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ABSTRACT

This paper is one of three presented at a symposium intended to suggest how historical studies of the curriculum field can aid in identifying alternative perspectives to the prevailing scientific-technical perspective, an orientation that has dominated the curriculum field since its inception as a formal area of study. This paper contends that inherent in the scientific-technical perspective is a commitment to social control that defines control in an exploitive sense, as a means of protecting the interests of the few over and above those of the majority of society. It is this notion of social control that has historically dominated American curriculum theory. Another notion of social control, one that defines control in a constructive sense, as a means of protecting the interests of all segments of society, is to be found in the work of George Herbert Mead. An examination of Mead's thought can counter the prevailing orientation of the curriculum field. (Author)

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GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, CURRICULUM THEORIST:
THE CURRICULUM FIELD AND
THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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A paper presented at the symposium, "Historical Studies within
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Although George Herbert Mead (1863-1931) is best known for his contributions to American philosophy and sociology, his early writings were devoted to educational issues, particularly to problems of curriculum. One critic has in fact argued that Mead's initial formulation of his idea of the individual as a social being is to be found in his curricular writings.¹ Despite this involvement with questions of curriculum, curriculum theorists have by and large ignored Mead's work and any potential contributions that it could make to curriculum discourse.² Of paramount importance in this respect is Mead's theory of social control, which he developed during the early years of this century. The idea of social control has, as it turns out, commanded significant influence among curriculum theorists since curriculum emerged as a formal field of study in the period between about 1913 and 1933. In fact no group of American thinkers during the first part of this century were so enamored of the idea of social control than were the formative theorists of the curriculum field. Notwithstanding this fact, however, Mead's notion of social control has had little impact on the curriculum field, either during its formative period, or for that matter today. In formulating their ideas on social control, the formative theorists of the curriculum field turned instead to the theory developed by Mead's contemporary, the American sociologist, Edward A. Ross.

It is our purpose in this paper to examine Mead's theory of social control and its implications for curriculum discourse. Our focus will be on the dominant role that technological thought has played within the curriculum field and the problem this dominance has created. We will argue that this problem, which concerns the field's social orientation, is due to the influence of Ross' theory on curriculum discourse. It is our contention in this paper

that Mead's alternative perspective on social control possesses particular potential for dealing with this problem.

Technological Thought and the Curriculum Field

Throughout its history one mode of thought has seemed to dominate the curriculum field, what we are calling technological thought or perhaps more aptly a technological-scientific perspective. It is rooted in the historic desire of curriculum theorists as well as other American educators and social scientists to obtain the exactness, certainty, and control which they have attributed to science and its methodology. To attain this control, these thinkers have attempted to model their work on the scientific method, specifically on the empirical procedures of the physical sciences. This extreme preoccupation with control and certainty has in point of fact, however, led curriculum theorists astray. They have mistakenly come to equate science with its technological applications in industry, and consequently they have come to adopt technological models of thought into their work as representing the embodiment of science. This practice, according to Professors Herbert Kliebard and Michael Apple, manifested itself during the formative years of the curriculum field in the emergence of scientific curriculum making and the social efficiency movement, both rooted in the industrial reform of the day, the scientific management movement. In contemporary curriculum thought, the same tendency has manifested itself in the adoption by curriculum theorists of a host of systems management procedures, derived from the systems engineering procedures of the defense industry.³ Most important among these systems procedures are the behavioral objectives movement and competency based education.

The problem inherent in the dominance of these technological models has been examined most compellingly by Professors Kliebard and Apple. They argue that these models act to make the curriculum an instrument of control for the

creation of uniformity or homogeneity. They point out that because these models are derived from industry, they tend to conceptualize students in industrial terms, that is, as raw material to be molded into a finished and pre-established product. As such the optimal role for students within a technological curricular framework is to adapt to a uniform and predetermined pattern of behavior, one typically specified within these systems by pre-selected performance standards or by behavioral objectives. Because of this tendency within a technological-scientific perspective, Kliebard and Apple contend that technological models within the curriculum field reflect a profoundly conservative social orientation. They make the curriculum a potential instrument for external imposition and manipulation.⁴

It is our view in this paper that these models act to deny the student any part in determining his educational and perhaps even his life destiny. They act instead to mold him to a predetermined pattern of behavior, the character of which he has no input in defining. The danger inherent in these models is that they can make the curriculum an instrument of social control for exploitative ends, ends that serve the self-interest of the few as opposed to ends that meet the larger, common interest of the many.⁵ In effect, within these models those who determine the objectives of the curriculum determine the fate of those who are subjected to the curriculum.

Historical Roots

To understand why these technological models represent instruments of exploitation we need to look more closely at the theory of social control embedded in them. The limitations of this paper do not allow for a complete examination of this theory. We have, however, dealt with it elsewhere. In brief, it has been our argument that this theory of social control emerged out of the work of Edward A. Ross, at around the turn of this century, in

response to the growing heterogeneity Ross saw in American society. Ross was concerned about the increasing influx into the population of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. He believed that they threatened the hegemony within American society of the native, middle class of Anglo-Saxon descent. Further, he believed that these immigrants threatened a homogeneous American culture which he thought existed, rooted in the values and beliefs of this middle class. As such his theory of social control represented an attempt to preserve the dominance of this native middle class and its culture within American society. Social control for Ross, then, was an instrument for creating social homogeneity or like-mindedness within the American population. It was this idea of social control that found its way into the curriculum field during its formative days and has since become part of the sedimented traditions of the field.⁵

Given our purposes in this paper, we need, however, to look in some depth at one aspect of this theory, the psychological mechanism it employed to explain how control took place. The clearest statement of this part of the theory is not to be found in the work of Ross. Rather it is to be found in the work of the individual who adopted Ross' notion of social control into the curriculum field, Ross L. Finney. Although less well known than, say, Franklin Bobbitt and W. W. Charters, Finney was one of the more important of the formative theorists of the curriculum field. His principal contribution was to spell out the social assumptions that grounded the principal organizational theories that existed within the curriculum field during its formative years.

It was Finney's belief that human learning occurred through a passive process of social suggestion. He argued that "...the fact has been too little observed and reckoned with in theory, especially pedagogical theory, that the contents of our mind is derived very largely from social sources

through a process of relatively passive mentation.⁷ Based on this view of learning, Finney talked about social control in behavioristic terms as a process of conditioning. In effect Finney integrated the psychological idea of operant conditioning developed by Edward A. Thorndike into the formative theoretical roots of the curriculum field.

Finney believed that the majority of the American population, particularly the immigrant working class, was not very intelligent and consequently was not able to govern themselves within a democratic society. They needed what he called an education in "followership" in which they would be conditioned with the habits he believed necessary for democratic living, habits which reflected the values and behavior of the native middle class. Talking about the mass of students that populated the schools, Finney maintained:

At least half of them never had an original idea of any general nature, and never will. But they must behave as if they had sound ideas. Whether those ideas are original or not matters not in the least. It is better to be right than to be original. What the duller half of the population needs, therefore, is to have their reflexes conditioned into behavior that is socially suitable. And the wholesale memorizing of catchwords--provided they are sound ones--is the only practical means of establishing bonds in the duller intellects between the findings of social scientists and the corresponding social behavior of the masses. Instead of trying to teach dullards to think for themselves, the intellectual leaders must think for them, and drill the results, memoriter, into their synapses.⁸

For Finney, then, the school and its curriculum represented an instrument of social control to promote the leadership of the middle class, who he believed were the most intelligent members of society, and to insure the obedience and good behavior of the immigrant working class.⁹

It is this perspective on social control that is embedded in the technological models that have historically dominated the curriculum field.¹⁰ It is this idea of social control, inextricably linked to these models, that makes them instruments for manipulation and imposition. It is our view that

we cannot relieve the school and its curriculum of its function as an agency of social control.¹¹ But we do believe that we can articulate a more constructive view of social control than contained within the thought of Ross and Finney, a perspective committed to promoting the common interests of all segments of society.¹² It is this constructive viewpoint that is reflected in George Herbert Mead's theory of social control, which he was developing during the very years that both Ross and Finney were writing.

Mead's Theory of Social Control

Mead's theory of social control was rooted in his notion of self. Self for Mead was a concept roughly equivalent although far richer than the psychological idea of personality, the structure of norms and values that are inculcated within the individual as part of the process of socialization. Self emerged for Mead when the individual assumed the same attitude toward himself that other individuals held toward him. When Mead talked about society, this emergence of self referred more particularly to the individual taking on the attitudes of the generalized other, Mead's term for the collective attitudes of the individuals that make up a given social order.¹³

The fully developed self for Mead had two phases, which he called the "I" and the "me." The "me" represented the attitudes called for by the generalized other, that is, society. The "I" constituted the response of the individual to these attitudes. "I" then represented the individual's particular and unique identity within social life. As such self for Mead was not a physical object, such as the brain or the body. The self was reflexive, which an object, such as the body, was not. By reflexiveness Mead meant, "...the turning-back of the experience of the individual upon himself...."¹⁴ That is, reflexiveness allowed the individual to treat himself as an object of which he could gain a total view or perspective. The

body, or any object for that matter, could not do this. As Mead pointed out, the eye could see the feet, but it could not see the back. It could not see itself whole.¹⁵ The self for Mead was in effect not an object but a process. It was there insofar as it was reflexive. As a process the self was not, according to Mead's student, Herbert Blumer, a collection of norms and values which the individual is inculcated with and which guide his behavior. In that form the notion of self would lack the quality of reflexivity. Norms and values are typically conceptualized as externally derived structures that the individual responds to. Being reflexive, the self could indicate something to itself. This meant that the individual could do more than just react to external stimuli. He could examine, judge, evaluate, act, or even withhold action.¹⁶

The interaction between the "I" and the "me" then represented a tension between two conflicting forces. The "I" suggested freedom, initiative, and novelty. The "me" represented certainty, consistency, and regularity. The "me" acted to instill the individual with the attitudes of his society. It attempted, in other words, to create a certain type of "I." But the "I" which emerged was always different than the "me" intended it to be. And this difference could not be predicted in advance. Once the "I" emerged, it caused the "me" to change. A new "me" came forth, one that was more appropriate to the nature of the emerging "I" than the "me" which just previously existed.¹⁷ The reflexivity between the "I" and the "me" allowed the individual to do more than just respond to external stimuli. It allowed him to reconstruct or reconstitute their very nature.

Self for Mead emerged within a process of social interaction, and consequently the idea of society represented an important concept for him. Unfortunately Mead did not deal with the idea of society beyond simply

positing its existence as something prior to the emergence of self. Blumer, however, has attempted to construct what appears to be Mead's thinking on the question of society. He argues that society for Mead represented a multitude of social acts or joint actions, events in which individuals acting together in society mutually adjusted their conduct in response to conditions they confronted. That is, joint actions referred to the emergence of individual selves in reference to the problematic conditions of social life. Because these conditions contained known and unknown elements, the requires responses on the part of interacting individuals had to reflect both certain routinized patterns of behavior as well as novel responses. As such they called for individuals engaged in joint actions to exhibit conduct mediated by both the "I" and the "me." In other words, joint actions called for conduct reflecting unique individualities that were under the control of society.¹⁸ Thus inherent in Mead's notion of the self was a theory of social control, to which we will now direct our attention.

Mead defined his theory of social control in terms of his notions of the "I" and the "me." By defining the limits of a socially acceptable response for "I," "me" provided a moderating effect on "I." This represented for Mead the act of social control.¹⁹ As such, social control for Mead was a natural and spontaneous psychological process that involved the functioning of the "phiso-logical" mechanism of the central nervous system. According to Mead, when the individual took on the attitudes of the generalized other:

...the general social process of experience and behavior which the group is carrying on is directly presented to him in his own experience, and so that he is thereby able to govern and direct his conduct consciously and critically, with reference to his relations both to the social group as a whole and to its other individual members, in terms of this social process.²⁰

In other words, the individual under social control adjusted his behavior in relation to the demands of his social group. He did this through a process of self-criticism. The taking on of the attitudes of the generalized other made the individual, according to Mead, self-conscious. But taking on those attitudes also made him self-critical. For in taking on the attitudes of the generalized other, the individual was in fact adjusting his conduct in terms of these attitudes. As Mead pointed out, "...self-criticism is essentially social criticism, and behavior controlled by self-criticism is essentially behavior controlled socially."²¹

Although social control constituted an adjustment in individual conduct, it did not, according to Mead, lead to conformist behavior:

Hence social control, so far from tending to crush out the human individual or to obliterate his self-conscious individuality, is, on the contrary, actually constitutive of and inextricably associated with that individuality; for the individual is what he is, as a conscious and individual personality, just in as far as he is a member of society, involved in the social process of experience and activity, and thereby socially controlled in his conduct.²²

To understand why this control does not produce simply conformist behavior on the part of the individual, we have to turn again to Blumer's notion of joint actions. Joint actions, as we mentioned earlier, referred to those interactions that emerged out of the problematic situations of social life. They were the events in which individuals engaged in social life took on the attitudes of the generalized other. The focus of these events, according to Blumer, were social objects, anything that individuals could refer to or could take an attitude toward, be they physical or imaginary, concrete or abstract.²³ That is, social objects represented the problematic events that led to joint actions.

Social control for Mead took place within joint actions. It was the bringing of the object into relation with the individuals participating in the joint action that constituted social control. What this meant was that social control was the defining by the individual of the object of his action in terms of an "I," which was in turn an "I" that had been brought under the supervision of a "me." That is, under social control the social object was defined by a fully developed self.²⁴ The critical factor in determining whether this control was social for Mead was the degree to which each individual engaging in the joint action had a part to play in the definition of the social object:

...Social control depends, then, upon the degree to which the individuals in society are able to assume the attitudes of the others who are involved with them in common endeavor. For the social object will always answer to the act of developing itself in self-consciousness. Besides property, all of the institutions (of society) are such objects, and serve to control individuals who find in them the organization of their own social response.²⁵

Social control broke down for Mead when individuals within society were excluded from defining the social objects which they confronted. For example, Mead pointed out that a Marxist state and a political machine both constituted examples of the breakdown of social control because they both represented patterns of social organization that restricted power, the social object, in this case, to a small segment of the population.²⁶ Although one could quarrel with the correctness of Mead's reference to Marxism, his point was clear. Patterns of social organization that did not allow for the participation of all segments of society in their operation were not under social control. For social control to exist, it was necessary for all the individuals engaged in any given joint action to have some input in defining the outcome of that action.

Social Control and Reciprocity

We could compare the two perspectives on social control that we have identified along several lines. But the critical issue is that of reflexivity. It was the reflexive quality of the relationship between the "I" and the "me" that accounted for the principal differences between Mead's perspective and the perspective we have identified as prevailing within the curriculum field. We call this reflexive quality reciprocity, by which we mean the mutual adjustment between interacting individuals through the building up of shared expectations about a given social object.²⁷ In talking about these expectations as being shared, we are trying to convey our view that they represent more than common expectations. That is, they represent not only agreement but agreement that emerges out of the input of all persons engaged in a given interaction.²⁸ As such reciprocity refers to the ability of the "I" of interacting individuals within a joint action to play a part in constructing the shared definition of the social object which represents the outcome of the joint action.²⁹

The notion of reciprocity we are talking about here represents a counter viewpoint to the behavioristic orientation we identified in the theory of social control held by Ross and Finney. The source for Mead's notion of reflexivity, his formulation of the principle of reciprocity, was Dewey's critique of the reflex arc theory in psychology. Although there is some evidence to indicate that Mead himself had developed a principle of reciprocity prior to the appearance of Dewey's critique, it was this critique that Mead explicitly referred to in defining his idea of reflexivity.³⁰ Dewey's concern in his article on the reflex arc was with the inadequacy he saw in the concepts of stimulus and response in the psychology of his day. He argued that the metaphor used to conceptualize the relationship between

the stimulus and the response, the reflex arc, was faulty. It conceptualized human action, he believed, as simply the organism's response to sense stimuli. This was the case because the metaphor posited a separation between the stimulus to action and the organism's response. Dewey believed that this view of a hard and fast distinction between the stimulus and the response could not be made. For Dewey the stimulus and the response were not separate entities but rather two phases of the same coordinated action which functioned together to 'maintain' and to 'reconstitute' the action. For Dewey a more appropriate metaphor than the reflex arc was the circuit. Employing this metaphor, Dewey defined a mutual interaction and influence between these two phases. Not only did an external stimulus bring about a response within the organism, but the very response of the organism acted reflexively on the stimulus to alter its character.³¹ Human action for Dewey included more than just the response of the organism to sense stimuli. It included in addition the organism's reconstruction of the stimuli.

It was this viewpoint which Mead expressed in talking about the reflexivity between the phases of the self and between individuals engaged in joint actions:

Whatever we are doing determines the sort of stimulus which will set free certain responses which are there ready for expression, and it is the attitude of action which determines for us what the stimulus will be. Then in the process of acting we are constantly selecting just what elements in the field of stimulation will set the response successfully free. We have to carry out our act so that the response as it goes on is continually acting back upon the organism, selecting for us just those stimuli which will enable us to do what we started to do.³²

In the context of social action, Mead viewed the relationship between the "I" and the "me" as well as between the individual and society in terms similar to Dewey's conception of the interaction between the stimulus and the response. Not only did the "me" stimulate the "I" to respond in a certain way, but the

very response of the "I" altered the nature of the 'me.'" And not only did the demands of society for a certain type of behavior or certain attitudes cause a response in the individual, but the response of the individual altered the nature of these social demands. These demands came to reflect in part the commitments and orientations of the individuals responding to them. In effect, then, social control for Mead involved the individual in a process of defining and constructing certain aspects of his social reality, specifically the attitudes and patterns of behavior he would adhere to as a member of society.

Implications for Curriculum Thought

The importance of Mead's work for the curriculum field lies in the fact that Mead is quite explicit about the educational and curricular implications of his theory of social control. Mead, as we mentioned earlier, had a long standing interest in problems of curriculum. During his early years at the University of Chicago, Mead assisted Dewey in the development and operation of the Laboratory School as well as serving as editor of The Elementary School Teacher. It was in this latter capacity that Mead articulated his principal educational concern, that of mediating between, on the one hand, the needs of society and, on the other hand, the interests of the child.³³ The curriculum could mediate these seemingly different ends, Mead believed, by serving as a forum for the development of the self.³⁴ As such the curriculum would be an instrument of social control. Its function would be to provide the individual with experiences of self definition, which were rooted in individual interest, and with experiences of mutual adjustment, which reflected the needs of society, toward the end of attaining a public and shared, that is, a reciprocal, social perspective.

In his lectures on the philosophy of education, Mead pointed out that

social objects, such as attitudes and patterns of behavior, were social constructs which the individual himself helped to define. It was for Mead the function of the school and its curriculum to teach the child to construct these social objects:

The child on the other hand is not only taught to react properly, but also to construct the object toward which he acts--e.g., to recognize the money of another, as belonging to, as the "property" of another. Thus the child learns why he acts, and why he does not, etc. There is with the child a conscious construction of the object as of "property."³⁵

The value of Mead's work is that it provides for an alternative viewpoint on the social function of education, particularly on the role of the curriculum as an instrument of social control. At about the same time that curriculum theorists such as Finney were integrating a perspective on social control into the formative roots of the field that would establish the dominance of technological thought, Mead was articulating a far different perspective. Although this perspective has historically been ignored by curriculum theorists, it is a viewpoint that is vitally needed today. American social thought, particularly our understanding of the psychological principles of social control, has developed over the last 70 years far beyond the ideas of Ross. But our contemporary views on the question of social order continue to ignore the need for reciprocity.³⁶ Thus we continue our historic tradition of viewing socialization and social control as processes of conditioning.³⁷ Despite the growth in our understanding of how individuals influence each other at the psychological level, we have in our contemporary social and educational thought reified our notion of personality. We do not view it as a reflexive process but instead as a structure made up of certain attitudes and values. We view the personality, the element that socializes the individual, as a pre-established and externally derived

entity that is instilled into the individual. There is little or no room for the individual construction of the socializing element which we saw in Mead's notion of the 'self.' Although all variations of this contemporary viewpoint do not employ a strict behavioristic psychology, they all tend to view the individual as simply a responding organism.³⁸

In making this assertion about our contemporary thought, we seem to be ignoring the impact of Dewey's ideas on the curriculum field. On the face of it Dewey's conception of education as the "reconstruction or reorganization of experience" on the part of the individual would seem to provide for the principle of reciprocity which we claim is missing in our contemporary curriculum discourse.³⁹ But unlike Mead's theory of social control, Dewey's ideas have already found their way into the curriculum field through the child's needs-interests tradition of selection and organization. Thus Dewey's ideas of "reconstruction" offers us a direct link with the principle of reciprocity without necessitating our introducing a new figure and a new perspective into the field, in this case Mead and his theory of social control. But when Dewey talked about the idea of social control, he focused his attention less on the reciprocal interaction between individuals and more on the resulting adjustment in attitude and behavior, which he called the "socialized mind."⁴⁰

As a result of this concern with the outcome as opposed to the process, Dewey's theory of social control takes on a certain vagueness. It remains unclear, despite a careful reading of Dewey's statements on social control, whether or not his theory allows for the principle of reciprocity.⁴¹ The real difficulty in this respect, however, may not be with Dewey. It seems to be the case that Dewey and Mead were not really in disagreement about the nature of social control. Rather it seems that Dewey chose not to emphasize ideas, such as self and reflexivity, which Mead had first articulated.⁴² The real difficulty may lie with those theorists who popularized Dewey's thought within the

curriculum field. When we turn to their formulations, we find explicit indicators of the absence of reciprocity. William Heard Kilpatrick, Dewey's principal popularizer, adopted as his explanation of the learning process Thorndike's Law of Effect, the mechanism of conditioning that represents the antithesis of the principle of reciprocity.⁴³ Similarly, Kenneth Benne, the theorist responsible for the integration of Dewey's thought into the contemporary humanistic education movement, employed a mechanistic language to talk about educational activity that is similar to the language system employed by the advocates of a technological-scientific perspective within the curriculum field. Although Benne talked about the need for individual input in the formulation of social policy, he has been criticized for viewing socialization as a process of "cultural induction" that denies the principle of reciprocity that we have been developing within this paper.⁴⁴

There are, however, indications that Dewey's seeming neglect of the principle of reciprocity may reflect more than vagueness or a lack of emphasis on his part. Recent reinterpretations of Dewey's thought, particularly his political ideas, by several revisionist historians of education suggest that Dewey defined social control as an instrument of cultural imposition in much the same way that Boss and Finney did.⁴⁵ It may just be that Dewey's notion of the "reconstruction of experience" did not in fact provide for the principle of reciprocity. If this is the case, it may turn out that such popularizers as Kilpatrick and Benne were not distorting Dewey's thought. They may in fact have indicated its authentic meaning. In any event this uncertainty about the meaning of Dewey's notion of "reconstruction" makes it doubtful that we can find an alternative viewpoint within his philosophy to supplant the theory of social control that prevails within the curriculum field.

The problem this lack of an alternative viewpoint on social control poses for the field can be seen if we turn to the humanistic education movement, the

contemporary variant of the child's needs-interest tradition of curricular organization. Rooted in both Dewey's thought and in psychoanalytic theory, this curricular movement seems to offer a compelling challenge to the manipulative ends inherent in the technological models that now dominate the field. Its commitments to creating an environment of freedom, openness, and trust seem to represent the antithesis of the commitments of technological thought to control, certainty, and uniformity.⁴⁶ A deeper examination of this movement suggests, however, that the differences may be more apparent than real. We have already indicated that the Deweyian tradition within this movement did not seem to allow for the principle of reciprocity we consider critical in countering the dominance of the technological-scientific perspective. Inherent, however, in the technique of psychoanalysis, particularly in the therapist-client relationship, is a notion of reciprocity. The individual in therapy is engaged in a self-reflective activity designed to allow him with the assistance of the therapist to recall and to understand his distorted conceptions of his past experience, the distorted conceptions that led him to therapy in the first place.⁴⁷ But in developing and refining the technique of psychoanalysis, its practitioners, particularly Freud, were primarily concerned with attempting to turn psychoanalysis into a natural science. This attempt has resulted in the original and authentic commitment of psychoanalysis to the principle of reciprocity being supplanted with a more mechanistic conception of interaction approaching the behavioristic notion of conditioning.⁴⁸ As such therapy has ceased to be an instrument for reflexive understanding and has become instead an instrument of imposition.

We can see the problem that this transformation in the nature of therapy creates by looking at encounter or sensitivity training, the principal application of psychoanalytic theory within humanistic education. Although

the characteristics supposedly nurtured by encounter groups seem to represent the antithesis of imposition and manipulation, these groups are in fact highly manipulative. Sensitivity training acts in effect to subjugate the individuality within heterogeneous groups of people by instilling within them common and shared emotional attachments.⁴⁹ The process, according to one critic, is one of indoctrination:

They actually work to control their members, however, by an indoctrination process which makes them emotionally dependent upon the group. The individual is first encouraged to admit something distressing about himself, which makes him anxious about the good will of the others. Sympathy from them then brings about his conversion and consolidation with the group; this leads to his participation in constraining the 'next guy' to do the same. As one trainee put it, 'It's funny how committed we each get after we're worked over by the group.'⁵⁰

In effect, then, the child's needs-interests tradition as it is currently represented in the humanistic education movement appears to reflect the same commitment to like-mindedness that has historically dominated curriculum thought. The curriculum within this movement becomes an instrument of social control for exploitative ends just as it is within competency-based education and the other forms of the technological-scientific perspective that exist within the contemporary curriculum field.

Conclusions

In this paper we have argued that the problem facing the curriculum field is that it lacks an alternative viewpoint on social control to counter the theory that has prevailed within the field since its formative days. We have identified this prevailing theory as being rooted in the work of Edward A. Ross and Ross L. Finney. We have shown that this theory of social control has posed two critical difficulties for the field. First, it has made the dominant organizational tradition within the field, the technological-scientific perspective, an instrument of exploitation. Second, the apparent integration of

this theory of social control into alternative organizational traditions within the field, such as the child's needs-interests tradition, has prevented these traditions from expressing what appears to be their authentic orientation. As a result these traditions too have become instruments of exploitation

We have also argued that within the history of American social and educational thought there exists a different perspective on social control than that of Ross and Finney's, specifically the theory of social control developed by George Herbert Mead. Mead's theory, which was developed during the same years that Ross' theory was developed and adopted into the curriculum field, represents the alternative perspective on social control which the contemporary field needs. Mead's provision for the principle of reciprocity can, at the least, free contemporary curriculum theorists from their historic over-reliance on technological thought by providing them with the construct they need to develop truly alternative modes of curriculum organization to that of the technological-scientific perspective. In this respect Mead's theory of social control constitutes a valuable theoretical tool from the historic traditions of American thought, traditions which curriculum theorists need to reacquaint themselves with, which can be employed to redirect the field toward more constructive ends that support and nurture individuality.

FOOTNOTES

1. John W. Petras (ed.), George Herbert Mead: Essays on his Social Philosophy (New York: Teachers College Press, 1963), p. 3.

2. There have been, however, two attempts made to derive the educational implications of Mead's thought. There was the 1943 study, originally a doctoral dissertation at Teachers College, by Alfred Stafford Clayton, entitled Emergent Mind and Education: A Study of George Herbert Mead's Bio-Social Behaviorism from an Educational Point of View. Unfortunately, the majority of this study was limited to a summary of Mead's social psychology. It was not clear that the educational implications he claimed to have discovered were rooted in Mead's thought. Most of them could have been as easily derived from the principles of the Progressive Education Movement, particularly the child centered tradition within that movement. More recently O. K. Moore and Alan Ross Anderson have attempted to adapt Mead's social psychology to educational practice in their notion of a "clarifying educational environment." The embodiment of their "clarifying environment" was the talking typewriter, a computerized system, that responded to student inputs made through a keyboard terminal in both print and in a simulated human voice. As such the response was designed to represent Mead's generalized other. The function of the "clarifying environment" then was to simulate, using a machine, the pattern of interaction that leads to the emergence of self. Unfortunately their use of technology led them to a rather mechanistic interpretation of Mead's ideas that failed to reflect the most important element, the reflexiveness between the phases of the self. See O. K. Moore and Alan Ross Anderson, "Some Principles for the Design of Clarifying Educational Environments," in Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research, ed. by David A. Goslin (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1969), pp. 574-608; and O. K. Moore and Alan Ross Anderson, "The Responsive Environments Project," in Early Education, ed. by Robert D. Hess and Roberta Meyer Bear (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 130-133.

3. Herbert M. Kliebard, "Bureaucracy and Curriculum Theory," in Freedom, Bureaucracy, and Schooling, ed. by Vernon Haubrich (Washington: Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, 1971), pp. 75-89; Michael Apple, "The Adequacy of Systems Management Procedures in Education," The Journal of Educational Research LXVI (September 1972), 13.

4. Kliebard, Ibid., pp. 87-93; Apple, Ibid., pp. 12-16.

5. H. C. Brearley, "The Nature of Social Control," in Social Control, ed. by Joseph S. Roucek (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1947), p. 3.

6. Barry H. Franklin, "American Curriculum Theory and the Problem of Social Control, 1913-1933," a paper presented at the 1974 annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Chicago, Illinois (ERIC #092 419-Research in Education, October, 1974).

7. Ross L. Finney, A Sociological Philosophy of Education (New York: Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 60.

8. Ibid., p. 395.

9. Ibid., pp. 397-398.

10. For an examination of this issue see Barry H. Franklin, "Technological Models and the Curriculum Field: Some Thoughts Toward a New Curriculum History," The Educational Forum, in press.

11. We are in this paper assuming that social control is a constitutive property of social life. The idea of social control then is synonymous with the notion of society and its institutions. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 55.

12. Brearley, loc. cit.

13. George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, ed. by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 140, 142, 154-156.

14. Ibid., p. 134.

15. Ibid., p. 136.

16. Herbert Blumer, "Sociological Implications of the Thought of George Herbert Mead," American Journal of Sociology LXXI (March, 1966), p. 536.

17. Mead, op. cit., pp. 177-173, 199-200.

18. Ibid., pp. 249-250, 253; Blumer, op. cit., pp. 540-541; Maurice Natanson, The Social Dynamics of George H. Mead (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 19.

19. Mead, Ibid., p. 210.

20. Ibid., p. 255.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. Blumer, op. cit., p. 539.

24. George Herbert Mead, "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control," International Journal of Ethics XXXV (April, 1925), p. 275.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. We have derived this notion, although we are using it in a more limited and less mechanistic sense, from the work of Alvin Gouldner on the norm of reciprocity. See Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," American Sociological Review XXV (April, 1960), pp. 161-179.

28. Alfred Schutz implies a similar idea in his notion of the "reciprocity of perspectives," his term for those aspects of our thought that allow us to resolve the conflicts between our private experience and our shared, public experience. See Alfred Schutz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," Collected Papers I: The Problem of Social Reality, ed. by Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 11-12. Maxine Greene also seems to find an idea similar to the one we are positing in Schutz's notion of the "reciprocity of perspectives." See Maxine Greene, "Cognition, Consciousness, and Curriculum," in Heightened Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory, ed. by William Pinar (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Company, 1974), p. 73.

29. Our idea of reciprocity is suggested in the notion of "reciprocal expectations" as developed by Jürgen Habermas. See Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics, trans. by Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 93.

30. The philosopher, David Miller, a student of Mead's at Chicago, suggests that Mead was more concerned than Dewey with the question of the coordination and reciprocal relationship between the environment and the organism and between the stimulus and the response. He believes that Dewey consulted with Mead in writing the reflex arc critique. But more interesting is his view that Mead had developed a rudimentary formulation of his idea of the act, which had inherent in it a notion of reciprocity, before the publication of Dewey's article. See David L. Miller, George Herbert Mead: Self, Language and the World (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1973), p. xxvi. But it was to Dewey's reflex arc critique that Mead referred to in articulating his notion of social interaction, particularly its reflexive element. See George Herbert Mead, Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, ed. by Merritt H. Moore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), p. 389.

31. John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," in Philosophy, Psychology, and Social Practice, ed. by Joseph Ratner (New York: Capricorn Books, 1967), pp. 252-253, 253, 265-266.

32. Movements of Thought in the Nineteenth Century, op. cit., pp. 389-390.

33. George Herbert Mead, "The Policy of The Elementary School Teacher," in Petras, op. cit., p. 26; Arthur C. Wirth, John Dewey as Educator (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 48, 49, 76, 100, 102.

34. Mind, Self, and Society, op. cit., pp. 264-265.

35. Juliet Hammond, "Notes on a Course in the Philosophy of Education" given by George Herbert Mead at the University of Chicago, 1910-1911, The George Herbert Mead Papers, The University of Chicago Library, p. 9. Mead spelled out the notion that social objects are social constructs in the following terms: "This power to combine stimuli makes manifold conduct possible. We control our conduct by determining (sic) the objects to which we will respond,--by constructing objects, by determination of stimuli. So we resent an insult only when it comes from one of our own, or of a higher class. It is only a mere passing sound, with no meaning otherwise for us." (p. 8)

36. Couldner, op. cit., pp. 161-162, 167-168: For an example of how the idea of reciprocity has become distorted in our contemporary thought see Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951), p. 33.

37. For a discussion of this trend see Charles E. Bidwell, "Schooling and Socialization for Moral Commitment," Interchange III (#4, 1972), 1-27; for an example of this trend see Edward Wynne, "Socialization to Adulthood: Different Concepts, Different Policies," Interchange V (#1, 1974), 23-25.

38. Blumer, op. cit., pp. 535-536, 542.

39. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: The Free Press, 1966), 76-30.

40. Ibid., pp. 14, 33.

41. Compare, Ibid., p. 30 with John Dewey, Lectures in the Philosophy of Education, 1399, ed. by Reginald D. Archambault (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 43.

42. Personal communication from Professor David Miller. See also, Miller, loc. cit.

43. William Heard Kilpatrick, "The Project Method," Teachers College Record XIX (September, 1918), 323-325.

44. Kenneth Benne, "Democratic Ethics and Human Engineering," in The Planning of Change, ed. by Warren G. Benis, Kenneth Benne, and Robert Chin (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 141-148; Kenneth Benne, "Authority in Education," Harvard Educational Review XL (August, 1970), 335-410. For an example of this critique of Benne's thought see David N. Silk, "Authority and Consent in Education," Educational Theory XXIV (January, 1974), pp. 247-254.

45. For examples of this revisionist interpretation see Walter Feinberg, "Progressive Education and Social Planning," Teachers College Record, LXXII (May, 1972), 435-505; and Clarence Karier, "Liberal Ideology and the Quest for Orderly Change," in Roots of Crisis (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 94-107. For an example of the aspect of Dewey's thought that these revisionist historians are concerned about, see John Dewey, "Conditions Among the Poles in United States," Unpublished Confidential Report, 1913.

46. Carl Rogers, Freedom to Learn (Columbus: Charles Merrill, 1969), pp. 253, 290-291, 310. For a discussion of the linkage between humanistic education and therapy see Alan Lockwood, "A Critical View of Values Clarification," University of Wisconsin, mimeo.

47. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, trans. by Jermy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), chapter 10; Sigmund Freud, "Freud's Psychoanalytic Method," in Therapy and Technique, ed. by Philip Rieff (New York: Collier Books, 1963), pp. 55-61.

48. Habermas, Ibid., chapter 11. Habermas argues that the kind of transformation in the pattern of interaction that we are identifying with our

example of psychoanalysis represents a larger tendency in modern, industrial society, which he associates with the growth and increasing dominance of technology. Its chief characteristic is that patterns of interaction that traditionally have been guided by a system of reciprocal expectations, such as psychoanalysis, now come to be guided by a behavioral mechanism of conditioning. See Toward a Rational Society, op. cit., p. 107.

49. Kurt W. Back, "The Experimental Group and Society," The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science IX (#1, 1973), p. 19.

50. Perry London, Behavior Control (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 205.