Similarities and differences between Erik H. Erikson's and Jean Piaget's theories concerning social development and the process of identification are explored in this report. The first part of the report is a synthesis of Erikson's concept of the developmental processes of personal growth and societal development. The second part integrates Piaget's theory of affective development and Erikson's theory of childhood psychosocial development. The third part compares major theories of identity formation, including: (1) the psychoanalytic conceptions of ego, self, and identity, (2) the theories of identity formation advanced by B. F. Skinner, Carl Rogers, and George H. Mead, and (3) the different conceptions of the relationship between self and society in these theories of identity. A reformulation of the concept of identity is suggested. (BRT)
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Title: An Analysis of Erikson's and Piaget's Theories of Human Growth

November, 1973
An Analysis of Erikson's and Piaget's Theories of Human Growth

As "basic research in education," this report focuses on the emotional or personal development of the child. In the wake of Sputnik, this side of education was neglected and only now begins to receive the attention it deserves. Two giants in psychology speak to this side of education, Erik H. Erikson and Jean Piaget. While educators have paid great attention to Piaget's work on cognitive development, they have passed over ideas of both Piaget and Erikson on affective development.

In response, this report provides a theoretical basis for developing educational programs that consider both the personal and cognitive dimensions of education.

Part I is (to my knowledge) the first attempt to synthesize Erikson's whole theory of development. It is only a beginning and invites further analysis. Part II, I believe, is the first integration of Piaget's and Erikson's stages of childhood growth, which results in both being strengthened despite their fundamentally different starting points. Part III compares major theories of identity formation as the critical task of adolescence and suggests a reformulation of how identity emerges from the individual's relation to his social world.
Final Report

N.I.E. Project No. 1-0529
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Donald W. Light, Jr.
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Preface

This report is an outgrowth of a graduate seminar on the sociology of education which I taught at Princeton University. Seminar members chose as their special project the relation between social institutions (school being one) and personal growth. This led to a close reading of Erik Erikson's theory of psychosocial development with an emphasis on the social side of his writings. From this beginning, other parts of the research developed. I am particularly indebted to two members of the seminar, Michael Stoll and Val Burris, for their contributions. As my research assistant, Val Burris was responsible for the second and third parts of this report. Another research assistant, Paul Stepansky, did valuable work on other aspects of the research. Finally, I am grateful to Professors Robert Tucker and Bruce Mazlish for their support and good ideas.
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The Thought of Erik Erikson: A Developmental Theory of Society

Erik H. Erikson has earned wide respect for his original theory of human growth and for the warm intelligence of his writing. Historians, sociologists, educators and clinicians draw on his work to understand the development of the personality, especially after infancy. Although appreciated for extending beyond the first few years Freud's theory of personality development, Erikson's contribution towards understanding how the individual and society relate to one another has received little notice. Moreover, his ideas come in pieces so that the social theory of Erikson eludes most readers. This essay attempts to bring Erikson's concepts together in a developmental theory of society, a theory which shows how the character of social institutions is rooted in man's epigenetic nature. Thus Erikson's familiar "psychosocial theory of development" rests in a larger frame. It provides a framework for analyzing the strains between individuals and the structure of society in which they find themselves.

The character of Erikson's work stems from two, interrelated sources: his emphasis on conscious, ego development instead of the unconscious interaction between the superego and the id, and his "Eight Ages of Man" from birth to death. Unlike some other ego psychologists, Erikson roots his theory in Freud. He worked out in detail, "Hartmann's concept of autonomous ego development of anxiety" (Erikson 1959b:14). This he called the psychosocial theory of development.

Although Erikson's work is much more psychological than social, his conceptual framework invites one to make links between the
indivdual (both as a child and later as an adult) and major social institutions. His clinical studies of Indians, veterans, world leaders and contemporary youth carefully consider the social and cultural context of personal experience. In a sense, this paper will assume the opposite style; formalizing the psychosocial character of human life while omitting in its short span the rich clinical detail which Erikson so ably provides.

It is simplest to proceed from the familiar to the less familiar by starting with Erikson's eight ages of man. Less understood is how Erikson arrived at these stages by deriving them from stages of physiological development. From there the essay shall argue that the eight stages cannot be understood outside of the social institutions which originate from them, influence them and depend upon them for sustenance. Within the limitations of this paper, we shall have to assume an epigenetic theory of physiological maturation, as do Freud and Erikson. Whether this confounds or illuminates the theory will depend on the reader.

The Eight Ages of Man

Erikson presents human growth as "conflicts, inner and outer, which the vital personality weathers, re-emerging from each crisis with an increased sense of inner unity, with an increase of good judgment, and an increase in the capacity 'to do well' according to his own standards and to the standards of those who are significant to him" (Erikson 1968a:92). From this short statement emerge two important themes. First, Erikson's is a conflict theory, more in the style of Lewis Coser than Ralf Dahrendorf. That is, internal
conflicts provide the force to push the individual to greater strength and integration. Second, the passage defines the healthy, normal personality. This is one of Erikson's great contributions. In contrast to many psychoanalytic writers who only define pathological man, Erikson's ideas center on healthy man. At the same time, this emphasis bothers some readers of Erikson. His major early writings exude such a harmony and faith in the good capacities of man that his ideas seem inapplicable to troubled people in a troubled society. However, this tone is not a necessary part of Erikson's concepts. As David Rapaport reminds us (Erikson 1959:1-14), the outcome of each stage of development is a balance between the healthy and pathological extremes by which Erikson frames the borders. In the normal case, it is a tipped balance wherein ego strength outweighs weakness, leaving an active tension in the healthy person (Erikson 1964:139). These pairs of strengths and weaknesses provide the agenda for the developmental crises which make up the eight ages of man.

- Basic Trust vs. Mistrust
- Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt
- Initiative vs. Guilt
- Industry vs. Inferiority
- Identity vs. Identity Diffusion (Role Confusion)
- Intimacy vs. Isolation
- Generativity vs. Stagnation (Self-Absorption)
- Ego Integrity vs. Despair

These stages reflect Erikson's emphasis on the process of development,
rather than substance. The qualities emerging from each state are active forces in a person by which he shapes the specific content of his life. Moreover, the emphasis in Erikson on these psychosocial crises is a concern for heightened process.

For Erikson, crisis does not mean an emergency. "Crisis is used here in a developmental sense to connotate not a threat of catastrophe, but a turning point, a crucial period of increased vulnerability and heightened potential, and there, the ontogenetic source of generational strength and maladjustment" (Erikson 1968a: 96). Thus each of these qualities has a time of gradual ascendence, a crisis when it is most prominent, a metamorphosis emerging from the resolution (a resolution prepared by previous stages), and subsequent re-integrations into each later stage (Erikson 1964:140-1; 1968a:93-5). The need for subsequent re-integration means that a person does not gain or lose a particular ego strength once for all time. Rather, each stage challenges to new growth what ego strengths have been acquired and provides an opportunity to overcome past weaknesses and defenses.

In his theory, Erikson is also stating that each stage and its resolution must precede those which follow. Autonomy has little chance of developing if some measure of basic trust has not been established, and the ability of taking initiative without doubt and guilt rests in turn on some degree of trust and autonomy.

This sequence is based on the idea of epigenesis, perhaps the most misunderstood foundation of Erikson's theory. Taken in its original, strong meaning, epigenesis refers to a biological theory that an embryo develops from the successive differentiation of an
originally undifferentiated structure. Thus epigenesis means both a sequence of stages and a gradual "progression through time of a differentiation of parts" (Erikson 1968a:93). Many readers of Erikson regard his stages as vaguely-conceived, intuitively sensible observations by a wise clinician. This impression comes from the deceptive grace of Erikson's writing, but there is little doubt that he takes his epigenetic principle seriously and not metaphorically. He explains this principle as meaning that "anything has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a functioning whole" (1968a:92). In the passage that follows, his argument becomes more explicit.

"The healthy child, given a reasonable amount of proper guidance, can be trusted to obey inner laws of development, laws which create a succession of potentialities for significant interaction with those persons who tend and respond to him and those institutions which are ready for him. While such interaction varies from culture to culture, it must remain within the proper rate and the proper sequence which governs all epigenesis. Personality, therefore, can be said to develop according to steps predetermined in the human organism's readiness to be driven toward, to be aware of, and to interact with a widening radius of significant individuals and institutions... (emphasis added) (1968a:93)

The epigenetic principle, therefore, underlies Erikson's concept of the healthy adult personality. He adopts Marie Jahoda's definition of the latter as one who "masters his environment, shows a certain unity of personality and is able to perceive the world and himself correctly" (1968a:92). In his writings, Erikson regards the child as initially lacking these adult qualities but as gaining them through mastering successive crises.
An epigenetic theory must be grounded in physiological growth, and Erikson relates his theory to Freud's psychosocial insights by emphasizing their epigenetic quality (1963b: Chapter 2). Thus he emphasizes the physiological and therefore genetic developments of the "organism" which underlie Freud's theory of psychosexual development. It should be clear that although this essay began with the familiar psychosocial stages, Erikson begins with the development and differentiation of organs, argues (following Freud) their interrelationship with psychosexual changes and then shows how each stage has a psychosocial crisis emerging from the physiological crisis of the organ modality.

"Organ modality" refers to the behavioral styles of different organs (receiving, taking, giving, letting go, holding on, making, etc.) each of which has its time of physical predominance during which the individual learns how to work and control its use. Like the psychosocial crises, each organ has its conflicting modalities. Holding on and letting go of the anus is a familiar example. Once again, Erikson writes of a "proper rate" and "normal sequence." Once again, each organ has its time of origin, and another time factor determines the most critical stage of development.

We now realize that for Erikson to postulate stages of personality development beyond the early years he had first to work out their physical foundation. Few seem to realize that Erikson stretched our understanding of man's growth by extending psychosocial stages beyond puberty. For example, the genital stage in young adulthood seems to be closely linked to having (or not having) children. Finally, the last stage in Erikson's model is most clearly marked by the age when genital activity wanes. Notice in
the list below how closely the psychosocial crises reflect the
central issue the person faces in coping with his physiological
stage of development.

**ERIKSON'S PSYCHOSOCIAL STAGES AND THEIR EPIGENETIC ROOTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of Sexual Development</th>
<th>Stages of Ego Development (psychosocial crises)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oral-sensory</td>
<td>Basic trust vs. Mistrust</td>
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<td>Anal-muscular</td>
<td>Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phallic-Oedipal Locomotor</td>
<td>Initiative vs. Guilt</td>
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<td>Latency</td>
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<td>Puberty</td>
<td>'Identity vs. Identity Diffusion</td>
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<td>Genital-Young Adulthood</td>
<td>Intimacy vs. Isolation</td>
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<td>Genital-Adulthood</td>
<td>Generativity vs. Stagnation</td>
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<td>Post-Genital</td>
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*A Developmental Theory of Society*

The character of Erikson's psychosocial stages and their rela-
tion to society cannot be fully grasped by merely understanding
their roots in physiological and psychosexual development. Taking

*This implies that psychosocial crises occur at quite fixed ages,
In fact, they arise with their organ modalities, but they may not
be resolved for some time. Luther, for example, had a long identity
crisis. Such prolonging (or acceleration) modifies later stages
(1964:139ff).*
the culture into account helps some, because it supplies the symbols and the content for each phase in a person's life. Thus "basic trust" is a universal problem which all small children must confront (and confront again as adolescents and again as adults), but the culture determines in what a person will place his trust.

Of greater importance than culture to the theory before us, however, is the interconnection between stages of development and social institutions. Each crisis in development is worked out by people together, generation after generation. From these struggles evolve social institutions, repositories of the ego strengths collectively gained and thus stable social frames in which developmental crises can be successfully resolved.

An example of this process can be seen in the anal stage, when the crisis is one of autonomy, of holding on and letting go. One begins by recognizing this as a physiological problem, but it immediately becomes a psychological one too. A child begins with epigenetic drives, far less complete than those of other animals. In training the child, the parents and significant others guide these energy fragments and give them meaning. For example, social institutions will greatly influence the proper ratio of letting go and holding on which constitutes autonomy in that society, and after the crisis has passed, that resolution will generalize itself to other organs and other activities than the control of feces - for example sexual activity, eating and talking. "The outcome of this more variable completion of drive patterns by tradition - glorious as it is in its cooperative achievements and in its inventive specializations and refinements - forever ties the individual to
the traditions and to the institutions of his childhood milieu, and exposes it to the - not always logical and just - autocracy of his inner governor, his conscience" (Erikson 1963:97).

This theory presents an interesting notion of socialization, where the surprising term, "genetically social character of the individual" has real meaning. Societal norms are not grafted on to the genetically asocial individual. Rather, the society makes the individual a member "by influencing the manner in which he solves the tasks posed by each phase of his epigenetic development" (Erikson 1959:15). Although grounded in Freud's work, this theory departs significantly from him at this point, and a comparison between the two needs more attention than can be given here.

It is clear that while the individual develops along predetermined steps, they are steps of readiness, of potential. As the quotation on page 5 indicates, individuals need social institutions ready for them to mature. Erikson states that "Society...tends to be so constituted as to meet and invite this succession of potentialities for interaction and attempts to safeguard and to encourage the proper rate and the proper sequence of their unfolding" (1963: 270). The theory postulates an interdependency between three levels of process: the somatic, the psychological, and the social. As in Freud, the somatic and the social lay down the parameters of development and the rules of behavior, while the ego mediates to assure a sense of identity, becoming stronger in the process.

There is little sense here, as there is in Freud, that the social opposes the somatic. Rather organs and drives await molding and coordination into an socially integrated mature being.
An important concept which ties together some of these developmental stages is what Erikson calls cogwheeling. In this process, the caretaking persons who represent society are coordinated to the developing individual by means both of their inborn responsiveness to his needs and their own stage-specific needs, thus forming a system of generation and regeneration (1959b). In particular, the stages of childhood and adulthood cogwheel. Nothing so strongly calls out for intimacy as an infant seeking trust, and nothing instills a sense of generativity so much as seeing one's offspring gain autonomy and initiative. (The undercurrent of value here is great; it appears that the bachelor or "spinster" is doomed to isolation, stagnation and despair. But this assumption is not built into the structure of the theory. Rather, it reflects Erikson's Western, mid-century experience). The cogwheeling works in both directions; the more trusting a baby becomes, the more love and delight it expresses, which deepens its intimacy with its caretakers. Erikson writes that every parent knows, that the vulnerability of being newly born and the meekness of innocent needs have a power all their own to bring whole families to the baby's command (1964:114).

Institutions seem to enter this developmental theory of society in two ways, but Erikson only deals with one. He believes that the adult manifestations of each crisis resolution are collectively organized into such institutions as religion, law or the economy (1963b:273:4). Before elaborating on this argument, let us consider the second role of institutions, as immediate social contexts for ego development. Such institutions as the family or the school
are often mentioned by Erikson as he illustrates his points, but they are not linked clearly to different phases of development or to his main argument. Yet they seem crucial and therefore worth describing for the various stages.

As a rough start, we can postulate that the crucial institution for the first two stages is the family, and that loving, hopeful, trusting care is essential for the first stage. In the second stage, firmness enters as a new quality which must be balanced with love and acceptance for the child, if he is to gain a sense of autonomy without too much shame or guilt. In Erikson, these environments have, respectively, a female and a male cast to them (1958:255).

Although the family remains an important institution, play and relations with peers become very important for the third and fourth stages. As soon as school starts, the teacher takes an active role in determining one's sense of industry. Since Erikson casts this fourth stage in terms of being productive, we sense a move away from ascribed relations and a move towards adult values in the society at large. Parsons argues that school introduces universalistic values to the child, who before then has been treated as a unique individual in his family up to that time. This shift from ascribed, particular values of home to the achieved, universal values of school is an important ingredient of the fourth crisis.

During the identity crisis (Stage V), almost every institutional setting seems important; for one is reforming and uniting all previous elements into a cogent whole. Family, school, the self as seen in peers and in adults all pertain to this task.
The time of intimacy (Stage VI) seems closely focused on the couple. Even though people at this age work and live in many contexts, the couple, and perhaps close friends, are the context that really matter. In some societies, one's family would also be important as one reestablished family ties, not in the role of child but of new adult.

Ironically, children become the most immediate people concerned with generativity (Stage VII); once again the family is the main institution but as seen from the parents' point of view. This is also the time when one's job takes full shape. The way in which work is organized in a society affects a person's sense of generativity or stagnation. The community is a third arena for working out the seventh stage of maturity.

It is difficult to imagine the institutional context for the final psychosocial crisis, ego integrity versus despair. This is Erikson's weakest stage and needs the most work in all of its ramifications. The most obvious institutional settings for old people are small dwellings where they live alone or nursing homes, both smelling of despair. Perhaps this is why an optimistic author is silent; for most older people in America there are few institutional supports for final integrity.

The more distant set of institutions which Erikson discusses stem from the ego strengths of each stage which in their more general form Erikson calls virtues, one for each crisis.

*I omit here the negative impact of these social institutions, the ways in which they can disconfirm a person or reject rather than invite his emerging modalities. In future work I hope to show how this developmental theory of society deepens our understanding of contemporary social pathologies.
and he argues that society needs them to thrive (1963b:273-4).

Virtues are the lasting outcome of the "favorable ratios" of successful to unsuccessful solutions arrived at during each psychosocial stage. They are an essential link, because they constitute the process by which ego strengths can be imparted to the next generation. Major institutions in society are their product, their permanent expression, the context which will support and shape the psychosocial solutions of newer generations. They are not "external ornaments easily added or omitted according to the fancies of esthetic or moral style" (1964:135). Erikson calls them "basic virtues" because without them and their reemergence from generation to generation, all other and more changeable systems of human values lose their spirit and their relevance (1964).

Erikson, therefore, writes tentatively of Hope, Will, Purpose, and Competence as the virtues developed in childhood; of Fidelity in adolescence; and of Love, Care and Wisdom in adulthood (1964:118-34). Although they seem unrelated, they depend on each other. Will cannot be trained until hope is secure, nor can love become reciprocal until fidelity has proven reliable. Because they form the vital link between man's psychosocial development and the social institutions which shape it, they are a "blueprint of essential strengths which evolution has built both with the ground plan of the life stages and into that of man's institutions" (1963b:274).

Here is a second cogwheel, not between adults and children but

*Like much of his schema, the virtues receive little elaboration. Erikson has given more attention to fidelity in "Youth" (1962) and Youth (1965).
between the institutional strengths of society which reflect the ego strengths of previous generations and the developing ego which looks to the society for guidance as it grows. This, then, is the most immediate connection between the basic virtues and the essentials of an organized human community: adults are organized (among other reasons) for the purpose of deriving from the collectivity and from its traditions a fund of reassurances and a set of methods which enable them to meet the needs of the next generation in relative independence of the vicissitudes of individual fate (1964:152).

Thus, basic virtues are anchored in three different systems, the epigenesis of individual development, the sequence of generations and the growth of the ego.

ERIKSON'S DIMENSIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages of Sexual Development</th>
<th>Stages of Ego Development (psychosocial crises)</th>
<th>Basic Virtues</th>
<th>Supporting Social Institutions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oral-Sensory</td>
<td>Basic trust vs. Mistrust</td>
<td>Hope</td>
<td>Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anal-muscular</td>
<td>Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt</td>
<td>Judicious will</td>
<td>Law (politics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phallic-Oedipal</td>
<td>Initiative vs. Guilt</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latency</td>
<td>Industry vs. Inferiority</td>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Work technology (Job structure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puberty</td>
<td>Identity vs. Identity Diffusion</td>
<td>Fidelity</td>
<td>Ideology (World View)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genital-Young Adulthood</td>
<td>Intimacy vs. Isolation</td>
<td>Love</td>
<td>Family (Customs of Intimacy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genital-Adulthood</td>
<td>Generativity vs. Stagnation</td>
<td>Care</td>
<td>Education (broadly conceived)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Genital</td>
<td>Ego Integrity vs. Despair</td>
<td>Wisdom</td>
<td>Philosophy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Like stages of psychosocial development, each virtue has a time of ascendance, a metamorphosis and later reintegrations in subsequent stages. "Thus, hope in infancy already has an element of willfulness which, however, cannot be challenged as yet in the way it must be when the crisis of will arrives in the play age" (Erikson 1964:141). The negative of these virtues is not vice but weakness, producing disorder, dysfunction and disintegration. This means that the basic virtues are closely related to order, personal and social, and themselves have an orderly sequence.

The healthy personality, however, does not emerge merely from a succession of physical, mental and psychosexual stages. It must be verified at every point by social reality or something is lost. The vital virtues are qualities "arising from the convergence, in each life and in each generation, of unfolding capacities with existing institutions" (1964:142). The important question for our time is what happens when existing institutions do not converge with the individual's unfolding capacities?

Erikson's work is important because so much of it concerns social and personal object relations. Object relations have gained increasing attention among clinicians, and they form a vital link between psychiatry and sociology. Unlike most theories of socialization, the developmental theory of society outlines the interconnections between social and personal object relations.

One Stage in the Developmental Theory - An Illustration

Since most of this paper is quite abstract, it may help to illustrate the relations between different dimensions of the theory.
and their mechanisms. The stage of Industry vs. Inferiority serves as a good illustration while it brings our attention to the important role which technology plays in development, initially at this fourth stage and later in the fifth- and seventh stages.

In classical psychoanalytic theory, this fourth stage coincides with latency. In contemporary society, it covers the ages of six to eleven, the years of elementary school. During latency, a child's love for the parent of the opposite sex and rivalry with the parent of the same sex lie dormant. During this period, which follows one of extensive play and expanding imagination, the child learns to reason with a sophistication not possible before. In play, the child becomes social and shares with other children. Now the child is more ready to watch adults, imitate what they do, and attach themselves to adult models. Having acquired mastery over much of his body and muscles, the child now wants to do something, to make something, in short, to extend his mastery from his own body to the world around him.

But when they reach school age, children in all cultures receive some systematic instruction. In preliterate people much is learned from adults who become teachers by acclamation rather than by appointment, and much is learned from older children, but the knowledge gained is related to the basic skills of simple technologies (1968a:122-3).

While children still play and need time to themselves, Erikson believes that "they all, sooner or later, become dissatisfied and disgruntled without a sense of being able to make things and make them well and even perfectly: it is that I have called the sense of industry" (1968a:123).

The society invites this new emphasis. It senses, just as the
individual child does in extending his mastery, that the child must learn now to become a potential worker and provider. Every society has institutions which invite this development. "In many nations today, the schools represent this new orientation, and they also embody new values, different from those at home. As Parsons has explained, the school treats the new pupil like a little adult. Teachers measure the worth of a student by his "achievements," not by ascribed values like those in the home. The criteria are universal, not particular to each individual. The curriculum centers around technical competence rather than personal qualities.

Needless to say, this is an idealized portrait of how the transition works. One important task to be done is to analyze precisely how reality differs from this ideal and to consider the consequences. For example, technologically inspired achievement values have probably entered middle-class homes to such a degree that many children of industrial nations gain their whole sense of worth from their performance. When there is no ascriptive base, no one to say, "I love you because you are my child and for no other reason," the effect on a generation's identity can be troubled.

If the child comes out of a family which loved and accepted him unconditionally so that he could dream and play without anxiety, he now sublimates the drives which made him dream and play in terms of the new approved goal of producing things. "He develops perseverance and adjusts himself to the inorganic laws of the tool world" (1968a:124). His ego now includes tools and his skills with them.

The relationship between psychosexual development in this stage and the crisis of industry versus inferiority is a complementary
rather than a direct one. Unlike previous stages, an inner upheaval does not lead directly to a new mastery. Latency finds strong drives dormant, but only as a "lull before the storm of puberty" (1968a:126). Society uses this lull in sexual development to develop the tool possibilities of body, mind and thing-world and to postpone further progress along sexual and sensual lines until they become part of a larger area of social responsibility" (1968a:123). Erikson makes its social basis clear:

Since industry involves doing things beside and with others, a first sense of division of labor and of differential opportunity—that is, a sense of the technological ethos of a culture—develops at this time. Therefore, the configurations of culture and the manipulations basic to the prevailing technology must reach meaningfully into school life, supporting in every child a feeling of competence—that is, the free exercise of dexterity and intelligence in the completion of serious tasks unimpaired by an infantile sense of inferiority. This is the lasting basis for cooperative participation in productive adult life (126).

The danger is a sense of estrangement, from the tasks the child is doing and from himself, a sense of inferiority. In describing this danger, Erikson suggests how previous stages relate to this one.

This may be caused by an insufficient solution of the preceding conflict: the child may still want his mommy more than knowledge; he may still prefer to be the baby at home rather than the big child in school; he still compares himself with his father, and the comparison arouses a sense of guilt as well as a sense of inferiority. Family life may not have prepared him for school life, or school life may fail to sustain the promises of earlier stages in that nothing that he has learned to do well so far seems to count with his fellows or his teacher (1968a: 124).

When a child finds out that his race or the status of his parents decides his worth rather than his will to learn, it may deeply affect his sense of inferiority. For, as many black children in
America have learned, he discovers that the family that loved and nurtured him, the parents he respected, are "no good" in the larger world. And neither is he.

Milder forms of pathology that may be common include the experience of going through years of school without ever acquiring "the enjoyment of work and pride in doing at least one kind of thing really well" (1968a:125). Another form--some think the malaise of our time--occurs when a child accepts work as the only criterion of worth. Imagination and play are sacrificed. He becomes a slave to his technology and to those who control it.

The outlines of this stage signify the important advance which Erikson has made in psychoanalytic theory. His emphasis on the role of social institutions and the influences of persons outside the family (especially in school) on personality development extends developmental theory beyond the primary group. At the same time, one senses in this fourth stage that childhood is coming to an end, that this young person is now beginning his adult identity. The tone of Erikson's discussion about this stage is sober and unchildlike. Significantly, his first step towards a matured identity involves tools and one's relation to production.

Sources of Change in the Developmental Theory of Society

Taken in their strongest sense, the writings of Erikson lead to a bio-psychological theory of society. Postulating an epigenetic theory of development, Erikson outlines the basic crises of the organism which constitute each stage of development, the range of outcomes of those crises, and the value orientations which emerge
Moreover, he states that the "strength" and "virtue" of each "stage" are a prerequisite for coping with the next stage. (Many of these common words have specific meanings.) He outlines mode epigenesis, in which each mode lies dormant, awaiting its time of transformation when it changes its function to a corresponding behavior modality.

So far, the theory focuses on the individual, but Erikson also postulates the need for supporting social institutions and their need of human dispositions to support them. This concept of mutuality is important when one considers the causal chain. A developmental stage, whose form is latent in the organism, brings forth a "strength" whose remnant in adult life produces a corresponding "virtue" which supports and is reflected in a corresponding "social institution," which for another generation provides the nurturing context for someone else in that developmental stage. These relations and sequences for each stage are outlined in the following chart.

The most significant source of change in this developmental theory is culture. The theory does not specify the content for each ego strength or virtue. Nor does it describe the structure of those social institutions which embody the strengths (and weaknesses) of past generations. Historically, the theory provides a shell in which to place the changing forms of faith or technology. It defines the structure of content. Its great advantage is to offer a way of thinking about many events and trends in the social and cultural life of an era so that one can make connections between particular and general observations. The theory also helps one to
The Dynamics of a Developmental Stage

- Strength
- New Developmental Stage
- New Basic Virtue
- Resolving

- Life Cycle
- "Coping"

- Resolution

- Aquired Virtue of Previous Stage
- Developmental Support
- Psychological Support
- Social Support

- Sexuality
- Social Context
- Cognitive Attention

Changes in:
think about symbols and their significance for both the individual
and society.

Culture aside, sources of change depend on the assumptions made
about the model. Taken literally, for example, the epigenetic prin-
ciple means that structural change can occur only through genetic
mutation. For example, to have a society thrive without religion
would require a genetic change in man so he no longer had oral
needs and the needs which Erikson says must follow from them—basic
trust, faith, religion.

What this strong position suggests is that a society which has
lost its sense of faith or which educates its young in institutions
that do not embody a sense of care and generativity will experience
inherent strain. In other words, precisely because the structural
elements of the theory are so stable, they will impose strains of
change in a society where some of those elements are missing or
distorted.

Given the interlocking nature of the theory, however, it would
seem conceptually impossible that a society not have all basic
institutions in good order. But this spirit of Erikson's theory
invites a looser reading of his theory, that the human organism
has basic tendencies which are inherent and epigenetic. The con-
cept of mutuality between these and social supports may be more
ideal than inevitable. Such phrases as "those institutions which
are ready for him" can be interpreted as an inclination rather than
a law. Clearer still is "society...tends to be so constituted as
to meet and invite this succession of potentialities..." Erikson
also writes about the effects or undeveloped virtues on defects in
the fiber of generations and institutions. All is not sure. The personality continuously engages in existential hazards. The specific strengths from each previous stage must transform once again at each subsequent stage to find their place in the new order.

The sources of change have now grown considerably. Referring back to the chart, "social context" at the left is not sure. The developmental strength of previous stages and the acquired virtues, may not be there either. To the extent that previous individuals or generations have not matured fully, cogwheeling will be impeded and the supporting social institutions may not wholly affirm the next generation's emergent self.

If one thinks about these three points of change, they would seem to have their origins in changing institutions: for the assumption is that given institutional support, everything else in the process is self-affirming. Some external sources of institutional change are technology, invasion or migration, and stable conflicts. By the latter I mean institutional tensions which have never been resolved but which settle down into relatively stable patterns. These are common, such as race relations in America. Such conflicts are unstable stabilities, and they permeate modern society.

These external and internal kinds of change affect the psychosocial stages themselves. Most readers and perhaps Erikson himself believe that the eight ages of man apply universally to all individuals at all times. Yet any interpretation of Erikson's theory short of epigenetic determinism allows for changes which can alter the stages themselves. It is at this point at which Erikson's
ideas become vulnerable. Although this essay presents the theory in the positive light in which Erikson presents it, historical and cultural criticism can be leveled at almost every point. But that is subject for another essay.
Erikson, E. H.

1950  Growth and Crises of the "Healthy Personality,"  In Symposium on the Healthy Personality, M.J.E. Senn, ed., New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation

1958  Young Man Luther, New York: Norton.


AN INTEGRATION OF PIAGET'S THEORY OF AFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT AND ERIKSON'S THEORY OF PSYCHOSOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

This essay has two purposes: to summarize Piaget's theory of affective development, and to compare it with Erikson's theory of ego development. We shall be particularly interested here in identifying areas in which the two theories complement and reinforce one another, as well as areas in which they appear to conflict.

The theories of Erikson and Piaget are similar in their emphasis on fairly distinct developmental stages. Erikson describes the progression from birth through adolescence in five stages. Piaget's formulations vary somewhat, but usually he identifies six major stages to cover the same period. Since there is no one-to-one correspondence between Erikson's stages and those of Piaget, we will use a compromise for all of four stages in order to compare the two theories (Figure 1). Each of the
<table>
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following four sections will concentrate on a single one of these four stages and the developments—both cognitive and affective—which occur at that stage.

Piaget's major concern, of course, is not with affectivity, but with cognitive development. Nevertheless, as we hope to show, it is possible to find scattered throughout his works a fairly detailed theory of affective development as well. As a secondary concern, however, affective development is commonly discussed in terms of its relationship to corresponding changes in cognitive schemata. In fact, although he often speaks of these two aspects of development as "complementary," for the most part Piaget treats affective development as a secondary response to changes in modes of cognition, rather than as an equal or reciprocally conditioning factor. As a consequence, it will be impossible to discuss Piaget's affective theory apart from his theories of cognitive development. We shall attempt, however, to keep our comments concerning cognitive development at a minimum, assuming a familiarity with Piaget's theory in this realm on the part of the reader. Likewise, a prior familiarity with the basic features of Erikson's theory is assumed. Discussion of each developmental stage will thus contain the following elements: a brief summary of important cognitive developments, a discussion of corresponding affective developments (in terms of Piaget's theory), a mention of those aspects of ego
development emphasized by Erikson, and a comparison of Piaget's and Erikson's theories.

STATE I: INFANCY (0-2 YEARS)

Piaget divides infancy into three fairly distinct stages: the reflex stage (0-1 month), the motor habits stage (1-9 months), and the sensorimotor intelligence stage (9-18/24 months). Intelligence throughout all three of these stages is entirely practical and develops in the absence of language or other symbolic functions. Development consists in the elaboration of action schemata and the organization of the environment into spatio-temporal structures, accomplished solely through the coordination of actions and perceptions, and without the intervention of representation or thought.

During the first stage, mental life is limited to the exercise of reflex apparatuses--i.e., hereditarily determined sensory and motor coordinations corresponding to instinctual needs. Exercise of these sensorimotor reflexes leads, in the second stage, to the development of "circular reactions." New elements are assimilated into the reflexive action schemata as the infant learns to repeat actions which, in the course of his random movements, he discovers produce interesting results. Finally, in the third stage we find the first real signs of intelligence with the appearance of purposive actions aimed at achieving a pre-
established goal.

The unifying thread which underlies these three stages is the transition from a primary state of egocentrism in which there is no differentiation between the self and the external world to a final state in which the infant is conscious of his own body as but one element among others in an objective universe. Corresponding to this change is the construction of the fundamental practical categories of object, space, causality, and time.

Affective developments during this period follow a similar pattern. At the first stage of reflex behavior there are corresponding elementary instinctive strivings and "affective reflexes" which constitute the primary emotions, such as fear. Corresponding to the second stage there is a set of emotions or affective percepts linked to the modalities of action, most of which are organized in terms of the schema of good and bad—e.g., agreeable, disagreeable, pleasure, pain, etc. With the onset of purposive behavior come the first realizations of success and failure. Only at the third stage, with the gradual differentiation of the opposing poles of self and external world, and the development of the category of object, is it possible for the infant's affective life to become organized in terms of such Freudian mechanisms as object-cathexis, anticathexis, projection, introjection, etc. Finally, corresponding to the progression from cognitive
ego-centrism to consciousness of the distinction between self and object, there occurs, at the affective level, a similar progression from primary narcissism to object choice.

In Erikson's theory each stage is described in terms of a basic ego strength which must be achieved if the child is to mature into a healthy adult personality. In the first stage the ego strength which must be achieved is a sense of basic trust. As affectivity in this stage centers around the oral zone, the infant's achievement of basic trust depends primarily on the quality of the mother-child relationship in the satisfaction of the child's instinctive nutritional needs. The fact that Erikson labels this period the "oral-sensory stage," and not simply the "oral stage," however, is an indication of his belief in the importance of sensory stimuli generally, and not just oral stimuli—even though his own analysis is limited almost entirely to the latter topic.

Basic trust requires a belief not only in the capability of the environment to satisfy instinctive nutritional needs without undue frustration, but also, as Erikson suggests at one point, the development of "an almost somatic conviction" that the environment (and especially the behavior of his parents) is ultimately meaningful. It is at this point that Piaget's insights into the complementary development of cognition and
affectivity become relevant. Piaget here would probably emphasize the dependence of basic trust upon the prior development of certain cognitive categories (object, causality, space, time, etc.) through which the world comes to have meaning. Piaget would also concur that any conviction that the world is meaningful at this stage would have to be "somatic," since a mental conviction would be impossible prior to the development of true representational thought.

A further point of similarity between the two theories is their joint emphasis on the importance of instinctual behavior at this stage. For Piaget it is reflexive behavior aimed at the satisfaction of instinctual needs, which is eventually elaborated into sensorimotor intelligence, and around which the earliest affective states revolve. For Erikson the manner in which the infant's instinctual needs are met and the nature of the environment's response to the infant's reflexive behavior (sucking, biting, etc.) are crucial to the development of a sense of basic trust.

One area in which the two accounts of affective development differ is in Piaget's greater emphasis on the importance of the transition from ego-centrism to object consciousness and from ego-cathexis (narcissism) to object-cathexis. For a Freudian, Erikson places surprisingly little emphasis on the existence of a
primary non-differentiated state, the difficulty of the transition out of this state, and the relevance of these to the development of certain defense mechanisms, in particular, those defense mechanisms which purposefully confuse inner and outer, self and object: projection and introjection.

STAGE II: CHILDHOOD (2-7 YEARS)

During the second stage the appearance of language is by far the most important cognitive development. Language allows for the possibility of verbal exchange with other persons, and hence for the eventual socialization of action; for the internalization of words and symbols, and hence the first true thought; and for the representation of action internally in the form of "mental experiments" (what Freud called "secondary processes").

Despite the importance of new developments, Piaget also stresses the continuity of this stage with the previous ones. In particular, he notes that the infant's ego-centricity vis-à-vis the physical universe is carried over in this stage in the form of ego-centricity vis-à-vis the symbolic and social universes. This new ego-centricity assumes an almost pure form in symbolic play, where the child employs his new powers of representation and imagination to transform what is real into what is desired.
More generally, thought at this stage is characterized by finalism (the belief that human needs are the raison d'etre for everything), animism (the tendency to conceive things as living and endowed with intentions like oneself), and artificialism (the belief that everything has been built by man or by a divine being who fabricates things in a human fashion)—all of which exhibit ego-centrism of a sort.

In his early social relations, rather than extricating himself from his own point of view in order to coordinate it with that of others, the child remains unconsciously centered on himself. In verbal exchanges among themselves children have difficulty achieving true communication; at first their language behavior assumes the peculiar form which Piaget calls the "collective monologue." Thought at this stage is termed "intuitive" to indicate the total lack of attempts at proof or rationalization. According to Piaget, this stems from the character of the child's social behavior, i.e., from the ego-centric lack of differentiation between his own point of view and that of others, since it is only vis-à-vis others that we are led to seek evidence for our statements and beliefs.

As with the previous stages, Piaget sees affective development at this stage as, if not simply the result of cognitive developments, at least dependent upon the prior achievement of certain cognitive capacities. As
in the cognitive realm, the appearance of language is a crucial factor here. With language and verbal communication with others the child begins to develop affective interpersonal relationships—sympathies, antipathies, etc. Language greatly expands the child's social horizon, introducing him to the unsuspected riches of a world of realities superior to himself. It provides him with both the materials and the medium for self-evaluation, often leading to early feelings of inferiority. Of particular importance is the child's verbal communication with significant adults—language serving as the primary mechanism of the child's subordination and psychological constraint by the adult world. This allows for the socialization of the child's actions (a development which rises from a foundation laid in the previous stage in the child's proclivity to imitation). Such communication is also essential to the child's development of feelings of respect and the emergence of an ego-ideal. Finally, corresponding to intuitive intelligence at the cognitive level, there appear at the affective level intuitive moral sentiments, which arise as a by-product of the (largely verbal) relationships between the child and adults. The child's morals at this stage are not yet rationalized, but remain essentially "heteronomous," i.e., subject to an external will, which is that of respected persons or parents.

For Erikson the period from two to seven years encompasses two stages of ego development. The two ego strengths
achieved. Here are a sense of autonomy and a sense of initiative. Autonomy is concerned with the development of will power sufficient to cope with the rapid muscular maturation occurring at this stage. Of particular importance is will power in regard to excretory retention and elimination. There are two dangers at this stage: shame, which is aroused by the feeling of being completely exposed and conscious of being looked at disapprovingly, and by the sense of being small; and doubt, which involves being unsure of one's will and a sense of vulnerability to those who would dominate it. Initiative is essentially the ego strength which results from a successful resolution of the Oedipal crisis and development of an adequate, but not overbearing super-ego. Excessive guilt is the most common danger at this stage.

How do Piaget's insights relate to Erikson's theory at this stage? In the first place, the emergence of language (which Piaget so strongly emphasizes) would appear to be an important ingredient in the ego-developmental crises of which Erikson speaks. Indeed, perhaps the most important distinguishing factor between Erikson's second and third stages is the fact that the third assumes a high degree of language development, whereas the second does not. In the second stage the child is still largely preoccupied with his own body, and the crisis at this stage is concerned primarily with the control of motor activity. The feelings of shame and doubt which threaten
the child at this stage are also pre-verbal and are experiences in terms of visual and kinesthetic sensations. They appear as the precursors of guilt in the third stage and inferiority in the fourth, both of which depend upon language competence.

In the third stage the child begins to venture farther into the external world, and his actions become more intrusive and aggressive. This is partly the result of increased confidence in his growing locomotor skills, but also depends on the great new capacities which language brings. This same combination of locomotor skills and language permits the expansion of the child's imagination to such a point that his own thoughts become frightening and a potential source of guilt. Language contributes to the subordination of the child to adults, thereby creating the conditions for super-ego formation. And, since super-ego formation is largely a process of internalizing auditory cues, language serves also as the medium for that process.

Of additional importance to super-ego formation would be the intuitive nature of the child's thought at this stage, and especially Piaget's concept of "heteronomous morality." Also relevant to the concerns of Erikson would be the activities of imitation and symbolic play which occupy a prominent position in Piaget's theory. These would appear important to the development of autonomy and especially to the development of initiative. Imitation serves a
transitory, but crucial function of allowing the child to exercise numerous motor capacities and to assume a variety of roles prior to the development of a sense of personal initiative which would enable him to perform the same actions on his own. Symbolic play is possibly of greater importance in allowing the child (over an extended period of time) to develop his sense of initiative and mastery over his environment independent of his limitations in terms of size, age, or competence, and without the potentially costly consequences of real action.

As with the infancy stage, the most outstanding difference between the theories of Piaget and Erikson is Piaget's greater emphasis on the child's cognitive and affective ego-centrism. Greater attention to these matters would appear warranted on Erikson's part. For example, the child's cognitive difficulty in dissociating his own point of view from others would seem especially relevant to issues which pertain to the fusion of points of view which occurs during processes of identification—a major concern of Erikson.

Closely related to the issue of ego-centricty is the question of cooperation. For Piaget, you will recall, cognitive ego-centrism severely limits the child's capacity for cooperative behavior. Erikson's view concerning the capacity for cooperation at this stage is just the opposite. "At no time," says Erikson, is the
child more "eager and able to make things cooperatively, to combine with other children for the purpose of constructing and planning." Perhaps no other place are the claims of Piaget and Erikson so diametrically opposed.

STAGE III: SCHOOL AGE (7-12 YEARS)

Perhaps the most important cognitive development of the third stage is the child's overcoming of the egocentrism of previous stages. According to Piaget, it is not until about the age of seven or eight years that the child becomes capable of real cooperation, because only then does he cease to confuse his own point of view with that of others. At this stage he learns both to dissociate his point of view from that of others and to coordinate these different points of view. True discussions are now possible in that the children show comprehension with respect to the other's point of view and begin to search for logical justifications for their own statements. This development marks the end of the intuitive stage of thought. Corresponding to this progress of social behavior are changes in the individual's mode of thought which appear, according to Piaget, both as the causes and the effects of that progress. In particular, the child becomes capable of rudimentary reflection, which is a form of mental deliberation or dialogue, and may thus be seen as an internalization of social discussion.
The animism and artificialism which characterized the child's explanations in the previous stage give way to explanations involving rational relations between cause and effect based on the principle of identity. Explanations become atomistic in the sense that the whole may be explained in terms of the composition of its parts. This development presupposes mastery of the operations of partition and addition, and especially of principles of conservation. These principles of conservation are strengthened throughout this period as the child develops his ability to recognize invariants which persist through transformations in shape or form. Related to this development is the child's increased comprehension of the principle of reversibility (i.e., recognition of the possibility of reversing certain processes to reach an original starting point).

These many changes are brought together and culminate in what Piaget calls the development of "concrete operations." Representational acts become "operationalized" when they come to constitute groupings which are both composable and reversible, i.e., when two actions of the same kind can be composed into a third action of that kind, and when these various actions can be compensated or annulled by a reverse operation. Examples of such operational groupings are qualitative seriation (A > B > C... etc.), coordination of symmetrical relations, especially relations
of equality \((A=B; B=C; \text{ therefore } A=C)\), and the generation of systems of classification through application of the principle of nesting. Throughout this period, operations remain "concrete" (as opposed to "formal") in that they are concerned only with reality itself, rather than hypothetical or abstract relations, and in particular with tangible objects that can be manipulated and subjected to real action.

Corresponding to these changes in the cognitive realm (and interacting with these) are important developments in the child's affectivity and moral feelings. The child's emergence out of the previous state of ego-centricity and his entry into communicative and cooperative social relations is paralleled by the development of feelings of reciprocity and mutual respect. The child's new capacity to dissociate his own point of view from that of others and then to coordinate these points of view is paralleled by a new morality which emphasizes both individual autonomy and cooperation. The child's progress from intuitive to more rational modes of thought corresponds to the abandonment of intuitive and heteronomous moral ideas. In their games children develop a new conception of rules. Rules are no longer heteronomous, but come to be viewed as an expression of mutual agreement. The child's earlier authoritarian notions of justice are likewise replaced by conceptions of distributive justice based on strict
equality and retributive justice which considers the intentions and circumstances of the act, rather than simply the act itself.

But, by far the most important affective change is the development of what Piaget calls the "will." The will is the affective equivalent of the operation in the cognitive realm. Whereas an operation is a grouping of representational acts, the will constitutes a grouping or coordination of values into a stable and enduring equilibrium. The will appears whenever there is a conflict of tendencies, as, for example, when one oscillates between a tempting pleasure and a duty. In such a case the will reinforces the established but temporarily weaker tendency. Just as operations must be reversible, the coordination of values represented by the will is reversible in that the will re-establishes values according to their prior equilibrium. As with cognitive operations, this involves an element of conservation in the sense that the will maintains an invariant hierarchy of values through an ever-changing context of situations and actions.

Erikson at this stage is concerned with the development of the ego strength of a sense of industry. With the oncoming latency period the dominant concerns of the Oedipal period are forgotten and the child sublimates the intrusiveness and aggressiveness of the previous stage: he learns now to win recognition by producing things. His energy is absorbed in the task of developing competence in the
fundamental technologies of his culture. His success at this task will naturally depend largely upon prior and simultaneous developments in the cognitive realm—especially upon his capacity for cooperation and his mastery over concrete operations.

The child's danger at this stage lies in a sense of inadequacy and inferiority. If he desairs of his skills or of his status among his peers he may be discouraged from identification with them. The result may be a depression into the familial relations and rivalries of the Oedipal period.

As is often the case, Piaget's stages show a greater continuity here than do Erikson's. Whereas Erikson does not introduce the issue of inferiority until the fourth stage (and fails even then to link it to previous related phenomena such as shame, doubt, and guilt), Piaget's theory stresses the fact that feelings of inferiority have a long and complex history in the development of the child. They first arise as soon as the child emerges out of the earliest state of extreme ego-centrism and comes to distinguish between his own body and the outside world. In the early stages inferiority is experienced primarily as a sense of being small or as a feeling of incomplete control over muscular actions. (Note that these are phenomena which Erikson mentions in regard to shame and doubt respectively.) Later, inferiority is
experienced mentally, in terms of symbolic representation. The acquisition of language is important here, both as a medium for the child's making comparisons between himself and others and as the means by which his horizons are widened to include realities and activities greater than his own. (Also note the importance of language as a prerequisite for the development of a sense of guilt in Erikson's scheme.) In general, the less the child's egocentricity---i.e., the greater his capacity for dissociating his own identity from others', the more vulnerable he becomes to feelings of inferiority. It is therefore not surprising that a sense of inferiority should be of greatest danger at the stage when the child's triumph over egocentrism is at last complete.

A similar situation presents itself when we try to locate Piaget's concept of will within Erikson's scheme. As a comparison of the two theories reveals, the development of will must be understood as a transitional stage between the development of autonomy (will power) and the development of identity (the ego strength of Erikson's fifth stage), and incorporates some elements of both of these. Like autonomy, it involves the regulation of bodily energies and drives; yet, like identity, it also requires an invariant (or, at least, equilibrating) sense of one's hierarchy of values. This suggests the possibility that the ego development which begins with autonomy and culminates
in identity may be seen as a continuous and multi-dimensional process, rather than, as in Erikson's theory, a discontinuous series of isolated and uni-dimensional developments. For Erikson the fourth stage serves as a moratorium on ego development. According to Erikson's account, the child develops no significant new psychological functions or affective relations during this period (or, at least, not in the case of the normally adjusted child). Rather, he acquires simply new technical skills. As such, the fourth period acts as a buffer which completely isolates the more sweeping ego developments of the second and third stage from those of the fifth. Piaget's theory contradicts this emphasis on discontinuity by pointing to the continuity of affective development throughout the so-called "latency period," and by stressing the importance of the development of the will as an intermediary stage between mere autonomy (will power) and true identity.

STAGE IV: ADOLESCENCE (12-16 YEARS)

Adolescence is viewed by Piaget as a period of momentary disequilibrium. Cognitive abilities multiply at this stage. At first these additional capacities are troubling to both thought and affectivity, but subsequently they strengthen them. The eventual effect of this disequilibrium then is to establish a new equilibrium of thought and affectivity superior to that which existed in childhood.
Furthermore, this newly achieved equilibrium effectively concludes cognitive development, since there are no significant changes in cognitive schemata following adolescence.

For the most part, Piaget avoids discussion of the problems associated with this transitional period, and instead concentrates on the structure of the final forms of thought and affective life achieved at the conclusion of the stage. The outstanding feature of adolescent modes of thought, in comparison with those of childhood, is its "formal" or abstract character. The child thinks concretely; he deals with each problem in isolation and does not integrate his solutions by means of any general theories from which he could abstract a common principle. By comparison, the adolescent shows surprising interest in theoretical problems and abstract concepts. His thought is "formal" rather than "concrete." The term "hypothetico-deductive" is used to characterize this type of thinking, which is meant to indicate the fact that it permits drawing conclusions from abstract hypotheses, and not merely from real observations.

These new capacities for reflection and for the construction of abstract systems and theories often produce a period of what Piaget calls "intellectual egocentricity." Comparable to the ego-centricity of the infant who assimilates the universe into his own corporal activity, and that of the young child who assimilates everything into his own
nascent thought through symbolic play, the intellectual ego-centricity of the adolescent manifests itself in the belief in the omnipotence of idealistic schemes born of individual reflection. This intellectual ego-centricism has affective aspects as well. These include an egotism which is coupled with disdain for one's elders, an often severe megalomania, and fervent (and often messianic) religious strivings.

The development of formal operations is paralleled on the affective side by the formation of personality. While personality development is completed only in adolescence, it is a process whose roots extend far back into childhood. According to Piaget, this process includes at its earlier stages the development of an autonomous (but ego-centric) self in infancy, and the formation of the will in late childhood. In contrast to the self, personality is not wholly ego-centric, but is rather the achievement of an equilibrium between the demands of the self and the requirements of one's social relations and roles. Personality requires submission of the self to discipline, but this submission is really auto-submission, i.e., it is autonomous rather than heteronomous. Like the will, personality involves the regulation and coordination of moral tendencies, but it is also something more in that it integrates all of these factors into a single all-encompassing system which the person experiences as
as a sense of his own identity. This system is "personal" in the dual sense that it is unique to the individual and that it implies autonomous coordination. Finally, unlike the will, personality at this stage is largely future oriented. It depends on the formulation of a Lebensplan (life plan) which serves both as a source of discipline for the will and as an instrument of cooperation.

Erikson's concerns at this stage show a striking resemblance to those of Piaget. The task of the ego during adolescence, according to Erikson, is to integrate past accomplishments and future hopes into a lasting sense of identity. In their search for a new sense of sameness and continuity, adolescents look to others for a definition of themselves, and to potential occupational roles in which they hope to find direction for their lives. Experimentation with a variety of roles is commonplace and creates the possibility for more confusion. Also a danger is the possibility that ego-identity may be achieved only by identification with a particular ideological creed.

Although there are some differences between Piaget's and Erikson's analyses of adolescent affective development (especially in Piaget's greater emphasis on the continuity of adolescence with previous stages), in all this stage stands out as one in which the two theories show a remarkable degree of convergence. Both minimize the importance of
pubertal changes; both emphasize the development of a self concept and stress the importance of social interaction in this process; both identify similar dangers in the adolescent's susceptibility to theological or ideological doctrines of absolute truth; and, finally, both see personality development as largely complete by the end of this stage.

A careful look at Erikson's concept of identity shows that it really involves not one, but a number of interlocking ego developments. The three most fundamental of these are (1) the development of a sense of continuity or sameness, (2) the assumption (or at least anticipation) of a well-defined social and occupational role, and (3) the development of a self-definition or subjective experience of one's identity. These three are "interlocking" in the sense that they develop in conjunction with one another, each serving as a reciprocally conditioning factor for the others. Breaking the concept of identity down into these three components will make it easier to show how Piaget's theory relates to Erikson's at this stage.

The first aspect of identity—a sense of continuity and sameness—has much in common with Piaget's concept of will. Will, you will remember, is the affective equivalent of principles of conservation in the cognitive sphere, and involves the development of an invariant hierarchy of values which persist throughout the constant flux of the
child's experiences and activities. According to Piaget, this component of identity is already well developed in late childhood. The equilibrium achieved at this time, however, is temporarily upset by the drastic changes (both bodily and cognitive) which mark early adolescence. Thus, the appearance of a sense of continuity as an aspect of identity is, in fact, the reappearance of an ego quality which existed already in childhood, but was temporarily lost.

The second aspect of identity—the assumption of a social role—is also an important element of Piaget concept of personality. Unlike will, personality does not appear until adolescence. The reason is that the development of personality presupposes certain cognitive functions which do not mature until this stage—in particular, the hypothetico-deductive mode of thought. The anticipation and the acceptance of a social and occupational role, for example, requires the capacity to imagine and evaluate reflectively a variety of hypothetical role situations—a capacity which matures only during adolescence.

In Piaget's theory the third aspect of identity—development of a self-definition—is difficult to separate from the second. Both are subsumed under the concept of personality. Piaget appears to subscribe to the Meadian viewpoint which sees one's self-concept as the internalization of one's social role (or, to be more exact, the
internalization of the other’s view of one’s self in social interaction. In Erikson, this Meadian perspective is made even more explicit. Identity formation, according to Erikson, is largely a process of looking to others for a definition of one’s self, and is complete only when one’s inner sense of sameness and continuity is matched by the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others. Thus, identity formation (like personality formation) would appear to depend upon the prior achievement of certain cognitive capacities—notably the ability to assume the point of view of the other and the corresponding sense of reciprocity—which develop only in late childhood.

A GENERAL COMPARISON

Having completed our discussion of each of the four developmental stages, we wish now to direct a few remarks toward more general issues concerning the relationship between Piaget’s and Erikson’s theories. It should be apparent that the greater part of the dissimilarities in the two theories are really dissimilarities in emphasis, resulting from the fact that the two writers begin from different starting points and with different primary interests. Piaget treats affective development as an adjunct to cognitive development, while Erikson deals with affective development in its own terms. Most of the differences which result from this fact are differences
in content rather than in form or method. These have been discussed in the previous sections and shall not occupy us further here.

Such differences, it should be noted, do not in any way make the two theories incompatible. Rather, they serve to make them complementary, and ripe for the sort of synthesis we have attempted in this paper. In addition to these differences of content, however, there are other more fundamental differences between the two theories. These deal essentially with issues of methodology and are less easily resolved. The first such issue pertains to the nature of scientific explanation. The second concerns the issue of continuous versus discontinuous development.

In Piaget's theory, affective development is treated as an adjunct to his major concern, cognitive development. As such, it commonly assumes the role of a dependent variable, where cognitive developments assume the role of independent variables. Affective developments are explained either as the direct effects of cognitive developments, or through the operation of some homeostatic mechanism responding to the disturbing influence of cognitive developments. In either case the mode of explanation is essentially causal: affective developments are explained in terms of their cognitive antecedents.53 Erikson, on the other hand, is more inclined to functional explanations—so much so, in
fact, that it gives his theory strong teleological over-
tones. Ego developments in childhood are most often
discussed according to what they contribute to some future
adult personality, not according to the factors within
the present and past situations which motivate them. In
other words, development is explained in terms of the
capacities which it produces (functionally), rather than
in terms of the motivating factors which underly it (causally).
The only major exceptions to this tendency are (1) Erikson's
explanations of unsuccessful ego development, which tend to
be much more causal, and (2) his emphasis in the very
earliest stages on biological maturation as a conditioning
factor for ego development. While positivistic social
science would tend to side with Piaget in this issue in
favoring causal as opposed to functional explanations,
as we have suggested elsewhere, Erikson's attraction
to functional explanation must be understood in light of
his subordination of theoretical to therapeutic aims.

This same difference in objectives (theoretical vs.
therapeutic) is also at least in part responsible for the
opposing positions taken by Piaget and Erikson on the
issue of continuity versus discontinuity. As we hope
to have shown, despite apparent similarities in Erikson's
and Piaget's organization of their theories in terms of
developmental stages, the two writers are far from agree-
ment concerning the nature of these stages. Piaget
stresses the continuity between stages (and, we feel, amply documents that continuity). Each affective development is preceded and prepared for by a series of lesser developments—each similar to those which follow it, but also lacking in some essential aspects (usually for want of certain necessary cognitive capacities). For example, according to Piaget, autonomy (to use one of Erikson's ego strengths) is not the achievement of a single developmental stage, which fails to exist in previous stages and is not significantly altered in subsequent ones. Rather, each stage (except perhaps the very earliest) has its own form of autonomy. These change in conjunction with other affective and cognitive developments, yielding, for example, an ego-centric autonomy in early childhood which is quite distinct from the cooperative autonomy of late childhood. Erikson, on the other hand, stresses the discontinuous nature of the developmental stages. His theory is based on the principle of epigenesis, which taken in its strongest sense maintains a fixed sequence of ego developments and a strictly one-to-one correspondence between life stages and the development of ego strengths. When placed on the defensive, Erikson usually concedes to a weaker interpretation of epigenesis which recognizes the possibility of lags and leaps forward in the epigenetic schedule, and especially of the existence of certain ego capacities in some form prior to their time of ascendency,
and of the possible continuation and modification of particular developments in later stages. One must look in vain through Erikson's writings, however, attempting to find an adequate discussion of such earlier and later manifestations of each ego strength. The absence of such an analysis would appear to be a serious omission in Erikson's theoretical writings, and a critical shortcoming as compared with Piaget's theory.
NOTES

1. Piaget's most systematic discussion of his theory of affective development is in the essay "The Mental Development of the Child" in Six Psychological Studies. In this paper we shall draw heavily from this essay, as well as from the discussion of affective development in Piaget and Inhelder's The Psychology of the Child.

2. While we wish to register disagreement with the extremely idealistic (or mentalistic) conception of development implicit in this approach, we shall attempt to be faithful to this aspect of Piaget's theory in the discussion which follows. An adequate critique of this facet of Piaget's work would require first that we untangle the multiple contradictions involved in Piaget's peculiar combination of idealistic theory with empiricist methodology—a considerable task, and much beyond the scope of the present paper.

3. Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 249.

4. Erikson, ibid., p. 258.

5. At times Piaget speaks of a mutual causation between cognitive and affective structures (see, for example, Six Psychological Studies, pp. 69-70). However, even here it is clear that change is always introduced into this system of circular causality on the cognitive rather than the affective side, so that the situation is not truly reciprocal, but involves a uni-directional causality with a feedback loop.

6. Here biological development fulfills the same role of precipitating affective developments as cognitive development in Piaget's theory—often with the same emphasis on equilibration.

7. See "Erikson's Theory of Epigenetic Development: A Case Study in the Role of Theory in the Human Sciences."

8. Erikson suggests this himself in one of his few explicit confrontations with Piaget in Insight and Responsibility, pp. 134-141.

10. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
11. Ibid., p. 29.
13. Ibid., pp. 36-38.
16. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
17. Ibid., pp. 43-45.
18. Ibid., p. 46.
19. Ibid., p. 49.
20. Ibid., p. 55.
21. Ibid., p. 57.
22. Ibid., pp. 58-60.
23. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
24. Ibid., pp. 62-64.
25. Ibid., p. 63.
26. Ibid., p. 64.
27. Ibid., pp. 56-59.
28. Ibid., p. 64.
29. Ibid., p. 65.
30. Ibid., p. 65.
31. Ibid., p. 65.
32. Ibid., p. 65.
33. This threefold distinction is not made explicit by Erikson himself, but is implied in most of his discussions of the concept "identity." For example, in the opening two paragraphs of his summary of the fifth stage in Childhood and Society (pp. 261-262), Erikson discusses identity first in terms of a "search for a new sense of continuity and sameness" (our first aspect of identity), second as "ego identity" (our third aspect), and third in terms of the assumption of social roles and the anticipation of a career (our second aspect). For a more exact account of the difference between "ego identity" (our third aspect) and mere "personal identity" (our first aspect)—a distinction which is somewhat blurred in the Childhood and Society passage—see Erikson's Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 50.

34. "It has even been said that personality is a social product linked to the role it plays in society (persona = theater mask)." It is not altogether clear the extent to which Piaget is willing to subscribe to such a view, although clearly he is not wholly opposed to it.


36. At times Piaget speaks of a mutual causation between cognitive and affective structures (see, for example, Six Psychological Studies, pp. 69-70). However, even here it is clear that change is always introduced into this system of circular causality on the cognitive rather than the affective side, so that the situation is not truly reciprocal, but involves a uni-directional causality with a feedback loop.

37. Hero biological development fulfills the same role of precipitating affective developments as cognitive development in Piaget's theory—often with the same emphasis on equilibration.

38. See my "Erikson's Theory of Epigenetic Development: A Case Study in the Role of Theory in the Human Sciences."

39. Erikson suggests this himself in one of his few explicit confrontations with Piaget in Insight and Responsibility, pp. 134-111.

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3. To emphasize the radical nature of the change involved, Piaget refers to this development as a "miniature Copernican revolution" (Six Psychological Studies, p. 9).

4. Ibid. p. 15.

5. Ibid. pp. 15-16.

6. Ibid. p. 16.

7. Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 249.

8. The idea that the infant passes through an early stage in which the ego does not differentiate between itself and the external world is important for Freud and appears repeatedly in his writings. In Civilization and its Discontents (Norton paperback edition pp. 11-20), for example, he uses this idea to explain the "oceanic feeling" of oneness with the universe—an important element in the genesis of religious ideas. If Freud's speculations concerning the relationship between primary ego-centrism and religious sentiments are correct, they would appear to be directly relevant to Erikson's theory, since Erikson too locates the ontogenetic source of religion in the crisis of the first stage. For other examples of the importance of this concept to Freud see the two essays "Negation"
THEORIES OF IDENTITY FORMATION

INTRODUCTION

The following pages concern theories of identity and identity formation (sometimes referred to as the formation of self). The discussion is organized into three major sections. The first deals with psychoanalytic conceptions of ego, self, and identity, and pursues in some detail the concept of identity articulated by Erik Erikson. The second section deals, somewhat more briefly, with three additional theories of self formation, including the behavioralist psychology of B. F. Skinner, the humanistic psychology of Carl Rogers, and the social psychology of George H. Mead. The final section compares differing conceptions of the relationship between self and society in these theories and suggests a reformulation of the concept of identity which is more relevant to issues of social change than the ones above.
THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF IDENTITY

Within the psychoanalytic tradition, the concept of identity and the process of identity development have received their most extensive treatment in the writings of Erik Erikson. In this section, our major concern will be to present as comprehensive a statement of Erikson's theory of identity as may be pieced together from his extensive writings on the subject and to show the key importance of the concept of identity to Erikson's psychology of ego development. However, since Erikson's theory cannot be adequately understood apart from the psychoanalytic tradition from which it evolved, it will be necessary to precede our discussion of Erikson with some remarks concerning two of his most important predecessors in that tradition: Freud and Hartmann.

Freud's Theory of Ego Development

Freud's concept of the ego is deeply imbedded in, and in a sense a derivative of, his concept of the id, with which is with his concept of the id this we must begin our discussion of Freud. The id, for Freud, represents the instinctual basis of the psychic system. It is the obscure, inaccessible, and most archaic part of the personality. What
we know about it has been learned indirectly by the study of dreams, free association, and the formation of neurotic symptoms. The id is the oldest element of the psychic apparatus. It is the seat of all biologically derived instinctual drives, and, most importantly, it is the exclusive source of all psychic energy ("libido"). Freud summarizes both the nature and the function of the id in the following statement: 

"Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge—that, in our view, is all there is in the id."  

According to Freud, the sole contents of the id are ideas of immediate gratification, i.e. "wishes." The sole purpose of the id is to provide for the free and untrammelled discharge of quanta of excitation arising from somatic sources.  

In fulfilling this function, the id operates in accordance with the "pleasure principle" and by means of the "primary process." The "pleasure principle" denotes the biologically grounded imperative to keep the level of bodily excitation constant and as low as possible. The "primary process" accomplishes this function through the immediate discharge of tension through counteracting bodily actions.

Because it does not take into consideration environmental exigencies and because it does not benefit from learning, the primary process has a limited capacity to provide gratification. As a consequence of this insufficiency there is
formed out of the id a new mental agency—the ego—which is
governed by a new principle—the "reality principle." The
ego is viewed by Freud as a specially differentiated portion
of the id; it is "that part of the id which has been modified
by the direct influence of the external world." In
accordance with the "reality principle," the primary function
of the ego is to assume the self-preservation of the organ-
ism by inhibiting the discharge of excitation until the ap-
propriate object in or condition of the environment for the
satisfaction of the need is discovered. This is accomplished
by the development of higher mental processes, or "secondary
processes," such as reasoning out a satisfactory solution
to a problem by "mental experimentation" and verifying that
solution through "reality testing."

A crucial characteristic of this formulation is that it
subordinates the ego to the id. The ego has no purpose
of its own, but is merely a more efficient means of satis-
ifying the instinctual drives comprising the id. Further-
more, it has no energy of its own, but must draw its energy
from the id. The implications of this formulation are some-
what perplexing. In the first place, how are we to account
for the emergence of the ego? Can the interplay of instinct
and environment really explain the conversion of the plea-
sure principle into its exact opposite, the reality principle?
What is there within the id which would deter the organism from a course of continued frustration? More importantly, this formulation poses a dilemma as to the very possibility of psychoanalysis as a profession. As Freud repeatedly states, the aim of therapy is the strengthening of the ego. 5 "Where id is, there ego shall be" is perhaps his most famous motto. Yet too many aspects of Freud's theory point to an inherent weakness of the ego, for him to be sanguine about the chances for greatly strengthening the ego. Thus the theory makes the lasting cure of neurosis, the very aim of psychoanalysis, unlikely. These problems serve as the point of departure for Hartmann's revision of Freud's theory and reformulation of the concept of the ego.

Hartmann's Theory: the Autonomy of the Ego

Hartmann modified Freud's concept of the ego as "servant to the id" by developing the notion of the autonomy of the ego. The ego, Hartmann insisted, must be more than "a developmental by-product of the influence of external reality on the instinctual drives;" its functions must be to some degree independent of the functions of the id. 6 Although Hartmann always emphasizes his continuity with Freud by striving to introduce this notion with the fewest possible repercussions,
on the classical conception of the psychic apparatus as a whole, and by insisting on the limited extent of the ego's autonomy and its susceptibility to regression, nevertheless, in retrospect at least, his modification of the concept of the ego must be viewed as a fundamental revision of Freud's theory.

The functioning of the ego, according to Hartmann, is explainable only if we attribute to the ego biological roots of its own. The development of the ego cannot be solely the result of the impact of environment upon instinct. Rather, says Hartmann, the ego follows its own inherent timetable of development analogous to the development of physiological processes. The ego does not develop out of the id; it is present from the very beginning. It is not to be viewed as the non-biological portion of the personality; rather, it is a manifestation of the adaptive nature of biological instinct.

Introducing this modification of the concept of the ego, Hartmann distinguishes between two forms of autonomy: primary autonomy and secondary autonomy. According to Freud, perception, reality testing, and other higher ego functions develop only when the instinctual drives fail to gain immediate satisfaction. Without denying the importance of instinct-environmental conflict for the development of many ego functions, Hartmann nevertheless singles out several basic ego
functions which he insists are prior to and independent of such conflict, for example, the ego functions of perception, intention, object comprehension, thought, memory, language, and motility. According to Hartmann, these ego functions are "inborn and conflict-free;" they are what Hartmann calls functions of "primary autonomy." In addition to these functions, other ego functions, although originating as defenses against instinctual drives, may develop a relative degree of autonomy (as in the case of reaction formation). These forms of behavior may undergo a "change of function" by means of which they "turn from a means into a goal in their own rights." They thereby become, in Hartmann's words, "ego apparati of secondary autonomy."

Erikson's Theory: the Epigenesis of the Ego

Erikson's theory of ego development may be viewed as an elaboration of Hartmann's concept of the primary autonomy of the ego. What begins with Hartmann as a refinement and extension of Freud's theory becomes with Erikson a full-blown reformulation. Whereas Hartmann restricts the notion of primary autonomy to a few basic ego functions, Erikson takes it as the principle of all ego development. Furthermore, Erikson is more emphatic about the biological nature of the
ego in that he treats ego development as an extension of the biological principle of epigenesis. Derived from the study of the growth of organisms in utero, the principle of epigenesis states that anything that grows has a ground plan, and that out of this ground plan the parts arise, each part having its time of special ascendancy, until all parts have arisen to form a functioning whole.

When applied to the development of the human ego, this means that

...in the sequence of his most personal experiences the healthy child, given a reasonable amount of proper guidance, can be trusted to obey inner laws of development, laws which create a succession of potentialities for significant interaction with those persons who tend and respond to him and those institutions which are ready for him. While such interaction varies from culture to culture, it must remain within 'the proper rate and the proper sequence' which governs all epigenesis. Personality (read ego), therefore, can be said to develop according to steps predetermined in the human organism's readiness to be driven toward, to be aware of, and to interact with a widening radius of significant individuals and institutions.

According to this formulation the relationship between ego development and interaction with the environment is reversed as compared with Freud. No longer is ego development viewed as a response to the impact of the environment.
Rather, ego development derives from the unfolding of an inborn developmental schedule, which itself determines the capacity for and nature of the person's interaction with the environment at each stage.

Also implicit in the principle of epigenesis is the view that ego development is discontinuous: it proceeds in stages. Each stage is characterized by a stage-specific developmental concern or "task," which rises to ascendancy, meets its "crisis," and, if all goes well, finds its lasting "solution" by the end of its specific stage. The human "life cycle" is comprised of eight such stages, the major components of which are summarized in Figure 1 (overleaf). The term "crisis" is used by Erikson "in a developmental sense, to connote not a threat of catastrophe, but a turning point, a crucial period of increased vulnerability and heightened potential." The successful resolution of the tension between these new vulnerabilities and new potentials (in a relatively stable balance which favors the latter), yields a lasting ego strength or "basic virtue."

These virtues exist in the form of predispositions to engage in certain types of behavior (both personal and interpersonal), and are mirrored in the structure of particular social institutions into which that behavior is organized and through which it is maintained.
## Basic Aspects of Erikson's Eight Stages of Human Development

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Identity and Adolescence

Of the eight stages of ego development, it is the fifth stage--roughly equivalent to the period of adolescence--to which Erikson devotes his greatest attention. In contradistinction to most psychoanalytic theories of adolescence, Erikson de-emphasizes the role of sexuality as a source of the conflicts arising at this stage. In fact, Erikson views adolescence as a "psychosexual moratorium," as a sort of second latency period, during which sexual intimacy is postponed in order that other developmental obligations may be met. In effect, Erikson is saying that sexuality may be ignored at this stage because it is repressed--indeed a strange position for a Freudian to take, but one which cannot occupy us at this time.

Physiological maturity, coupled with a relative freedom from interpersonal obligations, make this a period of "role experimentation." Through such experimentation the adolescent seeks to "find himself" by finding himself a niche in some section of his society--a niche which is firmly defined and yet seems to be uniquely made for him. The dominant characteristic of this stage is that it is a period of integration. This integration takes several forms: first, the integration of past accomplishments and future hopes; second, the integration of disparate aspects of the personality; and
These various forms of integration are combined in the concept of identity, and the search for a lasting sense of identity is seen as the ego's developmental task at this stage.

The Concept of Identity

The ambiguity of Erikson's use of the term "identity" (or "ego-identity") is, according to Erikson, not wholly accidental. Says Erikson:

So far I have tried out the term identity almost deliberately—I like to think—in many different connotations. At one time it seemed to refer to a conscious sense of individual uniqueness, at another to an unconscious striving for a continuity of experience, and at a third, as a solidarity with a group's ideals. In some respects the term appeared to be colloquial and naive, a mere manner of speaking, while in others it was related to existing concepts in psychoanalysis and sociology. And on more than one occasion the word slipped in more like a habit that seems to make things appear familiar than as a clarification.

In general, Erikson's approach to making the subject matter more explicit has been to approach the concept from different angles—biographic, clinical, theoretical, etc.—rather than to attempt an exhaustive theoretical formulation. In a sense, Erikson is probably correct in insisting
that to specify the meaning of "identity" too exactly would be to falsify rather than to illuminate the concept. Nevertheless, some systematization and clarification of Erikson's use of the term seems warranted.

Only once has Erikson himself attempted a systematic presentation of the concept of identity and its relation to other psychoanalytic concepts. This is in a paper originally prepared for presentation at the 1953 Midwinter Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Here Erikson distinguishes four fundamental connotations of the term "identity." "At one time it identity will appear to refer to a conscious sense of individual identity; at another, to an unconscious striving for a continuity of personal character; at a third, as a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis; and, finally, as a maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group's ideals and identity." To these four aspects of identity should be added a fifth aspect much discussed in Erikson's subsequent writings on identity: identity as the adoption of a convincing and wholistic worldview, i.e., an ideology. These five aspects will serve as the framework for our attempt to elucidate Erikson's conception of identity and identity formation.
Identity as a Conscious Sense of Individuality (Self-Concept)

According to Erikson, the concept of identity is closely related both to Freud's concept of ego-cathexis (or narcissism) and his concept of the ego ideal. 17 "Narcissism," in Freud's theory represents a state in which libido has been withdrawn from the objects in the outer world and directed at (or invested in) the ego. This takes three forms: as a necessary stage in the early development of the ego (primary narcissism); as a normal residual state in adulthood during periods in which object-cathexes are weak (e.g., sleep); and as a pathological condition accompanying certain forms of neurosis. 18 Later in life the narcissistic libido which during infancy is directed towards the ego is displaced onto a socially inculcated idealized ego, or "ego ideal." The importance of these processes for ego development is summarized by Freud in the following passage:

The development of the ego consists in a departure from the primary narcissism and results in a vigorous attempt to recover it. This departure is brought about by means of the displacement of libido to an ego-ideal imposed from without, while gratification is derived from the attainment of this ideal.

At the same time the ego has put forth its libidinal object-cathexes. It becomes impoverished in consequence both of these cathexes and of the formation of the ego-ideal, and it enriches itself again both by gratification of its object-love and by
fulfilling its ideal.

Part of the self-regard is primary—the residue of childish narcissism; another part arises out of such omnipotence as experience corroborates (the fulfillment of the ego ideal), whilst a third part proceeds from gratification of object libido. With Hartmann, Erikson seems to prefer using the term narcissism to denote the libidinal cathexis of a "self-representation" rather than of the ego itself, but otherwise apparently accepts Freud's theory of narcissism and of the role of the ego ideal. Furthermore, Erikson recognizes in Freud's comments on positive self-regard the precursor both to Hartmann's concept of self-representation and his own concept of identity. He apparently approves of Freud's suggestion of a close relationship between positive self-regard, narcissistic ego-cathexis, attainment of the ego ideal and gratifying object-cathexis. His remarks elsewhere, however, suggest his preference for dealing with these phenomena at the level of concrete clinical observation, rather than at the metapsychological level of imputed libidinal processes.

In his earlier writings, Erikson employed the term "ego identity," in place of the simple word "identity" which he now uses. Among other factors, the similarity between the term "ego identity" and the more familiar term "ego ideal," and the possibilities for confusing them, forced...
Erikson’s to opt for the simpler term. Although ego identity and ego ideal are in some ways similar, Erikson is nevertheless careful to distinguish between them:

Ego identity could be said to be characterized by the more or less actually attained but forever-to-be-revised sense of the reality of the self within social reality; while the imagery of the ego ideal could be said to represent a set of to-be-strived-for but forever-not-quite attainable ideal poles for the self.

Identity is thus closer to Hartmann’s concept of the self-representation than to Freud’s concept of the ego ideal, although attempted fulfillment of the ego ideal may figure in identity formation. In another passage, however, Erikson suggests that it is not so much the self-representation itself which constitutes identity, but the synthesizing capacity of the ego to achieve a "genetic continuity of such a self-representation." These apparently conflicting remarks are reconciled in Erikson’s suggestion that "identity formation ... can be said to have a self-aspect, and an ego aspect." In other words, identity formation has both a subject pole (the ego) and an object pole (the self), and the concept of identity refers to neither the ego nor the self exclusively, but to the successful result of the process by which the ego effects a continuity of the self (or more succinctly, to the process by which ego "identifies"
Only in certain instances, however, are either the self-representation or the process by which the ego integrates the disparate aspects of self into a single continuous self-representation present to consciousness. In most situations they remain unconscious, or at least pre-conscious. Typically, it is only when we are threatened by a loss of identity or when identity formation is almost, but not quite fully accomplished that we experience the transitory extreme consciousness of self, which is the common core of the many forms of "self-consciousness" typical for youth. More often, identity is experienced merely as a diffuse sense of psychosocial well-being.27

Identity as an Unconscious Striving for Continuity

If the conscious endeavor to achieve an integrated and lasting self-concept is, so to speak, only the tip of the iceberg in the formation of identity, what then of the unconscious aspects of the search for identity? Because Erikson avoids the usual terminology for describing unconscious psychic processes, it is sometimes difficult to discern exactly what sorts of unconscious mechanisms he assumes to be operative here. A close examination of some of his des-
criptions of the adolescent's striving for continuity, however, should give us some clue as to the unconscious dynamics of this process. In particular the following two passages should be instructive:

In their search for a new sense of continuity and sameness, adolescents have, to refight many of the battles of earlier years, even though to do so they must artificially appoint perfectly well-meaning people to play the roles of adversaries; and they are ever ready to install lasting idols and ideals as guardians of a final identity.

The sense of ego identity, then, is the accrued confidence that the inner sameness and continuity prepared in the past are matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others.

The first thing that should be clear from these passages is that the unconscious striving for continuity manifests itself in and is accomplished through overt behavior of an interpersonal sort. Thus, to say that the formation of identity is largely an unconscious process is not to suggest that it is accomplished in some deep and impenetrable interior level of the human psyche. Just as on the conscious level the search for identity is not a matter of lonely existential anguish over the question of "Who am I?" on the part of some isolated individual, at the unconscious level too the formation of identity is more of an inter-psychic...
than an intra-psychic phenomenon.

Aside from this, in the above passages, Erikson suggests that identity formation may involve unconscious processes of projection and acting-out, and the introjection of an ego ideal (to use the standard psychoanalytic terminology), and the unconscious "taking the role of the other" (to use symbolic-interactionist terminology).

Identity as Ego-Synthesis

Identity formation, in Erikson's view, is largely a matter of syntheses accomplished by the ego. These syntheses are made on various levels and in various forms, but most important to identity formation is the synthesis of childhood identifications. According to Erikson, identity formation may be viewed as the last of a three-stage schedule by which "the ego grows in ever more mature interplay with the available models." The stages which proceed identity formation and prepare the basis for it are, first, the introjections of infancy, and second, the identifications of childhood. Says Erikson: "Identity formation, finally, begins when the usefulness of identification ends. It arises from the selective repudiation and mutual assimilation of childhood identifications, and their absorption
in a new configuration. "31 "The final identity, then, as
fixed at the end of adolescence is superordinated to any
single identification with individuals of the past: it
includes all significant identifications, but it also al-
ters them in order to make a unique and a reasonably co-
herent whole of them." 32

Other levels at which identity emerges through ego syn-
theses are suggested in the following passage:

From a genetic point of view, then, the
process of identity formation emerges
as an evolving configuration--a con-
figuration which is gradually established
by successive ego syntheses and hypo-
theses throughout childhood; it is a
configuration gradually integrating con-
stitutional givens, idiosyncratic liqiol-
inal needs, favored capacities, signifi-
cant identifications, affective processes,
successful sublimations, and consistent
roles.

Note that here, as in the previous two quotations,
Erikson stresses the continuity of identity formation with
the ego developments of childhood. Such continuity tends
to be obscured in Erikson's writings by his emphasis on the
stage-specificity of ego developmental crises. However, as
Erikson is careful to point out, even though developmental
crises may be stage-specific, ego development is still large-
ly a cumulative process.

While the end of adolescence thus is
the stage of an overt identity crisis, identity formation neither begins nor ends with adolescence: it is a lifelong development largely unconscious to the individual and to his society. Its roots go back all the way to the first self-recognition: in the baby's earliest exchange of smiles there is something of a self-realization coupled with a mutual recognition. Although Erikson is not specific on this point, his emphasis in the above passage suggests that "self-realization coupled with a mutual recognition" may be taken as the quintessential characteristic of identity-formative situations.

Identity as the Establishment of Solidarity with a Group

In the previous pages we have already witnessed the importance of social interaction to the formation of identity. Every situation in which the individual achieves a new conception of himself is paralleled by the establishment of a new relation between himself and the community; every achievement of a new degree of continuity is matched by a new degree of continuity of his meaning in the eyes of others; and every integration of the disparate aspects of his personality is achieved through the further integration of himself into the system of social roles of his community. In fact the social factor in identity formation is so important that
Erikson sometimes speaks of identity formation as a process by which the community "identifies" the individual. Identity formation...is dependent on the process by which a society (often through subsocieties) identifies the young individual, recognizing him as somebody who had to become the way he is and who, being the way he is, is taken for granted. ...the community in turn feels "recognized" by the individual who cares to ask for recognition; it can, by the same token, feel deeply—and vengefully—rejected by the individual who does not seem to care.

A community's ways of identifying the individual, then, must more or less successfully the individual's ways of identifying himself with others.

Identity thus depends on a mutual recognition between the individual and the community and on the reciprocal adaptation of the one to the others. By stressing the social element of identity formation Erikson does not thereby mean to negate the importance of the individual ego, or to suggest that identity is achieved through the individual's completed surrender to given social roles and expectations.

The process of identity formation involves a mutual accommodation, i.e. accommodation on the part of the community as well as the individual, or in Erikson's words, "an implicit mutual contract between the individual and society."
Identity or the function of an ideology

In using the term ideology, Erikson does not restrict himself to the narrow political sense of the word, nor does he use it in a necessarily perjorative sense. According to Erikson, "an ideological system is a coherent body of shared images, ideas, and ideals which, whether based on a formulated dogma, an implicit Weltanschauung, a highly structured world image, a political creed, or, indeed, a scientific creed (especially if applied to men), or a 'way of life,' provides for the participants a coherent, if systematically simplified, over-all orientation in space and time, in means and ends." He understands in this sense, "identity and ideology are the aspects of the same process." It is only within the fixed frame of a stable ideological view of the world that the individual is able to construct a stable and lasting view of himself.

Erikson suggests eight different functions through which ideology serves to promote identity formation in adolescence. A wholistic ideology serves such functions:

(1) A simplified perspective which encompasses all aspects of life and thus counteracts individual 'life confusion';
(2) Some strictly delimiting existence between the inner world of ideals and evils and the real world with its goals and dangers;
(3) An opportunity for exhibiting some uniformity of appearance and behavior counteracting individual identity-consciousness;
(4) Inducement to collective experimentation with roles
and techniques which help overcome a sense of inhibition and personal guilt; (5) introduction into the ethos of the prevailing technology and thus into sanctioned and regulated competition; (6) a geographic-historical world image as a framework for the young individual's budding identity; (7) a rationale for a sexual way of life compatible with a convincing system of principles; and (8) submission to leaders who are above the ambivalence of the parent-child relation.

As we shall see later, however, the benefits of ideological commitment are not without their corrosive potential dangers.

Identity Formation as an Integrative Process

As the previous pages should indicate, identity for
Erikson, cannot be described apart from the processes by which identity is formed. Of the five basic aspects of identity, only the first really speaks to the question of what identity is; the others approach the matter indirectly, in terms of how identity is formed. The underlying thread in each of these descriptions of the process of identity formation is that each views identity formation as an integrative process. This integration may be seen as operating on two distinct but interrelated domains: intrapsychically and interpsychically. There is an integration of disparate aspects of the personality through the unconscious striving for continuity and through syntheses accomplished by the ego; and there is the integration of the individual with the community in terms of his fulfillment of given role expectations and his adoption of the ideals and ideology of the group. These twin processes are dialectically related: integration of the first sort is possible only to the extent that it is paralleled by integration of the second sort.

The Pathologies of Identity Formation

According to Erikson's scheme, at each developmental stage or crisis there is both the potential for the development of a unique ego strength and the vulnerability to a unique developmental pathology. At the stage of adolescence Erikson singles out "role confusion" as the most likely or
most characteristic vulnerability. A close reading of Erikson's writings on identity, however, shows role confusion to be only one of several pathologies typical to adolescence. For example, Erikson also notes the danger of the development of a deviant or "negative" identity. He also mentions the possibility that ideological commitment may take the form of the adoption of a secure but stultifying totalitarian ideology.

These three pathologies may be related to one another in terms of the above conception of identity formation as a process of dual integration. Negative identity may be viewed as a successful integration at the intra-psychic level, but which is accomplished at the expense of a failure to integrate with society. In other words, the personality becomes integrated in terms of its opposition to the approved roles and norms of the society. Conversely, submission to a totalitarian ideology may be viewed as a totally accommodating integration with the norms and views of a culture (or subculture) but which is accomplished in the absence of the development of an independent and internally integrated ego. Finally, role confusion applies only to those extreme situations where there is a failure to achieve integration either within the individual personality or vis-a-vis society.
Ego and Environment

In Freud's theory, you will recall, the ego was "developed out of the id by the continual influence of the external world." The ego thus came to form the interface between the id and the external environment. It arose out of the inevitable conflicts arising between non-adaptive instincts seeking gratification and an independent and objective external reality. A comparison of Freud's concept of the ego and Erikson's concept of identity shows them to be structurally very similar. Ego identity, according to Erikson, is that part of the ego (and of the personality as a whole) which is closest to the external social reality. It is, as with Freud's "ego", the interface between the psychic apparatus and the external world. In a sense, then, we might say that Erikson transposes Freud's id psychology to the level of the ego by giving the ego attributes which Freud ascribed only to the id—i.e., a biological basis and an autonomous developmental schedule. Erikson then concentrates in the concept of "identity" those aspects of the ego which are the least biologically determined and the most environmentally influenced, so that the identity becomes the locus for a characteristic which Freud attributed to the ego as a whole—its role as a mediator between biological and social (and other...
environmental) forces.

The effects of this transformation are profound. By treating ego development as biologically grounded, Erikson changes the concept of instinct from a view which sees instincts as "blind" (i.e., non-adaptive) to one which sees them as inherently adaptive. As a result, the interface between instinct and environment need not be a point of necessary and unresolvable conflict, as it is for Freud, but may instead be a point of pre-established harmony. This harmonious conception is taken up by Erikson in his notion of "mutuality" or "co-wheeling" of generations, in his concept of an "average expectable environment" and his view of the nature and function of social institutions.

Erikson uses the term "mutuality," to refer to the coordination of psychic needs and capacities between generations which serves to promote the conflict-free development of the human ego and the incorporation of the individual into his society. "Erikson postulates what he calls a "co-wheeling of the life cycles": the representatives of society, the "caretaking persons", are coordinated to the developing individual by their specific interactions which satisfy his needs and by phase-specific needs of their own. The inborn epigenetic schedule insures that the predispositions of differ-
ent generations serve to promote the development of one another.

This mutuality creates for the growing individual a series of "average expectable environments" which are attuned to his developmental needs at each stage, and to which he is himself "preadapted."

The specific kind of preadaptedness of the human infant—namely, the readiness to grow by epigenetic steps through psychosocial crises—calls not only for one basic environment, but for a whole sequence of "expectable" environments, for as the child adapts in spurts and stages he has a claim, at any given stage reached, to the next "average expectable environment." In other words, the human environment as a whole must permit and safeguard a series of more or less discontinuous and yet culturally and psychologically consistent developments, each extending further along the radius of expanding life tasks.

The concept of mutuality extends even to the genesis and function of social institutions.

Each successive stage and crisis has a special relation to one of the basic institutionalized endeavors of man for the simple reason that the human life cycle and human institutions have evolved together. The relation between them is twofold: each generation brings to those institutions the remnant of infante needs and youthful anxiety and receives from them—as long as they, instead, manage to maintain their institutional vitality—a specific reinforcement of childlike vitality.
The institutional order of society thus tends to be so constructed as to meet and invite a succession of potentialities for ego development and to safeguard and encourage the proper rate and the proper sequence of their unfolding. Each of the major social institutions—religion, law, economic institutions, technology, education, science, etc.—reflects the needs of the ego at a particular stage of development and is maintained by the ego strength derived from this stage. Erikson suggests the need for a "psychoanalytic sociology" to accomplish "the task of conceptualizing man's environment as the persistent endeavor of the generations to join in the organizational effort of providing an integrated series of "average acceptable environments." Given this view of the social realm and the corresponding emphasis on integration, it is not surprising that Erikson gives so much of his attention to adolescence and its problems, for it is at this stage that the problem of the integration of each new generation into the institutional structure of society meets its "roots," and it is through the process of identity formation that such an integration is accomplished.
FURTHER THEORIES OF IDENTITY

Psychoanalytic theory is only one of several contemporary approaches to the issue of the formation of identity (or, as it is more often termed, the formation of self). In this section we shall consider three additional approaches, both for what they themselves contribute to our understanding of identity and in order to highlight and expand upon certain elements of the psychoanalytic conception.

It is common today to speak of three "forces" or schools of thought in psychology. The first approach, the Freudian or psychoanalytic, has already been dealt with. The second is behaviorism, also known as associationistic or stimulus-response psychology. The third is known variously as humanist, existentialist, or self-actualization psychology. These latter two shall be discussed in the sections which follow. In addition to these, we shall also be concerned with the Meadian or symbolic-interactionist perspective on identity.

The Behaviorist Approach to Identity

According to Skinnerian behaviorism, man (i.e., man's behavior) is almost wholly conditioned by his environment. The only residual not determined by environmental conditions is a limited number of instinctual reflexes. The basic con-
cept of behaviorism is that of the reflex, or stimulus-response arc. Every human behavior or pattern of behavior (response) may be likened to a contingency in the external environment (stimulus) which acts as a reinforcer for that behavior. The importance of internal or mental mediations between stimulus and response is minimized. Mental states do not contribute to our knowledge of the determinants of behavior—they are epiphenomenal and not causally linked to behavior.

Generally speaking the concept of identity is foreign to the behaviorist approach. There is some discussion among behaviorists, however, over related concepts such as identification, internalization, and, in particular, self-concept. For Skinnerian behaviorists, one's self-concept is, in the first place, determined by the social environment, and, in the second place, oftentimes an extreme distortion of one's true nature. In particular, self-concepts which incorporate a feeling of autonomy or which are framed in moralistic terms (eg. Erikson's "basic virtues") are culturally fostered illusions. The only scientific meaning we can give to the term "self" is expressed by Skinner in the following statement: "A self is a repertoire of behavior appropriate to a given set of contingencies, and a substantial part of the conditions to which a person is exposed may play a dominant role... The identity conferred upon a self arises from the
continencies responsible for the behavior. According to this view, the only type of self awareness that is not illusory involves the individual's ability to discriminate the operant properties of his own behavior which serve as sources of control for himself and social others.

The Humanist Approach to Identity

Diametrically opposed to the behaviorist approach is that group of writers and therapists we have called the "humanist" school. The most prominent among these are Abraham Maslow, Rollo May, and Carl Rogers. In this section we shall deal primarily with Rogers' theory since it is both the most fully articulated, and most relevant to our concern with identity. It should be noted that in many ways Erikson's views of the therapeutic process and of human development resemble those of the humanist school. They are distinct from Erikson, however, in their rejection of an opposition to Freudian metapsychology.

Rogers' view of human development evolved with and cannot be understood apart from his conception of the therapeutic process. Emotional or developmental disorders are seen by Rogers as manifestations of "incongruence," which means that there is some discrepancy between the way the person
in question perceives himself (his "self") and what he is experiencing. Such incongruence, oftentimes unconscious, makes the person vulnerable to anxiety, depression, and above all to a sense of threatened self-image. The therapist, if he is to help the patient, must first of all be "congruent" himself. That is, his must not misrepresent what is happening between himself and the client. Secondly, he must display "unconditional positive regard" for the client. This means that the therapist must always hold the client himself in high esteem, irrespective of the client's specific behaviors or the therapist's opinions concerning those behaviors. The therapist must also attain an empathetic understanding of the client's subjective thoughts and feelings.

These conditions being set, therapy proceeds through the ever more open expression of the patient's thoughts and feelings. These expressions often relate to the patient's concept of "self" and to the relationship between self and experience. In the course of this process, incongruencies between self and experience are articulated and resolved. The result is a reorganization of the self-structure. The patient's perceptions of himself and his experience become more accurate. His conceptions of his real self and of his ideal self accommodate to one another and become more congruent.
This conception of therapy is based on the assumption that humans have an "inherent tendency... to develop all... capacities in ways which serve to enhance the person." This "self-actualizing tendency" is understood as a striving toward congruence between each individual's experience and the unique nature of his inner self. This congruency may be impeded by environmental conditions or by denials and distortions of experience caused by a threat to self-image. The role of therapy is to remove these impediments and to make such distortion unnecessary through continuing unconditional positive regard.

The most important of the concepts which comprise Rogers' theoretical framework is his concept of the "self." Like Erikson's concept of identity, its precise meaning is left ambiguous or implicit and derives largely from common-sense usage of the term. In general, the term refers to an essential inner nature which is instinctual, yet individual, and which exists in the form of natural capacities and inclinations.

The self is characterized by two potentially conflicting qualities. In the first place, the self exists as a tendency toward (self-) actualization of an essential inner nature. In the second place, one's conscious awareness of
self arises and becomes associated with feelings of "belongingness." There develops with the self a need for positive regard both by the self and by others. The self comes to be selective in so far as the positive regard of others is conditional on certain types of thoughts and behaviors.

The self thus develops according to two distinct principles. The one, based on self-actualization, encourages or discourages behavior depending on whether or not the resulting experience is seen as one which will enhance the person and fulfill his inner nature. The other, based on the need for positive regard, encourages or discourages behavior depending on whether or not the resulting experience is seen as one which will meet with approval from significant others. Clearly, the person often encounters situations in which these two basic needs dictate opposite behaviors.

It is within the context of this conflict between these two basic needs, the need for self-actualization and the need for positive regard, that all self development takes place. Developmental disorders, understood as a falsification of or an incongruence between self and experience, are the result of failure to accommodate these two basic needs to one another.
The Meadian Approach to Identity

The last approach to the issue of identity (or self) formation which we shall consider is that of George H. Mead. Mead refers to his perspective as that of a "social behaviorist." As we shall see, however, he differs greatly from that sort of behaviorism represented by Skinner, and in many ways more closely resembles Erikson in his understanding of the development of self.

Like the behaviorists, Mead emphasizes the importance of the social environment as a determinant of individual development. For Mead, the whole (society) is prior to the part (the individual), not the part to the whole; and the part must be explained in terms of the whole—not vice versa. The conduct of the individual can only be understood in terms of the organized conduct of the social group. Says Mead:

We must regard mind... as arising and developing within the social process, within the empirical matrix of social interactions. We must, that is, get an inner individual experience from the standpoint of social acts which include the experiences of separate individuals in a social context wherein those individuals interact. The processes of experience which the human brain makes possible are made possible only for a group of interacting individuals: only for individual organisms which are members of a society, not for the individual organism in isolation from other individual organisms.
Head explicitly rejects partially social interpretations of psychic phenomena which, like Erikson, agree that psychic development requires a social environment, but nevertheless maintain that it is rooted in biological processes.

...this entirely social theory or interpretation of mind—this contention that mind develops and has its being only in and by virtue of the social process of experience and activity, which it hence presupposes, and that in no other way can it develop and have its being—must be clearly distinguished from the partially (but only partially) social view of mind. On this view, though mind can get expression only within or in terms of the environment of an organized social group, yet it is nevertheless in some sense a native endowment—a congenital or hereditary biological attribute—of the individual organism, and could not otherwise exist or manifest itself in the social process at all; so that it is not itself essentially a social phenomenon, but rather is biological both in its nature and in its origin, and is social only in its characteristic manifestations or expressions. According to this latter view, moreover, the social process presupposes, and in a sense is a product of, mind; in direct contrast is our opposite view that mind presupposes, and is a product of, the social process.

Nevertheless, in contrast to the behaviorists, Head does not deny the importance of human subjectivity, nor does he treat individuals as the passive object of societal conditioning. Although both are social in nature, the human psyche has two poles—an object pole and a subject pole. Individuals are both the objects of socially conditioning
agencies, and the active subjects who construct and react to such agencies. Mead calls these two poles of social functioning the "I" (subject) and the "me" (object). 60

Mead's theory of the formation of the self concerns the process by which the person as a subject ("I") comes to view himself (his self) as a social object ("me"). This process is seen as arising directly from the nature of social interaction.

The primary characteristic of the experience of the self, and one which distinguishes it from all other experiences, is that it is an object to itself. 61 This turning back of the experience of the individual upon himself Mead calls "reflexiveness." Such a process is possible only within the context of social interaction and results from our assuming (often unconsciously) the attitudes of others toward ourselves. The development of our conceptions of self thus arises indirectly and is mediated by the experience of others.

The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoint of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only in so far as he
first becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or in his experience; and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved.

Mead postulates two general stages in the full development of self. At the first of these stages, the individual's self is constituted simply by the organization of the particular attitudes of other individuals toward himself in the specific social interactions in which he participates with them. At a later stage, the self is constituted not only by the organization of these particular individual attitudes, but also by an organization of the social attitudes of the "generalized other," i.e., of the social group as a whole to which he belongs. These attitudes enter the individual constitution of his self by means of a generalization or synthesis of the attitudes of particular others. The self thus reaches full development by incorporating within itself the general systematic pattern of social or group behavior in which it and the other selves are all involved. In this way "the unity and structure of the complete self reflects the unity and structure of the social process as a whole."
COMPARISON OF EXISTING THEORIES OF IDENTITY--TOWARDS A REFORMULATION.

In the preceding pages we have discussed four different conceptualizations of the formation of a sense of self or identity, or five, if we treat classical Freudian theory as distinct from Eriksonian ego psychology. In this final section we shall attempt a critical comparison of these five theories, with the aims of elucidating the common features of the various conceptions, of revealing the weaknesses of particular theories as compared with others, and of suggesting a reformulation of the concept which incorporates many of the features of existing theories, yet moves beyond them in certain important ways.

Our consideration of existing theories has led us to the conclusion that there is one overriding issue to which each theory of identity must address itself, and according to which different theories may be compared. This is the relation between the individual self and society. Our remarks in these final pages will focus on this fundamental theme.
The concept of identity as a specification of the relation between the Individual Self and Society

All theories of identity are implicitly theories of the relation between the individual and society. A brief summary of the ways in which the various theories approach this problem will better enable us to specify their differences and to compare their relative merits.

The Freudian theory views the relation between the individual and society as one of inevitable conflict. This conflict pits man's instinctual nature, as embodied in the pleasure principle, against society's interests in order and self-preservation, as embodied in the reality principle. The ego, arising at the interface between instinct and environment, embodies these conflicts in the forms of mechanisms of defense, and oftentimes neurotic symptoms.

Erikson reverses this view of the inevitable conflict between individual and society and replaces it with a conception which assumes a biologically grounded, pre-established harmony between the two. This is accomplished by treating instinct as adaptive rather than blind, by rooting ego development in biological maturation, and by treating the social order as a derivative of psycho-developmental needs. The concept of identity is crucial to this formulation since
identity formation finalizes the harmonious integration of individual and society implicit in their respective natures.

Erikson's formulation is similar to Freud's in that he views self as deriving from social interaction and as a token of the individual's integration into society. In contrast to Erikson, however, he accounts for this integration of self and society more in terms of the influence of society upon the individual than in terms of the influence of the biological nature of the individual upon the structure of social institutions.

Each of the preceding formulations, in one way or another, treats identity (or self) as developing out of the interaction between individual and society. The last two theories differ from these in denying the importance of such an interaction. The humanist theory treats the self as biologically inherent in the individual human psyche and self-actualization as the accomplishment of the individual—often achieved only through the renunciation of societal demands. The behaviorist theory takes the opposite point of view. According to it the individual is wholly conditioned by his social environment. The individual self is nothing more than an organized set of responses to societal and environmental contingencies.

These five different conceptions of the relation between individual and society are schematized in Figure 2 (overleaf).
Figure 2.

1.) Freud

2.) Erikson

3.) Mead

4.) Rogers

5.) Skinner
Towards a Reformulation of the Concept of Identity

In this section we wish to propose an alternative conception of identity which is in many ways a synthesis of the theories considered above, and yet, which by combining features of several of these theories leads to conclusions which are wholly different. The basic theoretical framework for this view is derived from the Hegelian-Marxian conception of man. This conception emphasizes that the relationship between the individual and the social world is a truly reciprocal or dialectical one: that man as an active subject determines the social world at the same time that he is determined by it. Self and society are inextricably interwoven entities; the two maintain and change one another by means of a reciprocal structured-structuring relationship. This view denies a natural or a priori structure to either the individual personality or to the organization of society. There is neither a biologically fixed substratum determining the variability of socio-cultural formations, nor does society function according to natural or inevitable "laws" which impose themselves on individual behavior or development. Neither the subjectivity of the human individual nor the objectivity of the social order may be denied.

According to this formulation, self or identity is formed out of this dialectic between individual and society and embodies all of the tensions and unfolding contradictions.
inherent in this dialectic. Identity formation takes place within the context of a specific, socially constructed world. The self is not passively determined by the social order, however, but takes form only as it actively responds to and acts upon that social order. Identity formation may be viewed as an integration of self and society, however, this must be conceived as a dynamic rather than a static integration. Contradictions which emerge from the structure of the society are mediated through individual life histories and in particular through the tensions and conflicts surrounding identity formation. These contradictions are resolved only in so far as they lead to the formation of individual selves who experience the need for social change as part of their experience of their own identity.

It should be apparent that this conception of identity formation has much in common with a number of the previously considered theories, and especially with the theories of Erikson and Mead. Both view identity as arising out of the interaction between the individual and society. The difference is that each of these theories is largely static in that this integration is largely predetermined by the dominance of one of the poles to this interaction over the other. Erikson guarantees integration by viewing society as determined by the nature of the individual psyche. Mead, in his homage to behaviorism, emphasizes the determination
of the self by society over the determination of society by selves. Although in his formulation of the "I" and the "we" he allows for the possibility of the reciprocal impact of the self upon society, for the most part this reciprocal impact is restricted to a reactionary or feedback role, and nowhere is it suggested that the self's reaction to society might fundamentally alter the structure of social relationships from which it originally derived.

Because of this prefigured integration embodied in their theories, neither Erikson nor Mead can adequately deal with conflict or change. Failure to achieve an integrated identity (and thus adjustment to society) is viewed by both as an exception to the natural and normal course of events. Conflicts surrounding identity formation are not understood in terms of their relation to social change. Indeed, it is difficult to see where change might come from within such an inevitably integrated system.

Freud, on the other hand, allows for conflict in the formation of self by treating neither the individual nor society as a derivative of the other. However, Freud does not allow for the reciprocal impact of self and society upon one another. Both are viewed as fixed and unchangeable in their essential natures. Freud thus hypostatizes the conflict between self and society as the cosmic struggle be-
between self and society as the cosmic struggle between the pleasure principle and the reality principle. He does not recognize the historical and changing nature of self, society, and the tension between them.

The alternative conception of identity which we have suggested here, while compatible with many aspects of existing theories, is, we believe, superior to them in its ability to incorporate identity formation and the conflicts surrounding it within the context of a theory of social conflict and change. The task remains of fully elaborating and documenting such a theory, and of applying it to contemporary trends of identity formation and their implications for social change. We intend to pursue these topics in a later paper.
NOTES


8. Ibid., p. 23.


10. Ibid., p. 93.

11. Ibid., p. 96.

12. Ibid., p. 156.

13. Ibid., p. 156.


16. Ibid., p. 102. Unfortunately, Erikson does not elaborate on this four-fold distinction in the remainder of the paper, and, significantly, this passage is deleted from a revised version of this paper which forms a chapter of
Erikson's later work—Identity: Youth and Crisis—another indication of Erikson's hesitancy to specify the various aspects of identity too exactly.

17. Ibid., p. 147.


19. Ibid., p. 100.


22. See Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, pp. 70-71, and also Dialogue with Erik Erikson, p. 86.


24. Ibid., p. 149.

25. Ibid., p. 147.

26. Ibid., p. 149.


29. Ibid., p. 261.


31. Ibid., p. 159.

32. Ibid., p. 141.


34. Ibid., pp. 113-114.


36. See Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 12, n. 1 for an elaboration of this point.
41. See ibid., pp. 172-176.
42. See ibid., pp. 74-90.
44. See Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents.
46. This term, like many of Erikson's concepts derives from Hartmann. See Hartmann, Eco Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation.
47. Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 222.
48. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
49. Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 270.
50. The social institution corresponding to the fifth stage, adolescence, is, according to Erikson's earliest formulation, social stratification (see Childhood and Society, p. 279). In later formulations, however, Erikson substitutes ideology (see Identity: Youth and Crisis, p. 133).
52. There are several varieties of behaviorism. In this section we shall be concerned with that type of behaviorism most influential in the U.S.--the Skinnerian.
54. In the Skinnerian vocabulary, an "operant" is a response of the organism which operates on the environment and that is directed toward reinforcement.
55. Shaw and Costanzo, Theories of Social Psychology, p. 44.

57. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, p. 7.

58. Ibid., p. 133.

59. Ibid., pp. 223-224.

60. Ibid., pp. 174-175.

61. Ibid., p. 136.

62. Ibid., p. 138.

63. Ibid., p. 156.

64. Ibid., p. 144.

55. See especially Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents.
CONCLUSION

Although using different evidence and different models of human nature, Erikson and Piaget agree on the stages of affective development which underlie the preschool and school years. To this consensus, Piaget contributes a cognitive sequence of development which gives it more strength. Erikson presents a number of important ideas about how social structure and resources which surround the child contribute to or impede his personal development. These ideas are vague but worth developing. What Erikson contributes is a way of thinking about these connections which is useful. The creative and destructive dialectics between the individual and specific social institutions for children of different backgrounds needs to be researched. This would provide valuable information for developing educational programs which could respond to deficiencies and augment supports in the child's environment so that he or she has a better chance to mature in a healthy way. When all that is done, however, we will probably find that schools do not make much difference.