

## DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 132 741

95

EA 009 083

TITLE Educational R&D and the Case of Berkeley's Experimental Schools. Volume I: A Summative Evaluation of the Berkeley Experimental Schools Project. Volume II: The Life and Fate of Individual Alternative Schools in the Berkeley Experimental Schools Project. Final Report.

INSTITUTION Scientific Analysis Corp., San Francisco, Calif.

SPONS AGENCY National Inst. of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.

PUB DATE Nov 76

CONTRACT NE-C-00-3-0297

NOTE 585p.; Pages 202-236 of Volume I may not reproduce legibly due to small print size

EDRS PRICE MF-\$1.16 HC-\$31.47 Plus Postage.

DESCRIPTORS \*Alternative Schools; Community Involvement; Educational Alternatives; Educational Change; \*Educational Development; Educational Programs; \*Educational Research; Elementary Secondary Education; \*Experimental Programs; Formative Evaluation; \*Program Evaluation; Racial Integration; Research Projects; Summative Evaluation

IDENTIFIERS Berkeley California Unified School District; \*Berkeley Experimental Schools Project; California (Berkeley); National Institute of Education; NIE

## ABSTRACT

Summative and formative evaluation of the Berkeley Experimental Schools Project (BESP) are summarized in this two-volume document. In Volume I, the evaluators answer the specific evaluative questions posed by the National Institute of Education, the primary funding agency for the alternative schools project. Out of an initial 23 alternative schools, only two programs survived the five years of BESP. The evaluators conclude that this educational alternatives program failed to produce the "comprehensive change" in the Berkeley school district that it was supposed to produce. Although community involvement in the experimental schools project was fairly high at first, in the end the degree of involvement was no higher than in traditional public schools. The experimental schools also failed to achieve the "racial-economic-academic mix for students and staff" that they set out to achieve. In Volume II, the evaluators deal with the larger issues raised by the application of federal research and development to education. They conclude that a lack of coordination between the federal funding agency and the local Berkeley school district, including a difference in definition of educational change, led to what might be described as a \$6 million misunderstanding. (Author/DS)

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EDUCATIONAL R&D AND THE CASE OF BERKELEY'S  
EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS

in Two Volumes

Final Report Submitted under NIE/ESP Contract #NE-C-00-3-0297

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November, 1976

EA 009 083

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Berkeley Experimental Schools Project (BESP) was one of eight projects funded nationally by the federal Experimental Schools Program (ESP), which was launched in 1970 as part of the U.S. Office of Education and was shifted to the National Institute of Education upon its establishment in 1972. The announced federal aim of the program was to effect "comprehensive change" within local school districts.

Time, scale and investment were calculated to correspond with the project's ambitious aim. BESP extended over five years (1971-1976). At its peak (1972-1973) average daily attendance (ADA) at 23 BESP sites, ranging from self-contained schools to modest supplemental programs, was 4,235, or 30 percent of the average daily attendance of 14,250 in the Berkeley Unified School District (BUSD); the ADA at BESP sites ebbed to 2,865 in 1975/76, or 22 percent of BUSD's total ADA of 12,977 in that school year. Over the five years, federal ESA funneled \$6,101,338 into the Berkeley project; if indirect costs, including federal overhead and external evaluation, are added, the total investment exceeded \$7 million.

Evaluation, performed at two levels, was an essential element of the project. Level I, formative evaluation, was an in-project operation, charged with ongoing assessment of the experiment in progress, so as to provide feedback to project staff for making changes, corrections, adjustments; for differentiating between innovations that proved promising and those that did not, and making the appropriate decisions. Level II, summative evaluation, was the function of an external agency, charged with a final and comprehensive assessment of the project, its conduct and its outcomes; Level II findings were to be delivered to the sponsoring federal agency to help it appraise, so to speak, the return on its investment, and extract from the project such conclusions, positive or negative, as might be useful both for the federal government's own effort in the educational field and for the diverse components of the school system in the localities and states.

Through competitive bidding, the Scientific Analysis Corporation was awarded the Level II evaluation contract by NIE in 1973. The Institute for Scientific Analysis, a division of SAC, conducted the research for the summative evaluation during the three final school years (1973/74 - 1975/76) of BESP. Our research included a survey of parents and students in a cohort sample drawn from BESP and common (i.e., non-BESP) schools in Berkeley; field observations of BESP schools; an organizational analysis of BESP; interviews with a sample of BESP and common school teachers and key project personnel

at all levels, and with Berkeley residents. Our three-year longitudinal study, conducted along the above lines, produced the empirical data base for this, our summative evaluation report.

Given the stated objective of federal ESP at the outset of the program, our first summative finding is: BESP did not produce "comprehensive change" in the Berkeley school district; nothing in the data indicates that BESP even pointed the District in the direction of "comprehensive change."

#### 1. Replies to NIE's Detailed Questions

Requiring a more itemized account than the foregoing, the NIE contract specified that the Level II evaluator determine whether changes, attributable to BESP, occurred in various areas and practices of the Berkeley school district. The areas ranged from such seemingly simple tangibles as truancy and dropout rates to the more complex and less tangible concept of "quality of education." Presumably, if there were a significant number of changes in these several areas, they would, in their sum, indicate "comprehensive change." The first issue posed by NIE was whether BESP "has...led to greater diversity in the range of educational options within the school district." This primary emphasis meshed with the local plan for BESP, which envisioned increased options as the seminal force from which all other beneficent changes would sprout. We examine the issue of options quantitatively, qualitatively and developmentally.

At its peak, BESP encompassed 23 options with considerable diversity in teaching styles, curricular content and focus, educational values and goals, and organizational structure. However, only 13 of these options were launched under BESP's aegis; the other 10 (including almost all those that were most innovative) antedated BESP. Furthermore, when BESP was terminated only seven of its options survived, and only two of these were produced in the BESP years. These two surviving programs served some 200 students--and this in a school district with about 13,000 students.

Qualitative measures are of necessity more complicated. How diverse were the 23 options (or alternative schools, as they were commonly called in Berkeley)? In approving these options as components of BESP, the school district and federal ESP certified, in effect, that each represented something "different" from the common schools, else there would have been no rationale for funding it as an experimental program. But how "different"?

One significant index of difference was their locale. Seven options were "off-site"; that is, they were housed in their own quarters, separate from any common school. The other 16 were "on-site," sharing the classrooms, campus and facilities of a

common school. Off-site alternatives were self-contained schools, offering their students a full program at their particular grade level. They developed a greater sense of community among staff, students and parents. They lent themselves more readily to forms of governance that involved those three components of the school community. On-site alternatives ranged from minimal supplemental programs, offering their students as few as one or two alternative classes per day, to schools that offered a comprehensive curriculum at their respective grade levels. Students in the supplemental programs took the remainder of their classes in the common school. This latter arrangement made it virtually impossible to differentiate with any degree of certainty between the impact of BESP and the common school on student attitudes and overall performance. More generally, an on-site locale tended to blur the distinct identity of BESP programs, rendered it more difficult to develop a sense of community that involved parents, and served to create tensions between the common school host and the possibly transient alternative guest. After all, BESP's tenure was fixed at five years, and no BESP program had prior guarantees that it would continue to exist beyond the five years. Each on-site alternative understandably calculated that its chances for survival would be influenced by the capacity it displayed for "fitting into" its common school environment. This calculation inhibited "innovation" that might be an irritant to the common school, or that might create a bureaucratic inconvenience for the common school administration, which retained overall administrative responsibility for its campus. Only three of the 16 on-site BESP programs managed to achieve a relatively high degree of "alternativeness," or "difference" from the common schools.

By and large, off-site location provided the more salubrious climate for "innovation" and "diversity." It is significant, then, that less than one-third of the BESP alternatives were off-site. It is, perhaps, even more significant that the off-site alternatives suffered the highest casualty rate in the course of the program. After two years of BESP two off-site alternatives were liquidated, and these were joined by a third a year later. That is, three out of seven off-site experiments (43%) were truncated.

The significance of this is accentuated by the reasons for the truncation. They were closed because the federal Office for Civil Rights insisted that their racial separatism violated Title IV of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Two of the closed schools, Black House and United Nations West, were all-Black (except for one student) and the other, Casa de la Raza, was all-Chicano. These schools represented the greatest degree of "diversity" and "innovation" within BESP. The first two to be closed set out deliberately to test the hypothesis that students from ethnic minorities, which have been historically oppressed, discriminated against and consigned to an

inferior status by the dominant majority, could be better motivated to achieve their educational potential in a setting that was informed with the culture, historical experience and contemporary reality of their ethnic group. Such a setting, it was argued, would cultivate ethnic pride and self-esteem among the students, both as individuals and members of an ethnic minority. It was argued further that autonomy for the given ethnic group was best designed to create such a setting. We are aware of powerful arguments disputing that position. However, in attempting to assess the "diversity" introduced by BESP, it seems to us that the closure of the three schools significantly curtailed its quality and range.

As one facet of its longitudinal study, ISA selected six indicators of "educational diversity" from the field observers' data at the individual BESP sites. We found that of the 20 then-existing BESP schools, 12 possessed two or fewer indicators of "educational diversity," whereas eight had three or more. If all 23 sites are considered, it can be said that 11 were distinguished by at least three indicators of "educational diversity." (These indicators were non-graded classrooms, peer teaching, interdisciplinary approach to subjects, multi-cultural emphasis, emphasis on controversial or avant-garde subjects, and programmed learning.)

It seems to us, however, that the issue of diversity is best apprehended by viewing the developmental process. This process described a curve, a short upward turn in both the quantity and quality of diversity during the first two years of BESP, and then a longer and steeper downturn on both counts in the final three years. On one level, the decline in quality resulted from the decline in quantity; some of the terminated alternatives, as indicated previously, represented a high degree of diversity. However, even in the alternatives that remained through the final years there was a qualitative decline in diversity; there was a marked tendency to greater conformity with the common schools, prompted in part by the feeling that this was the more likely to ensure the continued existence of an individual site within the Berkeley school system once the flow of BESP funds ceased.

In our view, the summative evaluation of BESP must focus, not on the transient phenomena, but on the residual and possibly enduring impact of the experimental project upon the Berkeley system. Looking at the seven alternatives and lesser residues that remained after BESP's end, we found that their contribution to "educational diversity" was far below a level that would be required to effect significant, let alone comprehensive, change in the Berkeley school district.

• A similar developmental process applied to "parent/community participation in school program and policies," another item that NIE specified for evaluation. There was much more of it at the beginning of BESP than there was at the end. In the end, the difference in such participation between BESP and common schools was negligible. Addressing other NIE items, we found no significant differences between BESP and common schools in dropout rates, truancy, vandalism. The absence of significant difference also applied to staff and fund allocation, to the locus and nature of leadership.

As for "racial-economic-academic mix for students and staff," the most striking change was introduced by the racially separatist schools that were terminated. One all-Black BESP program survives on the Berkeley High School campus, but in a manner that minimizes this distinction. It is a supplemental program and most of its students spend most of their school day in common school classes. Otherwise, BESP had no impact at all on student-staff mix along the above lines.

The final two NIE items concerned "quality of education" and "policies, practices and perceptions of school staff." On the first item, our data revealed no significant difference between BESP and common schools. On the second item, the data indicated that BESP's multi-cultural curricula and teacher-training programs did impact upon teachers, and thus effected some change of an unmeasured dimension in the perception and classroom practices of the school staff.

## 2. BESP as a Federal R&D Project in Education

Honoring our contract with NIE, we have answered its specific questions in this final report, as we did in our two previous annual reports. However, as we worked to fulfill our contract we became increasingly uneasy about the perspective that guided our efforts, which essentially limited evaluation to local implementation of a federal program, and evaded the burden of evaluating the federal agency's conception, methodology and strategy in launching and overseeing the experimental program. We finally concluded that our summative evaluation had to confront the critical issues posed by BESP, not as a thing in itself, but as an instrument in a large-scale federal experiment in education.

Once we expanded the scope of our summative evaluation beyond the local implementation, our attention turned to the following problems:

a. BESP, including its Berkeley component, was an application of the research and development methodology in the field of education. R&D gained its enormous prestige as an application

of the physical sciences to technological systems. Was this methodology, which was primarily tested and refined in the sphere of defense and space technology, transferable to social institutions that involve human subjects rather than physical objects, and if it was transferable, how was the transfer best effected?

b. The R&D model employed in Berkeley encompassed four distinct strategies: local planning, comprehensiveness, five-year forward funding, and twin-level evaluation. How effective were these strategies? What can be learned from the conception and implementation of these strategies that would have a bearing on the larger issue of the applicability of R&D to the field of education to bring about "comprehensive change" in the nation's schools?

Our broader perspective also impelled us to a broader examination of the socio-political context in which the aim of "comprehensive educational change" gained currency, and in which the transfer of R&D from the realm of defense and space technology to the field of education was attempted. Such an examination could not be definitive but it did serve to highlight the enormous diversity and conflict in the political and educational arenas about change in the public schools; why it was needed, how it could be brought about, and, indeed, what its character should be. By implication at least the contextual examination suggested the serious difficulties that attended the transfer of R&D from the relative tidiness of the physical world to the turbulence of a human institution that was commonly regarded as in a state of crisis.

Reverting to the two problem areas listed above, we deal first with the second, the R&D strategies employed by ESP.

### 3. Local Planning as an Educational R&D Strategy

Local planning was the strategic kingpin. The other three strategies were, in a sense, conditions (comprehensiveness and evaluation) or an incentive (forward funding) for the local planners in devising their plan. ESP's premise was that local planning of the local project would not only reflect local needs and aspirations, would not only draw on an intimate knowledge of and responsiveness to local conditions, but also would most likely generate the commitment, initiative, creativity and enthusiasm that would enhance the possibility of achieving the project's goal: "comprehensive change" in the Berkeley school district.

We found that the local planning strategy, as applied, did not fulfill the high hopes that rode with it. More specifically, we found:

a. The local planning process, including submission of proposals from "interested parties," the screening of these proposals, and the integration of those chosen into an overall plan, consumed two months at most. This extreme haste, dictated primarily by federal ESP deadlines, precluded adequate deliberation, severely curtailed input from teachers, parents and others whose commitment would be vital in implementing the plan, and stripped the planning process of its political utility in revealing and reconciling different viewpoints so as to ensure the broadest base of support for the plan that was finally adopted.

b. The plan was vigorous in enunciating goals and arguing their desirability; it was weak in delineating means for attaining these goals, in analyzing probable obstacles and specifying ways of overcoming them.

The local plan set three goals: (1) to provide program options that will reflect the cultural pluralism in the community; (2) to move toward elimination of institutional racism in the school system, and to facilitate acquisition of basic skills by educationally disadvantaged students, especially ethnic minority members\*, and (3) to promote power-sharing in the school system.

In our previous response to NIE's questions, we presented our findings on BESP's option-creation. Our findings with respect to the other goals follow.

Decreasing institutional racism. The data indicated that BESP students and staff were somewhat more sensitized to racism than their common school counterparts. BESP students reported fewer incidents of overt racism in their schools than did common school students in theirs. BESP contributed to a change in curriculum content to reflect traditions, cultures and accomplishments of different ethnic groups in America. The BESP training component trained teachers in the use of such curricula.

However, BESP did no more than overall BUSD did to increase employment opportunities for minorities. True, many minority persons were hired by BESP in the first three years, but most of these were fired with the termination of non-certificated staff at the end of the 1973/74 school year. Generally, BUSD hiring practices are governed by a tenure system, which results in placing most minority personnel in the "last hired, first fired" category; this system is formalized in the state educational code and district practice. BESP could do nothing about that. Indeed,

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\* At one point BUSD/BESP listed separately the goals with respect to institutional racism and basic skills, so that four distinct goals were presented. In this executive summary we also treat institutional racism and basic skills separately.

BESP was not vested with the power to change organizational structures and practices of the school district. Since it is implicit in the term "institutional racism" that racism is institutionalized through structures and practices, BESP's lack of power to alter these institutional elements fatally circumscribed its capacity to diminish institutional racism.

Finally, a possible line of resistance to or attack on institutional racism was thwarted with the termination of three ethnically separatist schools.

Basic skills. BESP produced at best only a minor difference in the acquisition of basic skills. Comparisons of standardized test scores by BESP and common school students in the basic skills areas over a three-year period (1973-1976) revealed few significant differences between the two groups. Among ethnic minority students, the higher scores for the BESP group were somewhat more pronounced. Still, a widening gap between white and ethnic minority students (except for Asians) in reading scores over their school careers existed in both BESP and common schools.

One possibly significant but tentative finding cropped up, not between BESP and common school students, but between Black students in racially separatist BESP schools and Black students in both BESP and common integrated schools. The finding is tentative because the samples were so small, consisting of 19 Black students at BESP integrated sites, 40 at BESP racially separatist sites (College Prep and United Nations West), and 55 at integrated common schools. Aside from sample size, the absence of controls for variables (other than the integrated or separatist nature of the school) that might have affected outcomes prompts us to reiterate the caution that the finding is not conclusive. Nonetheless, a comparison of CTBS reading scores for the three groups at the same grade level revealed a significantly greater annual growth by the sample in the all-Black options than by the other two samples.

Power-sharing. At several BESP sites power-sharing by parents and/or students was significantly greater than it has been in Berkeley's common schools. Most BESP sites, however, did not differ significantly from the common schools in this respect. At these sites, the traditional distaste of school administrators and teachers for amateurish intervention in what they perceive as the areas of their special professional competence, and their more overt hostility to intervention that impinges upon their economic security and professional prerogatives effectively precluded power-sharing, despite the rhetorical attachment to it in the BESP plan.

Even at sites that were different, the difference was most pronounced in the first two years of BESP, then it progressively diminished so that by the end it was barely discernible.

Attrition also played a part in diminution of power-sharing. Liquidation of Casa de la Raza by OCR fiat eliminated a school with the highest degree of community, parental and student involvement in governance. Of the six BESP sites on the Berkeley High School campus, Agora and Genesis developed the highest level of student involvement in site governance. Merger of these two schools after the 1973/74 school year obliterated this distinction. Elsewhere, especially at off-site schools (e.g., Odyssey and Kilimanjaro), difficulties that might have been anticipated served to vitiate the impressive power-sharing that was present at the outset. One difficulty flowed from a tendency in power-sharing to precipitate disagreement about the slices of power to be shared. This tendency is exacerbated in a school situation by narrow self-interest. That is, parents as a rule are motivated to intervene in school governance to secure what they regard as "good" for their child, but this does not necessarily coincide with what other parents regard as "good" for their children. Such differences triggered internecine strife at a few BESP sites. Internal strife is more prejudicial for a school than for other public institutions because of a deeply ingrained public belief that the ideal learning situation is marked by calm, stability and order. Consequently, at sites where conflicts erupted, concern for "public image" (which was also related to the school's survival) exerted a powerful pressure to "cool it." Given the paucity of experience, tradition and structural forms for resolving such conflict at the site level, the tendency was to eliminate conflict by curtailing active parental participation in the exercise of power; i.e., by reverting to the traditional system of vesting decisive power in the site director.

BESP's lopsided emphasis on secondary schools (only six of the 23 sites were elementary schools) also created a formidable barrier to power-sharing. Parents are most inclined to get involved in school affairs when their children are in the elementary grades; their interest wanes almost in direct ratio to the grade advancement of their children. BESP did not significantly counter this trend.

In sum, we found that BESP did not significantly alter the locus and exercise of power in the Berkeley school district.

If the progress toward BESP's four stated goals is used to evaluate the local plan, the conclusion is that the local plan was grievously defective. However, in this instance local planning was a particular strategy of an R&D project designed, launched and monitored by ESP. On the most obvious level, ESP impaired its own strategy by the very brief time it dictated for the local planning process. Such haste left little time to ascertain how well the Berkeley participants understood they were getting into an R&D experiment, not an enrichment or compensatory program.

#### 4. Comprehensiveness as an Educational R&D Strategy

Since "comprehensive change" in a school district was the aim of the R&D project, federal ESP specified that a district program had to be "comprehensive." Comprehensiveness meant three things: (1) the district project should include no less than a third of the district school population, (2) it should encompass the full grade spectrum, K-12, so that parents and students would have alternatives to choose at every grade level, and (3) it should construct an organization parallel to the existing district organization, including an administrative apparatus and a panoply of support services from training to publicity.

On the first dimension BESP never quite made it. In its peak year it involved 30 percent of the district student population, and the five-year mean was closer to one-fourth than to one-third.

On the second dimension the Berkeley plan provided for pro forma compliance with the K-12 requirement, but even this formal effort broke down after only two years. When site proposals were submitted for BESP in Spring 1971, the missing link in the K-12 chain was at the junior high school level. Whereupon, the district administration directed the principals of Berkeley's only two junior high schools to produce quick proposals for alternative schools at their sites. The hasty conception resulted in a slow birth: both junior high alternatives did not open until Fall 1972, a year after BESP was launched. Both programs were terminated in Spring 1974, two years before BESP had run its course. For three of the five BESP years, the only alternative school serving grades 7-8 was Odyssey, which also included the 9th grade and had a total student enrollment of slightly more than 100.

Even those parts of the K-12 chain that did exist were defective in that they did not provide for articulation. Parents and students who chose a particular option at a K-3 site for example, were not offered a similar option at any 4-6 school. Furthermore, the previously noted, lopsided BESP emphasis on secondary schools foreclosed an even flow of students through the BESP network.

On the third dimension of comprehensiveness, a parallel PESP organization was set up and staffed, but its authority was never clearly defined, so that it existed as a dependent of BUSD. The fate of central BESP support services indicates the weakness of the organization. Only one of four support services, the training unit, managed to survive into the fifth BESP year as an autonomous and parallel entity.

In sum, we found that comprehensiveness as a strategy was not really applied. Local performance indicated that the Berkeley district never attached the same importance to comprehensiveness as did the federal ESP.

##### 5. Five-year Forward Funding as an Educational R&D Strategy

Five-year forward funding was intended as an earnest of the federal commitment to the project for five years, and as an instrument to exact a similar time commitment from the Berkeley school district. It expressed "comprehensiveness" in terms of time and money. Just as "comprehensive change" was counterposed to "piecemeal change," so five-year funding was counterposed to "piecemeal" funding, doled out in one-year chunks.

The strategy did produce a five-year project. But it did not exact the depth of commitment that would be commensurate with the goal of "comprehensive change." Among the factors that impaired the anticipated effects of the five-year forward funding strategy were the following:

a. The \$6,101,338 that ESP channeled into Berkeley represented only 3.7 percent of the school district's total income in the five BESP years. It represented less than one-fourth (24%) of all federal funds allocated to the district in those five years. For ESP the experimental schools project was "the only game in town," but for the Berkeley school district it was only one of several and when measured by the money it contributed it was not even the biggest game. The district was more prone to be pre-occupied with its chronic fiscal crisis. This divergence of viewpoints between Berkeley and Washington was a constant source of tension.

b. Auditors' reports and the findings of a special committee appointed by the Berkeley Board of Education to review the district's fiscal condition agreed that "egregiously bad business management practices" prevailed within the school district. The sheer inefficiency of the district's administrative and accounting systems was in itself enough to frustrate the exercise of the refined discrimination implicit in ESP's insistence that its funds be used only for "catalytic" change costs.

c. ESP funds to BESP sites provoked jealousy and resentment among common school personnel. Because authoritative spokesmen within the district failed to come forth as vigorous champions of BESP to secure understanding and support among district personnel for the experimental program, ESP funds tended to create friction, rather than a sense of security and continuity at BESP sites.

d. Half way through the project, following the shift of ESP from OE to NIE, the Washington-Berkeley arrangement was changed from a grant to a contract. The change created anxieties, especially at the BESP site level, because the contract negotiations were difficult and protracted, and there was uncertainty about their outcome. Subsequently, NIE/ESP threatened to withhold monies at several junctures until BUSD/BESP complied with evolving federal interpretations of evaluation and experimentalism. Such episodes heightened a feeling within BESP that the funding was, in fact, conditional and renewable on a yearly basis.

#### 6. Evaluation as an Educational R&D Strategy

In ESP's R&D model, the local project was Development and evaluation was the Research. The Development (i.e., local project) was funded so it could serve as the object of Research (i.e., evaluation). Consistent with the prime importance attached to evaluation, it was generously funded. Initially, ESP planned three levels of evaluation. Level I, formative evaluation, was to be an integral component of Development. It was to be the internal monitor of the local project in progress, supplying data and analysis to guide project personnel in directing the project, in making rectifications and changes that seemed to be necessitated by actual experience and outcomes. Level II, summative evaluation, was to be an independent agency that would provide federal ESP with an overall assessment of the local experiment and its outcomes. Level III was to conduct a cross-site evaluation of the eight district programs sponsored and funded by ESP. Level III was abandoned.

Level I. Symptomatic of Level I's fitful existence, it went through four distinct reorganizations and in the fourth year was absorbed into BUSD's Research and Evaluation unit. It was caught between a constant drumfire of criticism from federal ESP and a cross between passive resistance and overt hostility at the BESP sites it was supposed to evaluate. It had no "feedback" channels either to sites or the BESP administration. There is no evidence that such research as it did was ever utilized in policy or program development at any level of BESP. Much of Level I's troubles stemmed from the lack of a clear understanding within the district that BESP was an R&D project. Consequently, there was no understanding of the central role of evaluation.

Level II. Level II evaluation went through two major organizational phases. Initially, a Level II grant was awarded to DEEPS (Documentation and Evaluation of Experimental Projects in Schools), an ad hoc academic team. This arrangement blew up after 20 months when NIE/ESP rejected four DEEPS evaluation plans and the DEEPS co-director resigned. The Scientific Analysis Corporation, which was sponsor of the DEEPS staff at that time, exercising fiscal and administrative responsibility, was now thrust into a caretaker role; it phased out the grant with two reports: A Study of the Choice Structure of BESP, July 1973, and A Retrospective Description of BUSD/BESP From Its Inception Through June 1973, September 1973. Simultaneously, in competitive bidding, SAC secured the NIE/ESP contract for Level II evaluation of the Berkeley project over its final three years.

SAC's division, the Institute for Scientific Analysis, responding to NIE's questions, as itemized earlier in this summary, produced two annual reports. This third and final report concludes our work.

In a retrospective review of how summative evaluation was employed as an R&D strategy, we find a lack of clarity and precision with respect to Level II. The fiasco with the first Level II team (DEEPS) is symptomatic. Patently, after the first two years of the project, there was no meeting of minds between the Level II evaluators and their federal sponsors. Our own change of perspective for this final report grew out of a conclusion that NIE's contract questions were not the most important or most relevant for a summative evaluation of the R&D experiment that was conducted in the Berkeley school system.

In sum, evaluation as an R&D strategy shared a crucial defect with the other strategies: basic schisms between the project principals about the nature of the project and, consequently, about their particular roles in it. Such schisms can crop up in the application of the R&D methodology in the realm of physical science and technology, but there the objects of research, such as physical properties or technological instruments, are not protagonists with attitudes and understandings that can determine outcomes. In an educational setting the human objects of an experiment do possess those troublesome attributes. The R&D methodology floundered in the Berkeley school experiment because it did not reckon fully with the diverse human elements and did not, therefore, devise adequate strategies to cope with them.

On the most elemental level, implicit in ESP's approach was the assumption that the Berkeley district was ready and willing to effect "comprehensive change," that the infusion of \$6 million into

the district over a five-year span would provide that extra incentive, that extra bit of money that could transform good intentions into a viable and effective action program. This assumption proved false. There was a discrepancy between Washington's anticipations and Berkeley's commitments. Faith in the catalytic effects of \$6 million had been misplaced. As a consequence the project might be described as a "\$6 million misunderstanding" among the principals involved. Given the social realities that emerged over the five years of the project NIE/ESP might have asked Level II more appropriately to ascertain whether "change" had been the true commitment of the participants, and, if so, what sort of change and under what conditions, and whether the participants realized the project was an educational R&D experiment in which their district had been chosen as an object of study and evaluation.

Had there been a common understanding of the nature of the project, and a common commitment to change, the outcomes might have been different from those we evaluate in this report.

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November, 1976

## PREFACE

More than three years ago, the Institute for Scientific Analysis undertook the study of the Berkeley Experimental Schools Project. This publication, the final report of the study, is directed not only to the National Institute of Education, the contracting agency, but also to public school staffs, legislators, educational researchers interested in innovation and change, and concerned laymen.

The research reported in this publication could never have been completed without the cooperation of the staff throughout the Berkeley Unified School District. More than 250 teachers, school administrators, and other school personnel participated in the study. In the schools where extended field studies were conducted, we tried not to disrupt daily operations but we know that we did, and we appreciate the understanding and patience shown by the staffs in these schools. We are also indebted to many persons in the Berkeley community for sharing with us their valuable knowledge and insights respecting the alternative education movement in Berkeley. All gave freely of their time and knowledge. We hope the findings will be useful both to the educational professionals and concerned lay persons as they grapple with the problems facing education.

Many persons have been associated with the Institute as staff and consultants on this project. They have shared in the labors of implementing a complex research design by providing expertise in data preparation and analysis. Field staff, interviewers, coders and other support personnel exerted effort without which this report could never have been completed. Their names are listed on the following page.

Our special appreciation is extended to Mr. John Newton, the director of the Berkeley Experimental Schools Project, for arranging the entry into the BUSD. We are equally indebted to Ms. Marie Wilson and Ms. Marilyn Hillard of the BESP administrative staff.

Lastly, our deep appreciation is expressed to all the students in the Berkeley Unified School District who have in one way or another participated in the study.

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## PART I: BEGINNINGS

This report represents the Institute for Scientific Analysis' final summative evaluation of the five-year Berkeley Experimental Schools Project (BESP). It is partly based on findings that ISA has submitted to the National Institute of Education (NIE) in previous reports, but goes beyond them to raise and answer new questions about educational R&D projects in general and their application in Berkeley in particular. In fulfilling our contractual obligations to NIE, we have divided Volume I of this report into two parts: the first contains four chapters which are intended to serve both as groundwork for the report and as the place where conclusions are tentatively introduced; the second part contains the main conclusions.

In our contract with NIE, we were given three questions to answer; we state these in Chapter 1, and provide the main answers forthwith, depending mostly although not exclusively on findings already explicated in our previous reports. We then argue that the three contract questions necessarily forced us into a specific sort of summative evaluation, namely, an evaluation of program implementation exclusively, and that such an evaluative strategy is too limited for the findings to be properly understood or interpreted. At the end of Chapter 1 we state our case for following a more encompassing strategy wherein implementation is merely one component--we argue that the best way to understand the findings is to consider BESP as simply one instance of a public policy conceived as and administered by a research-and-development logic. In our opinion, the confusion and agony that marked and marred Berkeley's project are attributable more to problems of applying an R&D strategy in education than to insufficient planning or funding, lack of expertise, or bureaucratic ineptitude. We summarize our overall aim at the end of Chapter 1 by stating, "In short, we are evaluating the history, logic, utility, and consequences of educational R&D projects as such, in order to account for the fate of the project as it worked itself out in Berkeley."

The remaining three chapters in Part I then follow this theme. Chapter 2 sets the stage by recreating for the reader, and for ourselves, those features of the 1960's and early 1970's that led to an interest in "comprehensive educational change" in the White House, the Office of Education, the educational profession, and, to some extent, the populace. The chapter traces the establishment of NIE and the emergence of R&D as a strategy to be followed by the federal government, first in

the Department of Defense, then as applied to perceived educational problems. These developments are linked throughout to the sociopolitical movements that swept the country during this period, and to their local variants in the city of Berkeley. This chapter is by far the most comprehensive in scope of any chapter in this report, evoking as it does the relevant political, social, and educational developments within which educational R&D was embedded.

The two remaining chapters in Part I narrow the scope considerably by elaborating in some detail the logic of an R&D strategy and its specific application in Berkeley. Chapter 3 analyzes and criticizes R&D, arguing that its application in education and in other "human service" sectors is misconceived, in at least two senses: on the one hand, the logic of R&D as applied to the development of material objects (such as airplanes) tends to be distorted in practice when applied to social objects (such as children); and, on the other, even if R&D were applied in its pristine form, the "state of the art" in a field such as education is insufficiently developed to accommodate the technical requirements of R&D for stringent definitions, predictions, and controls. The "lack of fit" between the guiding ideas held by NIE officials and those held by BUSD/BESP administrators and staffs who were not imbued with an R&D ideology, created considerable confusion not only for both sides, but also for our own task of summative evaluation.

Following the exposition of these themes in Chapter 3, the final chapter of Part I discusses the four specific components of the R&D strategy initially conceived by the Office of Education (OE) and thereafter taken over by NIE: local planning, comprehensiveness of program design, five-year forward funding, and formative/summative evaluation. Chapter 4 assesses OE/NIE's rationales for each of these four components, as originally formulated and as they emerged over the five years of BESP. While ambiguities, inconsistencies, and various other shortcomings are noted in this chapter, the main consequences of an R&D strategy composed of these four elements are left for exposition in Part II of this volume. Part II is then followed by two appendixes: a chronology of "significant events" affecting BESP's five-year existence, and a description of ISA's research design. The concluding Volume II of this report contains detailed histories of each of Berkeley's experimental/alternative schools to whose operations NIE/ESP contributed financially.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS FINDINGS

Berkeley, California is a city of approximately 117,000 persons, including 20,000 University of California students. The social context of Berkeley is an important backdrop for understanding the unique climate in which the Berkeley Experimental Schools Program operated. The University is Berkeley's dominant economic, social, intellectual and cultural institution, but the University itself is no monolith; aside from the most manifest distinctions between students and faculty, and between youth and age, employment on the same campus does not lead the janitor and the Nobel Prize winner to resemble each other, nor does the common designation of student erase the ethnic distinction between Black and white.

Thus, the University's influences are as diverse as they are pervasive. Moreover, even in Berkeley not all of life revolves around the University. There are pockets of small-scale industry along the city's waterfront. Berkeley is part of the San Francisco-Oakland Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, and some of its residents are employed in the larger cities nearby.

Although the University's stamp upon it is paramount and indelible, Berkeley does not escape Disraeli's division into "two nations" of the privileged and the people. In Berkeley usage the image for this dichotomy is usually para-sociological: "town and gown." Sometimes, it is topographical: hills and flatlands. The hills, stretching eastward from the campus, are inhabited by professors, researchers, theorists, and other professionals or executives and managers, occupying big houses commensurate with their socio-economic status. The flatlands, stretching westward from the campus, are a hodge podge of small houses, big old homes (frequently subdivided for rental or accomodating communes), and apartment dwellings, inhabited by workers, white or blue collar, and students. The hills are the panorama of affluence; the flatlands are an economic sprawl that ranges from the modest comfort of the skilled worker to the poverty of the welfare recipient.

Ethnic divisions are not completely identical with the socio-economic divisions on that topographical map, but they are similar. For the most part, whiteness goes with affluence in the hills, whereas the ethnic minority populations are concentrated in the flatlands. A quarter of Berkeley's population is Black, and another eight percent is Asian, Mexican-American, or American Indian; thus, ethnic minorities constitute one-third of the population. The statistics, however, do not convey the minority,

particularly the Black, influence in Berkeley. The Black community is a major political force; during 1973/74 the U.S. Congressman from Berkeley was Black, so was the mayor, so was one of the city's two State Assembly representatives. Two factors enter into this political performance. The first is that the socio-economic character of the Black community is also influenced by the University presence, resulting in an unusually high representation in white-collar and professional/business occupations. More than half of the non-white students in the BESP alternative schools have families whose breadwinner was in the above categories. The second factor arises from liberal influences among the white residents in the hills and radical influences among white students in the flatlands, creating diverse ideological compulsions for political alliance with the Black community, or, in some instances, with the moderate or radical currents within it.

Despite the diversity, all are influenced by the special flavor of Berkeley--the home of the "free speech" movement, of Telegraph Avenue--but also the home of Asian technicians, Mexican-American small business operators, Black insurance salesmen, all striving to succeed, sharing aspirations of middle-class whites, proud of their freedoms and their cultural backgrounds, and all partaking of the democratic and intellectual ethos that is Berkeley. The dominant politics range from liberal to radical. The "hippy" culture is ever present; a significant segment of the community is "into" groups, "into" communes, "into" stained glass and weaving, "into" rock soul and multi-cultural "raps." Berkeley is not an "average" American city--in some of its cultural and social manifestations it is a pace-setter.

While it has a radical aura, "frat houses" are experiencing a resurgence; "counter-culture" and "youth culture" seem rampant in Berkeley, but in the hills musical tastes run to Mozart and Bach. And in many ways Berkeley's school system retains a slightly "old-fashioned" atmosphere, as though it were still teaching the sons and daughters of merchant families in the big, brown, shingled homes of Norman Rockwell days.

The Berkeley Unified School District (BUSD) is a medium-sized school district now serving approximately 12,000 students, 45 percent white, 44 percent Black, and 11 percent other minorities, with an operating budget of approximately \$30 million a year. It was one of the first school systems to integrate voluntarily, and is proud of having graduated many students who have gone on to successful academic and professional careers. Today, BUSD consists of 18 elementary schools (including two off-site ESP schools), two junior high schools and one high school, plus one off-site junior high and one off-site high school. BUSD also contracts

for special education services, runs a busing system and has a full range of educational support systems. It is funded by state and local funds and has a multitude of additional federal grants which provide its budget. It is facing a continuous financial crunch, and has a high per-capita school expenditure.

BUSD is considered by many to be a "progressive school system," and was chosen as a site for the federal Experimental Schools Program because it was already operating ten option sites prior to federal funding.

The federal ESP grant\* was an educational research and development project emphasizing both internal and external evaluation. This report is a summative evaluation by an "outside" independent firm (Institute for Scientific Analysis) under contract to NIE/ESP, granted after the program had already been underway two years and after the first summative evaluation contract had been terminated (DEEPS).\*\* After completion of its third year, BEPS was evaluated and the following was the "Summary of Findings" in the ISA report, submitted September 1, 1974, which answered three contract questions raised by NIE/ESP in its BEPS RFP.

1. Has BEPS led to greater diversity in the range of educational options within the school district?
2. Has BEPS been associated with change in dropout rates, truancy, vandalism; in parent/community participation in school program and policies; in new and/or changes in policies, practices and perceptions of school staff; in racial-economic-academic mix for students and staff; in staff and fund allocation; in the locus and nature of leadership?
3. Has BEPS brought about change in the quality of education as measured by objective and subjective questionnaires administered to parents and students?

These three questions represent the ambitions that NIE/ESP had for BEPS in 1973. With the approval of NIE/ESP the Berkeley

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\*For a discussion of the significance of the federal grant as a form and its subsequent change into a contract, see Chapter 7.

\*\*See the ISA report, A Retrospective Description of BUSD/BEPS From Its Inception Through June, 1973: Report #1 (NIE), September 1, 1973. DEEPS is an acronym for Documentation and Evaluation of Experimental Projects in Schools.

Unified School District had earlier placed special emphasis on four objectives: increasing options, decreasing institutionalized racism, increasing parent participation, and improving basic skills of students. In pursuing its study and preparing this report, ISA's compliance with the NIE/ESP mandate, as formulated in the above questions, also encompassed BUSD's particular emphases.

ISA addressed the three contract questions above by using several methodologies: an organizational analysis of BESP, field observations of BESP schools, and a survey of parents and students in a cohort sample drawn from BESP and common schools (i.e., Berkeley's public schools outside of BESP). In addition, interviews were conducted with key personnel at all levels of the project and with a sample of BESP and common school teachers. Berkeley residents were also interviewed to determine their awareness of and support for BESP. These data constitute the empirical base for this report (see Appendix 2 for full research design).

Our September 1, 1974 Report represented the first year of study and included the baseline data for follow-up change measures in the second year (1974/75)\* and the third and final year (1975/76).

With the approval of NIE/ESP, the Institute for Scientific Analysis initially approached its evaluative task by examining the underlying assumptions about diversity and choice as these concepts evolved in the creation of options in BESP.\*\* Thereafter we assessed the impact of these options which seem to have created tracks within the school district for two types of disaffected youths: (1) students from upper-middle-class families who reject the traditional educational values of their parents and who voluntarily choose the most diverse options; and (2) students, largely from minorities, who are disaffected underachievers, and who are system-tracked into remedial-oriented schools of lesser diversity and choice.

We also investigated other issues, such as (1) the role of federal funding and its impact upon local control, (2) desegregation vs. racially separatist schools, and (3) the moral and practical issues inherent in "experimenting" with public

\*See ISA Report, A Descriptive Analysis of BESP (1974/75), September 1, 1975.

\*\*See ISA Report, Choice Structure of the Berkeley Experimental Schools Project, July 15, 1973.

school students who are channeled into untried and untested "alternative" schools,\* perhaps without their parents' clear understanding about potential educational consequences for the child's progress after the "experiment" has been concluded.

After creating a typology of the alternative schools according to their degree of diversity and choice, we described how the types of alternative schools covaried with each of the following: (a) the extent of parent-student consensus in educational values, (b) each student's assessment of the quality of his or her education, (c) ethnic identity, (d) parents' occupation, (e) objective outcome measures, and (f) subjective outcome measures. We then conducted a multiple regression analysis in relation to both subjective and objective outcome measures.

We now turn to the questions raised by NIE/ESP in its contract RFP. The following is a summary of our findings regarding BESP's first three years of operation, as previously reported in our 1975 submission to NIE/ESP.

1. Has BESP led to greater diversity in the range of educational options within BUSD?

Over the first three years 23 alternative schools were established by BESP, serving between 3,000 and 4,000 students each year. The two most "diverse" schools were closed at the end of the 1972/73 school year because the Federal Office for Civil Rights ruled that the racial separatism of Casa de la Raza and Black House violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. (These racially separate, diverse schools were closed before they could be evaluated by ISA, which began its BESP evaluation June, 1973.)

During 1973/74 BESP consisted of 21 schools of considerable variety, ranging from those that were distinctively "different" to those which were quite conventional, including residual and remedial schools offering little diversity or freedom of choice. The former tended to be fewer in number and smaller in size than the latter; as a result, our aggregate comparisons showed that the diversity in the BESP schools resembled the diversity in the common schools--after all, they are not homogeneous either--and we therefore found few observable or reportable innovations

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\*In Berkeley the experimental program schools are commonly referred to as alternative schools, as distinct from the "common" schools which retain their regular or traditional programs. We follow this community usage in this report.

in curriculum, educational practices, teaching styles or organizational structures. Further, in its later years, BESP became increasingly less open and more structured, less autonomous and more centralized, less scattered and more consolidated, less innovative and more conventional.

Staff turnover was remarkably high at every level of federal, district, and BESP administration and management. Major staff changes occurred in the NIE/ESP offices, including resignation by its director and frequent replacement of its contract officers; the BUSD school board changed in composition; the BUSD superintendent resigned and was replaced by another; a new BESP Director was installed in Fall, 1973; the local Evaluation Director (Level I)\* resigned and several evaluation staff members were replaced; many BESP site directors failed to retain their positions during the five years of the project, including two who committed suicide; many teachers flowed in and out of BESP; and all non-certificated staff members paid by BESP funds were laid off on one occasion. The first outside evaluation contract was cancelled after two years and a competitive RFP was issued and awarded to ISA. As the new outside evaluation team, we did an intensive system-wide study in response to an NIE/ESP RFP issued in May, 1973. All these changes, in varying ways, reflect tensions within the system, and some reflect increasing bureaucratization.

As to degrees of choice, parents and students knew something about alternative schools, but the scope of that knowledge was limited. Students in alternative schools perceived slightly more choice of alternatives than did common school students, a natural result of their status as BESP students. Since most of the alternatives were located "on-site," i.e., within a common school, this reinforced the perception among many students that alternative schools were neither diverse nor particularly innovative. Berkeley common schools also have "innovative" classes, and many parents and students were unaware of any difference.

Analysis of interviews with BESP directors and with teachers in both BESP and common schools revealed few differences between BESP and BUSD curricula, teaching styles, staff make-up or utilization, or in their use of educational output measures. Interviews with students in both BESP and common schools revealed no significant differences in diversity, but did define some differences in images: proportionately more BESP students tended to view their schools as "hip" and unstructured, while more common school students viewed their schools as "traditional."

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\*The Level I evaluation was under the authority of BESP, to be conducted by personnel within the BESP structure, as distinct from ISA's "outside agency" evaluation which was designated Level II.

2. Has BESP been associated with change in dropout rates, truancy, vandalism; in parent/community participation in school program and policies; in new and/or changes in policies, practices and perceptions of school staff; in racial-economic-academic mix for students and staff; in staff and fund allocation; in the locus and nature of leadership?

- a. In investigating organizational-administrative issues, we found a variety of factors that influenced leadership function and staff allocation. During BESP's operation there was a strong trend toward centralization of authority and control over staff and funding allocations. Local BESP site directors had little autonomy, and, over the years, this eroded further. The turnover of directors and staff was very high and lines of authority and accountability were often unclear; there were few apparent alternative school "true believers" or "leaders." Few new or innovative "programs" developed as BESP continued.

BESP was transformed from a grant to a contract as of December 1973 when NIE/ESP entered the local alternative-school arena and took decision-making power over certain fiscal allocations. The entire BESP noncertificated staff was terminated, as was most of the in-project (Level I) evaluation staff. In 1973 no BESP Level I evaluation results were available to aid the administration in making decisions about which BESP schools to phase into BUSD or to close. Three schools (in addition to the two racially separatist schools mentioned previously) were terminated without the use of any objective evaluative criteria. United Nations West was terminated because it had a high proportion of Black students and staff and was considered potentially out of compliance with Office for Civil Rights desegregation rules. KARE and Willard Alternative, two of the largest "remedial" junior high schools, were closed because they were not considered to be in any way different from common schools. Since KARE, Willard and U.N. West were in existence during the year of ISA's study, they are included among the 21 BESP schools encompassed in the evaluation.\*

Some problems within BUSD stemmed from the school superintendent's resignation and his replacement by an out-of-state applicant. A bitter school board battle was waged over hiring his successor. Symptomatic of the acrimony generated in this controversy was the subsequent resignation of one Black Board member.

\*Detailed descriptions of each of the BESP schools are presented in Volume II of this final report.

The most serious organizational change was the great conflict and uncertainty over the future of BESP since no plan for 1974/75 was approved until much too late. Staff morale was low and hope for BESP's future dwindled away.

b. Turning to other components of NIE/ESP's compound Question 2, comparisons of BESP and common schools revealed:

- (1) No difference in student absentee rates
  - (2) No difference in vandalism, by cost or type
  - (3) No difference in student truancy
  - (4) No difference in dropout rates, except more BESP students reported they had "thought about dropping out"
  - (5) No difference in the proportion of students expelled or suspended
  - (6) No difference in resort to "parent-notices" (problem reports to parents )
  - (7) No difference between BESP and common school teachers' emphasis on basic skills
  - (8) No differences in teachers' assessment of various teaching techniques
  - (9) No new testing procedures developed in BESP that were "innovative" or even racially sensitive despite an emphasis on multi-cultural curricula in both BESP and common schools
  - (10) BESP teachers estimated their students' academic abilities lower than did common school teachers
  - (11) BESP teachers were more likely than common school teachers to rate themselves as "unstructured and permissive," although students saw no difference except in "hippy schools"
  - (12) In elementary grades, what children "liked" in their curriculum was approximately the same in BESP and common schools
  - (13) Mothers of BESP students had a greater amount of education than mothers of common school students
  - (14) Proportionally, more white students attended BESP, more Black students attended common schools
  - (15) White staff in both BESP and common schools are more experienced and better paid than minority staff
3. Has BESP brought about change in the quality of education as measured by objective and subjective questionnaires administered to parents and students?

A quality of Education Scale (QE) was developed from student interview data, indicating the degree of their satisfaction with

schooling, their actual educational attainment, and their academic self-rating. The QE measure permitted us to examine the relationships between students' objective achievement, perceived achievement, self-esteem and degree of anomie. On the QE scale, the significant difference revealed was not between BESP and common schools, but among BESP schools. The percentage of students who rated the quality of their education as high ranged from 6 percent in one BESP school to 67 percent in another, highlighting the contrasts within the alternative-school universe.

Scores on the Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills, used by the BUSD to test all students, were unavailable for one-half of the subjects in our sample. The test scores cannot be used as valid measures because of the bias contributed by such a loss of data. However, test data were reported and showed no significant difference between BESP and common school students.

We next examined the grade-point averages for BESP and common school students and found no statistically significant differences between the two groups.

Subjective measures were then used, and no differences between students attending BESP and common schools were found in mean scores on the Anomie Scale or in the mean scores on the Self-Esteem Scale.

Parents and students responded to a number of survey items regarding their perception of the equity and effectiveness of their respective schools. Analysis of these responses revealed no statistically significant differences in perceptions between BESP and common school parents and students.

Students and parents were asked about their image of BESP and common schools on a range of attributes. In general, parents were not familiar with BESP schools. Both parents and students rated common schools as having a greater emphasis on college preparation than BESP schools.

Students indicated that both BESP and common schools emphasized basic skills, while parents thought that common schools emphasized basic skills more.

Parents and students were asked to rate the schools as to their emphasis on ethnic identity and there were no major differences in rating between BESP and common schools.

Neither did parents and students feel that either BESP or common schools placed different emphases upon personal growth.

ISA then compared the opinions that students expressed about the value of educational attainment with those of their parents. The resultant Matched-Pair Scale allowed us to distinguish between students who agreed with their parents and those who did not. A large number of students thought poorly of education even though their parents valued it highly. These disaffected students were from two types of families, one white, upper-class professional, and the other, ethnic minorities. White "hippy" students were disaffected and cynical, but still did well academically; the disaffected students from ethnic minorities, on the other hand, had low levels of academic achievement. These two groups of disaffected students appeared to be "tracked" into different types of BESP schools, the "hippy" schools and the "residual" schools.

We next examined the correlation between the Matched-Pair Scale and students' assessment of the quality of their education. Those students who shared their parents' high regard for education also disproportionately rated the quality of their current education highly.

One-half of all students in Berkeley have parents who are professionals, and significantly more children from this group attended highly diverse BESP high schools, while more children from the working class attended residual schools. Children who shared their parents' high regard for education tended to be satisfied with the quality of their education, and disproportionately attended high schools of high diversity. However, approximately the same proportion of this type of student also attended common school, so there was no difference between BESP and common schools' ability to attract such students.

Among children of middle-class parents, one-third of the white students and one-half of the non-white students disagreed with their parents about the value of education, indicating a great amount of disaffection among students of all races in affluent families. When middle-class children shared their parents' positive views toward education, the students had high levels of achievement irrespective of race.

In conclusion, these findings were interpreted to mean that there are no significant differences in diversity between BESP and common schools, but within BESP, there is a dual tracking system for the "new,hippy youth" who choose highly diverse options, and another tracking system for "turned-off" minority students who are referred to remedial schools for work in basic skills, or for ethnic awareness within a framework of "survival skills."

Both groups of students are seeking new meaning, having rejected middle-class values. These types of disaffected youths found in BESP schools (and in Berkeley common schools as well) may well be the "problem students" of affluent America all across the country.

Each BESP school was rated as to its diversity and freedom of choice. Over the first three years of the project, the number of BESP schools rated as having high diversity decreased, and the number rated adjunct or residual increased.

The hiring of minority staff has been slowed, and many minority non-certificated staff have been laid off. However, there is no difference between the proportion of minority staff employed in either common or BESP schools. Students in both BESP and common schools reported on the incidents of racism they had observed in their schools, and BESP students reported less racism than did common school students.

Asked about parent power-sharing in government and decision-making, BESP directors reported only relatively small amounts of parent participation in any aspect of school policy. Parents reported no significant difference between amount of participation in BESP and common schools.

Both common and BESP teachers indicated great concern about the teaching of basic skills, but both groups of teachers agreed that basic skills were more likely to be emphasized in common schools.

In summary, we found no conclusive evidence that BESP had met its four goals in any significant manner, nor was there any evidence to conclude that BESP was more successful in these areas than were the common schools nor that it was able to create any major organizational change in the BUSD.

After two additional years of evaluation (1974/75), ISA has found no significant change in any of these findings reported in 1974. Now, after five years of the BESP, only seven of the 24 original alternative schools remain open. Five of these seven had already been in existence as alternatives, planned or in operation, prior to BESP funding. Only two options originated by BESP remain--College Prep and Early Learning Center."\*

\* It can be reasonably argued that Early Learning Center is a hybrid with a BESP K-3 "free school" component having been grafted on to an early learning experimental model that antedated BESP.

In the following analysis, we choose to go beyond the three contract questions, since they focused upon the local schools' implementation of BESP rather than upon the broader range of issues which emerged over the course of the experiment, issues that led us to examine the methodology of educational R&D itself. Responses to the three contract questions are included in this report, but they are embedded in a more sweeping analysis than the questions originally envisioned.

As Scriven (1967) has noted, summative evaluations include not only the "measuring of performance against goals, but include procedures for the evaluation of the goals." We have followed this prescription in the summative evaluation undertaken for this, our final report. To engage in such an endeavor required analytical as well as descriptive or measurement efforts, because such an evaluation assesses not only whether program goals have been met, but also whether the stated goals properly reflect the larger policy from which the goals were derived. In its final stage, this sort of evaluative research is intellectual work, resting in part on the inductive, empirical method, but finally turning to deduction to recreate the meanings of original policy intentions and suppositions.

Such an ambitious conception of the evaluative mandate is, of course, not universally shared. Wortman (1975) states, "Summative evaluation takes on the role of analyzing how effective the particular program was in attaining certain objectives and goals it was set up to obtain. It assumes that the treatment has been properly implemented." Wortman's conception is more humble than Scriven's or our own, because it restricts itself to assessing means-ends relations and fails to ask whether the programmatic ends fit the larger aims of the policy from which they stem. By following such an evaluative strategy, one is likely to conclude by "blaming the victim": if goals are not achieved, then it logically follows that the local people are to blame, since they are the ones responsible for operating the program and achieving its specified goals. Even if the stated goals are met, however, one still does not know whether the larger policy has been successfully achieved unless one follows the more ambitious evaluative strategy we suggest here. In this summative evaluation we do not assume that the stated "treatments" were proper or even that these "treatments" were properly implemented. Instead, for purposes of summation we are calling into question not only the efficacy of the "treatments," i.e., the programmatic actions taken to fulfill the goals set forth in the local BESP plan, but also the organization and logic of the whole experimental-schools enterprise, taking into account three project levels:

that of OE/NIE/ESP which contracted an educational R&D project to the Berkeley Unified School District, that of BUSD/BESP which implemented the six-million dollar experiment, and that of the consumers (students and parents) who were the project's ostensible or presumed beneficiaries. In short, we are evaluating the history, logic, utility, and consequences of educational R&D projects as such, in order to account for the fate of the project as it worked itself out in Berkeley.

## CHAPTER 2: SOCIO-POLITICAL AND EDUCATIONAL CONTEXTS

In our first annual report on BESP, which not only covered the 1973/74 school year but also sketched the origins, genesis and the first two years of this program, we dealt briefly with the socio-political background and context of ESP in general and of its Berkeley component in particular. In this final report it is appropriate to revert to these matters as essential factors in any serious summative evaluation. We proceed to such a contextual examination under four major headings: (1) the overall socio-political background and context (as these were directly related to education), (2) relevant developments in the educational field, (3) the specific political mold in which ESP was cast, and (4) the Berkeley environment as it influenced the public school system.

### 1. The Overall Socio-political Background and Context

In the two decades preceding ESP a gathering movement for school reform was spurred on by a variety of socio-political phenomena. In the 1950's the sharpest spurs were administered by the Supreme Court's desegregation decision, by the technological revolution and "the message beeped by Sputnik" (Rafferty, 1970), a message whose volume was magnified by the cold war. In the 1960's the most painful pricks were inflicted by the two wars--the war on poverty and the war in Vietnam--and their corollary movements: ghetto upheavals and youth insurgency. Simultaneously, persisting and growing through both decades as a public concern with the educational outcome (e.g., Why Johnny Can't Read) and the behavioral performance (e.g., The Blackboard Jungle) of the school system. The several phenomena were not so separated in time as might be inferred from the above; the technological revolution, the cold war, Black discontent were not confined to just one decade, and the poor were, indeed, always with us in all that time. Nonetheless, at different times the relative degree to which one or another phenomenon impinged upon public awareness varied.

In the 1950's the impact of the technological revolution was manifested in academic and governmental initiatives to improve curricula in mathematics and the physical sciences. Symptomatic of this trend was the National Science Foundation's Course Content Improvement Program and the emergence of NSF as the principal federal sponsor of research and development in education (Sproull, et al., 1975). Early in the decade the University of Illinois Committee on School Mathematics began its revisions of the secondary school mathematics curriculum and a little later the Physical Sciences Committee began to perform the same service for high school physics (Silberman, 1970).

It is a point of pride among pioneers in this curriculum reform movement that they began their labors before Sputnik was catapulted into orbit, but they acknowledge that their initially modest enterprise was given an extraordinary fillip by the Soviet satellite. Curriculum reform was blasted from the academic cloister into the central arena of world politics, and academic detachment was not so detached as to miss the implications. Not atypically, Kerber and Smith (1968) observed:

We are presently engaged in a cold war with Russia, in which everything the Soviets do, and everything we do, assumes a competitive posture....Ever since Sputnik knocked American provincialism into a cocked hat, we have been making a reappraisal of our educational system. More than ever, people are aware that the greatest battle in the ideological war is being conducted in the field of education.

Despite such expansive visions of education's mission in the cold war, it is relevant to note, especially in view of what was to come in the post-Sputnik decade, that much of the furor occasioned by the Soviet surprise had an elitist thrust. That is, the ideologues could serve as cheerleaders, celebrants, priests and propagandists in the space race, and in these several roles might involve a mass public, both here and abroad, but the decisive runners in the race itself were the scientists and technologists. The obvious conclusion was that the country needed more and better scientists and technologists, but "more" is a relative term; it did not signify so many as to alter the essentially exclusive nature of such a talent pool. It is, of course, wise to call many even though only few are to be chosen, as this renders the process of competition and selection more productive. This consideration provided an added incentive to revamp high school curricula in mathematics and physical sciences, but an emphasis remained on the few to be chosen. Among the unchosen residue, there would be a cadre to perform the lesser chores in the new technological system.

We have dwelt on this early elitist strain in the contemporary clamor for educational reform because it persisted as an apparent contradiction when the focus shifted to the bottom layers of our society, the most remote from any brand of elitism. The shift was executed with the proclamation of the war on poverty. It soon became apparent that, if some saw education as the principal ideological battlefield of the cold war, others now perceived it as the superweapon in the new war. Certainly President Johnson conveyed this impression. "As a son of a poor farmer," he said, "I know that education is the only valid passport from poverty" (Goldman, 1969).

In signing the Economic Opportunity Act in August, 1964, the President declared:

Today, for the first time in all the history of the human race, a great nation is able to make and is willing to make a commitment to eradicate poverty among its people.

In signing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in April, 1965, he declared: "I believe deeply that no law I have signed or will ever sign means more to the future of America" (Johnson, 1971).

In the President's design for the "Great Society" the two acts were intertwined. Such personal conviction as may have motivated him was also buttressed by the exigencies of politics. Hodgson (1975) has argued that the President was bent on achieving that "Great Society" without alienating the power structure or the Congress, and as other expedients encountered stiffening political opposition, the resort to educational programs increased. After all, giving money to public schools was more honored in the American tradition than giving money to the poor.

Four months after the White House fanfare that attended enactment of ESEA, the most ambitious of the educational programs, gunfire and flames swept the Los Angeles ghetto of Watts, ushering in a series of long, hot summers, with their shocking toll of death and devastation in the country's ghettos. "The civil peace has been shattered....The American people are deeply disturbed..., baffled and dismayed by the wholesale looting and violence," said President Johnson in appointing the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders.

The Commission's report was not reassuring: "Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white"; "the future of every American" is now threatened. It also found that "the typical riot participant was a high school dropout." One of the very few of its witnesses it quoted directly was Superintendent Paul W. Briggs of Cleveland:

Many of those whose recent acts threaten the domestic safety and tear at the roots of the American democracy are the products of yesterday's inadequate and neglected inner-city schools.

The Commission thereupon proceeded to document its finding that "the bleak record of public education for ghetto children is grow-

ing worse." (It is worth noting that the report was written in 1968, when the ESEA, Head Start and Upward Bound programs were well under way, and yet found that education in the ghetto was getting worse instead of better.)

With all the attention centered on "the typical riot participant" and the schools that produced him, when the report turned to "Recommendations for National Action," Education led all the rest, consuming 33 of the 73 pages devoted to recommendations, three times the space given to Employment, and twice the space for Housing. The section on education urged, among other things, "expanded experimentation, evaluation, and research," proposing that research be oriented to learning "about the most effective methods of teaching disadvantaged children in schools segregated by race and class," and that "current efforts to develop new patterns of education (such as storefront schools and street academies)" be considered and evaluated. These and other efforts, including ESEA, it was said, should be subject to "thorough evaluation." (Although this was 14 years after the Supreme Court's desegregation decision, the Commission accepted schools, segregated by race as well as class, as realities to which educational research had to be adjusted.)

The preoccupation with education had an elementary logic: if the "typical riot participant" was a dropout from a deplorable school system, then a less deplorable school system might produce fewer dropouts who become typical rioters. Once again education was thrown into the breach in confrontation with a social problem of staggering magnitude. But what was the root of the problem? The report said: "White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II." White racism was the primary cause--but better education of Blacks was to be a primary remedy. The logic of this juxtaposition was more complex than that of the progression from better schools to fewer rioters.

Whatever the logic, by the end of the 1960's our schools were to be principal instruments to overcome white racism, or at least some of its most serious consequences; to eliminate poverty; to help us win the space race (and related military races); and to triumph in the cold war. Since the existence of these challenges was prima facie evidence that the schools, as constituted, had not obviated them, then the schools had to be changed.

As if all that were not enough, education was also shaken by rebellion among those who were conventionally assumed to be its principal beneficiaries. This was rebellion, not by the Black and the poor, but by the white and relatively affluent; not by the academic underachievers and dropouts, but by those whose places at the top of the academic achievement ladder was attested to by

their attendance at some of the country's most prestigious universities. For a time, the country's attention shifted back and forth between "disturbances" in the ghettos and "disturbances" on the campuses. And not only the college campuses, unrest spread to the high schools. Three out of five principals, responding to a national survey in March 1969, reported some form of active protest at their high schools during the preceding four months; in the big cities the count was three out of four (U. S. News, September 8, 1969). The scope and intensity of the college protests is conveyed in one set of figures compiled by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover: 4,000 arrests in the 1968/69 academic year; 7,200 arrests in 1969/70 (President's Commission on Campus Unrest, 1970).

The Commission (1967-68) on "civil disorders" in the ghettos was followed in 1970 by the President's Commission on Campus Unrest. The Campus Commission found that "three issues--racism, war and the denial of personal freedoms--unquestionably were and still are contributing causes of student unrest," but that these issues were subsumed in "the new youth culture," which was "a basic--perhaps the basic contributing cause of campus unrest." Curiously, although the Commission's inquiry was directed to an arena of the educational system, its recommendations did not center on educational reform. Instead, it said: "The most urgent task for government must be to restore the faith of Americans in...government" (and also in "their fellow citizens"). "In this task the President must take the lead. For as President Nixon has said, it is the responsibility of a President to 'articulate the nation's values, define its goals, and marshal its will.' The Presidency is a symbol of national unity and values...." (Three years later the incumbent President also became a symbol of Watergate.)

The Commission's accent may have been on an ideological-political response, but others, e.g., Silberman (1970) and Rafferty (1970), saw student unrest as the symptom of a profound crisis in education that called for drastic changes in our schools. In addition to all the other problems that had been piled on the schools (poverty, racism, and the cold war), they were now also summoned to overcome what was regarded as an intergenerational cultural malaise. Heavy, indeed, were the burdens laid upon education. How did the educators and educational theorists respond?

## 2. Relevant Developments in the Education Field

Two conspicuous aspects of the response of educational functionaries and theorists to the swirl of pressures about them were: (1) the remarkable swiftness of the transition in the mid-1960's from near-euphoric optimism to what Moynihan and Mosteller (1972) described as "a certain atmosphere of 'cultural despair'," and (2) a rich abundance of conflicting opinions about what ailed education and what to do about it.

An example of the optimism that prevailed as late as 1965 was afforded by Robert Havighurst, social psychologist, when fund allocations under ESEA Title I were begun. The next five years, he said, will see an all-out effort to:

1. Raise the average IQ of children from low income families by ten points.
2. Eradicate that large segment of mental retardation which is due to environmental deprivation.
3. Clear out 50 to 75 percent of the severe retardation in reading and arithmetic which now exists in elementary schools. (In Beck and Saxe, eds., 1965)

Others were also bullish on experiment and change in education, but somewhat more restrained than Havighurst, among them James E. Allen, Commissioner of Education, first for New York State and then the United States; Robert H. Anderson of Harvard; and Silberman (1970). The abrupt change of mood in mid-decade may be dramatized by names and years: 1965--Havighurst; 1966--Coleman. With the Coleman report's massive data, which indicated that physical plant and equipment, and even enriched curricula and lower pupil-teacher ratios, and all the other things that money was buying for the schools had little effect in lessening inequalities of achievement between children from unequal socio-economic backgrounds, some basic premises of ESEA and related programs were seemingly shattered. Soon after, specific innovations--team teaching, curriculum reform, nongraded primary schools, television and computers as teaching tools--were debunked as representing "more gimmickry and packaging than substantial change" (Silberman, 1970).

The debate touched off by the Coleman report centered not so much on its findings of fact, which, in the main, withstood challenge, as on the political conclusions that were drawn from those findings, particularly the conclusion that there was little point in throwing much money into compensatory education because of the uncertainties about the good it would do. A representative comment on the latter issue appeared in a New York Times editorial (August 15, 1970):

Contrary to much politically motivated criticism of compensatory education for disadvantaged children, these programs are not only too new for meaningful judgment but, more important, many have lagged precisely because they have never been adequately funded.

Controversy continued to flare around specific innovations.

There certainly was no consensus about the issues sprouting from the Coleman report and other findings that seemed to contradict earlier assumptions about educational reform, but just as certainly there was a marked change of general mood circa 1966. The educational reform movement of the prior decade had been launched, as reform movements often are, on a high wave of hope, and now it appeared to have descended into a slough of skepticism. It is not possible to gauge the degree to which this change of mood was influenced by major socio-political developments external to the educational system, but it is relevant to note some of those developments. By 1966 Washington's focus had shifted from the war on poverty to the war in Vietnam. By 1966 the ghetto upheavals had shattered societal complacency about the progress being made toward "equality" with anti-poverty expenditures, civil rights legislation, and the deliberate pace of integrationist efforts. New, militant voices clamored in Black communities, branding integration as a euphemism for assimilation, proclaiming that the melting pot was not for them, they wanted "Black Power." By 1966 campus unrest had attained sufficient force so that there was a certain irony to repeating the old complaint that white middle-class values were alien to the children of the Black poor and it was therefore inappropriate for schools to attempt to foist the former upon the latter. Now it appeared that white middle-class values were also alien to a good many children of the white middle class.

All those developments, which were bound up with the socio-political phenomena we described earlier, impinged ever more directly upon educational controversy. Manifestly, "Black Power" militancy stimulated movements for community control of ghetto schools, for Black studies, for varied forms of Black autonomy within the educational structure. Similarly, a resurgence of white radicalism, which was most explosive on the campuses but which also found a wider constituency in opposition to the Vietnam war, stimulated a movement for "Free Schools" and for more radical alternatives within the official school system, radical not only in the extent of their departure from conventional forms, but also in the cultural and social substance of what was to be taught. These and other pressures were reflected in the educational controversies that have raged since the mid-1960's. Some of the principal antagonists and the issues they joined are listed below:

Moynihan vs. Jencks (Hodgson, 1975): "Benign neglect" vs. far more profound governmental action against economic inequality, up to and including establishment of "political control over the economic institutions that shape our society," which "is what other countries usually call socialism."\*

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\* (Footnote on following page.)

Silberman vs. Katz (Katz, 1973): inadvertent mindlessness vs. deliberate policy as the explanation for the state of our schools, which both agree is deplorable.\*\*

Fantini vs. Kohl (Fantini, 1973): moderation and consensus vs. radicalism and confrontation in effecting educational change.

Armor vs. Pettigrew (Hodgson, 1975): the contention that school integration has failed to improve academic achievement vs. the argument that integration has yet to be truly tried.

Even an extension of such a list would not convey the profusion of the arguments and what, at times, appears like a confusion, as they criss-cross ideological lines. Central to the controversies is the function of the public schools. Deeply rooted in tradition is the vision of Horace Mann and other pioneers of public education in the United States that school is the "great equalizer," and the primary instrument, therefore, for beneficent change in society by eradicating or diminishing social and economic inequality. A typical contemporary expression of that credo comes from Glennan (1970):

The nation's school system...faces rising expectations....For no part of the population is this more true than for the poor and disadvantaged who see the nation's school system as an essential contributor--perhaps the main contributor--to success of their children and an essential means for equalizing opportunity.

Opposed to that credo is a growing number of educational scholars who maintain that the public schools were designed, not to eliminate socio-economic inequality, but to reinforce it; that instead

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\* To be sure, Moynihan coined "benign neglect" in an extra-educational context, but his celebration of the "splendid...achievement" of education in overcoming "the mores of caste and class" by the mid-1960's (Mosteller and Moynihan, 1972) invites the inference that prevailing concerns with education's failures are excessive. Jencks' proposals for bold societal action, on the other hand, flow from a conviction that schools, per se, have done, and can do, little to overcome the socio-economic consequences of "the mores of caste and class."

\*\* For a specific example, both Katz and Silberman agree that schools inculcate docility in children, and both deplore this, but Silberman attributes it to mindlessness, whereas Katz insists that such inculcation is part of a larger design to condition children to accept their place in the social structure.

of being instruments for social reform and change, they are tools in the hands of the most powerful and privileged beneficiaries of the existing social order to perpetuate the status quo. A typical expression of this viewpoint: "They [the schools] were designed to reflect and confirm the social structure that erected them.... American education...is, and\*was...bureaucratic, racist, and class-biased" (Katz, 1971; also see Rist, 1973, and Carnoy, 1974). Such analyses lead to certain conclusions. One sees "the fundamental necessity to change the economic and social structure before the system of public schooling can be changed" (Carnoy, 1974), which inverts the traditional view that schools would change society. Another is simpler: scrap the public schools (Illich, 1971). However, most radical critics are inclined to agree that "abandoning the children in the schools until the basic structure of society is changed is a luxury appropriate for those who can separate themselves from the present needs of parents and children" (Leiner, 1975).

For these critics American public education was tainted from its birth in the second third of the 19th century and subsequent reforms were merely adjustments to changing circumstances, so that the schools could better perform their initial mission of rendering the lower social orders economically functional and politically acquiescent. However, another and no less critical school of thought contended that the crisis in education began when it was taken over in the second third of the 20th century "by the burning-eyed, thin-lipped disciples of Dr. John Dewey," who squelched all dissent from "Progressive Education" and its "life adjustment" cult (Rafferty, 1970). This school not only clamored for change, but celebrated its manifestations. Typically, Dr. Rafferty declared:

...education has of late convulsed violently against this [Progressive Education] cult of gray-flanneled facelessness. Fireworks are going off all over the educational map....The winds of change are freshening.

Rafferty's advocacy of "Education in Depth" (i.e., "the systematic imparting of organized and disciplined subject matter" in an environment of discipline and order) evoked an impressive public response. This was demonstrated not only by his election (1962) and a re-election by a landslide (1966) as California State Superintendent of Public Instruction, but in other manifestations of public sentiment, typified by a Gallup Poll which found that a majority of Americans, if given the choice, would send their children to a public school "that has strict discipline, including a dress code, and that puts emphasis on the three R's" (Phi Delta Kappan, December, 1975).

It would seem that in the 1960's there was a widespread belief in two propositions: (1) education was in a crisis, and (2) drastic

changes were needed to overcome the crisis. But what sort of change? There the agreement ended. All over the educational landscape, educators and parents unfurled the banner of "Change"--but they marched in different directions.

Moreover, ideological lines in themselves were no certain clues to what was meant by the cry for change. For example, it seemed that Katz had a much closer ideological affinity with Jonathan Kozol than with Rafferty, and yet it also seemed, on the surface at least, that on a critical issue he was closer to the latter than the former. One of Rafferty's Ten Commandments for education (1970) was "Thou Shalt Not Propagandize" (said he: "One of the biggest problems is ... teachers with a message.") Katz (1971) concurred: schools should concentrate on "strictly educational tasks," including "fundamental skills" and excluding "the conscious attempt to formulate social attitudes."\* To Kozol, on the other hand, the "neutral classroom" is the ultimate betrayal, a Pontius Pilate-like evasion of the ethical obligation to challenge injustice and oppression in our society, an evasion which tacitly acquiesces to the larger pressures in the society that stunt or deform the moral sensibilities of children. For him, "The only forms of educational innovation that are serious and worth considering in this nation...are those that constitute direct rebellion, explicit confrontation, or totally independent ventures, such as networks, storefronts, Free Schools, and the like, which stand entirely outside of the public system and which at all times labor to perform the function of provocateur and counterfoil" (Kozol, 1975).

It would be presumptuous for us to pass judgments on the conflicting opinions we have sketched, or to embark upon an analysis of the merits or defects of the several protagonists. Indeed, we have not even attempted a comprehensive summary of contending viewpoints. Our more limited aim was to provide a symptomatic description of the educational context in which the U.S. Office of Education, in the year 1970, embarked upon a program of research and development to produce "comprehensive change" in the schools, without defining just what this meant, leaving this burden to local school districts which were to find their own way amid all the strident, contentious and confusing counsels abroad in the land.

Our survey of educational cross-currents, joined with the earlier sketch of the socio-political context, also serves as pre-

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\* Katz seems to be more consistent than Rafferty, as the latter aggressively champions inculcation of "Patriotism" in the classroom, presumably on the premise that what he perceives as "Patriotism" is a self-evident truth, and its advocacy, therefore, could not be labelled propaganda.

lude to considering the specific political circumstances that attended the birth of ESP.

### 3. The Specific Political Mold in Which ESP Was Cast

By 1970 President Johnson was in retirement in Texas and the remains of the "Great Society" lingered on in Washington. Over all, it is fair to say, Nixon administration policy called for retrenchment of programs launched under the "Great Society" rubric, but legislative enactments and bureaucratic structures tend to acquire a life force of their own, independent of their original creators; they are not easily attenuated or dismantled. The extant educational programs posed special problems for the administration, not only because of education's lofty niche in the American value system, but also because education, as President Nixon noted in 1970, was a \$65 billion a year business. An enterprise of such magnitude begets vested interests: a bureaucracy, a work force, a network of suppliers (from big publishing houses to crayon manufacturers). All these interests had a stake in maintaining, and even expanding, the flow of federal funds to the schools. Moreover, the "anti-poverty" aspects of those programs represented, on one level, a transfer of funds to urban slums. Finally, slum dwellers did not read such studies as the Coleman report, and even if they did, it is doubtful that they would be dissuaded from assuming a correlation between more money and more education.

Cognizant of those political realities the White House established a Working Group in 1969, under the aegis of John Ehrlichman's office for domestic affairs, to formulate an administration policy on public school education. Moynihan, who appeared to be the guiding spirit of the group, shaped the essential guidelines for its labors: the "Great Society" educational programs were working poorly, the benefits of compensatory education were dubious, more money was not the answer (Sproull et al., 1975). What, then, was the answer? More and better research was needed to find it. This stratagem was not as simple as it seemed. If research was presented, in the long run, as the quest for the answer, it also could be vested, in the short run, with the guise of the best answer to the immediate problem of what to do. As will soon be shown, this dual aspect of research was the seed of political discord. To initiate and guide a more ambitious research and development effort a new federal agency was proposed, exclusively devoted to this function. This ideal looked even better when a young HEW staff member recalled that in the 1968 election campaign Nixon had proposed a "National Institute for the Educational Future." Thus, the National Institute of Education was conceived as an educational program with a distinct Nixon stamp and the fulfillment of a Nixon campaign promise. In a special message to Congress (March 3, 1970), the President said that (1) for the most part, the "ambitious, idealistic, and costly pro-

grams for the disadvantaged," launched in the preceding decade, have not measurably helped poor children catch up;" (2) "we are not getting as much as we should for the dollars we spend" for education, and therefore more should be spent "toward finding out how to make our educational dollars go further;" and (3) NIE would be "a focus for educational research and experimentation in the United States," as part of "a searching re-examination of our entire approach to learning." In the meantime, while the Congress deliberated the NIE proposal (a deliberative process that was to consume two years), the President urged approval of an immediate increase of \$67 million for educational research in FY 1971, including \$25 million for the Experimental Schools Program, which he considered to be "highly important." ESP was thus conceived in tandem with a more grandiose educational research and development program, and the same political considerations were attached to both. The President's several references to the defects of ongoing programs and to the inadequate returns from the educational dollar, coupled with his emphasis on research and development, invited the suspicion that the NIE proposal, irrespective of its intrinsic merits, was also a foil in the politically delicate business of trimming outlays for the "idealistic and costly programs" to which he had referred. "Will research be largely the pause that relaxes the budget?" was the pointed question of Fred M. Hechinger, educational commentator of the New York Times (March 8, 1970). The Democratic Congress manifestly harbored suspicion of NIE and extended it to the Republican administration's overall enthusiasm for educational research and experimentation. As a consequence, Congress did three things in considering the FY 1971 budget: (1) for the first time it handled the appropriations for the Office of Education separately from the total HEW budget;\* (2) it fattened the Administration's overall budget for education-- and (3) it slashed the proposed outlays for research. In his veto of the Congressional measure, the President complained:

This bill raises the spending on old approaches that experience has proved inadequate rather than moving boldly on the new approaches that we need...and it cuts requested funds for such forward-looking programs as...research (August 11, 1970).

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\* Separate consideration of the education budget was justified on the grounds that this would facilitate its approval before the school year began, and thereby enable school districts to take federal funding into account in their planning. However, separate consideration also ensured a focused spotlight on the politically sensitive issue of educational funding, not blurred or obscured by everything else that goes into an HEW budget.

These tensions persisted even after Congress finally voted the legislation to establish NIE. In late 1973, Representative John Brademas, Indiana Democrat and Chairman of the House Select Subcommittee on Education, commented on a seeming paradox in the initial funding for NIE, namely,

That the \$162 million recommended by an anti-education administration should have been reduced to \$75 million by a Congress that consistently votes more money for education than the President wants...(Brademas, 1974).

In large measure, Brademas went on, Congress acted as it did because "the mentality of Watergate...cropped up in...the White House attitude toward the NIE." The President, Brademas said, exhibited "contempt for the law of the land" by being dilatory in appointing a National Council on Educational Research, which Congress had designed to make policy for NIE. The point is not whether Brademas's invocation of Watergate was justified in the circumstances. The point is that educational research, which, on the surface, should have been as sanctified as motherhood, was caught in such strong political cross-currents that probably the most influential member of the House in educational matters could hurl the most pejorative term in the politics of the time at the White House in a controversy about the agency that was established to bear the principal burden of educational research and development.

To be sure, ESP antedated NIE, but both were born under the same political star, and although ESP's first nest was in OE, it was commonly understood that it would be transferred to the bureaucratic precincts of NIE as soon as these were established.

The rationale for creating NIE was a standard one: a new agency was needed to implement a bold, new program. Implicit in this rationale are two assumptions: (1) the program is so new and bold that (2) existing agencies lack the capacity to launch and operate it. The existing agency, in this specific instance, was the U.S. Office of Education, a venerable institution that for more than a century has been the principal federal instrument in the field of education. Moreover, within the constraints of the American governmental system which vests responsibility for public education in the states, OE's primary function was research. Much of it was the most elementary form of research, i.e., the collection and dissemination of information about education, but it also embarked, increasingly so in the 1960's, upon more sophisticated research into educational methodology and what President Nixon termed "the mystery of the learning process." Indeed, just prior to the conception of NIE, OE's Bureau of Research had been transformed into the National

Center for Educational Research and Development, reflecting the new emphasis in educational research. Why could not NCERD have been enlarged and entrusted with the implementation of an expanded research and development program in education? One possible answer has already been suggested: there was political advantage in dramatizing what was offered as an innovative federal initiative in education, and the creation of a new agency served this purpose. However, a scholarly study of NIE's creation (Sproull et al., 1975) suggests that more was involved.

In the latter half of the 1960's, as misgivings grew about federal educational programs, OE was increasingly subjected to critical surveillance. In 1967-69, for example, 10 different studies of federal educational research and development were conducted by arms of the Congress and executive branch. Within the executive branch, the most critical attitude toward OE was exhibited by three agencies: the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Office of Science and Technology (OST), and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE), HEW. These three agencies inspired the re-organization of OE's Bureau of Research into the National Center for Educational Research and Development, but after NCERD came into being they looked at what they had helped to create, and they were disappointed. They concluded it would be best for educational research and development if it were removed from OE control. Thereafter, they became key initiators of the proposal to create NIE. They decided, according to Sproull et al., that it would be easier to launch a new agency than to reform the old one.

Underlying the bureaucratic displeasure with OE was a fundamental issue of orientation. The three agencies, most especially OMB and OST, were logical protagonists of R&D. For OMB, the cost-benefit ratio was a paramount consideration, and patently this yardstick is more readily applicable to R&D than to basic research. The coupling of science and technology in OST's name already suggests a predilection for tangible products of scientific research. As for ASPE, its evaluative function would predispose it to measurable outcomes. All three were pragmatic in outlook, and R&D is the quintessential pragmatism in the field of science.

Responding to the pressures for R&D in education, OE officials entered into seminars with officers of the Defense Department, which was the epitome of R&D expertise and performance. OE's Bureau of Research began to resort to RFP's that followed the Pentagon models. Many OE RFP's went so far as "to stipulate sampling design, questionnaire topics, scheduling of the projects' phases, and other features of research design which traditionally have been the prerogatives of the researchers" (Sproull et al., 1975). The shift from basic research to development was striking; by FY 1970 only 8 percent of

OE research funds went for basic research, whereas 31 percent went to applied research and 61 percent to development. This corresponded to the Pentagon pattern, but was in marked contrast to other HEW agencies, such as the health institutes, that continued to devote one-third of their budgets to basic research.

OE tried to conform to the new R&D wave but, as noted before, it was found wanting by agencies that wielded far greater influence in Washington. OE's directorate was traditionally staffed by personnel from the educational establishment; for education R&D, it was felt, a different breed of leaders was needed: men trained in modern technology and the physical sciences, experienced administrators in the public or private sectors, business managers, systems analysts. It is symptomatic that the first director of planning for NIE in its pre-natal phase was Roger Levien and the man who recommended him for the planning post, Thomas Glennan, became the first director of NIE. Neither came out of a school of education, neither was part of the educational establishment, and both possessed some or all of the attributes listed above. These were men much more consonant with the pragmatic considerations of R&D than traditional educationists.

In the next chapter of this report we examine in some detail the origins and implications of educational R&D. Here we are concerned with the background and context of ESP, and it seems that the hard, pragmatic compulsions that entered into the creation of NIE, which was to direct the latter phases of ESP, are significant features of the background and context.

Spending its formative period in transition from OE to NIE also affected the development of ESP. One gets a sense that in its first year ESP was in OE but not of it. The knowledge that it was soon to be transferred to another agency, that its parent agency of the moment had been judged, in effect, deficient in the very sort of endeavor for which ESP had been created, imparted to ESP a unique feeling of autonomy. This feeling was so pronounced that ESP withheld information about what it was doing from its nominal chief, the U.S. Commissioner of Education. By the time the transfer to NIE was effected, the fundamental outlines of ESP's operation had been completed; the principal experimental school sites had been chosen; the several school-district projects had been approved; funds had been allocated. From NIE's vantage point, ESP was a transplant from another agency, not something that emerged from NIE's planning and creative processes. At the same time, as a new institution still evolving its own patterns of authority, NIE felt it incumbent to establish its authority over this program which already was well under way. Such a situation is conducive to an excess of intervention. And if, in fact, this occurred, one may speculate about the effect upon ESP, which had been habituated to the relative laissez faire parentage of OE. We are not privy to the internal organi-

zational operations of NIE, and our references to them must therefore be tentative, but we are well acquainted with certain external symptoms: the changes in ESP's relationship to the Berkeley project after NIE took over, the frequent turnover of personnel in the overall command of ESP and in the supervision of the Berkeley project. These symptoms are detailed and examined elsewhere in a more appropriate framework: the description and evaluation of the Berkeley project. Their relevance here goes to context; they do seem to corroborate our tentative assumptions that ESP's transition from OE to NIE was attended by organizational friction, dislocation and instability, which could not help but affect the Berkeley project.

Despite the hyperbole that attended ESP's debut (the President called it "a bridge between basic educational research and actual school practices" and the initial ESP directorate spoke of "comprehensive change" and even "total change in education), it was a relatively modest program as measured by the decisive fiscal yardstick. Only \$25 million was initially intended for it in an education budget that exceeded \$4 billion for FY 1971, and half of the \$25 million was diverted to the Division of Vocational and Technical Education.

From all the foregoing, it appears that the origins of ESP and NIE were clouded by political suspicion and contention, were marked by organizational tensions, and that in the politics shaping federal educational policy in 1970-71, ESP was a small potato.

In the society at large, complex and conflicting social passions, pressures and forces produced movements for change in the schools, but the metamorphosis of inchoate public desires into federal statutes and appropriations proceeds through the checks-and-balances maze of the executive and legislative branches. These political institutions place their stamp on what ultimately emerges. Inevitably, the quality of this stamp affects the quality of performance in implementing an enactment. It may be assumed that this held true for the enactments creating ESP and NIE.

#### 4. The Berkeley Context.

Campus radicalism and the continuing growth and assertiveness of the Black population were two big things that happened in (and to) Berkeley in the 1960's.

It is important to understand that the "Free Speech Movement" on the University of California campus in late 1964 was not just another disturbance among many on the country's campuses. Dubbing this movement "The Berkeley Invention," the President's Commission on Campus Unrest (1970) reported:

What happened at Berkeley was more than the sum of its parts. The events on that campus ...defined an authentic political invention-- a new and complex mixture of issues, tactics, emotions, and setting--that became the prototype for student protest throughout the decade.

The Commission rendered its judgment in 1970; the campus protesters had arrived at a similar perception six years earlier. The sense of innovation and pioneering, of having set a pattern that was followed by others, imparted a unique elan and vitality to Berkeley campus radicalism for the rest of the decade.

What happens on campus is supremely important in Berkeley. The university dominates the city's economic life; it is the paramount influence in shaping the city's social, intellectual and cultural ambience. Campus radicalism reverberated throughout the city. It must be remembered that a focal point of the campus protest was the educational system, which was condemned as dehumanized, irrelevant, computerized, bureaucratized, and repressive. And if this was said about the university, what was there to say about the elementary and secondary schools? The question was both asked and answered in Berkeley. One answer was a proliferation of private "Free Schools," which sprouted and perished at a hectic pace; by 1970, 39 of these were in operation with an estimated enrollment of 1,000. These were symptomatic of a widespread desire for experimentation and change in the schools, and this desire was shared by many more parents than were ready for the radical leap out of the official public school system.

The conspicuous visibility and audibility of the campus radicalism, along with an older radical tradition (Berkeley had had a Socialist mayor circa 1912), tended to obscure a deep, countervailing conservative current that was also endemic in the city. Nonetheless it manifested itself. In the 1966 election of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Rafferty won a majority in Berkeley, securing 19,324 votes to 9,787 for his closest competitor. To be sure, the ascendant radicalism in the second half of the 1960's, which spilled over into the subsequent decade, provided a powerful stimulus to the demand for educational change and set a style for rhetoric within the school system, but a conservative counterweight was also present.

We turn now to the dramatic changes in the ethnic makeup of the city's population. Continuing a trend that had set in earlier, between 1960 and 1970 Berkeley's Black population grew by 25.5 percent, even as the white population declined by 3.7 percent. In the same decade the white public school enrollment dropped by 27.7 percent and the Asian enrollment fell from 8 to 6 percent of the total. By 1970 Black students accounted for more than two-fifths of the enrollment in the district.

Berkeley was ill-prepared for such changes. In 1954 (coincidentally, the year of the Supreme Court's desegregation decision) members of the Emerson Elementary School PTA, which was white and university-oriented, became concerned that the only Blacks their children ever saw close up were menials. They decided to inform the school board that they "would welcome a full time Negro teacher at Emerson." Apparently, the PTA membership was worried by such temerity; at a subsequent meeting the message was revised to say that "we would have no objection to a Negro teacher." In the same year, Dr. Thomas Nelson, Berkeley Superintendent of Schools, declared he would never place a Negro teacher at Berkeley High School (Sibley, 1972).

Ready or not, Berkeley continued to receive the wave of Black settlers. It was not impervious to the massive civil rights movement of the early 1960's. By the late 1960's, after the ghetto volcanoes had erupted across the country, it was not politic or possible to say things that were said in the early 1950's. In 1966-68, the concerns with race and racism in the school district were manifested in three developments:

1. An episode occurred in September, 1966, and to understand it requires an appreciation for the socio-economic character of Berkeley's Black population. Berkeley is not Watts or Detroit or Newark. The city's university ambience exerted its most powerful attraction to Black settlers in the white-collar and professional/business occupations. As noted in ISA's first annual report, for example, more than half of the Black students in its Experimental School student sample had parents in those occupations. The ghetto explosions produced only a faint echo in Berkeley and this, in turn, was touched off by a relatively minor disturbance across the Bay in San Francisco. The most serious of four Berkeley episodes, which followed the outbreak in San Francisco, was a gathering of some 60 Black high school students after school on a Friday; they chanted "Black Power," forced their way into several science laboratories, and struck some white students who tried to repel them. Superintendent Neil V. Sullivan reacted to these events. He recognized that what had happened at San Francisco's Hunters Point was not of the same magnitude as the previous year's outbreak in Watts, but, he added, "again, as in Watts, it was the minority youth, the jobless high school students and high school dropouts who burst out in anger." He also said: "Glossing over the San Francisco outburst, as well as our comparatively minor outburst in Berkeley, would be as dangerous as treating cancer with an aspirin" (Sullivan, 1969). He took emergency steps: an informal gathering of students and teachers Sunday evening, a general assembly at Berkeley High School Monday morning, where students could voice grievances and "hurts." In retrospect, Sullivan felt his efforts were successful. Tensions eased. It had taken a small incident to lay bare the large anxiety.

2. In September, 1968, a grand design for the bused desegregation of the entire public school system was put into effect.

3. Earlier that year, even as the plan for desegregating the elementary schools was being completed, uneasiness grew about the tensions at the secondary school level. Berkeley High School, being the only high school in the district, had been desegregated, perforce, all along. In March 1968, Superintendent Sullivan perceived such "growing tensions between students" at the secondary level, such "increasing alienation between students and staff," that he appointed a committee to seek the causes of these conditions. The committee, headed by Jeff Tudisco, reported in May that "the overall Berkeley public school environment creates hostility and alienation, especially among minority students." It also found that "secondary education is dull, meaningless, irrelevant, and archaic." In summary, it placed "the blame" for the existing state of affairs "upon the adults in the schools who have inherited and fostered the system."

The Tudisco report attested to the persistence of the tensions and anxieties manifested in the episode of 1966. Indeed, Sullivan's charge to the investigators, which was corroborated in their findings, indicated that hostility and alienation had increased in the intervening years. All this, coupled with the report's generic condemnation of "the [school] system," cried out for change. Simultaneously, the "free school" protagonists generated their pressures for change from the perspective of white, largely middle-class radicalism. There was much talk of change, and some action: ten of the alternative schools that were to be included in BESP were created between 1968 and 1971 before federal funding from ESP was made available.

When ESP came along with its offer of federal funds for research and development to achieve "comprehensive change" in the schools, Berkeley was ready to respond. In this response, as formulated in the experimental schools plan submitted by BUSD to OE/ESP on June 8, 1971, the background influences, as briefly sketched above, were obtrusive.

1. The preeminence of space and emphasis was given to "institutional racism."

2. Assessment of the school system was permeated with radical criticism.

3. The major thrust of the proposed program was directed to the secondary schools.

It is worth recalling what was said under the first two headings above, and to examine what was implied under the third.

Institutional racism: By inculcating middle-class values "education has fulfilled the expectations of a 'racist' society and has become itself a racist institution." The bureaucratic and hierarchical "structural organization of the school system...provides a major overt example of institutional racism." "For great numbers of the oppressed minorities the educational payoff ceases to exist" because of the school curriculum and the manner of its presentation.

Radical criticism:\* "The public school has served as a sifting and sorting mechanism. It is a middle class institution. It... serves the middle class child while acting as an acculturating agency for the lower class child....The school preserves the stratification system by limiting 'upward mobility' to those who are willing and able...to acquire the value orientations and motivations appropriate to middle class membership." In the school system "education occurs--or more often fails to occur" (our emphasis).

Secondary schools: At this level, hostility and alienation, particularly among minority students, are the more likely to be expressed in the most overt and disturbing forms, not only in the school but in the community. As Sullivan (1969) phrased it, "the jobless high school students and high school dropouts...burst out in anger" in the ghetto disturbances. From a purely educational viewpoint, according to much pedagogic theory, change and reform would be more productive in the lower grades, but from the vantage point of what might be termed rehabilitative or prophylactic socialization the secondary schools provide a logical focus.

The above quotations were not culled from the report of some external evaluator, surveying the school system in general (e.g., someone like Coleman or Silberman). They were produced by the responsible administration of a particular school district. It may be assumed that the Berkeley planners were not referring to "education," "the public school," and "the school system" only in general, but were talking about education as it is conducted in the public schools of the Berkeley Unified School District. The Berkeley planners said, in effect: We (not some ubiquitous and undefined "they") are presiding over bureaucratic, class-biased, racist schools in which the non-occurrence of education is more common than its occurrence. In retrospect, the tenor of the Berkeley plan suggests a difficult question for its authors:

If the catalogue of existing evils under your leadership and command is authentic, then what

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\* Racism in the schools, is, of course, also a target of radical criticism. Under the latter heading we include other elements that are typical of the radical critique.

do you propose to do now that is so different from what you have been doing as to inspire confidence in your determination and capacity to effect the profound changes that are patently in order?

Before proceeding to the answer to this question, as contained in the plan for BESP, it is well to note that alongside the self-deprecation, and in contradiction to it, BUSD also harbored a conceit that placed Berkeley on a pedestal which, in French intellectual tradition, is reserved exclusively for Paris. At one point BUSD asserted:

Berkeley by late 1967 was the conscience of the white western world. It was, whatever else was thought of it, the intellectual epicenter of the United States as well. It was a logical and fitting focus for what became, in 1971, perhaps the most important educational experiment ever funded by an agency of a national government: the Berkeley Experimental Schools Project. (BUSD report to NIE in 1973, outlining plan for final 30 months of BESP.)

Reverting to the question posed above, a general answer to it in the original 1971 plan for BESP was couched as a statement of "philosophy," which was a list of assumptions:

- 1) The richest life is filled with choices,
- 2) in an education system the choices not only enhance the educational experience but themselves provide an educational tool through which students may learn problem-solving, and
- 3) the offering of options immediately opens up the school system to others whose involvement is both solicited and needed to change the outdated policies and practices of the institution of education.

The problems were racism, class bias, bureaucracy, and the prevalent failure of the schools to educate. The solution is options. It is difficult to perceive the efficacious correlation between the problems, which seem so complex, and the solution, which seems disarmingly simple. Unless, that is, the options were posed as follows: we will give you a choice between racist and non-racist schools, between class-biased and non-class-biased schools, between bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic schools, between schools that do not

educate and schools that do. Then, presumably, the overwhelming majority of parents and children would, in their wisdom, choose all the second alternatives in that series, and the racist, class-biased, bureaucratic, and non-educative school would shrivel away. That our scenario is, on the face of it, sheer fantasy already indicates the problem of options as the solution.

The actual options or alternatives proposed by BUSD approached the problems perceived as fundamental in a circuitous manner. Changes in classroom environment, style, methodology, and curriculum, coupled with some organizational innovations, would, it was hoped, bring about changes in attitudes and power structure. Elsewhere in this report options are discussed in greater detail. Here they are a tangential issue. Our purpose here was to indicate how the Berkeley environment, within the framework of the larger national arena, influenced the perception and definition of the problems in the Berkeley schools. Once done, it seemed appropriate to indicate what struck us as a discrepancy between the perceived problems and the proffered solution.

#### ESP, BUSD, and the Community

"The richest life," wrote the Berkeley planners, "is filled with choices." The three principal participants in ESP--the federal office, the Berkeley school district, and the educational consumers--were all to lead the rich life.

The Nixon administration had choices, and it chose, in the words of the President's veto of the 1971 educational appropriations bill, to minimize "spending on old approaches that experience has proved inadequate" in favor of "moving boldly on the new approaches that we need," i.e., educational research and development. The political reactions we have cited suggest the implications of this choice.

ESP was established and it, in turn, presented choices to the country's school districts. Announcing the program to the districts, Robert B. Binswanger, the first ESP director, advised them that they were being offered "the opportunity to address the need for total change" in the schools by assembling previously developed "promising practices" in a "comprehensive program." Districts would have to design their own plan, and thus would be free to choose among the "promising practices" and also free to choose the form in which these practices would be arranged and combined. Here, indeed, were many choices, and the only stipulation was that they be exercised to produce a comprehensive program, which presumably addressed the need for total change.

ESP, however, also retained a choice; it would choose which programs would be funded. The choices it made, incidentally, appear to have reflected the shifting emphasis of the administration in the field of education. None of the three districts initially chosen for funding (Minneapolis, Franklin Pierce County in Washington State, and Berkeley) embraced a "typical" ghetto, a primary concern of the antecedent programs. Berkeley contained the largest black population, but, as previously noted, its socio-economic composition differed from the ghetto norm.

At the same time, the diversity among the three programs initially funded by ESP authenticated the considerable range of choice open to local planners. Still, a tension was inherent between the local districts' freedom to propose and ESP's freedom to dispose. An excess of human frailty is not assigned to the authors of Berkeley's response to ESP's invitation if it is assumed that among all the other considerations that guided them, there was also their perception or anticipation of what was most likely to be approved for funding. The modern art of grant writing is highly utilitarian. This observation is offered in no pejorative sense, but only to suggest an implicit, almost natural, inhibition on BUSD's freedom of choice.

Moreover, BUSD had been attempting changes piecemeal, but ESP insisted that, to be funded, a program had to be comprehensive. Very little time was given to arrange and augment the piecemeal changes in a program that was to be both coherent and comprehensive. As a rule, an essential element in the freedom of choice is a decent interval of deliberation in making it. Indecent haste, externally imposed, circumscribes the freedom.

Nonetheless, BUSD made its choice, and then turned around and offered choices to the parents and children of Berkeley. But they could choose only among the things that were offered to them. As documented in previous ISA reports, the hectic process out of which the final Berkeley experimental schools plan emerged allowed no time for significant input from parents, or from teachers for that matter.\* The alternatives submitted for ESP approval were the alternatives chosen by a committee of the BUSD administration. And these were the alternatives presented to parents and children.

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\* Parent and teacher input was reflected in some extant alternative programs, and to the degree that these were incorporated in the final ESP package, so was the input that went into them. However, at the critical stage when new alternatives were being proposed and the total package was being shaped, such parent-teacher input was conspicuously absent.

We have sketched the chain of choice from the top down. The choices of the national administration and its creation, ESP, were circumscribed, as well as dictated, at least in part, by political considerations. BUSD's choices, in turn, were limited by the factors we have described. By the time the chain reached the parents and children it was already burdened with all those a priori circumscriptions (as well as by some others, e.g., the state educational code, the diverse pressures of local politics, the precarious fiscal position of the school district, the "state of the art" of education).

The chain can be sketched in another way. At the top, the President declared, "We must stop pretending that we understand the mystery of the learning process." To unravel the mystery he proposed federal funding of research and development. ESP then turned to local school districts and said: we will give you money for experimental programs that you devise, within the very broad specifications we set, and perhaps out of them we will learn more about the mystery of the learning process. BUSD then turned to the parents and children, and said: we will offer alternatives to you, and your choices will point to clues for solving the mystery.

Matters were not phrased that way, of course, but it must be assumed that the talk of "comprehensive change" referred to change that would facilitate the learning process; that, in the ultimate analysis, this was at the core of the furore about education. In the end, it seemed, the burden was imposed upon the parents and children. And unfairly so, because they did not create the alternatives from which they were to choose.

Furthermore, the timing was inauspicious. Some influential persons in the Berkeley school system felt it was too soon after bused integration of the system in 1968. Integration at the elementary grade level was implemented by dividing the district into zones to facilitate achievement of a desired ethnic mix, and there was an inherent tension between a rigid zonal pattern and an option system, which required fluidity if students and parents were to choose among diverse sites. Moreover, the shift in priorities from one value (integration) to another (options) also produced tensions.

However, the major problem of timing was shaped by other factors in the sociopolitical environment. A major impetus for educational reform had been generated in the turmoil of the 1960's. Certainly this was so in Berkeley, with the pervasive effects of the campus upheaval, with the rapid and drastic changes in the ethnic composition of the population, coinciding with the explosive unrest in the county's ghettos, and its echoes in Berkeley. By the time ESP got well under way, that turmoil had subsided; the campus was quiescent, the fear that sparks from other ghettos might touch

off a conflagration had receded. Discontent with the schools might have been as great as it had been before, but in the changed climate, it was not prone to be so manifest and assertive. Indeed, ISA's observations of BESP trace a diminishing parental involvement in the program, a diminishing intensity of parental concern. The termination of three alternative schools in the fourth year (United Nations West, KARE, and Willard Alternative) was effected without a murmur of protest from parents. There was no powerful countervailing pressure from the community against the reversionary tendencies inherent in a school bureaucracy (or any bureaucracy for that matter).

The same held true on the national scene. By 1975-76 the most conspicuous educational occurrences nationally (aside from racist outbreaks in Boston) were the teachers' strikes, reflecting the acute fiscal crisis in school district after school district. Getting a greater yield from the educational dollar carried a different implication from what it had before. And the mounting concern was with getting the educational dollar in the first place.

The fiscal preoccupation was certainly characteristic of Berkeley where a teachers' strike was the most important single event in the school district in the final year of BESP. Any attempt to describe, let alone analyze, the fiscal crises that beset U.S. school districts and municipalities in the mid-1970's would lead us far afield. However, it is essential to note that the fiscal squeeze, already chronic in the Berkeley school district when BESP was launched, was in an acute crisis phase at the end of the program. Certainly this was a significant contextual factor just at the time when the district was supposed to be concerned with sorting and extracting such items of educational value as might have been produced by BESP.

What was or was not produced by BESP is analyzed in the pages that follow. In this chapter, on the solid premise that the program was neither launched nor conducted in a vacuum, we have tried to indicate the complexity, variety and multiplicity of salient factors in the socio-political environment, nationally and locally, that impinged upon the origin and development of the Berkeley experimental schools project.

CHAPTER 3: THE R&D APPROACH MISAPPLIED

Research and Development as a methodology earned its considerable fame within the federal space and defense programs. This "new" R&D methodology has created a new language, a new set of specialists and, combined with the managerial-systems culture, has emerged as the new doctrine, able to place missiles in the sky and epidemics under control. R&D is a new, large, and important industry.

The federal government allocated \$21.7 billion in 1976 for R&D projects covering 14 different areas, ranging from national defense to international cooperation and development. The 1976 allocation was \$2.7 billion larger than the expenditure for 1975. Education showed the largest relative rise in 1976--up 102 percent for a total of \$318.2 million. Between 1969 and 1976, the average annual growth rate for educational R&D spending was 10.8 percent. In 1969 the education share in the federal R&D total was 1 percent and by 1976 it was 1.5 percent, up 50 percent. A breakdown of educational R&D 1976 allocations by federal agencies follows:

TABLE 1: EDUCATIONAL R&D ALLOCATIONS, BY FEDERAL AGENCY

	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Office of Education		
Vocational research and education	50.3	
Innovative and experimental program	9.0	
Education for the handicapped	<u>3.5</u>	
		62.8
National Institute of Education		25.1
National Science Foundation		
Science Education Improvement	8.5	
Institutional Science Development	<u>3.5</u>	
		12.0

As can be seen, NIE, which was established as an educational R&D center, received only one-fourth of the education R&D funds (National Science Foundation, 1975).

R&D work has converted the individual scientist into an employee of a research institute or some group with a research contract, and organized R&D work ("Applied Science") has come to resemble the industrial system in the quantity and diversity of its production. In the last decade, \$150 billion was spent by the U.S. Government on sponsored research. The returns are in the form of products--

some 600,000 research reports, with 50,000 new titles added each year. As Rapoport (1974) noted: "The evergrowing avalanches of material products amid which we live, from nerve gas to the Salk vaccine, from atomic-tipped warheads to cinnamon-flavored toothpicks, is the incarceration of ideas spawned by organized research."

But, while one might engineer a transistor into ever smaller sizes by the use of R&D, is it efficacious to apply a similar methodology to the elements that constitute a human institution?

Whereas many scientists, humanists, philosophers, and concerned citizens have pondered this question in diverse public and private arenas, albeit not always in those terms, the national administration seems to have answered it with a resounding and self-confident "yes." Educational R&D is viewed as an appropriate method of reforming and changing the public school system. The proponents of educational R&D came to define the method as one of "demonstration and evaluation," or "program and evaluation." This blurring of "hard science" R&D and "soft science" program development and evaluation has many implications for the uses and values of this technique.

For one thing, our summative evaluation of BESP is itself a very different enterprise than a research project in the strict R&D sense. If the Berkeley Experimental Schools were a missile experiment, the research team, the research design, the research work would be the experiment. Research personnel would design, manage, manipulate, monitor, measure, and control all phases of the experiment and its interface with other systems. Their function differs profoundly from that of evaluators in either the summative or formative evaluation of an educational experiment. Misunderstanding or lack of appreciation of this difference created serious difficulties for our efforts in this project, as will be shown in detail in later chapters of our summative evaluation.

Another latent consequence of using an R&D methodology on human organizations is inattention to the range of moral and ethical issues that emerge when humans are treated as "experimental" objects. Some moral issues posed by the Berkeley school experiment were discussed in ISA's first annual report (1974), pp. 191-195. These issues involved (1) the dubious nature of the informed consent elicited from the human subjects (i.e., students and parents) of the experiment, (2) experimentation with a relatively large population without adequate pre-testing, and (3) the absence of meticulous planning that provides for vigilant monitoring of possibly harmful side effects. These specific issues were placed in the broader context of scientific concern with experiments designed to control or modify human behavior.

Many social scientists are unwilling or unable to face the ethical and political reality that is an integral part of their everyday research efforts when they work in "applied research areas." Sjoberg (1974) states that social scientists try to resolve or overcome the ethical and political issues in social R&D in three different ways:

One is to construct a highly formal system and to obscure some of the central issues of collecting and analyzing data by making the assumption that problems do not exist in the best of all possible worlds. A second tack is to rework and 'patch up' existing research procedures; a third one is to build new research strategies or methodologies....The full meaning of the ethical and political issues will be realized when these are examined as an integral part of the research process. The ethics of the research affect every phase of research, including the sampling procedure, the mode of data collection, and the analysis. (p. 95)

Moral and political issues most frequently emerge when there are disjunctures within a social system, or when there is a failure in connecting up two different areas of analysis. Everyone becomes uncomfortable, searching for problem definitions and their sources of irritation.

Perhaps the moral and political issues around sponsored or applied research might be examined more profitably in terms of a "poor fit" between the methodology (R&D) and the area of study (human behavior). The assumptions underlying R&D are the assumptions basic to physical science, i.e., that matter is controllable, manipulable, knowable. A chemical compound can be known, in the sense that its properties are empirically visible or ascertainable. It can be described in relation to its functions, to known chemicals, and to chemical theory, and hypotheses can be tested under a wide variety of conditions. The knowledge obtained can then be used to manipulate, combine, change and control the substance under study. But an educational situation cannot be defined, studied and manipulated in the same manner. Can control be exercised when so little is actually known of the properties and conditions of public schools? Many researchers have expressed doubts. Kirst (1974), reporting on the development of federal influence in public education, points to the instability and lack of consistent long-range planning which have characterized the federal role. Averch et al. (1974) have stated that "...[educational] research has not yet identified a variant of the existing system that is consistently related to educational

outcomes" (emphasis ours). The "state of the art" of research in education is hardly at the physical sciences' R&D level of applicability, even though many of its proponents wish to add educational "science" to "art" for the improvement or change of the present public school system.

The increase in federal evaluative funding can easily be understood in light of the reports that educational achievement scores have been declining in spite of rising federal expenditures on education. In 1974 Congress mandated a study of Title I and other federal compensatory educational programs. In his report to Congress on the "Assessment of Reading Activities Funded Under the Federal Program of Aid for Educationally Deprived Children," the Assistant Secretary for Education testified before a Congressional subcommittee on education as follows:

I would have to say at the present stage, after seven years of Title I, while many good things can be said about it in terms of attitudes of teachers, parents, and in some cases of children, the bottom line does not show very much. In other words, the measurable conditions do not make a strong case yet for saying the \$8 or \$9 billion which have gone broadly to the disadvantaged have yet made a sweeping difference.

According to OE, the national goal of the Title I programs was to close the gap between the achievement level of an educationally deprived child and the national norm. If the bottom line of the national assessment of federally funded programs indicated failure to improve the reading scores of those children who were the targets of federal priorities, it also indicated how little was known about the elements which contribute to improving the learning process. It further implied that there was no direct relationship between improved performance and the amount of federal funds expended.

The reasonable conclusion to be drawn from these results was that the state of knowledge about the "mystery of the learning process" was too primitive to make an appreciable difference. The logical, or illogical, deduction thereafter was that greater research into the mystery of the learning process had to have federal support. Congress created the National Institute of Education in 1972 to serve as the focal point for federal R&D in education.

Typical of the optimism among proponents of educational R&D are the comments of T. H. Bell, U. S. Commissioner of Education,

before the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association in March, 1975: "It is pretty obvious by now that the potential of research and development for serving education and the public is enormous." Conceding that delivery of the R&D potential was lagging behind by 10 or 15 years, Bell outlined the reasons for this gap:

Education R&D is a young science, for one thing, still finding its way, still somewhat uncertain about its mission and theater of operation. What research is appropriate and what is not? Where does research end and development begin? Which critical issues in education merit priority? What, for that matter, is the learning process, and how does it work for each student?

Yet, even though educational R&D suffers from such admitted intellectual imprecision, its theoretical framework is based on two elements that require precision: evaluative research and systems analysis. As Sleber (1974) points out, the system requirements recognized by OE over the last several years have been functional specialization and quality control.

Functional specialization is a basic property of any engineered system. Related to educational R&D, these functions include basic and applied research, product and systems development, dissemination, technical assistance, training, and evaluation. Quality control also includes evaluation. The proponents of systems analysis argue that basic elements of quality control in education, as in any applied science, are cost-benefit analysis and the methodology of evaluative research.

The central core of this new scientific mood revolves around the concept of experimentation. Here lies a new challenge for behavioral scientists who can perform social experiments and test their results. Testing a hypothesis has become the precursor to developing a social program. A typical model of hypothesis-testing cited by the Social Science Research Council was the experiment conducted through the Instituto de Nutricion de Centro America y Panama, testing the hypothesis that protein supplements in the diets of pregnant women and pre-school children can reduce or eliminate retardation in cognitive ability at school age. More specifically, this experiment tested the notion that such results will be obtained by biochemical and nutritional intervention without altering the socio-cultural, educational, and economic circumstances of the population.

The focus of the hypothesis-testing experiment, however, is not on program outcomes as much as it is on testing the validity of

a proposition in order to proceed further with, abandon, or modify a particular direction in social-policy formation. If protein supplements prove ineffective in reducing retardation in cognitive ability, then some other line of social intervention must be sought. With all the new tools, plus support of federal funding, the social scientists took to the field.

The adoption of the hypothesis-testing model, even if only implicit, assumed a certain logic. It entailed, first of all, the development of a theory and the issue to be tested. In addition, the selection of a program design was essential. In most cases, this involved the recognition that in the field of educational R&D there are many points of view and significant power blocs which compete for federal allocations, requiring a compromise between the rigorously controlled laboratory experiment and the popular or politically appealing features of community participation and local control of compensatory education.

As the concept of testing various components of an experimental design against the conventional methods won acceptance, a system of evaluating the comparative outcomes became essential to the measured success of programs. Evaluative research became a new arm of educational R&D as a means of resolving conflicting claims between alternative methods. In effect, evaluation ideally serves as the National Bureau of Standards for consumers of education.

Thus, experimentation in educational R&D can be seen as the integration of planning, implementation, testing, and development of social intervention programs. To its protagonists, social experimentation structured on the R&D model promises to produce results that are convincing.

As was exemplified by Commissioner Bell, many of educational R&D's strongest proponents recognize the existence of problems, but few place the blame on the "goodness of fit" between methodology and its object. Rather, some see insufficient funding or the difficulties of disseminating the acquired knowledge or lack of policy planning or bureaucratic ineptitude at any level of governance as the sources of the perceived difficulty. Typical of these views is that expressed by Chase (1972):

Deficiencies in national planning, management, support and evaluation are a continuing impediment to the realization of the full potential of education R&D. These shortcomings spring largely from the failure to place educational R&D in charge of an adequately funded agency at a level in the government hierarchy comparable to NSF or NIH (pp. 29-30).

What funding would be "adequate" if there were a specific variant of the existing educational system that would merit an R&D effort? And how should such experimental funds best be administered, given the peculiar political and legal divisions of education into federal, state, and local school systems? These issues are not resolved by assuming that R&D efforts can produce any result if given a sufficient commitment of funds (and we say this despite the fact that R&D was the methodology that eventually took our astronauts to the moon, at a cost equally astronomical). Further, irrespective of funds, are the technology, skills, theory, and commitment for "changing public education" readily at hand? The application of an R&D methodology to education is necessarily based on the premise that our state of knowledge is sufficient so that education can be defined, controlled, developed, researched, predicted.

Let us assume that the state of educational R&D was sufficiently advanced to support an experiment in "comprehensive change," just as U. S. Commissioner of Education S. J. Marland, Jr. did when he proposed ESP as one of his highest priorities in 1970. The basic information letter inviting ESP bids sent out by Robert Binswanger stated:

Since 1945, research projects, demonstrations and various kinds of experimentation have generated a wide variety of products, practices and ideas which hold promise for the improvement of American education....Dissatisfied with the results of piecemeal or individual component changes, educators have sought the opportunity to address the need for total change by placing a number of these promising practices together in a comprehensive program (emphasis ours).  
(Experimental Schools Program, 1971, HEW/OE, p. 149)

What would an R&D effort afford such "promising practices" in terms of funding, support, or guidance? In the physical or technological fields, R&D efforts are costly indeed. Models or prototypes which are "R&D'd" or "changed" or "improved" are known to cost a hundred or thousandfold more than the regular product. That is, a new nose cone for a missile might cost millions of dollars in R&D while it could be manufactured for much less once the R&D model evolved.

Not so in the field of education, at least in BESP. As a school system, BUSD has a yearly budget of approximately \$30 million. OE/ESP proposed to spend only about \$1.2 million each year to create "comprehensive change" in that \$30-million system. This is hardly

comparable to prototype-building in defense or space technology. What could one reasonably expect from 1/25th of an investment? As one NIE/ESP project officer wrote the BESP Directors (December 8, 1972):

What ESP monies should be used for are special catalytic change costs. Training, staff development, building of community involvement processes, design of evaluation procedures, development of new assessment measures, etc. are all the type of areas which should receive heavy funding during the lifetime of the project to ensure that the changes brought about are lasting and self-renewing.

This memo is very revealing because it shows that (1) R&D funds were "catalytic" additions to existing school funds which were assumed to be committed to the R&D experiment; and (2) this memo was written after the project had been underway for over one year, pointing up the differing interpretations with which BUSD and the federal ESP viewed funding, control and management.

Kirst (1974) has stated:

At first glance federal aid appears to be a major factor in influencing school policies. But a closer inspection reveals that funds have frequently not hit their targets or have been overwhelmed by larger state and local developments. It is very difficult to build viable new institutions with uncertain, fluctuating and "soft" money from Washington (p. 456).

Let us suppose that the education R&D funds had totalled \$31.5 million yearly, i.e., that funds had been used to "buy out" the local district in order to carry out an experiment designed to produce "comprehensive change" in BUSD. Even if this were legally permissible, it is highly unlikely that a school district would readily hand over such control to an outside agency, however lofty or worthwhile its aims and purposes. Thus, the R&D methodology again is flawed as applied to local school systems--the control and manipulation of the experiment is not possible without the consent of the "experimented-upon."

Clark (1974) has commented about this particular problem in educational R&D as follows:

The process of R&D inquiry will have to be brought closer to the point of effective action in education, i.e., will have to involve the direct participation of practitioner agencies in all the processes of educational R&D. Without mobilizing support, the current pattern of underfunding and facilitation from program to program will continue indefinitely\* (p. 11).

Was the ESP viewed as a true educational R&D experiment and did it elicit the direct participation of practitioner agencies? The initial project indeed attempted to "buy into" local school districts that were actively engaged in some form of "promising practices," such as having already established some sort of experimental school. But a local commitment to the goals and means of educational R&D as conceived by ESP never fully materialized in BUSD. Almost from the beginning, local school officials had to be told, over and over again, that they were participating in an experiment which had to be evaluated.

For example, the Federal Project Officer wrote to the BESP Directors on December 9, 1971 as follows:

Key concern is the need for the alternatives to be designed as an experiment and hence receive exemption from those local and state regulations which hinder or even cripple the goals and objectives of the general programs.

Thus, from the very inception of the program, the R&D methodology was part hindrance, part directive. The funding and the control were inadequate for any true R&D effort, but were perhaps too much for mere icing on an existing cake. All participants struggled to make this school-based, relatively long-term, experimental project into something that would answer long-standing problems in public schools, all with their own definitions of priorities and solutions.

The confusion of means and ends, of control and experimentation, gave rise to much anguish as each of the actors tried to cope with his own views of the script. Our summative evaluation, poorly understood by most of the participants, was not exempt from these underlying dilemmas. We were "hired hands," independent of the school

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\* For additional detail on this view see Gideonse (1974).

system we were to study, but totally bound by the terms of the contracts signed by our firm. We were received by some as "spies" working for the government. We were forbidden to engage in feedback lest we "change" the experimental situation. We were to remain silent, invisible but omnipresent on the local scene, reporting directly to the federal agency about events occurring in the institution we were studying. This caused distrust and concern at every level of BUSD/BESP. The role of NIE/ESP was that of a monitor of Level II's work, method, production and perspective. Conflicts between such contract-monitoring activities and the role of scientist would seem to be inevitable.

Ethical issues are ever-present when "contract research" is being carried out. Broadhead and Rist (1976) have shown that some of these issues arise in the area of the social control of research. They state:

The way sponsors exert their influence can be broadly summarized as occurring in one of three ways:

1. Through detailed specification of the research issue so that the eventual problem is cast within a framework congruent with the sponsor's perspective;
2. Through emphasis upon a positivistic style of research thought more susceptible to manipulation for the purposes of controlling the results;
3. Through the threat of withdrawing present funding and denying future support should the researchers move into areas "not in the best interest" of the sponsor (p. 325).

To this list of social control mechanisms can be added several others; for example, accounts receivable can be withheld causing cash-flow problems for small contractors, or reports can go "unaccepted" until changes are made which satisfy the sponsors.

Alongside this social control issue, questions such as the following also arise. What is the moral relationship between the persons "under study" and the evaluator? What are the understandings which allow for access to observational data, for mutual exchanges of perspectives, for reassessment of "causal findings"? How does the role of "spy" assigned to an outside evaluator affect data collection and analysis? Such questions are discussed by

Orlans (1973), as well as many others. Berk and Rossi (1976) argue that all evaluation research must necessarily rest on significant moral and political judgments, but that despite this, evaluation research may play a progressive role if one is prepared to employ research designs that capitalize on inevitable value judgments rather than ignoring them.

Our summative evaluation of BESP does not escape moral or political issues; rather, it **must** be viewed within the context of these social realities. We do examine contesting moral and political positions as a method of understanding what we have observed, documented, surveyed, read, and heard. So-called findings taken out of their moral and political contexts are stripped of their meaning--and we urge the reader not to engage in such false bifurcation.

The employer-employee relationship which inheres in contractual relations (albeit at two distinct points, the beginning and the end) is one which may constitute a challenge to any scientist engaged in evaluation work. As Deutscher (1976) has pointed out:

The professional social scientist always approaches an evaluation with the suspicion that the "problem" as the client has defined it, may require redefinition....Perhaps this is not related to any inherent nature of evaluation research as it is to the capacity of the investigator to distinguish between the technician-employee role and the scholarship role (p. 235).

In this final contract report, we have taken the position that a summative evaluation requires us to go beyond the problem definition spelled out by the terms of our current NIE contract which asks three questions focused upon the degree of success in the implementation of BESP. We have raised larger issues by viewing BESP as an example of an educational R&D project and by examining the problems which must be resolved within the context of such a methodology. This becomes, therefore, not an "implementation evaluation," but a study of experimentation in a public school system within the wider social context of school financing, federal-local school relations, racial integration, school governance, unionization of teachers, and changes in various aspects of social and political life over a five-year period.

Evaluative research, at the summative level, has caused great agonizing about the role of the research evaluator, about the so-called objectivity of the research design, about the impact of the moral and political context upon the work. Why should this be the case?

In our view, R&D methodology, when mechanically transplanted from the terrain of the physical sciences into a social milieu, forces concepts such as "products," "models," "transportability" upon social processes which defy such parameters. Social scientists may yearn for such precision of thought, action and result, but are unable to mold their constructs into these mechanistic concepts. For social systems differ in kind, not just in degree, from physical structures as objects of study. In one, the units are other humans, whose actions and interactions are shaped or influenced by an intricate, changing mosaic of diverse and contradictory wills, passions, ideologies, cultures, interests; in the other, the units are inanimate, manipulable, knowable, and controllable objects to a degree sufficient to meet the canons of science. One cannot reasonably speak of an "education system" in the same manner one would speak of a "weapons system." Proven strategies and methodologies of "testing," "evaluation," or "research" in one system are not necessarily applicable in the other. At the very least, any attempted transference of methodology ought to be preceded and accompanied by painstaking, profound examination of adaptations, modifications, or additions that are necessitated by the differences between the two systems. We believe that failure to acknowledge those differences, and hence to grapple with their implications, underlies much of the frustration, despair, and disillusionment which is so characteristic of many social and educational R&D projects and, in particular, of the NIE/ESP project in Berkeley. Our "summative evaluation" of the Berkeley Experimental Schools Program is intended to serve as an example of what one is likely to find in similar endeavors in education, health, welfare, crime or delinquency "systems"--indeed, in all cases where R&D as a strategy for change is not clearly elucidated or understood.\*

Our summative evaluation was planned by NIE as only one of a chain of efforts to evaluate experimental education R&D projects; eventually, Berkeley was one of eight across the nation. Three levels of evaluation were initially conceived, each at different levels of abstraction, each carried out independently of the others and each to stand both alone and in concert with the other two levels as the total research evaluation of comprehensive change in local school systems. Level I evaluation was to be a part of the ed-

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\* For elaboration of this position as evidenced in the field of public housing, see Meehan (1975). He points out that (1) "dangers are inherent in direct federal-local relations when large-scale operations are undertaken on an inadequate factual-theoretical base," and he questions (2) the "adequacy of the policy-making and implementing machinery at both federal and local levels." We found both of these drawbacks present in the Berkeley example of an educational R&D project.

educational program itself, and was intended to provide formative research for the program. Formative research has been called "a menial role" by Cronbach (1969), and is often seen as being only descriptive and illustrative, acting as a monitor and self-correction within a program. It gathers data to measure progress and to provide early warnings of trouble or signs of "success" in aspects of the project. NIE/ESP described the functions of Level I as "an internal assessment which provides for the basic tracking of student progress and for the collection of vital data. This level of evaluation takes place within an Experimental Schools project site and is conducted by the project staff" (DHEW Publication No. (OE) 72-74, 1972, p. 3). Such a conception fits nicely into a mechanistic view of product-manufacture: factory inspectors measure each piece to validate its fit with all other pieces in assembly. This is "formative evaluation" in its most pristine and mechanistic sense, and is what Cronbach means by its "menial role." It is evaluation which can be used to contribute to the work while it is still fluid, still in process.

Level II's task was to evaluate and assess the overall impact of the R&D effort. It was described by NIE/ESP as follows: "Evaluation on a second level is also specific to an individual site, but is carried out by an evaluation contractor who is external to the project staff" (DHEW Publication No. (OE) 72-74, 1972, p. 3). The relation between summative and formative research remained unspecified.\*

In addition, a Level III evaluation effort was planned by NIE/ESP, combining all relevant data and assessments for the educational R&D efforts in several cities and rural areas, so that a broad comparative overview of Experimental Schools projects would be produced. In fact, this plan was never implemented, in part due to the failure of the Level I and Level II evaluation models to produce such ladder-like products of research findings.

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\* In a brief review of the eight NIE/ESP projects, we learned that in no single project did the formative-summative (Level I and Level II) evaluation model actually work. In some cases, both "failed," in other cases, only one type of evaluation worked, and in others, Level I attempted Level II work, and vice versa. We believe this model is a faulty one for use in educational research, since it assumes that such interface can occur despite the lack of consensual definitions, operationalization of procedures, orderly processes of communication, and common data collection methods.

#### CHAPTER 4: OE/ESP'S FOUR R&D STRATEGIES

The U.S. Office of Education Experimental Schools Program proposed to employ four R&D strategies: (1) local planning and implementation, (2) comprehensive program designs for each of the local field experiments, (3) five-year forward funding and (4) "formative" and "summative" evaluation of each field experiment.

The OE/ESP rationale for these strategies as a whole was that they would not only maximize the conditions and incentives for keeping local and federal commitments intact, but they would also serve to have the utility of these strategies tested. The strategies were promulgated out of a short-term pragmatic concern for sustaining commitment to ESP in particular, and out of a long-term experimental concern for their use in other educational programs. These two objectives were interrelated, insofar as the transportability of the strategies was keyed to their ability to preserve commitments.

ESP entailed a high risk for a participating school district and federal agency. For district and agency alike, trying to effect in practice the idea of far-reaching district change was likely to involve an investment of time, money, and personnel which could not be recouped easily if the program went fundamentally astray. Even assuming the two entered into an honorable and mutually supportive partnership, the possibility existed that the national program and the local experiments would fail, with, perhaps, irreversible consequences for federal funder and district recipient. Such was the terra incognita of "comprehensive change." However, the more immediate risk was that a sustained commitment would be unforthcoming from either the school system or the government. Once formally joined in partnership, the lapses of one posed a threat to the other.

In order to offset the risk to local communities, OE/ESP relied primarily on the local-planning/implementation and forward-funding strategies. They were publicized by the government as incentives to local participation and commitment. Contrarily, OE/ESP chiefly invoked the comprehensive and evaluation strategies to protect the federal interest and investment in local ESP experiments. These latter two strategies were viewed by the federal agency as conditions for receiving federal monies. Yet, despite requiring strict federal monitoring, the strategies of comprehensiveness and evaluation would logically have to respect and support the local-determination strategy and not be used as

excuses for withholding the promised federal money. Besides being conditions, then, comprehensiveness and evaluation could also be regarded by local persons as federal pledges to take seriously the proclaimed incentives.

With all four strategies the difference between a condition and an incentive was a tenuous one. Much depended on a particular point of view, the district's or the government's. Further, each strategy was susceptible to being viewed as either a solution to, or an experiment in, local educational change. This might depend upon whether the district or the agency, both undergoing changing circumstances, stressed federal assistance and development or federal evaluation of local ESP experiments. Crucial to the application of the strategies would be the extent to which they were fully understood and agreed upon in Washington and in the local districts, especially by the "second generation" asked to take the lead from the original ESP designers. Even viewed individually, the four strategies were not pre-tested axioms of educational change. Their importance as instruments in the furtherance of lasting and beneficial comprehensive change had yet to be shown. Their use in ESP partially bespoke a federal disenchantment with previously tried, diametrically opposed strategies, not a keen regard for the proven value of new ones. Keeping this in mind, we shall describe each of the four strategies in turn.

#### 1. The Strategy of Local Planning and Implementation

This strategy was meant to ensure that each of ESP's field experiments would be consonant with local wishes and desires, that each grew organically out of a community's political, economic, social, and educational context. Local planning was especially tied to the kind of school districts which OE/ESP intended to fund in the first year of the national program, for which the Berkeley Unified School District was one of three eventually chosen. Grant awards were earmarked for a few districts prepared to forge already tried or intensively considered educational changes into an interrelated plan for comprehensive change, one that offered a reasonable chance of making the various components of a local school system's ESP plan mutually reinforcing. The possibility of observing and assisting "holistic" district change as such, not dramatic "breakthroughs" in discrete practices or education technology, was the paramount consideration behind ESP's FY 1971 funding. To inaugurate its program, then, OE/ESP wanted to ally itself with seemingly ambitious change-processes already at work in districts known for their innovative climates.\*

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\* On December 28, 1970, OE issued an announcement about ESP to the nation's school districts. The announcement stated that ESP grants initiated in subsequent years might go to district proposals urging novel or previously untried practices.

The major considerations behind federal endorsement of this strategy were: 1) the high risk to local districts and communities of an experiment in comprehensive change; 2) the apparent failure of previous educational R&D to bring about significant local reform; 3) the political calculation that there were insuperable obstacles to the federal government's assuming a direct role in local education; and 4) the assumption, later validated by non-ESP research, that local adoption of innovation depends on its congruity with emerging local pressures for change.

1. The Risk Factor. Experience and knowledge of what an experiment of this scope would mean in practice was severely limited. By itself, the idea of comprehensive change implied no more than an abstract value. A specific and advanced understanding of the behavior appropriate to this value was missing. Indeed, no one was sure if comprehensive change was capable of being recognized even if it occurred. Yet, ESP-designated districts would be vulnerable to the charge that they were "experimenting" on children on a supposedly unprecedented scale, while denied an opportunity to "pilot test" the local project in small and easily reversible ways. OE/ESP was naturally reluctant to see federal monies used for purposes unintended by the national program. But federal insensitivity to district understandings of current priorities and desired outcomes was apt to produce this distortion of purpose, given the unpredictable difficulties facing local ESP projects. Hence, in order to lessen distortion and difficulties, it seemed wise to accede to district flexibility from the outset.

2. Limitations of Past Research and Demonstration. Previous federally supported education research had focused on the development of "model" educational programs which, if deemed worthy, were then funded as "demonstration" programs. Both types of programs were marked by the faith that R&D in education need not be grounded in field experience exclusively, that reform impulses and new technologies could partially arise outside the schools themselves and then be grafted on to the "real world" setting in which actual teaching must transpire. "Model" and "demonstration" programs were byproducts of an educational R&D penchant for purely research centers and laboratories.

However, at the time ESP was fashioned, disillusionment with R&D centers had set in because they glutted education with practically unworkable innovations (Sieber, 1975). Research and demonstration programs stemming from these centers tended to view educational consumers as rational and passive recipients of the conclusions of education research. In this "linear" conceptualization of R&D, the experience and views of local educators, parents, and students were implicitly discounted (Sproull, Weiner, and Wolf, 1975). In particular, the socio-economic and political barriers to their

freedom of choice, to their ability to embrace innovation, were overlooked. As a result, increase in the supply of educational products and systems, mostly at a distance from the field, threatened to outstrip knowledge about the demand for this supply. Given the reputed "surplus" of "hot house" innovations, the pressing need was to gauge the effective demand of local educational interests, not the hypothetical demand imputed to them by educational research centers.

ESP was intended to contain a new sensitivity to local viewpoints. OE had tried a variety of approaches to educational reform prior to ESP, none notably successful. Therefore, ESP would allow local districts to try various approaches. Increased attention would be paid to the needs of particular communities at particular points in time. The replicability of local ESP experiments was foreseen by federal ESP officials as an unlikely program outcome, but they did anticipate that by permitting local actors to decide major substantive issues, appreciation of contextual restraints and opportunities would be heightened, thereby potentially making each experiment useful for other districts embarking on roughly similar endeavors in the future. Thus, in contrast to the "linear" R&D approach, it seemed necessary to try to understand local perceptions of what is practical and desirable in schools. Encouraging a variety of innovative developments at the local level seemed a plausible alternative to past failures. Rather than pursuing hardline federal goals--a situation encouraged by researchers removed from the schools--it seemed wiser to watch locally spawned innovations and to assess intensively their consequences at first hand. Moreover, a new emphasis on local district goals might suggest opportunities for significant reduction or redirection of federal education expenditures without incurring deterioration in educational outcomes.

3. The Political Calculation. In non-educational sectors, the political logic of the local planning strategy is simple enough. Indeed, as Derthick (1970) points out, one very important justification for many new grant programs based on local planning is their ability to "provoke" innovative leadership at the less-than-national level. The prospect of a grant, when accompanied by a local-determination strategy, is believed to set into motion people who want to "plan themselves into" a new venture. If incentives for acceptance of a grant are tantalizing enough, then actors who independently share an interest in the proposed federal activities are given excuse and opportunity to present their views more confidently than is possible in the absence of federal stimuli. This strategy encourages the coalescence of concerned parties who previously have not recognized their commonality or have been discouraged by their lack of influence. Local influence is redistributed, since reigning local officials who do not respond to the offer of federal partnership become vulnerable to criticism for

failing to take advantage of federal funds or for failing to meet national standards. Or, if local officials do respond, then previously excluded groups or individuals may gain in influence. This effort at local "consciousness-raising" could be deemed worthwhile even if a clash of local interest groups effectively squelches the particular activities which the federal government wants to encourage. Considering whether or not to apply for a grant could serve a community if this deliberation is a pause in business-as-usual or reduces local inertia.

Since the federal government has no formally recognized right to make decisions or to function as a lobby within local school districts, it could be expected to value the grant system as a way to intervene by indirection. At a minimum, OE/ESP could hope to place the notion of comprehensive change on the political agenda of local districts. This in itself would be no mean achievement, given what Iannaccone (1967) describes as the usual "politics" of American public education, the retreat into "closed-system tendencies" of "invisible" internal factionalism. By requiring local planning to conform to the comprehensiveness and evaluation requirements, OE/ESP might be able to insert itself by proxy into a deceptively polite, non-partisan environment and create a locus for the more publicly evident politics of the market place. Beyond this minimal aim, possibly damaging political costs could be transferred from the federal to the local level. Billing ESP as a research program is in tune with the political calculation, because this tactic assigns to local persons the obligation to choose sides on volatile issues such as community control and integration, thereby enabling the federal government to avoid an uncomfortable political limelight.

In sum, local planning and implementation implied that OE/ESP, by relying on a grant incentive, would encourage the mobilization and increase the influence of local persons devoted philosophically or obliged by official position to making drastic educational changes. ESP districts funded in the program's first year were intended to be true exemplars of incipient comprehensive change; and their genuine innovators were encouraged to apply for ESP funds so that district applications might be in line with previous district innovation and reform. Afterwards, and pursuing the logic of this strategy, OE/ESP would stand aside to permit district processes to run their natural course. Then ESP-funded districts might have to be treated as special entities, not to be hampered by larger federal requirements for commensurability or uniform treatment of nationally dispersed ESP sites resting on radically divergent student populations. An ESP district, possessing its own peculiar, perhaps accelerated, change processes, could be victimized by federal management unprepared to deal with this uniqueness in its own contextual terms. Without district freedom, the federal rationale for supporting a variety of districts--to explore the implications of different comprehensive schemes--would be indefensible.

4. Compatibility with District Trends. One of the few findings of which education researchers are fairly confident is that school reform depends on an exogenous shock to the system that is to be changed (Averch, et al., in Levine and Bane, eds., 1975). Real innovation seems to depend on the leverage that can be exerted from outside the system--by the federal government or by consumers. In the absence of external pressure, the essentially conservative, system-maintaining proclivities of school districts tend to prevail. The best of stated intentions are then shunted aside or channeled into "safe" directions, those that involve the kinds of changes that do not threaten well-organized groups in or out of the district bureaucracy (Pincus, 1973).

In apparent conflict with this view of educational change is one that stresses a need for pre-existing district interest in innovation. A Rand Corporation study of major federal programs supporting educational change has concluded that "the success and suitability of an innovation depend primarily on local conditions" (Berman and McLaughlin, 1975). Local school personnel are rarely persuaded to adopt an innovation that cannot be grounded in knowledge already accepted by the school district. A new program, if it is to be regarded seriously, cannot deviate markedly from a district's resolve to move in particular directions. District impressions about the usefulness of a given innovation tend to harden early, and are very much shaped by its consistency with pre-existing pressures for change. To quote the Rand study again:

The initial patterns of motivation that underlay initiation [of an innovation] persist; support or commitment is not altered by evaluation data.

Also, as Sarason (1971) and Averch, et al. (1975) note, principals and teachers often possess in advance of a new program the technological and organizational ability to surmount school rigidities; what is usually missing is the professional's will to change. This implies that for adoption to occur, a new program aimed at change must enable the staff to choose that which is already thinkable and close to being implemented.

Because of the tension between externally recommended innovation and local ideas and beliefs, Turnbull, Thorn, and Hutchins (1974) maintain that the preconditions for local adoption are usually at odds with the innovation itself. That is to say, if a new practice must evidence a close fit with locally prevailing ideas and emerging practices, then in what sense can it be considered "innovative"? Change agents typically face a dilemma: whether to increase the likelihood of a program's adoption by decreasing its distinctiveness--thereby running the risk that its adoption will be

in name only--or whether to stress its distinctiveness, thereby decreasing the likelihood of its adoption. This dilemma is accentuated in the very districts that Lindeman, et al. (1968) and Baldrige (1974) found the most disposed toward innovation, namely, ones that are complexly organized to grapple with heterogeneous populations and institutions.

In complex, heterogeneous districts the demand for innovation tends to be incessant, but the visibility of any single program tends to be engulfed by a myriad of other, unrelated responses. How can a new program become a discernible locus for comprehensive change in a district selected for its inherent change properties? Movement occurs incessantly in schools, particularly in ones noted for innovativeness. Indeed, this is one of the complaints about schools: change parades as improvement. Especially in a venturesome district living off many federal and state programs, change is a fact of life. But if change is a constant, in relation to what does one measure its comprehensiveness, short of a district being overhauled beyond all previous signs of recognition? The very social forces that might encourage the selection of a particular district for its change capacity may also militate against the detection and measurement of change. Vocal community groups, for instance, suggest a readiness for more intensive school participation, but, by their volatility and wide range of concerns, they also have the ability to blur an educational experiment.

Adelson (1967) and Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) have argued that school improvement can actually be impeded by untimely or mutually exclusive innovations. Even in the case of complex, heterogeneous districts, there may be a maximum rate of change. Adelson states: "It is sometimes more important that the system be known than that it be improved." The sheer outpouring of established and discarded alternatives, opportunities, and incentives may present a bewildering maze to participants and evaluators alike. Change in education can mean increased complexity leading to consumer perplexity. Or, even more disturbing, teachers may revert to familiar methods when asked to use ever-new materials and techniques. The change route of multiple offerings for diverse student populations provides ample opportunity for the hidden retention of old ways. And a school district which stakes its reputation on change may decide to cover its mistakes by more of the same.

Still, even though American schools require tremendous overhauling, they are caught in the above-stated dilemma. Smith and Keith (1971) point to a typical but artificial resolution of it by school bureaucracies: the substitution of the language of innovation for its substance, what these authors term the "alternative of grandeur." The increasing tendency over time is likely to be rhetorical exaggeration of program distinctiveness--meant to counter

past disappointments with innovative programs and to gain support for new ones--while simultaneously reducing actual distinctiveness, owing to the difficulty of incorporating something genuinely new into an existing social structure. This cycle is probably more likely to occur in districts that have become adept at grants entrepreneurship.

Through a delicate balancing of incentives and conditions to ESP participation, OE/ESP sought to work around the tension between federally recommended innovation and local adoption. This federal decision was a prescient one, arising before much of the research evidence on the nature of the tensions had been gathered. In ESP, the intention was to leave to local persons the task of establishing substantive program goals which would be consistent not only with the federally prescribed comprehensiveness and evaluation themes but also with continuing district reform initiatives from the recent past. Local planning and implementation would represent the "active" change component of the R&D model; the other three strategies would represent a "passive" framework which would remain constant, thereby permitting school districts to know always the limiting constraints within which they could plan. The melding of district goals with federal requirements was deemed feasible, since the latter were judged to be sufficiently value-neutral as to be applicable regardless of the more specific district goals.

## 2. The Strategy of Comprehensiveness

OE/ESP stipulated that each local experiment would have to be "comprehensive" in two primary senses: (1) a vertical or longitudinal structuring which would permit students from kindergarten through the twelfth grade (K-12) to participate in the program; and (2) a horizontal or lateral inclusion of all the important components of a school system, including, but not limited to, "curriculum development, community participation, staff development, administration, and organization" (U.S. Office of Education, 1971).

The target population for the five-year local experiment was to be limited to approximately 2,000 to 5,000 students, one-fourth to one-third of the total district enrollment. The primary but not exclusive emphasis was to be placed on low-income children. Within the scope of a local ESP program the entire school environment was to be altered, by making every aspect interconnected and mutually reinforcing, within and between grade levels and other system components. The central theme of educational change was intended to inform and permeate the local ESP program, thereby easing the task of planning and implementing a comprehensive framework. Beyond the target population, however, OE/ESP envisaged that the K-12 and

multiple components requirements, as they affected the ESP sites within a given district, would have repercussions throughout the total school system. Ultimately, it was hoped, a comprehensive local experiment would impinge upon and challenge a district's standard approach to instruction and governance, extending further the transformation process.

The basic rationale for the requirement of comprehensiveness was the government's desire to investigate two basic questions: (1) What promising educational practices grow out of or are made possible by a comprehensive local plan for change? (2) Are comprehensive change efforts more effective and lasting than piecemeal or segmental ones? These research interests stemmed from a widespread belief that reform programs producing relatively isolated educational changes had failed. Federal ESP planners wished to get away from "piecemeal change," but they were far less certain about the precise meaning to be assigned the presumed antidote--"comprehensive change."\* Conceivably, the K-12 and interlocking components requirements were but one version of comprehensiveness; however, these requirements may have been intended as desired results or as the means for creating comprehensive change. In any case, the government planners pinned their hopes on comprehensiveness mainly because of the dismal record of federal education programs which were piecemeal in character.

Research findings supported the conclusion that the infusion of new federal monies into only partially modified school systems produced neither higher levels of academic performance nor greater school efficiency. Even the larger categorical aid programs had come under acute suspicion following federally sponsored evaluation. The Piccariello study (1969) concluded that the Title I

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\* Commenting on urban school reform, Janowitz (1970) states: "The first phase in 'inner city' experimentation has ended. The first phase, roughly designated from 1960 to 1967, emphasized piecemeal change, the demonstration project, and the process of change from the bottom up or by lateral diffusion. There has been a great deal of social learning, but of course, this whole first phase might well have been avoided or more readily terminated by more rational analysis and more forthright leadership. The emerging second phase is that of strategic innovation, or institutional building, which focuses on the system as a whole. It involves a strategy from the top down, it is more comprehensive in scope, and it is concerned with the realities of authority and decision making. What is needed from our social scientists is a conceptual framework, as comprehensive as the schemes that have been developed for other 'people-changing' institutions."

programs, sizably funded under the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, revealed no marked improvement of students in the cognitive skills. At any rate, students exposed to Title I programs were found not to do appreciably better than similar students not in such programs. In addition, the Westinghouse study (1969) concluded that neither year-round nor summer Head Start programs had had significant long-term effects on cognitive growth.

According to Rogers (1968), both demonstration and categorical aid programs appeared to share certain inherent liabilities from the standpoint of being able to change the public school. As partial models of transformation, they suffered from an inadequacy of scale. If one tried to move from a demonstration in a particular school to a district or city-wide level, or from a concentration on a particular grade level or curriculum to system-wide planning, the difference in the kinds of persons, roles, and organizations affected was seemingly too great to permit the application of lessons learned at the more restricted, "local" level. Moreover, less than system-wide planning involved a political cost, since it permitted opposition to coalesce against the isolated experiment thereby inhibiting its spread into the larger system. If a local or segmental experiment did fail, perhaps for reasons unrelated to its intrinsic merits, a ready but spurious excuse was available for not trying it out on a larger scale.

Aside from the lack of comparability due to differences in scale, the piecemeal, "add-on" nature of federal programs conducted in the 'sixties ran athwart the mounting research conclusion that no particular innovation always works regardless of other aspects of the educational environment (Averch, *et al.*, 1975). No practice seemed effective universally, thereby suggesting that insufficient attention had been paid to the interaction between innovations and between innovations and traditional practices. Even more disturbing, "input-output" studies (Coleman, 1966; Jencks, 1972) emphasized the limited role that formal education plays in the lives of individuals as contrasted to the importance of non-school factors. Hence a piecemeal change in schooling could be expected to represent such a small increment in the total experience of a child that there was no reason to expect dramatic improvement in attitude or performance. And the small changes which may be produced are hard to detect amidst other, more constant influences on a child. To summarize, piecemeal and segmental reforms were considered inherently self-limiting; once federal funding retracted from a given program, the "carry-over" effect was considered minimal (Pincus, 1973).

By the end of the 1960s, a rare consensus in American education was taking shape among academic critics and federal officials as to what should be opposed in public school reform. What had

been done in the recent past to eradicate defective schools was regarded as either too fragmental or too small. At the same time, a subtle shift in educational emphasis had occurred in a relatively few public schools. The shift was toward a new recognition of the importance of organizational climate, institutional milieu, and operational doctrine, and away from a priority on narrowly specific programs and techniques (Janowitz, 1970). This shift seemed to call for a greater investment in human as opposed to technological resources. The sheer need to mobilize interest in subject matter before teaching it was impressed upon the professionals, especially regarding urban schools. These new awarenesses, as yet more rhetorically than practically expressed, were there to be prodded and capitalized upon. The creativity of the national ESP consisted in merging the idea of comprehensive change with its presumed but faint reflection in a handful of public school districts. The K-12 and multiple components requirements were to provide the operational definition of comprehensiveness in order to bridge theory and practice.

### 3. The Strategy of Five-Year Forward Funding

Federal ESP planners reasoned that comprehensive change in a local school district required an unusually long period of federal support, relative to past national programs. The risk to local communities of implementing a comprehensive design also figured prominently in the federal decision to provide full and guaranteed five-year financial support to ESP districts. If the federal funder was to adhere consistently to the strategy of local flexibility and determination, then to renege on the financial guarantee could only be done in the extreme case of malfeasance in the use of public money or evident abandonment of a local experiment's primary objectives. Also integral to the federal ESP funding strategy, however, was the need for participating sites to plan for the "phase-out" of ESP monies upon the conclusion of five years. As a result, sites would have to learn how to spend the additional ESP monies, so-called "catalyst" incentives for innovation intended as a supplement to regular district outlays, as well as gear themselves to living without these extra funds. To abet this local learning process while furthering innovation, the federal ESP intended to put a heavy emphasis on supplementing such local costs as staff training and development, building of community involvement procedures, and the designing of appropriate evaluation measures.

At the time ESP was created, however, there was an ingrown resistance on the part of school districts to accept federal funding for innovative purposes. Pincus (1973) has pointed to several causes for local cynicism about the seriousness of federal interest

in innovation. Among the major ones were: (1) the belief that federal aid for innovation tends to be small-scale, unreliable "soft money" that will disappear as suddenly as it arrives; (2) the consequent belief that not enough time is allowed to separate effects of the innovation from effects of the frictions arising from the effort to implement; and (3) the lack of any long-term benefit or penalty to districts which adopt or fail to adopt one set of innovations in preference to another.

This local uncertainty about stability and continuity in federal funding was bred by such diverse programs as the National Defense Education Act of 1958, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1965, the school lunch program, and assistance to federally impacted areas. Funds for these programs were categorical in nature, i.e., they were intended to reduce fiscal inequities among states and among specific groups of individuals within states. Yet, in all of these, funds were disbursed on a yearly basis. The amount the local district received would vary from year to year with the number of its eligible students and the changing eligibility criteria established by the government. Thus, it was difficult for school districts to predict in advance the amount of income from each of these programs, especially since the next school-year's budget had to be decided many months in advance of the receipt of federal funds. While all of the federal programs mentioned here did provide funding for more than one year, the actual amount of support to be received was not guaranteed.

But many federal grants did not even provide minimal fiscal security to local districts. Many grants were for a one-year period only; others required expensive and distracting renewal proposals. Also, federal-local grants which bypassed state offices of education were often accompanied by more explicit federal controls than grants that had to rely upon general guidelines for states to reinterpret (Kirst, 1974). School districts tended to draw one of two conclusions: they should seek funding for easily assimilable alternatives to current practices and avoid rigorous federal conditions accompanying even the unreliable aid for genuine innovation, or they should keep federal aid insulated from regular programs so that its sudden withdrawal would not precipitate an enduring "hard money" obligation. In either case, though, federal aid was viewed as providing "slack" resources for ancillary services, not for innovations that could be expected to affect significantly student outcomes (Berman and McLaughlin, 1974). Moreover, there was no recognized optimal financial incentive for local planning of innovation and reform. Too little money discouraged local planning and too much led, irresistibly, to calling almost anything by the name of innovation, simply in order to get desperately needed funds (Pincus, 1973).

Just a few months before the idea of a national experimental schools program was presented to Congress, the Center for the Study of Public Policy released its Education Vouchers study (1970), done under contract for the Office of Economic Opportunity. This study urged a minimum funding period of five years for pilot voucher programs in a few select districts, and also contained a strong recommendation for an eight-year funding period. The recommendations contained in this study may have had some influence on federal ESP planners because of broad similarities between the two proposed types of federal programs. In any event, it is noteworthy that the voucher study tied the notion of long-term funding to the encouragement of certain generally stated changes in a school system's components. The study suggested that an extended funding period was required to more adequately: "(1) provide sufficient options and diversity; (2) develop supplemental programs to those which already existed; (3) provide a greater amount of programmatic information to parents; (4) encourage the development of a parallel organizational structure; (5) encourage a higher degree of parental/community governance; (6) develop continuity in the articulation of curriculum; and (7) develop programs which were to be aimed predominantly toward low-income families."

For federal ESP designers, too, ample money and general guidelines seemed to require one another. In conjunction with ESP's comprehensiveness requirements, the forward-funding strategy was developed to allay district uncertainty while compelling districts to plan authentically for holistic change. By offering a seemingly substantial sum of money to communities at a time when uncommitted dollars were hard to come by, ESP was supposed to create a powerful incentive for school districts to think in comprehensive terms. A constant monitoring of local experiments, justified by the government's own long-term financial commitment, might also arrest school districts' natural tendency to controvert the federal purpose.

#### 4. The Strategy of Evaluation

Federal officials contended that evaluation and documentation of ESP projects were necessary and important due to the lack of reliable evaluation in other federal education programs and to the unknown ingredients of comprehensive change. Past failure to evaluate or to understand change processes was explicitly traced by the government to the lack of "sufficient education theory and sufficiently powerful statistical techniques to identify and determine the relative importance of the various factors influencing educational progress" (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1969).

The federal ESP intention was to authorize local project staff to undertake "formative" evaluation of local experiments; "summative" evaluation would be undertaken by external contractors who would report to the federal ESP office, not to local school officials. Formative evaluation was to assist in the improvement of local projects while they were in the throes of development and operation. Summative evaluation was to assess the overall impact of a local project throughout its lifetime. The rationales for combining in one local project both types of evaluation were as follows:

1. Funding. Education evaluations tended to be funded meagerly; this necessitated very limited types of studies. Evaluations of large-scale and complex programs tended to depend on "economic" measures and techniques, given the scarce funding. However, in ESP, the level of investment in evaluation was meant to be commensurate with the formidable task.

2. Personnel. Evaluators were frequently brought in after the fact rather than at the early stages of a project. Even then, studies were most often conducted haphazardly and intermittently, rather than by continuous on-site presence. Evaluators often had limited training and experience, and were asked to play multiple and conflicting roles in a particular project. In ESP, though, continuous on-site evaluation was intended as a hallmark of the program. Experienced inter-disciplinary teams would be recruited.

3. Method. Most evaluations were stationed outside the program to be evaluated, in the sense that a few important variables under investigation were settled upon in a priori fashion, without their selection being sensitive to all the factors crucial to a given program. As a consequence, such evaluations were unable to appraise the interdependencies and interactions of variables. Few studies attempted to document fully what a school system's program actually was. Instead, most reported what was supposed to be happening rather than what did happen. But the evaluation-and-documentation designs for ESP were meant to be as comprehensive as the local programs themselves. Maximizing what one could learn from diverse field experiments called for the adoption of techniques from a number of academic fields.

In concluding this chapter's discussion of the four R&D strategies followed by OE/NIE, we may say that differing and fluctuating perspectives about the strategies make it exceedingly difficult to recapture exactly the relative weight to be accorded the several rationales for each. Some of these rationales were more implicit in the strategies themselves than expressed outright at the time of ESP's inauguration. Others seemed to have emerged

during local implementation. However, we have presented the major and most persuasive rationales for each strategy and shall assess in Part II of this report the actual impact of the strategies on the Berkeley Experimental Schools Program.

## PART II: CONCLUSIONS

Drawing on the specific context of BUSD/BESP, this second part of Volume I presents and analyzes our findings about the largely negative impact of the four federal R&D strategies. Local program outcomes are interwoven with and explained by an analysis of the distrust, confusion, and uncertainty surrounding BESP as an R&D "experiment." We examine in detail the manner in which the R&D strategies were applied and not applied to BESP, and with what consequences. We assess the conditions at the local and federal levels under which the attempt to test the strategies was made; we raise theoretical issues concerning the preconditions to testing assumed or implied by the strategies.

Part II consists of four chapters, each organized around a single and different R&D strategy. Each chapter begins with a brief overview of BESP outcomes that were particularly influenced by a given strategy. However, in all four chapters, we show that the strategies could not be neatly compartmented in practice, that they affected one another and were mutually incompatible in some crucial respects. In particular, the tension between the strategy of local planning and the other three strategies (comprehensiveness, forward funding, and evaluation) is explicated.

Throughout Part II we stress that BESP was not a univocal program but rather an uneasy mixture of various attitudes, values, and behavior. The various people and institutions involved in BESP seldom held converging and consistent perspectives on the strategies. To evoke for analytical purposes the implications of these divisions, we examine the interpretations (and lack thereof) placed on the strategies by federal ESP, BUSD, and consumers (students, parents, and, when appropriate, teachers). Elaborating on this explanatory scheme, we analyze the effects on BESP of changing actors and emerging institutional preferences, showing how apparent agreements often gave way to underlying differences in viewpoint. The absence in BESP of binding consensual definitions of the strategies is a theme which permeates and unifies the separate chapters on each strategy.

This theme is appropriately introduced in Chapter 5, which centers on the haste, indecisiveness, and disinterest with which BESP goals were planned. We show that for the following goals there was no true plan: the creation of options, the elimination of institutional racism and increase in basic skills, and the provision of decision-making power to site

consumers. For each goal, we establish criteria against which to assess and measure fulfillment. Chapter 5 sets the tone for the remaining three chapters insofar as it notes structural and policy rigidities in BUSD, uncorrected by original BESP planning.

Similar rigidities beset the introduction into BESP of the other derally mandated strategies, and lack of agreement on the meaning of the strategies prohibited the expulsion of local obstacles to comprehensive change. As we demonstrate in Chapter 6, the two main indexes to BESP comprehensiveness--K-12 options and a parallel organization--were not seriously planned, with resulting deficiencies in the impact and scope of the local program. Variations on the same basic problems of lack of consistent agreement and inflexibility in BUSD as a "receiving" system are delineated in our analysis of five-year forward funding in Chapter 7. In keeping with the theme that BESP was a "\$6 million misunderstanding," we reserve to final Chapter 8 a capsule history of the problems afflicting the dual-level evaluation strategy, for it epitomized the whole program's flawed funding logic, hesitant conceptualization, and unclear lines of responsibility.

## CHAPTER 5: BESP'S LOCAL PLAN AS AN EDUCATIONAL R&D STRATEGY

### A. The Development of the Local Plan

The local plan concept was in many ways the most important strategy exemplified by BESP within the framework of an educational R&D project. As has been previously described, local participation, commitment and innovative ideas expressed in a "local plan" were thought to be the major mechanism for bridging the interface gap between federal aspirations and local school district desires. The ESP was a brave federal attempt to build upon this time-honored concept, but there was, in reality, neither sufficient time nor support for the local planning process in the OE/ESP scheme of things.

All school districts are pluralistic--different groups want different things, and a "local plan" capable of bringing comprehensive change to a school district could only emerge after a very complex planning process which is itself preeminently political. It is more than the generation of a master plan or of position papers, more than the outlining of goals and the detailing of well-defined, coordinated, organizational roles. Planning certifies who is important and what is important even if this has to result from contending parties fighting over the spoils. This certification process may aptly be termed "political," since it serves to capture the sympathy of an "audience" which is "played to." The spirit in which planning is conducted sets precedents and expectations which are likely to help or hinder a new program throughout its later implementation. If the process includes the bona fide opinion-makers in a district, and appears to be rational, doubts about the substance of a program do not necessarily interfere with arousal of enthusiasm and support for it. Planning can make the "plan" somewhat immune to criticism. True, planning does not end with the start-up of a local program, the development of policy and its initial application. Planning continues to help cope with slippage in conditions and the need to modify goals. But an ability to sustain an initially favorable impression of a new program enhances the likelihood that disputes over content can eventually be ironed out. The words that Sproull, Weiner, and Wolf (1975) use to describe the significance of planning for the creation of the NIE also apply to that agency's stepchild, ESP:

The process of planning demonstrates a style of analysis and decision-making. If the audience is impressed with the style, it is unlikely to quarrel with the content. Finally,

to announce that an agency is being planned endows the concept of that agency with an aura of judiciousness and rationality. The "plan" itself becomes a symbolic reassurance that good faith and sound minds stand behind the proposal.

However, it is also true that the "plan" tends to be forgotten unless used as an enforcement document. Plans can, moreover, be misleading.

Yet, in order to encourage the sort of innovation that districts would not ordinarily permit, federal education money cannot be permitted to reinforce an "artificial" resolution of district apprehensions in the local plan. If precautions are not taken, federal money may allow a district to buy time, to avoid genuine resolution of fundamental conflicts. The soundness of the federal grant system is impaired when the government misperceives the local conditions forming the backdrop of a district's application. To have a reasonable chance that grants will further innovation, the government must fund the district, not simply its proposal.

The federal ESP sought to work around the tension between externally recommended innovation and local adoption. It proposed to leave to local definition and practice the fixing of goals which would be consistent with the past, yet which would mark another step forward.

Turning to BESP planning that led to the production of a "local plan," we find it to have been deficient in three areas: (1) school board and central administration's confidence and resolve about what the District was taking on; (2) inclusion of newly emergent values and groups; and (3) conveyance of a sense of responsibility and information to all BUSD personnel, especially teachers and principals.

Further, the federally imposed timeline for ESP initiation severely hampered BUSD planning. In February 1971, "interested persons," meaning those whom the central administration could predict to be "interested," were told by the BUSD central planning staff that they had only a few days to fashion their ideas about possible innovations. Between February 26 and March 2, as the Planning and Development Director later confirmed, the bulk of the proposals were received by his staff. The Director waited until March 15 to send a memorandum to persons selected by the central administration for a screening committee which would rate the proposals on the following day, March 16. They had little more than 24 hours to read a packet of information, consisting of 38 project proposals, a prospectus, a set of federal guidelines, a statement on District-established BESP goals, and the March news release. The screening committee was composed of representatives from teachers organizations, the Board, and

some parents and students. The full complement of 55 proposals initially received by the BUSD planning staff was not considered by the committee. Moreover, the Director later admitted that the committee's ratings were "combined" by his office with its own independent ratings, and that the Superintendent then made recommendations to the Board as to which sites should be included in BESP. The Board endorsed the combined set of ratings and on April 1 the administrative staff began writing the final proposal which was due April 10 in Washington. The proposal was refined, revised, and submitted to OE/ESP two days before the deadline.

The institutional role of the BUSD Office of Planning and Development is also noteworthy. The OPD is headed by a highly proficient grant-writer, a virtuoso at the increasingly valued craft of bringing outside money into a school district. He played a considerable part in coordinating the BESP application. More generally, however, OPD's impact on BUSD policy has been immense. Its sway has not depended on officially recognized power, but on the adaptations to its bureaucratically prescribed activities by more fully legitimized school authorities. Simply by expediting funding applications, the OPD writes the tune to which the rest of the BUSD must dance. But having written, the hand moves on: other federal programs beckon. Ironically, a BESP proposal which heralded a need for organizational change was chiefly fashioned by an office which symbolized unaccountability to the community.

Once set in motion, the Berkeley application had its own dynamic. The creation of local site proposals was the result of BUSD planning. The overall proposal to Washington was amended after intensive questioning of BUSD officials by federal ones. Standing between these two planning processes was the BUSD central administration, notably the Superintendent and the Director for Planning and Development. Even the BUSD school board, when finally called upon to ratify the application, was asked, in effect, to rubberstamp a set of individual site proposals which had to be read and endorsed hurriedly if the District was to meet the application deadline. Indeed, the Superintendent later admitted to Level II staff that the school board was only exposed briefly to abbreviated versions of site proposals. The precise agreements reached by the BUSD and the federal ESP office, particularly about district compliance with federal conditions, remain obfuscated to this day.

According to the BUSD/BESP proposal, the District would be guided by these goals:

1. To provide program options that will reflect the cultural pluralism extant in the school community and affirm the District's value of it.

2. To provide a system which can move toward the elimination of racism in the schools and the larger community, and which will facilitate the acquisition of basic skills for those youngsters who are educationally disadvantaged, with special focus on those who are members of the ethnic minority groups.
3. To provide significant changes in the administration and organization of the system so that power of decision-making becomes a shared activity.

How did BESP implement these goals and how effective were these activities in producing "comprehensive change" in BUSD? This has been one of the tasks of our summative evaluation during which we evaluated the outcome of each of the three goals specified by the local plan.

#### B. Summary of the Findings

We present below a brief precis of our summative evaluation of the outcome of BESP's efforts to attain the three goals implicit in its local plan.

##### 1. Outcome of program options in BESP (1971-1976)

- a. Of the 23 options actually developed in BESP, only one-half were evaluated as being different in any degree from common schools. Of those options which were eventually phased-in, only 27 percent were evaluated as being "diverse" or "innovative" in curriculum, teaching styles or structure.
- b. Options which provided separate ethnic schools were closed by the BUSD for fear of losing federal monetary support. At the end of the 1972/73 school year, Casa de la Raza and Black House were discontinued by the BUSD because HEW's Office for Civil Rights ruled that the racial separatism of these two schools violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. One year later, the school district closed United Nations West as racially separatist, leaving one Berkeley High School sub-school as an all-Black "option" (albeit its students attend regular classes as well as separatist classes).
- c. Options which did not receive school-wide support or could not sustain enrollment were phased out or merged during the last two years of BESP funding. The first two such program casualties were the two junior high on-site options, KARB and Willard Alternative.
- d. The actual phase-in of BESP included only seven options, five of which existed before BESP planning. The five are East Campus, Jefferson Tri-Part, Kilimanjaro, Model School A, and Odyssey. Only Early Learning Center and College Prep remain of the 13 options established with BESP funding.

e. BESP has not led to increased diversity of education within the BUSD. There have been few observable or reportable innovations in curriculum, educational practices, teaching styles or organizational structures. Over the last three years of funding, BESP has become less open and more structured, less autonomous and more centralized, less scattered and more consolidated. Interviews with BESP directors and with teachers in both BESP and common schools revealed few differences between the BESP/BUSD curricula, teaching styles, staff make-up or utilization, or in the use of educational output measures.

f. BESP has not led to increased knowledge of choice by parents and students. As to degrees of choice, parents and students knew something about BESP, but the scope of their knowledge was limited. Students in alternative schools perceived slightly more choice of alternatives than did common school students, a natural result of their status as BESP students. Since most of the alternatives were located within a common school, this reinforced the perception among many students that alternatives were neither diverse nor particularly innovative. Berkeley common schools are also innovative in many of their classrooms, and many students and parents did not know of any differences between them and BESP option programs.

## 2. Outcome of decreasing racism and increasing acquisition of basic skills (1971-1976)

a. BESP did not significantly alter the organizational format of BUSD. Employment opportunities for minorities have not increased because of BESP. Although many minority persons were hired during the first three years of BESP, most of the non-certificated BESP classroom staff were terminated at the end of the 1973/74 school year. Some BESP certificated staff members were laid off at the end of the 1975/76 school year because of the fiscal squeeze and their lack of seniority in BUSD. Although the BESP training component did establish a credentialing program to enable 58 non-credentialed staff to obtain professional status by earning academic credit towards State credential requirements, the program was discontinued during the second phase of the project.

b. BESP did seem to contribute to changing curricular contents to reflect traditions and accomplishments of ethnic groups in America. The BESP training component developed curricula in the area of ethnic histories and cultures. It trained a large number of BESP teachers in the use of the TABA social studies series. It offered social studies and history courses with a multi-cultural approach.

c. Students and staff in BESP were more sensitized to institutional racism than were those in BUSD. Students in BESP reported they had observed less racism in their school than did students in the common schools. Teachers in BESP were somewhat more concerned about the problems of institutional racism than were BUSD teachers, based on responses to an interview questionnaire.

d. The BESP had no differential impact on the acquisition of basic skills as measured by standardized test scores. Comparisons were made between BESP and common school students over a three-year period (1973-1976). An analysis of these comparisons showed no significant differences between the test scores of BESP and common school students in any grade, at any time in the program.

e. BESP had no significant effect on the acquisition of basic skills by those students who are members of ethnic minority groups. An analysis of CTBS reading scores for each grade showed that test scores for Black students diverged dramatically from those of whites from the 4th grade level on. The gap between minority and white students increased steadily through their school careers regardless of their enrollment in the BESP or common schools.

### 3. Outcome of developing power-sharing (1971-1976)

a. The BESP did not make structural changes in the BUSD capable of putting a site community (students, parents, and teachers) in control of its program or school. A closer solidarity among consumers and teachers than traditional schools seem able or willing to grant did emerge at off-site BESP schools. However, this achievement was not supported by a continuing basis for power-sharing; therefore, the new-found "sense of community" was fitful and evanescent.

b. The power-sharing that did occur marked the opening three years of the BESP rather than existing at its close. By 1973/74, real experiments in power-sharing were lost with the closing of Casa de la Raza and Black House, or substantially diluted by administrative intervention or a diminution of parent activity in the governance of Odyssey and Kilimanjaro.

c. It proved impossible to devise incentives and opportunities to involve parents, students, and teachers consistently in school affairs, either at a given site or throughout the school career. What worked at one time and place did not necessarily work at another. The history of BESP power-sharing is a checkered one.

d. Some sites deliberately rejected power-sharing. This was true of the "supplementary" West Campus 9th grade sites (HUI, Yoga/Reading, Career Exploration, Work/Study), the aborted junior high

"alternatives" (KARE and Willard), and certain Berkeley High School sites emphasizing "academics" instead of "social experience" (Model School A, On Target, College Prep).

e. Some sites were so locked into normal BUSD operations as to have, past a point, little power to share, despite their feeble encouragement of this goal. This was true of sites which either predated the BESP as essentially zone-restricted common schools (Jefferson, Franklin Alternative, John Muir) or were established for special clientele with BUSD encouragement (Early Learning Center and East Campus).

f. Some sites stressed more than the others an identity predicated upon community involvement in order to persist in the face of disruption; however, actual power-sharing was largely fictitious at these times, as was shown when internal site conflict was halted by the site director or the BUSD and BESP central administrations. This was true of Odyssey, Kilimanjaro, Other Ways, Agora, Genesis, and, to a lesser degree, Environmental Studies.

g. The more active interest that parents usually take in the schooling of younger children was not counterbalanced by BESP, despite the fact that most sites existed at the junior and senior high levels. New and attractive forms for parental involvement at the secondary level were not created. Only Casa de la Raza (K-12), Odyssey (7-9), Early Learning Center (K-3), and Kilimanjaro (k-6) developed formal governing boards with parental participation. In fact, parental involvement at Berkeley High BESP sites suffered in comparison to that at the regular senior high school, owing to the almost exclusive student-oriented biases of the sites and the greater number of standard parent-oriented activities at the common school.

h. Even more generally, however, the BUSD/BESP central administrations did not plan for power-sharing; a corporate form thereof, applicable across sites, was not devised from above. Instead, discretion was conferred on each site to fashion a form of community involvement that would coincide with the particular circumstances of each. Opinions about what would actually constitute "power-sharing," when they existed, varied within and between sites. Thus, the realization of this goal was frustrated by its incompatibility with BUSD priorities and structures, and by disinterest or differences of opinion at the site level.

i. BESP parental participation differed little statistically from parental participation in the common schools, whose presumed failure to share power provided one of the rationales for BESP.

j. There was no significant difference between parents of BESP and common school students when they were asked if they knew what was going on in their child's school. The same lack of difference prevailed when parents were asked if they could get something changed in their child's school if they had a complaint. Of both BESP and common school parents, at every grade level, about half believed they could get successful complaint resolution. Parents were also asked whether they were satisfied with the meetings they had with their child's teacher; again, the data revealed no significant difference at any grade level.

### C. Explanation of the Findings

We now turn to an elaboration and explanation of these findings, following the same sequence as above.

#### 1. Local Plan Goal #1: The Development of Program Options

One of the essential goals of BESP was to create educational alternatives to the common schools that already existed in the district. Students themselves could then elect, if they and their parents so chose, to attend one or another of the options provided. But what constitutes an option, how can it be described and studied? An option must have two distinct properties. It must offer something educationally different, and it must be available to parents and students in such a way that they can choose among different offerings. Each option must therefore be assessed in terms of its degree of diversity and the degree of freedom with which it may be chosen.

If options (meeting the two criteria of diversity and choice) were not found in the alternative schools, then it followed that no comprehensive change attributable to BESP would occur in the public school system. Therefore, our first task was to discover whether and how BUSD/BESP offered educational diversity and allowed its consumers (parents and students) freedom to select among the schools so as to match each child's educational interest with a specific school that would meet the child's educational needs, would maintain his/her interest, and would maximize his/her motivation for learning.

Diversity in BESP Schools. Empirically, almost all of the 20 BESP programs\* appear to have contained some degree of uniqueness, according to the six basic items we used to define diversity: (1) a non-graded classroom structure, (2) peer teaching visible in the majority of the school's classes, (3) an interdisciplinary approach to subjects, (4) a thematic emphasis on multi-cultural curriculum,

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\*Of the 23 BESP sites, two programs terminated before ISA's classroom observation began, and Agora merged with Genesis in the Fall of 1974.

(5) a thematic emphasis on controversial or avant-garde subjects, and (6) programmed learning.

These six indicators of "diversity" were chosen from observational data which reported "distinct" or "unique" or "different" aspects of BESP sites, combined with interview data obtained from BESP directors and teachers, claiming that their site provided educational "options" or "diversity" or "innovation."

Table 2 presents the number of indicators of diversity we found in each of the BESP schools. One site had no indicators of diversity, seven had one indicator, four had two, five had three, two had four and one had five. It is particularly noteworthy that although the local plan called specifically for program options to meet the needs of culturally pluralistic student groups, only one-half of the sites were found by our observers to be presenting any type of culturally pluralistic curricula or activities to their students.

Freedom of Choice. A second criterion of an option is the freedom of its consumers (parents/students) to choose the site they feel will best meet their interests or needs. Choice addresses the question: regardless of whether or not a program is unique, has freedom of choice been exercised in the decision to attend a particular school?

Early in the process of documenting and evaluating BESP we noted that the ideal model of a "free market," where students exercised freedom of choice in selecting schools, was more rhetorical than substantive.\* At certain schools and at certain grade levels, choice was severely restricted because of a number of structural constraints that operated at the district level. Systemic barriers to choice were of three types: (1) integration and zoning regulations, (2) programs devised exclusively for special "problem" students, and (3) channeling processes within BUSD.

The BUSD initiated a policy of school integration in September, 1968, and several consequences flowed from the implementation of the school integration plan.\*\*

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\*For a more thorough discussion of this point, see ISA's report, The Choice Structure of the Berkeley Experimental Schools, July 15, 1973.

\*\*In noting the limitations on choice that flowed from zoning regulations, instituted to achieve desegregation, ISA does not imply, of course, that segregation--either de jure or de facto--affords greater "freedom." On the contrary, institutional segregation, tailored by institutional racism, is the deprivation of choice.

TABLE 2: EDUCATIONAL DIVERSITY INDICATORS BY SITE, BESP SCHOOLS

BESP Schools	Indicators of Diversity						Total Number of In- dicators Present
	Non-Graded	Peer-Teaching	Interdisciplinary	Multi-Cultural	Controversial or Avant Garde	Programmed Learning	
Jefferson				x		x	2
Kilimanjaro	x						1
John Muir							0
Franklin Alternative		x		x		x	3
Environmental Studies			x	x			2
Early Learning Center	x	x		x			3
Odyssey	x		x	x	x	x	5
Willard Alternative			x	x			2
KARE		x		x			2
HUI					x		1
Work Study		x					1
Career Exploration		x					1
HILC						x	1
College Prep		x		x		x	3
Model School A		x	x		x	x	4
Agora/Genesis	x			x	x	x	4
On Target		x					1
East Campus						x	1
School of the Arts		x	x		x		3
Un West		x		x	x		3
Total	4	10	5	10	6	8	43

In order to facilitate a racial balance in all schools, the district was divided into a number of geographic zones. At the primary level (especially K-3), these zones defined the potential population for a given school. Students were bused to a given primary school according to the zone in which they lived. In contrast, the high school drew from the entire school district; therefore, zoning played no role in the freedom of individual choice for high school students. In general, our evidence suggests that zoning was inversely related to grade level; that is, the higher the grade level, the less the impact that district-mandated zoning had on freedom of individual choice of schools.

In characterizing the situation as one in which zoning influenced freedom of choice, it is important to note that the distinctions were not so much matters of kind as of degree. There were no situations where zoning operated in such a way as to be absolutely determinative. Even in the lower grades (K-3), where the designated zone was most restrictive, various options existed within schools from which a given student could select. For some of the schools from the fourth grade to high school, zoning played an important role, but the main pattern was one wherein a student had a choice between the "regular" school in the zone or the alternative (BESP) school that drew largely from that same zone.

In addition to district-mandated zoning, other "systemic" factors affected individual choice. Several schools were specifically intended for students who had special problems that made it difficult for them to function in "regular" school settings (e.g., students "sent" to the continuation school, East Campus). It is a tenable conclusion that because there was no other place (or few other places) where a student enrolled in one of these programs could go, such a student had little freedom of choice. His "problem" was defined on a district-wide basis, and such students were channeled to "special" schools from other district programs, schools or community agencies.

Obviously all public school districts engage in "matching" educational programs and presumed student characteristics, at least to some degree. An exhaustive study of educational channeling in a secondary school (Cicourel and Kitsuse, 1963) concluded that specialization of bureaucratic function increases its extent:

It is our thesis that the bureaucratization of the counseling system in large, comprehensive high schools leads to an emphasis upon and concern for professional status among counselors, and that this professionalization will produce a greater range and frequency of student problems (e.g., over and underachievers) than in

schools in which counseling duties are assigned to and performed by less professionalized teacher-counselors. Furthermore, there should be a specific emphasis upon defining the academic difficulties of students in clinical terms, and this emphasis should significantly affect the processing of students in the search for talent, the differential sponsorship of students to higher educational opportunities, and the processes of social mobility within the larger society.

These conclusions were based on observations in a high school where the student-counselor ratio averaged approximately 225 to one. This school was chosen because it represented an extreme: it was atypical in the sense that each counselor had relatively few students to advise, in comparison with other possible high school settings. Our study found that student-counselor ratios at Berkeley High School were even lower than those in the school mentioned above. Depending on the definition used, between 15 and 20 persons employed at Berkeley High could be conceived as "counselors." Even the most strict definition produced a ratio of students to counselors below 200 to one. Our field observations tended to corroborate the Cicourel and Kitsuse conclusions quoted above. Counselors and administrative personnel did play an important role in student choice at the high school level. In most cases this role was only informational or advisory; nevertheless, by setting boundaries on student options and defining the nature of student and program characteristics, counselors and administrators could and did have an important impact on student choice.

Obviously, some of the system-barriers to choice mentioned above affected the structure of student choice more than others. In general, the most important factor affecting choice was the district's zoning policy. Secondly, the "special problem" programs functioned in conjunction with the counseling system to produce channeling, thereby reducing choice. And thirdly, "channeling" or "tracking" also occurred independently, since "special programs" could and did acquire students without assignment by counselors.

Using these three factors, we classified the BESP schools along a single continuum, ranging from those which permitted the most freedom of choice to those with the least:

- "Relative Free Choice." Observations indicated that there were few barriers to free choice. Five schools were of this type: Early Learning Center, Kilimanjaro, Odyssey, Agora/Genesis, and On Target.

- ° "Choice Within Individual Site." Although choice in these schools was hindered by zoning, there were options within these schools from which a student or parent could select. Three schools fell in this category: Jefferson, Franklin Alternative, and Willard Alternative.
- ° "Little Freedom of Choice." Zoning played an important role, or counselors and other school personnel restricted choice significantly on the basis of achievement or other presumed student characteristics. The remaining BESP schools fell into this last category: John Muir, Environmental Studies, HUI, HILC, KARE, Work Study, Career Exploration, East Campus, MSA, College Prep, School of the Arts, and UN West.

Developing an Option Typology. After classifying the BESP schools separately along the two continua of diversity and freedom of choice (by using the criteria explicated in the two preceding sections), we combined the results to form a typology of schools, resulting in the four types shown in Table 3.\*

The Type I sites had neither free choice nor diversity--they had a regular school structure. The following BESP schools were in the Low-Choice and Low-Diversity Category: John Muir, Environmental Studies, HUI, Career Exploration, HILC, Work Study, East Campus, and KARE.

The Type II sites had a routinized intake, but had some diversity within their educational offerings. The following BESP schools were in the Low-Choice and High-Diversity Category: Model School A, College Prep, School of the Arts, and UN West.

The Type III sites had a relatively free-choice potential, but had few innovative or unique programs for their students. The following BESP schools were in the High-Choice and Low-Diversity Category: Kilimanjaro, On Target, Jefferson and Willard Alternative.

The Type IV sites had both a relatively open choice structure and a diverse curriculum and/or unique teaching practices, etc. The following schools were in the High-Choice and High-Diversity Category: Early Learning Center, Franklin Alternative, Odyssey, and Agora/Genesis.

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\*For statistical purposes and reasons of practicality, we simplified the "freedom of choice" continuum by reducing its categories from three to two, combining the schools classified as "Choice within Individual Site" and those classified as having "Relative Free Choice." The "diversity" continuum was also dichotomized.

TABLE 3: TYPOLOGY OF BESP SCHOOLS BASED ON DEGREE OF DIVERSITY AND CHOICE

		<u>Degree of Diversity</u>	
		<u>Low</u>	<u>High</u>
<u>Degree of Choice</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Type I</u> John Muir Environmental Studies HUI Career Exploration HILC Work Study East Campus KARE	<u>Type II</u> Model School A College Prep School of the Arts UN West
	<u>High</u>	<u>Type III</u> Kilimanjaro On Target Jefferson Willard Alternative	<u>Type IV</u> Early Learning Center Odyssey Agora/Genesis Franklin Alternative

Effect of Option Types on Students. We will now examine whether these four option types have any relation to a student's achievement, self-esteem, and anomie. Many researchers have tried to relate school variations to student outcomes, but few have been able to report that such variation has any differential effect.

The first relationship examined is that between options and student gains in achievement. For this analysis, we asked if the BESP option types had any impact on a student's average annual growth in CTBS reading scores over three years (1973-1976). Examining Table 4, we find that white and Asian students attending different option types do not differ significantly in their achievement gains. However, we do find statistically significant differences in the Black and Chicano group. Those students who are in either high choice or high diversity options are better achievers than those who are in the options with low choice/low diversity or high choice/high diversity.

In Table 4 and the two that follow it, we have combined Blacks and Chicanos into one group and whites and Asians into another. The rationale for this procedure is twofold: (1) the data revealed a conspicuous and significant division between Blacks and Chicanos on the one hand, and whites and Asians on the other; and (2) since

TABLE 4: AVERAGE ANNUAL CTBS READING GAINS IN YEARS, BY TYPE OF SCHOOL AND ETHNICITY (1974-1976)

	Blacks and Chicanos		Whites and Asians		Total	
	n	Mean Gain	n	Mean Gain	n	Mean Gain
BESP Type I: Low Choice, Low Diversity	124	.725	99	1.284	223	.975
BESP Type II: Low Choice, High Diversity	52	.885	108	1.298	160	1.164
BESP Type III: High Choice, Low Diversity	44	.905	51	1.323	95	1.129
BESP Type IV: High Choice, High Diversity	41	.756	73	1.296	114	1.142
Total, BESP Schools	261	.809	331	1.297	592	1.083
Total, Common Schools	147	.756	137	1.297	284	1.016
Grand Total	408	.790	468	1.297	876	1.061

the numbers of Chicanos and Asians were so small as to be of little use in statistical analysis, it seemed utilitarian to join them with the respective larger groups whose scores were similar. In connection with this procedure, it might be relevant to cite Ogbu (1974), who wrote:

I shall distinguish between two types of ethnic minorities..., designating one group as subordinate minority and the other as immigrant minorities. By subordinate minorities I mean those minority groups who were incorporated into the United States more or less against their will. Subordinate minorities include the American Indians who were already here before the dominant whites arrived and conquered them, the Mexican-Americans of the Southwest and Texas who were similarly incorporated by conquest, and blacks who were brought here as slaves. Immigrant minorities include Arabs,

Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, among others. These groups came to the United States for the same reasons as the dominant whites-- for political or religious asylum, but especially for economic betterment. Subordinate and immigrant minorities appear to differ in the way they perceive American society and in how they respond to the educational system.\*

Next in Table 5, we examine the relationship between option types and the academic self-concept of students (Appendix II contains a detailed description of how the academic self-concept scale was constructed). Here, among Blacks and Chicanos, we find the same variation between option types and self-concept as we did in reading scores: Blacks and Chicanos have the highest self-concept scores in the low-choice/high-diversity and high-choice/low-diversity options. Among whites and Asians, there is considerably more variation in academic self-concept than there was in reading gains, but none of the differences between students enrolled in different option types is statistically significant. Overall, when all students are considered jointly, students with the highest academic self-concepts are found in the low-choice/high-diversity options.

Finally, we examine the relationship between anomie scores and option types. The Srole Anomie Scale is an instrument generally deemed to be a measure of an individual's belief in the suitability or unsuitability of the social structure, and his sense of power or powerlessness in that structure (see Appendix II). A high anomie score indicates a low sense of social control. For Black and Chicano students, those who are in the low-choice/high-diversity option have lower anomie scores than those in the other three options. The white and Asian students with low anomie scores are also disproportionately in low-choice/high-diversity options, while those in the high-choice/low-diversity options scored highest in anomie (Table 6).

Although the differences we found cannot be attributed to the option types alone, we did find that the low-choice/high-diversity students scored slightly better than students in the other option types on each of the three measures, regardless of student ethnicity. Second, the high-choice/high-diversity options do not significantly

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\*Ogbu's distinction runs counter to that of "Third World" protagonists who perceive an essential affinity among all "people of color" and a fundamental schism between them and whites. However that may be, in the Berkeley school system all the available evaluative data indicate an affinity between Asians and whites and a gap between them and Blacks and Chicanos.

TABLE 5: ACADEMIC SELF-CONCEPT SCORES, BY TYPE OF SCHOOL AND ETHNICITY

	Blacks and Chicanos		Whites and Asians		Total	
	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean</u>
BESP Type I: Low Choice, Low Diversity	85	.759	69	1.101	154	.916
BESP Type II: Low Choice, High Diversity	33	1.152	98	1.250	131	1.225
BESP Type III: High Choice, Low Diversity	6	1.083	9	.889	15	.967
BESP Type IV: High Choice, High Diversity	33	.636	51	.951	84	.827
Total, BESP Schools	157	.828	227	1.123	384	1.004
Total, Common Schools	85	.971	86	1.116	171	1.044
Grand Total	242	.878	313	1.121	555	1.016

TABLE 6: ANOMIE SCORES\*, BY TYPE OF SCHOOL AND ETHNICITY

	Blacks and Chicanos		Whites and Asians		Total	
	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean</u>
BESP Type I: Low Choice, Low Diversity	72	3.417	63	1.921	135	2.713
BESP Type II: Low Choice, High Diversity	31	2.710	93	1.538	124	1.831
BESP Type III: High Choice, Low Diversity	16	3.563	14	2.429	30	3.033
BESP Type IV: High Choice, High Diversity	17	3.353	20	2.300	37	2.784
Total, BESP Schools	136	3.264	190	1.811	326	2.415
Total, Common Schools	74	3.568	77	1.727	151	2.629
Grand Total	210	3.371	267	1.787	477	2.483

\*High scores indicate a low belief in ability to control one's own destiny.

impact on student achievement, academic self-concept, or anomie. These findings are suggestive of the idea that choice may not be important in affecting achievement. Further, diversity by plan or by system design may best appeal to minority students. Since, as we have previously shown, much of the so-called "diversity" is in the multi-cultural curriculum field, it might be reasoned that minority students are more likely to respond positively to schools which offer diverse, perhaps more relevant courses.

We caution the reader that while these findings are provocative, the fact remains that Blacks and Chicanos still scored significantly lower than whites and Asians on all measures. Compared to the latter, Blacks and Chicanos have lower average reading gains, less favorable academic self-concepts, and substantially higher anomie. Nevertheless, Blacks and Chicanos in BESP programs do somewhat better than do Blacks and Chicanos in the common schools, at least in reading gains and levels of anomie; and it is of interest that school diversity (particularly in sites with peer teaching and a multi-cultural emphasis) favorably affected minority students on all three measures.

Yet, when we examine the options that remain after the close of BESP, we find that low-choice/high-diversity sites were not necessarily selected to remain. Among the seven options phased-in, only two (Model School A and College Prep) are such sites. Both are sub-schools within the high school, and one is all-Black. It would be of interest to continue to encourage such options for disadvantaged minority students. The other five phase-in options do not impact as well upon the achievement, self-concept and anomie scores of minority students as do some of the options which were "phased-out" (especially UN West and School of the Arts).

## 2. Local Plan Goal #2: Eliminate Racism and Facilitate Acquisition of Basic Skills

The second goal in the BESP plan addressed a value, rather than a goal per se. The plan writers asserted that racism was the barrier to learning, especially for minority students, and that BESP would, in some unspecified manner, attempt to "move toward eliminating racism in the schools and the larger community."

Throughout these passing years, we have come to recognize the complex, pervasive tenacity of institutionalized racism, and we no longer expect any one social institution to "cure" this deep-seated disease. Berkeley is sensitive to the deep racial divisions in our society and this concern loomed large in BESP's local plan.

But this "goal" of the local plan was never operationalized, nor were the mechanisms linking racism to options, and options to acquisition of basic skills, ever thought through or presented in the plan.

We have assumed that the major mechanism for achieving such goals would be found in the program options, and have therefore analyzed student attitudes and achievement by option types. We turn now to a fuller discussion of the BESP local plan's second goal.

BESP's aim to decrease racism and its effects was to be achieved partly by improving minority students' basic skills. To test BESP's impact on the acquisition of basic skills among its students, we analyzed the standardized achievement tests (Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills in grades 2-11) administered to the BUSD student body at semester intervals for the duration of the program. A comparison of the standardized\* mean scores of BESP and common school students in each grade is given in Table 7, covering a three-year period (1974-1976).

In general, the table reveals some differences in achievement between BESP and common school students, but these differences form no clear pattern, and the differences in the upper grades are subject to special explanations.

The apparent disparity between BESP and common school student scores in grades 7 and 8 can be accounted for by the nature of the BESP program in those junior high school grades. KARE, a remedial program, accounted for 78 percent of BESP students in these two grades. Therefore, the difference in scores between BESP and common school students in grades 7 and 8 is the result of selection bias, rather than an effect of the experimental program. After KARE and Willard Alternative were terminated, Odyssey was the only BESP site with grades 7 and 8 in 1975 and 1976. As the table shows, scores for very few Odyssey 7th and 8th graders were available in those years.

In the 9th grade, the vast bulk of the BESP students attended HUI, a high-potential program that selected the most able students in grade 9. Once again, the gap in achievement can be explained by factors other than an effect of BESP vs. the common school.

The explanation of the apparent variation at the high school level is different. The testing policy of BUSD allowed students in grades 10-11 to "top out" of the CTBS, based on their teachers' prior assessment of their basic skills ability. The population that remained to take the test was biased towards the lowest basic skills levels and too small for reliable aggregate data.

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\*Test scores have been standardized on the national mean and standard deviation for each grade level, resulting in standardized scores ranging from 200 to 999.

**TABLE 7: CTBS READING MEANS, BY GRADE AND TYPE OF SCHOOL, SPRING 1974 - SPRING 1976\***

Grade	BESP Schools			Common Schools			% of Total Grade**	Total n in Grade
	n	Mean	S.D.	n	Mean	S.D.		
<u>Spring 1974</u>								
4	120	464.77	74.39	724	444.13	78.55	80	1055
5	104	511.13	88.17	695	489.03	93.54	76	1051
6	94	539.19	93.77	797	521.32	100.31	79	1128
7	93	485.09	109.67	660	538.25	108.45	72	1046
8	103	513.51	105.06	638	573.97	115.98	72	1029
9	287	644.56	130.56	333	571.08	115.96	61	1016
10	137	605.51	151.98	143	506.27	76.38	25	1120
11	75	614.68	122.27	71	512.06	86.25	14	1043
<u>Spring 1975</u>								
2	176	366.66	54.57	519	360.57	59.36	67	1037
3	186	411.95	89.05	558	429.41	89.27	68	1094
4	30	415.72	85.72	582	450.58	92.71	61	1003
5	133	507.67	98.43	613	491.09	102.98	72	1036
6	92	539.34	106.30	666	535.70	107.50	74	1024
7	8	538.38	127.16	779	532.24	106.05	69	1140
8	13	602.23	113.94	693	568.61	114.33	70	1009
9	383	631.38	128.28	193	554.99	110.42	54	1067
10	48	552.85	129.73	101	517.26	79.83	13	1146
11	36	583.50	124.92	88	500.89	85.75	12	1033
<u>Spring 1976</u>								
2	116	372.31	61.67	542	363.57	56.78	69	953
3	121	438.36	78.60	522	438.02	86.11	68	946
4	76	480.26	78.27	494	457.74	90.21	65	877
5	102	470.39	89.27	464	477.90	96.38	64	884
6	91	541.15	100.35	475	531.90	103.20	68	832
7	7	506.86	107.60	668	545.79	109.72	70	1064
8	7	509.00	119.84	720	582.58	110.55	68	1069
9	438	638.86	118.18	157	506.22	90.09	61	975
10	37	565.54	80.41	46	491.35	92.90	8	1037
11	11	561.91	114.19	46	517.00	68.09	6	950

\*Figures from BUSD Office of Research and Evaluation. Test results for 12th-graders are not included because, in that grade, the CTBS is administered only to a few students of lowest skill levels. The Spring 1974 data do not include test results for grades 2 and 3 because the Coop Primary rather than the CTBS was used in those grades that year.

\*\*The percentage figures represent the proportions in each grade for whom test results are available and recorded in the table.

However, we would also suggest other interpretations of the findings. We question the validity of the testing procedures and of the design of BESP itself as an "experiment." On the latter point, the implicit assumption appears to be that BESP students constitute an "experimental" group who spent their entire school day in a BESP school, to be measured against a "control" group of randomly selected students who were, by and large, concentrated in two separate zones, and who attended a BUSD school. This logic is inappropriate, however, at the secondary level. Except for the two off-site schools, Odyssey and East Campus, BESP programs were not full-spectrum curricula, as were those in the elementary schools. They were, rather, partial programs which themselves depended on the common school to provide an appreciable part of their curriculum. Even in the most comprehensive BESP programs almost all students still took a majority of their classes in the common school. To test the impact of BESP requires an experimental design, but the "experimental" group was so thoroughly contaminated that it was practically impossible to assess the differential effect of BESP.

The second objection is that the BUSD testing program during the five years of BESP injected both bias and measurement non-comparability into the assessment of BESP impact. At the high school level, the BUSD Office of Research and Evaluation, which was charged with the supervision of all standardized test administration in District schools, actually had no effective control either of choice of testing materials or of procedures for administering them. As a result, instruments to measure achievement were not used consistently over the five years of the program. Forms were changed periodically; in addition, it was up to the discretion of each teacher which test (CTBS or COOP) his/her class took. These inconsistencies biased the achievement measures of the high school sample.

The objections outlined above indicate that at best the high school data were inconclusive as measures of BESP's impact. The sources of error and bias discussed did not affect elementary level students.

Despite these shortcomings, we analyzed the achievement data and did find systematic variations in the basic skills mastery of Berkeley students. Indeed, the variations that do exist in test scores would seem to strike at the heart of a major objective of BESP and of the Berkeley system as a whole--the elimination of the effects of racism by narrowing the achievement gap between white and minority students.

Table 8 below, comparing ethnic groups by the average annual CTBS reading gains they achieved over the five years of BESP's existence, shows considerable and statistically significant differences between these groups.

TABLE 8: AVERAGE ANNUAL CTBS READING GAINS  
IN YEARS, BY ETHNICITY (1972-1976)

<u>Ethnicity</u>	<u>Mean Gain</u>	<u>S.D.</u>	<u>n</u>
White	1.359	.353	320
Black	.759	.300	354
Asian	1.304	.390	64
Chicano	.892	.309	23
Other	.993	.570	16
Total	1.063	.462	777
Between groups variance =		13.132615	4 df
Within groups variance =		.1140681	772 df
Total variance =		13.2466831	776 df

$$F(4,777) = 115.878 \quad p < .001$$

The table clearly indicates that the mean growth scores of white and Asian students are substantially larger than those of Black and Chicano students. Over the span of the program, the disadvantaged minority students have lagged obviously and severely in their reading mastery. BESP has not managed to erase the gap.

This is certainly a most serious finding, given the emphasis placed by BUSD policy-makers on removing institutional racism and remedying the effects of past discrimination. It would indicate failure of two of BESP's primary goals: improving basic skills and eliminating institutional racism.\*

\*Since these are disturbing findings, we subjected the data to a path analysis in order to account for the demonstrable effect of ethnicity on achievement gains. Briefly, we found (among high school students) that ethnicity by itself accounts for 11 percent of the variance; its first-order effects through father's and mother's education account for an additional 15 percent; its further first-order effects through peer group loyalties and anomic attitudes account for another 16 percent; and second- and high-order effects account for five percent of the total variance. In short, ethnicity affects reading gains independently of socio-economic background, peer attachments, and other attitudes and beliefs, but it also exercises an effect indirectly in that the parents of Blacks and Chicanos tend to be less educated, which has a depressing effect on academic achievement, and minority students are more likely than others to have peer loyalties and anomic attitudes which also tend

Actually, even though the BESP plan was vague about the strategies BESP would employ to overcome institutional racism, two further lines of attack were activated: (1) minority staff, both certificated and classified, were to be hired at every level of BESP; and (2) every BESP site was to have some type of multi-cultural curriculum.

Due to pressures from sectors of the minority communities, another potential means to decrease racism also emerged: the development of racially separate options within BESP. Four such racially separate sites developed, one for Chicano students (Casa de la Raza), and three for Black students (Black House, UN West, and College Prep). The racially separate schools found an uneasy home within BUSD, given its commitment to racial integration, but were tolerated as "experiments" with the support of the federal ESP staff. Three were short-lived, and one remains after BESP's end.

How well did these three tactics to decrease institutional racism fare?

Increase in Minority Staff. Over the last three years of BESP (the period covered by ISA's Level II evaluation), the percentages of minority staff employed by BESP were as follows:

TABLE 9: BESP STAFF BY ETHNICITY (1973/74 - 1975/76)

	<u>1973/74</u>	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76</u>
White	46%	51%	54%
Black	34%	30%	29%
Asian	13%	12%	10%
Chicano	6%	6%	7%
Other	1%	1%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%
n	215	184	157

Table 9 shows that, in fact, the proportion of minorities employed by BESP decreased over this period (Blacks by 15 percentage points, Asians by 23 percentage points) while the proportion of whites increased by 17 percentage points. In absolute figures,

to lower their achievement. The single most powerful effect we found was an indirect one: ETHNICITY----ANOMIE----ACH GAINS. While schools cannot be expected to influence "objective" factors such as parental educations and occupations, action regarding the more "subjective" factors of peer attachments and anomic attitudes and beliefs is well within the bounds of school district authority.

the BESP staff was reduced during these three years by 58 persons. Of these, 14 were white, 27 were Black, 12 were Asian, three were Chicano, and two were "other." Among the classified, non-certificated staff, BESP initially hired a significant proportion of minority persons. When the decision was made in 1974 to lay off all classified staff, 75 percent of those who were laid off were minority employees.

Compared to the staff of the common schools, BESP staff had about the same percentage of minority persons. In fact, common schools had a slightly higher proportion of Black staff than did BESP, although they had a somewhat lower proportion of Asian staff.

Thus, BESP staffs did not differ appreciably from BUSD staffs in their ethnic composition, and the trend was in the direction of reduced minority staffs. One might conclude that the relatively high proportions of minority staff in BUSD and BESP were a result of an overall district commitment to affirmative action, rather than a particular "change" prompted by BESP's goal of decreasing institutional racism. BESP did not have the power to revise the institutional norms or organizational rules that bore the imprint of racism, served to perpetuate it, and were, therefore, structural impediments to a reduction in institutionalized racism. BESP was given a goal, but not vested with an essential power for its realization. No major organizational changes occurred within the Berkeley schools that would have impacted upon racial imbalance. For example, tenure was not changed; minority staff were last hired, first fired. The tenure system prescribed by state law ensured this, and one can only conjecture about what BUSD/BESP might have done without state constraints. No special attempts were made to purchase books, supplies or equipment from minority firms. Indeed, the goal of reducing institutional racism was itself differently understood by different participants in the project, and the absence of clear definitions to guide policy or practice obstructed the development of consensus.\*

Relative to the severity of the problem, some rather simplistic attempts were made to improve racial sensitivity in BESP training programs. For example, BESP-funded teacher training included in-service workshops on the "Self Image of the Minority Child" and on "Multi-cultural Social Studies." Yet, no one in BUSD would claim that institutional racism had been "cured," and most would agree that this deeply-ingrained American penchant could not be rooted out by holding a few courses.

\*See our report, A Preliminary Descriptive Analysis of BESP (1973-1974), Sept. 1, 1974, pp. 160-168.

Multi-Cultural Curricula. BESP developed various types of multi-cultural curricula as one way of combating institutionalized racism. In almost every BESP site, some courses covered various ethnic subjects, from "Swahili" to the "White Experience." As we showed in Table 2, one-half of the BESP sites used multi-cultural curricula fairly extensively. BESP youth, both minority and white, were sensitized to different cultural styles. About one-half of all students in BESP felt that their school emphasized ethnic identity and their curriculum contained a multi-cultural aspect. About two-thirds of BESP's teachers reported the same thing.

However, BUSD classes also use multi-cultural curricula. An equal proportion of BESP and BUSD students reported that their schools emphasized ethnic identity and multi-culturalism, and the proportion of BUSD teachers who said so was only slightly less than that of BESP teachers. Several of the multi-cultural courses or materials which were originally developed in BESP spread to BUSD, principally via the in-service training funded by ESP. Included in these materials were the multi-cultural aspects of the TABA Social Studies series, Project Read, and Project Write, and the materials created by teachers and others at the individual BESP sites.

Thus, to a limited degree, BESP has managed to encourage the development of curricula which emphasized ethnic identity and multi-culturalism, although this is not unique in BESP since one finds such courses throughout BUSD.

Racially Separate Schools. Three of the racially separate schools were located "off-site" and were embattled from their opening day. The one exception, College Prep, is an on-site high school, a sub-school which uses traditional means to spur Black students on to college. It is not a full-time option, and students take only two courses in the sub-school, enrolling in BUSD for the balance of their work. With approximately 130 students, it has survived the BESP phase-in. College Prep has an all-Black faculty, and a high proportion of its graduates have enrolled in college. It has maintained a high degree of organizational and constituent support, and is, in many ways, fully established within the Berkeley High School as an all-Black sub-school. It escapes "integrationist attacks" because its students also attend Berkeley High classes.

In contrast, the fate of the off-site, racially separate options (Black House, Casa de la Raza, and UN West) was that of a short and harried existence. We present the following case study of Black House as an example of the fate of one attempt to impact on institutional racism within BESP. A fuller account of all three schools (and all other BESP schools) is to be found in Volume II of this report.

Black House was conceived by a young Black teacher and a group of Black students at Community High School I, the pioneering alternative venture on the Berkeley High School campus. The students complained that CHS was not responsive to Black needs. The teacher perceived a fundamental dichotomy between the large high school, in which the values and cultural predilections of the white majority were pervasive, and the Black experience. As a consequence, he argued, Berkeley High could not solve "the real problem," which was "how to motivate and teach Black students," who were "not performing according to their best abilities." A promising alternative, he concluded, was a school rooted in the Black ambience, where shared experience and culture, and a broad community of aspirations, created the possibilities for empathic communication between staff and students.

Guided by such perceptions, Black House opened in Fall 1970 with School Board approval and was included in the BESP package submitted to Washington in May 1971. Its acceptance by OE/ESP as part of the package presumably legitimized it as an experimental project. However, it was immediately subjected to investigation by the Office for Civil Rights on charges that its all-Black composition violated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Even before OCR intervention, Black House, "surrounded by heated controversy," was the target of "many angry epithets," according to its first director. By challenging the integrationist credo, Black House offended much of Berkeley's educational establishment, its white liberal community, and some articulate Black community spokespersons, all of whom took pride in the desegregation of the city's schools in 1968.

Amid these diverse pressures Black House resembled a beleaguered fortress during its two-year life span as a BESP site, before its liquidation in June 1973 at OCR insistence and the Superintendent's concurrence. The struggle for the right to exist consumed much staff time and energy. There was little inclination to internal evaluation, and considerable suspicion of outside evaluators. Hard evaluative data are non-existent. In a sense, such data would have been irrelevant because the decisive "evaluation," rendered by OCR, hinged on socio-political and legal factors, not educational performance.

From the imprecise statistical data available, Black House student enrollment was between 40 and 80 in grades 9-12, served by certificated staff that ranged between 1.4 and 3.5 full-time equivalents, supplemented by five to seven classified personnel, six consultants and four work-study students. Curriculum had two emphases: basic skills and Black consciousness and pride. ISA observers noted, on the whole, good morale and self-discipline among Black House students, a dedicated staff, an atmosphere of "restrained

relaxation," a sense of community, and a salutary rapport between staff and students. Central BESP reported that the success of Black House, "whether measured in terms of student enthusiasm or student willingness to pursue further education, has been remarkable." Even allowing for excessive zeal in the BESP estimate, all the foregoing indicates that, on its own terms, Black House was a viable alternative.

Nonetheless, it was liquidated. The school's protests that the student composition resulted from free student choice, not system coercion, were in vain. So was the argument that the school was constituted as it was to achieve an affirmative educational purpose, which was altogether different from a negative intent to enforce racial exclusion as the expression of racial superiority. Black House protagonists also argued the dubious efficacy of integration if it simply meant thrusting Black students into an educational environment dominated by the prevailing mores, needs and aspirations of white society, and permeated by institutional racism. Such an environment, they contended, lacerates the self-esteem of many Black students and diminishes their educational achievement. The experimental hypothesis for Black House was that Black autonomy, which creates an atmosphere and program that are rooted in Black experience and are responsive to distinct Black needs, would create the educational environment to motivate Black students to realize their learning potential. It would instill in them the sense of self-worth and self-confidence, both as individuals and members of an ethnic community, that could make for authentic, not illusory, integration as they encountered their contemporaries of other ethnic strains on a psychological plane of equality.

It seems to ISA that this was a tenable hypothesis, worth testing in an experiment. OCR thought otherwise. So do others, who believe that at this juncture racial separatism, in whatever form, would be a retrograde step educationally, politically and socially. Still, Black House might have offered some clues as to what could usefully be done to cope with problems in education that are recognized as staggering. Perhaps, it could have shed some light on what should not be done. Truncation of the experiment precluded the possibility of gaining such knowledge.

We sought other ways to evaluate the potential effect of an all-Black school upon the acquisition of basic skills by Black youth. We noted two all-Black schools on which we have some data, albeit suggestive rather than firm. We have average CTBS reading gain scores for College Prep and UN West, representing 40 students from our total sample of 47 Black students at those two sites. These growth scores were compared with growth scores of Black students who attended integrated BESP and common schools (Table 10).

TABLE 10: AVERAGE ANNUAL CTBS READING GAINS IN YEARS, BY TYPE OF SCHOOL SETTING (BLACK HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS ONLY)

	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean Gain</u>
BESP Integrated	19	.605
BESP Racially Separate	40	.866
Common Integrated	55	.658

F(1,58)=5.854  
p < .05

We note a statistically significant difference in the annual growth rate on CTBS reading tests for Black high school students in all-Black options. But we caution the reader that these data, though provocative, are only suggestive.

We further examined the scores on anomie and academic self-concept for Black students in the three different settings (Table 11). While the samples are small and one of the relations is not statistically significant, the findings are in the expected direction: Black students attending all-Black BESP sites sense more power and have more favorable academic self-concepts than Black students attending integrated sites.

TABLE 11: ANOMIE AND ACADEMIC SELF-CONCEPT SCORES, BY TYPE OF SCHOOL SETTING (BLACK HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS ONLY)

	<u>Anomie</u>		<u>Academic Self-Concept</u>	
	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>Mean</u>
BESP Integrated	14	3.143	15	.438
BESP Racially Separate	27	2.815	29	1.172
Common Integrated	34	3.618	34	1.074

F(1,40)=1.965    F(1,43)=5.455  
n.s.                      p < .05

These three tentative findings need far more investigation than we have been able to devote to them here. To many of us who feel racial justice to be crucial, an adequate understanding of the schooling of minorities would seem to require an examination of the three major structures in which they are schooled: segregated facilities (such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs boarding schools), integrated schools (such as BUSD), and separatist schools (such as Black House or Black Muslim schools). The difference between segregated and separatist schools is poorly understood. At least theoretically,

in a segregated school the atmosphere and power structure are those of colonialism; in a separate school, the ambience and control constitute self-government, self-determination. Clarification of these differences should lead us into more germane research, rather than relentless rhetoric.

In sum, the four major strategies which BESP utilized to decrease institutional racism produced checkered results, but on balance the advance toward the stated goal was not significant. BESP did not erase the gap between the academic achievements of white and Asian students on the one hand, and Black and Chicano students on the other. No difference was found between BESP and BUSD in hiring minority staff. The BESP multi-cultural emphasis has contributed to a similar emphasis district-wide, and has apparently influenced staff and student attitudes toward ethnic identity. BESP development of racially separate schools was truncated by OCR pressure, and their adequate evaluation was inhibited. Thus, only one of the strategies (i.e., multi-cultural emphasis) had an observable impact upon the Berkeley school system, but this did not come to grips with the structural institutionalization of racism.

### 3. Local Plan Goal #3: Power-Sharing

The third goal of the BESP Local Plan was "to provide significant changes in the administration and organization of the system so that power of decision-making becomes a shared activity." Our evaluation finds that BESP did not structurally change BUSD so that a site community could be in control of its school. Rules and roles within the total District were not reordered so as to permit the development of sites highly responsive to consumer entreaties. Indeed, BUSD never seriously activated systemic changes, and the federal ESP offices had other and more pressing priorities. On the whole, power-sharing was a slogan, not a planned and operationalized reality.

Further militating against limited attempts at power-sharing by certain, though not all, BESP sites were (1) BUSD and ESP budgetary inflexibility, (2) the administrative origins of on-site schools and programs, (3) the fractionated character of BUSD grade configurations (K-3, 4-6, etc.) and (4) consumer and staff concern for site phase-in.

In combination, these pressures (1) removed substantial decision-making authority from the sites; (2) hampered the ability of parents to identify with particular sites and to develop that identity organizationally; (3) prevented the emergence of consistently used formal governing bodies composed of parents, teachers, and students; and (4) fortified the normal disinclination of secondary school parents toward formal school participation.

These evaluative findings are elaborated in the remainder of this chapter.

### Power-Sharing Was Not an Authentic BESP Goal

When ESP was created in 1971 the idea of community control of schools was in national vogue. This idea had gained currency from the publicized failure of desegregation and compensatory education to raise the educational performance of minority students. Increased participation of, and accountability to, a local school community seemed another way to unlock a school's potential. This latest straw in the educational wind was seized upon by OE/ESP. In its original December 28, 1970 announcement, this office made "community participation" in ESP-designated school districts a prerequisite to funding.

BUSD/BESP planners responded in kind to this language. The idea of parental/student participation in decision-making figured prominently in the BESP proposal. BESP sites were envisioned as dramatically altering the traditional relationships between administrators, teachers, parents, and students. To amplify the stated BESP intent, the Board of Education issued a "draft" statement on June 13, 1971, reaffirming in these words the local commitment to organizational change at BESP sites:

Experimental Schools will be administratively autonomous and responsible directly on the one hand to the youngsters and their parents, on the other to the Superintendent of Schools, for carrying out BUSD policy. They shall relate to both of these with the least possible bureaucratic intervention. Development of a child-centered, simplified administrative structure is a major goal of our alternative schools program. Alternative schools must develop from staff, parents and teachers working together.

District planners had not only the federal announcement to consider. In addition, Berkeley's pre-existing alternative schools had evidenced a community voice, and these schools provided Berkeley with its most attractive case for ESP funding. Further, the power-sharing language in the BESP proposal provided a post hoc compensation to consumers for having neglected them during the planning phase. The Board's June 13 statement offered this consolation to consumers:

The process by which the proposal was developed has been criticized for lack of community

participation, and specifics of the proposal have met with much community comment and some hostility regarding content, philosophy, and implementation....The School Board is satisfied that the terms on which Berkeley was awarded the grant are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the changes our guidelines and community involvement may bring to the specific proposals prior to and during their implementation. (Emphases added.)

Admittedly, little is known about the educational effects of parent and student power.\* There are still many unresolved questions about the most productive relationship between parents and students on the one hand, and professional educators on the other. Given the unpredictable results of parent/student decision-making, BUSD cannot be faulted for conferring discretion on sites to fashion forms of community involvement that would coincide with their own distinctive situations and experiences. However, BUSD was not prepared to honor site preferences, for the endorsement of community power ran counter to other potent BUSD tendencies, especially those of the Superintendent who guided BESP into the District. In this vein, we note an initial BUSD resistance to administrative decentralization and to evaluation of school staff by consumers.

Resistance to decentralization. After consideration in late 1971, the Board of Education voted to decentralize its budget procedures and to give school principals the key role in allocating funds. However, this decision was made over the strenuous objection of the Superintendent, who refused to implement it during a tenure which lasted until June 1974. Interestingly, the reaction of several school principals was also negative; they asserted that decentralization of the BUSD would be tantamount to shifting an explosive political issue from the Board to the schools. It also might reduce the extent to which principals could play central pressures off against local ones. Thus, some of those occupying positions of de facto authority over BESP schools, and who were authorized to enlist parental involvement, were clearly uncommitted to power-sharing and viewed even limited decentralization as an abnegation of Board responsibility. The formal policy adoption

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\*The Coleman Report (1966) does not reveal any association between parental participation in schools and student achievement. On the basis of Coleman's findings, Cohen (1971) alleges that small school districts, presumably having fewer bureaucratic impediments to parental participation than do larger ones, do not produce higher levels of achievement. A brief literature review of the unknown impact of consumer participation in school decision-making is contained in Chesler and Lohman (1974).

occurred subsequent to the first revelations of BUSD financial embarrassment, which increasingly dampened enthusiasm for decentralization during the BESP years.\*

Resistance to evaluation by consumers. There was also deadlock over another District-wide issue of parent and student power-sharing: should consumers be directly involved in evaluating teachers and administrators? In June 1973, a proposal to permit consumer evaluation was brought before the Board of Education. Unable to decide at that time, the Board waited until late November 1973 to vote unanimously to include parents in the evaluation of teachers, and to include students in such evaluations in the higher grades, altogether excluding administrative positions. But the Board left to the BUSD central administration the determination of how such a policy would work. The administration formally opted to confine the policy to only half of the tenured teachers per year; however, even this compromise was not implemented. Only in 1974/75, under a new superintendent, was "user" evaluation given a trial run at a few common schools. Significantly, an affirmative Board vote was taken after the earlier Superintendent had repeated his opposition to direct participation by parents or students in teacher evaluation. Previously, in June, he had explained his opposition by pointing to his difficulties with other citizens' committees "which get so politicized.\*\* Noteworthy, too, is that the November 1973 vote had only the qualified support of two Black members of the Board. One charged that the policy would inadvertently enact a hardship on both underachieving minority students and poor working parents, since they would lack a sustained and persuasive voice in decisions; the other claimed that the administratively watered-down version of teacher evaluation lacked the bite necessary to remove incompetent teachers from the District.

Power-sharing was not a real BUSD goal despite its prominent position in the BESP local plan. Signs of power-sharing at the District level were responses to state and federal demands. California legislation compelled the BUSD to set up a teacher evaluation system in 1973, and federal guidelines prompted the Superintendent to convene a Community Educational Advisory Committee to advise him on the development and implementation of federal projects in the District. The guidelines, requiring one-half of the

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\*The divided opinion within the BUSD over decentralization is illustrated by the reaction of a Board member who consistently favored decentralization. This member later charged that "the administration has essentially sabotaged the policy" and accused it of being composed of "empire builders who don't want to yield power to the school principals." As for the principals, they were described as being "afraid of the responsibility that would go with more power." Berkeley Daily Gazette, December 18, 1973.

\*\*Berkeley Daily Gazette, June 21, 1973.

30-member Committee to be parents of BUSD students, were issued in February 1973, too late to play a part in BESP planning. Compliance with the guidelines was perfunctory at best. The BUSD central administration lacked the determination to advance the sort of decentralization and community participation which Weiler (1974) found to be crucial for the limited first-year success of the Alum Rock voucher project.

The absorbing federal concern in BESP's first year was that each alternative receive the added advantage of ESP funding, especially support services for off-site schools which would bring them up to par with those provided regular BUSD schools. Power-sharing was not a first-year federal priority. Afterwards, NIE/ESP highlighted the importance of evaluation, articulation, and teacher training, but never power-sharing. Though ESP funds were initially routed to the central BESP for the development of community involvement mechanisms, this funding tapered off dramatically and the services of the Family-School Transaction component were suspended. Even at the central project level, then, federal funding and monitoring did not abet power-sharing as a critical element of BESP.

The BUSD and BESP central administrations did not plan for power-sharing. A corporate form of power-sharing, applicable across sites, was not devised from above. Since time did not permit extensive BESP planning, BUSD accepted the proposals of sites with a previous community orientation, but without attending to structural obstacles to power-sharing. The underlying tensions between the District administration and the pre-BESP alternatives (i.e., those with the greatest parent, student, and teacher input) tended to be submerged rather than resolved in the BUSD planning process. Yet, by failing to concede this, the BUSD tended to presuppose the existence of what had never occurred, that is, the resolution of these and other political tensions. Despite the self-criticism in its proposal to OE, especially in regard to institutional racism, BUSD in its planning for BESP did not take the accusations seriously. BUSD acted as if local power-sharing could be attached to normal District operations, for teachers were not presumed to be racist or protective of professional prerogatives, and the school bureaucracy was not thought to be opposed to reform. In other words, the negative attributes imputed to BUSD in its BESP proposal justified funding, but the positive traits were assumed correct for the purpose of local planning. In respect to power-sharing, BESP built on presumed BUSD strengths instead of guarding against admitted BUSD weaknesses. Community power was viewed as thoroughly compatible with District power. As a result, stumbling blocks to power-sharing arose, among which the following were the most crucial.

Inflexibility in BUSD and BESP budgets. It was difficult to create and maintain an organization of parents and/or students when such organizations could not point to accomplishments for which spending authority was a vital prerequisite. Site communities lacked important decision-making authority since about 85 percent of the BUSD budget was tied up in fixed salary commitments. Site power tended to vanish, then, because of pre-existing BUSD decisions. The BESP and BUSD decentralization policies were announced after the BUSD budgetary process had grown inflexible. A Citizens' Budget and Finance Committee reported to the School Board in 1972 that many principals were too embarrassed even to call meetings of school advisory committees "because there is no real decision-making capacity and the amount of non-allocated funds is very small." The Committee concluded that BUSD's small size--about 15,000 students and 21 principals--prevented the District from realizing any advantage through a decentralization policy "that is not practically capable of implementation."\* Turning the OE grant into a NIE contract further restricted the type and amount of discretionary money available to sites. Hence, the forms which community participation took were generally incapable of engendering power-sharing. Sometimes these forms already existed in BUSD (e.g., using parents as volunteer teacher's aides at K-3, 4-6, and off-site secondary schools), or they could be erased by BUSD policies (e.g., giving students influence over curricula through sign-up lists, a privilege at some secondary level sites that was substantially withheld in BESP's last two years by shrinking enrollments and, thusly, by BUSD formulas affecting the number of teachers available to sites).

The administrative origins of most on-site schools. Participation by parents and students in school governance partly depends on their identification with a particular school and their decision-making talents, which take time to develop (Cronin and Hailer, 1973). But the majority of BESP sites were created by their directors or BUSD principals, or by central BUSD edict. Parent/student participation was mostly added to schools and programs whose directions were already set, making it difficult to arouse consumer interest in power-sharing.\*\*

\*Berkeley Daily Gazette, December 18, 1973.

\*\*BUSD rejected two community-proposed sites outside the two BESP zones, despite their acceptable ratings by the District screening committee. BUSD then moved to provide sites at two common schools whose principals, teachers and parents had not shown a strong desire to be included in the program. This turnabout was accomplished by assigning to John Muir a new principal committed to an "open classroom" approach, and by telling the Franklin staff to write a proposal which would be convincing to OE. Later, the BESP central administration encouraged what had not been explicitly denied to

Fragmentation in the BUSD school career. The K-3, 4-6, 7-8, 9, 10-12 grade-configuration of BUSD schools upon which the majority of BESP sites were superimposed, and the narrowly programmatic quality of some BESP sites, restricted consumer interest in power-sharing. Parents could not continue their role once their children moved to a new site. However, the major effect of this fragmentation was felt at BESP's beginning, when some sites abjured community involvement altogether. Power-sharing was deliberately rejected at the "supplementary" West Campus 9th grade sites (HUI, Yoga/Reading, Career Exploration, Work/Study), at the aborted junior high "alternatives" (KARE and Willard), and at Berkeley High sites emphasizing "academics" instead of "social experience" (Model School A, On Target, College Prep).

Limitations inherent in the role of director/principal.

Some sites were so locked into normal BUSD operations as to have little power to share, despite their feeble encouragement of this goal. This was true of sites which either predated BESP as essentially zone-restricted common schools, or which were established for special clientele with BUSD encouragement. Increased participation was initially bequeathed to parents' directors, who were themselves soon influenced by their larger District identification and responsibilities. Implicitly assured of phase-in by virtue of their central BUSD origins, some sites were not allowed to encroach upon the customary prerogatives of principals. Unable to modify traditional leadership patterns, BESP parents at Franklin and Jefferson did help to create enough turmoil to have director/principals removed by BUSD officials. However, in these instances, parents acted as external pressure groups upon those who commanded the power of decision, not as inside participants in the decision-making process. Furthermore, teachers' recommendations based on parents' suggestions were no match for principal or central BUSD recommendations. When, for example, a crisis ensued at the Early Learning Center in 1973/74, teachers and parents discovered that they lacked the authority to evaluate or remove certificated teachers. Even earlier, in 1972/73, Jefferson teachers beseeched the site director for a more formalized teacher-parent governance process; yet, after two versions were agreed upon, neither was implemented. In the same year, some Franklin staff unsuccessfully attempted, against the wishes of the director/principal, to create another instructional model within the school, one with a Black ethnic focus.

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parents and teachers by OE/ESP: the planning of new ESP-funded schools. On this matter, the federal predilection for staying out of controversial value choices in the short run, only to affect them later by defining specific budget items non-admissible, led to consumer disappointment.

Consumer and staff concern for site phase-in. Most off-site BESP schools, plus Agora, Genesis, School of the Arts, and Environmental Studies, encouraged some form of community involvement. The off-site schools interpreted power-sharing to mean: (a) sharing power with parents (Casa and Kilimanjaro); (b) sharing power with students (Other Ways and Black House). Odyssey alone attempted to join parents and students in governance. Agora and Genesis were unique among the on-site sub-schools, especially before their consolidation in 1974/75, in attempting to govern themselves by student-dominated school meetings. Environmental Studies restricted itself to informal consultation between parents and staff, School of the Arts to warmer student-staff relations than existed in the common school's Performing Arts Department.

Despite their attempts to involve parents or students, however, power-sharing either never occurred or was substantially diluted at these sites. Other trends intervened. Black House staff decided that the disciplined imparting of basic skills was incompatible with student decision-making. A similar evolution marked Other Ways as it turned into Garvey and then UN West. Casa experienced a communication block between its governing board (La Mesa Directiva) and its staff, which nullified the powers of the former. At Odyssey and Kilimanjaro, directors supported and implemented the desire of the BUSD and BESP central offices to check the unruly and disruptive features of community governance. Without an influential director unencumbered by conflicting or changing community preferences, BESP sites were threatened by bureaucratic insensitivity. Communitarian sites especially felt the need, and were pushed by the BUSD, the central BESP, the NIE/ESP, and their directors, to choose survival over power-sharing. In BESP, strong community sentiments tended to be seen as a barometer of site instability. Yet, directors reported that parents required crisis before they would become actively involved, an outcome unanticipated by BESP planners. Parents were not interested in being involved in a regular decision-making process. Even governing boards became inert when there was nothing crucial to decide and the community was pleased. There was a constant tension between a desire for phase-in and consumer involvement, since the latter was best "incited" by controversial issues, while the former was threatened by them.

Teachers and directors at sites which originally invited parental participation eventually blunted it. They believed that a majority of parents would prefer no parental input over domination of site meetings by a parental clique. Even Odyssey and Kilimanjaro, which had formal governing boards, were believed by their staffs to be dominated in the first three years by a few outspoken parents narrowly concerned about their own children rather than the welfare of the school.

New parent forums were not created at the secondary school level. Parents usually take a more active interest in the schooling of their young as opposed to their teenage offspring, and this pattern was not countered by BESP, despite the fact that most sites existed at the junior and senior high levels. Only Casa de la Raza (K-12), Odyssey (7-9), Early Learning Center (K-3), and Kilimanjaro (K-6) developed formal governing boards with consumer participation. The authors of the power-sharing goal did not consider that parental involvement at the secondary level might require an inducement which sites themselves lacked the authority to offer. At the same time, staffs at the senior high sites believed there were unbridgeable differences in viewpoint between adolescents and their parents. Because of their rebellious outlook, either imputed or real, adolescents were granted immunity from strong parental influence in the schools. Thus, planners and implementers collaborated to reduce parental involvement at Berkeley High sites. In fact, BESP parental involvement suffered in comparison with that at the regular senior high school, owing to the almost exclusively student-oriented activities of the sites and the greater number of standard parent-oriented activities at the common school.

In ISA's parent survey, proportionately more BESP parents than common school parents at the high school reported that they never visited their offspring's school (39% vs. 23%,  $p < .02$ ). To examine how students in our sample saw their parents' participation in the governance of their school, we asked them, "How often do your parents participate in the decision-making at your school?" Only among high schoolers did we find a significant difference between the perceptions of BESP and common school students: BESP students were more likely than common students (46% vs. 22%,  $p < .01$ ) to see their parents as never participating in school governance.

Parent participation in BESP and common schools. Sixty-nine percent of the parents in our parent survey reported that they knew "what went on" in their children's schools, and there was no percentage difference on this score between parents of students in the BESP and in the common schools. However, parental participation permitting this knowledge was too divorced from critical school decisions to constitute power-sharing.

In four categories BESP sites featured more parental participation than the common schools (Table 12). At the elementary level, a significantly higher proportion of BESP parents than of common school parents (36% vs. 19%,  $p < .02$ ) reported going to their child's school as classroom volunteers. At the junior high level, nearly half of the BESP parents reported a counselor/teacher-requested conference with school officials as a reason for visiting the school, whereas in the common schools a significantly smaller proportion

(45% vs. 34%,  $p < .05$ ) listed this as the reason for coming to school. At the senior high level, parents of BESP students reported a higher proportion of visits to observe their child's classroom. Three times the proportion of parents at BESP sites than at the common schools (6% vs. 2%,  $p < .01$ ) reported that they went to their child's school to observe classrooms, although the parents who did so were relatively few. Also, over one-fifth of the BESP parents reported visiting the high school for "other" reasons, while far fewer did so at the common schools (22% vs. 3%,  $p < .001$ ).

On the other hand, the common school parents reported higher visitations than the BESP parents in four categories at the senior high level: attending parent committees or PTA meetings (14% vs. 6%,  $p < .02$ ), attending special events (30% vs. 19%,  $p < .02$ ), participating in a parent-requested conference with school officials (32% vs. 16%,  $p < .01$ ), and attending conferences requested by teachers or counselors (35% vs. 19%,  $p < .01$ ).

While these are differences in minute details, when the activities of all BESP parents (regardless of grade level) are compared to those of all common school parents, the differences between them are not striking. Common school parents were somewhat more likely than BESP parents to participate in parents' night and to attend parent-requested and counselor/teacher-requested conferences; BESP parents were somewhat more likely than common school parents to serve as school volunteers/aides and to observe classroom activities. For both groups, however, the four most frequent forms of school participation were attendance at parents' night and at special events, and conversation with school staff at parent- and staff-initiated conferences. These are quite conventional forms of parent-school relations. If some parents shared power with school administrators and teachers, it is quite clear from these data that the vast majority did not.

TABLE 12: REASONS FOR PARENT VISITS TO SCHOOLS, BY TYPE OF SCHOOL

	Elementary		Junior High		High School		Total		Grand
	BESP	Common	BESP	Common	BESP	Common	BESP	Common	Total
Parents' Night	67%	72%	32%	52%	27%	36%	43%	54%	48%
Volunteer/Aide	36%	19%	3%	6%	1%	2%	15%	8%	11%
Attend Parent Committee or PTA Meeting	33%	29%	21%	21%	6%	14%	19%	21%	20%
Special Event	49%	35%	30%	29%	19%	30%	32%	30%	31%
Parent-requested Conference	29%	29%	45%	34%	16%	32%	26%	33%	29%
Counselor/Teacher-requested Conference	54%	47%	17%	31%	19%	35%	31%	36%	34%
Observe Classroom Activities	52%	40%	13%	18%	6%	2%	24%	20%	22%
Other	26%	35%	9%	15%	22%	3%	21%	17%	19%
n	(111)	(72)	(53)	(160)	(139)	(63)	(303)	(295)	(598)

Moreover, differential results in types of participation did not create statistically significant differences between BESP parents and parents in the common schools with respect to parental satisfaction. Results of the final ISA parent survey show this and are presented below.

- Parents of both BESP and common school students overwhelmingly responded "yes" when asked, "Is parent participation in your child's school important?"
- There was no significant difference between parents of BESP and common school students when they were asked if they knew what was going on in their child's school.
- The same lack of difference prevailed when parents were asked if they could get something changed in their child's school if they had a complaint. Of both BESP and common school parents, at every grade level, about half believed they could get successful complaint resolution.
- The parent sample was asked to evaluate their satisfaction with their meetings with their child's teacher, and the data revealed no significant difference between BESP and common school parents at any grade level.

Community participation in BESP. We conducted two surveys of random samples of Berkeley residents (described in greater detail in Appendix II) to determine (a) the extent of awareness of BESP, (b) the extent of community support for its continuance, and (c) the extent of community acceptance of alternative education.

In 1973/74, 54 percent of Berkeley residents answered "yes" when asked if they were familiar with BESP; the affirmative response declined to 42 percent in 1974/75. Despite the drop in public awareness, the 1974/75 survey revealed that 50 percent of the community respondents favored supporting BESP with BUSD money after federal funding expired, while 16 percent opposed such a commitment and 27 percent were undecided. Berkeley residents seemed to be favorably disposed to the experimental schools.

This impression is fortified by the preponderant majorities in both years' community samples who felt that alternative education is at least desirable. Table 13 indicates that 81 percent in 1973/74 and 79 percent in 1974/75 held this opinion, even though far fewer had any familiarity with BESP itself.

TABLE 13: COMMUNITY ATTITUDES TO ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION, 1973/74 - 1974/75

	<u>1973/74</u>	<u>1974/75</u>
Very desirable	50%	44%
Desirable	31%	35%
Undesirable	9%	14%
Don't know/undecided	10%	8%
Total	100%	100%
n	442	545

Contributing to the stark contrast between no more than a bare majority aware of or supporting BESP, and a significant majority favoring the idea of alternative education, was the fact that no city-wide group made a prominent issue out of BESP. Unlike BUSD's desegregation drive, BESP did not become a focal point for public debate. Existing pressure groups did not publicize BESP, and no new city-wide organizations emerged because of BESP. Neither community groups interested in minority education (e.g., the Black Aces) nor the teachers' unions (Berkeley Federation of Teachers and the Berkeley Education Association) dramatized, by praise or criticism, the BESP presence. While favorable attitudes existed in the general populace, they were given no organizational embodiment. Thus, they formed a backdrop to school decisions, rather than exercising power in their own right.

Conclusion. The history of BESP power-sharing was a checkered one. It proved impossible to devise incentives and opportunities to involve parents, teachers, and students consistently in school governance, either at a given site or throughout the school career. What worked at one time and place did not work at another. The limited power-sharing that marked the opening three years of BESP did not exist at its close. By 1973/74, real experiments in power-sharing were lost with the closings of Casa and Black House, or substantially diluted by administrative intervention at Odyssey and Kilimanjaro. Power-sharing was never firmly attained in the BESP, not even at sites most disposed toward this local plan goal.

## CHAPTER 6: COMPREHENSIVENESS AS AN EDUCATIONAL R&D STRATEGY

In BESP, the R&D strategy of comprehensiveness was embodied in two major indicators: (1) options at every grade level (K-12); (2) an organization parallel to BUSD, combining within itself aspects of holistic change, i.e., administration, training, publicity, and other support services.

The BESP K-12 structure was exceedingly unbalanced. The preponderant number of sites existed at the secondary school level (18 out of 23). There was a radical discrepancy between BESP's ability to serve elementary school students and to serve secondary ones. The unemphasized elementary level was further reduced in importance when matriculating 6th-graders experienced a "bottleneck" at the junior high level, after the program lost 7-8th grade sites. BESP planning ruled out an essential continuity for students and parents desirous of a particular teaching style and/or curricular emphasis.

A parallel organization to the BUSD hierarchy, one capable of serving and defending the K-12 structure and the special nature of alternative/experimental sites, was never fully implemented. The BESP central office contained a multiplicity of official functions without corresponding authority and ability to carry them out evenly. BESP lacked the organizational muscle to coordinate sites and present a united front to BUSD decision-makers, for the purpose of avoiding program dilution and of changing BUSD. BESP "parallelism" was an ineffectual compromise between project autonomy and BUSD alignment.

### 1. Initial Agreement about BESP Comprehensiveness

BUSD and OE/ESP originally concurred that BESP could stress diversification of options and evolutionary organization, rather than continuity in consumer choice and early specification of roles and functions. BUSD began with a preference for project "looseness," to which OE/ESP acceded, and there were no countervailing pressures from consumers for anything different. However, this agreement minimized the strong federal interest in an experimental comprehensive design, one soon at variance with BESP practice. Before turning to this lurking discord, however, we shall examine the initial consensus about comprehensiveness from the three major viewpoints on BESP.

The BUSD View. To BUSD officials, BESP was not to be permitted to forestall the District's future evolution, to become an obstacle around which total BUSD planning would have to work. "Creative"

implementation, responsive to newly arising pressures, was the preferred BUSD approach. By becoming a detailed, irreversible commitment, BESP might have prevented the District from keeping important client groups in some kind of equilibrium. BESP, so far as top-most BUSD officials were concerned, had to appear--simultaneously--of dramatic immediate consequence and of perhaps negligible long-term importance. The Superintendent expressed these predispositions soon after BESP began (Kohn, 1973):

From the alternatives will emerge the next stage of development. They will be part of an ongoing process, rather than a stopping place, and they'll also be important in changing nonalternatives to pick up alternative concepts that are important to them and therefore will affect the rest of the system. I see them as another stage in the process of the development of mankind. It's a much more humanizing stage than what we've had. But I hope that no one will see alternative schools as the final conception of what education ought to be. They're a stage in the process; they will take us another leap.

The Superintendent proceeded to ask:

Whether a school, as a subsystem within the culture, can survive doing things like experimenting with alternatives if the rest of the culture is doing different things?

Haphazardness in the K-12 structure was forecast by the Berkeley plan, by its primary stress on diversity in education rather than articulation. Alluding to the desirability of choice for parents and students at every grade level, the BESP proposal gave the impression that choice per se could satisfy this desideratum, that continuity for the same kind of choice might not be possible throughout a student's career in the Berkeley schools:

The design will provide a mechanism for continuous participation in educational experimentation throughout the entire school life of students, who, in collaboration with their parents and teachers, choose this educational path. The program will be so structured that no student, K-12, who enters an experimental school at any juncture, will be denied the choice of alternatives at a future juncture. While the specific mode of a student's

initial choice may not, and need not, persist throughout all 12 years of public schooling, the availability of choice will maintain.

Further, the BESP proposal avoided what local planners feared to be a premature precision in project organization. On how to encourage, coordinate, and serve diverse sites, BUSD grant writers were reticent. They merely provided a skeleton outline of how various parts of BESP and BUSD would be interfaced, despite BUSD's principal role in funding sites. Due regard, the BESP proposal contended, had to be paid to the fact that all too frequently the organizational context into which new educational approaches are placed tends to be inappropriate to their purpose. The proposal declared that "these positions, their relation to one another, and their place on the organization chart, will be evolutionary in nature during the duration of the program." Where and how organization might need strengthening was to depend on what needs developed and results achieved. Values were to shape institutional arrangements rather than organization molding values to fit bureaucratic convenience.

The Federal View. The first OE/ESP posture on comprehensive-ness was struck by the original federal ESP director. It was maintained during the pre-implementation period and overlapped into BESP's beginning year. The federal director condoned more than he positively endorsed BUSD-dominated project organization and sites embracing a variety of educational purposes--basic skills, career preparation, and individual creativity.

That OE/ESP funded BESP, with its medley of schools, sub-schools, and programs, testifies to original federal satisfaction with the minimal value of some option at every grade level. Implicitly at least, OE/ESP expressed interest in discrete schools and programs, not in one or a few distinctive school careers and in sites offering a diffusive curriculum, not in ones articulated on the basis of narrow or fixed identities. According to the BUSD Superintendent who spearheaded the Berkeley application, he was quizzed by federal ESP officials about the compatibility of options and racial integration. But the basic focus of this interchange was the number, not the kind, of sites necessary for BESP representation at every grade level within a two-zone restricted experiment.

Confining BESP to two of the four BUSD school zones superceded in importance linkages between sites. It proved difficult enough to create sites at every grade level within the two zones, let alone give adequate forethought to interconnecting sites. BESP planning stressed the two-zone requirement over articulation because of local interest in not endangering the BUSD's desegregation

plan and federal interest in not so diffusing the program across the District that experimentalism was lost. Black House and Casa de la Raza aggravated local concern over integration and federal concern over K-12 experimentation; their presence reinforced the primacy of the two-zone limitation in early 1971 BUSD-ESP negotiations.

OE/ESP originally lacked a strong demonstrated interest in bolstering a parallel organization. At first, the main federal objective was to ensure equitable funding for BESP sites, and this end seemed realizable through more direct ties to the BUSD bureaucracy than to a parallel BESP organization. Central BESP prerogatives, especially those of the BESP director, were not stressed by the federal director. In fact, he proposed a parallel office to that of the BESP director: an "ombudsman" who would act as a liaison to BUSD in order to provide for the effective delivery of services to sites. Although this proposed office was never instituted, the federal director indicated by his recommendation that he did not expect BESP coordination to occur as a result of central BESP supervision alone. OE/ESP participated in the early failure to breathe life into the BESP organizational skeleton. For instance, financial leverage was not used to create an Alternative Schools Council capable of informing and influencing central BUSD policy-makers.

The Consumer View. BESP was funded without extensive study or sensitive understanding of "community demands." The BUSD did not engage in an educational equivalent to market research. However, it would appear from ISA surveys of parents and students that consumer preference in Berkeley was for schools answering a number of demands, rather than for an options system of highly specialized and hence potentially interrelated schools. Although consumers did not actively participate in BESP planning, indeed were excluded from it, the structure of consumer demand in Berkeley did not reveal a strong latent interest in articulation. As shown in Table 14, demands on the Berkeley schools by the "average" consumer were multiple and sizable.

BESP sites which were individually comprehensive and functionally diffuse addressed themselves to the mainstream of consumer demands. The structure of demand uncovered by ISA surveys would appear to lend consumer support to schools which only with substantial difficulty could use highly specialized teaching skills and be tightly articulated vertically. And, neither the project autonomy craved by some pre-BESP alternative school staffs nor the District alignment favored by some BUSD authorities was clearly and automatically inconsistent with Berkeley consumer preferences.

**TABLE 14: FEATURES OF SCHOOLING THAT PARENTS AND STUDENTS  
DEEMED IMPORTANT IN CHOOSING THEIR SCHOOL\***

<u>Features of Schooling</u>	<u>Parents</u>	<u>Students</u>
1. Friendly atmosphere among students	95%	86%
2. Friendly and considerate teachers	94%	84%
3. Emphasis on learning basic skills	90%	82%
4. Emphasis on personal growth	88%	75%
5. College preparation	83%	79%
6. Ethnically integrated	81%	65%
7. Good program in art, music or drama	80%	56%
8. Wide choice of electives	78%	75%
9. Job training or developing a job skill	61%	71%
10. Emphasis on political education	56%	59%
11. Strict discipline	51%	46%
12. Emphasis on ethnic identity	50%	55%
13. Loose structure	37%	61%
	Totals ***	***
	(603)***	(498-608)***

\* Parents were asked, "In choosing a school for [child's name], are each of the following items important in making your choice?" Students were asked, "As you choose the school you attend, how important were the following items in making this choice?"

\*\* Since students and parents were asked about each feature separately, and since they could therefore designate more than one as important, the totals far exceed 100 percent.

\*\*\* The sample of parents on which the percentages are based is composed of students' parents in grades 2, 5, 8, 9, and 11. The student sample does not include 2nd-graders; 5th-graders were asked to respond only to the items numbered 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 12, 13, and not to the others; students in grades 8, 9, and 11 were asked to respond to all the features of schooling listed.

## 2. Significance of Agreement

Hasty planning is an important explanation for why ESP did not extract a deep-seated five-year commitment from BUSD (see Chapter 7). But slapdash BESP beginnings cannot adequately explain the failure to balance and articulate the composition of sites or to invest power and authority in the BESP central office. Planning gaps reflected choices that neither BUSD nor OE/ESP were willing to make. After their opening compact, and despite the federal ESP becoming disenchanted with BUSD performance, weaknesses in BESP comprehensiveness were so far advanced as to discourage corrective steps. The disappointing performance of Level I evaluation, as seen by federal eyes, cautioned NIE/ESP against expanding sites to cover holes in the K-12 structure. Moreover, it proved too late for NIE/ESP to bolster parallel organization. BUSD persisted in divided and uncoordinated responses to elementary and secondary school reform and in control over the project from atop the District hierarchy.

### 1. Gradual Emergence of Federal Position on Comprehensiveness.

Under the cumulative impact of a series of BUSD-Washington disputes, the federal ESP director grew increasingly disillusioned with the BUSD central administration, which ramified into a new federal concern for articulation. Major disagreements between the federal director and the BUSD Superintendent involved: (1) the size of the administrative overhead properly due BUSD on the basis of early BUSD-OE negotiations; (2) off-site complaints that \$200 per BESP student of ESP monies was not reaching the sites, that these monies were being used to defray normal BUSD expenses; and, (3) the proper activities of the Level I evaluation unit, which the federal director had originally hoped the BUSD Superintendent would whip into compliance with the expressed federal yearning for top-notch evaluation.

The federal ESP tried to tighten program requirements during the summer of 1972. This task fell increasingly to the federal project officer assigned by the federal director to monitor BESP. The project officer hoped to provide for better articulation between mutually supporting programs at all grade levels. At the end of the first year, the project officer asked the BESP director to have students and parents polled, especially those ready to move from one site to another, about what kinds of programs they desired. Possible readjustments in site curriculum were suggested by the project officer: one or more of the distinctive classroom prototypes at Jefferson and Franklin might have to be deemphasized; KARE might have to change its entire focus to accommodate seventh graders wanting a more open or free program; BESP sites on the Berkeley High campus might have to cater to a wider racial mix. At a relatively advanced stage of BESP, the project director was seeking to redress the failure of planning to survey extensively community desires.

The federal ESP clarified its understanding of a K-12 options system. To the project officer, the value of educational diversity, taken alone, too much encouraged site enrollments which were racially drawn and prevented choice for parents and students wanting to pursue a distinctive school career. The project officer was calling, in effect, for alternative schools that served whites and minorities alike, and that could be interrelated at every grade level. The question of which value--integration or articulation--was most esteemed is rather moot, since the project officer felt that one supported the other. Certainly by the end of the third year there were simply too few sites to provide for diversity and ethnic focus as well as for articulated programs. The project officer was prepared to scuttle existing diversity for the sake of consumers previously denied continuity in schooling.

However, negotiations between BUSD/BESP and NIE/ESP over the second-phase 30-months contract made evident that ESP monies could not be used for newly proposed sites; consumer demands would have to be satisfied through a shrinking number of sites. The federal justification for prohibiting new BESP sites was that even existing ones had not collected sufficient student data. If existing sites lacked an evaluative focus, so the federal reasoning went, even less could be expected of new sites. Thus, at the very peak of outward federal indignation over poor evaluation, the national ESP office was begrudgingly admitting that good evaluation was no longer possible. Given the desire of the federal funding agency to reduce significantly its financial contribution in the last half of the program, in order that BUSD become accustomed to paying the full cost for sites, baseline data would have had to exist from the start.

Local attachment to an evolutionary conception of the program was fortified by the early federal impreciseness on the importance of the K-12 structure and on the issue of adding new sites over the course of the program. First-year remoteness between the central BESP and the OE/ESP, created by the roadblock of the central BUSD, allowed the BESP director to encourage the planning of new sites, to engage in idle utopia-building. It turned out, though, that what OE/ESP had not explicitly agreed to was interpreted by NIE/ESP as consciously prohibited.\*

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\* This interpretation prevailed, for instance, in the case of the central BESP's independent encouragement of a new junior high option (Model School Y), planned by a group of parents expecting eventual inclusion in BESP funding. During contract negotiations between BUSD and NIE, the latter finally stipulated that sites other than original ones would not be funded. However, under the OE grant, the federal project officer had previously informed this same group of parents that, as a local program, the BESP was to be evolutionary in design, thereby giving the parents cause for optimism.

The federal agency also developed greater interest in the central BESP in 1972/73, after becoming disenchanted with the Superintendent. The project officer sought to bypass a new distrusted Superintendent. For instance, the Superintendent's invitation to the project officer to meet with the BUSD administrative cabinet was spurned. Instead, the project officer unsuccessfully attempted to meet with the Board of Education in public session in order to lay out the federal interpretation of articulation, evaluation, and comprehensiveness. In the same vein, the project officer did succeed in removing the local BESP fiscal officer from the BUSD Business Manager's supervision, placing this officer more directly under the BESP director in order that an ESP-paid salary would not be used to facilitate strictly BUSD functions. The federal ESP director certainly supported the mid-program idea of circumventing the BUSD, as was evidenced by his May 3, 1973 stipulation (included as part of a revised evaluation plan) that all Level I personnel be hired outside of the normal jurisdictional limits imposed by BUSD policies. NIE/ESP considered a more independent BESP central office a possible avenue to greater project accountability and to greater pressure on the BUSD to upgrade its services to all BUSD and BESP schools. However, the government had missed its chance to shore up a parallel organization during initial BESP planning. As a result, the NIE/ESP found the central BESP office to lack focus and strength.

The BUSD central administration remained the final arbiter of what would be permitted within its legal jurisdiction. In some cases, as those involving the BUSD status of off-site schools, the federal ESP office left central BESP and the concerned sites suspended in tension while it waited to get a reading on more general BUSD intentions. The comprehensive change of BUSD, then, was stymied by the need to get central administrators to decide how they were willing to be changed. Once the funding agency became suspicious of central BUSD, it turned its pique upon its own offspring, the local BESP program. Open conflict between the BESP and the BUSD over appropriate changes in the latter were superceded by a series of clashes between BESP central administration and sites, on the one hand, and the federal ESP office, on the other. But these bouts did not alter the opinions of key central BUSD actors.

2. BUSD Reforms at Elementary and Secondary Levels Unreconciled. Concentration of BESP sites at the secondary level permitted the BUSD to assert a special interest in pre-school and elementary education. Eighteen of the originally proposed 24 schools and programs were to exist at the junior and senior high levels, thereby lending the impression that the uncompleted agenda in secondary school reform would be filled in. Through BESP, it seemed, stimulating elective courses, a small school environment, and a modicum of choice, would be provided 7-12th grade students. Thus, the federal grant relieved BUSD of community pressure for secondary school

reform. The grant allowed the BUSD central administration and school board the luxury of appealing to a greater number of publics within its jurisdiction. Failure in BUSD secondary school reform could be shared with the federal funder. For undertaking a shift in educational emphasis, BUSD's ability to transfer political costs to the federal government was as important as its ability to transfer monetary ones.\* Not surprisingly, the BUSD resisted from first to last the sometimes federal conception of BESP implementation as an exclusively District responsibility. For BUSD to veer publicly toward this federal conception would have reduced its credibility in proposing other educational directions, ones at variance with the pre-BESP alternative movement in Berkeley.

Shortly after the BESP began, BUSD statements reverberated with a new emphasis upon K-6 education. In a draft budget assumption letter of February 1972, a Board of Education member gave an exposition of the goals for the 1972-73 BUSD budget. Among four goals cited was "the primary goal" of teaching reading, but also, and second, "to break the cycle of non-learning resulting from years of unequal educational opportunities for poor and minority youngsters." To fulfill this second goal, it was claimed that the proper remedy was to "shift the allocation of resources toward the early childhood through sixth grade levels" and away from the secondary schools. The Superintendent quickly countered that secondary school students had suffered segregated education earlier in their school careers and should not now be subjected to reduced spending. Despite the Superintendent's opposition in this instance, BUSD policy thereafter reflected the sentiment of a three-member Board majority consistently comprised of whites favoring the shift.

Soon, too, the BUSD central administration proved itself fully capable of mixing the K-6 emphasis with budgetary opportunism. Support of early childhood and elementary education "at maximum

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\* BUSD decision-makers reaped solid dividends from the political transfer upon the closure of some BESP secondary schools. The barely audible disgruntlement of the Black and Chicano communities in Berkeley is explainable in part by the remoteness of the apparent foe--the federal government. After giving due recognition to lack of community enthusiasm for these schools, it must also be noted that resentment was stifled by lack of a creditable District target for opposition. By having defended Black House and Casa, though without exhausting all appeal processes, BUSD fixed the onus for later shutdowns on the government. Federal ESP sponsorship eased this transfer of responsibility. However, respecting U.N. West, KARE, and Willard Alternative, the second BESP director said that he and the BUSD administration were instrumental in the closings; the initiative came from the District, though Washington was a willing accessory.

possible levels" appeared in subsequent budget assumption letters; on these later occasions they were put out by the Board but in essence justified the financial figures put together by the Superintendent's office. Expansion of early childhood education represented a financial saving for BUSD in addition to its putative educational importance. Expanded children's centers at common schools and the Early Learning Center fell under a budgetary category permitting new revenue from a tax "override." Expansion of pre-school education circumvented the State's restriction (SB 90) on increasing local property taxes for general purposes, allowing the transfer of expensive teachers' salaries into this category, thereby relaxing demand on general purpose funds.

Due to its affinity with BESP planning style, one attempted elementary school reform deserves special mention. In April 1973 the BUSD Office of Planning and Development prepared a \$1.8 million proposal to gain federal funds for two 4-6 common schools. The money was available under the Emergency Schools Assistance Act (ESAA) for districts experiencing problems in the wake of desegregation. The proposed BUSD program would have restructured the basic skills curriculum at both schools and divided one school of 600 students into three mini-schools. This was a BESP-type program in many respects, though available federal money, not the example of BESP 4-6 schools, was crucial in the District's decision to introduce another ambitious program.\* Without time to read the proposal in advance, the Board approved it. Two members dissented, terming the Board vote "illegal" in light of the premature closing of public hearings and lack of sufficient opportunity for the Board to consider the proposal. The chairman of the citizens' advisory committee mandated by federal law to work with BUSD on this proposal also affirmed that none of the 28 committee members had even seen the 73-page proposal.

Nonetheless, the proposal was submitted to federal review, where it was rejected. What makes this drawn-out affair more remarkable is that concurrently BUSD was at loggerheads with NIE/ESP in BESP contract negotiations. During a time when the past and future of BESP were severely questioned, from within and without the District, BUSD was replicating the BESP planning syndrome in seeking still another sizable federal fund allocation.

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\* The BUSD Director for Planning and Development called the program "as monumental as integration itself," saying it represented the "third phase of the desegregation process" (Berkeley Daily Gazette, April 26, 1973). The other two stages were said to be the busing program begun in 1968 and the subsequent pilot programs tackling the problems of "minority underachievement," BESP in particular.

Along with the proposed remodeling of K-6 programs, BUSD secondary school programs were trimmed. The Berkeley High School principal announced on December 16, 1971, that at least 40 elective courses would be discarded from the regular school program. As reasons for this move, he pointed to loss of enrollment at Berkeley High School, lack of student interest, and the need to expand programs in basic English skills.\* But expanded funding for alternatives under BESP auspices made plausible the more restricted effort of the common school. Even so, the implication was that BESP/Berkeley High School sites would be planned amidst an environment leaning another way. Before the actual trial, the offerings at many secondary level sites promised to cut across the District grain by virtue of their student-generated, non-traditional qualities.\*\* In addition, financial constraint in the summer of 1973 induced the Board to abandon Room 210, a two-year-old alternative education project, and Model School Y, the proposed junior high alternative which had failed to get ESP funding. And BUSD refused to support with its own funds the Berkeley High School "Phase-In" Program (proposed in 1973 by the Berkeley High School principal as a way to achieve orderly assimilation of BESP sites on that campus).

At issue in the BUSD's divided allegiance to preschool and elementary education on the one hand, and secondary on the other, were two different understandings of how to upgrade minority student achievement. Implicitly at least, the first emphasis is pitched to the individual student, in the belief that schooling can have a strong and independent effect on the youngest school-age groups; the second is aimed more at the entire minority community in the belief that older students are opinion leaders for the younger, upcoming generation. Taken by itself, each emphasis has a signal drawback. The first ignores an early sense of frustration with school stemming from exposure to larger community frustrations, especially those experienced by older siblings. The second ignores

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\* The English Department Chairman offered a slightly more economic justification: "In a time when the central thrust is in the area of basic skills, when a financial crisis exists within the district, and when many of these courses have grown moribund over the past few years, we felt such programs had ceased to merit further consideration in our curriculum" (Berkeley Daily Gazette, December 16, 1973).

\*\* In fact, School of the Arts and College Prep were at this moment still designing courses for their inaugural the next semester. The same could be said for the four BESP programs at the 9th grade West Campus, which were not to open until Fall 1972, but would eventually "feed" students onto the Berkeley High School campus.

that older students are likely to be impervious to belated signs of school reform; their hostility may be too advanced already. The promising contribution of BESP was that it would free BUSD to devote greater resources to the neglected side of the equation: the education of the youngest. In combination, the two emphases would seem to offer a better prospect for comprehensive change than one pursued alone.

Yet, in the BUSD, a two-pronged attack on minority underachievement lacked a clear recognition of the interrelationship of local strategies. To combine them effectively, it would have been necessary to plan continuously the educational nexus between the two, rather than simply letting each slip into District practice under the pressure of fiscal and political considerations. Symbolizing the failure to make this linkage, the BUSD options system was the softest at the junior high level, particularly at grade seven where the two reform impulses touched. Throughout the history of BESP, Berkeley's unsure and uncoordinated response to junior high education served as visible evidence that BESP planning and BUSD planning took place in isolation from one another. The 4-6 curriculum had been criticized by Berkeley parents and teachers; but even this criticism paled before the disaffection engendered by violence and truancy at the junior highs. But the BUSD record on community participation in planning was blotted at the junior highs. There, the central administration acted unilaterally, without receiving any federal edict. Berkeley's two junior high campuses were informed that they would have to submit BESP proposals. The principal wrote a proposal for Willard Alternative as did a small group of teachers for KARE.\* When KARE and Willard Alternative were eliminated as BESP sites, for being too remedial and no different from the common school, the BUSD lacked the resiliency to beef up this sector. The federal disinclination to expand 7-8 BESP sites was greeted with BUSD inattention. The District had become preoccupied with lower grade levels.\*\*

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\* A retrospective account of King Cluster School by members of the parent group responsible for its creation (whose allegations went undenied by the BUSD administration), contended that parts of this 7-8 school's proposal were incorporated into the administratively sanctioned KARE proposal, but without the Cluster group's knowledge or consent. Although this school existed as an alternative during 1971-72, it never obtained BESP funding, despite encouragement by the Superintendent and the BESP director that it would. Unable to get minority-group support or guaranteed staffing, the school folded in a year's time, but without the BUSD central administration coming to a considered decision on its utility.

\*\* At this writing, the groundswell proceeds: the present BUSD Superintendent issued a plan in April 1976 to take effect in the Fall semester, which would divide each BUSD 4-6 school into several mini-schools whose accent would be diagnostic-prescriptive attention to

A bifurcated approach to school reform--the alternation between preschool, elementary and secondary education--thinned the District's resolve to see to conclusion developments in any one restricted area. The BUSD was trying to accomplish several objectives as pursestrings tightened. These objectives were not so intrinsically related that planning for their interconnection would rightly be dispensed with. Yet the Experimental Schools Program had been launched in a school district unexceptional in its steady postponement of overall evaluation of activities and programs. Only in late December 1974 did BUSD attempt to get an objective assessment of its myriad activities by hiring an outside research and consulting firm. Strapped by limited funds for this evaluation, BUSD contracted for a 6-9 month rush-order appraisal.

3. Parallelism as Compromise. The pre-ESP alternative schools within the BUSD constituted an informal network of personal and professional relationships. The majority of these schools were linked by staff contact and exchange rather than by membership in a formal organization. Around selected and short-run issues, they sometimes supported one another in negotiations with the BUSD bureaucracy: for example, in 1970-71, Black House, Community High, Odyssey, and Other Ways jointly presented to the BUSD Board of Education a proposal for a new system of student evaluation, including a reading test devised by Herb Kohl.\* The small group of radical educators revolving around Kohl formed the initial backbone of the pre-ESP alternatives in Berkeley. It was held together by a shared belief in site autonomy, full-time student and teacher commitment to a particular site, and educational priorities based on the expressed needs of students. However, over time, the compromises which the "radicals" struck with BUSD rules and officials impaired their sense of being bound together in a common endeavor.

On March 1, 1971, a group of alternative school advocates submitted a package of 16 proposals to the BUSD for ESP funding. This group included Herb Kohl as well as other leaders from the New Schools Network. The proposal package included alternative schools

individual students. According to the Superintendent's report, the example of the BESEP influenced this proposed extension of the option system less than had a steady stream of complaints from Berkeley parents, lamenting the lacklustre performance of these particular schools.

\* There were exceptions to this mutuality, notably those sites which existed before the ESP but which were never considered "alternative" by the originators of off-site schools. Jefferson Tri-Model School (K-3) and Model School A (10-12) were so regarded by the Kohl group, since these schools were more administratively than teacher inspired, and were solidly implanted on traditional BUSD campuses.

such as Black House, Casa de la Raza, Other Ways, and Odyssey. After submitting the proposals, this group decided to stick together in the hope that a united front would guarantee the funding of all their proposals. In addition, its members agreed that several demands would have to be met before they would participate in the District's application: an autonomous budget for each site; control over hiring and firing of teachers; the right to develop curriculum independently; accountability to parents and the Board alone; an influential voice in evaluation of their respective sites.

This group selected a few of its members to serve as an Alternative Schools Council which would negotiate these demands with the Superintendent. Reportedly backed by his top administrative staff, the Superintendent decisively rebuffed this pitch for autonomy and for collective inclusion in the BESP proposal. The central administration's main contention was that the composition of the group was limited to teachers in alternative schools; consequently, this group lacked an appropriate overview of how individual schools fit into the larger BUSD scheme. Moreover, by virtue of acting collectively, the group was viewed as trying to gain control of the whole program. Conversely, the group interpreted the BUSD administrators' position this way: we will not be the ones to lose power.

Confrontation with the Superintendent soon resulted in the group's dissolution. It was split apart by the possibility of acquiring unassailable standing for the pre-BESP alternative schools, a legitimacy previously denied by shoestring budgets. Persisting in unison, then, seemed to be jeopardizing the future of particular schools. The BUSD central administration was in the driver's seat; it had the line to the federal dollar. As the group disintegrated, so did the idea of the site independence which it had advocated. The BUSD central administration had divided and conquered. The federal ESP negotiators turned their backs to this dismemberment of Berkeley's indigenous alternative school movement--one based on independent teacher-parent initiatives.

Now, in the BUSD, there were two distinguishable groups who were diametrically opposed on whether or not to seek central District administrative responsibility for the BESP. The two groups were comparatively small and compact in membership and by no means spoke for extensive Berkeley constituencies. Still, they tended to frame the decisive choices confronting BESP planning. One group, composed of the teachers most influential in starting the District's pre-BESP alternative schools, favored going outside the bureaucracy. In effect, they wanted to establish a new organization for alternative education in Berkeley, one permitting autonomy from the BUSD central administration. The teachers were opposed by another interconnected group, dominated by BUSD administrators who were mostly in the central office. They claimed that less than full District

alignment would prevent BUSD from benefiting from BESP, would make evaluation a fraud since it would consist of site self-appraisal, and would, in effect, allocate public funds for essentially unaccountable "private" schools.

BESP planning did not meet this division head-on. Instead, it excluded the first group [of teachers] from a legitimate role in the planning process; at the same time, it bowed toward this group's viewpoint by adopting an organizational form which left sites autonomous. However, the resulting autonomy was equivalent to isolation. Teachers who were inexperienced in BUSD administrative corridors became directors at the community-based sites. The right to formulate site objectives were accorded them and their staffs, yet this was accompanied by an insistence upon evaluation relevant to evolving federal concerns in whose formulation they lacked a voice. Conversely, the administrators were accorded the right of selective intervention when sites proved out of compliance with BUSD regulations, but were denied an opportunity for continuous concern and involvement. Twin results flowed from this compromise: individual sites were given a great deal of formal independence, which was rendered spurious since many crucial decisions were beyond their recognized ken; decisions by the BUSD central administration were made fitfully, without benefit of continuous and reliable information about particular sites. Individual BESP sites were thus thrown back on themselves, forced to choose survival strategies in isolation from District guidance, yet severely constrained in their latitude for choice.

The most tangible expression of this compromise was the semblance of a nonbureaucracy within a bureaucracy. A "parallel" organization to the BUSD administrative hierarchy was established. It was publicized as being capable of serving and defending the special nature of alternative/experimental education. Its proclaimed reason for existence was to get something done in a hurry, to launch a program and perhaps provide a quick object lesson to regular BUSD personnel who would eventually have to take an important role in sustaining alternative education. Few if any persons expected or wanted this nonbureaucracy to last. It was intended as a short-lived, one-time, makeshift device.

However, no one could really explicate what a separate BESP organization was meant to accomplish. Indeed, its presence often grated on certain BUSD Board members concerned about the soaring number of administrative posts in the District. Central administrators still favoring bureaucratic control of BESP sometimes saw it as a roadblock to long-range planning. Moreover, its temporary quality failed to impress or benefit site people worried about "phase-in" permanence and the apparent need to appeal to the power-wielders at the District apex. For those smitten with the idea of

comprehensive change, the existence of a central BESP office seemed to soften the impact of BESP on BUSD, since the latter did not have to adjust to the BESP during the course of the program. On the contrary, central BESP had to adjust, while its transiency made it powerless to change the total system. In turn, the lack of continuous BUSD involvement perpetuated an original disunity among sites.

BESP organization served to disguise the conflict between site autonomy and interdependence with the District. The BESP hierarchy was a "paper" solution to conflict. Since, in theory, the BESP administration was to be the one point where all project interests were to intersect, it was conveniently viewed as a crucible which could transform conflict into coordination. But the word "coordination" had a deceptively simple appearance in the context of a complicated program like BESP, wherein divergent perspectives met and clashed.\*

### 3. Deficiencies in BESP's K-12 Structure

BESP sites were so many educational "islands," cut off from one another and the larger BUSD.\*\* Separate jurisdictions were established for local BESP staffs within a program that was initially viewed as

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\* Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) state succinctly our point about BESP coordination:

Here we have one aspect of an apparently desirable trait of antibureaucratic administration that covers up the very problem--conflict versus cooperation, coercion versus consent--its invocation is supposed to resolve. Everyone wants coordination--on his own terms. Invocation of coordination does not necessarily provide either a statement of or a solution to the problem, but it may be a way of avoiding both when accurate prescription would be too painful. Coordination means getting what you do not have. It means creating unity in a city that is not unified.

\*\* Also, BESP planners never entertained the possibility of promoting direct educational partnerships between BESP sites and all or some of the common schools. However, the lack of communication between sites and common schools was regretted by some site directors and staff who felt that, within the BUSD, they had pioneered "promising" practices of immediate interest to BUSD common schools. The John Muir director stated that two common school staffs were "re-inventing the wheel" in their isolated endeavors to develop an open-classroom approach. The ELC director lamented that her site's unique multi-cultural library was not used by the common schools.

an emergent process rather than a rigorously interlocking system of alternative schools. Sites were cordoned off from one another, so to speak, limiting their potential for articulation. The "separateness" and diversity of BESP sites conflicted with articulation. It proved impossible to create a coherent panoply of sites once BESP included pre-BESP alternatives and added new ones by administrative fiat in order to comply with the two-zone requirement.

Created by different people for different reasons, most BESP sites lacked indigenous ties capable of promoting vertical communication. To some degree all sites turned inward, some to the point of internal feuding over power-sharing. This made it particularly difficult for off-site and on-site programs to collaborate, since the former tended to be community-oriented while the latter were under the closer supervision of BUSD administration. BESP was highly splintered at the site level, with each site's special identity being surrogate for project-level autonomy.

Site attrition further undermined articulation. Not even the original cast of sites was large enough to accommodate diversity and articulation. Reduction in the number of sites further affected the form and content of the K-12 structuring. Only 12 sites existed during the final BESP year.\* The most significant effects of the attrition were felt at three crucial points:

7th-8th grade junior high level. With the closings of KARE, U.N. West, and Willard Alternative, a gap opened in junior high alternative education after 1973/74, leaving only sparsely populated Odyssey to fill the 7-8 void. As a result, the K-12 structure was weakest in grades 7 and 8, where BUSD's announced reforms of elementary and secondary education had to be joined.

Ethnic schools. The elimination of Black House and Casa de la Raza in 1972/73, along with the later consolidation of Agora and Genesis in 1974/75, effectively stopped BESP sites from catering to the self-defined, special interests of minority students (as opposed to their academic deficiencies identified by regular school staff for remedial treatment).

Individual K-12 schools. The closing of Casa de la Raza and the failure to start New Ark did away with the "built-in," natural articulation between grade levels of such comprehensive schools, making all BESP students and their parents subject to whatever continuities could be agreed upon between sites, which proved negligible.

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\* This count of 12 sites excludes Environmental Studies, which continued to receive BESP funds as a diffused 6th grade program at Malcolm X,, and not as a distinct entity; and On Target, which also continued to receive BESP funds as a facet of a "Career Center" program at Berkeley High.

Reduction in the number of sites indirectly affected the ability of surviving ones to stick to a coherent educational emphasis. This further limited the possibility for articulating across grade levels, as surviving sites had to absorb students from the terminated sites, even though the former were sometimes guided by a different philosophy, were designed to serve a different clientele, and had assembled staff skills that corresponded to initial purpose and target population, skills that were not necessarily appropriate for different purposes and populations. HUI, Model School A, and Kilimanjaro directors, for instance, felt pressured to increase Black student enrollments; however, in ISA interviews, these directors acknowledge that the initial rationales for their sites were not well-suited to students who might have benefited most from individualized instruction. According to their directors, On Target, Career Exploration, and Yoga/Reading had their original purposes thwarted by the kind of student they could get to enroll.

The gulf separating an inflated senior high BESP program from the comparatively reduced program at lower grade levels militated against the creation of a distinctive school career for BESP students. Specific programs were not "followed through" from one segment of the BUSD grade configuration to another. Students experienced discontinuity at the two elementary school levels:

Grades 3 to 4. The bilingual program at Jefferson, in grades K-3, had no matching program at Kilimanjaro or Franklin, the "receiving" BESP sites for matriculating Jefferson students. Third graders who had had English and Spanish or Chinese as languages of instruction at Jefferson were unable to choose a comparable program in the fourth grade, at a common or BESP school. A similar predicament faced students graduating from the John Muir K-3 school, where an "open classroom" philosophy obtained, for the "receiving" 4-6 Environmental Studies lacked an equivalent classroom emphasis. And 4-6 sites were either smaller (Environmental Studies) or less monopolized by a BESP orientation (Franklin) than were K-3 sites, which further frustrated continuity.

Grades 6 to 7. The kinds of programs and types of teaching styles available in grade 6 were not consciously planned in grade 7. KARE and Willard Alternative, in the number of students enrolled, were the primary junior high sites. However, they had been administratively concocted in order to meet the federal K-12 demand and to ease BUSD's problem with truancy and violence at this school level. Thus, the educational rationale for these schools was brittle and unstable, a conclusion which figured in the BUSD decision to close them.

Increasingly, BESP at the senior high level was basically a loosely contrived "elective" education, not an ensemble of tightly-knit "sub-schools" capable of powerfully reinforcing alternative education provided at lower grade levels. Especially in BESP's last two years, sites at West Campus and Berkeley High were characterized by: (1) the opening of more BESP classes to common school students; (2) a reduction in BESP courses combined with a readdition of BESP-type, elective courses in the common school curriculum; (3) the inability of students and their parents to discern at all times whether the students were registering in common or BESP classes; (4) appreciable mobility of students, BESP and common, between site and regular classes; (5) obstacles to recruitment of new BESP students by current ones and staff, which affected the enrollment size necessary to add new courses and augment a suffusive alternative climate.

#### 4. Parallelism in Practice

Diverse parties brought complexities and contradictions into BESP. These were superimposed upon, rather than reconciled by, its central administration. The central BESP was responsible to all participants but empowered by none. The June 1971 school board guidelines aptly summarized the predicament while straining to make it seem a positive virtue. Referring to the position of BESP director, the guidelines declared: "He would not be viewed by himself or his colleagues as allied with either sector [the sites or the BUSD hierarchy] nor as deriving his power or status from either." From whence the "power" and "status" of the BESP director would derive was never made evident. BESP central administration was literally consumed by conflicting demands from diverse quarters. Pressures on its core activities came laterally from Washington, downward from BUSD, and upward from sites. A parallel organization was used as a convenience for others' organization-maintaining interests.

More implied than stated by the BESP proposal were three main functions of a parallel organization. First, one can infer, it was to promote cooperation between disparate sites and between the sites and the BUSD hierarchy. Second, it was to provide services to individual sites. Third, it was to be a model worthy of BUSD emulation, either in some of its parts (e.g., staffing, administration, curriculum development) or, perhaps, as an integral whole.

However, each of the main central BESP functions was partially thwarted by other BESP participants. The coordinating function was chiefly impeded by an unreliable relationship between the central BESP office and the sites. The servicing function was never fully developed, principally because of truncated federal-local planning. The exemplary, or demonstration, function was impaired, not only by deficiencies in performing the other two functions, but also by indecisiveness at the top of the District hierarchy and the inherent subordination of BESP to BUSD.

1. Project Coordination. The critical role of project advocate was never adequately assumed by either of two successive BESP central directors. Instead, BESP central administration became a residuary legatee, shouldering those tasks which other groups and organizations were unwilling or unable to perform. In the main, these tasks were administrative in the narrowest sense: acting as a liaison for individual sites, the BUSD, and concerned federal agencies.

Though selected by the BUSD, the BESP central director was not given real line authority within the school system. His potential for long-range cooperative planning with BUSD was acutely circumscribed. He had to make essentially intuitive judgments about what others would tolerate and be prepared to draw back when his views were seriously challenged. He was able to make decisions only within the interstices created by others' disinterest, not within formally acknowledged spheres of authority and competence.

According to the BESP plan, the central director was to be advised by a council of student, parent, and project staff representatives and by local advisory committees from each site. But the representative composition of an Alternative Schools Council never developed, nor did local site committees for other than intrasite decision-making. Instead, a less prestigious council of site directors, one not formally recognized by the BUSD administration, met sporadically during the first year but was then disbanded in favor of occasional meetings between the BESP director and particular site directors as specific issues compelled. So, too, a formal mechanism for bringing "grass roots" recommendations to upper-level BUSD decision-makers was missing from the program.

Still, some sites were better situated than others to take advantage of the internal politics and hierarchical structure of BUSD. Not all sites enjoyed favorable access to sources of money and influence; not all broke from the starting gate with the same chance for success. Some sites did not need a parallel support structure, while others felt that they could not depend on it for survival. Thus, BESP central administration was cast into a passive role: sites could exercise discretion over how a parallel organization would be used, if at all. The BESP central administration responded to this situation by treating sites discretely rather than collectively.

The dynamics of the BESP director's relationship to various sites was largely framed by the BUSD-defined status of their directors. The relationship was governed, then, by whether site directors were located off-site or on-site and whether or not they were also BUSD principals. To the degree that site directors' roles were multiple and contradictory, the central BESP administration found it hard to harmonize and articulate the sites.

In the last two years, the BESP director's impact on on-site activities was minimal. Especially his visits to sites at Berkeley High School were steadily reduced. As he himself pointed out, they harbored directors who most criticized central BESP performance. The tensions between alternative and traditional education at Berkeley High, the BESP director claimed, made ever more appealing the insulation provided by office work. Throughout BESP, the central director lacked a dependable constituency at the site level.

2. Service Delivery. The BESP director was assisted by a central support staff, consisting of these components: Evaluation, Family-School Transaction, Media and Public Information, and Training. However, they were consolidated within BESP or merged with BUSD central administration prior to the program's completion, with an attendant loss of "parallelism" in BESP organization. In the third year, Family-School Transaction and Public Information were merged into a new Community Education unit. The BESP director decided there was little parental support for the new unit, and NIE/ESP concurred that this short-lived component be phased out by the start of 1974/75. The responsibilities of the Family-School unit devolved upon sites, where they were handled sparingly by site directors coping with a down-winding program. The lone public information specialist was transferred to District offices and asked to function in a dual capacity for BUSD and BESP. The separate Media component was dissolved in 1974/75, with its lone specialist being subsumed under Training. For the final year, Evaluation was put under the supervision of the BUSD Director of Research and Evaluation.

The Evaluation unit within the BESP central office was the heart of this office's anticipated functions. The other proposed components were dependent on the results of formative evaluation to greater and lesser degrees. For evaluative findings were originally conceived by the BESP director and the federal ESP project officer as being available not only to sites, but also to any interested parent, teacher, community group, or school district. The scope and performance of the other components were to be affected by the Evaluation unit, since, on paper, they appeared to be "feeders" or conduits for it. Specification of their functions awaited a fuller understanding of the substantive information available to them, for which Evaluation was, logically, a prime supplier.

Level I evaluation is discussed elsewhere in this report (especially in Chapter 8). Nonetheless, that there were shortcomings to the Evaluation component must be mentioned in the present context, for these affected other BESP support units. Failing the integration of Evaluation with the other components, the latter were diminished in importance and required to improvise new aims

as the program unfolded. Without evaluative input, the several BESP components overlapped in function, owing to scarce tasks having to be divided among them; this, in turn, offered excuse and reason to collapse them still further. Moreover, the resulting uncertainty in purpose led to frictions within the central BESP office.

Family-School Transaction. This component was intended as a new alternative to the District's counseling and guidance services. The BESP proposal called for a racially mixed team of pupil personnel staff (psychologists, social workers, and counselors) to be assigned to families instead of schools, in order to advance "a participatory, interactionary, reciprocal relationship between school persons rendering services and consumer or user groups needing service." Basically, the main purposes were to assist families to make appropriate school choices and to gain optimal benefit from their choices.

In truth, however, the original staff of four functioned in a variety of ways, many of which were unrelated to the stated objectives. The Family-School component was an early victim of a beleaguered BESP director having to use this small staff for his own administrative needs. He was too busy responding to requests--running errands for sites--to be able to use project staff on ill-defined community assignments.

By the end of 1971/72, recommendations by the BESP director and the Family-School coordinator did aim at redressing the unclear definition of roles. These recommendations were intended to give this component a closer tie to the consumer, especially in the non-white population. Transfers within the overall BUSD pupil personnel staff had left two professional staff positions vacant; the BESP director converted these two slots into three classified positions, and hired persons with Asian and Spanish language abilities. In addition, the coordinator asked the new staff to set up a central information service center where families could obtain accurate information about BESP. However, the center was housed in poor facilities on the outer fringe of the school district, and subsequently received meager parental use.\*

To some, this component was seen as the agent of the central BESP support services, with only loose ties to the various BESP sites; to others, it was seen as the agent of the various sites,

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\* Interestingly, in March 1972, the Family-School staff urged the BESP director to narrow the component's roles by confining it to an evaluation function. The staff asked that it be permitted in the forthcoming year to provide data from the community on "the effectiveness of the total ESP" (Memorandum, March 9, 1972).

providing support in achieving their respective goals. Seldom, if at all, was the staff seen as agents of the consumer--parents and students. Aside from this confusion, there was the unresolved question of whether to limit the services to a geographic zone, to specific BESP sites, to transitional populations within BESP (at grades 3-4, 6-7, 8-9), or to a specific age group such as early childhood, K-3, etc. The component's coordinator asserted that inadequate staffing made such a decision both necessary and impossible, given the previously mentioned constraints on the BESP director.

Media and Public Information. These two components, though listed separately in the BESP proposal and yearly budgets, were jointly charged with the task of providing information on the existence, activities, and accomplishments of sites. Limited to one media expert and one public information specialist, however, these two components devoted themselves primarily to designing and updating site brochures and issuing occasional news releases.

According to the second BESP director, the program was vastly underplanned in this area of publicity. If Berkeley had really wanted to become a bellwether for alternative education, he claimed, professional outsiders should have been hired to disseminate aspects of the program. By BESP's end, he concluded that money expended on media equipment and materials was largely wasted, insofar as publicity and dissemination should have been done properly or not at all. He interpreted BUSD inattentiveness to BESP's public relations as exemplifying the District's generally insular character, which he felt also tended to restrict other regional and state interassociations.

Adequate publicity about sites was critical to fashioning an options system, at least one that would provide consumer choice. However, the site descriptions contained in the brochures available to parents and students did not give them what they would need to make a choice. Budget information was not included in any program description, nor were the qualifications or profiles of staff. The manner used to describe the sites resulted in their using different methods to describe themselves, thus making it hard to compare the programs before selecting one. Apparently the media specialist simply edited and put into a common format the descriptions provided by site directors, who themselves had no organizational mechanism for collaborating on the task of creating useful, comparable information. Admittedly, though, BESP dependency on fluctuating BUSD staff assignments exacerbated the problem of providing this information, as did an Evaluation unit which was not set up to assist students who were not enrolled, or parents not involved, in a particular site.

Training. This component was to be responsive to the needs of sites and support staff in the areas of media, curriculum and instruction, and staff development. The primary strategy for BESP trainers was to encourage staff to try out alternative roles. In the BESP proposal, it was stated that in-service training would depart from a tradition of organizing sessions around issues of "the cognitive aspects of mastery, i.e., techniques and information which have been handed down from the top echelon of the school system." Trainers were not to use the "T-group" style of "aiming at achieving personal support" when dealing with "affective training" issues. Instead, they were "to recognize the major issues in interpersonal life," namely, "mastery versus powerlessness," "mutual support versus isolation," "accountability for action based on clear mutual expectations versus mistrust," and "racism and its resulting effect upon the program."

In the first year, the one person assigned to Training spent most of his time in administrative consultation with various site directors. This consultation with directors was deemed necessary for they lacked experience negotiating their way through the BUSD bureaucracy. Also during the first year a BESP teacher intern program was started in conjunction with a local college. This was a program whereby people who had B.A.'s and had been hired by sites could get teaching credentials; this had the effect of credentialing minority teachers, which continued until the fourth year, when BUSD closed the door on new BESP hiring. With an additional request and a small fee from teachers, some workshops allowed college credit in a program that BESP training coordinated with a private college in the area. Although the BUSD, in conjunction with several districts in the Bay Area, coordinates a training program with instructors from several colleges, BESP training was unique in offering college credit as well as in-service credit for its workshops.

BESP Training met with more satisfaction among teachers and principals than any other single feature of the program. This unit ended on an upnote, as its workshops and High Intensity Learning Centers were gradually refined and extended over the five years. Teacher training in the first year was confined to "one-shot" kinds of workshops, e.g., on how to manage the HILCs supported by ESP funding. Similarly in the second year, most of this unit's time was spent writing plans and materials. But, by year three, workshops were added in multiethnic studies, teaching reading and writing, communication skills, and classroom problem-solving. Teachers from the common schools were invited to the workshops when space permitted. As shown in the table below, a total of 372 teachers participated in the workshops in 1974/75, when the training effort crested.

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TABLE 15 : NUMBER OF TEACHERS IN BESP TRAINING, BY  
GRADE LEVEL AND TYPE OF SCHOOL, 1974/75\*

	ELEMENTARY		JUNIOR HIGH		SENIOR HIGH	
	BESP	COMMON	BESP	COMMON	BESP	COMMON
Number of Total Teaching Staff	95	439	28	158	64	176
Number of Total Workshops Attended	202	154	3	3	7	2
Average Number of Workshops Attended per Teacher	2.13	.35	.11	.02	.11	.01
	p < .05		p < .05		p < .05	

\* According to the above table, in averaging the number of BESP workshops attended per staff, BESP teachers were more involved than the common school teachers. At each level this was statistically significant at the .05 level. In general, the elementary teachers, both BESP and common, were the most involved in BESP Training. According to the BESP Training Coordinator, "It's historically a much tougher problem getting secondary teachers [involved in training]. They think they're experts; they'd rather go to college in the summer than take courses in Training workshops."

A partial explanation for Training's success, relative to other support units, is that it assumed an evaluative function by undertaking a "needs assessment" among BESP teachers. Before workshops were planned, site directors met with teachers to discuss possible areas for training. Site recommendations were passed on to the Training component, which slated workshops oriented to teachers' expressed needs. BESP funds permitted teachers "release time" for the workshops, by enabling sites to hire substitute teachers. Site directors and principals could require teachers to attend, though this prerogative was generally declined by the administrators, as they preferred to make participation voluntary.\*

Nonetheless, the accomplishments of BESP Training were hedged by a BUSD "no fire-no hire" staffing policy which prevented the program from drawing heavily upon extra-District personnel, curbing

\* Voluntary BESP Training reduced possibilities for following a diagnostic and prescriptive approach vis-a-vis individual teachers. A Training associate remarked that "some of the teachers who show up at the workshops are teachers who might be doing well anyway, and who are looking for reinforcement." The smallness of the Training staff also precluded diagnosis-prescription, though the staff was involved in many on-site consultations.

extensive use of teachers' experiences in alternative education. Though BESP was partially able to remedy racial imbalance in staffing between sites by hiring classified (non-certificated) personnel, even this practice ended with the 1973/74 school year. In April 1974, the BUSD gave most classified staff at BESP sites notices of termination. BUSD hiring policies put a significant limitation on the ability of BESP to "stretch" BUSD's imagination.

3. Demonstration. Central BESP support units were also intended as instructive contrasts to regular District practices. However, their operations, as described in the above survey, hardly commended them as exemplars. Furthermore, even if their performance had been better, their demonstration function would have been confounded by structural and situational handicaps. Currying favor, doing things differently, and "turning around" the system could not be pursued simultaneously, especially by a small central BESP office encouraged to mirror and promote other, substantive BESP goals. And, given the sites were only partially funded by the government, and that the survival of each depended on BUSD acceptance, they required and sought BUSD services and support. Thus, site survival-seeking and system change were at variance. So, too, were site diversity and system change. From BESP's start, BUSD failed to clarify what the program should or should not attempt; it had an uncertain status within BUSD.

The BESP central administration shared in the uncertainty, was itself trapped between the idea of alternativeness and of alignment. The isolation of this "parallel" office was reinforced by the BUSD's reluctance to decide what would happen to the director and his staff after federal funding ceased. The selection of a BESP director who would be able and willing to combat vigorously BUSD inertia was exceedingly improbable. Neither of two successive directors was so inclined. Drawn from the ranks of BUSD principals, they were used to the system's constraints despite their relatively forward-looking views on education. The first director almost immediately found himself having to salvage a program gone astray, rather than pressing ahead with his avowed commitment to cultural pluralism.

The second director accepted the post in order to conduct a "mopping up" operation. He believed that BESP should have been consciously intermeshed with BUSD from the start, in order to mitigate specific problems, rather than vainly presenting itself as an utter contrast to the regular system. He also commented on the "loneliness" of the directorship, the lack of accountability within the program, and his situational limitations for grasping power. Entering the directorship in the BESP's third year, he claimed that by then site staffs had staked out "territories" which his office could not encroach upon without causing renewed, damaging controversy. He adopted a defensive posture himself, wary of becoming a stalking horse in sites' losing battles with BUSD and the federal ESP office.

The two Superintendents who successively presided over BESP advocated and hastened, respectively, an initial BUSD-cum-BESP expansionist phase and a concluding consolidation phase. Their differing administrative styles and principal areas of competency reinforced viewpoints also being dictated by the particular problems facing BUSD in each phase. The times and the personalities interacted, indeed seemed to require one another.

Judging from most local commentaries, the first Superintendent's forte and passion was to bring outside monies into the BUSD, at which he excelled. He was not particularly interested in becoming immersed in the execution, administration, and coordination of projects. While building up an exceedingly complex BUSD program, the Superintendent was content to let others run it. BESP in particular was permitted free rein until crisis or governmental regulations made his intervention inescapable. Operating within specified plans, irrespective of the political "fallout," held little appeal for him. He was sensitive to the bargaining power of interest groups, which made tight formal organization a liability from his standpoint.

Under this BUSD administration, the BESP had difficulty making an acknowledged chain of command work. Communication upward and downward, between sites and central BUSD administration, was prone to getting stalled at the central BESP level. For the gap between this level and the central BUSD was, in fact, bridged primarily by personal contact between the first BESP director and the sometimes distracted Superintendent. Despite the official reporting line running through the Assistant Superintendent for Instruction, this BESP director depended on his personal ties to the Superintendent.

If the first Superintendent was handicapped in pushing the BESP cause, owing to his sensitivity to political debts and pressures, the second was none the less restricted because of the systematizing, economizing role for which he was hired. Neither the time nor the circumstances augured well for a fruitful relationship between the second Superintendent and BESP. The initial stimulating injection of federal ESP funds was giving way to a dreary problem of withdrawal: how to effect phase-in with the least financial burden for the BUSD. Subjecting BESP to gradual consolidation with BUSD centralized activities had the interim effect of running the project on neither a strictly program nor a strictly functional basis. Under the new Superintendent, BESP's last two years were spent in a twilight zone, wherein it was neither autonomous from nor integral to the BUSD hierarchy. For example, the BUSD Director of Research and Evaluation assumed titular control of the Evaluation unit but had to rely fundamentally on a BESP-chosen staff trained in and for an autonomous program conception; also, the task of publicizing BESP was newly attached to a BUSD public information specialist, but materials and intimate knowledge of sites remained at separate BESP headquarters.

So long as BESP sites did not establish "liberated" territories for teachers, parents, and students, and BUSD problems could be resolved or accentuated by BESP, a separate BESP organization would exist only at BUSD discretion. Only the previous Superintendent's willingness to work with the first BESP director inhibited the collapse of formal channels. Even so, site directors in the first three years occasionally routed information and inquiries around the central BESP office to the Superintendent's top staff officers. The On Target director, for example, was exempted by the BUSD Director of Research and Evaluation from having to administer state-mandated tests in reading and math; contrarily, the Model School A director funnelled his students' test results to the first NIE/ESP project officer by way of the Assistant Superintendent for Instruction. Apparently, these departures from BESP-centered procedures were not discouraged by BUSD central administration. However, other BESP sites were excluded from knowing about even the practical efficacy of appealing to BUSD officials on similar concerns. With both BUSD administrations there was a tendency to focus on trouble spots, to proceed on a case-by-case basis. As a result, the problem of one school failed to provide a solution for another facing similar constraints.\*

## 5. Conclusion

The national ESP regarded the R&D strategy of comprehensiveness as the bulwark of the local program design. The truth of this proposition is borne out by two basic considerations. First, the substantive ESP purpose was to correct the deficiencies of "piece-meal" or partial programs, since they seemed unable to make any appreciable impact on school systems. Second, the correlative federal interest in evaluation would lack scope and purpose if the local program was not comprehensively structured.

Despite the importance of this strategy in the federal ESP formulation, however, OE/ESP did not reveal a painstaking concern for comprehensiveness during initial BESP planning. Respecting the K-12 composition of sites, OE/ESP emphasized the two-zone limitation

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\* The failure of BUSD central administrators to respond to site inquiries had a similar effect. For instance, the John Muir director/principal protested the presence at her school of two other federal programs (Criterion Reading and Math Wirtz). Upon BUSD request, she wrote a formal letter to the Assistant Superintendent for Instruction asking for exemption. Receiving no response, John Muir exempted itself, but without drawing attention to the issue of non-BESP programs at BESP sites.

to BESP but did not exhibit a strong interest in the kinds of alternatives available or in their distribution throughout the school career. As a consequence, BESP was permitted to become a top-heavy inverted pyramid. A relatively large number of sites existed at the secondary level, coming too late in the school career to further a belated federal interest in articulation. Similarly, OE/ESP originally deferred to the BUSD interpretation of the interlocking, multiple components requirement, which resulted in a "parallel" BESP central office which was neither autonomous from nor integral to regular BUSD activities.

The R&D strategies of comprehensiveness and of local planning proved to be in tension with one another. Neither a federal nor a local assessment of priorities was able to prevail. Although BUSD was required by OE/ESP to establish some sites which were not congruent with local wishes, BUSD based the remainder of BESP on preexisting alternatives which were already functionally diffuse because haphazardly created. The conjunction of the federal comprehensiveness requirement and deference to local wishes imparted further centrifugal tendencies to alternative schooling in Berkeley. On the whole, one had neither "experimental" nor "alternative" schools in BESP, but, rather, a hybrid product unsusceptible to overall program organization or articulation. Never truly planned at the local level, the R&D strategy of comprehensiveness actually contributed to piecemeal change endeavors from which ESP had proposed to depart.

CHAPTER 7: FIVE-YEAR FORWARD FUNDING  
AS AN EDUCATIONAL R&D STRATEGY

The primary aim of five-year forward funding as an educational R&D strategy was to exact and solidify a five-year commitment from a local school district to the experimental project as the means for effecting "comprehensive change." However, the strategy did not exact a special local commitment to BESP.

BUSD failed to clarify the place of alternative education in the total District program, to undertake cost-benefit analysis of BESP, to make BESP the centerpiece of other local programs. Intermeshed with central BUSD fiscal policies and procedures, BESP became mired in and engulfed by the District's chronic fiscal crisis and unsure management. The \$6 million plus that OE/ESP promised to the Berkeley experiment over a five-year period could neither be spent nor claimed efficiently. Further, BUSD financial control of BESP was not accompanied by a concerted effort to allay community suspicion of BESP. Distrust and misunderstanding of the federal funding strategy pervaded BUSD ranks.

Although NIE/ESP heeded OE/ESP's promise to provide five-year funding, it threatened to withhold monies at several junctures until BUSD and BESP complied with evolving federal interpretations of evaluation and experimentalism. In effect, federal funding of BESP occurred on a yearly renewable basis. A "stop-go" effort hampered BESP. Local anxieties were provoked by what amounted to conditional funding based on performance. In practice, the forward-funding strategy never fully enshrined consistent federal service to or monitoring of BESP. Federal ESP slid from one view of its proper role to another, making reliable financial support of locally planned and implemented change seem to local persons a strategy missing from BESP. Thus, the amount and method of ESP funding failed to correct appreciably the uncertainty of past federal funding of educational innovation and research.

The strategy foundered before two basic problems. First, there was lack of agreement at and between the federal and local levels on the purpose of ESP monies. Second, the BUSD fiscal system was too cumbersome and unresponsive to permit BESP sites to define and pursue their goals in a coherent manner. There was a tension between the approaches to solving these problems. That is, were ESP funds to stimulate an experimental program that might eventually alter BUSD fiscal practices or was the greater

priority that of reforming those practices in order to facilitate an alternative program?\* The first approach was geared to changing personal attitudes; the second, to changing financial-administrative structures. Neither approach was pursued consistently within BESP. Initial planning emphasized the "attitude-before-structure" approach. However, federal ESP belatedly caved at the weaknesses of BUSD financial controls after renouncing its attempt to gain local support for its view of the proper uses of ESP monies.

#### 1. Divergent Views About Forward Funding

When originally funding BESP, OE/ESP felt impelled to move with the greatest possible speed. The task of "moving money" encouraged the government to look to already advantaged school districts, on the premise that they were in the best position to spend money. Given the vagueness and riskiness of the comprehensive change motif, the most evident criterion of success immediately present was the ability to spend money.\*\* Going by this criterion, BUSD was a promising recipient, hardly in a position to demur. The preparation of BUSD's "letter of interest" to OE/ESP coincided with the revelation from the Superintendent that BUSD would be facing a \$2.6 million deficit which, in accordance with state law, would have to be eliminated in the 1971/72 BUSD budget.

Soon after funding of BESP, however, some federal ESP officials and Berkeley citizens' groups came to the belief that the OE/ESP grant was pursued by BUSD primarily because of fiscal troubles and that this motive influenced adversely the kind of local commitment with which the grant was being applied. They felt that BUSD was never genuinely interested in educational alternatives, that it hurriedly whipped up the grant proposal because a large federal grant might soften BUSD budget difficulties. Contrarily, though, BUSD felt it should not be put on the defensive, accused of dilatory performance and subjected to forceful

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\* Thomas K. Glennan, the first NIE Director, has stated that a similar dilemma afflicts much of educational R&D: "We cannot conduct many kinds of R&D without creating or at least improving the system, and, at the same time, we cannot create or improve the system without conducting R&D" (Glennan, March 1973). Translate the word "system" into "BUSD" and you have a statement of the two horns impaling BESP.

\*\* The beginning and end of BESP, we parenthetically add, had this criterion in common.

federal monitoring. To BUSD officials, national ESP had patently erected a program keyed to District promise, not to District performance. BUSD reasoned that once ESP funding was given to Berkeley, the government had an implicit obligation to assume the local effort was the best one possible under stringent financial constraints. Indeed, the BUSD versions of the forward-funding concept slipped easily into the notion that the federal government should be easing the financial crises of local schools through a program similar to revenue sharing. Federal ESP talk of a local-federal "partnership" implied to BUSD that the government would make allowance for the local "cash conundrum." Naturally, District survival was seen by BUSD officials as a prerequisite to program success.\*

Actual BUSD motives are hard to ascertain with any certainty. However, the original and relatively straightforward problem of giving and receiving money unquestionably concealed latent differences in outlook between the major parties to BESP. Deepening BUSD financial troubles served to make these differences sharper. Budgetary woes bred distrust and solidified oppositions and antagonisms. Lacking consensus on the meaning and implications of forward funding, BESP was inherently a cauldron of conflict, irrespective of more tangible obstacles to successful BESP financing. Stated somewhat differently, chronic BUSD fiscal crisis did not simply reflect "objective" limitations to BUSD capacity to use ESP monies effectively; crisis also hardened the "subjective" variations in perspective among diverse BESP participants. By specifying these variations, we see that each was too narrow to permit **reconciliation among them and**, thusly, a basis for remedying defects in BUSD fiscal policies and methods.

The Federal View as Catalytic Incentive. The stated federal desire was to assist in the development of mechanisms for lasting, self-renewing change within BUSD structures. Hence, ESP funding would be confined to "catalytic" change costs. It was to be used in three basic ways: (1) to provide for alternative school curriculum and program content; (2) to support new or additional services to BESP programs (administration, evaluation, training, etc.); (3) to hire certain BESP personnel (i.e., professional experts from within BUSD, outside consultants, and clerical staff).

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\* During a "feedback" session between BUSD/BESP administrators and Level II staff in the summer of 1975, a Board of Education member questioned the federal wisdom of funding a fiscally troubled BUSD for innovative purposes. According to this member, OE/ESP should have anticipated difficulties with BESP and had only itself to blame for discounting the obvious.

ESP monies were therefore not simply to provide a sum per student over and above BUSD's own financial allotment per student, but were to be used to change the system. With this funding formula, federal ESP hoped to encourage BUSD to plan BESP with a constricted focus. At the end of five years, perhaps, BUSD would possess a solid foundation for continuing reform and innovation.

In furtherance of this federal purpose, ESP expenditures on BESP sites were planned to be higher in the first two years than the last three. OE/ESP reasoned that a swift injection of the monies budgeted for sites would put them on an alternative/experimental footing in a hurry, thereby providing a "long" five years for evaluation and for establishing sites in local esteem. Then, in mid-program, the burden of sustaining sites would swing even more toward BUSD. However, the support units were not to receive the same proportional cuts in ESP funding as the program sites. Table 16 shows that this shift in federal expenditures was implemented.

TABLE 16: BESP EXPENDITURES BY TYPE, 1971/72, 1975/76

<u>Year</u>	<u>Expenditure Category</u>					
	<u>Support Units</u>		<u>Program Sites</u>		<u>Total</u>	
1971/72	\$ 430,544	15%	\$ 742,194	24%	\$1,172,738	19%
1972/73	602,458	20%	1,143,836	36%	1,746,294	29%
1973/74	757,921	26%	708,277	23%	1,466,198	24%
1974/75	573,845	19%	391,002	12%	964,847	16%
1975/76*	578,433	20%	162,828	5%	741,261	12%
Total	\$2,943,201	100%	\$3,148,137	100%	\$6,091,338	100%

\* 1975/76 expenditures are budgeted figures.

Nonetheless, the negotiated BUSD-ESP agreement to reduce over time the federal expenditures on site development could not compel BUSD to give special prominence to BESP. Slackening federal expenditures for sites would have to be absorbed by BUSD, but not the intense federal zeal.\* The major fallacy in the

\* While another Level II evaluation of an ESP project (other than Berkeley's) compared the five-year federal dollars to revenue sharing, the full import of educational R&D tied the dollars to the "experiment"--to bringing about comprehensive change. Federal ESP never intended that its monies be used to balance district budgets.

federal view was that it would be possible to dramatically change BUSD "on the cheap." Though originally riveted to the assumption that money may change attitudes, the federal view slighted the fact that however much ESP monies were valued locally as convenience, they were insufficient to make BUSD highly self-conscious of a need for fundamental change. While federal ESP possessed a strong proprietary interest in how its monies were deployed locally, BUSD did not share the same lofty respect for the sanctity of federal dollars. The reasons for this were embedded in the BUSD view of the five-year commitment.

The BUSD View of BESP as Added Revenue. To BUSD central administration, BESP required a local administrative effort far above that bestowed on the regular BUSD program and other federal grants received by BUSD--provided that a full-scale effort was indeed to be mounted. BUSD stressed the importance of these additional and unforeseeable costs to its own budget: rent, renovation, and transportation needs of off-site schools; increased paper work, disruption of routine, and decreased ability to rely on past experience; the long-term effect of hiring new BESP staff with BUSD monies. In exchange for this effort, central BUSD required adequate compensation from ESP monies, which BUSD saw to be unforthcoming. However, it is doubtful that more federal money would have been an incentive sufficient to create BUSD resolve for "comprehensive change." This speculation aside, the reality was that BUSD central administrators and Board members "let the chips fall" where they might, in the knowledge that some routine and mildly progressive school activities were being assisted by ESP monies.\*

The BUSD view received further elaboration during BUSD's disagreement with NIE/ESP about the administrative support costs properly due BUSD for the first 30-months grant period. According

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\* ESP monies assisted BUSD by relieving it of responsibilities and by augmenting the existing BUSD program. For example, some BESP administrative, support, and site positions were filled by people who had previously held BUSD salaried positions, and not all of these were subsequently filled by new hires. Thus, ESP monies enabled BUSD to undertake the reduction in BUSD staff--at least for a time--that BUSD officials were otherwise reluctant to undertake because of the District's affirmative action employment policy and system barriers. At the same time, though, ESP monies also permitted the purchase of materials and equipment, such as the High Intensity Learning Centers (HILCs), which were capable of serving BESP and BUSD students. A few site directors, wishing to ingratiate themselves with the common school officialdom and staff, deliberately followed a purchase policy attuned to BUSD equipment needs (e.g., video equipment, additional supplies, etc.).

to the Superintendent, the Director of Planning and Development, and the Director of Business Services, BUSD had sought and gained verbal approval for a fixed administrative support cost, i.e., stated in dollars, rather than for a fixed percentage overhead rate. The 4.6 percent overhead which NIE/ESP ascertained to be the proper rate due BUSD for the first 30 months was strenuously resisted by the Superintendent, but to no avail. For this percentage was one applicable to the "average" program in the District. On the contrary, said BUSD officials: ESP monies were in the nature of special categorical aid and, as such, in no way assimilable to normal District operations.

Also during contract negotiations, a corollary to this basic BUSD stance emerged: BESP should be regarded as one contract rather than a group of site-specific contracts. Behind the BUSD opposition to the reverse federal interpretation were two primary BUSD fears. First, BUSD was apprehensive that autonomous sites, not financially subject to central BUSD direction, might make independent agreements with the federal ESP, causing BUSD to incur long-term obligations and stimulating the development of local political pressure groups. BUSD was wary of federal expenditures necessitating use of local funds in perpetually short supply. Second, BUSD was afraid that monies from eliminated or reduced sites would not remain in the BUSD treasury. For this reason, the contractual arrangement with NIE/ESP was itself suspect in BUSD eyes, since the contract disallowed the "recycling" of untapped monies budgeted for BESP and eliminated the payment of indirect or overhead costs to BUSD during the second 30-months contract phase of BESP. The contract tied the receipt of ESP funds to cost-reimbursement instead of allowing a monthly cash flow in advance as had the first 30-months OE/ESP grant. As the Director of Business Services informed the Superintendent in a memorandum dated November 12, 1973:

This [the contract] will mean about  
\$300,000 less average cash balance in  
the County Treasury and a loss of approx-  
imately \$9,000 in interest income.

But BUSD also had to balance against the not altogether satisfactory terms of the contract the impecuniousness of ESP monies when contrasted with the larger District program. Federal ESP funded the high-flown ideals stated in the BESP proposal. It did not heed the reality that BUSD had no compelling reason to reform itself by spotlighting BESP. In Berkeley, ESP forward funding was dwarfed by the size, complexity, and munificence of the total BUSD program. BUSD became an ESP recipient because it had ready-to-go programs on its back burners. The federal policy

of awarding the "haves" instead of the "have-nots" backfired, however. For the same local conditions that encouraged federal ESP to favor BUSD also offered BUSD a plausible excuse to resist pressure to make it act in ways local officials deemed undesirable. The major characteristics of the BUSD program which offered such excuse are cited below.

High expenditures per student. In a June 1975 issue of Nation's Schools and Colleges, it was stated that the 1974/75 national "cost per student" was \$1,170. BUSD's \$2,713.99 "cps" for the same year was 132 percent higher than the national average. In a recent publication, About Berkeley Schools (1975) the League of Women Voters in Berkeley pointed out that, in 1974/75, BUSD commanded a tax rate of nearly \$7.50 per \$100 of assessed valuation, while the City of Berkeley's portion was less than \$3.50 per \$100. The same report noted that the BUSD tax rate was the highest in the State.

Sizable BUSD enrollment relative to BESP enrollment. Whereas total BUSD student enrollment dropped 15 percent over the five-year period 1971/72-1975/76, BESP student enrollment showed a decline of 31 percent from its peak of 1972/73 (from 4,235 students to 2,865). Thus, the decline in enrollment was greater for BESP than for BUSD as a whole. Closure of five BESP sites after the enrollment peak of 1972/73 accounts for this, in part. Black House and Casa de la Raza, with a combined total of 180 students, were closed in June 1973. The closing of KARE, UN West, and Willard Alternative in June 1974 affected 357 other students, making a total of 537 displaced BESP students, most of whom could not be accommodated by still remaining BESP programs. As Table 17 below makes evident, only in 1972/73 did BESP approach the Average Daily Attendance (ADA) of 5,000 students which BUSD and federal ESP officials initially forecast as a reasonable BESP objective (which would have been 35 percent of the 1971/72 and 40 percent of the 1975/76 school population).

TABLE 17: BUSD AND BESP ENROLLMENTS, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	<u>1971/72</u>	<u>1972/73</u>	<u>1973/74</u>	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76</u>
BUSD ADA*	14,457	14,250	13,777	13,038	12,977
BESP ADA	3,632	4,235	3,857	3,210	2,865
BESP ADA as a % of BUSD ASA	25%	30%	28%	25%	22%

\* ADA figures for K-12 only and do not include adult enrollment since adults are not comparable to BESP students.

Revenue sources other than BESP. In terms of dollar and cents, BESP was a comparatively small portion of the BUSD program. BESP represented no more than 5 percent of the total BUSD budget, in any one BESP year. The reader is provided with comparisons between BUSD and BESP expenditures in the tables below.

TABLE 18: BUSD COST PER STUDENT, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	<u>1971/72</u>	<u>1972/73</u>	<u>1973/74</u>	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76</u>
ADA*	14,457	14,250	13,777	13,038	12,977
Total**					
Expen- ditures	\$28,408,472	\$33,284,130	\$31,318,185	\$35,358,002	\$35,247,686
CPS	\$ 1,965.03	\$ 2,335.73	\$ 2,273.22	\$ 2,713.92	\$ 2,716.17

\* ADA figures for K-12 only and do not include adult enrollment.

\*\* Total expenditures do not reflect expenses of adult education, and are "General Fund" expenditures only.

TABLE 19: BESP SUPPLEMENTAL EXPENDITURE PER STUDENT, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	<u>1971/72</u>	<u>1972/73</u>	<u>1973/74</u>	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76*</u>
ADA	3,632	4,235	3,857	3,210	2,865
Total BESP					
Expenditures	\$1,172,738	\$1,746,294	\$1,466,198	\$964,847	\$741,261
CPS/BESP	\$ 322.89	\$ 412.34	\$ 380.14	\$300.58	\$258.73

\* Figures in this column represent the BUSD budgetary estimate for 1975/76.

Especially noteworthy, however, is that ESP monies comprised no more than 38 percent of total federal funding of BUSD in any one BESP year. In its first year, BESP was but one of 42 outside grants and contracts, most of which were federal, managed through BUSD central administration. In fact, prior to 1973/74, BESP was second to Bilingual Children's Television in total federal dollar amount brought into BUSD. By 1975/76, as a percentage of total BUSD income, the federal contribution was the highest in nine years (except for 1972/73), though the ESP share of all federal allocations to BUSD had dwindled to 13 percent. Over its five-year involvement in Berkeley, ESP accounted for less than a fourth of the federal funds flowing into the school district. The relevant comparisons between ESP and all other federal monies in BUSD during the five-year period of BESP are shown in Table 20 below.

TABLE 20: INCOME RECEIVED BY BUSD FROM ESP AND OTHER FEDERAL GRANTS, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	<u>1971/72</u>	<u>1972/73</u>	<u>1973/74</u>
All Federal income	\$4,128,874	\$6,774,881	\$ 3,822,812
ESP income	\$1,172,738*	\$1,746,294	\$ 1,466,198
ESP as a % of Federal Income	28%	26%	38%

	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76</u>	<u>Five-Year Total</u>
All Federal income	\$4,734,626	\$5,874,190	\$25,335,383
ESP income	\$ 964,847	\$ 741,261	\$ 6,091,338*
ESP as a % of Federal Income	20%	13%	24%

\* Figures for 1971/72 ESP income, and total ESP income, includes the \$10,000 planning grant received from USOE in February, 1971.

Multiple funding of BESP sites. Other special District and state monitored programs existed at certain BESP sites, ones that had been proposed by BUSD administrators. BESP was not the solitary source of extra-BUSD funding and identity for these sites. Other programs at Franklin included BABEL (bilingual education) and an Arts sub-school, while state childcare funds were one of five non-ESP funding sources for the Early Learning Center. Among other incomes, John Muir received Follow Through monies; Jefferson had a BABEL program; East Campus received state funds as a continuation school.

No matter whether BUSD officials felt pride in wealth or alarm over swelling costs, BESP was apt to be a relatively negligible factor in their calculations. Either way, BESP diminished in importance over time. A five-year diffusion over many sites and services of ESP's \$6 million--as against an annual BUSD budget of \$30 million plus--did not seem to comprise a "critical mass" for anything approaching a demand for comprehensive change in BUSD. True, the plunge in BUSD student enrollment negatively affected the income BUSD received from the state in the form of ADA monies during a five-year BESP period in which BUSD expenditures soared 25 percent. Yet, viewed from the angle of BUSD officials struggling to balance ledgers, BESP sites became competitors to more established BUSD schools in the quest for uncommitted BUSD revenues. As indicated previously in this report, competition and phase-in were site problems which dampened enthusiasm for

alternativeness and experimentation. At the same time, BUSD overspending meant that the central BUSD administration did not stand pat in the search for federal monies. Other promising federal revenues were sought, and the pivotal role of BESP had to be played down in order to play up the importance of each new BUSD bid for additional revenue, as in the case of the ESAA monies previously discussed. The federal cash flow into BUSD in 1975/76 was the highest it has ever been except for 1972/73, and none of the latest federal programs in BUSD had to be justified by or built upon a connection to BESP.\*

The Site View as Discretionary Spending. ESP grant monies, though a minor supplement to largely BUSD-supported sites, were expected by BESP staffs and consumers to be that godsend of financial flexibility seldom visited on BUSD common schools. And, in reality, so long as the grant arrangement and the initial infusion of monies to sites obtained, BESP was not quite the BUSD-dominated program that were other state and federal programs in which BUSD funnelled external monies to schools and enforced guidelines. Although central BESP and BUSD had to approve site budgets even under the OE/ESP grant, there was enough flexibility in the uses of ESP monies by sites to say that their budgets for these particular monies genuinely originated within sites themselves. The major qualification to this judgment was that site discretion had to await BUSD determination of what District allocations to sites would be forthcoming. This meant that sites had to await final BUSD budgetary decisions, which impelled sites to "fill in" their needs hastily with ESP monies, without the advantage of long-range planning. Still, in the first two years, the BESP affiliation permitted site directors and some teachers to deviate somewhat from the budgetary rigidity of common schools.

Yet, a sense of doing something extra for students because of ESP funding was stronger at on-site than off-site programs. The latter programs, requiring high "capital intensities" due to their relative isolation from BUSD services, started out in arrears in physical plant capacity. They suffered from dilapidated facilities (Other Ways and Casa de la Raza) or incessant movement from one location to another (Odyssey was forced to move

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\* Speaking of the \$2.6 million deficit requiring elimination in the 1976/77 BUSD budget, a Board of Education member argued that "the present crisis is a legacy of the past where previous school boards accepted federal monies" (Berkeley Daily Gazette, July 12, 1976). However, the five-year upward trend in federal funding of BUSD seems to be at odds with this statement.

on six occasions). But on-site programs, including those with income other than BUSD and ESP, prized the small amount of leverage within BUSD that ESP monies afforded them. Paradoxically, then, BESP programs under the close supervision of BUSD felt that ESP monies freed them from BUSD constraints to some extent, while more structurally discrete off-site schools did not share in this belief.

The usual site attitude toward ESP monies, pegged as it was to gaining freedom and flexibility, conflicted with the stimulus-to-planning view of federal ESP. The federal decision to start BESP with heavier site funding in the first two than the last three years did not produce the results intended by federal ESP: site focuses that were--simultaneously--alternative, experimental, evaluable. The explanations for site "waywardness," as given by site directors, split along lines governed by the type of site program involved. Directors of programs with fairly turbulent beginnings--staff and/or parental conflicts, undefined student clienteles, rebellion against BUSD rules--pointed to the actual centrifugal effects of the federal grant. It encouraged the belief that every new idea could be tried at once and that site dissension could be handled internally, without resorting to a supravening office like the BESP or BUSD central administrations. Contrarily, directors of programs that had substantial centralized BUSD support (moral and financial) testified that these sites never really contemplated the full range of local BESP goals.

Thus, most BESP site directors experienced a tension between the forward-funding and local-planning strategies. Sites sided with either the forward-funding emphasis on judicious but narrow use of ESP monies or the local-plan emphasis on extrinsically comprehensive but diffuse and general goals. Still anxious to see BESP take certain directions, NIE/ESP tried by contract negotiations to achieve the federal aim for ESP monies: precise formulation of site priorities and BUSD commitment to a permanent groundwork for future District overhauling. Almost immediately in open conflict with the BUSD view, the federal view of forward funding more directly clashed with that of sites upon the advent of the NIE/ESP contract.

In off-site schools, the ability to remain flexible and "spontaneous" had been important. Now they were directed to plan, with increasing specificity, innovations and program expenditures for the second 30 months. This site planning had to proceed while several sites (Odyssey, Kilimanjaro, Early Learning Center) were in a state of uncertain flux over appropriate teaching styles and goals. No expenditure item was to be exempt from close scrutiny. NIE/ESP monies were not to be used to supplement the

salaries of BUSD personnel, or to help build new site facilities, or even to refurbish BUSD properties whose use had not been guaranteed by BUSD to a BESP site on a lasting basis. NIE/ESP also signalled its intention to withhold monies from central BESP personnel who might not be able to survive the end of governmental funding. In effect, NIE/ESP asked sites not only to have confirmation from BUSD that it would pick up the salaries of presently NIE/ESP-supported personnel during the fifth year and beyond, but that sites regard even confirmation with skepticism and plan accordingly.

Whether realizing or not that these stringent limitations on site flexibility were likely to produce considerable uneasiness among site staffs, NIE/ESP did attempt to put requirements on BUSD, which, if followed, might have ameliorated site anxieties. As part of the 1973-74 BUSD-NIE contract planning, federal ESP pressed the Board of Education to get as specific as possible about what would make it start, support, and terminate alternative schools generally, not simply BESP sites. Specificity was also requested on phase-in plans for individual sites, which federal ESP wanted to settle prior to final contract negotiations (save, possibly, for a few justified exceptions). It also wanted to know what would be done with all BESP personnel paid from ESP funds. Further, it stipulated that any merger of a central BESP support unit with BUSD would require at least 60 days advance approval from the contract officer.

BUSD remained in the driver's seat where phase-in was concerned; it sloughed off program rationalization as a threat to centralized BUSD discretion. BESP sites not well-advantaged strategically, being on the periphery of central BUSD's priorities and politics, had to bear the brunt of the tighter contract terms. They were pushed inexorably by diminished federal funding into narrower basic skills orientations. Yet, despite BUSD's parallel drift toward a basic skills orientation, there was no assurance given by the BUSD central administration or Board of Education that they would consider curtailed site objectives to be "optional" enough to merit phase-in. During the program's last two years, the troubling question of how to be unique, without help from those very budget categories which the NIE contract disallowed, haunted BESP sites which were not also BUSD "showcases."

The completion of BUSD-NIE contract negotiations in August 1974 marked the significant watershed in BESP history. Then began several developments that proceeded apace with each of the two subsequent year's slashes in federal monies: the shifting of all key budgetary and administrative decisions from BESP to BUSD and NIE/ESP; increased course and secretarial "loads" for site directors;

curricula turned more sharply toward basic skills instruction; and concentration on site survival strategies for post-BESP phase-in. These developments led by the end of the fourth year to a claim from directors that, for all practical purposes, their sites were "institutionalized," brought into the larger school system, by diminished funding. The directions of the last two years were seen by site directors as interrelated; these directions affirmed the indivisibility of the total school system. Directors more fully understood that BESP was but one program among many in the District, having no ultimate right to special consideration.

Federal program officers "made up" the local scenario as BESP unfolded. Changing federal officials, each with a separate and special interest, contributed to shifting emphases at the local level. An elusive conception of comprehensive change allowed broad scope to federal administrative discretion. Changing government regulations sent site staffs back to the drawing boards time and again, especially over their attempts to write acceptable plans for the second-half, contract phase of BESP. The choice presented BESP sites often seemed the best and worst of two evils: either take government funding and attached stipulations or fall back completely into the clutches of BUSD. Site personnel often believed that Washington was too remote to appreciate highly individualized experiences. They directly faced the multitudinous reality of everyday life, becoming aware through this exposure of the degree to which events in one site were too special to lend themselves to neat equation with those in another. Federal intervention was often interpreted at the site level to be unwarranted rationalization of project activities. However much the federal money-giver was seen as a disruptive irritant, BESP sites could not relinquish the knowledge that the BUSD bureaucracy would ultimately decide their fates. In the absence of BUSD effort to systematize the program, federal efforts to obtain phase-in criteria, cooperation among site directors, and student evaluation data were experienced by site staff as unreal "game-playing."

## 2. BUSD as a Management System: The Capacity to Innovate

BUSD capacity to "systematize" and "rationalize" BESP was always in doubt. Federal planning did not consider the organizational and technological ability of BUSD to absorb and install BESP efficiently. Since the forward-funding strategy was to award a fixed-term sum of money--a blanket award--it was not geared to BUSD capability to deal satisfactorily with well-defined stages of planning and implementation. The federal perspective entailed the assumption that the integrity of BESP would elicit integrity from the "receiving" BUSD system. While the local-planning strategy was meant to give scope to local formulation of substantive project

goals, the forward-funding strategy acted at cross purposes. That is, the latter strategy implied an external impingement on BUSD structures and services.\* Local determination stressed the need for BESP to be consonant with the vagaries of a distinctive BUSD culture; however, forward funding tended to assume the existence of a rational educational system eager to (and capable of) change. Forward funding was more sordidly dependent on local good will toward the federal purpose than was local planning. Once local and federal views about the proper use of ESP monies diverged, BESP had to be implanted in a school system lacking internal mechanisms for fiscal control and accountability and any special reason to reform because of BESP.

Many of the same BUSD management problems disclosed by annual audits of District budgets and accounting procedures also afflicted BESP. Unable to put adequate controls on a burgeoning educational program, BUSD imprinted on BESP its own shortcomings as a vessel and instrument of change.

Outmoded data processing techniques. From 1971/72 through 1974/75, BUSD audits reported that the BUSD computer system was too limited in capacity to digest the sheer volume of data necessary to keeping adequate records. Exacerbating this situation was the selection of BUSD as one of six California school districts to pilot test a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS), beginning July 1, 1969. According to the BUSD Audit Report for 1971/72, "When the complexities of maintaining both a standard accounting system as well as the PPBS system are considered, the task assigned to the present equipment becomes over-burdensome." As subsequent audits attested, many simple calculations concerning payroll distributions, student attendance, and many general accounting functions were performed manually, with an attendant loss of many person-hours from other administrative chores.\*\*

\* Berman and McLaughlin (September 1974) suggest that this impulse to effect system change from the outside is the heart of the implementation view of why federal programs fail: "We define implementation as the change process that occurs when an innovative project impinges on an organization." In this view, local systems are too obdurate to accommodate worthy externally recommended models, rather than federal programs misreading local conditions.

\*\* Throughout the BESP years, BUSD tried to combat systemic deficiencies by a large administrative staff. The 1975 League of Women Voters report stated, "By virtually any criterion Berkeley's school administrative staff is remarkably large." Utilizing the administrative categories developed in the State's School Accounting Manual, the League concluded that, among seven other districts of medium or larger size, BUSD stood out for its exceptionally high per-pupil costs in most administrative categories. The State of California agreed. In 1974/75, BUSD was assessed \$118,431 in fines because it exceeded the state requirement that school districts limit themselves to eight administrators per 100 classroom teachers. For the same offense, the 1975/76 BUSD budget projected another payment of \$127,000.

Data-processing inadequacies also manifested themselves through the "huge volume of transactions and dollars being processed through the revolving cash fund (RCF)" (Audit Report for 1971/72). In accordance with State Educational Code Section 21301, the RCF was supposed "to be used for small miscellaneous expenditures;" yet, in any one BESP year, hundreds of thousands of dollars were dispersed through the RCF because too much time elapsed in the payment of creditors, such as consultants, if other BUSD funds were used. The BUSD audit report for 1974/75 remarked: "During our review we noted that numerous disbursements (an estimated 20 percent of approximately 5,000 disbursements) were made from the RCF account for amounts greater than \$100" (the Education Code places a \$100 ceiling on disbursements from such accounts).

The audit reports suggest that the data-processing problem contaminated most every aspect of BUSD internal controls, loosening them to the verge of nonexistence. Not surprisingly, BESP records were affected. A federally required audit of BESP's initial 19 months concluded that the BUSD computer system "does not generate information for adequately allocating expenditures of the ESP programs between the District and the DHEW grant." The same audit found that BESP attendance figures at all but the off-site schools were lumped together with the figures from common schools, a procedure which made it impossible to relate costs to benefits or even to report accurately to federal ESP. Further, most of the consultants employed by ESP monies had been paid by checks drawn on the RCF which the federally prescribed audit declared to be "a violation of generally recognized principles of internal control."\*

Coupled with the "in-kind" support given by BUSD to sites (certificated teachers and health, guidance, and library services), the absence of fiscal control made it extremely difficult to ascertain if sites were getting a "fair share" of BUSD allotments, relative to other sites and common schools. For instance, ESP monies given to Odyssey were nearly one and a half times those of the next most expensive program (computed per student), yet this site served the seventh smallest BESP enrollment. Nobody could be sure, however, that such disproportionate ESP funding was

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\* This federal audit report, performed by a private firm chosen by NIE/ESP from among two bidders identified by BUSD, went on to say: "We found numerous instances of consultants submitting their invoices without their signature, or without the amount requested. In one instance, an invoice for \$1,500 was paid twice, on consecutive days. Often the director of an experimental school would prepare and submit the payment requests for his entire staff of consultants, and then personally pick up all the checks at the payroll window for distribution" (BESP audit by Elmer Fox and Company, April 26, 1973, p. 8).

actually needed to rectify BUSD imbalanced payments. Without evident standards for differential allotments, off-site schools felt especially threatened, since they began with less than the facilities of on-site and common schools. At "off-sites," fiscal fuzziness heightened tensions appreciably. Convinced there was no appeal to reason, off-site schools which had "intruded" into the BESP application process subscribed to the notion that "only squeaking wheels get greased." However, their displays of discontent before BUSD decision-makers reinforced their sense of renegade status in the District and further increased their misgivings about the even-handedness of BUSD allotments to sites.

Blurred lines of BUSD management responsibilities. Another conclusion shared by the yearly BUSD audits during the BESP years was that the BUSD Office of Business Services was overburdened by duties not properly its own, yet was too often neglected or missing when the expertise of the trained accountant was really needed. It did not, for example, serve as a watchdog over truly salient issues of fiscal responsibility: budget clearances and transfers; submission of budget proposals to outside agencies; administrative adherence to school board policies and directives; cross-training of personnel to relieve dependence on particular employees; the keeping of perpetual inventory records.

Defects in fiscal accounting and control were compounded by fuzziness and duplication in administrative operations. Two findings by independent agencies highlight the latter problems. The BESP audit report of April 26, 1973 noted:

There is a strong need in the District for a person reporting to the Superintendent who is able to identify weaknesses in interdepartmental communication and the absence of clearly established written lines of authority. At present District administrative manuals and codes are deficient in this area.

An evaluation of the total BUSD, including BESP, by Pacific Consultants (September, 1975) found:

A variety of centralized groups appear to be providing similar support services and these groups are organized at the central level by program rather than function. For example, Compensatory Education, Follow Through, ESP, and other programs are all trying to provide similar services to schools. In fact, they often address the same problems, have similar

objectives, and apply similar strategies. This results in a duplication of services from a District-wide perspective but also a confusion on the part of local school personnel as to whom to turn to for assistance.

Contemplating the fiscal and organizational maze, which is indicated in the above findings, one would have to have an extraordinary faith in the magical properties of money to suppose that ESP funds could somehow flow through that maze to best effect their "catalytic" purpose. This was hardly the sort of market that a reasonable buyer would choose in shopping for commitment.

Delayed filing of federal and state program claims and reports.

Although a hefty portion of the District's revenue is received from governmental sources, audits of BUSD revealed that during the BESP years claims for cost reimbursement and program reports were not being submitted on a timely basis to appropriate agencies. The audits continually served warning that carelessness was jeopardizing substantial amounts of interest revenue due to the delay in receiving cash from governmental sources. According to the audit for the 1974/75 school year, in some cases "reports were filed over six months late and some reports for the year ended June 30, 1975 have not yet been filed" (as of February 24, 1976). In addition, the BUSD-hired auditors noted that records and files related to governmental programs were not being kept in a systematic fashion, nor were they being reviewed by knowledgeable officials prior to submission. In the audit report for 1972/73 we find this recommendation:

...that the responsibility for maintaining files, preparation of reports, and claims be assigned to a cost accountant to insure compliance with guidelines and instructions.

Despite the lead time afforded the wrap-up of BESP by such warnings and recommendations, ISA interviews with the BESP central director and accountant at the program's end disclosed that BESP had underspent by some \$400,000 but that BUSD also held expenditure vouchers in about the same amount which had never been submitted to NIE/ESP for cost reimbursement. While the disposition of these two sums remains in limbo, they stand as vivid reminders of BESP's flawed funding logic. BESP was divided in two, since central BUSD held ultimate fiscal control locally while central BESP and sites were tagged with substantive program responsibilities. The filing of voucher claims belonged to central BUSD but the filing of reports on programmatic difficulties and progress belonged to central BESP. Casual attitudes if not chaotic

conditions in central BUSD inhibited the mending of this breach. It was hard for either central BUSD or BESP to know what was happening in each's respective camp, let alone to develop a genuine concern for what was happening. Ironically, not even the opening basis for BUSD-ESP accord--the ability to spend money--survived BESP.

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The above illustrations of BUSD fiscal and administrative unsoundness were presented because of their direct bearing on the functioning of BESP. Beyond them, however, lay the whole financial crisis of BUSD, which affected in far more subtle ways the attention and interest which BUSD could muster for BESP. Rather than attempt an analysis of the antecedents and manifestations of crisis, and of their implications for BUSD's handling of BESP, we shall conclude this sub-section with the District's crowning folly during BESP and the response it unleashed from a "blue-ribbon" panel asked to look into its significance.

Early in 1975, the BUSD Director of Business Services predicted that BUSD faced a budget deficit of \$2.6 million for 1975/76. Faced with this information, the Board began exploring cost-cutting strategies, and considered making cuts in programs, services, supplies, transfers of personnel, and reductions in substitute teachers and preparation-time personnel. One week later, the Board was advised that the predicted deficit to be balanced was up to \$3.2 million, and the Board considered further cutbacks in programs, supplies, and services. Then, on June 15, 1975, the Director of Business Services revealed that calculations of estimated income were in error and there would be an additional deficit of \$1.6 million. The Director resigned with an apology for the miscalculation in estimated income. (The Chief Accountant had also resigned three weeks earlier.)

Following the revelation of the large budget deficit and the resignation, the Board appointed a Citizens Fiscal Analysis and Review Committee to "...ascertain the present solvency of the BUSD...." The Committee's report to the Board contained these observations:

We have not and do not wish to appear to state that we have uncovered every example of poor management. Frankly, there are too many and the time was too short (p. 3).

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\* The Board was now faced with reducing a budget imbalance the Citizens Fiscal Analysis and Review Committee estimated to be nearly \$5.1 million in its report dated July 22, 1975 (p. 18).

...we believe the existing situation to be extremely serious and the direct product of egregiously bad business management practices within BUSD (p. 3).

\* \* \* \* \*

In blunt terms, BUSD is both technically bankrupt and in violation of state and county applicable laws and statutory codes (p. 16).

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...as difficult and alarming as the present financial situation is, the present low level of professional management practices is difficult to believe (p. 20).

### 3. The Absence of Commitment

The R&D strategy of forward funding proved itself unable to buy BUSD commitment. In an important sense, federal ESP was caught in the trap of its own strategy. Once having come to an initial understanding with centralized BUSD authorities, an agreement to which strictly BESP participants were neither party nor privy, federal ESP had no effective control over BUSD. Most reluctant to employ the one weapon in its arsenal that could conceivably hurt but not compel BUSD--the termination of ESP monies--federal ESP officials had only the local program itself upon which to vent their ire. And, in fact, central BESP and sites became the target of federal threats, real and implied. But these were threats that NIE/ESP hesitated to hurl any longer at the BUSD Superintendent.\* The federal hesitation thus bespoke a division within BESP, that between a centralized BUSD substantially impervious to federal retaliation and a BESP staff upon whom federal officials exercised their indignation. However, BESP staff were relatively more committed to BESP ideals than were BUSD administrators; moreover, they had precious little influence over project problems intrinsically connected to District problems. As a substitute object for prodding and scorn, BESP evaluators, directors, and the like, hardly sufficed. And ESP project officers in Washington knew it. Still, federal ESP

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\* In July 1975, for example, the federal project officer warned the BESP director that ESP monies would be withheld from sites that had compromised their alternative identities. Despite this federal message being sent to the BESP director, the federal threat to cut off fifth-year ESP funding was obliquely addressed to central BUSD which seemed prepared to submerge the alternativeness of Odyssey and Kilimanjaro.

only begrudgingly bestowed fiscal flexibility at the local project and site levels. The significant exceptions occurred at BESP's beginning when savings from aborted New Ark were redistributed among four off-site schools, and at the end when last-year rental fees were provided for Odyssey's classroom trailers.

But in BESP there was a friction between aiding sites and appeasing local critics, which the BUSD central administration and school board did very little to lessen. If forward funding was an unsuccessful bid for topmost loyalties and continuities, it was no more triumphant in enlisting the support of principals, counselors, and teachers at the common schools. The funding strategy required a boost from BUSD notables lest federal aid given to one BUSD segment alienate another. There was confusion in the common schools over the precise nature of the federal and BUSD commitments to BESP. Common school devotees understood well enough that BESP sites were to receive supplemental federal funds; however, the BESP proposal language was not later buttressed by strong demonstrations of BUSD faith and commitment. And federal ESP was not a sufficiently creditable witness when arguing on its own behalf.

Because authoritative spokesmen within the District did not come forth as vigorous champions of BESP, ESP funds tended to become seeds of discord, rather than sources of continuity and security for BESP sites. In its first semester at Berkeley High, BESP faced the rapidly circulating accusation that there was inequity in funding between BESP sites and the senior high school. As early as November 24, 1971, the Berkeley High PTA informed the BUSD central administration that the morale of teachers and students at the main school had deteriorated because of "inequitable distribution of ESP funds and lack of planning."\* Several BESP directors indicated to ISA observers their awareness of being resented by their common school contemporaries. An aura of resentment and suspicion was hardly conducive to District-wide commitment to BESP. Some BESP site directors sought to allay the resentment by sharing their ESP largesse with the common schools. That they felt impelled to resort to such an expedient also indicates the failure of BUSD to secure understanding and support of BESP among its constituents. It is reasonable to infer from such failure the absence of a deep commitment. In such circumstances, ESP funds could serve as an irritant rather than a catalyst.

Though the guarantee of forward funding was lost on most Berkeley citizens, the fact that ESP was a federal grant received greater attention. Local critics of federal grants to education

\* Berkeley Daily Gazette, February 1, 1972.

contended that these monies have special requirements necessitating the hiring of additional personnel in BUSD. Once hired, the critics said, the District is forced to continue these salaries when the grants are terminated, since a long-running program like BESP issues in newly tenured positions. Since a major portion of personnel hired to staff federal grant projects have come from minorities to operate programs for minorities, the Board of Education has been resistant to lay-offs because of the adverse effect on the District's affirmative action employment policy. The Board, since 1971, has generally followed a policy of making no staff cuts for budgetary reasons since the "last hired, first fired" formula would be disproportionately directed at recently hired minorities staffing federal grant programs.

The second BUSD Superintendent to oversee BESP symbolized what happened to BUSD commitment. True, he expressed the view that some genuinely alternative schools might make the vital difference for certain students who might otherwise perish emotionally and intellectually in the common schools. His commitment to this belief, he stated in a July 1975 ISA interview, was forged prior to his BUSD appointment and had not faltered during his first year in Berkeley. Nonetheless, subsequent public testimony from the second Superintendent suggests that individualized instruction and the breaking-up of large traditional schools into smaller sub-schools, not alternative schools per se, were ideas closer to the core of his educational philosophy. Both ideas did not strain his organizational view of educational leadership: they were compatible with his strong concurrent interest in resetting BUSD grade configurations. Neither had to be learned from BESP, despite the Superintendent's mild public protestations to the contrary. These ideas could as easily be derived from prior experience or other BUSD programs. In this vein, the Superintendent stated privately that BESP was but one of many worthwhile BUSD projects, and, on that account, the important phase-in comparison should be between BESP and other projects, rather than between individual BESP sites. BESP's value to an incoming, mid-program Superintendent was that its diffuseness permitted him to emphasize selectively those aspects which justified any administrative objective. Lacking extensive community support, and a consistent design, BESP was particularly incapable of putting inherent pressures of its own on a "new face in town." BESP, then, did not prevent the application of changing local administrators' preferences, any more than it did those of changing federal actors.

Juxtaposed to the federal claim for forward funding was one of the major claims for alternative public schools: they "enable communities to avoid having to decide between traditional and

innovative schools" (Watson, 1972). Despite forward funding, BESP also illuminated the dark side to this claim: the avoidance of many other critical choices. The same important questions constantly begged for answers, as when a joint BESP-BUSD Steering Committee in November 1972, and the Board of Education in May 1973, sought unsuccessfully to set firm BESP guidelines. On those two occasions the questions were the same: Were BESP goals also BUSD goals? What was the District-wide pattern of options to be? Did BUSD require a master plan for options? What criteria should be employed to determine if a true option did indeed exist? How could non-traditional and traditional, as well as on-site and off-site options, enjoy parity of financial support?

#### 4. Conclusions

Both BUSD and federal ESP proposed grand schemes for which their money and administrative capacity were inadequate. Washington had limited resources to allocate, while Berkeley had limited ability to spend, given federal requirements. Moreover, Berkeley was further limited in its capacity to spend most rationally by the glaring defects in its fiscal, accounting and administrative systems. Neither side took account of one another's limitations. Caught between prohibited federal expenditure categories and District economizing, BESP site development took a backseat to fiscal pressures on and priorities of BUSD and federal ESP. All site and project budget items required both BUSD and federal authorization. Yet federal R&D interest in evaluation and experimentalism and District interest in avoiding further financial embarrassment prevented sensitivity to the pressures and priorities felt by BESP staff and consumers.

Since BUSD negotiated over BESP support services with Washington and dispensed teachers to sites, BESP staffs felt they were left to choose largely between pencils and chalk, not between the real needs of alternative education. Additional budget requests were permitted to originate from sites, but in a program contained by tight BUSD and federal pursestrings, that amounted to the privilege of being turned down. After the advent of the NIE contract in 1973/74, less than one-third of BESP site directors stated that BUSD should have the primary influence over site budgets, whereas one-half of them stated that the primary fiscal allocation decisions were, in fact, made by BUSD. Although 70 percent of site directors said they should have the primary input, only 38 percent reported actually having it. Only one site director reported that parents shared in budgetary decision-making at his school. But, then, the only funds, BUSD or ESP, that allowed some flexibility were those for non-salaried items. The dichotomy in the perceptions of BESP site directors of what ought to be and what actually was indicates an inadequacy of the forward-funding strategy at the basic, operative level of the experimental project.

However, BESEP staffs tended to blame site difficulties on governmental stinginess and interference, not on the experimental nature of the R&D strategy which included BUSD as an ultimately irremovable "go-between." Even after contract negotiations in 1973/74, bad feelings toward federal ESP persisted. Each refusal from Washington, as in the case of the 1974/75 Savo Island proposal, was interpreted locally as being characteristic of historically strained relations between sites and government. Reduced funding for BESEP sites led on the one hand to the despairing site belief that there was little left to contend over, but, on the other, fueled abiding site suspicions. Locally, federal ESP was not known to possess a rationale for forward funding; it was seen to be renegeing on its own commitment. Clearly, the vaguely conceived idea of forward funding as a strategy carried with it connotations other than a staged reduction in federal expenditures.

## CHAPTER 8: EVALUATION AS AN EDUCATIONAL R&D STRATEGY

Of all four educational R&D strategies being "tested" in BESP, none was so illustrative of the structural flaw that haunted the entire project as was the evaluation strategy. If BESP had been viewed by the school district as an educational R&D project, then the dual evaluation plans would have been regarded as central to the "experiment." Instead evaluation, both internal (Formative--Level I) and external (Summative--Level II), was viewed by most local school officials as an extra requirement tied to the BESP grant. It was viewed at worst as a nuisance and at best, a supplemental service. Since the educational R&D definition never seeped down to site directors or teachers, the appearance and activities of two separate BESP "evaluation teams" created considerable confusion. This dual evaluation activity was further confounded by the discussion and eventual passage of California's Stull Act, which mandated "teacher evaluation." The general distrust of evaluation common to all institutions was heightened by the BESP failure to acknowledge the educational R&D definition of the project--hence the confusion and resistance to "evaluation" per se.

### 1. Overview of Three Evaluation Levels

We turn now to summarize the results of the three separate evaluation efforts inherent in NIE/ESP plans. Over five years of effort in BESP, Level I (the internal formative) evaluation group did not provide regular measurements of site progress, student achievement, or degree of system change. Level I underwent four distinct reorganizations and revampings and failed to achieve an organizationally feasible structure, existing marginally with unclear governance and poor administrative procedures. There were no "feedback" channels to either the sites or to the BESP administration. After three years of ineffectual and confused existence, Level I became a part of BUSD's R&D department, and merely elaborated on testing procedures already found to be invalid and incomplete with regards to the BESP sites. No formative research was ever utilized by BESP administrators for either policy or program development, such as adding to the decision-making process about phase-in or developing changes in the sites. No new or refined methods for evaluating educational programs were ever developed at the site level. In short, the formative purpose of BESP's internal evaluation was never achieved.

The summative evaluation team (Level II) was under independent contract to NIE and was charged with evaluating the overall value and progress of the project. It underwent two major changes of staff and direction. The first Level II evaluators (DEEPS) responded to OE/ESP's RFP with a broad statement of purpose, placing summative evaluation within a historical-contextual methodology, with no specific evaluation "plan" displayed in advance. After 20 months, the relationship between the Level II team and ESP (now part of NIE) was terminated, with the resignation of the DEEPS Director. Only one report, a history of BUSD's integration effort during the 1960's (Never a Dull Moment by Carol Sibley), was produced during these first 20 months.

Level II came under criticism from NIE/ESP, culminating in an outside site visit when none of four submitted research plans was deemed acceptable by NIE. The DEEPS Director resigned and the Institute for Scientific Analysis phased out the first grant with two reports: (1) A Study of the Choice Structure of BESP, July 1973, and (2) A Retrospective Description of BUSD/BESP From Its Inception Through June 1973, September 1973.

ISA won a new contract in a competitive response to an NIE/ESP RFP issued in May 1973 that focused on three questions:

1. Has BESP led to diversity in the range of educational options within BUSD?
2. Has BESP been associated with change in dropout rates, truancy, vandalism; in racial-economic-academic mix for students (and, in the ethnic category, for staff); in parent/community participation in school program and policies; in new and/or changes in policies, practices and perceptions of school staff; in staff and fund allocation policies; in the focus and nature of leadership?
3. Has BESP brought about change in the quality of education?

To address these questions ISA used two major methodologies: (1) field method, and (2) longitudinal survey of a selected sample of BESP/common school students. Yearly reports covering the findings for the third and fourth years were produced.

There was dissension between NIE/ESP and ISA staff over the scope, direction, and interpretation of the findings from the two reports. For the final summative report, ISA asked to enlarge the fifth year evaluation report to include a larger perspective than the original three contract questions. This larger perspective enabled the summative research team to do more than study just the implementation of BESP, and allowed an evaluation of BESP as an example of educational R&D strategies.

None of the Level II evaluation reports was distributed to the public, although copies of reports covering the third and fourth years were given by ISA (with NIE's permission) to the BUSD Superintendent and school board. One "feedback session" with all interested BUSD/BESP personnel was sponsored by ISA.

The third level of evaluation proposed by NIE/ESP's evaluation strategy--one which would compare and contrast all ESP efforts--never came into being. Although an RFP for a Level III evaluation was issued, it was later cancelled and no overall evaluation of ESP was ever made across the eight different Experimental School projects in various geographic areas. No common data base was ever established, and no overall assessment of the various NIE/ESP projects has yet been made.

Having briefly summarized the results of the evaluation strategy in BESP, we now turn to discuss the possible explanation for such outcomes.

Most educational evaluation projects have been seriously under-funded: often less than 1 percent of the total program costs is allotted for program evaluation. The evaluation component of BESP was richly funded, built into the local program and set a precedent of hope and expectation that, at long last, an educational effort would be fully and adequately evaluated. This strategy of complete and "richly funded" evaluation was inherent in the methodology of educational R&D. During the five years of BESP, the Level I evaluation component was allotted 11 percent of the total program budget. Level II, under contract to NIE/ESP for this summative evaluation, spent \$846,413.\* While these appear to be richly funded evaluation efforts, the products are less than satisfactory.

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\* The contract with ISA took effect June 30, 1973. Prior to this date, \$683,694 was spent by DEEPS as the Level II evaluator. Thus, the total spent for Level II over the five years of BESP was \$1,530,107.


Why was so much spent for so little? What should it cost to conduct a "good evaluation" of an educational R&D experiment? We argue that given the structure of BESP, either too much was spent for evaluation--or too little. If the BESP were not set up as an R&D effort, then the task of program evaluation could conceivably have been assigned to a few "evaluators" who could have worked with BUSD's office of Research and Evaluation. Such costs would have been minimal and perhaps routine test scores ("background data") could have been made available for each option site, as a function of the regular BUSD test and evaluation program.

Suppose BESP had been designed as an R&D effort, then the research component would have designed the experiment, run the experiment, and conducted the evaluation as an integral part of the experiment, retesting, etc. Then the cost of the "evaluation" would have been the total cost of BESP. As previously noted, this R&D model could not be carried out, given the present federal-local school arrangements, i.e., no local school district would willingly hand itself over as a research site for a federal experiment.

We wish to raise two major issues about the faults within BESP's evaluation: (1) the structure of BESP as an educational R&D effort, and (2) the state of the art of educational evaluation as a research component of an R&D effort. The widespread confusion about these two major issues created conflict and communication breakdowns at all three levels of operations: federal ESP, BESP, and the consumers (students and parents).

Let us first examine the structure of BESP as a research and development effort. How could the federal agency expect any local school district to participate willingly in a federal R&D experiment to create "comprehensive change" in that school district? The answer was to develop the technique of the federal agency "buying into" school districts where "change" was welcomed and already under way, and where R&D as the means would meet the ends of both the federal Experimental Schools Program and of the local school district. The collaborating arrangement would be derived from operationalizing a model shown in Figure 1.

FIGURE 1: ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL FOR FEDERAL-LOCAL EDUCATIONAL R&D: EVALUATION COMPONENTS



The federal program (as previously mentioned) planned to gain R&D sites by inviting school districts that were already involved in some type of "change" or "innovation" to apply for a relatively large sum of grant funds over a projected five-year period. Both of these strategies for enticing a local school to permit itself to be used as a research site (the money and the five-year forward funding) built upon a district's commitment to "change." These were bold and innovative attempts by a federal agency to develop an R&D experiment within a local school base. In addition, local school district commitment to the R&D effort was to be further strengthened by allowing (requiring) the local district to develop its own "plan." Thus, this apparent dichotomy: Research was the master; the Development (i.e., local plan) was funded as the object of Research (i.e., evaluation). One part of the evaluation (Level I) was also part of the Development, i.e., it was to be the internal monitor and self-correcting mechanism of the Development aspect of the educational R&D project. Level I was to be the dynamic that aided the "change process" as it proceeded over time, i.e., it would do the formative evaluation. Level II would, independently, assess the goal-attainment of the experiment, i.e., conduct summative evaluation. As will be shown, these conceptual distinctions became fuzzy, faltered and collapsed at various times throughout the five BESP years.

The theoretical R&D model was to solve that difficult territorial problem of who "owns the schools." There would be collaboration between the federal ESP and the local school district, i.e., a "new partnership." Then the summative evaluation would provide the overall research data on that particular local project, completing the R&D model.

But how clear was this model in the minds of the three major participants? For example, evaluation was listed as only one of six selection criteria by ESP, the local school district did not view BESP as a federal "experiment," and the parents and students viewed the new sites as extensions of the public schools. Such diverse views would cast a long shadow on the fate of the overall project.\*

Level I, the local evaluation component, had great difficulty defining its role, responsibilities, and chain of command. It was never accorded full access to BESP sites, nor did it offer any meaningful progress measurement or feedback into site development, maintenance, or demise. It had no clear communication channel or power to change the local sites.

Very early on, the failure of the local evaluation effort to function as the R&D model would require became a matter of concern to the federal Project Officer, who tried again and again to clarify the expectations for local evaluation in BESP. The combined pressures of federal needs and local site resistance, plus the basic role confusion about "formative evaluation," incapacitated the effort from its very inception.

Level II, the federal ESP independent contractor, was equally confused about its role, and about the whole methodology involved in "summative evaluation." The Director of the DEEPS Level II team described his views as to why the Level II contract had been given to him, as follows:

...everybody wondered why we [Leonard Duhl, M.D., Human Interaction Research Institutes] got the grant. There were some groups already perceiving us as, "Ah, you must have an 'in' with somebody," and "You really must represent somebody." Well, if you know the history of some of the cast and characters, you know we didn't attempt to represent just ourselves or the establishment. Jack Seeley, for instance, has a history of being a "guru" of the free speech movement. Steve Blum has

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\* To this "definitional" misunderstanding must be added the inherently negative attitude and resistance by any institutional client to "evaluation." This structural resistance has been noted by all evaluation scholars, and in this project the resistance to evaluation per se became even more crucial given the ambiguous nature of the R&D objectives.

worked with Upward Bound. I [Leonard Duhl, M.D.] had a lot of experience working with all kinds of deviant groups; in fact, my previous history before coming to Berkeley was being in government, but operating with various deviant groups. (BESP Level I Results, General Report, 1976, p. 124.)

Dr. Duhl's description of what he apparently regarded as positive qualifications for Level II evaluators leads us to the second major issue which led to the general failure of the evaluation portion of BESP, i.e., the state of the art in educational R&D. What is evaluation? Who is qualified to do it?

The dual-level formative-summative evaluation plan was the product of such scholars as Michael Scriven (1967) who proposed a distinction between the roles and goals of two types of evaluation, calling one formative and the other summative. Scriven, a UC Berkeley philosophy professor, was a consultant to the federal educational planners, and played an important role in shaping formative and summative models for many types of educational evaluation projects. (A recent ERIC print-out on evaluation in educational innovations yielded 75 pages of print-outs of formative and summative evaluation abstracts.) Scriven, in his important piece, "The Methodology of Evaluation" (1967), stated: "Evaluation proper must include, as an equal partner with the measuring of performance against goals, procedures for the evaluation of goals" (p. 127). It is in the area of this called-for partnership that one of the major roadblocks occurred in BESP evaluation. The federal model called for Level I (formative evaluation) to be an integral part of BESP, totally separate from the Level II (summative evaluation), which was given to an outside contractor with NIE/ESP. In fact, in the first years of BESP, Level II was expressly forbidden to have any feedback or contact with Level I evaluation.\*


Thus, an artificial chasm was structurally present between the two evaluation efforts, and between Level II and the entire BUSD/BESP. Level II was clearly the "eye in the sky," the

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\* For example, that portion of the ISA work plan (1973) in response to NIE/ESP's RFP, which called for community and school feedback, was deleted during contract negotiations. The rationale was that input from the summative evaluation might change the "natural process of the experiment," based on the strict interpretation of the canons of the experimental method of science.



2.5



NIE/ESP evaluator on the Berkeley scene, while Level I became neither fish nor fowl, with unclear lines of authority, accountability, and communication within BESP. No common operational definitions between Level I and Level II for "measurement" or "testing" or "evaluation" ever emerged. Thus, while there was no partnership, neither was there any competition or checks or balances, since each evaluation effort played to its own audience. In this respect, the Level II effort was somewhat more directed (at least during the last 36 months) than was the case for Level I, which never forged a clear mandate in the rapidly evolving political ambivalence of BUSD/BESP. Two directors of Level I and one co-director of Level II were consumed by the double-level pressures before BESP reached its midway point.

Some of the difficulty experienced by both Level I and Level II was inherent in the problems of defining the rare species of "professional evaluator." Scriven evidenced great concern about the paucity of professional evaluators, stating "there are very few professionally competent evaluators in the country today...they or someone else need to know the answers to the important questions, whether process or outcome, they need skills and resources which are conspicuous by their rarity even at the national level" (p. 128, emphasis his).

But Scriven does not define the skills or the resources or the competency of a "professional evaluator." Given this, it is small wonder that "evaluators" are so rare, so burdened, or so confused.

For example, BESP tried to meet one of its major goals, i.e., of decreasing institutional racism, by hiring minority professionals in as many positions as possible. Level I evaluators were hired first on the basis of minority membership and second on the basis of possessing some type of professional degree.

The Federal ESP guidelines for "professional evaluators" were more traditional, i.e., "key personnel were to have advanced professional degrees, and/or evaluation experience." These criteria were loose enough to include as Level II "evaluators" a psychiatrist and a writer. In Dr. Duhl's own description of the Level II evaluators' qualifications, he lists those who were experienced in "working with deviancy," and makes no mention of evaluation expertise--whatever that might be. The Level II co-director, Jack Seeley, did not have a professional degree, but was characterized by Dr. Duhl as "the guru of the free speech movement." Dr. Duhl said his own qualification was "having a

lot of experience working with all kinds of deviant groups." Later, Level II hired a Black graduate student to satisfy local pressure for minority staff, given BESP's major goal to attack "institutional racism." None of the three Level II "co-directors" had ever managed a large and complex summative evaluation, and despite their hopes to develop a new social-historical evaluation methodology, they came, after 20 months, to despair of the effort, given conflicting goals of NIE/ESP and BESP pressures and problems. DEEPS attempted to become "advocates" and documentors of the process--but could not meet the challenge of definitions of "reliability" and "validity" called for by NIE/ESP in asking for a research plan.

The second Level II contractors (ISA) employed a "professional evaluator," i.e., a director who had, in fact, completed a number of program evaluation studies, and a multi-ethnic staff with a variety of research evaluation and computer analysis backgrounds. Were these staff expert in summative evaluation? What skills would be required to conduct a "professional evaluation"? The state of the art in educational evaluation is such that the skills and competence of evaluators or the scope and validity of the evaluation effort have not been defined. We assert that this obscurity has created many of the problems of evaluation as an R&D strategy.

Let us now turn to the history of Level I and Level II to trace the effect of the two structural deficits mentioned above, i.e., the structure of BESP as an R&D project and the state of the art in educational evaluation.

The Director of NIE/ESP defined formative evaluation as follows: "Formative evaluation provides for a legitimate internalized role of evaluation, and can be tailored specifically to an individual project and its goals. It should provide for quick feedback and enhance resident and staff participation. It is designed to aid in meeting objectives and improving performance" (Memo of Robert Binswanger to J. Kent, Minneapolis ESP, April 12, 1974).

## 2. Documentation and History of Level I (Formative Evaluation)

Level I was established as a part of BESP, to provide "quick feedback and enhance participation." In 1971 the initial proposal for internal evaluation was detailed in the original BESP plan. The procedure as originally envisioned was to utilize a field observation system developed by the Horace Mann-Lincoln Institute of Teachers' College, Columbia University. As this

was a new system, unfamiliar to the Berkeley personnel who would eventually be involved in the evaluation effort, the actual evaluation plan was at this stage quite general. Data gathered both by on-site observation and by structured and unstructured interviewing would be analyzed in terms of their impact on the goals of the individual sites (which were to be determined later on in discussions with site directors and the Level I evaluation consultants), and on BESP's overall stated goals. In the original plan it was visualized that the data collected would take the form of standardized tests to measure student achievement, and interviews on the following general areas: program structure, program content, contribution of program structure and content to outcomes, participant evaluation and response to the program, and observational data on program operation. After an evaluation component was organized, underwent training seminars, and had a certain amount of field experience, it would then be possible to submit a revised and more specific evaluation plan.

By the middle of BESP's first semester Level I had hired a staff of observers, and had articulated what the Level I staff felt to be the general goals of the component. However, it was felt at that time that any gathering of data, or more specific enunciation of goals, would have to wait until after the interviewing staff was trained in the field observation system. This training session was scheduled for January 1972, six months after the start-up of the evaluation component. The reason for this delay is unclear. After this training period the Level I staff felt that data collection, observation and conceptualization of variables could begin, i.e., after the new staff had been "trained" in the field methodology.

By January 1972, Level I encountered pressure from OE/ESP as to the progress and style of its activities. In a memo dated January 26, 1972, the federal project officer for BESP expressed concern to the BESP director that, as of that date, neither a concrete set of goals nor baseline data with which to begin evaluation had been forthcoming, or, for that matter were even in the making. The project officer noted that no ground had been gained, although the project had been in operation for six months. This discrepancy between federal expectations and local performance indicates a fundamental misunderstanding between OE and the BESP evaluation team from the onset of the project.

At the same time the evaluation effort was running into opposition from another quarter: the personnel of the sites. In the project progress report dated March 17, 1972, the director of the project remarked that "it was decided to document rather than evaluate" (emphasis added); this decision was reached, according to the project director, because of intense resistance to the

evaluation effort encountered by the observation team on first observations of the sites. He remarked that the site personnel looked upon the evaluation effort as an attempt at direct surveillance of their work on the part of both the school district and OE. Although this progress report also indicates that "good will visits" were used in an attempt to break down resistance and familiarize personnel with the true intent of the evaluation (i.e., an assessment of the ongoing program rather than of their performance and status as personnel), the blanket statement that the observers would "document rather than evaluate" seems to indicate the abandonment of one of the fundamental tasks of Level I--feedback--at the very beginning of the project. According to the Coordinator of ESP Evaluation, Berkeley, this morale problem was intimately connected with the ambiguous nature of relations with OE in this early period. He wrote in the Alternative Evaluation Report:

Initially the site directors, teachers and students were quite receptive to our attendance at their project. This, however, soon changed because our instructions from the associate director of Evaluation stipulated that we were to be non-participant observers, meaning we were to sit in on staff meetings, visit the site and classrooms in an unobtrusive manner. We were instructed to visit the sites, observe what went on, take notes about the process and the physical description of the sites but were not to engage in a verbal exchange with the site people. This behavior soon caused the site personnel to begin viewing us with reserve and suspicion ....Since we were instructed or ordered to operate in silence, the teachers and site directors naturally assumed that notes we were taking were going to be utilized in the process of teacher evaluation....I am relatively sure that a great part of the reason the Evaluation observers were required to function as such was due to the fact that ESP had not had an evaluation plan formally accepted. This was a fact that was known by all...ESP project observers. The lack of an accepted plan put us in the situation where we were prevented from involving ourselves closely with the Project. If, for instance, we began a process of looking at certain variables and the site people began to expend great amounts of effort and time in order to provide us with the data, we ran a real chance of making groups of frustrated evaluation resistant enemies.

Strains resulting from conflict between various institutions involved in the evaluation eventuated in the rest of the 1971/72 school year being taken up with negotiations between Level I and OE on the final form of the evaluation plan, which was finally approved on June 1972. This plan, which spelled out in detail the variables and measurements to be used, had undergone several revisions before OE deemed it acceptable. For example, on January 5, 1972, the federal ESP Project Officer wrote:

What does each option really offer? What options are not included in the program that should be? How clearly do the teachers recognize their response as part of the option? What about the financing of options? Problems of articulation?

As this memo to BESP indicates, the federal Project Officer six months after the start of the Level I evaluation effort was raising critical evaluation issues--albeit issues which could be viewed as both formative and summative in nature.

Again in April 1972, the federal Project Officer wrote to all site directors a definition of the role of Level I, evidently in an effort to ease site resistance to evaluation:

The job of Level I is to keep a tight and well documented record of what is happening: to document each student's individual growth.... Sufficient funds were provided for a Level I evaluation team to handle all local evaluation and documentation needs. Each site has a host of assumptions which need strict evaluating.... ESP deals with comprehensive change designs-- it is a research program, hence the heavy emphasis (in funding as well as design) on evaluation and documentation.

This memo from the federal Project Officer to BESP site directors reveals a lack of consensus about the structure of BESP as an educational R&D experiment and about the role of Level I evaluation.

After Level I's first uncertain and unproductive year of operation, the Research Director was dismissed, due to both federal and BUSD concern about the progress of Level I's effort. In the interim period, when the Level I effort drifted leaderless, the federal ESP Director and Project Officer called a meeting of all BESP site directors in Washington in an attempt to get a stronger BESP presence in BUSD. One of the agenda items at that meeting was to urge each site director to select one or two major

innovations," "promising practices" or some aspect of the individual site's program that they (the site directors) would choose to be evaluated by Level I. The federal view was that such a local site-based evaluation issue would activate the latent forces of formative evaluation, and would lead each site to operationally define its goals, its "difference," its potential for public education. No Level I staff member was present at that meeting nor did the federal ESP Director clarify this request in writing.

As a result of this federal "pressure," two local views about Level I's role appeared to emerge: that Level I "belonged to the local sites" and could be called upon to work directly for each site, and conversely, that the functions and funds assigned for formative evaluation could be divided up and assigned to each BESP site, which would do its own program evaluation.

These two definitions became an arena for considerable conflict in the subsequent relationship between Level I and BESP sites. (The federal Project Officer later tried to clarify the individual site-evaluation misunderstanding in a memo, as pressure for Level I funds reached its pinnacle.)

Later, BUSD hired a second Level I Director who had to meet the approval of the federal ESP office, as a "key personnel" issue. The criteria for selection of a director of formative evaluation remained unclear, and a newly-degreed psychologist with no educational evaluation experience was hired. He entered a situation already embattled, and never managed to resolve the major conflicts. Level I took a defensive position, and became increasingly isolated and embattled throughout the two years, until the second director was also forced to resign, having failed to provide adequate "baseline evaluations."

The federal Project Officer revealed that at NIE/ESP there was considerable role confusion as to whose responsibility it was to monitor and assist Level I. The local lines of authority and responsibility between BESP, the sites and BUSD were blurred. The Level I Director reported to the School Superintendent on rare occasions, by-passing the BESP Director. The federal ESP officials were often at odds over who was responsible for Level I. This confusing uncertainty created an atmosphere of distrust and defensiveness. Level I staff retreated to existing secondary data bases for information and produced very little--and certainly did not function during those years as a "change agent" or as a "formative evaluation" team.

As of the end of the 1971/72 school year, the first year of the project, Level I had compiled baseline biographical data and census information on BESP's student and staff populations. An

attitude inventory was taken among both students and parents in an attempt to find out why students entered BESP, with an eye toward a formulation of site and BESP goals from the students' and parents' points of view. However, these instruments were not administered until the last week of the school year; therefore they provided only retrospective data, since the respondents' viewpoints were colored by a year's experience with BESP. These instruments did not measure growth, since they were the first measurements of any kind to be applied to this population by Level I.

Again, in July 1972, the federal Project Officer wrote, "Since our entire focus is on research [emphasis ours] we are deeply interested in how the work is being documented and evaluated." Again the lack of clarity and consensus about the structure of the project as understood by federal and local agencies is evident.

The 1972/73 school year began with several personnel changes in the Level I staff, including replacement of the associate director for BESP evaluation. This change in staff helped to disrupt further the effort to define goals and collect data begun so shakily the year before.

During 1972/73 two studies were conducted, both secondary analyses of data collected in the previous year: (1) a "Site Uniqueness Scale," constructed by matched pair ratings of observational site data by the evaluation staff, and (2) "Student-Parent Choice Satisfaction Scale," formed by factor analysis of the open-ended attitude survey of BESP students and their parents at the end of the previous school year.

Also, the component developed several assessment instruments for in-class use: a Cumulative Progress Chart, a Behavioral Checklist for measuring changes in disruptive behavior, and a Site Homogeneity/Heterogeneity Survey, for measuring the racial breakdown of each site.

On December 8, 1972, the federal Project Officer wrote to the BESP Director, seeking again to clarify the educational R&D structure of BESP. We quote:

ESP is testing comprehensive change in Berkeley. This means that you must be sure your plans include such variables as teacher training, curriculum development, articulation among alternatives, community involvement, evaluation as part of the decision-making process and new thrusts in administration and management. What ESP monies should be used for are special catalytic change costs. Train-

ing, staff development, building of community involvement processes, design of evaluation procedures, development of new assessment measures, etc., are all the types of areas which should receive heavy funding during the lifetime of the project to insure that the changes brought about are lasting and self-renewing.

Again, the federal definition is restated, and again the BESP did not seem to be able to form consensual definitions.

This second year of the program found Level I staff still coping with the perennial problem of eliciting operationalizable statements of goals from site personnel. The stress laid upon this task in the proposal for the second phase of BESP, written in April 1973, shows both the critical nature of the effort, and the degree to which Level I had theretofore failed to achieve it.

Finally, the 1972/73 school year was noteworthy as the year of the Off-site Testing Moratorium. The administration of standardized tests to the alternative schools was a problem that plagued BESP from its inception. The pre-existing off-site schools, which came under BESP auspices at the start of the program, were ideologically opposed to administering the tests, and, prior to BESP, were not required to do so. However, with federal funding and the stipulations of the ESP grant, pressure was put on the off-site schools to test, a pressure which they resisted for the first year of the project. At the end of this period, a compromise was worked out: the requirement that these schools administer standardized tests would be suspended for one year, during which time each of them (aided by Level I) would develop tests acceptable to them and NIE. At the end of this period, the schools would either resume testing with some acceptable instrument, or be dropped from the program. Unfortunately, 1972/73 went by without sufficient work on this problem, either on the part of Level I or the sites themselves. As a result, at the end of the 1972/73 school year, the off-sites were required to begin testing their students, with an instrument not substantially different from the District-used tests.

During July 1973, the BESP Director wrote to the Level I Director as follows:

Level I should work out with BESP and BUSD a detailed plan for internal evaluation geared to supplying decision-making data to the pro-

ject.\* I cannot stress enough how important I feel it is to focus Level I activities as soon as possible on project-related direct service evaluation activities....Level I could develop some ways of looking at institutional racism and issue regular quarterly reports on progress in this area.

Here a local goal (elimination of institutional racism) was specifically mentioned as one of the foci of Level I evaluation, as well as service-related evaluation effort--even though the BESP was already one-half completed, and no "baseline" or "evaluative" reports had been issued for "decision-making use." But as Cohen and Garet have pointed out (1975) the relationship between research and decision-making is by no means a linear one. They state:

The relationship between research and policy in education is often relatively undisciplined, evident in a loose and elusive interaction among applied research, climate of knowledge and belief, and public action.

Thus, the poor interaction relations between the federal ESP, Level I, and BUSD/BESP was creating a climate where little or no positive feedback could occur.

Year three of the project (1973/74) was the first year of Phase 2 of BESP, under a contract plan submitted to NIE in April 1973. In it, Level I proposed the following data collections and analyses:

1. Analysis of standardized test scores, within and across sites, cross-sectionally and longitudinally, and in terms of the staff and student profiles of each site.
2. Analysis of longitudinal changes in the Behavioral Affect check list.
3. A Site Efficacy Study, a replication of the earlier parent/student choice survey, using the 11 categories derived from the original open-ended responses.

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\* By identifying evaluative research as a decision-making tool, the BESP Director was following the commonly-held assumptions, such as stated by Stufflebeam (1971) who said, "Evaluation is the process of delineating, obtaining and providing useful information for judging decision alternatives." This simple linear relationship between evaluation and decision-making is much too narrow and mechanistic, given the socio-political climates of educational systems.

4. A Training Needs Assessment.
5. A field study of truants in Provo Park.
6. A study of parent knowledge in terms of the articulation plan.
7. A Student General Opinion Survey.

However, at the outset of this plan period, it quickly became evident that the proponents of this plan had outreached themselves. In a memorandum to the director of BESP, the director of Level I listed several reasons for the inability of Level I to fulfill the design already agreed upon: (1) NIE had reduced Level I's budget request by 50 percent--this was deemed too low an amount to fulfill the plan. (2) Level I had anticipated using Level II as a source of baseline data for the BESP student population.\* It was only discovered post hoc that Level II had not yet planned the kind of data collection that would have facilitated the Level I effort. (3) District records of baseline data were either badly compiled or unavailable. Therefore, the memorandum went on, no hard data at all would be collected by the Level I staff, which would restrict its effort to the design of instruments and collection of attitudinal survey data. Thus, an important part of the second phase plan was already nullified by Level I less than six months after it was negotiated.

Als , an internal memo circulated in Level I at about the same time mentioned once again the necessity of concretizing site goals. That this should continue to be an issue three years after the inception of the project, shows the degree to which Level I had failed its central responsibility.

A meeting of Level I staff with the director of BESP three months later articulated four basic problems of the component: (1) poor organization--the component relied on crisis management; (2) Level I was not following the second phase plan; (3) an ambiguous relationship (tinged with hostility) persisted between Level I and the sites; and (4) the Level I personnel were basically untrained in the research techniques to do their jobs properly.

One outcome of this meeting was a memo in December 1973 from the BESP director to the director of evaluation, expressing displeasure with Level I's lack of productivity and foreshadowing a massive reorganization that was to follow in six months.

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\* This anticipation of conjoint use of Level II data by Level I had grown out of a stormy session between NIE/ESP and the Level I Director--a discussion which never involved Level II.

Of the seven studies proposed in the Phase 2 plan, three were completed: an analysis of standardized test scores (although not of the broad scope originally envisioned), the Site Efficacy Study, and the Student General Opinion Survey. Additionally, the component attempted to approximate student SES by using as a measure parental occupation, and compiled a racial breakdown of site populations.

By May 1974 the ominous tone of the BESP director's December memo bore fruit: the entire Level I staff was terminated; the component itself was radically restructured and reduced in scope. The federal Project Officer wrote: "An essential link in the overall project apparently has not been forged."

During the period, April 1 - June 30, 1974, BESP revised and updated the Five Year Educational Plan (negotiated in June, 1973, with NIE/ESP). The Proposed Operational Plan for the final 24 months of BESP was submitted to NIE/ESP August 4, 1974, for approval. The plan had been revised twice: June 24, 1974, and July 30, 1974. Both revised plans did not receive approval from NIE/ESP. Included in the Operational Plan for the final 24 months was a proposal for reorganizing and restructuring the Evaluation Component (Level I) of BESP.

In its Quarterly Progress Report of April 1 to June 30, 1974, BESP requested clarification from NIE/ESP on the funding of Level I. It claimed:

The first 'Proposed Operational Plan' of June 24, 1974, specified ten evaluation personnel plus two clerical assistants. The revised plan due in Washington, D.C. by August 4, 1974, prepared under the aegis of the new BUSD Superintendent, specified four evaluation personnel and no clerical assistants under the direction of BUSD's Research and Evaluation Component....The reduction of staff was in response to oral information that ESP Washington would only approve funding for three or four Level I personnel. No reason has been given...[for] such an arbitrary and limiting decision.

In the July 30, 1974, revision of the Proposed Operational Plan for BESP (for the period July 1, 1974, through June 30, 1976),

...the proposal to reorganize [Level I] was made on the basis of the general dissatisfaction of site directors, the director of the project, the District administration, and the Washington office of NIE.

This was the second time the Level I Evaluation Component had undergone major reorganization. The July 30, 1974, proposal stated:

The remaining evaluation effort, supported by BESP funds [will] be divided into two parts: a formative aspect lasting 24 months, and a summative aspect covering the initial 3-1/2 years with work done during September, 1974, through January, 1975.

In that report, both formative and summative evaluation types were defined.

Formative evaluation was defined by BESP Administration and Level I as:

...information collected and used to modify ongoing structural activities. Such information is usually quite specific and is used to make overall decisions regarding the relative merits of the program. It will be developed for improvement of particular instructional programs on an ongoing basis.

Summative evaluation was defined as:

...that evaluation used for the comparison of alternative programs on the basis of their overall effectiveness to the total system.

Thus, BESP Level I was to do both formative and summative evaluation.

This revised plan, submitted to NIE/ESP on August 4, 1974, was not approved, primarily because NIE/ESP felt the plan was too broad. With that, BESP Administration solicited outside help. Charles E. Woodson, Ph.D., from the University of California School of Education, was hired as a consultant to assist in the rewriting of the July 1, 1974, through June 30, 1976, B. P. Operational Plan that was eventually submitted in December, 1974, to NIE/ESP. This plan was finally approved in January 1975.\* In that plan, Level I was "to develop a simple design to provide evaluative data from which recommendations and decisions" could be made by the BESP Director "regarding the continuances of the individual programs within BESP."

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\* In fact Level I and BESP spent \$93,754 on evaluative consultant fees--truly a large sum for such consultation for a fully-staffed evaluation project!

The Level I Evaluation Team was reduced from 15 members in 1973/74 to five in 1974/75. Two of the 15 staff members were kept on, two additional professional evaluators and a secretary were hired. The reorganization of the evaluation component was completed in September 1974 and it was placed under the direct supervision of the BUSD Director of Research and Evaluation.

By the time the first quarterly report of 1975 came out (January 1 to March 31), Level I defined its aim as,

...to furnish summative data for the four priority areas: (1) standard achievement, (2) criterion referenced tests, (3) survey of satisfaction, and (4) fiscal analysis.

Information was to be site-specific as well as project-wide. The major aim of Level I's efforts was "to investigate whether or not there were differences between BESP and non-BESP programs."\* The information was to provide assistance to the BESP Administration concerning the survival of the entire project. (Before Level I was reorganized, major changes had occurred in BESP sites. Agora and Genesis were scheduled to merge effective Fall 1974; U.N. West, KARE, and Willard Alternative were scheduled for phase-out effective Fall 1974; Casa de la Raza and Black House were phased out in Spring 1975 for violation of OCR regulations; and the West Campus alternatives--Career Exploration, Yoga/Reading (HILC), Work/Study, and HUI--were scheduled for placement under one director and budget effective Fall 1974.)

The areas of highest priority, developed by Level I (approved in January 1975 by NIE/ESP), were in order: (1) Examine data on BUSD and state-mandated achievement tests in reading and math for grades 10-12 and language arts for grades 4-12, administered in the Fall 1974 semester and Spring 1975 semester.\*\* Two major areas were emphasized: (a) descriptive data on currently enrolled students and (b) longitudinal data on individual students. (2) Collect and examine semi-locally developed criterion-referenced tests. (3) Survey satisfaction on the part of students, parents and staff in BESP and non-BESP schools. (4) Collect other data useful for the decision-making purposes of the BESP director available from BUSD sources and developed by sites, including fiscal operation and staff utilization. (5) Examine attendance patterns of BESP and non-BESP students for differences. (6) Examine evidence of cultural pluralism within BESP.

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\* Note the similarity with Level II's 1973 SAC contract in terms of aims of evaluation.

\*\* These standard achievement test scores were very limited data indeed. We have elsewhere criticized the ability to use such data for this type of analysis.

During the 1974/75 school year, Level I summarized the results of data concerning priorities 1, 3 and 4 above. With respect to standard achievement analysis, data were collected in Spring 1973 and Spring 1974 on BESP and non-BESP students from district-wide testing programs: the Cooperative Primary Tests (grades 2-3), Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills (grades 4-11) and the Cooperative English Test (grades 10-11). The data from the Cooperative Primary Tests (grades 2-3) and the CTBS tests (grades 4-6) were again collected in Spring 1975 by Level I. The analyses focused on differences between BESP and non-BESP student achievement. The administration of the tests was mandated by BUSD for all students.

With respect to the survey of satisfaction of students, parents and teachers within BESP, Level I developed and administered surveys for 2nd graders, 5th graders and 7-12th graders, plus parents and teachers, to assess differences between BESP and non-BESP students, staff and parents. For students, data were collected in December 1974 and May 1975; for parents and staff, data were collected in February 1975.

The 1974/75 Summary Report of Level I claimed:

The fiscal analysis consisted of securing all 1973/74 and 1974/75 expenditure information from the BUSD data processing office, the translating of that information for maximum analytic flexibility on University of California computers...the basis for the budget planning process of the BESP site directors.

To supplement the information gathered from BUSD et al., Level I also interviewed site directors. Because the Board of Education contracted outside the district to review fiscal management within BUSD, Level I felt it would be wise to withhold its findings until BUSD released its report. Level I had hoped to complete data collection and develop a fiscal analytic system during the 1975/76 school year. A six-year cost plan of BESP was published by Level I in December 1975. For each component and program of BESP, a program description, rationale for phase-in (survival) and budget justification were presented. There was no budget planning for individual sites or the BESP program as a whole.

Other information/analysis systems under development during the 1974/75 school year by Level I included: The Student Data File and the Standardized Achievement Analysis System. Both systems were developed for potential use by BUSD after BESP funding ended, not for use during the life of BESP.

Recommendations coming out of the 1974/75 Level I report were geared primarily to the evaluation component or design itself. The most detailed recommendation concerned BESP Evaluation commitment to the maintenance of a strong BUSD Office of Research and Evaluation, expanding to include three more evaluators.

During the 1974/75 school year, Level I proposed changes in the evaluation design, deleting some facts and adding others. The major areas of Level I examination for the 1974/75 school year included: Administrative Survey, further development of a BUSD information system and Information Needs Survey, Achievement Analysis preparations, a Narrative History of BESP, evaluation of the HILC's, and development of materials for the post-AERA Conference entitled Educational Evaluation and Public Policy, 1976.

Duties of Level I staff were redistributed for the 1975/76 school year. Rather than four full-time evaluators (as in 1974/75), there were three full-time evaluators concentrating their energies on: (1) Narrative History, (2) Administrative Survey, and (3) the Information System Development Project, and preparation for the post-AERA Conference. The fourth evaluator was employed half-time by Level I, and continued to evaluate the HILC System.

A number of consultants were contracted by Level I to help with the Student Achievement Analysis and development of the Information System. Individuals from the Survey Research Center, the University of California Computer Center, and the University of California School of Education assisted Level I during the 1975/76 school year.

The criterion-referenced testing was dropped from the Level I design for the 1975/76 school year. Level I claimed that the locally developed tests were intended to be responsive to BESP personnel who felt CTBS was not an adequate instrument for assessing educational effectiveness. However, CTBS testing was found to be as good a gauge (or as poor a gauge) as the IOX and EPIC tests (criterion-referenced tests utilized), particularly for the K-6th grades.

The BESP site staff attitude toward the criterion-referenced tests was the major cause for Level I's proposal to discontinue their use. Most staff of BESP projects viewed evaluation as useless, and additional testing of children created hard feelings between BESP site staff and Level I staff. Level I was anxious to become involved in more personal relationships and to provide a supportive role for the entire project, a role different than what had been the experience prior to reorganization of the Level I team in June 1974. NIE/ESP approved the discontinuance of the criterion-referenced tests.

During the 1975/76 school year, the evaluation of the High Intensity Learning System was amended to provide a summative view (rather than formative), determining the impact and output of the HILC System in BESP.

The High Intensity Learning Center Evaluation report provides an in-depth description of the practices in the reading centers. The evaluators did not find any difference in achievement of HILC over non-HILC students in either reading or student attitude toward reading. Level I did not have the resources or time to determine interactive effects among attendance, attitudes, time spent in reading and growth in reading scores.

The Information Needs Survey was compiled from open-ended questioning of the BUSD administrative staff. The report's recommendations included the necessity for more study, more funding and, not surprisingly, the continuance of an evaluation staff in the District.

The section of the report entitled "Student Achievement on Norm Referenced Tests" detailed a series of analyses of variance in Spring 1976 test scores in Reading and Mathematics, comparing BESP to common schools, and sites with each other, for students at three different pretest (Fall 1975) levels. Notable in this effort is the fact that no further comparisons, particularly in terms of student background variables which conceivably confound the results, were attempted; thus, the results can be construed as inconclusive, since possible masking and specification effects were not taken into account. In addition the sample studied was biased, in that it included only those students who took the pretest; since, on the high school level, teachers select students to take the test (CTBS) on the basis of the teachers' estimates of the students' low achievement, the sample screens out the brightest students in the District, leaving a population below mean achievement for the District.

The Administrative Survey was conducted during the first quarter of 1976 (January 1 to March 31). According to Level I,

Persons who make key decisions in BUSD which directly affected alternative schools were interviewed. The major purpose of the survey was to assess the impact of federal funds in bringing about comprehensive changes in BUSD.

The Administrative Survey Report drew on intensive interviews with the BUSD superintendent, School Board, BESP director, and site directors. Because of the small sample size involved (N=11), the report is highly anecdotal in nature, the percentage figures given are not useful for any but illustrative purposes.

The Narrative History of BESP was added to the evaluation design in the period July 1 through September 30, 1975. The History, when completed, "was to be a collection of narrative descriptions of project participants' experiences in the BESP." (This report is completed, but may never be issued, given the inflammatory nature of some of the anecdotes.)

This report, entitled the "Alternative Evaluation Report, 1971-1976," is primarily a description by its author, the Coordinator of BESP Evaluation, Berkeley, of his experiences during the five years of the project; for this reason, possibly, it dwells most heavily on the evaluation aspect of the program. It is written in a conventional style, directed primarily to interested laymen as a sort of "how-to-avoid-the-pitfalls" manual. However, the documentation for the points the author makes must be found in other sources, if at all.

Level I Evaluation received more money in the years of 1974/75 and 1975/76, with the exception of Jefferson Tri-Part, than any other component of BESP during the five years of BESP funding. By far, Level I received more throughout the five years than any other component within BESP. Yet, it was generally duplicating Level II's work. No formative evaluation ever materialized.

Problems Encountered by Level I. It seems clear from the above history that, in terms of its mandate to evaluate the progress of BESP for the specific purpose of feedback to the sites for their guidance, the effort of Level I in the first three years was markedly unsatisfactory. Much of the time was spent in attempting to gather basic biographical data and trying to determine the goals against which the success of this project might be evaluated, and as a result little time, facilities, or resources were available for actual evaluation. Why did Level I staff apparently have such difficulty in fulfilling the function outlined for it in the original evaluation plan? Several reasons emerge from the history of Level I.

To begin with, the personnel involved in the formative evaluation of BESP were, from the top down, unfamiliar with the method chosen to undertake the evaluation. The technique selected was one developed at Columbia Teachers College; a consultant was hired to train the staff in the nuances of this technique, but no permanent staff member was thoroughly conversant with this style of evaluation from the beginning of the project. There remains a question, then, of the degree to which the concept involved in the task was understood by those designated to perform it.

A second problem faced by Level I in attempting to evaluate ESP was role ambiguity on two levels. The first ambiguity felt by the Level I staff concerned responsibility. There was considerable

confusion evidenced by the Level I staff as to whether its primary responsibility was as a support organization for the sites, or as a representative of the BUSD and OE/ESP. This role ambiguity problem took on a more serious character as the sense of ambiguity was also shared by the site personnel. A feeling, prevalent among site personnel at the beginning of the project, that Level I observers were coming into their schools as "spies" to evaluate them for the benefit of the district bureaucracy caused an immediate show of general staff resistance to Level I. Although efforts were made at the outset of the project to clarify Level I's function both to the professional staff of the sites and within Level I itself, staff hostility to the presence of Level I on their sites probably contributed to the continual lack of feedback provided by Level I throughout the project.

Another area of ambiguity was the relationship between Level I, the internal, formative evaluation component of BESP, and Level II, the external, summative component. There seem to be several facets to this problem: (1) general uncertainty as to the meaning of formative evaluation, as discussed above; (2) actual overlapping of the functions of Level I and Level II as stated in the evaluation proposal (Level I was also given a secondary summative responsibility); and (3) the uncertain position of Level II at one point in the program, which brought up the possibility that its function would be transferred to Level I. At another point, it was suggested that Level I be transferred to Level II.

These role ambiguities were not satisfactorily resolved within Level I during the first three years of the project. Certainly, they brought additional strains into the working of a unit already operating under other organizational handicaps.

Additionally, our field work indicates that there was virtually no contact between Level I and its counterpart within BUSD, the Research and Evaluation Department, until the two were merged in the final year of the project. This lack of cooperation between two organizations with similar needs and complementary resources sacrificed an important potential facility for Level I, which could have benefited from such additional aid.

There seems to be no question, then, that Level I's primary mission, to monitor the ongoing project and to feed the information back to the sites, was largely unfulfilled. A brief survey of site directors at the end of the third year of the project was conducted in order to gauge their attitudes toward the performance of Level I. Of the 15 site directors responding, more than half made uniformly negative comments. Generally, Level I was either never seen on their sites, or was seen only as a test-taking and test-supervising organization--as getting information from the sites, but never as

giving information back. As a result of all the above problems, which by the third year of the project had been deemed to be of a chronic nature by NIE, Level I was massively reorganized for the fourth and fifth years of the project, its size and scope massively reduced, and the formative nature of the original task largely abandoned in favor of an essentially summative evaluation, paralleling the task of Level II. It was merged with its BUSD counterpart, losing whatever autonomy it originally had.

But, overarching all of these difficulties was the basic lack of understanding that BESP was an educational R&D project. For example, more than half way through the project, NIE/ESP wrote to the BUSD superintendent as follows:

For your information, the purpose of ESP is to test whether change would be better and more lasting if it were comprehensive rather than piecemeal.

We believe that the fact that BUSD, and its students and constituents, neither understood nor accepted to the fullest extent that their school district was an Experiment, and that the six million federal dollars were granted (unlike a morass of other educational grants) in order to study the impact of certain educational R&D strategies (under the rubric of "comprehensive change") caused such a structural gap that a myriad of misunderstandings and role confusions developed, as particularly evidenced in the two evaluation components, Level I (formative) and Level II (summative)--neither of which was ever realized in its pristine or rigorous definition.

In the spring of 1974, the new BESP Director wrote:

There seems to have been, from the beginning, a lack of clarity as to what should or should not take place in this project. There seems to be a great deal of distrust from both sides [BUSD and NIE/ESP], that should not be present. Almost like a contest as to who is going to be responsible for the failure.

This sense of frustration, of communication failure and of distrust indeed characterized much of the project's history.

### 3. Documentation and History of Level II (Summative Evaluation)

As to the summative evaluation experience, Level II's history lends further credence to the structural problems created by the lack of recognition on the part of all participants that they were

(in the words of an NIE/ESP official) "participating in a multi-million dollar program to help provide some answers to the question: 'Should change be comprehensive rather than piecemeal?'"

The first RFP for BESP's summative evaluation allowed for a wide scope of flexibility and innovation in the evaluation design and effort. The well-funded summative evaluation contract was itself an educational innovation, a new and daring approach to educational project evaluation, one which was a substantive adaptation of the R&D methodology for educational uses. The climate was ripe for evaluative innovation. Further, documentation, i.e., good historical analysis of the ongoing process of BESP, was thought to offer great promise for further scholarly educational research. The DEEPS response to the RFP for summative evaluation was a promissory note, which broadly stated the evaluator's awareness of the impact of the social context upon any educational innovation effort. The two co-directors were innovative (and controversial) scholars. Leonard Duhl, M.D., was a psychiatrist and prolific writer; Jack Seeley was a professor and a writer of philosophical social commentaries. Both were extremely sensitized to the late 1960's Berkeley climate of "Free Speech," of student revolt, of politicalization and resistance so characteristic of the Vietnamese War era. Both co-directors were avant-garde in their views and generally resistant to bureaucracy built on routine. Duhl intended to give only one-quarter time to the effort while he continued to teach full-time in the School of Environmental Design of the University of California, Berkeley, leaving the day-to-day operation of Level II to Seeley, who organized the project employees around independent study issues. One's impression was that of a graduate school, with Seeley as a dean and a teacher. Most of the DEEPS staff were graduate students, intent upon studies which could lead to their doctoral theses. A third co-director was later hired, a Black doctoral student in education, who after a few months came to feel he represented DEEPS' "Black face." He later resigned because he felt the responsibility for the major evaluation methodology was being assigned to him, while most of the resources were allocated to a relatively large staff of young students engaging in independent study. In addition, DEEPS employed a number of prominent University of California educational scholars as consultants, each being free to develop summative evaluation themes. These consultants were only marginally connected with the project, although it was hoped that they would create new approaches to the whole evaluation effort. The federal project officer was initially impressed with such an array of talent and enthusiasm, and encouraged the DEEPS staff to enlarge on the "documentation" of processes and issues as they emerged in BESP.

After the first year, pressures from the new NIE director (and indirectly from Congress) began to push the NIE/ESP staff to call upon DEEPS for an "evaluation plan." The climate began to cool as

greater pressure for the development of an acceptable summative evaluation plan mounted. Four separate DEEPS plans were submitted from September 1972 through January 1973. All were rejected by NIE/ESP as too vague or too unsound methodologically. NIE/ESP demanded rigor instead of innovation and the rules of the game seemed to have changed radically. DEEPS staff, now under Scientific Analysis Corporation sponsorship (following the transfer of the Level II grant from a Los Angeles-based firm, HIRI, to the San Francisco-based SAC), became increasingly frustrated. NIE/ESP staff became impatient and demanding.

Finally, after several stormy confrontations, NIE/ESP called together a site-visit team of experts in educational evaluation (David Cohen, Michael Scriven and Henry Dyer among others) to assess the DEEPS effort. At that point Dr. Duhl and his major staff resigned, leaving the grant in the hands of SAC, which up to that time had only exercised fiscal and contract administrative responsibility.

The federal NIE/ESP director and SAC staff began a stormy relationship, each suspecting the other of dealing in bad faith. SAC advanced an evaluation design, based on developing a longitudinal study of BESP/BUSD students and an in-depth study of each BESP site. In February 1973, SAC placed the DEEPS grant under "suspension" and laid off all DEEPS staff. The summative evaluation effort was halted as a skeleton SAC staff sorted out the past work of DEEPS, and NIE/ESP deliberated the fate of the BESP summative evaluation contract. SAC was asked to give a full report and account of DEEPS' work, and to develop any pieces possible for early completion. The first SAC report on the development of a choice structure in BESP was completed shortly thereafter. This report was an attempt at summative evaluation of BESP options, focusing upon the ability of parents/students to choose an alternative school within BUSD/BESP. The report documented little choice due to a number of system effects, such as zoning, special interest tracking, counselors, referrals and a lack of distribution of specific site information which would have permitted informed choice to be made by parents or students.

A second report followed in September 1973 which traced the history of BESP over the first two years--focusing upon each site's development. At that time the first Level II evaluation grant was terminated and a new NIE/ESP RFP for a contract was issued. As previously stated this RFP was quite specific, calling not for an innovative approach to summative evaluation, but rather for narrow, specific responses, based on previously described methods of procedure, to three specific questions regarding how well BUSD had implemented its plan and its effect upon the system and the parents and students in BESP. This narrow perspective did not permit a complete summative evaluation, but rather allowed for an evaluation

of BUSD's implementation of the BESP plan, according to criteria specified a priori by NIE/ESP.

Problems Encountered by Level II. SAC hesitated to reply to the RFP but finally came to feel that, given the atmosphere of suspicion and doubt left behind by the DEEPS/NIE/ESP struggle, only by bidding and winning a new contract could SAC regain its reputation as an organization capable of competent evaluative work. Pride came before the bid.

SAC won the new contract, competing against a dozen or more bidders, and NIE/ESP reluctantly re-awarded the contract to SAC, based upon the merit of its work plan as judged by outside-NIE bid evaluators.

In September 1973, a division of SAC, the Institute for Scientific Analysis, began to work seriously to answer NIE/ESP's three questions, placing observers at each site, selecting a sample of students for a three-year longitudinal survey, and carrying out all the methods outlined in the Work Plan Chart (see Appendix II). The annual reports were submitted which traced our findings vis à vis the three contract questions.

The first report was received poorly by NIE/ESP. It was not accepted, nor was it rejected. A complete rewrite of the report was demanded, and the contract was to be cancelled if NIE/ESP's demands for revisions in the report were not met. A summary of the findings from ISA's first report are to be found in Chapter 1 of this report, all of which found the BESP to be failing to meet NIE/ESP's goals as expressed in its RFP questions.

After a difficult confrontation and many staff changes in NIE/ESP, the report was finally rewritten in part and accepted. The second report consisted of interim findings and was accepted by NIE/ESP without challenge.

After those difficult days, after a new NIE/ESP director and a new NIE/ESP project officer were installed, ISA's work continued. Throughout, ISA's position has been that a summative evaluation requires a broad perspective, and in this report, at the close of the contract period, we have chosen to go beyond those RFP questions to assess BESP as an example of an attempt to carry out an educational R&D project. Our final summative team has consisted of social scientists, a political scientist, a social-policy writer, a computer analyst, and two educational professionals. This final report is a cooperative and collaborative effort of all.

Level II's current evaluation (1974-76), as a summative effort, is that the RFP asked erroneous, or at best, irrelevant questions, given the social realities that emerged over the five years of the project. Perhaps the NIE/ESP Director should have asked if "change" had been the true commitment of the participants, and, if so, what kind of change under what conditions, and whether or not the participants realized the project was an educational R&D experiment in which their district had been a subject for study and evaluation.

Had such an understanding evolved, we believe the history and the outcome might have been different than what we observe today. Indeed, BESP might be described as a six million dollar misunderstanding on the part of all parties involved.

#### 4. Summary of Level I and Level II Efforts

Summarizing the history of Level I and Level II evaluation efforts in BESP, we note that most schools had little contact with either Level I or Level II evaluation teams during the first 2-1/2 years. Contact was often made under crisis situations with little advance warning, when one or the other team had a sudden need for some kind of data. Roles and purposes were unclear to most participants. Information gathered under these less than ideal conditions was seldom if ever fed back to the schools in any useful form. At the same time, with the "phase-in" process hanging ominously on the horizon, it was clear that survival was directly linked to evaluation.

During the course of the second Level II contract, two major reports at the close of each year were issued. These reports, using a wide variety of data collection and analysis methods, found no differences between BESP and common schools, and, in general, documented BESP "failure." These reports were never widely distributed or discussed at the local BESP level.

Our final summative report now raises our gaze from the narrow RFP questions to the broader issue of methodological problems inherent in educational R&D. We feel this frame of reference provides an explanation for the "failure" of this educational R&D project.

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APPENDIX I: CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS (1963-1976)

The choice of the Berkeley Unified School District (BUSD) as a promising site for the federal Experimental Schools Program's educational R&D effort derived, in part, from its reputation as a district willing to change and ready to act on pressing social issues. As early as 1963 the district had begun planning voluntarily to desegregate its schools, and its subsequent achievements in racial integration gave BUSD a nationally acknowledged "progressive" stamp. By 1970, and again voluntarily, the district had moved ahead to engage in various types of "alternative education." These features of BUSD's history could be taken as signs that the district was willing to work toward comprehensive change. Since ESP's educational R&D effort needed such prior commitment, BUSD seemed to have high potential as a site for a "comprehensive change" experiment, and was subsequently chosen to be a beneficiary of federal largesse for such a purpose.

The chronology that follows traces these events, although admittedly in a somewhat sketchy fashion. Nevertheless, we include it to achieve several purposes. On the one hand, the chronology may be read simply as "background information" so that the reader has some sense of the flow of events. Since the main text of this volume tends to be more analytic than descriptive, an orderly presentation of concrete details may prove useful.

Second, educational evaluations tend, on the whole, to be short-sighted and narrow-minded: they tend to concentrate on the specific programs they have been charged to evaluate, and tend to ignore everything else. That is a serious error, because no program in education or in any "human service" sector is encapsulated to such an extent that "outside" forces and events do not impinge on it. In the chronology that follows, we have included at least the most notable "outside" events that affected the operation of BUSD and, either directly or indirectly, of BESP.

Third, the implementation of a federal R&D strategy in a local school district is necessarily marked by a considerable organizational complexity. Interested parties include the federal government, its several agencies, and numerous persons acting as its agents, not always harmoniously; the state government, which in the case of BESP stayed in the background, but which promulgated other rules and regulations affecting local education; the legally responsible policy and administrative organs of the district; the district's constituency, including affected parents and students; and the administrators and staffs who actually carried out the program in its daily operation. To take these various organizational

"levels" into account, we have divided our chronology so that it actually consists of several. By reading across the page from left to right, one can get an appreciation of the organizational complexity of the project; and by choosing a single column and reading down the pages that follow, the reader can appreciate the sequence of events in any single "level."

If the reading proceeds jointly across and down, we hope to have achieved our larger purposes of presenting the project in as full a complexity as possible within a limited space, and of fixing this educational R&D effort in its proper historical perspective, placing it in time, and tying time to event, event to process, and process to completion.

Our chronology starts with 1963 and ends with the district's plans for the 1976/77 school year.

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<p><u>1963-64 SCHOOL YEAR:</u></p>	<p>November: <u>Hadsell Committee reports to Board of Education.</u> Board-appointed community committee recommends desegregation of junior high schools and reduction of the tracking of students according to their tested ability. Also recommends redistricting of elementary schools and compensatory education for low-skilled students.</p>	
<p><u>1964-65 SCHOOL YEAR:</u> September: <u>Ramsey Plan to desegregate the junior high schools is implemented.</u> Plan sets up one 9th-grade school to serve all of Berkeley 9th-graders.</p>	<p>October: <u>Election to recall two school board members is held.</u> Recall is urged by PANS (Parents' Association for Neighborhood Schools) formed to protest busing. Recall fails.</p>	
<p><u>1965-66 SCHOOL YEAR:</u> September: <u>Federally funded Equal Start Program for preschoolers begins at Columbus using parents as "community aides."</u></p>		<p><u>Elementary and Secondary Education Act is passed by U.S. Congress</u> making possible allocation of funds to four target areas in Berkeley. Community input about the use of these funds produces the first tentative steps towards desegregation of Berkeley's elementary schools.</p>
<p><u>1966-67 SCHOOL YEAR:</u> Fall: <u>ESEA funds make possible reduction in class size, use of parents as aides and a pilot desegregation program in target schools.</u></p>		

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<p><u>Summer, 1967: Summer Arts Program at Berkeley High</u> tried by Jay Manley and Peter Kleinbard. This is Berkeley's first alternative program at the secondary level. Program staff begin extensive negotiations with BHS administration to set up an alternative school at BHS.</p>		
<p><u>1967-68 SCHOOL YEAR:</u></p> <p><u>September: Tom Parker becomes Principal at McKinley</u> (Continuation School). Parker and staff are called "the six angry young men." They revamp the school, beginning to attract a white counter-culture element to its looser atmosphere.</p> <p><u>May: BHS reports on "Tension in the Secondary Schools"</u> (Jeff Tudisco, Chairman). Committee recommends implementation of administratively created model school for 1,000 9-12th graders at West Campus.</p>	<p><u>October: School Master Plan Committee</u> (community group appointed by Board) recommends that elementary schools be desegregated, parent participation be urged, and ability tracking be de-emphasized.</p>	

BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1968-69 SCHOOL YEAR:</u></p> <p><u>September: Elementary schools are desegregated. Four attendance zones are created, with cross-town busing to overcome residential segregation.</u></p> <p><u>September: Dr. Neil Sullivan, BUSD Superintendent and architect of desegregation, announces his resignation.</u></p> <p><u>February: Community High School, outgrowth of Summer Arts Program (1967), begins at CHS. Program is funded by BUSD and Ford Foundation and features open-structured learning and student participation in decision-making.</u></p> <p><u>March: Dr. Richard Foster is appointed Superintendent of BUSD. He comes with successful record in desegregation and innovative education. Board charges Foster to implement decentralization at High School.</u></p>	<p><u>September: "Other Ways," a teacher training center, is started by radical educator Herb Kohl in a store front. Center prompts lively discussion of alternative education. Other Ways is sanctioned by BUSD and supported by a Carnegie Grant. (Kohl is author of several books significant to free school movement.)</u></p> <p><u>October: Black Student Union at BHS presents demands to Board: Black courses, counselors, curriculum associate, firing of racist teachers.</u></p>	

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<p><u>1969-1970 SCHOOL YEAR:</u></p> <p><u>Fall: Decentralization Committee formed at BHS</u> to study breaking up High School into smaller instructional units.</p> <p><u>September: Other Ways becomes an offsite, open-structured community school</u> for high school students. Herb Kohl is director. School attracts mostly the "difficult and turned-off" students. Fiscal support by BUSD and Carnegie.</p> <p><u>September: Environmental Studies, alternative subschool at Lincoln</u> (4-6 grade), created by Melvin Stroud. Program features use of the community as a resource for learning.</p> <p><u>Spring: Alternative classroom started at LeConte (K-3) by secondary students from Other Ways.</u> Program prompts meetings of LeConte and Lincoln parents with Herb Kohl. Parents secure BUSD sanction to start an off-site elementary alternative in 1970-71 year. (This school begins as PTAE, later called Kilimanjaro.)</p> <p><u>June: Odyssey, an off-site free school,</u> is proposed to Board by some parents and teachers at Willard Junior High.</p>	<p><u>May: Chicano Task Force appointed by Board</u> to study problems of the bilingual Chicano student in the Berkeley schools.</p>	<p><u>March: President Nixon's message to Congress calls for increased support for educational innovation and research;</u> proposes establishment of National Institute of Education, and urges approval of experimental schools program.</p>

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Summer, 1970: Pilot Chicano Studies implemented using ESEA funds.

Summer: Black House Proposal presented to Board by Buddy Jackson. Plan is to set up an ethnically oriented and relevant school for Black students unable to develop in present high school setting. Board approves this off-site program as a project of CHS.

Summer: Community High II, an out-growth of Community High School, is planned by Jay Manley with support of overflow demand for CHS.

Summer: PTAE (Parents and Teachers for Alternative Education) run a free school for K-6th graders at various Berkeley parks.

July: Amendment to Cooperative Research Act, passed by Congress, sets up the Experimental Schools Program as part of Office of Education, HEW. Twelve million dollars appropriated to fund ESP for the first year.

1970-71 SCHOOL YEAR:

Fall: "Options Through Participation," a Ford-funded project, begins. Includes Other Ways, Odyssey, Black House, planning grant for Glens Crumal (later results in John Muir model) and Jefferson. Jefferson, a new K-1 program, features three models, each using different instructional styles.

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BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1970-71 SCHOOL YEAR, FALL:</u></p> <p><u>September: Parents and Teachers for Alternative Education (PTAE), an off-site free school, begins for LeConte and Lincoln students and parents.</u> School features parent participation in classroom and parental control of decision-making (later to be called Kilimanjaro).</p>		
<p><u>1970-71 SCHOOL YEAR, SPRING:</u></p> <p><u>February-June: Fiscal crisis announced and debated. Two million dollar deficit is forecast for FY 1971-72. Heated, lengthy Board workshops about ways to cut expenses.</u></p> <p><u>February: Model School A, an alternative subschool, begins at BHS.</u> School has been planned and implemented by teachers and administrators on BHS Decentralization Committee.</p> <p><u>February: Community High II (later called Agora) begins at BHS.</u></p> <p><u>February: BHS counselors express to Board that they will not serve Black House because of its racially separatist policies. Board directs counselors to continue to serve all schools.</u></p>	<p><u>February-June: Berkeley teachers' unions organize to protest teacher cutbacks as solution to budget crisis.</u> Teachers protest pending staff cuts to the Board. Black staff from BHS protest that newly hired minority teachers will be the first to be fired under tenure rules.</p>	<p><u>February: Experimental Schools Program awards BUSD a \$10,000 planning grant to develop a proposal.</u> Proposal is to address five-year comprehensive change, oriented to needs of a target population.</p>

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BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1970-71 SCHOOL YEAR, SPRING:</u></p> <p><u>February: Foster announces ESP planning grant to Board.</u> BUSD has 60 days to prepare ESP proposal.</p> <p><u>February: Board adopts District goals, setting elimination of racism in the schools and the delivery of basic skills to minority students as top priorities.</u></p> <p><u>March: BUSD personnel invited to present proposals for ESP.</u> Fifty-five are received from administrators, teachers and community groups. A community committee screens, and an administrative team selects less than half of this number to submit.</p> <p><u>March: Board freeze on firing stipulates that fiscal crises will be solved by salary reductions and staff attrition rather than by blanket staff cutbacks.</u></p> <p><u>April: First Draft Berkeley's Experimental Schools Plan</u> passed by Board and submitted to the national ESP office. Chicano community out in force at Board meeting to demand that Casa de la Raza, an alternative for Chicanos, be included. Board passes plan on condition that Casa be included.</p>	<p><u>March: Chicano community comes before Board to cite disrespect in schools for Chicano youth, and to demand an alternative program for Chicanos.</u></p> <p><u>March-April: Alternative Schools Network, a community group in support of alternative education, attempts to influence planning of ESP project.</u> Group argues for alternative school participants' input into planning and into the organizational structure of project design. Includes off-site school people (Kilimanjaro, Black House, Other Ways, Odyssey).</p>	



BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1970-71 SCHOOL YEAR, SPRING:</u></p> <p><u>May: Final ESP plan prepared by BUSD administration. Two schools (Willard, Franklin) added to design to fulfill USOE's request for K-12 articulation in two experimental zones. Plans submitted to USOE on May 21, 1971.</u></p>	<p><u>June: Heated community meetings to discuss BESP chaired by Foster and Board. Alternative Schools Network continues to protest that non-alternative schools have been included. Some BUSD personnel protest that their ideas for innovations have validity, too.</u></p>	<p><u>April-May: USOE negotiates changes in Berkeley's first-draft ESP plan. USOE stipulates that (1) accountability must be precisely delineated; (2) two control zones must be used, to balance against experiment in two zones; (3) within experimental zones options must span K-12; (4) Level I evaluation design should be more specific and not overlap Level II evaluation efforts.</u></p> <p><u>June: USOE awards Berkeley \$3.6 million to fund the project for 30 months.</u></p> <p><u>June: Senator McClellan (Arkansas) writes to HEW protesting the inclusion of Black House and Casa de la Raza in a federally funded program.</u></p>
<p><u>Summer, 1971:</u></p>		<p><u>July: USOE awards contract for Level II Evaluation of Berkeley's ESP to DEEPS (Documentation and Evaluation of Experimental Projects in Schools).</u></p>

BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1971-72 SCHOOL YEAR, FALL:</u></p> <p><u>September:</u> <u>BESP begins.</u> Six new schools (Work Study, John Muir, On Target, Casa de la Raza, College Prep, Franklin) join the ten already in operation before ESP funding (East Campus, Environmental Studies, Odyssey, Other Ways, Agora, Genesis, Kilimanjaro, Black House, Model School A, Jefferson). BESP Central Support Staff gets under way, staffed almost entirely by BUSD personnel. Components include Administration, Evaluation, Training, Media, Public Information, Family Transactions. Design follows BUSD system of centralizing supportive services.</p> <p><u>January:</u> <u>Casa community organizes a "teach-in" at BUSD administrative offices</u> to protest the inadequacies of facilities being provided to Casa by the BUSD. Casa is located in prefabs at King Junior High. Prefabs are unheated and have no bathrooms or hot running water.</p>	<p><u>September:</u> <u>Foster formally directs Larry Wells, first central BESP director, that all positions in BESP are to be filled with BUSD current employees having "permanent status" except for positions needing bilingual teachers, exceptions already authorized by Board.</u></p> <p><u>November:</u> <u>BUSD administration reports to Board that 119 classroom-teacher and 31 non-teaching positions will have to be eliminated due to declining enrollment. Firing freeze is still in effect; these personnel will be placed in unassigned pool. Still supported by BUSD, these personnel are to be placed as vacancies occur.</u></p> <p><u>December:</u> <u>Berkeley High plans to concentrate on delivery of basic language skills to underachievers. Language labs will be expanded in Spring and required during 1972-73 for students testing below grade level; 40 electives to be discontinued; junior highs plan to install or use similar language labs.</u></p>		<p><u>November:</u> <u>Office for Civil Rights, MEM, writes BUSD that Black House and Casa are "constitutionally suspect" and in possible violation of Title VI of 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title VI forbids racial segregation in any federally-funded project.</u></p> <p><u>December:</u> <u>Senator McClellan files formal complaint against Black House and Casa with OCR. OCR directs Berkeley to answer the complaint.</u></p>

BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1971-72 SCHOOL YEAR, SPRING:</u></p> <p><u>February: BESP director distributes \$30,000 from administrative budget to the five off-site schools.</u> Funds are to be used to pay site rentals and thus to allow off-sites to use grants for program development rather than for facilities.</p> <p><u>February: Three schools join BESP.</u> School of the Arts (BHS) features integrating arts with academics. NOI (West Campus) provides enriched classes for "high potential" 9th-graders. College Prep is designed to equip Black students for higher education.</p> <p><u>Spring: BESP schools face internal crises and are subject to intercession by BESP's administration:</u> Odyssey wants to refuse to admit students coming from Kilimanjaro; by design of project, BESP students are to have first priority at other BESP schools. Other Ways alters its focus to become an ethnocentric (continued on next page)</p>	<p><u>March: BHS Administration reports to Board about problems caused by secondary BESP subschools.</u> Report states that alternatives are circumventing BHS procedures, resulting in increased tension between alternative and common school personnel.</p> <p><u>April: Superintendent Foster announces to Board his intent to resign, effective at the end of the 1972-73 school year.</u></p>	<p><u>February: PTA investigates the effect that subschools are having on Berkeley High.</u> Study committee reports that morale of teachers in common schools is very low, due to extra funds and freedom to innovate that subschools have.</p>	<p><u>March: Stull Bill is passed by California legislature.</u> Measure outlines grievance procedures necessary for firing a certificated employee, and requires school districts to evaluate all certificated personnel.</p> <p><u>April: The Office for Civil Rights, HEW, cites Black House and Casa de la Raza as in "probable non-compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."</u></p>

BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1971-72 SCHOOL YEAR, SPRING:</u>  school primarily for Black students and is renamed Garvey Institute. Jefferson parents and staff charge their BESP site director with ignoring their recommendations. Casa community divides over issue of best teaching style. Killmanjaro divides over whether or not to fire a teacher. Genesis rejects an early BHS deadline for projecting 1972-73 enrollment, and loses three teachers (allotted on basis of enrollment) as a result.</p> <p><u>Spring: Testing crisis,</u> involving Level I, USOE, and BESP off-site schools; Level I is unable to produce an evaluation design acceptable to USOE (March-June).</p> <p><u>May: Level I and BESP Director order schools to administer district tests.</u> Off-site schools refuse.</p> <p><u>June: Level I produces a plan acceptable to USOE.</u> Level I's director resigns.</p>	<p><u>Spring: Jefferson School appeals to Superintendent Foster to intercede in crisis</u> about their school director. Foster directs Director of BESP to intercede at the school.</p> <p><u>April: Responding to Level I crisis with USOE,</u> Superintendent orders all BESP schools to administer district-mandated achievement tests by June 15.</p> <p><u>May: Superintendent and off-site schools work out testing compromise.</u> Off-sites can have one year (1972-73) to create alternative achievement tests. BUSD and BESP evaluation components are to assist them.</p>		<p><u>March-June: USOE requests from Level I an evaluation design and the collection of baseline data on all BESP students.</u></p>

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<p><u>1971-72 SCHOOL YEAR, SPRING:</u></p> <p><u>Activities of BESP's support components:</u>            Training arranges for BESP classified staff to enroll in teacher credentialing program and plans to institute High Intensity Learning Centers in BESP schools. Family Transactions holds community meetings to inform ethnic minorities about BESP. Media supports site uses of media and Public Information assists BESP's director with USOE progress reports and prepares BESP brochure. Administration begins work on Alliance proposal to counter OCR's charges against Black House and Casa.</p> <p><u>June: BESP's Central Support Staff identifies as critical problems:</u> 1. BESP schools' isolation from each other; 2. BESP administration's inability to "decentralize" decision-making, due to its accountability to USOE.</p>	<p><u>May: All classroom teachers required by Assistant Superintendent of Instruction to write behavioral objectives for their 1972-73 classes.</u> Purpose is to collect data upon which to base evaluations of teachers' performances (Stull Bill). Teachers' success in raising minority students' skills will be basis of their evaluations.</p> <p><u>May: BHS Administration announces to BESP that BHS can no longer accredit diplomas issued by off-site schools.</u> BHS feels that off-site course offerings are below their standards. Director of BESP proposes to become the principal of the off-site schools, and thus manage their accreditation.</p> <p><u>May: BESP workshop with Board, BESP's director cites needs:</u> BUSD financial support in staffing; autonomy for on-sites; BUSD fiscal support for off-sites; lifting of restrictions on hiring of classified personnel.</p>		

BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>Summer, 1972:</u></p>	<p><u>Summer: Teachers' Unions negotiate with BUSD over tests to be used to measure teachers' success with students (Stull Bill evaluations). Compromise includes teacher-made and criterion-referenced tests as well as district-mandated achievement tests.</u></p>		<p><u>June: National ESP moves to newly created National Institute of Education; NIE is to foster educational research.</u></p>
<p><u>1972-73 SCHOOL YEAR, FALL:</u></p> <p><u>September: Three new schools bring ESP total to 21. Early Learning Center is an ungraded free school (K-1) combining day care with instruction. Willard and KARE (7-8) focus on delivery of basic skills to underachieving minority students.</u></p> <p><u>October: Part of Kilimanjaro's and all of Odyssey's sites are declared in violation of city codes by the Berkeley Fire Marshall. Kilimanjaro starts remodeling and Odyssey locates temporarily at West Campus.</u></p>	<p><u>September-October: All BUSD personnel involved with instruction prepare "self-evaluation forms" for the Assistant Superintendent of Instruction required by Stull Bill. Emphasis in evaluations will be on how well employee enhances the basic skills of minority students.</u></p>		

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<p><u>1972-73 SCHOOL YEAR, FALL:</u></p> <p><u>October:</u> <u>BESP finalizes Alliance Proposal.</u> Alliance is to combine portions of programs at Odyssey, Black House, Casa de la Raza and an Asian component. This design is presented as an answer to "probable non-compliance" by Black House and Casa (cited by OCR). This and two subsequent plans are rejected by OCR.</p> <p><u>November:</u> <u>Dr. Edward Turner, of U.C. Davis, becomes chiefly responsible for Level I evaluation.</u> Turner communicates to sites that Level I will assume an "advocacy role." Evaluation is to be viewed as a resource for sites. Sites are asked to appoint their own internal "documentor" who will submit a yearly "advocate's report" on site developments.</p> <p><u>Fall:</u> <u>Eight schools implement High Intensity Learning Centers to foster language skills of underachievers (MSA, College Prep, Willard, KARE, Jefferson, Genesis, Carvey, East Campus).</u></p>	<p><u>October:</u> <u>Board directs Superintendent to take \$30,000 (from undistributed BUSD reserves) and apply it to housing needs of the off-site schools.</u></p> <p><u>November-December:</u> <u>BESP's Director negotiates with BUSD about how to phase-in off-sites and allot these schools more teaching slots.</u></p>		<p><u>October:</u> <u>USOE directs BESP to produce plan for second 30-months funding. Deadline is March 1. Plan must include method of phasing BESP into the BUSD.</u></p>

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<p><u>1972-73 SCHOOL YEAR, FALL:</u></p>	<p><u>January:</u> Board discusses tensions between common school and alternatives at BHS. BHS administration reports that the situation has improved, but that communication between the two segments is still inadequate.</p> <p><u>January:</u> Accreditation Team of Western Association of Schools and Colleges reports to Board on accreditation of Berkeley High. Team gives enthusiastic approval for BHS, but expresses concern over tensions between common school and BESP subschools.</p> <p><u>January-February:</u> BUSD and the Board are preoccupied with the subject of school violence. Lengthy Board meetings result in new disciplinary procedures (passed by Board, Feb. 21).</p>		

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<p><u>1972-73 SCHOOL YEAR, SPRING:</u></p> <p><u>February:</u> One more BESP school is established: Career Exploration (9th grade) gives job-oriented classes to middle achievers.</p> <p><u>March:</u> BESP Site Directors at Training-Component Workshops evaluate BESP's administrative structure. Concerns include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Roles ambiguous, Director of BESP has little power in BUSD, but much power in BESP.</li> <li>2. Schools are isolated and are unfamiliar with administrative decisions regarding other schools.</li> <li>3. Lack of site input into staff selection or services by Support Staff components.</li> <li>4. On-site subschool directors have little autonomy in relation to their common school administration.</li> </ol>	<p><u>February:</u> BESP plan (Berkeley's Five Year Educational Plan) presented to Board for approval. Odyssey Governing Board protests that the Odyssey Plan has not been submitted to nor supported by them. The former King Cluster School (King Junior High) asks that their plan (Model Y) be included. Board approves plan for submittal, stipulating that Model Y should be included and that BESP director should meet with parent groups objecting to any part of the planning process. Plan includes 26 sites (the 23 in existence plus Model Y, an Asian Component, and a Berkeley High School Learning Centers proposal). Board reserves prerogative to set BESP guidelines at a later date. Plan submitted to the National ESP with Board approval.</p>	<p><u>February:</u> Community group (Concerned Black Parents) recommends to Board: tighter structure and more discipline for Black students; and direct involvement of Black parents with teachers and in programming for Black students.</p>	<p><u>February:</u> Scientific Analysis Corporation (SAC) assumes responsibility for BESP's Level II evaluation. Change from DEEPS to SAC is result of USOE's displeasure over evaluation and documentation conducted by DEEPS.</p> <p><u>April:</u> Final Alliance Proposal is presented by BESP to OCR. Proposal stipulates that Casa, Black House and Odyssey will spend half of each day in shared activities with other Alliance and BUSD schools.</p>

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<p><u>1972-73 SCHOOL YEAR, SPRING:</u></p>	<p>May: <u>Superintendent informs Board that HEW "Right to Read" Program grant to Berkeley is being held up pending the Office for Civil Rights ruling on the BESP Alliance Plan for Black House and Casa. Federal funds to BUSD under Emergency School Assistance Act have been withheld by HEW since January 1973, pending such a settlement.</u></p> <p>June: <u>Superintendent Foster notifies OCR and BUSD that Black House and Casa de la Raza will be closed.</u></p>		<p>Spring: <u>Berkeley's ESP audited by NIE.</u></p> <p>June: <u>OCR's assessment of Alliance is discussed by BUSD officials, OCR and NIE. ESP funds for second 30 months are threatened unless Black House and Casa are closed. These schools are cited for non-compliance with Title IV of 1964 Civil Rights Act and Executive Order 11246.</u></p> <p>June: <u>NIE awards Berkeley \$2.8 million to fund BESP for the second 30 months.</u></p> <p>June: <u>OCR sets conditions under which Black House and Casa may be reopened: students can only spend 25 percent of day in these schools, racial proportions of teaching staff must be in line with overall district ratios.</u></p>

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<p><u>Summer, 1973:</u></p>	<p>July: <u>BESP Guidelines are set by Board</u> after three months of Board and administrative discussion. Guidelines address all alternatives in BUSD:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To be phased into BUSD, BESP schools and any other new alternative must show adherence to BUSD policies, be racially integrated, insure community involvement and participant satisfaction, and demonstrate that students perform as well as common school students on standardized tests or other "acceptable measures."</li> <li>2. All alternatives are to be treated equally, with same staffing and fiscal allocations as other BUSD schools. Staffing is to conform to BUSD staffing pattern. The right to rental funds for off-site schools was unresolved.</li> <li>3. Alternatives will be encouraged at all grade levels and in all attendance zones.</li> <li>4. Alternative schools will not be separately administered.</li> </ol>		<p><u>Summer:</u> SAC is awarded contract to conduct Level II Evaluation of BESP.</p>

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<p><u>Summer, 1973:</u></p> <p><u>August:</u> John Newton is appointed as new Director of BESP. Larry Wells becomes Assistant Superintendent of Instruction.</p>	<p><u>Summer:</u> BUSD approves 27¢ tax increase. The 4 percent rise, passed by a three to two vote, includes a 1 percent pay hike in lieu of a proposed 5.75 percent hike, and eliminates some programs. Total revenue will still be \$2 million less than last year.</p> <p><u>Summer:</u> Superintendent tells Board of minority skills scores. Although minorities improve yearly, test results are no better or worse in Experimental programs. Says tests are questionable and improved skills scores take time.</p> <p><u>July:</u> Superintendent announces receipt of ESP grant of \$2,867,735, excluding Black House and Casa de la Raza.</p>	<p><u>Summer:</u> School teachers/employees consider strike. Proposed 5.75 percent wage hike rejected, 1 percent hike approved by Board. Superintendent's offer of "2 percent plus" in negotiations rejected by unions who argue too much spent on administration. Strike possible.</p> <p><u>Summer:</u> Black community representatives continue discussion with BUSD about more effective instruction and increased teacher accountability.</p>	<p><u>Summer:</u> Serrano vs. Priest court decision requiring equal funding of all educational facilities in California due to go into effect, but returned to lower court.</p>

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<p><u>1973-74 SCHOOL YEAR:</u></p> <p><u>Nearly all BESP programs are affected adversely by reduced ESP funding; overcrowding due to increased enrollments; and understaffing due to BUSD's hiring freeze, firing of many classified instructional staff in BESP schools, and reassignment of other BUSD teaching staff into BESP programs.</u></p> <p><u>Fall: BESP conforms to OCR guidelines but attempts to retain ethnically relevant education: Black House and Casa are disbanded. Casa's director becomes BESP director of Chicano Studies, and CASA students are moved to Jefferson, Columbus, Franklin, Odyssey and Agora. The Black House Director becomes a consultant to BESP, and Black House students are placed at Carvey, Genesis and College Prep. Carvey is revamped, moving from a Black focus to a multi-cultural emphasis, and is relocated in the Old Black House site, changing its name to United Nations West and trying to attract white students to the program.</u></p>	<p><u>September: Newton announces to Board that Black House and Casa are closed.</u></p> <p><u>September: School bus drivers in Berkeley strike for one week to demand pay raise--granted by the BUSD.</u></p>		<p><u>September: NIE/ESP is re-organized. Budding, Director of Level II Evaluation, resigns. Gold becomes ESP Director of Evaluation; Williams takes over as Program Director for ESP. Bucknam becomes Berkeley's Project Officer for Level II Evaluation.</u></p>

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<p><u>1973-74 SCHOOL YEAR, FALL:</u>  <u>BESP budgeting becomes an issue.</u> BESP Director freezes BESP program budgets pending his own audit and balancing of expenditures. BUSD/BESP enters into negotiations with NIE concerning overhead costs that BUSD wants charged to the ESP contract.</p> <p><u>October: Community education, a new BESP public information unit, opens a Parent Resource Center to inform Berkeley Community about ESP.</u></p>	<p><u>Fall: Violence and vandalism are an issue</u> on BUSD's secondary school campuses. Administrators recommend that juvenile officers patrol campus; students and Board protest the presence of armed officers.</p> <p><u>October: Administrators and teachers report to Board</u> that Berkeley High School is in trouble due to increased enrollment, lack of instructional supplies, and cutback of teaching staff.</p> <p><u>October: BUSD Administration proposes tentative budget for 1974-75 school year.</u> To hold line on tax rate and guarantee teachers 5 percent pay hike, a reduction of total staff by 102 is proposed.</p>	<p><u>October: BUSD submits selection of a new superintendent to public debate.</u></p>	<p><u>Fall: Federal GAO program audit of BUSD's Bilingual Children's Television Project (BABEL) and of ESP ordered by NIE.</u> BUSD/BESP negotiates with NIE to include overhead costs in the ESP contract for the second 30 months.</p>

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<p><u>1973-74 SCHOOL YEAR:</u>  <u>Evaluation plan implemented:</u> Level I continues to serve individual sites on a consultant basis; emphasizes criterion-based tests for basic skills; studies demographic characteristics of BESP's population and participants' opinions about the program; and ranks individual sites in terms of "alternative-ness" and "effectiveness."  Level II addresses questions of educational/institutional change in BUSD resulting from BESP, by means of a longitudinal study of samples of students in BESP and common schools, and by documenting for each site significant changes in staffing, educational style, organization, and rates of attendance, student dropout and vandalism.</p> <p><u>BESP Training Component initiates "mini grants."</u> Small sums of money are made available to BESP sites for innovative programs such as John Muir's to purchase cooking equipment in order to provide a 10¢ breakfast for disadvantaged students.</p>		<p><u>Students at U.C. Berk. Graduate School of Public Policy are commissioned</u> by Level I to do cost-benefit analysis of BESP; report being unable to do so because of poorly kept budgetary and attendance records at BESP sites and in BUSD Administrative offices.</p>	

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<p><u>1973-74 SCHOOL YEAR, SPRING:</u>  <u>BESP Administration plans reorganization of programs:</u> Due to falling enrollment and other problems, BESP plans in 1974-75 to close KARE and United Nations West, to merge Willard Alternative with its common school, and to merge Agora and Genesis.</p>	<p><u>Spring: Teachers and classified employees negotiate with Board over budget and staffing pattern for the 1974-75 school year.</u> Board promises to raise employees' salaries by \$2.1 million and to continue to rely on attrition to reduce staffing costs.</p> <p><u>Spring: Heated Board and community discussions over hiring of new Superintendent.</u> Board splits along racial lines over whether to hire a local Black resident or a Black applicant from out of town. One of the two Black Board members, H. Williams, resigns after bitter fight and a recall threat.</p> <p><u>May: The Board allocates \$3,000 to investigate the possibilities of reopening Casa de la Raza and Black House.</u></p>	<p><u>February: The National Task Force for Bilingual Culturally Based Education and members of Berkeley's Chicano community ask Board to investigate reopening Casa de la Raza.</u> The Board discusses spending \$3,000 on reviewing the legal possibilities of reinstating Casa and Black House.</p> <p><u>May: Three teachers fired from UN West complain to Board that no one remains in the program to teach basic skills to students.</u></p>	<p><u>January: Parsons resigns as Berkeley's NIE/ESP Project Officer in charge of programs.</u> Alvarez takes her place.</p>

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<p><u>1973-74 SCHOOL YEAR:</u>  <u>May:</u> <u>BESP Expo</u>, an entertainment and information fair, is put on by the BESP programs for the Berkeley community.</p> <p><u>Summer, 1974:</u> <u>Evaluation results for 1973-74 released.</u> <u>Level II</u> finds no major differences between BESP and non-BESP schools in terms of (1) diversity of educational offerings; (2) drop-out, truancy and vandalism rates; (3) participants' satisfaction with school. In addition, a dual-tracking in BESP is described, whereby high-achieving white "hippie" students attend one type of alternative school, low-achieving minority youths another. <u>Level I</u> disagrees with the BUSD/BESP decision to phase-out some schools and consolidate others, arguing that the affected schools are high on their "alternative-effectiveness" scale and serve a high percentage of poor and minority students.</p>	<p><u>May:</u> <u>Laval S. Wilson is appointed by Board as Berkeley's first Black Superintendent of schools.</u></p> <p><u>Summer:</u> <u>Board begins discussions about bringing six schools up to new earthquake codes, as decreed by California's Field Act.</u></p>		

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BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>Summer, 1974:</u>  <u>July: BESP participates with BUSD and other districts in three-day national conference in Emeryville on alternative education.</u></p> <p><u>August: "Operational Plan" prepared by BESP for the last 24 months of the project. Major emphasis is on the integration of fully developed alternatives and support services into the BUSD by the end of the funding period. Level I is again reorganized: staff is reduced and a new plan is drawn up for the final two years of BESP.</u></p>	<p><u>July: BESP Director Newton proposes to Board the elimination of Willard, KARE and UN West; and merger of Agora and Genesis, MSA and College Prep, and West Campus programs (Career Exploration and Basic Skills). Level I Director disagrees, stating these schools rate high on "alternativeness-effectiveness" and in serving poor and minority students. Board complains over lack of adequate evaluation information about programs and follows Newton's recommendations.</u></p> <p><u>July: Laval Wilson becomes Superintendent.</u></p> <p><u>August: Board adopts 1974-75 budget and staffing changes, including a 25¢ property tax increase; a slight reduction in classified staff; and a reshuffling of existing teaching, administrative and support staffs to fill vacancies caused by attrition.</u></p> <p><u>August: Board continues to discuss Black parents' demands for better education, allocates \$10,000 to Assistant Superintendent for this purpose.</u></p>		

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<p><u>1974-75 SCHOOL YEAR:</u></p> <p><u>Seventeen BEEP sites in operation.</u> KARE, Willard and 7th West have been closed; Genesis and Andrea merged; West Caryas Basic Skills has been renamed the West Campus High Intensity Learning Center and been given instructional emphasis on Yoga (NIA/Yoga). Staffing is a major problem at all sites as programs lose temporary employees and have to accommodate BUSD teachers from the common schools being transferred in the new staffing program.</p> <p><u>Level I is again re-structured.</u> Staff is cut to four evaluators and placed under supervision of the BUSD Director of Research and Evaluation. A new evaluation design seeks to document differences between BEEP and non-BEEP students in attitudes toward school, peers and self and in standardized achievement test scores, and to conduct a fiscal analysis of BEEP sites. Level II continues its longitudinal evaluation.</p>	<p><u>Superintendent Wilson runs pilot trial of new user evaluation in Berkeley schools.</u> Traditional direction of evaluation is reversed for all levels, having a superior evaluated by those under his/her direction or by his/her parent and student clients.</p> <p><u>Fall: Board decides not to appoint anyone to the seat left vacant by H. Williams' resignation.</u></p> <p><u>Fall: BUSD employees begin heated negotiations over 1975-76 budget and staffing, seeking cost-of-living pay increase and a promise of no layoffs.</u></p> <p><u>September: Powerful NIA and BFT unions in Berkeley seek sanction from Alameda Central Labor Council to strike for 5.75 percent pay increase denied by BUSD. Strike is forestalled by BUSD's re-hiring of 21 out of 42 temporary teachers and commitments to a 5 percent pay boost in 1974-75.</u></p>	<p><u>September: Teachers and community members protest to Board about the large-scale transfers of employees between schools that resulted from the staffing decision to fill vacancies opened up by attrition.</u></p>	<p><u>Fall: Wilson Files, State Superintendent of Instruction, publicizes new guidelines for secondary schools; guidelines emphasize the need for better instruction in basic skills.</u></p> <p><u>Fall: California legislature passes Vasconcellos Bill (AB 4114), requiring school district management and employees to make their negotiations over salaries and working conditions public, and to include citizen participation in negotiations. Measure is called the "meet and confer" negotiating process.</u></p>

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<p><u>1974-75 SCHOOL YEAR:</u>  <u>BESP Training Develops and tests in BESP schools two coordinated learning programs: Project Reading, a criterion-based curriculum guide, including behavioral objectives, diagnostic tests, reading materials and lesson plans; and Tabo Multi-Cultural Social Studies Program, coordinating reading and cultural studies for grades K-6.</u></p> <p><u>October-November: Level I and Level II evaluation staff meet to coordinate the collection and sharing of data on BESP. A shared data bank of test information about BESP students is planned.</u></p> <p><u>Spring, 1975, February: College Prep reports success: in first graduating class, 47 percent are attending four-year colleges, another 47 percent are attending two-year colleges.</u></p>	<p><u>December: Board of Education contracts with Pacific Training and Technical Assistance Corp. for a district-wide evaluation of curriculum, instruction, staffing, and district staff and client attitudes.</u></p> <p><u>February: Board adopts proposed budget reductions for 1975-76: salary increases are curtailed; ratio pay reduced; allocations for instructional supplies, employee insurance, and consultants are cut back; and plans are made to fill vacant classroom teaching slots with existing administrative staff who hold proper credentials.</u></p>	<p><u>February: Education Planning and Grade Configuration Committee proposes to Board the re-organization of the BUSD into K-5, 6-8, and 9-12 grade units.</u></p> <p><u>February: Alameda County Central Labor Council grants BUSD employees strike sanction.</u></p>	<p><u>December: Binswanger, Director of NIE/ESP, resigns. Gold is appointed acting Director.</u></p>

BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>Spring, 1975: BESP's activities include:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Pilot evaluations by Level I of NIEC sites.</li> <li>2. Re-definition by sites of program objectives and budgets in order to plan for phasing into the BUSD.</li> <li>3. Incorporation of BESP's Chicano component into Franklin's BESP.</li> <li>4. Profitful sharing by BESP and the Minneapolis ESP (SEA) of public information and evaluation strategies.</li> <li>5. Negotiations by BESP with BUSD and NIE for moving Kilimanjaro in 1975-76.</li> </ol>	<p><u>February-March: 90 classified instructional aides strike for higher pay. BUSD settles strike by increasing salaries and fringe benefits.</u></p> <p><u>March: Superintendent makes recommendations to Board about redefining grade configurations. Urges that K-3 include early childhood units, 4-6 schools remain, three 7-9 schools be created (King, Willard and West Campus) and BHS remain 10-12.</u></p> <p><u>March: BUSD administration notifies 45 temporary certificated teachers that they might not be hired for the 1975/76 school year. Many are minority staff, latest BUSD employees in BESP and other federally funded program.</u></p> <p><u>April: Berkeley elections result in a white, fiscally conservative educator joining the Board. The Board is now composed of one Black, one Asian, and three white members.</u></p> <p><u>April: BUSD forestalls teacher strike with new 1975-76 contract. Teachers promised 6.5 percent pay hike if surplus funds can be found.</u></p>	<p><u>March: Berkeley PTA Councils and other citizen groups urge teachers not to strike and BUSD's Administration to iron out difficulties with teachers.</u></p>	<p><u>March: Buckman, Berkeley's ESP Project Officer for Level II Evaluation, is reassigned within NIE. Alvarez, Berkeley's Project Officer for programs, assumes this post as well.</u></p> <p><u>March: NIE commends Kilimanjaro as "excellent and truly innovative," pledges continuing financial commitment to school for both housing and staff, and commends the program's parents for their continuing support.</u></p> <p><u>April: Cupp joins Alvarez as joint Project Officer for Berkeley's Level II Evaluation and ESP programs.</u></p>



BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>Summer, 1975: Evaluations of the 1974-75 School Year are reported. Level I reports: (1) no major differences between BESP and non-BESP students in standardized test scores; (2) some impact on BESP students' attitudes towards school at the secondary level, no noticeable impact on the elementary level; (3) greater satisfaction among BESP than non-BESP teachers in regard to school atmosphere and race relations; (4) greater satisfaction among BESP than non-BESP parents about educational programs and race relations. Level II finds: (1) BESP's diversity has decreased due to closing of several schools and movement toward the more traditional instruction and organizational processes of BUSD; (2) no major differences between BESP and non-BESP schools in terms of their quality of education as reflected by students' test scores, self-concepts, attitudes about school, or drop-out, truancy, or vandalism rates; (3) a slight decrease in minority</u> (continued on next page)</p>	<p><u>June-July: Board considers staff layoffs, salary cuts and tax increases as possible remedies for budget deficit, which now is estimated to be from \$2.5 to \$5 million. Votes a 15 percent across-the-board salary decrease and cuts back administration by six vice-principals.</u></p> <p><u>August: Board passes \$3.2 million budget for 1975-76. Increases the tax rate on children's centers, cuts teachers' salaries by 2.25 percent and classified employees' pay by 1.5 percent.</u></p> <p><u>August: Level II Evaluation has feedback session with the BUSD Administration concerning its evaluation of BESP.</u></p>	<p><u>August: Citizen's Fiscal Analysis Committee points out similarities in BUSD's budgetary crisis of 1975 and the crisis before ESP funding in 1971. Cites BESP as temporarily bailing out BUSD, but worsening its fiscal irresponsibility when temporary project employees were allowed to become permanent BUSD staff.</u></p>	<p><u>July: California Allocations Board decrees that five earthquake-unsafe schools in Berkeley can reopen in 1975-76, but under the proviso that BUSD begin reconstruction of buildings before the July 1977 deadline.</u></p> <p><u>August: Rental costs are sought for Odyssey's off-site trailers. NIE agrees to pay rental for 1975-76.</u></p> <p><u>August: BUESD teachers receive strike sanction, say a strike is likely, and take the BUSD to court to obtain an injunction against proposed pay cut and staff and program reorganization, charging the BUSD reneged on its contracts with BUSD employees.</u></p>

BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p>Summer, 1975: student enrollment in BESP; (4) a decrease in budgetary allocations at the site level; and (5) less power-sharing in BESP as the project becomes increasingly preoccupied with phasing into the BUSD in the last year of funding.</p>			

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BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1975-76 SCHOOL YEAR, FALL:</u>  <u>BESP begins last year of federal funding. The project is rocked by the financial and staffing crisis in BUSD. BESP teachers honor strike by BUSD teachers; some conduct classes for BESP students in off-site locations.</u>                      Morale in sites remains low throughout 1975-76 as non-BESP teaching staff are transferred again into BESP programs to fill vacancies, causing some discontinuity, and as BUSD plans to fire 122 tenured teachers before 1976-77, many of these being the "last hired, first fired" minority teachers in ESP programs. On Target leaves BESP and becomes part of the Career Center at Berkeley High School. West Campus BESP programs (HUI, Career Exploration, Work Experience, and Yoga/HILC) are merged in a single West Campus Alternative Program.</p>	<p><u>Sept. 3-Oct. 7: Berkeley teachers go on strike; 90 percent of Berkeley's teachers stage walkouts and some picket. Only half of BUSD's students are in school; substitute teachers are called in to handle classes. Students at Berkeley High strike to support teachers' demands.</u></p> <p><u>Sept. 8: Classified employees threaten to strike. BUSD averts action by reversing former decision to cut their salaries.</u></p> <p><u>Nov. 19: Board and teacher unions agree to accept negotiating team's recommendations. \$450,000 of the \$1.5 million in program budget cuts are restored, teachers' salaries and fringe benefits are restored to conform to the contract between teachers and the BUSD of April 1975. BUSD retains the right to transfer teachers to correct imbalances in class loads due to budget cuts and falling enrollment.</u></p>	<p><u>September: Berkeley community in uproar over teachers' strike. Many parents support strike by keeping their children out of school, some utilizing makeshift child-care arrangements supervised by striking teachers in public parks. Pressure put on both teachers and Board to negotiate to end strike. Recall petitions are filed against four Board members for mismanagement of funds.</u></p>	<p><u>September: Cupp, Berkeley's Project Officer in NIE/ESP, resigns.</u></p> <p><u>Oct. 8: Three-member negotiating team, appointed by Wilson Riles, State Superintendent of Instruction, ends teachers' strike in BUSD and begins new negotiations between BUSD and teachers.</u></p> <p><u>November: California District Court rules that Black children cannot be given standardized IQ tests unless such tests make provisions to account for cultural differences between Black and white children. Schools ordered to develop alternative tests by February 1976.</u></p>

BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1975-76 SCHOOL YEAR:</u></p> <p><u>December:</u> <u>BESP conducts workshop with BUSD staff</u> to plan for phasing BESP into BUSD in 1976-77. Recommendations are prepared and presented to Board.</p>	<p><u>November:</u> <u>Board and teachers begin discussions</u> about the possibility of firing 50-75 teachers before 1976-77 to balance the budget and maintain present salary and program-budgeted levels. Emphasis placed on eliminating inept teachers through the BUSD user evaluation plan.</p> <p><u>Nov. 25:</u> <u>Pacific Training and Technical Assistance Corp.,</u> commissioned by Board to evaluate the BUSD, presents its report: criticizes district's educational planning and coordination.</p> <p><u>Spring:</u> <u>BUSD adopts BESP Training programs</u> for use throughout BUSD in 1976-77. Project Read, other oral language programs, and the Reader Management System will be utilized. The Reader Management System, coordinating behavioral objectives, diagnostic instruments, reading materials, lesson plans, and the High Intensity Learning Centers, will be mandated for all K-6 teachers, as part of the district-wide evaluation of teachers mandated by the Stull Bill, and will be piloted in some secondary schools.</p>	<p><u>November-December:</u> <u>Citizen and teacher groups protest</u> the involuntary transfers of teacher and support staffs between Berkeley's schools. At issue are transfers out of Franklin and Jefferson.</p>	<p><u>December:</u> <u>Doyle becomes Director of NIE/ESP.</u> Gold is reassigned as Project Officer for Berkeley's Level II Evaluation.</p> <p><u>January:</u> <u>Alvarez, Berkeley's NIE/ESP officer,</u> visits Berkeley. States that the BUSD will have to assume full funding of BESP sites in 1976-77; federal funding for programs will not be extended.</p> <p><u>April:</u> <u>NIE holds conference</u> for all ESP Level II Evaluation teams to discuss the meaning of ESP and its effects on public education.</p>

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BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1975-76 SCHOOL YEAR:</u>  <u>May: BESP presents final recommendations to Board, urges BUSD to:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Continue to offer and expand small-scale diversified educational offerings.</li> <li>2. Articulate and coordinate training, curriculum development, and accounting/reporting procedures.</li> <li>3. Retain alternatives within the large common schools, set up a permanent small facility for off-site programs, and continue to maintain funding and support for alternatives.</li> <li>4. Continue as off-site alternatives: Early Learning Center, Killmanjaro, Odyssey.</li> <li>5. Continue as on-site alternatives: College Prep, MSA, HUI, NILC/Yoga, Environmental Studies, Franklin Multi-Cultural, Jefferson, John Muir.</li> <li>6. Discontinue as alternatives: East Campus, Genesis/Agora, On Target, School of the Arts, and the West Campus Alternatives.</li> </ol>	<p><u>Spring-Summer: BUSD is concerned about:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Balancing the 1976-77 budget by cutting back on program and administrative costs and planning for the firing of some certificated staff.</li> <li>2. Planning to relocate existing staff to balance shifting enrollment in Berkeley schools.</li> <li>3. Planning for remodeling the three earthquake-unsafe schools (Cragmont, Jefferson, Willard) and for relocating their staffs and students.</li> </ol>		<p><u>July: Alvarez resigns as Berkeley's ESP Project Officer. NIE extends Berkeley's ESP funding two months past the June, 1976 deadline until August 31, 1976.</u></p>

BERKELEY EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS PROJECT	BERKELEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT	THE BERKELEY COMMUNITY	STATE AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS
<p><u>1976-77 SCHOOL YEAR:</u></p> <p><u>Call: BESP is merged into BUSD.</u></p> <p>1. BESP Director Newton becomes Affirmative Action Officer for BUSD.</p> <p>2. BESP programs retained: East Campus, Early Learning Center, Jefferson, College Prep, and MSA continue as before; Kilimajaro and Odyssey are relocated in earthquake-safe rooms at Willard.</p> <p>3. BESP programs discontinued: Franklin and Environmental Studies, because of district-wide reorganization of 4-6 schools; Genesis/Agora, because of falling enrollment. John Muir is relocated in LeConte and Malcolm X because of earthquake codes. On Target is fully integrated into the Career Center at Berkeley High, and the School of the Arts becomes part of Berkeley High's Performing Arts Dept.</p>	<p><u>4-6 Intermediate schools (Columbus, Franklin, Langfellow, Malcolm X) are reorganized.</u> Teachers at each school are formed into six-teacher teams working closely together in BUSD's Reading Management Program. Teams are either traditional or alternative. Both types feature individual instruction, and parents are given the option of choosing one type or the other.</p>		

## APPENDIX II: METHODOLOGY

This appendix outlines the procedures by which the Institute for Scientific Analysis carried out its summative evaluation of the Berkeley Experimental Schools Program.

Our analysis plan was designed to be comprehensive (see Work Plan, next page). Both field observation and quantitative analysis were employed on a number of data bases reflecting the different segments of the community affected by or affecting BESP. In terms of qualitative research, classrooms were directly and systematically observed from the outset of BESP, both by ourselves and by our predecessors, Documentation and Evaluation of Experimental Programs in Schools (DEEPS). Additionally, our field staff conducted a series of open-ended interviews with administrators responsible for BESP, from individual site directors to officials in BUSD's central administration. Finally, a continuing record was kept of published material pertaining to BESP, both that produced by the program and district (e.g., publicity releases, information brochures), and relevant articles appearing in the local press.

Quantitative research took three forms: collection and analysis of statistical information on various data bases, the administration and analysis of structured survey instruments, and analyses of coded classroom observations. The first category included record searches for background statistics on our sample of students and teachers (sampling procedures for each of the data bases will be discussed below), analysis of BUSD's standardized test data for our student sample, and evaluation of fiscal data bearing on the budgetary impact of ESP on BUSD. The second category included structured interviews carried out with both our student sample and their parents for the duration of the program; with a sample of BESP and common school teachers; and with random samples of the Berkeley population. Finally, the field workers' observations were coded on-site so as to make them amenable to quantitative analysis.

Naturally, a study of this magnitude is bound to be extremely complex, both in terms of the various units of analysis and of the methods used to study them. The following is an attempt to clarify the procedures used by this study. The first section describes the various samples that comprised our data bases and their mode of selection; the second concerns itself with the design of the instruments used and the construction of scales to tap the achievement of program goals; and the third section describes the methods by which the data were processed.

CHART 1: WOPK PLAN FOR DATA COLLECTION

UNITS FOR ANALYSIS	AGGREGATE						INDIVIDUAL					
	Published Material Field Observation (From Fall 1971 onward)	BUSD Administrative Data Secondary Analysis of Level I Data	BUSD Administrative Data	Community Survey Staff and Administrative Surveys	Summarized Variables From Student Data Base	Summarized Variables From Student Data Base	Generalized Variables from School Data Base	Student-Parent Longitudinal Data	Record Searches Nonstandard Performance Data	Standard Test Scores (as available)	BUSD Administrative Data	BUSD Administrative Data
<b>A. Goals</b>												
1. Basic Skills	X	X	X	X	X					X		X
2. Educational Options	X	X	X	X	X					X		
3. Combat Racism	X	X	X	X	X					X		
<b>B. Educational Practices*</b>												
1. Curriculum	X			X	X	X				X	X	X
2. Staffing	X		X	X	X					X	X	X
Other												
<b>C. School Descriptions</b>												
1. Student Socio-Demo- graphic Composition	X		X	X	X	X				X	X	X
2. Attendance and Student Turnover	X		X	X	X					X	X	X
3. Vandalism & Violence	X			X	X	X					X	X
<b>D. Consumer Descriptions</b>												
1. Student Satisfaction	X		X			X			X		X	X
2. Parent Participation and Satisfaction	X		X		X	X					X	X
3. Choice Structure	X		X			X					X	
4. Student Progress	X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X
<b>E. Administrative Struc- ture &amp; Political Milieu</b>												
1. School Histories	X	X	X	X	X					X		
2. Decision-making Structure	X	X		X	X	X				X		

\*(Including identification of Promising Practices)

## 1. SAMPLING DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

In discussing our techniques of sample selection, we must describe three different processes: the selection of the student sample, the selection of classes for observation, and the drawing of samples for the community survey. The administrators and directors interviewed by our field staff were not subjected to sampling, since they comprise a very small population; the field staff simply interviewed all of them (N=25).

### The Student Sample

The overall goal of the sampling design was to select a student sample for interviewing that would permit us to make inferences about all students in BUSD--and certain subsets of those students--within a tolerable range of error at a specified level of confidence. A second goal was to use a sampling design that would facilitate the three-year longitudinal study of the students in our sample. For financial and methodological reasons, we finally decided that the sample would consist of first, fourth, seventh and tenth grade students. Parents of the student sample (presumably the real choice agents at the first and fourth grades) were also surveyed.

The first step toward this goal was to obtain the most current available list of registered students from the school district. This list of 14,200 ID numbers was obtained on October 15, 1973 from the data processing service of the district and provided the foundation for our sample selection. Like all lists of this type, certain students included on it no longer attended a school in the district, and others in attendance were not yet listed. Without further investigation, it was assumed that the characteristics of those who had left and of the new arrivals were similar in the aggregate.

The list included the following data for each student: grade, room assignment or counselor's code, physical school (address of school), last school attended, BUSD ID number, birthdate, sex, race, and zip code.

The data cards we were given did not, however, denote the student's actual school; i.e., on-site alternatives did not have unique codes. Only the physical school site itself was given, and to obtain a listing of students in a particular on-site alternative it was necessary to examine each student's home classroom assignment, comparing the classroom with a list of "alternative rooms" at the school. In this manner, we created a new variable equal to the child's school.

However, even after extensive consultation with BUSD data processing personnel, not all classroom numbers could be defined as common or alternative with absolute certainty. In some cases, no on-site alternative classrooms could be identified on the cards. Specifically, identifications could not be made for KARE and Willard Alternative schools because they have no standard BUSD administrative code to identify their students. Further, the BUSD had not identified any students as participating in the On Target School Program, although an administrative code does exist for this purpose. In effect, these three alternatives were administratively invisible and their students could not be distinguished from the common school students at their sites simply by using the data made available to us initially.

Two lists from the original list of ID numbers were then created. The first consisted of all first, fourth, seventh and tenth grade common school students regardless of site. The second was a list of alternative school students, including students from KARE and Willard Alternative whose names were obtained directly from their schools. Since no list of students in On Target could be obtained either from the school or the district, On Target was excluded from the sample.

#### Sampling Within the BESP Sites

The procedure used for sampling the BESP student population was predicated on our need for a sufficient number of sample subjects from each school in order to enable us to describe its unique aspects. With this in mind, the total population of those BESP schools which had fewer than 30 students in the first, fourth, seventh and tenth grades were included in the sample. Students in the other BESP schools were then selected by a stratified random procedure and use of sampling fractions. Since our previous surveys and field work had shown that secondary school students transfer out of a district at a relatively higher rate than other students, we used a higher sampling fraction at the seventh and tenth grade levels. Accordingly, after each BESP school was stratified by grade and ethnicity, a larger proportion of seventh and tenth grade students was selected in order to increase the likelihood of having an adequate number of students at the ninth and 12th grade levels two years hence (see Sampling Chart, next page).

#### Sampling Within Common School


The common school population was not stratified by school since this procedure would have produced no appreciable gain in information required by the contract. However, a minimum number of students in each grade was sought and more students in the seventh and tenth

CHART 2:

SAMPLING CHART

FOR

BESP



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grades were sampled, as in the BESP sample. The sampling procedure in the common schools consisted of stratifying the whole population by grade and ethnicity, and randomly selecting students within each of the ethnic strata from first, fourth, seventh and tenth grades. Varying sampling fractions were used to assure minimum acceptable cell size and a common school sample not to exceed 300 (see Sampling Chart, next page).

As mentioned above, the sample was drawn in order to facilitate longitudinal study; therefore, it was stratified by selected grade levels so that a three-year follow-up would give us a population of whom some members would have been in all grades of the program at some point in the study. However, in the second year of the study, it was thought necessary to add a sample of students who were then in ninth-grade BESP programs (the junior high school age cohort of the original sample was then in the eighth grade). The primary reasoning behind this was that the ninth-grade programs were unique in being single-year programs, "bridges" between the junior high and high school BESP. With the sample designed as it was, the evaluation would have ended before the effects of these programs on their students could have been measured. For this reason, a special 10 percent sample of each ninth-grade BESP program, stratified by race, was drawn in the second year. This sample was used only to describe the ninth-grade sites, and was not combined with the three-year sample for longitudinal analysis.

#### The Classroom Sample


In choosing a sample of classrooms for observation, our goal was to highlight distinctive features of the program, rather than to achieve randomness. Therefore, classrooms had to meet two criteria in order to be observed: (1) they had to include at least five of our student sample, and (2) they had to offer either instruction in basic skills (reading or mathematics) in the case of elementary school classes, or a course unique to the program (e.g., drama in School of the Arts). The number of classes which met these criteria were 288.

All of these classes were observed with use of a structured observational protocol; additionally, in the second year, the teachers of these classes themselves became a sample with whom a structured interview was conducted.

#### The Community Sample

Two community surveys were undertaken by telephone, one in 1974 and the other in 1975, to get an idea of how knowledgeable the Berkeley populace was of BESP. The community samples were

CHART 3:  
SAMPLING CHART  
FOR  
COMMON SCHOOLS



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drawn from a "reverse" (street address) telephone directory with the object of obtaining a random sample of all Berkeley residents.

The telephone numbers in Berkeley were contained in 54 pages of the directory. A calculation determined the numbers per page needed to draw 500 random telephone numbers from the directory. Once that determination was made, the length of the columns on a page were calculated at intervals. Numbers from commercial places or offices were discarded if selected, and the next non-commercial or non-office telephone number was used. In short, the procedure comprised a systematic sample with a random start, using each page of the directory.

Interviewers were instructed to go through the complete list before making a return call to unanswered phones. Numbers which were out of service were replaced by the next phone number in the directory column. Calls were made in the evening as well as during the day to insure that the sample would not be biased by an over-representation of retired people and housewives. Interviews with 492 residents were completed after two rounds of return calls.

## 2. INSTRUMENT DESIGN AND SCALE CONSTRUCTION\*

For the student interviews, three forms were used: one for seventh-12th graders, one for fourth-sixth graders, and one for first-third graders. The separate forms were necessary because of the disparities in maturational level in our large sample. The junior-senior high school instrument made cognitive demands and discussed topics that were considered inappropriate for elementary school students. Therefore, we developed simplified interview schedules for the younger segment of the sample.

### The Elementary Interview

The elementary level instrument was restricted to inquiries about the degree of a student's satisfaction with his or her school experience. We wanted a measure that was appropriate for first and fourth graders, and our first concern, therefore, was that the instrument not require the children to be verbally or conceptually sophisticated.

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\*In this section we briefly summarize the contents of the interview guides and questionnaires used, and some of the major scales constructed from the resulting data. Actual copies of the instruments were included in our previous ISA Report, A Descriptive Analysis of BESP (1974-1975), September 1, 1975.

Obviously, it was inevitable that some skill was required, but we attempted to minimize the skills that were necessary. The questionnaire we developed was administered to small groups of 2-3 children.

For each question we offered a trichotomous set of respondent alternatives consisting of faces: one smiling, one frowning, and one intended to be non-committal. Each student was asked to color in the face that indicated how he or she felt about various educational areas being probed, and the child responded by coloring in the face that corresponded with his or her feelings.

Initially we worried about whether first and fourth graders would be able to answer questions about their sense of satisfaction with school. It was possible that the attitudes of children in these age groups are situationally determined and that no consistent attitude about schooling is likely to have coalesced. Yet, when we administered the questionnaire, we found that most of the children were able to respond meaningfully to our major categories. For example, we asked our first graders if they had been instructed in reading or arithmetic, and virtually all of them knew what we were referring to when we used these terms.

Another validity question that we investigated while pre-testing our instrument concerned the test situation itself. We noted that many of the children seemed to be anxious about having the "right answer," and some copied the answers of others.

This anxiety was apparent even among first graders. Perhaps some degree of anxiety about proper performance is endemic to any educational setting. Be that as it may, we worried lest such anxiety serve to decrease the validity of instruments based on subjective reports.

In order to minimize such distortions we emphasized to the children that there was no "right answer," that the questionnaire was not a test, and that we were interested in opinions and feelings. We also asked our proctors to seat students (without being obvious about it) in such a way that copying would be detected. We then reduced the ratio of students to proctors, so that for each proctor the number of students was rarely more than three; this allowed us to monitor each child's performance fairly closely.

In the second year of the study, we felt that sampled students who were by then in the fifth grade were capable of giving more information than had been asked for in the elementary interview. We therefore developed a third form, a modification of the junior-senior high schedule described below, for use with the fifth grade.

## The Junior/Senior High School and Parent Instruments

The instrument for the Parent Survey was constructed to parallel closely the junior/senior high school interview schedule. This was considered important in view of our desire to compare the educational attitudes of students with those of their parents and to assess the effect of their correspondence or disparity on educational outcomes.

The questionnaire included, but was not limited to, (1) a choice structure battery to tap both the effectiveness of information and the sources of consumer choice in BESE, (2) a knowledge of violence and vandalism battery and (3) measures of outcomes for both parents and students. Various scales were formed in the first year by factor analysis of individual items and thereafter by B-C-TRY Cluster Analysis which was deemed, after the first year's experience, to be a more robust technique for determining relationships between the variables. A description of the scales built in this way follows.

### Factor Analysis

#### A. Parent-Student Expectations and Satisfaction with School

We included identical questions about expectations of and satisfaction with school in both student and parent interviews. Student and parent responses were then combined in a Matched-Pair Scale built on student-parent consensus about the following six general areas: agreement on choice, agreement on satisfaction with present school, agreement on perception of student progress, agreement on trust in the function of education, agreement on high interaction at home about the student's education, and agreement on future educational expectations of students.

#### B. Quality of Education Scale (QE)

Since the validity of standardized test data has been placed in doubt in recent years, educational researchers have turned to affective measures to assess student progress. The quality of education scale is one such measure that ISA developed, and is composed of the following items in the student questionnaire:

1. How satisfied are you with this school? That is, in terms of satisfaction how would you rate how you feel about your school?
2. What would you like to do when you leave high school?
3. What do you expect to do when you leave high school?
4. In academic terms, what kind of a student would you say you are?
5. How often do you cut classes?

6. Have you ever thought of dropping out?
7. Teacher-student interaction scale score:
  1. How often are your teachers willing to listen to your problems with school work and help find solutions?
  2. How often do your teachers encourage students to get together and help each other with homework?
  3. How often do they give you positive suggestions about your school work?
  4. How often do you work with teachers in planning what the school work will be--like what topics will be studied, or how they will be studied?
8. Student decision-making scale score:
  1. How often does your school give you chances to do things that are challenging?
  2. How often does your school give you chances to make your own decision about rules?
9. Trust in the function of education scale score:
  1. Do you believe if you study hard, you can succeed in the future?
  2. Do you believe that you are getting a good education in this school?
  3. Do your parents expect you to do well in school?
10. Can you honestly say you like school?
11. Do you think your school is preparing you for what you want to do in the future?

### Cluster Analysis

In the second year, having investigated more efficacious methods for constructing the scales necessary for the study, we typologized each of our samples according to the following process.

For each sample we took batteries of attitude questions (in the case of classroom data, we took a battery of observation variables), and clustered each of them by means of the B-C-TRY Cluster Analysis Program. This is a program that defines the structure of relationships between variables in a correlation matrix; it is similar to factor analysis with certain important differences: (1) B-C-TRY clusters are never orthogonal, but are always intercorrelated to some degree; (2) cluster analysis attempts to define each cluster by extracting for each a set of cluster-defining variables chosen as the most collinear variables on the cluster.\*

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\*This method was developed by R. C. Tryon and D. Bailey; a computer program and description are available at the University of California Computer Center, Berkeley.

The batteries used in this process were as follows:

Student Sample

A. Student Educational Choice Battery. A battery of Likert items investigating the importance of various aspects of schools to the student choosing the school he/she attends is posed, as follows:

As you chose the school you attend, how important were the following items in making this choice?

1. Very important
  2. Fairly important
  3. Not very important
  4. Not important at all
- 
1. College Preparation
  2. Job training or developing a job skill
  3. Emphasis on ethnic identity
  4. Emphasis on personal growth
  5. Emphasis on political education
  6. Emphasis on learning basic skills
  7. Ethnically integrated
  8. Friendly and considerate teachers
  9. Friendly atmosphere among students
  10. Good program in art, music, and drama
  11. Wide choice of electives
  12. Strict discipline
  13. Loose structure

An empirical cluster analysis of this battery revealed three clusters which intercorrelated at approximately .6. Since cluster III was defined by variables which were also definers of the other clusters, the empirical solution appeared to be a poor one; since two clusters alone accounted for nearly 90 percent of the communality in the matrix, it was suggested that a two-cluster solution would be a satisfactory one. Therefore, the operation was performed again, but restricting the rank to two. The resulting two clusters, accounting for 58 percent and 30 percent of the communality in the matrix, were identical to the first two clusters extracted empirically, confirming the validity of the manipulation.

The two clusters extracted and their definers are as follows:

Cluster I--Humanistic Educational Goals, defined by:

8. Friendly and considerate teachers important
9. Friendly atmosphere among students important
4. Emphasis on personal growth important
7. Ethnic integration important

Cluster II--Skill-Oriented Educational Goals, defined by:

2. Job training or developing a job skill important
6. Emphasis on learning basic skills important
12. Strict discipline important
1. College preparation important
5. Political education important

The correlation between these two clusters is .57; these clusters are positively associated in this sample, so some members of the sample hold both humanistic and skills-oriented goals important. This finding reflects, to some degree, the format in which the items were administered: respondents were asked, simply, which goals were important, and were not asked to rank-order the goals in terms of their importance, a procedure which would have produced sets of competing goals.

B. Student Values Index. An index of dichotomous (yes-no) questions asking which of a set of typical short and long-term goals are important to respondents is posed, as follows:

How important are each of the following items to you?

Important  
Not important

1. Getting a good job when I get out of school
2. Having friends think I am all right
3. Staying out of trouble
4. Driving around in a really nice car
5. Getting good grades in school
6. Getting by in school without doing too much work
7. Getting what I want without cheating
8. Being loyal to my friends, whatever happens
9. Having enough time to do things I want to do
10. Getting by in life without working too hard
11. Making it through the day without too much hassle

Cluster analysis extracted three clusters which had very low intercorrelations, ranging from .02 to .22. This structure accounted for more than 90 percent of the communality in the correlation matrix; however, a three-dimensional space plot of the cluster structure provided by the program revealed that one of the definers of Cluster II was actually located in the area of Cluster I; in addition, its empirically derived assignment was inconsistent with the substantive meaning of its cluster. It was therefore decided to reassign this variable (#11 below) to Cluster I; this reassignment raised the cluster intercorrelations, but did not otherwise affect the parameters of the structure. The new structure had a clearer, more interpretable meaning.

The three clusters extracted and their definers are as follows:

Cluster I--Present-Oriented Values, defined by:

10. Getting by in life without working too hard
6. Getting by in school without doing too much work
11. Making it through the day without too much hassle
4. Driving around in a really nice car

Cluster II--Peer/Socially Oriented Values, defined by:

8. Being loyal to my friends, whatever happens
2. Having friends think I am all right
9. Having enough time to do things I want to do

Cluster III--Future-Oriented Values, defined by:

5. Getting good grades in school
3. Staying out of trouble
1. Getting a good job when I get out of school

All three clusters are weakly but positively intercorrelated; Clusters I and III correlate more highly with Cluster II than with each other. The Present and Future-Oriented Value Clusters are, for all intents and purposes, orthogonal.

C. Parent Educational Choice Battery. The parent sample was asked identical questions to those in the Student Educational Choice Battery. An attempt at a cluster analysis of this matrix was unsuccessful, since there was little variance in the matrix to start with; most of the parents thought all of the goals "important" in choosing a school. Thus, we had no choice but to abandon the use of this battery in our analysis.

#### Student Record Search

In addition to the structured interview material on each student in the sample, background information was gathered by a search of the students' BUSD records. This background information included students' sex, ethnicity, the occupational level of their parents, and information on the students' school history, including schools attended, special status, if any, and disciplinary history. This information was merged with interview data, so that they could be analyzed together.

Our student data included a record of standardized test scores over the five years of BESP, collected and provided us by Level I Evaluation. These test scores provided an alternative indicator for the analysis of student progress.

Scores were provided for two test series: the Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills (CTBS), with subtests in Reading, Language, and Mathematics; and the Cooperative Achievement Tests in English and Mathematics. In general, the CTBS was administered in grades 1-8, and the Cooperative in grades 9-12; unfortunately, however, due to irregularities in the testing procedure, many scores on each test battery were missing for a large segment of the sample. Nevertheless, the remaining test data were integrated into the student data file and used, with caution, to supplement attitudinal indicators as a measure of program outcome.

#### Site Directors' Interviews

All BESP site directors were interviewed twice during the 1973/74 school year. The first interview, conducted early in the fall semester, elicited from the directors lists of classes which they felt were the most innovative in BESP. These classrooms were initially observed, since BESP protagonists felt they were the best. Subsequently, classrooms were chosen for observation according to the sampling plan described in the previous section on the Classroom Sample.

The second directors' interview was conducted at the beginning of the second semester. Most of the interview questions were designed to elicit opinions about the four BESP goals:

- Questions 1-11, improvement of basic skills.
- Questions 12-31, educational options and practices.
- Questions 32-49, racism.
- Questions 50-61, incidences of violence and school vandalism.

Several other subjects were also included in the interview, especially those bearing on the rapport between school staffs, students, and parents:

- Questions 62-68, student responses to educational opportunities.
- Questions 69-77, parental participation and responses to educational opportunities.
- Questions 78-83, power-sharing and decision-making.

#### Executive and Administrative Interviews

Key administrators in BUSD and BESP were interviewed to obtain an overall view of the project. The BESP director was interviewed numerous times during each school year. Important decisions and project interaction with NIE/ESP were monitored. Other administrative staff, e.g., of the training component and accounting office, were also interviewed.

Interviews were held during the first year with the superintendent and members of the Berkeley School Board\*, Central Administration, and other key administrators in BUSD. Upon attaining office, the new Superintendent was also interviewed.

Although initially the staff and administrative interviews were intended to be similar, it was decided that different approaches would result in more useful information.

The administrative interview, unlike the staff interview, was more loosely structured and was tape recorded. The questions that were asked of the BESP director dealt with the project as a whole, and were of the following sort:

1. Define innovation, what it means to you in an educational setting.
2. Do you think the people who are involved in BESP perceive these goals as something real and tangible? Or do you think they are still operating in a way they think is effective?
3. How about your perception of the organizational structure within BESP? What types of decisions are easily made?

The questions directed to the support staff dealt more with the operation of the project. Some questions included were:

1. Describe the history of the entire central support staff.
2. Where does the pressure for accountability come from?
3. Do you think there is competition between the alternative and common schools, or what?

#### Teacher Interviews

The sample of BESP teachers selected for interview during the first year was a 20 percent random sample of each BESP school. In BESP schools with a large staff, the sample was stratified by race and sex. The sample for the common school staff was selected to match the BESP sample by sex, race, and grade level.

The interview guide included the following topics:

1. Teacher goals and strategies.

\*All were interviewed with the exception of one school board member who was unavailable during the school year.

2. Educational options.
3. Basic skills.
4. Violence/vandalism.
5. Parental participation.
6. Racism.
7. Opinions about the Experimental Schools Project.

In the second year the teacher interview was expanded and held in conjunction with classroom observations. The second-year questionnaire contained items that covered the following issues:

1. Respondent's assessment of his/her students.
2. Judgment of the "uniqueness" of respondent's program.
3. Respondent's educational goals.
4. Retrospective comparison of program with regard to goal achievement.
5. Assessment of program's effect on vandalism, violence, and racial tension.
6. Respondent's personal educational ideology.
7. Degree to which respondent has input into curriculum changes.
8. Teaching techniques used.
9. In-service training taken.
10. Respondent's professional identity.
11. Student attendance.
12. Parent participation.

The items dealing with issue #3 above were identical to corresponding batteries in the student and parent interviews. For comparison purposes, these items were cluster-analyzed, using the B-C-TRY method (see above), revealing two goal clusters indicative of "Traditional" and "Liberal" educational goals:

Cluster I--Traditional Educational Goals, defined by:

9. Improved student scores on standardized tests.
1. Increase basic skills ability in your students.
5. Develop greater respect for discipline in your students.
13. Prepare your students for the next school year.

Cluster II--Liberal Educational Goals, defined by:

12. Encourage greater participation of students in choosing goals, planning curriculum, and other classroom activities.
4. Encourage independent activity and creative expression.
8. Develop a positive self-image in students.
13. Develop a respect for cultural pluralism in your students.

### The Community Survey

The community survey, a trend study carried on in the Berkeley community over two successive years, was concerned principally with the success of BESP in responding to the demands of consumers and potential consumers. To that end, the brief telephone questionnaire contained items referring to (1) the respondent's familiarity with BESP in general and individual BESP programs in particular, and (2) satisfaction with the school system in Berkeley, and where appropriate, with BESP.

### Classroom Observations

Observations by ISA field observers were undertaken both informally and formally. After a letter of introduction by ISA for entry into the school (classroom), the field observer's presence, impressions and subsequent informal discussions with the classroom teachers expedited the descriptions of the BESP programs as presented in Volume II. Aside from this informal means of gathering information, the development of an observation code assisted the systematic collection of data for Volume I with respect to the classroom structure, curriculum, teaching styles and use of aides. The observation code finally developed was incorporated into a checksheet format, adapted from the Weber Teacher Observation Code (Weber County School District, Ogden, Utah, 1962) and based on techniques suggested by Dr. Francis G. Cornell and his associates at the University of Illinois.

In addition, the observers noted for each classroom such information as teacher ethnicity and sex, and ethnic and sex characteristics of students. This information was combined with data from the coded observations to form a classroom observation file.

The observation instrument was pre-tested at each sampled grade level for inter-observer reliability by several ISA field observers. They completed the protocol twice per period; each recorded observation covered five minutes, during which they were instructed to focus intensely upon the classroom situation rather than to indulge in leisurely perusal or random ethnographic recording. A ten-minute interval between the two five-minute spans allowed the observers also to record classroom events other than those specifically asked for by the observation instrument.

Randomizing the observation times necessitated different approaches in elementary and secondary school classes, because the elementary schools have longer and more undifferentiated time segments per subject than those at the secondary level. In the elementary school classes the observers recorded their sets of observations at the beginning, middle and end of class periods. The

original intention of dividing secondary school class periods into two segments turned out to be unfeasible, because most classes spent at least the first five minutes "getting organized"--a factor which cut into the period considerably. Therefore, in the secondary school classes, only one five-minute time span was used for recorded observations, leaving plenty of time, of course, for noting events and details that were not covered in the observation instrument. At both elementary and secondary levels, each class was observed (at least) on two different days, selected at random. The recorded observations began in December, 1974, and extended through March, 1975 for the elementary schools and the end of January, 1975 for the secondary schools.

From the coded information garnered from these structured observations, we cluster-analyzed a number of variables so as to type the classes along empirically derived dimensions. The variables analyzed were:

1. Type of delivery--lecture/structured discussion/equal participation.
2. Type of thinking required--memory-identification/thinking-generalized/thinking-interpretation.
3. Degree of affect--none/low/high.
4. Teacher domination--does the teacher dominate class discussion, or do the students, or neither?
5. Mutuality--do both students and teachers share equally in class discussion?
6. Student domination--do students dominate class discussion, or does the teacher, or neither?  
(Questions 4, 5, and 6 were derived by dichotomizing Item 5 [Types of Domination]--teacher vs. all other categories, mutual vs. all other categories, and student vs. all other categories.)
7. Number of disciplinary interruptions.
8. Type of class goals--short/long.
9. Do students leave room without reprimand?--yes/no.
10. Peer teaching--yes/no.
11. Number of aides.
12. Number of groups into which students are divided.
13. Punitive affect.
14. Rewarding effect.  
(Questions 13 and 14 were derived by dichotomizing Item 4 [Types of Affect], similar to Questions 4, 5, and 6 above.)
15. Physical freedom.
16. Verbal freedom.  
(Questions 15 and 16 were derived by dichotomizing Item 6 [Degrees of Freedom], similar to Questions 4, 5, and 6 above.)

Since each class had anywhere from one to six observations, each of these indicators is an average of all observations of that characteristic.

Cluster analysis of the Classroom Observations Matrix produced four factors, of which two were defined by only two items in the matrix, and were also defined by definers of another cluster. The matrix was therefore reanalyzed with a rank limited to two. The resulting two cluster dimensions, which account for 52 percent and 25 percent of the communality in the matrix, correlate with each other at .36. The two clusters and their definers are:

Cluster I--Structure, defined by:

5. Mutuality in class discussion
1. Type of delivery, from lecture to equal participation
12. Number of groups into which students are divided
11. Number of aides

Cluster II--Affect, defined by:

3. Degree of affect, from high to none
14. Rewarding affect
16. Verbal freedom

Using scales composed of these two sets of items, we typed each classroom according to its degree of structural and affective "openness," and used this typology to investigate whether BESP classes differed from BUSD classes, and whether any differences found had appreciable effects on student progress.

Finally, aggregate data were collected on staffing patterns in BESP, to determine age, sex, ethnicity, teaching status, and teaching experience of the staff at each site.

### 3. DATA PROCESSING

All data processing on the Level II project was done with a software package in the social sciences called the Berkeley Transposed File Statistical System, nicknamed "PICKLE." The package was designed by the Survey Research Center at the University of California, Berkeley. The hardware system used by the project is the CDC 6400 at the University of California Computer Center.

The software system provides most of the operations required by social scientists performing statistical analyses on large amounts of data. The system includes capabilities for file management, for variable generation or transformation and for univariate, bivariate and multivariate analysis. The same "language" is used throughout the

system, so that once general rules are learned they may be applied in many instances.

The system is designed to handle a large volume of data by a transposed or inverted data structure. Most file systems store data by cases, PICKLE has the unique property of storing data by variables. The advantage of an inverted or transposed system is that it cuts down machine time needed to process data, thereby saving costs, unlike packages such as the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) which can only handle a limited number of variables. The data collected by the Level II research team would have been too voluminous to be handled by most social science software packages without splitting the data into different files and thus increasing costs in machine time. In addition, a feature of PICKLE gives it the capability of creating, from its own file, a binary file suitable for direct input to SPSS, thereby giving the PICKLE user the advantages of both programs.

EDUCATIONAL R&D AND THE CASE OF BERKELEY'S  
EXPERIMENTAL SCHOOLS

Volume II:

The Life and Fate of Individual Alternative Schools in the  
Berkeley Experimental Schools Project

Final Report Submitted under NIE/ESP Contract #NE-C-00-3-0297

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November, 1976

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## INTRODUCTION

The Institute for Scientific Analysis has compiled a summative description of all the sites that comprised the Berkeley Experimental Schools Program, not only those that still were in existence in the final year five (1975/76) of BESP, but also those that fell (or were pulled) by the wayside. This volume contains 24 site descriptions. BESP, the merger of two of the original BESP schools, Agora and Genesis.

Some BESP sites, like old soldiers, did not die, they just faded away. This complicates any count of fatalities and survivors. Consequently, some explanations will be appended to the count that follows.

Putting Agora/Genesis aside to consider the 23 separate identities that had borne the BESP stamp, we find that almost half--11--still existed as distinct units in Year Five. If the individual components of the Agora/Genesis amalgam are rated as survivors, then the score stands: survivors--13, non-survivors--10. The non-survivors had either been liquidated or assimilated.

Those liquidated were Black House and Casa de la Raza, ethnically sensitive schools; KARE and Willard Alternative, the two junior high school sites that were created bureaucratically to meet the federal requirement for K-12 comprehensiveness in the program; United Nations High School for Black underachievers in the terminal phase of that checkered career; and Yoga/Reading (HILC), a ninth-grade program that never achieved the synthesis conveyed by its name.

Three work or career-oriented programs, both at the main Berkeley high school campus and its adjunct campus for ninth graders, were liquidated into more general career-work programs, which were offered to the entire student populations on the respective campuses. The liquidated trio were Work/Study and Career Exploration at the ninth-grade West campus, and On Target at the main high school. Finally, Calcola X Environmental studies was diffused into its grades 4-6 common school host.

The 11 survivors, as of June 1976, were (in addition to Agora/Genesis):

Elementary schools - Early Learning Center, Kilimanjaro, Franklin Alternative, Jefferson Tri-Part and John Muir.

Secondary schools - Odyssey, East Campus, HUI, College Prep, Model School A and School of the Arts.

We turn now to the promised explanations. On Target and Malcolm X Environmental Studies continued to receive BESP funds in 1975/76, and thus for budgetary purposes they were still alive. However, as distinct educational sites they were dead. What remained of On Target's original program was subsumed in a Career Center that serviced any interested student on the Berkeley High campus. The residue of the Environmental Studies program was used to enrich curriculum for all 6th graders at Malcolm X. In contrast to these two sites, HUI vanished as a separate entity from the BESP budget in 1975/76, but remained very much alive on West Campus. In this instance, for administrative and budgetary purposes all BESP programs on West Campus were combined into something called West Campus Alternative, but by 1975/76 HUI was the sole remaining viable BESP program on that campus. Other BESP remnants were absorbed into a service program for all West Campus students called Career Education.

In 1976/77, the year after BESP, the number of survivors dwindled to seven. The surviving elementary schools were Early Learning Center, Kilimanjaro and John Muir. At the secondary level survivors were College Prep, East Campus, Model School A and Odyssey.

In keeping with the overall framework of this final report by ISA, the site descriptions are structured to pinpoint the four strategies inherent in NIE/ESP's research and development model. Thus, each site description is divided under four major headings:

- Emergence in Local Plan
- Articulation
- Funding
- Evaluation

## BLACK HOUSE

### ABSTRACT

Black House opened in Fall 1970 with the help of a Ford Foundation grant and was taken into the BESP fold in 1971. It was liquidated in June 1973 because the Office for Civil Rights ruled that it violated Title VI (school desegregation) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In its two years as part of BESP, Black House was under constant OCR surveillance. The cloud of suspicion, the ever present danger to its existence, were the paramount conditions of its brief life span.

The idea for the school originated in discussions between a young Black Studies consultant-instructor at Community High School (later Genesis) and some Black students who felt that CHS was so white-oriented that it did not respond to needs of Black students. The rationale for the school was as follows: Many Black students did poorly in the high schools that were, despite desegregation, permeated with the predominant assumptions, values and aspirations of white society. These students lagged because of a vast gulf between their ethnic frame of reference, both experiential and cultural, and the educational program and ambience that emerged from a different (i.e., white) experience and culture. It was hypothesized, therefore, that a school that was steeped in Black historical tradition and contemporary reality, that nurtured Black consciousness and self-esteem, that viewed subject matter from a Black perspective and in relation to the Black condition, would eliminate the gap between the community and school environments and would motivate Black students to realize their potential.

Curriculum had two emphases: basic skills (according to a BESP estimate between 80 and 90 percent of Black House students were deficient in basic skills) and Black consciousness (typical of the latter emphasis were a political economy course in Black Nation Building and a civics course called The Black Man and the Law). The student population, estimated at between 40 and 80 9-12 grade students in the two BESP years, was all Black (except for one Chicano in 1971/72), as was the staff (without exception). BESP and the Black House staff emphasized that student composition was determined by free student choice, not system coercion, and the choice was determined by the school's educational mission, not by a racial exclusion policy. These arguments were rejected by OCR. So was a plan for an Alliance of Black House; Casa de la Raza, an ethnically oriented Chicano School; and Odyssey, a multi-ethnic BESP site. Under the Alliance proposal the three schools would have retained their autonomy and the integrity of their original conception; they would have taught core courses to their respective student populations in the morning, but in the afternoon the students would have attended multi-ethnic courses that drew not only on the Alliance schools, but

also on other BESP or common schools in the district.

Forced into a defensive position, preoccupied with the struggle for survival, Black House had little inclination, time and energy for internal evaluation, and was not disposed to be hospitable to outside evaluators. Moreover, truncation of the school's troubled existence after only two years as a BESP site also impaired adequate evaluation. As a consequence there are no evaluation data on cognitive or affective growth.

However, even if such data were available and indicated a high rate of achievement, they would not have been relevant to the decisive "evaluation" that was made by OCR. The critical issue became the right of a school district to sponsor such an experiment, rather than what the experiment did or could produce. Given the fact that desegregation, as thus far implemented in the United States, has not produced conclusive evidence of overcoming ethnic inequality in educational achievement (with all the consequent implications for ethnic inequality in the society at large), it would seem that experimentation with alternatives to the prevailing patterns is valid and vital. Black House represented such experimentation, the most innovative experimentation attempted under the BESP flag. By compelling the liquidation of Black House, OCR has cast a blighting pall on a crucial area of educational experimentation in the United States.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

The origins of Black House can be traced to two sources: the "free school" movement and the powerful surge to Black identity and Black pride, which began to be generated by conspicuous currents in the Black freedom movement in the late 1960's.

The "free school" movement, in the form of Community High School I (later Genesis), served as the launching pad, but the propellant was the assertion of Blackness as a distinct and admirable value. More specifically, a young Black teacher, who was brought into CHS as a Black Studies consultant, found deep discontent among Black students at that site. They complained that CHS was oriented toward the white majority in its student body and staff, that it was not responsive, either in program or atmosphere, to needs of Black students. In discussions between the young Black teacher and the discontented Black students the idea for Black House was born. In the process of shaping the idea into a proposal for submission to the Berkeley School Board, the young teacher consulted with the originator of CHS and Herbert Kohl, the most influential "free school" proponent in Berkeley at that time.

The proposal was submitted to, and approved by, the School Board in July 1970. Black House opened in the Fall semester of that year, housed in makeshift quarters at the West Berkeley YMCA, which is in a Black community. In the plan produced by BESP in Spring 1973 for the second 30 months of the program, it was said retrospectively that "the (initial) aim of Black House was to structure an educational program which accurately reflected Black achievement and would renew the will of Black youth to learn and become prepared to survive in the hostile, racist American environment."

The young Black teacher, who was the founder of Black House and became its first director (a service that was terminated by a fatal auto accident in Summer 1971), offered a more elaborate rationale for the school. "The blatantly obvious fact," he wrote, "(is) that Black students are simply not performing according to their best abilities in Berkeley High School...The real problem at hand (is) how to motivate and teach Black students."

Berkeley High, he argued, could not solve this problem for large numbers of Black students because of a yawning gulf between the school and the home (home being used not only to designate domicile and family, but to embrace the Black community with its unique status, experience and culture). The large, "integrated" but white-dominated high school offered Black students an "ivory tower" education, unrelated to their experience and culture, and to the real problems they would have to confront in their real world. A viable alternative, he concluded, was a school that was not cloistered in a white "ivory tower" but rooted in the reality of the Black ambience, a school where shared

experience, shared culture and a broad community of aspirations created empathy and the possibilities for true communication between staff and students. Students could be motivated to learn because then education would be seen as "more than something 'the man' says one has to go through." Instead, education would be perceived as vitally relevant to the needs of the students as individuals and as members of an ethnic community. "Many students," he asserted, "cannot even begin to understand the importance of going to school unless they know that it will help their survival as Black people." Black House, as an all-Black alternative, would impart that knowledge and would, indeed, provide education designed to help the students' survival as Black people.

The essence of this argument had been articulated previously by proponents of various forms of Black autonomy at various levels of the educational system. However, here it was advanced in specific circumstances, and the form in which the argument was couched reflected these circumstances. The form was an open letter, addressed to "Whom It May Concern," dated March 29, 1971, a scant seven months after Black House opened its doors. That the founder-director felt impelled to so address a militant apologia for Black House already indicated the hostile pressures to which it was subjected from the very outset. The document was explicit on this score: the school "finds itself surrounded by heated controversy"; it is a target for "many angry epithets"; some critics have gone "so far as to include attempts to defame the characters and qualifications of some of our staff members."

To understand the intensity of feeling about Black House, it is well to remember that the school was launched in 1970. This was only two years after Berkeley had completed the bused "integration" of its entire public school system, a feat that was widely celebrated for its comprehensiveness and relative orderliness. Within Berkeley, this achievement was a source of great pride in many quarters, and nationally it enhanced the reputation of the Berkeley school system as a model to emulate.

Black House was a discordant note amid the still-resounding echoes of self-congratulation. It was a challenge to the integrationist credo. Inevitably, it offended much of the Berkeley education establishment, much of Berkeley's politically potent white liberal community, and an unmeasurable segment of the Black community that included a number of articulate Black educators and Black community figures who had been in the van of the integrationist movement.

A coincidence only exacerbated the situation. In the same year that Berkeley public schools were integrated the cry of "Black Power!" reverberated through the land. Within Berkeley, the many innuendos

of this suggestive slogan were embodied in the tangible form of the Black Panther Party. Another coincidence: 1968, the year of Berkeley school integration, was also the year when Berkeley was the scene of a sensationalized "shootout" between Black Panthers and police. In the public mind (or some part of it), it was not difficult to form a vague association: Black House-Black Power-Black Panther.

Even so brief a sketch of certain factors in the Berkeley environment circa 1970 helps to explain why the March 29, 1971 open letter from the Black House director and staff had the tone of a defiant communique from a beleaguered fortress. From its inception Black House was forced into a defensive position. A concentrated and overt manifestation of the hostility that attended the birth of Black House was an extraordinary action by the counseling staff of Berkeley High School. Even before Black House opened, the counselors announced that if and when it did open, they would not service it. They formally retreated from this position only after a dramatic confrontation with the superintendent and school board members, in which they were advised that failure to carry out their duties in relation to the new school would constitute grounds for dismissal. Abandonment of a formal position under threat of dismissal is not the same as a change of heart. Indeed, the Black House staff was never persuaded that the BHS counseling staff (with one exception) faithfully fulfilled its responsibilities to the school.

Given all the above, the question arises: why did the school board approve the Black House proposal in July 1970, which also meant district assumption of responsibility for funding the school, as this was a year before ESP came upon the scene. One tangible explanation is vigorous support of the proposal by Hazaiah Williams, a Black school board member, and Superintendent Foster. Other explanations are more speculative. Even if it is assumed that the initiative for Black House reflected only a minority sentiment in the Black community, this was a highly vocal and assertive minority at the time, and those attributes endowed it with some political clout. Moreover, with the elements of pluralism that were operative in the Berkeley school system and community, any given alternative did not have to represent a majority consensus; all it needed was a credible constituency. Black House was conceived as an experiment that would involve some 100 students at a time (out of a student population of some 15,000 in the school district). As such it was deemed worthy of active support by Foster and Williams, and if some board members had misgivings about the general conception of the school, its very modest size could have been a factor in dissuading them from entering into battle over it with such potent opponents as Foster and Williams.

Once the school had been approved and funded as a district alternative, it was hardly politic to exclude it from the BESP package that was submitted to OE/ESP in June 1971. And once Black House became the recipient of federal funds, it was also subject to special federal scrutiny. Federal pressures, it soon became apparent, could be far more formidable than hostility or criticism within Berkeley.

In Spring 1971 (just about the time when BUSD was drafting its experimental schools plan for submission to OE/ESP), the U. S. Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity conducted hearings in Berkeley (and elsewhere) on the progress of desegregation and its effects upon educational opportunity. The committee exhibited particular interest in Berkeley's system of educational options and seemed to regard such schools as Black House and Casa de la Raza (a Chicano school that was being proposed as part of BESP) as acceptable experiments in coping with problems of certain minority students.

Among those not present at the hearing was Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas, a committee member. Later that year, after Black House and Casa had been approved for federal ESP funding, McClellan dispatched a letter to the Office for Civil Rights, the HEW agency charged with primary responsibility for enforcing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. McClellan posed a question: how could OCR legally countenance such "segregated" schools as Black House and Casa even as it was insisting on desegregation of the Arkansas school system? The question seemed simple, but an answer would have been complicated--if it had been given. OCR chose not to answer this question; instead it decided to investigate the two schools and subsequently adopted the position that they could not, in fact, be legally countenanced.

McClellan's thrust and the OCR response created an embarrassing situation for HEW. In approving the BESP package, including Black House and Casa, OE ruled, in effect, that the two ethnic schools were acceptable educational experiments. Thus, it appeared that two agencies of HEW were at loggerheads. However, there was no public clash. A defense of the two controversial schools would have faced formidable political odds. Some of these were:

1. Paradoxically, in Berkeley the greatest misgivings about the two schools were voiced by committed integrationists, but in Washington the pressure against them was being applied by a traditional leader of segregationist forces. To be sure, the motivations were opposite, but just the same the practical effect was to lodge the two schools between two very heavy millstones in the educational mill.

2. A conspicuous peculiarity of American politics is a re-current bloc between Republicans and Conservative Southern Democrats in the Congress. For a Republican Administration faced with a Democratic majority in Congress that bloc is the best hope for getting much of its program through the legislative process. This was the situation in 1970-73. McClellan was an influential spokesman of the conservative Southern Democrats in Congress, and it may be assumed that the Nixon Administration would not lightly risk his displeasure.

3. Within Berkeley, as already indicated, there was a serious cleavage about Black House. The school district was not in a position to play the political trump of a united citizenry behind it on this issue. Moreover, defiance of the OCR finding that Black House and Casa, as constituted, did violate Title VI would have jeopardized not only federal funding for the two controversial schools, but all federal funds coming into the district. The district could reasonably assume that this was an intolerable price to pay.

4. Finally, the issues posed by the two schools were complex. Powerful arguments could be advanced for their validity as educational experiments, but at the same time, as McClellan clearly demonstrated, they could also be used by segregationists to embarrass the implementation of the officially adopted public policy of school desegregation. Aside from their susceptibility to use as political foils, there was also the honest conviction in integrationist circles that separatist schools at this juncture represented a retrograde step educationally and sociologically.

Considering the above factors, it would seem in retrospect that once McClellan prodded OCR the fate of Black House was sealed. But the denouement was delayed. McClellan made his move just as Black House became a BESP site and two full school years passed before it was terminated in June 1973. If local hostilities and pressures pushed Black House into a defensive position in the pre-BESP period, the subsequent federal pressures, with the power of legal sanctions behind them, magnified and solidified the beleaguered fortress mentality. Sporadic ISA observations at the site confirm that the director and staff were so preoccupied with the struggle for survival that other problems received inadequate attention. The circumstances were not designed to encourage a welcome to outside evaluators.

The most ambitious strategy devised to deflect the OCR axe was the Alliance plan. The plan, shaped over an extended time in the 1972/73 school year and intended for implementation in the Fall 1973 semester, proposed an alliance of Black House, Casa and Odyssey, a

multi-ethnic BESP site. These three off-site schools were to retain core courses for their respective student populations, and the integrity of their original conceptions. However, they were also to offer supplementary programs in which they not only shared their resources, but also utilized the facilities of BUSD common schools. "The purpose of the Alliance," the plan explained, "is to link the ethnically oriented education that Black House and Casa have developed to the multi-cultural emphasis that is offered by Odyssey and other alternatives in the Berkeley district." The core courses were to be scheduled for the morning, and the other courses, exposing Alliance students to multi-ethnic settings and multi-cultural programs, were set for the afternoon. Examples of proposed daily schedules were as follows:

A 10th-grade student at Black House would attend classes, one hour each, in U. S. History, Black Studies, and Intermediate Reading and Writing at Black House. After the lunch break he would, along with students from other Alliance sites, take Physical Education at Casa and Multi-Art at Odyssey. His final period would be devoted to a Physics class at Berkeley High, attended by other Alliance students as well as Berkeley High students, enrolled in either alternative programs or the common school program.

A sixth-grade student at Casa would take World History, Math, and Language Arts at Casa in the morning. In the afternoon he would attend a Science and a Music class at Longfellow Elementary (4-6) School.

On June 13, 1973, OCR formally rejected the Alliance proposal. OCR insisted that "no student be permitted to attend a one-race or racially isolated class for greater than 25 percent of any school day." Compliance with this condition (along with some others) would have effectively nullified the rationale for Black House and Casa, as originally conceived. At this point BUSD was threatened with non-approval of its \$2,867,735 ESP contract (for the December 1973-June 1976 period) unless the two schools were closed pending adoption of a compliance plan satisfactory to OCR. The BUSD superintendent thereupon notified OCR: "We will discontinue the operation of Black House and Casa de la Raza schools."

Having sketched the history that involved the legal right of Black House to live, we turn now to what it did (aside from struggling for survival) while it was alive.

Precise data are hard to come by. When the school closed the incumbent director retained all its records. District record-keeping was spotty. Access for evaluators was uneven and uncertain. As a consequence one must rely on the best approximations.

Black House opened in the Fall 1970 semester with approximately 40 10-12 grade students, six staff members (including the founder-director), a \$28,000 Ford Foundation grant, and cramped quarters in the West Berkeley YMCA.

With BESP funding, it moved in 1971 to more ample quarters in a remodeled warehouse-office building in West Berkeley's industrial district, bordering on Black and Chicano residential communities. The student population in 1971/72 was between 40 and 70, depending upon which estimate and which method for computation are accepted. The district attendance roster carried 40 students at Black House. But this excluded students who attended Black House classes, although they were enrolled at Berkeley High School. A BESP brochure estimated "about 60" students in this school year. ISA's Report No. 1: A Retrospective Description of BUSD/BESP from Its Inception Through June 1973 (dated September 1, 1973) put the student number at "approximately 70."

A similar uncertainty attends staff size. The central BESP office estimated that certificated staff ranged between 1.8 and 3.5 full-time equivalents in 1971/72; the district attendance office put that figure at 1.4. ISA observers reported that the classified staff roster ranged between 5 and 7 in that year, and that 6 consultants and 4 work-study students rounded out the staff. The grade spread became 9-12. The administration consisted of a full-time director and a secretary.

Stated objectives were:

1. To develop ethnic pride
2. To develop a knowledge of Black history, art, literature and culture, and a consciousness of the Black experience.
3. To create a functional relationship between the school and the Black community.
4. To help students develop self-discipline, self-awareness, self-direction and motivation.
5. To develop communication and thinking skills.

To help realize these objectives, the curriculum for Fall 1971 included such class subjects as:

African Literature	Black Philosophy	Black Music
Science	Black Art	Math
Creative Writing	Black Man	Photography
Reading and Writing	Slavery, Civil War, and Reconstruction	Rewriting Black History and Literature

Class scheduling resembled college patterns more closely than conventional high school patterns. If three hours per week were earmarked for a particular course, for example, it could be offered in three one-hour sessions, or in two 90-minute sessions, or in a block of three hours. Such flexibility was facilitated by the smallness of the overall student population and the smallness of individual classes.

Black House also experimented with what was called a "sexemester" (six six-week sessions within the school year, three sessions in each semester). It was felt that these short but concentrated courses would be particularly useful in teaching basic skills, helping to develop a positive attitude among students by imparting to them a sense of productivity and accomplishment upon completion of each six-week session. This system was employed in the Fall 1972 semester. For the Spring 1973 semester a modification was introduced: the semester was divided into two nine-week sessions.

According to the BESP plan for the second 30 months of the program, between 80 and 90 percent of Black House students were deficient in basic skills, and consequently a primary focus of the school was on basic skills. Team teaching, small class sizes (one teacher for 15 students), and special tutors from U. C. complemented the experimentation with class scheduling and sub-division of the semester into smaller time periods in the effort to further the acquisition of basic skills.

In interviews with ISA, administrative personnel stressed an insistence on student discipline and a serious commitment to learning. It was stated repeatedly that Black House was not the place for "jiving around." To corroborate this point, there was a decision in the Spring 1973 semester to drop 16 students because they were not responsive to the program. There were also instances when students were refused enrollment because of an apparent inclination to view the school as a congenial and convenient locale for dubious activities.

In the 1972/73 school year student population was estimated (by central BESP) at about 80 and a goal of 100 students was set. (An ISA observer counted 69 students at the school in the Spring 1973 semester, 38 males and 31 females.) The curriculum retained its dual emphasis on Black consciousness and basic skills. Typical of the Black consciousness emphasis were a political economy course in Black Nation Building and a civics course called The Black Man and the Law.

Only students who volunteered (and this included those referred by counselors) were admitted to the school. The enrollment was all

Black, except for one non-Black student (a Chicano) in the 1971/72 school year. The staff was all Black throughout the school's existence. ISA observation discerned a change in student composition between the school's first year, pre-BESP, and subsequent years when it was in the BESP fold. In the first year more than half of the students came from middle-class families. This was probably due to the principal source of the initial enrollment--Community High School. In the subsequent years the students were predominantly of working-class origin, and an ISA observer estimated that about 50 percent came from single-parent families. In part, according to Black House staff, the change in composition was due to the inclination of the Berkeley High School counseling staff to view Black House as a remedial program. About 30 percent of the Black House students in 1972/73 were steered to the school by BHS counselors. The staff would have preferred a more representative cross-section of Black students, both with respect to academic achievement and socioeconomic status.

Governance of the school was lodged essentially in the director and staff who made the major decisions through consensus. Parent understanding of, and support for, the school were sought, but parents were not involved in the governing process. Nor were the students.

One must remember that Black House existed as a BESP site for only two years, and in all that time it was under constant pressure. It is tempting--but idle--to speculate about what might have been, had it lived longer, and without the OCR axe over its head.

#### ARTICULATION

Because of its unique and concentrated Black consciousness orientation, Black House did not readily fit into a system-wide articulation scheme. Any student in grades 9-12 could choose Black House and secure admission on a showing of serious attitude toward the school's program. Consequently all Berkeley public schools that served these grades, as well as the grades 7-8 junior high schools, were potential recruiting grounds for Black House. To be sure, students in Black Studies courses at other sites could transfer to Black House for what was presumably a more comprehensive and more intensive Black Studies curriculum, but this hardly made for a systematic articulation design.

An undetermined number of Black House students also took courses at Berkeley High School, which possessed facilities (e.g., science laboratories) that Black House did not. Here again, the evidence is that this was a matter of individual choice, and not part of an articulation pattern.

From the available data it is not possible to spell out the articulation within the school. However, students did graduate from Black House, indicating that a process of articulation was at work.

## FUNDING

Because of the uncertainty that shadowed the existence of Black House from the outset it is unlikely that five-year forward funding could have been reassuring on the issue of continuity over the allotted time span.

Like administrators of other alternative schools, especially those that were off-site, Black House administrators complained about a tight budget. However, no claim was made that Black House was discriminated against in the allocation of BESP funds.

In the pre-BESP year, 1970/71, Black House was funded by a \$28,000 Ford Foundation grant that supplemented BUSD allocations. During the BESP years, BESP allocations to Black House were:

1971/72 - \$35,242

1972/73 - \$55,266

Salaries were the major item in both years. Building costs were the biggest non-salary items: \$10,000 in 1971/72 and \$18,450 in 1972/73.

## EVALUATION

As noted previously the embattled status of Black House created a virtually insurmountable obstacle to objective evaluation. With the administration and staff feeling that the school was a target of hostility and distrust, and that it was threatened with extinction, a disinclination to objective in-house evaluation is understandable. Moreover, the insistent demands of the struggle for survival left little if any time or energy to design an on-site evaluation system. The circumstances were also not conducive to an open-door policy for outside evaluators, or for acceptance of institutionalized district-wide evaluation measures. On the latter score, the argument could be made that since Black House was attempting to do something that no other Berkeley school was doing, its performance could not be measured by the same yardsticks as were used for other schools. This argument was, in fact, made in rejecting the standard CTBS. The issue of CTBS, or some alternative, was being negotiated by Black House and central BESP, but the school was closed before the negotiations were concluded.

Level I did attempt to test student attitudes toward Black House, but only 18 students responded, which invalidated the test as an evaluation measure. All 18, however, expressed a very positive attitude toward Black House.

All that remains of an evaluative nature are field notes of ISA observers and several estimates by Black House personnel and central BESP. The latter estimates were offered from a defensive

position and are, therefore, vulnerable to the charge that they are self-serving.

ISA field notes describe, by and large, good morale and self-discipline among Black House students, a dedicated staff, an atmosphere of "restrained relaxation," a sense of community, and a satisfactory rapport between staff and students.

The school's founder-director made these assertions after it was in existence for seven months:

We feel that in the past months we have very definitely seen positive improvements in our students. For example, there have been measurable changes in our students' communication skills (i.e., reading, writing, speaking and thinking). Initially we had to encourage students to get over the negative feelings they had of themselves so they could admit to their deficiencies and positively work on improving them.

\* \* \* \* \*

Many of the changes we have implemented, we feel, are valuable to educational theory on any level. Small classrooms, a relaxing environment, informal teacher-student relations, college oriented class scheduling and, most importantly, building an educational system flexible enough so that it revolves around the student and his needs instead of the teacher and his lesson plans, are innovations essential to improving the educational system.

In a presentation of the Alliance Proposal (as an appendix to the second 30-month Plan for BESP), central BESP bracketed Black House and Casa in these observations.

The success of both schools, whether measured in terms of student enthusiasm or student willingness to pursue further education, has been remarkable. Over half of Black House and Casa graduates have gone on to post-secondary schooling; that feat is all the more remarkable when one realizes that these students were drop-outs from the regular system, literally plucked off the streets. Students at both schools report stronger feelings of self-worth, greater appreciation for their cultural



heritage, increased understanding of other groups and--perhaps most significant for this proposal--greater enthusiasm for additional ethnically and culturally diverse experiences.

As suggested previously, there might well be a self-serving edge in the above statements. They were ventured in a context of defense and advocacy. They are not buttressed with hard data. Nonetheless, they emanated from sources that had familiarity with, and responsibility for, Black House.

Perhaps the most important datum of all is that the decisive "evaluation" of Black House was rendered by the Office for Civil Rights, and customary measurements of educational performance and achievement did not enter into it (except by strained allusion to the premises of the Supreme Court's school desegregation decision of 1954). Suppose, for instance, that Black House had done fantastically well in improving the basic skills of its students, as measured by the most honored of standard tests, would this have dissuaded OCR from rendering its summary judgment? Actually, Black House was given neither the opportunity (by dint of the relentless pressure to which it was subjected) nor the time to show what it could do. Hence, pro forma evaluation is of dubious relevance.

What was, in fact, evaluated was its raison d'être, and its right to exist. We therefore deem it appropriate to summarize the arguments for the school's right to exist as expressed by the advocates of Black House in the Berkeley school system, and to append a brief observation of our own.

The principal arguments, which were contained in documents by the Black House founder, by BESP, its legal counsel, and the BUSD superintendent, may be fairly summarized as follows:

1. The Black composition of the student population at Black House was the result of choice, not system coercion. This was true for those who chose to enroll in the school, and those who chose not to enroll. Since the development of Black consciousness and Black pride were central to the school's educational mission, it is understandable why white students chose not to enroll in it. But the choice was theirs, and it was based on a perception of educational needs, not skin color, and there was no policy of exclusion on the latter criterion.

2. Related to the above, the school was constituted as it was to achieve an educational purpose. This affirmative purpose was altogether different from a negative intent of achieving racial exclusion, especially when such exclusion is coupled with a sense of racial supremacy and superiority. Both the founder-director of Black House and the BUSD Office of Project Planning

and Development (in a draft paper, dated February 1, 1971) cited evidence to support the school's educational purpose: Black students were performing poorly in the large, desegregated high school. It was, therefore, proper to experiment with alternative settings to overcome the achievement lag.

3. BUSD had implemented district-wide desegregation. This district whole was not altered essentially by the existence of parts (small parts at that) which, in the pursuit of educational diversity and experimentation to find better ways of meeting demonstrable educational needs, departed from the district norm. Moreover, these ventures were experimental, and their duration was therefore limited to a time necessary to demonstrate success or failure.

4. On a more abstract philosophical plane there is the complex issue of what integration means in practice, and what is its relationship to assimilation. When Black students are thrust into an educational environment dominated by prevailing mores, needs and aspirations of the white society, and permeated with institutional racism, some may be assimilated (e.g., those who, for some reason or other, feel competent to compete on the terrain delineated by white society), while many will be maimed or destroyed. The latter outcome is likely because of the gap between the educational setting and the communal experience and cultural frames of reference of the Black students. Furthermore, white domination, within an integrated framework, reinforces the historical patterns of white supremacy, and is therefore destructive of pride and a sense of self-worth among too many Black students. Integration without equality may be a chimera, a replication of the racist caste system in a new guise, irrespective of the sincere desire among integrationists to achieve something different and better. If, in fact, the large, impersonal, white-dominated and white-oriented setting of Berkeley High lacerates the self-esteem of some Black students and diminishes their learning achievement, then it is not only permissible, but obligatory, to seek alternative settings that are likely to produce positive outcomes. And if, in fact, it turns out that Black autonomy, which creates an atmosphere and program that are rooted in Black experience and are responsive to distinct Black needs, provides a positive alternative setting, then it will enhance the possibilities for authentic integration. That is, by instilling in Black students a proud awareness of their own culture and an appreciation of the value of their Blackness, and by consequently motivating them to realize their potential for learning, it will equip them to enter into multi-ethnic and multi-cultural situations without being submerged, overwhelmed and alienated. They will have a sufficient sense of self-confidence and self-worth, both as individuals and members of an ethnic community, to enter into functional relationships with their contemporaries on a psychological plane of equality. In this conception, the unity of integration is best achieved through ethnic and cultural diversity, including the opportunity for autonomous manifestations of this diversity.

It seems to us that the above arguments have sufficient substance to justify at least the sort of educational experiment that Black House (and Casa) represent. Of all the alternatives in the BESE fold, Black House (and Casa) were the most innovative experiments by far. We are too cognizant of the complexity of racism and racial division in the United States, of the deep historical roots of these phenomena, to offer any simple solutions for these organic problems of our society. By the same token, the illegalization of the Black House experiment strikes us as simplistic. In education, as in other spheres of American society, racism, racial division and their consequences are still so much with us that one may prudently predict that much travail, conflict, pain--and innovative experimentation--will have to be traversed before these societal deformities are overcome. In such an expansive historical and societal context, Black House is a small thing. Still, it might have perhaps offered some clues as to what could usefully be done at this historical moment to cope with problems in education that are universally recognized as staggering. Perhaps, it could have provided empirical data to shed some small light on what should not be done. We will never know.

## CASA DE LA RAZA

### ABSTRACT

The plan for Casa de la Raza was produced by an ad hoc committee in Berkeley's relatively small Chicano community, which also selected the school's first director and assistant director. Staff recruitment was also performed by a Chicano community group.

An authentic community product, Casa opened as a BESP site in Fall 1971 and was immediately subject to investigation by the Office for Civil Rights on charges of practicing segregation in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Like Black House, Casa was compelled to close in June 1973 when OCR returned its verdict of guilty as charged.

Casa was a K-12 school with a bilingual curriculum that aimed to meet the special problems and needs of Chicano children, not only through bilingualism but also with a curriculum and atmosphere that were informed with Chicano culture and values. Its founders argued that the language (English) and the culture and values (Anglo) of conventional U. S. schools imposed enormous handicaps upon Chicano students reared in Spanish-speaking homes and the Chicano traditions. Casa was designed to eliminate such handicaps.

Community participation in Casa was impressive. Almost a third of the 427 Chicano students in Berkeley's public schools attended Casa. Enrollment ranged from some 130 in 1971/72 to 95 in 1972/73. The drop was explained by dissension about the "free school" atmosphere in the first year, deficient housing for the school (four wooden bungalows with poor light, no heat, and portable outside privies), and OCR pressures. In the second year, there was a new administration, a more structured format, and a sharper focus on basic skills.

Casa was governed by La Mesa Directiva, which was composed of three staff members, three students and three parents. Its regular staff was supplemented by 20-30 volunteers, including students from the University of California and local colleges, parents, and professionals from the Chicano community. It also served as a community center, especially on ceremonial occasions (e.g., Cinco de Mayo, a Chicano holiday).

For all of its two-year life span Casa was under the cloud of OCR investigation, and thus forced into a preoccupation with the struggle for the right to survive. This circumstance compounded the difficulties in designing a system of evaluation that corresponded to Casa's unique character and needs.

No hard evaluation data are available on Casa. As was true of Black House, the decisive "evaluation" of Casa was rendered by OCR, which was not concerned with specific educational outcomes at Casa. In a reply to OCR charges, Casa's staff said the school was culturally based, not intentionally segregated; that attendance was by student choice, not system coercion; that the school addressed definite educational needs of Chicano students. Casa's purpose, said the staff, was to correct ills inflicted upon Chicano children by discrimination, and it was thus unjust to call the school discriminatory. OCR rejected this defense, and also refused to accept the Alliance proposal as an alternative (see Black House description).

The fundamental issue posed by OCR's liquidation of Casa (and of Black House) was whether the legally permissible range of experimentation to overcome the acknowledged educational deficit for disadvantaged ethnic minorities in our multi-ethnic, multi-cultural society included a cultural pluralism that allowed for experimental schools based on an autonomous ethnic and cultural identity. To state the issue is already to indicate its magnitude for U. S. education.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

Casa de la Raza opened in Fall 1971 as a BESP site. This timing stamped it as part of the strong alternative education current in Berkeley, but its origins can be traced to the ethnic awakening in the latter half of the 1960's that introduced such words as Chicano and Raza into the vocabulary of California and the Southwest, and thrust upon the national scene such diverse personalities as Cesar Chavez and Reies Lopez Tijerina.

Pressures from Berkeley's relatively small Chicano community brought Casa into being as an alternative school that would embody Chicano culture and meet the special needs of Chicano children. The community pressures were generated by the widespread feeling that traditional U. S. education served Chicanos very poorly; that classes taught solely in English imposed an enormous handicap upon students reared in Spanish-speaking homes; that schools, whose atmosphere and curriculum were steeped in Anglo tradition and culture, alienated Chicano students with their different ethnic background. As a consequence, it was argued, the traditional schools virtually guaranteed academic underachievement by Chicano students, lowered their self-esteem and diminished their aspirations. Indeed, it was said among Chicanos that the traditional schools tended to lessen the Chicano student's command of the Spanish he had learned at home, even as they supplied him with a woefully inadequate command of English; thus, the ultimate triumph of such a system was a functional illiterate in not just one, but two languages! Casa, as a bilingual school informed with Chicano culture, was offered as the viable alternative to all that was deplored in the conventional schools.

Casa was the most innovative of all the BESP sites in three respects:

1. It was a K-12 school.
2. Its curriculum was bilingual.
3. It provided the greatest degree of community participation in school policy-making.

Nonetheless, from the outset Casa, like Black House, was shadowed by an investigation by the Office for Civil Rights on charges of practicing "segregation" in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. As with Black House, the investigative and judgmental process extended over two years before the final verdict that shut down Casa. The history of OCR intervention is sketched in the description of Black House, as is the Alliance proposal, the most comprehensive strategy devised to save the two ethnically

oriented schools. This information will not be repeated here.

What bears repetition, however, is the destructive effect upon a school of spending a brief two-year life span under an ominous cloud. The uniquely innovative character of Casa only exacerbated that effect, as the nature of true innovation entails trial and error and free, vigorous debate about alternatives, but the exercise of such vital functions is inhibited when the innovative institution is constantly compelled to defend its right to live. A defensive posture tends to breed the excess of caution that is the blight of innovation.

Despite their common fate, Casa was significantly different from Black House in certain respects (in addition to ethnicity, grade range and curriculum), as follows:

1. Although its ethnic community was much smaller, Casa seemed to command a greater proportion of active support within it. One observer\* noted, for example, that whereas Black House enrolled some 75 students out of the 1,400 Black students in Berkeley high schools, Casa enrolled some 125 students out of the 427 Chicano students in the Berkeley public schools. The comparable ratios were 1:3.4 for Casa and 1:19 for Black House; that is, Casa did about six times as well as Black House did in recruiting students from their respective ethnic constituencies.
2. Black House was governed essentially by the director and staff; Casa was governed by La Mesa Directiva, which was composed of teachers, students and parents. Moreover, the assistant director was a community representative who did not come from the educational system. Also, Casa served as a Chicano community center, especially on such ceremonial occasions as the celebration of Cinco de Mayo, a Chicano holiday.
3. A post mortem analysis of the Casa experience was performed by Chicanos (Casa de la Raza, published by the Southwest Network, Clearinghouse for Chicano Alternative Education, Hayward, California).

The case for Casa vs. the OCR was stated by the Casa staff in the terminal phase of their confrontation:

We at Casa are not an intentionally segregated school. We are a culturally based school.  
Attendance at Casa is by student choice, not

\*Appleton, Susan Frelich, "Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitution, the Civil Rights Act, and the Berkeley Experiment," California Law Review, Vol. 61:858, May, 1973, pp. 26-86.

system coercion. Raza children have definite educational needs and Casa de la Raza is an alternative school that addresses itself to those needs. In fact, Casa attempts to correct the ills projected onto Chicano children by discrimination. We do not see how a program that tries to correct ills caused by discrimination can also be discriminatory. (Casa de la Raza, p. 9).

What Casa was about is well exemplified in the school's statement of teacher recruitment policy:

Casa seeks teachers who are not only competent in the subject matter areas, but who also are committed to Carnalismo, Raza culture, language and the values of Casa. They must understand that teaching Chicanos is not a job but a movement.\*

A common ideological commitment to teaching as a movement does not, in itself, answer the question of how to teach. On this score there was great dissension within Casa from the beginning. Broadly defined, the issues between contending forces were "freedom" vs. structure, and the proper relationship between ideological abstractions and basic skill tangibles. How much emphasis should be accorded such ideological and/or anthropological concepts as Raza, Chicano and Carnalismo, and how much to development of proficiency in speaking, reading and writing in two languages? On the theoretical plane it could be agreed that there was no fatal contradiction between nurturing ethnic consciousness and imparting basic skills; that, in fact, a synthesis of the two would afford the best education for Chicano students. But this did not preclude disagreement about proportion and emphasis in the practical implementation of a theoretically conceived synthesis.

In Casa's first year, 1971/72, there was much dissension and considerable experimentation involving the issues above. At the end of the school year the director was replaced, and with the new director there was a shift to a more structured format and sharper focus on basic skills. The shift in emphasis is indicated by a comparison of an initial statement of Casa objectives (June 1971) and a revised statement drafted by the staff in Spring 1972.

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\*For a comment on the implications of the contradiction between Casa's teacher recruitment policy and BUSD policy, see ISA's report, A Preliminary Descriptive Analysis of the Berkeley Experimental Schools Program (1973-1974), September 1, 1974, p. 41.

The June 1971 statement included these objectives:

1. That 75 percent of the students in grades K-12 would become aware of and value their cultural heritage, traditions and values, as measured through positive attitudes reflected in the interpersonal relationships within their group and with other groups throughout the community.
2. That on a continuing basis, students would demonstrate self-actualization through the initiation and pursuit of goals and options related to their learning activities.
3. That 75-80 percent of all students would, according to the dominant language of the students, achieve one year's growth in basic language and math skills for each year of attendance.
4. That the staff would be prepared and provided bilingual training toward effective teaching of the second language through all-day involvement in the teaching-learning process in theory, language and practice. Strengths, techniques, tools, methods and materials would be developed. In addition, bilingual staff would learn through first-hand personal and academic inter-relationships with students and parents.

The above was amended by the Spring 1972 statement to include the following:

1. To train students to operate bilingually.
2. To get parents more involved in the educational experience of their children.
3. To deliver the basic skills.
4. To enable students to learn by doing.
5. To instill the concept of "carnalismo" (brotherhood) in students.
6. To train staff in bilingual techniques of teaching.

In a description of Casa (in Second 30-Month Plan), BESP said: "During the first ten months of the ESP program, Casa experimented with the idea of a free school. The curriculum was flexibly adapted to students' needs and the school day was not

structured into specific class periods. Classrooms were self-contained. Organizationally, Casa experimented with different administrative structures...."

Although progress was observed in these ten months (in students' pride and attitudes, and in a decline of absenteeism), BESP went on, "At the same time, the free school atmosphere produced a 'freedom shock' on the part of many students. An evaluation by staff, students and parents led to a re-orientation of the school. The school would continue with the same philosophy but would try a different structure. The change in educational methodology led to a revision of the school administrative structure."

The change in emphasis was, in part, a response to the demands of a sizable group of parents, who wanted more attention to basic skills, more structure, more discipline. However, the change was too late to hold many of these parents (and their children), who were repelled by the dissension and experimentation, which created an atmosphere of instability in the first year. The consequence was a significant drop in enrollment in the second year. It is not possible, of course, to gauge just how much the OCR investigation contributed to the sense of instability, although it may be reasonably assumed that it was a contributing factor.

An examination of Casa rolls for 1971/72 by an ISA observer yielded the names of 168 students. Some of these, however, attended for only a brief spell to see what Casa was like. In the lower grades, it was mostly parents who terminated such "trial period" enrollment of their children. More realistically, BUSD/BESP estimated the first year's enrollment between 132 (in the Alliance proposal) and 140 (in a sketch of Casa for the final 30-month plan). Enrollment for 1972/73 dropped to 95 (an official BUSD estimate corroborated by an ISA field observer's count). The decline approximated 39 percent.

Glaring defects in physical plant might well have contributed to the enrollment decline. For its first year, Casa was housed in four wooden bungalows behind Martin Luther King Junior High School. Lighting was poor, and there were no heating facilities (although it does get uncomfortably chilly in Berkeley during the winter). The toilet facilities were outside portable toilets. A gym and cafeteria had to be shared with King. Matters were not made better by a reported resentment among King students of their Casa neighbors. Certain other facilities (e.g., for science classes) were also lacking for what was planned as an autonomous, self-contained school.

There was some, but not much, improvement in facilities for the second year. Casa was transplanted into eight new green trailers, about a block and a half from King, in an area that

turned to mud when it rained; not until late January 1973 were asphalt pathways laid. The facilities were better than the year before, but parents (and students) who had to decide about enrollment in Fall 1972 were influenced by the discomforts of the first year.

A certain improvisation also attended recruitment of the initial staff. The director and assistant director were selected by an ad hoc group of 15-20 members of the Chicano community. This group had written the Casa proposal and included members of a short-lived Chicano Task Force and BABEL (Bay Area Bilingual Education League), along with some students from the University of California. Neither the director nor the assistant was a credentialed school administrator. They were selected primarily on the basis of their experience in the Chicano community, in Chicano education, and in dealing with BUSD on issues of concern to Chicanos. The instructional staff was recruited through an informal community grapevine and the employment of each member was subject to approval by an ad hoc community group.

The regular staff consisted of eight teachers (four full-time and four part-time, which added up to six full-time certificated positions) plus four classified employees: a clerical worker and three part-time teacher aides. There were also consultants and 20-30 volunteers, including students from the University of California and nearby colleges who helped with individualized instruction, as well as professionals and semi-professionals (some of them parents of Casa students) from the Chicano community, and a few interested parents who accompanied students on field trips, assisted in the classroom, provided transportation, participated in work crews to make the school more habitable, or monitored playground activities.

Since Casa spanned grades from K to 12, it was thought necessary to have a coordinator for the elementary grades and another for the secondary grades. These two coordinators were chosen by the director, subject to ratification by the staff.

The governing board of Casa, La Mesa Directiva, consisted of three staff members, three students, and three parents. The board dealt with overall policy and personnel issues. The director was charged with the administrative implementation of policy. Most budget expenditure decisions were made by teachers and approved by the director. The budget was explained to parents, but they did not actively participate in the fiscal sphere (although indirectly they exerted an influence to the degree that they helped shape overall policy, which necessarily affected budgetary decisions).

From the above it can be seen that there was an extraordinary amount of community input into the initial shaping of Casa and its

subsequent operation. Much emphasis was also placed on an intra-school sense of community, which was articulated in the term La Familia, conveying an image of the school as an extended family. In keeping with this concept there was much peer teaching, and espousal of the principle that all in Casa were both teachers and students. In accordance with the latter principle, which envisioned fluidity rather than rigidity in the division of labor, the director's duties were not exclusively administrative; he also had to teach.

The trend to a more structured format in Casa's second year did not diminish community input. In one respect, it was even strengthened. Responding to the expressed desire of parents, a parent was appointed assistant director to serve as liaison between the school and parents.

In keeping with Casa's objectives, the curriculum included the following:

#### Primary level

- o Raza Studies, focusing on individual projects to portray history and social institutions from a Chicano perspective, to develop an affirmative ethnic awareness, and to maintain and reinforce a positive image of self and Chicano cultural tradition.
- o Language Arts, teaching bilingual communications skills through use of Spanish and English materials, written and spoken.
- o Mathematics, emphasizing the practical uses of mathematics through individualized, bilingual instruction.
- o Health and Science, using student experiments and projects to guide them in discovering practical applications of scientific and health practices in the Raza community.
- o Art, emphasizing the development of cultural awareness and exposure to Raza art through such forms as teatro, murales, Ballet Folklorico, Conjunto Musical and puppet shows.

#### Secondary level

- o Bilingual Communications Skills, emphasizing oral and written expression through creative writing, and reading English, Spanish, Raza and Multicultural literature.

- o Mathematics, emphasizing the development of mathematical logic and practical uses of mathematics.
- o Social Science, emphasizing the perspective and contribution of La Raza as a way to develop skills for relevant social action and to further self-consciousness as a member of a pluralistic society.
- o Science, emphasizing the use of individual instruction and student projects to teach students how to apply scientific principles in their daily lives (science included biology, psychology, nutrition, first aid and ecology).
- o Special Interest Courses, including karate, yoga, guitar, boxing, film-making, sailing, photography and Ballet Folklorico.

Field trips and physical education were included in the curriculum at both the primary and secondary levels.

As noted previously, during the first school year Casa operated in a "free school" atmosphere. The shift to more structure in the second year was exemplified in such changes as: (1) at the primary level learning centers supplanted self-contained classrooms, and (2) at the secondary level all core skills courses (language arts and math) were scheduled in the morning.

In examining the operation of Casa as an educational institution, three factors should be kept in mind:

1. Much time and nervous energy were consumed in the confrontation with OCR.
2. Housing problems also diverted time and energy from educational pursuits. Aside from staff (and student) time spent to make the quarters reasonably livable, time also was spent in searching for a new site.
3. Casa was engaged in search and experimentation, but this process was truncated by the OCR axe, before some potential outcomes materialized.

The last point merits elaboration. For example, as noted previously, Casa's enrollment declined significantly between year 1 and year 2, probably because of instability, created by internal dissension and exacerbated by external pressures and defective housing. In year 2, there were greater stability

and somewhat better quarters. If the causes of the enrollment decline were, in fact, what they appeared to be, then the better situation in year 2 with respect to these causes was the basis for a reasonable anticipation that some or even all of the enrollment losses might be recouped in year 3. But Casa did not live to see year 3 and there is no way of knowing whether its conscientious effort to meet certain consumer demands would have evoked a positive consumer response.

Another example. Experience with bilingual education in the American public school system was relatively limited, especially on a comprehensive K-12 scale, and even more especially, within a framework that attached equal worth to the two languages. Casa's staff searched diligently for what it could profitably acquire, in methodology and materials, from the experience of others with bilingual curriculum. In Spring 1973, for instance, La Mesa Directiva approved a staff request to dispatch several staff members for first-hand observation of bilingual programs in other areas. Among the locales to be visited were Crystal City, Texas (where the entire school district converted to a bilingual, bi-cultural curriculum); Denver, Colorado (where Tlatelolco operated as an alternative Chicano school from grade 1 through the university level); and Seattle, Washington (where there had been more modest work in bilingual and bi-cultural education). These observation journeys were scheduled for late May and early June. In early June Casa's liquidation was announced and the results of those missions were rendered moot.

Casa hired a consultant to work with primary grade teachers on the development of the Raza Studies curriculum for grades K-7. The developmental work was to continue until June 1973. This was the month when Casa was formally finished.

It would be presumptuous to anticipate the outcome of an experiment that is abruptly terminated before midpoint in its allotted time. It is not presumptuous, in this instance, to assert that a bona fide experiment was in progress, that it was being conducted with serious dedication, that its final results seemed promising - even if incalculable.

## ARTICULATION

For Casa, as a self-contained K-12 school, articulation was essentially an internal problem. As can be seen in the previous brief sketch of the curriculum at the primary and secondary levels, certain fundamental themes--bilingualism, Chicano consciousness and Chicano culture--were present from entrance into kindergarten to graduation from the 12th grade, but simultaneously there was a progression in subject matter from lower, elementary levels to higher, more sophisticated levels. The design, at any rate, provided for an impressive form of articulation. Unfortunately, two years, especially when these were formative years, do not afford enough time to evaluate how well the articulation design worked out in practice.

Systematic articulation was also a central concern in the structural distinction and coordination of the primary and secondary levels. The first year's plan for separate coordinators of the primary and secondary grades gave way in the second year to a system in which the two staffs met both separately and together. The director was made responsible for coordinating teaching. The trend, it seemed, was toward greater integration of the entire school, even as a distinction was made between the two levels, but there was not enough time to gauge how all this affected articulation.

## FUNDING

As with Black House, so with Casa: five-year forward funding could hardly have provided the intended assurance of continuity while the OCR sword dangled overhead.

Unlike the Black House staff, however, Casa's felt strongly, bitterly and vocally that it was being shortchanged in the allocation of funds. At first blush the charge might seem surprising, as Casa received funds from three sources: BESP, BUSD and the Ford Foundation. But Casa personnel insisted that despite this multiple funding, its total per-pupil allocation was smaller than the average for the entire Berkeley district. This grievance was especially irritating in Casa's first year.

In an interview with ISA, Casa's budget director supplied the following computation of income for the first year:

BESP	\$ 30,000
Special BESP supplement given all off-site schools	10,000
Ford Foundation grant	30,000
BUSD	<u>80,000</u>
Total	\$150,000

The \$10,000 BESP supplement was a special allocation for that year only; it was not repeated the next year. The Ford grant of \$30,000 was

to be trimmed to \$21,000 in the subsequent year. The \$80,000 from BUSD was a rough estimate (covering salaries, supplies, services), and was, in fact, somewhat larger than the figure in the district's own tentative budget for FY 1973.

Estimating Casa's enrollment as approximately 150, the budget director concluded that total funding of \$150,000 from all sources amounted to approximately \$1,000 per student. The district-wide average for regular schools, he pointed out, was \$1,455 per student for grades K-6 and \$1,900 per student for grades 7-12. Even if one accepted the bottom figure of 132 for Casa's 1971/72 student enrollment, the total fund allocation would be \$1,136 per student, still considerably below the district-wide average, especially because about half of Casa's students were in the 7-12 grade bracket. To make matters worse, the BESP allocation was supposed to provide \$200 per student over and above the district's "normal" contribution per student, and yet, according to Casa's reckoning, it was receiving less, rather than more, per student than the common schools did.

To be sure, the budgetary comparison was not as clean-cut as presented by Casa's budget director. In computing its per-student expenditure, the district included the costs of its central administrative superstructure and its support services. Casa's budget director took into account only the funds directly available to Casa, and made no allowance for the district's administrative and service superstructure. The Casa budget director made two comments on that problem: (1) district support services were of little value to Casa; (2) district administrative costs were grossly inflated, resulting in a distortion of fiscal priorities, so that money that could be productive at the site level was eaten up by non-productive bureaucratic excesses.

Patently, the Casa-district discrepancy involved complex issues of educational cost accounting--and of educational values. Without attempting to resolve these issues, it is still possible to offer two relevant observations:

1. From the vantage point of Casa, its uniquely innovative character did render traditional district cost accounting largely irrelevant. Indeed, it does seem reasonable that a cost-benefit computation of district administration and services would be different for Casa than for the common schools, to which district operations had been geared. Latent in all this was a deep feeling in the Casa staff that the support it received from the district was a good deal less than enthusiastic.

2. The Casa staff's belief that it was being shortchanged was, in itself, a most significant factor. The edge of bitterness implicit in that belief was sharpened by several corollary factors:

- a. The poor housing provided for Casa.
- b. The chafing OCR pressures, which heightened sensitivity to any perceived slight or discriminatory treatment.
- c. The tangible reality that comprehensive bilingualism and other unique features of the Casa program did necessitate out-of-ordinary expenditures (e.g., for the creation and acquisition of special materials, for site study visits to other bilingual and bi-cultural programs).

Actual expenditures of BESP funds indicated that the Casa budget director's estimate of \$30,000 was excessive. That is, BESP may have set aside that sum for Casa, but less was spent. In its two BESP years Casa's expenditure of BESP funds was as follows:

1971/72	\$25,963
1972/73	24,533

#### EVALUATION

No hard evaluative data are available for Casa. The problem of designing a system of evaluation that corresponded to the school's distinct character and needs was compounded by the hostile OCR pressure that placed the school in a defensive position, which is not conducive to objective evaluation.

Internal evaluation by staff, students and parents did go on, and did serve as the foundation for the changes in emphasis and structure in Casa's second year. However, such evaluation produced no presentation of findings or evaluative measures.

Level I produced nothing. By the time the present Level II contract was signed, Casa was on its way out, and the Level II work done under the previous contract (by DEEPS) had not reached the point of producing evaluative data about Casa.

As with Black House, what remains then are ISA field observations and several BESP judgments. Since the most important of the latter bracketed Black House and Casa, they were cited in the description of Black House and need not be repeated here. It may be appropriate, however, to repeat the caution that these judgments were rendered in the context of defending the two schools against OCR charges, and may therefore not be free of self-serving bias.

Notes of ISA field observers generally record good morale, a high degree of enthusiasm, and a spirit of La Familia at Casa. The notes also record the absence of evaluative data to measure educational outcomes.

However, as was said in the Black House description, the conventional measurements of educational performance and achievement had little to do with the decisive "evaluation" that was rendered by the Office for Civil Rights. What was evaluated by OCR was the right of such schools to exist. And the criterion for the ultimate judgment was an interpretation of legislation that had been enacted seven years before Casa was born; whether Casa did or did not overcome the universally acknowledged educational deficit that the conventional school system delivers to Chicano students was not relevant for OCR.

The gist of what was said about Black House vis à vis OCR is also applicable to Casa. However, two additional points need to be made:

1. The problem of ethnic distinction and awareness for Chicano students is rendered more complex by the issue of bilingualism, which also supplies an additional rationale for experimentation with special schools that cope with this issue. Language, in the instance of Casa, played a very special and specific role in defining the target population, and in determining the free choice of students to attend or not to attend such a bilingual school.

2. The Chicano community in Berkeley is much smaller than the Black, and consequently exerts much less political influence in the city at large and in its school system. There is a difference in kind between the impacts of the two communities on the overall school system, its curriculum and personnel policies. The loss of such an enclave as Casa, it would appear, had more serious consequences for the Chicano community than the loss of Black House had for the Black. In the light of the political realities, the prospects of school-system responsiveness to the special needs of Chicano students may be rated as even poorer than the prospects of responsiveness to Black needs. Awareness of such considerations might have been reflected in the proportionately greater community participation in Casa.

We reiterate that the experiment essayed with Casa was justified. Effective delivery of education to Chicano students is among the more acute, unsolved problems of the American school system. The experiment addressed this problem (and by extension the larger problem posed by the condition and status of the Chicano people in American life). Its findings might have produced insights that would have contributed to a solution of the problem. OCR's action precludes knowledge of what might have been. What remains is what is, and in the sphere of education for Chicanos, it is not good.

UNITED NATIONS WEST (aka Garvey Institute, aka Other Ways)

ABSTRACT

It was born in 1968 as Other Ways, conceived by white avant-garde educators as a cross between a "happening" and a seminar to disseminate new, bold educational techniques to teachers in BUSD. It expired in 1974 as United Nations West, a residual high school for Black underachievers. In between it bore the name of Garvey Institute. It began with Carnegie Foundation money and ended with BESP funds.

If a low student/staff ratio is the key to educational success, it should have succeeded. In its final year that ratio was 1/5.3, by far the lowest in BESP. If money is the secret of educational survival, it should have survived. In its final year, its BESP allocation amounted to \$1,178 per pupil. The schools most comparable to it, Odyssey and East Campus, received per pupil allocations of \$366 and \$236 respectively. If autonomy is a prescription for the viability of an alternative school, it should have been viable. Legally, it was an autonomous corporate entity that entered into a contract with BUSD.

Why then did it expire? Its metamorphoses already indicate a fatal flaw. It was engaged in a frenetic and frustrating search, first for identity, and later for an image (i.e., the semblance of identity).

Changes in name were symptomatic of changes in ideology. As Other Ways (inspired by an inchoate, white, middle class non-conformism), the school featured such subjects as Taoist Science and the Unconscious and Decision Making, along with skindiving, sailing and the Knack of Travelling Around the World. The switch to Garvey Institute in February 1972 was accompanied by a switch to Black nationalism; typical course offerings now included Black Art, Swahili and American History from a Black Perspective. UN West, the name assumed in November 1973, was a protective facade in the wake of OCR termination of Black House and Casa for racial separatism. The multi-ethnic profusion suggested by the name did not jibe with reality; the student population consisted of 52 Blacks and 1 white. In such circumstances, it was felt that "UN West" would be less provocative than "Garvey." A less provocative curriculum now featured such electives as Advanced Music and Student Store; Swahili was the sole vestigial remain of the Garvey period. With the ambiguous name came an ambiguous ideology. And with ambiguity, the rationale for being became ever more tenuous.

As Other Ways, the school was caught between its internal anarchism and amorphism on the one hand and the external hostility of the district bureaucracy on the other. As Garvey, it feared that its overt Black identity made it vulnerable to an OCR crackdown. Motivated by this fear, it assumed the disguise of UN West, but this expedient to survive an external threat vitiated whatever was left of its inherent capacity to survive. By the time of its demise in June 1974 only 10 students were left. (The peak enrollment of the BESP years had been 88 in Spring 1973, during the semester that preceded the switch to UN West).

The spasmodic twists and turns of this alternative might have suggested that something was amiss. But there is no evidence that either central BESP or NIE seriously tried to ascertain what, if anything, was wrong, and what, if anything, could be done about it.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

Prior to its involvement in BESP in 1971/72, Other Ways focused on new and innovative teaching strategies and programs in order to effect change in BUSD. After BESP funding, its primary focus was on the student population.

Other Ways opened for the 1968/69 school year as a teacher training center for BUSD. It began with a grant of \$80,000 from the Carnegie Foundation. The grant was awarded to two men: Herb Kohl, a well-publicized open educator and short-term teacher at U. C. Berkeley, and Alan Kaprow, an art historian and creator of "Happenings," informal teacher idea-exchange sessions.

The program that first year involved both students and teachers. Students came by bus from Willard Junior High School, and Kohl also went on campus to BHS to teach a theatre class. About 50 teachers (including 20 regulars) came to the "Happenings." There were also individual on-site classroom consultations by the program facilitators. Six of the Other Ways staff worked with students and teachers from McKinley (East Campus), Community High School (Genesis), Berkeley High School, Willard Junior High School and several elementary schools.

Books, posters, pamphlets, folders and ideas for teachers to use in the classroom were published that year. Also, a half-hour documentary film, "Project Other Ways," was produced.

By September 1969, Other Ways officially became the first of a series of off-site Berkeley public schools. Its proponents argued that the regular schools in BUSD had become too large and impersonal, and that rules and restrictions within a large school inhibit the development of innovation and a close-knit school community. The director (now only Kohl) developed a decentralized decision-making procedure incorporating the views of students as well as staff. He designed the program as a learning facility and a social center.

During the 1969/70 school year, the students were all enrolled at one of the other BUSD secondary schools and most did attend classes at those schools. By 1970/71 Other Ways offered: skindiving, jogging, Taoist Science, the Unconscious and Decision Making, Human Behavior, Art and Drama as seen through media, Guerilla Theatre, Trash Can Films, Urban Survival, Seamanship, the Knack of Travelling Around the World and tutoring for students in grades 4 through 6. There were no basic skills offered. Although community businesses offered their services for students in skills such as dressmaking, auto mechanics, sandal making, pottery and

bookkeeping, for example, there was no indication that these resources were utilized.

Spring 1971 became a crucial time in the development of the site when BUSD received a \$10,000 grant from the Office of Education to develop plans for experimental schools. A group of alternative schools people submitted a package of 16 proposals to BUSD for ESP planning. Their intention was to guarantee the funding of each and a share in policy-making. The group included Kohl of the New Schools Network and alternative schools advocates within BUSD, representing such schools as Black House, Community High (Genesis), Casa de la Raza and Odyssey.

After submitting the proposal, the group decided to negotiate together and formed an Alternative Schools Council. The School Board and the Superintendent did not agree that BESP operate as a separate school system. Therefore, each project was rated independently by the Board screening committee. Of the proposals submitted by the Alternative Schools Council only those already in operation were approved for funding.

Other Ways was submitted to OE/ESP in June 1971 as an off-site alternative for 7th through 12th graders bored with or alienated from regular school programs. This approach was similar to that of Black House, Casa de la Raza, Odyssey and East Campus, all off-site alternatives. However, Casa and Black House specified their target populations as Chicanos and Black students respectively, Other Ways never specified which bored and alienated students it intended to serve. Some staff saw the free structure of Other Ways as harmful to the learning of students who lacked basic skills. Staff and student conflict along with BUSD's rejection of BESP's independence resulted in Kohl's resignation in Spring 1971, and a gradual shift in Other Ways during the first year of BESP funding (1971/72) to a culturally pluralistic type, primarily Black emphasis, in ideology. With the change of director and staff came a new style of leadership and new curriculum.

Of the 14 staff members, all but two (the director and the sailing instructor\*) were new. Eight were full time, the remainder were part time staff or volunteers. All new members were Black. According to one student, the white students felt the Black teachers were emphasizing structure too much. The majority of students were still involved in decision making and in February 1972 the students renamed the school Marcus Garvey Institute, after the Black Nationalist of the post-World War I era. The focus of the school was now on basic skills, Black pride and cultural identity, self respect and leadership development.

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\*A sail boat had been purchased with funds from the Ford Foundation.

The BUSD Quarterly Progress Report on BESP (November 1971) claimed: "A much more intense focus on the needs of minority youths, especially Black, characterized the program this year. The effort revolves around the question, 'Can integration work?'"

Curriculum reflected the change in focus. By Spring 1972 courses revolved around a two-part curriculum, stressing basic skills and ethnic culture. The ethnic culture courses were Black Art, Swahili, American History from a Black Perspective, and World History from a Black and Poor Perspective. A unique offering of the school that semester was the "Business Enterprise Project," providing students with up to \$100 to borrow in the process of setting up their own business. Two businesses were started, though patronized only by Garvey students--hair styling services and sailing instructions. Attempts to develop a child care community-oriented program never materialized. Also, a weekly newspaper written and sold by the students, "Black and Determined," and a school yearbook "Garvey Soul" were published that year.

Disciplinary problems were handled through a court system comprised of students and staff. It was devised to cope with potential problems of misdemeanors, loitering, excessive absences, and felonies such as selling or using drugs. It involved punishments and sanctions with fines established by students and peers. Most of the cases, however, involved innocuous absences.

By May 1972, BUSD/BESP had printed up a new description of the site for distribution: the purpose of Other Ways/Garvey Institute is "to deal with the effect on minorities of institutional racism, to deliver reading and math skills through awareness of each individual...The form of the revamped program has more structure, including controls on and requirements of students."

This was in direct contrast with Kohl's philosophy of a learning discovery/social center. A Black student who had been at Other Ways when Kohl was director described the school as a "play pen for little smart whiteys." Now, the focus was Black. Following is Other Ways/Garvey Institute's student population by ethnicity from Fall 1970 through Spring 1974.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, 1970/71-1973/74

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Fall 1970	35	51	32	46	1	1	1	1					69
Spr. 1971			unavailable										72
Fall 1971			unavailable										
Spr. 1972	12	20	38	63	1	2	9	15					60
Fall 1972	1	5	18	90	1	5							20
Spr. 1973			57	85	1	1	9	13					67
Fall 1973	1	2	52	98									53
Spr. 1974													60*

\*By the end of this semester in June, only 10 students remained.

For no apparent reason, the new director resigned in June 1972, and in September 1972 a former female teacher at Garvey assumed this position. She held it for two years through the school's demise in June 1974. Half of the staff remained, but half were new. Four full time and five part time employees, two volunteers and two former students comprised the staff. Nearly all were Black.

In Fall 1972, all the staff at Garvey felt they related to the basic skills issues. The basic skills curriculum--reading, journalism (writing), and math--was enhanced by a HILC laboratory from BESP money. Other courses offered were: Broadcasting, Modern and Afro Dance, Film Analysis, Swahili, Wood Shop, Personality Assessment, Computer Programming, Politics in Current American History, General Science and Slide Rule. Classes remained small and non-graded.

The school's social events were ethnically oriented. In 1972/73, school opened with 20 students. In November there were 48 on the rolls, in January 1973 there were 67, in March 1973 there were 88. Of the 88 students, 87 were Black, one was Asian. Between March and June 1973, 27 new students came to the alternative. The number of dropouts is unknown. With the student body made up of all Black students but one, and with the focus on Black pride and Black American culture, and because it was an off-site school, unaffiliated with BHS, Garvey Institute changed its name to United Nations West of Garvey Institute in November 1973, following the Office for Civil Rights investigation of the two separatist off-site schools, Black House and Casa de la Raza. UN West then signed a contract with BUSD for educational services. The contract between BUSD and UN West gave UN West the authority to receive and expend

funds for services rendered by "specialists" who were NOT district personnel. The service agreement stated that: (1) classes for pupils will be conducted per Board policies and (2) a final report for ten months work will be submitted by July 31, 1974. BUSD was held responsible for utilities and rent (25% BUSD, 75% BEBP), Funds for materials were not stipulated for either party.

Essentially, the staff was responsible to provide the raison d'être for the students' educational goals and attendance. There were fewer staff members, one certificated full time, four certificated part time and five classified full time. Half of the previous year's staff was gone. There was an increase in attendance and popularity with courses such as audio-visual and broadcasting/creative writing. Social Living, which discussed current events, became more popular. The required courses were physical education, basic English, algebra, U. S. history, social living, and world history. The innovative electives were Student Store, Advanced Audio Visual, Advanced Music Workshop and Swahili III. Several skills classes were electives such as Office Experience, Basic Math, Reading Labs I and II. Field observations during the year indicated that these basic skills classes had smaller enrollments than the more innovative classes.

As an alternative to dropping out of the educational system, UN West was to provide students with survival skills. Its three main areas of focus during the second contract period were: (1) expansion of the use of communications media in instruction, evaluation and production, (2) establishment of higher standards for student achievement, and (3) making real within the school the concept of cultural pluralism.

In the Spring 1974 semester, 60 students enrolled at UN West, but by March this dropped to 37 and by June all but 10 of the students had left. This was an 83 percent dropout rate.

#### ARTICULATION

The BEBP plan submitted to OE/ESP for funding in 1971, allowed for articulation between and throughout the sites.

The design will provide a mechanism for continuous participation in educational experimentation throughout the entire school life of students who, in collaboration with their parents and teachers, choose this educational path. The program will be so structured that no student K-12 who enters an experimental school at any juncture will be denied the choice of

alternatives at a future juncture--within the specified zones, and throughout all grade levels, as well as across the grades, no student need leave Zone A or D in order to participate in the alternative school programs; and the district need not jeopardize its control over desegregation.

The original proposal for Other Ways as a part of BESP was to include grades 7-12, the only program with this particular grade range. Since zones did not apply at this grade grouping, students from BESP or common elementary schools were allowed to matriculate into the program. Only two BESP programs proposed were at all similar in philosophy to Other Ways. Lincoln Environmental Studies (later Malcolm X Environmental Studies), already in existence for a year, had stated goals to integrate technology into the curriculum. The K-6 PTAE School (later Kilimanjaro) also was similar to Other Ways. PTAE involved the children in the community and had a non-graded thrust. In spite of the purported 7-12 grade grouping during the entire three years with BESP, Other Ways had only two eighth grade students and no seventh graders.

When Other Ways became Garvey Institute in February 1972, the school went from freedom and chaos to one that upheld structure and order, according to the Berkeley High head counselor at that time. Counselors began to recommend Garvey as a viable alternative to the regular program at Berkeley High for those students with attendance problems. Students transferred from Black House, East Campus, College Prep, Odyssey, King and from West Campus with no academic credit difficulties. By the end of 1972/73, 25 percent of students referred to Garvey, according to the director, were students with "recalcitrant behavior or excessive truancy." A counselor at Berkeley High reported:

Some students choose to transfer to Garvey when they get behind in their studies either because they have been cutting classes, have been in jail and miss too much work or when they realize that for them the environment at Berkeley High School is too big for learning.

Another 25 percent of the referrals were students East Campus could not accept or who couldn't make it there. Garvey staff was confident that their program had something special to offer those students: a Black perspective to learning and film/video production. BHS counselors referred students from BHS and College Prep to Garvey, hoping the student "would look more seriously and

realistically at him/herself and his/her goals" at Garvey. And so it became a type of residual system for Black students.

Although the staff at Garvey seemed highly committed to the goal of helping minorities succeed in their education and in life, they began to reevaluate their open door policy and planned to regard the individual student's potential before admitting him/her to the program for the 1973/74 school year.

When Garvey became UN West the school's reputation and focus changed again, according to counselors at BHS. Now UN West was the school for serious attendance problems and for those students with fitful behavior manifested by "thick school folders," one BHS counselor's indicator of a school problem.

According to an articulation study done in November 1972, the trends indicated that "there seems to be a pattern of rejection of Berkeley High School among both incoming and outgoing Garvey students. For example, most of the old students came from BHS or Project Other Ways. Those students who left for other schools went to other experimental schools (only one student went back to BHS). The fact that four new students came from Black House may indicate that students are trying to combine several ethnic educational experiences for their high school degree."

Records indicated only a few alumni had been able to utilize fully this alternative as a means of continuity in their education--one of the focuses of the original overall BUSD plan submitted to OE/ESP. Two alumni worked in the alternative, one as the school secretary, another as janitor. Other students were reported to be attending college (Alameda and Laney Community Colleges and U. C. Berkeley), working for BUSD and writing a book, attending East Bay Skills' Center for welding and working in a library.

For most of the students, however, articulation of curriculum, of education in general, became an obsolete issue. UN West's entire history described a means for survival--not only as a site, but also for the students involved. As the director said in February 1974, "In a way, we are a survival station, for many students who can't function in the traditional setting, we are the alternative to dropping out and burning bridges into the future." And, without this survival station, students in the population served by UN West have the same options today that they had before UN West, before Garvey, before Other Ways. They can attend East Campus (provided there is space), or drop out.

## FUNDING

UN West's educational philosophy and goals emphasized survival skills and teaching students (mostly Black) the politics of self-determination. Ironically, this alternative lost its authority to control its own destiny when it accepted funds from BUSD/BESP.

UN West was in its initial stages fiscally autonomous. As a non-profit corporation able to set up its own contract with BUSD/BESP the possibility existed to control its focus, its goals, the hiring and firing of personnel and other monetary allocations. Without BESP funding, Garvey would have had to seek alternative funding sources much more aggressively, resulting in time and energy taken away from the education of its students. But as the school became more dependent on BUSD/BESP money, it came under federal and district regulations, such as the Office for Civil Rights regulations regarding racial composition.

Other Ways began with Carnegie Foundation money, supplemented through Ford Foundation's "Options Through Participation" in 1970. This money paid for salaries and the initial purchase of expensive video equipment that remained a unique aspect of the site.

Garvey received \$140,587 (4.46 percent of the total BESP site budget) from BESP between 1971 and 1974. The Ford Foundation supplied \$12,409 in teaching salaries during the first 19 months of the grant period.

From 1971 through 1974, \$74,345, over half (53%) of BESP funds allocated to Garvey, was spent on salaries for contracted teacher services. An additional 6 percent (\$9,081) of Garvey's BESP allocation was expended for certificated and classified personnel salaries and fringe benefits.

As indicated earlier, there was a tremendously high staff turnover rate. There were 35 paid staff members during the life span of this alternative, 1968-74, with never more than 14 in one year. The majority participated during the BESP years. With staff members considered to be contracted service providers, there was a constant level of uncertainty which contributed to the lack of far-reaching plans at the site itself. Of those 35 persons involved in the site in any way, only four remained with BUSD. One is an Environmental Studies Coordinator\* at Odyssey, one is a custodian at BHS, another is a science teacher at BHS, and Kohl is working with the New Schools Network in a BUSD elementary school with funds

\*Considered a "professional expert," his salary was paid out of BESP Support Services (Training).

separate from the district.

Building rental and purchase of major equipment--audio-visual, teaching machines, teletype terminal, office equipment and site renovation--each used 17 percent (\$24,412 for capital outlay, equipment; \$24,314 for rental) of Garvey's BESP funds from 1971 through 1974.

With the innovation of contracting services came the ultimate power that BUSD held over the site, namely, to cut off the contract at will.

#### EVALUATION

Other Ways began as a way of effecting a change in a school district, an opportunity for several reputedly creative educators to experiment. Guidelines of the grant were vague from the very beginning. As Kohl said in Half the House,

We could have done anything we wanted for and with the kids. We were free to cooperate with one another...all of a sudden, however, I had to deal with peers, not kids, and it was much more difficult...we could talk about alternative life styles but essentially we didn't know how to be any different from our parents and teachers. (pp. 15-16).

In 1970/71, Other Ways joined with Black House, Community High (Genesis) and Odyssey to present to the Board an alternative system of student evaluation, including a reading test devised by Kohl. It was not considered seriously by the Board and finally dismissed as unacceptable with no explanation.

Michael Scriven, a philosopher with educational evaluation expertise, has said that quality and uniqueness are not enough to continue innovative programs. Ingenuity and responsibility toward a workable implementation are as important, he says. In Garvey/UN West's case, quality and uniqueness were never evaluated either by internal or external methods. Level I was not sought out, nor did it place itself in a position to evaluate the UN West program.

Evaluation of student achievement, however, became an issue in 1972/73. Since the off-site alternative had been exempted from taking CTBS for a year, this was the first year that Garvey was to use them. The staff did not resist CTBS, but the issue arose because the staff believed that its own criteria for achievement were more important. This judgment was based on the premise that

the staff was more fully aware of the prerequisites for survival in the Black community. The director said, "Our purpose is to define those areas where a student should work harder to improve." However, the method of definition was never clear or specific.

On Level I's '0.0.-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale, UN West was rated a perfect 1 for "alternativeness," between .5 and 6. for "effectiveness," and between .5 and .6 on the combined "effective alternative" scale. This placed it a close second to top-rated Agora among BESP high schools. But apparently this evaluation bore no relation to the school's chances for survival.

## COLLEGE PREP

### ABSTRACT

College Prep, a sub-school of Berkeley High, has served 125-150 Black students each year in grades 10-12. The plan for CP was submitted with the original BUSD proposal to OE/ESP in April 1971, and after an interval for planning, it opened in February 1972.

Its stated purpose was "to provide courses of study for underachieving Black secondary students that will insure college admission and/or entry into non-college career lines for 60 percent of the graduating seniors." Traditional subject content was taught from an Afro-American perspective. It also offered such elective courses as African-American Literature, Black Drama, Poetry and Poetry of Soul Music, the Black Man and the Black Woman.

CP is the only "separatist" school in Berkeley that has survived at the secondary level, a phenomenon explicable in part by two facts: (1) it is on-site, and therefore part of a larger, integrated environment; its students take courses in the ethnically mixed common school, and (2) its pragmatic goal--preparation for college--is eminently acceptable to the educational and political establishment, and does not offend conventional ideological sensibilities, as did Black House and Casa de la Raza, whose motivation was more overtly ideological. Moreover, at first blush, CP's pragmatic purpose seems to have been crowned by pragmatic success. Of the 37 CP graduates in June 1975, 34 (92%) were accepted by colleges, and the other three graduates were accepted for modeling or airlines training. (An independent ISA follow-up indicated a rather high dropout rate for these graduates; of the 29 for whom ISA was able to obtain information in Spring 1976, 14 [48%] were still in the programs to which they had gained entry a year earlier.)

With the end of federal funding, CP continued, except that there was less money for "extras" in staff and materials.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

College Prep was included in the original BESP proposal submitted to OE/ESP in April 1971. The proposal was supported because of its focus on the particular problem of Black students, who, although inclined to go on to college or careers, lacked certain basic "survival skills." Its aim was to provide those skills and thus sustain the motivation to go on to college. CP opened on schedule in February 1972, after one semester of planning, choosing a director and recruiting students and staff.

Historically, the program ideas germinated long before CP opened. There had been a growing discontent among Berkeley High School Black students since 1967/68 when BUSD reorganized the K-9 schools to achieve racial balance by busing. BHS, as the only high school in Berkeley, necessarily was ethnically balanced. Ethnic identity, however, became the issue. The Black Student Union demonstrated on the BHS campus and presented a request for a Black Studies program to the Board of Education. In November 1968, the Board appointed a teacher at BHS with a master's degree in Black Studies as coordinator for a Black Studies Department at BHS. In February 1969, he was quoted in the Oakland Tribune: "There can be no real integration of the races until a Black person has respect for himself as a Black. Then he will be able to deal with the white people on an equal basis. Black teachers establish a certain rapport with (Black) students."

He and a Black Studies teacher, who later became district Black Studies coordinator, wrote the proposal for College Prep. Although CP was similar to the Black Studies Department in three ways--staff, students and curriculum--the difference was the directed pragmatic goal of CP versus the ideological one of the Black Studies Department. One objective of CP was stated in the original proposal: "To institute a college preparatory program for underachieving Black secondary students, utilizing an Afro-oriented approach to the traditional subject content....." It offered core courses--Math, English, History--establishing innovative and related electives such as College Survival Skills and Communication (and Futurism).

The goals and design of CP created its staff and student population. The program opened with eight certificated teachers filling five full-time positions. Most of the certificated teaching staff came from the Black Studies Department, including the director. Two teachers--Math and History--came from the overage pool of the district. Two of the certificated teachers were hired as classified staff paid out of BESP funds. One other classified staff person was hired from the community. All staff was Black.

The director and one teacher were full time staff at CP while the remaining staff spent from 40 percent to 80 percent of their time there. Most of the part time staff spent the remainder of their teaching time in the Black Studies Department at BHS.

In 1974/75, an Asian math teacher was brought into the CP faculty for several classes. This was the first non-Black staff member. Involved in another BESP sub-school at BHS, Model School A, she was well received by the students at CP. In 1975/76, the district-wide staff shifts began, causing "bumping" with persons at the administrative level scheduled to return to the classroom. This directly affected CP when the former BESP Training Coordinator was scheduled to teach "Communication (and Futurism)" at CP. The course was an elective, accredited for English or Performing Arts, and focused on examining possible future developments in jobs, communications, family life, etc. as well as gaining practical experience in media--radio, press and television. The teacher was white, the class had a very low enrollment, and by November the class had dwindled to four students.

CP staff from 1972 (Spring) to 1975/76 is listed below:

TABLE 1: STAFF BY ETHNICITY AND SEX, 1971/72-1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Total
	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>F</u>	
1971/72 (Spring)			* (1) 3	(2) 5			(3) 8
1972/73			(1) 4	(2) 5			(3) 9
1973/74				(2) 4			(2) 7
1974/75			2	4		1	7
1975/76	1		1	3			5

\* ( ) Classified personnel

The certificated staff has remained fairly stable with five teachers teaching two to four classes at CP each year. The first director, a former teacher at BHS for three years in the Black Studies Department, remained in his position through June 1975. He was

replaced by a Black female teacher who had been at CP since 1972/73, teaching College Survival Skills with the former director. The first director was committed to CP as a program, but he left to accept a higher paying position in another San Francisco Bay Area district.

The teachers, who divided their time between CP and the common school, said that despite this dichotomy they felt an allegiance to CP and its philosophy. The alternative actually enjoyed a positive relationship with the BHS administration. This was, in part, due to the CP director's diligence in completing BESP/BUSD paperwork for BHS.

Sixty-five sophomores were enrolled in the first semester. About 70 percent, recommended by counselors, were students who demonstrated some potential and wanted to get into college. The director, however, felt that the referral system was not working because BHS counselors often did not recommend students to BESP sites. Therefore, the director recruited his own new students for the next year by talking to classes at West Campus and telephoning others. Most of the students in 1972/73 chose the program through personal contact with the director, staff or peers. Several students transferred between CP and Black House.

The requirements for becoming a CP student are twofold. First, the student must be admitted to BHS during his or her sophomore year (with certain specific exceptions). Second, sophomores and juniors must take a minimum of three courses in CP and seniors at least two. The students view CP as a sub-school in which they may study Black cultural history while fulfilling their high school requirements.

The public image of the school has an effect on entry. Course scheduling plays a major part in leaving. A reported turnover rate of about 10 students each year is quite low relative to other alternative secondary sites. The student ethnic composition has been 100 percent Black with nearly twice as many females as males.

TABLE 2: STUDENT POPULATION BY SEX, 1971/72-1975/76

Year	Male		Female		Total
	n	%	n	%	
Spring '72	25	38	40	62	65 (sophomore)
1972/73	50	36	90	64	140 (65 soph/75 juniors)
1973/74	56	37	97	63	153
1974/75	35	28	90	72	125
1975/76	48	37	83	63	131

In June 1973, when the Office for Civil Rights closed Casa and Black House for not conforming to integrationist criteria, CP did not want to be confronted with the same problem. Although CP operated under the umbrella of the racially integrated BHS and had never officially been confronted with the question of its all Black student population, the CP staff chose to have an active summer recruitment for whites. As a result, 15 white students took classes at College Prep in Fall 1973. None of them was considered an enrollee of CP, however, since none met the minimum three (or two if a senior) class requirement. That was the only semester that white students (or any non-Black students) took any courses at CP.

With an all Black population, CP has tried to deal with the racism issue by teaching the students how to cope with it through elective courses on the Black heritage and the Black condition. Some of the electives have been Black Woman, Poetry and Poetry of Soul Music, Black Drama, African-American Literature--all in 1972/73; and the Black Man and the Black Woman in 1973/74. In 1974/75 and 1975/76 only English and History were being taught from a Black perspective.

The basic curriculum and the teaching styles have remained generally the same since the alternative began in February 1972 with 65 sophomores. Discrepancies in skills and motivation prompted a group of students to initiate a survey of all students to determine course organization and student grouping. The student survey resulted in a multi-graded approach for all courses except College Survival Skills (I and II for grades 10-11 and III and IV for grade 12) and Advanced Composition for grade 12.

Since the start of the program there has also been both a better defined and more expansive curriculum offering with the core classes. The core courses mandated by BUSD--U. S. History, Math and English--have all undergone changes throughout the history of CP. College Survival Skills, beginning in 1972/73, is a course that changes focus as the students overcome their academic weaknesses. As an elective, it is offered for history credit--though not acceptable for the University of California--for no particular reason other than the director had been a credentialed history teacher.

The two electives that were unique to CP were College Survival Skills and Communication (and Futurism). The former was considered a history elective, and the latter an English elective. For BHS graduation credit, students could realistically take these two electives with math. This would round out their requirements with College Survival Skills as a supportive course, Communication as a social break and math as a stringent effort.

CP did not intend to be considered a basic skills program and the basic skills courses in math and reading were not so labelled. Math, representing 21 percent of the total courses, was the only subject naturally falling into a remedial curriculum once the skill level of the students was determined. At first CP offered a differentiated program of modern algebra and trigonometry. By 1972/73, however, algebra and geometry were the top of the math line, with the elimination of trigonometry. Often the math teacher found it necessary to begin with basic math skills for some students with a specific weakness in one area. College Survival Skills also served as a basic math tutoring program when a student indicated that need.

Reading as a basic skills course was offered under the title "Developmental Reading" and utilized the High Intensity Learning Center, purchased by BESP in 1972/73, for those students reading below the 8th grade level. "Introduction to Composition Writing" was developed as a basic skills course to upgrade writing skills including grammar and sentence structure.

The strengths of the program have remained the same from its inception: (1) All of the classes at CP have had a low student-teacher ratio. (2) There has been a direct and close relationship between the teachers and students. (3) The program exists around a structured framework of courses and teaching style. The student-teacher ratio was especially low during the time BESP funded classified staff in 1972/73 and 1973/74. During those same years, the basic skills classes in English/Reading and College Survival Skills were taught by the classified staff members. Class size also depended on the particular grouping; e.g., Developmental Reading often had fewer than eight students and College Survival Skills has had as many as 19 (in 1974/75).

In spite of the structured framework, the original director felt that he and the staff were flexible. For example, after the first semester, the staff tried one team teaching effort with 28 students in an English class. When the teachers were unhappy and the students were unresponsive, the teachers split the class into two groups of 14 students each. This was more agreeable to all but there have been no other attempts at team teaching since then.

In March 1976, BESP recommended to the Board of Education that College Prep be continued and expanded. BESP said:

College Prep represents an opportunity for the Berkeley School District to make a concerted effort to service the Black students at the secondary level. Also, it would provide an

opportunity for leadership in the education field of a positive nature dealing with minorities...The program has developed a very positive image and is generally accepted as an opportunity to provide for a high school education for Black youngsters. Consideration should be made to expand the program.

### Articulation

According to the BESP second thirty-month operational plan dated June 1974, CP's value to students was "better achievement in school and improved self-image" and the value to the district was "increase in diversity and effectiveness of instructional program and counseling available to students." The rationale stated: "CP is one of the few programs that has addressed itself to the capable minority students and has provided a way for them to survive in the academic world."

This has caused the school to have a selection policy rather than a recruitment policy in the district. Generally students are selected after assessing recommendations from the teacher and counselor along with the CTBS test scores. This is not to say that Black students who have potential or the intention to continue their education only select CP. Many articulate, successful Black students who have learned to cope in the competitive integrated classes are enrolled in MSA or remain in the common school. Several of these students interviewed saw CP as being too limited in its scope of classes or in the range of student interests and abilities to satisfy their needs. They did, however, view the program as positive for those who chose CP as an option.

Parents and students have had little input into the program operation in an active or advisory capacity. During the 1972/73 school year, the director said that "the parents have a sense of security about the school that seems to give the school a certain amount of harmony." The anniversary banquet that year was well attended by parents, and there was also contact between the individual teachers and the home that year. Since then the extent of parent participation or school-home contact has been minimal. Only the Awards Dinner held in May each year draws parent interest. In 1973 (Spring) one Black counselor at BHS said, "This (CP) program has gotten more Black parents out to learn about college opportunities than we have ever had at similar orientation meetings for 11th graders." A student advisory group began as an active segment of the site with the initial multi-grading survey and the implementation of intramural basketball. But when CP's autonomy as an on-site sub-school of BHS became an obvious bogus, the students lost interest in trying to effect changes even at their own site.

Attendance has been monitored and controlled by several methods throughout the history of CP. During the first year, students decided to monitor their own attendance and report peer absences to the director in the office. Few absences were actually reported and when BHS requested attendance lists for all BESP schools, CP was forced into a more stringent policy. Teachers then took attendance systematically. Attendance affected students' academic grades. CP students had to maintain a passing grade in order to stay in school. The philosophy of CP was to help the students both with academic and personal problems within the classroom to ensure their remaining in school. Several students interviewed at CP said that for the first time at BHS they had a feeling that teachers actually cared about their success or their academic problems. Students felt that the fact the teachers were also Black affected their own attitude toward CP.

### Funding

College Prep spent a total of \$96,422 over a period of four and one half school years from February 1972 to July 1976. It received the most in salaries and materials through June 1974. Salaries accounted for 72 percent (\$69,210) of the total with most spent for classified staff. Only 15 percent was used for certificated hourly substitute salaries for teachers' in-service release time. Of the three classified staff members hired specifically for CP for 1972/73, two were credentialed teachers and one was a community person. Two of the classified staff remained on the BESP payroll through 1973/74 and a half-time secretary (shared with Genesis) was added. But by 1974/75 the only classified salary accounted for was the half-time secretarial position.

By Fall 1972, the 11th grade was added to CP. As a college survival program with a concentration on reading, CP was one of the BESP sites selected by BESP Training to utilize the Random House Reading Package, High Intensity Learning Center (HILC). The HILC materials were combined with those of Agora and Genesis for a more complete lab run more efficiently by one manager in 1973/74. With 41 percent of CP's five year budget spent in 1972/73, about 20 percent of the money that year purchased HILC materials.

In 1975/76, College Prep spent \$8,000 (only 8 percent of its total five year budget). Most was spent on instructional supplies and part for substitute hourly salaries for certificated teachers' in-service release time. A minimal budget of \$2,300 is projected after BESP to enable College Prep to buy college books and pre-college examination booklets and to pay for special college courses for students and trips to local colleges. Twelfth grade students enrolled in college courses at either the University of California or the junior colleges in the area while at College Prep in 1973/74. There were no 12th graders at CP in 1971/72 and 1972/73. In 1973/74

there were 25 12th graders, in 1974/75 there were 37, but in 1975/76 there were only three.

BESP funds enabled the school to purchase ethnic publications for its English classes and extensive audio-video equipment for the Communication (and Futurism) class. Equipment purchasing ended in 1972/73 when CP was notified of a cut in BESP funds for the coming year (1973/74) with those monies going toward teacher training.

Several extra classified staff persons (three at first, then two) enhanced the CP program, particularly in the Reading and College Survival Skills areas, through 1973/74. Another \$8-10 thousand budget cut in March 1974, caused the lay-off of these classified staff members, however. To offset the inevitable increase in class size, the director added a new class to his teaching load for the 1974 Fall semester.

By 1975/76, CP was paying for no extraordinary expenses and had all but phased itself into BUSD.

#### Evaluation

CP's original goals were concerned with affecting student achievement standards. They were:

- 1) A minimum of 60 percent of students finishing College Prep would enroll in college--more than half at a four year school.
- 2) A minimum of 70 percent of students finishing CP would take the Scholastic Aptitude Test and the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test/The National Merit Qualifying Test.
- 3) A minimum of 33 percent of CP graduates would complete the requirements for admission to the University of California.
- 4) The average gain in achievement scores in English and math would be a minimum of three grade levels for the three years of attendance at CP.
- 5) The average student completing CP would show cognitive growth in all courses completed and positive affective growth at the end of each year as measured by an appropriately normed instrument.

Evaluative measures relative to those objectives have been essayed by Level I and the director. Level I used district mandated test (CTBS) data and the CP director used his own student sample

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over a three year period considering attendance, student flow, types of courses taken and entrance into college.

Few scores were available for ISA's sample students prior to 1974/75. In 1974/75, the sample students' scores (most of whom were in their junior year) indicated that the highest rate of achievement existed in math, with the equivalent of almost a full year's average growth. A lack of growth in reading was indicated from the sample. Students were nearly at grade level in reading when tested in the Fall and remained about stable.

TABLE 3: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, COLLEGE PREP

	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Math</u>
Fall 1974	10.367	8.633	8.043
n	15	15	7
Spring 1975	10.291	9.189	8.960
n	11	9	5

The director's evaluation (special progress report of June 21, 1974) was accomplished in conjunction with supplemental information supplied by Level I at his request. When CP began with 65 sophomores in Spring 1972, 80 other students were considered as potential CP students according to the criteria established for admittance: (1) CTBS scores, (2) counselor recommendations and (3) teacher recommendations. The only difference noted was that those 80 control group students never applied. With most of the control group continuing in the common school, much information was available. Unequivocally, the CP students over the course of three years had better attendance records, stayed in one program of study longer, took more academically oriented classes and entered college at a higher rate. The study was designed by the director to indicate that CP was effective in motivating the potentially achieving Black students and enhancing the prospect of their further education in a college. Disappointed in the lack of feedback from Level I, the first director said in his special evaluation progress report: "Effective evaluation of educational programs has been a long-standing problem. Hopefully these alternative evaluation designs as noted through results above, can be used to gain a better understanding of 'what is happening' in this special alternative school."

Of the 37 graduates in June 1975 92 percent (or 34) were accepted to college with 70 percent (or 24) of them accepted to a four-year college. This was far above the 60 percent ratio

established in CP's original goals. The three remaining students were accepted to modeling or airlines training. In the 1976 Spring semester/quarter, ISA followed up the graduates from June 1975. With information unavailable for seven students accepted to four-year colleges, 53 percent (or 9 of 17) were still enrolled in the four-year colleges by the Spring quarter/semester. Four of ten students (or 40%) were still enrolled in the two-year colleges. With information unavailable for one student, one of two was still enrolled in occupational training. Of the 29 students followed up by ISA 14 (or 48%) were still enrolled by Spring 1976 in the programs for which they had been accepted upon graduation in 1975. See table below.

TABLE 4: COLLEGE PREP: 1975 GRADUATES' ENROLLMENT  
IN HIGHER EDUCATION BY SPRING 1976

	<u>Four-Year College</u>	<u>Two-Year College</u>	<u>Other (air- lines, modeling)</u>	<u>Total</u>
No. graduates accepted June 1975	24	10	3	37
No. followed up in Sp. semester/qtr. 1976	17	10	2	29
No. enrolled as of Sp. semester/qtr. 1976	9	4	1	14

On Level I's 0.0-0.1 "Effective Alternativeness" scale CP was rated as follows: for alternativeness, a shade above 0.5, which was the mean among BESP high school programs; for effectiveness, between 0.9 and 1.0, which was second only to MSA; on the combined scale, between 0.4 and 0.5, which placed it third, after Agora and U.N. West.

## EARLY LEARNING CENTER

### ABSTRACT

Early Learning Center is a combination of nursery, day-care center, and K-3 school. Its population ranges in age from 2 1/2 to 8-9 years. Its functional diversity is matched by diverse funding; the director has to prepare six budgets to receive district, state and federal money under six separate labels. Its new building, designed especially for ELC and completed in 1974, was funded by the state, both the construction and land purchase.

BUSD launched ELC with state funds in 1968 as an exemplary early childhood education center. Because of its multi-funding, ELC was not included in the original BESP package. However, in Spring 1971 two elementary school administrators and two parents, who were not associated with ELC, developed a plan for a "Junior Community School." But they could not find a site. Their dilemma was resolved by a decision at the district level that fused their project with ELC to produce a proposal for ESP funding. In September 1972 this new BESP alternative was in business.

BESP was exclusively concerned with the K-3 population. However, it is not easy to separate the BESP facet from other facets of ELC. Parental relationships with the school, for example, were manifestly affected by the day-care service (available until 5:30-6 p.m.) provided for some two-thirds of the K-3 students. Day care may also do more than educational innovation can to explain the large waiting list--up to 340 at one point--for admission to ELC, which accommodated only 61 K-3 students in 1975/76 (up from 40 in 1972/73).

The school featured an "open classroom" approach and an intense multi-cultural focus for a multi-ethnic population. Of the 61 K-3 students in 1974/75, 38 percent were white, 31 percent Black, 16 percent Chicano, and 15 percent Asian. All other special funding was essentially marked for ELC's nursery and day-care facilities; hence, BESP funding was primary in enriching the K-3 program through more staff and consultants, more materials, more books, especially for an impressive multi-cultural library. Even with termination of BESP, ELC plans to retain its multi-faceted character and increase its population.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

Efforts to create the Early Learning Center began in 1968 when BUSD received state funds to develop an exemplary center for early childhood education. Using a small educational facilities laboratory, a group of parents, teachers and administrators worked for a year to develop a model:

The ELC was conceived as a combination nursery school and day care center with primary education. Advocates of the model maintained that the effects of neither nursery school nor day care were carried into the primary grades. They felt that the three experiences should complement and reinforce each other. (Proposal for an Early Learning Center, 2/28/74)

The district used state funds to purchase land at the former Savo Island Naval Barracks site in Berkeley. State children's center funds were reserved for construction of a permanent building. No funds were left for education program planning.

Unrelated to the ELC project, in Spring 1971, a junior community school proposal was accepted for the OE/ESP grant, but it had no site. With the development of the educational program for ELC in need of funds, it became realistic to combine the existing program of ELC with the concept of the junior community school.

Planning proceeded during the 1971/72 school year, with emphasis on recruitment of families, selection of staff, search for additional funding and an interim facility. Parents worked with the school director in planning the program and interviewing and selecting the teaching staff. The school opened at a temporary location in September 1972, as a part of BESE, and remained there through Spring 1974.

Two major factors influence the educational strategy of the center--the integrated day and the British Infant School concept of informal education. The day-care hours for children of parents who work extend from approximately 7:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. Usually, about two-thirds of the students in the K-3 program have been served by these day-care arrangements. In 1975/76, for example, 47 of the 61 K-3 students were involved in both morning and afternoon day care. The program included a hot lunch and three daily snacks.

The integrated day involved several advantages. The first is that students in the K-3 program are able to be complete participants in the ELC's model "responsive environment." There is

a continuity and familiarity in staff, materials, and environment. The second advantage has become a reality only in 1975/76--that of a 20-hour commitment per parent, established through a contract each semester (twice a year). These 20 hours may be fulfilled by participating in one of the following areas: the classroom, the library, or one of the special-interest committees.

In ISA's report submitted to NIE/ESP in September 1974, ELC was considered a Type I - Innovative School, characterized by relatively open classrooms and a highly multi-cultural atmosphere. One ELC teacher noted:

The ELC is basically an open classroom situation. There is often too much freedom, which leads to unconstructive activity.

According to the Proposal for an Early Learning Center (2/28/74):

The program intends to develop a multi-ethnic, non-sexist curriculum with the collaboration of staff and parents. An "open" classroom approach offers student choice in group learning activities, peer-teaching, and personalized instruction, in order to encourage self-confidence, responsibility, and self-direction.

Cross age groupings mean that there is a wider range of skills so the child is not trapped in failure situation.

Actually, the staff has changed its instructional style several times. Prior to BESP, the K-3 students were in one large group. Students on their own spontaneously regrouped themselves according to skills and interests. Beginning with ELC's inclusion in BESP in 1972/73 (and through 1973/74), the staff divided the students into the age groups of K-1 and 2-3. By 1974/75, the staff went back to the total cross-age grouping of K-3, switching once more to the K-1 and 2-3 division in 1975/76.

Learning centers were set up in language arts, math, science and art at first. Children were free to choose their own activities while teachers guided small-group discovery experiences, and tutored individual children. The K-3 student ethnicity from 1972/73 through 1975/76 is given below.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, 1972/73 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1972/73	15	38	15	38	2	5	6	15			2	5	40
1973/74	14	34	17	43	5	13	2	5			2	5	40
*1974/75	13	30	13	30	11	26	6	14					43
1975/76	23	38	19	31	9	15	10	16					61

\*In 1974/75, parents and staff discussed their concern with the lack of ethnic identity for children of racially mixed parents. As a result, there was an effort to shift children who previously had been categorized as "other" to a specific ethnic category.

Designed as a "responsive environment" for the total needs of both the child and the family, ELC attempted to incorporate this concept in the physical structure, through careful architectural planning. ELC moved into its modern, asymmetrical structure in Fall 1974. Several major deficiencies of the structure became obvious. First, at odds with ELC's commitment to handicapped children\*, stairs leading both upstairs to the balcony where the library was situated and downstairs to where the offices were situated, were inaccessible to certain handicapped youngsters. Second, the balcony necessitated a different type of sprinkler system to comply with the fire code. This put the balcony and the library off-limits to all until the problem was resolved by 1975/76.

ELC has taken its multi-cultural program focus very seriously with respect to staff hiring (within district limitations), students' curriculum materials, and parent understanding. It has acquired a comprehensive multi-cultural, non-sexist library collection.

In trying to incorporate the concept of preventive social services for families within the program itself, the parent-staff council planned a series of workshops dealing with racism. During Spring

\*According to the Operational Plan for July 1, 1974 to June 30, 1976: "The school is participating in a training project involving the inclusion of handicapped children of all types in a normal school environment." At that time there were two handicapped children. By 1975/76, there were three (two in grade 3 and one in Kindergarten). One was neurologically and orthopedically handicapped, one had severe hormone imbalance, and the other severe asthma.

1975 workshops held on Saturdays were led by a Black psychologist as consultant/moderator dealing with overt/covert racism. These were directed mainly toward the re-education and counseling of white parents and racially mixed couples experiencing cultural/racial identity crises.

ELC operates the year round; in the Summer 1975 program further development of multi-cultural curriculum was undertaken. This involved development of Spanish bilingual tapes for the library center and a Chicano studies program for pre-schoolers, as well as an environmental yard curriculum.

The ELC staff has reflected some of the internal programmatic changes. The staff by ethnicity and numbers is listed in Table 2 below:

TABLE 2: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1972/73 - 1975/76\*

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1972/73			** (3)	75	(1)	25							(4)
	2	33			1	17	2	33			1	17	6
1973/74	(1)	20	(3)	60	(1)	20							(5)
	1	17	2	33	2	33	1	17					6
1974/75	(1)	20	(2)	40	(1)	20	(1)	20					(5)
	1	33			1	33	1	33					3
1975/76			(3)	75	(1)	25							(4)
	1	33			1	33	1	33					3

\*Not including director (white female)

\*\* ( ) Classified staff

The decrease in certificated personnel between 1973/74 and 1974/75 reflects structural change in the ELC program. In 1973/74 several staff members were on a rotation basis with the day-care facility. In 1974/75 this was changed so the K-3 teachers spent the entire school day with the K-3 children during regular school hours. The nursery program's staff rotated among themselves.

In 1975/76 a quarter-time librarian (or multi-cultural specialist) was available from the district for the wide variety of multi-cultural books in which ELC prides itself. This library was

also managed through volunteers--parents and University of California students. With no centralized library services by the district, even this meager part-time position was held up as an issue of favoritism by Kilimanjaro, another off-site school with no district support staff and 33 percent more students.

#### ARTICULATION

In Spring 1971, in anticipation of the Experimental Schools program, a K-3 BUSD school's (Cragmont's) administration and several parents devised the Junior Community School for the original BUSD proposal to OE/ESP. Approved in the original proposal, it was scheduled to open in September 1972, but had no particular site, since Zone B, in which its parent school was situated, was not within the negotiated K-12 articulation plan. Instead, the director of Early Childhood Education in Berkeley was asked by BUSD to plan for an Early Learning Center, including the parent and community input into the Junior Community proposal. Therefore, 1971/72 became the planning year for merging Early Learning Center with the proposed Junior Community School.

ELC (as K-3) once was planned to be a part of a K-12 educational complex on Savo Island. "The ELC is the first phase of a long range plan for three schools of approximately 135 children each" (Proposal for an Early Learning Center, 2/28/74). East Campus for grades 9-12, in its shared facilities with the Adult School, was already built on this land. Missing from the K-12 configuration were grades 4-8. Although nothing has come of it to date, there was a good deal of talk about how to incorporate the missing five grades into a Savo Island complex.

Generally, the approach was to add grades 4-6 to ELC because ELC was solid and stable: it had community/parent support, a new building, funds, and a director with influence in the district. At different times the ELC administration contemplated the absorption of either Kilimanjaro or Malcolm X Environmental studies, both of which included grades 4-6, but nothing tangible materialized. As for grades 7-8, Odyssey was a contender to fill that gap by locating on Savo Island. After a flurry of communications involving NIE, Central BESP and Odyssey in 1975, the plan was indefinitely tabled.

Meanwhile, primary considerations for enrollment at ELC were age, sex, ethnicity, address and income level. Then priority was given to siblings of enrolled students, children of the staff, and formerly enrolled students who returned to the area. Half of the children must reside in Southeast Berkeley and half in the other Berkeley areas. However, this pattern is flexible, as non-Berkeley residents with special needs (e.g., handicapped children) are admitted. ELC strives for an equal number of boys and girls and tries to maintain an equal number in each grade. Table 3 below indicates that only in 1975/76 was the latter goal beginning to be realized.

TABLE 3: NUMBER OF STUDENTS BY GRADE LEVEL,  
1973/74 - 1975/76

	<u>K</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>Total</u>
1973/74	15	16	5	4	40
1974/75	1	15	16	6	38
1975/76	15	20	12	14	61

With so few openings there has been a decrease of students on the waiting list. In 1973/74 there were 340 and in January 1976 there were 160. With staff and parents' concern for outgoing 3rd-graders not finding an equivalent 4th-grade program, ELC plans to add a 4th-grade age group to its program for 1976/77. It will retain its present third-grade students (14) to accomplish this. According to the director, the ELC building can ultimately accommodate 125 children.

#### FUNDING

ELC received \$106,449 from BESP during the years 1971/72 through 1975/76. This was 3.38 percent of the total BESP sites' budget. Prior to its official BESP affiliation in Fall 1972, ELC got \$13,664 from BESP, most of which was used for the partial salaries of the director and three consultants for project development.

Site rentals consumed 25 percent of the total BESP allocation; 63 percent was spent on salaries of certificated staff, classified staff consultants and fringe benefits for all categories. In 1974/75 the total of \$18,272, or 17 percent of the total five-year budget, was spent mostly on salaries--release time for in-service credentialed teachers, and a secretary--and instructional materials and books to help develop their extensive multi-cultural library.

In 1975/76, money was only spent in two categories--\$3,000 for consultants' fees for multi-ethnic programs brought into the school

and \$850 for field trips. For 1976/77, ELC is asking for a half-time multi-cultural media specialist (librarian) for more complete service by the library. Continuing field trips, including overnight camping trips, "are needed to continue basic educational experiences" (BESP Budget Report to Board of Education, December 9, 1975).

As indicated earlier, ELC receives special funds from several sources for its nursery, pre-school and day-care programs, along with the standard allotments from the state (ADA) and BUSD (e.g., for credentialed teachers). This permits some flexibility. For example, the initial state allocation to develop an "exemplary center for Early Childhood Education" was all spent to acquire the school site on Savo Island, necessitating additional funds for program development. BESP funding helped to meet this need, as well as some others.

#### EVALUATION

ELC considered evaluation an important segment of its comprehensive, integrated day-care/K-3 program. Parents were brought into the process--they developed an inventory of students' competencies. An ambitious evaluation program was announced after the 1973/74 school year. "ELC has developed a documentation process which will be initiated in September, 1974. It is based on the work of Pat Carini at Prospect School in Vermont, the E.T.S. (Educational Testing Service) Early Childhood Group and the work of the Education Development Corporation. ELC will request that ESP Training and Evaluation Components provide direct expert assistance to implement this program" (BESP Progress Report, July 30, 1974). This evaluation meant a review of the childrens' work from teacher observations each week, comparing it to stated goals and objectives.

This process was never realized. It was considered too tedious with too few results by the teachers in 1974/75. ELC felt that Level I did not spend the necessary time with the staff to train it in documentation-evaluation. Level I did, however, make ELC aware of the complexity of developing an evaluation process for an alternative school. It was Level I's feeling that "every teacher and parent must be involved in the documentation process" and this training should involve a minimum of one day per week. Training became a part only of the User Evaluation Component as mandated by the district. The January 1976 BESP Progress Report said ELC was still in the process of developing "an alternative evaluation model using verbal and written language samples."

In the meantime parents were trying to devise their own process evaluation for the program. In 1974/75 four parents observed teachers and wrote out a short sketch of their impressions of the teachers'

strengths and teaching techniques. The observations were descriptive but could not measure growth during the year. In Spring 1975, parents were asked to respond subjectively to an evaluation sheet developed by parents and staff for suggestions for the future. They were asked to consider structure, curriculum, teaching styles, and evaluative techniques, also social environment and overall perspective of parents and children. The main categories were instructional program, social environment, physical environment, options and services available to students and parents, school rules and disciplinary procedures.

For the children's academic progress and growth, the district used the CPT and the CTBS tests. As indicated below, the changes in mean scores reflect an average growth of more than one grade equivalent over a single academic year in both reading and math.

TABLE 4: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, ELC GRADE 2

	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Math</u>
Fall 1974	1.967		2.387
2nd grade n	9		8
Spring 1975	3.130	3.080	3.630
2nd grade n	10	10	10

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale\*, ELC's ratings were: .5 for "alternativeness," somewhat above .4 for "effectiveness," and between .2 and 3. on the combined "effective alternative" scale. This placed ELC in the middle of a cluster that included all the BESP elementary schools, except Malcolm X Environmental Studies, which scored close to .8, about .5 ahead of the runner-up.

\*For construction of this 0.0 to 1.0 scale, see Appendix.

KILIMANJARO (aka Parents and Teachers for Alternative Education)

ABSTRACT

Kilimanjaro, a non-graded, off-site K-6 alternative, existed with a grant from BUSD for a year before BESP funds became available.

It was founded by parents who wanted a child-centered, open-structured, "free school" type format, in which parents had the decisive voice. Their radical bent was articulated in the aim "to facilitate maximum communication for a truly dynamic, human, creative, and yet productive alternative to a racist, sexist, authoritarian, economically exploitative society."

As an off-site alternative, Kilimanjaro has faced the fiscal problem stemming from the need to allocate a sizable portion of its budget for rent, and the elementary problem of finding an adequate home. With its particular constituency, it has also been beset by internecine quarrels that are not uncommon in a radical milieu. Issues of leadership and degrees of structure and accountability have been recurrent. Despite such problems, Kilimanjaro apparently responded to a felt need in the Berkeley environment: in the five years of BESP funding its enrollment swelled from 48 in 1971/72 to 95 in 1975/76. Although parents have expressed deep concern with racism and inter-ethnic understanding and respect, the school has tended to revert to its original "white hippie" image. The proportion of whites in the student body declined from 57 percent in 1971/72 to 46 percent in 1972/73, but then grew to 61 percent in 1975/76.

Throughout its tempestuous and discordant history (and possibly because of those traits), Kilimanjaro has managed to retain enough of a parent-directed "free school" image so as to seem like an authentic alternative to a Berkeley constituency. It continued to exist in the post-BESP year of 1976/77.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

Kilimanjaro began in the Spring 1970 semester at Le Conte elementary school. It was taught in part by students from Other Ways, another alternative school in Berkeley prior to BESP funding. Kilimanjaro was designed as an unstructured classroom model for K-3 students. Parents whose children participated in the open classroom at Le Conte met together during the Summer of 1970 to plan a program more stimulating and relevant than the traditional elementary school program in the district. BUSD granted permission to the parents of about 50 children in the K-6 bracket to move off-site for the 1970/71 school year.

The new off-site K-6 school was named Parents and Teachers for Alternative Education (PTAE). Its philosophy was: "the world as classroom." The parents and teachers hoped to "develop an appreciation of ethnic, sexual and personal worth of the individual child in a free learning environment." In the PTAE community, children were viewed as people who should be taken seriously and who should be allowed to contribute to the direction of their own education.

In Spring 1971, PTAE submitted a proposal to BUSD and obtained BESP funding before the Fall semester. With BESP funding, PTAE changed its name to Kilimanjaro. For the next two years the staff and parents did not accept the concept of a school director, preferring to govern themselves collectively by group consensus. Parents and later teachers were designated as liaisons to BUSD and BESP. The liaison position was jointly filled by two parents in the first year (1971/72) and by a teacher in the second year. Initially, the liaison served as nominal director for BUSD/BESP purposes. By 1973/74, there was, in fact, a director.

Initially, the parents and teachers sought to establish an open structured community school in which the students would have a say in regulating their own learning, and parents could be actively involved at the school in the educational process. However, when some parents ceased active participation in the classroom, those who remained were angered and felt cheated. The question arose, why did some parents leave and how could they be brought back? The parents who left felt the true issue was not their irresponsibility to their children's education but rather the creation by a few influential parents of a selective, cliqueish decision making body which prevented the development of a total participating community.

While the parents were involved in that struggle, the students came to realize the lack of influence and control they actually

exerted in the program.

During the first BESP year, the program chairpersons were two parents voted in at a general meeting of the school community. For the 1972/73 school year, a teacher was voted in. Following the teacher's selection, some parents felt they abdicated their responsibility for the school to the teachers. The chairperson position would negate the school's finance committee since the duties included control of the money. And, during the 1971/72 school year, all of the designated BESP funds went toward rental costs of the site.

At the close of the first BESP year, the Kilimanjaro community set up objectives for the coming year: to become more of a multi-cultural community, to develop effective means of program and staff evaluation, and to expand and perfect the teaching of basic skills.

During Summer 1972, a core group of parents and teachers worked to explore and plan ways to meet the new commitments. Governance was more defined, the functions of school committees were established, a multi-cultural program was designed and a search for more minority students was initiated. Discipline procedures and rules were also examined.

The curriculum in the second year continued to reflect the skills and interests of students and participating adults. The school was also relocated to another site at which it remained through the 1974/75 school year. A complete arts and crafts curriculum was implemented, including pottery, sculpture, painting, woodworking, jewelry, welding and stained glass. The photography class was expanded with new equipment. Basic skills remained in a "work room," supplemented by an activity room that provided space for students to develop math and reading skills through games and projects. Black Studies and Asian American Experience courses were added during the 1972/73 school year. Attendance was not mandatory. The school remained un-graded.

During the 1973/74 school year, general meetings were held weekly to discuss business matters and procedures for building a more positive environment. Students and staff also met separately on a weekly basis. Budget, admission and recruitment committees convened as the need arose, reporting at general meetings to keep the community informed. Parents functioned more as advisors to the staff during the 1973/74 school year than in prior years. The staff and director were responsible for decision making at the school, with final say resting in the hands of the director. The

staff and administration, according to the director, shared responsibility for curriculum development, planning, course requirements, disciplinary procedures and school governance. The following table shows certificated and classified staff by ethnicity during the five years of BESP funding.

TABLE 1: STAFF BY ETHNICITY,  
1971/72 - 1975/76

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Total</u>
1971/72	* (2) 3	(1)	(3) 3
1972/73	(2) 2	(2) 2	(4) 4
1973/74	(1) 2	(3) 2	(4) 4
1974/75	(1) 4	1	(1) 5
1975/76	(1) 2	2	(1) 4

\* ( ) = classified staff

Parent participation waned during the 1973/74 school year, partly because of increased BUSD involvement in the school. During the 1972/73 school year, BUSD/BESP did not approve of the parent directors of the program, and for 1973/74 the District demanded that a teacher be placed as director. The first teacher/director lasted one year. By 1974/75, there was a new director/teacher selected by the parents, who remained until the Spring 1976 semester. He was an advocate of incorporating Black Studies into the curriculum at Jefferson Tri-Part and was a promising candidate for organizing Kilimanjaro's multi-cultural and basic skills curriculum.

With a new director came a new form of governance. For the first time, class attendance and follow-up were made mandatory. According to the director, the free school approach resulted in educational accountability difficulties for BUSD and for the education of the students themselves. Progress was difficult to chart. Stricter rules of discipline and teacher evaluation/accountability controls were implemented.

With three certificated teachers (one part time), including the director, the curriculum was divided into reading, language arts and math. The director taught reading with additional materials by Random House for the HILC. This program, inherently structured and managed to specification, philosophically did not jibe with the free structure approach. It did allow for individualization and instituted self-discipline, an issue of continued conflict within the site.

In order to maintain discipline among students, and to decentralize power to discipline, staff and parents established a Conflict Committee in 1974/75. The director, however, felt that dispersal of other controls at the site resulted in chaos. He stressed the need for accountability for all--students, teachers and parents. A process for curriculum changes was established by the director, requiring parents and staff to attend curriculum workshops. The parents resented the director's dictum, and viewed it as stifling creativity. As mentioned earlier, when Kilimanjaro began, curriculum was to be developed spontaneously and by trial and error. The general scheduling of basic skills in the morning and activities in the afternoons remained throughout Kilimanjaro's history. What specifically occurred, however, in each of these time periods changed drastically in 1974/75.

Grade configurations changed several times. In the beginning students were grouped according to their particular choice and preference. By 1974/75, there were two groups: K-3 and 4-6. Within those two groups, students could then make their choices. In 1974/75, the kindergarten students spent most of their morning time with a student teacher and the remaining students rotated in three groups of approximately grades 1-2, 2-4 and 5-6. By 1975/76 there was an additional teacher and additional upper grade students, which prompted a regrouping to include K-2 in a self-contained classroom and rotating 3-6 graders among three teachers for social studies, reading and math. The number of students at each grade level also affected the groupings that year.

TABLE 2: NUMBER OF STUDENTS BY GRADE LEVEL, 1971/72 - 1975/76

<u>Grade</u>	<u>1971/72</u>	<u>1972/73</u>	<u>1973/74</u>	<u>1974/75</u>	<u>1975/76</u>
K	10	7	4	8	6
1	3	6	3	3	8
2	9	7	6	8	9
3	9	6	6	8	15
4	4	8	11	13	19
5	14	7	8	12	19
6	5	7	8	8	19
Total	<u>54</u>	<u>48</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>95</u>

The director's peers, the other two teachers, resented impositions placed upon them regarding structuring the classroom, planning curriculum, and accountability to the director. At the same time, certain parents resented the usurpation of power by the director. The director often bypassed both parents and BESP administration in his efforts to create order. Sometimes the results were favorable, sometimes not. For example, only when he complained to BUSD about the filth and lack of maintenance services at the site was the janitor replaced (in Fall 1974).

In the BESP Progress Report issued in the Spring 1975 semester new policies were cited, policies developed and instituted by the director. Some of these were: restrictions on leaving the campus, wearing shoes on campus, and attendance.

Resistance to change grew to the point where a professional counselor was brought in to lead a group therapy session with the parents and teachers.

In the Spring 1976 semester, the director recommended the site secretary be replaced. Extreme hostility resulted from the staff, students and parents. The director, though, had some support from the Kilimanjaro community.

The conflicts that began between the director and both the parents and the staff in 1974/75 continued during the 1975/76 school year, culminating in the medical leave of absence forced upon the director by BUSD/BESP in April 1976. At this time, the directorship was jointly held by two volunteer parents under the direction of the central BESP director.

By April 1976 student enrollment dropped by 12 percent from January, from 95 to 84 students. Following is a table showing the student enrollment at Kilimanjaro from Fall 1971 through Spring 1976; the student drop in the middle of the Spring 1976 semester is not noted in the table.

TABLE 3: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
1971/72	31	57	16	30			2	4	1	2	4	7	54
1972/73	22	46	21	44	1	2	3	6			1	2	48
1973/74	22	48	13	28	4	9	7	15					46
1974/75	38	63	17	28	1	2	3	5			1	2	60
1975/76	58	61	10	10	9	9	11	12			7	8	95

Although Kilimanjaro did not maintain a racial quota, an attempt was made to admit every non-white applicant. The issue of a waiting list for the white families was raised every year. The list peaked with 40 families in the 1972/73 school year when Kilimanjaro seriously sought out more minority students to implement the multi-cultural emphasis it was undertaking.

Black student enrollment increased between 1971/72 and 1972/73, but this only lasted for one year. (White student enrollment decreased presumably because of the attempts to make Kilimanjaro more of a multi-cultural school, thus putting white students on the waiting list more readily than others.)

White student enrollment remained constant, both absolutely and relatively, through the 1972/73 and 1973/74 school years (between 46 and 48% of the student population); however, Black student enrollment decreased during these two years primarily because Black parents did not want their children enrolled in such an unstructured chaotic school as Kilimanjaro. In 1974/75, Asian and Chicano enrollment dipped, the reduced Black enrollment remained stable, and the white enrollment increased significantly. As a consequence, white student preponderance (63%) was the most pronounced in the school's history.

#### ARTICULATION

Since Kilimanjaro began before BESP funds, it was never considered an alternative that would have to accommodate the comprehensive K-12 plan. As a school for children from kindergarten through grade 6, it eliminated the necessity of K-3 matriculation into a 4-6 school program (the desegregation plan). As a K-6 configuration bent on remaining autonomous, it was housed in non-BUSD property, an off-site rental until the last BESP year, when it was temporarily situated at a K-3 school.

Kilimanjaro could reasonably fit well with the program at Odyssey, a 7th-9th grade BESP alternative--the curriculum, governing policies, non-graded configuration and classroom structure were similar. Few students, however, matriculated there. When Willard Alternative was functioning (1972/73 - 1973/74) the Kilimanjaro staff often interceded with their graduates for enrollment there. In reality, Odyssey and Kilimanjaro were very different in two major areas. First, the ages of their parents (much younger at Kilimanjaro), and second, the difference in leadership at each alternative. Both factors have worked interdependently for each school. For Kilimanjaro, they created continuous internal difficulties for teachers, parents, students and director.

As an off-site school, ultimate survival for Kilimanjaro was a tenuous issue at best. In the plans for a merger into the district the BESP Progress Report of Spring 1974 stated:

Kilimanjaro has staffing problems and will have housing problems eventually; considering merger with Early Learning Center though philosophies are a little different; however, it will be a matter of survival.

In March 1976 the BESP administration recommended Kilimanjaro "to be continued." The unique aspects of this concept were discussed:

A viable concept serving K-6 (ungraded) students is the most innovative of the Experimental Schools Project programs. As yet to be refined to the degree necessary for smooth management, this should be the major emphasis for the program. The program serves an unique segment of Berkeley's diverse population.

Kilimanjaro's future as of June 1976 was still tenuous. Parents had considered the extra space at Willard Junior High School in which to move their program. The director had been on a leave of absence since April, two certificated staff members were scheduled for the district layoffs, and the additional teacher brought on for the 1975/76 school year from the district's overage pool in order to equalize the staff/student ratio with the increase of student population did not wish to stay at Kilimanjaro. The possibility existed that the Kilimanjaro alternative would move to a new site with an entirely new staff. This had ramifications for another cycle in the philosophy, governance, and curriculum structure at the site.

As of June 1976, Kilimanjaro and Odyssey were planning on relocation at Willard Junior High School. The central BESP director

recommended one director for the two programs, solely responsible for administration. The intent was to move toward merger of the two programs to implement a K-9 grade configuration.

#### FUNDING

In 1970/71, BUSD gave PTAE two half-time and one full-time certificated teachers as well as \$14,000 to operate off-site at a service center called Kilimanjaro. The funds went toward rent and supplies. Parents contemplated charging tuition at \$7 per month per child, on a sliding scale. This was never implemented. Financial records were not kept that year.

With the onset of BESP in Fall 1971, and a move to a church rental, the name of the school was changed to Kilimanjaro, borrowing the name of the service center where it had been housed the previous year.

During the five years of BESP, Kilimanjaro received \$110,541 or 3.51 percent of the total BESP five-year budget for sites. Of that amount, \$44,412 (40%) was expended on salaries, primarily for classified staff, but also consultants and release in-service time for certificated teachers. The next highest expense, \$37,682 (34%), was for building rental (not including renovation). Supplies consumed \$15,699 (14%) during the five years; more than three-fourths of that sum was spent in 1974/75 and 1975/76, most of it for the Reading HILC lab. The director was the HILC manager during those two years.

With the afternoon program at Kilimanjaro heavily relying on field trips, a relatively small proportion (3%) of the budget was expended in this category. Many of the afternoon excursions, therefore, were limited to the Berkeley area and to walking distance.

At Kilimanjaro forward funding was never considered a security cushion. Fiscal survival was not planned for, the school was expected to exist on a shoestring--both by Kilimanjaro staff and parents and by BESP, which did not give special consideration to rental cost for off-site schools. As a result, in 1971/72 nearly the entire BESP allocation to Kilimanjaro (\$14,715) went for rent (\$940 per month). The school found it difficult to obtain enough instructional materials to run the program.

There was a curious gap between Kilimanjaro's needs and the district's awareness of them. For example, it was not until the director of BUSD business services chanced to see an old VW bus leaving Kilimanjaro filled with children that an adequate bus was provided to the school. Janitorial service is another case in

point. Physical upkeep of the site was almost nil until a new director took over in Fall 1974. His vigorous complaints finally moved the district to provide reasonably adequate janitorial service.

Money, or the services money can buy, was a recurrent problem at Kilimanjaro. In a sense, this was a price it paid for the "freedom" of operating off-site.

#### EVALUATION

In the original BSP proposal Kilimanjaro's sole behavioral objective was:

Throughout the school year, to create a spontaneous learning situation for K-6 students and their parents that will meet the needs and interests of all those involved, as measured by parent, student, teacher responses and attitudes reflected in narrative reports, check lists, questionnaires, interviews and observation, according to P.T.A.E. and District measurements.

For two years there was no documentation either by site or by Level I of any of the above-mentioned areas. By Spring 1973, an Evaluation Contract was drawn up with Kilimanjaro by Level I. It stated:

Baseline performance will be determined by site developed inventories and/or stipulated standardized tests to measure math and English skills, site developed attitudinal surveys to elicit student ethnic awareness, appreciation of other races and cultures, occupational goals, perceived self-confidence and sense of personal responsibility, and by recorded teacher evaluations.

Again documentation by site (and within the site) was not accomplished primarily due to continuous internal conflicts, upheavals and struggles for fiscal survival. The Spring 1973 contract provided that the documentation of progress "made toward the realization of site/student objectives..." would be administered by site staff and done twice yearly. Although CTBS tests were never named, this was the only documentation accomplished, albeit marginally. Kilimanjaro parents and staff refused to submit the students to CTBS testing in 1971/72 and 1972/73. But by the 1973/74 school year, Kilimanjaro students took the tests, which at that time were

mandated by BUSD. However, not until the Spring 1975 tests were scores available for a significant number of ISA's sample students in the 2nd and 5th grades at Kilimanjaro. These were as follows:

TABLE 4: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, KILIMANJARO, GRADES 2 AND 5

<u>Grade Level</u>	<u>Reading</u>		<u>Language</u>		<u>Math</u>	
	<u>2nd</u>	<u>5th</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>5th</u>	<u>2nd</u>	<u>5th</u>
Spring, 1975	3.631	6.920	2.546	7.047	2.438	5.319
n	6	8	6	10	6	10

Record keeping within the site of the individual student's progress in each subject was neglected until 1974/75. In spite of the director's insistence upon individual student files with updated progress reports and his own immaculate record keeping within his reading/HILC program, resistance by the other two staff members prevented this process from being realized.

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale, Kilimanjaro was rated slightly below .9 for "alternativeness," between .2 and .3 for "effectiveness," and between .2 and .3 on the combined "Effective Alternative" scale, placing it second only to Malcolm X Environmental Studies among BESP elementary schools on this scale. This, however, is not quite as good as it seems because MXES was way out front with a score of almost .8, and all the other BESP elementary sites were bunched between .2 and .3.

## FRANKLIN ALTERNATIVE

### ABSTRACT

Franklin Alternative (originally Franklin Multi-Cultural) opened in 1971/72 as a BESE option for grades 4-6 on site at Franklin Intermediate. By the end of BESE funding in June 1976, Franklin had more alternative programs (seven) and more students (nearly the entire population at the site) enrolled in alternative programs than any other intermediate school in Berkeley.

The school's early years were marked by tension between the principal-director and parents and teachers. Although antagonistic to "alternativeness," the principal wrote the original proposal for BESE funding at the direction of BUSD to meet BESE articulation needs in Zone A (the zonal pattern was designed to facilitate integration). Acceptance of the proposal did not reconcile him to "alternativeness." Simultaneously, in the Asian and Chicano communities there were pressures for an innovative response to their needs, and a group of teachers and parents, who had cooperated in an alternative "mini-school" for children with behavior problems at Franklin, reinforced the opposition to the principal-director. The upshot was that in 1973/74 the principal was replaced. The new principal/director and a co-director were fully committed to alternative education.

Initially, reflecting the existing pressures, the alternative consisted of three components--Asian, La Raza and Multi-Cultural. Later, La Raza was incorporated into the Multi-Cultural component as a bilingual (Spanish-English) option. The school finally listed seven distinct programs: the Asian component, four within the Multi-Cultural component, a School of the Arts, and a Fundamental (focus on basic skills) program.

Franklin Alternative's enrollment was stable, ranging between 336 and 357 in the five BESE years. Fluctuations in ethnic composition were minor; in 1975/76 the breakdown was: white 42 percent, Black 31 percent; Asian 20 percent; Chicano 6 percent, and "Other" 1 percent.

With the end of BESE funding, the alternative and common schools were combined into a whole in which the alternative aspects were predominant.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

Reluctantly Franklin Administration submitted a proposal for BESP funds in Spring 1971. The principal's negative attitude toward "alternativeness" stemmed from his previous experience with vocal white parents asking for "innovation" in the school program. His major concern at the school was to provide basic skills to disadvantaged and minority students. He expressed sympathy with their needs rather than those of the white middle class with its demands for "alternativeness."

For the two years prior to BESP there was one "alternative" at Franklin (backed by vocal white parents) involving two teachers in a team teaching situation. Experiencing success teaching children with behavior problems they wanted to create an autonomous unit with a high concentration of such children. Their emphasis was on personalizing and individualizing instruction in order to improve students' self-image and self-motivation.

Two other groups emerged in the midst of negotiations at Franklin for autonomy to implement their "alternative" models. The strongest of these with the most community and BUSD support was an Asian group. The Board of Education had created an Asian Studies Coordinator to facilitate the development of Asian-oriented instructional programs. An Asian teacher at Franklin was trying to create an Asian Studies Model School. The purpose of the school would be to help children understand patterns of racial stereotyping by studying the Asian-American experience. As an "Asian Cluster" model, the plan would feature a high concentration of Asian students and Asian teachers.

A second group, the Bay Area Bilingual Education League (BABEL), had received support from BUSD to set up bilingual classes in several schools, including Franklin. Similar clustering of bilingual Spanish-speaking students and teachers would occur. Students would learn about Mexican-American culture and a second language, either English or Spanish.

These groups submitted proposals for ESP in late February 1971 to BUSD's Office of Project Planning. None was approved and Franklin was not included in the first BESP draft sent to OE/ESP. Out of the initial negotiations between BUSD and OE came the decision that Franklin was in the designated experimental zone to fill the 4-6 grade level gap (Jefferson, a K-3 feeder school, had already been operating for a year as an alternative on a Ford Grant). Franklin's involvement was forced. The Franklin principal met the deadline given him by the BUSD superintendent by ignoring parents and the already existing alternative at Franklin. Instead, he incorporated

all three distinct groups urging the sole establishment of their educational alternative--Asian, La Raza, and Multi-Cultural. Each was to contain children from all cultural groups.

BESP public relations literature in 1971/72 said the Asian component was "to improve self-image through awareness of past history and contributions and appreciation of the uniqueness of the different minority groups." The La Raza component was "to develop proficiency in conversation and written Spanish and English and to improve school attendance by Spanish-speaking students." The Multi-Cultural component was "to increase understanding of the nature and worth of all cultures to find new ways to work together toward common goals and to help each child to learn by himself."

With BESP funds, the Franklin principal was appointed the director of the alternative there as well. He outflanked and alienated both teachers and parents. Their built-up resentment fostered two important developments within the site. First, it helped to keep the alternative segments supportive of each other and against the leadership. Second, it helped to organize the parents for the eventual ousting of the principal.

By 1972/73, the Multi-Cultural groups asked for and were granted a coordinator within this component's teaching staff. By 1973/74, after pressure from the parents to the School Board, the principal was replaced by the former assistant director in charge of BESP training. He has remained at Franklin in a role both supportive to the alternative offerings and acquiescent to the Multi-Cultural teacher/coordinator who subsequently became co-director of the entire alternative there.

Excluding staff shared with the common school, the alternative certificated staff remained fairly stable as noted below in Table 1:

**TABLE 1: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1971/72 - 1975/76**

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Total
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
1971/72	(1)* 3	33 27	(1) 1	33 9	(1) 4	33 36			(3) 11
1972/73	(1) 3	13 27	(2) 3	25 27	(5) 5	63 45			(8) 11
1973/74	(1) 4	14 29	(2) 3	28 21	(3) 5	43 36	(1) 2	14 14	(7) 14
1974/75	4	33	2	17	5	42	(2) 1	100 8	(2) 12
1975/76	3	27	2	18	5	45	1	9	11

\* ( ) = Classified aides

Comparing the alternative staff in 1974/75 and 1975/76 to both the combined classroom teaching population and the total site certificated staff, two facts are noticeable. The alternative has all of the Asian classroom teacher population. And the percent of Blacks in the alternative is slightly lower than in the combined classroom teaching staff. See Table 2 below:

**TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF BESP CLASSROOM TEACHERS, COMBINED BESP AND COMMON CLASSROOM TEACHERS AND ALL CERTIFICATED STAFF, 1974/75 AND 1975/76.**

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other	Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	n	
BESP													
1974/75	4	33	2	17	5	42	1	8				12	
Combined	14	42	8	24	5	15	5	15			1	3	33
*All certified	24	49	12	25	7	14	5	10			1	2	49
BESP													
1975/76	3	19	2	13	5	31	1	6			5	31	16
Combined	13	37	9	26	5	14	3	9			5	14	35
*All certified	23	45	13	26	6	12	3	6			6	12	51

\*All certificated staff include administrators, prep time teachers, district personnel assigned to Franklin as well as classroom teachers.

The major program changes occurred with the bilingual La Raza component and the Multi-Cultural component. The La Raza component historically began with the Chicano Community Task Force efforts of three years prior to BESP. A former teacher in the La Raza component said that the program's strengths were the acceptance of both English and Spanish as languages and the fact that white and Black kids were included too.

By 1972/73, the bilingual sub-school, however, had been eliminated from the BESP funding, continuing under funds from BABEL. And by January 1975, the Chicano component was re-approved as an integral part of BESP through the Franklin Alternative's insistence. The principal said, "They were functioning as orphans up until about 3-4 months ago." (Interview May 1975.)

The special identity of the Multi-Cultural cluster was continuously being developed. By 1974/75 the Chicano component (a 4-6 grade class) was considered a part of it and two additional groups were emerging--Neo-Arts Cooperative and Monkey Business. The Neo-Arts Cooperative, originally proposed for low-achieving Black students by the teacher/coordinator of the alternative, was accepted as a heterogeneous student program. Fifth and sixth grade students in two classrooms were involved in this educational experience interweaving home and community, transcendental meditation and physical activity. It became a testing ground for the issue of students sharing in policy decisions within their own structure at these grade levels.

Monkey Business was started by two teachers in order to make school stimulating and provocative. It was, in fact, a micro-economic game that provided a reward system for effort and cooperation. Utilization of the concepts and techniques in both of these sub-programs has spread through interest (rather than mandated workshops, etc.) to other teachers in the school.

In ISA's report submitted to NIE/ESP in September 1974, an analysis of the field observations classified schools on the basis of classroom structure and cultural diversity. Franklin was considered an Innovative School, characterized by relatively open classrooms and a highly multi-cultural atmosphere. Although there was a mixture of both emphases within each model, the Asian Studies component has been concerned with delivering specific content and the Multi-Cultural component focused on developing children's cognitive and affective processes. Team teaching occurred in both models and between models. Teaming within models was to deliver basic skills instruction, while cross-teaming between models was to deliver specific ethnically-oriented content.

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During the first year of BESP, students were merely placed with a teacher. The teacher's place in the program was dependent on his/her preference and/or ethnicity (for the Asian cluster). Teachers were recruited from the regular program to form the Multi-Cultural component. By 1973/74, parents were able to select classes in the Asian cluster. In the Multi-Cultural cluster, parents were able to sign up for waiting lists according to classes. The principal/director in 1974 was asked whether the classes in the alternative were innovative. He replied, "If by innovative (you mean) we accommodate all parent requests, then Franklin is innovative."

Student population remained stable both at the site and within each component from 1972/73, with the separation of the bilingual program, through 1975/76 as noted below in Table 3.

TABLE 3: STUDENTS BY ETHNICITY AND BY CLUSTER, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
Multi-Cultural (including bi-lingual)	85	37	88	39	21	9	33	15					227
1971/72													
Asian	66	51	29	22	35	27							130
Total Alter-native	151	42	117	33	56	16	33	9					357
*Multi-Cultural	116	56	76	36	12	6	4	2			1	1	209
1972/73													
Asian	49	39	33	26	42	33	1	1			2	2	127
Total Alter-native	165	49	109	32	54	16	5	2			3	1	336
Multi-Cultural	100	46	76	35	20	9	18	8			2	1	216
1973/74													
Asian	51	39	28	21	48	37	1	1			3	2	131
Total Alter-native	151	44	104	30	68	20	19	6			5	1	347
** Multi-Cultural	112	50	81	36	16	7	13	6			2	1	224
1974/75													
Asian	50	38	36	27	45	34	2	1					133
Total Alter-native	162	45	117	33	61	17	15	5			2	1	357
Multi-Cultural	94	44	76	36	19	9	20	9			3	1	212
1975/76													
Asian	49	39	29	23	47	38							125
Total Alter-native	143	42	105	31	66	20	20	6			3	1	337

\*The bilingual program moved out to become incorporated with Casa.

\*\*Included the Chicano component from the common school.

The recommendations from the BESP Administration Office, March 8, 1976, was to continue as is:

The influence of the Experimental Schools Project on Franklin School has been to enrich its curriculum offerings and to allow for different teaching styles. The teaching styles have been fairly well adopted by the staff involved with the project, thus the refinement of Franklin School has been along the cultural lines and should be incorporated as just a multi-cultural school.

A variety of offerings for all of the youngsters has been developed, and the staff training has enhanced the commitment on the part of the other staff members at the school.

#### ARTICULATION

Franklin was the obvious 4-6 school to follow the previously established Zone A articulation scheme. Zone A already had an alternative at the K-3 level which was planned for funding--Jefferson Tri-Part. Significant for the social character of the zone is the high concentration of Asian and Chicano youngsters. Figures gathered prior to the BESP proposal were as follows: of all Asians in grades 4 through 6 in Berkeley 45.4 percent lived in Zone A. Of all Chicanos in these grades 89.1 percent lived in this zone. The area also contains larger Black and white populations, but is so mixed ethnically that no one group is predominant.

Franklin Alternative's bilingual programs, designed to appeal especially to Chicano and Asian students, represented a salient form of articulation with its BESP feeder school, Jefferson Tri-Part, which also had classes offering Spanish or Chinese, along with English. Moreover, the Bay Area Bilingual Education League (BABEL), which was involved in the bilingual programs at both schools, also served as a bridge between the two. However, these special threads of articulation within the BESP network were broken once a student left Franklin Alternative to go on to the 7th grade. Not only were there no bilingual programs in the short-lived BESP junior high schools, but there was no program that focused on Chicano or Asian-American culture. As a consequence, the "peak" Chicano enrollment was 1 for KARE and 0 for Willard Alternative; Asian enrollment peaked at 1 in KARE and 14 in Willard Alternative (at a time when Franklin Alternative enrolled 68 Asian students).

Franklin Alternative, as a sub-school of Franklin Common, was subject to the common school's administrative policies and protocol.

Initial conflicts between BESP and common teachers resulted from the allocation of additional funds to BESP teachers. Sharing of ideas and materials as well as organizational development group retreats in 1973/74 (with BESP funds) helped alleviate those conflicts.

Both BESP and non-BESP teachers shared the facilities offered by the school--U. C. tutorial program, Help Center and HILC Lab. Students were recommended by teachers to receive one-to-one tutoring twice weekly in reading. The Help Center (begun in 1973/74) was staffed by guidance personnel and volunteers for immediate (crisis) student problems. And the HILC, paid for by BESP funds, was the first to be operationalized in a 4-6 school. It was opened in Fall 1974 to all 4th grade students and teachers. The HILC at Franklin was inherited from Black House after that alternative school was forced to close because of OCR regulations. A second HILC opened in February 1976 at Franklin. Teachers used HILC as a reading center to supplement their classroom language arts instructions.

#### FUNDING

Franklin Alternative expended 5.3 percent (or \$166,739) of the total BESP funds allotted to all sites during the five years, 1971-76. Almost all the funds (87%) were spent during the first three years. The expenditures those years were mainly for classified salaries, fringe benefits and consultants.

The second major expense included purchase of the High Intensity Reading Lab. According to the principal, one of the least costly though important benefits BESP afforded Franklin was in the area of organizational development with sensitivity type sessions opening the lines of communication among staff and components. It subsequently helped to alleviate jealousy between the common school and the alternative teachers.

The principal discussed the issue of funding and its BESP history at Franklin (May, 1975):

Well, I don't think we can divorce funding from any program. I think money does set values, and in terms of the original Franklin project, the money was really not into a program, but into classrooms. So that when the allocation came, the first director of ESP (at Franklin) took the \$60,000 and said, 'Okay, we have 12 classrooms, each of you will get \$5,000 apiece.' And the classrooms did whatever they wanted to do with

that money. So there is really no program...  
Some classrooms didn't spend money at all.

In the revised Operational Plan (July 1974) a criticism was leveled at the manner of funding:

The inconsistent level of ESP funding has made planning and efforts to achieve original goals very difficult.

After internal conflicts were resolved, eventual judicious use of funds and stable site goals were justifications for the 1976/77 budget as stated in the December 9, 1975, BESP budget report:

The continuation of funds for training in classroom management techniques, maintenance of resource labs, and participation in community multi-cultural activities are required to meet the diverse population served by the alternative.

#### EVALUATION

Although the original proposal stated that evaluation techniques would be continuous and extensive in all areas of development and achievement, there was no formalized evaluation other than CTBS testing. Informal evaluation was done on an individual class/teacher basis or in an impressionistic vein on an overall site level. The July 30, 1974, Revised Operational Plan, submitted to NIE/ESP, said:

Informal evaluation indicates a satisfied community and staff regarding their past year's involvement with the experiment.

Student CTBS scores at Franklin--common and alternative--were overall higher than those at any of the other three 4th - 6th grade schools. ISA's sample students in 1973/74 and 1974/75, in 4th and 5th grades, respectively, showed aggregate gains in reading, language and math which reflect growth of more than one grade-equivalent in all areas.

TABLE 4: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, FRANKLIN ALTERNATIVE, GRADES 4 AND 5

	Reading		Language		Math	
	<u>Fall</u>	<u>Spring</u>	<u>Fall</u>	<u>Spring</u>	<u>Fall</u>	<u>Spring</u>
1973/74						
(Gr. 4)	5.041	6.000			4.342	5.468
n	49	50			48	50
1974/75	6.654	8.286	3.443	6.797	6.438	7.567
(Gr. 5) n	41	37	40	39	21	40

Those students in the sample, whose scores were reported in Fall 1973 and Spring 1975, showed better than two years growth in all three areas.

TABLE 5: GROWTH IN MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, FALL 1973-SPRING 1975

	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Math</u>
Fall 1973 to Spring 1975	2.965	2.281	3.117
n	34	36	36

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale, Franklin Alternative's ratings were: between .5 and .6 for "alternativeness"; just below .4 for "effectiveness"; and just above .2 on the combined "effective alternative" scale, the lowest among the BESP elementary schools, although all of these (except Malcolm X) were clustered nearby.

## JEFFERSON TRI-PART

### ABSTRACT

Jefferson Tri-Part, a K-3 school, emerged out of a parents' revolt against educational inertia a year before BESP appeared on the scene. In the pre-BESP year (1970/71) the alternative was funded mostly by the Ford Foundation. The three parts or models, which gave the school its name, were called Multi-Cultural, Individualized Personal Learning, and Traditional, and were supposed to represent the approaches implied in the nomenclature.

Within the Multi-Cultural model Chinese and Spanish were offered in bilingual classes, and these have been the most unique offerings in the school, creating the only significant distinction among models or, for that matter, within the Multi-Cultural model itself. At one time the Multi-Cultural model was also distinguished by a Black Studies component, but this has been made available to the other models.

Generally, the trend has been toward blurring rather than sharpening the differences among the models. Aside from similarity in curriculum, two other factors encouraged the trend toward uniformity: (1) a desire to eliminate what was seen as a destructive inter-model rivalry, and (2) the difficulty of maintaining K-to-3 articulation within each separate model. In practice, such articulation was never consistent.

BESP's most significant contributions to Jefferson Tri-Part were a High Intensity Learning Center, a Math Lab, and in-service staff training. Such alternativeness as exists was formally designed prior to BESP and appears to have been diminished, rather than enhanced, during BESP's tenure.

For reasons unrelated to BESP, school enrollment declined steadily from 663 in 1970/71 to 416 in 1975/76. In the latter year, the breakdown by model was: Multi-Cultural - 197; Individualized Personal Learning - 139; Traditional - 80. The school goes on.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

The Jefferson Tri-Part Model, a K-3 school, was one of the first large scale educational experiments in BUSD involving an entire site. It was developed as a consequence of vociferous parental dissatisfaction with a traditional school coupled with administrative resistance to change. In 1968 parents applied pressure to BUSD concerning Jefferson's administration. The parents' major complaint was that there were too few teachers at Jefferson who were offering their children an exciting and positive educational experience. Parent requests for placing their children with specific teachers were not honored and the administration was apparently content with the status quo within the staff.

As a result, a new principal was brought in for Fall 1969 to develop a program more suited to the desires of the parents, namely choices in teaching style and curriculum focus.

During 1969/70, the principal, with several consultants, developed the three-part model program after consultation with the BUSD. The proposal, submitted to and approved by the Ford and San Francisco Foundations, was implemented during Fall 1970 with funds mostly from the Ford Foundation. The proposal was resubmitted as one of the 55 ESP proposals (February 1971) and approved by central administration as part of the BESP grant. The three-part model was placed under the auspices of BESP in September 1971--after the first year of operation.

Although many parents felt that traditional education was meeting the needs of their children, they indicated interest in individual and multi-cultural programs as well. Thus, the three prototype models--Traditional, Individualized Personal Learning (IPL) and Multi-Cultural--were selected by parents for the Ford Grant "Options Through Participation." A parent advisory group (of about 50) was formed after the announcement in May 1969 to develop these three models. Their desire was to create a model school that would maximize the development of skills and values in the learner and maximize the number and kinds of settings in which learning can take place.

When the site opened in Fall 1970 unforeseen problems began relative to logistics of forced matching of the three models. First, more parents opted for the IPL model than did teachers. The principal's solution created more problems. She suggested that some traditional teachers move to the individualized model. Her strategy was to reduce the magnitude of the traditional

approach, but she did not want to do away with it altogether. Second, teachers forced to participate in a model they didn't believe in became hostile to both the principal and the models themselves. The traditional staff felt its days were numbered. By Fall 1971 this group unsuccessfully tried to secure a no confidence vote in the principal from other staff members. As a result one teacher was transferred and two others retired. Third, with the introduction of the three models, the competition level among the staff was heightened.

With the principal's attempts to move the school more fully toward the tri-model concept, staff retraining became a major focus of program development. The principal was accused of favoring first the Multi-Cultural model, and then the IPL. In August 1970, a five-day workshop on individualization was conducted at the district's expense. In developing a viable Multi-Cultural Model, the principal expressed the need for expanding minority staff to work with the existing mostly white staff. A Chinese Studies program, a Spanish bilingual program and later a Black Studies curriculum were developed. The traditional (white) teachers felt alienated.

In the revised educational plan submitted to OE/ESP for the BESP grant, each previously developed model was identified as follows:

1. Multi-Cultural: "a total community for students, parents, staff will be developed through a Heritage House, community center and artists in residence."
2. Individualized Personalized Learning (IPL) "will provide a psychological environment."
3. Traditional: "The major instructional thrust will be in the field of children's literature through bibliotherapy, role playing, creative dramatics, and live theater...there will be an integration of all subjects in the use of children's literature."

Anxious to please all during the first year of BESP, the principal turned each model's BESP budget over to the staff and parents for planning. With the principal and vice principal making the final decision--since the staff and parents did not meet the deadline--many emotional discussions resulted in serious problems. In November 1971 the staff went to Calistoga for a weekend retreat at which the following issues emerged: teacher support was coopted by the administration; emphasis on Black concerns, including a Black Studies program, was carefully avoided by the staff; staff members, in general, had become insecure about their positions, mistrusting the administration and feeling threatened by the intermediate staff--consultants, resource teachers and specialists.

The conclusion was: "The rhetoric of the innovation in the experiment suggested democracy and some more openness but the reality of the transition involved principal control" (a staff member at the retreat). The staff then reorganized and formed a faculty senate consisting of representatives from all three models. With issues of insecurity and support still unresolved, the model representatives began vying for recognition and funds, further dividing the teachers with inter-model rivalry.

By February (1972) grievances against the Jefferson principal were filed with the Board of Education by a group of Jefferson parents. The grievances involved unmet promises, subtle racism within the site unquashed by administration, and misuse of funds, of materials, and of available rooms at the site. The June 1972 Progress Report from BEBP observed:

This year has been traumatic for Jefferson staff and parents. Parents have pushed for more communication and to be able to have an impact on the program. Staff have pushed for approximately the same. Some results are more frequent task-oriented sessions with parents and all-school, staff meetings of a faculty senate nature. The Multi-Cultural model continues to soar as a together and productive unit. The Traditional model looks more and more like the Individualized-Personalized. Jefferson this year has given witness to the fact that bringing about change, and conducting alternative education, involves pain and struggle. Power sharing is the term now at Jefferson and the process is difficult.

By 1972/73 non-communication was the norm within the structure of the school. There were no meetings with/for teachers or parents. The principal's strategy was to retreat from the public eye. But as a result of continuous parent and staff pressures, in Fall 1973, the principal was replaced by a Black female vice principal from another K-3 BUSD school. The new principal's main task was to rebuild trust and communication. She said,

The teachers have had enough of this inter-model rivalry and now the most important thing to do is try to get the staff in the whole school together regardless of models.

She stopped the individual model meetings, the staff discontinued its faculty senate and there was freedom to communicate with the principal on a personal level.

The Operational Plan of July 1974 was a testimonial to the improved year with the new principal/director:

In terms of governance and shared decision-making, Jefferson has had a long history of parental involvement and this year has one of the most highly organized and active parent advisory groups in the District. The group deals with general school issues as well as specific ESP matters. As a result of the degree and quality of community and parental involvement, the tension and internal difficulties which characterized the school in the past have ceased. Staff morale is high as a result of the strong, positive leadership of the school, involvement and shared decision-making and improved relations with the community.

Ethnic distribution by individual model from 1973/74 through 1975/76 is listed in Table 1 (student enrollment) below.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY AND SITE MODEL, 1970/71 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other	Total	
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	n	
T												221	
*1970/71 MC												209	
IPL												233	
Total	266	40	265	40	99	15	33	5				663	
T												149	
*1971/72 MC												234	
IPL												217	
Total	246	41	240	40	66	11	35	6	1	-	12	2	600
T												111	
*1972/73 MC												244	
IPL												200	
Total	218	39	207	37	71	13	48	9	1	-	10	2	555
T	30	32	46	48	13	14	1	1			5	5	95
1973/74 MC	73	31	77	33	30	13	40	17			13	6	233
IPL	75	38	90	46	16	9	8	4	1	1	6	3	196
Total	178	34	213	41	59	11	49	9	1	-	24	5	524
T	29	39	32	43	10	14	1	1			2	3	74
1974/75 MC	86	43	46	23	25	12	39	19			5	2	201
IPL	74	36	95	46	26	13	7	3			5	2	207
Total	189	39	173	36	61	13	47	10			12	2	482
T	31	39	34	43	10	12	3	4			2	3	80
1975/76 MC	76	39	45	23	35	18	40	20			1	1	197
IPL	48	35	63	45	18	13	7	5			3	2	139
Total	155	37	142	34	63	15	50	12			6	2	416

\*Ethnic distribution by model not available for first three years.

Because most of the students lived within walking distance, Jefferson was able to institute a split schedule that enabled teachers to spend more time with smaller groups of students at both the beginning and the end of each day. Most teachers had two academically homogeneous groups of students. Generally, the higher achieving students came to school at 9 and left at 2, the lower achieving students arrived at 10 and left at 3. Teachers could spend more time with students on reading skills on a more individualized basis. By 1975/76, however, this was a little used teacher option. Previously, the extra teaching time was eased by the prep time for teachers during the day. With cutbacks in staff (particularly prep time teachers), this was no longer available in 1975/76.

Through both a decrease in enrollment and district and BESP cutbacks, Jefferson's staff, racially stable proportionately each year, has decreased considerably. Beginning with 1971/72, the certificated classroom teachers have gone from a high of 24 to a low of 16. See Table 2.

TABLE 2: CLASSROOM CERTIFICATED STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Total
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
1971/72	14	58	6	25	3	13	1	4	24
1972/73	14	61	5	22	3	13	1	4	23
1973/74	12	55	4	18	5	23	1	4	22
1974/75	8	42	5	27	5	27	1	5	19
1975/76	7	44	3	19	4	25	2	12	16

Staff shrinkage exceeded the decline in student enrollment. The ratio of certificated classroom staff to student population was 1:26 in 1971/72 and 1:27.6 in 1975/76.

In June there was a BESP cutback of classified staff, reducing the classified staff at Jefferson from 10 to 6 the following year (1974/75). With a decrease in classroom teachers, there was a shifting (bumping) of teachers to accommodate administrators at all levels within the district moving back to the classroom for Fall 1975. At Jefferson this meant several shifts. One HIL teacher retired, several classroom teachers took over specialists' positions (HIL, Math Lab), a former science prep time teacher took over the library (the former librarian was transferred to a classroom in

another K-3 school in the district). At the site since 1971/72, the vice principal, an Asian male, was moved out and replaced half-time by a Black male from the district administration. See Table 3 below:

TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF SPECIALISTS, ADMINISTRATORS AND CLASSIFIED STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1973/74 - 1975/76

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Asian</u>	<u>Chicano</u>	<u>Total</u>
1973/74*	(2) 4	(3) 5	(2) 3	(3)	(10) 12
1974/75**	4	(1) 4	(2) 2	(3)	(6) 10
1975/76***	3	3	(2) 2	(3)	(5) 8

( ) = Classified Staff (includes aides, Black Studies coordinator, instructional display technician, 1971/72)

*Principal	**Principal	***Principal
Vice principal	Vice principal	Vice principal (1/2 time)
Librarian	Librarian	Librarian
Learning assistance	Learning assistance	HILC (2)
Psychologist	Math	Visually handicapped
Guidance	Guidance	ESL (English as a second language)
Reading specialist (2)	HILC	Math
Science (2)	Science (2)	
Chinese bilingual specialist	Visually handicapped	
Visually handicapped		

For 1976/77, another major shift was scheduled at Jefferson with the principal to be transferred to the 4-6 receiver school, Franklin Intermediate, to accommodate the district's new 4-6 school plan.

Since 1973/74 preferential services and/or consultants by model were non-existent. The Multi-Cultural model's Heritage House was disbanded and materials were distributed, the Black Studies teacher was available to everyone, and in-service training was open. Any services to the school involved everyone. This included the High Intensity Learning Center and the Math Lab, both purchased by BESP in 1972/73. The HILC, in 1974/75, was the research model for all

Berkeley elementary schools in the district's attempt to develop a viable reading curriculum. The Math Lab, packed away in 1973/74, was managed by a Compensatory Education teacher in 1974/75 and a former IPL teacher in 1975/76. The entire site was included in the in-service training of TABA Social Studies (and questioning strategies). The principal said that with the site's adoption of the (TABA) program "it will get at the feelings and attitudes of all cultures, not just one..."

Emphasis on basic skills was primary at all three models. Individualized instruction was a technique encouraged to attain them. There was no particular curriculum distinction between the models when they actually were planning to be distinct. Curriculum differences existed then--and continue to do so--only in the bilingual (Chinese and Spanish) classes in the Multi-Cultural model. Here, too, there has been a shift from the intended multi-cultural emphasis with bilingual augmentation to a bilingual focus with multi-cultural emphasis diminished. BEBP's perspective for Jefferson is as follows:

The recommendation for the K-3 (Jefferson) program has been to be continued. By this it is meant that the program has been able to develop curriculum that has enhanced the school's functions. They are not necessarily to be seen as alternatives as much as they are enrichment for the curriculum that the school normally has. The district should be enriched by having schools at this level that have different teaching styles, thus giving the community choices in the educational offerings. (BESP, March 1976, Recommendations to the Board.)

#### ARTICULATION

After operating for one year as a three-part model with funds from a Ford Grant, "Options Through Participation," Jefferson was easily included in the K-12 articulation plan proposed to OE/ESP.

Jefferson is one of the K-3 schools in Zone A which feeds into Franklin Intermediate, a 4-6 school. Because of Jefferson's assured BEBP status, Franklin was developed as a BEBP alternative specifically to fit into the articulation pattern as mandated by OE/ESP in the original negotiations. Jefferson is the only K-3 school in Zone A that achieves ethnic balance by drawing students from the immediate neighborhood. Busing is for 15 percent of the students who live more than a mile from school, which is a long way for K-3 children; busing is for transportation, and not for achievement of ethnic

balance. Students from other zones are occasionally enrolled in the bilingual programs--Chinese and Spanish. Students in these bilingual programs can continue bilingual studies in Franklin Alternative, which makes for a specific and clearcut articulation that was unique in BESP.

It was planned to enhance the options of Jefferson's students (parents) by offering an ostensibly free choice between the three models. Since the differences were not necessarily intended to be in curriculum, but rather in approach and style, the model was to have been the parents' ultimate choice for the duration of the child's enrollment at Jefferson. The teachers made decisions about specific classes within the model. However, the available classes did not allow for movement from one grade to another within each model. From 1974/75 to 1975/76, there were several problems that hindered such intra-model movement. First, often no classes were available for the students within that model the following year (e.g., a student in the Traditional Model in Grade 2 in 1974/75 was forced into another model for 1975/76 since there was no Traditional grade 3 that year). Second, there were not enough grades at certain levels for which students could matriculate.

Table 4 (below) shows that the number of classes per model each year changed with a continuous decrease in classes and students in the Traditional Model, a slight decrease in the IPL and a relative increase in Multi-Cultural--all proportionate to the overall decrease in student population at the site in general.

TABLE 4: NUMBER OF STUDENTS AND CLASSES  
PER MODEL, 1970/71 - 1975/76

	<u>Traditional</u>	<u>Multi-Cultural</u>	<u>IPL</u>	<u>Total</u>
1970/71	221 (10)	209 (9)	233 (10)	663 (29)
1971/72	149 (6)	234 (9)	217 (9)	600 (24)
1972/73	111 (5)	244 (10)	200 (8)	555 (23)
1973/74	95 (4)	233 (10)	196 (8)	524 (22)
1974/75	74 (3)	201 (8)	207 (8)	482 (19)
1975/76	80 (3)	197 (8)	139 (5)	416 (16)

Jefferson does not meet earthquake safety standards established by the California Field Act. The Board tabled the vote (May 18, 1976) on the issue of demolition and reconstruction versus rehabilitation. A vociferous community favored the latter but lack of funds may play the deciding role, favoring the former, for which more funds are available on the state/federal levels. Either decision will result in transferring teachers. Despite these complications, Jefferson continued to operate as an alternative school in 1976/77, after ESP funding ceased.

#### FUNDING

The original Jefferson Tri-Part design was funded in 1970/71 by a Ford Foundation Grant, "Options Through Participation." The \$352,631 from BESP over five years was used to maintain and develop rather than initiate a new program. Jefferson Tri-Part has been the most heavily funded BESP site, with 11.20 percent of the total amount budgeted for sites.

In the first two years, Jefferson spent 82 percent (\$287,757) of its five-year budget, and 85 percent of this amount was used for salaries, fringe benefits, and consultants' fees. Although Jefferson added three resource persons and three consultants--one each per model--as well as a number of classified staff, the bulk of this money was used for certificated monthly salaries, salaries which were previously and subsequently paid by BUSD. The \$15,400 spent on certificated

hourly salaries involved training funds for release time teachers.

The High Intensity Reading Center and then the Math Lab were purchased and maintained with BESP funds. Equipment for the Perceptual Motor Development Room, which was consequently integrated into the math lab and disseminated to other schools, was also purchased by BESP. Another several thousand dollars was spent on audio-visual equipment.

In the early years of BESP funding at Jefferson, budgetary issues were the source of much dissension that involved the different models, parents, teachers and the principal. Indeed, this dissension was probably the catalyst for the first principal's fall into disfavor with her constituencies. She was accused of showing favoritism toward the Multi-Cultural and then the IPL model. With the disproportionate amount of money spent on the Multi-Cultural model's Heritage House and extra staff, and then on retreats for the IPL teachers, rifts continued between the models. There are, however, no records to indicate how funds were finally allocated to each model. Accountability through evaluation was the issue raised in many discussions among parents, principal and staff, but never followed through by the administration.

Requests for additional monies after BESP funds end are concentrated in two areas--staff development and materials. This includes in-service (release time) hourly certificated salaries, funding for consumables and replacement of non-consumables for the maintenance of the HILC Reading and Math Labs and materials and equipment for the Perceptual Motor Development Room.

#### EVALUATION

One of the original goals developed by parents in creating an alternative school (prior to BESP funding) was "to test the viability of choices between the three models in this project as a prototype for other elementary schools in Berkeley." There was never any plan in which the three models would be tested, however, and Level I never made any distinctions, even with CTBS comparative testing--the whole of Jefferson was treated as one alternative. The fact that it was based on the offering of three choices seemed irrelevant.

Although it was the only K-3 school with true autonomy in both BESP and BUSD, Jefferson's means of evaluating student progress was basically no different than at any other K-3 school in the district. It used both CPT (Cooperative Primary Test) and CTBS.

ISA's sample students in the first grade (Spring) 1973/74 and second grade (Fall and Spring) 1974/75 scored above mean grade equivalent on CTBS tests.

TABLE 5: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, JEFFERSON GRADES 1 AND 2

	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Math</u>
Grade 1 Spring 1974	2.138		2.342
n	36		35
Grade 2 Fall 1974	2.754	2.759	2.524
n	28	17	25
Grade 2 Spring 1975	3.815	3.859	3.293
n	27	27	27

From Spring 1974 to Spring 1975, reading scores indicate more than one year's growth. In math it was a little less than one year, though still above grade level\*.

Because Jefferson was a BESP school, additional evaluations were being administered. One, the ICX, a culturally unbiased test developed from Stanford and U. C. Berkeley to assess progress in reading and math, was used until 1975/76 and administered by Level I. According to Level I, the administration decided to discontinue it because it was satisfied with the new CTBS.

Because Jefferson had a Random House HILC (purchased with BESP funds) two other Random House tests were used at the site. One, the Criteria Reference Test, was developed by Random House to assess the effectiveness of conventional classroom teaching in which behavioral objectives and accountability were major concerns. In 1974/75, Jefferson was to be the "model" and "test" school for the K-3 HIL Centers. The Gates-McGinitie Reading Test (Comprehension section) was administered to measure students' gain from using the HILC itself. Both second and third graders that year had an average gain of one year's growth over a four-month period. Also, Spanish and Chinese bilingual classes developed pre and post oral and written nonstandardized tests to measure comprehension.

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale, Jefferson was rated between .3 and .4 for "alternativeness," just below .7 for "effectiveness," and between .2 and .3 on the combined "effective alternative" scale. On the combined scale it was in a cluster with all the other BESP elementary schools, except Malcolm X Environmental Studies, which was first by a wide margin.

\*Grade two should score @ 2.80 by Spring testing.

Parent participation obtained some results at the school. Most crucial was the selection of and eventual removal of the first BESP principal/director and the subsequent selection of the second principal for Fall 1973. This was important but does not lend itself to qualified evaluation.

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JOHN MUIR CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER

ABSTRACT

John Muir Child Development Center, a K-3 alternative, is situated in one of Berkeley's most affluent residential districts, and even its architectural design--English Tudor--blends with the socio-economic ambience.

The alternative was patterned after the British Infant Model, utilizing the open classroom approach and emphasizing learning as a process. One of Berkeley's oldest schools, erected in 1910, Muir has served several generations of well-to-do whites. It has tradition--and part of it has been high academic achievement.

With integration of Berkeley's schools in 1968, minority children, primarily Black, have been bused to Muir from Berkeley's economic underside. At the Muir alternative the non-white student population has ranged between 46 percent and 50 percent of the total. Such statistics, however, do not convey the character of the school. White parents in the neighborhood, whose children walk to school, retain a proprietary attitude toward it. They are nearby, articulate and influential; they set the tone. Efforts to involve Black parents have been sporadic and ineffectual. The total staff has been between two-thirds and three-fourths white. Among certificated personnel the proportion of whites has been between 76 percent and 88 percent.

Initially, all of John Muir was slated to be a BESP school; some parents demurred, and as a concession to them a traditional enclave was carved out, but it never attracted more than 19 percent of a total campus population that ranged between 321 (1975/76) and 416 (1973/74).

Essentially, John Muir was left unchanged by five years of BESP. It retained its elitist image. It did nothing tangible to alter inter-ethnic relations, or to diminish the racism implicit in the pervasive white domination of a school with an enrollment that is almost half non-white. In retrospect, ESP funds subsidized a status quo that was relatively comfortable and comforting for a privileged stratum of Berkeley residents.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

The Child Development model for the Berkeley Experimental School Project was developed by an intermediate (4th-6th grade) school principal who, in submitting her proposal, was also requesting a transfer. The proposal was based on the British Infant Model and utilized an open classroom structure. The idea was readily accepted by BUSD and was incorporated into the BEBP proposal submitted to OE/ESP in Spring 1971.

With several openings for principals in the K-3 schools at the time, she was assured of placement in one of them. The BUSD's desire to implement experimentation in the district without disrupting the integration plan of 1968 necessitated the placement of the Child Development Model in an integration zone where a 4-6 alternative school was operating (Malcolm X Environmental Studies). Because of this, the originator of the plan was appointed principal of John Muir Elementary School, and the Child Development Model was designated to be implemented at this site. Within the zone then, children could attend traditional K-3 and 4-6 schools or alternative K-3 and 4-6 schools; thus, articulation was realized.

Once funding was assured, the newly appointed principal met with John Muir staff and parents to explain the BEBP concept. Staff members were given the option to remain in the school or transfer out. About half the staff remained, additional staff members were recruited from the principal's previous intermediate school. Parents were critical of the failure to consult them in selecting the new staff.

Parents of John Muir students, particularly the white parents who lived in the surrounding neighborhood, regarded John Muir as a neighborhood school, despite the busing of about half the students from a predominantly Black neighborhood. Parents at Muir have played an important role in governance and shaping the educational program. Parent involvement, however, was marked by racial division: white parents participated, Black parents did not. Efforts to involve Black parents in decision-making were never successful. The failure may have been due to channels of communication geared to and controlled by the neighboring white parents.

John Muir Child Development Center was intended to involve the entire Muir student population. Parent opposition to this concept plus the criticism of staff selection prompted a compromise between the principal and the white parents. A traditional program was retained at Muir, but less than one-fifth of Muir students ever took advantage of it.

A federally funded project, "Project Follow Through,"\* was incorporated into the BESP program. This decision was reached by a committee of teachers and parents prior to BESP operation.

Parents of bused children (mostly Black) were especially encouraged to participate in the school by the principal. Meetings in Summer and Fall 1971 were held for these parents to open up channels of communication between them and the school. These meetings, however, did not result in a strong Black parent interest group. In Spring 1973, "Concerns of Black Parents for Education," a group of Black parents, contacted the Muir staff to voice dissatisfaction with the continued low achievement of their children. The principal responded with a plan for increased contact between school and home and intensive personalized instruction for underachievers. Follow-up of her plan indicates that these policies were not instituted the following year.

In the Fall 1971 semester, Muir claimed a commitment to ethnic studies. In science courses, taught by the administrative assistant, a Black man, Black studies and ethnic studies materials were used. The course was discontinued after the 1973/74 school year. The principal claimed lack of student interest caused the discontinuance. In fact, teachers did not participate in the program and therefore could not follow through on classes the A.A. taught. Field observations indicated that ethnic-related material was used only in connection with holidays.

Parents of children in the neighborhood attending Muir formed a committee in 1974/75 to deal with the state earthquake regulations. The issue was rehabilitation vs. reconstruction (or replacement) of the site. The "John Muir Site Committee" favored rehabilitation of the building for practical reasons. If it were razed, their children would have to be bused to other schools. Besides, it was an aesthetically pleasing structure which blended well with the neighboring single family dwellings, and thus enhanced property values. The School Board voted in June 1975 in favor of rehabilitation, based on feasibility studies that found it was less expensive than reconstruction.

Teachers and parents collaborated in a project to provide breakfast for Muir students. A proposal for funds for the program was submitted to BUSD but was denied. Nonetheless, the breakfast

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\*The Follow Through program began in 1967 at five elementary schools in BUSD. Its avowed purpose was to open the school up to the community for the benefit of the child, the home and the school. Project Follow Through at John Muir was incorporated into five classrooms prior to BESP funding.

program was partially implemented by teachers and parents for a short while early in the BESP project. It was supported by the principal.

The Muir administration was also responsive to teachers' suggestions related to program. At the request of teachers, for example, a reading specialist was hired and assigned classroom teaching responsibilities. (The child development model was somewhat distorted, however, when low achieving students were channeled to this specialist.) Also, after teachers expressed dissatisfaction with the BUSD-mandated Wirtz Math Program, they were granted a summer BESP training workshop to develop a math curriculum of their own in 1975. Early in the BESP involvement, an environmental yard, utilizing the creek running through the school grounds, was proposed by one teacher but received no response. Later, however, a "People's Playground" was constructed and provided a choice of attractive play areas rather than the barren black-topped playground.

The curriculum focused on science and reading, both taught by specialists and the regular staff. Science was taught by a specialist for the first two years and later by the regular teachers in their respective classrooms. Other specialists were hired to teach music, dance, movement and perceptual motor development. During the first year of operation, organized activities and play through the City Recreation Department were provided. Ceramics, film making, tumbling, and French language classes were offered in the afternoons.

There was very little staff turnover during the five years of operation. Budget cutbacks, especially for 1975/76, forced reduction in the use of certificated teachers on-site at Muir but not assigned to a classroom. These teachers were the several specialists and the media librarian.

The following table shows the certificated and classified staff of Muir by ethnicity during the five years of operation.

TABLE 1: STAFF BY ETHNICITY,  
1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
1971/72	* (4)	44	(5)	56			(9)
	21	84	3	12	1	4	25
1972/73	(3)	38	(5)	62			(8)
	22	85	3	12	1	3	26
1973/74	(1)	17	(5)	83			(6)
	22	85	3	12	1	3	26
1974/75	(1)	17	(5)	83			(6)
	19	76	5	20	1	4	25
1975/76	(1)	17	(5)	83			(6)
	16	89	2	11			18

\* ( ) classified

The following table shows certificated\* staff at Muir who were not classroom teachers.

TABLE 2: CERTIFICATED NON-CLASSROOM STAFF ONLY\*

	White		Black		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
1971/72	6	86	1	14	7
1972/73	6	86	1	14	7
1973/74	6	86	1	14	7
1974/75	4	67	2	33	6
1975/76	2	100			2

\*Included in certificated staff in Table 1 above.

The proportion of white staff members, including classified aides, classroom certificated and non-classroom certificated teachers ranged from 64 percent to 74 percent of the total staff during the five years of operation. Among certificated staff assigned to a classroom, whites constituted between 79 percent and 88 percent of the total.

There was only one full time male on the staff at Muir through June 1975, the administrative assistant, and he was Black. The Black classified staff members were the Follow Through aides. The number of Black non-classroom certificated teachers employed ranged from zero to two in any year, with one being the norm.

In the 1975/76 school year, staff changes occurred at Muir. The vice-principal (administrative assistant) was cut, the single Asian teacher requested a transfer due to personal and professional disagreements with the administration and some staff, and the principal/director of the program took a leave of absence from the district. She was replaced by the former administrative supervising teacher of Early Childhood Education for the district.

In the classroom, there was little recognizable difference between the experimental and the traditional approaches to education. In the experimental classroom, children were re-grouped according to skills, specialists were brought in particularly to assist those students deficient in skills. Access to a media center/library and new reading and math materials was available to all. The differences between this program and the traditional program were in the further use of particular BESP personnel (specialists) and in-service training. Follow Through had its own support staff within the district. Guidance, speech, health and community aides were available to the program until the 1974/75 school year when all positions were grouped under the one Community Aide classification.

Children at Muir were singled out according to behavioral problems and deficiency in skills. According to ISA field observations, Black children were far more often labelled problem students than white children, both behaviorally and academically. The administrative assistant (through June 1975)--known as "Big Daddy" by the Black children--handled the discipline problems. Teachers (who were mostly white, anyway) were more apt to send Black students to him for discipline, utilizing their own measures for handling white students' discipline difficulties.

Following is a table of students enrolled in the BESP program by ethnicity during the five years of operation.

TABLE 3: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1971/72	194	50	183	47	10	3	1	-			1	-	389
1972/73	202	52	171	44	7	2	3	1	2	1	1	-	386
1973/74	231	56	172	41	7	2	1	-			5	1	416
1974/75	209	53	175	44	6	2	3	1					393
1975/76	172	54	136	42	6	2	1	1	2	1	4	1	321

Evidenced in the table is the student population stability, both ethnically and in total enrollment. The greatest change has been in the last year of BESP funding, when student population declined by 18 percent. Enrollment still was ethnically proportional to previous years.

In general, the John Muir Child Development Center model went through very few changes during the five years of operation. Provided with BESP funds, specialists and new reading and math materials were made available. The program itself was not significantly different from the traditional program.

#### ARTICULATION

With the availability of federal funds in Spring 1971, with a proposal submitted for a child development program by a 4-6 principal requesting a transfer to a K-3 school, with an existing alternative (Malcolm X Environmental Studies) in a 4-6 receiver school, BUSD selected John Muir as a K-3 site for the BESP program. To round out the K-12 articulation of the entire BESP program, and to avoid interference with the integration program of the BUSD, Muir was designated as the site in which the Child Development Model would be implemented.

Some choice of schools is available for white John Muir parents while virtually none is available to Black parents. Certain neighborhood residents can choose between two other common K-3 schools (Emerson and LeConte) while bused children must attend their designated school. There is also a small number of Muir students, who are neither bused nor live in the surrounding neighborhood. Enrollment of these students at Muir is based upon their parents' need for child care arrangements. The majority of these students are white, as is the waiting list for Muir. In May 1973,

80 students from outside Zone D enrolled in Muir. Of these, 50 children were white, 30 were Black. The possibility of enrollment at Muir on the basis of child care needs is one of those policies informed parents are aware of, yet it is not widely publicized. Muir does not openly make any effort to inform parents of this option.

On the other hand, Black students from outside the zone came to Muir with the Follow Through program. Those students are identified by the district and then assigned to one of the five elementary schools which have a Follow Through program operating.

When John Muir Child Development Center began in Fall 1971, the principal/director requested each parent to choose either the BSP program or the traditional program for her/his child. Efforts to inform parents during Summer 1971 and into the first semester of operation, resulted in 400 out of 500 families choosing the BSP program in the first semester. The following table shows the number of students in the Child Development program and those involved in the traditional program during the period 1971/72 through 1975/76.

TABLE 4: ALTERNATIVE AND TRADITIONAL ENROLLMENT, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	BESP		Traditional		Total <u>n</u>
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	
1971/72	389	82	88	18	477
1972/73	386	85	69	15	455
1973/74	416	89	52	11	468
1974/75	393	85	72	15	465
1975/76	321	81	76	19	397

The traditional program was staffed by four teachers the first year (1971/72) and three teachers each of the remaining four years of operation under BSP funding.

#### FUNDING

In the five years of BSP funding, John Muir was allocated \$240,643. This amounted to 7.64 percent of the total BSP budget for sites, the second largest allocation to any site in the entire program. (Jefferson Tri-Part was allocated the largest amount of the budget.) Of the total amount, \$122,433 (51%) paid for salaries of certificated and classified staff (monthly and hourly) as well as consultants. The second largest expense was instructional,

including reading and math materials. This expense accounts for 35 percent (\$84,434) of the total Muir budget over the five BESP years. Nine percent (\$22,424) went for capital outlay and equipment. This included the "People's Playground" constructed in 1972/73. In addition to the construction of the new play areas, capital outlay expenditures went toward media center equipment such as 8mm and slide projectors, cameras, tape recorders, etc. In addition, a kiln for the ceramics class, furniture and vacuum cleaners were also purchased for use by the entire school.

During the first two years of operation, half of the money expended in salaries went toward the monthly certificated salaries of three staff members: the administrative assistant/vice principal, the dance, movement and physical development teacher, and a teacher-consultant in program planning for the experimental project classrooms. By the 1973/74 school year, all three positions were salaried by the district. A sharp increase, from \$3,538 to \$21,657, in certificated hourly salaries between 1971/72 and 1972/73 reflects the use of substitute teachers hired for teachers attending the in-service workshops.

In all, salaries and instructional materials were the major benefactors of BESP funding, easing the strain on the district budget for one of the larger K-3 BUSD schools.

#### EVALUATION

The original proposal for the John Muir Child Development Center called for stringent evaluation controls. Standardized testing was regarded with disdain by most of the teachers, however. Internal evaluation was the prime consideration in recording students' progress. Teachers, reading specialists and tutors collaborated to determine the individual remedial or accelerated material utilized in the grouping of children.

But because Muir had a reputation of being an academically excellent school, standardized testing had always been a sure way of endearing the school to the district administration and the neighborhood residents. In the following table, the district mandated CTBS tests of ISA's sample students show mean grade equivalent growth in achievement from Spring 1974 to Spring 1975, with .923 in Reading and .423 in Math. In Spring 1974, the sample was completing grade one with second grade equivalencies in both Reading and Math. By the end of the second grade the mean gain did not indicate a full year's growth, although the students were scoring above their grade equivalency of 2.9.

TABLE 5: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, JOHN MUIR

	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Math</u>
Spring 1974	2.508		2.804
n	26		26
Fall 1974	2.453		2.415
n	19		20
Spring 1975	3.431	3.854	3.227
n	26	24	26

Even though teachers questioned whether the standardized tests adequately assess comprehensive growth and felt the test to be culturally and racially biased, the staff recognized that since the test results showed growth, they could be utilized to endear the project to and facilitate teacher requests from the district.

With that in mind, teachers asked Level I Evaluation team to make a comparative study of John Muir to other K-3 students from the time busing began in 1968. The focus was on the third graders by school and into their 4th grade school over a three year period, 1972 - 74.

On the district level, third grade Black children scored lower than white children. The degree to which the scores of Black children were much lower by the fourth grade was a major concern in the district. The same trend held true for Muir students. At Muir, there was a further delineation of students by alternative and traditional class grouping for grade three in 1972 and grade four in 1973.

**TABLE 6: MEAN CTBS READING SCORES OF JOHN MUIR THIRD GRADERS TESTED IN GRADE 3 AT JOHN MUIR (May 1972) AND IN GRADE 4 AT MALCOLM X (May 1973), BY ETHNICITY**

Year Tested:	White				Black				Total Group			
	1972		1973		1972		1973		1972		1973	
	3rd grade		4th grade		3rd grade		4th grade		3rd grade		4th grade	
Percentile Score and # Tested	%ile	n	%ile	n	%ile	n	%ile	n	%ile	n	%ile	n
Traditional Group	86	24	79	17	50	20	29	12	68	45	44	29
Alternative Group	81	45	87	37	30	31	30	26	59	79	55	66
Total Group	83	69	79*	123*	37	51	31*	113*	63	124	49*	250*
Total District	77	602	77	479	39	442	29	424	61	1167	47	1033

\* John Muir was the 3rd grade school, which included both traditional and alternative groups of third graders. Malcolm X was the 4th grade school which included not only former traditional and alternative students from John Muir, but also students from two other K-3 schools as well. The totals refer to all 4th-graders at Malcolm X.

As the table above indicates, the traditional third graders scored better than the alternative third graders for both Black and white students. However, alternative fourth graders scored better than traditional fourth graders for both Black and white students (though for the Black students, the difference was only 1 percentile). A possible explanation might be the number of high achieving students transferring to private schools beginning in grade four. This would also account for the decline in the number of students considered at the fourth grade level in general.

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale Muir's ratings were: slightly above .2 for "alternativeness" (the lowest for any BESP elementary school); 1.0 for "effectiveness" (the highest for any BESP elementary school); and slightly above .2 on the combined "effective alternative" scale.

The principal/director of John Muir was very critical of the activities of both Level I and Level II evaluation teams.

## MALCOLM X ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES (MXES)

### ABSTRACT

What is the value of evaluation?

This is an intriguing question posed by the fate of Malcolm X Environmental Studies (MXES), an on-site alternative for grades 4-6. On the Level I evaluation team's "Effective Alternative" scale\* MXES was rated .8, the highest by far of any BESP site. The runner-up elementary school, Kilimanjaro, scored only .25. MXES was rated a perfect 1 for "alternativeness" and a near-perfect .8 for "effectiveness." Such perceived excellence was not, however, sufficient for autonomous survival.

MXES was launched as an alternative mini-school on the Malcolm X (then called Lincoln) campus in 1969/1970, two years before BESP, by parents and teachers, who wanted something smaller and more personal than the common school. They also wanted to use the total environment in the educational process. BESP seemed like a boon: additional funds could be used for more intensive exploration of the environment by students and for retaining the services of persons in the community who could help illuminate the environment.

MXES did much that was imaginative (e.g., students conducted much-publicized TV interviews with top city and school officials; reading and language skills were taught initially from stories told by Cousin Wash, a radio-TV personality, whose TV studio the students visited.) Yet, it was caught in a bind. An internal dynamic seemed to impel it in the direction of a school that served Black students by helping them to comprehend the Black environment and the Black relationship to the larger environment. Countervailing pressures (accentuated by the closure of Black House and Casa for racial separateness) pushed it toward cultural pluralism.

This contradiction was manifested in a divergence between enrollment and curriculum. Between 1971/72 and 1974/75 the proportion of Blacks in the student body grew from 56 to 84 percent--and the curricular emphasis shifted from a Black perspective to multi-cultural offerings. Simultaneously, enrollment shrank--from 180 for a brief spell in 1971/72 to 45 in 1974/75. The decision was then made to phase out the program, in effect, by transforming it into a non-optional supplement for eight classes selected by the administration.

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\*For construction of this 0.0 to 1.0 scale, see Appendix.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

Malcolm X Environmental Studies (MXES) began as a mini-school for 4th - 6th graders in 1969 on-site at Malcolm X Common (then known as Lincoln Intermediate School) through parent and teacher collaboration. Its further development was made possible by a planning grant from the San Francisco Foundation in 1970/71. Program focus, leadership, enrollment procedures and student population were all interdependent factors in the seven years of operation (1969-1976). The program went through two major changes-- in 1973/74 and 1975/76.

In the beginning of BESP, MXES emphasized basic skills taught from a Black perspective, utilizing the physical and social environment. The student population was representative of the heterogeneous common school. The teachers were mostly Black (4 out of 6). The teacher/director, who was Black, was intent on maintaining the established goals.

The original proposal submitted to OE/ESP in Spring 1971 was a composite of the attempts of the two previous years. It described MXES's uniqueness:

For this program "environment" will connote the personal, human entities, or environment of, by, for and through whom this program will operate.

The students will be the developers of their instruction through their relationships and responses to the daily teacher-planned experiences. These personal experiences will be the vehicles for the development of basic skills for all students, as well as for a variety of other related interest-activities.

Paraprofessionals from the community will add a variety of skills and interests to the diversified program.

The initial staff planned for innovative approaches to teaching basic skills, improving student self-image and combating institutional racism. The program was designed to be responsible to the common school principal, a non-BESP participant.

Readjustments began in the first year of BESP regarding scheduling, enrollment procedures and site identity. After trying a departmentalized approach for basic subjects, the teachers changed to a self-contained classroom concept, which continued through June 1975.

The student enrollment procedure changed after dissension over the Black perspective emphasis forced two white teachers to withdraw from the Environmental Studies Program; they and their classes were absorbed into the common school. With student enrollment dependent upon the participating teachers up to then, it was changed to be one of parent choice. This continued through June 1975. Because of continued staff disagreements that first year concerning site identity, the staff hired a consultant psychologist in 1972/73 to lead sensitivity sessions.

As far back as 1971/72, the focus of the program was on Blacks. In regard to the student population, the original director said:

Students come to us because either their parents want them in a Black setting or they are having problems with other schools. White students attend because they gain experience and reward from such a setting. They are mainly from liberal backgrounds.

From the onset of BESP funds in Fall 1971, the student population at MXES slowly decreased until Fall 1975, when the program was turned into a non-optional supplement for eight common school classes, chosen by the administration. Table 1 below indicates the percentage increase of Blacks enrolled through Spring 1975.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
*1971/72	77	43	101	56	2	1							180
1972/73	41	46	48	53	1	1							90
1973/74	19	28	46	67							4	5	69
1974/75	5	11	38	84			1	2			1	2	45
**1975/76	76	36	130	63			1	1			1	1	208

\*Figures are prior to the withdrawal from MXES of two white teachers and their classes, which reduced the student population to 120.

\*\*Program turned into something else; see paragraph preceding table.

The first major change at MXES, however, was in 1973/74, prompted by the second director. First hired as a consultant to abate internal difficulties, she then advanced to assistant director during the same

year, 1972/73. She was politically aware of the situation with the Office for Civil Rights closing Black House and Casa and recommended MXES move away from the Black perspective. MXES began to feature a multi-cultural curriculum, conducting consciousness raising sessions with students about racism, involving Black, white and other ethnic groups. The change in the curriculum was ostensibly to realize the BSP goals of cultural pluralism; however, the students enrolled that year were even more disproportionately Black than the previous year. By 1974/75, 38 of the 45 students enrolled were Black.

The second director indicated that an understanding between the home and the school occurred best when Black parents were involved with Black teachers. She said: "I think the parents relate better to these teachers because they are Black. Parents will come in and talk to my teachers like they are old friends. And they are willing to sit with a Black teacher and expose their very personal kinds of problems at home where they may be hesitant to do that with a white teacher."

Internal staff strife became a major problem of MXES. Prior to BSP, a Black male was the teaching director. He was assisted by five teachers (3 Blacks, 2 whites) in developing the project as a mini-school. College students and parents helped in the classroom and on field trips. BSP funds made possible additional staff, including a Black Studies coordinator and two aides (both Black males). One taught photography and tutored in basic skills and remained as a specialist through June 1975. The other edited the project's newsletter, taught gospel choir and supervised and planned field trips.

TABLE 2: STAFF BY ETHNICITY,  
1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
*1971/72	2	29	5 (2)**	71	7 (2)
1972/73			4 (3)	100	4 (3)
***1973/74	1	33	2 (2)	67	3 (2)
1974/75			2 (2)	100	2 (2)
****1975/76	4	50	4 (2)	50	8 (2)

\*Two white teachers withdrew from MXES and were absorbed (with their classes) into the common school at Malcolm X.

\*\* ( ) = classified staff

\*\*\*There was a series of 10 4th grade substitute teachers (mostly white) taken from the teacher overage pool.

\*\*\*\*The program was administratively expanded within the common school.

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As noted in the table above there were two major staff changes. First, in Fall 1971, two white teachers withdrew from the program and were absorbed by the common school. This resulted in an all Black staff the remainder of that year through 1973/74. Second, in 1975/76 the program was expanded to include eight teachers, four Black, four white, selected by the Malcolm X common school administration.

When both the directorship and the focus of the program changed in 1973/74, another staff problem occurred. The 4th grade had a series of ten substitute teachers from the overage pool in the district that year. Most were white and most were unable to cope with the students and the program. As a direct consequence of this continuous problem, the student population decreased considerably in 1974/75.

In the December 1974 BESP Quarterly Progress Report, the MXES director was very forthright in her comments:

An emerging problem is the decreasing non-Black enrollment in this predominantly Black program. The BESP director has initiated planning sessions through the Principal and site director [herself] to alleviate this condition which is considered to be a total school, and not merely an ESP, problem.

The director's position was in jeopardy. Justification for maintaining the program with four adults--two certificated teachers, the director and the media skills aide--was improbable.

The daily curriculum plan through June 1975 had been to concentrate on basic skills in the morning--reading, language arts, math, etc.--and 4-6 week projects in the afternoons. Math was taught in relation to planning a camping trip, excursions to grocery stores, etc. Reading and language skills were taught initially from stories told by Cousin Wash, a radio-TV personality introduced to Environmental Studies by an ESEA Project. MXES printed his and students' stories as its basic texts. The major field trip that year was to his TV studio.

Aside from three field trips to East Bay parks, the afternoon projects involved community organizations, educational structures, community businesses, multi-cultural awareness centers, recreation facilities, and civil service organizations. One instructional aide, involved with media and equipment, helped one group of students record the activities of others through video tape and photography.

As stated in the revised site goals relative to the 1973/74 multi-cultural change in emphasis:

Students will be exposed to social resources that will enable them to appreciate a broader cultural perspective.

Several units were subsequently developed--Chicano, Native American, Asian-American, City Government. In 1973/74 students went to Alcatraz, Intertribal Friendship House and Wagner Ranch School for a Native Nature Area Tour in conjunction with their multi-cultural units. They also went to city government offices, TV newsrooms and were involved with career exploration projects visiting businesses as well as bringing in speakers.

In 1974/75, students visited other schools in Berkeley, BESP evaluation, BUSD Transportation Department, Business Office,

Instructional Media Center, and BUSD Administration Office. They interviewed the Superintendent and the Malcolm X common school principal on TV.

By 1975/76, the program was abandoned as an autonomous entity and transformed to include all 6th grade students. The aides' salary remained in the BESP budget, the director's was transferred to BUSD. The concept of environmental studies now had no cultural emphasis. Eight individual teachers with their classes were assigned by the Malcolm X common school administration to the program.

After the teachers' strike in the Fall 1975, teachers and the director developed three classroom options for the Environmental Studies Program: Berkeley City [government] Project, Project Water [conservation], and Malcolm X Beautification Project.

Field trips were rotated among the classes on Fridays and included City Hall, a fire station, Bay Delta Model, San Pablo Reservoir, EBMUD\* Filter Plant, Angel Island and a tour of Berkeley.

In March 1976, BESP administration recommended:

In view of the difficulties the district is having at the 4-6 schools and also the projected configuration, the Environmental Studies approach offers a different slant that might enrich the curriculum at this particular 4-6 level. It is the plan of the school's staff to enlarge this concept and to utilize it throughout the school.

On April 27, 1976, at the Board of Education meeting the BUSD Superintendent presented a plan for a near complete shift of teachers and principals from the 4-6 schools and transformation of the latter into more intimate "mini-schools." He told the board that "drastic changes must take place in the 4-6 schools' organization and staffing patterns. We must rethink, reorganize and rejuvenate the entire 4-6 elementary instructional program." In essence the superintendent asked for the concept MXES represented when it began in 1969. In view of his comments, if the MXES concept continues it will necessarily begin with a reorganization of staff and without its present director.

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\*East Bay Municipal Utilities District.

ARTICULATION

In 1969/70, MXES established itself as an alternative to the common school. It was not only convenient to include it in the BESP proposal in Spring 1971 but also to use this zone as a basis for articulating a K-3 elementary program. Consequently John Muir Child Development Model was included in the final proposal and submitted to OE/ESP as the K-3 feeder school to Malcolm X in zone D.

This supposed articulation not only between the two BESP programs but between the two overall (common) schools became a bone of contention for the vociferous John Muir neighborhood parents. They had objected to busing their children to Malcolm X since the desegregation plan was instituted in 1968. They said they were critical of busing their children because: (1) the Malcolm X (common school) staff had poor administrative leadership, (2) the quality of education was not commensurate with that at John Muir and (3) there were no options at Malcolm X.

Leadership and staffing at the two sites were different; John Muir showed a definite disproportion of whites consistently whereas Malcolm X was consistently ethnically balanced. John Muir's principal was a white female, Malcolm X's was a Black male. John Muir had only two males on the full time staff (and this was only in 1974/75). Nearly one third of the staff at Malcolm X were males.

In the table below, several blatant facts emerge regarding the differences between the two sites in 1974/75 and 1975/76.

TABLE 3: FULL-TIME CERTIFICATED STAFF AT MALCOLM X AND JOHN MUIR BY ETHNICITY, 1974/75 and 1975/76

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Asian</u>	<u>Chicano</u>	<u>Native American</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>JOHN MUIR</u>							
1974/75	20	5	1				26 (2 males)
1975/76	17	2					19 (0 males)
<u>MALCOLM X</u>							
1974/75	22	19	2	1		1	45 (13 males)
1975/76	16	18	2	2			38 (11 males)

Regarding quality of education the same group of complaining parents at Muir did research on the CTBS test scores. Their findings were that student growth in the 4-6 grades at Malcolm X was not up to the growth patterns of students at John Muir (See John Muir report in this volume).

Regarding options, BESP funding of an alternative at Malcolm X had no impact on the parents for two major reasons: (1) the Environmental Studies did not have the same emphasis as the Child Development Model, (2) by 1971/72 when BESP funds were available, the MXES program had a reputation for being a "Black school." In actuality students enrolled in MXES at that time were ethnically proportionate; however, four out of six teachers were Black.

On all three issues--poor leadership, poor education, no options--parents manipulated their findings and conclusions as a way of regaining the power they felt they had lost from their own neighborhood school. At Malcolm X, they confronted an administrative leadership that was Black, as were nearly half of the teachers. Also Muir parents now were up against male teachers and administrators--something they never had to deal with at Muir. Low achievement in the 4-6 grades, particularly among Blacks, was an issue that was not unique to Malcolm X. As for options, they were available at Malcolm X in the same way they were at John Muir--parents could request a teacher; however, the parents did not consider this a viable option since honoring their requests would lead to ethnic imbalance in those classrooms.

#### FUNDING

MXES received a total of \$169,519 (or 5.38 percent of the total BESP sites' budget) from 1971/72 through 1975/76. Prior to BESP the mini-school (as it was called at first) was awarded a \$35,000 grant from the San Francisco Foundation in 1970/71.

Eighty-two percent (\$138,388) of the BESP allocations was spent on salaries--certificated hourly and classified monthly and hourly--and fringe benefits. An additional \$7,963 (5%) was spent for consultants. Much of this money was used to bring personnel into the program who could implement the concept of integrating the environment with the curriculum.

Classified salaries covered a secretary, instructional aides (two the first two years, one each year through June 1975), and an instructional aide from 1972/73 to phase-out in June 1976. The director was paid by BUSD in 1975/76. Consultant fees accounted for the two outside resource people--a "professional" storyteller and a psychologist--in 1971/72 and 1972/73 respectively.

With the program's basic tenets--basic skills taught through the use of the physical and social environment--it was necessary to develop a curriculum based on its own materials and outside activities. The budget, however, represented a scant use of funds for instructional materials/books and field trips. Six percent

(\$9,946) of the total site budget was spent on instructional materials, including printing of the storyteller's and students' stories. Only 4 percent of the budget was expended on field trips beginning with \$3,000 in 1972/73 and gradually decreasing to \$1,000 in 1975/76. This was disproportionate to the number of students involved in the program, since the nominal enrollment was the highest in 1975/76 and the program focused primarily on field trips. From another vantage point, however, the figures suggest that the apparent expansion of the program was, in fact, its dilution.

The BESP administration (March 8, 1976), recommended phase-in for MXES, stipulating the need to keep the two classified staff members, shifting the one BESP salary to BUSD funds.

They have been an integral part of the development of the program and there is need for management. The recommendation of the additional staff is based on the need for coordination of the school's offerings.

By the time BESP funds drew to a close, maintaining the staff actually was more important than maintaining the program.

#### EVALUATION

"Evaluation" was always a moot issue at Environmental Studies. The original teacher/director felt there was a schism between home and school environment which adversely affected student learning processes, especially that of Blacks.

We are having success (with out students) but have basic problems of defining and showing it (i.e., demonstrating results via testing procedures).

Reading, according to him, was not a gauge of education.

Reading is not as colorful as communication on the corner. Things that are important for survival for Blacks can be picked up on the corner.

In order to minimize the gap he saw the need for inculcating different values in Black students--things that cannot be measured by standardized testing.

In spite of his beliefs, the April 1971 Environmental Studies proposal linked district mandated (CTBS) evaluation with behavioral

objectives in both the areas of reading and math. The second director has been vociferous in her condemnation of CTBS validity, placing more importance on teacher-made tests for basic skills and her own multi-cultural unit tests. She contended that the congruency between the parents and the staff at MXES necessarily remained an important (though untapped) measure of the program's success. The Black parents were supportive of the Black staff and subsequently of the daily school activities. Students could feel this mutual understanding and support which, in turn, affected their behavior and motivation. These factors were not measurable in any way other than satisfaction figures compiled from student and parent surveys and behavior problem progress.

The second director said in Spring 1975:

You can't test everything. You can't evaluate everything. There is a lot of change in attitudes. Ninety-eight percent of the kids who have been referred to us have been discipline problems. We lay a lot of responsibilities on the kids as to what they have to do.

The June 1974 BESP Quarterly Progress report cited comments by the principal of Malcolm X common on the Environmental Studies program. He stressed "the progress of the children on the route to self-control in the area of student behavior" and described Environmental Studies' style as "using a diagnostic prescriptive approach to the whole area of discipline." He attested to the success of this approach and transferred at least seven "hard to manage" students into the program for two years in a row. In his laudatory summary he said, "We are pleased that the Environmental Studies Program at Malcolm X affords us an alternative when placing children." Level I Project Studies for its Quarterly Report of June 1974 involved MXES in its site specific studies in these previously mentioned areas: site developed surveys for parents, staff, students, and teacher made tests in basic skills. Its analysis of the Teacher-Made Tests was: "Pre and post testing was done on a program-wide basis in all basic skill areas. The data revealed marked student growth in math, language arts and social studies." Included in this was the pre and post multi-cultural unit testing. Level I reported that "results showed a 75 percent rate of growth in awareness."

In 1972/73 Level I reported that the 4th grade CTBS (numbers unavailable) mean scores in reading, language and math were at grade level. ISA's sample 4th and 5th grade students in 1973/74 and 1974/75, respectively, indicated that mean grade equivalents were not up to par, as shown in table below:

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TABLE 4: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA  
SAMPLE, MXES GRADES 4 AND 5

	READING		LANGUAGE		MATH	
	<u>Fall</u>	<u>Spring</u>	<u>Fall</u>	<u>Spring</u>	<u>Fall</u>	<u>Spring</u>
1973/74 (Gr. 4) n 8	4.100	3.592			3.886	4.317
		12			7	12
1974/75 (Gr. 5) n 15	3.473	4.087	3.443	3.513	3.664	4.521
	15	15	14	15	14	14

Not only do the above scores indicate that ISA's sample students were below grade level; in several instances they also indicate retrogression, rather than progress over a period of time. The apparent discrepancy between Level I's findings in 1972/73 and ISA's findings in the subsequent two school years might be explained perhaps by changes in student composition. In 1972/73, the student population was 46 percent white; this percentage dropped to 28 percent in 1973/74 and 11 percent in 1974/75. Thus, it is very likely that ISA's sample contained a higher proportion of ethnic minority students than was represented in the group whose test scores Level I recorded.

KARE (King Alternative for Relevant Education)

ABSTRACT

KARE was a 7-8 grade alternative on-site at King Junior High School. As with the other BESP junior high school program at Willard, the creation of KARE was bureaucratically decreed by BUSD to fill the junior high gap in meeting the OE/ESP requirements for K-12 comprehensiveness. King and Willard are Berkeley's only junior high schools.

However, what was conspicuously absent at Willard in 1971 was present at King; namely, a desire and movement for alternative education. A parents' group was actively trying to revive an alternative program that had existed on the King campus in 1969/70, but King's principal, mandated by BUSD to draft a proposal for ESP funding, totally excluded the parents' group from the formulation and implementation of his proposal. This rock of bureaucracy managed to kill two birds: the parents' program perished for lack of administrative support, the administrative program was doomed for lack of support from parents, students, or teachers.

KARE opened in Fall 1972 and was terminated by BUSD in Spring 1974. In the two years of its fitful existence, marked by constant turnover in administrative and classroom personnel, KARE served largely as a dumping ground for academic underachievers. It was pejoratively labelled "CARE." In the one year (1973/74) it served both 7th and 8th graders its enrollment was 226, 68 percent of it Black. In formally recommending KARE's termination to the Board of Education in March 1974, BESP noted: "The alternativeness was not readily recognizable." The Level I evaluation team seemingly contradicted that judgment by rating KARE as the most "effective alternative" in the grades 7-9 range. But no one seemed to take Level I's evaluation seriously, and there was no post-mortem to ascertain the cause of KARE's demise. Its short life line extended from bureaucratic birth to bureaucratic death.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

The emergence of KAPE appeared to be a timely one for several reasons: (1) at the district level, it would round out the K-12 articulation by helping to fill the gap at the junior high level for the original OE/ESP proposal; (2) at the community level some parents exhibited an interest in an alternative school at King; (3) at the site level, there was to be a new principal at King for Fall 1971.

Of these three seemingly promising and timely factors, only the first provided positive impetus to the alternative's emergence. That some parents at King were interested in developing an alternative was discounted by the BESP developers who deferred instead to the changing heads of the King administration.

Meanwhile, the outgoing principal was still on board, and he was requested by the district administration to develop a proposal to round out the K-12 articulation plan for OE/ESP. Oblivious of this assignment, the group of parents, in the process of trying to revive a 1969/70 program they had called Martin Luther King Cluster School, presented their ideas to the principal. They proposed a small school within King that could generate small learning groups; it would develop skills for high school survival, productive choice making, and the pursuit of a variety of meaningful human relationships. These parents did not know of the ESP funds in the offing--and the principal did not let them in on the secret.

The principal, as a final duty before he left in Spring 1971 to become a Rockefeller Intern, submitted his own proposal to BESP. Its emphasis was on "psychology which would prepare students to deal with themselves as worthwhile individuals before dealing with basic skills in English, Math, Social Studies and other areas." This bore a marked resemblance to what the parents had been saying.

When the original alternative parents learned that BUSD had ESP money, that they were not entitled to any, and that the BESP alternative to be funded at King would not start until Fall 1972, they decided to go ahead with their scant plans anyway for two years. This would allow their children to have the benefits of an alternative sub-school during the BESP planning year. And in 1972/73, when BESP would enroll only 7th graders, their 8th graders could continue in their program.

The parents' group was, however, put off in finalizing its plans until school began with a new principal. By then, rearranging of students and the four staff members' schedules resulted in further delay. The parents' mini-alternative opened in November.

BESP gained leverage from the parents' alternative in several ways. First, the BESP alternative originally chose the same name and gave the group a coordinator who was the director selected for the BESP alternative to begin a year later. Second, the parents' alternative was given no funds from BESP and was labelled a "pilot" for the actual BESP program to open in Fall 1972.

The parents' King Cluster and the BESP alternative later re-named KARE were different, however, both in the participation of parents and the composition of students. In the parents' King Cluster, the parents were the impelling force and actually were in total charge of the afternoon elective program. In KARE, the parents were totally removed from the process of planning or operationalizing the alternative. Their only participation was in parent-teacher conferences concerning their own individual children. The parents' alternative began with 110 seventh and eighth grade students: 59 percent white, 33 percent Black and 8 percent other ethnic groups. Minority students tended to drop out, increasing the percentage of whites enrolled.\* At KARE the program started out with 149 seventh graders in 1972/73 and grew to 288 seventh and eighth graders in 1973/74. The proportion of white students decreased from about two-fifths to one-fourth during the two years.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, 1972/73 - 1973/74

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1972/73	57	38	89	60	2	1					1	1	149 (7th graders)
1973/74	60	27	154	68	3	1	7	3			2	1	226 (7th & 8th graders)

Despite the rhetoric in the outgoing principal's proposal, the program's focus shifted to basic skills. Counselors referred students to KARE as a last resort for basic skills. In 1972/73 35 percent of the student population were at least two years below grade level in reading (May 1973 CTBS scores). By 1973/74, with the addition of grade 8 and a total of 226 students, the entire population changed, with 80 percent of the majority ethnic group (Black) achieving below grade level in math and reading.

\*The parents' alternative, King Cluster, after failing to merge officially with Odyssey for 1972/73, disbanded in June 1972. The reason was primarily lack of administrative support and the lack of a firm commitment from any teacher.

One of the issues debated during the planning year was that of heterogeneity vs. homogeneity in class groupings. The issue was never settled officially because the students' general range of academic achievement was at or below grade level. Accelerated or high potential courses were offered in science, math, social studies and English. The courses were basic skills oriented with the addition of the HILC for a diagnostic/prescriptive means of teaching reading. Innovations in curriculum were Majority/Minority Rights and coed P.E. in 1972/73. Offerings in 1973/74 included a cosmetology mini-class, Black Studies, and an interdisciplinary science program that integrated math, science and reading.

Students at KARE could take a range of electives in the common school (e.g., art, shop, drama, creative writing). However, students not enrolled in KARE were not allowed to take its courses.

KARE proposed to provide a humanistic learning environment sensitive to the difficult transitions of adolescent development. A smaller teacher/pupil ratio and its counseling-oriented program were to promote affective growth as a means to accelerated academic achievement. The planning year (1971/72), involving recruitment of staff and students, was to be used for developing a curriculum commensurate with this philosophy. Five prospective certificated teachers, four prospective instructional aides (two paid out of BESP funds), a secretary and a counselor were involved in sensitivity training sessions in December 1971 and later in Spring 1972. The full time counselor was to be responsible for setting up programs in peer counseling, with parents and staff.

When the counselor and one teacher left the staff before the program was operationalized, sensitivity training as a prerequisite became impossible, since teachers were assigned to KARE by the King principal according to the King schedule. The principal did not assign another counselor to KARE. Without the impact of a counselor, KARE essentially became a basic skills sub-school at King. Although two teachers became involved with students outside of school this was not a scheduled part of the program. The counselor then--or lack of one--became the scapegoat for the program's inability to fulfill its basic tenets.

With staff turnover imposed upon KARE by the King principal, a total of 16 certificated teachers were involved with KARE, though never more than seven at one time. All teachers taught from one to four classes at King. Staffing patterns are indicated in the following table.

TABLE 2: STAFF BY ETHNICITY AND SEX, 1971/72 - 1973/74

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Total
	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	
Planning		(2)*		(2)	(1)				(5)
1971/72	2	1	1	1			1		6
1972/73		(1)		(2)					(3)
	1	4	2	2		1			10
Fall 1973				(3)					(3)
	1	4	2	2		1			10
Spring 1974				(3)					(3)
	1	3	2	1		1			8

\* ( ) = Classified staff

During the 1973/74 school year there were four teachers at KARE during the Fall who were transferred out in the Spring. Two teachers from the common school were assigned to two KARE classes during the spring.

With this high certificated staff turnover rate came minimal program identity and/or stability. The two positions that may have offered program stability were those of the secretary and the director, but occupancy of these posts also was unstable. The original director took two unplanned leaves of absence and the Social Living teacher became the acting director during the Spring semesters of 1973 and 1974. The focus of the site changed according to each woman's style and priorities and the students' reaction to first the Black woman and then the white woman. Both women, however, followed through on their concerns about problems of the alternative, directing these concerns to the BESP administration as well as the King principal. Regardless of their attempts at keeping communications open, they received no responses. For example, after many unanswered memos and calls to the BESP director in Fall 1973, a crisis memo stated:

As a result of these problems and concerns the following things are happening: (1) we are losing students as they report the confusion to their parents and (2) there is a great deal of misplaced hostility in both King and KARE staffs which eventually will affect the relationship of the teachers to their students.

Several months later the KARE director took her second leave and finally the BESP Assistant Director sent a memo to the BESP Director, posing the following issues:

- 1) the desire for a viable alternative after BESP funding, 2) the need to make the program more attractive for next semester, 3) ethnic balance needs to be achieved and the curriculum should be the primary focus for recruitment, 4) needs assessment should be carried through at the site, and 5) immediate BESP support staff is needed for staff training and organizational development.

None of these issues was dealt with, however, and in March 1974, BESP recommended to the Board of Education KARE's discontinuance by June 1974. Justifications for this phase-out were:

1. The program would have required a complete reorganization to enable it to continue for the duration of the project.
2. The lack of continuity in the leadership of the program. There have been two directors in two years. 1974/75 would require a change again.
3. The internal strife that existed at the school has not been conducive to the proper management of the program. With even another change in principalship for 1974/75 further adjustments will be required.
4. The alternativeness was not readily recognizable.
5. The staffing requirement could not fit into the district's pattern.

It was further recommended that BESP monitor the HILC in 1974/75. In 1975/76, BUSD would take over complete support of this BESP contribution. Plans for phase-out triggered new considerations for students' needs among KARE staff and director. They worked at developing a basic skills program with a focus on environmental education. This new alternative, called Urban Prep, was to be based on two assumptions: (1) the need for basic skills would be better accepted in a context of relevancy, i.e., environmental education, and (2) money from BESP was still available. The co-director of BESP Training said: "For the NIE/ESP scope, Urban Prep should be shown as an organized evolution from KARE rather than the starting of a new program."

Publicity was minimal and recruitment by mail resulted in the expressed interest of 18 seventh graders and 33 eighth graders. With such small numbers, Urban Prep as an alternative was impossible.

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## ARTICULATION

Articulation was KARE's reason for existence. It was conceived to fill the void left by the missing junior high link in the BESE K-12 chain of articulation. Originally, junior high schools themselves were bold innovations, created to cope with the very special problems of puberty and early adolescence. One might have reasonably anticipated, therefore, that some special thought would have been given to an alternative school intended for children in a very sensitive phase of their development. This, as we have seen, was not the case. KARE was the product of bureaucratic ukase in pro forma compliance with the OE/ESP requirement for K-12 comprehensiveness. After two years BUSD decided that so weak a link was no better than a missing link. KARE was done in; the formal pretense of K-12 articulation in the BESE program was formally abandoned.

From the very beginning, according to KARE personnel, the school was used as a dumping ground. Recruitment of students for KARE's opening in Fall 1972 was accomplished by the director and one staff member talking to the staff and students at the feeder intermediate schools. The students were self-selected primarily on the basis of their interest in the proposed program. There was no alternative site screening committee or policy other than district racial and sexual balance at first. By August 1972, 175 seventh graders signed up to attend KARE--68 were from Franklin Intermediate (a school with a predominantly ethnic minority student population) and the remainder were from the other three intermediate schools and elsewhere. By November, however, only 149 seventh grade students were actually enrolled. The KARE staff felt that the King principal and counselors, through a tracking system, were responsible for both the decrease in enrollment (26) and the disproportionate number of disciplinary problems. One teacher said that high achieving students were convinced KARE was not the place for them, accounting for the decrease. Another said that administration directed students with disciplinary problems to KARE.

A High Intensity Learning Alternative was being promoted by the principal of King to include science, history and math developed to accelerate teaching/learning. The fact that it began to emerge at about the same time that KARE was operationalized is more than a mere coincidence. It included the Random House Reading Package's High Intensity Learning Center, a BESE funded reading program, shared by KARE with King common. Although the HIL Alternative was

not given much attention by the district,\* it nevertheless continues to function as the only viable alternative for some students and a legacy of the principal.\*\* When KARE closed down in the Spring 1974, the HILC materials were sent to Odyssey to begin a new HILC at that 7th-9th grade alternative school.

#### FUNDING

BESP allocated a total of \$119,598 to KARE from 1971/72 through 1974/75. This included one planning year and one post-operational year. Approximately 80 percent of the total amount went toward salaries, fringe benefits and consultants' fees. The remainder went for instructional supplies: a large amount for the High Intensity Learning Center and a smaller amount for the equipment and furnishings of the KARE office.

Of the total BESP funds, 25 percent were spent during the planning year, 1971/72, on salaries for the director, the secretary, pre-service training by the consulting psychologist and the release-time substitutes for both the director and the teachers. During the first operational year (1972/73) 45 percent of the total BESP funds were spent, 29 percent the second year, with \$1,000 expended for replacement materials in the HILC for 1974/75.

All certificated salaries except for the director during the planning year and one teacher in the first operational year (1972/73) were paid by BUSD.

The program's personnel mainstays were two female classified staff members who were with the program from beginning to end. Both women were paid out of BESP monies and remained with the district after KARE dissolved. One became the HILC teacher at Odyssey for one year. When the district then shifted her to a parent nursery program in 1975/76 she resigned. The other woman went to West Campus with students in BESP's Work/Study. There her salary was paid out of funds from HUI for the 1974/75 school year and taken over by BUSD beginning in 1975/76.

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\*Probably because of the type of students it both accepted (high track) and excluded (low track).

\*\*The principal left at the time of KARE's phase-out in June 1974 and was succeeded by the head counselor of King common. When KARE's phase-out was in the making and the Urban Prep project fizzled, some KARE staff members proposed a second High Intensity Learning program to be funded by BESP. But since the first HILC program, promoted by the principal, required no additional funding, both he and BESP rejected extra funding for a duplicate and the proposal died.

## EVALUATION

The benefit to the students at KARE was to have been "increased sensitivity to environment and increased sophistication toward and understanding of social forces, systems and institutions; a minimum of a year's academic growth for a year's attendance in school; experience of success in academic advancement; concern with sharing and caring for others." The only area measured was academic growth.

For 1972/73 the educational objectives stated that by June 1973, 90 percent of the students enrolled since October would gain at least one grade level in reading and math as measured by the CTBS. In May 1973, the CTBS indicated that 35 percent of the students were at least two years below grade level in reading, and 39 percent were at least two years below grade level in math. Complete scores (both Fall and Spring) in Math were available for 114 students. With an average of .7 of a year's growth in math, 42 students indicated a year's growth or more. With an average of .2 of a year's growth in reading, out of a total of 112 students with complete scores, 24 achieved growth of a year or more. The director was not optimistic, however. She said that an entering 7th grader reading at a 4th grade level and gaining one year's reading growth in one year's time does not elevate his or her chances for ever catching up.

The results of the 7th graders' Fall and Spring (1973/74) CTBS scores were:

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, KARE GRADE 7

<u>Scoring at:</u>	Fall 1973		Spring 1974	
	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Math</u>	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Math</u>
4th grade or below	35%	35%	37%	38%
5th - 7th grade	41%	54%	35%	40%
8th - 10th grade	16%	7%	15%	17%
11th - 12th grade	8%	4%	13%	5%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	85	85	78	81

The mean change in reading from Fall to Spring for the 72 students who took both tests was .354 with a standard deviation of 1.811. The mean change for math scores for the 74 students was .322 with a standard deviation of 1.353.

Level I was not involved in any recommendations for phase-out. Ironically, knowing full well that KARE was being discontinued, Level I included KARE in its Spring 1974 "Effective Alternativeness" scale--ranking it overall as the highest of 7-9 grade BESP program. On a 0.0-1.0 scale KARE's ratings were: .7 (second only to Odyssey) for "alternativeness;" slightly below .6 for "effectiveness;" and between .4 and .5 on the combined "effective alternative" scale.

It is perhaps indicative of Level I's impact upon the BESP program that just at the time that it was giving KARE a high score for "alternativeness," central BESP was advising the Board of Education, in recommending the program's termination, that "alternativeness was not readily recognizable" at the site.

## WILLARD ALTERNATIVE

### ABSTRACT

Willard Alternative, an on-site program for 7th and 8th grade students, was the product of bureaucratic edict. To comply with the OE/ESP requirement for K-12 comprehensiveness in the BESP plan, BUSD had to fill the gap at the junior high school level, where the only available alternative in 1971 was Odyssey, an off-site school that could accommodate about 100 students at best. Furthermore, Odyssey was a defective articulation link because it was not formally included in the BUSD integration plan.

Therefore, BUSD directed the Willard Junior High School principal to produce a plan for an alternative school on his campus. Prepared in 72 hours, the proposal promised to "provide an alternative school model...involving parents, staff and students," which would offer students "a body of knowledge relevant to their life styles" and would "maximize (their) future social, educational and career options." The substantive specifics in the proposal were three staples from the grab bag of educational innovations: (1) smaller class size through use of teachers' aides, (2) interdisciplinary modules, and (3) rearrangement of time schedules to allow for more field trips.

Points (1) and (3) required money; more money, as it turned out, than BESP was disposed to supply. The fundamental problem, however, was the absence of demand or movement for this particular alternative. Two Willard teachers, committed to alternative education, had left the school a year prior to BESP to launch Odyssey. They presumably siphoned off from Willard those students and parents most interested in innovation. To populate the new, unwanted alternative on the Willard campus, teachers had to be coerced and students had to be cajoled or conned with a false image of the school.

Although the original proposal envisioned a program for 300 students, Willard Alternative enrolled only 138 at its peak (Spring 1973); by Fall 1973 this was down to 78. BUSD terminated the program in Fall 1974. No one protested. No one mourned.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

The Willard common school staff was requested by BUSD to submit a proposal for an alternative program in Spring 1971. They had 72 hours in which to come up with one. Teachers at Willard who had felt a need for an alternative junior high school left a year earlier to develop an off-site alternative, Odyssey. The Willard principal was then left with the responsibility to develop a plan.

His proposal stated that the primary thrust of Willard Alternative would be to "maximize future social, educational and career options" for participating students. The Willard Alternative proposal was approved for funding in June 1971, with provision for a planning year.

A director, selected by the common school principal over several other applicants, was hired during the summer of 1971. In September 1971, the principal requested the director, who was a trained counselor, to assist in the first two weeks of crisis registration at the common school. The director had hoped that in so doing he would win the affections and trust of the common school staff, who were cool to the alternative school concept. His counseling role in the common school was extended several times through to November 1971 by the principal, leaving little time to plan the alternative program.

By Spring 1972, problems encountered by the director centered around the potential relationship between the alternative and the common school. Major problems had emerged in the relationship of the director to his staff. Of the five teachers who agreed to discuss the alternative with him, four backed down. With only one staff member in April 1972, and as yet no planning, the principal intervened. He sent a memo to the common school staff in the form of an ultimatum, presenting three possibilities for staffing the alternative:

1. on a volunteer basis with the Willard common school staff,
2. on an assigned basis from the Willard common school staff,
3. on a volunteer basis within the district teacher overage pool.

The third possibility, the principal ventured, would result in the involuntary transfer of common school teachers whose positions would be eliminated by the decrease in the number of Willard common students (who would be enrolled in the alternative program).

Faced with this threat, five teachers agreed to fill two full time positions on a part time basis. The justification was to

ensure variety of available skills. Teaching 20 to 80 percent of their day in the common school intensified feelings of split allegiance between the two programs for the teachers.

The director had hoped to avert these feelings by keeping in close contact with the principal. The close contact, however, resulted in his capitulation to the principal who became de facto director of Willard Alternative. Later, this was to widen the distance between the staff and the alternative school director.

In May and June 1972, the still incomplete alternative school staff spent one full week of release time, followed by scattered lunch hour and after school meetings, in planning their forthcoming program. Though the planning year was whittled down to a week, the staff managed to define five basic objectives. These included: power sharing, student voice in curriculum development and school governance, expansion of the teacher's role as counselor, elimination of suspension and detention, and curriculum relevant to students' needs and life styles.

The principal's initial objectives for the program cited in the June 1971 proposal were not integrated into the new design. They were delivery of skills, raising individual's self-esteem, preparation for the future (college or work), and creating a secure educational community for maximum effectiveness in learning, a humanist attitude toward society, and understanding of self. Instead, three components--learning dynamics, core curriculum and afternoon application--were developed to differentiate the alternative from the common school program.

Learning dynamics was to involve continuous self and program evaluation. The core curriculum was designed as a school without walls, interdisciplinary in approach and modular scheduling. Math/Science and English/History were the basic components. Afternoon application was to include electives in the common or the alternative school, independent study and/or field trips.

The director predicted that Willard Alternative would be similar in emphasis and in teaching approach to Odyssey, the 7th - 9th grade off-site alternative. As the director saw it, Willard Alternative would also be different because of its half day academic structure and defined student expectations, thus answering some of the major criticisms directed at Odyssey. The director's forecast was unfounded.

Staff cohesiveness eventually developed, however negatively. Seven teachers took issue with the poor planning and financial inefficiencies. A petition was presented to the common school

administration, by-passing the director altogether. Major problems, as the teachers saw them, were delineated:

1. unfulfilled promise of teacher aides,
2. afternoon application component promised to new students could not be realized because of limited funds,
3. additional physical education course assignment to each teacher on top of teaching six periods with no prep time was unworkable,
4. lack of support staff for the director, who already served as a counselor for the alternative school students plus common school students, and acted as assistant principal,
5. no explanation was given to parents and students as to why they were not involved in the planning of the program and curriculum (an objective of the planning week used to entice students into the program).

Because of these problems, the teachers proposed that the opening of the school be postponed to the Spring 1973 semester, and that they all work part time during the Fall 1972 semester planning and structuring the school.

The petition was ignored by the common school administration. The director did not sanction the method employed by the teachers in expressing their grievances. The staff and director became even more factionalized. Several members of the staff exchanged places with common school staff, a move sanctioned by the principal. Four teacher aides began working weeks after the program had begun.

Although the original proposal was geared for 300 students, incorporating 35 percent of the Willard Common School student body, the actual program planned for 150 students, 75 in each grade level. Parents and students each anticipated something different from the alternative. Parents were reassured that their children would receive basic skills training. The students thought they were coming to a free school, something that sounded like what they wanted, something different from Willard Junior High School. During the first year of operation, it became clear to students in and outside of Willard Alternative that it was not a free school. With expectations shattered, enrollment declined by 42 percent between Fall 1972 and Fall 1973 (from 138 students to 78 students.) The following table shows the student enrollment at Willard Alternative for the two years of operation by ethnicity.

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TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
FALL 1972 - FALL 1973

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
Fall '72	72	53	53	40	4	3			1	1	5	4	135
Sp. '73	55	40	69	50	14	10							138
Fall '73	42	54	36	46									78

Noticeable in the above table is the increase of Black student enrollment during the first year of operation, from 53 students in Fall 1972 to 69 students in Spring 1973. The Willard Alternative director claimed that an extra effort was made to recruit Black students, and it proved successful. During the two years of operation, both Black and white students, however, complained of classroom disruptions. They felt a lack of disciplinary policy caused increased disruptions. Classroom disruptions were felt to be the sole difference between the common and the alternative schools.

The declining student enrollment points to dissatisfaction among both Black and white students in the handling of behavioural problems in the classroom. Because no specific disciplinary process existed, teachers leaned heavily on their expectations for each individual student. Behavior was not so different among students, but teachers interpreted differences by race. White students who were considered radical by the teachers were labelled as truants, or as having difficulty in keeping rules. Black students, on the other hand, were considered by the teachers to view schools as an authoritarian based structure, resulting in these students balking at the rules and teacher expectations. Teachers drew ambiguous lines according to the degree and time of classroom disruptions.

Willard Alternative policy called for every effort not to refer disciplinary problem students out of the classroom. The issue of teachers as counselors, intended to stimulate warm, trusting relationships between teacher and student, was bitterly debated by staff and director. Some staff members felt that teaching basic skills to potentially problematic students meant they could not relinquish control over the students, negating any possibility of counseling. The power issue was heightened when some teachers felt the director took the side of parents and children against them in disciplinary matters. The teachers felt that the director backed down under community pressure. Frustrated by their

powerlessness, most of the staff took refuge in split allegiance with their common school assignment.

The planned curriculum of the alternative called for core courses in English/History and Math/Science. The courses were taught, but the interdisciplinary approach was not utilized during the Fall 1972 semester. By Spring 1973, however, the English/History core was implemented. A prospective Math/Science teacher from outside the district could not wait for BUSD to loosen hiring regulations, so this core was never realized.

The science teacher from the common school was scheduled for 40 percent of his time in the alternative, but refused to use the interdisciplinary approach. During the 1973/74 school year, the English/History core continued to function. A judo class was also offered the second year of operation. Afternoon application and learning dynamics were never realized.

#### ARTICULATION

BUSD has only two junior high schools (grades 7-8): King and Willard. The development of on-site alternatives at that level promised to be expeditious for both the district and the specific common schools involved.

For district-wide articulation of the BESP plan, it was necessary to involve the junior high schools in alternative education. Neither common school administration had initiated an alternative program proposal in the original pool of 55 submitted by groups inside and out of the BUSD in February 1971. Although Odyssey School, a 7th-9th grade off-site alternative, was included in the BESP proposal to OE/ESP, it still did not round out K-12 articulation because it was not forced to comply with the BUSD integration plan. Moreover, Odyssey was so small that it would have been, by itself, a bottleneck rather than a channel for articulation at the junior high level.

Willard Alternative, developed by the common school principal, planned to provide more intensive training in basic skills, directed to students not quite up to level, yet not far enough behind to warrant full time status in the Learning Assistance Program or other special programs for slow learners. Some of these students were disciplinary problems.

There were three basic strategies utilized in publicizing and promoting Willard Alternative:

1. at the feeder schools'\* parents' meetings there was a sales pitch for sixth graders to enroll in the alternative,
2. the director and one teacher visited the feeder schools, and talked to students, teachers and counselors in an effort to attract students who would benefit from the program,
3. at Willard common school student body assembly, students were told of the alternative program, encouraging the then 7th graders to enroll in the program the following fall as 8th graders.

By June 1972, however, the director stated he was 20 students short of the 7th grade quota. By September 1972, the seventh grade quota of 75 was realized, accomplished through student word of mouth rather than a planned summer recruitment drive by the director or staff.

As mentioned earlier, the director had hoped that Willard Alternative would be similar to Odyssey in content but more structured. Because of this, Willard Alternative had hoped to attract students from Kilimanjaro. This was a rare occurrence, however.

The 4th to 6th grade alternative feeder school for Willard Alternative, Malcolm X Environmental Studies (Zone D), was in no way similar in structure, curriculum, governance or program ideology. There was never any attempt to coordinate Willard Alternative with any of the West Campus alternative programs, though theoretically Willard Alternative students could have possibly fit into the West Campus Yoga/Reading (HILC) or Career Exploration programs (for low achievers and middle range students respectively).

Because of staff animosity to the program and to the director, the intended staff training, particularly in counseling techniques, was not actualized.

Willard Alternative's relationship to BESP central administration was purely a paper one. Internal workings of the alternative were handled through the common school principal and BESP appeared only relative to funding. The common school principal later (December 1974) commented on Willard Alternative's premature phase-out as though it were an autonomous entity: "I really do not know why they got rid of it."

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\*Malcolm X and Columbus, 4th to 6th grade schools in zones A and D, were the BUSD designated feeder schools for Willard common and Willard Alternative Schools.

## FUNDING

During the period 1971 through 1974, Willard Alternative spent \$22,868 (20%) of its total budget on instructional materials, books, supplies, capital outlay and equipment. A large portion of that money was used for supplying materials for the HILC, developed during the 1972/73 school year. Upon the alternative's dissolution in June 1974, Willard common school retained the lab. The BESP office recommended the HILC be monitored and developed further by the BESP Training Component for the 1974/75 school year, and after that, it would be the responsibility of BUSD, in effect Willard Junior High School. The principal further requested the HILC be repaired and remodeled with promised BUSD funds, separate from any site allocations.

Although field trips were integral to the three component plan of the Willard Alternative design, only \$2,918 or 2.5 percent of the total budget was expended for this purpose.

During its three year life, including the planning year, Willard Alternative spent a total of \$114,895, 3.65 percent of the total BESP five year budget for sites. The greatest expenditure went for salaries, fringe benefits, and consultants' and professional aides' fees. This amounted to \$86,107, or 75 percent of the site's total budget. The site's stated aim to enhance the learning process by a "warm, congenial relationship between students, staff and parents," necessitated a low student-teacher ratio, and a correspondingly higher money-student ratio. This budgetary pattern was used against the site's survival. One of the reasons the BESP office gave for closing the site was:

The budgetary requirement of the Willard Alternative precluded a recommendation to the Board for continuance of the program. The projected staffing for this program would not have enabled it to meet the District's staffing pattern. The program had essentially become a team teaching effort requiring additional staff and supplementary funding.

## EVALUATION

Willard Alternative planned for evaluation to be integral to the achievement of its goals. Testing, written records, observation and evaluation were to be integral to the learning and teaching design. In practice evaluation was perfunctory. The director had hoped to incorporate student/parent evaluation of the program and diagnostic/prescriptive testing of basic skills into the Willard Alternative program. These were only used marginally during the two years of operation.

During the planning year, the Level I Director scheduled to meet with the director and the new staff, but the meeting was postponed due to staff disintegration. Another meeting with a new staff was never scheduled.

CTBS testing was a routine measure of the district. The results of the CTBS testing of ISA's sample 7th graders at Willard Alternative in the 1973/74 school year were as follows:

TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, WILLARD GRADE 7

<u>Scoring at:</u>	<u>Fall 1973</u>		<u>Spring 1974</u>	
	<u>Math</u>	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Math</u>	<u>Reading</u>
4th grade or below	22%	22%	26%	25%
5th - 7th grade	53%	31%	42%	40%
8th - 10th grade	19%	36%	19%	16%
11th - 12th grade	6%	11%	13%	19%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	36	36	31	32

The mean change in reading scores for those students who took the test in both Fall 1973 and Spring 1974 was  $-.173$  with a standard deviation of 1.250. The mean change in math scores for those students who took the math test in both Fall 1973 and Spring 1974 was  $.386$  with a standard deviation of 1.351.

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale, Willard was rated slightly below .5 for "alternativeness," slightly above .7 for "effectiveness," and between .3 and .4 on the combined "effective alternative" scale. This was the second highest rating (KARE's was highest) among all BESP programs for grades 7-9.

## BERKELEY HIGH SCHOOL WEST CAMPUS

West Campus is the 9th grade school for BUSD, situated three-fourths of a mile from the main Berkeley High School campus. The 9th grade school was an innovation in Berkeley, originating in the Berkeley Desegregation Plan.

During the 1963/64 school year, a School Board-appointed community committee, the Hadsell Committee, recommended the desegregation of the three 7th to 9th grade junior high schools. It was hoped that through redistributing the students, tracking by ability would be reduced.

Marjorie Ramsey, at that time an English teacher at West Campus (formerly Burbank Junior High), felt "the revisions recommended would do too little to effectively end segregation in these schools." Ramsey developed a proposal based on psychological findings that 14 year olds were in a very vulnerable stage of transition to maturity. The proposal recommended an all 9th grade school to serve this age group "without the babyishness of the 7th and 8th grades or the too early sophistication of the big (main) high school."

She proposed the present West Campus site, formerly a mostly minority school (primarily Black students), to be the 9th grade school. The 7th and 8th graders would then be divided between the other two junior high schools (one was formerly mostly white and one was ethnically mixed). In September 1964, the Ramsey Plan to desegregate the junior high schools was implemented, serving all 9th graders in one school, and 7th and 8th graders in two schools.

The Berkeley articulation K-12 plan for the original BESP proposal in Spring 1971 had to include all grade levels. The West Campus principal\* at that time was instrumental in the original decisions of what to include and meting out internal planning to the respective coordinators. The staff considered the school's "extreme" student populations--both the high achievers and the retainees--to develop HUI and Work/Study respectively. Middle range students were earmarked for Career Exploration and Black underachievers for an extension of Black House, which later became Yoga/Reading (Basic Skills). None of these programs was ever a separate, self-contained alternative; each utilized the common school's facilities, resources, administrative and support services.

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\*By Fall 1971 and the beginning of BESP, the principal had been selected as a Rockefeller Intern. Upon his return, he became the BUSD's BESP Director, ministering to all the BESP programs.

Of all 9th grade students scheduled for West Campus since BESP began in 1971/72, approximately 50 to 100 students have selected other alternatives. Other Ways, Black House and Casa were available for the first few years of BESP funding, and East Campus and Odyssey throughout BESP's existence. Within West Campus itself, the BESP programs' enrollment has included from 37 percent to 48 percent of the total school enrollment.

TABLE 1: WEST CAMPUS: COMPARISON OF STUDENT ENROLLMENT BY BESP PROGRAM, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	HUI (9A)		WORK/STUDY (9B)		EXPLORA-TION (9C)		YOGA/READING (9D)		TOTAL BESP		TOTAL W.C.
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
1971/72	342	32	48	5					390	37	1058
1972/73	*270	27	41	4	**51	5			362	36	1000
1973/74	249	24	58	6	36	4	150	15	493	48	1026
1974/75	276	27	24	2	53	5	98	10	451	45	1010
1975/76	276	30	31	3			90	10	397	43	925

\*Includes 20 Tenth Graders

\*\*Began in Spring, 1973

As evident in the above table, HUI was not only the most heavily enrolled BESP West Campus program but the only one to remain intact throughout the BESP years. HUI was the high potential program operating even prior to BESP.

The Black House extension was changed to Yoga/Basic Skills/Reading after pending difficulties with the Office for Civil Rights. It was geared for underachievers. It did not begin until the Fall 1973 semester, and became a two-part program--HILC and Yoga--and then only HILC (in 1975/76).

Work/Study was an existing program for students who didn't pass 9th grade, funded by the city's Workrecreation program prior to BESP. By 1975/76, it merged with the ill-defined Career Exploration, a program fraught with difficulties from the start with the death of its coordinator, putting off the starting date to Spring 1973.

West Campus alternatives were coordinated under the directorship of the HUI director in 1974/75 school year. In effect, BESP afforded West Campus the opportunity to expand the existing tracking system with materials, experience, and extra staff. Alternativeness was never intended, rather tracking was meant to be legitimized.

WEST CAMPUS: CAREER EXPLORATION (aka West Campus Alternative 9C)

ABSTRACT

Career Exploration, launched with BESP money in Spring 1973, was an elective and supplemental program that offered three classes to ninth graders on Berkeley High School's West Campus.

During the planning phase, the program's creator said it "is not to be seen as a vocational exploration," but in operation this is what it became. Originally, the program was intended to stimulate "middle range" students by relating academic subjects to the world of work, but in practice it tended to become a "dumping ground" for problem students. These were, however, exposed to information about a variety of occupations, ranging from the armed forces and cosmetology to agriculture and banking. For one class that centered on occupations in which language skills were paramount (e.g., advertising, teaching) students received English credit. For another class, which dealt with occupations in a historical framework (e.g., the industrial revolution), students received History credit. The third class focused directly on "jobology."

At its peak (1974/75) Career Exploration enrolled 53 students, 70 percent of whom were Black. In Fall 1975 the program was merged with Work/Study, a work program for students who had spent a year in the 9th grade and were not advanced to the 10th. The merged programs became part of a mini-conglomerate called Career Education.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

In the June 1971 amended BEBP package submitted to OE/ESP, West Campus Alternative school 9C was briefly and poorly developed. Its stated aim was "to build within each student an acceptance of his own responsibility in determining his future by contracting for part of his education through the utilization of the resources of the community." The program was contractual between the student and outside community resources focusing on exposure to various careers. The students for whom the program was geared were those oft-forgotten "middle range" students.

The 9C Alternative, later named Career Exploration, was initially intended to be a complete program, encompassing an interdisciplinary approach to education. Course credits would be fulfilled in the fields of mathematics, social science, English, history and science. The program was to open in the Fall 1972 semester, but only 20 students enrolled. It was then postponed for another semester and opened in Spring 1973. The complete educational program did not get pulled together for that semester either, so the program was designated a "pilot." The staff of Career Exploration planned to work through the summer of 1973 developing program structure and curriculum. Another reason for lack of organization in that first semester of operation, according to the director, was staff schedule conflicts in the common school.

As a pilot program, CE provided students field trips to work sites so they could experience first hand actual working conditions, and guest speakers from community business and industry. During the first semester staff members individually developed their own CE curriculum but hoped to coordinate their efforts into an integrated curriculum during the summer of 1973. Recruitment during the Fall 1972 semester was productive and 61 students enrolled in the CE program for Spring 1973. The director of the program, a white woman, was the Student Activities Director for all of West Campus. Her intent was to make school meaningful to those students who rarely were provided with alternative options to the traditional school, namely the middle range students. In a planning document issued in the Fall 1972 semester, she said:

Career Exploration is not to be seen as vocational exploration...the new emphasis (is) bringing together the many parts and facets of education in an attempt to make school meaningful and relevant to students...One of the basic goals of the concept is that change is inherent.

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She had hoped to provide three to four class periods in a morning session for CE students. But, when the program finally began, students could choose between one and three classes in CE during a semester. Student enrollment changed each semester.

The curriculum was developed around the 15 occupational clusters developed by the Office of Education. The director developed one class called "Jobology." The focus of this class was to help students learn about their range of career option through interpretation of their interests and aptitudes. The staff was handpicked by the director from the certificated staff of the West Campus common school. Shortly after the first curriculum development meeting of the CE staff in the Summer of 1973, the director died. Her planning documents, notes, etc., were thrown out by her parents. With few working papers other than their own particular course outlines used during the pilot semester, the staff organized the program. Rather than a total program, they retained the concept of the CE elective. The energy level and commitment were not the same as when the director was alive. A drama teacher at West Campus, earlier chosen by the director to participate in the CE experiment, assumed responsibilities as interim director. He concentrated most of his energies on developing the Career Center, finally made available to all West Campus students by Spring 1975. The CE elective developed after the director's death provided English credit, only because of the amount of research students were forced to do if they utilized the available resources in the Career Center. Teachers taught on a rotational basis, initially changing every six weeks in a semester, and later every nine weeks in the 18 week semester. All staff were assigned part time to CE, 60-80 percent of their time was in the common school.

The sudden change of directors left little planning time for the Fall 1973, and thus once again CE opened with a poorly developed structure and a partially developed curriculum. Phase-in was already topical in progress reports. During the 1973/74 school year, all four West Campus alternative programs and budgets were consolidated under one coordinator.

Curriculum was finally systematized on a much smaller scale than originally anticipated but did utilize the expertise of the staff members in drama, multi media/audio visual, shop and sewing. In these areas, the 15 occupational clusters of OE were divided up so that on a rotational basis students were exposed in one class in one semester to: environment ecology, armed forces, cosmetology, personal services, science and health careers, oceanography, interior design; and advertising, teaching, performing arts, public services and individual study of six other jobs in the Career Center. These groupings were split between two teachers, and students received English credit. Students in this course were considered CE students.

The two other staff members in a second class covered such areas as: basic tools, industrial revolution, metal, plumbing, graphic arts, jobology, agriculture, home industries, and engineering, small business, merchandising, banking, transportation, communications, clerical/office careers. There were no job oriented workshops, exhibits or demonstrations and few field trips during the 1974/75 school year. Field trips to job sites were found to be inappropriate for 14 year olds. There was very little to which 14 year olds could relate. Hospitals, for example, would not allow them to examine operating rooms or emergency rooms.

Because the design of the program was a one semester elective, student enrollment never reached the proposed 60-100 student range. In fact, after the first semester, student enrollment dropped by almost 30 percent (from 51 to 36 students).

The interim director claimed that the original director intended to recruit students personally during Summer 1973, but, due to her untimely death, student recruitment during that summer was not attempted. Except for the interim director, the CE staff relied on the counsel or referral system. The interim director recruited students from his drama class.

Below is a table showing the student enrollment in the Career Exploration elective from Spring 1973 through Spring 1976. In the 1975/76 school year, CE and Work/Study were functioning as one under the Career Education program.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
SPRING 1973 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Sp. '73	14	27	36	71	1	2							51
1973/74	7	19	25	69							4	12	36
1974/75	15	28	37	70							1	2	53
1975/76	6	19	18	58	4	13	3	10					31

Noticeable in the above figures is the preponderance of Black students involved in the CE program.

Institutional racism was dealt with, according to CE staff, by exposing students to all possible career options, regardless of race. This seemed to beg the issues of racism that are encountered on the job and in the search for work.

Increased enrollment between the 1973/74 and 1974/75 school years was a direct result of the consolidation of all four West Campus alternatives under one director and budget.

There were very few staff members because the program was small. Student/teacher ratio ranged between 7/1 and 13/1. Following is a table showing the CE staff by ethnicity from Spring 1973 through Spring 1975.

TABLE 2: CERTIFICATED STAFF BY ETHNICITY,  
SPRING 1973 - 1974/75

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Asian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Spring 1973	4	1	1	6
1973/74	3	2		5
1974/75	3	1		4

Proportionately, there were more white teachers than white students involved in Career Exploration.

#### Articulation

West Campus Alternative 9C/Career Exploration attracted only 20 students the first semester it was to begin (Fall 1972). Because of low student interest, the program's implementation was postponed for one semester, rescheduled to open in Spring 1973. Recruitment procedures for Spring 1973 proved more successful and 51 students enrolled in the program.

Those recruited into the program that first semester were referred by counselors from King and Willard Junior High Schools and West Campus, and by the principal of West Campus. Although the program was geared for middle range students, it quickly became a "dumping ground," according to the interim director, for students with behavioral problems. In addition, middle range students referred to the program were frequently misled into thinking the program was work study, that is, job placement.

A Career Center was developed under the direction of the interim director/drama teacher. Without a systematic plan, nonetheless did acquire materials. The Career Center of the BHS campus, affiliated with and developed by BESP's On Target program, invited the director to investigate its materials and layout, but he claimed he never had time to do so. When Career Exploration was consolidated during the 1973/74 school year with the other three West Campus alternatives, the interim director no longer related to the program as director but rather as one of the teachers on the staff.

Formally, there could have been articulation between Career Exploration (for 9th graders) and On Target (for 10th through 12th graders), but students regarded the two programs more as student services provided by the sites, and not as autonomous programs. Common school and BESP school students both utilized the Career Centers on both campuses.

During the 1974/75 school year, the merger of the West Campus Work/Study Program and Career Exploration was planned. The proposed merger implied a tacit recognition that the practical similarities between the two programs outweighed the theoretical differences. In theory, CE aimed at middle range students, whereas Work/Study was created for non-achievers who failed to make it out of the 9th grade. In practice, CE was populated primarily, not by middle range students, but by low achievers, usually referred by a counselor. Thus, the distinction between the two programs was blurred, leading to the recommendation by the West Campus administration and the West Campus alternative director that they be merged.

The resistance from the CE staff to merger with Work/Study seemed to be related to the loss of status in focusing energy on "trouble makers" rather than middle range students.

The merger, implemented in Fall 1975, produced Career Education. This new program integrated Work/Study's work experience, both in and out of school, and features of the Career Exploration program, which now centered on utilization of the Career Center. A memo from the Director of Career Education (March 1976) listed program activities since the previous autumn: field trips, visits to employers, weekly seminars for students to discuss work related problems, assignment of counselors to the Career Center to guide students in exploring careers, participation by community persons with expertise in various careers in the guest speakers program, maintenance of individual folders on each student, which were updated every three weeks. After the merger, the Career Center was available as an elective course to any 9th grade student at West Campus.

#### Funding

During the five years of BESP funding, Career Exploration received \$19,462, or .62 percent of the total BESP site budget. Even though CE did not begin operation until the Spring 1973 semester, the program was allocated several hundred dollars prior to that time. In the 1971/72 school year, CE spent \$562 in capital outlay for equipment. The bulk of the CE BESP money was spent between Spring

1973 and Spring 1975; half of it went toward salaries for certificated and classified staff, the other half went toward field trips, conferences and travel expenses, instructional and office materials, capital outlay for equipment. Classified salaries were allocated funds only in the 1974/75 school year, and capital expenditures occurred during the years prior to 1974/75 when all West Campus alternative programs were incorporated under one budget and program.

Mostly, the CE BESP funds paid salaries and purchased materials for the Career Center. Field trips and guest speakers were minor items, as these features of the program were only partially implemented. During the 1975/76 school year all West Campus Alternatives were allocated a total of \$22,150. Of this amount, \$15,600 went for certificated and classified salaries. Another \$2,500 went for consultants' fees. Instructional and office supplies and field trips were allocated budgets of \$3,000 and \$700 respectively. How much of the 1975/76 budget went toward the Career Education program is unknown.

#### Evaluation

CE had no mechanism for evaluating either curriculum or the students incorporated into its design. Attitudinal surveys regarding job interests were administered through the Career Center. These tests included the Kuder Interest Test, SRA Interest Profile and Vocabulary Test on Careers.

Simulating work sites on West Campus students compiled "employer" reports on the job performance of their peers.

The program materials were geared to middle range students. However, counselors referred problem students and underachievers to the program, and much of the available career related materials was inappropriate for most of these students who were reading below grade level. Basic skills testing was left to the common school.

WEST CAMPUS: HUI (aka West Campus Alternative 9A)

ABSTRACT

HUI was the 9th grade school for high potential students, or "mentally gifted minors," as state law phrases it.

Launched a year before BESP funding became available, the program was then guided by the "Berkeley Plan," which was intended to make it less exclusively white and upper middle class than such programs are ordinarily. To achieve this purpose differentiated admission standards were established for ethnic minorities. Initial impact of BESP seemed to serve this purpose. In the pre-BESP school year the student body was 70 percent white; in BESP's first year it was 55 percent white. Since then, however, the trend has been in the opposite direction. By 1975/76 the percentage of white students had climbed to 65 percent, whereas the percentage of Black students declined from 28 percent in 1971/72 to 22 percent in 1975/76.

Thus, BESP did not produce a sustained improvement in ethnic mix. BESP's most distinctive contributions to HUI were funds for additional staff and a variety of materials, and in-service staff training. This did not make for a qualitative change in HUI; it served to enrich what already was a rich academic program. In an exercise of noblesse oblige, HUI shared materials and some of its BESP funds with its less prestigious co-inhabitants of West Campus. At its peak (1971/72) HUI enrolled 342 students and although this levelled off to the 270 range, it retained the largest enrollment by far among the BESP programs on West Campus.

Given the character of the school and the selection of its student body, its students did well academically before BESP, during BESP, and presumably will continue to do well after BESP. HUI was, by definition, a tracking instrument. This essential quality was subsidized--and not altered--by BESP money. HUI seemed destined to continue after ESP funding ceased. but a massive reshuffling of students in BUSD, necessitated by the requirement that several schools be brought up to state-mandated earthquake safety standards, resulted in a total reorganization of West Campus and dismemberment of HUI in 1976/77.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

The West Campus HUI program originated in the high potential program which began operations at West Campus in Fall 1970. Students in that program were those identified by state testing as "mentally gifted" plus those identified by teachers and counselors either diagnostically or through intuition as students who potentially would benefit from exposure to a high-academic-level program. This, in effect, was the Berkeley Plan. The Berkeley Plan was aimed at bringing other than middle and upper class white students into a high potential program.

In Fall 1970, the West Campus principal (later BSP director), a small group of parents (Berkeleyans for Academic Excellence, then known as Berkeley Association for the Gifted), students and teachers began discussions of alternative means to deal with the diverse abilities in heterogeneous classes. The focus was on the advanced students.

Discussions led to an old device: tracking. The West Campus High Potential program began operation in Fall 1970, with commitment from the Berkeleyans for Academic Excellence to develop recruitment procedures for students not state-identified as mentally gifted but with potential to blossom in an environment offered by a high potential program. The purpose of the Berkeley Plan was to counteract the practice of tracking as a means of racial separatism for white students.

When federal funding became available, the West Campus high potential program, under the principal's direction, submitted a proposal for the BSP package of June 1971. Originally known as West Campus Alternative 9A, it soon was renamed HUI, Hawaiian for "working together." According to the June 1971 proposal, students eligible for HUI/9A were those students identified by state standards as mentally gifted and ethnic minority students who were identified under the Berkeley Plan as potential high achievers or were qualified under a state law (AB 807), which provided for selection by a screening committee rather than through standard testing.

Teachers of HP classes from the 1970/71 school year were recruited to help plan the program. The director was appointed at that time. Program goals were: smaller pupil-teacher groups, more diverse courses than at the common school; increased student motivation, initiative and sense of responsibility; and creation of a closer working relationship between students and teachers.

Initially scheduled to open in the Spring 1972 semester, HUI opened in Fall 1971, thanks to staff planning during the Summer of 1971. HUI was the only BESP school that opened ahead of, rather than behind, schedule. The curriculum for the first year of BESP operation was planned by HP English and history teachers; thus the focus was on English and history. In Fall 1972, math and science teachers were recruited. Art, music and independent study were also added to the HUI curriculum. However, in adding all the disciplines to the program in 1972/73, the HUI staff found that the student-teacher rapport, facilitated by small class size, was thwarted because classes were enlarged. Class size averaged about 25 to 30 students, smaller for independent projects.

HUI English and history classes were required for students in the HUI program, all other classes were electives, with much crossover into the common school. HUI teachers taught common school classes in addition to their HUI assignment. The curriculum provided by HUI through the five years of BESP funding has not undergone any major transformations. Core curriculum has remained, plus courses in science, math, foreign language, physical education and art.

Non-traditional time scheduling, instituted in 1974/75 at HUI, has allowed students to choose "alternative" day classes or "regular" classes. The "alternative" day provided students with special courses, such as Hawaiian legends, Asian, Chinese and Italian cooking, and field trips to such places as the San Francisco Asian Art Museum, U. C. Berkeley's Lawrence Hall of Science, Silkscreening workshops, Batik workshops, or the San Francisco Zoo.

HUI has also developed a summer school program for incoming and outgoing HUI students.

An ongoing project of the HUI staff has been the development of a multi-cultural curriculum. But implementation has never been successful. The multi-cultural approach, as the HUI staff called it, was seen as a triad: helping students understand the ethical and cognitive contributions to the human experience in all areas of learning, broadening values by understanding the ideals and mores of many peoples, and understanding the effects of modern technology on the world.

This triad was never incorporated into the curriculum though some multi-cultural courses were offered, broaching an anthropological focus. Some of these classes included: Tradition and Change in Three Societies (Asia, Latin America and Africa), Trouble Spots (using current events as the springboard to study the cultural,

political, religious, social and ethnic characteristics of peoples "in the news").

As stated earlier, students were recruited into the program through state tests that identified mentally gifted students, the Berkeley Plan and AB 807. The director reported that based on these criteria, he selected students for the program.

During the 1972/73 school year, 20 tenth graders were included in the program. Due to resistance from the BHS administration and the overabundance of paper work involved, HUI returned to 9th graders only in 1973/74.

Following is a table showing the student population of HUI from Fall 1970 through Spring 1976 by ethnicity.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
1970/71 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1970/71	167	70	43	18	24	10	1	-			5	2	240
1971/72	188	55	95	28	49	14	7	2	1	-	2	1	342
1972/73*	144	53	73	27	43	16	4	2	1	-	5	2	270
1973/74	146	59	58	23	34	14	3	1			8	3	249
1974/75	177	64	52	19	37	13	1	1			9	3	276
1975/76	180	65	60	22	32	12	4	1					276

\*Includes twenty 10th graders

In an effort to achieve ethnic balance, white students were admitted only if they scored in the 99.9 percentile on standardized tests, whereas Black students were admitted on the basis of referrals by teachers, counselors and/or parents.

In the Fall 1972 semester, Black students reported that on the whole HUI was an extension of the traditional school system. During the 1972/73 school year, at least seven Black students were placed arbitrarily in each of the HUI English and history classes in order to eliminate the tendency to isolation because they were so few in the program. One counselor claimed that peer pressure from outside the program was such as to prevent high potential Black students from enrolling. The image of HUI in West Campus and throughout the district was one of an "elite" white school. After the first year

of BESP funding, the student population levelled out at around 250-275.

Below is a table showing the staff ethnicity of HUI from Fall 1970 through June 1976. As with the student ethnic distribution, more than 50 percent of the staff was white.

TABLE 2: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1970/71 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	
1970/71	ethnicity unknown											6*	
1971/72	ethnicity unknown											8**	
1972/73	9	60	5	33	1	7							15***
1973/74	7	58	3	25	1	8					1	8	12**
1974/75	7	64	3	27	1	9							11**
1975/76	10	62	5	31			1	6					16**

\*No director 1970/71.

\*\*Includes one white classified staff, rest are certificated.

\*\*\*Five full time at HUI.

Unique to the HUI program was the focus on the education of the teachers involved. While in-service training was practiced throughout the district through BESP funding, at HUI the training was utilized on a much larger scale, and on a regular basis.

The major purpose for the in-service training of HUI teachers was to improve "teacher-to-teacher relationships" (according to the November 1, 1971 - March 3, 1972 Progress Report). Weekly meetings, afternoon workshops, all-day curriculum planning sessions, retreats, occasional staff dinners led to the development and strength of unity among HUI staff members. While personal relationships were enhanced, developing more professional approaches to working with high potential students was also included in training workshops. Leadership development, curriculum development, communications skills, etc., were prime ingredients of HUI teacher training.

Trained psychologists were brought in at different times to work with the staff in developing the group's ability to work together in greater understanding of each other. In addition, BESP training workshops attended by HUI staff included: Enhancing the Self Image of the Minority Child, White Teachers in a Multi-cultural

School, Leadership/Staff Relation Training, etc. HUI staff attempted to bring the common school staff into training workshops by providing funds for substitute teachers out of the HUI BEPP budget. One common school teacher, however, felt that in bringing subs in, and with HUI teachers leaving at various times throughout the school year for training sessions, students' education was unnecessarily interrupted; in addition, staff members who did not attend the workshops were left to deal with the subs and the inevitable chaos that ensues in the classroom.

Teachers at HUI often took on the role of counselor, much to the dismay of the West Campus counselors. West Campus counselors gave varying views of the HUI students. Some felt that HUI Black students needed special counseling to help them understand their "special status." The seeming intent of the "special counseling" was to let the Black high potential students know they had a privileged position in the upper echelons of the school hierarchy. On the other hand, some counselors felt that white students in HUI needed special counseling in order to prevent snobbishness.

Decision-making power was concentrated in the BESP West Campus Coordinator who was also director of HUI, and chairman of the Social Science/History Department at West Campus. The parent group most involved with HUI was an outside, BUSD-wide organization called Berkeleyans for Academic Excellence: its membership was almost exclusively white and middle and upper class. The only case of power-sharing with parents was the approval of the overall West Campus budget, presented to the larger West Campus parent committee.

In June 1974, the coordinator of the BUSD High Potential program reported that 22 percent of the total BUSD student population were state-identified as mentally gifted. (Compared to 2 percent for the Nation, and 3 percent for California). Of Berkeley's state-identified gifted students 71 percent were white (2152/3043). In addition to those identified by the state, BUSD also had 175 ethnic minority students identified by the Berkeley Plan included in the district's high potential program.

In the 1973/74 school year, for which district-wide figures of state-identified and Berkeley Plan-identified high potential students are available, HUI had 8 percent (N=249) of the total BUSD high potential students (N=3,218).

#### ARTICULATION

HUI was unique in that the entire site was officially designated as high potential. However, the existence of a district-wide high

potential program suggests tracking both before and after the 9th grade watershed. In this sense, HUI served as a conspicuous link in an articulation chain, but not within the BESP system. To be sure, Model School A would seem like an appropriate destination for HUI students going on to high school, but there was no alternative at the junior high level that "naturally" fed HUI.

#### FUNDING

From Fall 1971 through Spring 1975, HUI was allocated 3.75 percent (\$118,004) of the total BESP site budget. In the 1975/76 school year, all four West Campus alternatives were coordinated under one token BESP budget of \$22,150.

In a report dated July 1974, a HUI teacher described in detail how HUI shared its BESP wealth with the common school. HUI staff claimed that it shared all audio visual material ordered for the HUI program, provided money to pay for substitute teachers so common school staff could attend in-service training sessions, provided 75 percent of the funds that enabled classes in literature, creative writing, and improvisational drama to have new texts (HUI students were enrolled in all these common school classes), provided funds to purchase printing machinery to assist the graphic arts and art metal teachers, sponsored a part time art teacher and supplied money to buy necessary materials (HUI students were enrolled in these classes too).

In all, 63 percent of the HUI budget between 1971 and 1975 went for salaries. Twenty percent or \$23,539 went toward instructional materials and office supplies. Conferences, travel expenses, and field trips consumed \$6,149 or 5 percent of the budget over the four years. Capital outlay for equipment amounted to \$7,431 or 6 percent of the HUI budget. (This money was spent between Fall 1971 and Spring 1974, most of it during the 1972/73 school year.)

More than four-fifths of the HUI budget between 1971 and 1975 went toward salaries and materials, and because HUI teachers also taught at the common school, and HUI students also were enrolled in common school classes, much of the HUI BESP funds served to supplement the common school budget.

#### EVALUATION

In the June 1971 proposal to OE/ESP, HUI provided for evaluation and measurement of program effectiveness. Narrative reports, teacher-student observation, questionnaires, interviews with teachers and students, and district approved measurements were the

means by which HUI was to assess its effectiveness in providing continued academic achievement for high potential students.

HUI did utilize teacher/student observations, but the results are not available. Most of the evaluative strategies utilized by the HUI staff were geared toward helping the teachers better meet the needs of high potential students. By 1974/75, HUI stopped making site surveys on the assumption that the Level I and II evaluation components could do a better job, and had more time to commit to those surveys than did the HUI staff and director.

Standardized testing showed above average scores for HUI students. Below are the grade equivalent scores of ISA's sample students in CTBS tests for the 1974/75 school year.

TABLE 3: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, HUI GRADE 9

	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Math</u>
Fall 1974	12.222	10.911	12.188
n	27	27	26
Spring 1975	12.193	12.465	12.365
n	28	26	26

Of the 429 honor roll students at West Campus in the winter of 1975, 194 (45%) were HUI students; 70 percent of HUI students were on the honor roll. (HUI student population comprised 27 percent of the West Campus population in 1974/75). Of the 52 West Campus students with 4.0 G.P.A., 38 were HUI students; of the 141 students with 3.5 to 3.9 G.P.A., 79 were HUI students; and, of the 236 students with 3.0 to 3.4 G.P.A., 78 were HUI students.

The scores of HUI students, both on standardized tests and in grade point averages, are impressive, but there is no evidence that they would have been less impressive if there had been no BSP. Most of the students, after all, were in HUI because they had previously scored in the 99.0 percentile on standardized tests. Most of them also came from the ethnic (white) and socioeconomic (upper or middle class) origins that have traditionally stamped the academic high achievers in our school system. If BSP was conceived as an instrument for change, then HUI's service to this purpose evokes the French aphorism: the more things change the more they remain the same.

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WEST CAMPUS: WORK/STUDY AND PRAGMATICS (aka West Campus Alternative 9B)

ABSTRACT

Work/Study, launched with BESP money in Fall 1971, was developed as a program for students who had spent a year in the 9th grade but were not advanced to the 10th because of academic and/or behavioral problems.

The stated aim was to change their attitude and behavior by providing them with work opportunities, either on-campus (e.g., as teachers' helpers or cafeteria workers) or off-campus (e.g., as department store clerks or animal shelter employees). They received compensation either in cash or course credit. Because of limited job opportunities off-campus, most of the work was in-school for course credit. Work assignment was theoretically contingent upon a student's regular attendance at common school classes. Theoretically, the classes were selected for the student on the basis of the teachers' special competence or interest in teaching such problem students. The theoretical guidelines were generally ignored in practice.

In 1974, informally in the Spring and formally in the Fall, a daily "Pragmatics" period was introduced. This consisted of lectures (e.g., on such subjects as job applications and good behavior) and "rap sessions". These sessions were conducted by administrative and counseling personnel. They were supposed to be rehabilitative.

At its peak (1973/74) Work/Study served 58 students, 91 percent of them Black.

There is no evidence that Work/Study effectively served a rehabilitative purpose by modifying attitude and/or behavior. Indeed, its merger with Career Exploration in Fall 1975 to be absorbed into a program called Career Education suggests a district judgment that it did not fulfill its stated mission. For students it never was truly an alternative. For the district it was another variety of residual program into which a particular group of problem students could be tracked.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

West Campus Alternative 9B/Work/Study was created by the West Campus principal in Spring 1971 and submitted to OE/ESP with the amended BESP proposal in June 1971. Work/Study was designed to serve those students who had failed academically and had been detained at West Campus. Initially, Work/Study was scheduled to operate for only one semester but upon recommendation of the West Campus vice principal, it continued operations. West Campus had a constant group of failures, usually numbering around 50 students per year.

The proposal submitted to OE/ESP in June 1971 asserted that the Work/Study program for 9th grade retainees would provide basic skills and attempt to develop positive attitudes toward school in those students who had been ignored, alienated, and/or turned off to school to such a degree that they were kept back from proceeding to the 10th grade. Attitudinal changes would result from positive working experiences, compensated with either money or course credit. It was hoped that education would appear to be relevant to these students, and that they would develop a sense of responsibility through work experience.

There were two parts to the Work/Study program. One was job placement either on-site at West Campus as teachers' helpers, cafeteria workers, or off-site in such fields as sales clerks in department stores, aides in school libraries, animal shelters, etc. Theoretically, if a student persisted in cutting classes (as this was one of the major reasons for retention in the 9th grade level), the student would not be allowed to keep his/her job. In practice, however, this did not bear out.

The second facet of the Work/Study program was course programming in which students were to be assigned to common school classes on the basis of the teachers. Those teachers with the greatest capacity to create personal and positive relationships with students and those teachers most responsive to the aims of the program were to be earmarked for Work/Study students. This part of the program was not implemented. Students were not given consideration with respect to course scheduling, and in fact, some students were placed with the same teachers who flunked them the semester before. In all, between the program's inception in Fall 1971 through Spring 1974, the only functioning facet was job placement, and that was primarily in-school work experience (IWE).

In the 1974/75 school year when all four West Campus alternative programs were consolidated under one director and budget, the Work/Study program was de-emphasized in terms of target student

population, and teacher sensitivity to retainees. The only aspect of the program actually operating at this time was the job placement; even with this, many students remained unemployed.

In Spring 1974 the coordinator of all four alternative programs at West Campus recommended the merger of Work/Study and Career Exploration for the 1974/75 school year. The merger was delayed until the 1975/76 school year, however, because of resistance from the CE staff. It seems the CE program geared for middle range students (even though not attracting these students) was felt to be quite different from job placement for low achievers and retainees who were tracked into Work/Study. The CE staff came up with a suggestion to avoid the merger, and that was to have potential 9th grade repeaters meet daily the first period in the same classroom. These sessions began in the Spring 1974 semester and were formalized by September 1974. The new program was called "Pragmatics," and became a part of the Work/Study project.

Pragmatics encompassed the CE staff suggestion of daily sessions with students in order to "rehabilitate" the students through closer staff contact with them and their parents. On a rotational basis, the West Campus vice principal, administrative assistant, coordinator of student support services, school guidance consultant and three counselors met with the students. Lectures on such topics as job applications, proper behavior, and general rap sessions between students and counselors were the format for the Pragmatics class.

The original target students were those failing the common school program, but with the addition of Pragmatics to Work/Study, the program admitted any student interested in a Work/Study situation and paid work experience, either in or out of school (OWE). In addition to jobs, students were required to take five common school classes daily.

In the 1975/76 school year, Work/Study and Career Exploration merged under the Career Education program. In this umbrella program, Career Education, IWE and OWE, Career Center and interaction with the Berkeley Workreation program operated for the purpose of exposing students to careers and work experience and to positively affect attitudinal change in students. The Work/Study facet of Career Education no longer dealt primarily with turned off students, under achievers, low achievers, or retainees. Rather, students from every ethnic background, students who were experiencing academic success in school, students who used the Career Center regularly and/or who dropped into the center, students who needed special skills training, students who received wages from employers and/or West Campus and students receiving only credit from West

Campus were involved in the Career Education program.

Following is a table depicting the ethnic composition of the students enrolled in the Work/Study program from Fall 1971 through Spring 1976. In the 1975/76 school year it was incorporated in the larger Career Education program.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, 1971/72-1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other	Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>n</u>
1971/72	6	12	38	79	2	4	2	4				48
1972/73	6	15	30	73	3	7	2	5				41
1973/74	3	5	53	91			2	3				58
1974/75	5	21	18	75	1	4						24
1975/76	6	19	18	58	4	13	3	10				31

Student enrollment in Work/Study was low throughout the BESP years. The drop in enrollment between 1973/74 and 1974/75 (from 58 to 24 students) may be attributed to the shrinking availability of jobs in the community and the minimum wage increase from \$1.65/hour to \$2 /hour.

Figures for 1974/75 and 1975/76 do not include those students participating in the Career Center and other facets of the umbrella Career Education program. Total student involvement in Work/Study and Career Center use in 1974/75 is presented below.

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other	Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>n</u>
1974/75	20	14	106	72	17	12	4	3				147

Student enrollment in the umbrella Career Education program at West Campus in 1975/76 was: 31 in Work/Study, 30 in Out of School Work Experience, 185 in In School Work Experience, 30 in Career Exploration program, and 27 who utilized the Career Center. These figures total 303 students.

Noticeable in all the figures is the majority of Black students connected with the program throughout the BESP funding period.

Staffing in the Work/Study program consisted primarily of a director and job coordinator for students involved in IWE and OWE, and an instructional aide for Pragmatics. The Pragmatics aide, salaried by HUI in 1974/75, was retained by West Campus in 1975/76. Program directors at various times had secondary responsibility to Work/Study, their primary duties were as vice principal or West Campus alternative coordinator, or some such administrative position for the entire complex. Because there were no classes in the Work/Study program there was no need for a staff. In the Pragmatics classes, as mentioned previously, West Campus counselors supervised the class and counseled students on a rotational basis.

Primary emphasis of the entire program, prior to the merger with CE and the addition of the Pragmatics facet, was job placement.

#### ARTICULATION

The Work/Study program was initially aimed at those students who needed extra motivation to complete 9th grade requirements. It later expanded to include potential problem students, that is, students who would probably be retained at West Campus because of poor class attendance, low or underachievers.

The alternative to the Work/Study program for retainees was the East Campus continuation school, and until Spring 1974, United Nations West (formerly Garvey Institute).

Students were primarily tracked into the Work/Study through the junior high school counselors and counselors at West Campus. It was hoped that involving students in positive work experience (through in-school and out-of-school working situations) would change their attitudes toward school.

#### FUNDING

Between Fall 1971 and Spring 1975 Work/Study was allocated \$62,764, or 2 percent of the total BESP site budget. In the 1975/76 school year, under one budget, the West Campus Alternatives were allocated \$22,150 (.7% of the total BESP budget.)

The focus of the Work/Study program was to provide students jobs as a means of changing their attitudes toward school. Because of this, most of the Work/Study BESP budget, between 1971 and 1975, went toward hourly wages of students holding jobs through Work/Study. The amount allocated was 60 percent of the Work/Study budget between 1971 and 1975 or \$37,636 (typed as classified hourly salaries in budget).

Other salaries, such as certificated hourly, classified monthly and service contracts used 26 percent (or \$16,517) of the Work/Study budget during the period 1971-1975. Most of this went toward the classified monthly salary of the job coordinator/community liaison person during the 1973/74 and 1974/75 school years.

Three percent of the budget (\$2,019) went toward office materials and instructional supplies and books; 8 percent went toward capital outlay for equipment (\$5,148).

#### EVALUATION

As stated in the ISA 1974/75 report on Work Study/Pragmatics, since the death of the former vice principal of West Campus during the summer of 1973, all but one instrument to measure the growth of students has been discontinued. Under his direction, evaluative instruments included: teacher and parent logs documenting student behavior, pre- and post-tests for basic skills, comparison of grades before and after work experience, CTBS scores and criterion reading tests, student attendance before, during and after the work experience to test attitudinal change toward schooling.

The only semblance of measurement is the routine class attendance record maintained by the school attendance office, and that is done simply for ADA purposes, not to measure growth. There is no evaluation to evaluate. However, the absence of any pretense of evaluation indicated that the program served as a residual refuge into which educational "misfits" were tracked.

WEST CAMPUS: YOGA/READING (aka 9D/Black House and Basic Skills)

ABSTRACT

Yoga/Reading, launched with BESP money, was a ninth grade program designed to bring below grade readers up to par by combining intensive instruction in reading with yoga exercises to develop the ability to concentrate.

It was an innovative idea but it was never truly tested because the planners had not reckoned with their host. Students were tracked into the reading component of the program, but they were not required to take the yoga class. These target students did not take it. They were almost all Black and the explanation given for their abstention from yoga was that they perceived it as a "cult" or "religion" that was alien to their own experience and culture.

In the end the yoga class was dropped and all that remained was a High Intensity Learning Center to impart basic reading skills to 90 students, 78 of whom were Black.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

The West Campus alternative program originally intended for Black underachievers was called 9D/Black House, and was submitted to OE/ESP in the June 1971 amended BESP proposal. The idea was to appeal to Black underachievers through utilization of the Black perspective in teaching basic skills. The program, however, got off to a late start due to staffing difficulty.

The original Black House idea was never implemented, presumably due to Office for Civil Rights objections to separatist programs. In the 1971 proposal, Black students were earmarked as the target population. Following abandonment of the first plan, a new plan was produced during the 1971/72 school year which proposed to provide work experience for Black students with Black employers. This plan proved unfeasible and a third plan was developed which aimed at providing intensive basic skills instruction to students who were considered underachievers. The two men who designed the initial proposal were the principal and vice principal of West Campus, both Black, one of whom became BESP director for the district, the other remaining on as vice principal of West Campus.

The third and final plan combined yoga and basic skills instruction. The West Campus vice principal had some exposure to yoga, having studied it for five years, was interested in the concept of applying yoga to human potential.

Though the aim of Yoga/Reading (HILC) was to provide basic skills instruction with yoga training in order to develop powers of concentration, which in turn was hoped to improve reading scores, the two facets of the program never were presented as a unified program. Rather, they operated separately throughout the existence of Yoga/Reading.

Yoga/Reading, then, was two courses offered to ninth graders. The yoga facet was amended to include physical education credit for a body contact sport available to any West Campus student in the Spring 1974 semester. Reading or HILC was for students achieving below the 9th grade level in reading, but above the 5th grade level. (West Campus already had a remedial program for students between the 2nd and 5th grade levels.)

The HILC was part of the Random House package purchased by BUSD in 1972. The materials were not multi-cultural, though apparently geared for students to work individually at their own pace. However, in 1974/75, the HILC teacher claimed she did not utilize all the available material and equipment for fear that students would destroy or steal them.

Students in the HILC class were tracked into the program, based on their reading scores in standardized tests, by counselors and/or teachers. In the first semester of operation, 81 percent of the students participating in the HILC were Black. By the third year of operation, 1975/76, the yoga class had been dropped out of the program due to budget cuts. It was also felt that due to the failure of attracting Black underachieving students into the yoga classes, it was no longer feasible to continue the experiment in developing concentration skills among underachieving students. Yoga class was attracting the high potential students, almost all of them white, from the HUI program.

Below is a table showing the student enrollment in Yoga/Reading from Fall 1973 to Spring 1976, by ethnicity.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
1973/74 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total <u>n</u>
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	
1973/74	37	25	101	67	7	5	2	1			3	2	150
1974/75	10	10	78	80	5	5	3	3			2	2	98
1975/76*	8	9	78	87			3	3			1	1	90

\*HILC only, Yoga phased out for Fall 1975 semester.

In the 1973/74 school year, 80 of the 150 students in the Yoga/Reading program were enrolled only in the HILC/Reading, of these 81 percent (N=65) were Black students. Sixty of the 150 students were enrolled only in the yoga class, of these 59 percent (N=35) were Black. Ten students were enrolled in both yoga and reading, of these one was Black.

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There was no attendance policy for Yoga/Reading students separate from what existed throughout West Campus. There was also no separate administrative component to the program. In 1973/74, the vice principal of the common school acted as Yoga/Reading director. In 1974/75 and 1975/76, the West Campus BESP coordinator served as director for the Yoga/Reading program. Major decisions were made by the West Campus BESP coordinator in cooperation with the West Campus principal and vice principal.

Two teachers constituted the Yoga/Reading staff for two years of the program. In 1973/74 and 1974/75, a white certificated female taught the HILC/Reading classes and a Black classified female taught yoga. In the Fall 1975 semester, both teachers went back to the common school. The yoga class was dropped from the curriculum and the reading/HILC coordinator/teaching position was taken over by an HILC teacher from Agora/Genesis (who also helped at MSA's HILC and led training sessions for HILC throughout the district.) In 1975/76, the HILC/Reading staff consisted of one white certificated male.

#### ARTICULATION

West Campus Yoga/Reading in actuality functioned as two separate classes: yoga (physical education elective for body contact sport) and reading (English Introduction). Students were tracked into the reading (HILC) class but recruited into the yoga class.

The program was an enrichment program for the common school. It provided an HILC with special emphasis on students reading between the 5th and 8th grade levels, and though initially intended to appeal to Black students through a Black perspective, the curriculum materials in the HILC were not multi-cultural.

Yoga/Reading, with its HILC, could be viewed as fitting into the articulation plan with the other grade levels that also had an HILC, such as Willard Junior High School, Agora/Genesis, College Prep, MSA. However, such articulation was dubious to the degree that it implied continuing underachievement, thus seemingly presupposing failure of the HILCs to achieve their aim of bringing underachievers up to the norm for their peers.

The HILC did provide West Campus with a program for students reading at the 5th to 8th grade level, an area not previously covered by the West Campus common school program. (Areas covered at West Campus were 2nd to 5th grade reading level, high potential and retainees.)

The HILC teacher was originally from Willard Junior High School. Before transferring to West Campus in Fall 1973, she took a summer workshop with the Cappuccino program, which was sponsored by BUSD as in-service training for English teachers. As an HILC coordinator/teacher, she utilized the training component of BUSD/BESP, just as other HILC coordinators in the district did. She remained with Yoga/Reading (HILC) until the 1975/76 school year when she was transferred into the West Campus common school and an HILC coordinator from Agora/Genesis (also an HILC coordinator at one point in MSA) was assigned to the West Campus HILC.

Through the cooperation of the counselors, who follow the students through to BHS, the students in Yoga/HILC were placed in some appropriate level of the skills classes in the high school English Department when they passed into the tenth grade.

#### FUNDING

During the five years of BESP funding, Yoga/Reading received 1.43 percent (\$44,995) of the total budget for sites. This amount was allocated during the period 1971 through 1975. In 1975/76, all four West Campus alternative programs were operating under a single budget of \$22,150, or .7 percent of the total BESP five-year site budget. It is unclear how much of this money went to each of the four programs.

In the period when Yoga/Reading was receiving its own budget, 55 percent (\$24,815) went toward salaries, including the classified staff member, and in-service training of HILC teachers; 23 percent of the budget went toward instructional and office materials, books, etc., most of which was for the reading HILC, and 13 percent went toward capital outlay for equipment, and again most of this was for the HILC.

In all, the impact of BESP funding of Yoga/Reading on the common school came from building, developing and equipping the HILC laboratory.

#### EVALUATION

Because Yoga/Reading operated as two separate units, the evaluation/growth practices varied. According to the October-December 1974 progress report from Yoga/Reading,

in Yoga P.E. 20 yoga poses have been mastered. In Yoga/HILC, some introduction of yoga has been made to responsive members of class and during interludes in student work.

There was no attempt to check on the acquisition of concentration skills through yoga exercises against improved reading ability. The reason primarily was the infrequency of students in HILC/Reading participating in yoga as well. Through the 1973/74 school year, students were allowed to wander in and out of the HILC lab to participate in the yoga class; however, in 1974/75 this practice was stopped. Students were required to stay in HILC for the entire schedule time period. This decision was made on account of students misusing the freedom; that is, students would go into yoga class because they didn't like the reading/HILC, resulting in poor work performance and production in the reading lab.

HILC students were evaluated on the basis of the Gates McGinitie tests, CTBS and the Reading Criterion Diagnostic Test for Cognitive Basic Skills. In addition, skills testing occurred every six weeks. The HILC teacher said that she incorporated this measure from the Cappuccino program. The HILC teacher also attempted to record the participation ratio scores in the HILC for the BESP/HILC coordinator.

HILC students were placed, based on their CTBS scores. Counselors in both the West Campus school and the junior high schools informed teachers of students with diagnosed and undiagnosed reading problems of the West Campus HILC program.

Of ISA's sample students who took the CTBS in the Fall and Spring, 1974/75, the grade equivalencies show the most average growth in the language area with over one year achievement by grade equivalency. Though the scores indicated general below average basic levels in all three areas (math, reading and language,) there was improvement between the two semesters. As stated earlier, the HILC was geared for students reading between the 5th and 8th grade level.

TABLE 2: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, HILC GRADE 9

	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Math</u>
Fall 1974	6.100	5.467	6.300
n	6	6	2
Spring 1975	6.740	6.800	6.500
n	5	4	2

The Gates McGinitie test results in the 1973/74 school year indicate reading students were not only progressing at the required growth rate demanded by the district, but on the average, they doubled the required growth rate. The HILC teacher stated:

Seventy three total student test scores are given. Of the 73, 80 percent (N=53) are Black students. The average entering score of this 80 percent was 5.0. The average January 1974 score for these students was slightly over 5.8.

The other 15 students (out of the total 73) had average entering scores of 5.0 too. The average January score for this group was 6.5. For both the Black and non-Black students, the regressive score was included in the averaging.

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale, Yoga/Reading was rated slightly above .0 for "alternativeness," slightly above .8 for "effectiveness," and slightly above .0 on the combined "Effective Alternative" scale, just ahead of last-place Odyssey among BESP's 7-9 grade programs.

## EAST CAMPUS

### ABSTRACT

As a traditional continuation school, East Campus was an obligatory "alternative" for student "rejects" from grades 9-12. In 1967, a newly appointed principal began an effort to transform East Campus into a continuation school with a difference, or an alternative to the "alternative."

This effort was well under way before BESP. However, inclusion of East Campus in the BESP network, beginning in September 1971, served two purposes: (1) it legitimized East Campus's status as an alternative school and thereby diminished the continuation school stigma, and (2) it provided funds to enhance the academic and human relations aspects of the school's program. At the same time, East Campus remained the continuation school with the mixed blessings of this status: special regulations and special subsidies.

As is the norm for such institutions, ethnic minorities were overrepresented. Blacks constituted between 50 percent (1973/74) and 60 percent (1975/76) of the student body. In the five BESP years the student population grew from 124 to 219.

Persuaded that a continuation school need not be just a "human warehouse," but could serve as a house of learning, the innovative principal placed a premium on the personal factors: the individual teacher's commitment, empathy and skill - and the individual student's instructional needs and aptitudes. The academic emphasis on basic skills was supplemented by courses that ranged from Gardening to Black Awareness and the Sociology of Men and Women. The school did change, and increasingly students actually applied to it, instead of being sentenced to it, although a major proportion continued to fall into the latter category.

BESP funds helped in the purchase of materials (notably a High Intensity Learning Center), permitting greater flexibility to recruit and enlarge staff, and acquisition of such extras as a professional family counseling program. Symptomatic of the change in the school was the change in the sex makeup of the staff. In the first BESP year (1971/72), consistent with the tradition that males can best handle such difficult students, the certificated staff consisted of nine males and three females; in the last year (1975/76) there were nine males and eight females.

With termination of BESP, phasing East Campus into BUSD posed no special problems, and necessitated no change in identity. There will just be a little less money. For 1975/76 the BESP allocation to East Campus had dwindled to \$63 per student.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

East Campus won a place in BUSD as an alternative for a number of reasons long before it became part of the proposal submitted to OE/ESP in April 1971. In order to consider its emergence as a BEBP alternative, it is necessary to discuss some of these reasons. First, EC was needed to deal with those high school students not succeeding in the common school. Second, a facility was needed to contain dropouts and/or students with attendance, family or personal problems (i.e., probation, parole, etc.)

Two salient points in the East Campus development, beginning in 1967, were leadership and planning. The newly appointed principal in 1967 and his self-selected new staff reshaped the continuation school "dumping ground" approach into a program which attempted to provide individually tailored instruction in basic skills in an atmosphere of personal concern. The result was that many disenchanted students opted for, rather than were forced into, the school. The nature of the school's population remained the same, but a change in attitudes was obvious.

The director with the staff decided to eliminate the F-grade. They continued to test but used the results as a relative standard of performance and as a diagnostic tool rather than as an absolute measure. The new message was that students could and would learn. The director abated the impact of constrictive rules, but demanded students not disturb those who were trying to learn. Finally he made staff changes through voluntary transfers out and in. A teacher's skill and commitment to the principal's philosophy were the determining criteria, and not any particular educational method.

The school was autonomous and, in fact, staff members were accountable only to each other. In January 1972, Herb Kohl discussed the changes that took place at McKinley (as East Campus was then known). He said that the staff "got away" with the total governance of their school because the superintendent never visited the school, he never knew what was happening there. Other teachers in the district felt the McKinley staff did not recognize legitimate authority, but... "it was a safety valve for the system. It was used to let off steam... And the kids were all on paper considered psychiatrically disturbed."

By the time the opportunity for developing a proposal for BEBP funds came about in Spring 1971, the East Campus staff was stable and had settled into a new and permanent district-owned site.

They were able to plan consciously for expansion of their existing program (i.e., counseling, work experience, individualized instruction) and for one far-reaching goal, stated in the proposal:

Experience over the past year has indicated that in order to more effectively meet the needs of the students, we must lengthen the school year to 11 months and the school day to include evening classes. A small 24-hour residence facility to house 6-8 young people at a time should be provided.

They did, in fact, extend the program through the summer, and opened it to non-EC students as well. Evening classes were held during that first BESP year, but student interest waned after one semester. The residence facility never was realized. Adequate funding for this would have been a major undertaking. BESP did not take this part of the proposal into serious account, according to its budget allocations for 1971/72.

BESP was able to help effect changes and enhance two vital areas of the EC program--basic skills and interpersonal humanistic contacts. In addition to reading, writing and math skills, social and/or survival skills were included. The principal/director called those survival skills "knowing how to get along with your fellow man and how to deal with the system." Besides fulfilling teaching responsibilities, the staff related to students individually, helping them to deal with conflict, counseling them on how to take tests and fill out job applications, how to make decisions and accept the consequences.

An evaluation of East Campus, developed by one of its counselors in 1972, aptly describes one of its major features:

At East Campus everybody teaches, counsels and admin-  
istrates. Some staff members have more time to do  
more in the week in all three. However, we all  
must be held accountable for opportunities.

East Campus operated on a four period morning schedule. The present director takes issue with those who consider this a half-day program. Whereas the high school requires the common school students to take six 40 minute periods, EC students are required to take four 60 minute periods; thus students at both schools are required to take 240 minutes per day. The major difference is that EC has no physical education requirements because it is a continuation school.

The morning scheduling serves several purposes: (1) it enables students who work or who have children to be free for the afternoon, (2) it keeps a student in school once he/she arrives, and (3) it enables the staff to meet regularly to plan and spend extra time with individual students.

East Campus has seven different areas/rooms used by the students: High Intensity Learning Center, Career Center, Math Lab, Library and Snack Bar, Art Room, and Business Lab. BESP was directly involved with one since 1972/73: the HILC. Although it was well supplied with materials it was misused by managers and students. Until managers were changed in Spring 1975, students learned their reading skills in other classes and in other ways. The Career Center was funded in 1974/75 by a Rosenberg Foundation grant of \$18,765, written up by one of the staff members. Called "Project Outreach," it contained materials on the world of work, and helped students in finding jobs.

Aside from the basic skills courses, other courses have been offered and developed in response to interests expressed by students: such as Black Awareness, Gardening, Communications Skills, Social Problems, Psychology, Sociology of Men and Women, Science, Human Biology and Library Project. In 1972/73, the BESP media department helped teach photography and the use of video equipment.

At EC no hard lines were drawn between who teaches, who counsels, and who administers. There were four positions that incorporated both teaching and counseling (part time). This was not an unusual phenomenon, especially for the alternative secondary schools. Often counseling occurred while teaching. What was unusual were the roles of the principal and the vice principal. When McKinley functioned solely as a continuation school, an invisible line separated the administration from teaching and counseling. At East Campus, when the innovative principal took over, he also taught, and the vice principal was a half time counselor. In an interview in 1973/74, the director described the ideal teacher necessary for EC as "a strong, mature, intelligent person willing to give of self and not necessarily looking for love of students."

The EC certificated staff numbered 12 at the beginning of BESP and stabilized the next year at 15 with a number of part time positions (three in 1973/74 and two in 1974/75). Classified staff positions began at eight and decreased to one in 1974/75. The certificated staff has ethnically represented only whites and Blacks, with Asians from classified staff since 1972/73. The Black staff has remained stable with four of the same teachers throughout BESP history.

TABLE 1: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
1971/72	*(6) 8	75 67	(2) 4	25 33			(8) 12
1972/73	(3) 11	38 73	(4) 4	50 27	(1)	13	(8) 15
1973/74	(5) 12	50 75	(3) 4	30 25	(2)	20	(10) 16
1974/75	11	73	4	27	(1)	100	(1) 15
1975/76	13	76	4	24			17

\* ( ) = classified staff or counselor aides paid out of BESP budget.

The male/female ratio of certificated staff has steadily become more equalized as noted:

	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
1971/72	9	3
1972/73	9	6
1973/74	9	7
1974/75	8	7
1975/76	9	8

In 1974/75, the founding BESP principal/director was appointed principal at BHS common. With this drastic change the EC Assistant Principal/Head Counselor (and long-standing staff member) was temporarily appointed to take over administrative duties for the year. When the position of principal/director was officially advertised in Spring 1975, another BESP site director (College Prep) applied as well. The subsequent appointment of the temporary director as new principal/director of West Campus beginning in Fall 1975, was contingent on EC staff's vote.

BESP funds were used to hire counselor aides between 1971/72 and 1973/74. A Woman's Rap Group, originally organized as an inter-racial women's class by two university students, later extended into evening meetings in people's homes. It was continued in 1972/73 through two foundations. Several students, who were later interviewed, said that it was one of their most meaningful experiences at EC.

In 1974/75 under the supervision of the principal and staffed by interested counselors at EC, a family counseling program began. Its aim was to "help students and their families develop the ability to meet their emotional, social-economic, and education needs through a variety of healthy, established, socially acceptable, and legal means" (Kappan, Feb.1976). It began from the need for a therapeutic focus to alter hardened attitudes. The necessary training was provided at the Family Therapy Institute of Marin County, California, partially subsidized by in-service funds from BESP.

Since the EC philosophy was altered in 1967, an increasingly larger number of white students applied for admission and were enrolled through 1973/74 when the charismatic principal/director left to take the appointment as principal of BHS.

Enrollment at EC was ideally set at the limit of 175 students with the onset of BESP. This number was ostensibly dictated by the limited facilities at the site shared with the Adult School on Savo Island. EC administration and staff, however, were somewhat flexible in enrolling more students (see table below), considering several factors: the overwhelming need as exhibited by the extensive waiting list, the constant turnover of students, and the willingness on the part of the staff to accommodate as many students as they possibly could.

TABLE 2: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1971/72	42	34	67	54	1	1	2	2			12	10	124
1972/73	71	41	94	55	2	1	3	2			2	1	172
1973/74	86	41	105	50	6	3	8	4			3	3	208
1974/75	96	40	127	53	2	1	9	4			6	3	240
1975/76	72	33	131	60			6	3			10	5	219

## ARTICULATION

East Campus was considered an alternative to an alternative (the continuation school concept). EC, however, offered little choice for the students once enrolled.

Admission and the subsequent educational processes within EC suggest the following pattern of facilitating or inhibiting students' options. First, no other district options are available for those "in trouble." Although more whites than Blacks apply, proportionately more Blacks are admitted. (In part, as will be seen later, the relatively greater enrollment of Black students is due to their overrepresentation among those involuntarily assigned to the school.) Second, it was necessary to have sufficient courses and teachers that were responsive to the large Black student population, that reinforced a sense of Black identity. To avoid any one-sided focus on Blacks there are also courses aimed at attracting white and Asian students, though not necessarily the same courses (e.g., Black History, Asian Studies). Third, all students are subject to restrictions in terms of the specific math, English or other basic courses they choose to take. Students' course schedules shifted in accordance with staff and student evaluations of students' needs (e.g., at their skills level). Fourth, the student is subject to a routine and structures forcing him/her to live up to his/her educational commitment. The ultimate restriction is that no student is graduated unless he/she performs at an absolute level as defined and measured by the staff, usually around 10th grade. The practice of placing the non-performing student on the waiting list applies only to the student's behavior: namely, failure to live up to the "contract" that the student makes with the school. Although the school exercises considerable control over the students, the "contract" between teachers and students is reciprocal--the student can call upon the staff to deliver what they promise, too.

EC facilitates student choices between schools. Thus, at the same time that a student is rejected by EC, the staff directs the student to other school choices that seem reasonable alternatives. EC staff as facilitators, likewise, help to direct their own students toward future choices related to the goals the students set for themselves (e.g., junior college).

By 1972/73 a majority of students at East Campus were self-referred (sometimes with the counsel of peers), and almost half were without a clouded dossier at some other institution. The following table depicts prior records and types of referral of the student population in 1972/73.

TABLE 3: STUDENT REFERRALS AND PRIOR RECORDS

	Students with un- favorable records at other institutions		Students with favorable records	
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>
Court Assignment	28	30		
BHS Counselor Referral	46	50		
Self Referral (advice from peers)	18	20	80	100
Total	92*	100%	80**	100%

\*Of this number 71 were non-white and 21 white, which means that 70 percent of all non-white students and 30 percent of white students were in this category.

\*\*Of this number 50 were white and 30 non-white, which means that 70 percent of all white students and 30 percent of non-white students were in this category.

The removal of students from the school because of inappropriate behavior is not considered to be a disciplinary action. Rather, suspensions and expulsions--though never reported as such on student records--are viewed as either catalysts for improving students' commitments or as necessary for clearing the rolls of uncommitted students so that those on the waiting list can have their chance. Removals are handled through a case conference approach with the entire staff involved rather than through traditional and inflexible disciplinary processes.

Therefore, the waiting list--the same waiting list that accommodates as yet unmatriculated students--becomes a tool to revitalize commitment. Being put on the waiting list for a time is temporary suspension used to encourage students to attend and try harder in their classes. Students are cycled back in as soon as they promise recommitment. An average of five students a month undergo this process.

Removal occurs only after repeated attempts to reach a student have failed. Reasons for temporary removal include unrelenting hostility (especially to other students), unwillingness to relate to at least one adult at the school, continual absence and continual lack of application to learning while in class. District rules can be used rendering the student ineligible for continuous enrollment. Students over 18 and students living outside of Berkeley's attendance zone may be exempted from school. A female student can withdraw if she has a child, for child care needs can be construed as superceding matriculation needs.

Transfers in and out have high frequency rates; e.g., in the period, February 26 - March 23, 1973, with a population of 186, 24 students transferred in and 25 transferred out for a month's turnover rate of 12.5 percent. As a consequence the secretaries' record-keeping focuses primarily on keeping the enrollment list complete and up to date.

For that entire 1972/73 year, of the 172 students enrolled in the fall, 140 withdrew throughout the course of the year. Of those students small numbers either graduated, transferred out of the District, went back to BHS, transferred to another BESP school (Black House, Garvey Institute), or entered a program like Job Corps. Most who left, however, did not continue their education. They either had a residence out of Berkeley, or had child care needs.

Because of the system of partial credits at EC, students can graduate any time during the school year. A few students do graduate during the course of the school year, a few go on to the Berkeley Adult School, a few go on to community or state colleges. The largest group, however, loses contact with the school.

Parent meetings were organized in 1975/76 by a counselor. Several small group meetings were held to discuss problems in raising and living with adolescents. Leaders of these small groups came from outside of the school (Bridge Over Troubled Waters and the Institute of Human Development). Parent input into the site was, otherwise, negligible. The staff felt that most EC students functioned better without parent interference; that actively seeking parent input would have alienated their students.

To lend itself to a gestalt of evaluation involving day to day activities, the staff met twice a week in the afternoon. They discussed individual student needs, behavior, etc., and discussed and aired their differences. Open confrontation was encouraged at the staff meetings as well as in the classrooms. Consistency was the byword.

#### FUNDING

In spite of its alternative school status, East Campus was still considered a continuation school on the District and state records. It therefore continued to receive extra monies from both the state and local property tax base. East Campus was reimbursed by the state for students' hourly, rather than daily, attendance. BESP monies, however, helped East Campus develop its formative program beyond that which the District supported per pupil.

By the onset of BESP and alternative status in the District, attendance at East Campus was becoming less of a problem. Considering the "commitment" policy and philosophy at East Campus, the waiting list became a constant source for filling in the ADA (Average Daily Attendance) gap. The ADA increase enabled East Campus to have a higher dollar rate per pupil paid by the District.

Over the five years of BESP, East Campus received \$146,859. This was about 4 percent of the total amount allocated to all BESP sites. BESP money allocation to EC over five years described an arc: beginning with 18 percent of the total (\$26,140) in 1971/72, rising to 33 percent (\$49,099) in year three (1973/74) and descending to 17 percent in year four and 9 percent (\$13,750) in its final BESP funded year. For 1976/77, the site requested \$4,000 for only one area of the program--Instructional Materials. This would primarily be used to update and upgrade the HILC program.

Salaries consumed 78 percent of the total budget during those five years. This included salaries of both certificated and classified staff, fringe benefits and consulting contracts. The certificated salaries were paid hourly, accounting, in part, for the in-service release-time of teachers. The monthly salaries of certificated personnel continued to be paid out of BUSD's budget. Classified salaries include both hourly and monthly salaries. Of the 1972/73 BESP allocation 92 percent (\$30,812) was expended on salary allotments, contributing to the extensive counseling program incorporated that year with three student workers and four counselor aides.

In 1972, East Campus began a summer program which was funded by BESP. This involved six teachers, two administrators, and various student aides. The director planned to phase this program out of the BESP budget into BUSD to ensure its ultimate permanency after BESP funds.

Fifteen percent (\$21,346) of the total five-year budget went toward Instructional Supplies, 38 percent of which was spent in 1973/74 to expand HILC materials. An additional \$4,557 from "Capital Outlay and Equipment" went into the HILC lab for study carrels, projectors and video and audio tape recorders.

## EVALUATION

The EC principal/director methodically planned for an in-house evaluation when the school became a BESP alternative. Tentative plans for developing student and teacher evaluation techniques were outlined in July 1972. Their evaluation was divided into three areas: (1) the individual student, (2) the staff, and (3) the institution (i.e., how it serves the needs of students, parents, and the community). The student evaluation was the most comprehensive and included measures for academic skills and psychological, emotional and social adjustment. The staff evaluation, Ted Parsons' Guided Self-Analysis, was to be used to help teachers recognize their teaching patterns and to set their own goal for change. BESP helped train the teachers in the use of this instrument. The final measure would be in students' and parents' attitudes toward teachers. No evaluation was set up for EC as an institution other than the input of parent satisfaction coupled with the other two phases of the evaluation--that of students and teachers and the satisfaction level of each.

Record-keeping was important at EC. All students' testing in academic and adjustment areas became a routine part of EC. The teacher evaluation was never developed as planned, nor were the attitudes of students and parents systematically tapped for evaluative purposes.

The present principal said (1974) that EC considered itself to be an alternative to BHS or any other BESP alternative, because it offered something no other program could offer--a continuation school with a half-day program focused on basic skills for survival in the world, supplemented by a caring and cohesive staff. In spite of this, EC was the only BESP program clearly missing from the evaluation scale of "Effective Alternativeness", developed by Level I in Spring 1974.

In 1973/74, Level I reported that 4 percent of the EC 10th graders "topped out" of the CTBS reading tests; 5 percent "topped out" in math. No information was available for the students in ISA's 10th grade sample, however.

## ODYSSEY

### ABSTRACT

Odyssey, the only off-site junior high school alternative and the only grades 7-9 school in Berkeley, was the stormiest petrel of BESP.

At various times it has endured a temporary (cooling off) shutdown, the layoff of its entire staff, eviction from a warehouse site because the Fire Marshall found it in violation of Berkeley's fire code, a Black student boycott organized by a Black staff member. Odyssey lived up to its name; it was a wanderer, looking for a home, perching briefly at six different sites in one three-year span. Initially, it changed directors about as often--four of them in the first two years. Despite all this and more, with the help of BESP and extra financial support from ESP in Washington, Odyssey managed to achieve stability and viability, and since Fall 1974 has generated enthusiasm among its teachers and loyalty among its students.

From the foregoing it may be accurately inferred that Odyssey had been plagued by problems of governance and racism. The latter was reflected in a decline of the Black proportion of the student population from 54 percent in 1972/73 to 25 percent in 1974/75. Simultaneously the total student population declined from 170 to 104. There has been an improvement on both scores: in 1975/76 129 students were enrolled and 27 percent of them were Black.

The problems of governance were related to what was perceived as Odyssey's most distinctive hallmark: community control. In the first two years, there was neither structure nor process to implement the concept. In Fall 1972 a School Council was established and designed to represent a communal trinity--staff, students, parents. But it was ineffectual because it lacked power. In Fall 1973 it was endowed with full powers to govern the school (except for final authority to dismiss employees). But then it was discovered that in a power-wielding body a determined minority can usurp authority. In this instance, according to the last site director, the usurpers were parents, most of them "white racists," whose aggressive intervention in school affairs turned the 1973/74 council into the most "counter-productive force in Odyssey's history."

Central BESP, which had intervened piecemeal at Odyssey, finally decided to confront the problems more fundamentally and retained an outside consultant to help it find solutions. The resultant recommendations appear to have been effective, and currently a director was found who could and did assume responsibilities

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of leadership, while remaining accountable to the School Council. Noteworthy features of the Odyssey program have been its use of community facilities (e.g., the Lawrence Hall of Science computer center, a local FM radio station), extensive field trips and weekend excursions, (e.g., the entire student body went to Modesto to observe a Farmworkers union march), an emphasis on "learning by doing," and its multi-cultural courses.

Its attractiveness as an alternative to the other junior high schools was attested to by a waiting list of 180 in 1975/76. With the end of ESP funding, Odyssey was to remain as an off-site school, presumably retaining some of its distinctive characteristics. It continued to operate in 1976/77.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

In the Fall 1969 semester, two teachers at Willard Junior High School and some of their students collaborated with Herb Kohl of Other Ways and designed a course to study the problems of junior high school education in Berkeley. (The junior high schools in Berkeley had been integrated since 1965, where there used to be three 7-9th grade schools, there were now two 7-8th grade schools, and one 9th grade school for the entire district.)

The course, entitled Contemporary Problems in Education, was incorporated into the Willard curriculum in the Spring 1970 semester. The course explored alternative education, in response to the criticism levelled at traditional educational approaches in Berkeley's junior high schools. The students and teachers developed the Odyssey concept, an off-site junior high school, smaller and more personalized than the larger, impersonal, junior high school.

With school Board approval and BUSD funds, Odyssey began operations in September 1970 off-site at the University of California's Lawrence Hall of Science. Eighty students were selected from the 7th and 8th grades at Willard by the two teachers who taught the contemporary problems course. Students were selected on the basis of their "need for and probable success in a school offering the chance for more responsibility and individual attention." The goals of Odyssey in the 1970/71 school year were "to create a stimulating and cordial atmosphere for students to enable them to develop emotionally and intellectually." As a small school, Odyssey incorporated the notion of shared decision-making, insisted on the importance of basic skills and maintenance of complete racial integration, and aimed for heterogeneous grouping by race, sex and academic level.

Major problems faced by Odyssey the first year of operation, 1970/71, were: although the staff had hoped to implement a free school approach to education, it did not develop a viable curriculum to facilitate such an approach; though community control was desirable, no processes were developed for parent and student involvement in decision-making; Black families were critical of the free school, unstructured atmosphere, and whereas an off-site, autonomous school was integral to the Odyssey experiment, Lawrence Hall of Science did not prove to be accommodating to the junior high school. Odyssey was evicted after the first year because the "scientists" did not feel comfortable with the alternative school on their grounds. The scientists felt the students were disruptive to scientific research and did not take care with the expensive science and math equipment in the complex. Odyssey was in the basement of the LHS.

With the advent of federal funding of an experimental school project in Berkeley, the director/teacher originator of Odyssey applied for BESP funding. The Odyssey alternative was included in the BESP proposal to OE/ESP with the stipulation from the BUSD Superintendent that the director would resign. It seems the Superintendent did not want another "hippie-dippie" free school in the spirit of Other Ways, and Community High School I (Genesis) included in the proposal, and felt that with a new director, the junior high school alternative would be easier to direct from the administration's point of view.

The director/originator accepted the Superintendent's demand, and the Odyssey proposal was approved for funding along with the other alternative school proposals in June 1971.

The Odyssey proposal included in the BESP packet was descriptive of the school's operations and goals for the BUSD funded year prior to BESP. The aim was to "provide three approaches to learning: traditional classes, experimental classes and workshops-projects." Emphasis was still to be on personalized learning through individual and small group attention. Accountability to the community at large was also included whereby students would move beyond the classroom walls for extended educational experiences. The June 1971 proposal to OE/ESP did not include means by which shared decision-making was to be realized, though students and parents were to be interviewed before admittance into the program in order to ensure understanding and acceptance of Odyssey's goals and approach. The impetus for interviewing students and parents apparently arose out of Black families' criticisms of the free school concept and unsystematic approach to curriculum. Odyssey was labelled a "white hippie" school and, while the student enrollment was overall integrated, the stigma intensified racial turbulence and the heated debate between pro-structure and pro-free school advocates. Following is a table showing student enrollment by ethnicity for the Fall 1970 through Spring 1976 school years.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, 1970/1971-1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1970/71	38	49	32	41	5	6	3	4					78
1971/72	46	48	39	41	5	5	5	5					95
1972/73	60	35	91	54	8	5	9	5	1	-	1	-	170
1973/74	52	52	34	34	4	4	10	10					100
1974/75	61	59	26	25	3	3	13	12			1	1	104
1975/76	68	53	35	27	5	4	14	11			7	5	129

During the height of racial tension among staff, students, parents, and administration at Odyssey in the 1972/73 school year, Black students constituted 54 percent of the school population.

The huge drop in Black student enrollment between 1972/73 and 1973/74 was probably in part due to the effects of the turmoil at the school during the 1972/73 school year, the lack of formal recruitment proceedings for the 1973/74 school year, and the firing of all staff between Spring 1973 and Fall 1973 by the BESP administration.

Black student enrollment continued to decline until the 1975/76 school year, which was unfortunate for the developing organization structure, the new leadership and viable curriculum integrating in a workable fashion multi-cultural courses, workshop-projects in the community and basic skills.

A new director was appointed for the first BESP funded year, 1971/72, the second year of operation for Odyssey. A new location was found at a neighborhood church and leased for one year. The free form structure of the first year was revised. A morning session covering basic skills curriculum was instituted with the afternoon session set aside for volunteer community work experiences, cultural, social and academic course electives, and field trips. There was a general tightening up of the Odyssey structure with BESP funding, managed by BUSD/BESP administration and generally approved by the Black parents and students involved in the Odyssey program. White parents and students viewed the tightening up of the school as a move back to the traditional educational approach they hoped to escape by participating in the Odyssey program. This Black/white dilemma was to peak during the 1972/73 school year. At the end of Spring 1972, Odyssey relocated again, this time in a warehouse.

In the period, 1970 through 1973, staffing problems flourished at Odyssey. As previously noted, in order to be accepted by the Superintendent in the original BESP proposal, Odyssey's director/originator had to resign. The 1970/71 Odyssey pre-BESP staff was then cut from full time to part time for the first BESP year, 1971/72. During that period, the new director was classified along with all the other staff members, save one who was certificated. The teachers were getting paid for 11 hours of work per week but some teachers were putting in far more time on-site than others. Staff morale began to take a turn for the worse. During the summer of 1972, the director and most of the staff (except for two) left Odyssey. Those that remained had the responsibility of finding a new director, selecting other needed staff members, planning the curriculum and finding a site location. No formal procedure was developed for student input into curriculum development. Thus the 1972/73 school year began. On top of that, the new director lasted no more than six months, resulting in the hiring of another director, the fourth in a period of two years.

During the 1972/73 school year, the Odyssey staff was accused by parents and students of ineptitude, and shirking their responsibilities: the directorship was found to be weak, uncommitted to alternative education and lacking administrative ability. The end result of the year was the firing of all the staff by the central BESP Director and the search once again for new director and new staff.

In April 1973, when the entire staff was notified of layoffs by the central BESP Director, the school relocated into rented trailers on Berkeley city property.

The Governing Board/School Council advertised for five teaching positions throughout the area, not limited to BUSD teacher overage. Ninety applications were submitted. The director was selected from the staff of 1972/73 (all staff were laid off but were allowed to re-apply with no preferential treatment). The director has stayed with the school since then.

In the 1974/75 school year, Odyssey advertised for teachers in math and English from within the BUSD teacher overage pool, particularly teachers from KARE and Willard Alternative, phased out after the Spring 1974 semester.

Following is a table of the Odyssey staff over the five year BESP period by ethnicity. Ethnic breakdown for 1971/72 staff is not available.

TABLE 2: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1971/1972-1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
1971/72	unavailable								13
1972/73	8	57	5	36	1	7			14
1973/74	3	38	4	50			1	12	8
1974/75	5	56	3	33			1	11	9
1975/76	5	63	2	25			1	12	8

The numbers above may be broken down as follows:

- 1971/72: 1 certificated, full time; 12 classified, part time.
- 1972/73: 1 certificated, 13 classified; 9 full time, 5 part time.
- 1973/74: 6 certificated, 2 classified (1 white, 1 Black).
- 1974/75: 5 certificated, 4 classified.
- 1975/76: 5 full time (4 white, 1 Black, the director); 3 part time (Black, white, Chicano).

During the 1970/71 school year, prior to BESP funding, Odyssey staff numbered: four full time certificated, one classified secretary, six full time student interns from U. C. Santa Cruz, and an unspecified number of student teachers' aides from U. C. Berkeley, and community volunteers. Ethnic breakdown of these staff people is not available. Staff ethnicity in the main shows a majority of white teachers. Black students were alienated from the identity crisis Odyssey was undergoing. They felt that the school was oriented toward and preferred white students who did not need basic skills instruction (even though the Black students during the 1972/73 school year comprised 54 percent of the total school enrollment).

A Black staff member organized a Black student boycott and made clear to the entire school, to BESP and BUSD, that the school did not provide what Black students and parents wanted.

A new director was appointed, and lasted for no more than six months. During his term as director (Summer 1972 and part of Fall 1972) further moves toward a more traditional approach to education took place, though white teachers were dissatisfied with the Odyssey administration. Black teachers conceded to the white teachers during the Fall 1972 semester and fired the latest director and together they hired a compromise candidate. The new director favored structure. Under his direction homeroom period was instituted, letter grades were required for 9th graders, parents were sent written evaluations of

their children's progress.

BESP central support staff in the latter part of the Fall 1972 semester led group discussions with students at Odyssey which dealt with racism at the school, the director, staff, curriculum, communication, parents and student governance. Drawing on the report of these discussions, the BESP administration made recommendations to deal with the discord at the school. These recommendations included: (1) bring in an outside consultant to help with organizational problems in group interaction, multi-racial understanding and collaborative problem solving; (2) define structure, (3) establish a more unified, racially tolerant staff; (4) find means to communicate with all students, staff and parents regarding information about race, school enrollment, curriculum and governing body to squelch rumors; (5) evaluate curriculum, teachers should decide what they can teach within their abilities; (6) director should be at site most of the time to be more involved in interaction with students, exert stronger leadership, should have training in site management, staff and student relationships and leadership problems, director should be relieved of all duties for the selection of a new site; (7) reduce number of staff meetings and increase efficiency of the meetings, (8) student representatives should be utilized in polling and consulting students to get input into decision-making; (9) use parents to help with intergroup relations; (10) provide ways for students to communicate with each other.

During this period of evaluation, Odyssey was again evicted from its warehouse/site by the Berkeley Fire Marshall because it was not up to fire code. BUSD/BESP then arranged with West Campus (the BUSD's 9th grade school) to house Odyssey. Problems were intensified with this new location. As an off-site separate school for 7th to 9th graders, Odyssey found West Campus chafing. By the end of the Spring 1973 semester, Odyssey had acquired a permanent trailer(s) home on Berkeley city property, in a Black residential area in southwest Berkeley. Odyssey has remained there to this day, though threats to move it back to West Campus for the 1975/76 school year were made.

An outside consultant was hired by the BESP office to help Odyssey get its act together. His report focused on how some of Odyssey's problems might be solved, "problems which appeared to be the major barriers to the school fulfilling its educational and community mission."

Staff, parents, students, administration, governing council and BESP were viewed as they related to the school, and as the school related to them. Recommendations for improvement included:

(1) continuing the development of the Governing Board/School Council as a positive move in formalizing parent, staff and student relationships; (2) developing avenues of power-sharing, a viable solution to program stability, curriculum continuity, site location, and employment procedures; (3) formal recognition of the Board by BESP, and BESP assignment of a liaison to communicate with Odyssey in order to eliminate misinformation and poor communication channels, (4) assumption of responsibility by BESP to secure a permanent site for Odyssey.

Other recommendations included: multi-cultural courses, core and elective courses (to be approved by the Governing Board/School Council), and contracts with staff clarifying terms of work to avoid unequal distribution of labor on-site (where some of the \$400 per month staff members were doing more work than the \$11,000+ per year full time employee from BUSD).

Overall, the consultant's report pointed to problems created by poor organization: no one person or group to be accountable to, no regular channel through which to express dissatisfaction.

The change in the program between the conflict filled 1972/73 school year and the next year points to the positive benefits of better organization, accountability, quality leadership, and formalized channels whereby students, parents and staff were enabled to contribute to the running of the school.

Prior to the growth years from Fall 1973 through Spring 1976, however, the Spring 1973 semester saw yet another director fired, all the staff laid off, and absolute control of the Odyssey budget by the central BESP Director.

After the 1973/74 school year, the staff stabilized and the director was still there in June 1976. Leadership played a vital role in the Odyssey experiment: when sensitive, insightful, facilitative leaders/directors were lacking, the program floundered. Some of the directors hired also had little if any administrative experience or training.

The Odyssey School Council, commonly known as the Governing Board, began functioning during the 1972/73 school year, but without much real power. It wasn't until BESP central support evaluation of the program in Fall 1972, and the outside consultant's report on problems in Spring 1973, that a new focus on actualizing the role of a governing board in school governance beyond crisis situations took place.

The school by-laws provided for 15 members (six parents, five students and four staff members) to constitute the council. These directors, elected from each constituency, had exclusive power over the school (except where limited by legal code or BUSD by-laws). The power included: selection of agents and employees, recommendations for firing employees when necessary to BUSD, making rules and regulations for the school, site location, and conduct and control of school affairs, including curriculum planning, grading, course requirements, students evaluation, disciplinary procedures, and fiscal allocations.

Students took a more active role in the governing board during 1973/74. While the board handled school problems and developed plans for the future, as opposed to crisis intervention, the director in the 1973/74 school year, hired by the board after the 1972/73 school year ended, had the final decision in almost all matters. He was, however, held accountable to the board.

During the 1973/74 school year, math, English and ethnic studies became required courses for Odyssey students. Courses included: Black Experience, Espanol, Photography, Human Biology, Third World Studies, Creative Writing, Arts/Crafts, Life Study, Sex and Psychology, P.E., French, Raza Studies, Team Sports, Landscaping, Afro Haitian Dance, Wilderness Survival, Computer Math, Publications Workshop, Photo Journalism, Street Theatre Group, Science Projects, Student Power, History of Sexism, Mural Painting.

After KARE was phased out in Spring 1974, the HILC materials at KARE were sent to Odyssey to begin a new HILC there. Average class size in the HILC was nine students. One field studies university student managed the HILC from Fall 1974 until the Spring 1976 semester when the HILC was closed down due to lack of funds to pay an HILC manager.

Curriculum remained about the same from the 1973/74 school year through the 1975/76 school year. The multi-cultural course requirement was slightly altered in the 1974/75 school year, when Black, white and Chicano students were required to take Black, white and Chicano experience respectively in the Fall semester, then in the Spring semester the students were divided equally in three ethnically integrated groups for the multi-ethnic experience course.

Odyssey Project, offered in 1973/74, was for students in need of basic skills intensive instruction, and HILC labs for math and reading also were required for students in need of basic skills.

Field trips, weekend excursions, and total school experiences were integrated into the Odyssey curriculum as part of the commitment

to community involvement. Camping trips, boat trips, food collection and delivery to farm workers, observation of the United Farmworkers march from San Francisco to Modesto, etc., were types of out-of-school education Odyssey students experienced.

In all, Odyssey has emerged out of its tumultuous beginnings as an on-going experiment in developing viable processes for student/parent/staff involvement in power sharing, and in combining basic skills/academic instruction with workshop-projects for school plus involvement in the outside community. Leadership has played an important role, whether in hindering the program or facilitating its development.

#### ARTICULATION

Odyssey was a non-zoned 7th to 9th grade alternative school, the only junior high level alternative option in the district (since the phaseout of the KARE and Willard Alternative programs in Spring 1974). Odyssey was also the only 7-9th grade configuration in BUSD/BESP.

During the first and second year of BESP funding (1971-73), Odyssey recruitment efforts were organized and extensive, including advertisements in the junior high schools (Willard and King) and in the intermediate schools (4-6), through direct mail, and through student word of mouth. During the third year (1973/74), the school made no effort to recruit students formally save by peer contact.

Students were admitted to Odyssey based on their ethnicity, sex and other factors. During the first year prior to BESP funding, students were admitted into the program by the originator/director on the basis of their need for and probable success in a school offering the chance for more responsibility and attention.

During the Spring 1973 semester, Odyssey, Black House, Casa de la Raza, and a proposed Asian studies program collaborated in developing a proposal, The Alliance, in order to protect the survival of the two ethnically homogeneous schools, Black House and Casa, from the Office for Civil Rights threats of closure because they were separatist.

The Alliance proposal was never accepted by OE/ESP. The proposal, though, was an innovative attempt to bring together four programs, each meeting different needs of designated ethnic populations. The Alliance was to utilize facilities of each of the sites, as well as the common school facilities. BUSD buses were to transport students around the different sites, as well as to

community facilities in Berkeley for field study of community services and to recreation areas belonging to Berkeley for outdoor education in natural settings.

During the 1974/75 school year, Odyssey joined with Early Learning Center in proposing the housing of Odyssey at Savo Island. In December 1975, the Odyssey director was appointed to the board of directors of the Savo Island Project Area Committee. Savo Island is part of Berkeley's Model Cities program redevelopment, sponsored by HUD. The committee was formed by neighborhood residents concerned with the quality of life in their area. The committee is concerned with development of low to moderate income housing in the area. Odyssey was primarily interested in Savo Island as a permanent location. Odyssey's present site will be used by the City of Berkeley for housing development.

#### FUNDING

Over the five years of BESP funding, Odyssey was allocated \$239,850 or 7.62 percent of the total BESP budget for sites. As an off-site school, particularly plagued with relocation virtually on an annual basis, building/site/land rental used up 32 percent (\$77,957) of the allocated funds. In 1973/74, the amount expended, \$17,355, was 75 percent of the total rental costs, BUSD paid the remaining 25 percent. In 1974/75, 50 percent of the rental costs was paid by Odyssey's budget, or \$11,520. In 1975/76, BESP funds were initially to pay for 75 percent of the rental costs; however, protests from the Odyssey director, staff, parents and students resulted in NIE/ESP paying the entire rental. This amounted to \$30,240.

In the 1971 through 1973 school years, Odyssey paid all of the rental costs, which amounted to \$18,842.

BESP funding provided the BUSD a means by which to experiment with an off-site school, as BESP funding was the primary source of rental payment, relieving the BUSD of the burden. BESP, however, did not exhibit responsible leadership in finding a permanent site for Odyssey and, therefore, contributed to the insecure atmosphere which permeated Odyssey throughout its five years as a BESP alternative.

Although rental costs used up about a third of the total Odyssey budget, 41 percent (\$98,212) of the Odyssey BESP funds went toward payment of salaries (including certificated and classified hourly, classified monthly, fringe benefits and consultants' fees). This amount primarily went for classified personnel, who comprised over half the Odyssey staff through the five years. Such staff composition was due to the commitment of the school community to hire Third

World staff from outside the district teacher pool overage.

Instructional and office supplies and materials used 12 percent (\$28,081) of the total budget. Of this amount, \$13,354 was spent in the 1974/75 school year on stocking the HILC lab.

Field trips, while an integral part of workshop-project community services and experiences, consumed 3 percent (\$6,718) of the Odyssey BESP budget between 1972/73 and 1975/76.

#### EVALUATION

Evaluation played a vital role in Odyssey's survival beyond the troubles of the 1972/73 school year. Outside consultants were brought in by BESP to help reorganize the school, to salvage the concept of this unique alternative.

Level I even participated as part of the evaluation team made up of BESP central staff in presenting students' views of what was wrong with the program, and how to reform it.

During the 1973/74 school year, parents of Odyssey students had a special agreement with the teaching staff not to release CTBS scores to the Level II evaluation team. This agreement, made after attempts to develop their own testing devices failed, was later rescinded. Below are CTBS reading, language and math grade equivalencies' scores of ISA's sample students for the periods: Fall 1973, Spring 1974, and Spring 1975. Fall 1974 scores are not available.

TABLE 3: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, ODYSSEY

	<u>Reading</u>		<u>Language</u>		<u>Math</u>	
	<u>n</u>	<u>G.E.</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>G.E.</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>G.E.</u>
Fall 1973	7	7.940	6	6.575	7	6.066
Spring 1974	11	8.235	10	6.775	11	5.600
Spring 1975	15	10.628	14	8.328	14	7.560

These scores show a steady advance in reading and language, approximating two years' growth over the two year period. In math, despite a slump between Fall 1973 and Spring 1974, 1.5 years' growth was achieved in the two years.

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale, Odyssey rated the maximum 1.0 for "alternativeness" and the minimum 0.0 for "effectiveness." Since the combined score was computed by multiplying the scores for the two separate components, it rated 0.0 as an "effective alternative." Paradoxically, KARE and Willard Alternative,

which were in the process of being phased out when Level I performed this evaluation in Spring 1974, were rated well above Odyssey as "effective alternatives." Their scores hovered around .4.

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Berkeley High School: Overview

The main campus of Berkeley High School is situated in a four square block area on the fringe of downtown Berkeley. It houses grades 10 through 12. Alternative education in Berkeley public schools was primarily a high school movement. Six of the ten programs in existence prior to BESP funding were high school programs. In part, this can be attributed to the influence of the self-determination movements for student power and Black power centered on the University of California's Berkeley campus. Turned off high school students, inspired by university radicals, and aided by radical educators, started a movement of their own.

In March 1968, the BUSD School Superintendent appointed a committee of teachers, headed by the BHS History Department Chairperson, to examine staff-student relations in grades 7-12. This committee recommended changes in staffing, student governance, curriculum, and proposed one model school program with a heterogeneous student body but with fewer students involved than at the main campus of BHS.

During the 1969/70 school year, the BHS principal appointed a committee to establish guidelines for alternative schools, on-site, or schools-within-a-school. The guideline committee was needed in order to establish accountability processes and responsibilities for both the sub-schools and the common high school. By then the first alternative sub-school (Community High School) was in operation on the BHS campus, and there was talk of more. Hence, a need for guidelines was felt.

Following is a table depicting the student enrollment at Berkeley High School (including those students involved in the BESP on-site programs) during the five years of BESP funding.

TABLE 1: BHS STUDENT POPULATION\* BY ETHNICITY, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1971/72	1337	43	1366	44	239	8	114	4	3	-	38	1	3097
1972/73	1270	43	1273	43	258	9	77	3	6	-	49	2	2933
1973/74	1272	41	1418	46	259	8	101	3	3	-	62	2	3115
1974/75	1267	42	1394	46	258	8	81	3	4	-	49	2	3053
1975/76	1181	42	1273	45	226	8	62	2	1	-	82	3	2825

\*Figures from BUSD Office of Research and Evaluation, Report of the Student Racial Census.

The original alternative secondary schools, Community High (Genesis) and Other Ways, were based on the white counter-culture critique of the educational system. BHS was seen as excessively large, inflexible, impersonal, boring, not motivating the student to take responsibility for his/her own learning, and tending to discourage rather than foster autonomy. The remedy was to provide a small, intimate learning situation, where students directed the content of learning around their own interests, often learning informally through action. Classes were to be interdisciplinary, based on interests rather than traditional disciplinary divisions. Students were to actively participate in their own education.

The alternative model sketched above did not appeal to the needs of Black, Asian, Chicano students. Ethnic schools, first Black House then Casa de la Raza, were more likely to emphasize that they offered a clearly defined but radically different direction. The content of the educational critique and changes envisioned differed from school to school, though sharing a similar motivation: intense dissatisfaction with BHS and the perceived irrelevancy, discrimination and poor quality of the traditional educational process.

The site histories that follow reveal a common thread: a struggle by almost all the secondary schools in the BESP program for autonomy versus the bureaucratic needs of the larger BHS. Different methods of coping with BHS administration were attempted by the different sites, depending on their needs and plans for their own survival beyond BESP funding. Students participating in the on-site alternative programs comprised between 25 percent and 50 percent of the total BHS student population during the period 1971/72 through 1975/76. The following table shows the student population in each of the on-site schools during the BESP funding period and the percentage of students involved compared to the entire BHS main campus student population.

TABLE 2: BESP STUDENT POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL BHS, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	Agora		Ag/Gen		C/Prep		Genesis		MSA		S/Arts		OTS		BESP		BHS
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1971/72	168	5			65	2	174	6	415	13	200	6	**		1022	33	3097
1972/73	96	3			140	5	150	5	400	14	187	6	508	17	1481	50	2933
1973/74	100	3			153	5	90	3	289	9	196	6	442	14	1270	41	3115
1974/75	-- *		167	5	125	4	--		320	10	211	7	212	7	1035	34	3053
1975/76	--		94	3	131	5	--		323	11	150	5	--		698	25	2825

\* The dotted lines, --, designate the phase-out of the respective sites.

\*\* Unavailable.

As is evident in the above table, student participation in the on-site BESP schools at BHS remained fairly constant up until the final year of funding, 1975/76. In this last year, student involvement in the BESP programs declined by 32 percent (from 1,035 students to 698 students). BHS overall student enrollment (at the main campus, including those students involved in the BESP programs) declined by 7 percent.

What follows is the history of each on-site alternative program for 10th - 12th grade students, how each emerged out of the dissatisfaction with BHS, and how each attempted to change the high school students' experiences through alternative education.

GENESIS (aka Community High School)

ABSTRACT

Genesis (originally Community High School) was the first on-site alternative school on the Berkeley High School campus. It emerged out of the social ferment of the late 1960's in Berkeley, and more specifically out of the "Berkeley Summer Project" of 1967, an experimental initiative by two BHS Art Department teachers to "explore basic questions of self-worth, relationships with other people and ways to control one's own destiny."

Community High opened its doors in January 1969 as an alternative school: non-graded, open-structured, interdisciplinary, and committed to the input of "student power" in decision-making. Given its origins, it was dubbed a "white hippie school," a label that was reinforced by its initial 70 percent white enrollment. A concerted staff effort changed this picture: in 1970/71 half of the 298 students were from ethnic minorities. The following year--1971/72--BESP came on the scene, and Genesis began Exodus. From the high of 298 in the pre-BESP year, enrollment steadily shrank to 90 in 1973/74. The exodus of minority students was even more pronounced; by 1973/74 they constituted only one-fourth of the Genesis student population. Inadvertently, BESP facilitated this decline by creating other alternatives, but this did not account for all of it. Yet, Genesis performed a seminal role: ethnically focused Black House and Agora were its outgrowths.

However, Genesis could not overcome its own contradictions: the natal stamp of white, middle class discontent vs. conflicting needs of ethnic minority students; its original "free school" style and need for autonomy vs. inhibiting pressures and demands of the common school environment and administration; the commitment to "student power" vs. countervailing powers (administrative) and pulls (partially ethnic, in that power for a white student majority did not jibe with minority student aspirations).

When its enrollment hit the untenable low of 90 in 1973/74, Genesis sought a merger of survival with Agora. They merged in Fall 1974.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

Genesis (then called Community High School)\* began in the Spring 1969 semester on-site at BHS. Genesis was an outgrowth of a successful BUSD summer project experimenting with a small, intimate learning environment. It was a means of responding to the needs of students alienated by a larger, impersonal urban high school. The "Berkeley Summer Project" of 1967 explored the basic questions of self-worth, relationships with other people and ways to control one's own destiny.

The project was initiated by two BHS Art Department teachers. The success of the Program resulted in continuous meetings from Fall 1967 to Spring 1969 to enlist interest in an alternative approach to education based on the arts and dedicated to restructuring education and building an affective curriculum.

Genesis opened in the Spring 1969 semester with an enrollment of 120 10th graders. According to the BUSD Office of Project Development site description (December 3, 1968), Genesis was a design for a radically new urban high school in America. An approach to education was needed to make integration more than the sharing of the same building by Black and white students. An approach was needed to cause students from heterogeneous backgrounds to share feelings, concerns and knowledge. A non-graded model school encompassing grades 10 to 12 was envisioned.

With teachers of English, history, drama, art, music, science and physical education, curriculum was to be interdisciplinary to maximize student-teacher cooperation and to allow for student input into the decision-making process.

Because Genesis was for two years (1969-71) the only on-site alternative at BHS, it had to serve the diverse needs of all individuals seeking alternative education. As a result of ensuing complications, Genesis was instrumental in creating other options at the secondary level. The BHS student newspaper, the JACKET (February 6, 1974), reported 600 out of 1,054 Berkeley 10th graders applied for 116 openings for Genesis in January 1969.

Because of the overwhelming interest in alternative education at the secondary level and the inability of Genesis to handle all the students who applied, Community High School II was created. It opened in Spring 1971 and by Fall 1971 had changed its name to Agora.

\*In this report, the name Genesis will be used, even in referring to the period when the school was called Community High School.

The stigma of a "white hippie school" haunted Genesis from its first semester, when 70 percent of students randomly selected were white. With the emphasis on student involvement in decision-making and considering its overwhelmingly white student body, Genesis very quickly geared itself to the alienation they experienced at the larger BHS. The problem Genesis did not foresee was that alienation experienced by white students was necessarily different from the alienation experienced by Black, Asian, Chicano, Native American and other non-white students.

Discontent emerged as a result of the school's neglect of the needs of minority students, particularly Black students. The result was an off campus program, Black House, formed during the 1970/71 school year by a Black Studies consultant at Genesis and the Black students at Genesis.

Genesis felt a need to tighten up its objectives and approach to education in response to the issues raised by the Black House split and the emergence of CHS II (Agora). A planning document for reorganizing and redefining the school was released in the Spring 1971 semester by a committee of students and staff members.

What began as a program of self-actualization through self-direction and little formal structure underwent a process of re-emphasis and more formalized instructional and department policies. Student power was a vital part of the Genesis philosophy; however, as emphasis on basic skills for Third World Students became a priority, student power declined.

The new objectives of the school for the 1971/72 school year were: (1) increased representation of minority teachers to at least one half the staff, and (2) recruitment of an ethnically heterogeneous student body of approximately 225 students, 45 percent white, 45 percent Black and 10 percent other ethnicities.

During the same semester, the director was replaced in a student election by a three vote margin, (61-58).

While the restructuring was taking place, Genesis also submitted its proposal for BEP funding in April 1971. The proposal combined goals from the initial Genesis plan which evolved from the Summer Project of 1967 and those from the restructured program.

Staff concerns with meeting the needs of Third World students produced a gradual drain of power from the students. This occurred primarily because the students were white and the program's new focus was non-white. The needs of white students were not being met, and they felt left out of the decision-making process.

The 1971/72 school year was marked by a power struggle of competing interests, namely: students vs. staff, Third World people vs. white people, and staff-site autonomy vs. BHS bureaucracy.

Students organized themselves to maintain a voice in the decision-making process at the site. What developed, however, was a tension between white students and Third World staff. Input from the new Third World staff and their alignment with the Third World students, led to a new multi-ethnic focus strengthening a basic skills curriculum. The whole staff stepped up the struggle for site autonomy against BHS administration.

In November 1971, the staff felt that the developing goals of Genesis focusing around institutional racism could be better met by a Third World director. The new director (the fourth), a Chicano who had been with the school since Fall 1970, was chosen by the staff. He proposed that the staff share the duties and responsibilities of the directorship. The staff then developed a new decision-making structure, the aim of which was to increase the collective power of the staff as a group.

Up to this point, Genesis structure provided for student input into the program through an Inter-Tribal Council, with representatives from four Tribes. Tribes were organized around interests such as ecology or arts and crafts, and students and teachers would select the tribe of their choice, interests, or field of expertise. But, in the latter part of the Fall 1971 semester, the Inter-Tribal council was eliminated. Student response to the new structuring was negative. A group of white students initiated a student newspaper, The Rag, which criticized and debated the action of the faculty. In the first edition, the editorial discussed the restructuring of the school:

It is very important that we develop a trust in the staff but the trust has to be two-way; the staff has to trust us to be responsible enough to help in the planning of our school ...We the students, the majority of the school, shouldn't be left out of forming "our" school ...We do trust the staff and we Know they are not trying to fuck us over. But they, as teachers, represent different interests and have different ideas than we do. The staff has no right to exclude us and our views from these meetings that are forming our school. (Emphasis in original.)

In response to student requests, the director proposed to set up a school Governing Council. Student representatives would comprise two whites, two Blacks, two Asians, one Chicano and one other person of mixed racial background.

At the end of the Spring 1972 semester, Third World students suggested Community High School I be renamed Genesis to symbolize the birth of the new multi-cultural philosophy and the new emphasis of the school. In the beginning of the summer of 1972, a Black woman was selected as the new director (the fifth) by a committee of staff, students and parents.

In the Fall 1972 semester, a Genesis Constitution was established with three goals: (1) to deliver basic skills to all students who lacked them, (2) to encourage the development of individuality and independence on the part of all students, and (3) to provide a positive learning environment for all students by recognizing and meeting the different needs of Black, Chicano, Asian and white students.

The Constitution also provided for a Governing Board to consist of all certificated teachers at the site (and, at their discretion, consultants), and students and parent-elected representatives. The Board's responsibility was general decision-making, setting the budget, and reviewing the position of the director.

A mandatory cross-cultural course was developed in which students and staff would explicitly confront their own and others' ethnic group identities. In addition, a Black Awareness course was developed and made mandatory for all Genesis Black students.

Modular scheduling was utilized to facilitate the variety of courses offered. Literature and Psychology, Black Drama, Juggling and Chess (student taught classes dealing with the practical application of mathematical principles), S.A.T. preparation, Urban Survival Skills, Women's Studies, and Independent Study in math, English, history and the sciences were some of the more innovative courses offered to Genesis students during the 1972/73 school year. By 1973/74, all course offerings emphasized basic skills. More traditional courses emerged with 11 math related classes. Additional courses included Cross-Cultural English and History, Sexism, Women's Literature and History, and Black History 1619 to 1877.

Staff turnover was very high, and between Spring 1971 and Spring 1974, Genesis had five directors. Three probable causes for the turnover rate are: (1) the use of student teachers, work study students and volunteers, to reduce class size (in fact,

averaging a 10:1 student-teacher ratio,) and provide program variety; (2) the conflicts between the common school and Genesis regarding the autonomy of an on-site school versus the rules and regulations of district bureaucracy, and (3) program restructuring.

Following is a table of the Genesis staff by ethnicity for the period 1971/72 through 1973/74.

TABLE 1: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1971/72 - 1973/74

	White	Black	Asian	Chicano	Total
	<u>n %</u>	<u>n %</u>	<u>n %</u>	<u>n %</u>	<u>n</u>
1971/72	7 44	5 31	3 19	1 6	16*
1972/73	2 25	4 50	2 25		8**
1973/74	3 38	4 50	1 12		8***

\*Certificated Staff: 3 whites, 3 Blacks, 1 Chicano, 1 Asian

\*\*Certificated staff: 1 white, 2 Blacks, 1 Asian

\*\*\*Includes 4 certificated teachers, including the director

During the period, Spring 1969 to Fall 1971, out of a total of 36 staff members, 19 were Third World. Of the 36 members, eight were certificated, six were consultants, 12 were student teachers, six were work study students and four were volunteers. Ethnicity is not available for all these people. By the Fall 1972 semester, no founding staff members were still with the project. The decrease in white staff members between 1971/72 and 1972/73 can be attributed to the restructuring of the school, with its new focus on Third World student needs.

Students were recruited into the program through formal presentations at West Campus and informally through student word of mouth. The following table represents student enrollment (over the five years of Genesis operation). The change in ethnic composition of the student body is an indicator of internal strife at the school.

**TABLE 2: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
SPRING 1969 - 1973/74**

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Sp. '69	81	70											116*
1969/70													225**
1970/71	148	50	119	40	18	6	13	4					298
1971/72	109	63	40	23	14	8	5	3	4	2	2	1	174
1972/73	106	71	32	21	6	4	2	1	3	2	1	1	150
1973/74	60	67	23	26	5	6	2	2					90

\*10th graders only, non-white student figures not available.

\*\*Director claimed same ethnic proportions as BHS.

The above table discloses two glaring facts: (1) a declining number of student enrolled at Genesis, and (2) a sizable white majority of students. The causes can be described historically. In Berkeley, "alternative education" appealed primarily to the white middle and upper class students. For Black, Asian and Chicano parents, "alternative education" connoted an unstructured, undisciplined atmosphere in which learning the basic skills by their children could not be accommodated. Patently, many ethnic minority parents were dissatisfied with the sort of education their children received in the common schools. Implicitly, therefore, they desired an alternative to the educational status quo, and quite often they asserted this desire explicitly. But there are alternatives and alternatives. The term "alternative education," as used here, is burdened with its historically determined meaning in Berkeley circa 1970, reflecting the discontents and aspirations of certain strata of the white population.

Because of ethnic minority distrust of "alternative education," application for enrollment in the experimental schools, particularly at the secondary level, was dominated by white students. The figures for the 1970/71 school year reveal, however, a high enrollment (about 50 percent) of Third World students at Genesis. As the first alternative school attempting to deal with the alienation felt by many students--white, Black, Asian, Chicano and others--Genesis was seen as no worse and potentially better than the large impersonal common school. Increased options in Fall 1971 with OE funding of BESP may be one of the primary causes for the large drop in enrollment at Genesis, from 298 students in 1970/71 to 174 in 1971/72.

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As mentioned earlier, Black House began operation in the Fall 1970 semester with Black students from Genesis who felt that school was not meeting their needs. Decline in Black student enrollment between 1970/71 and 1971/72 reflects the appeal of Black House and College Prep to Black students.

Even with the new organizational structure and new focus on meeting the needs of Third World Students, white student enrollment increased, both relatively and absolutely, in the 1972/73 school year over the previous year, whereas there was a relative and absolute decline in ethnic minority enrollment. Interesting to note, too, is that when Genesis finally emerged in 1973/74 as a basic skills, multi-cultural curriculum program overall student enrollment had been drastically reduced. The reduction was 70 percent from the 1970/71 peak. In the BHS student newspaper, the Jacket (February 6, 1974), it was reported "that for the first time in several years, Genesis has made no attempt to recruit new students which explains why only 22 tenth graders entered this fall (1973)."

In December 1973, the director was notified that beginning the 1974/75 school year, the budget would be cut in half. All classified staff was lost. This is when Genesis and Agora began to discuss merging.

#### Articulation

One of the major obstacles faced by Genesis was that as a new model for education, district-initiated, district-sponsored, and operating prior to any BESE administration, it had to function within the confines of district regulations, particularly within those already established rules and procedures of the common school.

Rufus Browning (July 1972) examined the internal organizational structure of Genesis and its relationship with the common school. He stated: "BHS is concerned with CHS should it lose its ability to offer the student, especially the bright student who does not need special work in basic skills, greater opportunity for independent study and flexible curriculum than the common school provides." For the common school, Genesis was a dumping ground for students who did not conform and/or abide by the BHS structure and policies.

Conflicts were compounded between the two schools as Genesis turned more to a basic skills curriculum through a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic approach. Restructured, Genesis was viewed as effectively counteracting BHS's original intentions in supporting the concept of alternative schools on-site. BHS needed a school or program for students bored but adept in the basics who were biding their time until graduation. BHS did not know what to do with these students, but felt that an on-site alternative school would potentially keep them busy and out of trouble.

With the onset of the entire BESP project, there was no plan for 9th grade students' matriculation into the Genesis program. Genesis recruited at West Campus but the efforts were not geared toward any particular academic, curricular, or special interest groups. The thrust of Genesis recruitment for the 1971/72 school year was aimed at Third World Students due to the Spring 1971 restructuring.

The Genesis staff was hounded for acceptable accountability measures, attendance records, letter grades (rather than pass/not pass grading), measurable products for any independent study taken on by students. In the Second 30 Months Plan, Genesis attempted to devise strategies to deal with the constraints imposed by BHS. These strategies resulted from negotiations between the Genesis staff and the BHS administration during the Spring 1972 semester. The Genesis staff was angry and bitter during these negotiating sessions. The staff's position paper stated:

...The main thing that we have discovered through all of this is that BHS administrators may be very good at managing budgets to suit themselves, at building schedules, at quoting the law, at indoctrinating parents, at manipulating students and teachers through their bureaucracy; but they care little for and know even less about learning and education. In three and a half years the BHS administration has often hindered and blocked us; they have never once attempted to constructively help us accomplish any goals established by students, staff or parents of Community High.

The Genesis staff strongly believed that if the school was to be a viable alternative, it had to have autonomy and the power to make its own decisions.

The end results of the negotiations were: the Genesis staff would turn in attendance reports with the understanding that the information would be used only for ADA (average daily attendance) purposes, and that the Genesis staff would do "hall" duty in the common school complex.

### Funding

During the 1970/71 school year, Community High School and Black House survived on a joint budget of \$50,000 from the Ford Foundation, with BUSD financing credentialed teachers. The Ford grant paid for a secretary and consultants who were hired to make the staff more representative of the racial composition of the school, which in that year was 50 percent non-white.

During the BSP period, 1971 through 1974, Genesis was allocated a total of \$110,214 in BSP funds, or 3.5 percent of the total BSP five year budget for sites. The greatest portion of this money went for salaries, particularly classified monthly salaries, fringe benefits and service contracts with consultants. Over the three school years that amount totaled \$76,170, or 69 percent of the Genesis budget. The next greatest outlay of funds was for instructional and office materials and books, amounting to \$26,570, 24 percent of the Genesis budget. The bulk of this money went toward the HILC which was implemented in Fall 1972.

The effects of institutional racism became more apparent when funding problems surfaced as the BSP funds were cut back in the alternative schools. The commitment to staffing alternative schools with Third World teachers and consultants created problems. The district overage of teachers was predominantly white. Thus, Genesis relied heavily on service contracts in order to bring in Third World staff. To provide role models for students, and to make it possible for multi-cultural, multi-ethnic programs to function at all, the staff had to reflect multi-cultural and multi-ethnic backgrounds.

Because the greatest portion of BSP funds went to salaries and consultants' fees, many of the alternative schools were doomed to be phased out as BSP funding dwindled and finally ended after five years.

Small class size and tutorials necessitated more staff than was used in the common schools, further depleting the BSP allocations. Because so much of the BSP funds was used to staff the schools, purchase of educational materials, outside of HILC lab

materials, that were non-racist, non-sexist and non-alienating was neglected.

At Genesis, the budget was cut from \$47,568 in 1972/73 to \$23,522 in 1973/74. Between May 1973 and the Fall 1973 semester student enrollment declined by 40 percent, from 150 to 90 students. In the Fall 1971 semester, the first semester of BESP funding, Genesis enrollment dropped to 174 from 298 students the previous Fall. This occurred during a budget increase (from sharing a budget with Black House during the 1970/71 school year to having its own budget of \$39,124 in 1971/72). Thus, it would seem that budget cuts do not explain the year-to-year drop in student enrollment.

Evaluation

Students were evaluated at Genesis with the traditional grading system of A to F after a short period of pass/not pass grading. The A to F grading system was required by BUSD and by colleges and universities. Field observations found that teachers in 1973/74 had a low regard for the usefulness of standardized tests; nonetheless, the staff did use standardized tests to determine which classes the students should take and where they would need the most help. The results of the CTBS testing of ISA's sample 10th grade students in 1973/74 were as follows:

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, GENESIS GRADE 10

<u>Scoring at:</u>	<u>Fall 1973</u>		<u>Spring 1974</u>	
	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Math</u>	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Math</u>
4th grade or below	17%	15%	8%	0%
5th - 7th grade	25%	23%	17%	33%
8th - 10th grade	8%	23%	25%	22%
11th - 12th grade	50%	39%	50%	45%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
n	12	13	12	9

The small sample of available test scores is a reflection of BUSD policy which did not require students to take the CTBS test once they scored at the 13th grade level. The percentage of ISA sample 10th graders at Genesis who "topped out" in 1973/74 in the CTBS Reading tests was 40 percent, in the math tests, 23 percent. For the whole site, 50 percent topped out in the CTBS reading and math tests combined in Fall 1973.

Level I evaluators completed two measures by Summer 1974 and reported the following results.

Survey of Educational Priorities: A majority of the 67 students surveyed attached high priorities to knowledge of own race, social skills, knowledge of other races, creativity and expression, personal development and college preparation; low priorities were given basic skills and training in citizenship.

Effective Alternativeness Scale: On this 0.0-0.1 scale, Genesis was rated .73 for "alternativeness," .41 for "effectiveness," and .29 on the combined "effective alternative" scale.

The Genesis director evaluated evaluation as follows:

The internal evaluation component (Level I) could have been more effective by helping sites to structure surveys, interviews, and collect data which they could use to evaluate their programs. Much information has been collected by Level II, little of which can be utilized by directors. Level I evaluation should have worked with ESP training in order to help sites develop better evaluative tools. It is hoped that during the final phase of the program we will have help from the evaluation component.

AGORA (aka Community High School II)

ABSTRACT

Agora (then called Community High School II) was constituted as an on-site alternative at Berkeley High School in the Spring 1971 semester, before BESP funding, out of the waiting list of applicants for Community High School I (later Genesis).

Its initial enrollment--110 white students and 12 Black--reflected the ethnic composition of the CHS I overflow. However, from the outset the Agora staff was bent on avoiding the "white hippie" label of CHS I, and on creating the staff, style, curriculum, and sense of community that would make for positive inter-ethnic relationships in a multi-ethnic population. In the first year of BESP funding (1971/72) Agora's student body of 168 was made up of four components--white, Black, Chicano and Asian--each numbering 42. This precisely equal numerical division did not last, but the multi-ethnic mix did, and in 1973/74, Agora's final year, the student population was 39 percent Black, 29 percent white, 26 percent Chicano, 6 percent Asian.

Agora was distinguished for its sensitivity to Chicano needs. It was also guided by a perception that the "Third World" is not really one world but several worlds, which are diverse and at times antagonistic. This perception produced a summer course on Blacks and Chicanos in Contemporary Society to develop a better understanding between the two groups. Along with its heavy emphasis on multi-cultural courses Agora also focused on basic skills.

Despite Agora's strengths, its enrollment declined during the BESP years, from 168 in 1971/72 to 100 in 1973/74, which was not as precipitous as the Genesis decline. As an on-site alternative it faced the contradiction between its desire for autonomy and the demands of its common school host. It was also affected by the prevalent suspicion among ethnic minorities of "alternative education" as it evolved Berkeley.

Budget cutbacks in 1973/74 rendered its continued existence precarious. The Agora administration, therefore, entered into merger discussions with the Genesis administration. The two schools merged in Fall 1974 in the hope that they could survive together rather than perish separately.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

Agora (then called Community High School II) was initially an outgrowth of another alternative sub-school, CHS I (later Genesis). Due to tremendous interest in learning environments that provided an alternative to the larger, impersonal urban high school, CHS II began with students on the waiting list for CHS I.

During the summer of 1970, an originator of Genesis met with students and parents. Focusing on a small, intimate learning environment, this planning committee designed a school for 125 students. Conflict was imminent with the BHS principal, however. A Guideline Committee, appointed by the BHS principal, for sub-schools within the common high school had established a minimum of 200 students for which a sub-school was to be structured. The BHS principal would not support the CHS II planning committee. Superintendent Foster, however, encouraged the CHS II committee to present its plan to the School Board. The School Board, convinced that CHS II would attempt to increase enrollment once it opened, approved the plan. CHS II began operations in the Spring 1971 semester. Soon after opening, CHS II changed its name to Agora, invoking the ancient Greek word for a place of popular assembly to convey the image of a school that was open to the free exchange of ideas.

Agora was part of the Berkeley BESP proposal approved by the Office of Education in June 1971. Its objectives were: (1) to build a sense of community among the diverse students, teachers and parents involved in Agora, and (2) to deliver basic skills to all students.

The "sense of community" was to be achieved by creating conditions whereby institutional racism and student and parent apathy in decision-making could be confronted.

With respect to basic skills the aims were: (a) as determined by district testing, to ensure a minimum of one year's growth in reading, writing, and computation for one year's instruction, (b) to ensure intensive experience in the communications skills of listening and speaking, and (c) to provide intensive remedial assistance to all Agora students reading, writing, communicating or computing below grade level.

Incorporated in the plan was a description of student population and curriculum. For Fall 1971, the plan proposed that the student population would reflect certain racial proportions, namely, 40 percent Black, 50 percent white and 10 percent Chicano, Asian and other ethnic groups. The curriculum was to be student-staff

developed, with a flexible organizational structure to allow for new, fresh courses each semester. General course offerings were suggested, though not limited to the following: English, history, art, math, drama, science, dance and physical education.

Crucial to the goals of the Agora plan was commitment by the students, staff and parents to work and struggle together.

The Agora community began in earnest to develop an organizational structure as soon as the School Board approved its plan (prior to BESP funding). Agora's account of its history states:

Student-made questionnaires were distributed to determine reasons for disenchantment with the traditional high school. Democratic decision-making processes were established, and students worked with staff to determine curriculum.

The major concern of both the staff and students was that the student body was almost all white (110 out of 122 students in Spring 1971).

A Black teacher who taught an Agora class in Minority History Survey approached a University of California Chicano Studies teacher to teach a class on Chicano history. He then recruited a Black Studies teacher, in BHS at the time, to join in the effort to recruit Chicano and Black students. The plan was to develop Agora into a minority student center for the district.

The originator, also from Genesis, who was the first director of both sites, lasted for one semester at Agora. During the summer of 1971, the appointed director for the following year was forced to resign because he opposed the influx of minority students in the virtually all white program, according to his successor, the Black Studies teacher from BHS.

By the Fall 1971 semester, the Black Studies teacher was director and the Chicano Studies teacher was her assistant responsible for ethnic studies. The Agora structure developed rapidly under their leadership. Agora was to be an alternative school where all ethnic groups were represented equally and a school where "staff and students would be dealing with racism on an absolute, overt daily level" (director's interview, May 1972).

The Agora perspective on education considered "cultural imperialism" to be the fundamental cause for discrimination and the systematic exclusion of "minority" peoples from the mainstream of

the American society.\* The Agora perspective on education proposed a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic environment to create conditions wherein students and staff who had been historically excluded from active responsibility in their education could participate. Through active and equal participation in the educational process, Agora felt that students, staff and families would be stimulated to actualize their potential in acquiring skills necessary to survive and possibly to participate in social movements trying to change the social structure dominated by a white culture.

The first students at Agora were overflow students from CHS (Genesis). Below is a table describing student enrollment for Agora between Spring 1971 and Spring 1974 by ethnicity.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
SPRING 1971 - 1973/74

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Sp. '71	110	90	12	10									122
1971/72	42	25	42	25	42	25	42	25					168
1972/73	30	31	42	44			24	25					96
1973/74	29	29	39	39	6	6	26	26					100*

\*In September 1973, enrollment at Agora totaled 74 students. At the end of Spring 1973 semester, Black House and Casa were closed by order of Office for Civil Rights. The effect on Agora was an increase in the number of Chicano and Black students enrolled during the 1973/74 school year. In September 1973, white students=21 (28%), Black students=25 (34%), Chicano students=23 (31%) and Asian students=5 (7%).

The distinctive feature of Agora's student population was its ethnic composition each year. With a nearly all white population at the opening of the alternative in Spring 1971, the 1971/72 school year reflected a successful recruitment program by concerned teachers. The desired ethnic composition of the school was unique for the district, especially for an alternative school. It was not proportional representation but equal distribution. Agora hoped to achieve by the end of the Fall 1971 semester a student enrollment of 25 percent white, 25 percent Black, 25 percent Chicano, and 25 percent Asian. As the table shows, it succeeded.

\*"Cultural imperialism": the domination of one culture over other cultures, where the dominant cultural values are the norm and the guiding values of the society.

While Genesis was having problems in appealing to Third World students, Agora was implementing practical methods of bringing students from different ethnic backgrounds together. It recognized traditional frictions between Blacks and Chicanos and developed a "Blacks and Chicanos in Contemporary Society" summer program in 1971. The Black and Chicano students who participated were, at the request of the director and co-director, the most difficult problem students with regard to behavior, attendance and/or probations in the district.

The success of the summer program brought these students into the school. The Asian component of the student body was shortlived. An Asian Studies teacher in the common school was approached by the directors. She and her 40 students agreed to join the Agora community in Fall 1971. With the prospects of developing a separate Asian Studies alternative in the district, the "Asian Component" of Agora left. The disassociation of the Asian students and teacher from Agora was not a reflection on the inability of the Agora goals and structure to appeal to Asian students; it resulted from the perceived need of the Asian students and staff to develop a sense of worth, importance and strength in themselves and their cultures. The Asian students and staff felt this would be better actualized in a separatist environment.

The learning process at Agora was holistic. Consensus of students and staff in decision-making, intercultural exchange, intracultural classes, political history classes and an arts and cultural program were integrated into the Agora curriculum. Courses changed from semester to semester in response to needs and understanding of the students.

A mandatory multi-cultural experience class was held daily. It was offered in four sections, and all students took all four units, rotating monthly. The focus was on Black, Asian, white and Chicano history. Classes dealing with the oppression women have experienced also became part of Agora's curriculum offerings. The BUSD progress report for March-June 1972 remarks that "the school gained a strong reputation in its first year as being a learning place with vitality, openness to and acceptance of youths where an earnest effort was being made to match the curriculum to the interest of the students." The curriculum in general was developed to meet two needs: those determined by the larger educational and social system and those of the students, staff and families of the Agora community.

Like Genesis and many other on-site schools, Agora had its share of conflict with the BHS administrative bureaucracy. Some of the Agora staff felt the "on-site experience with BHS

administrative rules" affected staff turnover. Between Spring 1971 and Spring 1972, there was a 60 percent staff turnover\*; 50 percent between 1971/72 and 1972/73, and 74 percent between 1972/73 and 1973/74. The turnover between 1972/73 and 1973/74 was also due in part to the district policy of freezing the hiring of classified staff. Below is a table describing the staff's ethnic composition from Spring 1971, when Agora opened, through Spring 1974, the last semester prior to the merger with Genesis.

TABLE 2: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, SPRING 1971 - 1973/74

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Total
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
Spring '71	7	64	1	9	1	9	2	18	11
1971/72	3	37	4	50	1	13			8
1972/73**	2	33	2	33			2	33	6
1973/74	2	22	4	44			3	33	9

\*\*Certificated Only. In 1972/73, there were 15 consultants and three work study students in addition to the certificated personnel.

Characteristics and skills necessary for teaching at Agora were codified. They included: (1) flexibility to perceive and respond to changing student needs, (2) ability to work effectively and affectively with students from all racial and ethnic backgrounds, (3) strong self-image based upon one's own racial and ethnic background, and (4) belief in the concept that growth is a life time process.

In coping with institutional racism, Agora staff and students found racism to be intricately imbedded within every part of daily life. "We've had some touchy situations," the 1971/72 director stated in an interview (May 1972).

For example, the bilingual Spanish class was all Chicano the first semester. The second semester about eight or ten white students enrolled and right away there was difficulty because the Chicanos, having been made ashamed of speaking Spanish all of these years, were now taking pride in learning to speak their

\*There were so many classified staff, consultants, professional experts, at Agora, it is impossible to account for them all. These turnover percentages are a close approximation. The staff ethnicity table numbers are of part time personnel composite relative to full time positions.

language except for the fact that many of the whites (in the class) were in Spanish 2,3,4,5, or 6, so that Chicano students, in struggling to learn their language, were being corrected by white students..Chicanos stopped coming to class, the whites stopped coming to class and what we ended up doing was separating the classes...Fortunately we already had a white Spanish teacher and a Chicano Spanish teacher ...Out of it also came a series of group meetings, with the groups individually and with the groups together so that the white students came to understand why this was happening to them and the Chicano students were able to verbalize why they felt the way they did.

A drop in the number of Chicano students in 1972/73 coincided with the decrease in the Casa de la Raza student enrollment, reflecting a general decrease of Chicano student involvement in alternative education. Casa began operation in the 1971/72 school year, and after one year, lost 40 students "because of the 'free school' atmosphere and the protracted division within the staff over the school's program and direction" (Chicano Alternative Education, by Southwest Network of the Study Commission on Undergraduate Education and the Education of Teachers, 1974).

In December 1974, BESP described Agora as

the only setting at the 10th to 12th grade level where cultural and individual needs (of Chicano students) are recognized and receive planned attention through the curriculum and related activities.

While Chicano students maintained a 25 percent representation in the Agora student body, the actual number of students peaked at 42 in 1971/72, and levelled out to about 24 students from 1972 through 1974. Still, even at the lower figure Agora accounted for more than half of all Chicanos enrolled in BESP programs on the Berkeley High campus (e.g., 23 out of 41 in September 1973).

Students, parents and staff were expected to learn tolerance and understanding of cultures and races other than their own.

Chicano Studies, Black Experience, White Studies, Black Drama provided a unique focus on each ethnic group. Other courses included in the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic program were: Multi-Cultural World History of Ideas, Multi-Cultural U.S. History, Pocho

Spanish, Bilingual Spanish and English, Swahili, History of Black Music, Multi-Cultural Women's Class, Crime in the Streets, International Cooking, Harlem Renaissance, Multi-Cultural Drama. Evident in these course titles is the Agora commitment to deal with institutional racism through exposure to a variety of cultures.

Agora also offered traditional basic skills courses such as: Geometry, Algebra, Creative Writing, and Language Lab. Classes were open to all students. The multi-cultural classes included the different cultures while focusing on cross-cultural course content. The White Studies course dealt with the causes of racism, how racism affects white people, how white people practice racism and what white people can do in their personal and public lives about the elimination of racism. The impetus for this class was the problems many white students were facing in dealing with guilt when they became conscious of the whole issue of racism.

In 1972/73, Agora implemented the Random House HILC package. In the Spring 1974 semester, Agora, Genesis and College Prep combined their HILC materials and formed one lab, available also to BHS common school students.

During 1973, parent participation was dropped from the school objectives at the request of the students, a reflection not on the school or staff but rather a sign of teenagers attempting to be independent.

The director and ethnic studies consultant/assistant director resigned after completion of the 1971/72 school year. Two new co-directors were chosen by the staff and students. One was from the Agora teaching staff and the other from the Black House teaching staff.

Even with budget cutbacks, Agora created in 1973/74 a community liaison position to promote better relations between Agora and the Berkeley community. Pot luck dinners in parents' homes, open houses, classes held off campus from time to time, and circulation of mail announcing activities relevant to the community were practices Agora utilized to keep the school in touch with and accessible to the community. For example, students were given time off from school to work with the United Farmworkers, a union with wide support in Berkeley, but especially so in the Chicano community.

Further cutbacks announced in the Fall 1973 semester necessitated the eventual merger of Genesis and Agora for 1974/75. The Agora director stated that "the merger is being effected in order to create a structure and program for the school which will allow continuance after federal funding ceases."

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### Articulation

There was no formal plan for students leaving the 9th grade Odyssey or West Campus alternative programs to matriculate into Agora. Informally, multi-cultural courses at Odyssey could have been followed through with participation in the Agora curriculum.

Agora, recognized in the district as the only secondary school with special concern for Chicano students, had no formal plan for Chicano students leaving the 9th grade.

The similarities between Agora and Genesis--their origins, multi-cultural curriculum and use of classified staff--provided each site an opportunity to survive beyond 1973/74 through merging. Although the organizational structure and student ethnic composition were vastly different, both sites began to plan for the merger during the 1973/74 school year due to severe cuts in each of their budgets.

The merger of the two schools, the effects on articulation, and survival strategies will be discussed in the Agora/Genesis site description. Suffice it to say that except for the merger with Genesis, Agora was not articulated with any other BESP school program.

### Funding

During the first semester of operation, Agora and CHS I (Genesis) shared a grant of \$12,000 from the Ford Foundation. The funds were used for planning purposes and salaries for one secretary and one Chicano Studies consultant. With BESP funds, Agora was budgeted at \$200 per student with BUSD supported teaching positions. BHS allocated ADA funds on the basis of three-fifths of the students enrolled.

During the school years 1971 through 1974, Agora received \$77,989 in BESP funds. This was 4 percent of the total BESP budget for sites from 1971 through 1976. Most of this money (87%) was spent on salaries, service contracts, fringe benefits. This amount totaled \$68,102 over the three years. Eight percent or \$5,980 was spent on supplies and/or instructional materials between 1971 and 1974, most of which went into the HILC laboratory implemented in 1972/73.

Like many of the other BESP schools, Agora relied heavily on BESP funds to bring Third World teachers, classified and certificated, into the district. These staff members were hired on a temporary basis. When BUSD put hiring restrictions for anyone

outside the district in Spring 1973, even with BESP funds, many sites experienced high staff turnover.

In Spring 1973, Agora was notified of funding cutbacks of 37 percent (from \$27,560 in 1972/73 to \$17,302 in 1973/74). To meet the new budget, Agora reduced curriculum offerings as well as personnel. Despite budget cuts, and though enrollment in Fall 1973 was initially down from Spring 1973, Agora showed an overall increase in student population in the 1973/74 school year.

Evaluation

Student evaluation was done at Agora through classroom testing and CTBS scores. The results of the CTBS testing of ISA's sample Agora 10th grade students in 1973/74 were as follows:

TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, AGORA GRADE 10

<u>Scoring at:</u>	Fall 1973		Spring 1974	
	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Math</u>	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Math</u>
4th grade or below	15%	8%	0%	14%
5th - 7th grade	39%	50%	50%	72%
8th - 10th grade	31%	33%	25%	0%
11th -12th grade	15%	8%	25%	14%
Total	100%	99%	100%	100%
n	13	12	8	7

Scores for all 26 ISA sample 10th graders at the school were unavailable. BUSD policy did not require students to take the CTBS once they scored at the 13th grade level. This contributed to the low availability of scores. The percentage of 10th grade Agora ISA sample students who "topped-out" in the CTBS Reading test in 1973/74 was 15 percent, in the CTBS Math test it was 8 percent.

In the Spring 1974 semester, the Agora director reported:

We have had very little contact with Level I evaluation. Although we have generated a number of questionnaires designed to measure student-teacher and student-student interaction, it has never been clear whether it was Level I's role to help us with analyzing the data. The promised analysis of CTBS scores to help us identify areas of student deficiency has never come through.

In the Agora generated questionnaires regarding teacher-student interaction, results showed that students had a closer

relationship with Agora teachers than with BHS teachers. Students discussed "race" with Agora teachers much more than with BHS teachers, and more often with teachers of their own race. However, students also discussed race with teachers of other races more at Agora than in BHS.

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale, Agora's ratings were: between .9 and 1.0 for "alternativeness"; .65 for "effectiveness"; and .6 on the combined "effective alternative" scale. Its combined score was the highest among the BESP high school programs.

AGORA/GENESIS

ABSTRACT

In January 1969, when Community High School (later Genesis), the first alternative school on the Berkeley High campus, opened its doors 600 of Berkeley's 1,054 10th graders applied for admission.\*

In Fall 1974, after Genesis merged with Agora (founded in the Spring 1971 semester as Community High School II, partly to accommodate the Genesis overflow), the product of this merger, Agora/Genesis, had an enrollment of 167 in grades 10-12. By March 1976 the Agora/Genesis enrollment had dwindled to 79. The contrast between 600 applicants in 1969 and 79 enrollees in 1976 suggests a conclusion:

The promise of alternativeness seemed to have been more attractive in the heady socio-political ambience of the late 1960's than its reality, after five years of existence, in the different climate of the mid-1970's.

In the operational plan for its final phase, BESP explained, "The Agora/Genesis merger is being effected in order to create a structure and program for the school which will allow continuance after federal funding ceases."

Thus, post-BESP survival was the rationale for the merger. However, the merger also signified the non-survival of the two schools as distinct entities. In a way, the merger was a form of life after death. Agora/Genesis did survive for the two years of federal funding after the fusion. When federal funding ceased, so did Agora/Genesis. The merger failed in its stated purpose.

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\*The Jacket (Feb. 6, 1974), Berkeley High School's student newspaper.

EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

At the end of the 1973/74 school year, the existence of both Agora and Genesis was threatened by district wide budget cuts, specifically because of BUSD policy discontinuing many new non-certificated teaching positions. Both Agora and Genesis relied on classified staff to teach the multi-cultural classes, act as role models, provide students with a wide choice of electives and personalized instruction. With these aspects jeopardized, Agora and Genesis mutually agreed to merge. The merger was to take effect in the Fall 1974 semester.

Genesis' survival was also threatened because of a massive drop in student enrollment, from 140 in 1972/73 to 90 in 1973/74. Agora's enrollment, on the other hand, had stabilized at about 100 students in 1972/73 and 1973/74 after suffering a 44 percent decline between 1971/72 (168 students) and 1972/73 (96 students). (See separate site descriptions for an examination of causes of decline in student enrollment).

The merger affected Agora and Genesis differently. For Genesis the new school represented an advance in curriculum, staff and student ethnic composition, whereas for Agora it meant a setback in ethnic composition and loss of a sense of community among students and staff. By Spring 1976, Agora/Genesis seemed no more than a small supplemental program for BHS students.

Following is a table showing the ethnic identities of Agora/Genesis students just prior to the merger and then up to Spring 1976.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
1973/74 - FALL 1975

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
Agora													
1973/74	29	29	39	39	6	6	26	26					100
Genesis													
1973/74	60	67	23	26	5	6	2	2					90
Agora/Gen													
1973/74	89	47	62	33	11	6	28	15					190
Ag/Gen													
Fall 1974	80	48	66	40	5	3	15	9			1	1	167
Ag/Gen													
Spring 1975	59	45	52	40	4	3	14	11			2	2	131
Ag/Gen													
Fall 1975	41	44	32	34	5	5	13	14			3	3	94*

\*March 1976 Agora/Genesis enrollment totaled 79 students.

Between the first two semesters (Fall 1974 and Spring 1975) in which the two schools functioned as a unit, the overall drop in student enrollment was 22 percent, with white student enrollment experiencing the largest decline. Even with the drop, the ethnic distribution remained about the same. Between Spring 1975 and Fall 1975, enrollment dropped again by 28 percent, from 131 to 94 students. Because of the declining enrollment, there were no selection criteria--all student who applied were accepted. The declining enrollment each semester pointed to the ineffective appeal of the merged school as an option for students.

Previously at Agora there was an equal representation of all ethnicities. Both Agora and Genesis limited white student enrollment to provide an opening for other ethnic groups, though the "ceilings" were different for each site. The selection criteria at Agora were enforced for only one year, presumably because it appeared that a satisfactory ethnic balance could be achieved "naturally."

For Genesis, however, an overrepresentation of white students was considered to be a chronic problem. With the merger, there were proportionately fewer white students than previously at Genesis.

With the merger, Black student enrollment remained about the same in the first semester; however, by Spring 1975, Black student enrollment dropped by 21 percent and again by 38 percent by Fall 1975. Chicano student enrollment, never more than 5 percent of the Genesis student enrollment prior to the merger, decreased by 46 percent (from 28 students to 15 students between 1973/74 and 1974/75). Twenty-six out of the 28 Chicano students were from Agora.

Agora's reputation as the only secondary school in the district where Chicano students' cultural and individual needs were recognized was damaged. The curriculum remained about the same as before for a year after the merger, but the atmosphere and spirit of the school did not. In Agora, 26 Chicanos in a student population of 100 achieved near parity with the other major ethnic groups; in the larger merged school they were a numerically insignificant minority (only 9 percent of the total in the first semester).

A major limitation on maintaining the Agora community and/or creating a new Agora/Genesis community was created by the actual physical setup of the merged alternative as well as the BHS scheduling. Before the merger, the sites were in two different wings of the BHS complex and that setup continued through Fall 1974. Meetings during the day became virtually impossible. In the BESP Progress Report for October 1 - December 31, 1974, it was said that school

meetings were not being held because they would disrupt the students' participation in BHS classes. Teachers also had difficulty with meeting times because many had split assignments with BHS and other BESP schools. Students expressed concern that things were not happening to pull the school together. A student committee was set up to deal with the problem. There was, however, a general apathy among the students. Agora/Genesis was no longer considered an autonomous entity. Agora/Genesis no longer offered a comprehensive program. Students' enrollment in BHS courses for graduation requirements became necessary. Though students shared activities with BHS and other BESP schools, as well as an HILC with College Prep, these activities and resources did not lead to mutual planning.

For the first time in the two schools' histories, teachers were assigned by BHS. Classes were pushed up to maximum size in the district, with a 30.1 student-teacher ratio. The two co-directors found it impossible to carry out an ongoing evaluation and supervision of the staff and classes in the school because they also had a teaching load of four classes each. Student counseling suffered because administrators were not as available as in the past.

Below is a table of staff ethnicity at Agora/Genesis for 1973-76.

TABLE 2: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1973/74 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Agora													
1973/74	2	22	4	44			3	33					9
Genesis													
1973/74	3	38	4	50	1	12							8
Ag/Gen													
1973/74*	5	29	8	47	1	6	3	18					17
Ag/Gen													
1974/75	**3	27	4	36	1	9	2	18			**1	9	11
Ag/Gen													
1975/76	2	40	2	40			1	20					5

\*Full time equivalent positions for Agora and Genesis in 1973/74 were: 3 white, 6 Black, 1 Asian, 2 Chicano; total = 12 F.T.E.

\*\* Classified staff: 1 white, 1 "other." There were nine certificated during the 1974/75 school year.

The most noticeable feature of the staffing at Agora/Genesis is the sharp decline in staff between 1974/75 and 1975/76. The merger was intended to prevent this by increasing student population, but

it did not. Staff was still trimmed because of budget cuts and declining student population. The effect on the curriculum offerings was severe. The two co-directors also had assignments in the common school, one even had an assignment to School of the Arts.

ISA reported in 1974/75 (Volume II) that although the multi-cultural curriculum was still the main thrust of the program, the effect of the merger seemed to neutralize the previously separate programs: Agora no longer was a positive experience for its students, especially for Chicanos, according to one co-director; Genesis students benefited with more exposure to Third World students.

Basic skills courses comprised 32 percent of the 1974/75 curriculum (including physical education courses.) Multi-cultural curriculum included Chicano Workshop, Multi-Cultural Women's Studies, What is White?, Multi-Cultural History/English, Black Experience and Black Drama. By the Spring 1976 semester, courses offered were down to ten (30 courses had been offered in the Fall 1974 semester). The courses dropped from the curriculum were all the physical education classes except for self-defense and most of the innovative and multi-cultural classes developed separately over the years: Journalism, What is White?, Multi-Cultural History/English, Black Experience, advanced math classes, U.S. History I, Multi-Cultural Women's Studies, Black Drama and Mexican Folk and Afro-American Dance classes.

The only courses remaining with a trace of the multi-cultural/ethnic emphasis were: Chicano Workshop (Agora), Art Workshop (Agora), Literature and Psychology (Genesis), Crime in the Streets (Genesis), and Self-Defense I and II (Agora). Cross-cultural/multi-cultural courses, once mandatory for both Agora and Genesis students, have been incorporated into the BHS Black Studies and English Departments as electives. Other courses, such as Women's Studies and Spanish for Chicano students, have also been incorporated into the BHS curriculum. Another Agora-initiated course, What is White?, dealing with institutional and personal racism, is no longer offered in any secondary school program.

For Spring 1976, most advanced math classes were dropped, leaving only Algebra Lab and Mathematics.

#### FUNDING

The merger of the two sites allowed for their continued funding; if they had not merged, total phase-out was imminent.

Since the merger of Agora and Genesis in the Fall 1974 semester, total allocation of BESP funds has been \$39,938 (1.2 percent of the total five year BESP site funds). Between 1973/74 and 1974/75,

the funding decreased by 23 percent (from combined budgets of \$40,824 to \$31,588). Between 1974/75 and 1975/76, there was a 74 percent decrease in BESP allocations, from \$31,588 to \$8,350.

Between Fall 1974 and Spring 1976, 41 percent of the Agora/Genesis joint budget paid for salaries, fringe benefits and service contracts. Slightly more money was used, 43 percent or \$17,302, for instructional and office materials, books, etc., most of which went into the HILC lab. Travel expenses accounted for 8 percent or \$3,332 of the budget during the two years of operation as a merged school.

BESP funding allowed the two sites to function as one unit for two years. And it was in the merged state that salary-related expenses were finally second to instructional materials and books.

#### EVALUATION

As reported in ISA's 1974/75 report (Volume II), Agora/Genesis grading policies and practices were those standard at BHS, including the F-rule (failing grades) for excessive cutting of classes.

Besides the Gates-McGinitie test used in the HILC lab, the COOP English Test and CTBS were used for all students. The COOP English Test (of vocabulary, comprehension and expression) has a standardized score set at a mean of 150 with a standard deviation of 10. With only 7 or 6 students from ISA's sample having recorded test results in Fall 1974, the students' average was close to the mean or within one SD above.

TABLE 3: MEAN COOP ENGLISH TEST SCORES, ISA SAMPLE, AGORA/GENESIS

	<u>English Vocab.</u>	<u>Eng. Com. Level</u>	<u>Eng.Com. Speed</u>	<u>English Expression</u>
Fall 1974	157.143	154.143		148.167
n	7	7		6

Among ISA's sample students taking the CTBS the average scores from Fall to Spring (1974/75) improved from 1-1/2 grade equivalencies in reading to nearly 3 grade equivalencies in language. The students' test scores did not approach their actual grade level, however.

TABLE 4: MEAN CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS, ISA SAMPLE, AGORA/GENESIS

	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Language</u>	<u>Math</u>
Fall 1974	8.392	6.682	6.624
n	12	11	7
Spring 1975	9.929	9.500	
n	7	5	

Level I could have been instrumental in the decision-making process that led to the merger of Agora and Genesis. If Level I had acted (or had been permitted and encouraged to act) as a trouble shooter, the merger might not have been for naught. Continuous evaluation of the merger as a survival strategy could have potentially proved useful to all BESP schools faced with phase-out. The absence of systematic evaluation of the merger, both before and after its consummation, is not simply, or even primarily, the responsibility of Level I. After all, the ultimate power to effect the merger rested with central BESP.

Thus, a key issue is central BESP's perception and utilization of formative evaluation as an ongoing process to help ensure the most informed and thoughtful decision-making. BESP, in turn, had been subjected to many pressures and demands from the federal ESP office with respect to Level I's operation. However, it is not at all clear that federal intervention was designed to enhance the utility of Level I in confronting such concrete problems as were involved in the merger of Agora and Genesis.

## MODEL SCHOOL A

### Abstract

Model School A (MSA) began operations on the Berkeley High School campus in the Spring 1971 semester, when BESP was in the making but not yet funded.

Its name already said something about the purposes of its founders; it was to be a model of academic achievement. The administration-sponsored founders emphasized structure, disciplined academic instruction, accountability and expectations of performance. The classroom was their temple and the teacher was its prophet. MSA was the answer to the "free school" wave--and a response to the perceived needs of achievement-oriented students. As a small sub-school, MSA was designed to shelter its students from the depersonalization, the social tensions and the common denominator pressures of the large, urban high school; to create an environment in which traditional education virtues would prove their worth. It was conceived, paradoxically, as an experiment in non-experimentation.

When BESP appeared, MSA's founders modified their design in a candid bid for federal dollars. They developed basic skills courses for "low achievers" and resolved "to do something about improving the racial composition of MSA." The latter effort produced quick success, followed by swift, huge retrogression. Black enrollment peaked at 53 percent of the total in 1972/73--plummeted to 33 percent in 1973/74. In that period total enrollment declined from 400 to 289, but white enrollment increased--from 168 to 171--whereas Black enrollment nosedived from 212 to 96. By 1975/76 the enrollment of 323 was 68 percent white. The proportion of whites in the staff held steady at about 70 percent.

Academic division coincided with ethnic division; almost all white students were in advanced classes, almost all Black students were in basic skills classes for "low achievers." As the ethnic balance shifted, so did the academic, and MSA tended to revert to its original type: a school for academic high achievers who were white with a secondary track for Black students.

The most noteworthy effort to bridge the ethnic gap was a physical education program called Leisure Sports, which introduced Black students to such pastimes as archery, badminton and skiing, and reflected the hope that play would do more than study did for inter-ethnic relations. When BESP funding was scaled down the sports commonly associated with white affluence or near-affluence proved too expensive for MSA, and the program was absorbed by Berkeley High's PE department.

By and large, MSA did well in what it was intended to do before BESP; it did not do as well with its announced objectives as part of BESP. It continued to operate in the post-BESP year.

### Emergence in Local Plan

In a press release issued November 18, 1970, MSA was announced as a new sub-school of Berkeley High School. Its focus was "academic work and a more personalized structure to begin in the Spring semester, 1971, for 360 students, 10th and 11th graders, and to expand to include all three high school levels in the Fall semester 1971."

Initially, MSA was to have opened in the Fall 1970 semester, but due to undefined goals and philosophy, it did not attract the hoped-for students. Consequently, during the Fall 1970 semester, the staff developed a more structured program and recruited students for MSA. A director was named during the planning semester. He coordinated efforts with other teachers already committed to the sub-school concept to define and structure the new school. The director was Chairperson of the BHS History Department, and also served as Chairperson of the 1968 BUSD Committee on Staff Student Relations. He was appointed by Superintendent Noel Sullivan to chair this committee.

The main characteristics of the new school, according to an MSA counselor, were: interdepartmental courses, team teaching and an emphasis on the basic skills of reading, writing and thinking. An impetus for the sub-school was provided by a study of the decentralization of the larger Berkeley High School by a committee appointed by the BHS administration in 1969. This committee and MSA itself were a response of the BHS administration to the growing alienation felt by Berkeley High School students. Although the Committee to Study Decentralization of the High School was composed of students, staff and parents, the design, philosophy, and curriculum of MSA were the products solely of the teachers under the direction of the director, who were to become the MSA staff. MSA was the system's answer to alternative education, intended as a model for other programs. BUSD subsidized the school during the first semester of operation. MSA utilized the interdisciplinary curriculum approach to education but de-emphasized self-determination, a radical emphasis which other alternative schools such as Community High School I and Other Ways/Garvey Institute/UN West adopted in their designs.

In an MSA letter to the School Board in March 1971, the courses were described as structured and heterogeneous. The philosophy was integration through pluralism. This letter also claimed:

MSA will prove that within structure, learning flourishes best. MSA will prove that self-image is enhanced through a mastery of basic skills, we will prove that students can be creative and imaginative within a framework of expectations and accountability.

During the first semester of operation, MSA also submitted a proposal for ESP funding. The director stated that:

...Once enrolled into the BESP (plan)... we had to look at the objectives of BESP. One of them was developing or bringing skills to those who needed them and also, that the school had to reflect somehow racially the mother school. So, in order to get the money, which frankly we wanted, it became necessary for us to create some kind of program which would meet BESP goals and at the same time do something about improving basic skills. (Director interview, May 1975)

ESP money was not the sole incentive to change; the MSA staff was also aware of student complaints and unrest. Students complained about not understanding what was happening in the classroom, and teachers observed that absenteeism increased sharply soon after school opened in Spring 1971. In a reaction to this situation, all MSA students were given the CTBS tests. The results were that almost 40 percent of the 324 students enrolled (about 125 students) at MSA were reading below 8th grade level. MSA staff then began developing courses geared specifically "to aid low achievers reach a level of competency in reading." The effects of the basic skills component of the MSA program were far-reaching and will be discussed later in this report. For now, we can say the MSA program led to dual tracking: low achievers and high achievers were in separate programs. The programs were further differentiated by the racial composition of the students, where low achievers were overwhelmingly Black and high achievers were white.

In the BESP proposal submitted to the Office of Education in Spring 1971 MSA defined itself as a "structured skill-oriented sub-school at BHS." Courses were to be interdepartmentally offered with emphasis on the humanities and personalized instruction. They were designed to "enhance the basic skills of students, eliminate racism, and promote the joy of learning and focus on the pluralistic aspect of society."

These stated aims were not incorporated wholistically into the MSA curriculum. There was some overlap of personalized instruction and cultural pluralism and basic skills, but generally, basic skills and personalized instruction were grouped together, and cultural pluralism and the elimination of racism through interdepartmental course offerings were grouped together. For example, a vehicle for dealing with racism was the Study of Man course developed by MSA staff. It was a core course required of all MSA students in 10th grade. History and literature from Asia, Africa and Europe were the studied topics, and students received both history and English credit for the course. Eleventh graders were required to take the American Culture class in which the history and literature of the many nationalities and cultures in American society were studied. This course also offered English and history credit.

These two innovative courses continued to be required of MSA 10th and 11th graders, but they were geared for the advanced academic students. Basic skills students received personalized instruction in the labs (reading, math, and language/arts and history) and materials available to them included multi-ethnic and multi-cultural literature. The basic skills students, however, were separate and distinct.

Recognizing the de facto segregation that persisted in the two programs--basic skills and advanced academic--MSA developed a unique co-educational physical education course offering, entitled Leisure Sports, to bridge the gap. Through Leisure Sports, the MSA staff hoped to bring together Black and white students as well as expose Black students to games and physical exercises traditionally practiced by white middle and upper class students, e.g., skiing, archery, badminton. Leisure Sports was an MSA course for all students until the 1973/74 school year, when it was cut back to a 10th grade option only. In 1974/75, the common school incorporated it into its P.E. elective offerings. The primary impetus for BHS control of Leisure Sports was the expense attached to the course itself. With budget cutbacks, Leisure Sports became financially prohibitive for MSA's BESP budget.

The development of the basic skills program at MSA was a priority for the MSA staff. During Summer 1971, teachers participated in a workshop in reading skills (Gattegno's Words in Color program). In Fall 1971, MSA supplemented its academic program with Words in Color, and modified it again in the Spring. During Fall 1972, MSA enhanced its skills development program with a High Intensity Learning Center developed and distributed by Random House Publishing Co., and later added Cohen's systematized program.

Improved test scores of MSA students were advertised throughout BUSD. The effects proved a boon to the growing respectability of MSA. Throughout the five years of operation, MSA was perhaps the most accepted and most popular alternative school within the BESP. Its popularity reflects the positive growth in reading and math skills students acquired while enrolled in the special skills programs. MSA has always had waiting lists of students anxious to get into the program. As a BESP school, MSA was even more unique in the popularity and respect it generated among BHS administrators and other educational leaders throughout the BUSD.

The process MSA developed and utilized in its efforts to gain popularity is rife with political implications for alternative education. In a Spring 1975 interview, MSA's director stated:

We have had very little association with other (alternative) schools. Partly we were caught up in our own things. Also, we were trying to avoid close identity with other alternative schools because we were suffering from faculty hostility. There has always been an enormous resentment from the (BHS) faculty toward sub-schools. And...being primarily concerned with the survival of MSA, we avoided close identification with other sub-schools. Also, we didn't believe in their philosophies and we still don't.

Students were required to participate directly in the common school. In so doing, MSA could keep abreast of the attitudes common school teachers and students had toward the sub-schools. A letter, sent to parents of 9th graders inviting them to enroll in MSA, stated that as a sub-school of the common high school, MSA required students to take courses in both schools:

This [the director explained] was planned deliberately. By moving back and forth between MSA and BHS, the students serve a valuable, dual function: they become catalysts for change in BHS, and they encourage further exploration in techniques within MSA.

MSA staff was required by the MSA director to participate in the common school department teachers' meetings in order to counter antagonisms toward sub-schools, and to ensure a fair representation for the MSA staff and program. Contact with BHS also was maintained through monthly reports by MSA to BHS department chairpersons.

Perhaps the most important vehicle of communication and cooperation between MSA and the common school was the sharing of MSA's BESP "wealth" with common school staff and students, particularly the HILC laboratories.

The MSA program was not isolated from the BHS program; rather, MSA attempted to integrate its program into the larger school. MSA director and staff consistently defined MSA as a sub-school of BHS, supplemental to the BHS program, not an alternative school, separate, distinct or autonomous. In so doing, MSA teachers were freed from the conflicts other secondary on-site alternative schools experienced with BHS administrative policy and procedures. The MSA teachers were thus enabled to focus their energies on teaching the student in their own classroom.

Throughout the five years, MSA staff viewed themselves as "midwives" assisting each student to develop his or her own potential. The school was a "seedbed" for the "cultivation of instructional methods and courses which, if successful, could be transplanted into the larger instructional field of BHS." (MSA promotional brochure, 1974/75.)

Student enrollment at MSA remained fairly constant throughout the five years of operation. Below is a table showing the enrollment figures for MSA over the five years by ethnicity.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, 1971/72 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Sp. '71	139	43	185	57*									324
1971/72	207	50	208	50*									415
1972/73	168	42	212	53	20	5							400
1973/74	171	59	96	33	16	6	6	2					289
1974/75	220	69	68	21	22	7	3	-	2	-	5	2	320
1975/76	221	68	73	23	22	7	2	1			5	2	323

\*Numbers under "Black" in Spring 1971 and 1971/72 include all "non-white" students. There was no breakdown for the several ethnic groups under that heading.

Besides publishing the results of the reading skills programs, MSA recruitment practices also included letters to all 9th graders' parents describing MSA and formal presentations at West Campus inviting students to enroll in the program when they entered the 10th grade at BHS.

Informal recruitment practices included word of mouth. Particularly helpful to MSA enrollment was the fact that the BHS principal, School Board members and other education leaders in the district had their high school age children enrolled in the MSA program.

BHS counselors also recommended students returning from suspension or exemption status into the MSA program. The discipline, rigid structure and the intensive basic skills development program were considered ideal for these students.

Over all, however, as shown in the table above, Black student enrollment steadily declined after 1972/73, whereas white student enrollment rose. From 1972/73 to 1973/74, Black student enrollment declined drastically (by 55%). The director contacted P.E. teachers and coaches, particularly the Black coaches, and requested their help in recruiting Black students into the program. Also, an effort to recruit Black students from West Campus' HUI program was made by MSA staff. But, as the table shows, these efforts did not halt the decline in Black enrollment.

In its Fall 1975 progress report, MSA offered the following explanation for the drop in its ethnic minority student population:

When MSA was the only school offering specific courses in skills in reading, writing, and math, the minority enrollment hovered around 50 percent. With skills courses now being offered in other sub-schools, and BHS, the minority population dropped off.

A question arises: why did so many Black students find some other alternative more attractive? At the close of that 1973/74 school year, the BESEP director recommended the merger of MSA and College Prep, the all-Black school and the principal alternative to MSA for Black students who wanted to overcome academic underachievement (Berkeley Gazette, 7-1-74). This, however, never materialized.

Another possible contributing cause to decreasing Black student enrollment may be MSA's reputation carried over from the first semester of operation, that is: another alternative school for white hippie students.

We had envisioned it (MSA) primarily as being attractive to white students. That was the original conception because the (Community) High School had appealed at that particular time only to a white, if you will, hippie student. (MSA director's interview with ISA, Spring semester, 1975).

Even though the school staff amended its program to include skills programs for underachievers, the overriding focus and course offerings appealed and were geared to advanced academic students. For MSA, dual tracking broke down along racial lines--white students were primarily enrolled in the advanced classes and Black students were in the basic skills program.

All incoming 10th graders were required to take a minimum of 20 units within MSA, 11th graders were required to take 15 units, and 12th graders 10 units. As stated earlier, The Study of Man, American Culture and Leisure Sports were the required courses for MSA students (10th and 11th graders). Other elective courses included: math classes, advanced and below grade level (including a math skills lab and eventually an HILC/Math lab which began operation in Spring 1975); English and history classes such as: Harlem Renaissance, Comparative Religion, S.A.T. Exam Prep, American Political Institutions, Writing/Study Skills (for underachievers), Composition and Creation, HILC Language Arts (for underachievers), science classes, a tutorial program with MSA skills students tutoring elementary students at a nearby BUSD elementary school (Washington), and multi-area courses which changed according to interest each semester. These courses included: Fixit, Apartment Living, Trends in Film, World-wide Cooking, French Civilization, The Human Body and Medicine.

Except in the area of the math electives, the MSA course electives were governed by certain factors: availability of funds, student enrollment, availability of certificated teachers and approval of BHS principal. After the first semester of operation, the basic skills program was initiated and required of those students unable to function in the English and history curricula.

The skills development was initially designed to supplement the academic program. But, in practice, students remained in the skills program for at least one year, and many students continued skills courses in their second year at MSA. ISA field observations during the 1972/73 school year reveal that 97 percent of the students enrolled in the advanced academic program were white, while 97 percent of the students in the low skills program were Black. The remaining 3 percent of each track were either Black and Asian or white and Asian students respectively.

In 1974/75, ISA observed many of the MSA classrooms, and "mapped" such variables as the student ethnicity, course content, teaching style, etc. White and Asian students and Black and Chicano students were grouped together because the MSA student enrollment was primarily white or Black with few Chicano or Asian students enrolled at any time during the five years.

Of the 37 classes observed, eight were geared for low skills students. In these classes, the majority of students enrolled were either Black or Chicano. Nine classes were geared for advanced academic students, of these seven classes had a majority of white or Asian students enrolled with few if any Black or Chicano students. The remaining two classes were considered integrated. The other 20 classes observed by ISA were not distinctly geared for either advanced academic or basic skills students. Of these, five had mostly white or Asian students, 14 were integrated, and one class had mostly Black or Chicano students. (Although 14 classes ISA observed were considered integrated, the school enrollment for 1974/75 shows 69 percent of the student body were white.) Students who remained at MSA through the 12th grade did so usually because they were in the skills program. Twelfth graders were a relatively small proportion of the MSA student body, primarily because they had exhausted the electives MSA offered, so returned to BHS for advanced foreign language, science and math courses.

Parent involvement was never a priority of the MSA program, and was usually discouraged rather than encouraged by the staff. Even so, parents were notified of what was going on at MSA on a regular basis.

The role the staff played in MSA is unique compared to other BESP programs. The staff, for all practical purposes, gave MSA its identity. The staff-designed program focused on the teachers in the classroom. The design was structured and disciplined which allowed for each individual teacher to go about the business he or she was hired and trained for: to teach. Advanced classes had student-teacher ratios of 30:1. It was in the HILC labs where intense individualized instruction occurred. The teacher in the classroom was not entangled in red tape as were other alternative school staff. The teachers mutually agreed to give all authority to the director to take care of administrative duties. The director felt he was the prime mover for what has become MSA.

The staff that came to MSA in the Fall 1970 planning semester has remained fairly constant to this day. Most of the staff were credentialed BHS teachers committed to serve the changing needs of students. Staff turnover was a result of MSA courses being incorporated into BHS curriculum, particularly HILC lab teachers, P.E. teachers and basic skills teachers.

In a student-designed teacher evaluation questionnaire, sanctioned by the director and staff, the director's cover letter to the students stated:

The staff wants to know what students think of courses, the teachers. MSA was designed to serve you, the student. It was designed by the MSA staff to meet your needs. The staff volunteered to serve, they could have remained within BHS but they chose to give of their time and energies to serve.

During the 1973/74 school year, the director went on sabbatical and was replaced by the HILC manager. The temporary director, in an interview in November 1973, said that MSA was not nor did it consider itself to be an innovative school. The main emphasis, he felt, was on having a small student body, which allowed the teachers to maintain closer contact with individual students, to teach interdisciplinary courses. Curriculum changes occurred mainly as a result of the teachers perceiving unmet needs in the programs, with the exclusion of changes due to budgetary problems. These changes, however, primarily reflected teacher preferences and capabilities, and only secondarily, students' desires.

The MSA staff advocated "teachers' rights," all (except for one) were members of the Berkeley Federation of Teachers (BFT). The permanent director is a past president of BFT. During the 1974/75 and 1975/76 school years, a math teacher at MSA was president of BFT also and played an important leadership role in the Berkeley teachers' strike in the Fall 1975. In addition, another MSA teacher was chairperson of the BHS staff Senate in 1975/76.

Following is a table showing the MSA staff over the five years of operation by ethnicity.

TABLE 2: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, SPRING 1971 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Total
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
Spring '71	10	77	2	15	1	8	13
1971/72	10	71	3	21	1	7	14*
1972/73	11	61	5	28	2	11	18*
1973/74	11	69	4	25	1	6	16*
1974/75	13	72	2	11	3	17	18*
1975/76	10	77	2	15	1	8	13*

\*Includes one classified, typist in 1971/72; HILC coordinator 1972/76.

Clearly, from the figures above, white teachers remained the dominant racial group throughout the five years of MSA. Except for the HILC Reading Lab coordinator and a typist, all MSA staff were certificated. Such staff turnover as occurred was primarily concentrated among those teachers who were assigned to MSA for less than 60 percent time.

Most MSA staff who began with the project in Spring semester 1971 have remained with it to this day.

Following are two tables which show the flow of teachers out of and into MSA by race over the five years of operation.

TABLE 3A: STAFF WHO LEFT MSA, BY ETHNICITY

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Asian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Spring '71 to 1971/72	1	3	1	5
1971/72 to 1972/73	1	1		2
1972/73 to 1973/74	2	1	1	4
1973/74 to 1974/75	2	2		4
1974/75 to 1975/76	9		3	12

TABLE 3B: STAFF WHO CAME TO MSA FROM BHS, BY ETHNICITY

	<u>White</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Asian</u>	<u>Total</u>
Spring '71 to 1971/72	2	3	1	6
1971/72 to 1972/73	2	3	1	6
1972/73 to 1973/74	2			2
1973/74 to 1974/75	4		2	6
1974/75 to 1975/76	6		1	7

### Articulation

MSA was designed not as an experimental alternative to the common school but as a sub-school within the system offering intense academic instruction. MSA supplemented the common high school, but with one major difference, it was much smaller, averaging 350 students per year, slightly over 10 percent of the common school student population. Recruitment of students into MSA at the ninth grade level was aimed particularly at the West Campus HUI alternative program for high potential students.

The organizational structure of MSA, with power firmly in the hands of the director, supported by his staff, allowed the MSA model to flourish. The staff and director had the discretion to share their BESP wealth with the common school to ensure good relationships.

MSA related more to the BHS administration and district-wide traditional educational goals than it did to BESP goals. The school/staff ideology was grounded in a sub-school mentality rather than that of an alternative school in the experimental school project. As such, MSA staff did not identify with BESP. And more important, they did not want to be identified with BESP or any of the projects of the program.

#### Impact of Five-Years Funding

MSA strategically planned for survival at BHS after BESP funding ends by sharing its BESP-bought materials, labs, machinery, etc., with the common school. In a report by Rufus Browning (Policy Making in American School Systems Project, Center for Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon, July 1972), MSA was described as a BESP school which avoided the charge of success through riches. It did not strengthen teaching staff by hiring additional teachers with its BESP allocations. In particular, its student-teacher ratio was about 30:1, the same as in the common school. This ratio refers to the advanced classes. In the skills labs, individualized instruction took place with respect to students working at their own individual speed.

Unique to MSA in the history of BESP is the Reading HILC lab coordinator's particular position. A classified staff person, she has become an expert in the field and, in the 1975/76 school year, was salaried by BHS for her services. Prior to that year, MSA/BESP funds paid her salary. It is believed she will be kept on by BHS.

The director stated, in the oft-quoted Spring 1975 interview:

. . . I am not a supporter of ESP. I work for the money and also because Wong told me to go in there. BHS is normal for participation in the area of ESP . . . Now we have an \$18,099 duplicating and processing print shop and two labs and everything else is ESP.

In the first semester of operation, prior to BESP funding, MSA was allocated \$12,000 by BUSD. Staff salaries were provided by the district as well. BHS allocated ADA (Average Daily Attendance) funds based on the number of students enrolled. With BESP funding approved in June 1971, MSA was allocated \$49,131 for the 1971/72 school year.

During the five years of funding, MSA was allocated \$234,556 or 7.45 percent of the total BESP budget for individual sites. Salaries, including fringe benefits, service contracts and classified staff salaries (with a small amount for certificated hourly staff salaries), used 39 percent (\$92,225) of the total five year MSA/BESP Budget. Capital outlay for equipment totaled \$54,361, or 23 percent of the total budget. Capital outlay was primarily for the Reading and Math High Intensity Learning Centers. Instructional and office materials, including materials for the HILCs and other books, totaled \$72,104, or 31 percent of the total five year budget. The Reading

Lab has been increasingly utilized by the common school, and the Math Lab, opening in January 1975, has always been used by the common school.

### Role of Evaluation

After the first semester of operation, MSA committed itself to the use of standardized testing of its students. Primary impetus for this was the increased absenteeism after a few weeks of operation in Spring 1971, and the growing number of complaints from students who were having trouble keeping up with the course instruction. MSA staff then gave the CTBS tests to all students and discovered that 125 students were reading below the 8th grade level. The result was the development of the intensive reading lab course. To deal with similar deficiencies in math, a math lab was also planned though not operationalized until January 1975. (Absenteeism since the first semester has not been a problem at MSA in either the skills or advanced academic programs.)

From that point, MSA students were required to take the CTBS test each semester (unless, of course, they "topped out," scoring at the 13.9 grade level). In addition, students in the skills programs were measured by teacher generated tests at the beginning, middle and end of each semester to record their progress in acquiring reading and math skills. From ISA field notes, improved scores for selective years are available. In the Fall 1971 semester, reading comprehension scores using the Gates MacGinnitie test showed an overall increase of 1.98 school years from September to January for a total of 48 students. The average growth achieved by 96 students who took both the September 1972 and June 1973 CTBS tests was 1.4 years. Of these students, 86 percent were Black.

In the Fall 1973 semester, of the 67 10th grade ISA sample students, 53 took the CTBS reading test, 55 took the language test, and 16 took the math test. Those students in our sample who did not take the test presumably already topped out prior to entering MSA. Of those who did take the CTBS reading test, 73.5 percent (or 39 students) scored at the 12th or 13th grade level. In the CTBS language test, 56 percent (or 31 students) scored at the 12th or 13th grade level. Of those students taking the CTBS math test, 12.5 percent (or two students) scored at the 13th grade level.

In the Spring 1974 semester, of the 67 ISA sample students, eight took the CTBS reading test, four took the language test and 15 took the math test. Two students scored at the 12th or 13th grade level in reading, two scored at the 12th or 13th grade level in language and none scored at the 12th or 13th grade level in math.

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In 1974/75, most MSA students from ISA's sample were exempt from the CTBS testing. One student (out of our 67 sample students) took the CTBS reading test and scored at the 5th grade level. One student took the language test and scored at the 4th grade level. Nine students took the math test and scored between 2nd grade and 10th grade, all below their level (11th grade).

Most of ISA's sample MSA students in 1974/75 did, however, take the COOP English Test which has a standardized score set at a mean of 150 with a standard deviation of ten. Of the students from our sample, the average scores in the Fall 1974 and Spring 1975 semesters were as follows:

TABLE 4: MEAN COOP ENGLISH TEST SCORES,  
ISA SAMPLE, MODEL SCHOOL 7.

	English Vocab.	English Comp. Level	English Comp. Speed	English Expression
Fall 1974	160.981	154.879		155.923
n	54	58		52
Spring 1975	163.449	161.196	160.882	157.844
n	49	51	51	45

In June 1972, the director wrote to the director of the BESP program defending the work of the Level I Evaluation director. A group of BESP site directors had met to discuss grievances against the Level I director, particularly concerning his insistence on the use of standardized tests, or some other meaningful device for measurement. In the letter to the BESP director, the MSA director stated:

It has always been my belief that Dr. Pugh [the Level I Evaluation director] and you were far too lenient in your attitude toward evaluation in some of our alternative programs. Schools that rejected the use of standardized tests have had almost an entire year to develop something in its place . . . I can't but wonder if the move for dismissal would have materialized if Dr. Pugh did not push so vigorously for some form of evaluation.

His attitude toward evaluation, as evidenced in the letter, has become part and parcel of the MSA program.

Another form of evaluation utilized by MSA staff was the student generated evaluation which began in the 1971/72 school year, and has been used by the MSA staff and student body each year. In a cover letter addressed to students regarding the student evaluation of the teachers, the director stated: "MSA is the first group of teachers

to agree to have students evaluate them." On the evaluation form itself, questions asked pertained to grading systems of particular teachers, course assignments, teaching techniques, teaching attitudes towards students, students' attitudes toward MSA in general. Results of these evaluations are not available.

Level I Evaluation did not exercise formative evaluation techniques until the Spring 1974 semester, when it introduced the 0.0 - 1.0 scale of "Effective Alternativeness." In Alternativeness, MSA ranked between 0.2 and 0.3, slightly below School of the Arts and second lowest to On Target. On the effectiveness scale MSA scored a top 1.0. In the combined scale, MSA ranked between 0.2 and 0.3, slightly below Genesis.

MSA staff members have stated at different times that their concern in the basic skills program was the "future educatability and employability" of students, not political education or cultural pluralism. Progress reports issued by Level I, usually nothing substantive, stated in Fall 1971 that "time is needed for MSA teachers to learn how to offer true alternative education," quite a discrepancy from MSA goals and philosophy. By January 1975, Level I revealed a better understanding of the MSA design and stated: "The educational program is adult directed, which provides stability and allows a particular course to be refined over time. The skills labs and in-service training of staff served to make the program richer in instrumental resources compared to the common school."

There is no evidence that Level I evaluations played any formative role in the sense of affecting what was done or not done at MSA.

## ON TARGET

### ABSTRACT

On Target School, launched in September 1971 with BESP funding evolved out of prior vocational and career-oriented programs at Berkeley High School. Although called school OTS actually was a supplemental program that sought to impart an explicit career orientation to courses offered by the BHS Mathematics, Science, Business, Industrial Arts and Home Economics departments. As the program developed, the heavy emphasis was on the first three of these departments, which was in line with a focus on white collar careers that require some acquaintance with modern technology and science, or clerical skills.

Certain classes in these departments were labelled "OTS" on the premise they would highlight career possibilities. In some of these--e.g., Computer Programming, Introduction to Data Processing, typing, shorthand--the career potential was obvious, and these included familiar staples in high school curricula. In others--e.g., Trigonometry and Advanced Biology--the career connection was more subtle. Indeed, ISA observers could not discern what difference an "OTS" tag made in an Advanced Biology class. A few classes designed under OTS aegis were innovative; notably Man Made World, which investigated the interaction between man, society and technology, placing the issue of career in a wider context. Field trips and guest speakers were also part of the OTS program. BESP funds helped in this respect, as well as in maintaining a Computer Center, an OTS centerpiece.

The number of students who took at least one OTS class declined from 508 in 1972/73 to 212 in 1974/75. This was due mainly to a reduction in the number of classes with an "OTS" tag, as part of a phase-in process, and to the loss of field trips and guest speakers. Generally, the trend was to subsume OTS in Career Center, which was designed to respond to career needs and interests of the entire student body at Berkeley High. The absorption of OTS into the Career Center was smoothly consummated in 1975/76, but OTS continued to receive BESP funds as a distinct budgetary entity.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

A Berkeley High School biology teacher developed the OTS proposal submitted to OE/ESP in April 1971. OTS was created, according to the proposal, "in order to provide students with knowledge about careers and occupations open to them. The BHS Business, Math, Industrial Arts, Science and Home Economics departments collaborated in developing a career-oriented program."

BUSD has had a short history of vocational education. In 1964/65, Project R.E.A.L. began at the high school level. Funded with Alameda County money, it focused on health care, and provided students with exposure to the processes involved in seeking out health related careers and the nature of such occupations (e.g., doctor, nurse's aide, etc.). To this day, Project R.E.A.L. operates within the Vocational Education Department of BHS. These programs offer to all BHS students such courses as Graphic Communication, Office Experience, Merchandising and Display, Investment and Hospitality Careers, in addition to the health care offering.

In 1970, the city of Berkeley funded a Jobs for Youth Program, originated by the School Board president. This was part of the "Dreams for Berkeley" project, and focused on job placement for high school students. The BHS Career Center had its roots in this project; however, it was not utilized to its full potential until it was merged with OTS.

Finally, with the promise of federal funding through BESP, the OTS developer was encouraged to expand his original design into a contained program providing a technological career-oriented program to the regular BHS math and science curriculum. Field trips, guest lecturers representing business and industry, and a career center were incorporated into the OTS design.

The OTS curriculum was guided by three principles:

1. vocational preparation in the high school through the work world contacts, field trips and business courses,
2. science curriculum designed to equip students for employment in science and science-based industry,
3. supplements to the BHS math and business curriculum.

During years 1971-1975, any changes in the curriculum were staff initiated. Students had no voice in determining course content. They were, however, free to select their own program.

Courses were offered in block scheduling patterns incorporating speakers and field trips in the daily offerings and providing students the opportunity to secure necessary graduation

requirements from BHS. At first operating only on a morning schedule, OTS very soon expanded to a full day schedule. During the first year 15 courses were offered, including Typing, Short-hand, Bookkeeping, Model Office, Pre-Nursing and Health, Nursery Teacher Aides, Electronics, Geometry, Algebra II, Trigonometry, Computer Programming, Advanced Biology, Physics and Physiology. Other courses were later added; some of these were: Chemistry (Spring 1972), Introduction to English (Fall 1973) Physical Science (Spring 1974), Man Made World (1973/74), Planet in Peril (1975 '76), Human Anatomy and Physiology (1973/74) and Introduction to Data Processing (1973/74).

The technological aspects of OTS, primarily developed by the director included the Computer Center and coordination of the University of California Lawrence Hall of Science\* programs with BHS. In Fall 1973 an OTS staff member became co-director with the original director managing the Career Center until his retirement in June 1975.

In a promotional brochure (BESP), the Computer Center was described as open to all students, helping them make decisions about themselves through personalized testing. The computer programming courses were geared toward their application to future occupations, whether in the computer science field specifically, or in helping students come to responsible decisions about their future careers. It was integrated into the Career Center services. With BESP funds, OTS spearheaded the development of the Computer Center for the entire high school. Available equipment prior to BESP was put to use by OTS staff and students after the Summer 1972 when equipment was purchased from another project (ESEA) in the district.

The Career Center was used to train staff, aides and students in the use of occupational information, media, computers, employment agencies and related occupational and career literature. As part of OTS, the Career Center offered career reference material, facilities, personnel, testing materials, contacts with the business world, agencies and institutions needed in the OTS program. In return, OTS provided the Career Center with funds and personnel, enabling the Career Center to enlarge its potential and deliver expanded services to all BHS students, not just those students enrolled in OTS designated classes.

Success of the Career Center is, however, measured by its actual use by students. Monthly and yearly reports through Spring 1975 indicated an increase in the services offered by the Career

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\*The original director still maintains an office there.

Center and their use by students. Following is a table showing the number of times students utilized the Center's services and the amount of services provided by the Center.

TABLE 1: UTILIZATION OF CAREER CENTER SERVICES, 1971/72-1975/76

	<u>71/72</u>	<u>72/73</u>	<u>*73/74</u>	<u>*74/75</u>	<u>75/76</u>
1. Counsels students concerning their future careers, occupations and job opportunities.	293	200	2,400	3,280	725
2. Issues credit to students for paid and voluntary work while going to school.			270	399	145
3. Provides speakers representing different occupations, who may be heard and consulted.	863	1,302	4,324	4,448	200
4. Provides computerized and standard interest testing. Informational sound slides and cassette tapes related to securing and holding jobs are also available.	255	700	1,549	1,514	500
5. Issues work permits which all students under 18 years of age are required by law to hold when working.			1,533	672	700
6. Provides library materials relative to all kinds of occupations.					400
7. Aids and places students in jobs which include work experience and work reaction.			467	156	80
8. Provides Career Center orientations.				(70)	270
9. Provides computerized scholarship information.				136	--
10. California Occupational Preference Survey administered.					300
Totals	1,411	2,202	10,543	10,605	3,320

\*Including numbers of enrolled students in OTS designated classes.  
( ) Classes not included in totals.

The 1973/74 and 1974/75 school years indicate a tremendous increase in all areas of the chart. Included in those figures were all students enrolled in OTS classes. On the other hand, the 1975/76 figures indicate a sharp decrease in overall use of the Center. The decrease reflects absorption of OTS into the Career Center, which meant an end to OTS-designated classes and to the OTS speaker recruitment efforts. There was also a severe cutback in funds for consultants.

OTS designated classes were those classes, taught in the common school, in which students received OTS credit. In the BHS class schedules issued each semester from 1971 through 1975, OTS designated courses were listed in the Mathematics, Science, Business, Industrial Arts and/or Home Economics departments of the common school. In 1975/76, there were no OTS designated courses.

By the Fall 1973 semester OTS was described in a news release (issued by On Target) as a "drop-in alternative rather than a self-contained sub-school." It was designed to provide students with experience to improve their chances to secure jobs or enter a higher institution of education. In an interview in January 1973, the OTS director stated that whereas the initial students attracted to OTS were college prep material, by the second year of operation the majority of students enrolled in OTS classes did not plan to go to college. He attributed this to the change in ethnic composition with proportionally more ethnic minority students enrolled in OTS classes.

According to the director, no more than 50-60 full time students were ever enrolled in OTS. Each year, however, there were between 200 and 500 part time students enrolled. Students could take from one to three OTS courses, and those who took three courses were considered full time OTS students, whereas those who took one or two courses were considered part time. In the first year (1971/72) there was such confusion about how many OTS courses individual students took that enrollment figures are unavailable. Following is a table for student enrollment by ethnicity during the three subsequent years. There were no OTS designated courses in 1975/76.

TABLE 2: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY, 1972/73 - 1974/75

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1972/73	248	49	200	39	45	9	10	2			5	1	508
1973/74	165	37	195	44	67	15	5	1			10	2	442
1974/75	88	42	86	41	30	14	6	3			2	1	212

The 52 percent drop in enrollment from 1973/74 to 1974/75 was the result of a reduction in the number of OTS classes, and the loss of guest speakers and field trips, which had been regular features of the OTS program.

The On Target staff remained a stable group from the program's inception to its phase-in in 1975/76. Following is a table showing the On Target staff from 1971/72 through 1974/75 by ethnicity.


TABLE 3: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, 1971/72-1974/75

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
1971/72	9	75	2	17	1	8					12
1972/73	8	80	1	10	1	10					10
1973/74	9	75	1	8	1	8	1	8			12
1974/75	5	71	1	14	1	14					7

Notable in the above table is the consistently high proportion of white teachers involved in the program. Most of the staff were from the BHS faculty, most were credentialed teachers. The seven staff members in the program in 1974/75 also began with OTS in 1971/72. Unlike teachers at other alternative schools, none of the OTS teachers taught in any other BESP school. Each taught at least 20 percent time in OTS with the rest of the teaching time at the common school (BHS).

The historical development of the Career Center through OTS can best be understood by use of a chart. Following is such a chart showing the origins of the Career Center at BHS and the final outcome of the Center as an integral part of the BHS student services.

CHART 1: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAREER CENTER



In February 1975, the OTS director issued a memo to the BESP Director, recommending that On Target School be considered a part of the Career Center and Work Experience programs at Berkeley High School. The formal merger of these programs would then be considered the BHS Career Education Department, it was suggested by the BHS vice principal. In addition to the aforementioned three programs, the MESA Program (Math, Engineering, Science Achievement) which encouraged minority youth to enter these related technical fields, and the Career Exploration Courses (such as Health Occupation Education, Model Office and Planet in Peril) would be incorporated into the new program. (Career Education never attained department status in BHS). Career Education courses were considered, in the 1975/76 school year, to partially fulfill high school graduation requirements for all BHS students.

#### Articulation

Except for On Target School, BESP secondary schools emphasized a liberal arts and humanistic approach to education. OTS' focus was on science, math and business, a program which supplemented the common school curriculum. The OTS program utilized the expertise of BHS teachers from such departments as Home Economics, Industrial Arts, Math, Business and Science with the emphasis on future career-oriented development.

Administrative difficulties at BHS at the beginning of the 1971/72 school year created problems for On Target course scheduling, particularly because OTS had relatively few full time students.

enrolled in the program. The 1969 Guideline Committee for Decentralization of BHS (a BHS administrative committee) stipulated that 200 students were the desired minimum enrollment for any sub-school. Consequently, OTS arranged with BHS to count its students in terms of the numbers enrolled in its classes. Eventually, BESP funds were allocated to OTS on a 3/3, 2/3 or 1/3 student basis. A full time student was enrolled in three courses, totalling 15 units. This was the only BESP site which had this type of allocation. The OTS designated courses were available to any BHS student, though OTS full time or 2/3 time students were given priority for enrollment and allowed to go on field trips automatically.

Recruitment of students in the OTS program was informal. The "soft sell" approach, according to the director, was utilized with publicity focused on the field trips and field studies. At the end of each semester, recruitment of students on the basis of available courses for the following semester was done on a first come first served basis. Oftentimes, students who wanted one or two courses were prevented from enrolling because of conflicts with the regular BHS program. When courses reached maximum enrollment, OTS staff then suggested other courses to students, either at OTS or BHS. Special efforts to publicize the program were made at the West Campus Career Exploration program.

In 1973/74, the BHS vice principal stated there was no major attendance problem at OTS. Students attracted to the program were felt to be highly motivated in the specific areas of study provided by OTS. The Career Center advertised activities and available jobs throughout BHS. Flyers and notices in the BHS daily school bulletin announced guest speakers and job opportunities.

#### Funding

During the period of BESP funding, On Target School was allocated less than 2 percent (\$59,631) of the total BESP budget for sites between 1971 and 1976. Of those funds 47 percent was spent in 1972/73 with the major outlay toward the purchase of computer terminals and materials for the Career Center. Both the Career Center and the computer terminals existed prior to BESP. The Career Center, begun in 1970, was funded with federal money through the "Dreams for Berkeley" project. The computer terminals were left over from another ESEA-funded project and were purchased by BHS through BESP funds during Summer 1972. Fourteen terminals were purchased by OTS, primarily during 1972/73 and 1973/74. Of the 14 terminals, most are located off campus, namely, at King and Willard Junior High schools and at East Campus. BHS has access to four--one in the science department, one in the HILC Math lab (the lab

itself was purchased and developed through the BESP budget of MSA), one in the Career Center (which is also shared by the Social Living/Home Economics classes), and one in the computer programming class. The sum of \$13,613, or 23 percent of the OTS budget, went toward purchase of these computer terminals.

Salaries and fringe benefits during the five years of operation used 43 percent of the total budget (\$25,674), most of which went toward classified monthly salaries. By 1974/75, no money was used for stipends for guest lecturers and teachers were not released to accompany students on field trips. At this time, massive efforts to reach the total BHS student body became the primary emphasis of OTS. Career orientation for all 10th graders upon entry in BHS was introduced.

During the 1975/76 school year, OTS was all but phased into BHS. Its BESP budget amounted to \$1,600. On March 10, 1976, OTS's discontinuance was recommended by the BESP director. He stated: "The program is career oriented and has been able to function without a great deal of input from the Experimental School Project." Financing throughout the five years was directed toward enrichment of the BHS curriculum and student services, e.g., the Career Center.

The secretary of the program was paid out of BUSD funds during the 1975/76 school year. In addition to doing clerical work necessary for the operation of the Career Center, the secretary also was instrumental in maintaining and supervising the entire Career Center for BHS in general.

### Evaluation

Because OTS was not an autonomous sub-school of BHS, the director and staff felt that the type of evaluation and measurement conducted by Level I was irrelevant. Nonetheless Level I persisted.

In 1972/73 Level I decided to administer CTBS tests to OTS students. The OTS staff regarded this venture as ridiculous because OTS offered no basic skills courses in reading and math, and thus the scores would tell nothing about the OTS program. Still, Level I managed to make the math portion of the CTBS test mandatory for OTS students in 1973/74. In 1974/75 OTS was finally exempted by BES from the CTBS tests.

Level I conducted an attitude survey each year through 1973/74. Because there was no feedback from the survey, according to the OTS director, the students were uncooperative. The OTS and Career Center directors attempted to develop their own attitude survey

but their requests for help from Level I went unanswered.

On Level I's 0.0 to 1.0 "Effective Alternativeness Scale" OTS was rated slightly below .1 for "alternativeness," slightly above .1 for "Effectiveness," and barely above 0.0 on the combined scale, which placed it at the bottom of all BESP high school programs.

There is no evidence that Level I evaluation had any effect on OTS, except for apparent irritation of the staff.

The OTS staff employed several standardized instruments (e.g., the California Occupational Preference Survey or the Work Values Inventory), but these indicated the students' occupational preferences or aptitudes, and did not provide measures for evaluating the program.

## SCHOOL OF THE ARTS

### ABSTRACT

For personnel in the Performing Arts Department of Berkeley High School ESP was a providential arrival on the scene. In the district's fiscal crisis circa 1971, the inclination was to impose severe cutbacks in such "frills" as drama, dance and music, rather than in basic skills. Faced with this threat, PAD personnel submitted a proposal to create School of the Arts as an alternative sub-school on the BHS campus to secure federal funds that would relieve specialists and consultants then facing dismissal, and make possible the purchase of musical instruments, mass media equipment, and other tangibles essential to the performing arts. Moreover, within the framework of the sub-school students could be granted course credit for participation in stage productions, an activity that had been considered extra-curricular in the common school.

After a year of planning the curtain rose on S/A in Spring 1972. Credit for language skills and history was given for courses offered in the school. S/A students took their math, science and/or physical education in the common school.

S/A tried to focus on multi-cultural themes and to attract Black students, but ethnic composition was a persistent problem. In a student population that was in the 200 range, except for the last year, 1975/76, when it dipped to 150, whites constituted between 76 percent (1972/73) and 95 percent (1975/76) of the total. Comparable proportions obtained for the staff, and although claims were made that a more equitable ethnic distribution was achieved in hiring consultant/classified staff, the actual difference was modest. In this category 64 percent of the personnel was white.

S/A adequately performed the role of a federally subsidized enrichment program for PAD and did provide an alternative for students who were bored or repelled by the common school, and had an aptitude for or affinity with the performing arts. With the end of federal funding, S/A was phased into PAD.

## EMERGENCE IN LOCAL PLAN

School of the Arts was developed by the chairman of the Performing Arts Department of Berkeley High School, and encouraged by the BHS principal. Interest in establishing a performing arts oriented alternative school began in 1969, during the organization of Community High/Genesis. At that time, however, it was not encouraged by BHS administration because of stipulations set forth by the 1969 Guideline Committee for the Decentralization of BHS. There was fear that a single discipline sub-school would reduce the integrity of the comprehensive Berkeley High School.

With federal funds available through BESP, the chairman of PAD (who was also district coordinator of the Performing Arts program) in conjunction with the PAD staff wrote a proposal for the arts-oriented alternative. The PAD staff was especially interested in a sub-school because classified specialists' positions were threatened by the financial crisis in the district, which had to place basic skills before drama, music, etc.

The School of the Arts proposal was approved by OE/ESP in Spring 1971. But a planning semester was scheduled for Fall 1971 in order to tighten up curriculum and recruit staff and students. The students for whom the program was oriented were: "(1) those who have demonstrated success in the arts though not necessarily proficient in basic skills; (2) those who are seeking a broad cultural approach to the arts; and (3) those who wish to develop in-depth skills and knowledge as a performance specialist." (June 1971 Proposal to OE/ESP.)

During Fall 1971, a core group of five teachers and the PAD director planned the program. All but one of the teachers were members of the PAD. The non-PAD teacher involved in the planning semester was earlier involved in the development of the Community High/Genesis program. He saw the S/A program as a means of developing the processes for students' and parents' participation in governance, and for the further development of interdisciplinary humanities courses he helped pioneer in CHS I/Genesis.

Although this former CHS I/Genesis teacher was viewed with some distrust and uneasiness by his more tradition-bound colleagues because of the educational iconoclasm associated with CHS I/Genesis, he was appointed co-director of the S/A program in the first semester of operation, Spring 1972, and remained with the program through June 1976.

The program focus developed during the planning semester was a "universal and multi-cultural study and practice of the arts,

based on the belief that the study of artistic creation can provide every individual with a vision into the soul and cultures of humankind" (S/A self description of first 18 months of operation, Spring 1973). Performing arts productions and performance experiences were considered co-curricular, providing practical application of skills rather than learning by simulation only. The intended curriculum was to integrate arts, drama, music, foreign language and communications skills in the areas of writing, TV, radio, film making and an English/history humanities core course. Math, science and physical education requirements were to be fulfilled through common school courses. The result was that S/A was not an autonomous program, but rather an enrichment program for the common school's PAD.

Courses offered during the five years of operation were not any different from performing arts courses found at any large urban high school. They included: theatre workshop, performance workshop, stagecraft, costume production, music history, classical drama, glee clubs, harmony, marching band, concert band, conducting, stage band, basic musicianship, and dance production.

With BESP funding, more specialized courses were made available and oftentimes, through these courses, the multi-cultural emphasis of the program was brought forth. These courses included: Black Drama, Jazz/Modern Dance, Israeli Folk Dance, Greek Dance, Jazz Folklore, Rock/Soul Instrumental, The Art of American Politics and Law, The American Mind, Environment: Human and Natural; Dream, Myth and Magic, and Children's Theatre Workshop.

Academic oriented courses were offered such as Creative Writing, Developmental Reading and Writing, and English Composition. BESP funds were used to develop radio broadcasting studios and television and video studios. Classes in radio-journalism, television and videotaping were offered.

S/A and PAD shared facilities, staff and materials. However, they did maintain some semblance of separate identities through the students involved in the programs. S/A students could enroll in PAD courses and receive S/A credit, but PAD students could not enroll in any S/A classes. Most of the students enrolled in the program were white high achieving students. There were never more than 10 or 15 students who required specialized attention for basic skills. S/A course requirements were such that at least 15 students had to enroll in a course before the course would be taught. Consequently, basic skills students were systematically kept out of the program by a self-perpetuating situation. If each year there were not enough of them to warrant basic skills courses, then it became necessary for them to seek accommodation elsewhere.

The S/A structure provided performing arts related courses to high achievers, who were in the main white students. Recruitment of Black students was attempted each semester but never proved very successful. One staff member stated: "Black House, College Prep, etc., confiscated a lot of Black students. Since School of the Arts is not Black enough, no new Black students come. We get white and whiter." The Black students sought out by S/A were the high achievers, but these students seemed to find other programs in which to participate, such as College Prep, the Black Studies Department of BHS, etc.

Another effort to deal with institutional racism was hiring some minority consultants; however, the credentialed S/A staff were for the most part white PAD teachers. One S/A staff member stated: "The accidental, unintended, side-benefits from BESP funding were: 1) minority staff jobs (not in the BUSD teacher overage)--which helped the community unemployment problem, and 2) the elective program was kept alive in the secondary level. If it hadn't been for these, I would have long ago told Washington, D.C. to take their money and stick it up their ass."

To recruit students in the program, S/A staff and students paid visits to West Campus and Odyssey with a bevy of talent shows, media demonstrations, and publicity of special courses provided at S/A. Federal funds were used to construct a piano lab equipped with 15 pianos. This lab enticed some students into the PAD. In the Spring 1974 progress report, the directors claimed that the piano lab had attracted Black students. During that semester, 40 percent of the students enrolled in piano classes were Black. Piano classes were incorporated into the PAD curriculum in 1973/74. Thus, students from the common school enrolled without having to involve themselves in the S/A program.

The presence of a Black jazz musician on the staff was also used to entice Black students into the program. But this apparently was no more successful than other recruitment devices. Following is a table of student enrollment at S/A from Spring 1972 through June 1976 by ethnicity.

TABLE 1: STUDENT POPULATION BY ETHNICITY,  
SPRING 1972 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Native American		Other		Total n
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	
Sp. '72	151	76	31	16	8	4	7	4			3	2	200
1972/73	142	76	30	16	6	3	3	2			6	3	187*
1973/74	165	84	18	9	4	2	5	3			4	2	196
1974/75	174	82	23	11	11	5	2	1			1	-	211
1975/76	142	95	5	3	3	2							150

\*63 students left Sept. 72-Feb. 73; 14 students left Feb-May 1973.  
Total: 77 + 187 = 264; figures include grads.

Notable in the figures is the overwhelming white majority during the five years of operation. The usual form of recruitment was through student word of mouth, and with so many white students, it's not surprising they recruited primarily white students. There was no selection process, students needed only to apply and were openly accepted into the program. As a last resort to involve Black students in the program, S/A and College Prep worked out an arrangement whereby College Prep students received performing arts credit for one College Prep course, "Communication and Futurism." Begun in 1975 (Spring) it was first taught by the C. P. Director. In Fall 1975, though, it was taught by a white male from PAD (who also taught in Agora/Genesis) and was received poorly.

Students enrolled at S/A were required to take three out of five classes in the school. Math, science and most of the physical education requirements were satisfied at the common school.

There was a great deal of overlap among PAD teachers and S/A staff. The PAD chairman continued as co-director of S/A during the five years of operation. Following is a table showing the S/A staff by ethnicity between Spring 1972 and Spring 1976.

TABLE 2: STAFF BY ETHNICITY, SPRING 1972 - 1975/76

	White		Black		Asian		Chicano		Total
	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>n</u>
Sp. 1972	17	74	5	22	1	4			23*
1972/73	16	84	1	5	1	5	1	5	19**
1973/74	12	80	2	13			1	7	15+
1974/75	9	82	2	18					11++
1975/76	6	86	1	14					7

\* 12 certificated; 11 classified/consultants, including 6 white, 4 Black, 1 Asian

\*\* 14 certificated; 5 classified/consultants, including 4 white, 1 Black

+ 11 certificated; 4 classified, including 2 white, 1 Black, 1 Chicano

++ 9 certificated; 2 classified, both white

Despite claims of hiring consultants or classified staff who were not white, non-white consultants/classified staff were the exception rather than the rule. During the five years of operation, 22 classified/consultants were employed at S/A, of these, 14 (64%) were white, 6 (27%) were Black, 1 (4%) was Chicano and 1 (4%) was Asian. In all, the proportion of white staff to white students was about the same.

Most of the certificated staff at S/A shared their time with PAD, and some even shared time with other BHS departments and other BESP schools. Following is a table showing the number of S/A certificated staff over the five years of operation and the various assignments they had in addition to their S/A assignment.

TABLE 3: CERTIFICATED STAFF BY ASSIGNMENT, SPRING 1972 - SPRING 1976

	<u>At S/A Only</u>	<u>At PAD</u>	<u>At Other BESP</u>	<u>At Other BHS Depts.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Spring 1972	2	6		4	12
Fall 1972	1	6		5	12
Spring 1974		7*	2*	2	9
Fall 1974	1	5	1**	2	9
Spring 1976		5	1***	2***	7

\* Two staff workers were at both PAD and West Campus.

\*\* Co-director Ag/Gen (not the same one as in 1975/76).

\*\*\* One teacher at BHS and BESP (co-director Ag/Gen).

## ARTICULATION

As an enrichment program for PAD, S/A maintained a unique identity within the whole experimental schools project. Though other BESP programs were enrichment programs for the common school, S/A was the only one geared to artistic expression through drama, music, media, dance, etc. With an emphasis different from the other experimental programs, S/A attempted to cooperate with these programs in order to enhance their academic and multi-cultural emphases with performing arts and media related experiences. Through sharing resources with College Prep, Black House, or the Black Studies Department of BHS, S/A was able to claim involvement in dealing with institutional racism.

In addition, productions geared to a multi-cultural or ethnic thrust were incorporated into the "combat racism" drive. Some of these were: Purlie, Serpent and Elhajmalic, The Me Nobody Knows, Fiddler on the Roof and Bernarda Alba.

S/A aimed student recruitment drives at Odyssey and West Campus HUI programs, particularly for the Black students in those programs. However, the intent was to increase Black students' involvement in S/A rather than achieve any degree of articulation between Odyssey or HUI with S/A.

Through PAD and the director's involvement with the district-wide performing arts program (he was coordinator of it), S/A related to every grade level in BUSD; however, it was not a conscious goal or plan to do so, rather coincidental because of the PAD and the director.

## FUNDING

Over the five years of BESP funding, S/A was allocated 6.41 percent of the total BESP sites' budget. This amounted to \$201,712. Federal investment in the S/A program was primarily in the area of salaries for certificated hourly staff and classified staff, and consultants' fees, with 61 percent or \$122,511 thus expended. Capital outlay and equipment expenditures amounted to \$61,494, or 4 percent of the total budget. In this area, special television and radio equipment, musical instruments, stage materials, and the piano laboratory were acquired with BESP funds. Instructional and office materials, including books, musical scores, etc., used 10 percent (or \$19,973) of the total S/A budget over the five years.

PAD was the benefactor of BESP funding of S/A. PAD had access to the equipment, musical instruments, television and radio broadcasting studios, and other resources bought with BESP funds.

During the 1975 Spring semester, S/A began exploring the role the program would play after BESP funds ended. The staff viewed total phase-in as a means of expanding PAD. In addition, the staff felt larger classes and less variety due to reduced funding (particularly in 1975/76 with \$9,169) necessitated the incorporation of S/A into PAD. Within PAD, more students would be accommodated and the budget, staffing and curriculum overlap problems would be resolved once and for all.

The S/A program always was integral to the PAD. Through BESP, S/A broadened performing arts resources and successfully carried the PAD and its staff through financially threatening years.

#### EVALUATION

In the five years of operation, the S/A staff was critical of the Level I evaluation component. The staff requested assistance from Level I to evaluate affective goals. S/A wanted to measure the connection between successful performance on stage and successful performance in academic subjects. Such a measure was never designed. Instead, S/A issued evaluation questionnaires to students which covered program content, student/teacher relationships, program administration, and student voice in decision-making. One of the co-directors tabulated the results. They were used as a descriptive measure, communicating to the staff student attitudes and satisfaction with the S/A program.

On Level I's 0.0-1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale S/A ratings were: for alternativeness, between .2 and .3, slightly above MSA, and third lowest among BESP high school programs; for effectiveness, slightly above .2, second lowest; on the combined "effective alternative" scale, between 0.0 and .1, second lowest to On Target.

With respect to standardized testing, most S/A students were exempted from taking the CTBS because they had topped out at the 98th percentile. In 1973/74, CTBS scores in both reading and math are available for only 10 students in ISA's sample of 49 10th graders at S/A. The results of the CTBS testing of 10th graders in our sample who took reading and/or math are as follows:

TABLE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF CTBS GRADE EQUIVALENTS,  
ISA SAMPLE, SCHOOL OF THE ARTS

<u>Scoring at:</u>	Fall 1973		Spring 1974	
	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Math</u>	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Math</u>
7th grade or below	6%	33%	-	12%
8th-10th grade	33%	33%	4%	25%
11th-12th grade	61%	33%	96%	63%
Total	100%	99%	100%	100%
n	18	3	22	8

Of the ISA sample students who took the CTBS test in the Spring 1975 and were then in the 11th grade, all but one scored about the 11th grade equivalency.

In 1974/75, students did, however, take the COOP English Test which has a standardized mean score of 150 and a standard deviation of 10. Of ISA's sample students who took the test, the average score was at least one half of one standard deviation above the mean as noted below.

TABLE 5: MEAN COOP ENGLISH TEST SCORES, ISA  
SAMPLE, SCHOOL OF THE ARTS

	<u>English Vocabulary</u>	<u>English Comprehension Level</u>	<u>English Comprehension Speed</u>	<u>English Expression</u>
Fall 1974 n	162.040 25	158.870 23		157.364 22
Spring 1975 n	163.500 12	157.333 12	156.33 12	157.909 11

## APPENDIX

### EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVENESS SCALE

In the Spring 1974 semester the Level I formative evaluation component of the Berkeley Experimental Schools Program rated all the then-existing BESE sites on a 0.0 to 1.0 "Effective Alternativeness" scale. The sites were first rated for "alternativeness," then for "effectiveness," and then those two scores were multiplied to produce a combined "effective alternative" rating. Thus, if a site were rated .8 for "alternativeness" and .2 for "effectiveness," its "effective alternative" rating would be .16 (i.e.,  $.2 \times .8$ ).

"Alternativeness" embraced these five factors: emphasis on ethnic identification, emphasis on personal growth, freedom allowed students, emphasis on political education, and cultural density (i.e., presence of art works, library materials displays and other cultural artifacts that signalled the presence of culture as a major contextual variable).

"Effectiveness" embraced these three factors: emphasis on basic skills, clarity of objectives, and efficient organization.

Level I's ratings of the sites on this scale in Spring 1974 are included in our site descriptions.