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ABSTRACT

The manual was designed as a practical guide for police department personnel in developing robbery control programs. An introductory chapter defines types of robberies and suggests administrative and operational uses of the manual. Research and control strategies are reported according to five robbery types: street (visible and non-visible), residential, vehicle, and commercial. Robbery control projects in five cities (Miami, New York City, Denver, Kansas City, and Minneapolis) are described in detail. A chapter on developing a robbery control project presents a step-by-step process for analyzing the pattern of robberies in a community and planning actions to combat them. Techniques are described that can be adapted for use by police departments of any size. Other chapters deal in depth with organizational and operational problems, training curriculum and methods, and sources of funding. Appended items are: (1) synopsis of robbery programs in 30 cities including program title, descriptions, cost, and a contact for each; (2) analyses of robbery and assault in Worcester, Massachusetts; and (3) public information material used in some of the programs. A 71-item selected bibliography is also contained in the manual. (Author/MS)

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

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POLICE ROBBERY CONTROL MANUAL

By

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FOREWORD

Robbery is among the most common and serious of crimes. In 1973, more than 382,000 robberies were reported to police, and recent LEAA surveys of crime victims show that the actual incidence of the crime is probably three times higher than the reported figure. In financial terms alone, robbery imposes a heavy burden: losses from robbery in 1973 totaled an estimated $100 million. Added to this is the tremendous price many Americans pay in fear and suffering.

In recent years a number of police departments have undertaken robbery control programs as part of their general crime prevention efforts. Because little attention has been focused on these efforts, many communities are unaware of the experience of other jurisdictions in devising successful programs.

The National Institute has prepared this "Prescriptive Package" on Police Robbery Control Projects to serve as a practical guide for police departments. The manual describes in detail robbery control projects in five cities and summarizes the operations of projects in another 30 cities. An entire chapter is devoted to the step-by-step process of analyzing the pattern of robberies in a community and fashioning action plans to combat the crime. A number of different types of robberies—from the visible street variety to the planned commercial robbery—are examined and control strategies suggested. New techniques are presented which, with minor adaptations, can be used by small, medium and large police departments.

GERALD M. CAPLAN, *Director*

PREFACE

The primary focus of this manual is on the development of projects which have an impact on the crime of robbery. The approach has involved research into existing programs, case studies, previous research, training, evaluation and funding models. The manual has been designed for both the administrator and line personnel ranging from general to specific applications in the development of a robbery control project; and with the following basic objectives:

- To provide criminal justice practitioners with an overview of robbery control projects in the United States.
- To provide a guide for the development of robbery control projects.
- To provide specific information which will enable the administrator and the line operation to develop, fund, implement, and evaluate their own project.

Essentially, this manual reflects the views of numerous persons, most of whom are criminal justice practitioners. We have drawn not only upon our experience as former police officers but also on the experience of numerous colleagues in the criminal justice system. Our goal was to develop a manual which will be of use to law enforcement agencies, and in so doing we have consciously avoided making this an academic treatise. Our intention was to produce a document that will answer questions, stimulate thought, and provide a background in the area of robbery control.

During the course of this study we visited over twenty cities and talked to hundreds of people, all of whom were willing to take time from their busy schedules to help. It would be impossible to thank each of them individually here, but we would like to make general mention of their contributions. Numerous police departments responded to our initial questionnaire, and we would like to thank them also. Without such assistance this manual would have been difficult, if not impossible, to complete.

Several persons have given of their time to read drafts of the manual and we would like to thank them also. We are particularly indebted to Dave Powell, formerly of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and Darrel Stephens, who was at the Institute on leave from the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, for their efforts and assistance as the project monitors. Mary Ann Beck, of the National Institute, also provided invaluable assistance and guidance through several versions of the manuscript.

We are indebted to Commissioner Robert DiGrazia of the Boston, Massachusetts, Police Department; Chief of Detectives Louis C. Cottell, Inspector Patrick Fitzsimmons and Deputy Inspector Terrence McKeon of the New York City Police Department; Dr. Gordon Misner of the University of Missouri at St. Louis; President Donald Riddle, Dr. Carl Wiedemann and Dr. Thomas Reppetto of John Jay College of Criminal Justice, all of whom assisted us with the initial focus on which this manual has been developed.

Particular thanks should also go to Major Fred Guenther, and Mr. Tom Sweeney, Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department; Sergeant Richard Witt of the Miami, Florida, Police Department; Detective Richard Nolen and Officer Gary Wright of the Huntington Beach, California, Police Department; and Lieutenant Terry McCann, Sergeants Steve Hartie and Robert Louden, of the New York City Police Department.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

The crime of robbery has tremendous impact upon the public, and in many cities and towns it is viewed as a barometer of police effectiveness. The fear of "crime in the streets" is largely a fear of robbery, and in many cities this fear has resulted in citizens virtually imprisoned behind their own locked doors. Robbery has contributed to the decay of our urban centers and has served to keep people from recreational and cultural centers. The Federal Bureau of Investigation reports a total of 382,680 robberies in the United States in 1973. This does not include unreported robberies, and, according to a victimization study conducted in eight American cities, between 40 and 50 percent of all robberies are not reported.[1]

While robbery is frequently viewed as an urban phenomenon, it is not unknown in suburban and rural areas. Robbery is more prevalent in the Northeastern states and occurs less frequently in the Western states. However, whereas the Northeastern states witnessed a 4 percent decrease in robberies during 1973, Western, North Central, and Southern States experienced respectively a 5 percent, 1 percent, and 11 percent increase in robberies during 1973.[2]

During 1973, robbery increased by 2 percent, and since 1968, robbery has increased 46 percent. Robbery remains one of the more difficult problems facing law enforcement agencies today. Data relative to robbery is relatively scarce, and that which does exist often focuses upon one particular aspect of the crime. During the past few years many police departments have begun to develop robbery control projects, often combining them with a general crime prevention program. The concept of crime specific planning has also resulted in greater interest and efforts in the robbery area. Unfortunately, much of the work and programs now underway have not received wide dissemination, and frequently it has not been possible to learn from the mistakes and/or accomplishments of others. This manual represents an attempt to bring together under one cover information which will aid both the police administrator and line personnel in making decisions and developing programs to combat robbery.

A. The Crime of Robbery

Generally, robbery is defined as: "theft and attempted theft, directly from a person or commercial establishment, of property or cash by force or threat of force, with or without a weapon."[3]

For purposes of clarification, the authors have categorized the types of robberies as follows:

1. Street Robbery:
   Visible—Those robberies occurring on a public street or thoroughfare which would not be obstructed from public view.
   Non-Visible—Those robberies occurring in public places, facilities or buildings not categorized as a street or thoroughfare. The actual place or structure becomes a visibility issue in that it shields the perpetrator(s) from the public view. An example of such a crime would be a robbery in a public transportation facility.
2. Residential Robbery:
   An action whereupon the perpetrator forcefully enters the domicile of a person for the purpose of taking that person's possessions and valuables.
3. Vehicle Robbery:
   A robbery in which the operator of a commercial type vehicle is the target of the crime. For example, robberies of taxi cabs, buses, and milk trucks would fit this category.
4. Commercial Robbery:
   A robbery against a commercial establishment where cash and other valuables are available.

In 1965 it was estimated that robberies cost the American public over $27 million, not including the personal costs in terms of injury or other harm done the victim. Arnold Sagalyn notes that the fifty-seven large core cities (populations over 250,000) experience 75 percent of all the robberies that

take place in the United States each year.[4] A major consequence of robbery is fear, and while the number of actual robbery victims is relatively small, the public perception generates a fear that is frequently out of proportion to reality. However, to an individual, perception is reality. Because the average robbery victim is accosted in an unexpected and potentially violent manner, the unknown and unpredictable factors contribute to the fear.[5]

In the following chapter we have attempted to draw together the results of robbery research as an aid in developing strategies and tactics for a robbery program. It is not all inclusive and the reader is encouraged to review the bibliography and familiarize himself thoroughly with the available literature.

B. The Robbery Project Manual

This manual draws together both current research and data relative to robbery and descriptive data relative to robbery control projects underway throughout the United States. Obviously, this volume cannot be all inclusive, but it does provide the reader with information which can be used to conduct further research or to develop or improve a robbery control project. The manual is designed to serve four functions:

- Provide crime specific information which can be used for comparative purposes by planning or crime analysis units.
- Provide a descriptive analysis of current projects, which should aid in selecting suitable efit data, and the means for evaluating projects.
- Provide specific information for those personnel actually engaged in a robbery control project.
- Provide the administrator with information on funding, resource allocation factors, cost-benefit data, and the means for evaluating projects.

Furthermore, recognizing the diversity of the robbery problem, an attempt has been made to develop several typologies which will aid in developing a robbery control project suitable to an individual city and useful for focusing upon particular types of offenders or geographic areas.

The manual is designed primarily to assist law enforcement agencies in the development or improvement of a robbery control project. Essential to this is the ability to evaluate successes and failure, compare the costs of one program over another, determine resource allocation needs, and implement the program with a minimum of problems.

An attempt has been made to develop "model" projects which are based upon the findings of this study. In many cases this is based upon subjective judgments and interviews with those now engaged in robbery projects. In order to facilitate communication, Appendix A outlines various robbery control projects now in existence and persons who can be contacted for further information. Much of the material in Appendix A is based upon self-reported data, although on-site visits were made to some twenty police departments to develop further information.

Information on particular robbery types and likely offenders is presented in order to assist in the planning effort. This includes socio-economic and demographic data where applicable. Those involved in the line operation should be familiar with probable targets, suspects and other factors which will enhance the design of a successful robbery control program.

Because of the wide variety of approaches to robbery control, the manual should also serve to assist in other areas. These might include crime analysis, community relations and general patrol techniques.

C. Administrative Uses of the Manual

The decision to develop a robbery control project lies with the police administrator, and his decision should be supported by relevant information. How, for example, does one determine that a robbery problem does exist? Obviously, this varies from area to area. Where it has been determined that a robbery problem does exist, what is the most effective way to deal with it? This depends, in large measure, upon existing resources, funds available, and other departmental and community needs. Where a robbery project is to be implemented, how long should it run, how can its effectiveness be measured, and where should it be located organizationally? The importance of evaluation cannot be overstated, and while it is often difficult to isolate the variables involved in robbery, it is possible to develop measures of effectiveness.

The police administrator will find that the manual, while not providing all of the answers, should help in reaching a decision as to what may be best

for his city. It will also assist in developing funding proposals with a strong evaluation component.

D. Operational Uses of the Manual

The manual develops various strategies to be employed and offers alternative suggestions for various situations. In some instances this is specific, such as illustrations of public information fliers, general orders, and operating procedures. In some cases it may be more general, such as the explanation of patrol strategies, or decision-making techniques in the investigation of robbery. It should be kept in mind that the uses of the manual, as well as suggestions made herein are not all inclusive and that further information can be obtained by direct contact with those people listed in Appendix A.

Several aspects of the manual will be of interest to different units within a department. Investigators may find crime-specific information which will aid in general investigations, even though a robbery project has not been established. Public Relations and Community Relations Units may find much of the printed material of other departments to be of value in developing public awareness or in gaining public assistance in combating robbery. Crime Analysis Units will find the typological and methodological data of value in analyzing robbery reports and identifying possible suspects. The patrol force should find the manual of value in developing patrol strategies and training officers to observe high-target locations and possible suspects. Finally, many departments may choose not to develop a specific robbery control project, but rather to use applicable sections of the manual which will help improve specific units of the department. It should be kept in mind, however, that a coordinated and cooperative departmental approach is vital whether it be undertaken by a single unit or by the department as a whole.

E. References

[1]*Crime in Eight American Cities: Advance Report,* U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service. Washington, D.C. (July, 1974), p. 38.

[2]Clarence M. Kelly, Crime in the United States, F.B.I. 1973 Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 15.

[3]*Crime in Eight American Cities, Op. Cit.*, p. 7.

[4]Arnold Sagalyn, *The Crime of Robbery in the U.S.*, NILECJ (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971) p. 1, citing F. Alexander and W. Healy *Roots of Crime* n.1.

[5]John E. Conklin, *Robbery and the Criminal Justice System* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1972), p. 5.

CHAPTER II. RESEARCH ON ROBBERY

Robbery takes many forms, and in order to combat it law enforcement officials must be familiar with its typology and characteristics. This includes knowledge about the victim and the perpetrator, as well as socioeconomic and demographic factors. Generally, the literature in this area is scarce, as is the research. Nevertheless, a number of studies have been undertaken and this chapter presents some of the more significant findings.

We do know that certain types of businesses are more susceptible to robbery, and there is a growing body of literature in victimology which indicates that certain people may invite robbery by their actions for "when they display their possessions to impress one group of people (intended to view them), they are also tempting potential criminals."[1] Conklin's study of Boston robbery also points to a victim proneness to robbery on the part of certain individuals. His study found a clustering of robberies upon a small number of individuals. People who walk the streets at night alone, elderly people, a lone employee in a convenience store, are all more susceptible to robbery than a nine-to-five person who is not out after dark.[2]

The two most common forms of robbery are those committed on the street and those against commercial establishments, primarily liquor stores, gas stations and small service markets.

A study on victimization in eight cities, conducted by the National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, in 1974, indicates:

- The combined rate for robbery and attempted robbery without injury was about two to three times greater than that for robbery and attempted robbery with injury.
- The proportion of robberies committed by strangers was greater than the proportion of assaults committed by strangers.
- Persons under 35 were more likely to have been victims of robbery without contact than those thirty-five and over.
- Persons with annual incomes of less than $10,000 were more apt to be victims of robbery than those with incomes above $10,000.
- In general, crimes against individuals were least well reported, although crimes of violence were more frequently brought to police attention than crimes of personal theft.
- Attempted commercial robberies were fairly well reported.
- The most commonly cited reasons for not reporting personal and commercial victimizations to the police were a belief that, because of lack of proof, nothing could be accomplished, and a feeling the experience was not sufficiently important to merit police attention.[3]

John E. Conklin maintains that the rise in reported robberies is not due to better reporting and recording procedures, as some people speculate, but that there has been an actual increase in crime. He notes that changing age distributions may have had a slight impact on the rise in robberies, but attributes it also to changing race relations in the country—relations that have created increasing expectations among blacks that have not been realized. Added to this are the availability of dangerous weapons, high rates of drug addiction among blacks and in some cases an ideology which views the social structure as illegitimate.[4]

Armed robberies accounted for 66 percent of all robberies in 1972, with strong-arm robberies accounting for 34 percent. The FBI Uniform Crime Report indicates that:

> Special surveys have indicated that approximately 63 percent of all armed robbery is committed with a firearm, 24 percent with a knife or other cutting instrument, and 13 percent with blunt objects such as clubs, etc.[5]

The percentages of armed and unarmed robberies by geographic region appear in Table 2–1.

The correlation between narcotics use and robbery is thought to be high, although there is not

conclusive data. Conklin points out that data from 1964 and 1968 show a rise in the proportion of robbery suspects who had prior drug arrests in Boston. But he notes that in 1968 approximately 90 percent of those adults arrested for robbery were never arrested for narcotics violations.[6] Presently there is not enough evidence to establish a direct link between narcotics and robbery, at least statistically, although several studies have shown a relationship.

Robbery suspects who are apprehended are more likely to be young. In 1973, 76 percent of those arrested were under 25, and 56 percent were under 21 years of age.[7]

TABLE 2–1[8]

Percentages of Armed vs. Unarmed Robbery by Geographic Region—1973

	Total	North-eastern States	North-central States	Southern States	Western States
Armed (any weapon)	65.9	67.4	65.2	67.6	61.8
Strongarm (no weapon)	34.1	32.6	34.8	32.4	38.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

A. Street Robberies—Visible

Visible street robberies are those which occur in open areas, frequently on side streets or in parking lots, and which are characterized by the use of physical force, the element of surprise and speed. Research indicates that visible street robbery is more likely to involve a chance occurrence with little or no planning by the perpetrator. Generally, street robberies can be classified in one of three ways: armed, unarmed and the purse snatch. In some jurisdictions the purse snatch is classified as a grand theft.

Most visible street robberies occur quickly and it is unlikely that the victim will be able to provide a good physical description, other than perhaps clothing. Pocket book snatches and "muggings" are the most common form of visible street robbery, and studies indicate the perpetrator is not likely to be armed. However, the use of physical force is not uncommon, and the victim may be knocked to the ground or beaten by the perpetrators. It is also apparent that many street robberies involve two or more perpetrators, frequently youths.

The more sophisticated street robbery involves some planning, and the victim is usually a bank messenger or someone who is known to carry large amounts of money. In such cases the perpetrator is usually armed and works with an accomplice, who drives the getaway car. Statistically, the armed street robber is rare, with the exception of non-visible street robberies, where knives appear to be used more frequently.

1. *Victims*. Street robbery victims fall into specific categories, and research indicates women and older men are the most likely targets. In a study undertaken in Oakland, California, it was determined that women were more likely to be victimized than men, and 49 percent of the males victimized were over fifty years of age. Of the female victims 77 percent were over fifty years of age.[9] This study also indicated that more than half of the victims, particularly purse snatch victims, could be perceived as weak in appearance or stature. These findings generally support those of Conklin, who cited the elderly and lone women as prime targets.[10] Some type of force was used in two-thirds of the street robberies in Oakland, with weapons used in approximately 25 percent of the cases. Guns were used in less than 20 percent of the cases. Victims were injured in more than 50 percent of the cases, although less than 10 percent required hospital treatment. Most injuries resulted from the use of physical force. Sagalyn's study resulted in similar data.

The loss to the victim in strong-arm robberies is usually less than $10, with the combined loss in property and cash usually less than $50. Armed robberies generally produce a higher cash loss.

Most street robberies occur at dusk or after dark, although some form of artificial light is usually present.

2. *Perpetrators*. The subject who commits a visible street robbery is likely to be young, black and have a previous record of involvement with authorities. His preparation for the act is generally minimal, and it would appear that the decision to commit a robbery is based more upon opportunity than planning. In many instances the robbery is a group decision, frequently on the spur of the moment. However, it is not unusual for two or more youths to set out with the idea of committing a purse snatch or mugging.

The older street robber is more likely to plan the

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robbery, although he usually does not know who his victims will be. In such cases the perpetrator will frequently stalk a night depository box at a bank, or look for shopkeepers who close late at night.

The Oakland study indicates that:

> . . . juveniles tend to be primarily unarmed robbers (many probably of the purse snatch variety) while older robbers are much more likely to use weapons as a means of effectuating robberies.[11]

Perhaps it might also be noted that juveniles frequently see the commission of a robbery as an act displaying "manhood," and in many instances the major reward is in peer admiration rather than monetary gain. The older robber is more interested in the financial aspect of the robbery.

Conklin notes that youthful offenders often use their numbers as a weapon.[12] Several studies indicate that the strong-arm robbery suspect is more likely to be black and in his early teens. Youths also appear more likely than adults to use violence in the commission of a robbery.[13]

B. Robbery—Non-visible

While there are many similarities between visible and non-visible robberies, there are certain aspects which give them a character of their own. Non-visible robberies are defined as those which occur off the streets, usually in a residential or commercial building, a public transportation facility, or some similar location marked by a lack of visibility on the street. They are generally committed by youths, but there are some indications that the average age of the perpetrator is slightly higher than those involved in visible street robberies. The use of a weapon is more common, especially in those robberies occurring in residential lobbies, hallways and elevators; knives are the principal weapon employed.

1. *Victims.* There do not appear to be any significant differences, insofar as victims are concerned, between visible and non-visible robberies, with women and elderly males being primary targets. The age of women who are victimized in non-visible robberies does not appear to be as significant a factor as in visible street robberies. Thus, young and middle-aged women are more likely to be victims of non-visible robbery attempts. However, it should be pointed out that research in this area is sparse, and it is difficult to form solid conclusions.

With respect to male victims, age appears to remain a significant factor, and those over 50 represent a disproportionate rate of victimization.

There also appear to be some slight differences in victimization related to location. Robberies in public areas, such as train stations and bus terminals are more apt to resemble those described in the visible robbery category. That is, victims are likely to be elderly men and women. Robberies in residential buildings, particularly apartments and high rise buildings, are more likely to be committed against anyone who comes along.

2. *Perpetrators.* Perpetrators of non-visible robberies are also young, more likely to be armed, and frequently have "graduated" from the visible type of street robbery. There are some indications that they generally work alone or in pairs, particularly in residential buildings, and both planning and intent to commit robbery is more common.

The tendency toward violence is heightened in non-visible robberies, particularly where the victim refuses to submit to the robbery. Unfortunately, there is little data which would reveal the mobility factor of suspects, but it is generally thought that they do not travel great distances to commit the crime, are frequently familiar with the neighborhood, and escape on foot or in public conveyances.

Perpetrators of this type of crime are also more likely to be "professionals," and have criminal records.

C. Residential Robbery

Residential robberies, wherein the perpetrator actually enters a domicile for the purpose of committing a robbery, are relatively rare. Where such robberies do occur, at least one study indicates that fifty-five percent involved housebreakers who were discovered in the act of burglary. In forty-five percent of the cases the perpetrators gained entrance by knocking on the door and forcibly entering.[14] There is also some indication that a prior victim-suspect relationship, usually in the form of loose acquaintanceships, exists in residential robberies.

Where there is no victim-suspect relationship, it would appear that the owner of the residence was selected for the robbery, generally because he is

thought to keep money or valuables on the premises. Exceptions to this occur in wealthy neighborhoods, where the victim is apt to be the subject of a random choice.

Perpetrators of residential robberies are generally professionals and likely to be armed with either knives or handguns. Because the occurrence is relatively rare, it is generally assumed that the perpetrator has a previous record and similar occurrences may be the work of a relatively small number of subjects working together.

D. Vehicle Robbery

The vehicle robbery generally involves the holdup of commercial drivers. Taxicabs, buses and delivery vans are the most frequent targets, with taxicab drivers being extremely prone to this type of robbery. There is a correlation between the probability of robbery and the area a driver works, and those working in the inner-city are more likely to be victimized.

Most vehicle robberies occur during evening hours, with the exception of delivery vans, where robberies appear to be more frequent during the afternoon hours. Unlike street robberies, the perpetrator is generally armed, in his late teens or early twenties, and has set out with the intent to commit a robbery. Little or no thought is generally given to the individual victim, although plans are made for the method of escape. In the case of a taxicab the driver is frequently given an address in a quiet or secluded area, and robbed upon reaching the destination.

Perpetrators of vehicle robberies are likely to be violent and taxicab drivers are particularly prone to physical injury and death. There are some indications that the use of plexiglass screens in cabs reduces holdups and injuries.

Delivery van drivers are victimized less than cab drivers, and the little data available in this area indicates that perpetrators sometimes plan the robbery on the spur of the moment because they observe or know that the driver is carrying a large amount of cash.

Robberies on buses have appeared to decline as a result of ready-fare programs, which limit the amount of money a driver has under his control. Misner and MacDonald's study of bus robbery indicates that the median age of offenders was 20.5[15] This study, which is the most comprehensive work on vehicle robbery also supports the theory of a career path, in which robbery offenders begin with purse snatches, work their way up to vehicle robberies and then turn to commercial robberies.

E. Commercial Robberies

Most commercial robberies are of small businesses and stores, particularly chain stores and gas stations open late at night. Lawrence Gunn's comprehensive study of Columbus, Georgia, commercial robberies indicates that "5 percent of businesses (convenience stores, package liquor stores, and service stations) account for 72 percent of robberies."[16]

Gunn also determined that most robberies occur between 6:00 P.M. and 4:00 A.M. on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.[17]

1. *Victims.* While it is difficult to develop data on victimization of commercial establishments, Gunn's findings are consistent with figures from other cities.

The commercial robbery, as opposed to the street robbery, usually involves the use of a weapon. Sagalyn found that guns were used in 73 percent of the commercial robberies in Oakland, California in 1969, and Gunn found them used in all the 113 cases studied in Columbus.[18]

Commercial robberies generally involve more planning than do street robberies, although this may involve, no more than a cursory observation of the establishment. Loss appears to be minimal, given the seriousness of the crime, and the average commercial robbery nets less than $100.[19] According to Gunn.

> . . . if all commercial robbery offenders divided equally the total amount of cash stolen, each robber would have obtained $.55 per day or $200 in 1972. Even the most active multiple offender who according to reports, accomplished at least six commercial robberies netted only about $2,000.[20]

Other studies of commercial robbery victims indicate that stores in out-of-the-way places, run by a lone or elderly shopkeeper are more prone to robbery attempts. It is also thought that visibility of the premises from outside is a factor in preventing robberies, although there is no data which supports this.

Violence in commercial robberies appears to be

correlated with resistance. Those who resist the robbery are more likely to be killed or injured.

2. *Perpetrators*. Perpetrators of commercial robberies are more likely to be experienced. Several studies have shown a high correlation between commercial robbers and criminal history. Since a commercial robbery suspect is more likely to have a criminal record the possibility of developing information from his *modus operandi* is heightened. Obviously, the number of adults committing commercial robberies is higher than those involved in street crimes. Blacks are overrepresented among arrested suspects.

In the Columbus, Georgia study of 47 suspects arrested for robbery, 74 percent were adults, 80 percent were black and 38 percent were employed.[21]

In some measure, the perpetrator of a commercial robbery is a professional, although many are not truly professionals. As Conklin points out:

> The professional steals both for money to support himself and for the symbolic value of the money. Money makes him a "big man" in the eyes of others, in part because of his ability to go where and when he pleases and in part because a large sum of money stolen in a robbery shows others that he possesses the skill to commit a lucrative crime.[22]

3. *Robbery Suspects*. Unfortunately, the data relative to robbery suspects is generally inadequate, and it is difficult to develop a complete typology in each of the categories discussed here. Nevertheless, a general review of the literature should provide the reader with a better understanding of robbery suspects, and some of the more significant findings of the research to date. Robbery suspects in general are young, black and disadvantaged. Approximately 75 percent of those arrested are under twenty-five, with more than fifty percent being under twenty-one. (See Table 2–2.)

TABLE 2–2

Age of Persons Arrested for Robbery Nationally

Year	Percentage Under Age					
	15	18	21	25	30	40
1965	11.5	30.1	49.4	68.9	82.0	94.7
1966	11.3	30.9	51.9	71.2	83.8	95.3
1967	11.5	31.6	54.0	73.2	85.3	95.5
1968	11.9	33.1	56.2	75.2	87.4	96.4
1969	11.8	33.4	56.2	76.8	88.1	96.3
1970	11.1	33.4	56.6	77.0	88.6	96.7
1971	10.4	32.2	55.3	76.9	88.5	96.7

Source: Weir, as quoted from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports.

Weir found that juveniles were more likely to commit robbery with other persons, and blacks were more likely to have a partner than whites. About 25 percent indicated they had no partners.

About two-thirds of the adult subjects interviewed stated that the primary reason for committing the robbery was money. Only 45 percent of the juveniles cited this as a primary reason. Twenty-one of the adults said they committed the robbery because they were depressed or disillusioned, and two said they did it for the challenge or the excitement. Approximately 25 percent of the adults were addicts; only two of the fourteen juveniles stated they wanted drugs, but none were addicts. Of the total number, forty-four admitted to being high on liquor, drugs or a combination of both.

Adults appear more likely to think about committing a robbery, whereas only 55 percent of the juveniles indicated a previous intent. As might be expected, less thought is given to planning the crime where it is an individual or street robbery; 72 percent of the subjects indicated no advance planning. In commercial robberies, 62 percent of the subjects indicated there was some form of advance planning.

Guns are the most common weapon used in commercial robberies, with knives more common in individual robberies. Juveniles were more likely to have a loaded weapon than adults.[23]

Conklin provides new insight into the use of force in robbery. Through interviews with incarcerated robbery offenders and background research he has found that physical force was used by the offender to show that he meant business. Usually this took the form of a shove or a knock with a blunt instrument such as a gun. When used, both guns and knives were meant to create a buffer zone between the victim and the offender. When fear is induced the victim is less likely to resist, the time involved is lessened, and escape is more imminent. He also contends that offenders who carry no weapon are more likely to use physical violence against the victim than offenders who do carry a weapon.[24]

In terms of background characteristics, it is

TABLE 2–3

Number of Prior Arrests

	None	1–3	4–5	6+
Adults				
Blacks	2	10	11	24
Whites	2	11	4	18
Juveniles	3	9	6	13
Total Sample	7	30	21	55

Source: Weir, p. 144.

interesting to note that almost 50 percent of those interviewed in Weir's study had been arrested six or more times, and only seven had never been arrested previously. (See Table 2–3.) Most subjects also came from a family in which someone had been arrested previously. Over half the adult respondents and two-thirds of the juveniles had such a family background.[25]

In two other studies of robbery, one in Philadelphia and one in New York, it was also found that robbery suspects were likely to have a previous arrest record. Normandeau's study in Philadelphia indicated that there was a previous robbery arrest in 43.6 percent of the cases, and a New York study showed a previous robbery arrest in 26.3 percent of the cases. The bus robbery study also showed a pattern of previous offenses.

Robbery suspects are likely to commit the crime in their own town. The Oakland data indicate that 72 percent of the individual robberies were committed in the suspect's town and approximately two-thirds of the commercial robberies were committed in the same town.[26] This is more likely to occur in larger suburban areas where population density and geographic area are large.

There are also indications that the probability of incarceration for a robbery conviction has decreased in recent years. Weir points out:

> In 1966, 62 percent of those convicted of robbery in California received prison sentences while in 1969 only 30 percent did. If persons arrested for commission of a robbery but convicted of some lesser crime are included the percentage is even less.[27]

Evidence would also suggest that the particular character and nature of an individual city or neighborhood has a bearing upon robbery rates. Recent studies indicate that environmental design can be used to reduce, or at least displace robbery. The need for further research is obvious. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some broad generalizations based upon the foregoing data, and the reader is encouraged to examine the various studies and existing research contained in the bibliography.

F. References

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[2] Conklin, *Robbery*, pp. 96 and 97. (See I.F.[5])

[3] *Crime in Eight American Cities*. pp. 1–5. (See I.F.[1])

[4] Conklin, *Robbery*, p. 56.

[5] F.B.I. Uniform Crime Report, (1973), p. 17.

[6] Conklin, *Robbery*, p. 56.

[7] F.B.I. Uniform Crime Report, (1973), p. 17.

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[9] Aceituno, Thomas and Michael Matchett, "Street Robbery Victims in Oakland." *The Prevention and Control of Robbery*. Volume 1, edited by Floyd Feeney and Adrienne Weir. (University of California, Davis: The Center on Administration of Criminal Justice, April, 1973).

[10] Conklin, *Robbery*, p. 89.

[11] Weir, Adrienne, "The Robbery Offender." *The Prevention and Control of Robbery*, p. 117.

[12] Conklin, *Robbery*, p. 95.

[13] Weir, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 105, 110, 117.

[14] Gunn, Lawrence, "Commercial Robbery in a Medium-Sized City: Columbus, Georgia" (Draft). The Mitre Corp., Washington, D.C. (November, 1973), p. xi.

[15] Gordon E. Misner and William F. MacDonald, *Reduction of Robberies and Assaults of Bus Drivers* (Vol. 11, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 307.

[16] Gunn, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 15, 16.

[17] Normandeu, A., *Trends and Patterns in Crimes of Robbery* (with special reference to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1960–1966). (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1968), p. 128.

[18] Sagalyn, Arnold, *The Crime of Robbery in the United States*, p. 14; and Gunn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 17.

[19] Conklin, *Robbery*, p. 81.

[20] Gunn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 21.

[21] Gunn, *Op. Cit.*, p. 8.

[22] Conklin, *Robbery*, p. 85.

[23] Statistics quoted from Weir, *The Prevention and Control of Robbery,* pp. 146, 151, 156, 164, 174–176, and 192.

[24] Conklin, *Robbery,* p. 102.

[25] Weir, *Op. Cit.,* p. 143. See also Misner, MacDonald, *Op. Cit.,* p. 319.

[26] Weir, *Op. Cit.,* p. 183.

[27] Weir, *Op. Cit.,* p. 128.

CHAPTER III. SELECTED ROBBERY CONTROL PROJECTS IN THE UNITED STATES

This chapter highlights several robbery control projects that are underway in the United States. The projects selected are representative of the types of anti-robbery programs which can be adapted to virtually any size police department, depending of course upon resources available. A comprehensive list of robbery programs throughout the United States appears in Appendix A. This list was compiled from a questionnaire that was sent to over 300 police departments.

Several on site visits were made to police departments in order to develop first-hand information on the specifics of particular projects, and to discuss the problems encountered in developing them. A major drawback of virtually all programs is the lack of an adequate research design and the collection of necessary statistics to test effectiveness. The data provided both in this chapter and in Appendix A is largely self-reported, and the reader should recognize the inadequacies and pitfalls inherent in such information.

The emphasis here is to provide a brief narrative description of the project, its goals, the operational factors involved in mounting it, and brief analysis of its effectiveness, as reported by project personnel.

A. Miami, Florida Police Department

1. *Description and Goals.* The "Miami Police Robbery Control Project" represents one of the most comprehensive efforts in the United States. Developed under an initial grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, this project utilizes a wide variety of internal and external resources. In addition to involving virtually all operational units, wide use is made of advanced technology and various types of equipment.

The Miami project has been in operation since December 1971, and perhaps its single most important characteristic has been the ability of those involved to recognize and adjust to the need for change. Interviews with project personnel indicated a healthy skepticism which has resulted in adding and eliminating where necessary to improve upon the project. Thus, one finds that a variety of methods and approaches have been utilized to combat robbery, but only those which show proven results have been maintained.

The project conducts a comprehensive attack on the robbery problem from prevention and detection through apprehension and conviction of offenders. Existing personnel, procedures and equipment are being developed to a higher level of efficiency and incorporated with innovative approaches utilizing sophisticated equipment systems, training methods, procedural changes and specialist units.

Among the objectives of the project are to: reduce robbery incidents; reduce injuries to robbery victims; reduce money losses; develop greater awareness of robbery prevention factors in the patrol force; provide for greater identification of suspects; increase public awareness in the robbery area; develop greater cooperation between units of the department; and create a group of highly trained police officers who will conduct initial robber investigations and focus upon robbery prevention and the apprehension of offenders.

The project is multi-faceted and involved the establishment of the following:

Tactical Operations Platoon (TOP). A unit consisting of one administrative sergeant, one field sergeant and six officers.

Criminal Information Center (CIC). A unit responsible for collecting, analyzing and disseminating data on robberies and robbery suspects.

Public Information Program. A program designed to develop material on robbery prevention for public consumption, and to provide for crime prevention examinations of premises by patrol personnel.

Better Utilization of Technology. This involved the use of videotape for lineups and operational use, the use of robbery bait packs (a pyrotechnic device that explodes, spreading tear gas and colored dye, minutes after being removed from the

cash drawer), and more effective use of the computer.

Robbery Training Program. A program designed to provide specific training in the area of robbery for selected members of the department. It focuses upon operational tactics and the development of investigative information.

2. *Operational Factors.* A key feature of the Miami robbery project is the careful selection of officers for the Tactical Operations Platoon. Generally the six officers selected display a combination of experience on patrol and an interest in robbery control. Their functional responsibilities include conducting preliminary robbery investigations, surveillance of suspects, crime prevention lectures, and patrol in unmarked vehicles in high robbery prone areas. The unit works in civilian clothes, primarily during evening hours (6 PM–2 AM).

The Criminal Information Center was established as a "clearing house" for all information related to robberies and other serious crimes. The implementation of the GACHA (General Appearance of Criminals and their Habits Analyzed) file, according to its proponents, makes it possible to develop suspect information from general appearance characteristics. The department hopes that this system will be fully computerized in the future to enhance suspect identification.

The CIC also provides information gleaned from FIC (Field Interview Cards) and publishes a weekly report of persons stopped in each district. This report is distributed to the patrol force along with information bulletins on known offenders.

The CIC also publishes a book of photographs consisting of robbery suspects wanted on warrants. The use of a Stat-King photograph machine enables the unit to produce photographs at a moment's notice, without having to go through the photo section. This system has been credited with the solution of several crimes and is used widely by patrol and investigative personnel.

The department has also purchased color videotape equipment, which is used to provide "profiles" of known robbery suspects, their hangouts and their associates. Known offenders are filmed on the videotape equipment, and both this and color slides are used for viewing by victims.

The use of videotape equipment in the field is seen as important by project personnel. In one case involving repeated taxicab holdups the videotape equipment was used to film persons in the area who fit the general description of the perpetrator. Within hours a positive identification of the subject was made by a witness, and this resulted in the suspect's arrest.

Project personnel also note that the use of the camera has a deterrent value. In several areas where strong-arm robberies and pocketbook snatches were common the camera was used to film youths on the street corners. A significant decline in street robberies in these areas was reported by project personnel.

Mixed results occurred with the use of robbery bait packs and there are diverse opinions as to their value in anti-robbery efforts. The number of detonations of the bait packs has been relatively small, and several accidental discharges by store employees has resulted in their being used infrequently and only at select locations. There was some feeling that the wide media publicity given the bait packs did serve some deterrent value.

The Tactical Operations Platoon is also equipped with rental cars, binoculars and other types of equipment not generally available to patrol personnel. These include videotape equipment, cameras and other forms of surveillance technology. Each member of the unit completed a one week training course, which is discussed in Chapter VI. An in-service training program is also an integral part of the project.

The crime prevention aspect of the project includes the preparation of robbery brochures designed to inform the public on what to do and look for in the event of a robbery. Speeches are given before civic groups and business associations, and wide media coverage is given to successful anti-robbery efforts.

3. *Analysis of Effectiveness.* The broad scope of the Miami project makes it difficult to attribute a decline in reported robberies to any one factor. According to project personnel there has been an increase in the number of robbery arrests and clearances since the inception of the project.

The lack of a sophisticated research design makes it virtually impossible to determine the impact of various components of the robbery project. However, it is interesting to note that while the total index crime reported in Miami increased by almost 8,000 in 1973, reported robberies decreased by 166. (See Table 3–1.) While recognizing the inherent inadequacies of such comparisons one may view this as an encouraging sign.

TABLE 3–1

Reported Index Crimes and Robberies in Miami (1971–1973)

	Total Crime Index	Reported Robberies
1971	24,895	2,829
1972	22,429	2,555
1973	30,372	2,389

B. New York, New York Police Department

(The following description is based on an analysis performed by Abt Associates, Cambridge, Mass., for LEAA's Office of Technology Transfer)

1. *Description and Goals.* The New York City Street Crime Unit (SCU) was organized in November 1971 with the goal of combatting street crime throughout the city, with special emphasis on robbery and other violent crimes. Its principal methods of operation are blending and decoy techniques. While decoy tactics are used in response to particular crime/victim patterns, blending techniques are used continually to allow the officer to move freely on the streets and in closer to the crime scene.

Organizationally, the Street Crime Unit (SCU) falls under the City-Wide Anti-Crime Unit, which in turn reports directly to the Chief of Patrol. Figures 3–1 and 3–2 show the organization of the City-Wide Anti-Crime Unit and the SCU itself. SCU personnel totals 2 Captains, 8 Lieutenants (one in each squad), 25 Sergeants (each heading a team of 10 officers), and 248 Officers, including 5 females and 50 Detectives.

The Unit's equipment includes instant-picture cameras, radios, walkie-talkies, a wide variety of costumes, and some 70 vehicles, including a small fleet of taxis; delivery vans; a surveillance truck equipped with one way glass; late model autos not normally associated with police use; motorcycles; and bicycles.

The Unit's principal goal is the achievement of high quality arrests for violent street crimes while maintaining public safety and respect.

2. *Operational Factors.* Figure 3–1 points out two important features for understanding the SCU's operation. First, the Street Crime Unit does not perform its own analysis. This function is carried out for all three units by the Administration and Crime Analysis Division. The usual practice is to deploy the SCU on a monthly basis in the ten precincts showing the highest level of reported street crimes for the previous month.

Second, the Liaison and Special Projects Division is responsible for coordinating the activities of the Street Crime Unit, which operates city-wide, moving in and out of precincts each month with the precinct's own street crime units. Because of the activities of this division which is in daily communication with the precincts where the SCU is deployed, the dissension that normally exists between a special unit and patrol officers does not seem to be present in New York. Similarly, the Division has developed identification procedures which have prevented injuries to unit personnel when regular officers respond to the scene of an incident.

From its inception, the SCU has made the careful selection of personnel one of its highest priority tasks. All officers are recruited from members of the department. The emphasis is on experience, arrest performance, integrity, and motivation. In keeping with an emphasis on strong interpersonal trust, the teams within each squad have a voice in whether a new officer will become part of their team.

The importance of training is also recognized. Forty hours of training in civilian clothes police operation is given to all new members and is supplemented by special quarterly refresher courses and daily roll call training.

3. *Analysis of Effectiveness.* For the calendar year 1973, the Street Crime Unit effected a total of 3,551 arrests, of which 85% were felony arrests. As of August 7, 1974, of the robbery arrest cases which had been disposed of, convictions were obtained in 76% of the cases; of the disposed grand larceny from the person arrests, convictions were obtained in 95% of the cases. By way of comparison, for the entire department for the period January 1972–August 1973, the robbery conviction rate was 56%. (No department-wide survey was done for grand larceny person.)

One indication of the efficiency of the SCU is the fact that over the first five months of 1974 in the seven precincts in which the Unit was most heavily assigned, the average man-days per arrest was 8.2. Based on the first six months of 1974, the number of man-days per arrest for the entire department averaged 167. (However, it should be noted that the department arrest averages include all department personnel, including those assigned

Figure 3–1
City-Wide Anti-Crime Unit



The Street Crime Unit itself is organized as shown in Figure 3–2:

Figure 3–2
Street Crime Unit



to traffic details, and therefore, would be expected to be somewhat less efficient.)

One of the major accomplishments of the Unit has been its ability to handle potentially violent situations with little or no violence. In contrast to other cities with similar units, there have been few perpetrators or officers injured and citizen complaints have been consistently low.

Attribution of a specific reduction in crime to the Unit is hampered by the usual methodological difficulties involved in analyzing crime statistics and is beyond the present capabilities of the Unit's evaluation section.

C. Denver, Colorado Police Department

1. *Description and Goals.* The Denver, Colorado Police Department implemented a Special Crime Attack Team (SCAT) in December, 1972 which is designed to combat burglaries and robberies. While the primary emphasis of this program is to combat burglary, inreasing efforts have been directed toward anti-robbery tactics.

The SCAT unit consists of 1 lieutenant, 2 sergeants, 2 evidence technicians, 28 patrolmen, 10 detectives, a crime analyst and a secretary. The unit works in high crime areas over a period of several months utilizing a variety of techniques, including decoy operations, stakeouts, portable alarm systems, basic patrol, surveillance, and a public information and involvement program.

Among the objectives of the unit are to: increase community involvement in robbery prevention tactics that can be extended to the whole community; reduce aggravated robbery by 5 percent in the target areas over the 1972 baseline year; and increase the clearance by arrest rate for robbery by 5 percent for the SCAT team in the target zone.

A major feature of the SCAT program is the emphasis on prevention. The team conducts numerous security investigations of premises, advising merchants of hazards which might make a location a robbery target, i.e., covered windows, poor lighting, etc. In 1973 the team disseminated over 2,500 copies of the personal security and robbery prevention literature which was prepared by the department. The public service efforts, according to project personnel, have resulted in greater public awareness and cooperation.

An attempt was also made to develop better lines of communication with other law enforcement agencies in the surrounding area and, according to those involved, has resulted in a higher level of cooperation.

The utilization of evidence technicians and detectives assigned to the team has also had beneficial results, although their primary emphasis has been in the burglary area.

More recently the unit has adopted a TAC II alarm system, which is a portable robbery alarm that can be placed in a store with the enunciator board in a radio car. When an alarm is placed, an official agreement is made between the owner of the premises and the department, outlining the scope of responsibility of each, and assuring the store owner that all efforts will be made to apprehend the suspect off the premises. A thorough examination is made of each location where an alarm is set, and diagrams and photographs showing points of entry and exit and escape routes are made available to the team conducting the surveillance. This pre-planned response also lists the descriptions of employees likely to be present, and other conditions the officer should be aware of. Training of employees is also provided.

2. *Operational Factors.* Personnel selected for the SCAT unit undergo a careful screening process. A minimum of two years experience is necessary for application to the unit, and a series of interviews is conducted to screen those who show a high degree of motivation and interest in the project.

A major difficulty in the early stages was in selecting target areas for the unit to work in. Consideration was given frequency of crime occurrence, geographic localization, ability to identify offenders, and suitability of prevention measures. Late night commercial businesses were given a high priority. A second problem was in getting businessmen to cooperate by changing window displays, installing money drop boxes, and installing alarm devices.

In the second year of operation greater emphasis is to be placed upon the crime analysis aspect of the project, and an attempt is being made to develop improved criteria for allocation of the SCAT team.

The training component of the project involves a 40-hour program with a heavy emphasis on communication skills. Instructors from the local university are employed to improve the verbal skills of project personnel. Given the public education component of the program, its designers felt it

necessary to provide training which would enhance police-citizen contacts. Additionally, strong emphasis is placed upon tactics, and the use of weapons is strictly regulated in responding to crime scenes. Quarterly seminars are held to update training, and an in-service training program has been developed.

In order to facilitate inter-departmental communication, the commanding officer of the SCAT team meets with the precinct commander prior to the team's operational assignment. Team members then meet with precinct officers at roll call and explain their function. Efforts are made to give credit to local officers in any case where they provide assistance. Those involved in the project feel this serves to reduce hostility and creates better lines of communication.

3. *Analysis of Effectiveness*. Because much of the SCAT team's effort has been in the area of anti-burglary operations, it is difficult to make any definitive statement relative to anti-robbery efforts. A 90-day demonstration project designed to reduce aggravated robbery resulted in a 21 percent decrease in target areas, and an 11.1 percent increase in robbery clearances. However, it should be noted that these figures correspond to a decrease in robberies in precincts surrounding the target area, as well as a 31 percent increase in robbery clearances throughout the city.

There is no question that the project has engendered increased citizen cooperation and awareness, and this can be viewed as a major accomplishment.

The total robbery picture in Denver between 1971 and 1973 indicates a slight decrease in robbery between 1971 and 1972, and an increase of 410 reported robberies in 1973, which compares with a total index crime reported increase of 5,104 over the previous year. (See Table 3–2.)

Table 3–2

Reported Index Crimes and Robberies in Denver (1971–1973)

	Total Index Crimes	Reported Robberies
1971	37,706	2,167
1972	38,945	2,014
1973	44,049	2,410

D. Kansas City, Mo. Police Department

1. *Description and Goals*. The Kansas City, Missouri Police Department's apprehension oriented patrol model which was reorganized in 1974, focused upon the apprehension of robbery and burglary suspects. Two basic strategies were tested by the department—Location Oriented Patrol (LOP) and Perpetrator Oriented Patrol (POP). To supplement these activities, and to provide a crime information and analysis function for the department, the Criminal Information Center was established. Funding for these projects was made available by the Police Foundation.

The apprehension oriented strategies were developed by the Tactical Unit of the Special Operations Division and were put into operation in the fall of 1972. The primary concept involved the deployment of police officers in nontraditional ways in an attempt to apprehend offenders. The goal of the project was to test Albert Reiss' theory that:

> In the absence of massive police manpower, proactive policing is a feasible method for discovery only when crime is routine and organized and therefore predictable. From a sociological point of view, the patterned activity of vice, traffic and organized groups such as gangs lend themselves to proactive forms of policing and therefore to specialized units of police organization and tactics.[1]

While robbery and burglary are not generally viewed as being routine and organized, it was hypothesized that a specific group of individuals are largely responsible for much of the reported crime, and that both robbery and burglary can be analyzed for geographic patterns. In this sense these crimes were viewed as being routine and organized, and thus susceptible to a proactive strategy.

The importance of the Kansas City experiment is in its evaluation component, for while the strategies of surveillance and undercover operations are not new the attempt to measure their impact in a meaningful way is. In order to measure Location Oriented Patrol thirty-two matched beats in groups of four were identified, each having similar crime and demographic characteristics; these characteristics included percentage of nonwhite population, income level, occupied housing units, and reported robbery and burglary figures. One of every four beats was deemed a control beat, in which the unit would not operate.

Two hypotheses were tested in connection with the LOP experiment:

- A lower average number of robberies and burglaries would be reported in the location-oriented beats than in the control beats.
- A greater decrease in the average number of reported robberies and burglaries would occur in the location-oriented beats than occurred in those beats in 1970 and 1971.

Additionally, several secondary hypotheses were tested which related to the effectiveness of the LOP units in making apprehensions for the target crimes.

The POP model was tested using a four way experimental design. A list of the most active burglary and robbery suspects was compiled, based upon criminal activity, the number of felony arrests and convictions. This list of 107 subjects was randomly divided into four groups, A, B, C, and Control. Notebooks on groups A, B, and C, containing pictures and other information were prepared and disseminated to patrol units (Groups A and C) and the Tactical squads (Groups A and B). Additionally, a comprehensive file was maintained on each subject in the Crime Information Center. No information was disseminated on those in the control group. Theoretically, if the experiment were a success those in groups A, B, and C would be arrested significantly more times than those in the control group.

Because the Crime Information Center was a new addition to the department, measurements of effectiveness were based upon the level of activity generated by the unit over the experimental period.

2. *Operational Factors*. Two squads, consisting of eight officers and two sergeants, were assigned to each of the strategies. The Crime Information Center was staffed by two officers and a civilian crime analyst. Additionally, four civilians were hired and worked around the clock in the Crime Information Center, providing 24 hour coverage.

The LOP strategy involved the use of rental cars, surveillance equipment and innovative disguises, which made it possible to remain in an area over a period of time without arousing suspicion. Officers dressed as telephone repair men, utility workers and in other forms of disguise. The primary effort was devoted to patrol, using rental cars as "spotters" and unmarked police cars as back-up cars to check suspicious persons and autos.

An important component of the LOP strategy involved the ability of the crime analyst to identify areas where the strategy would be most effective. Prior to assigning a unit to an area the crime analyst prepared a summary of activity, a list of possible suspects in the area, and the times that activity was most frequent.

The POP strategy was based upon the theory that known criminals would continue to commit crimes, and that surveillance of their activities would result in more arrests. In order to safeguard against harassment arrests, an Arrest Review Committee was established to evaluate each arrest on a given set of criteria. This approach encouraged officers to make good arrests.

The POP strategy underwent several changes. The loose surveillance tactic was abandoned in favor of undercover personnel, who were used to infiltrate groups of known criminals.

In addition to assisting the Tactical Unit, the Crime Information Center was responsible for developing information for the patrol and investigative units. The Center provided information on crime trends, recently released offenders, possible suspects, and specific types of criminal activity. The Center developed a good working relationship with the patrol force and, because success depends upon intelligence and information generated by the patrol force, a concerted effort was made to reward an officer where his input proved valuable. Members of the CIC also made regular visits to District Stations and maintained a liaison with the courts and other criminal justice agencies.

3. *Analysis of Effectiveness*. The final evaluation of the Apprehension Oriented Patrol project has not been completed, but initial results are encouraging in several areas. Total robbery and burglary arrests for the Tactical Units are up significantly, from 169 to 275. (See Table 3–3.) Individual analysis of the two patrol strategies has not yet been completed.

A ten month survey of subjects listed in the CIC notebooks indicated that 79 percent of the subjects arrested by the patrol force were in the notebooks.

In evaluating the effectiveness of the LOP and POP models one must consider the number of arrests where an individual is charged and the ratio of convictions.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that while arrests for robbery and burglary by the patrol force decreased during the experimental year, arrests by the Tactical Unit increased. (See Tables 3–3 and 3–4.)

There is much more data to be evaluated in the Kansas City experiment, but signs indicate it is a project worthy of note.

TABLE 3–3

Tactical Unit Arrests

	Year 1		Year 2		Year 3	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total Arrests	184	100	169	100	275	100
Total Robbery Arrests	91	49	55	33	130	47
Armed Robbery	36	20	44	26	85	31
Strong-Armed Robbery	11	6	6	4	8	3
Attempted Robbery	2	1	3	2	3	1
Other Robbery*	42	23	2	1	34	12
Total Burglary Arrests	93	51	114	67	145	53
Burglary Arrests	81	44	114	67	144	52
Attempted Burglary Arrests	12	7	0	0	1	1

*These are robberies whose specific nature is unknown.

TABLE 3–4

Patrol District Arrests

	Year 1		Year 2		Year 3	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Total Arrests	171	100.0	200	100.0	182	100.0
Total Robbery Arrests	33	19.3	58	29.0	48	26.4
Armed Robbery	17	9.9	20	10.0	16	8.8
Strong-Arm Robbery	1	0.6	9	4.5	7	3.9
Other Robbery*	15	8.8	29	14.5	25	13.8
Total Burglary Arrests	138	80.7	142	61.0	134	73.6

*These are robberies whose specific nature is unknown.

The tables above show a breakdown of the total burglary and robbery arrests for the past three years. The actual number of arrests made as well as the percentage of total arrests are included. (e.g.: In Year No. 1, 91 robbery arrests were made which accounted for 49 percent of all robbery and burglary arrests.)

E. Minneapolis, Minnesota, Police Department

1. *Description and Goals.* The Minneapolis Police Department is comprised of approximately 825 sworn personnel. Its "Robbery Reduction Program" involves the use of 35mm cameras installed in commercial establishments which have a high incidence of robberies. The major feature of this program is its relatively low cost, and what project personnel see as its contribution to prevention. The camera, which takes 16 photos in 40 seconds, is activated by a "bait bill" when the bill is removed from the cash register.

The goals of the project are to provide photographs of offenders in the commission of the crime; help prevent robberies; and to inform citizens of the action to take if a robbery occurs.

The public education aspect of the program is centered upon written material aimed at teaching potential victims how to act and what to make note of during a robbery. The Department provides each establishment in the program with "suspect description" pads that will assist the merchant in recording data about the suspect. Enclosed with these pads is a one page instructional memo that outlines the specific steps the merchant should take before, during and after the robbery.

2. *Operational Factors.* Two detectives are employed in the robbery project and much of their time is devoted to identifying and apprehending suspects whose pictures are taken by the cameras. The program does not have a tactical response system built into it, although patrol officers are involved in checking stores where cameras are located and in providing robbery prevention material.

The cost of the camera is under $50, which can be assumed by the participating merchant.

There has been no statistical evaluation of the project and its effectiveness in terms of apprehension and prevention. However, project personnel indicate that numerous arrests have been made as a result of the cameras' use.

F. References

[1]Reiss, Albert, *The Police and the Public* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 101–102

CHAPTER IV. DEVELOPING A ROBBERY CONTROL PROJECT

Crime specific planning involves much more than a decision to buy equipment or deploy personnel in a particular way. To begin with, no two cities are alike. Neither are neighborhoods or blocks. What is applicable in one area may be impossible in another. The success of a project may vary according to any number of variables.

There are a great many factors which must be considered in developing a robbery control project. Among these are:

A. Problem Analysis

Before the police administrator attempts to plan a robbery control project he must identify those salient factors of the robbery problem in his jurisdiction. Oftentimes this is not done in the initial development phase thus producing a program that is multifaceted but has little impact on the real problem. The administrator must review all available data as it relates to street robberies, visible and non-visible; vehicle robberies; commercial robberies; and residential robberies. It is also suggested that key personnel from robbery investigation units be interviewed for the purpose of obtaining specific information on the latest trends and patterns of this crime.

Another critical factor that should be taken into account is the public's perception of the robbery problem. Occasionally citizen response to a dramatic robbery causes a police department to divert resources from other units into a hastily established robbery attack program. The chief or his representative must carefully weigh public attitude, but this should not be the single determinant in planning a robbery control strategy. It should be noted that the fear of crime sometimes surpasses the actual amount and severity of the problem.

The development stage should not include a discussion of the various robbery control strategies but should be devoted to determining whether or not a problem exists followed by a thorough analysis of the problem's integral factors.

B. Specification of Objectives

In this phase, consideration must be given to establishing logical objectives to the program. If it is assumed that a problem exists then it must be decided what will be different as a result of the control project. Consideration should be given to a range of goals. However, the end product should produce realistic, workable objectives.

Although a reduction of robberies is the primary goal of the project, attention must also be given to sub-objectives such as: more accurate reporting procedures, improved prosecution methods, improved criminal identification procedures, lower rates of recidivism for robbery offenders, etc.

The ultimate purpose of this phase, then, is to establish a parameter of objectives based on the results of the problem identification and analysis.

C. Analysis of Solutions

It is at this stage that consideration is given to remedying the robbery problem by exploring the various solutions that might be applied to the problem. The first step is a review of the traditional approaches, i.e. investigative approaches, decoy operations, electronic and technical devices, various patrol strategies and public education programs. In looking at these categories, the police administrator should carefully review what his department is currently utilizing in combating the various types of robberies. This will assist him in focusing on what his department has outlined as the foremost robbery concern at that point in time. Although there may exist a number of solutions, the department should limit itself to tangible solutions based on conclusions reached in phases one and two.

Of particular importance to this phase is the review of other robbery control projects in existence. For example, the department should seek to find jurisdictions with similar robbery problems and explore the successes and failures of their

approaches. Although it is recognized that many societal variables would hamper in-depth comparisons, such a review will give the administrator an overview of the latest developments in the field. For example, departments with computer capabilities at hand might be interested in the Denver Police Department's SCAT Program, which utilizes a computerized crime data system. Jurisdictions experiencing a consistent pattern of commercial robberies benefit from a review of Miami's comprehensive program. If possible, the department should send representatives to observe programs in operation.

It is also suggested that departments explore possible avenues of assistance from other professional fields, particularly those in the social sciences. Crime as a social phenomenon affects the lifestyle of all citizens and the control of it does not lie totally in the police service. The emerging field of environmental control utilizes the resources of a number of professions in proposing strategies that are aimed at reducing the rate of criminality.

D. Problem Solution Analysis

Upon completion of phase three the administrator should have a number of possible solutions to the robbery problem. This phase of development will match the stated objectives of phase two with the possible solutions. In effect, what we are saying is that Solution X will produce Objective Y thus making that segment of the project successful. For example, a saturation of decoys in patrol sector A will increase the number of arrests for muggings. Once this matching of solutions and objectives is complete, the administrator is ready to define and map out the program design.

E. Program Design

It is at this point that the administrator establishes actual operational activities that coincide with the previously stated objectives. The specifications of the program are drawn and these represent the department's view on the best approach to the robbery problem. The administrator explicitly defines what he wants to do and how he plans to carry out the strategy.

For example, let us assume that a jurisdiction is experiencing a serious robbery problem at its transportation facilities and has outlined the following program design:

- *Problem:* 62% increase in robberies at transportation facilities.
- *Objectives:* Reduce robberies; increase arrests; improved case preparation for prosecution purposes.
- *Solutions:* Increase personnel in uniform and plain clothes units; improve training program; increased technical assistance.
- *Program Design:* Establish 12 man unit for saturation patrol; Police Academy to provide specialized robbery course for new unit; D.A. to assign instructor to assist officers in case preparation; closed circuit TV monitors to be installed at high incidence areas.

This fundamental overview of a program design charts the stages of development that result in the crystallization of an actual robbery control project. This is the point at which the department is now ready to begin focusing on a particular approach, moving from the general to the specific.

F. Definition of Constraints

Before any program is approved for implementation, serious consideration must be given to manpower, budget, and political constraints which might hinder the project. Some examples of other constraints which might not seem obvious are: public acceptance of the project, union difficulties that might arise, the amount and degree of corruption in the department and jurisdiction, the status of police community relations in the target area and the impact the program will have on departmental morale.

Where possible, identifiable constraints should be lessened or eliminated. However, this is sometimes a difficult and time consuming factor. The important point is in determining to what degree they might interfere with the performance and success of the project. The police administrator should not treat this phase lightly but should expend considerable time in dealing with these important factors.

G. Conceptual Design

In this stage of development, the administrator actually molds the conclusions reached in phases five and six into a composite design. What he is actually doing is matching the idealistic characteristics of phase five with the realistic constraints

outlined in phase six. This is known as the conceptual design.

It is at this stage that departmental resources are brought into the developmental process. Manpower and technical equipment cost money, and most department budgets are sorely limited. An actual cost analysis should be conducted to determine the feasibility of financing the project.

H. Program Planning and Evaluation

This stage of development should provide a total picture of the intimate details of the program. It incorporates all factors and conclusions reached in previous steps and crystallizes these into a compact, coordinated robbery control project. The actual "nuts and bolts" of the program are incorporated into the general framework and departmental resources are reexamined.

Of particular importance to any program is the evaluation component, which must be considered before implementation. Unfortunately, many programs have not taken this into account in the past, leaving little data that can be considered meaningful. No project should be implemented until an adequate evaluation component has been designed. Departments not having personnel trained in this research area should consider using outside resources, such as consultants or research firms.

I. General Considerations in the Development Phase

The most important aspect of any robbery control project is cooperation, for without the cooperation of the entire department the project will suffer. Thus, during the developmental phase it is extremely important to include individuals from all relevant units. These would include representatives of the patrol force, investigative, records, data processing, community and public relations and other units which may interact with members of the project itself. During these preliminary discussions it is important to include line personnel, especially those who may later participate in the program.

At this point some mention of the problems involved in group planning is warranted. While most medium and large size departments generally utilize group planning approaches, there are a number of pitfalls which contribute to inadequate planning. To begin with, three factors have a direct bearing on group planning. These are:

- Planning sophistication.
- Status conflicts.
- Communication patterns.

The need for planning sophistication is paramount, and where this does not exist, consideration should be given to bringing in outside experts who are familiar with group processes and planning. Too frequently an administrator assumes that his personnel are capable of developing complex plans, whereas their actual level of sophistication is sorely limited. Further, because of the rank structure common to police organizations, planning frequently becomes a reflection of the ideas and opinions of the highest ranking member of the group. This form of status conflict prohibits meaningful participation on the part of junior members of the organization. Finally, it is important to understand the communication patterns of the organization, in order to ensure that those who need to be represented are represented. An example of this might be to include a representative of the line organization or union, who might be likely to criticize the program. By including him in the planning it is frequently possible to eliminate communication barriers and criticism of the project during the implementation phase.

The importance of these three aspects of planning cannot be overstressed, and are something that do not come easily. Many departments would argue that they have a high level of planning sophistication, when in actuality their planning approach involves little more than a mediocre statistical capability. The use of outside assistance has proven valuable in several departments for planning purposes, and also serves to increase the planning capability of those in the department.

Where a department does not exhibit strong developmental capabilities it might be wiser to consider assigning the planning role to an administrator, and making him responsible for it. In fact, this is generally what happens in most departments, while lip service is paid the concept of participative management and planning.

The ideal approach, however, is one in which there is participative planning, and if at all possible the following approach should be utilized in the developmental phase.

A series of general meetings should be held to develop ideas and solicit information. These meetings should be structured to gain maximum participation, but the agenda need not be rigid. Once the

meetings have been conducted and interest developed a committee can be formed to make specific plans. The committee should be a representative one, but should have several members from the unit or units which will have the greatest role in the project. This committee should be responsible for developing an initial report stressing statistics on the robbery problem and the thoughts and suggestions of those who participated in the initial meeting. Once the report has been written a series of recommendations for action can be acted upon by administrators.

Potential problem areas should be identified and possible solutions discussed. Keep in mind that any project is likely to have political ramifications, both internal and external. Failure to consider these points may produce hostility and a general reluctance to cooperate. It is important for the administrator and his representative to be aware of community feelings and attitudes. The influence of the media should also be considered, for a negative view here may endanger any hopes of cooperation between the community and the department.

The total cost of the project should be carefully worked out and consideration given to methods of funding. This may involve either the departmental budget or external funding sources in the form of grants. It should be kept in mind that the dollar cost of a project should be related to the overall goals of the department and its contribution to maximizing available resources.

The selection of a project manager should take into account his knowledge in the specific areas mentioned above. He should be familiar with the crime problem, the use of statistics, and the importance of evaluation. While his role may not involve him in line operations he should certainly be familiar with particular problems at this level and should have the respect of those assigned to the project.

Consideration should also be given to the type of individuals who will be selected to carry out the project. In some projects a whole unit or the whole patrol force may be involved, but in others individual selection of personnel will be necessary. By discussing the needs of the project, personnel selection can be enhanced.

J. Developing the Project

When a decision has been made on the type of project desired those involved in planning can get down to specifics. There are five basic types of robbery control projects, and a department may choose to develop one or a combination of them. The five categories are:

- Investigative approaches which focus upon robbery.
- Decoy operations.
- Electronic alarms and technical devices.
- Patrol strategies, including the use of tactical units.
- Public education programs and seminars.

In order to develop a better understanding of the development phase, three robbery projects are discussed here and consideration is given to small, medium, and large departments. This should afford the reader an idea of the information needed to develop a project for a particular city. Obviously, the more complex the project, the more supporting material and data it will require.

K. The Small Department: A Public Information Project

Since resources in the small department are generally limited, a public information program is likely to prove most economical. As viewed here, the small department is one in which there are less than fifty sworn members.

Let us assume that the department does not have a community relations or public information office, and that statistics indicate a rise in robberies justifying a program in this area. Assume also that an analysis by an administrator, two supervisors and two patrolmen has resulted in a report on the problem.

Once the administrator has made a decision to implement the project he must determine the costs involved. In this case he has three basic options: 1) to pay for it out of the departmental budget; 2) to seek a budget increase; 3) to explore external funding through a governmental grant or through private sources.

If there are no available funds in the existing budget the administrator is left with two options. The first is through government funding at the local, state or federal level. This is usually accomplished through direct grants or research proposals submitted to the State planning agency or a federal agency. Another alternative might be funding from outside sources such as the Center of Commerce or local insurance companies. This might be used to pay for printing costs of brochures and other

printed material. The use of the media should also be considered and contacts made with appropriate persons.

Dissemination of literature and other material should be through the patrol force, which necessitates some information and training on the purpose of the project. Thus, a two or three day in-service training component should focus upon the goals of the project and the role the police officers will play in carrying it out.

Several officers should also be selected to give talks before civic groups and other citizen organizations. Officers who have previous experience in public speaking, who may have taken college courses in public speaking, or who are adept at speaking before groups should be given special consideration for this part of the project.

The implementation phase of the project may coincide with the time of year when robberies begin to rise. In most cities this is during the Christmas holiday season, although some cities develop a rising crime rate during the summer months, probably as a result of schools not being in session. Here again an analysis of the data provides the decision-maker with certain types of options. Keep in mind that a public information program which deals with armed robbery will probably have little effect on muggings and other forms of street robberies.

The evaluation component of the project might include an analysis of:

- The increase or decrease reported in robberies.
- The number of arrests or clearances resulting from citizen input.
- Areas where information is distributed and areas where information is not distributed.

Generally, one year is too short a time for such an analysis. However, it is important for the project manager to submit interim reports, either monthly or quarterly, which illustrate progress to date. These reports should not be self-serving documents, but should be objective views of the project as it progresses, highlighting both successes and failures.

L. The Medium Sized Department

The medium sized police department has between 50 and 500 sworn personnel. Any of the projects previously discussed might be applicable for a city with this size department. It may be difficult to obtain funding for costly programs, particularly those involving computers or other forms of advanced technology.

In Worcester, Massachusetts, an initial report was prepared which analyzed the problem of robbery. (See Appendix B.) The recommendations called for the establishment of a five-man unit assigned to work on street robberies.

Prior to embarking upon this project; the planning division conducted a detailed analysis of robberies and their typology throughout their city. This analysis indicated that the majority of reported robberies were occurring on the streets in distinct sections of the city.

Federal funding was sought through a State Planning Agency grant. The funding was to provide for:

- Training for a special robbery unit.
- Training for the patrol force in robbery specific patrol and recognition factors.
- Special equipment for the unit.
- Rental cars.
- Clerical assistance.
- Travel to observe similar programs in other cities.

The evaluation component was specifically geared toward an analysis of street robberies. Keep in mind that other forms of robbery may increase as perpetrators become aware of the police focus on street crime. Thus, records should be kept which evaluate the trend in other forms of crime. However, since the focus of the project is on street robberies the project evaluation should focus on this area stressing the impact of the special unit in terms of arrests and information provided, and the comparative impact of other units, such as patrol and investigation.

The training program developed for the special unit must focus on apprehension techniques, including surveillance, perception, use of specialized equipment such as cameras or videotape, recognition of offenders and case preparation.

Training for the patrol force is more general and emphasizes the preventive aspects of their function. This may include an understanding of crime patterns, developing high visibility patrol, relationships with the community and what to look for in order to prevent robberies.

Selection of personnel for the special unit in this city took into account previous record, ability to work on the street, motivation, prior special training, and supervisor recommendations. Each candidate was given a battery of psychological tests and an oral interview.

The implementation phase of the project was developed in cooperation with the planning and statistical units in order to maximize the initial impact of the unit on the street. Publicity was withheld until the project had been in operation for over a month, after which a publicity campaign was developed which highlighted the special unit and the arrests it had made. The unit then changed its strategy from a decoy operation to surveillance of known offenders. A major consideration in the evaluation of this project is accurate reporting, which enables the evaluator to determine which techniques are more effective.

Deployment of the special unit was based upon crime analysis conducted by the unit supervisor, who received daily reports of all street robberies. The unit also worked closely with the patrol force and the investigative unit. For example, when a team was operating in a particular area the patrol force would frequently reduce visible coverage. The investigative unit provided information on possible suspects and in turn received information on suspects developed by the robbery unit.

A careful evaluation of specialized equipment employed by the unit was undertaken to determine which produced the highest probability of apprehension. Finally, a cost-benefit analysis was undertaken to determine the relative merit of assigning five men to a special unit as opposed to utilizing them in another way.

M. The Large Department

The large police department is generally an urban agency with several problems existing at the same time and in different locations. The report prepared in a department of this nature is, of necessity, likely to be limited to a particular geographic area, although an overview of the city itself may be included. Decisions in this type of agency may involve a project focusing on a small area or on a particular group of individuals known to be committing the crimes. The project developed here is a large one and would call upon resources at all levels of the department. The project itself would be multifaceted and would, because of its size, require strong administrative control and inter-departmental communication.

The hypothetical design outlined here involves all the strategies and techniques discussed in this manual. The reader should bear in mind that this is a large project and would generally involve great costs both in equipment and manpower. The model discussed serves merely to highlight the development of such a project.

To begin with, an in-depth study of reported robberies in the city was undertaken. This comprehensive study included information of perpetrators, victims, locations, and patterns of offenses, arrest and conviction ratios, analyses of the effectiveness of various units in combating robbery, and a five-year analysis of robbery trends.

Upon completion of this initial study a Task Force was established to develop a grant proposal. This included representatives from all areas of the department. Since the Task Force was quite large, subcommittees were formed and assigned particular areas. Each subcommittee was assigned an evaluation specialist whose role was to remind participants of the need for evaluation and to assist in developing models which could be tested.

Each subcommittee submitted a list of recommendations in the form of a completed staff report. On the basis of this a grant application was prepared with the assistance of the planning division.

The grant application focused upon the types of programs that were to be implemented and their costs. However, the grant proposal did not deal with the specific details of implementation. These were assigned to the units responsible for putting them into operation. Here again, a member of the planning division was assigned to work with each unit to serve as administrative liaison and coordinator. An outside evaluation team was responsible for developing measures of effectiveness and procedures by which these would be carried out.

Because there was some overlapping of functions and responsibilities, liaison personnel were appointed to each committee. The need for administrative control is something that cannot be too highly stressed, and the project was assigned to a staff officer who had overall responsibility. The reader should keep in mind that this frequently causes problems, especially when different units are involved, and responsibility should be delineated at the outset. In this case the staff officer served primarily as a project monitor and worked in cooperation with supervisors of the various units involved.

The grant application outlined the nature of the project and its corresponding programs. Since the project is so large a detailed progress chart was developed to determine the timetable for implementation, duration and evaluation. Each unit

involved was responsible for monthly reports and a quarterly report was prepared by the project monitor for submission to the Chief of Police and the grant agency. This also included a progress report by the evaluation team.

The procedures for implementation were similar to those outlined in the previous sections on small and medium-sized departments, although the planning effort was somewhat more detailed.

In order to evaluate the project, close attention was given to the establishment of control areas where nothing was done, and an attempt was made to minimize overlapping of programs, such as combining a patrol operation with a public relations program and the use of special robbery units. Keep in mind that the more changes made, the more difficult it is to evaluate the effectiveness of a single program. While there may be some concern that a department is not doing all it can to prevent crime if it doesn't use all its resources, in reality no department can use all of its resources on a particular problem. Thus, by developing a comprehensive experimental design it is possible to determine which approaches appear to be most effective in terms of resources and costs.

N. Summary

The development of a robbery control project is not difficult, but it should be thorough and it should not be done in a haphazard manner. The success or failure of such a project depends in large measure on advanced planning, well thought out objectives, selection of personnel, adequate funding, and meaningful evaluation. Without these the administrator is not only fooling the public, but he is fooling himself, for he cannot hope to attack a crime problem without giving it the attention and consideration it deserves. All too frequently projects are developed more as a public or community relations gimmick than as an honest attempt to deal with crime specific planning. The ultimate outcome in such cases is usually little more than a public reaction showing even less confidence than previously shown in the department's ability to cope with crime.

CHAPTER V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

One cannot assume that once a project becomes operational all problems will disappear. In fact, as a project progresses it is likely that anticipated problems—which may have been dealt with in planning—will manifest themselves in different ways. Of course, there will also be unanticipated problems, and these too must be handled. Frequently a project is implemented and runs for a period of time with little or no surface change, but in actuality may have been accidently hampered or subverted by individuals in the line operation.

A. Project Control

One example of this occurred in a large police department which implemented a program assigning officers specific "target" areas which they were responsible for. Because the project was not monitored carefully and the planning effort had not considered the problem of boredom, it was not long before the officers were expanding the target areas on their own, and not unsuccessfully. Thus, there was an increase in arrest activity and an assumption that the project was an initial success.

However, an evaluation of the project revealed the unauthorized changes and the whole question of assigning target areas was raised again. An analysis of arrest activity indicated that the officers were making more arrests, but they were not "on-view" or "undercover" arrests as stated in the original design. Instead the officers were making warrant and minor investigative arrests which should have been made by other units. Thus, the cost of providing additional equipment and manpower to reduce street robberies was questioned. A modification of the project and participation by the officers in the planning process resulted in its continuation with better measures of effectiveness.

There is an old maxim in police work which holds that the administrator will get what he wants to see, no matter what the facts are. Where a program is not monitored objectively and statistics are not honestly reported, the robbery control project is likely to be a success. But is it a real success, or only on paper?

B. Problems of Supervision

In another program the hostility of a supervisor toward the planning unit resulted in his efforts to sabotage his own program rather than give it a thorough and fair test. The supervisor made a point of keeping his squad tied up on extraneous matters, disciplining them by claiming they were too aggressive if they appeared conscientious, and playing down good arrests by those officers who were most effective. Reassignment of the supervisor resulted in a noticeable change in the arrest statistics of the squad.

C. Inter-Departmental Relationships

Rivalry and competition between units also frequently leads to ineffectiveness. The relationship between investigative and patrol units is frequently characterized by hostility, secrecy, and lack of cooperation. Such attitudes reduce the effectiveness of a department.

Administrative relationships must also be considered, for it is not uncommon for line units to get a "double" reading as to what is expected. In one department there was some confusion as to who was responsible for developing a project using videotape. The unit to which the equipment was assigned had loaned it to a staff unit because one of the administrators had indicated he wanted to supervise the program. As a result no action was taken and some three months passed before it was apparent that nothing was being accomplished.

The examples cited above are but a few of those disclosed during preparation of this manual. Nevertheless, they are typical and serve to highlight the organizational and operational problems one may encounter in developing a robbery control project. In some cases the problems are alleviated, in others there is an effort to make constructive

change, and in still others they continue to exist—either because they are institutional problems or because no one chooses to deal with them.

Within the organization we have identified the following areas as being most crucial to problem identification for a successful project:

- Line personnel.
- Supervisory assignments.
- Administrative relationships.
- "Political" relationships.

Since these four areas affect virtually all aspects of a police department, discussion is focused primarily on their relationship to project development.

In surveying police departments an attempt was made to identify areas which were both critical and problem provoking. In addition to the above, a considerable problem may arise in relationships with outside agencies and organizations. This is discussed in a later section of this chapter.

D. Line Personnel

The problem most often cited with respect to line operations in robbery control projects involved line personnel. Where the project involved a new technique, or revision of an old one, such as deploying personnel in civilian clothes as decoys, there was apt to be a feeling that the unit was not responsible to the rest of the department. Morale and *esprit de corps* were exceptionally high among such units, but frequently at a cost of cooperation with other units. While there may be some arguments for an elitist concept, and there is no getting around the fact that it exists in special units, strong and continuous attempts must be made to establish and maintain lines of communication between units. In some departments this involved members of the special unit appearing at roll calls or working closely with uniformed officers in particular cases. It would appear that the larger a department, the greater the need for formal communication. In the departments below 100 sworn personnel informal networks usually reduced such problems.

The implementation of a robbery control project is also likely to result in a feeling among officers that certain aspects of their job are no longer necessary. This appeared to be particularly true where departments instituted the position of crime prevention officer. Individual officers no longer felt it was their job to assist local merchants and citizens by providing information that was not being handled by the C.P.O. In some departments the addition of investigators assigned to robbery resulted in a sense of diminished responsibility on the part of the patrolmen. Officers were less accurate in taking reports, failed to provide all the information, and frequently told the complainant that an investigator would be around to take the full report. Needless to say, such an approach can have a detrimental effect on the operation and may actually reduce effectiveness.

There was also some negative feeling among line officers toward the implementation of projects, especially the experimentation and evaluation aspects. This resulted in a conscious or subconscious effort to sabotage projects. It appeared most frequently in newly required reports with officers omitting or misrepresenting particular activities. In some cases, they turned in false activity reports. This appeared to be most common in patrol experiments where officers were expected to be in a particular geographic area.

The lack of specific training in connection with a robbery project frequently resulted in confusion as to expectations and assignments. Most departments did not develop a particular training sequence, and in numerous cases the project was implemented without advance notification to the officers involved. In one department an officer was equipped with a rental car, disguised as an old man, and told to drive to a location, park, and act as a decoy. Four other officers were assigned to cover him. Within twenty minutes the officer made a minor arrest for possession of marijuana. He was not made aware of the costs involved in such an operation, or of his primary mission. Needless to say, his effectiveness in the neighborhood was blown the first night.

The lack of published orders or operating plans is also likely to create confusion, especially where a new unit is created. Orders should include an organization chart, specific duties, goals of the project, and implementation information.

Another complaint that was fairly common involved training in the use of technological equipment being employed. This ranged from use of audio-visual to computerized equipment. A number of respondents indicated that maintenance costs were probably double because officers did not know how to use or care for the equipment.

A final word should be said about attitudes and morale. Obviously, this varies with departments, but it does appear that officers are more favorably disposed toward a project when they have been a part of its development, have had an opportunity

to criticize it, and have some understanding of the way it is being evaluated. In those departments where the chief appeared to take an active interest in the project, usually by discussing it with participants, morale was higher and officers seemed genuinely interested in the contribution they were making.

E. Supervisory Assignments

In general, supervisors assigned to robbery projects tended to be carefully selected and, according to administrators, selected because of either specific knowledge in the area or past performance.

In a few instances it was apparent that supervisors had been selected because of their "connections" or as a reward. Officers were not only aware of this, but were quick to comment upon it in discussing the project. While it is difficult to evaluate the negative impact such selection has on a program, there are strong indications that it has a detrimental effect on morale.

The major problem insofar as supervisors are concerned appears to center on their attitudes toward their project. Most supervisors were not only in favor of their projects, but their bias frequently precluded any objective analysis. While this is difficult to change, it does appear that those departments which permitted line supervisors to participate in the planning phase were developing better data for evaluation. If the supervisor understands that the goals of the project are something that can be measured objectively, and that the project's failure is not necessarily a measure of his performance, he is more likely to be honest in carrying out his assignment. He should be aware that not all projects are successful, and he should be given the freedom to make suggestions and implement change when it becomes conclusive that something is not working. The participatory management approach makes the supervisor a part of the process, and not just someone who is being measured on the success or failure of the project.

Numerous supervisors who were interviewed felt strongly that some change in their project was necessary but that they had no channel by which they could communicate with those conducting the evaluation. In some cases just providing the supervisor with existing data caused him to change his mind about the success or failure of a particular operation.

In those few cases where supervisors were negatively disposed toward their projects or aspects of them, they were usually able to affect performance. In one department it was apparent that the supervisor was in favor of uniformed patrol, and he repeatedly ordered his squad to wear uniforms even though the project called for civilian clothes. When he was finally ordered to deploy his men in civilian clothes he exercised such tight supervision that the officers could not operate freely in an undercover manner. While this sergeant was a good one, his inability to cope with change had a detrimental impact on the project.

Most supervisors appeared familiar with the goals of the robbery project, but a number of them felt that in-service training would have been valuable both for them and for their subordinates. In connection with this, several supervisors also pointed up the need for including adjoining communities in the program. Since robbery suspects tend to be somewhat mobile, the need for cooperation was viewed as an important consideration which was overlooked in planning.

A number of supervisors also criticized the selection process of subordinates for special units. They maintained that they should have had some say in selecting officers for the project, since this would enable them to choose personnel they were familiar with and who would work well for them. While this does appear to be the case in most of the projects now underway in the United States, there are several in which all unit personnel were selected through administrative action. Obviously, this is not the case where a supervisor is transferred to a unit after it has been in operation for some time, and most supervisors in such a position indicated they would keep most of the personnel assigned, but would have liked to have been able to transfer an individual without going through a formal process which might reflect on the officer. Such problems of personality and working style are not new to police work and should be considered in developing a project.

Contrary to the morale problems among patrolmen, the morale of all supervisors working in robbery projects appears to be good. However, like the patrolmen, they frequently criticize the lack of communication between them and the administration.

F. Administrative Relationships

The primary problem affecting robbery projects and administrative relationships appears to be the

lack of organizational responsibility and clear-cut policy. A number of robbery control projects operate in a void, without clear channels of reporting and accountability. In one department it was not clear whether or not the special unit reported to a staff or a line administrator, but instead appeared to respond to both and reported to whomever asked a question. In another department there did not appear to be any policy on the use of personal automobiles and, as one officer said, "We'll see what happens when someone gets hurt."

Because robbery control projects are likely to result in the formation of new units, new procedures, and the purchase of new equipment, careful consideration must be given to establishing new administrative procedures. It would appear that the majority of existing projects are "playing it by ear" with respect to administrative relationships.

As a first step in developing administrative relationships a revised organizational chart should be drawn indicating who reports to whom. This should include job descriptions where applicable, and especially where a new position may result. Numerous departments have created the Crime Prevention Officer, yet few have set down what is expected of him and the parameters of his assignment. In one department officers were operating in an undercover capacity as far as fifty miles outside their jurisdiction without the knowledge of the administration or the adjoining police department even though this violated department policy.

The whole area of departmental policy is likely to be affected in developing a robbery control project, and this is something that should be explored in the planning stage, not after an incident has occurred. Obviously, not all situations can be anticipated, but thorough discussion and communication with other departments will make it possible to determine the types of situations that are likely to arise. As an example, many departments have begun experimenting with electronic devices which are installed in commercial establishments. Since most departments have a policy which prohibits alarms connected to the police station, the installationnof such alarms is against policy. Also, where such alarms are deployed, what will the citizen who wants one installed be told if he is not given one?

There appears to be some dissatisfaction with the administrative assignment of robbery control projects, especially in areas of general supervision. Most robbery projects are assigned to either patrol or investigation, although there are a few reporting to staff commanders with administrative responsibilities. In the case of special units, it is not unlikely that they operate on a city-wide basis, and this is cause for some concern by district commanders. Where the district commander is kept apprised of special unit operations and may request them on occasion the problem appears to be minimal. However, where units are consistently operating in areas and no coordination of effort exists, there is likely to be confusion and resentment. Here, it is the responsibility of the administrator to see that lines of communication and efforts are coordinated.

Finally, the efforts of administrators in both monitoring the project and keeping staff aware that they are interested in its development are crucial to the project's success.

G. "Political" Relationships

The term "political" relationships encompasses a great deal of ground, and is used here to mean those activities, attitudes and actions which play a major role in any organization. Political relationships are not necessarily negative, but they should be considered in developing a robbery control project.

When asked why the robbery control project was started, respondents in a number of cities attributed it to politics, usually external and related to adverse publicity, but also to an individual's ability to "sell" it to the administration, or the ability to generate funds. While most cities with robbery control projects have experienced a rise in reported crime, there are a great many more which have not developed projects even though their reported crime is equal or higher. Thus, one might attribute the development of a project to politics, both internal and external, although the motivation need not be viewed as serving the individual, but rather the goals of the department.

Despite good motives, there is always the feeling among some that nothing is done without a view toward such personal gain as assignment, prestige, or promotion. This feeling is likely to hamper the development of a project and should be countered immediately. One means of doing so is in the selection of personnel. Probably no other aspect of law enforcement is criticized within as much as the assignment of personnel. Thus, efforts should be made to select the best individuals for the position. Personal selections should be avoided.

A major problem in any organization is the rumor, and efforts should be made to keep rumors at a minimum. This wil involve making information about the project available to all members of the department. The super-secret elitist approach which characterizes some programs should be avoided.

While it is difficult to discuss all the problems in this area some general points should be raised.

In several departments the implementation of special units was viewed as the creation of "shotgun" squads which would shoot first and ask questions later. The policy was, in fact, just the opposite. Yet, members of the unit, for one reason or another, chose not to publicize this.

The use of statistics in some departments was misleading. Figures were used to prove that a project was working when, in fact, it had made little or no impact. The argument raised was that this was good politically because members of the department would work harder to maintain the record.

Instances of abuse of authority appear to have been covered up in some projects for fear that they would hurt the project and have political ramifications. In those departments where officers were disciplined there does not appear to have been any undue publicity or negative impact on the project.

In at least one city there is some indication that the project came close to being a political football between two administrative factions; used by one side as an indication of the department's efforts to curtail crime, and the other as an argument that the unit was ineffective. There was no data available to prove either side wrong.

H. External Problems

A police department does not operate in a vacuum. External forces have an impact on organizational and operational problems. While it would appear that most projects do not suffer from outside political interference, there are some indications that the role the media plays and the views of citizens can have an impact on the operation of a robbery project.

Perhaps the most significant instance of media and political involvement in a robbery project occurred in a large midwestern city where, as a result of several shootings by members of a special unit, media and political pressure was brought to bear on the department. While it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the particular project, there is no doubt that the publicity had an adverse effect.

In most instances robbery control projects have received favorable receptions. While there is still some disagreement as to how and when a project should be publicized, it appears that some information should be released to the media if they request it. It serves little or no purpose to keep a project secret after it has been discovered by the press, and it is probably more advisable to inform the press when a project is implemented, asking them to withhold publication for a period of time if necessary. Some administrators feel that information on the use of decoys and undercover operatives should not be released. However, it would appear that general, rather than specific publicity has not severely hampered such projects.

The assignment of personnel to a particular area or problem should be based on the goals of the project, and not the whim of outsiders. In at least two projects some assignments came as the result of an outside request, usually by a politician, and not on the basis of crime related information. Such assignment frequently hampers the project and results in the transfer of officers to an area in which crime is more a problem of perception than reality. One should keep in mind that the goals of a robbery control project are to prevent robberies and apprehend perpetrators, not to satisfy the *unjustified* needs of outsiders.

Another concern expressed by several administrators was the role funding agencies play in developing grants. It was pointed out that politics plays an important role in receiving funding assistance, and some form of objective evaluation of projects should be implemented. While it is no doubt difficult to define the individual criteria of each funding agency, it should be stated that many grant proposals lack the sophistication and methodology necessary for funding. Further, past experience with a department is an important criterion for funding agencies, and where a department has failed to live up to the terms of the proposal in a prior grant, it is not likely to receive additional funds. The evaluation component of a grant proposal is an important consideration and should not be taken lightly.

The success that an individual department has in receiving funding assistance is frequently determined by its relationship with the funding agency, and just as a Chief of Police must communicate with local government, he should be aware of who's who in the funding agencies. In essence,

politics is no more than the activities and actions of an individual. This should be recognized, for combined with a solid grant proposal and an honest effort, it is possible to obtain funding assistance to develop a project.

The role that citizens' groups play in a department's activities varies, but most projects in the United States today depend in large measure on citizen cooperation. Several respondents indicated that it took some time to break down citizen resistance and apathy. With this in mind a concentrated effort must be made to involve citizens' groups in the project. This may range anywhere from getting citizens to testify in court to crime prevention programs which directly or indirectly involve citizens.

It must be realized that any crime control project involves a number of criminal justice agencies in addition to the department responsible for implementation. One glaring blemish on the American Criminal Justice System has been the lack of cooperation between the various agencies comprising the system. This point of recognition is the first step in attempting to overcome the problem.

For instance, before a police department embarks on a new robbery program, it would be prudent to hold a conference of other agency officials whereby the program could be fully explained and questions answered. The conference could include representatives of agencies sharing enforcement responsibilities, the courts, the corrections agencies, the prosecutor's office and any others that would be involved or interested in the program. In this way, assistance and cooperation can be attained from these agencies which will ultimately strengthen the program's chances for success.

Law enforcement agencies do not operate within a vacuum, but are part of a larger system that has its success dependent on the capabilities of its component parts. It is therefore important that the fight against criminality be a concerted effort utilizing all the resources of the criminal justice system.

CHAPTER VI. TRAINING

One of the basic premises of a crime specific program is that activities directed at combating robbery must be channeled into a coordinated management effort. The resources of all administrative and operational components included in the program must be pointedly directed at a specific goal, e.g. the reduction of robbery offenses. Each participant unit must share responsibility for attaining the stated goal and should be dependent on the others for the overall success of the project.

In this regard, training requirements for a robbery control project must incorporate a broad-based curriculum aimed at all units involved in the project. Training cannot be a fragmented attempt aimed only at those units that have primary responsibility for the project, but should benefit the entire force. In this manner, personnel of various administrative units as well as members of secondary operational units will be well-versed in the nature and goals of the robbery control project. Most police training programs have not been broad-based, but rather have been targeted at a specific unit for a specific purpose. For example, most robbery seminars are attended by those members of the force who have primary responsibility for investigating robberies. This approach, although beneficial to those in attendance, fails to recognize that many organizational components are important in the control of robbery. An effective crime control project utilizes all available organizational energies in attempting to reach its declared goal. It is not predicated on the success of a specialized unit, but is dependent on joint effectiveness of all components.

Generally speaking, most police training efforts, except basic recruit school, can be categorized as in-service, specialized, command or on-the-job training. They are invariably directed at a particular division and concern a limited topic or subject matter. In most cases uninvited units become aware of a training course by way of a memo or directive that provides a general outline of the purposes of the course. This is usually the extent of the coordination and cooperation found within the training function of most police departments. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the training needs of a robbery control project by outlining a general curriculum for the primary and support units in the program. It does not present an established syllabus for all projects, but rather outlines general topics that could be incorporated into a department's training program. For instance, the core topic Crime Scene Procedures includes preservation and collection of evidence, preliminary investigation, and interviewing techniques. All this could, based on the department's robbery control project and the composition of the student body, be presented at a single session or as individual subjects in a more detailed program.

A. Curriculum Topics: General Core Areas

1. *Criminal Law and Procedure.* Of primary importance to any law enforcement officer is knowledge of the laws he is sworn to enforce. The training course should explain all sections of the penal law that deal with the crime of robbery. Officers should be intimately aware of what overt actions constitute the crime of robbery and what procedures are to be utilized in the arrest, booking and prosecution stages in their respective geographical areas of employment. If possible, the department legal advisor should present this topic; however, a police officer knowledgeable in this area might fulfill the requirements in the absence of a qualified criminal law attorney.

2. *Robbery Program Concept.* The purposes, functions, and goals of the robbery control project should be fully explained. Officers should be instructed on the responsibilities of their units in the operation of the project. If possible, comparable robbery projects should be discussed during this period. A question and answer session should follow.

3. *Tactical Response Plan—Uniform Force.* If

the project utilizes a pre-determined tactical response plan it should be defined and described in this session. A representative of the unit having ultimate responsibility for the project should deliver this lecture. Visual aids, maps, and diagrams should be used to outline the response and cut-off routes to be utilized in the event of a robbery alarm.

4. *Strategy and Tactics—Special Units.* The establishment of special units, particularly those operating in plain clothes, necessitates thorough training in strategy and tactics. This should include procedures to be carried out when responding to a robbery in progress, methods of covering escape routes, individual safety, assignment of responsibilities, and the types of clothing or disguises to be worn. For identification purposes officers should have in their possession a departmentally approved and recognized clothing code, i.e. a baseball cap clearly marked "police," colored arm bands, head bands, etc. This will reduce the chance of accidental injury when responding to a scene.

The strategies to be employed will cover such items as the type of patrol to be employed, offender information and how it can be used, relationships with other units, and particular problems that might arise.

5. *Surveillance.* Techniques of surveillance should include a lecture on fixed surveillance, moving surveillance, and long term surveillance operations. The various techniques of surveillance should be covered and use of equipment to enhance the operation should be explained.

6. *Crime Scene Procedures.* This instructional period should delineate the responsibilities of all units responding to the scene of a robbery. Duties must be clearly established between patrol, investigative, and criminalistics units to avoid duplication of effort and to conserve time. Procedures must be established for the search of the area and for the preservation and collection of evidence.

Instruction should be given in the area of interviewing techniques to those officers who will question robbery victims and witnesses.

7. *Report Writing.* Although report writing is accepted as a basic tool taught at the recruit level, it nonetheless represents an important facet of professional police work. A session should be scheduled for a review of the preparation of all departmental forms dealing with robbery. The advantages of proper report writing are too numerous to mention, but it must be stressed that case preparation for court is highly dependent on accurate reporting.

This refresher phase should be given to all personnel involved in the preparation of robbery reports.

8. *Crime Analysis Unit.* A representative of this unit should lecture on the operation of this important support function. The instructor should present visual aids describing the methods used in analyzing crime data and should explain the relationship between his unit and the operation of the project.

A brief description of the computer technology used in crime analysis will provide the students with some background in this area. The instructor should clearly define the methodologies used in projecting crime trends, with particular emphasis given the crime of robbery.

If the unit has established a "profile of a robber" it should be described and discussed during this period.

9. *Project Technology.* If any electronic alarm equipment is utilized in the project, it should be described and discussed during this session. An actual demonstration should be performed and a question and answer period should follow.

A discussion of other technical equipment used in the robbery control project should also be presented at this time.

10. *Public Information and Robbery Prevention.* An asset to any robbery control project is public support and understanding of the department's program. For this reason, departments should consider support programs that include: crime prevention surveys for commercial establishments, robbery prevention pamphlet and poster campaigns, seminars and instructional programs for the general public. Programs such as these are being utilized throughout the United States. Generally the public supports and appreciates such efforts.

This phase of the training should reinforce the necessity for public contacts by members of the force and should acquaint them with specialized public information programs. It should be stressed that the patrol division is a potent force in establishing citizen support for the department's robbery project.

TABLE 6–1

Curriculum Design

	Patrol	Invest.	Admin. Units	C.I.C.	Special Units	Public	Traffic	Intelligence
Robbery Grant Concept	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Criminal Law and Procedure	X	X			X		X	X
Crime Scene Procedures	X	X						
Report Writing	X	X						
Crime Analysis	X	X	X	X				X
Project Technology	X	X						
Public Information	X	X	X			X		
Crime Prevention	X	X			X	X		
Investigative Techniques	X	X						
Tactical Response Plans—Uniform Force	X							
Strategy and Tactics—Special Units		X			X			
Surveillance		X			X			X

11. *Investigative Phases and Techniques.* The first part of the session deals with an explanation of the various phases of a robbery investigation and establishes lines of authority for those units involved in the investigation. One of the difficulties in a major crime investigation is simply that "too many cooks spoil the broth." This unfortunate situation usually produces a fragmented effort. The instructor should stress the "delineation of authority" management principle and should visually display the network of coordination established in his department. Flow charts should be used to explain the exchange of information.

The second half of the session is directed at the various investigative techniques used in robbery cases. Experienced detectives and superior officers can be utilized in discussing surveillance, stakeouts, *modus operandi* files, intelligence information, etc.

Table 6–1 represents a breakdown of instructional topics and corresponding units that would benefit from such a robbery training program. It should be noted that topics and units included in this diagram will vary depending on the nature and organizational composition of a department's robbery project.

As previously stated in Chapter III, the Miami Police Department has one of the most comprehensive robbery control programs in the nation. Included in this is a thirty-five hour robbery control seminar given to acquaint all patrol sergeants, police officers, robbery investigators, and selected personnel from the Criminal Information Center and Identification Unit with the operations of the Project. (See Table 6–2.)

The curriculum of this program is quite comprehensive and has included topics dealing with every aspect of the Project. It is a coordinated training effort directed at all personnel involved in the actual operation as well as the support functions of the program.

Of particular interest in Miami's Seminar Program was the use of "TACHTISTOSCOPIC TRAINING." This involves the use of a visual perception program whereby a high speed flash recognition system enhances one's powers of observation. It is the department's intention to use this training tool at roll calls in showing pictures of active and wanted robbery offenders.

B. Instructional Methods and Program Scheduling

As course content varies from department to department so must the instructional methods vary. It is not reasonable to expect a forty-man department to utilize the same training schedule and techniques found in larger departments such as the Miami Police Department. Other methods must be available to departments that cannot enjoy the luxury of releasing a goodly number of officers to attend a training course.

Departments, particularly those with few sworn

TABLE 6–2

Sample Curriculum

MIAMI POLICE DEPARTMENT
ROBBERY CONTROL SEMINAR

Introduction	1 HOUR
Miami Robbery Problem	1 HOUR
Visual Perception Training	6 HOUR
Robbery Law	1 HOUR
Robbery Team Concept	1 HOUR
Robbery Prevention	1 HOUR
Robbery Grant Concept	1 HOUR
Robbery Intelligence—Before Act	1 HOUR
Preliminary Response to Robbery	1 HOUR
Hot Area Search	1 HOUR
On-Scene Investigation	1 HOUR
Crime Scene Search	1 HOUR
Follow-up Investigation	1 HOUR
Follow-up Special Situations	2 HOUR
Robbery Intelligence—During Act	1 HOUR
Arrest and Screening	2 HOUR
Gacha—Input and Inquiry	2 HOUR
Robbery Intelligence—After Act	1 HOUR
Basic Field Interviews	1 HOUR
Video and Identi-kit	1 HOUR
Active Robbery Suspects	1 HOUR
Robbery Intelligence	1 HOUR
Case Preparation and Filing	1 HOUR
Conducting Line-ups and Show-ups	1 HOUR
Robbery—Homicide	1 HOUR
Profile of a Robbery	1 HOUR
Critique	1 HOUR
	35 HOURS

personnel, should explore grant assistance in formulating training programs. Technical equipment that could enhance training programs, such as videotape, recorded lectures on cassettes along with a cassette recorder, etc., is available and should be incorporated into the grant proposal. Small departments should also keep in mind that grant assistance is available to departments requiring the services of a legal advisor.

In departments that cannot afford to sponsor robbery training programs on an on-going basis it might prove interesting to use videotape cassettes to film the original course. This way instructors have to present their lectures only once, thus saving many man-hours and personnel expenditures. Although instructor-student interaction is absent, this can provide important content information to officers viewing the presentation.

Another possible training method is the use of recording cassette tapes. Here cassette tapes are used to record the instructors' presentations and are given to officers to play and review in their off-hours. This method is best for small agencies that cannot afford formal specialized training programs.

Training is sometimes the deciding factor in making a project a success or a failure. Therefore, it is recommended that great emphasis be placed on the establishment of a meaningful training program as part of a department's robbery control project. Planning and research should be conducted in advance of the grant proposal to substantiate the department's needs in this area. Management should explore all possible training schedules and methodologies that could be incorporated into the department structure and that would enhance the overall effectiveness of the project.

C. Summary

Robbery is a stranger-to-stranger type crime that affects the lives of all citizens. For this reason, it is the responsibility of police departments to disseminate vital information to its members that will make them better equipped to deal with this criminal plague. One of the best methods of channeling information to the force is the use of the training function.

As previously stated, the success of a robbery control project may well hinge on the quality of training given those members of the department responsible for its operation. It is, therefore, incumbent on police administrators to initiate training programs that will benefit all personnel involved in the robbery project and to coordinate this program so that it has a positive impact on the project.

Crime specific planning involves the use of management techniques that foster a cohesive organization attack on certain designated crimes. This police managerial method thrusts all organizational components into a unified whole for the purpose of accomplishing some goal, e.g. an increase in the number of robbery arrests. For this reason, it is necessary that departments give birth to training curricula that can be aimed at all units that have primary, secondary, or even tertiary responsibilities for the project.

The battle against the crime of robbery is not the singular responsibility of the patrol and investiga-

tive units. The resources of the entire department must be mobilized and adjusted so that the success of a robbery control project is dependent on the overall productivity of the total organization.

CHAPTER VII. FUNDING THE PROJECT

A major consideration of any project is funding. Funding may be available from a variety of sources, but the three major areas of support are:

- Local budgetary support either in the department's annual budget or through a special allocation.
- Federal assistance in the form of grants or other subsidies.
- Private sources, usually foundations or civic groups.

In Chapter IV development of a robbery control project was discussed. We stressed the need for adequate planning, for this is the thread that runs through any project. Funding can only be based upon planning. Yet, a definitive plan is not necessary to explore external funding possibilities.

A. State and Local Funding

Most police administrators are aware of local funding sources. However, frequently they are not aware of specific departments or agencies which may be able to assist them in a particular area. There are a number of federally funded programs which are administered by state or local agencies, and these may relate to a robbery project.

Another source of local funding is through the department budget. Generally such funding must be anticipated in advance and specified in the annual budget. Obviously, the type of robbery project decided upon will have some bearing on the funds needed. Personnel costs, for example, might be absorbed; that is, personnel can be transferred or reassigned to a new unit or detail for the duration of the project. This is done frequently in larger cities. Many police departments fail to utilize their budgets to develop special programs even though funds are available. Close scrutiny of the department's budget can usually result in the discovery of funds which can be transferred, and this is an area that should not be overlooked. Equipment costs are not as easy to absorb. Rental cars, technical equipment and computer costs for special projects will generally require budget modifications or additions.

One of the major problems of projects funded locally is the lack of emphasis on evaluation. A number of police administrators appear to feel that if they (meaning the department) are supplying funds there is no need for accountability of effectiveness and efficiency. The result is frequently no more than a constant shifting of resources with no determination of what is not working.

B. Federal Assistance

The federal government provides millions of dollars each year in grants and research in the area of criminal justice. Most of these funds are provided through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). Some of the activities of LEAA are summed up in the Attorney General's First Annual Report:

> In establishing LEAA, Congress took an approach to Federal funding based primarily on block grants awarded in lump sums to States. The recipient States in turn allocate funds, according to a plan submitted beforehand to LEAA, for their own law enforcement and criminal justice projects at the State, county, and city levels, That approach recognizes that law enforcement is largely the responsibility of State and local jurisdictions. It also recognizes that solutions to most crime problems are best and most effectively worked out at the State and local level.
>
> *State Planning Agencies.* All 55 jurisdictions funded by LEAA block grants have State Planning Agencies (SPAs), which are required by law to be established as the official recipient agency for Federal funds on behalf of the State. The 55 jurisdictions consist of the 50 States and American Samoa, the District of Colum-

bia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

Comprehensive plans. Before it can receive its block action funds, each SPA must submit and obtain LEAA approval of a comprehensive plan for the reduction of crime.

Block grants. When the plan is approved by LEAA, it then grants block action funds to support programs which implement the plan. The States provide 25 percent of the funding for most action programs, while the Federal share is 75 percent. Construction projects are carried out with 50 percent funding by each element.

Pass through. During FY 1971, the States were required to pass on at least 75 percent of their block action grants to local governments. However, amendments to the act were enacted during FY 1971 which modified this requirement. Beginning in FY 1973, the amount of block actions funds passed on to local units of government is to be determined by the ration of local government expenditures to total State and local government expenditures for law enforcement during the previous fiscal year. Thus, for example, if local expenditures totaled 80 percent of all statewide, non-Federal law enforcement spending, 80 percent of the block action funds will be passed on to local units of government and 20 percent retained by the State.

Discretionary grants. LEAA is also authorized to award grants to specific promising projects through funding to States, cities, counties, and other units of government. These discretionary grants support innovative projects in all areas of law enforcement and criminal justice.

Appropriations. The LEAA appropriation from Congress during FY 1971 totaled $529 million, a dramatic increase from $63 million in FY 1969 and $268 million in FY 1970. Planning grant awards increased from $20.9 million in FY 1970 to $25.8 million in FY 1971; block action grants increased from $182.7 million to $340 million during those years; and discretionary grants increased from $32 million to $70 million.

Block grant utilization. The States utilized nearly 85 percent of their block grant funds in programs to increase the effectiveness of police, courts, and corrections. Grants for police activities were allocated in areas such as specialized training, personnel recruitment, and equipment. Grant spending for courts during FY 1971 was primarily for court management and information systems, while corrections spending emphasized community-based treatment, improved treatment programs, and personnel training.

Discretionary grant utilization. Discretionary grants also funded police, courts, and correction improvement programs as well as projects in such specialized areas as organized crime, narcotics control, civil disorders, and Indian law enforcement. A program directed at large cities enabled LEAA to direct further discretionary funds at urban areas where the high incidence of crime concentrated in a specific locale presents especially difficult problems. Other programs supported by discretionary funding, such as regional crime laboratories and certain efforts against narcotics trafficking, provide for coordinated regional or statewide activities.

Research and education. Other LEAA programs to provide criminal justice funding assistance include grants for research and development projects in crime control, awards to universities and colleges for support of study by law enforcement students and professionals, and grants for the development and implementation of projects in the area of criminal justice statistics and systems analysis.

Technical assistance. Beyond financial assistance, LEAA also provides technical assistance to aid States in their criminal justice efforts. Advisory personnel are

available to assist SPAs and State and local agencies in developing new programs and techniques for dealing with law enforcement problems. Training programs and information exchange, through regional and national conferences by which LEAA provides technical assistance. Technical assistance publications which provide resource material on a variety of law enforcement problems greatly expand the audience reached by LEAA technical assistance efforts.

Interagency agreements. Interagency agreements or transfers are funded by LEAA when the resources of other Federal agencies will benefit a particular program of law enforcement assistance. For example, the National Bureau of Standards, Department of Commerce, received LEAA funding to establish a laboratory for developing and testing standards of performance of law enforcement equipment. Interagency agreements, discussed in detail in the chapters of the various departments and agencies which have been funded, are largely aimed at problems which are common to law enforcement throughout the Nation rather than in a specific locality.[1]

The most promising avenue of funding assistance is the State Planning Agency which distributes federal funds made available through the government. Each state has its own agency, and the police administrator should be familiar with its operation and personnel. In addition to funding assistance the State Planning Agency may be able to provide technical assistance in specific areas.

C. Private Funding Sources

A number of foundations make funds available to law enforcement for particular projects. The Police Foundation was established in 1970 with funds provided by the Ford Foundation. "The central aim of the Police Foundation is to help American police agencies realize their fullest potential by developing and funding promising programs of innovation and improvement."[2]

Private civic groups and organizations may also be of assistance. These include the Chamber of Commerce, business groups, civic associations, and organizations such as the New York City Police Foundation, which was established as a private non-profit enterprise to assist the New York City Police Department in funding various projects.

Perhaps the primary key to funding a promising project lies in the administrator's ability to seek out assistance. Obviously, a department's "track record" is also important, for if a funding agency's previous relationship with a department has been poor, it will be difficult to procure future funds.

D. The Grant Proposal

Where inquiries have led to a request for a grant proposal all effort should be turned toward developing a specific proposal, and one which shows the planning involved in its preparation. All too frequently a department assumes that a request for a grant proposal requires little more than putting together a few ideas and figures. This is probably why some departments have trouble with subsequent funding.

Preparation of the Proposal. Responsibility for preparation of the grant proposal should be assigned to one individual, preferably one who has been a part of the planning phase. The proposal should be prepared with care and it is wise to assign an individual full-time to completing the task. Assuming that all of the preliminary work has been accomplished, the primary task is to put together a document that is easily understood, well researched, and presented in a manner which will interest the reader. Keep in mind that most funding agencies receive hundreds, if not thousands, of grant applications, and the key is to make yours stand out.

The following steps will be helpful in putting together the proposal:

- Where a concept paper has been submitted and returned with a request for a complete proposal, determine if possible, any criticism or suggestions that might have been made by the granting agency. Do not hesitate to call for clarification if a question arises.
- Pull together all reports, memoranda, or other documents relating to the project. Condense these into outline form, preferably as they relate to the various sections of the application, i.e. budget, objectives, methodology, staffing, and evaluation. Do not hesitate to call in those involved in the original research or planning for conferences.

- Ascertain specific costs of personnel, equipment and other budget items which are a part of the grant. Keep in mind that this also includes the grantee contribution. If three police officers and a department auto are to be involved in the grant, the cost of salaries, fringe benefits, the automobile and maintenance may be a part of the grantee's contribution, or in some cases funded by the grant. This should be made clear and actual costs ascertained.
- Prepare a line item budget which includes all costs. This is a crucial area and one which many departments do not give enough thought to.
- Prepare a draft of the application and disseminate it to key personnel for their comments and criticism.
- In the event outside staffing is necessary, get commitments, if possible, from those who might be hired. Their resumes should be included in the application.
- Develop a realistic plan for implementation of the project.
- Be honest! Do not make promises that cannot be kept. Do not falsify statistics to make a case. Do not set unrealistic goals. Do not inflate costs.
- Review the proposal for errors and keep in mind that it should be neat and follow the specified format.
- Submit the proposal.

E. References

[1] *Attorney General's First Report: Federal Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Assistance Activities*. Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice, 1972, pp. 40-43.

[2] *The Police Foundation: Preliminary Program Statement*. Washington, D.C. (Pamphlet).

APPENDIX A
SYNOPSIS OF ROBBERY PROGRAMS

BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
702	592	6	24	80

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	328	465	757
Arrests	N/A	108	140
No. Cleared	117	95	262

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	N/A	48	67
18–21	N/A	30	26
Under 18	N/A	30	47

Program Title: Robbery Detail

This program employs a varying number of officers at different times, with detective and civilian participation varying also. There are 10 supervisors assigned.

The primary object of the program is to reduce robberies and increase clearance rate. The program was implemented in August 1973.

Description of Program

1. Citizen Band Radio operators are utilized as observers at locations of potential robbery victims.
2. Auxiliary and regular police officers are assigned as decoy victims in areas where robbery from the person is a frequent occurrence.
3. Each robbery team is each month assigned 10 current suspects to concentrate on. This means that robbery detectives become familiar with the activities of the ten suspects for a period of one month with the intent of making the suspect aware that he is a suspect.
4. Monthly visits are made to uniform roll calls by robbery detectives to familiarize all officers with current suspects. This is accomplished by presenting slides of the subjects and their vehicles.
5. Publications—Three Monthly:

a. A bulletin containing a photo and other pertinent information about all current robbery suspects.

b. A bulletin containing pertinent information about vehicles owned and operated by robbery suspects.

c. A bulletin containing photos and other pertinent information about persons who are the subject of outstanding robbery warrants.

Contact: Jerry D. Frazier, Police Officer, Planning and Research
(205) 323-5431: Ext. 223

CONCORD, CALIFORNIA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
139	108	1	4	26

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	50	61	87
Arrests	19	34	43
No. Cleared	12	25	33

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	4	18	23
18–21	N/A	N/A	N/A
Under 18	15	16	20

Program Title: Operation Alert

This program employs one police officer and no detectives. One supervisor and one civilian devote half-time to the program.

The primary object of the program, implemented in September 1970, is prevention.

Description of Program

The Crime Prevention officer conducts business inspections to evaluate and advise on prevention strategies. Follow up inspections are made after all robberies to make recommendations for prevention. Informative and instructional pamphlets and hold up cards are distributed to businesses and available when requested.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Printing and expert training, personal contact to increase public awareness, publicity as a deterrent.

Cost: $1,500

Contact: Ray A. Bray, Crime Prevention Officer
(415) 682-4100: Ext. 321

HUNTINGTON BEACH, CALIFORNIA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
220	165	2	17	36

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	58	82	77
Arrests	43	67	61
No. Cleared	30	34	43

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	29	51	45
18–21	11	27	21
Under 18	14	16	16

This program employs eight detectives and one supervisor. No police officers or civilians are utilized.

The primary objects of the program, implemented in December 1970, are prevention and apprehension.

Description of Program

During a two-week period at Christmas time there are four cars with two officers in each working a line beat. These units check all high risk robbery commercial businesses and implement a high visibility patrol and stakeout technique for apprehension.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Two-way radio, unmarked cars, shotguns, high and low visibility patrols, stake-outs.

Cost: $1,120

Contact: Gary A. Wright, Public Affairs Officer
Richard Nolen, Detective
(714) 536-5322

ORANGE, CALIFORNIA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
143	115	1	1	26

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	51	41	34
No. Cleared	26	25	21

Program Titles: Major Crimes Detail, Specific Enforcement Detail, and Crime Prevention Committee.

This program was implemented in July 1973.

Description of Program

1. Four-man detail assigned to major crimes: homicide, robbery, major frauds, etc. They collect intelligence information, conduct stakeouts and investigate. Responsibility lies with the detective division.

2. Four patrolmen and one sergeant assigned to plainclothes patrol are responsible for selective enforcement on rape, robbery, burglary and auto theft. They engage in undercover patrol and stakeouts. They are also assigned to prevention programs, making business contacts and holding talks. This unit works on an "as needed" basis with flexible hours. No case load is assigned.

3. A committee of officers from various divisions and bureaus coordinates preventive efforts and devises new techniques and programs. The emphasis is on environmental changes to facilitate prevention of criminal activity with target crimes of burglary, robbery, and auto theft.

4. Energies are coordinated with narcotic detectives in appropriate areas where drug abuse and addiction are underlying motivators.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Assorted unmarked cars, motorcycles and bicycles; surveillance equipment—cameras, body bugs, binoculars, etc.; hand pack two-way radios; videotape recordings, etc.; use of informants, diversions, tailing by multi-units, stakeouts; high visibility patrol; flyers of suspects; prevention literature; talks with businessmen; security inspections and suggestions.

Contact: David L. Daniels, Detective Sergeant
(714) 532-0216

STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
256	189	7	27	33

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	403	474	559
Arrests	134	132	132
No. Cleared	N/A	115	136

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	18	85	85
18–21	45	47	47
Under 18	24	21	60

Program Title: Booby Trap

This program employs one police officer and one detective, both on a half-time basis. There are no supervisors or civilians utilized in the program.

The primary object of the program is to decrease response time in burglaries and robberies, increase apprehension of suspects, prevent the continued increased rate of these felonies and reduce these offenses to a more normal rate. The implementation of the program is pending.

Description of Program

The program consists of the placement of portable "silent alarms" in locations of expected victimization by burglars or robbers, allowing for a minimum of manpower to efficiently "stakeout" these locations.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars, surveillance, MARS packages, burglary and robbery packet alarm transmitter.

Cost: $64,314

Contact: Billy W. Brazzel, Lieutenant, Personnel and Training Section
(209) 944-8246

DENVER, COLORADO

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
1,519	1,202	21	138	158

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	1189	1499	1378
Arrests	655	699	577
No. Cleared	489	491	541

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	252	267	232
18–21	175	181	126
Under 21	231	251	219

Program Title: Special Crime Attack Team (SCAT)

This program employs 21 police officers, nine detectives, three supervisors and one civilian.

The primary object of the program is the reduction of stranger-to-stranger crimes and the reduction of burglaries in three target precincts by 25 percent.

During the first quarter of 1973, robberies increased 186 percent in the city. Due to this increase SCAT emphasized robbery, and in three months there was a 36 percent decrease. The program was implemented in December 1972.

Description of Program

The program is designed to utilize crime information data developed by the police department's processing section to deploy personnel resources. Another aspect of this program is preventive in nature. Impact patrolling and public contacts will implement this aspect.

A special pamphlet has been developed for businesses. Coupled with this, bulletins are sent out which bring all current robbery and burglary information up to date for businessmen. Information includes time of day, day of week, victim, setting, offender, property loss, injuries, and current crime trends.

Impact patrol functions are surveillance, community control work, security inspections, investigations and team assignments.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Six marked vehicles, six unmarked vehicles, three handi-talkie radios (portable), one strobe unit, 12 hand lanterns, binoculars, field camera, fingerprint camera, 135mm SLR camera with 200mm fixed telephoto lens.

Cost: $559,324

Contact: C. Y. Hanson, Captain, Research and Development Bureau
(303) 297-2045

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
474	404	2	24	44

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	164	251	248
Arrests	N/A	N/A	N/A
No. Cleared	67	150	115

Program Title: Street Crime Task Force

"Street Crime Task Force" employs 11 police officers, and one supervisor. No detectives or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program is to identify behavior patterns of perpetrators, apprehend assailants, and prevent street crime. The program was implemented in July 1971.

Description of Program

The Street Crime Task Force of the New Haven Police Department is a nine-man specialized patrol force which concentrates on stopping muggings, purse-snatchings, robberies, and burglaries. The casually dressed, long-haired appearance of the Task Force members allow them to blend in with the culture of the street people.

By operating only during night hours and by responding to only street crime calls, the Task Force becomes familiar with street crime perpetrators and their modes of operation. The supervisor initiates demographic studies and anticipates monthly crime trends and so redirects the patrol patterns of the Task Force.

Informants are used, primarily because their familiarity with street people facilitates identification of methods of particular persons. Decoys attract purse-snatchers, etc., who may confess to a number of past street crimes.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars, communications equipment, decoys, stakeouts, low visibility patrol.

Cost: $124,000

Contact: Joseph W. Kenny, Director, Planning and Evaluation
(203) 777-6591: Ext. 658

WILMINGTON, DELAWARE

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
328	268	1	4	55

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	394	458	399
Arrests	180	217	211
No. Cleared	N/A	N/A	N/A

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 18	93	165	162
Under 18	87	52	49

Program Title: Crimes Specific Improvement and Investigative Strike Force

This program employs 65 police officers and 25 supervisors. No detectives or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program is to prevent robberies and other street-related crimes through saturation efforts in target areas. The program was implemented in August 1973.

Description of Program

The "Crimes Specific" portion of the project is partially directed toward lowering the incidence of street related crime. Working on an overtime basis, uniformed officers saturate target areas through high-visibility foot patrols. The other portion of the Federal grant covering "Strike Force" activities

assist in detecting robberies through the use of alarms and stake-out activities. Working in trend areas, alarms and/or stakeouts are to be utilized at specified periods.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Alarm equipment, stakeouts, high visibility patrol.

Cost: $60,000 (Overtime Costs)
State Planning Funds (LEAA) 10 percent
Federal (LEAA) 90 percent

Contact: John Tomlinson, Patrolman, Planning and Research Unit
(302) 655-6131: Ext. 565

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
5,572	4,783	168	264	357

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	11,967	10,957	8,704
Arrests	1,975	2,280	2,373
No. Cleared	2,087	3,231	2,081

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	647	856	999
18–21	546	775	677
Under 18	853	714	681

Program Title: Tac II

This program employs 14 police officers and two supervisors. No investigators or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program, implemented in December 1971, is prevention.

Description of Program

Tac II, developed by Bell & Howell for use in Vietnam, is an alarm system. In a typical alarm setup a foot treadle behind a teller's window activates a silent alarm which a hidden transmitter relays to the police. The police ideally arrive in time to clear the sidewalk of bystanders and nab the holdup men as they come out of the bank. Tac II has two big advantages most other alarms don't have: it is faster and it saves manpower. Tac II is faster because its alarm is received directly by police staked-out near the place being held up. Tac II saves on manpower because it allows just a few officers to stake-out several locations at one time. For example, with a 10 channel receiver mounted under the dashboard of a squad car, two or three police officers can stake-out up to ten stores in an area of several blocks.

In addition to the portable alarm system, the department has an extensive public education program. The Community Relations Division has slide/cassette programs entitled "Robbery and the Private Citizen" and "Robbery and the Businessman" which are presented to interested groups. The robbery branch of the Criminal Investigations Division holds seminars for merchants on how to cooperate with police in preventing robberies and apprehending holdup men. This branch gives film and slide lectures about once a week on subjects such as the use of "bait" money and how to spot suspicious persons who might be "casing" a business establishment.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Twenty transmitters and a decoder, one unmarked vehicle, low visibility patrol, stakeouts.

Cost: $13,000 initial equipment investment. There have been no other capital costs.

Contact: Thomas R. Estes, Deputy Chief, Director, Planning and Development Division
(202) 626-2695

DAYTONA BEACH, FLORIDA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
160	114	1	5	40

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	152	194	229
Arrests	60	69	91
No. Cleared	33	59	62

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	12	29	33
18–21	13	19	26
Under 18	35	21	32

Program Title: Robbery and Crime Prevention Program

This program employs three police officers, four detectives, four supervisors, and one civilian.

The primary object of the program is to prevent robberies and educate the citizenry on identification and self defense. The program was implemented in January 1972.

Description of Program

The prevention aspect of the program includes one-hour audio-visual lectures presented to civic and fraternal organizations and handouts on robbery prevention methods. Displays are also erected at shopping centers, the central business district, retirement centers and schools.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked vehicles, motor bikes, mini communicators, low and high visibility patrol.

Cost: $2,000

Contact: J. J. Muffoletto, Police Lieutenant, Community Relations Division
(904) 255-1431: Ext. 60, 61, 62

SARASOTA, FLORIDA

Law Enforcement Personnel

	Sworn		Civilian	
Total	Male	Female	Male	Female
126	90	2	14	20

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	56	30	40
Arrests	29	13	20
No. Cleared	25	17	20

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	5	1	2
18–21	11	6	7
Under 21	13	6	11

Program Title: Help Stop Crime—Commercial Armed Robbery Phase

This program employs one police officer, and no detectives, supervisors, or civilians.

The primary object of the program is to reduce robberies and to instruct citizens on what to do before, during and after a robbery.

Description of Program

The program is designed to show merchants how they can take a few basic precautions and security measures to make their businesses less likely targets for robbers. Included in the informational program is an illustrated presentation telling merchants how they can make their places of business less prone to armed robbery. During the Commercial Armed Robbery Prevention Program the city will be saturated with copies of an informational leaflet designed to outline the basic security measures that can deter, discourage, and defeat the robber.

Additional Techniques

Presentations and inspections.

Cost: $1,000

Contact: H. H. Kendall, Patrolman
(813) 955-7171

TAMPA, FLORIDA

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	812	951	996
Arrests	270	332	320
No. Cleared	199	281	296

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	149	151	132
18–21	58	109	99
Under 18	63	72	89

Program Title: STAVS—Sensortized Transmitted Alarm Video System

This program employs 18 police officers and three supervisors. There are no detectives or civilians used.

The primary object of the program, implemented in October 1970, is increased apprehension.

Description of Program

In 1970, the Tampa Police Department experienced a marked increase in burglaries and convenience store robberies. This led to a proposal to LEAA, and STAVS was developed.

Based on sophisticated electronic equipment, this program should effect apprehension of the criminal at the scene. If the subject eludes units on the scene, air units should keep the culprit under surveillance until he is apprehended. If the suspect escapes, the video record will identify him for future arrest and assist in successful prosecution in court.

The STAVS equipment has also afforded the department the opportunity to establish a profile that people use to execute a robbery of a convenience store.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Ten unmarked cars, two helicopters and a separate radio frequency, low visibility patrol.

Cost: $20,000 (Man hours for operation and upkeep)

Contact: J. T. Youngblood, Sergeant, Selective Enforcement Unit, Tampa Police Department, (813) 223-8013

SOUTH BEND, INDIANA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
287	217	3	32	35

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	430	463	470
Arrests	89	75	76
No. Cleared	69	45	64

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	25	19	24
18–21	17	18	24
Under 18	47	38	28

Program Titles: Stakeout Squad and Overtime Foot Patrol

"Stakeout Squad" employs five police officers and one supervisor. The "Overtime Foot Patrol" employs 10 to 18 police officers and three to four supervisors. Neither employ detectives or civilians.

The primary object of the program is to apprehend and prevent robberies. The program was implemented in August 1973.

Description of Program

The "Stakeout Squad" operates on the same format as that used in other cities. Establishments are chosen and men assigned during high risk times.

Hand-picked uniformed officers are employed beyond normal working hours to walk in teams in high crime areas. The primary concerns of these teams are muggings, purse-snatchings, and related street crimes. This program is rated as a success in reducing crimes in the patrolled areas. Unmarked units and the use of plain clothes personnel have been used on occasion in conjunction with the uniformed officers.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Shotguns, vests, portable radios, unmarked units, civilian clothes.

Cost: $90,000

Contact: Loren M. Bussert, Divisional Chief of Services, (219) 284-9314.

LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
184	173	2	2	7

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	53	54	58
Arrests	23	37	27
No. Cleared	18	33	26

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	12	15	26
18–21	5	17	9
Under 18	6	5	2

Program Title: Criminal Bureau

"The Criminal Bureau" employs 14 detectives, four supervisors, and two civilians. No police officers are utilized.

The primary objects of the program, implemented July 1948, are the reduction of crime, apprehension of offenders, and protection of the life and safety of citizens.

Description of Program

Full 24-hour investigation with photographs, fingerprints, stakeouts, patrolling with unmarked cars, high and low visibility patrols, stakeouts,

Additional Equipment and Techniques

All types of cameras, surveillance and fingerprint equipment, sophisticated communication equipment, modern electronic filing system, unmarked cars, high and low visibility patrols, stake-outs, interviews and interrogations, visual search of photo files by victim.

Cost: $162,000

Contact: James E. Burke, Police Inspector
(617) 254-0425

LIVONIA, MICHIGAN

Program Title: CLEMIS

CLEMIS employs no uniformed police officers. It does employ 10 detectives, two supervisors, and one civilian.

The primary object of the program, implemented February 1972, is to prevent and reduce the number of robberies.

Description of Program

This is a computer program designed to provide statistics that can help the Livonia Police Department concentrate and zero in on robberies (time, location. etc.) and robbery suspects.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Cameras, stakeouts, informants.

Cost: $14,000

Contact: Robert M. Skinner, System Analyst
(313) 421-2900

SAGINAW, MICHIGAN

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
190	172	1	1	16

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	412	634	658
Arrests	81	78	159
No. Cleared	102	188	244

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	40	38	69
18–21	24	24	29
Under 21	17	16	61

Program Title: Crime Prevention Unit

This program employs 12 police officers and four supervisors. No detectives or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program, implemented April 1973, is to reduce crime in selected target areas by the active and passive units.

A four percent reduction in burglaries and robberies is anticipated the first year and if refunded a six to eight percent reduction the second year. Create community involvement in crime prevention objectives, and maintain surveillance of location and movement of fences, recidivists, known criminals, and dope pads.

Description of Program

Working in suppressible crime areas (i.e., robberies, breaking and enterings, purse-snatchings, auto thefts, etc.) try to develop community involvement, pattern recognition, and predictable types of crime to assist the rest of the department. An active tactical unit works with the above information. A passive unit works to inform the public on the most advantageous types of physical security hardware (i.e., locks, alarms, safety glass, lights, etc.) to prevent and/or delay a potential burglar or thief. They also attempt to follow up residential and commercial breaking and enterings throughout the metropolitan city.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

One unmarked van and five unmarked cars,

handi talkies, binoculars, tape recorders, Nikon camera, alarms, locks, lights, safety glass displays, one-way screen, portable business magnetic signs for surveillance, computer center, stakeouts, deployment of specific or spasmodic patrol surveillance patterns, saturation of a target area, a marked car unit to assist in apprehensions.

Cost: $268,000, funded Federally (LEAA) through the State Planning Agency.

Contact: Officers William Trim and Dewey Howie, Passive Unit members of the Crime Prevention Bureau
(517) 755-0536

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
901	816	6	24	55

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	1,818	1,646	1,908
Arrests	380	441	475
No. Cleared	442	426	474

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 24	39	49	N/A
18–24	81	131	N/A
Under 18	259	261	253

Program Title: Robbery Reduction Program

This program employs two investigators. No police officers, supervisors, or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program, implemented November 1972, is to identify and apprehend suspects.

Description of Program

The department has placed 35mm cameras in selected stores which have a high incident of robberies. These cameras are the same type that the Phoenix Police Department developed. The camera is activated when a "bait bill" is removed from the cash register. It takes 16 frames in 40 seconds.

The department has also placed height markers in stores to help clerks more accurately determine height and has given each store a "suspect description pad" which is to be kept near the cash register. They are instructed to keep a "bait bill" with the serial number recorded in the cash register.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

A 35mm spring wound camera built into a speaker box wired to the cash register.

Cost: $36 per camera—10 cameras HUD

Contact: Philip Holvenstot, Lieutenant, Planning and Research Division,
(612) 348-2961

LINCOLN, NEBRASKA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
248	199	11	2	36

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	45	24	49
Arrests	62	16	45
No. Cleared	25	8	31

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	23	9	23
18–21	18	4	10
Under 21	21	3	12

Program Title: Major Crimes Unit

"Major Crimes Unit" employs four police officers, three detectives, one supervisor, and one civilian.

The primary object of the program is reduction of crime with emphasis on high frequency crimes, namely drugs, robbery, and burglary. The program was implemented September 1973.

Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars, surveillance equipment and communications, stakeouts on expected targets and suspects.

Contact: Roger K. LaPage, Lieutenant of Detectives
(402) 477-7111

OMAHA, NEBRASKA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
673	555	5	49	64

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	753	482	692
Arrests	193	161	208
No. Cleared	177	172	269

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	73	91	124
18–21	48	36	45
Under 21	72	34	39

Program Title: Special Events Unit

This program employs 18 police officers and four supervisors. No detectives or civilians are employed.

The primary object of the program, implemented July 1973, is to prevent and reduce crime.

Cost: $327,928.55 Federal (LEAA)

Contact: Sergeant J. W. Janca, Research Unit
(402) 348-6868

EAST ORANGE, NEW JERSEY

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	371	574	567
Arrests	40	66	96
No. Cleared	89	103	124

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	13	23	39
18–21	15	31	39
Under 18	12	12	18

Program Title: Crime Prevention Unit

This program employs 11 police officers and one supervisor. No detectives or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program, implemented January 1969, is crime prevention and apprehension.

Description of Program

By use of census tract reporting, the Crime Prevention Unit is moved into high crime areas by time, location and area.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars, portable radio units, owl eye equipment to be used in near future, low visibility patrol, stakeouts.

Cost: $140,000

Contact: Harold L. Dunbar, Lieutenant
(201) 676-6000

ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
544	371	18	61	94

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	445	730	921
Arrests	153	204	225
No. Cleared	128	234	269

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	70	64	79
18–21	33	62	93
Under 18	50	78	53

Program Title: Property Crime Reduction Program

This program employs 27 police officers, four supervisors, and six civilians. No detectives are utilized.

The primary object of the program, implemented November 1972, is to reduce property crime.

Description of Program

The intent of the program is to reduce property

crime (commercial, residential, armed and strong-armed robbery, auto theft and auto burglary) by providing a comprehensive and coordinated effort of prevention, apprehension, and prosecution.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars, aerial surveillance unit, walkie talkies, binoculars, rifles with scopes, decoys, high and low visibility patrol according to needs and types of crime.

Cost: $422,921. Partially funded by State Planning Agency Funds (LEAA) and Federal (LEAA)

Contact: Jack F. Chappell, Deputy Chief of Police
(505) 766-4500

CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
608	502	4	34	68

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	488	573	602
Arrests	103	156	204
No. Cleared	157	168	224

Program Title: Robbery Prevention for Small Business

"Robbery Prevention for Small Business" employs two police officers and one detective. No supervisors or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program, implemented February 1972, is to prevent robberies and apprehend suspects.

Description of Program

The program is classroom instructional on how small businesses can protect themselves from robbery. The program is directed toward the convenience store.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Films and lecture on premise inspections.

Cost: $700

Contact: J. R. Kelley, Police Planning and Research Officer
(704) 374-2334

WINSTON-SALEM, NORTH CAROLINA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
299	259	15	8	17

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	204	199	230
Arrests	91	71	76
No. Cleared	64	59	64

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	45	40	61
18-21	35	19	8
Under 18	11	12	7

Program Titles: Crime Prevention Unit and Tactical Platoon

The "Crime Prevention Unit" and "The Tactical Platoon" employ 18 criminal investigators, eight patrolmen, one lieutenant and one captain supervisor for criminal investigators and two sergeants and one lieutenant for tactical platoon. No civilians are employed.

Description of Program

Immediately started with two programs: Neighborhood Watch Program designed to get citizens to report suspicious persons and vehicles to police; and also to secure neighborhood cooperation in the protection of life and property. Secondly, Operation Identification designed to get citizens to properly mark their property with their N.C. operators license number or social security number for the purpose of identity thereby making it easier on the police in identifying stolen property while enhancing closer relations with the citizens and the police. Four major industries take part in the program. Each industry furnishes the manpower and the equipment necessary to get the program across within their respective industries. The four industries are: Reynolds Tob. Co., Reynolds Industries, Hanes Inc., and Western Electric Co.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars, brochures for general public, decoys, high and low visibility patrol, stakeouts.

Cost: Unknown

Contact: Ray Shoaf, Captain
(919) 727-2955

CLEVELAND, OHIO

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
2,461	2,258	41	98	64

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	5475	5987	5639
Arrests	1052	1288	1294
No. Cleared	888	1012	1010

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	434	520	585
18–21	245	299	264
Under 18	373	469	445

Program Titles: Cleveland Impact Deterrent, Detection and Apprehension Program

The program employs 16 detectives, and two supervisors. No police officers or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program is crime prevention, identification and apprehension of suspects, and preparation of cases to obtain convictions. Police do selective investigations where patterns are formed by robbery suspects operating in districts or city-wide with a view of making consolidated clean ups.

Reduce crime rate with emphasis on those crimes affiliated with narcotics and committed by users of narcotics. The program was implemented December 1971.

Description of Program

1. Make original investigations of bank robberies and financial institutions in conjunction with the F.B.I. Both agencies prepare cases under state and Federal statutes.

2. Review daily crime reports and evaluate for possible patterns formed by robbery suspects and assign personnel of the Unit to do selective investigation where suspects operate city-wide.

3. Serve as a clearinghouse for information pertaining to robberies and coordinate police activity in these investigations.

4. Conduct searches for robbery suspects in dope houses, cheat spots and gambling places with members of the narcotics and tactical units.

5. Conduct other investigations assigned by the Chief of Criminal Investigation Division.

6. Keep records and files with view toward determining the relationship between narcotic addicts and the commission of robberies by persons using drugs.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars and trucks, transceiver radios (portable), Polaroid cameras, tape recorders, binoculars; weaponry includes shotgun, carbines, revolvers, tear gas grenades and masks, decoys in unmarked vehicles, stakeouts, low visibility patrol, investigating detectives on scenes of original crimes.

Contact: Stanley J. Slade, Lieutenant, Robbery Unit,
(216) 621-1270: Ext. 432.

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn Male	Sworn Female	Civilian Male	Civilian Female
9,121	8,120	63	590	348

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	6377	9243	9710
Arrests	2961	3672	3820
No. Cleared	2114	2921	3266

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
18–Over	1420	2154	2274
Under 18	1541	1518	1546

Program Title: Act I Act II

"Act I Act II" employs 120 police officers, and

no detectives. There are 14 supervisors and no civilians utilized.

The primary object of the program, implemented October 1972, is to reduce robbery and burglary offenses.

Description of Program

The police officers making up this program range in age from 20 to 30. All are described as young, aggressive patrolmen, with between two and 10 years experience, volunteers for the assignment who are rated as superior by their commanders.

Their primary technique is "blending." That is, they will seek to blend into their surroundings in high crime areas. Holdup men and burglars are their main target.

In addition to a 17-day training program at the Police Academy, they are briefed on the identities of holdup men and burglars in their areas. Special training is also given in night shooting, criminal law, court decisions on friskings and warning suspects of their rights, search and seizure laws, identification of drug pushers and users, methods used by pushers, and self-defense, especially disarming gunmen and knife-wielders. To help the officers blend into their backgrounds they have been granted exemption from the department's strict regulations on long hair and facial hair.

The 64-member team, which will work independently of the regular police force, will be specifically responsible for robberies, burglaries and drug abuse in areas which will be determined by computers.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Marked and unmarked vehicles, two-way radios.

Cost: The special teams were made possible through a $2 million grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in Washington and $600,000 in city funds.

Contact: James J. Powers, Captain, Research and Planning
(215) 686-3277

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1,156	968	4	91	93

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	1062	911	1200
Arrests	283	219	330
No. Cleared	338	329	387

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	97	79	115
18–21	77	72	102
Under 18	109	68	113

Program Title: Crime Task Force

"Crime Task Force" employs 28 police officers, three supervisors and one civilian. No detectives are utilized.

The primary object of the program is to identify suspects, prevent robberies, and apprehend while the suspect is in the act of committing the offense. The program was implemented August 1970.

Description of Program

This is a semi-undercover unit. All of the assignments are criminal investigation oriented. The dress and vehicles of the personnel fit the type of assignment. The hours vary, and the entire unit is flexible in order to cope with the time and type of crime.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars, walkie talkies, binoculars, separate radio channel, (Plans for silent hold-up alarms tuned on this channel are underway.), low visibility patrol, decoys, stakeouts.

Cost: $300,000 State Planning Agency Funds (LEAA)

Contact: Thomas T. Fenley, Sergeant
(512) 225-7484

WACO, TEXAS

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
183	139	2	12	30

Reported Robberies	1970	1971	1972
Number	155	122	127
Arrests	44	34	34
No. Cleared	N/A	N/A	N/A

Age Distribution	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	42	33	32
18–21	N/A	N/A	N/A
Under 18	2	1	3

Program Title: Tactical Unit

This program employs 10 police officers, and two supervisors. No detectives or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program, implemented February 1973, is to prevent, deter, and apprehend criminal elements in Waco.

Description of Program

The Tac Unit is a highly mobile unit which is assigned to high crime—high risk areas of the city. It concentrates on the crime which shows an upswing during a given period of time. The emphasis is shifted from month to month.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars, radio burglary—robbery alarm system, cars with removable light bar—siren combination.

Cost: $135,000 State Planning Agency Funds (LEAA)

Contact: Frank A. Wilson, Director of Planning and Research
(817) 756-6161: Ext. 205

ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
256	204	4	14	34

Reported Robberies	1970	1971	1972
Number	518	490	435
Arrests	80	61	69
No. Cleared	79	67	88

Age Distribution	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	21	14	31
18–21	17	18	17
Under 18	42	29	21

Program Title: Tactical Unit, Special Operations Section, Uniformed Division

This program employs 12 police officers and four supervisors. No detectives or civilians are utilized.

The primary object is the detection of possible robberies, identification and apprehension of suspects, prevention of robberies and reduction of these crimes. The program was implemented January 1971.

Description of Program

The Tactical Unit, based on department statistics, spot maps, report reviews, etc., saturate a high robbery prone area using various techniques such as male and female decoys, stationary and mobile taxis operated by plainclothes officers, marked and unmarked cruisers, bicycles and trail bikes. Stakeouts are maintained of businesses frequently robbed and of those susceptible to being robbed due to location, hours, etc. Foot patrol by K–9 officers, uniformed and plainclothesmen are utilized in areas that attract robbery suspects. Arrests of public intoxicated persons are made because they often are victims of muggings. In areas where muggings of drunks occur, this unit along with State Alcoholic Control Board investigators, seeks out license violators in these establishments. Many businesses have lost their license and as a result, muggings in these areas have drastically decreased. A surveillance van is utilized when the need arises to get close to a particular target without destroying the cover.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Trail bikes equipped with portable radios, unmarked cars, taxis, surveillance vans, bicycles, officers' personal automobiles, portable radios, binoculars, decoys, stakeouts, area saturation by both high and low visibility patrols, walking and

mobile plain clothesmen, field interrogation in high crime areas, increase in public intoxication arrests.

Cost: $345,581 Department Budget

Contact: John D. Scandling, Management Analyst, Planning and Research Section
(703) 750-6340

DANVILLE, VIRGINIA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
105	93	2	5	5

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	12	19	16
Arrests	14	20	14
No. Cleared	8	15	9

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	10	2	4
18–21	2	6	1
Under 18	2	12	9

Program Title: Robbery Prevention

Robbery Prevention employs 65 police officers, 10 detectives, and 16 supervisors. No civilians are utilized in the program.

The primary object of the program, implemented January 1958, is to prevent robberies and to identify and apprehend suspects.

Description of Program

The program consists of special patrols of banks during opening and closing hours with frequent checks while banks are open. Special checks by patrol officers of businesses in out-of-the-way places, and special checks by foot patrol officers in the central business district.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Marked and unmarked vehicles, special alarms and communication equipment, high visibility patrol and surveillance.

Contact: Major M. F. Setliff, Assistant Chief of Police
(804) 792-9211

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

Law Enforcement Personnel

Total	Sworn		Civilian	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
633	559	5	29	40

Reported Robberies

	1970	1971	1972
Number	937	1,317	1,487
Arrests	252	302	395
No. Cleared	129	164	182

Age Distribution

	1970	1971	1972
Over 21	93	70	114
18–21	50	113	160
Under 18	109	119	121

Program Title: High Intensity Patrol

This program employs six police officers, six detectives, and six supervisors daily. No civilians are used.

The primary object of the program, implemented August 1973, is a 15 percent reduction of the target crimes of robbery, burglary and auto theft.

Description of Program

This program consists of three elements: first, a high intensity police patrol which concentrates on designated target areas during the hours of maximum occurrence; second, a crime prevention awareness program; and third, a high intensity sodium vapor lighting project is underway in high crime areas.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked vehicles and sodium vapor lights.

Cost: $165,000 Federal (LEAA) Discretionary Grant

Contact: W. F. Kay, Captain, Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Police
(804) 649-5780

APPENDIX B

ILLUSTRATION OF ROBBERY ANALYSIS

ERIC

ANALYSIS OF ROBBERY IN WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

ANALYSES OF ROBBERY AND ASSAULT IN WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS

A. Robbery Analysis

In 1971 and 1972, Worcester ranked third in per capita occurrence of reported robbery, as shown in Table 1. These calculations of rates, while less than ideal, at least offer some basis of comparison of Worcester's robbery problems to other cities. A more reliable comparison for robbery statistics would be an index based on the numbers of commercial establishments (for robberies against businesses) and population over age 14 (for robberies against persons), since younger age groups are only infrequently victims of crimes against persons. Clearly, the exposed populations or organizations should form the base of calculation for such rates.

Despite the limitations of comparative data, much can be said about the nature and extent of robbery in Worcester. The Police Department uses the standard Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) classification of robberies into two major groups: armed robberies where a dangerous weapon is used and unarmed robberies where force is used or implied without a weapon.

Over the last four years, the composition of robberies in Worcester has shifted somewhat (see Tables 2, 3 and 4). In 1969, the ratio of armed robberies to unarmed robberies was 42%/58% (armed/unarmed). The ratio remained the same in 1970 (42%/58%), but increased in 1971 to 50%/50%. In 1972 the ratio remained similar, at 49%/51% despite a statistical reporting change which would have inflated somewhat the unarmed robbery figures during the latter part of 1972.[1]

It is difficult to determine recurrent seasonal trends in the occurrence of robberies. Over the last two years, armed robberies tend to exceed unarmed robberies during the fall and winter quarters (October through December), apparently because of the absence of persons—the target population for most unarmed robberies—from the streets and by-ways of the City. By the same token, unarmed robberies peak during the summer months (August 1971 and July 1972) when the exposed populations for unarmed robberies become more visible.

Armed robberies exhibit less definite seasonality than do unarmed robberies. Peaks in 1971 occurred in January and October, and in 1972 in May and July. Peak periods for armed robbery are almost invariably followed by a period of reduction. This phenomenon, according to several police officials, is related to the likelihood of multiple offense offenders being apprehended after a series of armed robberies where several victims are able to make positive identification of the assailants. The increase in armed robberies in April and May 1972 fall into this pattern; in June, two suspects were arrested and charged with several counts each for robberies occurring during the April–May period. In August 1972, an arrest by the Detective Bureau resulted in a rapid reduction in the robbery rate over the previous month. The assailant was charged with eleven counts of armed robberies occurring in July.

In conformance with Uniform Crime Reporting formats, the Worcester Department records robberies in several categories designating the place of occurrence: highways (streets, alleys, etc.); commercial houses; gas or service stations; chain stores; residences (anywhere on premises); banks and miscellaneous.

The UCR format appears to have some flaws in

[1] In June, 1972, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts (Suffolk County) upheld the conviction of Otis Jones, Jr. on one count of unarmed robbery (purse snatching). At issue in the decision were the elements of larceny from a person and the extent of use of force. As a result of this decision, in August of 1972, the Worcester Police Department changed the classification of the majority of purse snatching from larceny to unarmed robbery, thus inflating during the latter part of 1972, the extent of reporting of unarmed robberies. Despite the change, the 1972 percentage of armed robberies to unarmed robberies remains high.

TABLE 1

Comparisons of Index Crime and Target Crimes for Selected Massachusetts Cities

City	1970 Population (U.S. Census)	Robbery	Robbery Rate/ 100,000	Rank in 1972	Aggravated Assault	Agg. Assault Rate/ 100,000	Rank in 1972	Burglary	Burglary Rate/ 100,000	
Boston	641,071	4,735	739		1,907	297		12,439	1,940	
		5,073	791	(1)	2,015	314	(2)	10,173	1,587	(6)
Cambridge	100,361	355	354		243	242		1,978	1,971	
		329	328	(2)	238	237	(3)	1,711	1,705	(4)
Fall River	96,898	129	133		108	111		3,052	3,150	
		203	209	(6)	149	154	(5)	2,321	2,895	(3)
New Bedford	101,777	169	166		119	117		2,566	2,521	
		214	210	(5)	150	147	(6)	1,926	1,892	(5)
Springfield	163,905	407	248		325	198		4,358	2,659	
		430	262	(4)	791	483	(1)	4,565	2,785	(2)
Worcester	176,572	452	256		207	117		5,110	2,894	
		501	284	(3)	275	156	(4)	5,179	2,933	(1)

Source: Uniform Crime Reports, 1972 Preliminary Annual Release

TABLE 2

Robbery

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
January	20	14	31	52	33	42	
February	8	17	12	36	24	48	
March	14	22	12	29	30	47	
April	20	15	20	28	39		
May	16	23	20	32	58		
June	15	31	31	27	60		
July	16	26	46	43	76		
August	14	40	40	39	40		
September	26	38	42	36	32		
October	13	34	29	53	54		
November	28	44	43	43	44		
December	18	41	43	34	31		
Total	208	345	369	452	501		

Source: Worcester Police Department Planning and Research Section

that it leaves some leeway to the crime analyst in classification. For example, robberies of commercial houses may in fact be robberies of chain stores. (In Worcester, this classification might result in the robbery of a Honey Farms store being classified as a commercial house robbery, when in fact it is a chain store robbery. Honey Farms is a subsidiary of Iandoli Markets.) The miscellaneous category makes no distinction between robberies against businesses and robberies against persons. The robbery of a salesman-driver would most likely be classified as a highway robbery, but may have characteristics most typical of a robbery against a business. Finally, the UCR format does not facilitate the integrated analysis of robberies against persons, robberies against businesses, armed and unarmed robberies.

For these reasons, the CJDA has undertaken a more detailed analysis of the nature of robbery. A sample period was selected and initial and supplementary investigative reports were reviewed for additional information not usually provided in monthly reports prepared by the Planning and Research Section. The sample period selected was from January through May 1972 and was chosen for a number of reasons: (1) to facilitate offender

TABLE 3

Armed Robbery

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
January	9	5	6	30	16	27	
February	3	9	5	18	10	6	
March	5	10	4	15	20	23	
April	13	6	8	17	18		
May	6	7	7	15	38		
June	3	10	15	13	24		
July	5	9	29	21	31		
August	4	14	17	12	25		
September	14	24	19	15	15		
October	5	18	11	29	22		
November	23	17	15	23	13		
December	13	15	19	21	14		
Total	103	144	155	229	246		

Source: Worcester Police Department Planning and Research Section

TABLE 4

Unarmed Robbery

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
January	11	9	25	22	17	15
February	5	8	7	18	14	42
March	9	12	8	14	10	24
April	7	9	12	11	21	
May	10	16	13	17	20	
June	12	21	16	14	16	
July	11	17	17	22	45	
August	10	26	23	27	15	
September	12	14	23	21	17	
October	8	16	18	24	32	
November	5	26	28	20	31	
December	5	26	24	13	17	
Total	105	201	214	223	255	

Source: Worcester Police Department Planning and Research Section

tracking over an extended period of time; (2) to exclude from the analysis the reporting change of purse-snatching from larceny to unarmed robbery, and (3) to reduce the possibility of juvenile offender impact in the sample analysis during summer school vacation periods (July and August). The robberies studied in the sample analysis represent a 37% sample of armed robberies and a 16% sample of unarmed robberies which occurred in 1972. (After the sample period, this trend reversed, and unarmed robberies exceeded armed robberies. As stated before, unarmed robberies tend to begin increasing during the summer months when the target population becomes more visible.) The sample total (130 robberies) is a 26% sample of all robberies in 1972.

Previously mentioned is the ratio of armed to unarmed robberies in 1972—49% armed/51% unarmed. The sample period selected for analysis is composed of a 55% armed/45% unarmed ratio. If the sample period had been carried through to include robberies in June and July, the ratio would have been nearly the same as the annual composition. However, the higher ratio of armed robberies mandates expanded inclusion in any robbery analysis because of the increased likelihood of death or serious injury to the victim. Because of this reason and partially due to time limitations in the Impact

planning process, the sample analysis was not expanded to include a larger sample of unarmed robberies.

Although the Worcester Police Department breaks robberies into seven categories ranging from highway robberies to various business robberies, each of these categories can be further subdivided as armed and unarmed robberies. These categories will be discussed individually, and characteristics of each will be described in the following.

1. Armed Robberies Against Businesses

These robberies accounted for 30 percent of all robberies in 1972, but because of the armed robbery seasonality bias of the sample, accounted for 47 percent of robberies studied in the sample period.

There is no definite trend in the robbery of businesses, although small grocery stores, gas stations, package stores and small restaurants are preferred targets.

The largest numbers of robberies are targeted at gas stations and smaller grocery stores. This trend suggests that the number of people present in the store has some relevance to the robbery. One or two clerks present during the robbery make the situation easier to control for the robber and decreases the likelihood of the robber being identified. Also, both gas stations, and small groceries tend to pattern their hours, thereby making it easier for the robbery artist to observe regular business hours and slack periods.

Robberies of gas stations most definitely coincide with opening and closing hours and with slack periods in business. Later evening hours at gas stations are critical robbery times, usually between 9:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. All-night gas stations are another favorite target, with robberies occurring most frequently around 2:00 a.m. The fact that gas stations are usually very well-lit does not seem to be a deterrent to this crime. The average "take" in the 12 service station robberies studied in the sample period was $60.00, with the largest amount stolen ($200.00) occurring during a hold-up at closing.

Grocery store robberies tend to follow similar patterns as those for service stations. A favorite target is the Cumberland Farms or Honey Farms quick-service market. These stores are frequently held up and are oftentimes robbed repeatedly. An average loss of $70.00 per robbery makes these stores a favorite target. The fact that hours are set, that business on various days and hours tends to be fairly predictable and that these stores usually have only one or two clerks on duty at any time all combine to make the quick-stop mart an easy target for the robber. Also, accumulated receipts towards the end of the day tend to be fairly high, thus attracting the late-evening assailant. This trend is verified by sample analysis study—nine of fourteen grocery store robberies in the sample were Cumberland Farm hold-ups, and six were robbed between the hours of 7:00 and 10:00 p.m.

Robberies of other groceries appear to follow a similar pattern, but the hours of occurrence are more varied, occurring often in the late afternoon or early evening. Smaller grocery stores, on the other hand, usually have shorter hours and close earlier than do the Cumberland Farms-Honey Farms chains. Despite shorter hours, careful "casing" by a robber of cash flow and business patterns makes grocery store robberies a profitable business in Worcester. In two of the smaller grocery store robberies analyzed in the sample period, $346 and $200 was taken; both robberies were mid-afternoon heists. In both cases, a lone victim was in the store, during a slack in business.

Actual physical settings of the groceries seem to play an important part in certain robberies. The smaller, non-chain groceries usually have dimmer lighting. In many cases, vision from the street is obstructed by shelves and displays of merchandise. Even though the non-chain groceries are generally located on or close to the street, such vision obstacles make it difficult for the cruising route man to observe activities in the store. Physical layouts become an invitation to robbery.

Chain grocery stores, generally, are off-street markets with parking in front of the store. While lighting and merchandising in the chain store are better, the off-street, set-back of the store does make observation from the street difficult. In addition, the popular corner locations of in-city chain groceries contributes to robbery by providing alternative escape patterns for robbers.

Information provided by victims of armed robberies against businesses often provide descriptions on the robbers. Sample period analysis indicates that the typical robbery is executed by one or two young, white males, usually between the ages of 18–22. The method of escape generally is not known to the victim, although in several instances the suspects are known to have had a car.

"Escape on foot" by a robber is often "around a corner" and into a waiting vehicle, thus minimizing effective quadrant search patterns by the police. Additionally, the major thoroughfare locations of most retail establishments facilitate a speedy escape by the robbery team. The fact that most retail areas in Worcester are within a few minutes access to an Interstate route (I–290) improves escape channels for the robbery assailants. Finally, most robberies occur at times when traffic is not at peak volume, further aiding rapid egress from the scene of a robbery.

Information on the hour of occurrence, offender age and racial characteristics for armed robberies of gas stations and grocery stores is provided in Table 5.

The sample analysis also indicated that restaurants, especially pizza parlors, and package stores are also frequent robbery targets. Patterns are similar to those previously discussed: robberies are usually in the later evening hours (between 9:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.) and the assailants were described as 1–2 young white males.

2. Unarmed Robberies Against Businesses

This type of crime accounted for about 6 percent of all robbery offenses in Worcester in 1972, but only 2 percent during the sample period analysis.

Unarmed robberies of businesses sometimes seem to be more a crime of opportunity than a planned robbery. The practice of some shopkeepers of leaving registers open appears to invite an unarmed robbery. The perpetrator literally helps himself to the cash contents of the register.

Unarmed robberies seem to occur when the age or sex of the victim might contribute to easy victimization. An elderly female clerk, for example, may be so easily intimidated that the threat of force or a weapon is not needed to effect the robbery. On the other hand, our sample analysis

TABLE 5

Selected Information Service Station and Grocery Store Robberies

No.	Type of Business	Hours of Occurrence		Offender	Age
12	Gas Stations	11:53 p.m.		2 WM	17–19
		7:55 p.m.		1 WM	25–30
		6:19 a.m.	(opening)	1 WM	20–25
		9:40 p.m.		2 WM	24–26
		6:05 p.m.	(closing)	2 WM	25–30
		7:45 p.m.		2 NWM	18–21
		4:45 a.m.		2 WM	Unknown
		10:14 p.m.	(closing)	1 WM	20–25
		9:10 p.m.		1 WM	40–45
		4:42 a.m.		2 WM	Unknown
		2:37 a.m.		2 WM	22–25
		9:20 p.m.		1 WM	18–19
14	Groceries	9:24 p.m.	(C.F.)	1 NWM	24
		4:56 p.m.		2 WM	17–18
		9:55 p.m.	(C.F.)	2 BM 1 WM	Unknown
		8:10 p.m.		1 WM	18–20
		7:25 p.m.	(C.F.)	2 WM	18–20
		7:45 p.m.	(C.F.)	1–2 WM	18–19
		2:35 p.m.		1 WM	18–19
		9:50 p.m.	(C.F.)	1 WM	22–23
		7:07 p.m.	(C.F.)	1 WM	Unknown
		7:30 p.m.	(C.F.)	1 WM	Unknown
		8:15 p.m.	(C.F.)	1 NWM	19–20
		10:30 p.m.	(C.F.)	1 WM	18–20
		3:59 p.m.		1 WM	Unknown
		3:45 p.m.		2 WM	17–20

C.F. denotes Cumberland Farms Robberies

has indicated that elderly victims sometimes thwart unarmed robberies by throwing merchandise, and in one case, cash at the robber, lecturing the assailant or similar forms of verbal and physical harassment.

Of the four types of robberies, unarmed robberies against business exhibit very few standard patterns, either in terms of types of businesses victimized or hours of occurrence.

3. Armed Robberies Against Persons

In 1972, these accounted for 19% of all robberies. The sample period analysis composition was 22%, a slight variation from the yearly composition.

Investigation of the circumstances surrounding these robberies reveals that in many cases, the victim has contributed to his victimization either overtly or unwittingly. Initial and supplementary investigation reports indicate a surprising number (8) of armed robberies associated with misdemeanors such as prostitution and drunkenness. Of 27 armed robberies studied in the sample analysis, six incidents were related to hitchhiking. In some of these cases, the hitchhiker was the victim, in others the driver of the vehicle was robbed by persons picked up.

Armed robberies occurring as "street crimes" in several instances indicate the perpetrator had some knowledge of the amount of money being carried by the victim and imply some observation or awareness of the victim's habits or patterns. Typical armed robberies of this type include the intoxicated victim who was robbed shortly after leaving a bar, residence robberies where cash is expected to have been in the household, and "set-ups" where the victim is befriended by strangers and later robbed of his possessions. ADC recipients and pensioners are sometimes observed for check-cashing patterns and robbed when such patterns are established. In one case in the sample analysis, the perpetrator was aware of the victim's habit of stashing cash in her brassiere—this robbery netted $75.00.

The typical armed robbery, whether the victim is on foot or in a car, occurs under cover of darkness, usually on streets with poor lighting. It is difficult to determine victim-offender racial characteristics, and the offender racial patterns are varied: a single white male, a racially or ethnically mixed male-female team, and a group of black males appear most frequently as descriptions of the assailants.

4. Unarmed Robberies Against Persons

Unarmed robberies of persons represented 45% of all robberies in Worcester in 1972. In the sample analysis period, however, only 29% of all robberies were unarmed against persons. As mentioned elsewhere, this variation is explained by upward trends in unarmed robbery during summer months not included in the sample analysis.

Unarmed robbery is defined as a robbery in which a person is victimized through threats of force but without a weapon. In many respects, the circumstances surrounding and characteristics of unarmed robbery are very similar to armed robbery. Of the 40 cases studied during the sample period, several robbery victims were drunk or at least admitted to heavy drinking prior to the robbery. In most of these cases, the amount taken was sizeable, averaging $70 in the six "victim under the influence" robberies.

In ten other robberies analyzed, sizeable amounts stolen and previous exposure of a large amount of cash immediately preceding the robbery (in stores, restaurants, bars, etc.) are highly correlated. Although these can be classified technically as "street crimes", it may be inferred that their occurrence as highway robberies might have been prevented had some precautions been taken by the victims. Late evening and early morning occurrences (11:00 p.m.–2:00–3:00–4:00 a.m.) are typical patterns for such robberies.

"Stealing by putting in fear," as unarmed robbery is defined in the statutes is a crime of stealth occurring most frequently in hours of darkness. In many instances, assault is employed to effect the robbery. Many unarmed robberies netting small amounts of money are associated with assault upon the victim. The assailant described to the police in the majority of cases is on foot, indicating surveillance of the victim at least for a brief period.

A wide variance in the number of assailants was noted in the sample period analysis, but characteristic of the unarmed street robbery is the participation of more than one assailant. The racial characteristics of the offender in unarmed robbery appears to contain a balanced representation of white and non-white offenders. This is also true in armed

robbery against persons, but is dissimilar to robberies against businesses, where the offenders are predominantly white.

A distinct difference in location patterns was defined through the sample analysis for armed and unarmed robberies against persons; these are analyzed in a further section.

Purse-snatching is another form of unarmed robbery which exhibits unique characteristics. Of 76 purse-snatchings analyzed during the sample period, 15 occurred in shopping centers. There is no special time of occurrence associated with purse-snatching, but after-dark seems to be a preferred time. In the sample period, 40% of the purse-robberies occurred after dark.

In 1972, a rash of purse-snatchings in cemeteries increased the percentage of daytime purse-snatchings. Such a *modus operandi*, once established, sometimes exhibits a multiplier effect resulting in gangs copying the pattern and virtually terrorizing certain neighborhoods.

In Worcester, the correlation between juvenile auto thefts and purse-snatching is high. In addition, the seasonal trend toward July–August increases in purse-snatching is theorized to be related to a juvenile offender profile.

Purse-snatching appears to follow a random, (versus planned) opportunity format if the amounts stolen are an indication; it is usually a small amount.

The sample analysis did not provide sufficient data to determine a victim age profile, but offender descriptions further suggested that purse-snatching is a juvenile group activity.

Trends in purse-snatchings are depicted in Table 6.

TABLE 6

Worcester, Massachusetts
Purse-Snatchings, 1971–1972

Month	1971	1972	1973
January	8	8	4
February	4	5	1
March	2	4	3
April	7	20	
May	9	18	
June	3	23	
July	11	19	
August	9	2*	
September	7	1	
October	7	3	
November	5	1	
December	14	1	

* Purse-snatchings after August, 1972 are recorded primarily as unarmed robberies. Factors influencing this reporting change are described in footnote, page 58. Previous purse-snatchings (1971 and up to August, 1972) were classified as larcenies unless extreme force or assault was involved in the purse-theft.

5. The Robbery Offender: An Arrest, Court Appearance and Correctional Profile

In 1972, the Worcester Police Department made 113 arrests on robbery charges. However, some of the arrests were for robberies occurring in jurisdictions other than Worcester. Within the City, a total of 76 offenses were cleared by arrests as shown in Table 7. This represents an overall clearance rate of 15.2%, but is substantially below the national clearance rate of 27%.[2]

[2] Uniform Crime Reports, 1971, Federal Bureau of Investigation, P. 18.

Factors leading to arrests for robbery are not surprising. The sample analysis indicates that rapid response by the police to the scene of the robbery, accurate assessment by victims of assailant descriptions and information provided to the police through other sources are items cited most frequently as leading to an arrest clearance.

Specific frequencies of the factors leading to arrest could not be determined from the sample analysis due to the structure of record-keeping systems within the Department. Investigative reports, even supplementary reports, only infrequently document events leading to arrests. Arrest records maintained by the department are difficult to correlate with specific offenses, thereby making multiple clearance statistics (a single offense cleared by a single arrest or multiple offenses cleared by a single arrest) all but irretrievable except on a manual basis. These deficiencies in the offense-arrest record keeping systems raise some questions on the accuracy of the clearance rate statistics cited above (15.2%); however, these items are currently under investigation by William Clements, the Department's police planner. The CJDA suspects that a higher clearance rate exists, and will be able to determine in the near future if a higher clearance rate can be documented. Yet, it does appear that the robbery clearance rate may still be low in comparison to national standards.

Clearance rates for armed and unarmed robberies exhibit variations which seem logical in view of the characteristics discussed in Section 1. Clear-

TABLE 7

Robbery Clearance Rates, Worcester, 1972

	Offenses	Arrests Adult	Arrests Juvenile	Arrests Total	Clearance Rate
Overall	501	73	3	76	15.2%
Armed	246	53	2	55	22.5%
Unarmed	255	20	1	21	8.2%

ances for armed robbery in 1972 were 22.5%, for unarmed robbery 8.2%. Several factors influence such variations in clearance. In armed robbery, the confrontation between victim and offender is typically a face-to-face confrontation, thus improving the possibility for identification of the assailant. Secondly, armed robbery, especially against a business, is generally a single-offender crime, (or offender-accomplice crime) which further improves the quality of offender descriptions provided to the police.

Unarmed robbery, on the other hand, is more frequently a multiple-offender crime. The victim may be apt to blur, or consolidate offender descriptions because of this. It is also conceivable that a multiple-offender confrontation may intensify victim fears and substantially reduce the ability of the victim to concentrate on offender descriptions. In addition, unarmed robbery is sometimes characterized by the elements of susceptibility of the victim (i.e. drunk victim) and attack from the rear, both of which reduce the reliability of offender descriptions provided. Since assault to effect the robbery is more typical of the unarmed street robbery than for armed robbery, it seems reasonable to assume that attempts by the victim to defend himself will most certainly override his desire and, therefore, his ability to identify the assailant(s).

Racial and age profiles of persons arrested for robberies in 1972 correspond fairly closely with descriptions provided by victims. The average age of 59 armed robbery arrestees studied in 1972 was 22. 73% were white, 15% non-white, and 12% Spanish-Speaking. For unarmed robbery, the average age of 34 arrestees analyzed was 25. Racial and ethnic composition was dissimilar to armed robberies—57% white, 41% non-white and 3% Spanish-speaking.

Due to staff limitations and time limitations resulting from the relatively short Impact planning period, limited information is available at the present time concerning court and correctional profiles of robbery and suspects and offenders.

Included in the court and correctional profiles will be information relative to bail information, frequency of continuances, reasons for dismissal, plea bargaining, the role of public defense, degree of drug-relatedness in the crime, previous charges, identification of potentials for rehabilitation, etc.

Preliminary information gathered at the District and Superior Courts on robbery offenders is summarized below.

Dispositions of Robbery Offenses,
Worcester Superior Court: 1972

Total Defendants	196
Dismissed Before Trial	7
Acquittals	21
By Judge	7
By Jury	14
Convictions	
Guilty Plea	15
Not Guilty Plea or No Contest	153
Total Defendants Convicted	168
Placed on File After Conviction	7
Conviction (With and Without Sentence)	
Sentenced	98
M.C.I. Walpole	N.A.
M.C.I. Concord	N.A.
Worcester County House of Correction	N.A.

APPENDIX C
PUBLIC INFORMATION MATERIAL

If you are robbed, try to remember identifying features and mannerisms. Write them down quickly, then call the police.

WHAT TO DO DURING A ROBBERY!

IF YOU ARE HELD UP, remain calm and do what you are told! Give your marked $1.00 bills to the robber; they'll provide evidence later to convict him. It is your right, of course, to use your own gun if you keep one on the premises of your store. The police can't tell you not to use it, but too many times a weapon is used against the owner, or the presence of it causes the robber to panic and use HIS weapon when otherwise he might not have done so. In any case, the use of deadly force is a serious decision to make. Remember, there ISN'T ANYTHING on the premises WORTH MORE THAN YOUR LIFE or the life of another human being!

WE CAN'T CATCH THEM IF YOU CAN'T IDENTIFY THEM!

IF YOU ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED in helping convict armed robbery suspects, you've got to give accurate descriptions to the police.

There are several helpful hints that can aid you in identifying a suspect... even though you may not be perfectly calm while you're being held up:

- If you affix three or four strips of tape on the frame of your door at heights of 5' 8", 5' 10", 6' and 6'3", you can readily tell someone's height, either upon their entrance or exit.
- Try to notice abnormalities, speech defects, scars.
- Notice type of build or make a guess at weight.
- Make size judgments in relation to your own size.

69

care enough to fight crime

TO SERVE AND PROTECT

DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT

1257 CHAMPA STREET
DENVER, COLORADO 80204
PHONE 297-2027
EMERGENCY DIAL 911

Publication made available through L.E.A.A. funds.

Help Prevent

ROBBERY

DENVER POLICE DEPARTMENT

A robbery could be the death of you. Here's how you can protect yourself.

ROBBERY CAN BE A DEADLY AFFAIR! If you're disturbed by our frankness, then perhaps you'll see the critical importance of this subject. Holdup crimes are ALWAYS frightening, but there are preventive measures which, if taken, can lessen the possibility of your becoming a victim.

You can help by implementing a number of physical as well as psychological deterrents. You can increase your personal safety and provide valuable information to the police which may lead to the arrest of the robber.

HOLDUP MEANS A WEAPON THREATENING YOU!

From a legal standpoint, holdup always involves the presence of a weapon used by the armed robber. That's how holdup differs from burglary, theft, purse snatch, or strong-arm robbery; a knife, gun, or other potentially lethal weapon is usually used to threaten the safety of the victim.

WHO ARE THE VICTIMS?

Anybody can be robbed, but in Denver the PRIME TARGETS for holdup are take-out restaurants, grocery and liquor stores, taxicabs, and service stations. Bars and hotel/motel units are also common targets. In most cases, a gun is the weapon brandished by the suspect.



Signs and well-placed mirrors can be strong deterrents to a would-be robber. You have a right to keep a gun on your premises, but remember -- IT MIGHT BE USED AGAINST YOU.

MAKE YOURSELF UNATTRACTIVE FOR ROBBERY!

TO PROTECT YOUR PROPERTY and enhance your personal safety, make it evident to the would-be robber that robbing you would be a poor risk because of the precautions you have taken. Keep store window displays low so all areas can be seen - and so the potential robber knows HE'S IN THE LIMELIGHT – exactly where he doesn't want to be. Counters should be uncluttered and in plain view - and arranged so customers face the street. Install an alarm button near counter areas and have your phone there also... not on the wall.

Maintain a well-lighted business area, both outside and inside. A carefully located mirror or window, by itself, can act as a strong psychological deterrent to a possible holdup man. Have a radio or TV playing in a rear



room or office, and try not to work alone. Above all, help SPREAD THE WORD of how safe you are.

You should be protected by alarms, but if you're not, have signs made that say you ARE protected. Surveillance cameras offer some good protection and help make your place of business look unwelcome to the robber.

PLAN YOUR MONEY-HANDLING CAREFULLY!

Display your money safe in a front window that's well-lighted. A holdup man doesn't like to run the risk of being spotted by a cruising police car. Don't keep a lot of cash on hand - and make it known that you never do. Make all bank deposits during daylight hours, if possible, and carry your deposits in coat or trouser pockets – not in bank money bags, paper bags or briefcases, NEVER IN A PURSE – why advertise? It's best to employ armored car pick-up service, but if individuals do your firm's banking, vary the time and the route you use to travel to the bank so no one can establish a pattern for your movements.

Record serial numbers of several $1.00 bills and keep the numbers safely hidden. When you open or close, be certain to check all areas of the store or office for suspicious persons. At night, lock up and leave immediately. If you see something suspicious, call the police!

IS YOUR LIFE WORTH MORE THAN YOUR MONEY?

Seems like an unncessary question, doesn't it? Sadly enough, persons will take such risks. Some turn out to be losers. Robbery has become a more commonly committed offense in recent years. Criminals are bolder and their use of deadly weapons has increased.

In the event you may become the victim of a holdup, would you know what to do?

Concord's OPERATION ALERT

(ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT REQUIRES TEAMWORK)

CONCORD'S SQUEEZE ON CRIME THROUGH TEAMWORK

FIGHT ARMED ROBBERY

CALL: 682-6363
CONCORD POLICE DEPARTMENT

ROBBERY prevention

Do not keep large amounts of cash in the register. Extra money should be placed in a locked safe or deposited in a bank. Do not store cash in a cigar box under the counter. Even the amateur holdup men know enough to look there.

If possible, have a couple of bills in the cash drawer that you retain permanently and keep a record of the serial numbers. This can aid identification greatly in case your property is recovered.

A television set or a radio playing in the back room suggests that someone else may be present.

Do not clutter windows with signs and displays that block viewing from the street. Keep the premises well lighted.

Persons acting as bank messengers should —

- Travel back and forth to the bank with someone else.
- Vary the route and not always go at a scheduled time.
- Discuss only business with the tellers. The next person in line may be getting familiar with your routine.
- Never approach a night depository while anyone else is there. Wait until they leave. In the event suspicious appearing persons remain, call the police so the reasons for their behavior may be determined.

Do not set off a holdup alarm for a forgery or petty crime. This device is intended for a specific purpose. Police units respond to these alarms under emergency conditions and they should not be endangered unless the extra risk is justified.

Alarm switches should be placed at more than one location. All employees should be familiar with their use and locations. Alarms should be examined periodically to insure they are functioning properly.

In the event someone accidentally trips an alarm, telephone the police so emergency units will not have to respond.

Be careful of the answers you give to questions asked by strangers when they show an interest in the hours of operation, number of employees, or alarm systems.

If suspicious persons loiter around your place of business notify the police. Be particularly alert at opening and closing times or during other than regular hours when someone seeks admission.

When reporting for work in the morning, one employee should enter and inspect the premises. After giving him sufficient time to do this, another employee can telephone and by prearranged signal, the inside employee can indicate conditions are normal. Should the situation be irregular, he could vary the reply without arousing the suspicions of any intruders and the police can be summoned.

IF YOU ARE HELD UP...

remember to...

- Remain calm. Robbers usually are excited and may be provoked easily or might be under the influence of drugs.
- Avoid defending yourself with a firearm when you are already facing a weapon. The odds would be against you.

- Take a good look at the suspects. Notice any details which will aid you to describe them and their mannerisms. When trying to determine age, height, weight, and appearance make comparisons between them and yourself or people you know.
- Memorize peculiarities such as tattoos, scars, and prominent physical features.
- Note type and color of clothing worn, but keep in mind that clothes may be changed so try to concentrate on physical characteristics.
- Be able to describe size, type, and color of guns or other weapons that are used.
- Watch to see whether they touch anything so you can preserve it for evidence.
- Observe direction in which suspects leave. Obtain description of any vehicles they enter and **write down the license number.** Save this for the police.

AFTER THE ROBBERS LEAVE...

- Notify the police IMMEDIATELY! Tell them you have been held up and be prepared to report . . .

Location of the robbery. Be certain you give the exact address and the office or room number when necessary.

Description of the suspect.

License number and description of vehicles used and any other occupants.

Direction taken.



- Do not touch anything yourself and lock the doors until the arrival of the police. Preserve any items the suspects might have touched. Prevent anyone from going into areas where the robbers may have been.
- Remember at the time of your call, the police will have only the information you give them—be accurate. Save any note that may have been used and do not handle it unnecessarily or allow others to handle it.
- Direct your employees not to discuss the crime among themselves or with other witnesses until they have been interviewed by the police. If there is a delay, suggest they make notes while the information is still fresh.

WHEN THE POLICE ARRIVE...

Answer their questions and tell them only what YOU know. If an estimate is necessary to supply an answer, tell them you are estimating.

Do not exaggerate your experience or when describing what has been stolen.

Cooperate with the detectives assigned to the case by —

- Making yourself available for interview.
- Not being reluctant to identify the right suspects.
- Attending showups of suspects.
- Testifying in court when called upon to do so.

While this cooperation might not always result in recovery of your losses, you may be able to prevent other persons from becoming victims. Wouldn't you expect someone else to do the same for you?

WE WANT TO HELP

The Concord Police Department maintains a crime Prevention Unit staffed by officers specializing in crime prevention techniques. They would welcome the opportunity to visit with you, inspect your place of business and make suggestions about store security and other safeguards we've discussed here. We hope you'll give us a call – we're here to help make the armed robber unwelcome in Concord.

Minneapolis Police Department

WHAT TO DO WHEN A ROBBERY OCCURS

When you hear the nerve-shattering phrase, "This is a hold-up," it may be too late to prepare yourself.

The Police Department recommends that you follow the bandit's orders. He is usually a desperate man and may not hesitate to harm you to complete his mission.

The normal robbery places the bandit in your presence approximately one minute. During this time, you are asked to memorize the bandit's complete physical and clothing description, remember what style, color, and size of gun he carried, watch for his method of escape, remember what he said, remember where he touched (fingerprints), follow his instructions, and remain calm.

The [redacted] Police Department earnestly solicits your aid in the apprehension and prosecution of armed robbers. This bulletin is intended to instruct you and your employees how you can best help the Police Department if you are present when a robbery occurs.

I. BE SUSPICIOUS

Keep a notebook near the cash register for use by all employees. If you become suspicious of a person or vehicle, make a short notation in this book. Write down the date, time, and a brief description, including the vehicle license number, if possible. In the event you are robbed, your notebook may furnish the bit of information that leads to the bandit's arrest. To the police, one lead to investigate is much more encouraging than none at all.

II. PRECAUTIONS

Cash on hand

Keep a minimum amount of money necessary to operate your business in the cash register. The other money should be kept in a safe or hidden in the building. Keep the safe locked at all times. Keep a "bait bill" in the cash register. (Record the serial number of a one dollar bill and keep it in your register at all times). Keep the paper on which you have recorded this serial number available to the police at another location in your business establishment. Keep your windows clear of obstructions so that passing police units can see into your store.

Height Markers

The use of height markers has been very helpful to witnesses in the past and involve a minimum of time and money. Height markers are usually placed on the customer door or door frame. They can be installed by placing black plastic electrical tape or any contrasting colored strips, 5'6" and 6' from the floor. As the bandit passes the marker, you can easily note his approximate height.

III. BE PREPARED

Descriptions are of the utmost importance

While in contact with the bandit, concentrate on his physical and clothing descriptions, as if you are going to draw a picture of him when he leaves. Remember this: race, age, height, weight, color and length of hair, color of eyes, complexion, and characteristics such as scars, tattoos, disfigurements, and speech defects. The easiest way found to remember clothing descriptions is to start at the head and work your way down to his feet (hat to shoes).

NOTE: "Practice makes perfect." Practice descriptions with co-workers and customers. Describe their complete physical description and then get together with them and find out just how close you were to their actual description.

IV. AFTER THE ROBBERY

When the robber-suspect leaves your business, do everything safety permits to learn his method and route of escape. If he gets into a vehicle, remember its description and write down the license number at the first opportunity. Call the Police Department at 348-2861, immediately. Tell the police employee the location you are calling from, that you have been robbed, description of the bandit and his vehicle. A uniformed patrol car will be enroute to your business as soon as you give the police employee your [redacted]. Immediate broadcast will be made on police radio.

Call the MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

348-2861

If you need information or Police Service of a non-emergency type, call the Model City Precinct Station. No call will go unanswered.

MODEL CITY PRECINCT STATION 348-7940

MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPT.

SUSPECT DESCRIPTION P.D

	RACE	SEX	AGE	HT.	WT.	Hair	Eyes
1.							
2.							
3.							

characteristics such as scars, tattoos, disfigurements,

CLOTHING AND OTHER (DESCRIPTION)

Direction N E S W

WEAPON USED

AUTOMOBILE USED

MAKE/YR.

LIC NO.

COLOR

Call The Police

348-2861

Be Constantly on the Lookout for Suspicious Persons in the Bank — Report to Operations Officer Immediately.

HOLDUP PROCEDURES

UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES

Should a Staff Member Endanger His or Her Life or the Lives of Others

REMEMBER TO:

OBEY THE BANDITS INSTRUCTIONS

RETAIN ANY HOLDUP NOTE — IF POSSIBLE

TRIP THE SILENT ALARM — IF IT CAN BE DONE WITHOUT DANGER

OBSERVE THE ROBBER — AS SOON AS YOU CAN FILL IN REVERSE OF THIS FORM.

PROTECT THE SCENE OF THE ROBBERY — TOUCH NOTHING THAT THE BANDIT MAY HAVE TOUCHED.

THE OPERATIONS OFFICER SHOULD DELEGATE PERSONS TO:

(THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE DONE AS SOON AS IT IS SAFE TO DO SO)

NOTE DIRECTION AND MEANS OF ROBBERS ESCAPE — LICENSE NUMBER OF ANY CAR USED.

MAKE THE NECESSARY TELEPHONE CALLS:

1. LOCAL POLICE 682-6363
2. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION . . . . . (415)451-9782
3. AUDIT DEPARTMENTS, HEAD OFFICE . . . . . _____

OBTAIN NAMES AND ADDRESSES OF ALL WITNESSES IN THE BANK.
IF POSSIBLE, HAVE THEM FILL OUT FORM ON REVERSE.

OO 12 Rev. 11-68

TELLER'S PROCEDURE DURING HOLDUP

PREPARED BY

DATE

USE SEPARATE FORM FOR EACH BANDIT

OBEY THE BANDIT'S INSTRUCTIONS. MAKE NO MOVEMENT THAT COULD STAMPEDE THE BANDIT OR CAUSE HIM TO FIRE HIS GUN.

SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC AND THE BANK STAFF SHOULD ALWAYS BE THE FIRST CONSIDERATION.



USE THE SILENT ALARM IMMEDIATELY. DO NOT ENDANGER YOURSELF.

MAKE MENTAL NOTES OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE BANDIT AND OTHER DETAILS FOR LATER COMPLETION OF THE DESCRIPTION SHEET BELOW.

SOMEONE SHOULD FOLLOW THE BANDIT AT A SAFE DISTANCE TO DETERMINE THE DIRECTION AND METHOD OF GETAWAY.

LIST AS MUCH DESCRIPTIVE DATA AS POSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE:
HAIR - *Black, wavy, receding, and parted on right side.*

SEX _____ RACE _____ APPROXIMATE AGE _____

HEIGHT _____ FT. ____ INS. WEIGHT _____ LBS.

PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

COMPLEXION _____ HAIR _____

EYES _____ EARS _____

NOSE _____ LIPS _____

TEETH _____ VOICE _____

HANDS _____ BUILD _____

MUSTACHE _____ SCARS _____

MANNER OF WALK _____ POSTURE _____

OTHER DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS

DISGUISE _____ TATTOOS _____

JEWELRY _____ EYEGLASSES _____

OTHER _____

CLOTHING (TYPE AND COLOR) _____

_____

WEAPONS (REVOLVER, AUTOMATIC, RIFLE, SHOTGUN, KNIFE, ETC.) _____

REMARKS (NOTE ANYTHING SAID, ANY ACCENT, ANY NAME USED, GENERAL METHOD OF OPERATION) _____

MEANS OF ESCAPE (CAR, ON FOOT, IN WHICH DIRECTION) _____

IF VEHICLE (LICENSE NUMBER, MAKE, MODEL, YEAR AND COLOR) _____

_____

USE SEPARATE SHEET IF ADDITIONAL SPACE REQUIRED

ERIC

NOTICE

THIS STORE
never has more than fifty dollars in cash on hand at any time —

ARMED ROBBERY
in North Carolina carries a prison sentence of five to thirty years —

IS IT WORTH THE RISK?

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   ☐ Above Average ☐ Poor

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   B. Content/Coverage

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