result of an accurate perception of their environment than an indiscriminate expression of a hostile or fearful attitude toward that environment. In fact, only a small minority of the illegals volunteered any feelings of exploitation or discrimination. When asked how they had been treated by people they had worked with in the U.S. in the last five years, close to 90% of all respondents stated that they had been treated "like anyone else" by their fellow workers; 6.4% reported that they had been treated "not quite as well as most U.S. citizens," and 3.3% reported they had been treated "much worse than U.S. citizens."*

Nevertheless, given illegals' relatively low expectations and their understandable reluctance to endanger their illegal hold on the economic lifeline that the U.S. so often represents to them, more exploitation may have occurred than our respondents reported -- and perhaps more occurred than they even perceived.

Other Illegals in the Workplace. Illegals tend to belong to a social network of aliens, both legal and illegal, who often induce them -- if only by example or tall tales of success -- to come to the U.S. illegally in the first place, and then serve as a support system when they arrive.** A significant number of respondents in the study group (45.1%), for example, reported that they had found their most recent job in the U.S. through friends or relatives, almost all of whom lived in the

*Similarly, Samora found that only 4% of the 493 Mexican illegals interviewed in his study felt they were treated badly. See Los Mojados, p. 97.

**See Chapter IV for a discussion of this subject. For an interesting discussion of its role in illegal immigration, see Grace M. Anderson, Networks of Contact: The Portuguese and Toronto (Wilfred Laurier University Press, 1972), and "Illegal Immigration: A Sociologically Unexplored Field," an unpublished paper presented at the American Sociological Association (Denver, Colorado, 1971).

U.S.* We suspected, however, that this principle of safety-in-numbers for people in a strange land backfires for illegals in the market place. Though they may find jobs through this channel, it seemed reasonable to assume that illegals are more likely to be subjected to substandard wages and working conditions if they are clustered together in a workplace rather than if they are dispersed. That is, a tipping of the perceived proportion of illegal to legal workers in a workplace so that the former emerge as an identifiable group is likely to generate substandard, if not illegal, wage and hour norms, and hence to create the kind of underground market, on a micro as well as a macro level, that Michael Piore has discussed.**

Respondents were therefore asked how many other illegals worked in their place of employment. Almost 30% chose not to respond to this question or claimed that they didn't know, 258 respondents said there were no other illegals working at their place of employment, and 306 illegals (54% of the illegals who responded to the question) knew of at least one illegal coworker. As a group, all respondents had worked with an average of 8 other illegal employees.

Mexican illegals were three times more likely to report the presence of illegal coworkers than either WH or EH illegals. Illegals employed in California, the Southwest, or the Mid- and Northwest (in that order) were roughly twice as likely as illegals in the East to report they worked with other illegals. Overall, 180 respondents reported from one to five illegal coworkers; 53 reported the presence of from six to 10; 21 reported from 11-20; 20 reported from 21-40; and 16 reported a hundred or more other illegal employees.

*In addition, 44.0% had asked the employer directly; 2.8% found their job through classified ads; 2.7% had been recruited by their employer; 1.7% through public employment agencies; 1.3% through private employment agencies; .3% through a union; 1.1% through other means.

**Michael Piore, "The 'New Immigration' And the Presumptions of Social Policy," Paper prepared for presentation at a meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association (December 29, 1974) and subsequently condensed in The New Republic, (22 February 1975).

Despite the fact that about a third of all reports of illegal coworkers came from the Southwest, illegals tended to cluster more heavily in workplaces in California (15.5 illegal coworkers per respondent), and the Mid- and Northwest (10.0) than in either the Southwest (4.6) or the East Coast (2.5).^{*} Like illegals working in the Southwest, WH illegals exhibited a similar discrepancy between the number of respondents reporting illegal coworkers and the number of illegal coworkers they reported. Few WH illegals reported the presence of illegal coworkers, but those few had worked with such a large number of other illegals that the average number of illegal coworkers for this group was almost the same as the average number of illegals working with Mexican illegals (8.7 and 8.9, respectively). Very few illegals from the Eastern Hemisphere, however, reported other illegal employees -- and the number of illegal coworkers that were reported was likewise very small (.3 per EH respondent).

Illegal farmworkers were twice as likely to report the presence of other illegal employees as illegals employed in other industries, but nonagricultural respondents tended to work with more illegal coworkers (8.3 per nonagricultural respondent). Finally, illegals in the U.S. less than two years were only slightly more likely to report the presence of illegal coworkers than those in the U.S. two or more years -- but the former tended to work with a smaller number of illegal employees (7.4) than the latter (8.5).

Illegals in a Cash Economy. Another indicator of exploitation is payment of wages in cash, for it provides an obvious means of avoiding the documentation of illegal wages, which payment by check would entail.**

*Reports of concentrations of illegals in a workplace obviously indicate the presence of large numbers of workers in general, and not just the presence of illegals, which probably explains why respondents in the less industrialized Southwest reported fewer illegals than respondents in California. The regional distribution of illegals employed in manufacturing was as follows: California, 38%; East Coast, 35%; Mid- and Northwest, 17%; and the Southwest, 10%.

**Nevertheless, small businesses, particularly restaurants whose customers pay primarily by cash, are sometimes owned by friends and relatives of the illegals whom they hire; thus employees as well as employers may very well participate in the obvious assets of a cash economy, as well as be subjected to its liabilities.

More than a fifth (22.1%) of the respondents in this study reported that their wages had usually been paid in cash: 26.1% of the EH illegals (most working in New York City, probably in restaurants); 24.2% of the Mexicans; and 16.6% of the WH illegals. Illegals employed in the border counties were most likely to be paid in cash (63.3%), as compared to 36.0% of all respondents working in the Southwest, 21.0% of those employed on the East Coast, 14.8% of those working in California, and 10.7% of those working in the Mid- and Northwest. Illegals in the nation less than two years were almost twice as likely to report they were paid in cash than were illegals in the nation two or more years; so, to a lesser extent, were illegal farmworkers as compared to nonagriculturally employed illegals.

Illegals who reported a previous job in the U.S. were somewhat more likely to report that they had been paid in cash in that job. More than a quarter (27.1%), so reported, with much the same variations in the subgroups.

In sum, the illegals interviewed for this study generally earned considerably less than most American workers, but worked much longer hours. More than one-fifth of them appear to have been paid less than the minimum wage. Minimum wage violations were strongly associated with illegal domestics and, to a lesser extent, those employed in farmwork. Low wages and minimum wage violations were, however, found particularly in the Southwest, where respondents were also most likely to report they had been hired because they were illegal, that they had been paid less than legal workers, that they were paid less than the minimum wage, that they worked with other illegal employees, and that they had been paid in cash. Finally, evidence of exploitation was above all forthcoming from respondents who worked in the 23 counties that border Mexico. Thus, if we define an underground labor market as one in which illegal workers and illegal wages coincide, the findings of this study suggest that it is more likely to exist in the counties that border Mexico, in the Southwest itself, and in nonagricultural as well as agricultural employment.

Union Participation

Though a significant minority of all respondents had been hired by employers who operated outside the laws that govern the market place and hence were unprotected by those laws, 16.4% of the illegals interviewed for this study had received the protection that unions offer their members. As predictable, those two minorities did not overlap, and they were associated with significantly different wage levels.

A few respondents (10.2% of the study group) had belonged to unions in their native land. Interestingly enough, of all subgroupings, illegals working in the southwest border counties were most likely to have belonged to a union in their home country: 17.7% of that group so reported, followed by the illegals working in Chicago (15.6%), Los Angeles (12.8%), and New York (10.5%). Mexicans were slightly more likely to have belonged to a union than either EH or WH illegals (11% as compared to 9% for the latter two groups), but illegals working in the Southwest were least likely to have belonged to a union in their home country: 7.6%, as compared to 9.4% of those working on the East Coast, 10.8% of those in California, and 13.5% of those in the Mid- and Northwest. Illegals working in U.S. agriculture were only slightly less likely to have belonged to unions in their country of origin than were illegals employed in nonagricultural work (6.6% as compared to 11.0%, respectively). Although respondents who had belonged to unions in their native land reported that they had belonged to a union for as long as 22 years, the median was three years.

Nearly twice as many illegals had joined unions in the U.S. -- 130 respondents, or 16.4% of the study group. Almost half (62 respondents) had belonged for two or more years. Though Mexicans had been somewhat more likely to have belonged to unions in their home country than either EH or WH illegals, they were least likely to belong to U.S. unions: only 10.1% of the Mexican respondents had joined a U.S. union, as compared to 17.3% of the EH and 29.5% of the WH illegals. Similar changes in union participation in the U.S. held for illegals working in different parts of the U.S., as the following table shows:

<u>Location of Most Recent Job</u>	<u>Percent With Union Membership in Home Country</u>	<u>Percent With Union Membership in U.S.</u>
Border Counties	17.7	1.5
Southwest	7.6	1.4
California	10.8	15.6
Mid- and Northwest	13.5	23.8
East Coast	9.4	29.0

Respondents in nonagricultural employment in the U.S. were 20 times more likely to belong to U.S. unions than respondents employed in farmwork (19.8% as compared to .7%, respectively). Illegals in the nation two or more years were five times as likely to belong to U.S. unions as were those here less than two years (26.6% as compared to 5.2%).

The 124 illegals employed in New York City reported the highest incidence of union membership of any group of respondents: more than a third (37%) belonged to an American union. Respondents in that metropolitan area earned an average hourly wage of \$3.35 -- almost twice the wage of respondents working at the southwest border. Similarly, 26% of the respondents in Chicago belonged to a U.S. union, and the average hourly wage of the 71 illegals working there was \$3.05. Twenty-four percent of the 125 respondents working in Los Angeles had joined an American union, but the average hourly wage of the illegals who worked in that area was considerably lower than that in New York or Chicago: \$2.58. The hourly wage of the 96 illegals in San Antonio, where no illegal had joined a union, was the lowest of all metropolitan areas and barely above the minimum wage: \$2.18, though 33% were employed in craft and kindred occupations, as compared to 18% of the illegals in Los Angeles, 3% of those in Chicago, and 19% of those in New York City.

CHAPTER VI: THE ILLEGALS AS PARTICIPANTS IN PUBLIC PROGRAMS

Most current discussions about illegal aliens in the United States revolve around two issues: their presence in the labor market, and whether they are -- directly and indirectly -- a drain on social service and income transfer programs. Generally speaking, however, there has been substantially more heat than light generated on the latter subject, with much of the evidence anecdotal at best.

While we secured some information on the direct impacts of the respondents on social service and income transfer programs, we can contribute nothing on an equally important subject, their indirect impact on these programs. We do not know, and cannot know, the extent to which the illegals we interviewed caused other workers to draw unemployment insurance benefits, or to rely on food stamps or welfare. Given the inadequate data on these indirect impacts, those who have written on the subject have been forced to use a process of building assumptions upon assumptions.*

While it would seem far easier to gather data on the direct impact of illegals on social service and income transfer programs than on the indirect impacts, little has been done in this field, either. The lack of data in this field has been caused by an understandable agency standoff; the agencies that collect program information on unemployment

*See, for example, Paul E. Sultan and John M. Virgo, "The Legal and Illegal California Farmworker: Some Implications for Unemployment Insurance," Unemployment Insurance Service, Manpower Administration, Washington, D.C., 1974) and the 4 December 1975 letter from Richard D. Darman, Principal, ICF Incorporated, to General Leonard Chapman, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, which INS released to the press.

For a one-county study of the illegals' impact on such systems as welfare, food stamps, education, and the provision of health services, see the previously cited "A Study of the Impact of Illegal Aliens on the County of San Diego on Specific Socioeconomic Areas," by the San Diego (California) Human Resources Agency.

insurance, for example, know their program but have difficulty identifying illegals. The one agency which can identify illegals, INS, routinely has little access to social service and social insurance data and has done little to reach out for them.

This state of knowledge, or lack thereof, has persisted for years; the 1971 Rodino Committee hearings, for instance, were studded with frustrating conversations between members of the Committee and state and federal welfare officials, with the latter saying they were sure that illegals were collecting welfare payments and using health services, but that they had no way of knowing to what extent this was true.*

More recently, the Los Angeles County Health Department sought to determine the extent to which it is financing medical care for illegal aliens. The County has estimated that it spent \$8.1 million dollars in 1973 for such purposes, and, in order to dramatize the issue, it sent a bill for that amount to the Immigration Service. (The bill was not paid, and there was no expectation that it would be.)**

In a somewhat similar vein, the General Accounting Office (GAO) looked at some case histories of illegals collecting welfare in New York City, Boston, Los Angeles, and Miami. While GAO found 27 instances of illegals on welfare rolls in the course of its research, it made no effort to estimate the numbers of such cases that exist.***

*U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Illegal Aliens, Part 2, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 1, 92d Cong., 1st session, June 24, 25; July 9 and 10, 1971. See, for example, testimony of Dr. William T. Van Orman, Regional Director, HEW, pp. 303-309.

**For some of the inherent difficulties in identifying illegals receiving health services, see the testimony of Jerry Chamberlain, Chief Deputy Director of the Los Angeles County Health Department, in "Transcript of Proceedings, Los Angeles, California, in the matter of: Illegal Alien Hearings, Before the County Board of Supervisors, County of Los Angeles, June 30, 1975," pp. 22-37. Chamberlain made the point that the Health Department does not press the identification question so vigorously that an illegal needing treatment decides not to seek that treatment.

***Comptroller General of the United States, Report to the Congress: More Needs To Be Done To Reduce The Number And Adverse Impact Of Illegal Aliens In The United States (#B-125051), Washington, D.C., 1973, pp. 41-46.

Further, a California State Social Welfare Board Position Statement "Issue: Aliens in California" addressed this problem in general terms but reported no empirical research.*

The interviews provide some data on the subject of illegals' participation in public programs. Questions were asked about relationships to tax, social service, and income transfer programs. It should be noted, however, that the characteristics of the respondents, who were typically young male workers, are not those of a population likely to receive income transfer payments. The respondents reported the following levels of program participation:

<u>Program Activity</u>	<u>Percentage of Respondent Participation</u>
<u>Input</u>	
Social Security Taxes withheld	77.3
Federal income taxes withheld	73.2
Hospitalization payments withheld	44.0
Filed U.S. income tax returns	31.5
<u>Output</u>	
Used hospitals or clinics	27.4
Collected one or more weeks of unemployment insurance	3.9
Have children in U.S. schools	3.7
Participated in U.S.-funded job training programs	1.4
Secured food stamps	1.3
Secured welfare payments	0.5

A program-by program review of the respondents' participation in these 10 activities follows.

Social Security Taxes. The most common interaction of interviewed illegals with the U.S. government was, of course, their apprehension by INS at the time of the interview; the second most common dealt with Social Security taxes. More than three-quarters of those interviewed said that these taxes were withheld by their most recent employer.

*State of California, Health and Welfare Agency, Department of Social Welfare, Sacramento, California, 1973.

Two aspects of these transactions should be borne in mind; first, this, the most regressive of federal taxes, carries with it no refund provisions; in 1975, both the employer and the worker made contributions of 5.75% on the first \$14,000 of a worker's wages. Secondly, to collect the benefits from the program, an individual usually has to work for a substantial period of time. It is doubtful that any but a small number of the respondents will be able to recapture any of their investment in this system.

There were variations in the extent to which different groups of respondents reported that social security taxes were withheld. Expectedly, a higher percentage of those with non-farm jobs reported such deductions, compared to those in agricultural employment (80.5% vs. 61.7%, respectively). Unexpectedly, there was a higher incidence of withholding reported in San Antonio (84.0%) than in New York (74.1%). The geographical area with the lowest rate reported was the border counties, where only 27.9% of the respondents reported such deductions. Of the Mexican respondents, 74.5% reported these taxes, compared to 79.7% of the WH illegals and 82.3% of the EH illegals.

Income Tax Withholding. There are circumstances, such as relatively low wage payments, in which an employer is obligated to pay social security taxes but not to deduct income taxes. This presumably explains the lower rate of income tax withholding, which was 73.2% for the interviewed apprehended illegals. The rate was higher among respondents in Los Angeles (83.5%) than in New York (77.1%), and considerably lower along the border (24.6%).

We also asked about social security and income tax deductions in the respondents' previous U.S. job; it is presumably a measure of their upward movement that the incidence of such payments was a little higher in their most recent job than in the previous one. In the case of income taxes, for instance, 64.5% of the respondents who had a previous job in the States reported that deductions were made in that job.

Hospitalization. Income and Social Security tax deductions are mandated by the government, and violations by employers are risky. On the other hand, while sometimes written into union-management contracts, there is no statutory obligation for employers to deduct hospitalization insurance from workers' wages, or to finance it directly. Such deduc-

tions were reported, however, by a substantial minority of the respondents, 44.0%, which suggests that these illegals were not completely excluded from the fringe benefits that are generally part of the compensation for employment in the United States.

Of the illegals who had worked in Los Angeles, 62.6% were covered by hospitalization, as were only 9.4% of those who had worked in the border counties. Eastern Hemisphere illegals, the highest paid of the three groups in the study, oddly, showed a lower rate (37.3%) than WH illegals (44.2%), and Mexicans (45.1%).

Regionally, more than 60% of the respondents in California reported these deductions, compared to only 26.7% of those who worked in the Southwest. The rate of deductions was 42.1% on the East Coast and 47.5% in the Mid- and Northwest.

It should be noted that the only hospitalization insurance reported was that deducted from the workers' paychecks. It is possible that some illegals purchased such coverage as individuals, that some employers paid for hospitalization (without making deductions), or that some illegals forgot such deductions. In short, the 44.0% coverage should be considered a low estimate of the percent covered by hospitalization. Despite all of these caveats, however, comparison of the respondents' 44.0% coverage with that of Americans, generally, is suggestive; such coverage for people under 65 was at the 79.8% level in 1971.*

Filing Income Tax Returns. The rate for filing of income tax returns (31.5%) was approximately half that of withholding of income taxes reported by the respondents (73.2%). The precise activities inquired about were withholdings in the most recent job and the filing of at least one income tax return since January 1970. Clearly, given a complicated set of issues, sometimes dimly remembered, we cannot construct from these answers clear-cut projections of the extent of income tax payments made by illegals.

It is of interest, however, that a much larger percentage reported withholdings by the most recent employer than reported the filing of a return in any year. Only in cases where a return is filed can there be a refund; the fact that the inci-

*Social Indicators, 1973, Table 1/27.

dence of withholding taxes was at least twice that of filing returns indicated that there could have been no possibility of refunds in a substantial number of these cases. (Presumably, the respondents' unwillingness to show his hand, by supplying his address to the government, as well as a reluctance to tackle a formal document in English, accounted for the low incidence of filings.)

Among the respondents, visa abusers were more likely to file income tax returns than EWIs. More than 49% of the interviewed visa abusers, whose average U.S. income in 1974 was \$4,793, reported filing one or more returns, as compared to only 23.9% of the EWI respondents, who had an average 1974 U.S. income of \$2,224.

There were wide variations in filing practices among the respondents, by location within the U.S. and by region of origin. For example, 12.2% of the respondents in the Southwest had filed one or more returns, compared to 28.2% in California, 35.9% in the Mid- and Northwest, and 41.4% on the East Coast. Similarly, 22.3% of the Mexicans had filed, as had 43.0% of the WH illegals, and 54.8% of the EH illegals. These patterns, when laid against wage levels, suggest a correlation between wages and filing practices.

Use of Hospitals and Clinics. One or more visits to U.S. medical facilities were reported by 27.4% of the respondents, with such visits being reported by 41.0% of the visa abusers and 22.1% of the EWIs. Generally, such usage was higher in the East (35.2%) than in the Southwest (18.6%), and lowest at the border (9.1%). WH illegals (37.8%) were more likely to have used U.S. medical facilities than either EH illegals (29.7%) or Mexican illegals (22.0%). More than 83% of the interviewed illegals who said that they used such facilities said that it had not been free -- that either they, their hospital insurance, or their employer had paid for the care.

Unemployment Insurance. Among the respondents, 3.9% said that they had collected one or more weeks of unemployment insurance. The total number of weekly checks that the study group had collected over the last five years was 270, which would equal approximately one a week during that five year period. Although the concepts here do not mesh neatly with the reporting systems used by the Department of Labor, one UI check a week for a universe of 793 would be roughly comparable to an insured unemployed rate of less than 0.3%, if one assumes that only half the illegals were covered by the system. (For the full years covered by our questionnaire, 1970 through 1974, the average insured unemployment rate was 3.7%.)

One might also compare the number of weeks of UI benefits claimed by the respondents to the approximate number of weeks of unemployment that they experienced in the U.S. The respondents reported a 10% unemployment rate in the previous five years, but did not specify the nation in which the unemployment took place. However, this group of illegals had spent an average of 2.5 years in the U.S. If the 10% rate is applied to this period (130 weeks), it would produce an average period of unemployment in the U.S. of 13 weeks per respondent. Multiplying 13 times 793 respondents, one secures a result of 10,309 weeks of U.S. unemployment; this estimate can then be compared to the 270 weeks of UI benefits claimed. Even if the weeks-of-unemployment estimate is overstated by a factor of four or five, it is clear that the respondents were reporting a minimal utilization of unemployment insurance.

We assume that the respondents did not seek unemployment compensation out of a combination of prudence (avoiding government systems) and ignorance (not knowing that the benefits were potentially available and that the unemployment insurance and immigration systems rarely relate to each other). We also believe that the relatively low incidence of UI claims reported is considerably more significant than the even lower rate of filing for welfare payments. Unemployment insurance is designed for workers who suffer unemployment; the kind of illegal whom we interviewed (and that INS apprehends) fits this description perfectly. Most welfare programs, however, are designed for non-laborforce participants who lack income; this description does not apply to the respondents, so it is not surprising that they said that they rarely collected welfare benefits.

Returning to unemployment benefits, we found that the visa abusers said they were much more deeply involved in the program, as they are in filing income tax returns and using hospitals; although there were twice as many EWIs as visa abusers among the respondents, roughly the same number of each group were collecting UI, and visa abusers were more likely to collect it for a longer period of time. Further, the group of respondents who had been here more than two years were much more likely to have collected UI than the group that had been here less than two years. Interviewed EH illegals were the least likely to collect UI, 1.4% did so; WH illegals were the most likely, 5.6%, and Mexican illegals were in between, 3.6%.

Two more points can be made. Because our data suggest that INS is more likely to apprehend EWIs than visa abusers, it is apparently apprehending only a small portion of those most likely to use the UI system (just as it is less likely for it to pick up high-wage illegals as opposed to low-wage ones). Secondly, while an illegal injured on a job is probably eligible for workers' compensation, and an illegal who is old enough and who has enough Social Security credits is certainly eligible for a Social Security pension, it can be argued that an illegal is not eligible for UI payments, on the grounds that he is not legally "available for work," a UI requirement.*

Children in U.S. Schools. Children enrolled in U.S. schools were reported by 29 of the 381 respondents who were parents, or by 3.7% of all respondents; they reported a total of 51 children enrolled. The geographical incidence of this activity was highest among New Yorkers (6.5%) and lowest in the border counties (1.4%); the incidence was considerably higher among the interviewed visa abusers (7.1%) than among the EWIs (2.2%), whose families tend to remain in the homeland.

Mexican-born respondents were the least likely to have them in U.S. schools (2.7%), with 4.0% of the EH illegals reporting this phenomenon, as did 5.5% of the WH illegals.

These relatively low school usage figures may be the tip of the iceberg; although 51 children were said to be in the schools, the interviewed illegals reported a total of 153 children born in the U.S. It seems likely that most, if not all, of these children were here at the time of the interview. That only a third of the children born here are reported as in school is probable, given the relative youth of the respondents (28.5 years) and the relatively short stay here (about two and a half years). There must be many very small children among these 153.

*A California court ruled in 1975 that an illegal alien cannot qualify for unemployment compensation under California law, because he was not "available for work." See Alonso v. State, Department of Human Resources, 123 Cal. Rptr. 536 (Ct. of App., 2d Dist. July 30, 1975) and, for a comment, Interpreter Releases, Vol. 52, No. 49, December 15, 1975.

Job-Training Programs. Only 1.4% of the study group said that they had participated in such activities.* The screening and continuing contact in these programs is more extensive than it is in the unemployment insurance programs, so it is more likely that the illegals will be screened out of such programs, or that they will be reluctant to participate out of fear of detection.

As time passes, illegals tend to become more integrated into the society: of the 11 who reported that they had been in job-training programs, ten had been here for two years or more. Of the 31 who reported collecting unemployment insurance, 29 had been here for two or more years. The participation in all the programs mentioned in this chapter were noticeably higher for respondents who had been in the country for longer periods of time.

Food Stamps and Welfare. Although 19.3 million citizens and permanent resident aliens participated in the food stamp program in April 1975, the respondents had made little use of it. (As in the case of unemployment insurance, but not welfare, if it were not for their illegal status in the nation, the respondents would, in many cases, be eligible for food stamps, which is generally based on the relationship between income and family size.)

Only 10 of the 793 respondents, or 1.3%, reported that they had received food stamps. (One was a WH visa abuser; the rest were Mexican EWIs.)

Finally, we found four illegals (all EWIs, three from Mexico and one WH illegal) who said that they had received welfare assistance.** That is a rate of 0.5%.

*Marginal notes from our interviewers indicated that a handful of illegals confided that this training had been acquired during a stint in prison, an issue we did not raise with our respondents.

**The reader may suspect that the respondents were either shading the truth or lying outright in answering these questions; the indications are, however, that there was little dishonesty in connection with these topics. Other questions asked were evidently much more threatening than the ones discussed in this chapter, for the number of nonresponses was remarkably higher; for instance, when we asked, "About how many people do you know from your home town who are now or who have been illegal aliens?" we encountered 172 refusals
(footnote continued on next page)

Our data on the respondents' participation in public programs thus suggest that their principal direct economic impact is on the labor market (and perhaps upon the balance of payments), but not on the public treasuries. Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis is based upon a questionnaire administered, as we have noted before, to a group of illegals selected among those caught by INS, and selected precisely because they had been workers in the U.S. It cannot therefore be regarded as a reliable indicator of the activities of all illegals in the nation. Two general conclusions, however, appear reasonable:

- insofar as illegals are bona fide employees of bona fide employers, as a substantial percentage of the respondents were, they are making substantial tax contributions, in the form of withholding taxes, in addition to whatever other tax contributions are automatic (e.g., sales taxes, which illegals pay in their role as consumer).
- the impact of illegals on social service and income transfer programs warrants further research, but such studies will be effective only if they are cooperative ventures in which program data will be secured from within the program's files, and illegal identification will be made by INS (or another knowledgeable entity, such as an immigrant-serving organization.)*

(footnote continued) or professions of ignorance; only seven illegals reacted in this way to the welfare question, eight on the unemployment insurance question, and five on our query about food stamps.

*The Privacy Act presumably would not be a barrier to such research, as it does not cover either nonimmigrants or illegal aliens.

CHAPTER VII: THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF ILLEGALS ON THE U.S. LABOR MARKET: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RESEARCHERS

This chapter considers the question of the labor-market role and impact of illegal aliens and discusses their implications for U.S. manpower policy. In undertaking this task, the researchers draw upon the survey results and other available information, but it is important for the reader to note that the lack of adequate data on illegals renders any such discussion speculative. In particular, as discussed in Chapter II, because the number, distribution, and characteristics of illegals are unknown, and because random sampling from that population is not possible, a representative sample could not be drawn from it. Extrapolation from the survey results to the population of illegals working in the nation therefore requires judgment. Thus, while the survey data are not sufficient to substantiate firm conclusions, in considering the role and impact of illegals upon the labor market, the researchers have drawn upon their considerable experience in the study of alien workers, both legal and illegal, to develop tentative conclusions that are consistent with, and sometimes strongly indicated by, the survey data.

The Characteristics and Role of Illegals in the U.S. Labor Market: Preliminary Conclusions of the Researchers

1. Illegal aliens are probably disadvantaged persons, but they do not appear to constitute a homogeneous group. Most respondents in our study group were young disadvantaged adults who came from underdeveloped nations to find employment here. There were, however, significant differences between respondents from Mexico, those from other nations in the Western Hemisphere (WH illegals), and those from the Eastern Hemisphere (EH illegals): in their level of education, occupational status in their native land, ability to speak English, and once here, in the extent of their continuing ties to their homeland and their contact with U.S. governmental agencies, including INS.

Though Mexico is a more advanced nation than most nations sending illegals to the United States today, the Mexican respondents were substantially more likely than non-Mexican respondents to have come from rural areas, to have been farmworkers in their country of origin, to have had less than a primary educa-

tion, and to speak no English. The non-Mexican respondents, but in particular those from the Eastern Hemisphere, were more likely to come from urban areas, to have had at least some secondary education, to have been employed in white-collar jobs in their homeland, and to speak English. In brief, the socioeconomic status at entry of EH respondents was close to the U.S. norm; WH respondents clustered well below that norm; while the Mexican respondents fell below the norm of this nation's most disadvantaged peoples, its blacks and Chicanos.

The Mexican illegals were also considerably more likely than respondents from other regions to report that they had come here explicitly in search of a job. Once in the United States, they remained more closely tied to their country of origin than did the other respondents: they were more likely to have a spouse and children in their home country, to visit their homeland, and to send money home to relatives. The non-Mexican respondents were, on the other hand, more likely to have a spouse and children here, and to use public services in the U.S., such as schools and hospitals. They were also considerably less likely to be apprehended by INS.

It is reasonable to suppose that these differences between Mexican and non-Mexican respondents are principally the result of the unique physical accessibility of the U.S. to Mexico, which enables Mexicans of a lower socioeconomic class to become illegal aliens and enables Mexican aliens, legal or illegal, to maintain ties to both nations. And, in fact, most Mexican respondents were EWIs who crossed the southwestern border surreptitiously, on foot -- an entry technique that requires more in the way of physical endurance, native intelligence, personal ambition, and social contacts with an illegal network than it requires in the way of either money or education. By contrast, a large majority of the non-Mexican respondents were tourist visa abusers, which presupposes a socioeconomic status that will provide a prospective illegal with access to a U.S. consular office abroad, convince a State Department official that the alien's application for a nonimmigrant visa is a bona fide request, and that the alien has the means to travel to his destination and to return to his native land. Further, almost half the EH illegals had entered the U.S. with a student visa, which in most cases presupposes a secondary education and requires an alien to show that he or she has the means to support himself while a student in the U.S.

More generally, however, it seems reasonable to suppose that aliens become illegal workers in the United States only if they have more to gain than to lose by engaging in this illegal business. If that is indeed the case, the low socioeconomic status of most respondents in our study group is likely to be typical of most illegals in the U.S. work force. In particular, aliens who are skilled (and therefore, by implication, more likely to be established) workers in their country of origin are unlikely to become illegal workers in the U.S. The presence in the U.S. labor market of the young but substantially more educated student visa abusers is similarly explained: they, too, are unestablished, with relatively little to lose. Further, like students generally, they are likely to be employed in low-skilled jobs, as were most respondents.

2. Illegals probably cluster geographically. INS and other experts in the field agree, and there are some INS and Visa Office data to support the claim, that illegals are no longer almost exclusively a phenomenon of southwest agriculture, but are increasingly an urban phenomenon, both within and without the Southwest. We suggest that illegals are likely to cluster in the nation in the same manner as legal immigrants. In particular, EWIs crossing the southwest border (who are predominantly but not exclusively Mexican illegals) increasingly appear to migrate to metropolitan areas in that region or to the industrial centers of the Mid-West, as legal Mexican immigrants have historically tended to do. In addition, as immigrants have done since the turn of the century and as immigrants do today, increasing numbers of illegals from other nations in the Western or the Eastern Hemisphere (who are usually visa abusers) cluster in major metropolitan areas in the nation, especially in its principal ports of entry along both coasts, where the supportive ethnic communities they need and the employment opportunities for low-skilled workers they seek, generally coincide.

3. Illegals are probably clustered in the secondary labor market. Most of the respondents in our study group were employed in the secondary sector of the U.S. labor market; i.e., most were employed in low-wage, low-skill, low-status jobs. Less than a quarter were employed in white-collar or skilled blue-collar jobs, and most who were so employed were crafts workers (16%). Further, though respondents generally worked significantly more hours per week than did U.S. production and nonsupervisory workers, their wages were substantially below the average weekly wage of such workers in each of the seven major industrial divisions for which there were comparable data. In addition, a

significant minority of respondents in the study group (more than 20%) were apparently paid less than the minimum wage, particularly domestics, (Mexican) respondents working in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, or Colorado, and especially those working in the 23 counties that border Mexico.

Respondents' concentration at the bottom of the U.S. labor market, with more than three-quarters employed in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, contravened the heterogeneity of the study group. Despite the fact that respondents from Mexico, other nations in the West, and in the East tended to have different characteristics as individuals and workers in their country of origin, their roles in the U.S. labor market were markedly similar. Like recent legal immigrants, the few respondents who had been white-collar workers in their homeland exhibited a strong downward occupational movement upon entry in the U.S. labor market. Respondents were, however, significantly less likely to be employed in farmwork in the U.S. than in their country of origin. Hence the American labor market apparently tends to homogenize at a low level an otherwise more heterogeneous but still predominantly low-skilled work force.

In general, it is reasonable to suppose that if most illegals working in the nation have little education, few skills, and speak little or no English, their employment patterns are likely to resemble those of our survey respondents, i.e., they are likely to be employed as laborers, service workers, or, to a lesser extent, as operatives.

4. Illegals appear to increase the supply of low-wage labor and compete with disadvantaged U.S. workers. If most illegal workers in the U.S. are disadvantaged persons employed in low-level jobs, illegals are of course increasing, to an undetermined degree,* the supply of low-wage

*INS has recently received an estimate of the number of illegals in this country provided by Lesko Associates, Inc. It is a substantial number, 8,227,800 illegals, of which 5,222,000 are calculated to be Mexicans. This is, clearly, a significantly better documented and a more useful number than the previous INS estimates of a range between 2,000,000 and 12,000,000. On the other hand, when viewed in the context of other available information, we believe that the estimate is on the generous side -- by millions. The data (footnote continued on next page)

workers in the nation. It follows, then, that the subgroups of the U.S. labor force with which illegals are most likely to be competing are disadvantaged U.S. workers: the young, the old, members of minority groups, women, immigrants, and the handicapped, who, in some instances, tend to be clustered in the same parts of the nation, e.g., the Spanish-speaking in the Southwest, and minority groups generally and immigrants in major urban centers.

Further, illegals are likely to compete quite successfully in the secondary labor market. On the one hand, current immigration legislation, which makes it illegal for most nonimmigrant aliens to work in the U.S. but specifically exempts employers from any violation of those laws, makes illegals attractive to employers of cheap labor. On the other hand, apart from any consideration of their illegal status, illegal workers appear to be like immigrant workers: highly motivated and hard-working employees, whom U.S. employers generally regard as exceptionally productive workers, despite the fact that few speak English.

(footnote continued)

we have in mind include the 1970 Mexican census, which recorded 23,229,320 men and women between the ages of 15 and 59 (the age group from which the most of the 5,222,000 Mexican illegals would be drawn); the implication that between one-fifth and one-quarter of all Mexican residents in that age group are illegally in the U.S. appears to us most improbable. Then there is the Current Population Survey estimate that there are 10,795,000 Americans of Spanish origin in 1974 (both native and foreign born), and the January, 1974 filings of alien registration cards by 4,100,300 permanent resident aliens. Both the CPS figure and the INS data on legal aliens can be regarded as rough, but useful benchmarks. Although we believe there are substantial -- troublesomely substantial -- numbers of illegals in the nation, it strikes us as unlikely that there are twice as many illegals in the nation as legal immigrants who register. We also find it hard to believe that the illegal population, which is likely to be largely Spanish in origin, could be calculated at a level as high as 80% of the (presumably largely legal) Spanish-origin population estimated by CPS. There may be some overlap between the two populations, but BLS and Census staff members suggest that this is minimal.

On the other hand, the proportion of Mexican-born to non-Mexican illegals estimated by Lesko, 63.4%, strikes us as approximately correct. Coincidentally, our target sample in the survey was 62% Mexican, and our actual sample was 60.7% Mexican.

5. The major immediate impact of illegals in the U.S. today is probably on the labor market. Most respondents came to the United States explicitly to find employment. We suspect that most illegals who establish a residence in the U.S. similarly came to find jobs, and that those who did not are unlikely to remain in the nation without entering the labor force. Further, if the survey respondents are typical of illegals working in the nation, illegals in the U.S. labor force are substantially more likely to pay taxes than to use tax-supported systems and to support relatives in their country of origin than to have a spouse or children here. Apparently, then, illegals are also likely to have a significant impact on the balance of payments. Almost 80% of all survey respondents sent an average of \$151 a month to relatives in their homeland. The Mexican respondents were less likely than the non-Mexican respondents to have a spouse or children in the U.S. or to use public services, but they were more likely to send money home, and to report higher remittances. (We estimate a balance of payments loss of \$1.5 billion a year from that source alone, if we assume that there are 1 million Mexicans illegally working in the U.S. and that the Mexican respondents in our study group are representative of that population.)

It is important to note, however, that if illegals settle permanently in the nation -- a question which this study does not address -- their impacts, both direct and indirect, will of course be both more far-ranging and profound. In particular, if illegals working in the U.S. tend to become permanent residents, they can be expected to acquire a U.S.-based spouse and children, to have an impact on population, and to make more use of public services as they become more integrated into the society.

The Impact of Illegals on the U.S. Labor Market

A Heuristic Model. Depending upon the degree to which illegals cluster in specific labor markets, their numbers, and the pre-illegal entry conditions of those markets (e.g., the presence of unions), an increasing supply of highly productive, experienced, but generally low-skilled illegals, who are willing to work in low-level jobs at low wages for long hours, is likely to produce some particular combination of the following five kinds of interdependent impacts upon the markets they enter:

- illegals will maintain or increase productivity;
- they will maintain or increase profits;

- they will maintain or increase the use of labor-intensive work structures;
- they will maintain or depress labor standards in the secondary sector; and
- they will compete successfully with low-skilled legal workers.

To the extent that there are enough illegals to make any impact at all, they will be causing, simultaneously, all five of the impacts noted above. On the assumption that there is a domestic supply of low-level job seekers, the illegals hired by an American employer have already successfully competed with resident workers, whether by virtue of their initiative (44% of our respondents asked their U.S. employer for a job; 45% found it through friends); their reputation as hard workers (as aliens, legal or illegal); or because the low wages and long hours attached to those jobs cause legal workers to reject them -- or some combination of all three factors. Further, since it is likely that illegals are generally low-skilled workers, they presumably cluster in labor-intensive work establishments where, once they have been hired, they will keep their job only to the extent that they support or enhance employers' efforts to secure a profit.

Given those circumstances of mutual need, and assuming the laws of supply and demand are relatively uninhibited by external factors, illegals and employers find one another. The extent of the impact of this joining of forces upon a specific labor market depends primarily on the proportion of illegals to legal resident workers in that market. In this setting, then, of at least some available legal job seekers, employers with low-skill jobs, and a minimum of nonmarket forces, we propose a four-stage model of the flow of illegals into a market, showing both differential degrees of impact and four points in an historical development, where the principal variable is the number of productive and willing illegal workers available in that labor market:

Phase 1: No Labor Standards Effect. The first illegal arrives, an active job seeker. He takes a job which would otherwise go to a legal resident, at the prevailing wage rate, in that specific labor market, which employs or is beginning to employ low-level workers of the same ethnic background or national origin. While there is a (one-worker) displacement effect, there is no

impact on labor standards for that labor market; the illegal was not hired because of his illegal status, nor does his lone presence affect the labor supply-job demand balance.

Phase 2: Stabilization Effect: A chain migration of illegals into this labor market begins; increasing numbers of legal residents do not secure the jobs filled by the newly arriving illegals. The illegals may or may not be known as such, their illegal status is, however, of secondary significance; their impact is primarily a function of their increasing numbers.

At this stage, illegals play a conservative role vis-a-vis the labor market: like any other increasing pool of available workers, they inhibit any upward movement in wages or improvement in working conditions which might otherwise occur; and, as in Phases 3 and 4, they help forestall the likelihood that employees will unionize, or that employers will mechanize labor-intensive activities or relocate in search of lower wage workers.

Phase 3: Depressant Effect. Illegals continue to arrive; presumably more resident workers are displaced (though some of these jobs might have disappeared through relocation or restructuring of the market if illegals had not been available). In this phase, illegals are known as such; they constitute an identifiable subgroup of low-level workers in the market, and they are now hired because they will accept substandard wages.

At this stage, illegals are exploited workers, as we define it: the prevailing wages have not kept pace with other non-illegal-impacted markets. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, the labor standards in this market are responding to the presence of illegals by creating "jobs no American will accept."

Phase 4: Underground Labor Market. Illegals continuously enter the labor market; there are virtually no legal residents working in the sector of the market in which they are employed. Illegals are hired specifically because they are illegals.

Employers pay illegal wages (below minimum wage), often in the form of cash; they avoid income and social security tax deductions; and their employees work long hours without statutory compensation.

The previously described impacts on profit, productivity, and preservation of labor-intensive structures, are present in Phase 2, are strongly felt in Phase 3, and are most obvious in Phase 4. One can argue further, particularly in Phases 3 and 4, that to the extent that wages are generally lowered (or an increase in wages is inhibited), the Treasury loses revenue from income taxes that it would otherwise be receiving. This effect is aggravated to the extent that in some of the more extreme situations, neither illegals nor their employers are paying the taxes that are due.

This clearly is a model of the illegal penetration of a labor market, not a precise and certainly not a documented portrait of a chain of events, but rather a framework for discussing this phenomenon. Not every labor market moves in stately sequence through each of these four phases. In the El Paso market for domestics, for instance, the presence of large numbers of unskilled, willing Mexican workers has been a reality since the establishment of the city; only in the 1920s did they become (nominally) defined as illegal workers; and this definition has rarely been enforced with vigor. Thus, the domestic servant market in El Paso began at Phase 3, and has been at the Phase 4 level for a long time. We suspect that a number of other secondary labor markets, located in urban areas in and away from the border, e.g., markets for service workers, machine operators, and unskilled laborers, are moving from Phase 2 to Phase 3. To the extent that these markets are attached to establishments that operate within the mainstream of the American economy, it is improbable, however, that they (unlike the less visible and hence less vulnerable markets for domestics and farm-workers) will go underground; the end state of such markets would, then, be Phase 3.

There are other limitations to this model; some labor markets, including some near the border, are unlikely to be affected by the presence of illegals. In the case of public-sector jobs, the screening is such that few illegals will venture to apply for these jobs, much less secure them. In other cases, the formal screening may be missing, but the basic vocational requirements are such (a law degree, to take an extreme example) that an illegal would be unlikely to seek the position.

A third limitation of this model is that it neglects the indirect labor-market impacts of illegals: their presence in a labor market may have an adverse effect, even though no illegal is employed in a given work place, or even in a given industry. Returning to the El Paso wetmaids, for the moment, it is clear that the availability of full-time maids at, say, \$20 to \$25 a week, means that it is possible for a married woman with small children to hire a maid and work in a pants factory, say, for \$120 a week. If maids were only available at the minimum wage, presumably that housewife would not work in the pants factory at \$120 a week, and just possibly the factory would have to increase its wages in order to attract the needed workers (or make other adjustments).

These caveats to one side, we suggest that the most significant impact of the illegals is on the local labor standards in the areas where they congregate. Further, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the generally depressed economy of the southwest border is a taste of the future of secondary labor markets in the nation at large, should the flow of illegal immigration into those markets continue unabated and undeterred by the enforcement of the federal laws it contravenes.

Congruence With Manpower Policy. The nation has been making manpower policy decisions for years, but only recently has it regarded them as such. As it evolved, U.S. manpower policy can be viewed as having four principal objectives, with a fifth appearing on the horizon more recently:

- to upgrade the skills of the work force;
- to protect the welfare and rights of the work force;
- to provide employment opportunities for all members of the work force;
- to provide equal employment opportunities for all members of the labor force, regardless of race, color, creed, national origin, or sex; and
- to increase the level of job satisfaction.

These five relatively specific objectives flow from, interact, and sometimes conflict with, the general norms of a society which simultaneously stresses both the value of the individual and the virtue of productivity: We have been

pursuing the oldest of these objectives for a long time, since the creation of public education. Although the word "manpower" was not used at the time, it is clear that one of the underlying reasons for the introduction of free schools was to ensure the availability of a productive labor force as well as an educated citizenry. And, as that work became progressively more complicated, over time, the extent and sophistication of public education increased as well. In more recent times, the use of public funds to train workers has moved away from its historic focus on schools and people of "school age." Many of these programs have been aimed at special groups of people, such as veterans, migrant and seasonal farmworkers, welfare recipients, and the like; all were designed to give workers the skills (technical and social) that enable them to participate more fully in the market place.

Another strand of manpower policy undertakes the regulation of the labor market, to protect the welfare of its workers and to foster, as it were, industrial peace. The passage of child-labor legislation was an early example of these regulatory efforts, as were industrial safety measures, and later, minimum wage and hour laws. All of these measures sought to balance the competing demands of employers and workers. The conflict between the employer-related values of high-level profit and production and the employee-related values of high-level wages and other benefits, which we have described in connection with the illegals' impact on the labor market, is by no means, of course, a new battle: it is an inherent conflict.

The third strand of manpower policy came to the fore during the Great Depression, when, through the Works Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and similar agencies, the government created substantial employment opportunities for workers who could not find employment in the private sector. The alphabet agencies of the New Deal disappeared during the full employment of World War II, only to appear later, in smaller and more specialized editions, which often combined some elements of training with subsidized employment, e.g., the Neighborhood Youth Corps.

The fourth and more recent dimension of manpower policy was generated by the same social forces that led to the passage of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act: the civil rights legislation, which sought to provide equal opportunities and to ensure equal rights for all legal residents and citizens, within the labor market as well as without it.

A new aspect of manpower policy, more apparent in Sweden and Japan than in America, and one of the byproducts of an economy of abundance, involves the quality of life on the job. While the subject of some studies and demonstrations (in particular, the recent HEW report on work in America), and (in good times) of labor-management bargaining, further development of the emerging issue of job satisfaction has been inhibited by the recent decline in the economy, though it is likely to become a major manpower policy issue in the years to come.

If one accepts this broadbrush description of the nation's manpower policy, a continuing influx of illegal aliens into the U.S. labor market will have the following adverse effects:

- it will depress the educational and skill level of the labor force;
- it will depress labor standards in the secondary sector, which in some cases will create an underground market of illegal wages, hours, and workers;
- it will cause a displacement of low-skill legal resident workers;
- it will create a new class of disadvantaged workers, one which inextricably conjoins national origin and illegal status in the U.S.; and
- it will inhibit efforts to improve job satisfaction in the secondary sector.

Given the inherent conflict between what the nation has been, for generations, trying to do in the work place, and the apparent direction of the impact of illegal aliens, we believe that it is important to preserve both the direction and the momentum of the nation's manpower policy, by decreasing the flow of illegal immigration into its labor market.

In order to accomplish this, the nation will have to go into the labor market, as it has done many times in the past, and start to regulate effectively on another subject. If techniques can be found to enforce the payment of minimum wages, despite the objections of those regulated, then techniques can be found to minimize the employment of illegal aliens. We see this as neither an agreeable nor an easy task; but there is no reason to believe that is an impossible one.

The Question of the Adequacy of Current Immigration Policy:
Illegal Aliens as Needed Workers

Few would argue that the presence of illegal aliens in the U.S. labor market serves the public interest, and few would argue against the general thesis that the flow of illegal immigration into that market should be checked. However, as noted in Chapter I, the escalating apprehension rates of illegals have evoked questions about the adequacy of the immigration policy that defines those aliens as illegal, as well as questions about the adequacy of its modes of implementing or methods of enforcing that policy. If the principal impact of illegals today is upon the labor market, then the most significant policy issue is the question whether illegal aliens are, as some have claimed, "needed workers." Should the presence of increasing numbers of illegals in the nation be regarded as a sign that current immigration policy should be changed to fit current labor-market facts? Or should it be viewed as a sign that the nation needs to ensure that those markets conform to current law? Can the adverse manpower effects we have attributed to illegal-impacted markets be considered a function of the illegal status of those alien workers, so that their ill effects would be dissipated if their presence in the U.S. labor market were legitimated? Or would their adverse impact not be appreciably diminished by a change in their legal status?

Those who consider illegals to be needed workers identify their role in the U.S. labor market as one of providing it with an otherwise unavailable (as opposed to a simply preferred) supply of low-level labor. Thus, employers of low-level workers, immigrant-serving agencies, some labor economists -- and sometimes our respondents -- have claimed that illegals are "taking jobs that no American wants." A number of adherents to this view of the role of illegals in the current labor market conclude that illegals are therefore "needed workers" whose presence in the work force should be legitimated, by either loosening the restrictions placed upon immigration by the 1965 Amendments or by relaxing our traditional ban on the use of nonimmigrant workers.

Certainly, the findings of our survey are consistent with the claim that illegals are "taking jobs that no American wants." Most respondents were working at or near the bottom of the labor market, in terms of their occupation, their wages, and their hours. Clearly, the majority of our respondents had found employment in jobs that, for the most part, offer the least in economic rewards, social status, job

security and upward mobility. Few were earning incomes that would provide a family with more than a subsistence level of life, by American standards. There are few data that contraindicate the notion that, like the immigrants of the turn of the century, the Mexican wetback and the bracero of old, and the green-card commuter of today, the primary role of illegals in the nation is to provide its labor markets with low-wage workers who are willing to do its dirty work.

But does their presence at the bottom of the labor market inevitably imply that they are uniquely available low-level workers? And, if the evidence does lead us to that conclusion, is it either an inevitable or a desirable direction?

Note, first, that illegals are considered "needed workers," because they are believed to be employed in significant numbers in certain labor markets. But to the degree that they constitute a significant portion of a labor market, they are likely to be recognized as illegals, by both their employers and their coworkers, as we noted in our model of their penetration of a labor market. Thus, the argument that illegals are found in sufficient numbers to warrant the inference they are uniquely available workers, employed in "jobs that no American wants," carries with it the implication that their illegal participation in the labor force is a de facto sanctioned one. Only American employers can admit illegals into the American labor force. When that influx becomes substantial, it is unlikely to remain unnoticed. It is therefore not unwitting. Significant numbers of illegals in a labor market suggest the existence of the dual immigration policy we noted in the Southwest, where illegals find unlawful employment in the U.S. only through the collusion of their American employers, whose actions contravene and thereby undermine immigration law, though those actions are not themselves illegal, owing to the Texas Proviso in that legislation. In sum, the fact that substantial numbers of illegals work in certain sectors of the U.S. labor market does not so much suggest (much less prove) that they are uniquely available low-level workers, as it implies that they are uniquely low-wage workers. In a word, to argue from the fact they are employed in large numbers in low-level jobs to the conclusion they are needed workers is to beg the question at hand.

Further, although the dynamics of any specific labor market are always complicated, because it does not exist and they do not occur in a vacuum, and although they are rendered even more complex (and less known) when illegals enter that market, it is reasonable to suppose that, if low-skilled legal workers are available in any number at all, they will tend not to be significantly edged out of that market by illegals, unless employers offer and illegals accept less than adequate* wages and working conditions. Conversely, illegals will tend to displace and adversely affect legal workers only insofar as they are offered and accept "inadequate" wages and working conditions.

Given the low skills and low expectations of illegals and their lack of income alternatives, if we assume the presence of both legal and illegal low-skilled workers, there is every reason to believe that illegals will displace legal workers if the market they enter operates according to its own laws; i.e., if the laws of supply and demand rule relatively independently of non-market factors (unionization, immigration or minimum wage laws), which might otherwise inhibit the entry of illegals into, or substandard or illegal employment practices in, that market. Thus, the claim that illegals are currently employed in "jobs that no American wants" by no means entails the notion that they are needed workers, though it does strongly suggest their employers are successful in regulating that market, i.e., in keeping labor costs down, in this case, by opening the gates to illegal immigration.

It is not difficult, therefore, for us to believe that in some markets in the nation illegals are taking jobs that no American wants, but we suspect that the degree to which this is the case is also the degree to which illegals have come to dominate that market, as we described in Phases 3 and 4 of our model, or the degree to which the wages and working conditions of that market lag behind that of other low-level markets, for other reasons.

*Where "adequate" is defined as "minimally acceptable to those legal low-skilled workers" -- we use a relative definition here, for obvious reasons; e.g., prevailing wages in a given market may not remain acceptable, and illegal wages may not be invariably regarded as unacceptable.

It is, however, difficult for us to believe -- given the high unemployment rates of low-skilled U.S. workers in areas where illegals are believed to cluster, e.g., the Southwest, California, and major metropolitan areas in the nation -- that illegals are needed workers in the sense that the nation's pool of low-skilled manpower in those areas has been exhausted. Under circumstances of full employment of disadvantaged workers -- the young, members of minority groups, legal aliens, the old, the handicapped -- the inference that illegals' participation in the secondary sector is a sign that the demand for low-level labor exceeds the supply is a reasonable one. In circumstances of high unemployment and low productivity, when illegals' wages appear to be well below the norm of comparably employed U.S. workers, the claim that their presence in the U.S. labor market is symptomatic of a shortfall of low-level workers appears to us a dubious one.

Nevertheless, labor economists are beginning to discern other, more reliable, indicators that the traditional sources of low-level workers are beginning to dry up. In particular, Harold Wool,* in a closely reasoned study based largely on census data, has recently explored the supply of and demand for lower-level occupations; the National Planning Association** (with which Wool is associated) has taken a strong policy stand on the issue, and Michael Piore*** has written a provocative paper, which argues that illegal immigration in the secondary labor market is irreversible.

Wool's approach is the most comprehensive in scope, and his focus is on documenting demographic trends, e.g., the end of unlimited legal immigration, the dwindling supply of rural blacks, whose migration into urban areas provided

*Harold Wool and Bruce D. Phillips, "The Labor Supply for Lower Level Occupations," (by the National Planning Association, under D/L R&D Grant No. 21-11-73-02, June, 1975).

**National Planning Association, Upgrading Low-Level Employment: A Major National Challenge, (Washington, D.C., 1975).

***Piore, "The 'New Immigration' and the Presumptions of Social Policy." For a commentary on Piore's thesis that illegals are an inevitable result of a domestic imbalance in the secondary sector, see our unpublished paper, "The 'New Immigration' and the Presumptions of Social Policy: A Commentary."

them with a new supply of low-level workers, and the maturing of the post-war baby boom, which together indicate the depletion of traditional sources of low-level workers. Although Wool finds that the demand for low-level workers is falling, he argues that the supply is falling even more rapidly. In addition, like Piore, Wool suggests that this growing imbalance in the supply of and the demand for labor in the secondary sector is heightened by changes in the characteristics of the American labor force, which has progressively become more educated, exhibits greater job expectations, and has more adequate income support systems than have previous generations of American workers.

Thus, although the evidence at hand suggests that illegals today are preferred, not uniquely available, low-level workers, a unique manpower problem is now appearing on the horizon. This nation's formerly abundant supply of workers with minimal education, minimal skills, minimal job expectations, and minimal income alternatives is beginning to be threatened by the restrictions it has placed upon immigration and the gradual disappearance of maximally disadvantaged Americans. Clearly, then, jobs that make minimal demands in the way of education or skills, that offer at best a subsistence wage, and are not structurally related to more satisfying and better paying work will be increasingly disfavored. (Further, we are simultaneously learning, that it is not at all certain that high wages and short hours, even if economically feasible, will themselves prove sufficiently attractive inducements to employment in low-level jobs, or at least to continued or productive employment.) To the extent then, that the nation closes its borders and succeeds in upgrading the skills of its citizens and in providing them with equal opportunities, it becomes the victim of its own success, for it confronts a new, self-induced (but surely a more cheerful, if more subtle and complex) problem: that of upgrading and opening its low-level jobs.

One way of conserving the current structure of low-level work is the route selected by the employers of illegals: replacing maximally disadvantaged workers with their available alien analogues, who are, in this case, even more disadvantaged, since they are both disenfranchised and illegal.*

*Here, too, the nation is, we suspect, more (though by no means entirely) the victim of its own success. U.S. employers are undeniably the gatekeepers of illegal entry into the labor market, but they infrequently, we believe, produce or solicit it. Most illegals are probably pulled by news of its exceptionally high material standard of living and by the hopes expressed in the American Dream; U.S. employers need only lend them a hand.

We have argued that this de facto policy of replacing once cheap American low-level labor with still-cheap illegal alien labor adversely affects American workers, particularly its disadvantaged, primarily because that supply of labor currently outstrips the demand for it. Further, the introduction of more disadvantaged and illegal workers into the labor market inhibits the adjustments of that sector, which would normally occur, given the otherwise unimpeded working of the laws of supply and demand, when jobs remain unfilled. In addition, the admission of illegals in low-level jobs ensures that the work structure continues to depend upon the low-cost labor of maximally disadvantaged persons, while their status as illegals further depresses the labor standards of -- and tends to confer their own maximally low socio-economic status upon -- those jobs. In short, when we seek to assure the survival of the current work structure by acquiring this new source of cheap labor, we create -- in at least an ideologically classless society -- a lumpenproletariat of a most socially indefensible, and in the long run socially divisive, sort: one that is granted a de jure denial of its social, political, and legal right to reside in the nation, but a de facto sanction to work in the most economically unrewarding sector of its market.

Thus, even if we should suppose that the employment of illegals in the bottom of the American labor market is without adverse economic consequences to American workers, the social and political consequences of this method of avoiding changes in the structure of low-level work violate the nation's commitment to egalitarian values, an open society, and a minimal material standard of living, which are embodied in the manpower policy objectives enumerated above.

In addition, most illegals share a common ethnic origin and cultural heritage with one of the most deprived of all America's minority groups: the Spanish speaking. That group's recent efforts at shedding the stereotypical identification of the Spanish-speaking with the uneducated and amenable wetback and ensuring its political, economic, and social rights are hardly enhanced by the continued entry of minimally educated, minimally skilled, and minimally expectant illegal Spanish-speaking workers into the bottom of the American labor market. Given a pluralistic society, where ethnic identity is an emerging but still murky issue, the covert presence of substantial numbers of ethnically related illegals at once threatens the status of this American minority and raises serious questions about its precise reference group. Like unions, Chicanos must decide whether U.S. citizenship (or permanent resident alien status) is one of their criteria of membership.

Not only does this attempt to provide the economy with a supply of cheap, illegal, and therefore expendable, labor contravene fundamental American social policies and impede the advancement of the interest groups to which their national origin and their status as workers relate them, its implicit policy of containment is foredoomed to failure, so long as an open society obtains.

It is foredoomed in two senses: (1) once the gates to illegal immigration are covertly opened, they are virtually impossible to shut: illegal immigration tends to set off a chain migration, which can be checked only by comprehensive measures, which require overt federal action. But this means that the right hand must, most inconveniently, know what the left hand is doing. Though that dual policy worked in the Southwest -- where illegals have been an established if covert fact of life and the effectiveness of INS has ebbed and flowed according to the economic needs of the region -- it is unlikely to prove so readily acceptable to the nation at large, given its multiple interests, and the fact that illegals have not been an unquestioned part of its folkways. Similarly, just as some successful illegal immigration serves as a catalyst to more immigration, so (2) it sets off a socio-economic migration: as illegals acquire a taste for American success and a knowledge of its workings, they find ways of changing their legal and their economic status -- and their American-born children join the upwardly mobile immigrant stream. In short, though illegals may provide a new and cheap supply of low-skill labor, their underground status in a large and ethnically heterogeneous nation that exerts few controls over the movements of its residents, does not, in the long run, preclude their upward mobility. Hence, over time, illegals will reintroduce the very labor-market factor whose consequences their admission was to forestall, unless the entry of new illegals outstrips the assimilation of those who become established.

An alternative method of avoiding changing the structure of work in America to keep pace with the upwardly changing educational level, skills, and aspirations of its labor force is that selected by Europe: the admission of alien workers on a temporary basis, in a limited number and kind of low-level occupations that are being abandoned by resident workers. The American precedent for such an option was, as noted in Chapter I, the bracero program. The difficulties that this relatively small program (which was confined to the agricultural sector of the economy and covered primarily only the Southwest) experienced in protecting the highly circumscribed rights of alien workers and simultaneously protecting the market from an accompanying (often employer-induced) flow of illegals do not, however, encourage one to initiate a similar program on a nationwide and industry-wide scale.

Further, the adverse socio-economic effects we have attributed to illegals in the labor market do not substantially change when their legal status is changed to that of nonimmigrant. Though the market and its alien workers would each thereby receive more protection (presumably the federal government would take on the individual employer's former role as gatekeeper; nonimmigrants would be granted certain rights and guaranteed minimal labor standards, which explicitly proscribes the generation of an underground market); still, a nonimmigrant program would provide the United States with an abundant supply of cheap, willing, and productive labor at the profoundly disturbing social cost of creating a class of radically disadvantaged legal workers in the nation. For nonimmigrants are not only at the very bottom of the socio-economic scale, they are by definition and by law excluded from full participation in the labor market and from permanent residence in the nation. In essence, then, the nation admits nonimmigrants in order to maintain or enhance its citizens' increasingly higher standard of living, but explicitly denies them legal access to that standard of living or the opportunities and rights it grants to all its citizens, in order to restrict their role to that of low-level worker and avoid the social costs of acquiring a new crop of disadvantaged prospective citizens.

Though not obvious to the casual eye, our traditional proscription against the use of alien contract labor flows from the nation's fundamental commitment to an open society and the principle of equality under law. The adoption of a nonimmigrant-worker program substantial enough to make any meaningful contribution to the economy institutes an economically interdependent but socially and politically disparate two-class society of citizens and non-citizen workers. Thus, like the de facto admission of illegals, not only would the de jure admission of significant numbers of nonimmigrants provide cheap labor at the cost of depressing the labor standards in the secondary market and displacing the nation's most disadvantaged workers, their role in the nation would similarly contravene its democratic values, despite the fact that in this instance it represented a policy enacted by law.

At bottom, a decision to use aliens -- nonimmigrants or illegals -- as a supply of cheap, low-skill labor is an attempt to acquire that labor and to adjure its economic and its social costs. That is, of course, a form of exploitation,

the de jure or de facto institutionalization of inequities. We have argued at some length that this method of solving our manpower needs is in radical conflict with the social goals of the nation, and it should be readily apparent that the restrictions placed on the movements of large numbers of nonimmigrant workers in the U.S. are, over time, also certain to be highly ineffective. As Ray Marshall has discussed in a recent paper, though temporary workers generally set out as such, subsequent migrations begin to acquire the aspirations and interests of their host country, settle in that nation with their families, become more widely distributed in the labor market, and eventually are followed by a supporting population from their homeland.*

In addition, as INS apprehension statistics during the bracero program and other data suggest, the creation of a nonimmigrant program is equally ineffective as a method of solving the problem of illegal immigration as it is a method of acquiring the economic advantages of disadvantaged workers but avoiding the social costs of acquiring them as citizens. Though it absorbs a number of would-be illegals and includes a number of would-be employers of illegals, other illegals and other employers prefer to work out their own arrangements -- and, more importantly, as noted in Chapter I, a program of this kind sets up and indeed institutionalizes a network of contacts between alien workers and domestic employers, which eventually increases illegal immigration.

The remaining means of coping with a shortfall of cheap low-skill labor without changing the work structure is the more defensible traditional one: immigration. Expanding current numerical limits to immigration would resolve the social and political inequities associated with the other attempts to gain workers but neither permanent residents, nor citizens. As the National Planning Association position paper on low-level employment argues, however,** though low-wage immigrants may solve the economic need for cheap labor, they would introduce a presumably numerous -- to the degree that need is a significant one -- new class of disadvantaged people and their families into the nation, with all the attendant new social stresses and costs. In addition, increased immigration is at best a short-term economic solution to the problem of acquiring a supply of

*Marshall, "Economic Factors."

**Upgrading Low-Level Employment, pp. 11-12.

cheap labor, for over time the low-wage immigrants of today produce the more skilled and more ambitious citizens of tomorrow. Hence if it represents the primary method of supplying the nation with cheap labor, it ensures the permanent existence of an ever-changing class of maximally disadvantaged persons.

In sum, in a time of low productivity and high unemployment, especially among our most disadvantaged and low-skilled workers, we remain unimpressed by the frequently heard claim that illegals are needed workers. Illegals appear uniquely low-wage, not uniquely available, low-level workers. This suggests that illegals are depressing -- or suppressing any upward movement of -- working conditions and labor standards in certain sectors of the market, and displacing legal low-skilled workers.

We are, however, impressed with the demographic trends noted by Piore and Wool, which indicate a growing mismatch between the relatively unchanging structure of work in the nation and the more rapidly upward change in the skills and expectations of the American work force. Although no society, by definition, loses its more disadvantaged workers, we are apparently -- after considerable effort and at considerable expense -- losing our maximally disadvantaged workers. The upshot of this social success is that no American worker, one can say with only some boldness, can successfully compete with an illegal -- when the outcome of that competition depends on who is willing to take the lowest wages and work the longest hours. That game is, of course, an illegal one, though it is evidently not uncommon in the Southwest. Milder versions of that game appear to be occurring in increasing areas in the nation. Though we believe they are for the most part played within the legal limits, the economic and social consequences are destructive when issues of nativity, ethnicity, and economic security collide in a time of both real and perceived scarcity.

Recommendations

On the assumption that illegals are for the most part disadvantaged persons whose adverse socioeconomic costs to the U.S. outweigh their benefits as productive low-level workers, we recommend that the Government adopt a more restrictive policy towards illegal immigration and implement more

effective means of controlling it, primarily by discouraging their entry into the labor market, which appears to be their principal goal. Further, we recommend that the Government emphasize the prevention of future illegal immigration rather than the removal of illegals currently in the nation. There are three general reasons for advocating the latter approach: administrative (it is more cost effective to prevent the entry of prospective illegals than to apprehend and transport them home again); humanitarian (illegals whose entry is prevented are less badly hurt than those who are apprehended after establishing residence in the U.S.; the possible infringement of the civil liberties of minority-group members associated with the identification and apprehension of illegal residents are similarly avoided); and substantive (illegal immigration appears to set off a chain migration and to come primarily from underdeveloped nations with high population growth rates; i.e., illegal immigration appears to beget more illegal immigration). In the opinion of the researchers, it is the likelihood of continuing generations of disadvantaged aliens attempting illegal entry into the U.S. labor market that poses the most serious threat to the nation, and calls for the adoption of a more restrictive immigration policy as well as for more adequate enforcement of current restrictions.*

Within the framework of a restrictive policy and a preventive approach, strategies that discourage the employment of illegals and inhibit their movement into the nation appear the most effective. The recommendations have been divided into three categories: those requiring only agency policy changes, those that also require budgetary decisions, and those that require statutory revisions as well.

*Unless illegal immigration is controlled, another often-discussed strategy -- amnesty for illegals in the country -- would be self-defeating, since it would encourage additional waves of illegal immigrants who hoped to qualify for some future round of amnesty. Should effective controls be instituted, however, amnesty should be considered. In addition to the obvious humanitarian attractions, it would, with a stroke of the pen, make an illegal segment of the labor force legal, and thus better able to protect themselves as workers and less likely to lower the labor standards of others.

Agency Policy Recommendations

Recommendation 1: The Government Should Create Illegals' Employers Strike Forces. The Government can discourage illegal immigration by discouraging employers from hiring illegals without the passage of additional legislation; it can do so, in many instances, by focusing tax and labor standards enforcement efforts on the employers of illegals.

A significant minority of the respondents in this study reported that they were paid less than the minimum wage; some reported non-deduction of social security taxes and of income taxes. INS reporting systems could be adapted to produce a constant flow of leads on employers of illegals in apparent violation of labor standards and tax laws.*

We recommend that multiple-agency strike forces be established where illegal workers concentrate. Each strike force would include one or more enforcement officials from these agencies:

Employment Standards Administration, for minimum wage violations;

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, for OSHA violations

State Employment Security Agencies, for violations of unemployment insurance tax laws;

Internal Revenue Service, for Social Security tax and income tax withholdings; and

Immigration and Naturalization Service, regarding the presence of illegals on company payrolls.

When INS found evidence of repeated employment of illegals, and indications of violations of tax or labor standards laws, the strike force would review the employer's compliance with all the laws noted. In addition, where appropriate, other agencies, state and federal, could be invited to join the effort.

*Mexican illegals, according to both our interviews and INS officials, very frequently carry paystubs, sometimes sizeable collections of them, a useful source of basic documentation for such a program.

The survey data suggest that an employer who hires illegals and violates one tax or labor standards law is likely to violate others; mobilization of all agencies to deter further employment of illegals thus appears appropriate. Further, employers would be explicitly told that they are receiving this attention because they had hired illegals in the past. Finally, efforts should be made to select employers in a variety of locales, and in a variety of industries, so that the visit of the strike force, should it prove fruitful, would be reported in both the local press and in the national trade publication covering the industry.

Recommendation 2: The Immigration and Naturalization Service Should Focus More Attention on Visa Abusers. There are substantial historical reasons for the allocation of the bulk of INS law enforcement resources to the location and apprehension of EWIs along the Southwest border.

Our study, however, suggests that:

- visa abusers hold better paid jobs in the U.S. labor market than EWIs;
- visa abusers are more likely to participate in tax-supported programs than EWIs;
- visa abusers are significantly less likely to be apprehended by INS than are EWIs.

The researchers recommend that INS place a higher priority than it currently does on preventing the arrival of this kind of illegal.

For example, INS should continue its efforts to expand its inspection of persons at ports of entry along the Southwest border. Visa abusers come through U.S. ports of entry by definition, but roughly half the large number of entrants through those ports at the Mexican border are inspected by Customs personnel, not immigration inspectors. The former are less knowledgeable about alien and citizen documentation than the latter, and often lack the fluency in Spanish required of immigration inspectors.

Further, INS should focus more of its staff time on monitoring institutions that may be facilitating the arrival of visa abusers, and less on time-consuming casework; e.g., scores of full-time investigators currently review individual marriage

fraud cases, while scores of others attempt to locate aliens who committed war crimes three and a half decades ago. INS spends little time, however, monitoring wholesale institutionally-controlled movements of nonimmigrant aliens, such as those arriving with student visas. Although the agency has the power to issue or deny licenses to educational institutions that wish to enroll nonimmigrant students, it does not require regular reports on how many such students are, in fact, enrolled, the number of courses taken, or the attendance of such students. INS also has the power to revoke such licenses, but so rarely does so (despite some evidence of abuse), that its reporting system has no space for recording such an event.

Recommendation 3: The Government Should Develop Strategies to Discourage the Growth of Illegal Immigration from Specific Regions of Origin. Illegal immigration from Mexico has occurred for so many years that it appears to be institutionalized. To prevent a similar institutionalization of illegal flows from other nations, the Government should focus its limited resources on developing methods of controlling illegal immigration from particular areas where it appears to be increasing rapidly. For example, if Central America were so identified, INS inspectors could pay particular attention to plane flights from these regions, INS investigators could be assigned to pay particular attention to illegals working in or near Central-American neighborhoods in U.S. urban areas, the Embassy in Mexico City could make efforts to secure the Mexican Government's cooperation to decrease the flow of Central American EWIs entering Mexico's southern border, and consular officials in the identified nations should be given additional resources to screen applicants for nonimmigrant visas. In addition, the results of these activities would be publicized in Central-American neighborhoods in the U.S. and in nations of origin. The objective of these coordinated activities would not only be the identification of specific illegal aliens, but the creation of a climate of opinion designed to discourage would-be illegals from these nations of origin.

Recommendation 4: The Labor Department Should Deny Labor Certifications to Employers of Illegal Aliens. As part of an overall Government-wide effort to control illegal immigration, the Department of Labor should consider reinstating its former practice of denying labor certifications to employers known to have employed illegal aliens within the past two years. Data on such employment could be secured from INS District Office.

files, which show the names of employers and the numbers of illegals located in previous INS investigations. Further, if a labor certification application suggests -- as it often does -- that the alien who would benefit from the certification is already in this country, the employer should be required to show that the alien was here legally (or was not in the country).

While these procedures would not substantially reduce the number of illegal aliens in the country, it would help eliminate one of the techniques which illegals use to legitimate their presence in the country, and it would be a useful way of informing employers of the Department's interest in the problem.

Recommendation 5: Steps Should be Taken to Increase the Prosecution of Document-Abusing Illegal Aliens. Illegal aliens identified as carriers of counterfeit or altered U.S. documents or as imposters at U.S. ports of entry should be prosecuted more vigorously. Although in such circumstances a government witness (an immigration inspector) can swear that the illegal presented a specific fraudulent document, only 125 convictions were secured in FY 1975 for this felony offense, despite INS identification of some 13,037 such cases.*

Strategies for enabling more vigorous prosecution of fraudulent INS documents include the following: downgrading the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor, which would place the matter before a federal magistrate rather than a U.S. district judge, a much less time-consuming procedure; encouraging U.S. attorneys to place higher priority on these cases; and making additional resources available to U.S. attorney's offices in impacted areas, for this specific purpose.

Recommendations Involving Policy and Budget Considerations

Recommendation 6: The Government Should Allocate More Resources, and the State Department Should Allocate More Resources and Prestige, to the Visa Issuance Function. The State Department, for the reasons previously cited, should make more strenuous efforts to avoid issuing nonimmigrant visas to aliens who subsequently abuse them. This would involve three kinds of additional investments:

*Unpublished INS data from form G-105A.

- more resources to give consular officials more time to make such determinations, particularly in posts which produce substantial numbers of visa abusers.
- more prestige to the visa issuance function, which is now viewed within the Foreign Service as a necessary chore, but not one that is likely to bring career recognition.
- more willingness to absorb pressure, both from host nations and from the U.S. tourist industry, regarding visa denials: the prevention of illegal immigration warrants a significantly higher place on the State Department's list of priorities than it now has.

Further, where appropriate, U.S. embassies should set a higher priority on encouraging host nation's law enforcement agencies to prosecute illegal alien smuggling rings and counterfeiters who create fraudulent documents used by illegal aliens.

Recommendation 7: The Government Should Allocate More Resources to INS. While INS can adjust its priorities and its operations to enhance its effectiveness without any changes in its budget, the apparent size of the flow of illegal aliens into the U.S. suggest that additional resources are needed. The agency has grown very little over the years. Between 1965 and 1975, for example, funded INS positions increased by 14.8% (from 7,043 to 8,097), while apprehensions of illegal aliens increased by 594.5%.

Although the INS budget for FY 1976 permitted a staff increase to 8,832 positions, the FY 1977 budget proposed by the Office of Management and Budget calls for a reduction to 8,721 positions, including a reduction of immigration inspectors from 1,478 to 1,386, a reduction of investigators from 956 to 851; and a minimal Border Patrol increase from 2,011 agents to 2,016. The budget process has been somewhat more generous in providing hardware to the agency; sensor systems have been placed along various segments of the southern border, and a counterfeit-and-alteration proof alien document system is being developed.

Our recommendations for additional investments are less hardware-oriented; e.g., additional staff in the interior of the country to monitor nonimmigrant visa abuse, additional immigration inspectors at the southern ports of entry, and the extension of the pre-inspection process to Caribbean and Central American airports. (Currently, this process, in which INS personnel inspect passengers boarding U.S.-bound airplanes, is confined to four Canadian airports, and those in Nassau, Bahamas, and Hamilton, Bermuda.)

Recommendations Involving Policy, Budget, and Statutory Considerations

Recommendation 8: The Congress Should Enact a Work Permit Program. The principal legislative proposal designed to discourage entry of illegal aliens by discouraging employers from hiring them is the Rodino Bill. That bill, which has twice passed the House of Representatives, would, in effect, repeal the "Texas Proviso" of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and thus make it illegal to employ an alien who is not authorized to work in the U.S. Employers as well as illegals would therefore be subject to criminal penalties.

The debate about this legislation has generally taken the form of a discussion of the value of the means proposed to achieve an end, not the end itself. There has been little criticism of the bill's objective: the discouragement of illegal workers and illegal immigration. Thus, the debate has focused on the strategy proposed by the bill: that employers be made responsible for keeping illegal aliens out of the labor force. On the one hand, employers have argued that it is difficult to know who is an illegal and who is not; they have argued that the Immigration Service should keep the illegals out of the labor market by keeping them out of the country. On the other hand, those concerned with civil liberties and the rights of ethnic minorities have argued that certain classes of legal residents of the United States might not secure jobs because employers would turn them away, on the grounds that they might be illegal aliens. In short, both groups object to the proposed locus of responsibility for determining who can, and who cannot, work in the United States. Both groups object to employers playing this role.

While the Rodino Bill has the obvious attraction of having secured the approval of the House of Representatives twice, there are at least three serious problems with it:

- determining who is legally entitled to work in the United States can, in fact, be extremely complicated and also costly, as some employers have argued;
- placing this decision-making power in the hands of employers may endanger the employment prospects of certain classes of legal workers, as the minorities have argued; and
- passage of the bill, without allocation of substantial additional enforcement resources, would probably have limited impact.

In essence, the Rodino Bill represents an effort to solve a major social and economic problem with minimal investment of public resources, by placing responsibility for implementing public policy in the hands of private employers. We suggest that situation is sufficiently serious to call for a more effective and equitable strategy: the creation of a work permit system covering all U.S. workers, so that the Government bears responsibility for determining who is legally permitted to work in the U.S. labor market.

Once such a system were in operation, it would be relatively easy and inexpensive to enforce: employers would be penalized for hiring workers who did not carry a single, clearly understood document, the Government-issued work permit. (Currently, an employer would have to cope with a plethora of documents to determine a worker's legal status.)

The Government would, over time, issue permanent work permits to all citizens and all resident aliens, as well as temporary permits to nonimmigrants who are allowed to work. All members of society would be required to secure such a permit. Thus, the burden of this program (which is accepted by most industrialized nations in the world today) would be shared by everyone, without creating extraneous difficulties for classes of workers who might be mistaken for illegal aliens.

If the flow of illegal immigration appeared likely to decline over time, if it did not appear to have employment in the U.S. labor market as its primary objective, and if it appeared controllable by other means, we would not propose a program which is certain to be expensive, time-consuming, and controversial. We suggest, however, that, despite its complex ramifications, the work permit program is more likely to inhibit illegal immigration than any other proposed program, and that it is worth the price, if proper safeguards concerning the use of such permits are introduced and rigorously enforced.

Recommendation 9: The Congress Should Remove Elements in the Immigration and Nationality Act Which Facilitate the Legalization of Illegal Aliens. Many legal immigrants are apparently not newcomers, but successful illegals who have used immigration policy and practices to legitimate their presence here. Further, their ability to do so encourages other illegals to attempt to do the same thing, and does nothing to discourage potential illegals from coming to the U.S. We therefore recommend that three changes be made in the immigration law:

- Eliminate all possibility of legal immigration for all known or subsequently identified illegal aliens, except those on the visa waiting list at the time of enactment of the new legislation.
- Reduce opportunities for adjustment of status from nonimmigrant to immigrant (rather than expanding those opportunities, as pending legislation proposes).
- Narrow existing provisions for family reunification by eliminating the provision that permits infant U.S. citizens to seek immigrant visas for their Western Hemisphere parents.

The first provision would require not only a change in the law, but to maximize its effectiveness, a more comprehensive record-keeping system than is currently in place.

The second provision would be more controversial, since about one-fifth of all current legal immigrants adjust their status from nonimmigrant to immigrant while in the United States. Currently, adjustment is available primarily to natives of the Eastern Hemisphere (as well as to Cuban refugees); current proposals seek to extend this privilege to all natives of the Western Hemisphere.

Adjustment of status offers the most convenient method for the conversion of an illegal alien into a legal one; it should be granted only under restricted circumstances. As a first step in inhibiting illegal immigration by controlling such conversions, we recommend that no adjustments be granted to the most numerous and casual of the nonimmigrant visa abusers, those with B-2 visas, the visitors for pleasure. (In FY 1974, 26,140 of the 50,265 adjustees covered by Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act were in this country on B-2 visas at the time of adjustment.)*

*INS Annual Report, 1974, Table 6C.

These proposed provisions would neither adversely affect the qualified, would-be immigrant nor the genuine nonimmigrant who wants to come to the U.S. for a specific purpose and then leave. It would only inhibit the movements of those mala fide nonimmigrants, who deliberately come to the U.S. as B-2 visitors in the hope of adjusting their legal status to that of permanent resident alien, or the movements of bona fide B-2 visitors who decide, after arrival, that they wish to become permanent residents.

The third provision would eliminate one of the anomalies in immigration law. Currently U.S. citizen children cannot seek immigrant status for one or both of their Eastern Hemisphere parents until the children reach their 21st birthday. This is not the case, however, for Western Hemisphere children, and this pro-natal provision in immigration law is one of the more common strategies used by illegal aliens to legitimate their presence in the United States.

APPENDIX A

Green-Card Commuters

Introduction

In Europe, they are called "frontier workers." They live in Italy, for instance, and cross the border daily to work in Switzerland; typically, they work in a more developed economy than the one in which they live. In most cases, they have not secured immigrant status in the country where they work.

Although the formalities are different, the same phenomenon exists in North America. A number of workers live in Mexico or Canada and commute daily to jobs in the United States. (The traffic is rarely the other way, particularly not towards Mexico, which has a very stern view about outsiders holding jobs which might otherwise go to their own citizens.) There are three categories of these commuting workers, described in order of diminishing importance:

Green-card commuters: These are residents of Mexico or Canada who have acquired permanent resident alien (immigrant) status through the process described in Chapter I; although they have this status, they have decided to make use of a practice long accepted by all three governments (United States, Mexico, and Canada) of living outside the United States but working inside it. They are called "green-card commuters" because they -- unlike the other border-crossing workers -- possess an INS document (Form I-151) which signifies permanent resident alien status and which used to be green.

These commuters have the option of moving into the United States, and if they do, they secure all the rights of other permanent resident aliens, including the right to become a citizen; the commuters, by definition, have decided not to exercise this option.

We estimate (for reasons described shortly) that there are approximately 75,000 such workers, although the formal INS count is about 60,000.

Citizen commuters: These are citizens of the United States, who live in Mexico or Canada, and commute from their homes to U.S. jobs. This practice is particularly common along the Texas portion of the U.S.-Mexico border.

No data has been collected on U.S. citizen commuters from Canada, but on January 11, 1966, INS conducted a one-day count of U.S. citizen commuters crossing from Mexico and recorded 18,259 of them. Assuming that a one-day count missed a substantial number of workers who happened not to cross on that day, and that this population has grown at about the same rate as the green-card commuters, one could estimate that there are some 25,000 of these commuters. (We found, in an earlier study for the Labor Department, that this group of workers has much in common with green-card commuters; the majority of them are former residents of the United States, and the overwhelming majority of them along the southern border are of Mexican descent.*) The characteristics of this group, however, are beyond the scope of this work.

Nonimmigrant commuters: There are a handful of residents of Mexico and Canada, no more than a few hundred, legally crossing the border daily, with nonimmigrant visas which allow them to work in the U.S.** They, too, are beyond the scope of this study.

These are the only three categories of legitimate, regular border-crossing workers. Hundreds of thousands of "shoppers cards," (INS form I-186) are issued to people living in the area just south of the U.S.-Mexico border, but it is not legal for holders of these cards to work in the United States.

* David S. North, Border Crossers: People Who Live in Mexico and Work in the United States, TransCentury Corporation, Washington, D.C., 1970; subsequently reproduced in U.S. Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Migrant and Seasonal Farmworker Powerlessness, Part 5-A, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. Senate, 91st Congress, on Border Commuter Labor Problem, May 21, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 2236-2239 and pp. 2314-2345.

** Ibid., pp. 2346-2349

The Significance of Commuters

In macro terms, the estimated number of green-card commuters is less than one-tenth of one percent of the U.S. labor force. Why pay any attention to such a tiny sliver of the pie? There is a three-part answer to the question.

In the first place, the commuters are a control group against which we can measure the labor-market experiences of the illegals. We find it useful to compare, as we do in this report, the social characteristics and labor-market experiences of two Mexico-based work forces which have much in common: the green-card commuters and the illegals. The most pertinent of these comparisons is between the commuters and the illegals who work in the 23 counties along the border, a subgroup among the illegals which appears to be the least fortunate of all the illegal aliens in the nation.

The second answer is more speculative. The lives and the prospects of the green-card commuters give us insight into what will happen if we adopt an expanded nonimmigrant worker program as a part of our response to the increasing numbers of illegal aliens. These nonimmigrants, like the braceros of old, would have some legal protection, but few of the rights of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. Such a group would be in half-way position: on the one hand, they would not be full-fledged members of the society in which they work, but on the other hand, they would not be violating its laws. Green-card commuters from Mexico (but not from Canada) fit this description.* Although the commuters have a number of rights, such as protection under worker's compensation and minimum-wage legislation, which relate to the site of the job, not to the home of the worker, knowledgeable people along the border have long remarked -- and our interviews confirm -- that the commuters rarely act as if they had these rights. To be a green-card commuter in the Southwest is to be subject to feelings of profound insecurity: perhaps (the green-carder feels) the American government will take away my card, or change the whole system; perhaps joining a union, or asking for a raise will endanger it, so why take a chance? It can be argued that any major nonimmigrant worker program will produce

* For a treatment of a somewhat similar, obscure, and exotic segment of the American labor force, see College of the Virgin Islands, "Aliens in the United States Virgin Islands: Temporary Workers in a Permanent Economy," prepared by Social Educational Research and Development, Inc., Silver Spring, Md., 1968.

a group of people with similar sets of insecurities, a need to hold on to an all-important piece of paper, probably secured through the intervention of an employer, so that they can hold on to a job in the American economy. The clues offered by the green-card commuters about a nonimmigrant worker program are thus of some significance and are worth exploring.

The third reason they warrant study is one upon which we focussed in a more comprehensive review of this situation six years ago: although the green-card commuters make only a minimal impact on the nationwide labor market, they appear to have a significant impact on a number of relatively small labor markets along the Mexican border, where wages are remarkably low (for this country) and the incidence of poverty is remarkably high.

Methodology

We relied on three basic sources of data, besides the thin body of literature on the subject, to round out and bring up to date our earlier study:*

- INS statistical data on the numbers, locations, and occupations of green-card commuters, which are revised monthly;
- Labor-market statistics published by various entities dealing with the 23 counties along the U.S.-Mexico border, such as state employment security agencies and the Employment Standards Administration; and
- Interviews with 250 commuters, 209 along the southern border, and 41 along the northern border.

The interviews were proportionately distributed among the ten crossing points with the most commuter traffic, with approximately one interview assigned to a port-of-entry for every 200 green-card commuters. Seven ports were used on the southern border, and three on the northern border. The locations of these interviews and the numbers at each port are shown in Figure A-1. (The three northern ports-of-

* Little has been published in the last five years on the subject; the most useful documents are Parts 5-A and 5-B of the previously cited Senate hearings, which include reprints of many pertinent articles and legal documents (as well as the hearings per se), and Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration, The Impact of Commuter Aliens Along the Mexican and Canadian Border: Hearings Before the Select Commission, Parts I, II, and III (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968).

entry selected account for 64.8% of the INS recorded green-card commuters along the Canadian border, while the seven southern ports account for 77.4% of the recorded commuters from Mexico.)

The interviews were conducted on a volunteer, no-names basis, at the ports-of-entry, with the cooperation of the Immigration Service, and, of course, of the commuters involved (who were paid \$5 for stopping on their way to work in the morning to talk to the interviewers). The interviews were conducted between 5 and 10 a.m. The INS inspectors on duty were asked to inform a proportionate number of three subgroupings of green-card commuters of the interviews; the three subgroupings were those who walked, those who drove, and those who rode in cars driven by others. The interviewers were also told to interview a proportion of men and women which was roughly comparable to the sex ratio of the green-card commuters they observed crossing through that port, at that time.

The interviewing was a more or less continuous process, through the hours when the interviewers were working, in an attempt to minimize the time bias. This is an important variable because workers with different occupations and different industry affiliations tend to cross the border at different hours. (In Brownsville, for instance, like many other ports, the pattern is first the farmworkers, generally on foot, then factory workers, usually in automobiles, and finally, after 8 a.m., retail store employees, some on foot, some in cars.)

The survey instrument used was created in much the same way as the instrument used with the illegals, in that it was designed in Washington, tested in the field, and then revised. (Wherever possible, identical questions were used, for comparative purposes.) It was administered by bilingual interviewers along the southern border, where much of the resulting conversation was in Spanish. Subsequently, the respondents' answers were coded, keypunched, and tabulated.

The Legal Background

Prior to the Immigration Act of 1924, the U.S. Border was no barrier to a commuting worker: he could come and go as he pleased. That legislation, as first interpreted by INS (then an arm of the Labor Department) called for the issuance of a nonimmigrant visa to those who wanted to commute to work. Effective April 1, 1927, however, INS reversed itself and ruled that to commute one had to have an immigrant visa. (Western Hemisphere immigrant visas were

not hard to secure at that time, and the 1927 decision cannot be viewed, even in retrospect, as a major step taken to protect the rights of U.S. workers.) A gentleman of Italian descent, and a lady from Scotland, both living in Canada and commuting to jobs in the United States as non-immigrants, fought that decision up to the Supreme Court and lost.*

The green-card commuter practice, then, is the creation of administrative fiat, now strengthened by 40 years of tradition; according to the Service's view of the situation, a permanent resident alien is one who has the right to live and work in this country, but he does not necessarily have to opt to live here in order to work here. But green-card commuters and permanent resident aliens who actually live here are treated differently by INS. An alien must reside in the United States to become naturalized; commuting does not count. A commuter must continue to work; if he is out of work for six months, and INS notices, he may lose his green card. Further, the Labor Department can certify that a specific business establishment is enmeshed in a labor-management dispute and a green-card commuter, not already working in the establishment, cannot accept work with the employer in question. Finally, and quite recently, INS has ruled that a commuter cannot seek immigrant visas for members of his family: a green-card holder must live in the U.S. to secure equity for a relative.

Organized labor in the fifties and sixties, and poverty lawyers in the sixties and seventies, took a dim view of these American frontier workers. Unions have seen strikes broken by the importation of workers from across the border (usually green-card commuters but not always). Poverty lawyers have argued that the easy access to American labor markets by Mexican residents tends to depress wages and working conditions.** At least four suits were initiated by these forces, starting in 1958.

* Karnuth vs. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 1929.

** Sheldon L. Greene, "Immigration Law and Rural Poverty --The Problems of the Illegal Immigrant." Duke Law Review, No. 3 (1969): 475-94. "Commuters, Illegals and American Farmworkers: The Need for a Broader Approach to Domestic Farm Labor Problems," New York University Law Review 48 (June 1973): 339-492.

The Supreme Court finally ruled on the matter just before Thanksgiving, 1974, when it, by a five-four margin, decided that INS had been correct all those years. Justice Douglas, who wrote the decision, joined four conservative members in declaring that the commuters did not have to make use of their opportunity to live in the U.S. in order to continue working in this country.

The dissenters, liberals Brennan and Marshall, and conservatives Blackmun and White, speaking in gentlemanly, lawyer-like phrases said that the majority was flying in the face of common sense in their reading of the statutes:

"The immigration laws," White's dissent declared, "define 'permanent residence' as 'the place of general abode,' a person's 'principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent,' ...Confronted with the obvious difficulty that this statutory language...will not accommodate the daily and seasonal commuters, the majority...contends that these plain words should be given special, technical meanings..."*

Numbers and Distribution

Most green-card commuters are residents of Mexico; the INS running total of these workers was 51,922 in March, 1975; the most recent statistics available. A smaller group, 8,614, was recorded as crossing from Canada, for a two border total of 60,536.

The phrase "was recorded" is used deliberately here, as these totals reflect counts by busy federal officials, who are screening hundreds of aliens an hour, and who are often more concerned with other matters.**

Most aliens crossing the border are not commuters, they are simply coming back from a trip to Mexico or Canada; these traveling aliens and the commuters carry the same document, the green card or I-151. The visible distinction between the two is the metal grommet-punched into the commuter's card (or the "S" stamped in the cards of the seasonal workers, a subgroup we will discuss shortly). This distinction is made by the border offi-

*See *Saxbe v. Bustos*, 419 U.S. 65 (1974) and, for a comment, David S. North, "Green Light for Green Cards," Texas Observer, January 17, 1975.

**These are often Customs employees, rather than officers of INS.

cial, and is made, almost always, on his initiative -- aliens carrying a green card often do not want it to be grommeted on the grounds that the grommet does not do them any good, and might, potentially, do them some harm. The counts of commuters noted in the next pages must therefore be regarded as minimal. We do not have any firsthand knowledge of practices along the northern border, but our observations of the screening of early morning border crossers from Mexico make us think that there are probably closer to 75,000 green-card commuters than the official INS two-border count of 60,536.*

In the past, INS made no distinction between seasonal and daily commuters, but it started doing so in the early seventies, as a byproduct of one of the lower court decisions. Seasonal workers are green-card holders who live in Mexico part of the year, usually in the wintertime, and then cross into the United States to work the rest of the year, generally on farms or in agriculture-related activities (packing sheds, canneries, and the like). INS records no Canada-based seasonal, green-card commuters.

As Table A-1 shows, most green-card workers cross the border to work in urban settings. More than half of the Mexico-based commuters work in or near El Paso or San Diego, which lies a few miles north of the San Ysidro port-of-entry. Virtually all of the Michigan crossings on the northern border are of residents of Windsor, Ontario going to work in Detroit and its environs. Although INS reports 63 places where commuters cross, and although many of these workers are farmworkers, this movement is predominantly an urban one, and this appears to be increasingly the case.

In the last nine years, as the table indicates, there has been a decline in the incidence of commuters at the Canadian border (apparently reflecting the auto industry's troubles), while there has been a slow increase, about 2.0% a year, along the southern border. (The latter rate, coincidentally, is only slightly less than the rate of increase for the total U.S. civilian labor force for the same period of time.)

*A registered green-card commuter is, presumably, crossing the border regularly from Mexico or Canada into the U.S. to work. If he moves to the U.S., he will probably seek to have the grommet removed from the card; if he continues to live outside the U.S. and stops commuting (and INS notices), he is likely to lose the green card. Thus every month some new cards are grommeted, some old grommets are removed, and some green cards are cancelled. The statistics quoted on registered green cards are the end-of-the-month balances, after these additions and subtractions have been made; the statistics relate to the number of registered green-card commuters, and not to the number of their entrances.

TABLE A-1

Distributions of Port of Entry of Green-Card Commuters Registered
With INS, 1966 and 1975

PORT OF ENTRY	GREEN-CARD COMMUTERS					
	1 9 6 6	1 9 7 5			1966-1975 CHANGE	
		Total	Daily	Seasonal	Change in Nos.	Change by %
MEXICAN BORDER						
<u>Texas</u>						
Brownsville	2,032	2,311	2,234	77	+ 279	+13.7
Progresso	na	53	52	1	na	na
Hidalgo	1,163	970	500	470	- 193	-16.6
Roma	208	785	127	658	+ 577	+277.4
Laredo	2,581	2,489	2,393	96	- 92	- 3.6
Eagle Pass	1,604	2,525	1,916	609	+ 921	+57.4
Del Rio	313	401	341	60	- 112	-21.8
Presidio	na	16	16	-	na	na
Fort Hancock	na	136	136	-	na	na
Fabens	274	352	352	-	+ 78	+28.5
El Paso	<u>11,772</u>	<u>14,429</u>	<u>14,137</u>	<u>292</u>	<u>+2,657</u>	<u>+22.6</u>
Total	20,147	24,467	22,204	2,263	+4,115	+20.4
<u>New Mexico</u>						
Columbus	na	35	33	2	na	na
<u>Arizona</u>						
Douglas	418	323	316	7	- 95	-22.7
Naco	127	132	132	-	+ 5	+ 3.4
Nogales	1,614	993	847	146	- 621	-38.5
Sasabe	na	9	9	-	na	na
Lukeville	na	6	6	-	na	na
San Luis	<u>4,734</u>	<u>4,402</u>	<u>4,402</u>	-	<u>+ 168</u>	<u>+ 4.0</u>
Total	6,393	5,865	5,712	153	- 543	- 8.5
<u>California</u>						
Andrade	na	128	128	-	na	na
Calexico	7,616	6,019	4,903	1,116	-1,597	-21.0
Tecate	na	50	50	-	na	na
San Ysidro	<u>9,281</u>	<u>15,199</u>	<u>10,000</u>	<u>5,199</u>	<u>+5,919</u>	<u>+63.8</u>
Total	16,897	21,396	15,081	6,315	+4,321	+25.8
Minor Ports of Entry ¹	250	na	na	na	na	na
Subtotal	43,687	51,922	43,030	8,892	+8,235	+18.9
CANADIAN BORDER						
Maine	2,571	2,283	2,283	-	- 288	-11.2
New Hampshire	8	-	-	-	- 8	-100.0
Vermont	482	474	474	-	- 8	- 1.7
New York	1,466	1,525	1,525	-	+ 59	4.0
Michigan	6,074	4,289	4,289	-	-1,785	-29.4
Minnesota	30	24	24	-	- 6	-20.0
Montana	2	-	-	-	- 2	-100.0
Washington	54	19	19	-	- 35	-64.8
Alaska	1	-	-	-	- 1	-100.0
Subtotal	10,688	8,614	8,614	-	-2,074	-24.1
TOTAL	54,375	60,536	51,644	8,892	+6,161	+11.3

Source: 1975 data from INS form G-23-1, Supplement A, for March 1975; 1966 data from Report of the Select Commission on Western Hemisphere Immigration, Washington, 1968, pp. 104 and 115.

¹1966 data did not include separate listings for Progresso, Presidio, Fort Hancock, Sasabe, Lukeville, Andrade and Tecate, which were aggregated as minor ports of entry; data for these ports, however, were available in 1975. State totals therefore exclude these small ports, but the Mexican border total includes these ports. Also, El Paso data cover the Santa Fe Bridge and Ysleta in both years, and Cordova in 1966, and Bridge of the Americas in 1975; Canadian port of entry data have been aggregated by state at the Mexican border and the two border totals include 159 seasonals recorded at Bakersfield, California, who are not included with any specific port of entry because their crossing place is not known.

Commuter Characteristics

Although INS counts the numbers of active green-card commuters, by port-of-entry, and by a rough occupational distribution, which we will discuss shortly, it collects no other data on the characteristics of this work force, so we must rely on our survey for recent information on the subject.

Green-card commuters are apparently more likely to be men than women; the percentage of males among our respondents along the southern border (where our sample size was large enough to make male-female comparisons) was almost exactly that of men in the total U.S. fulltime labor force, 67%.

Similarly, the age distribution of the respondents along the southern border is much like that of the U.S. work force, as can be seen in Table A-2. The Mexican men among the interviewed commuters tend to be older than the Mexican women, and the interviewed Canadian commuters are older than either the Mexican commuters or the U.S. work force as a whole. Fully two-thirds of the respondents crossing from Canada are between 35 and 55.

Comparing Mexico-based male green-card respondents to our sample of illegals working in the counties along the U.S.-Mexico border (a group which is 90% male), we find that the commuters are about a decade older than the illegals (38.3 vs. 28.0). Our survey shows that a few more than a third of these commuters were over 45, while only about 9% of the border-county illegals had reached that age.

In terms of marital status, 78.0% of the Canadian commuters we talked to were married, as were 80.9% of the Mexican males; Mexican women commuters are less likely to be married, only 48.5% of the surveyed ones were married, whereas 63.0% of the U.S. female labor force is married.*

The surveyed green-card commuters, as one might expect, are living in larger households along the southern border than along the Canadian line. More than 60% of the former indicated that there were five or more people living in their household, and 15% indicated that

* Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1974, Table 550.

TABLE A-2

Distributions of Age of Green-Card Commuter Respondents, by Location,
and of U.S. Labor Force

(as percents of group responding)

AGE AT LAST BIRTHDAY	GREEN-CARD COMMUTERS					U.S. LABOR FORCE 1973
	Total	Canadian Border	Mexican Border			
			Total	Male	Female	
Under 20	4.0	2.4	4.3	5.0	2.9	9.7
20 - 24	12.4	-	14.9	10.7	23.5	15.0
25 - 34	23.7	24.4	23.6	23.6	23.5	22.7
35 - 44	26.9	31.7	26.0	27.1	23.5	18.4
45 - 54	19.3	34.1	16.3	17.1	14.7 ²	18.7
55 - 64	12.9	7.3	13.9	16.4	8.8	12.3
65 ² and Over	0.8	-	1.0	-	2.9	3.3
No. of Respondents	249	41	208	140	68	-
SUBTOTAL ¹	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	99.8	100.1
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.4	-	0.5	0.7	-	-
Total No. of Respondents	250	41	209	141	68	-
Average Age	38.9	41.7	38.3	39.2	36.6	38.5

Source: Columns 1 through 5, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; column 6, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., 1974, Table 544; average age of U.S. labor force calculated from Employment and Earnings, April, 1975, Tables A-19 and A-9.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

there were nine or more. About a quarter of the Canadians reported households with five or more, and none above the level of eight in the house.

The personal characteristic which most sharply distinguishes the Canadian from the Mexican respondents is level of education. The Canadians tend to have finished high school and to have attended, but not graduated from, college. Their years of school completed is bunched in the upper middle portion of the spectrum; they have no one with less than four years of education, but only one college graduate. In general, their educational experience is roughly comparable to that of the U.S. labor force. (See Table A-3.)

The interviewed Mexican commuters, on the other hand, have considerably less education than the U.S. population. Fully 80% of them did not go beyond eighth grade, and nearly 69% of them ended their education at or before sixth grade, which is the last year of primary school in the Mexican educational system. Stated another way, the Canadians reported a mean of 11.2 years of school, while the Mexican mean was 5.8. (Interviewed illegals in the border counties had even less education; their mean years of schooling was 4.7.) These differentials in education will be mirrored in similar differentials in earnings, which we will present shortly.

There does seem to be some improvement, however; in our earlier survey (we had interviewed 400 commuters for our 1970 study), we found that 17% of the Mexican commuters had no contact with schools whatsoever; this time, only 3% were in this category.

Ties With the United States

As we indicated earlier, green-card commuters acquire their special status because they have, but are currently not exercising, a right to live permanently in the United States, as well as the right to work there. Over and above their U.S. job, the commuters have other ties to the United States, which tend to be stronger along the southern border than the northern border.

According to the conventional wisdom of the southern border, many green-card commuters tried fulltime life in the United States, and then decided to continue to work in the States, but live in Mexico; sometimes the motivation was a desire to live with or near family members who cannot immigrate, and sometimes the motivation is attributed to financial considerations, the lower costs that come with

TABLE A-3

Distributions of Educational Attainment of Green-Card Commuter Respondents, by Location,
and of the U.S. Civilian Labor Force

(as percents of group responding)

YEARS OF SCHOOL	TOTAL	Canadian Border	Mexican Border			U.S. LABOR FORCE (16 years and over)
			Total	Male	Female	
0 - 4	26.6	-	31.7	30.5	34.3	2.1
5 - 8	43.5	15.0	49.0	50.4	46.3	12.9
9 - 11	17.3	27.5	15.4	16.3	13.4	19.2
12 - 12	7.3	30.0	2.9	1.4	6.0	38.7
13 - 15	4.8	25.0	1.0	1.4	-	13.6
16 & Over	0.4	2.5	-	-	-	13.6
No. of Respondents	248	40	208	141	67	85,410,000
SUBTOTAL ¹	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.8	2.4	0.5	-	1.5	-
Total No. of Respondents	250	41	209	141	68	85,410,000

Source: Columns 1-5, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; column 6, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1973, Table 12.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

maintaining a home in Mexico. This was borne out in our survey, which showed that a substantial majority of the interviewed southern commuters, 62.6%, had lived in the United States for at least a year (and about a fifth of these said that they had lived in the States for ten years or more). Only 14.4% of the Mexico-based commuters said that they had never lived in this country. Most of the Canadians, on the other hand, told us that they had never tried life on this side of the border; 65.9% were in that category.

When we asked the commuters where they had lived in the United States, we found a heavy incidence of Californians: 119 of the Mexicans, a majority of our sample of 209, had lived in California at one point in their lives. The second largest former home state for this group was Texas, where 87 of them had lived. The third most popular state was a surprise, Florida, which had played host to 29 of the Mexicans and a full dozen of our small sample of 41 Canadians.

Many of the Mexicans said that they have close relatives living in the United States, with over 40% of them saying that one or more children, a spouse, or one or two parents live in this country; the Canadian response to the same question was less than 20% positive.

The most significant tie that the commuters have to the United States is the green card that allows them to work in this country, and from our analysis of the survey results (and other information on the flows of immigration from Mexico and Canada) it is clear that new green-card commuters are being created steadily along the southern border, but that practice is dying out on the northern border.

Among our sample, we found that about half of the green carders in the south had secured their cards in the last ten years, while only 32% of the Canadians had received their visas in this period. (Although the numbers are too small to be significant, it is interesting that only one Canadian, out of 41, secured his card in the last five years, while fully a third of the 209 Mexicans received their cards in the same period.)

These substantial numbers of new green-card commuters from the south, among our respondents, and the apparently lack of them from the north, thus mirrors the changes in the total numbers of commuters recorded by INS, as shown in Table A-1. The causes of this are multiple, but must include the prosperity to the north of us (and the poverty to the south), as well as the differential way that

the new family-oriented criteria of admission enacted by the 1965 amendments affect would-be immigrants from the two nations (i.e., would-be Mexican immigrants are more likely to have relatives in the U.S. than would-be Canadian immigrants).

The principal recommendation of our previous study of this subject was that the green-card commuter phenomenon be eventually eliminated by attrition; that all current green-card holders continue to be honored for the rest of the lives of the holders, but that no new cards be issued. This, in effect, is what is happening along the Canadian border, but the opposite is true in the Southwest. That a third of our Mexican respondents secured their cards since we filed our earlier report five years ago suggests that had such a policy been put into effect, it would be making major reductions in this work force.

Commuters as Consumers

While the consumer economies on the two sides of the U.S.-Canada border are nearly identical, the prices and availability of goods differ markedly on the two sides of the southwest boundary. The recent publicity about low sugar and gasoline prices in Mexico is simply the latest indication of these disparities. If one lives near the U.S.-Mexico border, one shops in both nations, buying some foodstuffs here, and some there, buying alcoholic beverages in Mexico, and manufactured goods in the United States. The green-card commuters are therefore just one segment of the border population who play the role of consumers in two economies; they have the major advantage, however, of buying housing in Mexico, where it is considerably less expensive (being built by workers who, by definition, are living in the Mexican economy), while enjoying wages earned in the United States.

We asked three questions about buying patterns: where they purchased food, and clothing, and, if they owned a car, where they bought it. We expected to find that the Mexico-based commuters purchased most of these items in the United States, and we did. On the other hand, to our surprise, we found that the surveyed Canadian commuters spent relatively little money on this side of the border.

In our sample, we found that roughly 70% of the commuters, on both borders, own cars. Of the Mexicans, 58% bought their car in the States, while only 10% of the Canadians had done so.

As for clothing, two-thirds of the Mexican commuters reported that they bought all of their clothes in the United States, and another 11% said that they purchased about three quarters of their clothes here. (Border cities, such as Laredo, Brownsville, and El Paso have extensive collections of inexpensive clothing stores near the ports-of-entry, stores which draw most of their clientele from the other side of the river. The availability of relatively good and relatively inexpensive factory-produced clothes -- such as sturdy jeans for children -- is something which Americans regard as unexceptional. Clearly, as the numbers of these stores on Brownsville's Elizabeth Street and Laredo's Bridge Street indicate, this aspect of the American economy is not taken for granted by our neighbors to the South.)

Canadian commuters, on the other hand, apparently do not buy clothes in the United States. Of our group, 52% said that they bought no clothes here, and 37% said that they bought only about a quarter of their clothes in this country.

The response on where commuters buy food was comparable to the clothing response. Roughly two-thirds of the Mexico-based workers told us that they bought three-quarters of their food, or all of it in the States. More than half of the Canadian commuters said that they never buy food in the United States, and a third reported that they bought no more than a quarter of their food here.

Housing patterns are considerably different among surveyed Canadian commuters than among Mexican ones; 88% of the Canadians own their own homes (and a third of these own them outright, since they reported no mortgage payments). On the other hand, only 42% of the Mexicans own their homes, but most of them have no mortgages. Another 43% of the southern commuters rent, while some 12% live with parents or relatives who take care of such matters. Housing costs, whether expressed in mortgage payments or rent, differ sharply. Among those experiencing these costs, the mean monthly payment reported in the north was \$178, while it was only \$51 in the south.

Participation in Federal Programs

The most pervasive U.S. program beyond the immigration process, which reaches all commuters, appears to be the Social Security system. Ninety-six percent of the commuters reported that they had a social security card, and 90% reported positively when asked if their employers deducted social security taxes (it is possible that others are covered by the system, but are not aware of it).

There is an interesting comparison between the experience reported by the commuters and that of the interviewed border county illegals with the social security system; male commuters were highly likely to tell us of social security payments deducted (90.6%) and unlikely to be paid in cash (14.2% said that they were paid in this way), which together suggest above-board employment practices. The surveyed border county illegals, on the other hand, were generally paid in cash (63.3%) and generally did not receive social security protection (only 27.9% reported social security tax deductions). Although the green-card commuters are low paid workers whom we believe to play a depressing role in the border labor markets, apparently they, unlike their illegal brethren working in the same labor markets, are less likely to be exploited workers. (Female commuters from Mexico were, incidentally, more likely to be paid in cash (25%), and a little less likely to report social security deductions than Mexican male commuters.)

The facts that the commuters do not live in the U.S., and that the illegals are working contrary to law, will not interfere with their ultimate pension rights; the Social Security Administration regularly mails checks to more than a quarter of a million beneficiaries living outside the United States, including tens of thousands in Mexico and in Canada.

The federal program that appears to have the next largest impact is the one that others might expect to be the most all-embracing, and that is the tax collection system. When asked if their employer deducted U.S. income taxes, 76% of our sample said yes, indicating that many employers, 1% or so, take care of their Social Security obligations, but do not deduct income taxes.

The filing of income tax reports appears to be even more common than the deduction of taxes, though one might expect the reverse. A total of 84% of the commuters, on both borders, reported filing an income tax return on one or more occasions. Predictably, a report of at least one filing was more common among Canadians (98%) than Mexicans (82%), and higher among Mexican males than among Mexican females.

Despite the fact that about five-sixths of these commuters said that they had filed at least one income tax return, it is clear that there were many years in which they had worked in the United States, but had not filed a return. We asked all the commuters how many years, in all,

they had worked in the States; we asked them, in another question, how many years in all they had filed an income tax return. We then compared the answers. While 103 of the 250 reported that they had worked ten or more years, only 67 had filed ten or more income tax returns; similarly, at the five-or-more-year level, 139 had worked this long, but only 97 reported filing income tax returns in five or more years. Among the newer commuters, only 18 said that they had worked in the country for less than a year, but 38 said that they had never filed a return. There are clearly some holes in the system. (Green-card commuters, unlike other aliens leaving the nation, do not have to secure "sailing permits" from the Treasury Department, indicating that they have met their tax obligations; if such a requirement were made, presumably on an annual basis, the incidence of commuters filing income tax returns would probably increase.)

Whereas a large majority of green carders participate in both the income and social security tax systems, only a minority have tapped into various U.S.-financed service provision systems; thus the commuters and the illegals have comparable patterns in this regard.

The most common usage of such systems reported was in the health field; roughly a third of the commuters along both borders said that they had received treatment from American hospitals or clinics, and roughly a fifth said that members of their families had received such treatment. Those who did make use of these facilities reported in about 80% of the cases that the services were paid for by either the commuter, his health insurance, or by his employer (a typical Canadian border response).

One might expect that the occasional, and sometimes emergent, visit to a hospital would be more common than the daily border crossings of school children, and this turned out to be the case. Less than 10% of the surveyed green carders indicated that their children attended U.S. schools, but these 19 families had a total of 45 children attending American schools. (As noted before, the Canadian commuters are attracted by U.S. jobs, but by few other aspects of this nation; all the border crossing children were reported by Mexican families, no Canadian reported placing his child in a U.S. school.)

Respondent participation in welfare and food stamp programs was at the very bottom of the spectrum; in reply to the question, "have you ever been on welfare in the U.S.," there was a 4% positive response, all among Mexican commuters. There was a similar response to a similar question about the food stamp program. (Since most of the Mexican commuters had lived in the U.S., it is safe to assume that most of these instances of welfare utilization probably took place while the respondent was a resident in the U.S.) The border-county illegals in our sample were even less likely to participate in these programs; none of them had received welfare payments, and only 1.5% (one individual) reported receiving food stamps.

The 1975 data for the commuters is not out of line with the results of our earlier survey; at that time we found that 1% of those surveyed had sought welfare benefits, and that 3% had sought either surplus food or food stamps.

While we cannot guarantee that all 250 of the commuters we talked to in 1975, or all 400 that we interviewed in 1969, told us the complete truth about participation in welfare and food stamp programs, we felt that we were generally getting straight answers (because we encountered very few refusals to answer these questions). The green-card commuters are workers, and any adverse effect they may be having is on resident workers, and not on our service-delivery systems.

Green-Card Commuters as Workers

Since green-card commuters are a creation of the Immigration Service and are not counted as such by any other agency, American or foreign, we have to rely on INS data regarding their numbers and distribution over space and time. Unfortunately, when it comes to the kind of work the commuters do, we again encounter one of those infelicities in the way INS collects labor market data. INS classifies commuters according to their employment in six kinds of industries: industry, building and construction, agriculture, sales and service, household, and other -- which gives us only a rough idea of their types of employment. Further, commuters tend to change lines of work, and the data on their kind of work is collected once, thus, the six-part distribution tends to be automatically out of date.

Despite these caveats, it is useful to review the distribution of daily commuters along both borders, and to compare the totals with a similar breakdown of our group. (Seasonal workers are excluded from the data that follow, as well as from the interviews.)

Several comments can be made about the following table (A-4). The first is the modest one (which should be borne in mind in the pages that follow) that is the numbers of Canadian commuters are so small that the statistics shown can be viewed as only suggestive. Secondly, our data, along the Mexican border, roughly reflect INS data, except that we talked to a smaller number of farmworkers, and a larger number of domestics than the INS data would indicate. Further, it is clear that most of the commuters work in nonagricultural activities, and as we compare the current INS data to information gathered in the late sixties,* we know that the incidence of agricultural work is falling.

Since the INS industry group breakouts do not coincide with those used outside that agency, we also asked the commuters to classify themselves in the more generally used 11-part distribution which can be found in Table A-5. Again, several comments are in order. The commuters simply do not work in public administration: aliens are generally barred from civil service positions; and, in addition, some border communities require that their employees live in the United States. Similarly, no commuters identified themselves as self-employed in this question, although two of them, one from each border, so identified themselves in response to another question.

Of greater significance is the distribution of the commuters in several of the categories where they are represented. Thus, the Mexicans are much more likely than Canadian commuters to hold agricultural jobs or work in private households; Canadians, on the other hand, are generously represented in the manufacturing and finance-insurance-real estate sectors. Mexican commuters are considerably less likely to be in manufacturing than Canadian commuters.

The heavy representation of agricultural employment along the southern border relates to the skills of the commuters, the accidents of geography (the closeness of labor-intensive field crops to the border), and U.S. policies (the end of the bracero program caused a number of

* North, Border Crossers, pp. 2320-2321; 2487.

TABLE A-4

Distributions of Industry of Green-Card Commuter Respondents, and of Green-Card Commuters Registered With INS, by Location

(as percent of group)

INDUSTRY GROUP (INS Definition)	GREEN-CARD COMMUTER RESPONDENTS					COMMUTERS REGISTERED WITH INS	
	TOTAL	Canadian Border	Mexican Border			Mexican Border	Canadian Border
			Total	Male	Female		
Industry	23.2	29.3	22.0	18.4	29.4	24.3	49.2
Building & Construction	10.0	4.9	11.0	16.3	-	11.3	5.7
Agriculture	21.6	7.3	24.4	32.6	7.4	37.0	1.7
Sales & Services	32.0	48.8	28.7	29.1	27.9	20.3	31.7
Household	10.0	-	12.0	0.7	35.3	4.0	0.8
Other	3.2	9.8	1.9	2.8	-	3.1	10.5
TOTAL ¹	100.0	100.1	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	99.6
Total No. of Respondents	250	41	209	141	68	51,922	8,614

Source: Columns 1-5, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; Columns 6 and 7, unpublished INS data from form G-23.1, Supplement A, for March, 1975.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

TABLE A-5

Distributions of Industry of Green-Card Computer Respondents, by Location, and of U.S. Labor Force

(as percent of group responding)

INDUSTRY GROUP	GREEN-CARD COMPUTER RESPONDENTS					U.S. LABOR FORCE 1970
	TOTAL	Canadian Border	Mexican Border			
			Total	Male	Female	
Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries	22.2	-	26.7	34.8	10.4	5.1
Mining	0.4	-	0.5	0.7	-	0.6
Contract Construction	7.0	4.9	7.4	11.1	-	5.3
Manufacturing	24.7	39.0	21.8	18.5	28.4	24.1
Transportation & Public Utilities	2.5	4.9	2.0	3.0	-	6.0
Sales: Wholesale & Retail	17.3	12.2	18.3	19.3	16.4	17.9
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate	4.9	17.1	2.5	0.7	6.0	4.4
Services, except Private Household	14.0	22.0	12.4	11.1	14.9	21.8
Household Services	7.0	-	8.4	0.7	23.9	2.6
Public Administration	-	-	-	-	-	5.1
Self-Employed and Unpaid Family Workers	-	-	-	-	-	6.9
All respondents	243	41	202	135	67	
SUBTOTAL ¹	100.0	100.1	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.8
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	2.8	-	3.3	4.3	1.5	-
Total No. of Respondents	250	41	209	141	68	-

Source: Columns 1-5, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; column 6, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1972, Table 36.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

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ex-braceros, who previously had worked immediately north of the border, to secure green cards so that they could continue this work through another governmental mechanism).

A more precise description of green carders work can be gained from data on their occupational rather than their industrial distribution (Table A-6); data on the occupational distribution of U.S. workers is also included.

The differences between the two borders is even more apparent from these data than it was from the industry group distributions; reflecting on our survey results, Canadian commuters cluster at the top of the page, in the professional, managerial, and clerical categories, where there are few Mexicans, who, in turn, are grouped in the service and laborer categories. There are only three occupational groups, non-farm laborers, craft and kindred workers, and operatives except transport, where there is less than a two-to-one difference between the percentage distributions of the two groups. Among our respondents, Canadian commuters are white-collar workers, while those from Mexico wear blue collars.

We decided to take a closer look at the occupational distribution of the Mexican commuter respondents, and to compare it with that of three other related populations: apprehended illegal alien respondents, legal Mexican immigrants to the U.S., and members of the second generation, which the census defines as "native-born of foreign or mixed parentage." Our thought was that there would be a four-step progression, with the illegals at the bottom of the ladder, followed by the green-card commuters (a special kind of "immigrants," those who had not left Mexico), then the immigrants who had, in fact, immigrated, and finally the members of the following generation. This turned out to be the case.* That members of the second generation often do better than their parents is not exactly newsworthy in a study of immigration, but that one can backtrack and locate two earlier phases in the process for Mexican immigrants is an interesting, if narrow, discovery.

*The occupational distribution of the four groups are, of course, not strictly comparable, and the directions noted in occupational upgrading are only suggestive; the commuters are tied to the border counties, while the immigrants and their offspring are working all over the nation, and therefore face a broader range of employment opportunities; the illegals, also distributed around the nation, operate in the labor-market circumstances described earlier in this report.

TABLE A-6

Distributions of Occupation of Green-Card Commuter Respondents, by Location, and of U.S. Labor Force

(as percent of group responding)

OCCUPATION GROUP	GREEN-CARD COMMUTER RESPONDENTS					U.S. LABOR FORCE
	TOTAL	Canadian Border	Mexican Border			
			Total	Male	Female	
Professional, Technical & Kindred Workers	2.4	12.2	0.5	0.7	-	15.6
Owners, Managers, Administrators, except Farm	4.8	17.1	2.4	3.6	-	10.5
Sales Workers	3.6	7.3	2.9	1.4	5.9	6.4
Clerical & Kindred Workers	6.8	22.0	3.8	2.1	7.4	18.1
Craft & Kindred Workers	12.9	9.8	13.5	20.0	-	12.7
Operatives, except Transport	18.1	14.6	18.8	14.3	27.9	11.2
Transport Equipment Operatives	2.8	7.3	1.9	2.9	-	3.8
Nonfarm Laborers	7.6	4.9	8.1	12.1	-	4.6
Farmers & Farm Managers	-	-	-	-	-	1.9
Farm Laborers & Supervisors	21.3	-	25.5	32.9	10.3	1.3
Service Workers, except Private Household	12.9	4.9	14.4	9.3	25.0	12.5
Private Household Workers	6.8	-	8.1	0.7	23.5	1.5
No. of Respondents	249	41	208	140	68	-
SUBTOTAL ¹	100.0	100.1	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.1
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.4	-	0.7	0.5	-	-
Total No. of Respondents	250	41	209	141	68	-

Source: Columns 1-5, Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; column 6, Employment and Earnings, April 1975, Table A-28.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

If anything, the comparisons in Table A-7 are even more dramatic for women than for men; while none of the female green-card commuters were classified as professionals or managers, more than 10% of the second-generation women in the labor force were in these categories. The percentage of clerical workers among the second-generation women (generally implying English-language skills) was four times that of the female commuters.

Since Mexican immigrants are generally less likely to be highly skilled (when compared either to all residents of the U.S. or to all immigrants to the U.S.), the occupational distribution of the green-card commuters is, in effect, doubly different from the U.S. norm. These commuters, in short, are only part of the way into America; their contemporaries, the immigrants who both live and work in this country, have secured a higher range of skills, perhaps because of an exposure to a wider variety of opportunities, and perhaps because both working and living in the United States is more expensive than simply working here, thus producing a stronger incentive for upward mobility.

The interviewed commuters from Mexico, partially because of their low level of skills, partially because of the underlying economic conditions of the border areas, and perhaps to some degree because of conscious exploitation, are not paid very well. Taking a round number, \$100 a week, we find that 95% of the Canadian respondents made that much or more (generally much more), while close to half of the Mexicans made less than this. In fact, 31% of the Mexican commuters reported wages of \$84 or less weekly; this figure was selected because it was then the weekly equivalent of the minimum wage for most jobs (40 hours X \$2.10 per hour).

At the other end of the weekly income scale, at \$200 plus a week, close to 60% of the Canadian commuters reported such earnings, but only 7% of those living in Mexico.

In terms of averages, the weekly wage of Canadian commuters was \$230, of male Mexican commuters, \$122; of female Mexican commuters, \$85. (These data were for the wage rate in the job held by the commuter at the time of the interview, in the Spring of 1975.) Weekly earnings for all Americans in the private sector in April was \$158.*

* U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, August 1975, Table C-1.

TABLE A-7

Distributions of Occupation by Sex of Selected Segments of U.S. Labor Force With Ties to Mexico

(as percents of group)

OCCUPATION GROUP	MEXICAN ILLEGAL ALIEN RESPONDENTS	LEGAL WORKERS OF MEXICAN DESCENT ¹					
		M A L E			F E M A L E		
		Mexican Green-Card Commuter Respondents	Mexican-born U.S. Residents	Native-born U.S. Residents of Mexican or Mixed Parentage	Mexican Green-Card Commuter Respondents	Mexican-born U.S. Residents	Native-born U.S. Residents of Mexican or Mixed Parentage
Professional, Technical, & Kindred Workers	0.4	0.7	3.5	6.7	-	4.0	7.9
Owners, Managers, Adminis- trators, except Farm	-	3.6	3.0	5.3	-	1.7	2.4
Sales Workers	1.0	1.4	2.3	3.7	5.9	4.5	6.1
Clerical & Kindred Workers	-	2.1	3.4	7.2	7.4	13.2	20.2
Craft & Kindred Workers	16.5	20.0	19.0	21.9	-	2.5	2.4
Operatives, except Transport	23.6	14.3	23.2	19.0	27.9	38.1	33.6
Transport Equipment Operatives	0.6	2.9	4.5	7.7	-	0.2	0.4
Nonfarm Laborers	17.2	12.1	14.2	12.0	-	1.9	1.6
Farmers & Farm Managers	-	-	0.6	0.6	-	0.1	0.1
Farm Laborers & Supervisors	24.1	32.9	15.4	8.8	10.3	6.6	3.2
Service Workers, except Private Household	13.4	9.3	10.7	9.2	25.0	17.7	19.9
Private Household Workers	3.1	0.7	0.1	0.1	23.5	9.4	4.0
No. of Respondents	478	140	229,110	360,098	68	93,017	184,714
SUBTOTAL ¹	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.2	100.0	99.9	100.0
Don't Know/Refuse to Answer	0.6	0.7	-	-	-	-	-
Total No. of Respondents	461	141	229,110	360,098	68	93,017	184,714

Sources: Columns 1, 2, and 5, Litton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975; columns 3, 4, 6, and 7, calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, Subject Reports: Final Report PC(2)-1A, National Origins and Language, Table 13. Data is not available, by sex and occupation, on apprehended illegal alien respondents, but 90% of the group were males.

¹Percentages may not add to 100 due to roundoff.

These are all ballpark sorts of averages, but it is interesting to note that the Canadian respondents were making more than American workers, generally, and that the Mexico-based respondents were making less than either by a large margin. Bringing up the rear in these comparisons, as usual, were the illegals working in the border counties, who reported to us that their mean weekly wage was \$73.80.

The difference in wage levels between this group of illegals, who were 90% male, and the male green-card commuters amounted to nearly \$50 a week. It should be remembered that the surveyed commuters are ten years older, and they have a different occupational distribution, but given the fact that they are of the same ethnic group, working in the same counties, and with comparable low levels of education, one might surmise that a major reason for most of the \$50 a week differential was the fact that one group of workers were legal, and the other was not. (Presumably the previously mentioned remarkably different incidence of social security tax collection between these groups is at least as telling, if not more so, than the difference in weekly income.)

The hours that the commuters reported they work were unexceptional, with the data reflecting an almost perfect bell curve: 60% said eight hours, 10% said seven hours; another 10% said nine hours; six and ten hours were reported by 6% and 8%, respectively. My own early morning conversations with green-card commuters engaged in farmwork in the Eagle Pass area last spring suggested that substantial numbers of these commuters were working relatively brief days -- three and four hours -- but this phenomenon was not reflected to any degree in the survey, and may have been a passing occurrence. (A grower often finds it more convenient to have 80 manhours of work, in a day, performed for four hours each by twenty people, than to have the same work performed by 10 individuals over an 8-hour period, and the looseness of the labor market along the border permits such a practice.)

The days worked by the commuters are quite different on the two borders; 88% of the Canadians and 53% of the Mexicans reported a five-day week; almost one third of the Mexico-based commuters -- like the illegals -- declared that they work six days a week. The longer work week lingers in the kinds of work these commuters are likely to perform, in private households, in other service industries, and in agriculture.

Given their higher wage levels, greater education, and lack of recent acquisition of green cards, one might predict that the surveyed Canadian commuters had held their current jobs longer than those living in Mexico; this turns out to be the case. While there was very few differences between men and women, on both borders, Canadians had held their jobs an average of nine years; Mexican commuters had held theirs for only three and a half years.

There were also predictable differences in how commuter respondents secured their jobs, and in the extent to which they worked with other green-card commuters. We asked the commuters a multiple-choice question about how they secured their jobs, with these alternatives:

- through friends or relatives,
- through a private employment agency,
- through a public employment agency,
- from the employer directly, or
- other.

Among the Mexican commuters, almost half said they secured their job through the friends-and-relatives route, another 39% went to the employer directly, while 8% had been hired through a public employment agency. On the other hand, about half the Canadians had direct contact with the employer, while approximately a sixth used private agencies, and another sixth followed the friends-and-relatives approach. No Canadians had been placed by a public employment agency. (We found in an earlier study of immigrant workers for the Labor Department* that the first jobs held by immigrants were more likely to be secured with the help of the ethnic grapevine than subsequent ones, which are more often secured through more formal channels. That the Mexican commuters continue to make heavy use of this technique supports other observations we have made about their status in the labor market as bottom-of-the-rung, only partially arrived immigrants.)

Similarly, using a concept which William Weissert developed in our previous study,** we found that surveyed Mexican commuters were far more likely than Canadian ones, to work in "ethnic work places;" i.e., employment situations in which most of the workers are of the same ethnic background; we found in the earlier study that immigrants with less than average education and knowledge

* North and Weissert, Immigrants and the American Labor Market, pp. 139-141

** Ibid, pp. 145-46.

of English were more likely to work alongside their landmen in such situations which, in turn, tended to be low-skill, low-paid employment. With this in mind, we asked the commuters if there were other green carders employed where they worked; about half of the Canadians said yes, as did almost four-fifths of the Mexicans. Of those responding positively, we then asked, what proportion of your colleagues are also green-card commuters?

More than two-thirds of the Canadians said that fewer than a quarter of their colleagues were green carders, while almost half of the Mexicans said that more than three-quarters of their coworkers were in that category. Some employers along the southern border are reported to prefer hiring residents of Mexico, either U.S. citizens or green-card commuters, on the assumption that they are more productive workers than U.S. residents; such a preference is not regarded as discrimination by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, although one could presumably make an argument that such practices are contrary to the "national origins" segment of the law that the agency enforces.

Some green-card commuters do a heroic amount of traveling daily to work; some farmworkers, crossing at Calexico, for instance, walk from their homes to "The Hole," which is the local farm labor shape-up site; they then mount buses which will take them 90 to 100 miles before they can start work. One can hear the mariachi music in the busy bars on the Mexican side of the border, at two and three a.m., when these farmworkers cross to start their long day.

Again, this is the exception and not the rule. About 30% of the workers told us that they live within five miles of their jobs -- on both borders. Roughly 25% commute between six and ten miles each way, and another 25% commute between 11 and 25 miles. Less than 10% reported a daily one-way commute of more than 35 miles.

Although the trip to work is now held to manageable proportions by commuters on both borders, a significant number of the commuters based in Mexico used to be migrant agricultural laborers working in a number of different locations in the States. Some 46% of them said that they had traveled in the U.S. to do farmwork in the previous five years, with a majority of the men, and a little more than a quarter of the women so responding. Since only about a quarter of the Mexican commuters report that they are currently doing farmwork, this suggests one or two steps forward, in the last five years, for this group of workers.

It is progress, I suppose, to live in one place and commute to agricultural employment, as opposed to experiencing the difficulties inherent in following the crops. It is also, presumably, progress to move from farmwork to non-farmwork.

In this connection, we also asked about the job that the commuters held in the United States before the current job, if they had not held their current job for more than five years. Since about two-thirds of the sample of Mexican commuters fell in this category, we secured some interesting information about their past employment, and therefore some clues about their work history.

As reported earlier, about a quarter of our group were farmworkers at the time of the interview (which we noted was below the level suggested by INS statistics, which identified 37% of the Mexico-based commuters as farmworkers). We were somewhat concerned about this discrepancy until we looked at the previous job held by those who had changed jobs in the last five years. In this case, coincidentally, we found that 37% of those previous jobs were in agriculture. Thus, again, we see some evidence of movement away from farmwork over time, as we have with Mexican illegals who tend to leave farmwork when they leave Mexico to work in the States.

Similarly, when occupations in the current job and the previous one are compared for those surveyed, we see some movement, minimal but perceptible, into white-collar work. In terms of the previous job, less than 3% of the Mexican commuters said that they were employed in the four white-collar occupations; when asked about the current job, 9% said that they now hold white-collar jobs.

Thus, though there is substantial evidence that the Mexico-based green-card respondents are at the low end of the various education, skill, and income ranges, it is also clear that there is at least some upward mobility, over time, in terms of their occupational distribution.

The Economics of the Border

Given their relatively small number, the decline of these numbers over time, their greater age and higher wages, Canada-based commuters probably have a minimal impact on the U.S. labor markets in the three places where we conducted our interviews -- and no significant impact elsewhere along that border. While the distinctly prosperous treasurer of a bank -- one of our interviewees -- is holding a job which might otherwise be in the hands of a resident of this

country, that gentleman, like most of the northern commuters, is clearly doing nothing to depress the U.S. labor market, which is our principal concern.*

There is every reason to suppose, however, that the commuter system in the southwest, which appears to be growing slowly, has a depressive effect on the labor markets along that border, particularly those east of San Diego -- and the indications that this is the case are considerably stronger in 1975, a time of substantial unemployment, than they were in 1969, when we last reviewed the labor-market experience and role of the green-card commuters.

It is easy to show that there is a lot of poverty along the U.S.-Mexico border -- wages are low and unemployment is high, relative to the rest of the United States, but not to Mexico. It is also easy to show, as we have discussed earlier in this section and in Chapter I, that there is a substantial movement of Mexican workers into this part of the United States, of both legal green carders and illegal aliens. The rub comes, of course, when one seeks to show cause-and-effect relationships. At the very least, however, no matter what the primary causes of the substantial poverty that exists along the U.S.-Mexico border, it is obvious that the presence of the green-card commuters simultaneously aggravates the job market and working conditions of U.S. residents in the lower-income brackets and enhances the productivity and balance sheets of border employers. We find it impossible to doubt, and we shall next seek to show, that border county wages are lower and working conditions less attractive than they would be if the commuter traffic did not exist, or did not exist at its current level; that substantial numbers of jobs in specific U.S. labor markets would be in the hands of residents rather than commuters, were that traffic controlled; and that the people whose economic interests are injured by green carders are for the most part persons of Mexican descent. (In a few places, such as Eagle Pass, Texas, all involved in this equation are of Mexican descent -- the commuters, the employers, and the resident workers -- in most instances, however, the benefiting employer is an Anglo or an Anglo-controlled corporation.)

* Although the number of workers involved (two women and eight men) was too small to permit any sound inferences, we did notice that the largely French-Canadian group of commuters moving daily from the depressed province of New Brunswick into Fort Kent, Maine were considerably less well paid than those at the other Canadian border-crossing points.

Before we seek to support our twin thases of aggravation of poverty and worker displacement, it is useful to review the economic and geographic background of this part of our nation. With the exception of San Diego, which is blessed with both a pleasant climate and a magnificent harbor, most of the rest of the border strip has little in the way of natural advantages. Major investments in irrigation, largely on this side of the border, have made it possible to grow fruit and vegetables in what had previously been desert or near-desert conditions, notably in the Yuma-Calexico area in the West, and in the Lower Rio Grande Valley in the East. Beyond these limited belts of farming, the land has little to offer. (There is some oil and natural gas in the Lower Valley, and some mines in Arizona, but little employment is generated as a result.)

Most of the border area is either desert or mountain or both. By the time it reaches the border, the Colorado River (which is the border for a few miles) has been milked of its good water. The Rio Grande, similarly, is an extraordinarily long and thin river, often dry in much of the area where it serves as the border. Had this nation not annexed the Southwest, and were the border simply a line running between, say, states of Mexico, virtually no one would live there (with the exception of San Diego, which would presumably have become the jewel of Mexico's West Coast).

Further, most of the border is a long way from major markets in either the United States or Mexico. Given this fact and the lack of raw materials (such as the iron ore and coal which lie near the U.S.-Canada border), heavy industry, with minor exceptions, has not located on either side of the U.S.-Mexico border.

What, then, supports the economies of the U.S. border cities? With the partial exception of San Diego, which has a broader base, the answer tends to be four kinds of economic activity:

- international trade,
- government,
- tourism, and
- light industry (primarily clothing).

The first three of these activities are based on the fact that there is a border. Some of the international trade -- freight trains full of tomatoes moving out of Northern Mexico, for instance -- is conducted on the macro level. Much of it is on a much smaller scale, the purchases by Mexican citizens of modest quantities of goods in U.S. border towns, either for their own use, or for resale to other Mexican families.

Much of the governmental expenditures also relate to the fact that there is a border; the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Customs Service each have major elements of their staffs along the border, and they are supplemented by officials of the Public Health Service.* Further, there is a lingering tradition of military activity; the Army at Fort Bliss in El Paso, the Air Force at several locations, including their bombing range in Western Arizona, and the Navy at San Diego.

Tourism brings with it not only people from outside the area, some Mexicans traveling North and many more Americans traveling South, but jobs as well, generally in the service occupations.

Finally, there is light industry. In recent years, clothing manufacturers, particularly those making jeans and other casual pants, have moved to the border, in response to its supply of low-skilled workers and low prevailing wages (and, until recently, the almost total lack of union activity). This movement has been to the U.S. side of the border, and it has created jobs largely for women, many of whom are commuters.

Meanwhile, on the other side of the border, there are so-called "twin plants," where Mexican workers perform hand-labor, such as assembly operations, using parts (e.g., electronic apparatus and toys) which had been machine-produced in the States. U.S. manufacturers like this because it allows them to use low-cost Mexican labor to perform the work, and, at the same time, they can re-import the finished product into the United States after paying a tariff figured on the value added in Mexico, which, in turn, is minimal because of the relatively low wages. Mexico likes this system because it creates legal employment opportunities within Mexico without affecting any Mexico-based manufacturing operations -- nearly all the goods produced go right back into the U.S. economy. American border merchants, and therefore the border establishment, like it because it brings Mexican workers with money to shop in downtown Nogales, Eagle Pass, and the like.

* Federal civilian employment is largely at the clerical and journeyman professional level, particularly among the border-watching agencies; regional offices, with higher average grades, are never located on the border, and district offices only rarely. County and local government payscales are below those of the Federal government.

The AFL-CIO does not like it, however, because it views it as another threat to the wage levels of its membership.

The U.S. border area's economic mix, of trade (largely retail), service to tourists, light industry, and governmental activity, with the partial exception of the latter, produces a low-wage economy at best. It is against this background that we should explore the impact of green-card commuters.

The Impact of the Green-Card Commuters

The commuters along the southern border (as we will show presently) are working in the most depressed labor markets in the U.S. They are entering these labor markets in large enough numbers to be a factor, and we believe an aggravating factor. Although a number of economic indicators are available, we have confined ourselves to three: income levels (reported in the 1970 census), minimum wage violations (reported by the U.S. Employment Standards Administration), and unemployment (as reported by state employment security agencies), which have the advantage of breakouts along county or city lines.

Based on the 1970 Census, the County and City Data Book lists 840 cities over 25,000 in 1970. The five Texas border cities, in terms of median family income, are ranked as follows:

	<u>Median Family Income</u>	<u>Rank in U.S.</u>
Brownsville	\$4,893	840 of 840
Laredo	\$4,905	839 of 840
Harlingen	\$5,875	837 of 840
McAllen	\$6,109	835 of 840
El Paso	\$7,962	745 of 840

Another income index is per capita income. Brownsville again trails with \$1,487 per year, with Laredo next, at \$1,517. (Both cities had less than half the annual American average of \$3,119; the income index for these comparisons was for the year 1969.)

Minimum wage violations are not as good indicators as income, because they relate not only to an economic event (payment of wages) but also to a workload activity (an inspector detecting a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act). Nevertheless, an examination of these violations, in the border counties and in the border states,

shows that minimum wage and overtime violations are more likely to be detected in the border counties than a random distribution might predict (i.e., the percentages of these violations is higher compared to the state totals, than the percentage of border counties populations are to the state populations). As Table A-8 indicates, this is clearly the case in the three eastern states, but not as true in California (which buttresses our thesis that San Diego is a continuing exception to our generalizations).

When the data in Table A-8 are totalled, we find that the border counties have 8.2% of the population of the border states, 13.9% of the Fair Labor Standards Act Violations, 16.1% of the amount of unpaid minimum wages found in those states, and 9.6% of the unpaid overtime. (The significance of unpaid minimum wages is greater than that of unpaid overtime in most instances; in the case of minimum wage violations, the worker was not being paid a maximum of \$2.10 an hour, the highest of the three minimum wages then in effect; in the case of unpaid overtime, the question may be whether, for the final five hours of the week, the truckdriver was paid \$7.50 an hour or \$5.00 an hour.) In short, that the incidence of detected unpaid minimum wages in the border counties, was twice that of the border states tells us something about employer practices in that area.

Although the incidence of detected minimum wage law violations appears to be higher in the border counties than in the border states, this legislation plays a crucial role in these counties. In a Labor Department study of commuter wage rates in the City of Laredo, Texas, in 1968, the Department found that 47.7% of the 608 commuters studied were paid precisely the minimum wage, which was then \$1.40 an hour, and that 75.6% of these commuters were paid \$1.40 an hour or less.*

While it is personally depressing to have a low income, or to be paid less than the minimum wage, it can be argued that it is even worse to have no job at all. There is a substantial amount of unemployment in the border counties, and it is substantially higher than in the balance of the border states.

* Stanley M. Knebel, "Restrictive Admission Standards: Probable Impact on Mexican Alien Commuters," Farm Labor Developments (November 1968).

TABLE A-8

Federal Minimum Wage Violations Detected in Border Counties, by Location

State	Border Counties	Population (1970 Census)	Number of Cases ¹	Amount of Unpaid Minimum Wage	Amount of Unpaid Overtime
TEXAS	Brewster	7,780	3	\$ 688	\$ 58
	Cameron	140,368	212	261,605	80,578
	El Paso	359,291	232	84,653	40,118
	Hidalgo	181,535	141	32,949	45,043
	Hudspeth	2,392	0	0	0
	Jeff Davis	1,527	1	421	0
	Kinney	2,006	0	0	0
	Maverick	18,093	9	2,523	4,040
	Presidio	4,842	1	0	0
	Starr	17,707	11	2,357	2,057
	Terrell	1,940	0	0	0
	Val Verde	27,471	18	7,811	9,571
	Webb	72,859	94	42,258	35,069
Zapata	4,352	0	0	0	
Total Border County		764,952	722	435,265	216,534
State Total		11,196,730	5,558	2,581,921	3,758,540
Border County Total as Percent of State Total		6.8%	13%	17%	8%
NEW MEXICO	Dona Ana	69,773	44	33,715	88,129
	Hidalgo	4,734	4	24	942
	Luna	11,706	0	0	0
	Total Border County	86,213	48	\$ 33,739	\$ 89,071
	State Total	1,016,000	170	135,630	223,427
Border County Total as Percent of State Total		8.4%	28%	25%	40%
CALIFORNIA	Imperial	74,492	8	3,659	17,143
	San Diego	1,357,854	191	72,260	236,688
	Total Border County	1,432,346	199	80,919	253,831
State Total	19,953,134	2,884	941,459	3,524,053	
Border County Total as Percent of State Total		7%	7%	8.6%	7%

Source: Unpublished computer printout of the Employment Standards Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, entitled "Statistics on Compliance Action, Table 10, Monetary Findings by State and County, June 21, 1974-June 20, 1975."

¹These cases include, in addition to minimum wage and overtime cases, a small number of other cases dealing with violations of other provisions of the law, such as the Equal Pay Act.

Looking at the data one way, we found for the state of Texas (where conditions are, admittedly, more fierce than along the border generally) that unemployment in April 1975 was at the 11.9% level in the 14 border counties, and at only 5.5% in the other 240 counties of Texas. (This is the case despite the fact that several small border counties -- which, significantly, have no legal ports-of-entry -- are included in these calculations and report relatively little unemployment. See Table A-9.)

Taking another approach, we examined unemployment rates in all the counties of Texas in that month and found that there were 20 counties with double-digit unemployment rates, with the following counties leading that list:

<u>County</u>	<u>Unemployment Rate (%)</u>
*Starr (Rio Grande City) (Roma)	29.7
*Maverick (Eagle Pass)	17.4
*Webb (Laredo)	16.6
Zavala	13.3
Palo Pinto	12.4
*Val Verde (Del Rio)	11.8
*Zapata (Roma)	11.8
*Cameron (Brownsville)	11.4
*Hidalgo (Hidalgo)	11.1
*El Paso (El Paso)	11.1
Sabine	11.1

The counties marked with an asterisk are along the border; the location in parentheses is the principal port-of-entry serving the county. One of the three non-border counties is commuter-impacted Zavala, where commuters crossing at Eagle Pass do farmwork in the Winter Garden area, and are employed in Crystal City spinach canneries.

One more point is worth examining. This was the finding of Anna-Stina Ericson* that although the commuters were ill-paid, and that there was substantial poverty along the border in December 1969, there were more green-card commuters than unemployed American residents. This suggests that if every commuter disappeared and if their disappearance did not shrink the employment opportunities (which it would to some degree), and if every commuter were replaced by an unemployed U.S. resident, there would be a labor shortage.

*"The Impact of Commuters of the Mexican-American Border Area," Monthly Labor Review, August 1970.

TABLE A-9

Unemployment Data for Texas Border and Non-Border CountiesApril, 1975

<u>Texas Border Counties</u>	<u>Civilian Labor Force</u>	<u>Number of Unemployed</u>	<u>Percent Unemployed</u>
Brewster	2,979	93	3.1
Cameron	69,580	7,930	11.4
El Paso	148,995	16,607	11.1
Hidalgo	79,362	8,794	11.1
Hudspeth	1,184	55	4.6
Jeff Davis	828	30	3.6
Kinney	965	43	4.5
Maverick	7,190	1,252	17.4
Presidio	1,707	72	4.2
Starr	7,373	2,188	29.7
Terrell	672	36	5.4
Val Verde	9,564	1,128	11.8
Webb	25,328	4,207	16.6
Zapata	2,243	264	11.8
<hr/>			
Border Counties Combined	357,970	42,699	11.9
Non-Border Counties Combined	4,921,430	268,701	5.5
State	5,279,400	311,400	5.9

Source: Unpublished data from the Texas Employment Commission, entitled "Labor Force Estimates for Texas Counties," April, 1975.

Notes: The six border counties with unemployment rates of 5.4% or less include five which lack ports of entry or ports of entry with registered green-card commuters; the one exception is Presidio.

With the passage of time and the increasing unemployment in the United States, this could no longer be the case. Looking at the major labor markets along the border, she reported 49,770 commuters and 38,679 American unemployed. Using the same areas and data sources, we show in Table A-10 that in early 1975 that there were a few more commuters, 51,598, but three times as many U.S.-based unemployed, 116,556. On balance, this suggests 64,953 U.S.-based unemployed over and above the commuting work force.* (The exceptions -- counties where there were more entering commuters than resident unemployed -- were in agricultural areas, Imperial, Yuma, and Maverick counties, in California, Arizona, and Texas, respectively.)

It is clear, then, that the green-card commuters from Mexico are entering American labor markets where wages are low and unemployment is high, that they are working in low-skill jobs, and competing with the resident workers with comparable skill levels. Some employers positively prefer them to residents. There are more workers in these labor markets than there would be if there were fewer -- or no -- green-card commuters. The green-card commuters cannot help but be depressing the labor market and displacing U.S. resident workers.

What Happens Next?

With no pending legislation on the issue (though both Senators Muskie (D-Maine) and Kennedy (D-Mass.) have introduced bills on the subject in the past) and with the Supreme Court having spoken, the chances are that the adverse impact of the green-card commuters will continue into the foreseeable future. The Justice Department has, by the vote of a single Supreme Court Justice, shaken off the challenge of the poverty lawyers. Thus, although economic conditions have deteriorated on this side of the border, and one can argue that the green-card commuters are adversely affecting the working conditions and employment opportunities of resident U.S. workers, the pressures for changing that impact, which have often come from fortuitous sources, have just about disappeared.

* If San Diego County (which is an exceptional border county) is removed from the equation, there are 36,349 commuters and 51,856 U.S.-based unemployed, a difference of 15,507.

TABLE A-10

Distribution of Registered Green-Card Commuters and Estimated U.S. Resident
Unemployment in Border Counties With a Major Influx of Commuters

<u>Border Counties With Major Influxes of Commuters</u> ¹	<u>Green-Card Commuters Registered With INS, March 1975</u>	<u>Unemployed U.S. Residents March 1975</u>	<u>Unemployed U.S. Residents Reduced by Green-Card Commuters March 1975</u>
<u>Texas</u>			
Cameron	2,311	8,282	5,971
Hidalgo	1,023	7,915	6,892
Starr	785	1,649	864
Webb	2,489	4,343	1,854
Maverick	2,533	1,445	-1,088
Val Verde	401	1,373	972
El Paso	<u>14,781</u>	<u>18,369</u>	<u>3,588</u>
	24,323	43,376	19,053
<u>California</u>			
San Diego	15,249	63,900	48,651
Imperial	<u>6,169</u>	<u>3,900</u>	<u>-2,269</u>
	21,418	67,800	46,382
<u>Arizona</u>			
Yuma	4,402	2,125	-2,277
Santa Cruz	1,000	1,225	225
Cochise	<u>455</u>	<u>2,025</u>	<u>1,570</u>
	5,857	5,375	-482
<hr/>			
Totals (for listed counties)	51,598	116,551	64,953
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Sources: Commuter data (including seasonal workers) from unpublished INS data (form G-23.1 Supplement A); unemployment data secured in telephone calls to the Texas Employment Commission, State of California, Employment Development Department, and Arizona Department of Economic Security.

¹Defined as counties in which there are ports of entry with 400 or more green-card commuters registered with INS.

Note: In interpreting this table, the reader should bear in mind that commuters may work in a county other than the one in which the port of entry is located; to the extent that this is the case, this tends to understate the unemployed-commuter ratio by overstating the numbers of commuters active in a given county.

APPENDIX B

APPREHENDED ILLEGAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Identification Number _____
(do not code)

Interviewer: Fill in Place of Interview

- 01 - Swanton
- 02 - New York City
- 03 - Newark
- 04 - Miami
- 05 - Washington, D.C.
- 06 - Detroit
- 07 - Chicago
- 08 - Seattle
- 09 - San Francisco
- 10 - Los Angeles
- 11 - El Paso
- 12 - San Antonio
- 13 - Chula Vista
- 14 - Del Rio
- 15 - El Centro
- 16 - Laredo
- 17 - Marfa
- 18 - McAllen
- 19 - Tucson
- 20 - Yuma

4	I
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1-4/

5-6/

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7-8/

Date: _____

Name of Interviewer: _____

Time Interview began: _____ :

Time Interview ended: _____ :

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR APPREHENDED ILLEGALS

Interviewer: Before you begin this interview, it is very important to tell the person you are interviewing that his name and address will NOT be asked. Tell him you are asking these questions for a research organization which is studying the economic conditions and problems of illegal aliens in this country, that he does not have to answer any of these questions, that he can end the interview at any time, and that no names or addresses of any illegals or their relatives will be asked at any time during the interview.

1. How old are you? (fill in)

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9-10/

2a. What is your marital status? (fill in)

--

11/

- 1 - married
- 2 - widowed
- 3 - divorced
- 4 - separated
- 5 - single
- 6 - other (specify) _____
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

2b. If currently married, what nationality is your wife (husband)? (fill in)

--

12/

- 1 - U.S.
- 2 - U.S. permanent resident alien (green carder)
- 3 - Mexican
- 4 - Canadian
- 5 - Other (specify) _____
- 8 - N/A
- 9 - Don't know/refuse to answer

3a. How many children under the age of 18 do you have? (fill in -- if no children, code as below and skip to #4)

--	--

13-14/

77 - none

3b. How many of your children were born in the U.S.? (fill in number of children in box or use codes below, if necessary)

15-16

- 77 - none
- 88 - n/a (has no children)
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

3c. How many of your children go to school in the U.S.? (fill in number of children in box or use code below, if necessary)

17-18

- 77 - none
- 88 - n/a (has no children)
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

4. About how many people live in your hometown in your home country? (fill in)

19-25

- 8888888 - n/a
- 9999999 - don't know/refused to answer

5a. How many relatives living in your home country do you help support? (fill in number of relatives in box, using code below if necessary)

26-27

- 77 - none (supports no relatives)
- 88 - n/a (has no relatives in home country)
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

5b. About how much of that support do you provide? (fill in)

28/

- 1 - less than half their living expenses
- 2 - about half their living expenses
- 3 - more than half their living expenses
- 4 - all
- 8 - n/a (supports no relatives)
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

5. How much support do you get from relatives in your home country? (fill in)

29/

- 1 - less than half your living expenses
- 2 - about half " " "
- 3 - more than half " " "
- 4 - all " " "
- 7 - none
- 8 - n/a (has no relatives in home country)
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

7. Do you own a home in your home country? (fill in)

- 1 - Yes
2 - No
9 - don't know/refused to answer

30/

8. If you do not own a home, do you pay (or help to pay) rent for a place where you and/or your family or relatives live?

- 1 - Yes
2 - No
9 - don't know/refused to answer

31/

9. How much rent (or mortgage) do you (or your family or relatives with whom you live) pay (in U.S. dollars) every month for that place? (fill in \$ amount in box or use codes below, if necessary)

- 777 - none
888 - n/a
999 - don't know/refused to answer

\$

32-34/

10. How many people live in that household? (fill in)

- 88 - n/a
99 - don't know/refused to answer

35-36/

11. Does that household have electricity? (fill in)

- 1 - yes
2 - no
8 - n/a
9 - don't know/refused to answer

37/

12. Does that household have running water? (fill in)

- 1 - yes
2 - no
8 - n/a
9 - don't know/refused to answer

38/

13. Does that household have a television or a radio?
(fill in)

39/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

14a. How many of your relatives -- parents or sisters
and brothers -- live in the U.S.? (fill in)

40-41/

- 77 - none
- 88 - n/a (no relatives)
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

14. How many of your relatives -- parents or sisters
and brothers -- live in the U.S.? (fill in)

42-43/

- 77 - none
- 88 - n/a (no relatives)
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

14b. How many of your relatives -- parents or sisters
and brothers -- are permanent resident aliens in
the U.S. (i.e., are green carders)? (fill in)

44-45/

- 77 - none
- 88 - n/a (no relatives)
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

15a. Do you have a wife (husband) living in the U.S.?
(fill in)

46/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a (no spouse)
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

15b. Do you have children living in the U.S.?

47/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a (no children)
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

16. How many of your relatives -- parents or sisters
and brothers -- are U.S. citizens? (fill in)

48-49/

- 77 - none
- 88 - n/a (no relatives)
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

17. How many years did you go to school? (fill in)

- 77 - none
88 - don't know/refused to answer

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50-51/

18. How many years in all did you attend a U.S. school? (fill in number of years in box; if less than a year, use codes below)

- 44 - less than 1 month
55 - 1 to 6 months
66 - 7 to 12 months
77 - none
99 - don't know/refused to answer

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52-53/

19a. About how many years in all have you worked for wages, part-time or full-time? (fill in)

- 44 - less than 1 month
55 - 1 - 6 months
66 - 7 - 12 months
77 - none
99 - don't know/refused to answer

--	--

54-55/

19b. How many years in all have you been self-employed (rather than working for wages), full-time or part-time? (fill in)

- 44 - less than 1 month
55 - 1 - 6 months
66 - 7 - 12 months
77 - none
99 - don't know/refused to answer

--	--

56-57/

20a. About how many years in all have you worked for wages in the U.S.? (fill in)

- 44 - less than 1 month
55 - 1 - 6 months
66 - 7 - 12 months
77 - none
99 - don't know/refused to answer

--	--

58-59/

20b. About how many years have you been self-employed in the U.S.? (fill in)

- 44 - less than 1 month
55 - 1 - 6 months
66 - 7 - 12 months
77 - none
99 - don't know/refused to answer

--	--

60-61/

CARD 4

21a. About how many years in all has your wife (husband) worked for wages? (fill in)

62-63/

- 44 - less than 1 month
- 55 - 1 - 6 months
- 66 - 7 - 12 months
- 77 - none
- 88 - n/a (no spouse)
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

21b. About how many years has your wife (husband) worked for wages in the U.S.? (fill in)

64-65/

- 44 - less than 1 month
- 55 - 1 - 6 months
- 66 - 7 - 12 months
- 77 - none
- 88 - n/a (no spouse)
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

Now I would like to ask you some questions about your most recent job in the U.S. If you held that job for less than 2 weeks, describe the most recent job that you held in the U.S. at least 2 weeks.

22a. How many years did you have that job? (fill in number of years in box; if less than 1 year, use codes below)

66-67/

- 44 - less than 1 month
- 55 - 1 - 6 months
- 66 - 7 - 12 months
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

22b. When did you begin that job? (fill in)

- 99 - 99 - don't know/refused to answer

68-71/

22c. Where was this job located in the U.S.? (fill in below)

72-76/

City

State

Zipcode

22d. What kind of business or industry did you work for in that job? (fill in, using the examples to help the alien decide the correct category)

- | | |
|--|--|
| | |
|--|--|
- 77-78/
- 01 - Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries
ex: farms; plant nurseries; fish hatchery;
any farm services, like cotton ginning,
threshing, fruitpacking
 - 02 - Mining
ex: coal; oil and gas drilling
 - 03 - Contract Construction
ex: building contractors; street construc-
tion; plumbing, painting, electrical con-
tractors; carpentering, flooring, roofing
companies
 - 04 - Manufacturing
ex: cannery; textile factories; garment
factories; factories making food products,
electrical equipment, cars, chemicals,
machinery, wood products, etc.
 - 05 - Transportation, Communication, Electric,
Gas & Sanitation
ex: railroads, taxicabs, buses, trucking,
shipping; telephone; electric and gas
companies; water supply; garbage services
 - 06 - Services
ex: hotels; laundries; barbershops; auto
repair shops; hospitals; dentist offices--
all health services; schools
 - 07 - Household Services
in private households only: cleaning,
yardwork, babysitting, cooking, chauffeur
 - 08 - Sales: Retail & Wholesale
ex: clothing stores, food stores, drug-
stores, gasoline stations, restaurants
and lunch counters
 - 09 - Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
ex: banks, insurance companies; apartment
houses
 - 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

22e. Describe as exactly as you can the kind of business you worked for in that job.

Interviewer: Refer back to previous examples of kinds of businesses; e.g., lunch counter, private household, dairy farm, gasoline station, roofing company, cannery, electrical contractor, and describe below using not more than 2 words.

BEGIN
CARD 5

5	I
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5-6/

--	--	--

7-9/

DO NOT CODE

999 - don't know/refuse to answer

22f. What kind of work were you doing in that job?

Interviewer: describe as exactly as you can the kind of work in not more than 2 words; e.g., household maid, truck driver, automobile mechanic, farm laborer, hotel waiter, school janitor, crane operator, roofer.

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10-12/

DO NOT CODE

999 - don't know/refuse to answer

22g. How did you find that job? (fill in)

- 01 - public employment agency
- 02 - private employment agency
- 03 - friends or relatives in U.S.
- 04 - friends or relatives in home country
- 05 - you asked employer directly
- 06 - employer recruited you
- 07 - classified ads
- 08 - other (specify): _____
- 10 - was self-employed
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

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13-14/

22h. How many hours a day did you usually work? (fill in)

99 - don't know/refuse to answer

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15-16/

22i. How many days a week did you usually work? (fill in)

9 - don't know/refuse to answer

--

17/

22j. How did your employer pay you? (fill in)

- 1 - cash
- 2 - check
- 3 - cash, and room and/or board
- 4 - check, and room and/or board
- 5 - room and board only
- 6 - other (specify): _____
- 7 - was self-employed
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

18/

22k. How much did you earn (including tips or other money earned in that job)? (Interviewer: fill in only one wage rate; if respondent knows hourly wage, fill in per hour wage only; code all other boxes with 8's)

99-99 don't know/
refuse to answer

- per piece \$
- per hour \$
- per day \$
- per week \$
- per two weeks \$

19-22/
23-26/
27-28/
29-31/
32-34/

22l. If you were paid by the piece, how much money did you usually earn a day?

- 88 - n/a
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

\$

35-36/

22m. How often did you usually send money home? (fill in)

- 1 - every week
- 2 - twice a month
- 3 - once a month
- 4 - every two months
- 5 - every three months
- 7 - never
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

37/

22n. About how much money did you send home each time? (fill in)

- 888 - n/a (never send money home)
- 999 - don't know/refuse to answer

\$

38-40/

22o. Did your employer deduct hospital insurance from your wages? (fill in; if respondent was self-employed, skip to #22x)

41/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a (self-employed)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

22p. Did your employer deduct social security from your wages? (fill in)

42/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

22q. Did your employer deduct income tax from your wages? (fill in)

43/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

22r. Did your employer know you were an illegal (or that you were an alien working illegally) when he hired you? (fill in; if respondent answers "n/a," skip to #22x)

44/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer
- 8 - n/a (was working legally)

22s. If you feel that your employer knew or learned you were an illegal alien (or an alien working illegally), how do you feel he treated you? (fill in)

45/

- 1 - badly, because you were an illegal or working illegally
- 2 - about the same as any legal employee
- 3 - better, because you were an illegal
- 8 - n/a (employer didn't know)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

22t. If your employer knew or learned you were an illegal alien (or were an alien working illegally), did he pay you less than he paid legal employees for doing the same work? (fill in)

46/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a (employer didn't know)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

22y. If your employer knew or learned you were an illegal alien (or were an alien working illegally), did he pay you less than the minimum wage for your job? (fill in)

47/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a (employer didn't know)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

22v. Do you think your employer hired you because you were an illegal? (fill in)

48/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

22w. If your employer knew or learned you were an illegal alien or that you were working illegally, how did he learn that? (fill in)

49/

- 1 - someone working for your employer told him
- 2 - you told him
- 3 - other (specify): _____
- 8 - n/a (employer didn't know)
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

22x. About how many illegal aliens (or aliens illegally working) were working in the business where you worked, not including yourself? (fill in)

50-51

- 77 - none
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

22y. Why did you leave that job? (fill in)

- 01 - laid off
- 02 - fired
- 03 - to look for a better job
- 04 - moved to different place in U.S.
- 05 - caught by INS
- 06 - decided voluntarily to go to home country
- 07 - became sick
- 08 - quit
- 09 - other (specify): _____
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

--	--

52-53/

Interviewer: Now tell the respondent that you want to ask him a series of questions about what he has been doing in this country and his home country for the last 5 years; i.e., from Spring 1975-January 1970.

23. About how many jobs (whether employed or self-employed) have you had during the last 5 years? (fill in)

- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

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54-55/

24. About how many jobs (whether employed or self-employed) have you had in the U.S. in the last 5 years? (fill in)

- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

--	--

56-57/

25. What is the longest period of time that you have held the same job in the U.S. in the last 5 years? (fill in; if this job is the same job described in #22, code as 88)

- 44 - less than 1 month
- 55 - 1 - 6 months
- 66 - 7 - 12 months
- 88 - n/a (job already described)
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

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58-59/

25b. Were you employed or self-employed in that job? (fill in)

- 1 - employed
- 2 - self-employed
- 8 - n/a (job already described)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

--

60/

CARD 5

25c. What kind of work did you do in that job?
(describe below, as in 22f)

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61-63/

DO NOT CODE

- 888 - n/a (job already described)
- 999 - don't know/refused to answer

25d. When did you start that job? (fill in)

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64-67/

Month

Year

- 88 - 88 - n/a (job already described)
- 99 - 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

26a. When you first came to the U.S., did you have a student visa? (fill in)

--

68/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

26b. When you first came to the U.S., did you have a tourist visa? (fill in)

--

69/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

26c. How many years in all have you been in the U.S.? (fill in)

--	--

70-71/

- 44 - less than 1 month
- 55 - 1-6 months
- 66 - 7-12 months
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

26d. When did you first come to the U.S.? (fill in)

--	--	--	--

72-75/

- 99-99 - Don't know/refuse to answer

Month

Year

26e. When you have lived here in the U.S., did you usually live in a neighborhood where other people of your own nationality also lived? (fill in)

--

76/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer
- 8 - n/a (didn't live near other people)

BEGIN
CARD 6

26f. How many trips to the U.S. have you made in the last 5 years? (fill in)

6	I
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5-6/

99 - don't know/refused to answer

--	--

7-8/

27. How many times have you been caught by the INS in the last 5 years? (fill in)

--	--

9-10/

99 - don't know/refuse to answer

28a. How many years in the last 5 years have you mailed a federal income tax form to the U.S. government? (fill in)

--

11/

7 - none

9 - don't know/refuse to answer

28b. How many years in the last 5 years have you paid income tax in your home country? (fill in)

--

12/

7 - none

9 - don't know/ refuse to answer

29. As an alien, when you were in the U.S. during the last 5 years, how do you feel you were usually treated by people you worked with? (fill in)

--

13/

1 - much worse than most U.S. citizens

2 - not quite as well as most U.S. citizens

3 - like anybody else

4 - better than most U.S. citizens are treated

9 - don't know/refuse to answer

30. During the last five years, whenever you were hired by a U.S. employer, do you think he hired you because you were an illegal alien (or you were an alien working illegally)? (fill in)

--

14/

1 - always

2 - most of the time

3 - some of the time

4 - never

5 - was working legally in the U.S.

8 - n/a - was only hired once

9 - don't know/refuse to answer

31. During the last 5 years, how many times did you pay someone to help you get into the U.S.? (fill in)

15-16/

77 - never

99 - don't know/refuse to answer

32. How much did you pay someone last time? (fill in)

888 - n/a (never paid anyone)

999 - don't know/refuse to answer

 \$

17-19/

33a. About how many people do you know from your home town in your own country who are or who have been illegal aliens (or worked illegally) in the U.S. at any time in the last 5 years? (fill in)

20-21/

77 - none

99 - don't know/refuse to answer

33b. About how many people do you know from your home town who were caught at least once by the INS when they were in the U.S.? (fill in)

22/

2 - all

3 - most

4 - about half

5 - a few

7 - none

8 - n/a (didn't know any illegals)

9 - don't know/refused to answer

34a. About how many illegal aliens (or aliens illegally working) have you met in the U.S. (before you were apprehended by the INS)? (fill in)

23-24/

77 - none

99 - don't know/refused to answer

34b. About how many of those illegals have been apprehended by INS? (fill in)

25/

2 - all

3 - most

4 - about half

5 - a few

7 - none

8 - n/a (didn't know any illegals here)

9 - don't know/refused to answer

35. About how much money have you earned in all this year (gross wages from January through April 1975)? (fill in)

\$

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26-29/

- 7777 - none
- 9999 - don't know/refused to answer

36. About how much of that money did you earn in the U.S.? (fill in)

\$

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30-33/

- 7777 - none
- 8888 - n/a (earned nothing in 1975)
- 9999 - don't know/refused to answer

37. About how much money did you earn last year (1974)? (fill in)

\$

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34-38/

- 77777 - none
- 99999 - don't know/refused to answer

38. About how much of that money did you earn in the U.S. in 1974? (fill in)

\$

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39-43/

- 77777 - none
- 88888 - n/a (earned nothing in 1974)
- 99999 - don't know/refused to answer

39. About how much money did you earn in 1973? (fill in)

\$

--	--	--	--	--

44-48/

- 77777 - none
- 99999 - don't know/refused to answer

40. About how much of that money did you earn in the U.S. in 1973? (fill in)

\$

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49-53/

- 77777 - none
- 88888 - n/a (earned nothing in 1973)
- 99999 - don't know/refused to answer

41... During the last 5 years, what kind of business did you usually work for? (fill in -- see question 22d for examples)

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54-55/

- 01 - Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries
- 02 - Mining
- 03 - Contract Construction
- 04 - Manufacturing
- 05 - Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas & Sanitation
- 06 - Services
- 07 - Household Services
- 08 - Sales - Retail & Wholesale
- 09 - Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

42. During the last 5 years, what kind of work did you usually do? (fill in, using only 1 or 2 words, as in question #22f)

--	--	--

56-58/

DO NOT CODE

999 - don't know/refuse to answer

43. During the last 5 years, when you did not have a job (i.e., you were neither employed nor self-employed) what were you usually doing? (fill in)

--

59/

- 1 - looking for a job
- 2 - student
- 3 - taking care of your family
- 4 - other (specify)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

44. During those last 5 years, how much time in all were you not working? (fill in)

--	--

60-61/

- 44 - less than 1 month not working
- 55 - 1-6 months " "
- 66 - 7-12 months " "
- 77 - none (worked all 5 years)

45. During the last 5 years, what labor union in the U.S. did you belong to? (fill in)

--	--	--	--

62-65/

DO NOT CODE

8888 - n/a (didn't belong to a U.S. labor union)
 9999 - don't know/refuse to answer

46. How many years have you belonged to an American labor union? (fill in)

--	--

66-67/

- 44 - less than 1 month
- 55 - 1-6 months
- 66 - 7-12 months
- 88 - n/a (never belonged to U.S. unions)
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

47. How many years have you belonged to a labor union in your home country? (fill in)

--	--

68-69/

- 44 - less than 1 month
- 55 - 1-6 months
- 66 - 7-12 months
- 77 - none
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

48. In 1975, how many weeks in all did you work in the U.S., either full-time or part-time? (fill in)

--	--

70-71/

- 77 - none
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

49. In 1974, how many weeks in all did you work in the U.S., either full-time or part-time? (fill in)

--	--

72-73/

- 77 - none
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

50. In 1973, how many weeks in all did you work in the U.S., either full-time or part-time? (fill in)

--	--

74-75/

- 77 - none
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

51. In the last 5 years, did you ever participate in any U.S. government program which gave you a job or technical training? (fill in)

--

76/

- 1 - yes (specify name of program): _____
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

52. In the last 5 years, how many weeks did you receive money from the U.S. government when you lost your job? (unemployment insurance-fill in).

7	I
---	---

5-6/

- 77 - none
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

--	--

7-8/

53. In the last 5 years, how many years (in all) did you receive public assistance (welfare) in the U.S.? (fill in)

--	--

9-10/

- 44 - less than 1 month
- 55 - 1-6 months
- 66 - 7-12 months
- 77 - none
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

54. In the last 5 years, did you ever use food stamps in the U.S.? (fill in)

--

11/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

55. When you sent money back to your home country during the last 5 years, how did you usually send it? (fill in)

--

12/

- 1 - postal money order
- 2 - money order bought at a bank
- 3 - money order bought elsewhere
- 4 - cash sent by mail
- 5 - cash sent by a friend
- 6 - personal check
- 7 - other (specify): _____
- 8 - n/a (never sent money home)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

56. When you were in the U.S. during the last 5 years, did you ever seek help or advice about getting or changing your visa from any of the following: (fill in both boxes)

--

13/

--

14/

- 1 - lawyer
- 2 - visa consultant
- 3 - immigrant-serving agency (ex: Catholic Migration Service)
- 4 - employer
- 5 - school
- 6 - priest
- 8 - n/a (sought no advice)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer
- 7 - other (specify) _____

57a. In the last 5 years, how many times did you or any member of your family go to a U.S. hospital or public clinic for any medical care? (fill in)

--	--

15-16/

- 77 - never
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

57b. How was that medical care usually paid for? (fill in)

--

17/

- 1 - you paid by cash or check
- 2 - your own health insurance
- 3 - Medicaid or Medicare
- 4 - your employer
- 5 - the treatment was free
- 6 - other (specify): _____
- 8 - n/a (no medical treatment)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

57c. How many times this year (1975) have you or your family been given medical care by a U.S. hospital or clinic? (fill in)

--	--

18-19/

- 77 - never
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

57d. How was that medical care usually paid for? (fill in)

--

20/

- 1 - you paid by cash or check
- 2 - your own health insurance
- 3 - Medicaid or Medicare
- 4 - your employer
- 5 - the treatment was free
- 6 - other (specify): _____
- 8 - n/a (no medical care in 1975)
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

58. During the last 5 years, what kind of work in your home country did you usually do? (fill in below, using only 1 or 2 words, as in #22e, or code 888 or 999)

- 888 - n/a - wasn't working in home country in last 5 years
- 999 - don't know/refuse to answer

--	--	--

21-23/

Interviewer: Now tell the respondent that you would like to ask him some more specific questions about other jobs he has recently held in the U.S. Refer back to #22c for descriptions of businesses.

CARD 7

59a. You have described your most recent job in the U.S. or the most recent one you had that lasted at least two weeks. Before you had that job, what kind of business did you work for in the U.S.? (fill in -- if respondent had no other job in U.S., skip to #60)

- 01 - Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries
- 02 - Mining
- 03 - Contract Construction
- 04 - Manufacturing
- 05 - Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas & Sanitation
- 06 - Services
- 07 - Household Services
- 08 - Sales: Retail & Wholesale
- 09 - Finance, Insurance & Real Estate
- 88 - n/a (had no previous job in U.S.)
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

--	--

24-25/

59b. Describe the kind of work you were doing in that job, using only 1 or 2 words. (fill in, as in 22f)

--	--	--

26-28/

DO NOT CODE

999 - don't know/refuse to answer

59c. How many years did you have that job? (fill in)

- 44 - less than 1 month
- 55 - 1-6 months
- 66 - 7-12 months
- 88 - n/a
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

--	--

29-30/

59d. When did you begin that job? (fill in)

99-99 - don't know/refuse to answer

--	--	--	--

Month Year

31-34/

59e. How did you find that job? (fill in)

--	--

35-36/

- 01 - public employment agency
- 02 - private employment agency
- 03 - friends or relatives in U.S.
- 04 - friends or relatives in home country
- 05 - you asked employer directly
- 06 - employer recruited you
- 07 - classified ads
- 08 - other (specify): _____
- 88 - n/a
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

59f. How many hours a day did you usually work? (fill in)

--	--

37-38/

- 88 - n/a
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

59g. How many days a week did you usually work? (fill in)

--

39/

- 8 - n/a
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

59h. How did your employer pay you? (fill in)

--

40/

- 1 - Cash
- 2 - Check
- 3 - Cash and room and/or board
- 4 - Check and room and/or board
- 5 - room and board only
- 6 - other (specify): _____
- 8 - n/a
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

59i. How much did you earn? (fill in only one -- use hourly wage, if respondent knows it)

per piece \$	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>					<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>					41-44/
8888 - n/a	per hour \$	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>					45-48/				
9999 - don't know/ refuse to answer	per day \$	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>					49-50/				
	per week \$	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>					51-53/				
	per two week period . . . \$	<table border="1"><tr><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td></tr></table>					54-56/				

59j. If you were paid by the piece, how much money did you usually earn a day? (fill in)

--	--

57-58/

- 88 - n/a
- 99 - don't know/refused to answer

59k. Did your employer deduct social security from your wages? (fill in)

--

59/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

59l. Did your employer deduct income tax from your wages? (fill in)

--

60/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

59m. Were you paid less than the minimum wage? (fill in)

--

61/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

59n. Do you think you were hired because you were an illegal (or were working illegally)? (fill in)

--

62/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

59o. Why did you leave that job. (fill in)

--	--

63-64/

- 01 - laid off
- 02 - fired
- 03 - to look for a better job
- 04 - moved to different place in U.S.
- 05 - caught by INS
- 06 - decided voluntarily to go to home country
- 07 - became sick
- 08 - quit
- 09 - other (specify): _____
- 88 - n/a
- 99 - don't know/refuse to answer

59p. Where was that job located? (fill in)

City	State	Zipcode	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
			DQ NOT CODE

65-69/

88888 - n/a
99999 - don't know/refuse to answer

60. What was the rent (or mortgage payment) per month for the place in the U.S. where you most recently lived? (fill in)

\$	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
----	----------------------	----------------------	----------------------

70-72/

999 - don't know/refuse to answer

61a. How many people (including yourself) lived in that household? (fill in)

<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
----------------------	----------------------

73-74/

99 - don't know/refuse to answer

61b. How many people in that household (including yourself) helped pay rent (or mortgage)? (fill in)

<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
----------------------	----------------------

75-76/

99 - don't know/refused to answer

61c. How many of the people living in that household were illegal aliens or were illegally working, not including yourself? (fill in)

<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
----------------------	----------------------

77-78/

77 - none
99 - don't know/refused to answer

BEGIN CARD 8

61d. Did that household have electricity? (fill in)

8	I
---	---

5-6/

1 - yes
2 - no
9 - don't know/refused to answer

<input type="text"/>

7/

61.e. Did that household have a radio or television? (fill in)

<input type="text"/>

8/

1 - yes
2 - no
9 - don't know/refused to answer

61f. Did that household have running water? (fill in)

<input type="text"/>

9/

1 - yes
2 - no
9 - don't know/refused to answer



62. How many other people of your own nationality were in that neighborhood? (fill in)

10/

- 1 - most of the people in the neighborhood
- 2 - many of the people in the neighborhood
- 3 - about half " " " "
- 4 - less than half " " " "
- 5 - very few " " " "
- 6 - none
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer
- 8 - n/a (didn't live near other people)

63a. How well do you speak English? (fill in)

11/

- 1 - very well
- 2 - fairly well
- 3 - not very well
- 4 - very badly
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

63b. Did you learn to speak English in your home country before you came to the U.S.: (fill in)

12/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

63c. If you learned to speak English in your home country, did you learn in school?

13/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 8 - n/a (didn't learn English in home country)
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

63d. Did you study English in a U.S. school?

14/

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refused to answer

64. Why did you come to the U.S. this time? (fill in)

15/

- 1 - to visit relatives
- 2 - to study
- 3 - to see the U.S.
- 4 - to get a job
- 5 - other (specify): _____
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

65. Why did you come to the U.S. the first time you came?
(fill in)

- 1 - to visit relatives
- 2 - to study
- 3 - to see the U.S.
- 4 - to get a job
- 5 - other (specify): _____
- 8 - n/a (this time was the only time respondent came to the U.S.)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

16/

66. Do you plan to come back again? (fill in)

- 1 - yes
- 2 - no
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

17/

67. If you do plan to come back, why do you want to come back? (fill in)

- 1 - visit relatives
- 2 - to study
- 3 - to see U.S. again
- 4 - to get a job
- 5 - other (specify): _____
- 8 - n/a (don't plan to return)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

18/

68. If you don't plan to come back, why don't you want to come back? (fill in one, choosing the most important)

- 1 - afraid you'll be caught by INS again
- 2 - afraid of getting your relatives here in trouble
- 3 - it costs too much money to come back
- 4 - it's too much trouble to come back
- 5 - you or your family have enough money to live now
- 6 - other (specify): _____
- 8 - n/a (plan to return)
- 9 - don't know/refuse to answer

19/

69. More and more people from many countries are illegally coming to the U.S. or are here legally but get jobs when they are not allowed to.

(a) Why do you think they are coming?

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20-22/

DO NOT CODE

999

(b) What do you think your government should do about this situation?

23-25/

DO NOT CODE

999

(c) What do you think the U.S. government should do about this situation?

26-28/

DO NOT CODE

999

Interviewer: Now tell the respondent that the rest of the questions can be answered from the INS form I-213, but you want to check with him to make sure they are correct -- again, you will not write down his name or his address.

70. What is your nationality? (country of citizenship) (fill in)

29/

- 3 - Mexican
- 4 - Canadian
- 5 - Other (specify): _____

71. Where were you living in the U.S. most recently? (fill in)

30-34/

City State Zipcode DO NOT CODE

72. What is your home town in your home country? (country of permanent residence)

35-39/

Town Province Country DO NOT CODE

APPENDIX C

Schedule B

Occupational Titles

Assemblers.
Attendants, Parking Lot.
Attendants (Service Workers such as Personal Service Attendants, Amusement and Recreation Service Attendants).
Automobile Service Station Attendants.
Bartenders.
Bookkeepers, II.
Bus Boys.
Cadmets.
Chauffeurs and Taxicab Drivers.
Charwomen and Cleaners.
Clerks, General.
Clerks, Hotel.
Clerk and Checkers, Grocery Stores.
Clerk Typists.
Cook, Short Order.
Counter and Fountain Workers.
Electric Truck Operators.
Elevator Operators.
Floormen, Floorboys, and Floorgirls.
Groundkeepers.
Guards and Watchmen.
Helpers, any Industry.
Household Domestic Service Workers.
Housekeepers.
Housemen and Yardmen.
Janitors.
Key Punch Operators.
Kitchen Workers.
Laborers, Farm.
Laborers, Mine.
Laborers, Common.
Loopers and Toppers.
Maids, Hotel and Motel.
Men-of-all-Work.
Material Handlers.
Nurses' Aides and Orderlies.
Packers, Markers, Bottlers, and Related.
Porters.
Receptionists.
Sailors and Deck Hands.
Sales Clerks, General.
Sewing Machine Operators and Handstitchers.
Street Railway and Bus Conductors.
Telephone Operators.
Truck Drivers and Tractor Drivers.
Typists, Lesser Skilled.
Ushers, Recreation and Amusement.
Warehousemen.

OCCUPATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Assemblers

Perform one or more repetitive tasks to assemble components and subassemblies using hand or power tools to mass produce a variety of components, products or equipment. Involves such activities as riveting, drilling, filing, boiling, soldering, spot welding, cementing, gluing, cutting, and fitting. May use clamp or other work aids to hold parts during assembly. May inspect or test components. May tend previously set-up or automatic machines.

Attendants, Parking Lot

Park automobiles for customers in parking lots or garages and collect fees based on time span of parking.

Attendants (Service Workers such as Personal Service Attendants, Amusement and Recreation Service Attendants)

Perform a variety of routine tasks attending to the personal needs of customers at such places as amusement parks, bath houses, clothing checkrooms, and dressing rooms. Includes such tasks as taking and issuing tickets, checking and issuing clothing and supplies, cleaning premises and equipment, answering inquiries, checking lists, and maintaining simple records.

Automobile Service Station Attendants

Service automotive vehicles with fuel, lubricants, and automotive accessories. At drive-in service facilities. Also, compute charges and collect fees from customers.

Bartenders

Prepare, mix, and dispense alcoholic beverages for consumption by bar customers. Also, compute and collect charges for drinks.

Bookkeepers II

Keep records of one facet of an establishment's financial transactions. Responsible for maintaining one set of books, and specialize in such areas as accounts-payable, accounts-receivable, or interest accrued rather than a complete set of records.

Bus Boys

Facilitate food service in an eating place by performing such tasks as removing dirty dishes, replenishing linen and silver supplies, serving water and butter to patrons, and cleaning and polishing equipment.

Cashiers

Receive payments made by customers for goods or services, make change, and give receipt. Involves such activities as operating cash register, balancing cash accounts, preparing bank deposits and other related duties.

Chauffeurs and Taxicab Drivers

Drive automobiles to convey passengers according to their instructions.

Charwomen and Cleaners

Keep premises of commercial establishments, office buildings, or apartment houses in clean and orderly condition by performing such tasks as mopping and sweeping floors, dusting and polishing furniture and fixtures, and vacuuming rugs. Work according to set routine.

Clerks, General

Perform a variety of routine clerical tasks not requiring knowledge of systems or procedures. Involves such activities as copying and posting data, proofreading records or forms, counting, weighing, or measuring material, routing correspondence, answering telephones, conveying messages, and running errands.

Clerks, Hotel

Perform a variety of routine tasks to accommodate hotel guests. Involves such activities as registering guests, dispensing keys, distributing mail, collecting payments, and adjusting complaints.

Clerks and Checkers, Grocery Stores

Itemize, total, and receive payment for purchase in grocery stores, usually using cash register. Often assists customer in locating items, stock shelves, and keep stock-control and sales-transaction records.

Clerk Typists

Perform general clerical work requiring use of typewriter in majority of duties. Involves such activities as typing reports, bills, application forms, shipping tickets, and other matters from clerical records; filing records and reports, posting information to records, sorting and distributing mail, answering phone and similar duties. (Combines typing and filing, sorting mail, answering the telephone, and other general office work.)

Cooks—Short Order

Prepare and cook to order all kinds of short-preparation-time foods. May involve such activities as carving meats and filling orders from a steam-table; preparing sandwiches, salads, beverages; and serving meals over a counter.

Counter and Fountain Workers

Serve food to patrons at lunchroom counters, cafeterias, soda fountains, or similar public eating places. Take orders from customers and frequently prepare simple items, such as dessert dishes; itemize and total checks; receive payment and make change; and clean work area and equipment.

Electric Truck Operators

Drive gasoline- or electric-powered industrial trucks or tractors equipped with fork-lift, elevating platform, or trailer hitch to move and stack equipment and materials in a warehouse, storage yard, or factory.

Elevator Operators

Operate elevators to transport passengers and freight between building floors.

Floormen, Floorboys, and Floorgirls

Perform a variety of routine tasks in support of other workers in and around such work sites as factory floors and service areas, frequently at the beck and call of others. Involves such tasks as cleaning floors, materials, and equipment; distributing materials and tools to workers; running errands; delivering messages; emptying containers; and removing materials from work area to storage or shipping areas.

Groundskeepers

Maintain grounds of industrial, commercial, or public property in good condition. Involves such tasks as cutting lawns, trimming hedges, pruning trees, repairing fences, planting flowers, and shoveling snow.

Guards and Watchmen

Guard and patrol premises of industrial or business establishments or similar types of property to prevent theft and other crimes and prevent possible injury to others.

Helpers (Any Industry)

Perform a variety of duties to assist another worker usually of a higher level of competency or expertise. Involves such activities as furnishing another worker with materials, tools, and supplies; cleaning work area, machines and equipment; feeding or oilbearing machines; holding materials or tools according to worker assisted.

Household Domestic Service Workers

Perform a variety of tasks in private households, including such activities as cleaning, dusting, washing, ironing, making beds, maintaining clothes, marketing, cooking, serving food, and caring for children: *Provided, however,* That noncertification under this category shall apply only to those workers who have had less than 1 year of documented paid experience in the performance of the above tasks working on a live-in or live-out basis.

Housekeepers

Supervise workers engaged in maintaining interiors of residential buildings in a clean and orderly fashion. They assign duties to maids, charwomen, and housemen; inspect finished work, and maintain supply of equipment and materials.

Housemen and Yardmen

(1) Perform routine tasks to keep hotel premises neat and clean. Involves such tasks as cleaning rugs; washing walls, ceilings, and windows; moving furniture; mopping and waxing floors; and polishing metalwork.

(2) Maintain the grounds of private residence in good order. Typical tasks are mowing and watering lawns, planting flowers and shrubs, and repairing and painting fences. Work on instructions of private employer.

Janitors

Keep hotel, office building, apartment house, or similar building in clean and orderly condition, and tend furnaces and boilers to provide heat and hot water. Typical tasks are sweeping and mopping floors, emptying trash containers, and doing minor painting and plumbing repairs. Often maintain residence at place of work.

Keypunch Operators

Using machines similar in action to typewriters, punch holes in cards in such a position that each hole can be identified as representing a specific item of information. These punched cards may be used with electronic computers as well as tabulating machines.

Kitchen Workers

Perform routine tasks in kitchen of restaurant. Primary responsibility is to maintain work areas and equipment in a clean and orderly fashion. Involves such tasks as mopping floors, removing trash, washing pots and pans, transferring supplies and equipment, and washing and peeling vegetables.

Laborers, Farm

Plant, cultivate, and harvest farm products, following instructions of supervisors, often working as members of a team. Typical tasks are watering and feeding livestock, picking fruit and vegetables, and cleaning storage areas and equipment.

Laborers, Mine

Perform routine tasks in underground or surface mine, pit, or quarry, or at tipple, mill, or preparation plant. Involves such tasks as cleaning work areas, shoveling coal onto conveyors, pushing mine cars from working face to haulage road, and loading or sorting material onto wheelbarrow.

Laborers, Common

Perform routine tasks in an industrial construction or manufacturing environment. Typical tasks are loading and moving equipment and supplies, cleaning work areas, and distributing tools. Work upon instructions according to set routine.

Loopers and Toppers

(1) Tend machines that shear nap; loose threads, and knots from cloth surfaces to give uniform finish and texture.

(2) Operate looping machines to close openings in too of seamless hose or join knitted garment parts.

(3) Loop stitches or ribbed garment parts on points of transfer bar to facilitate transfer of garment parts to needles of knitting machine.

Maids, Hotel and Motel

Clean hotel rooms and halls; sweep and mop floors; dust furniture; empty wastebaskets; and make beds.

Men-of-all-Work

Perform a combination of duties to keep a private home clean and in good condition. Involves such activities as cleaning and dusting furniture and furnishings, hallways and lavatories; beating, vacuuming, and scrubbing rugs; washing windows, waxing and polishing floors; removing and hanging draperies; cleaning and oiling furnaces and other equipment; repairing mechanical and electrical appliances; painting and other chores as required.

Material Handlers

Load, unload, and convey materials within or near plant, yard, or worksite, under specific instructions.

Nurses' Aides and Orderlies

Assist in care of hospital patients. Involves such activities as bathing, dressing, undressing patients and giving alcohol fubs; serving and collecting food trays; cleaning and shaving hair from skin area of operative cases; lifting patients onto and from bed, and transporting patients to treatment units; changing bed linens, running errands, and directing visitors.

Packers, Markers, Bottlers, and Related

Pack products into containers, such as cartons or crates; mark identifying information on articles; insure filled bottles are properly sealed and marked; often working with team on or at end of assembly line.

Porters

(1) Carry baggage for passengers of airline, railroad, or motorbus by hand or handtruck. Perform related personal services in and around public transportation environment.

(2) Keep building premises, working areas in production departments of industrial organizations, or similar sites in clean and orderly conditions.

Receptionists

Receive clients or customers coming into establishments to ascertain their wants, and direct them accordingly. Involves such activities as arranging appointments, directing caller to destination, recording name, time, nature of business, person seen; answering phone and related duties.

Sailors and Deck Hands

Stand deck watches and perform a variety of tasks to preserve painted surfaces of ship, and maintain lines, running gear, and cargo handling gear in safe operating condition. Involves such tasks as mopping decks, chipping rust, painting chipped areas, and splicing rope.

Sales Clerks, General

Receive payment for merchandise in a retail establishment, wrap or bag merchandise, and keep shelves stocked.

Sewing Machine Operators and Hand-stitchers

(1) Operate single- or multiple-needle sewing machines to join parts in the manufacture of such products as awnings, carpets, and gloves. Specialize in one type of sewing machine limited to joining operations.

(2) Join and reinforce parts of such articles as garments, and curtains, sew button-holes and attach fasteners to articles, or sew decorative trimmings to articles, using needle and thread.

Street Railway and Bus Conductors

Collect fares or tickets from passengers, issue transfers, open and close doors, announce stops, answer questions, and signal operator to start or stop.

Telephone Operators

Operate telephone switchboards to relay incoming and internal calls to phones in an establishment, and make connections with external lines for outgoing calls. Taking messages, supplying information and keeping records of calls, and charges is often involved. Some situations primarily involve establishing or aiding telephone users in establishing local or long distance telephone connections.

Truck Drivers and Tractor Drivers

(1) Drive trucks to transport materials, merchandise, equipment, or people to and from specified destinations, such as plants, railroad stations, and offices.

(2) Drive tractors to move materials, draw implements, pull out objects imbedded in ground, or pull cable of winch to raise, lower, or load heavy materials or equipment.

Typists, Lesser Skilled

Type straight-copy material, such as letters, reports, stencils, and addresses, from draft or corrected copy. Not required to prepare materials involving the understanding of complicated technical terminology, the arrangement and setting of complex tabular detail or similar problems. Typing speed in English does not exceed 52 words per minute on a manual typewriter and/or 60 words per minute on an electric typewriter and the error rate reaches 12 or more for a 5 minute typing period on representative business correspondence.

Ushers (Recreation and Amusement)

Assist patrons at entertainment events in finding seats, searching for lost articles, and locating facilities.

Warehousemen

Receive, store, ship, and distribute materials, tools, equipment, and products within establishments as directed by others.

(79 Stat. 911; 8 U.S.C. 1182; 34 F.R. 6502)

Signed at Washington, D.C., this 29th day of January 1971.

M. R. LOVELL, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Manpower.

[FR, Doc. 71-1450 Filed 2-3-71; 8:45 am]

APPENDIX D

Occupation of Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents in Their
Most Recent U.S. Job

<u>Census Code</u>	<u>Occupation</u>	<u>No. of Respondents</u>
PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL, AND KINDRED WORKERS		
001	Accountants	1
005	Computer specialists, n.e.c.	3
013	Industrial engineers	1
022	Sales engineers	1
141	Adult education teachers (karate instructors)	2
155	Mechanical engineering technicians	1
182	Dancers	1
184	Reporter	1
185	Musicians and composers (drummer)	1
194	Writers, artists, and entertainers, n.e.c.	2
	Total	14
OWNERS, MANAGERS, ADMINISTRATORS, EXCEPT FARM		
230	Restaurant, cafeteria, and bar managers	3
245	Managers and administrators, n.e.c.	1
(200)	Owner (self-employed)	8
	Total	12
SALES WORKERS		
*264	Hucksters and peddlers	1
282	Sales representatives, wholesale trade	1
*283	Sales clerks, retail trade	5
*284	Sales workers, except clerks, retail trade	2
*285	Sales workers, services and construction	1
*296	Sales workers--allocated	2
	Total	12
CLERICAL AND KINDRED WORKERS		
*310	Cashiers	3
*345	Key punch operators	2
*374	Shipping and receiving clerks	5
*390	Ticket, station, and express agents	1
*395	Not specified clerical workers	2
	Total	13

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CRAFT AND KINDRED WORKERS

401	Automobile accessories installers	1
402	Bakers	2
410	Brickmasons and stonemasons	5
411	Brickmasons and stonemasons, apprentices (bricklayers)	3
413	Cabinetmakers	3
415	Carpenters	8
416	Carpenter apprentices	1
421	Cement and concrete finishers	15
424	Crane, derrick, and hoist operators	1
430	Electricians	2
431	Electrician apprentices	1
433	Electric power line and cable installers and repairers	1
436	Excavating, grading, and road machine operators; exc. bulldozer	1
441	Blue-collar worker supervisors, n.e.c.	3
443	Furniture and wood finishers	2
445	Glaziers	1
452	Inspectors, n.e.c.	2
453	Jewelers and watchmakers (silversmith)	3
461	Machinists	6
462	Machinist apprentices; mechanics and repairers	2
472	Automotive body repairers	3
473	Automobile mechanics	14
474	Automobile mechanic apprentices	1
481	Heavy equipment mechanics, incl. diesel	1
492	Miscellaneous mechanics and repairers	3
503	Molders, metal	1
510	Painters, construction and maintenance	18
521	Plasterer apprentices	1
522	Plumbers and pipe fitters	2
534	Roofers and slaters	4
(547)	Diamond cutter	1
551	Tailors	2
560	Tile setters	1
561	Tool and die makers	1
563	Upholsterers	5
575	Craft and kindred workers, n.e.c.	5
	Total	126

OPERATIVES, EXCEPT TRANSPORT

601	Asbestos and insulation workers	1
*602	Assemblers	17
603	Blasters	1
*604	Bottling and canning operatives	2
*610	Checkers, examiners, and inspectors; manufacturing	4

OPERATIVES, EXCEPT TRANSPORT (Cont.)

611	Clothing ironers and pressers	3
*612	Cutting operatives, n.e.c.	5
613	Dressmakers, except factory	1
615	Dry wall installers and lathers	1
*621	Filers, polishers, sanders, and buffers	3
*623	Garage workers and gas station attendants	4
*(625)	Meatpackers	2
630	Laundry and dry cleaning operatives, n.e.c.	5
633	Meat cutters and butchers, manufacturing	1
635	Metal platers	1
641	Mixing operatives	2
*643	Packers and wrappers, except meat and produce	11
*644	Painters, manufactured articles	13
*650	Drill press operatives	3
*656	Punch and stamping press operatives	6
*661	Sailors and deckhands	1
662	Sawyers	2
*663	Sewers and stitchers	14
664	Shoemaking machine operatives	2
*665	Solderers	2
*671	Knitters, loopers, and toppers	2
674	Textile operatives, n.e.c.	9
680	Welders and flame-cutters	13
*690	Machine operatives, miscellaneous specified	10
*692	Machine operatives, not specified	63
*694	Miscellaneous operatives	5
*695	Not specified operatives	1
	Total	213

TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT OPERATIVES

*706	Fork lift and tow motor operatives	2
*715	Truck drivers	2
	Total	4

NONFARM LABORERS

*740	Animal caretakers, except farm	1
*750	Carpenters' helpers	4
*751	Construction laborers, except carpenters' helpers	47
*753	Freight and material handlers	14
*755	Gardeners and groundskeepers, except farm	2
760	Longshore workers and stevedores	2
761	Timber cutting and logging workers	1
*762	Stock handlers	3
*764	Vehicle washers and equipment cleaners	10
*780	Miscellaneous laborers	4
*785	Not specified laborers	20
	Total	108

FARM LABORERS AND SUPERVISORS

*822	Farm laborers, wage workers		123
		Total	<u>123</u>

SERVICE WORKERS, EXCEPT PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD

*901	Lodging quarters cleaners, except private household		4
*902	Building interior cleaners, n.e.c.		12
*903	Janitors and sextons		8
*910	Bartenders		1
*911	Waiters' assistant (busboys)		22
*912	Cooks, except private household (short order)		17
*913	Dishwashers		36
*914	Food counter and fountain workers		2
915	Waiters		11
*916	Food service workers, n.e.c., except private household		16
(930)	Masseuse		1
*934	Baggage porters and bellhops		3
*943	Elevator operators		1
*962	Guards		4
		Total	<u>138</u>

PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD WORKERS

*980	Child care workers, private household		1
*982	Housekeepers, private household		3
*984	Private household cleaners and servants		8
* (985)	Yardwork		3
*986	Private household workers--allocated		10
		Total	<u>25</u>
999	Don't know or refused to answer		5

No. of respondents in schedule B occupations	575
No. of respondents in non-schedule B occupations	205
No. of respondents self-employed	8
No. of respondents who didn't know or refused to answer	<u>5</u>
	TOTAL 793

* = Schedule B occupations

() - Codes assigned by researchers in this study.

Source: Linton & Company Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

APPENDIX E

Industries Employing Apprehended Illegal Alien Respondents
In Their Most Recent U.S. Job

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries

<u>Code</u>	<u>Industry</u>	<u>No. of Illegals</u>
010	Agricultural production, unspecified	23
011	Field crops	14
012	Fruits, tree nuts, and vegetables	63
013	Livestock	13
019	Miscellaneous Agriculture (nurseries)	10
071	Agricultural services, except animal husbandry and horticultural services	4
073	Horticultural services	6
091	Fisheries, except fish hatcheries, farms, and preserves	1
	Total	<u>134</u>

Mining

140	Mining and quarrying of nonmetallic minerals, except fuels	1
	Total	<u>1</u>

Contract Construction

150	Building construction-general contractors	24
151	General building contractors	46
161	Highway and street construction, except elevated highways	7
162	Heavy construction, except highway and street construction	1
171	Plumbing, heating (except electric), and air conditioning	2
172	Painting, paper hanging, and decorating	13
175	Carpentering and flooring	1
176	Roofing and sheet metal work	6
177	Concrete work	20
179	Miscellaneous special trade contractors	6
	Total	<u>126</u>

Manufacturing

180	Manufacturing, not specified	29
200	Food products, not specified	1
201	Meat products	5
203	Canned and preserved fruits, vegetables, sea foods	3
204	Grain mill products	1
205	Bakery products	3
207	Confectionery and related products	2
208	Beverages	1
209	Miscellaneous Food preparations and kindred products	1

Manufacturing (Cont.)

220	Textile mill products, not specified	9
222	Broad woven fabric mills, man-made fiber & silk	1
225	Knitting mills	2
227	Floor covering mills	1
230	Apparel and other textile products, not specified	22
232	Men's, youths', and boys' furnishings, work clothing, and allied garments	2
234	Women's, misses', children's, and infants' under garments	1
238	Miscellaneous apparel and accessories	1
239	Miscellaneous fabricated textile products	6
241	Logging camps and logging contractors	1
242	Sawmills and planing mills	1
243	Millwork, veneer, plywood, and prefabricated structural wood products	4
244	Wooden containers	1
250	Furniture and fixtures, not specified	6
251	Household furniture	23
253	Public building and related furniture	1
259	Miscellaneous furniture and fixtures	5
260	Paper and allied products, not specified	1
265	Paperboard containers and boxes	3
271	Newspapers: Publishing, publishing & printing	1
277	Greeting card publishing	1
278	Blankbooks, looseleaf binders, and bookbinding and related work	13
280	Chemicals and allied products, not specified	1
282	Plastics materials and synthetic resins, synthetic rubber, synthetic and other man-made fibers, except glass	11
283	Drugs	1
285	Paints, varnishes, lacquers, enamels, and allied products	1
295	Paving and roofing materials	1
307	Miscellaneous plastics products	2
310	Leather and leather products, not specified	1
311	Leather tanning and finishing	3
314	Footwear, except rubber	2
317	Handbags and other personal leather goods	2
319	Leather goods, not elsewhere classified	1
320	Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products, not specified	1
321	Flat glass	1
325	Structural clay products	11
329	Abrasive, asbestos, and miscellaneous non-metallic mineral products	3
331	Blast furnaces, steel works, and rolling and finishing mills	1
332	Iron and steel foundries	1
333	Primary smelting and refining of nonferrous metals	1
336	Nonferrous foundries	1

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339	Miscellaneous Primary metal products	2
340	Fabricated metal products, except ordnance, machinery, and transportation equipment	6
344	Fabricated structural metal products	4
345	Screw machine products, and bolts, nuts, screw, rivets and washers	1
347	Coating, engraving, and allied services	2
349	Miscellaneous fabricated metal products	1
353	Construction, mining, and materials handling machinery and equipment	1
356	General industrial machinery and equipment	2
358	Service industry machines	1
359	Miscellaneous machinery, except electrical	2
360	Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies	2
361	Electric transmission and distribution equipment	1
365	Radio and television receiving sets, except communication types	3
367	Electronic components and accessories	4
369	Miscellaneous electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies	1
371	Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment	8
372	Aircraft and parts	1
379	Miscellaneous transportation equipment	12
382	Instruments for measuring, controlling, and indicating physical characteristics	1
391	Jewelry, silverware, and plated ware	1
394	Toys, amusement, sporting and athletic goods	3
395	Pens, pencils, and other office and artists' materials	1
396	Costume jewelry, costume novelties, buttons, and miscellaneous notions, except precious metals	1
399	Miscellaneous manufacturing industries	1
	Total	260

Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services

401	Railroad transportation, not specified	4
417	Terminal and service facilities for motor vehicle passenger transportation	1
421	Trucking, local and long distance	2
446	Services incidental to water transportation	2
458	Fixed facilities and services related to air transportation	1
491	Electric companies and systems	1
	Total	11

Wholesale and Retail Trade

506	Electrical goods	1
508	Machinery, equipment and supplies	1
509	Miscellaneous wholesalers	4
531	Department stores	1
535	Direct selling establishments	1

Wholesale and Retail Trade (Cont.)

541	Grocery stores	7
544	Candy, nut, and confectionery stores	1
546	Retail bakeries	9
549	Miscellaneous food stores	1
551	Motor vehicle dealers (new and used cars)	1
554	Gasoline service stations	9
560	Apparel and accessory stores, not specified	4
561	Men's and Boys' clothing and furnishing stores	2
569	Miscellaneous apparel and accessory stores	1
571	Furniture, home furnishings, and equipment stores, except appliances	4
581	Eating and drinking places	105
592	Liquor stores	1
593	Antique stores and secondhand stores	1
597	Jewelry stores	2
599	Retail stores, not elsewhere classified	1
	Total	<u>157</u>

Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate

630	Insurance carriers, not specified	1
651	Real Estate operators (except developers) and lessors	5
	Total	<u>6</u>

Services

701	Hotels, tourist courts, and motels	9
721	Laundries, laundry services, and cleaning and dyeing plants	7
722	Photographic studios, including commercial photography	1
729	Miscellaneous personal services	1
734	Services to dwellings and other buildings	5
739	Business services, not elsewhere classified	4
753	Automobile repair shops	20
754	Automobile services, except repair	4
764	Reupholstery and furniture repair	1
769	Miscellaneous repair shops and related services	1
794	Sports promoters and commercial operators, and miscellaneous amusement and recreation services	4
806	Hospitals	2
809	Health and allied services, not elsewhere classified	1
821	Elementary and secondary schools	1
824	Correspondence schools and vocational schools	1
866	Religious organizations	1
881	Private households	25
891	Federal government	1
893	Local government	1
	Total	<u>90</u>

Total All Industries	785
Don't know/refuse to answer	<u>8</u>
TOTAL	793

Source: Linton & Co. Illegal Alien Study, 1975.

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