John Searle's book, "Speech Acts," opened with the question, "How do words relate to the world?" This paper suggests a way of answering Searle's question by relying--in spirit if not in method--on Austin's linguistic phenomenology. The existential phenomenology approach is described in Austin's phrase as a "sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of phenomena." It is argued in this paper that a person's phenomenological existence generates communication at all semiotic levels and that this communication constitutes a living world. This contention is explained by orienting the analysis toward existential rather than transcendental phenomenology. Three modalities of encountering phenomenological existence in communication are examined, and several conclusions about the dialectic critique presented in this analysis are offered. (RBA)
EXISTENTIAL SPEECH AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF COMMUNICATION

By

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Wittgenstein begins *The Blue Book* by asking us the question: *What is the meaning of a word?* He might as easily have asked—as other philosophers have subsequently done—*what is a sentence? a proposition? a speech act? a linguistic unit?* Or even Alston's recent query, "*What are we saying about a linguistic expression when we specify its meaning?*" In each instance the question is an analytic probe of language for what it is. I take this general approach to the philosophy of language as having its contemporary reformulation in the explicit question which opens John Searle's book *Speech Acts*. Searle asks, "*How do words relate to the world?*" It is just this restatement of the question that attracts the existential phenomenologist who is precisely interested in how phenomena, such as language and speech, are constituted and the ways in which a person generate a "world" of such phenomena. This interest is not entirely a state of xenophobia for the analytic philosopher.

In his essay "*A Plea for Excuses*" J. L. Austin tells us "*When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or "meanings", whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena."* Austin himself is bold enough to tell his reader that this approach is not properly to be called linguistic or analytic philosophy, but *linguistic phenomenology*. One is rather startled with the parallel conception that is expressed some three years earlier (1953) by Maurice Merleau-Ponty who argues that "*the more energetic our intention to see the things themselves, the more the appearances by which they are expressed and the words by which we express them will be interposed between the things and us.***

In this paper, then, I would like to suggest a way of answering Searle's question, "*How do words relate to the
world?", which is a reply that is at least in the spirit, if not the method, of Austin's linguistic phenomenology. The approach of existential phenomenology is very nicely described by Austin's phrase, a "sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of phenomena." In short, I would like to suggest in answer to Searle's question that a person's phenomenological existence generates communication at all semiotic levels and that this communication constitutes a lived world. I propose to elaborate this contention first by briefly orienting the analysis as existential, rather than transcendental phenomenology. Second, I should like to look rather closely at three modalities of encountering phenomenological existence in communication which accounts for the bulk of my analysis. Finally, I shall offer a few conclusions about the dialectic critique that this analysis attempts.

I. Existential Phenomenology.

Existential phenomenology is a philosophic attitude and method of analysis which takes as its central concern a person's consciousness of living as his origin of being and as his history. As an attitude, existential phenomenology focuses upon the philosophic problem of the modalities of consciousness which are manifest essentially in the process of being a person, which is to say, the nature of personal existence. This is the problem of phenomenological existence. As a method, existential phenomenology utilizes a critique of living and lived experience which is the essence of being a person, of encountering other people, and of the history which they constitute by sharing and inhabiting a common world. This is the problem of communication. By combining the existential attitude and the method of phenomenological critique I am following, in the tradition of Merleau-Ponty, the procedure of phenomenological description, phenomenological reduction or epoché, and hermeneutic.
This is to say, a description of phenomena as immediately given in consciousness, a reduction of the phenomena by ignoring their constitution in consciousness, and the determination of the sense or meaning of phenomena by discovering the structure that inheres in the conscious presence of phenomena (genetic experience).

I am deliberately posing the problems of phenomenological existence and communication in existential terms to avoid any misconception about the direction I wish to follow. While a great debt is owed to Edmund Husserl for his exacting examination of consciousness as "pure" or transcendental phenomenology, his early writings from the Logical Investigations up to the Cartesian Meditations tend toward an unacceptable idealism in the attempt to make philosophy a so-called "rigorous science." In contrast, the approach represented by parts of the late Husserl and primarily in the subsequent additions and interpretations of Merleau-Ponty presupposes the necessity of making philosophy the proper objective of phenomenological inquiry. This existential approach correspondingly presumes the methodological necessity of making phenomenology ontological rather than logical. In specific terms of the present analysis, the existential approach emphasizes a new way of looking at consciousness. In Husserl consciousness is the power of signification by constituting the distance and absence of things. For him speech and perception are signified as one, as "appearing" for a conscious perceiver. But, in Merleau-Ponty perception becomes the experiential basis and genetic origin of all operations of consciousness. This consciousness signifies, judges, and speaks. The existence of the person and the sense of the existence of things are revealed simultaneously in perception. Consciousness in this view is the constituting appearance or experience of perception. Perception expresses consciousness, and in this sense phenomenological existence has its origin and extension in communication.

I propose to bring the attitude and method of existential phenomenology to bear upon three phenomena in which a
person encounters his own existence and that of other persons and things. Such an analysis discloses, if I may paraphrase the Husserl of the *Cartesian Meditations*, the interrelation by which a person's experience of subjectivity constitutes the consciousness of intersubjectivity. The three phenomena or objects of conscious experience that I have in mind are (1) perception, (2) expression, and (3) communication. The examination of perception and expression reflects the subjectivity of persons whose intrapersonal experience of silence and thought generates their self perception and whose experience of using language is constitutive of self expression. The third phenomenon, communication, reflects the intersubjectivity of persons whose mutual experience of speaking and speech acts are interpersonal synergisms of their subjective perceptions and expressions. This sketch of the relationships I want to deal with is analytically helpful, but conceptually misleading in its logical familiarity.

We must cut through, as it were, these usual and presumed categories of perception as only sensation in a causal sense, of expression as merely the utterance of sensible language, and of communication as the imparting of a message. Our critique should expose the interdependent modalities of the living and the lived in persons. Here, the term "living" is simply a phenomenological label for genetic consciousness, while the word "lived" refers to constitutive consciousness or experience. By way of illustrating my analysis I would like to use the word "vertical" to describe the relational force of the phenomenological concept of living; similarly, the word "horizontal" will be used to describe the term lived.

By "vertical" I mean to imply "existential" in the sense of active being here and now, namely, living. The vertical is a modality of being that is articulated in consciousness at three levels: (1) Silence, (2) Synchronic Language, by which I mean the current state of language use in a given society, and (3) Speaking. I want to stress that the three levels are synonymous in describing an active
here and now presence of consciousness. By "horizontal" I mean "empirical" in the passive sense of being there and then, namely, lived. The horizontal is a modality of being that is manifest at three levels which I designate as (1) Thought, (2) Diachronic Language, by which I mean the institutional nature of language in a given culture, and (3) the Speech Act. These familiar terms are intended to emphasize the passive value that one encounters as synonymous experiences of there and then, as the absence of genetic consciousness.

The term "living" has the experiencial force of an activity or situation occurring right now, what one is always conscious of as the present moment. Necessarily, the location of "living" as the "now" of human time carries with it the spatial implication of the vertical, of being positioned "here." Hence, "vertical" appropriately suggests the active sense of here as the locus of possibility, as the origin of undetermined capability. On the other hand, the term "lived" implies an experience of the event or activity which occurs then, in the past or future as the receding or approaching present. It is the experience of the past or future as a determinate reflection of the present. Correspondingly, the spatial implication of "then" in the time continuum is a location which is always "there." Thus, the word "horizontal" points to the passive sense of being a relational position, of being the location and fulfillment of an ability. In short, living or the vertical is how a person is existing, while the lived or the horizontal is how a person has existence.

To go a step further, vertical and horizontal as descriptions point to the relational direction or way of becoming that composes the respective experiences of existing and existence into one consciousness of being a person alive. The vertical experience is the consciousness that a person has of his own presence. In more familiar, but slightly misleading terminology, the vertical experience is the "subjectivity" of a person in the sense of being
the self that one is conscious of as himself. In contrast, the horizontal experience is an "objectivity" in the sense of a person being the object or body which has existence and which is the absence of the self. The horizontal is one's own consciousness of himself which he constitutes by being a genetic self. Unlike the traditional dichotomies of the mind-body paradigm, the terms vertical and horizontal assume the implicit unity and reversibility of both modalities in being a person. Just as the physical sensation of vertical and horizontal planes explains the occurrence of visual depth awareness, so the synergism of existing (the vertical) and existence (the horizontal) account for the intrapersonal (unity) and interpersonal (reversibility) consciousness of being a person who generates and constitutes his own world in life.

It is helpful at this point to introduce the term "other" as opposed to self. On the one hand, "other" means "another person" who is not oneself; a person whom one experiences as other than himself. This is the interpersonal sense of "other" which correspondingly assumes that "person" is the name of vertical existing. In contrast, the intrapersonal sense of "other" refers to one's own consciousness of being an experiencing person, what I call horizontal existence. In other words, the interpersonal sense of "other" is another person generated in the consciousness of a person, while "other" in the intrapersonal sense is the person constituted in his own consciousness. In order to avoid using the term other in these two senses, I shall adopt the convention of using the term "other" to refer only to another person. And, the word "person" will refer to the person himself in conjunction with the terms "consciousness" and "experience" respectively which are adequate to specify the genetic and constitutive modalities of the person in either intrapersonal or interpersonal relationships.

The similarities of consciousness and experience as intrapersonal and interpersonal relationships naturally suggests that the problem of communication is synonymous
with the problem of phenomenological existence. There are three themes which indicate philosophically how a person's consciousness and experience communicate phenomenological existence. First, the theme of phenomenological perception in which silence and thought are genetic and constitutive of consciousness in a person. This first theme discloses a person's consciousness of himself. Second, the theme of phenomenological expression by which the person experiences synchronic and diachronic language. This theme discloses experience as the object of consciousness for a person. Third, the theme of phenomenological communication which is the experience of being a conscious person and experiencing the consciousness of the "other" through speaking and the speech act. This last theme discloses the meaning or sense of experience as the intentional object of a person's consciousness.

The first theme, perception, indicates the dialectic interaction between the vertical and horizontal modalities of being a person capable of intrapersonally experiencing silence and thought as existence. Expression, as the second theme, suggests a person's vertical and horizontal modalities of being a person experiencing the normative and genetic language of his society, i.e., synchronic language, and the cultural value or constitutive nature of language as diachronic. Finally, the theme of communication recommends the synergism of perception and expression, that is, the dialectic movement of the vertical and horizontal in which speaking is genetic consciousness and the speech act is constitutive experience for the person and the other. In each of these themes the dialectic movement of consciousness and experience is a unity as vertical and a reversibility as horizontal which combine into one phenomenon. This phenomenon is the person who is defined by (1) the living and lived experience, (2) the pre-conscious and conscious modes of consciousness, (3) the immanent and transcendent modes of experience, (4) the absence and presence of the object of consciousness in experiencing, and (5) the pre-reflective and reflect-
ive modes of consciousness.

The brevity of outlining the problems of phenomenological existence and communication from the various methodological perspectives of existential phenomenology has no doubt created a reasonable amount of ambiguity. I hope some clarity will be forthcoming in the detailed analysis to follow where each of the three themes is analyzed systematically in its vertical modality, then in its horizontal modality. Each modality is progressively put to a phenomenological description, reduction, and hermeneutic. This is followed by an analysis of the dialectic movement in the two modalities of each theme.

II. Encountering Phenomenological Existence.


Perception is normally construed to be either the act of apprehending phenomena with the mind or through the organs of the physical senses. In both cases, the human agency is conceived to be an exclusively receptive object. The usual concern of the theorist or practitioner who studies perception is with what is taken into the human organism. In the present analysis, I wish to avoid the preconceptions posed by this naturalistic view of the person and concentrate on the phenomenological status of how the person is able to and does perceive, how perception is able to engage the person. Taking the vertical and horizontal structure of human existence as a point of departure, we can examine first the modality—existing—in which the person is the subject of self perception and secondly the modality of existence whereby the person is an object of self perception. In this regard, silence is the name we can ascribe to the activity of self perception, i.e., consciousness of oneself. And, thought is the awareness that we attach to the process of self perception in which one is the object of his own experience.

SILENCE. As with each topic to follow, I would like to examine silence or the vertical modality of existing
as progressively (1) a description of consciousness, (2) a reduction of the intentional object of consciousness, and (3) a hermeneutic of experience. At the descriptive level of consciousness it is possible for a person to engage his own awareness of living, that is, to discover how and in what way he is, not in fact, but in process existing. A person first discovers that by engaging in self perception he is an agent who can actively know and feel his own situation of being alive. This is to say, a person experiences the intrapersonal perception of self by self as his ability to be conscious of himself as the agent of himself. Necessarily then, as we speak of a person knowing his own situation of living or feeling that he is alive, we mean there is a consciousness of the existing process which is describeable as the knowing and feeling. Yet, existing is more than the sum of intellection and sensation. There is in consciousness a synergism which makes consciousness more than its analytic constituents of mind and body in action. In this vertical modality, then, how a person perceives is to take himself as the subject of his consciousness. In so doing he discovers that the perception of self by self is properly a state of ability or capability that is not strictly a conscious or reflective activity by which we mean causal engagement of the mind. Rather, the perception of self by self is a pre-conscious engagement. Perception as pre-conscious is a possibility of existing, it is not a fact of existence. As a possibility of constituting experience, the pre-conscious is a person's living experience of existing. To put it another way, the possibility of the state or situation of existence is one modality of the existing process which engages a person as his being a person. Hence, the pre-conscious is a possibility of a person's consciousness, yet a possibility that is bound up with the ability to be engaged by the person.

In much of the present context of discussion, perception and its pre-conscious status are virtually synonymous.
with "expression" inasmuch as engaging perception is in large part the act of expressing. When a person engages self perception there is simultaneously the expression of self to self as the subject of perception. The pre-conscious status of perception as a possibility able to occur is dependent upon the person's expressive capability as a subject for himself. In order to be capable of being the subject of self perception the person must be capable, as a subject, of self expression. Thus, as the vertical phenomenon of existing perception and expression are not distinguishable to the person. Note that I have used the phrase "distinguishable to," not the words "distinguishable by" which indicates clearly that perception and expression are a possibility and capability for the person, not a fact of or determination of the person. In short, perception and expression are not objects experienced by some sort of detached self, rather they are the person as such.

A person whom we describe as perceiving and expressing himself at the pre-conscious level of experience is existing in an immanent modality of being. This is to say, the living experience of the person is describeable as silence inasmuch as self perception and self expression generate the same, identical experience of a person as himself. But how is one to grasp this pre-conscious immanence we call silence if it is truly pre-conscious, yet immanent to experience? The answer lies in the second step of the present analysis which is the reduction of the intentional object of consciousness or silence.

Silence, whose essence we describe as pre-conscious and immanent, is necessarily a pre-reflective object of consciousness since its expressive and perceptive appearances are indistinguishable to the person himself. Hence, it is helpful to recall that our analysis is directed toward understanding how silence is a style of perception, not what silence is as an admixture of sensa. Because we are concerned with how rather than what, the pre-reflective object of consciousness as silence is not perception or
expression, nor any mediating combination of the two which succumbs to the psychological model of concept formation in verbal and non-verbal behavior. Rather, the pre-conscious and immanent essence of silence is the identity of perception and expression for the person alone. Silence as this relationship is the immanent experience of the person who lives and is existing with the possibility in the pre-conscious, the possibility and capability of perceiving and expressing himself to himself. Yet, the possibility and capability are always immanent, given to the person without reflection, without the intervention of sensation. Hence, silence is an intentional object of consciousness which is no less than the intrasubjective perception-expression identity. Silence is one style of capability, the capability of finding meaning in oneself.

The sense of perception as silence is the third area of present interest, that is, the hermeneutic of a person's perceiving experience of himself. Perceiving is the pre-conscious act of the person when he takes himself as the subject of perception. Such perception is manifest immanently to the person alone and thus perceiving is uniquely an intrapersonal dimension of meaning as existing. It is the living awareness of an "I" which is capable of self engagement as experience. This perceiving is the intrasubjective capability of being alive in an immanent manner by affirming the identity of self to self, that is, affirming the uniqueness of the person in existing as himself. It is the manifest singularity that identifies the person as a Body-subject. The consciousness of perceiving as so described is the vertical modality of existing experience which is, which means, an essential absence. The experience is the absence of any constitution as a reflective act, a fixed sensation, or a judgment. Silence or the perception of oneself as a subjectivity of person in expression is the becoming of speech. It is a style of becoming which is the ability to articulate a presence as the genetic embodiment of language and speech. In
short, silence is the perceived absence of appearance, the absence of how a person is. Silence is the perception of how a person can be manifest to himself, how existing can be expressed to himself.

**THOUGHT.** Perception as a horizontal modality of existence concerns itself with a person's self perception of himself as an objectivity. This notion is more explicit in the view that it is possible, if not just common sense, that a person can perceive himself as a self or appearing subject in contradistinction to himself as an object or material appearance. The most contemporary development of this idea is, of course, Martin Buber's "I-Thou" bifurcation which is a personal way of referring to the subject and object constitution of a person. However, I think it would be less confusing philosophically to rely on the ordinary language use of the pronouns "I" and "me" and also "I" and "you," rather than Buber's formulation. Obviously, the "I-me" and "I-you" relationships refer to the subjectivity of appearing and the objectivity of appearance for the person and the other. In such a conceptual framework, the objective mode of perception in which a person engages his own thought is the process of perceiving not "myself," but "oneself." The person perceives the other in himself and this perception constitutes the dimension of thought in the lived person. That is, perception as thought is the horizontal process by which the person monitors his subjectivity as a modality of his body and the objectivity of his body as a modality of his subjectivity. Thus there is no subject and object proper, only the person as appearing subjectivity and objectivity in appearance. This is to say, the person as intrasubjectivity lives vertical being as silence and horizontal being as thought.

For the first time, a person is aware of his experience that expression is the appearing object of his perception and that perception, likewise, is the appearing object of his expression. The discovery of perception and expression as the essence of a person's objectivity to himself is an
explicit indication of conscious activity and appearance pursuant to personal existence. Perception and expression are conscious activities at the thought level and they require each other as their objective counterpart in the agency of constituting existence for the person. In the present horizontal modality of existence perception can be described as a functioning transcendence in consciousness. This is to say, perception as thought is not a capability nor an ability which is immanent to the person in the process of existing, rather it is a fact that is constituted by the agency of existence. The significant consequence is the person's ability to distinguish perception and expression as different dimensions of his consciousness. Expression and perception are objective to the person as appearances of himself. The perceiving act of the person is dialectically immanent to himself and combines with expression as the transcendent agency of understanding. And conversely in thought, expressing is immanent with perception being the transcendent meaning.

 Appropriately at the reductive level of analysis, it becomes clear that thought as the appearance of consciousness is a person's horizontal existence as a reflective objectivity. This is to say no more than the fact that perception and expression, not perceiving and expressing, display a dialectic power of reversibility. To put it more clearly, perception translates expression and visa versa for the person alone. Thought is the ordinary language term which designates for us the reflective object of a person's horizontal existence. When the person is in the process of perceiving himself, that is, self perception as an appearance, the experience of the object is the fact of self existence for the person. Such existence as a reflective state manifests the reversibility whereby the perception or expression of oneself is the object of experience which occurs as appearance for the existing person. In short, thought is the level of meaning by which a person perceives his objectivity and expresses his ob-
jectivity through self existence. The lived meaning of thought is precisely the becoming of speech as perception. As such, perception is the fixed modality of reversibility that is expression, the explicit meaning that can be manifest and articulated in language and speech as the appearance of thought. Such meaning is precisely the hermeneutic level of consciousness in existence and in the horizontal experience of consciousness.

Perception as thought is an intentional object of the passive process of existence. It is the passive concern of the person's consciousness which is manifest as an appearing object, which is nothing else but thought. Thought is the reflective product of a person's perception of himself as an appearance. At the hermeneutic level, thought is an intrapersonal dimension of the person. Thought is the self or subjectivity which acknowledges oneself, that is, the body or appearance of existing which is a person's existence as such. Thought explains to a person his possibility of being a person as a person. The person is no longer an isolated "I" whose pre-consciousness is the solitary ego, rather the person reflects his objectivity as cogito. The person comes to understand the "I" which lives the "I,", the transcendent realization that "I" am "myself." The intrapersonal awareness is the hermeneutic experience which explains the person's horizontal existence of self for self which is manifest as a lived presence. A person is conscious of himself as a Body-subject. The hermeneutic truth of this consciousness is its total possibility, yet passivity in meaning. The person's presence is known to himself as being there in appearance and not the presence of here which is the active pre-conscious. The reflective consciousness constitutes the person as there then. The primacy of perception as genetically now is not available because it is already lived experience, no longer living consciousness. The lived experience of thought becomes the only possible object of consciousness which is the constituting appearance of oneself as a person.

THE DIALECTIC MOVEMENT OF PERCEPTION. By way of explaining the dialectic movement of silence and thought in
perception, I would like to first summarize the bifurcated relationship which constitutes equally a unity and a reversibility of the subjectivity and objectivity, or Body-subject, which is a person. In perception, the person is a vertical unity of experience which is pre-conscious and immanent in himself. Hence, the vertical unity is absent to the person as an object of reflective experience. Such an absence indicates the inadequacy of reflection as a specification of intrapersonal experience which is immanent. The person so constituted as a subjectivity in the person is a pre-reflective appearance to himself. Put another way, a person is aware of his existing prior to his reflection on it.

The dialectic status of the person is preeminently a self defined unity of the consciousness of experience as becoming which is incapable of fixed existence. The experience which is intrapersonally only pre-conscious as a unity is incapable of being present as such. The vertical person is an absence which is existing. Here the essential dialectic is the active and unified presentation of self to self, the here and now of existing which a person lives, knows, senses as silence. On the other hand, the person is a horizontal reversibility which is conscious and transcendent. The person has existence, the passive experience of being conscious of himself as being there and being then. The experience locates the person as an appearance to himself and as an object which is not immanent in himself. Rather, the object is transcendent to himself as the product of his reflection. The reversibility of horizontal existence is precisely the culmination of being the perceived perceiver, of being the appearing object of experience which is there and as the object of consciousness which was then. By definition, then, the dialectic status of the person is a presence to himself which he is able to engage only through reflection. And, reflection is simply the self constituting reversibility of becoming by which the person achieves fixed existence and is present as such to himself. The horizontal modality of the person is a pre-
sence of himself as the appearance which he is conscious of as being objective in existence. The existence of himself transcends his existing. Thus, the essential dialectic is a reversible presentation of self for self. The expression and perception of the person are the object of himself and the object is no more than the appearing reflection of his own consciousness. In short, the person is always present to himself in thought. The existing person has existence as such in the perception of himself which is the intrapersonal dialectic of silence and thought. The dialectic theme of perception is the unity and reversibility that generate the intrasubjective experience that a person has of his own consciousness of being in the world. Phenomenological perception is fundamentally a becoming of speech, that is, an articulation constituting intrapersonal consciousness as experience.


In our common experience the meaning of expression generally includes any process or activity which reveals or indicates something about a person, event or thing. Expression is also conceived to be the polar opposite of perception when expression is broadly inclusive of conception and sensation alike. This is actually a brief way of noting that expression is often determined by a definition which relies heavily on the analogue of the physical transmission of sound—the so-called behavior of encoding selected symbolic material for explicit reception by a hearer. As in the case of perception, this naturalistic and technological conception of expression is an over fascination with what expression is, rather than the phenomenological concern with how it comes to generate itself as part of a person's experience of existence.

How a person engages in expression is a matter best examined from two perspectives: what I am calling synchronic and diachronic language which I take to be two aspects of the general institutional nature of interpersonal
expression. In this respect, I take expression to include any semiotic system. In using the linguistic terms, synchronic and diachronic, I intend a very modified and generalized use beyond their technical restriction in linguistics to rather specific features of language.

SYNCHRONIC LANGUAGE. Every person is born into a language community and as he matures in the use of this language certain normative features of his participation become constituted as part of his experience. It is this social experience of language that I want to designate as synchronic language. I do not intend that my idea of the social experience of language should be equated with the philosophic notion of "institutional language," for I take the later to be my use of diachronic language. Rather, the social experience of language is the genetic expectation that a person has of how his language will express his meaning and himself.

At the descriptive level of consciousness, synchronic language is first of all a vertical mode of existing in which the person expresses his presence as a subjectivity to another person. This is to suggest that another person is able to perceive in a person's expression the fact that he is an existing subjectivity present as a subject of expression. Put another way, the existing person experiences the perception of himself by the other and what is perceived is the expression of the person. As an experience of language, the meaning of the person is that of expressing self to other. In short, the experience of perception by the other person and expression by oneself is indistinguishable only by and to the other person. For the existing person, the experience of himself is mirrored in the experience of the other and as such is distinguishable to the person himself. The person who is the appearance of the other person is thereby constituted as a pre-conscious and immanent experience of himself.

The experience is pre-conscious because the appearance of the person as a subjectivity is apparent to the other person as the experience of subjectivity for himself. This
vertical experience of synchronic language is immanent as such for the other person who is not able to distinguish it as the perception of expression of the person as himself. The other person necessarily perceives in a person's language the immanent experience that makes the articulation a distinct expression of personal perception.

At the second level of analysis synchronic language can be reduced to an intentional object of experience for the other person. As such synchronic language is pre-reflective as an object in a person's vertical modality of existing. For, the combination of a person's perception with his expression in the form of synchronic language is a dialectic unity the force of an identity for the other person only. The expression and perception which a person lives in himself are manifest to the other person in language, yet the person himself is not able to distinguish his perception from his expression. Only the other person is able to separate the genetic experience which he perceives as constituting the subjectivity and objectivity of the person, that is, the person's conscious appearance.

There is a problem with synchronic language as a unity of perception and expression since the other person encounters a person's language in an active manner and makes it part of the person's modality of existing, but not a fact of his existence. On the other hand, the person himself experiences the passive reversibility of perception and expression in appearance. Yet, both persons can in using language reverse their interpersonal modalities of consciousness thus reconstituting their intrapersonal modality of experience. While this appears to be a point of contradiction, it is not as Merleau-Ponty first noted. Such an ambiguity merely defines the reversible situation in which a negative element encounters another such element and yet the conjunction has a positive character. The ambiguity is simply the interplay of the vertical and horizontal modalities which simultaneously are genetic and constitutive. We misunderstand the dialectic in trying to locate a single modality for our analysis by imposing
an analytic division on a phenomenological situation.

As a pre-reflective object for the person, synchronic language is—to use an anthropologic metaphor—a sediment of speech as expressing. This is to say, the experience a person has of expressing himself is the generation of a living meaning. It is a participation in language as an interpersonal consciousness and experience of the other person. At this hermeneutic level, expressing is the consciousness of subjectivity through intersubjectivity.

This is, to put it another way, the living experience of the phenomenological fact that "I" generate the "me" which is constituted as "you" for the other person. A person's subjectivity is constituted in the intersubjectivity of the other person who also lives as a subjectivity (a "me") within his own objectivity (a "you") which is both himself (an "I") and the person "I" am (a "me" as "you"). This dialectic state of here and now is the active experience of the other person which constitutes an absence of the other to other. Put more precisely, the hermeneutic reflection teaches us that the living subjectivity of a person is the absence which is manifest to another person whose own subjectivity is generated as that absent objectivity. This is to say, for the existing person the "I" is the mark of absence for "me," yet it is manifest to another person as his existence, his "me" (the first person's "you") which in turn is his existing appearance as his "I".

DIACHRONIC LANGUAGE. Just as every person lives in a language community of other people that represents a certain state of social discourse, so each person is simultaneously experiencing the institutional force of language which is what I call diachronic language. The institutional nature of diachronic language is precisely its cultural value as a context or situation traditionally used for interpretation. The diachronic norm is a measure of language now in comparison to language used previously—which is itself the possibility of language in future usage. Hence, the diachronic use of language captures
the horizontal modality of existence in juxtaposition to synchronic language which encloses the vertical modality of existing. Diachronic language as a motif of existence indicates the expression of the person as an object to another person. As a description of consciousness the person embodied in his consciousness and perception is not distinguishable to the other person. The inability of the other to penetrate beyond the objectivity which is the person present to him is the conscious disclosure that the person exists as an appearance to him. The person's perception is simply consciousness of self by self and expression is no less than the experience of self to self. The person is fundamentally incapable of distinguishing himself from the object present to the other. Hence, the person knows himself as the other knows him, that is, as an appearance. As such the person is pre-conscious in his own experience which is also transcendent to his consciousness. This is to say, the person is pre-conscious inasmuch as he is able to be the reflective object only for the other person. The person in his subjectivity is thereby transcendent in his objectivity to the other person.

The experience of diachronic language is reducible to a person's consciousness of the intentional object in which language forms the reflective object of the other person. Diachronic language is such a reflective object insofar as the other person is able to perceive it as the expression of a person's objectivity in general for others. Hence, the intentional object is reflective by force of the dialectic reversibility which the other person experiences in the process of his perception which is the translation of a person's expression. Conversely, the other person's expression is a translation of the person's manifest perception.

The level of meaning for diachronic language, therefore, is the reversibility of experience which the other brings to bear upon the perception of self by self and the expression of self to self that is the objectivity present to the other. The lived meaning of this modality of existence in
diachronic language is a sediment of speech which is the
experience of expression. Not expressing, but the passive
process which is expectation for the other as only expression.
In short, expression is the person manifest as object to the
other person. Obviously, the manifestation is language it-
self, yet language with its diachronic value of being there
and then by its appearing reference. This hermeneutic level
of experience for expression as diachronic language is an
interpersonal dimension. It is through the necessary con-
stitution of the other person that a person is an object
to himself. In other words, the hermeneutic of expression
is the experience by the other person of the objectivity
of the person. The other's consciousness is an appearance
of a "myself" which is pre-reflectively the "I" that is
the person himself. In short, the experience of expression
is the other person's consciousness of the objectivity it-
self, that is, of the person's appearance as other. This
consciousness of the other for other is the presence of
the object of a person himself and the object of the other
person. This precisely the person's appearance there and
then as a person.

THE DIALECTIC MOVEMENT OF EXPRESSION. Synchronic and
diachronic language are the dialectic poles of expression
which are manifest constituents of a person's vertical
experience of existing or his horizontal experience of
existence. Synchronic language is pre-conscious and im-
manent experience, hence indicative of a person's pre-
reflective consciousness of the identity inherently gen-
erated in the perception and expression of oneself as a
person. This pre-reflective object which is synchronic
language constitutes the subjectivity of a person for an-
other person. That is, language in its synchronic dis-
position articulates the subjectivity of a person to an-
other person therein constituting the interpersonal level
of meaning. The dialectic of meaning at the inter-
personal level is the living experience which presents the
subject of personal experience as the objectivity which is
the absence lived by another person. That is, the subject-
ivity of one person is taken as the dialectic completion of another person by uniting the first person's subjectivity with the second person's objectivity. The dialectic of expression, then, is in one perspective the union of what is vertical appearance in one person with what is horizontal appearance in another. Such is the vertical dialectic of existing in expression as synchronic language. The dialectic movement allows for the emergence of the person from among other people as an expressing consciousness able to be experienced by others.

At the diachronic level of language, the person is an object to the other person. The person in his subjectivity is necessarily pre-conscious and transcendent, thus a reflective object of a person's consciousness. The reflective object is generated by the reversibility of perception and expression of the subjective person as appearing to the other person. This is another way of saying that the level of meaning in diachronic language is the reversibility of perception and expression which translate one another for the other person alone. As such, meaning is a sediment of speech as an appearance that is fixed in expression by being the object perceptible to another person, yet constitutive of the very person who expresses to the other. The dialectic meaning is thus the expressing of oneself to another in one's subjectivity by the objectivity of meaning which alone can be expressive.

The hermeneutic experience of expression then comes to be strictly interpersonal and constitutive of a person's other for the other, or objectivity for another subjectivity. This is to say, the objectivity of the person who is present to the other person is present as an other person from himself. That is, he is present in appearance and present as an objective other to his own living subjectivity. Expression is therefore the horizontal existence of a person as the passive object of appearing to another person. Expression is the force of diachronic language as the sediment of speech, as the meaning or sense received there and then in consciousness.

Phenomenological existence as a living experience is embodied in the phenomena of communication as the dialectic of speaking and speech acts. This is to say, the vertical or genetic experience of speaking and the horizontal or constitutive experience of speech acts together constitute communication. And, it is a person's consciousness of living and the lived in direct relation to other persons. As such, communication comes to constitute the history which is a person and his consciousness of other's experience.

SPEAKING. A person's vertical modality of existing in communication is the experience of speaking. This uttering experience is the modality of existing in which the person lives as a subjectivity to himself, yet is also a subjectivity for the other person as well. This relationship of a person and another person through one subjectivity means that in perception the encounter of a person by another is the same encounter that the person has with himself. Likewise, in expression the subjectivity which expresses the person is also the subjectivity which is expressive to the other person. Perception and expression in this dimension are only distinguishable by and to the other person. The other is able to separate the perceiving subject from the experience of subjectivity in the person, while the person himself apprehends only his subjectivity, but not his separate appearances as perception and expression. For the person, then, the experiences of perception and expression as speaking are pre-conscious and immanent. Speaking is pre-conscious because it is only appearance, the probable and possible experience to be lived, yet not distinguishable to the person in the vertical modality of his living. And, speaking is immanent because it is given to the person as such. Speaking is contingent on the other person for meaning as a living experience, yet it thereby constitutes the ground of meaning for the person.

Speaking thus comes to constitute a pre-reflective object of a person's consciousness; it is properly the
intentional object of the reduction to consciousness. For the articulating person expression is perception and conversely within the intentional object. Speaking is the identity of appearance that the person lives and which the other can recognize as being lived in the person. The expressing appearance generates expression and the perceiving appearance generates perception whereby both appearances constitute an identity of consciousness of oneself and the other.

The level of meaning which characterizes speaking is a living meaning in contradistinction to lived meaning. Speaking is the being of speech which generates the experience of communicating. The experience is active and determining of the process surrounding the person as his consciousness of self engagement among others. Put another way, speaking is a person communicating wherein that communicating manifests the sense of self existence which can only be called a person existing. At this hermeneutic level of analysis, the communicating act of speaking is an intrapersonal definition of existing; it is the vertical being and consciousness as one person. Speaking means no less than the phenomenological truth that a person lives the articulated reality that "I" am "me." In speaking there is no arbitrary distinction between the "I" and "me" which properly constitutes the verbal modality of being a person. There is only the consciousness of a person being absent to himself, that is, the genetic consciousness that is not yet constituted as experience.

The absence is the consciousness of the active force of speaking, of encountering oneself here and now. There is no possibility of being an object to oneself as one might be to another person, for in that case one would be the object person—the constituting speech act that is available to the other as well as to oneself. This absence as the consciousness of speaking is the experience of self to self which has no presence, no objectivity to oneself. In this sense, existing as manifest in speaking is an objective absence to the person. For the person, speaking is simply consciousness of living in a particular style which
is communicating.

**SPEECH ACTS.** Communication, as opposed to communicating, is the horizontal modality of existence which is the experience of the speech act by which a person is himself the object of meaning and the meaning to the other person. At the descriptive level of phenomenological analysis, the speech act enables a person to perceive the other person. This is to say, the speech act allows the person to experience his own objectivity in the same way that the other person does. The corresponding situation exists for expression in which the person expresses his objectivity as the other person would express the first person's objectivity. In short, perception and expression of the person as the speech act are the generation of an object as the person and it is this same object which is present to the other person.

Necessarily, the speech act dimensions of perception and expression are distinguishable by and to the person alone. Only he is able to distinguish the objectivity which he is for himself and the objectivity which he is for the other. In other words, the essence of the speech act experience is **conscious** and **transcendent** to the person alone. Only the person experiences his own objectivity as consciousness and yet that consciousness is transcendent as an experiencible object for the other person. The speech act is a conscious experience of appearance which carries the horizontal modality of existence as accessible to the person and the other alike. Also, the speech act is transcendent inasmuch as the object of consciousness, the speech act experience itself, is for the person and the other the mutual existence which completes the individual existing by constituting it.

The speech act in this developing context is a **reflective** object of consciousness, as was alluded previously, because it is the constituted product of the person and the other in the process of translating perception into expression and visa versa. The speech act is the reflective act of translation of experience into consciousness and consciousness
back into experience. This translation process is a dialectic movement that has a meaning value as the reversibility of perception and expression which constitutes the object. That is, the speech act is mutually constitutive in use by the person and others. This lived meaning which is shared in the speech act is the being of speech which is communication. Communication is not the subjectivity of consciousness, but the objectivity which contains the passive modality of existence. Communication is the fixed experience whose hermeneutic designation is interpersonal meaning; it is encounter by exchange for people. Communication is the realization and lived experience of recognition that the speech act as such is the reversible experience which teaches the person that "I" am a "you" for the other person. This is to suggest that the person experiences in communication the presence of his self for the other. The speech act as communication is the objectivity lived by the person as an appearance of objectivity available to the other person. The speech act is the horizontal relationship between a person and another which is lived, which is the passive consciousness of appearance located there and then. It is the fixed object of experience that was previously the living experience of speaking. The speech act is the passive being of speech communication which is the horizontal modality of existence.

THE DIALECTIC MOVEMENT OF COMMUNICATION. The vertical and horizontal modalities of communication which I have labelled speaking and the speech act reflect two dimensions of experience for the person and others. As a subjectivity the person is essentially pre-conscious and immanent in his experience of being. His speaking generates a pre-reflective object of consciousness for himself and the other person. The speaking experience constitutes the being of speech which is manifest in the active process of communicating. The communicating process is thereby an identity of perception and expression that is available to the person and the other. It is active process of the intrapersonal realization of the existing consciousness of self to self. That is, the active experience which is the awareness that
"I" am "me" and that neither dimension is distinguishable from the other for another person. Hence, speaking is the vertical modality of existing that is always a subjectivity to oneself and always an absence of the available objectivity in appearance that the other experiences of one as a person.

In the objectivity dimension of being a person, communication is manifest as the speech act. Such an act is essentially conscious and transcendent for the person and for other persons. The speech act constitutes a conscious experience because it is the reflective objectivity of a person's experience as constituted by the reversibility of one's perception and expression. The speech act is in fact the translation that interacts between perception and expression for oneself and the other alike. Put another way, the speech act is the passive process of communication that is properly interpersonal experience or meaning. The mutual exchange of the person with another person is the existence of self for the other. The exchange is the encounter of one's presence which is lived as the horizontal mode of existence. The encounter is between the reflecting consciousness and the experience of oneself which is there and then in constitution. The passive person that one sees as the objectivity of himself and which others also experience as such is a meaning constituted in the speech act. Communication is thus the objectivity manifest in the opposition between the communicating person and others in the dialectic subjectivity of phenomenological existence.

III. The Dialectic Critique.

The present phenomenological analysis yields several conclusions about the nature of existence in relation to communication. However, the fundamental ground of phenomenological existence and communication revealed by the analysis is the synergism which is captured in both and which is definitive of both. First, there is the synergism of the vertical and the horizontal modalities of existence.
Second, there is the synoptic style present in the vertical mode alone. And third, their is the synoptic mode of the horizontal alone.

The inclusive synergism illustrates the unity of phenomenological existence and communication which combines living and the lived consciousness as a person's experience of being. It is a unity of process and situation that brings the pre-conscious and conscious together as a person's consciousness. There is in this realization the unification of the immanent and transcendent dimensions of consciousness which is the interpersonal experience that inhabits a person and is shared with the other. The unity of consciousness as absence and presence constitutes the interpersonal appearance of a person and others. It is this consciousness which constitutes their history.

Finally, there is the unity of the pre-reflective and the reflective movement which is the simultaneous intrapersonal, yet intersubjective conscious experience of people as a genetic history, that is, as inhabiting a common world.

The second conclusion as to the synoptic nature of the vertical modality manifests the person as a subjectivity from an interpersonal point of view, yet as just a person whose intrapersonal nature is not divisible into subjective and objective dimensions. The vertical style of being for the person is the unity of the living, pre-conscious, immanent, absence, and pre-reflective consciousness experienced in silence, synchronic language and speaking. On the other hand, the synopsis of the horizontal modality points to the third conclusion that the person is an objectivity from the interpersonal perspective, yet not distinguishable as such from the intrapersonal point of view. Such an objectivity is the unity of the lived, the conscious, the transcendent, the presence, and the reflective consciousness experienced in thought, diachronic language, and the speech act.

Yet, the synergism of the synoptic elements as noted thus far is only a unity, only the passive dimension of the vertical and horizontal experience that is properly phenomenological existence as being there and then. The dialectic completion of the synergism is its reversibility
which I have called communication. The synergism as reversibility indicates the constant exchange and encounter of the intrapersonal and interpersonal modes of existence which yield perception and expression as styles of each other. This reversibility allows the dialectic integration and completion of perception as silence and thought; the constitution of expression which is synchronic and diachronic language enveloping each other; and, the genetic fulfillment of communication as such in speaking and the speech act. This dialectic critique indicates, finally, that the unity and reversibility that constitute the original ambiguity of existing are the product of consciousness and experience as the completion, yet the ground of each other. Consciousness as the genetic unity—and experience as the constitutive reversibility of the vertical and horizontal modalities—discloses the person as the origin and history of the perceiving perception, the expressing expression, and the communicating communication. How then do words relate to the world? Words are the articulated embodiment of the person and his lived-reality.
FOOTNOTES


