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**AUTHOR** van Manen, M. J. Max  
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**ABSTRACT**

The need for a different conception of research from the classical statistical approach to theory development in social studies teaching is addressed in this paper. In a schema of dominant orientations of social theory, the outstanding epistemological features of the three main schools of contemporary metascience are outlined. Three systems of doing scientific research--interpretive, empirical-analytical, and critical inquiry--are matched with some specific social theories. The practical significance of each theoretical interest mode of the three action systems is described in concrete and detailed terms. The schema permits explanation of the source of ideas for doing research and how these ideas animate the perceptions and formulations of the relevant problems in the theory and practice of social studies curriculum. A current social studies project and study are examined for the implicit modes of knowing that they employ in the study of man and society. References are included. (Author/KSM)

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SOME SEARCH ORIENTATIONS FOR RESEARCH  
IN SOCIAL STUDIES EDUCATION  
[draft]

M. J. Max van Manen

The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education  
252 Bloor Street, West; Toronto, Ontario M5S 1V6

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## Introduction

In the Second Handbook of Research on Teaching Shaver and Larkins have raised a number of issues and made recommendations regarding research and theory development in social studies teaching, which should be an invitation for supportive as well as for critical debate and appraisals. In this paper one of these recommendations is being addressed, namely the need for "a different conception of research from the classical statistical approach," which may call for "new theory" (p.1254). A study of research involves the use of "theory" on at least two levels: on the level of educational research and on the meta-level of research into research. Educational theory is concerned with inquiry into the how, what, why, etc. of teaching social studies. Metatheory or metaresearch is an epistemological activity and it may seem rather irrelevant for the practical research oriented educator. However, metatheory is useful when it manages to identify neglected areas of research, suggest alternative research possibilities or when it succeeds to make explicit the epistemological suppositions which form a basis for motivating new inquiry or for determining the worthwhileness and the special practical significance of research studies. Thus, epistemological research may serve the purpose of Shaver and Larkins in providing "basic research considerations with potential for making a contribution to the knowledge about teaching social studies curriculum."

Shaver and Larkins have presented a comprehensive set of challenging considerations and opinions which encourage the conceptualization of a "broader view" and a more rigorous foundation for doing research in social studies education. Specifically they suggest that research should be done within the context of scientific theory. However, the "broader view" which Shaver and Larkins explicate, especially in the context of introducing Smith's classroom ethnographic approach is still a limited view in a contemporary social science sense. It is true that Smith's application of ethnographic methodology moves beyond traditional statistical methodology in, for example, adopting a holistic approach

rather than a piece-meal gathering of a limited sample of behavioral data. But from the perspective of epistemology or metascience it would seem that classroom ethnography in the way it has been described in the Shaver/Larkins paper does not achieve a mode of cognition or awareness of the teaching-learning process which is different from the empirical-analytical orientation. For example, the knowledge outcomes of Smith's ethnographic research still serve the function of empirical-analytical science: (causal) explanation, prediction, and control. "Raw data" such as "positive feelings by students toward the teacher" are not analyzed, e.g., for their interpretive or communicative significance. Instead these descriptions are treated as concepts which are sought to "join" other such concepts in

"propositions hypothesizing causal links--for example, 'Increased teacher awareness leads to increased pupil esteem.' And such propositions can be linked to other concepts in further propositions, such as, 'Increased pupil esteem leads to increased classroom control.'"

Shaver and Larkins have admirably described the need for valid and relevant theory construction in social studies research, employing a concept of theory which remains allied to the framework and aims of empirical-analytical social science. It would seem legitimate, however, to pursue further the idea of a "broader view," beyond the orientation of empirical-analytical science.

#### Toward a Broader View of Social Studies Research and Theory Development

It is quite apparent from the Shaver/Larkins and Metcalf chapters that theorists in education have not yet sufficiently recognized or explored the potential contributions which may be made by alternative methods and paradigms of contemporary social science. This seems to be especially surprising in social studies research since social science represents an important source and reference frame for social studies curriculum. Freire has termed it a "limit-situation" in which a person finds himself, if he is not aware that there are other options beyond the taken-for-granted practices of the familiar scene. What is needed in social studies research, therefore, is a recognition of the epistemological limit-situation in which current research finds itself, i.e., a reflective awareness that existent inquiry has had a limiting and, to some extent distorting effect on the possibilities of theory and practice in social education.

In the following pages I wish to make an attempt to outline some potential social studies research orientations. However, such an attempt necessitates a clarification of some of the epistemological principles upon which many current research approaches are based. The search for alternative research orientations requires inquiry into the epistemology of science as well as a careful study of contemporary social theory. Those forms of social theory which are rooted in epistemological paradigms other than the positivist or the empirical-analytical one, tend to be based upon different conceptions of objectivity and validity in social inquiry, what it means to explain social phenomena, how to link theory and practice, and how to construct the framework and procedures of research designs. What is needed is a comprehensive epistemology which makes possible inquiry into research orientations beyond the empirical-analytical approach and which may help to guard against unconvincing research accounts, ill-directed research routes and inappropriate translation of theory into practice. Such epistemological inquiry may be relevant for actual research if it helps to serve Peirce's ideal "to help unblock the roads of inquiry".

In his introduction to the first issue of Theory and Society, Alvin Gouldner takes note of a phenomenon among researchers of the social sciences which has obvious implications for the educational researcher as well. A new epistemological infrastructure is being created which reflects a contemporary consciousness for the emergence of new criteria of objectivity in social science and social theory. Objectivity is less seen as something absolute, resting on observational/empirical evidence. Instead it is recognized as arising from the interpretation of the meaning of this evidence, which leads to the construction of consensus or truth by means of convincing accounts, acceptable in the intersubjective community of theorists and social scientists. In Gouldner's view the conventional infrastructure of objectivity in social science equates social research with a form of theory construction associated with the methodology and techniques of the physical and behavioral sciences. In the domain of social inquiry the behavioral or natural science paradigms are losing their positions of dominance over the field and are increasingly being challenged and supplemented by competing paradigms; by critical theory, ethnomethodology, cognitive sociology, the neo-Marxisms, language-sensitive social theory, structuralism, hermeneutics, and phenomenology.

The growing interest in epistemological thought within social theory is associated with an emerging awareness among social scientists that all knowledge production, thinking, and acting are based on certain socio-cultural presuppositions which Plattel calls "source ideas". Source ideas are those taken-for-granted sediments of knowledge and relevancies (in the sense of Schutz) which permeate the consciousness of an entire culture. Roszak has demonstrated the objectifying characteristics and the mythical nature of this scientific consciousness and the way in which it impregnates social life and the perceptions of public issues. Making explicit the source ideas which thus function on the level of unreflected pretheoretical thought is an epistemological activity.


This point is that the search for new orientations is not happenstance. From the epistemological perspectives of men such as Radnitzky, Habermas, Schroyer and Taylor it would appear that the variety of contemporary research orientations can be divided into three main streams: empirical-analytical, interpretive and critical inquiry. Of course, such distinction is not without controversy. For example, the particular relationships between critical theory and ethnomethodology or between hermeneutics and behavioral social science are still being debated. Furthermore, critical theory as elaborated by Habermas, Wellmer, and others, to a large extent rests on empirical-analytical and interpretive methodology. At the same time critical inquiry seems to be characterized by methodological elements which possess something extra. It is not my intention to address such epistemological issues in these pages.

In the schema of "Dominant Orientations of Social Theory" some outstanding epistemological features of the three main schools of contemporary meta-science have been outlined in a comprehensive framework. Any particular theory of man and society may to some extent integrate these orientations but even within a single identifiable theory (such as the ethnomethodology of Cicourel, the critical theory of Habermas, or the experiential theory of instruction by Torbert), the dominant inquiry modes, their characteristic view of "social phenomena" and their implicit concept of "practical significance," and what it means to "explain things," remain visible. The three forms of social inquiry are to be seen as distinctive in terms of

their methodology, their way of looking at man and society, in terms of knowledge they produce and the use to which this knowledge can be put. But no one social science will tell the whole story about man and his social world. Social inquiry may be viewed comprehensively as the exploration of social reality for the purpose of (1) understanding in an authentic or experiential sense, the meaningful phenomena of the human world; (2) discovering social laws, generalizations or facts which enable explanation, prediction, and technical control; and (3) being able to critically identify social issues and problems, and the ability to deal with such issues and problems in a normative emancipatory framework.

The schema of dominant orientations of social theory shows three systems of doing scientific research: (a) interpretive, (b) empirical-analytical, and (c) critical inquiry. Each of these systems is characterized by an internally consistent set of interpretive devices (1) for viewing the human or social system, (2) for conceptualizing the epistemological nature of the social systems behavior, i.e., the processes to be studied, (3) for selecting appropriate system elements for scientific research, (4) each action system has its own verification and validation procedures, and (5) each science has its inherent telic (interest) mode. Associated with each of the inquiry orientations is a certain concept of what constitutes an explanation (6). In the last two columns of the schema the dominant theoretical orientation of each action system is matched up, for purposes of illustration, with some specific social theories. And the practical significance of each theoretic interest mode of the three action systems is described in some more concrete and detailed terms. For example, with respect to the practical significance of knowledge Habermas has shown that owning knowledge (like owning wealth) inadvertently invests the proprietor with the practical interests inherent in the functions of that knowledge. Habermas speaks of "cognitive interests" which "guide" scientific research and theory development within the empirical-analytical, the interpretive and the critical spheres. Such issues will be illustrated in the following sections.

EPISTEMOLOGY OF DOMINANT INQUIRY MODES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES



### The Empirical-Analytical Orientation

Relevant "research problems" for empirical-analytical or behavioral social science are identified in the lack of having "discovered" the "natural constraints," "lawlike generalizations," "causal principles," or "controls" of a (social) system. This type of system has been termed pseudo-natural because the essential parameters of social systems, including teaching-learning environments, educational institutions, and even the "minds" of learners, have not been shown to be equally immutable and determinate as physical or natural systems. The inherent aim of natural social science is to be able to explain, predict, and control social phenomena in a technological sense. The underlying pretheoretical assumption is that social behavior is indeed natural, i.e. subject to natural "constraints" which can be discovered and ultimately brought under control. In social education this attitude is reflected in research studies which objectify the meaningful world of human teaching-learning experiences in terms of behavioral, measurable, or quantifiable performances, and cybernetic, input-output instructional designs.

A decade ago, in an article entitled "Theories of Teaching," Gage drew attention to the fact that problems of classroom instruction need not only be theories of learning but also theories of teaching. He stated that "theories of teaching deal with the way in which a person influences an organism to learn" (p.268). Within the context of selected teaching paradigms Gage is interested in the "inherent order and lawfulness that can be subjected to theoretical analysis" (p.270). The theory founded on this paradigm sees the teacher as manipulating the cognitive field in accordance with "laws of cognition." Learning, then, is to be regarded as the consequence of some causal sequence. The learner, according to Gage, "can no more avoid learning in this instance than he can avoid seeing the phi-phenomenon under proper conditions" (p.278). By manipulating principles of cognitive structure in the same manner as he would manipulate stimuli, the teacher can "compel" his students to achieve the curriculum learning objectives. This objectifying attitude toward the study of teaching is continued in the first Handbook of Research on Teaching where Gage strongly urges a type of research that is conducted within the framework of genuine theory. What is meant by genuine

theory? In Gage's words, research and theory of teaching possess similar aims: "increasing our power to understand, predict, and control (learning) events of a certain kind" (p. 96). A further development of this same emphasis on constructing scientific theories of teaching is to be found in the pamphlet "Criteria for Theories of Instruction" prepared by the ASCD Commission on Instructional Theory. In this document the term "theory" has been redefined for educators to give it the meaning "as it is used in the natural sciences". In doing this, the Commission has deliberately and explicitly adopted "the physical science model as their ideal . . . [since] it does indicate a direction toward precision in theorizing about instruction which we believe is required" (p. 4). Furthermore, the Commission is of the opinion that

. . . when persons in education become active in building theories of instruction in the tradition of the natural sciences, the power of the theories that are developed will rapidly surpass the rule-of-thumb approach of the layman or the practitioner. (p. 4).

Within the empirical-analytical reference frame, instruction is viewed as the

. . . the process whereby the environment of an individual is deliberately manipulated to enable him to learn to emit or engage in specific behaviors under specified conditions or as responses to specified situations. (Corey, p. 130)

In the words of Merrill, instructional design is the "process of specifying and producing particular environmental situations which cause the learner to interact in such a way that a specified change occurs in his behavior." (Merrill, p. 170).

In the work of these educational theorists the search is for nomological theory construction in the sense of empirical-analytical social science. The success of empirical-analytical theory development in economics leads Suppes to pose the question in education

. . . how we can develop a deeper running theory for the efficient allocation of resources to increase productivity and, at the same time, to develop a better theory for the measurements of input and output and the construction of production functions . . . It is natural to ask how we can measure the output of an elementary school, for example. (Suppes, p. 5)

Typically, in this context the contemporary educational researcher tends to employ the characteristic systems language borrowed from cybernetics and mathe-

mathematical models of, for example, economics or biological theory. Learning processes are described in terms of natural, adaptive, structure-increasing systems behavior (Merrill, Stolurow, Ryans) and teaching is viewed as reflectively intervening in the learner's adaptive responses to his relevant environment. Thus, the social reality of teaching-learning has become a natural reality, not unlike that of the world of physical objects and events. The trajectories of learning behavior are likened to the causal path of an object in physical space. The same recent article by Suppes on theory development in educational research serves to illustrate the empirical-analytical mode:

What we have been able to do is to derive from plausible qualitative assumptions a stochastic differential equation describing the trajectory of students through the curriculum, with the constants of the solution of the differential equation corresponding to unique parameters of each individual students . . . I think we can now speak with confidence in this area of student trajectories in the same spirit that we speak of trajectories of bodies in the solar system. (Suppes, p. 8)

Of course, Suppes' optimistic and hard-nosed (in a positivist sense) attitude toward the role of natural scientific theory construction in curriculum and instruction must meet the difficulties and reservations expressed by other social scientists (e.g., compare Cicourel, Schutz, etc.). The simple fact of the matter is that to date little teaching-learning theory has been developed which has the predictive, explanatory, and practical-technological significance of physical theory.

The empirical-analytical attitude is not only prevalent in the study of teaching acts, it also dominates frequently the programmatic aspects of the curriculum which is taught through the various inquiry, problem solving and issues approaches, and of those social studies curricula which place central the concepts and findings of contemporary social science. Inquiry teaching is generally understood as assisting the student in generating problems and hypotheses, pursuing tentative solutions and concluding or testing his generalizations. Compare for example the similarities among the models of Beyer, Massiales, Cox, Fenton, and others. In addition to facing questions which have been raised for example by Herrick, regarding the adequacy of inquiry models in the way they reflect the true nature and inquiry patterns of the everyday practices of scientists, social studies educators probably should more deliberately and rigorously pursue a broader epistemological concept of inquiry teaching than is currently practiced.

Of course to some extent this broadening of the concept of social inquiry has already evolved in the development of new forms of value education and of teaching approaches and of curriculum materials such as the Schools Council Integrated Studies which engage teacher and students in an analysis of e.g. the communicative, interpretive and sense making aspects of the function of, for example, language, art and music in the taken-for-granted and hermeneutic sphere of the experiences of the human life-world.

Another example of this empirical-analytical attitude in social education is the sharp distinction that is sometimes made between "facts" and "values". This dichotomizing orientation is a distinguishing feature, characteristic of the various forms of values teaching and valuing activities which are currently being explored and developed in social studies school curricula. The interpretive and the critical sciences do not necessarily share the recognition of such a sharp distinction. Or at any rate, the lines drawn between facts and values do not necessarily cast value and moral questions outside social research and theorizing. In the social theories of Schroyer, Habermas and Wellmer a special form of practical or normative reasoning involves a "cognition" of values and moral issues, rather than perceiving these to be belonging to an affective or irrational domain of social thought.

#### The Interpretive Orientation

The contemporary conceptualization of the epistemological difference between the interpretive sciences and the natural sciences refers back to Dilthey's logical distinction between interpretation and understanding in the human sciences, and observation and formal explanation in the natural sciences. His thematic analysis of the "cycle of interpretation" has been pursued further in contemporary social philosophy, notably by Gadamer. And the recognition of the characteristic metascientific orientation of interpretive science has led to programmatic formulations of social theory, such as phenomenological sociology (Schutz, Berger, Luckman, etc.), psycholinguistics (Brown), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, etc.), cognitive sociology (Cicourel, etc.) and symbolic interactionism (Blumer, etc.).

Interpretive science has a research-guiding interest to clarify, authenticate, uncover, or to bring the meaning structures expressed by the productive forces of the human cultural process into full human awareness. A research problem for interpretive science is identified in the need for an experientially meaningful, historically original, or authentically human understanding of

some aspect of an interactive or communicative human cultural system. The inherent telos is understanding (Verstehen) aspects of the human life world, in the sense of gaining insights into the processes and results (objectivations) of human cultural activity in the way of text of text analogues, expressing life projects, sense-making and interpretive practices, human actions and intentions, and the way in which man meaningfully experiences, and emotionally and intellectually appropriates the world.

In the epistemological debates (insofar as debates have taken place) between logical empiricism and phenomenology the demand for more rigorous scientific explanations (by philosophy of science) has been countered by arguments that the social world is expressive of meanings which are inaccessible to empirical-analytical science and which are in need of explanations of an interpretive kind offered by disciplines such as ethnomethodology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. The phenomenology of social understanding requires methodological investigation and analysis on at least three distinct levels (Misgeld). First, on the level of taken-for-granted reality (Schutz), the sense-making practices of the everyday social life world have become the object of study of ethnomethodology. Secondly, contemporary hermeneutics is concerned with the cultural activities of man which require a reflective or an interpretive approach (Gadamer) so that an authentic human understanding can be achieved of the meaning in its original or historical context. And thirdly, on the level of human activity where sense-making practices and practical normative social life are seen to be systematically distorted (Habermas), critical theory makes available critical tools and emancipatory or normative thinking skills which aim at "demystification" (Plattel) of false consciousness and re-orientation of misguided practice.

Hermeneutics, defined as the science of interpretation or as the phenomenology of social understanding (Gadamer), has as its object of study some text of text analogue (Taylor) embodied in a social situation or social phenomenon which in some way or another is confused, incomplete, cloudy, seemingly contradictory, or unclear. Within a hermeneutical framework social education is seen as a dialogical series of sense-making activities on the part of teacher and student (and also on the part of other participants in the educational process).

Teaching as sense making finds its focus (a) in the learner, i.e., in the way the teacher interprets the concrete nature of the transactional learning processes which are themselves sense-making activities; (b) in the teaching-learning interactions, i.e., in the way the teacher interprets the meanings embodied in the experiential encounters of the teacher himself and his students; and (c) in the curriculum decision-making practices which take place before, during, and after the instructional episodes, in the context of centralized or decentralized planning sessions.

Learning as sense making by the learner is situated in the interpretive moments of the way in which the learner transacts with (a) the display or the object of teaching in the form of some text or text analogue, i.e., some reified social phenomenon or event; (b) the teacher and the way in which the learner interprets the intentions of the teacher or the aim of the learning process; and (c) the self or ego of the learner, that is, the manner in which the learner sees himself and the way in which he sees himself meaningfully transacting with the display, the teacher, and his self.

In the teaching-learning of social studies there are various ways of gaining insight into the sense-making procedures which teachers and learners utilize in the transactive and interactive processes. Contemporary social scientists consider the various context-dependent and context-free modes of expression, and particularly the languaging activity itself, as an important field of inquiry, providing access to the structure, form, and content of social reality. Indeed, languaging is seen as the foundation of a world-constructing enterprise.

More concretely what is involved in the use of interpretive research methodologies of the classroom may be gleaned, for example, from studies of cross-modal communication in the classroom by Cicourel. His intent is to bring to the surface the hidden, but always present, creative activities of everyday social interpretive interactions in the communicative process. Ethnomethodological research has shown that everyday communicative practices are invariably contingent production embedded in emergent, context-sensitive, informative environments. Using video-taping technology, Cicourel has focused on the verbal and nonverbal activities of the classroom setting for understanding the child's grasp of the teacher's educational goals. His special interest is to clarify

the operation of the context within which the teaching-learning dialogue generates unexplicated and seemingly invisible "interpretive procedures," presumably at work on the part of the learners, the teacher, and the on-looker (the researcher) in their sense-making practice of the shared dialogue.

With respect to the instructional aspect of the social studies curriculum, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and related interpretive sciences are of imminent significance. The recommendation made to traditional minded social studies, history, or geography teachers to involve their students in less intellectualizing and more of a valuing orientation acquires strong theoretical support--and simultaneously quite a different meaning--in the exploration of the implications of hermeneutics for social education. Taking the insights of hermeneutics seriously produces an increased awareness of the crucial demand for authenticating and articulating phenomenologically the ideas embedded in the teaching-learning experiences of the social studies curriculum. Hitherto, the importance of relating to the experiences of the students, that is, to render the knowledge experientially meaningful with respect to the life-world of the learner, has been seen as relevant mainly for reasons of "motivating" the students, "awakening their interests" in a social studies topic to be studied. However, hermeneutic understanding of the "real meanings" of the social life world must be an aim of itself in social education. Reconstructing, in the formal setting of the school, the authentic structures of social life would require interpretive devices beyond an occasional role-playing or simulation-gaming activity. I am suggesting that development and evaluation research in this area would have to be based on a fundamental grasp of what is involved in acquiring something that, for example, ethnomethodologists refer to as "scenic understanding" (i.e., understanding of the world known in common and taken-for-granted). Of course, such research also would require an explicit and appropriate (but rigorous) concept of objectivity and validation procedures in a phenomenological sense. Gadamer develops an idea of "human understanding," which, in the apprehension of social (and physical) reality, is seen to be historical, linguistic, and dialectical. Over and against the idea of purely conceptual and verifiable knowing and affective states, Gadamer places a concept of the structure of experience and of dialectical hermeneutic experience which, on the one hand, might greatly enrich the idea of knowledge acquisition in the social studies teaching-learning process, and which, on the other hand, should throw a new light on the on-going debate of the meaning and place of taxonomic devices

(e.g., Bloom, Krathwohl, Popham, etc.) in monitoring the teaching-learning process. If social education is to be seen as serving and enriching the on-going life experiences of students, then it must reconceptualize its informational content to contribute to a larger aim of social studies, encompassing a view of the learner as acquiring something which Gadamer refers to as social wisdom. This refers to a process of a largely non-objectifiable accumulation of "understandings" achieved in a language-sensitive (Postman, Weingartner, Britton, etc.) and dialogical (Freire) educational environment. Such reconceptualization of social education opens up new realms of research possibilities, making accessible to educators the insights and methodologies of interpretive social science.

An important question is what should be the place of the dominant inquiry methodologies in an integrated knowledge curriculum, and how should the social studies teacher conceptualize the relationship of his hermeneutic interests to the curriculum of the humanities, i.e., literature, the arts? From the perspective of phenomenology the teaching-learning process is viewed as a meaningful reality-sharing and reality-constructing enterprise, directed at changing the consciousness of students in terms of orientations toward the social realities mapped out in the social studies curriculum. Teaching, learning, and the structures of orientations, including reified abstractions of skills, knowledge, and values, are usually studied and discussed as separate areas of interest. Research is needed to describe as accurately as possible the emerging "forms" in the transactional process which structures and transforms the learner's existential matrix of apprehended reality. Bernstein has demonstrated how the context independent nature of the experimental setting acts selectively upon the sense-making procedures insofar as the typical ground rules (Bernstein) or the interpretive devices (Cicourel, Garfinkel) practiced by certain children may result in more or less context sensitive speech. The nondialogical pedagogy (Freire) of the person-focused code as compared to the object-focused code (Bernstein) among lower-class children could be researched theoretically and empirically through a study of the systematically distorting (controlling) effect of institutions such as the family and educational systems in post-industrial societies with respect to, e.g., the parents' and teachers' orientation towards authority and communication. The relative context-dependency of sense-making procedures in the way that children of different socioeconomic backgrounds reconstruct meanings of the social world has

implications not only for the structuring of knowledge in social studies curriculum (e.g., in the sense of Bernstein's "integrated" rather than "collective" frames), but also for the explanatory meaning-constructing procedures of teachers, and for the implicit concepts of "power" (domination) and "property" of knowledge in the practice of curriculum.

The practical relevancy of interpretive social science is seen by critical epistemology to be situated in a research orientation which in the context of social education strives for things such as furthering one's understanding of the human life-world (i.e., the human life-world as teaching-learning social studies curriculum), and enabling deeper awareness or empathic understanding of culturally produced social orientations, activities, and relationships. Again, this may involve, on the one hand, a study of the continuation of everyday sense-making practices in terms of personal constructs (Kelly; Bannister and Fransella), fields of relevancies (Schutz, Zaner), or more generally in terms of orientations of learners in the social studies curriculum process. And, on the other hand, this deeper awareness may be conceived as an objective for social studies teaching-learning which would involve the research and development of curriculum programs designed to increase the learner's awareness of the social significance of inquiry associated with the interpretive knowledge orientation.

A further description of practical relevancy within the context of interpretive research in social studies education might include the interest in communication, understanding, historical texts and text-analogues (social happenings), the ability to communicate and recover meaning on a level of authentic experiences, to understand culturally embedded meanings and feelings (e.g., in the study of different cultures or other societies), and the internalization of practical norms which institutionalize social roles. It would seem that at this level the study of society (contemporary or history) is a hermeneutic science, in the sense of a phenomenology of social understanding, involving a creative interpretation of the past and of the socially different, thereby promoting communication, and seeking a continuation of cultural traditions.

Once more, any of such research topics could be carried out on the level of social studies teaching, investigating, for example, the sense-making interactions of the classroom (Bellack, Cicourel, Mackay), or it may focus on the social studies curriculum itself, aiming for hermeneutic awareness on

the part of the student himself.

### The Critical Orientation

The third major form of inquiry or research is represented by critical social inquiry. Critical inquiry can be seen as uncovering or making explicit, in the sense of bringing to the surface of consciousness, the hidden, underlying forces behind problematic phenomena. The methodological prototype of critical inquiry is the psychoanalytical technique (not the theory, Brown) of identifying pathological behavior (including deformations of language such as rationalizations, compulsive stereotyping, etc.), and of tracing such symptoms to suppressed and repressed motives (Fromm, Marcuse, Habermas). Critical social science has a research-guiding interest to emancipate man from repressive, asymmetrical, dominating, nondialogical, and oppressive forces on the level of societal, institutional, or personal life (Marcuse, Habermas, Schroyer, Freire). It promotes a theory of man and society that is rooted in the moral attitude of emancipation or liberation from coercive and dominating forms of social control.

As the academic fear of the recognition of Marx's contribution to a science of history and society subsides, educators too have become more interested in the ideas of radical-minded authors such as Kozol, Illich, Marcuse, and Freire. However, in North America critical social science has encouraged very few research studies in social education, perhaps for ideological reasons. The point is that a radical curriculum program in social studies may constitute a serious threat to the inherent order and the taken-for-granted values and practices of school and society. Furthermore, the writings of the so-called "romantic critics" of education, and even an Illich or Freire, lack the theoretical strength, perhaps to rationalize and conceptualize rigorous research into the developmental structure and the instructional dynamics, necessary for a critical foundation of social studies curriculum. The writings of Illich and Freire are more concerned with the politics and practice of education. Chances are, however, that the stepped-up rate of translations and publications of the thoughts of contemporary social scientists and social philosophers, who have continued the work of men like Horkheimer and Adorno, will have some influence on new directions in research practices and possibly on the attempts toward significant reconceptualizations of social education.

Social education seen as a critical activity would release new types of research, involving a reflexive and an emancipatory interest in man and society, and providing social studies with a fundamentally relevant connection to the practices, concerns, and problems of the conditions of ordinary social life. Apart from, for example, developing feasible models of emancipatory curricula, or investigating the forms and prerequisites of dialogical pedagogy, critical social theory provides a basis for reconceptualizing the concept of "critical thinking" and what it means to talk about the learner as realizing a major aim of social education, by becoming a socially aware critical actor. Thus far, critical thinking has been synonymous more or less with cognitive skills represented by terms such as "good thinking," "thinking straight," "logical (non-fallacious) reasoning," or more specifically with the problem-solving skills involved in social studies curricula which place central the inquiry techniques of empirical-analytical social science, as evidenced in the writings on critical thinking in the social studies by Bostwick, Starr, and Chausow. Although the various "thinking skills" promoted by the existent concept of critical thinking are very worthwhile indeed, from the perspective of critical social theory this concept-in-use lacks an adequate theoretical reference frame. The theoretical base of empirical-analytical science is too narrow, not taking into account a more complete concept of social science inquiry, and it is inappropriate simply for reasons that it is essentially not critical in a more fundamental sense. Approaches in social education, such as the Harvard Public Issues project and related issues and values-oriented curricula (e.g., Eisenberg), which appear ideally suited to advance genuinely critical attitudes, understandings, and skills, effectively fall short of achieving such aims (in the sense of Plattel, Freire, Habermas, Schroyer, etc.) as a consequence of a commitment to a form of inquiry into social and societal problems which is not truly emancipatory and not systematically reflective.

The term "critical" is used to refer to the human potentiality for self-conscious reflection and self-determination vis-a-vis the "seemingly" natural forces of social "nature" in personal, societal, and cultural history. How the seemingly natural forces are at work in pseudo-natural systems can be seen in the way that institutions "constrain" (control) their members.

Operating like natural systems, institutions "cause" certain patterns of behavior and interactions among their constituent parts--individuals, social or political groups, etc. Although institutions are humanly produced, once they are there, institutions acquire an invisible compulsion of their own, turning into "objective reality" as it were, and inducing (socializing) in man the culturally specific patterns of behavior. In Berger's terms, once an institution has been "externalized" it is "objectivated" and becomes "internalized"; these are the three phases in the social "life" of institutions. Thus, through reification of produced social systems the social world of institutions appears to merge with the world of nature. The social system acquires the characteristics of a natural system. The higher the degree of institutionalization of human activity, the more "predictable" and the more "controllable" men will become (Berger, 1966). To the extent that pseudo-natural systems constrain their members and just like natural systems "cause" certain patterns of behavior and interactions among the constituent parts of the system, to such extent individuals are involuntarily coerced into nonreflective courses of action and interaction. However, unlike a truly natural (physical) system such as a stone rolling down a slope, man has the potentiality to (self-) reflect upon the forces that "move" him and that may "cause" distorted patterns of social behavior. In this process of fundamental reflection lies the moment of "enlightenment" and the act of emancipation: in realizing the compelling or oppressive forces of his social environment man can decide to strategically act upon those forces in order to change them in accord with his needs. Through a reflective grasp of his culture, its social order, and those who maintain charge of it, man can gain enlightened insight into the conditioning aspects of his personal and social life. The similarities between individual and social pathologies have been discussed by Fromm, Brown and others. These authors stress the need for coming to terms with the repressive and dehumanizing elements of every day life which man has to face on the level of his personal and his social life. For example, in his personal life the object of reflection may be the "rationalizations" which speak for his actions and their underlying repressed motives, and on the level of society the object of reflection may be the "ideology" which speaks for the social practices and policies of society at large, thus "covering up" the coercive forces

which give rise to these activities. Habermas has explicated the interesting correspondence between rationalizations and ideologies: both are rooted in unreflected motives or interests. Rationalizations refer to unreflected interests on the level of personal action, while ideology serves to "cover" the "real" but unreflected interests of the collective action of members of a society. In this sense critical thinking consists of recovering or uncovering the "real" meaning rather than the "false" causes for some given social conditions.

Contemporary developments of critical social thought permits a form of practical reasoning that is rooted in an emancipatory concern for man and society. As such it seems to suggest a potentially powerful conceptualization of emancipatory social studies education, representing a rigorous (because it is fundamentally critical) and systematic epistemological approach which would be able to positively deal with issues of what research is worth doing, and what is the possibility and practical relevancy of theory in social studies education. Contemporary developments of such epistemology have reached a high level of sophistication, notably in the critical writings of social theorists such as Trent Schroyer, Albrecht Wellmer, and particularly in the work of Jurgen Habermas. Therefore, I will venture a brief expose of some of Habermas' theoretical and meta-theoretical ideas with a special view of its relevance to social studies education.

The essential components of Habermas' critical theory of man and society are his concepts of "systematically distorted communication," the critical-practical norms derived from the sociolinguistic idea of "communicative competence" and the related analytical concept of "ideal speech" or "ideal situation of discourse." The concept of "distorted communication" has acquired such a theoretical significance that it has become increasingly thematic in the literature of critical science: in sociolinguistics and political science (e.g., Mueller), in anthropology (e.g., Scholte), in sociology (e.g., Schroyer), in moral theorizing (e.g., Ricoeur), and in social philosophy (e.g., Wellmer). The analytical opposite of distorted communication is implicit in the emancipatory idea of pure communicative action, which, in turn, presupposes a symmetry in the intersubjective relations of human actors. Habermas speaks of "pure intersubjectivity."

Undistorted communication is in principle only possible in the context of complete and unlimited interchangeability of dialogue roles, where no situation of privilege or condition of dominance places unequal weight among the participants of the communicative process (Habermas<sup>2</sup>, p. 143). In other words, all human communication implicitly is oriented toward the relation of intersubjective symmetry and reciprocity in the practice of dialogue roles. Concretely, ideal speech can only come about if the constraints inherent in the structural features of the communicative system do not lead to systematic distortions. Thus, Habermas suggests that the concept of ideal speech may be used in concrete instances for emancipatory social analysis. This is an item of practical or research relevancy of critical inquiry, namely, that it provides a means for detecting social issues and societal problems in the existence of distorted communicative practices, which are generated by institutionalized social structure on the basis of asymmetries or uneven distribution in the performance of dialogue roles (p. 144). The fundamental point is that without such symmetry and reciprocity undistorted communication, promoted by social actions, motives, purposes, and intentions, is not possible.

On the level of metascience, Habermas founds his theory of ideal speech on the supposition that the base of all actions is organized linguistically. The concept of ideal speech is clearly an idealization, but the importance of the idea is that it can be grasped reflectively by every individual in virtue of the fact that every speaker or user of language possesses a practical understanding of the idea of communicative competence.

Habermas' critical theory is being seen as especially important for contemporary social thought in that it is put forward not only as a social theory of man and society, but also on a meta level, as a critical epistemology of research practice and theory development in social science (Schroyer). As a critical epistemology it rests upon the theory of cognitive interests, expressing "anthropologically deep-seated interests, which direct our knowledge and which have a quasi-transcendental status." (Habermas<sup>4</sup>, p. 9). By means of special elaborations of contemporary developments of a theory of linguistics and communication Habermas is capable of linking in a unique way, theory with practice, and subject with object. He does this partly by means of the idea of human interest which are seen to underlie every theoretical and non-theoretical knowledge orientation. Each form of human

interest governs an associated form of human activity characterized by a certain view of man and his world in the appropriation of social phenomena, and in the selection, formulation, and solution of practical/theoretical (research) problems. Furthermore, each form of human interest is seen to command a distinct and internally consistent orientation of social science partly along the lines of the three dominant streams of metascience as elaborated in this paper.

According to Habermas, not only the activities of scientists but all socially regulated behavior, that is, all social behavior that is regulated by the unreflected constraints of social institutions, serves either the interest of the sphere of "instrumental" or "purposive rational action," or it functions on the level of possible "intersubjective communication" or "symbolic interaction." In the case of "instrumental action," objects, processes, and situations are experienced and perceived in a manner which, in principle, permits human manipulation and control. In behavioral science instrumental action corresponds to the technical notion of practicality. And in the case of "symbolic interactions" social objects, situations, and processes are experienced in terms of persons who act, interact, and who express themselves. The ensuing structures are to be understood and interpreted symbolically. Hermeneutic or interpretive social science, therefore, sees practical relevancy exercised in the form of intersubjective communication involving authentic understandings and common meanings.

The third form of cognitive interest is served by emancipatory or practical/critical social action. Habermas employs the model of therapeutic discourse and the critical process of achieving self-knowledge as an illustration of the emancipatory nature of self-reflection. Critical/analytical thinking, both on the level of personal and societal experiences, has an inherent emancipatory interest. The practical consequence of self-reflection is that the analytic insights into the self-formative process (of man and society) tends to intervene in life. In other words, once an individual or social group is prepared to critically examine the manner in which some repressive or restraining condition of social life historically has come about, then it must be assumed that this action of self-reflection or self-understanding is at least in its original intent aimed at improving the social condition by removing the repressive circumstance.

Habermas sees the methodology of critical social inquiry to be mediated by the two lower cognitive interests of instrumental action and communicative interaction. Once a practical problem has been identified in the tension between some "given" (factual) and the "ideal" (contrafactual) state, a thorough knowledge of interpretive science and of empirical-analytical research and theory development (including special statistical and mathematical techniques and theories) must be available to the critical social actor in order to move the "existing" or "given" state of affairs toward the "possible" or more "ideal" state.

It is impossible in a few paragraphs to do justice to the scope and meaning of critical theory. The purpose of this part of the paper has been simply to provide some rough sketches of the nature of critical theory in the hope that it may entice prospective investigators to examine more carefully the problems and possibilities of the implicit research orientation for social studies education. I wish to make a start with such an endeavor by placing a few comments and suggestions in the following final paragraphs.

Critical inquiry in social education can be traced back to the writings of the classical progressives and more recently to educational critics from a variety of orientations: from the authentic civil rights proponents to the liberal/radical romantic critics and from the faddish counter-cultural groups to representatives of the more establishment-minded educators. However, critical approaches have been of limited value in education and of little consequence in so far as social studies is concerned. And this probably is due to the fact that no systematic attempt has been made to link research to existing and emerging critical social theories. It would appear that the normative interests inherent in many contemporary concepts of social studies would lend themselves most invitingly to critical research and emancipatory theorizing.

In a recent position paper on the rationale for the founding of a Center for Critical Studies in Education, Simmons argues that much research in education (although not necessarily invalid or irrelevant) is piece-meal, focusing on limited aspects of teaching-learning or on narrowly conceived curriculum issues. What is necessary for educational theory is a mode of thought that is concerned with the larger framework of socio-political and cultural influence on the expression of human nature and which does consider the constraining effects of institutions on the realization of human

possibilities. Research orientations are needed which reflect upon issues of curriculum and teaching-learning, and which simultaneously, by means of the appropriate (empirical-analytical, interpretive and critical) logics-in-use of social science relate such issues to theory of culture, society, institutions and of human communication and interaction.

### Conclusion

What are the implications of an epistemological awareness of the main streams of contemporary social inquiry for the study of social education? It would seem that a critical epistemological view permits one to make explicit how the source ideas for doing research unwittingly animate the perceptions and formulations of the relevant problems in the theory and practice of social studies curriculum and instruction to which the investigator applies his research. Research of the kind recommended by Shaver and Larkins, Gage, Travers, Suppes, and others, is seen by critical epistemology to be motivated by a research-guiding interest which is instrumental/technical in the sense of Habermas. That is to say, the use function of the knowledge of cause and effect relationships, of functional and determinate relations of teaching-learning is situated in their rational-technological manipulability. In a real sense learners and teaching-learning processes are objectivated and defined in terms of natural or pseudo-natural systems and systems behavior. Theoretical knowledge of how a social system naturally operates is converted into practical knowledge by determining how the social system can be made to operate. Therefore, research in social education as discussed in the Shaver/Larkins paper promotes a kind of theory which is implicitly valued for its practicality in a technological sense. Practical significance is equated with instrumental/technological significance. This technological attitude is reflected in teacher education programs where the need for "practical relevancy" is defined in terms of how best to increase "teacher competency," i.e., for the teacher to be able to apply a variety of techniques to the learning process so that a predetermined set of objectives can be "produced" most efficiently and most effectively. The increase in competency in social studies teaching is viewed as advancing the educator's stock of practical insights in the form of techniques, know-hows, etc., derived from research that is based on nomological propositional theory construction. Within the naturalistic frame empirical information is seen to

instruct the practice of education, and thus, educational research may come to serve the function of promoting the development of social management theory. But of course there is no assurance that greater technological insights derived from research into the essential parameters of teaching-learning will indeed lead to a more authentic insight and to an increased interpersonal understanding among teacher and students, and to their critical awareness of the significance of the form and the content of the social studies curriculum, etc.

The point is that the issues in social education do not necessarily or predominantly lie within the sphere of the technical/instrumental, but rather, they may be seen to lie within the larger scope of the practical as further defined by interpretive, communicative and normative emancipatory interests. Freire (p. 44) pointed out that to every understanding sooner or later an action corresponds. An exclusively instrumental understanding leads to depersonalized technocratic manipulation of the educative situation, but insights which are systematically supplemented by true hermeneutic, communicative and critical understanding eventually will result in humanistic, dialogical and emancipatory action. This involves for many social studies educators entirely new methods of knowing and valuing in the teaching-learning process as well as with respect to the goals, content and methodology of the social studies curriculum. These methods of knowing produce insights and moral orientations of a practical relevancy which is assessed by criteria not inherent to the dominant mode of inquiry and theory construction but consistent with the pretheoretical assumptions and the implicit interests of the particular metascientific orientation. Within respectively the empirical-analytical, the interpretive, and the critical orientations issues arise (a) as practical/technical problems of discovering lawful relationships in the teaching-learning of social studies and of optimizing the effectiveness of the teaching-learning process in the way of achieving specific (behavioral) learning outcomes; (b) issues may be identified in the practical/interpretive sphere of human communication, intersubjective understanding, and recovering the original (historical and cultural) meanings of the life-world; and (c) social studies education may be conceived as a practical/critical problem of emancipatory interest, aiming at the realization of dialogical roles in social studies teaching-learning involving a reflective process of enlightenment, that is, the autonomous

acquisition of a practical/theoretical awareness of social processes and phenomena as human productions of moral consequence. It might be an interesting task to examine current social studies projects for the implicit modes of knowing that they are being employed in the study of man and society. I would suspect, for example, that Bruner's *Man: A Course of Study* is characterized predominantly by empirical-analytical ways of understanding, leading to certain ways of viewing man and the human condition. For instance, in a study of "conflict" the students, armed with data-collecting sheets, develop observational skills by watching children "get into trouble" on the playground. From the data collected the students develop generalizations and predictions about the conditions under which conflict tends to occur, and they are led to reason about the ways in which conflict could be minimized, prevented or controlled. Exercises such as this one, prove the great value of MACOS. However, it should be pointed out that the students' understanding of the idea of conflict could have been greatly increased by supplementing the empirical-analytical inquiry mode with, for example, interpretive procedures of knowing. This would involve systematic analysis and reflection by students of the ways in which "conflict" is experienced and how it acquires personal meanings in specific situations such as just before, during, or after a fight, and how "your body feels" when you sense that a conflict may arise, etc. An imaginative use of personal experiences, social science texts, art, literary sources and other productions of cultural life assist in the examination of human sense making practices and of the typical interpretive devices which people tend to use. For example, students who were involved in such studies quickly discovered the meaning and roles of the interpretive functions of rationalizations, stereotyping, etc. through the personal accounts which people give about the ways they perceive conflict situations. Furthermore, specific instances of conflict can be seen to result from systematically distorted social relationships among individuals and social groups where stereotyping and rationalizations acquire ideological characteristics such as in colonial or racial contexts. Studies of the "meanings" of human experiences together with critical investigations into societal problems could increase students' awareness of taken-for-granted aspects of social life leading to greater mutual understanding of

what they share and how they differ in the cognitive and emotional appropriation of social life. Such a critical/practical approach is being taken in a recently begun Social Education Study by Misgeld and van Manen. This study is seen to be responding to the need for an integrative framework for research and development in social studies, by linking knowledge with practical interests in the application of the theoretical and normative tradition of human science, of a phenomenology of social understanding and of critical social inquiry in addition to the empirical-analytical approach. The concept of social studies which emerges from this approach is described comprehensively as a continuation of activities carried on in social life such as practical reasoning and making sense of social situations and institutions by means of the interpretive practices which members of society employ.

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