ABSTRACT
              The ethnic identification and political attitudes of
"mejicano" youth in San Antonio, Texas were examined during Spring
1973. The affect or attachment levels for various types of political
leaders, as well as for the President and the policeman, were
determined. Respondents were 170 "mejicano" students in the 7th, 9th,
and 12th grades. A questionnaire, which replicated other data sets to
facilitate comparability, was designed to tap (1) ethnic
identification with 4 elements considered to be integral
characteristics of the "mejicano" culture--language, contact with
Mexico, cuisine, and folk medicine; and (2) the respondents'
attitudes toward ethnic separation. Some findings were: (1) overall,
a strong sense of ethnic identification continued to govern the life
styles of "mejicanos" in San Antonio; (2) the language, way of life,
traditions, and social interaction favored the persistence of the
ethnic factor; (3) there was no discernable ideological preference in
the affect or attachment choices, nor did there seem to be much
support for Spanish surnamed leaders on the basis of their ethnicity;
and (4) the range of awareness of political leaders was rather
narrow. (NQ)

Ethnic Identification AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES
AMONG MEJICANO YOUTH
IN SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS


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# "ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

## AMONG MEJICANO YOUTH IN

## SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS"

## Introduction

In the years since Hyman[1] first assembled much of
the literature dispersed throughout the social sciences
on political socialization, political scientists have
struggled with the problem of formulating hypotheses,
paradigms, and methodologies which would place the
ancient concept of citizenship in a contemporary frame-
work. The list of scholars is indeed long,[2] representing
a myriad of scholarly perspectives and interests as to
the proper study of the process by which new members
are introduced into the political system of society and
how they are inculcated with reinforcing values to pro-
vide, at minimum, "diffuse" support for the system.

Although debates have flourished as to how poli-
tical scientists should study the political socialization
process, one conclusion has received general acceptance,
as Greenberg succinctly states: ". . . Most scholars
concluded that the American political system was charac-
terized by rather high levels of supportive attitudes

and these attitudes were widely and homogeneously distributed."[3] The scholars who quickly established themselves as authorities stressed the presence of positive affect toward the political system and its political authority figures.[4] Such an inclusive generalization was destined to be challenged. Indeed, other, less established authorities, re-examined the conclusion, particularly in light of the national events of the late 1960's, and came to the modest conclusion that "there is reason to suspect . . . that supportive attitudes in America are not as homogeneously distributed as these works would lead us to believe."[5]

The basic problem with much of the work in political socialization had been that the studies which outlined the major perimeters of knowledge of the process had been based on responses of white, middle class children-- a shortcoming recognized by some.[6] As a result, conclusions based on samples from one population could hardly apply to another population, specifically the non-white, lower SES youth groups. Subsequent studies have made quite clear the need for limiting conclusions to that sample and the population for whom they apply.[7]

One point has been made abundantly clear: before a
sound body of knowledge of political socialization can
be developed, samples need to be varied and studies
replicated--and refined--in order better to understand
the process by which societal members become "good"
citizens.

This paper is first an effort to help in the diver-
sification of samples studied in the field of political
socialization, and, secondly, probably to add to the
confusion. The report is based upon data collected
from mejicano children in San Antonio, Texas. Several
justifications can be posited for the study of this
group. First, is the worn out explanation that mejicanos
of U.S. citizenship make up the second largest ethnic
group in the country. Second, and more importantly, is
the fact that the mejicano population has tenaciously
held on to many of its cultural values in spite of the
social pressures applied by the dominant culture.[8] The
tenacity of the ethnic culture would lead to the suspicion
that distinctive styles of political socialization, re-
flected by political orientations, may exist and are
worth examining. Finally, investigation of the impact

of ethnic identification upon the style of political socialization is in order. The study is designed to explain whether or not children who closely identify with the mejicano culture differ in their attitudes toward the political system from those children who are in the process of acculturation and/or assimilation.

## Ethnicity and Political Socialization

That ethnicity plays a persistent role in American politics has been well argued. Litt maintains that, although the country's political culture is highly inclusive, "ethnic forces play a surprising persistent role in our politics."[9] One of the assumptions made about ethnic politics, primarily that ethnicity is a short-lived phenomenon eliminated by assimilation and acculturation, has been questioned. Handlin suggests that ethnic orientations fade by the third generation.[10] Political scientists have tended to follow the thesis. Dahl, for example, proposed his unidimensional hypothesis of ethnic politics. He maintains that, ethnic groups pass through three stages on their way to political assimilation.[11]

The first stage is characterized by low socio-economic status. Ethnic members are almost exclusively proletarian and highly homogeneous. They depend on other ethnics for leadership, and generally some as subleaders. The group's cultural similarity is associated with similar political orientations, attitudes, and behavior. Political homogeneity is associated with socio-economic homogeneity.[12]

In the second stage the group becomes more heterogeneous in socio-economic status. Portions of the group begin to rise into the middle class. As a result, they become more politically sophisticated and challenge successfully incumbent leaders.[13]

In the third and final stage, the group becomes highly heterogeneous. Large segments become assimilated, and ethnicity becomes embarrassing or meaningless. Political attitudes become a function of the adoption of middle-class values, and the effectiveness of a purely ethnic appeal is negligible.[14]

Dahl's hypothesis suffers from several limitations. First, the "withering away" of the ethnic factor is

suspect in every Presidential election where candidates are seen "politiking" in ethnic communities, partaking of distinctive foods, languages, and dance. Second, Parenti has presented some research indicating that ethnic values seem to survive the effects of social mobility.[15] Third, the linear developmental model manifests a rigidity which cannot explain the dynamic nature of the ethnic factor in real politics. Hawkins and Lorinskas collected a number of studies which question the dominant hypothesis. They provide evidence that "ethnic communities and identifications remain, and continue to affect political life . . . ."[16]

Among those who have studied the mejicanos political style in depth, the distinctiveness of the group has been documented.[17] There is little doubt that the mejicano has historically played a special role in the political process. If there is any one term which could describe the role, it would be "peripheral." Several causal theories have been proposed to explain the marginal political role of the group.[18]

Until very few years ago, the mejicano was generally characterized as a socio-political "sleeping giant,"

or a "forgotten" American with much of the onus placed
on the group itself for its political non-entity.
However, as Acuña points out, the history of the _meji-_
_cano_ is replete with events wherein the group has mani-
fested its political power, although not always through
the ballot. The fact that such events have been gener-
ally ignored by social historians and scientists has
overshadowed the actualities. However, the lack of
political opportunity comensurate with the potential
strength of the group had relegated the group to its
marginal position in the political system. The _mejicano_
has not enjoyed the developmental successes outlined by
Dahl and applicable to other ethnics, although the
_mejicano_ outdates all other ethnics with the exception
of the indigenous groups. _Mejicanos_ have begun to make
inroads into the middle stream of political life only
within the last few decades. As socio-economic oppor-
tunities increase or the yoke of colonialism is removed,
whichever theory seems the most plausible, the group is
exerting political influence.

A word of caution should be expressed. The style
of _mejicano_ politics may be quite different from that

which is generally perceived, despite the impact of ethnicity, the adoption of at least some of the dominant political culture's values, and the increasing opportunities toward full political participation. One other purpose for this study is to begin to investigate whether the political orientations of _mejicano_ youth may contain clues as to the political style of these future ethnic political participants. Their affective orientations toward political authority figures and their cognitive knowledge of the political system should provide some insight as to the prospects for continued political participation and the prospects for continued diffuse support for the political system.

## Data Base and Methodology

The data used for this study were collected during Spring, 1973, in San Antonio, Texas. Because of its prominent location in the state, and as the nerve center for the Urban Chicano Movement in Texas, it is assumed that much of what may be evolving in the movement would be reflected in the orientations of _Mejicano_ youth. Second, the city provides an environment in which intra-group differences are likely to be manifested.

Social observers of the group stress its heterogeneity
in terms of differential social, economic, and politi-
cal circumstances. San Antonio mirrors much of the
diversity found among the mejicanos. Evidence on this
point is available from the work done by the Mexican
American Study Project (MASP) of the University of
California.[19] The study included surveys and analyses
of Los Angeles and San Antonio. The comparison reveals
why a mejicano culture seems more likely to exist in San
Antonio than in any other city.

The economic structure of San Antonio lends itself
to the development of a distinctive mejicano group life.
While Los Angeles has become industrialized and diversi-
fied, San Antonio has primarily relied upon tourism,
regional commerce, and military bases. This has tended
to produce an occupational structure leading to social
and economic isolation and subordination of the mejicano
population. The MASP researchers emphasized the heavy
over-representation of mejicanos in service jobs which

> share one feature: Employees must
> express deference to the customer,
> who is more often than not an Anglo;
> and in San Antonio he is often a
> Texan visiting the Alamo, symbol of

Mexico's defeat. Such occupations
contrast sharply with those in
which the Mexican American is one
among many who has no direct con-
tact with others. On an assembly
line . . . deference is generally
expected only in relation to the
foreman. Thus the history of the
two cities suggests not only iso-
lation but also a distinctive
style of inter-action between mino-
rity and dominant group members.
The occupational milieu of San
Antonio is far more likely to perpe-
trate an etiquette of dominance and
subordination than the more indus-
trialized world of present-day Los
Angeles.[20]

Thus, the style of economic interaction between Anglos

and mejicanos in San Antonio seems likely to enhance

ethnic distinctiveness rather than promoting assimila-

tion and acculturation.

Second, the social composition of San Antonio seems

likely to produce and perpetuate a duo-culture. The

main point is that San Antonio lacks the ethnic hetero-

geneity characteristic of a city like Los Angeles. The

MASP group concluded that

since 1920, in San Antonio, Mexicans
have been the largest foreign population
and Mexican Americans the largest mino-
rity population, next to which all

others are insignificant. San Antonio
has almost no distinctive ethnic areas
outside of its Mexican "West Side";
there is no Negro Watts, Jewish Fairfax,
Little Tokyo, or other ethnic shopping
and residential centers. In Los Angeles,
on the other hand, Mexican Americans
have been one among foreign and minority
populations.[21]

It would be expected that the lack of ethnic heterogeneity

in San Antonio would lead to group solidarity in the face

of such clear-cut cleavages as evidenced by the high

degree of neighborhood segregation found in San Antonio.

The MASP group found that, according to the 1960 census,

more than half the mejicanos in San Antonio were living

in census tracts that were more than three-quarters

mejicano, as compared to only 10 percent living in

such tracts in Los Angeles.[22] Today, the same resi-

dential patterns exist, although there is some move-

ment away from the traditionally labeled "West Side."

This is more a result of the need for space than a

product of assimilation or acculturation.

In sum, the mejicano in San Antonio is characterized

by economic and social subordination and geographic iso-

lation. These factors seem likely to produce cultural

variations between and among groups.

The data to be discussed are based on a sample
of 170 mejicano public school students (grades 7, 9, and
12). The respondents are from an availability sample
from the Edgewood Independent School District. Selec-
tion of individual respondents was arranged by the coun-
seling staff with administrative approval according to
general guidelines concerning age, sex, and grade dis-
tribution. The loss of control of the nature of the
sample is regretted, but this was the only viable
method of selection. Thus, the limitations such a pro-
cedure places upon the generality of the findings are
recognized.

The construction of the questionnaire deliberately
replicates other data sets to facilitate comparability.
A number of new questions were designed, particularly
those which tap ethnic identification. These specific
questions dealt with four elements considered to be
integral characteristics of the mejicano culture--
language, contact with Mexico, cuisine, and folk medi-
cine. Each of the elements, in turn, when combined,
form much of the values, norms, mores, and traditions
of the ethnic group. A second group of items was in-

troduced which would compliment the ethnicity elements.
These questions attempt to tap the attitudes of the
respondents toward ethnic separation. The underlying
assumption behind this group is that the extent of
desired separatism from other social or ethnic groups
would indicate the prospects for ethnic heterogeneity
in the city, or the strength of a group sense among
the mejicano.

Finally, a comparison will be made of the respon-
dents' attitudes toward political authority figures as
exemplified by the two most extreme authority figures
in the political system--the President and the police-
man. Both figures are considered to be the most
visible representatives of the political system. The
validity of the hypothesis is substantiated when consi-
deration is given to the media coverage commanded by
the presidency and the patrol tactics of local law
enforcement agencies. Each figure is the most visible
to most people, even among the very young.

## Findings

The first of the elements treats attachment to the
Spanish language. No attempt was made to distinguish

between the purer form of Spanish a student would encounter in school and the Spanish which has evolved in the culture of the Southwest. The decision to leave the element ambiguous is intended to allow the respondent to perceive the question within his own framework, since he encounters both forms of the language in every-day experiences. The results are presented in Table II. In response to the question about the desirability of mejicano children studying Spanish in school, 60 percent answered in the affirmative, while the remainder disagreed. The difference between those who agreed and those who disagreed may be due to the fact that the more formal Spanish taught in the schools does not compliment the language spoken in the barrios. This speculative conclusion is reinforced by the subsequent question. When asked if they listened to Spanish-language radio, nearly 80 percent replied they indeed did. This impressive figure would tend to indicate that verbal communication is preferred, particularly since most Spanish-language radio stations in the city broadcast in the Spanish of the region. Only one of the radio stations broadcasts in what has been referred

to as the formal Spanish. The third and final item asked the respondents how well they read and wrote Spanish. Two-thirds responded they could do both, although 47 percent said "with difficulty." One-third replied they could do neither. Again, this is most likely a reflection of the lack of reading and writing ability of formal Spanish taught in the schools. The strong endorsement and use of the language would seem to indicate that the prospects of rejecting it as an impediment to social mobility are minimal. However, what will continue to emerge will be a distinctive language unique to the group and used as a medium for verbal communication rather than written, and continually adapting to changes within the group. It is impossible to project how the adaptive process will affect the value-laden nature of the language.

The second set of items attempted to determine the degree of contact with elements associated with the Mexican culture. The geographical location of San Antonio facilitates recurrent contact with Mexico, its people and culture. At worst, even with the energy conservation measures imposed on highway travelers, Mexico is

approximately three hours and a couple of six packs
away! Thus, the proximity to Mexico, and for that
matter the entire area to the south of San Antonio
offers genuine contact with this social and cultural
life. The hypothesis is substantiated by the responses
to a question which asked if the respondents ever went
to Mexico. Over 60 percent responded in the affirma-
tive. A subsequent question asked why they went to
Mexico. The vast majority indicated for pleasure and
visiting relatives or both as their reasons.

Two other items were introduced to tap ethnicity.
While not entirely crucial to ethnic identification,
they do indicate the extent of tradition and lore.
When asked whether they nourished themselves with
Mexican cuisine, over 60 percent responded they did
on a daily basis. An additional 20 percent said they
did too but not as frequently. The response pattern
seems significant since only 6 percent of the MASP
sample indicated that Mexican food, music, and art
were elements of the culture which should be preserved.
This, in practice, is not occurring. The second item
dealt with the visibility and cognition of <u>curanderas</u>

and _curanderos_. Of all the elements of the culture,
the practice of folk medicine has dissipated rather
drastically. Often associated with illiteracy and
superstition, the _mejicano_ has increasingly abandoned
consultation with _curanderos_ and _curanderas_ as other
values and norms have been adopted. Therefore, the
intent of the question was to determine the residual
influence of this element of the culture. While the
percentage indicating involvement with this aspect of
the culture is much lower, a substantial portion of
the sample was aware of these practitioners.

The second set of ethnicity questions were designed
to tap social distance. In general, the findings reveal
a preference for group-specific relationships. When
asked the ethnic-racial background of their best friend,
over 90 percent indicated _mejicanos_. It was anticipated
that high ethnic identification might be associated with
desire for group separatism. Table III presents the
responses from this series. When compared with Black
youth it appears that _mejicano_ youth indicated more
separatist responses. A greater desire for more segre-
gated neighborhoods and for more control of economic and

educational institutions was recorded. No doubt,

ethnic distinctiveness is a potential causal factor

for the attitudes reflected by the responses to the

items, however, the responses may also be a product of

the social and economic isolation of the _mejicano_ in

the city.

Overall, it is apparent that a strong sense of

ethnic identification continues to govern the life

styles of _mejicanos_ in San Antonio. The language, way

of life, traditions, and social interaction favor the

persistence of the ethnic factor.

## Affect for Political Authority Figures

As a means to relate ethnicity and the political

world, questions were designed to determine the affect

or attachment levels for various types of political

leaders, as well as affect for the President and the

policeman.

Table IV contains a list of a conglomerate of

political leader types. The list includes what would

normally be labeled as "liberal" and "conservative"

leaders, and a mixture of racial and ethnic leaders.

Several patterns were sought. First, the range of
awareness of political leaders. Second, the possi-
bility of ideological preference in the choice
patterns. Third, the extent of awareness of leaders
of the Chicano Movement, and the extent to which they
might prefer these over the more establishment type
leaders. To reiterate, the questionnaire was admini-
stered before the Watergate Affair and its aftermath.
Responses to national figures are not tainted by
those events.

As to awareness, it seems apparent that most poli-
tical leaders do not make a heavy cognitive imprint for
most of the respondents. Scanning the middle column
makes that clear. Of all the leaders, the late J.F.
Kennedy is the most familiar. Only about 8 percent
were not aware of the late president. The next most
familiar leader is Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez (D)
of the 20th Congressional District (part of which in-
cludes the area where most of the respondents reside.)
Only 17 percent were not cognizant of this leader. In
third place is President Nixon. Twenty percent (20%)
did not recognize the name. Among the Spanish-surnamed
leaders, Reis Lopez Tijerina, of Alianza fame, was the

least recognized. "Corky" Gonzales of Denver,
Colorado, follows close behind with a 65 percent una-
wareness score. Ceasar Chavez follows the congress-
man as the most familiar leader.

As to the matter of ideological preferences in
the affect choices, the data are not quite clear. The
two polar responses involve a high negative feeling for
President Nixon and a high positive affect for the late
J.F. Kennedy. Fifty-three percent (53%) would like to
be "very much unlike" President Nixon, while 63 percent
would like to be "very much like" Kennedy. There is
also some trace of negative affect for the conserva-
tives, Governor Dolph Briscoe, Senator John Tower,
Governor Ronald Reagan, and ex-Vice-President Spiro
Agnew. After Nixon, Agnew was the least liked, followed
by Governor Briscoe. However, it should be noted that
George McGovern is almost as much disliked as the state's
governor, and Ralph Nader rivals Senator John Tower.
It would be a mistake to impute any high ideological
perspective to these responses given the picture of
adult ideological capabilities drawn by the Michigan
Survey Research Center.[23]

Among the Spanish-surnamed leaders there does not
appear to be any significant discrepancy in responses
to the "very much unlike" option. Dislike for the
Spanish-surnamed leaders ranges from 7.6 to 10.8 percent.
Gutierrez, of the Raza Unida Party, is the least dis-
liked and Senator Montoya (D., N.M.) the most disliked.
As mentioned previously, the most liked Spanish sur-
named leader is Congressman Gonzalez, followed by
Gutierrez and Chavez. Compared to the responses to
J.F.K., it seems there is no.set of Spanish-surnamed
leaders who are especially dear to the respondents.
Even the dramatic exposure of Chavez on the national
level and Gutierrez on the local level do not seem to
have made a significant cognitive imprint on the group.
Any generalities concerning ideological or ethnic pre-
ferences would be difficult to substantiate. What does
seem to emerge is one specific element of the culture--
machismo. Ranking the most liked leaders indicates
that at the top of the list is J.F. Kennedy, followed
by Gonzalez, King, McGovern, Gutierrez, and Chavez.
This may be due to simply the visibility of these
leaders, but another explanation may be possible. A

cursory analysis of the character of these leaders reveals that they have fought successful battles against great odds. Kennedy's catholocism, Gonzalez's ethnicity, King's race, Gutierrez's radicalism, and Chavez's persistence indicate great courage to challenge dominant values and unpopular views. In other words, tienen huevos. Although it is dangerous to posit as a reason, the venacular, their manliness cannot be discounted. It would seem plausible that mejicanos will grant positive affect to individuals who project an image of courage regardless of the ethnic and racial background. Such a proposition would substantiate the observations and conclusions of those who have studied the culture. Machismo has and continues to have an impact upon the values and norms of the group. A cue is probably hidden somewhere in this speculation for those who seek elective public office. In brief, affect for political leaders may be directly associated with a particular image projected by the leader. Obviously, this hypothesis requires further examination.

## Responses to Political Authority Figures

One area which has dominated the concern of poli-

tical socialization is the response to political authority
figures. Easton and Dennis noted the tendency of chil-
dren to cognize what they called the head and tail of
the political system--the President and the policeman.[24]
Normally, children will manifest a high positive affect
for these two figures. An inference made from this
finding is that children will view the entire system
in the same light. The generality of the findings has
been brought into question. Jaros, et. al., for example,
found that the level of affect was not nearly so high
among a sample of poverty children from Appalachia.[25]
Similar findings have been recorded from samples of
Black children.[26] It would seem beneficial to examine
the orientations among mejicano youth toward these two
focal figures.

Table V records the responses of the sample's
attitudes toward the President and the policeman. For
comparison, the Easton-Hess eight city survey findings
are included.

Three qualities which seem to influence children's
affect for political authority are benevolence, depen-
dability, and power.[27] It is expected that children

would be favorably disposed toward an authority who would respond to their needs, keep his promises, and have the ability to enforce his will through the employment of sanctions. Easton and Dennis found that their sample overwhelmingly viewed the focal political authority figures positively. Utilizing the same qualities, the responses of the mejicano youth reveal some significant differences.

As to the President, most were either neutrally disposed toward this figure's benevolence or outright negative about it. Nearly one-third thought the President would "sometimes want to help them if they needed it," and 42 percent felt he would either almost never want to help or would never want to do so. Only about 25 percent were positively disposed. The Easton-Hess study indicated that 54 percent of white children were positively disposed and only 8 percent were negatively disposed. This finding tends to correlate with the findings on awareness of political leaders. There, President Nixon was the most disliked leader on the list. It could be that the mejicano youth were reacting to the personality in the office, and not the office itself.

There appears to be a lack of conceptualization for the institution of the Presidency. The results could have been quite different if J.F. Kennedy, or someone like him, would be in the Oval Office. To impute that feelings toward the President will parallel feelings for the system seems to be on precarious ground, at least among the mejicano.

The President does not fare well with the two other qualities. In terms of dependability, about the same proportion, 22 percent, feel positively disposed. This segment feels the President will almost always or always keep his promises. Thirty-three percent (33%) are negatively disposed, and the remainder, 44 percent, reacted neutrally. The differences between the white youth in the Easton-Hess sample and the mejicano youth in this study appear to be significant. Seventy-two percent (72%) of the white youth were positively dis-posed to the President's dependability and less than one percent (1%) were negatively disposed.

The last quality is that of power. Although cog-nitively, youth may not be able to perceive the opera-tional potential of power, they do comprehend the basic idea.[28] Among mejicano youth, 33 percent (33%) felt the

President could make either anyone or almost anyone do what he wants. This compares with 43 percent among white youth. At the other end of the scale, 28 percent of the _mejicanos_ were less convinced of the President's power. They thought he could make very few people do what he wants. Only 11 percent of the white youth were similarly disposed.

The second political authority figure, the policeman, ranks better than the President in all three qualities. The policeman is perceived as more benevolent, dependable, and as powerful. For example, 68 percent thought the policeman would almost always or always want to help, while 5 percent did not think so. Forty-one percent (41%) thought the policeman would keep his promises, while 11 percent thought he would not. Finally, 36 percent thought the policeman could make most people do what he wants, and 22 percent disagreed. One fairly obvious reason for the generally favorable disposition toward the policeman must be the socialization process in the schools. Without exception, public schools socialize students to view the police as an asset and essential segment of the

community. Apparently, this process is reinforced by the police, at least in San Antonio. It would seem possible to hypothesize that it is the policeman, the tail of the system, which has the greater impact generating support for the political system than the President. Since it has been generally accepted that the nature and type of contact people have with policemen will determine their attitude toward law enforcement, it is not unrealistic to expect those attitudes to apply to the political system.

## Conclusions

The items especially designed to tap ethnic identification revealed a strong sense of intra-group awareness. Besides continued use of Spanish or its regional derivative, and the contact with the people and culture of Mexico, it was interesting to find that even awareness of <u>curanderas</u> and <u>curanderos</u> was significant. The practice of folk medicine has declined with increasing education and acculturation, but the large proportion of respondents who know of these practitioners indicates that even the more peripheral elements of the mejicano culture continue to do well. These elements

of the culture produce other aspects which make up the mejicano culture in San Antonio and play an important role in the life-style of the group.

As a means to relate ethnicity to the political world, the study revealed several points of interest.

First, it was found that the range of awareness of political leaders is rather narrow. Most of them were unknown to most of the respondents. John F. Kennedy was the most familiar leader. He was followed by Congressman Gonzalez. Third ranked was President Nixon. That the Congressman was more often recognized implies at least two things. One, the Congressman has functioned skillfully as a representative of the district, and has contradicted the proposition that most people do not know their Congressman. Second, the political socialization process in the schools is not succeeding in transmitting cognitive knowledge of the President. All in all, most political leaders do not make a strong impact upon the group.

Second, there is no discernable ideological preference in the affect or attachment choices, nor does there seem to be much support for Spanish-surnamed

leaders on the basis of their ethnicity. A rather

tenuous speculation is that mejicano youth seem to

prefer leaders who project strong, forceful charac-

teristics and great quantities of self-determination.

These characteristics would also be essential in the

barrios in order to survive. Thus, the character of

life in these areas seems to color the perception of

leaders among mejicanos, and they would prefer a leader

who shares with them the same qualities they see as

important for life in the barrio.

Third, in terms of responses to political

authority figures, the President and the policeman, the

study found that the President is a poor representative

of the political system. Unlike the findings of the

Easton-Hess study, mejicano youth are not as positively

disposed toward the President as white youth. Of

interest here, however, is the possibility that meji-

cano youth demonstrate negative attitudes toward the

personality in the Oval Office, not the institution.

Their disaffection is aimed at President Nixon, not

the presidency. This hypothesis seems to be reinforced

by the data on political leaders. Nixon is the most

disliked leader, while Kennedy is the most liked.

It would seem plausible to expect entirely different

dispositions if a better-liked President were in office.

Therefore, to propose that attitudes toward the Presi-

dent will reflect attitudes toward the system seems

faulty in light of the lack of a sense of the institu-

tionalized presidency.

The policeman, on the other hand, is an anonymous,

impersonal figure who could be perceived within an insti-

tutionalized framework. Generalizations about his im-

pact as a representative of the system would be better

grounded. The tail of the system seems to generate

more supportive attitudes for the system than the head.

The implications of using this analogy are far from

clear. In any case, the type of contact people have

with law enforcement officials not only determines

their attitudes toward the police but possibly could

extend to the political system. If true, the political

socialization role of law enforcement agencies might

require more extensive analysis.

Table I
BREAKDOWN OF SAMPLE BY AGE, GRADE, AND SEX

| Age | Grade 7 Male % | Grade 7 Female % | Grade 9 Male % | Grade 9 Female % | Grade 12 Male % | Grade 12 Female % | NA % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12 | 35.3 | 64.7 (N=17) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| 13 | 65.0 | 35.0 (N=20) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| 14 | 57.1 | 42.9 (N-7) | 50.0 | 50.0 (N=14) | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| 15 | 66.7 | 33.3 (N=3) | 41.7 | 58.3 (N=24) | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| 16 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 (N=8) | 0.0 | 0.0 | |
| 17 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 50.0 | 50.0 (N=2) | 33.3 | 66.7 (N=9) | |
| 18 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 43.5 | 41.9 (N=62) | 14.5 |
| 19 | 0.0 | 100.0 (N=1) | 0.0 | 0.0 | 100.0 | 0.0 (N=1) | |
| | (Total N=48) | | (Total N=48) | | (Total N=72) | | |

## Table II
## RESPONSES TO ITEMS USED TO MEASURE ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION
## AMONG MEXICAN AMERICAN YOUTH

A. <u>Attitudes Towards Spanish Language</u>

Mexican American children should study Spanish

|  | % |
|---|---|
| Agree | 60.3 |
| Disagree | 39.7 |
|  | (N=131) |

Do you listen to Spanish radio?

|  | % |
|---|---|
| Yes | 79.0 |
| No | 21.0 |
|  | (N-143) |

Do you read and write Spanish?

|  | % |
|---|---|
| Yes, well | 19.2 |
| Yes, with difficulty | 47.3 |
| No | 33.6 |
|  | (N=146) |

B. <u>Association with Mexican Culture</u>

Do you know if there are any
curanderos in this city?

|  | % |
|---|---|
| Yes | 43.0 |
| No | 15.5 |
| Don't know | 41.5 |
|  | (N=142) |

How often does your mother cook
Mexican foods

|  | % |
|---|---|
| Every day | 60.6 |
| Once a week | 19.7 |
| Rarely | 19.0 |
| Never | 0.7 |
|  | (N=142) |

Do you ever go to Mexico?

|  | % |
|---|---|
| Yes | 64.3 |
| No | 35.7 |
|  | (N=140) |

Table II (Cont'd.)

C. Social Distance from Out-Groups

| Do you ever visit Anglos? | % |
|---|---|
| Yes | 62.6 |
| No | 37.4 |
| | (N=123) |

| Do you ever visit Blacks? | % |
|---|---|
| Yes | 47.5 |
| No | 52.5 |
| | (N=122) |

| How do you feel about having friends who have married Anglos? | % |
|---|---|
| Favor it | 30.6 |
| Don't care | 66.3 |
| Oppose it | 3.1 |
| | (N=98)* |

(*This question was preceded by a filter question:
"Do you have any Mexican American friends who are
married to Anglos?")

## Table III
### COMPARISON OF PERCENTAGE OF MEXICAN AMERICANS AND BLACKS INDICATING SEPARATIST ATTITUDES[a]

| | Mexican American % | Blacks % |
|---|---|---|
| What would you like your neighborhood to be like? | | |
| All Mexican American/Black | 25[b] | 8 |
| Mostly Mexican American/Black | 20 | 5 |
| Mixed | 40 | 48 |
| Don't know, other | 15 | 39 |
| | (N=170) | (N=362) |

| | Per Cent Agree | |
|---|---|---|
| | Mexican Americans | Blacks |
| Stores in Mexican American/Black areas should be owned by Mexican Americans/Blacks | 50 | 22 |
| Mexican American/Black schools should have mostly Mexican American/ Black teachers | 32 | 16 |
| Mexican Americans/Blacks should have nothing to do with Anglos/Whites | 29 | 14 |
| | (N=170) | (N=362) |

[a]The data on Blacks are derived from Angus Campbell and Howard Schuman, Racial Attitudes in Fifteen American Cities (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1968). The respondents in the 16-19 age group have been extracted for comparison with our sample.

[b]Percentages are rounded to whole numbers in this table to match the published Campbell-Schuman data.

## Table IV
## AFFECT FOR POLITICAL LEADERS
## AMONG MEXICAN AMERICAN YOUTH

Which of the following people would you most want to be like?

| Leader's Name | Very Much Like[a] | Somewhat Like | Don't Know | Somewhat Unlike | Very Much Unlike | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nixon | 2.2 | 11.5 | 20.1 | 12.9 | 53.2 | (N=139) |
| McGovern | 12.0 | 25.6 | 26.3 | 11.3 | 24.8 | (N=133) |
| M.L. King | 18.0 | 24.8 | 34.6 | 9.0 | 13.5 | (N=133) |
| Tower | 4.6 | 10.7 | 54.2 | 13.0 | 17.6 | (N=131) |
| R. Reagan | 2.3 | 10.9 | 62.5 | 5.5 | 18.8 | (N=128) |
| Ceasar Chavez | 10.0 | 16.2 | 56.2 | 7.7 | 10.0 | (N=130) |
| Sen. Montoya | 4.6 | 15.4 | 60.0 | 9.2 | 10.8 | (N=130) |
| Gov. Briscoe | 6.1 | 24.4 | 31.8 | 13.6 | 24.2 | (N=132) |
| Tijerina | 4.0 | 11.2 | 68.8 | 5.6 | 10.4 | (N=125) |
| Nader | 3.8 | 16.9 | 58.5 | 6.2 | 14.6 | (N=130) |
| D. Berrigan | 9.8 | 12.9 | 59.8 | 4.5 | 12.9 | (N=132) |
| Agnew | 0.8 | 13.8 | 43.1 | 13.1 | 29.2 | (N=130) |
| Gutierrez | 11.5 | 15.3 | 60.3 | 5.3 | 7.6 | (N=131) |
| "Corky" Gonzales | 8.5 | 14.0 | 65.1 | 4.7 | 7.8 | (N=129) |
| R. Abernathy | 2.4 | 11.8 | 70.1 | 2.4 | 13.4 | (N=127) |
| H.B. Gonzales | 21.3 | 40.4 | 16.9 | 11.0 | 10.3 | (N=136) |
| J.F. Kennedy | 63.4 | 22.8 | 7.6 | 0.7 | 5.5 | (N=145) |

[a]All cell entries are percentages. Percentages sum row-wise to 100%.

## Table V
## ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICAL AUTHORITIES
## AMONG MEXICAN AMERICAN YOUTH AS COMPARED TO ANGLO YOUTH

| A. The President . . . | Mexican Americans | Easton-Hess 7-8 Grades[a] |
|---|---|---|
| | % | % |
| Would always want to help | 13.9 | 29.9 |
| Would almost always want to help | 10.9 | 24.4 |
| Would sometimes want to help | 30.9 | 38.6 |
| Would almost never want to help | 21.2 | 4.9 |
| Would never want to help | 23.0 | 3.1 |
| | (N=165) | (N=3385) |
| | | |
| Always keeps his promises | 5.4 | 22.3 |
| Almost always keeps his promises | 16.7 | 50.5 |
| Sometimes keeps his promises | 44.6 | 26.7 |
| Almost never keeps his promises | 16.1 | 0.2 |
| Never keeps his promises | 17.3 | 0.3 |
| | (N=168) | (N=3393) |
| | | |
| Can make anyone do what he wants | 13.3 | 9.5 |
| Can make almost anyone do what he wants | 19.9 | 33.2 |
| Can make some people do what he wants | 38.6 | 46.0 |
| Can make almost no one do what he wants | 10.2 | 4.3 |
| Can make no one do what he wants | 18.1 | 6.9 |
| | (N=166) | (N=3381) |

B. The Policeman . . .

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Would always want to help | 47.3 | 61.8 |

(Table V Cont'd.)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Would almost always help | 21.0 | 21.0 |
| Would sometimes want to help | 26.3 | 15.9 |
| Would almost never want to help | 3.0 | 0.8 |
| Would never want to help | 2.4 | 0.5 |
| | (N=167) | (N=3379) |
| | | |
| Always keeps his promises | 10.3 | 17.4 |
| Almost always keeps his promises | 30.9 | 40.4 |
| Sometimes keeps his promises | 47.9 | 40.8 |
| Almost never keeps his promises | 7.9 | 0.5 |
| Never keeps his promises | 3.0 | 0.8 |
| | (N=165) | (N=3275) |
| | | |
| Can make anyone do what he wants | 11.5 | 10.4 |
| Can make almost anyone do what he wants | 24.8 | 30.0 |
| Can make some people do what he wants | 41.2 | 49.8 |
| Can make almost no one do what he wants | 7.9 | 4.7 |
| Can make no one do what he wants | 14.5 | 5.3 |
| | (N=165) | (N=3371) |

[a]The responses were calculated from the Easton-Hess eight city survey. The data were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.

# NOTAS AL PIE

[1] Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization* (New York: The Free Press, 1959).

[2] See for example Jack Dennis, "Major Problems of Political Socialization Research" in his reader *Socialization to Politics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), pp. 2-27.

[3] Edward S. Greenberg, "Trends in Political Socialization Research" in his reader *Political Socialization* (New York: Atherton Press, 1970), pp. 1-16.

[4] David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), Fred Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitude in Children* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).

[5] Greenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[6] Easton and Dennis, *op. cit.*, Chapter 19, p. 401.

[7] Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Subculture," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (June, 1968) pp. 564-575, and Paul R. Abramson, "Political Efficacy and Political Trust Among Black School Children: Two Explanations," *Journal of Politics*, XXXIV (November, 1972) pp. 1243-1269.

[8] See F. Chris Garcia, "The Political World of the Chicano Child," paper presented to the APSA annual meeting, November, 1973.

[9] Edgar Litt, *Ethnic Politics in America* (Dallas: Scott, Foresman, 1970), p. 2.

[10] Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1951).

[11]Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 32-36.

[12]Ibid., PP. 34-35.

[13]Ibid., p. 35.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification," American Political Science Review LXI (September, 1967), pp. 717-726.

[16]The Ethnic Factor in American Politics (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill, 1970).

[17]See for example the works of Garcia particularly "The Political World of the Chicano Child," presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, 1972, and "Mexican Americans and Modes of Political Participation," a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, 1972; and Rudolph O. de la Garza, "Voting Patterns in Bi-Cultural El Paso," paper presented to the Rocky Mountain Social Science Convention, 1973, among others.

[18]Ralph C. Guzman, "The Function of Anglo-American Racism in the Political Development of Chicanos," 50 California Historical Quarterly (September, 1971) pp. 321-337, Mario Barrera, Carlos Munoz, Charles Ornelas, "The Barrio as an Internal Colony," in Urban Affairs Annual Review, Vol. 6, 1972, edited by H. Halin, Tomas Almaguer, "Toward the Study of Chicano Colonialism," 2 Aztlan (Spring, 1971) pp. 7-20, Armando Gutierrez and Herbert Hirsch, "The Militant Challenge to the American Ethos," 53 Social Science Qua erly (March, 1973), pp. 830-845, and Rodolfo Acuna, Occupied America, San Francisco: Canfield Press, 1972.

[19]For the published results of this study see Leo Grebler, et al., The Mexican American People (New York: Free Press, 1970).

[20]Ibid., p. 299.

[21]Ibid., p. 300.

[22]Ibid., p. 305.

[23]Angus Campbell, et. al., The American Voter (John Wiley, 1964), especially Chapter 9.

[24]Easton and Dennis, op. cit., Chapter 7.

[25]Jaros, et. al., op. cit.

[26]See Edward S. Greenberg, "Orientations of Black and White Children to Political Authority Figures," Social Science Quarterly, LI (December, 1970), 561-571; and Harrell R. Rodgers and George Taylor, "The Policeman as an Agent of Regime Legitimation," Midwest Journal of Political Science, XV (February, 1971), 72-86.

[27]Easton and Dennis, op. cit., 183-188.

[28]Ibid., p. 187.