ABSTRACT
        The research reported in this document shows how two
junior college counselors perform "explaining what we are doing now"
differently, depending on the social personage or identity of the
student, and identifies the social meaning of different forms of
"explaining what we are doing now." It shows how in formulating,
counselors can say more than they mean or mean more than they say,
implicitly communicating to the student the counselor's expectations
regarding the student's ability to do what he is told to do during
the encounter, to understand advice given, or to achieve a desired
future goal. This report is divided into three sections. Section 1
defines key terms and issues. Section 2 illustrates two types of
formulation--"explicit" and "implicit"--by examples of utterances and
by quantitative summaries of differences in the form of doing
formulation. Section 3 presents implications of our
"micro-ethnographic" analysis of school talk for a general theory on
interethnic relations. (SW)

"Talking to an 'Us' or a 'Them': Differences
in Performing the Speech Function 'Formulation' in
School Counseling Interviews"[1],[2]

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Introduction

This paper has two purposes. First, to show how two junior college

counselors perform "explaining what we are doing now" differently, depending

on the social personage or identity of the student (including but not limited

to the student's ethnicity.) Such explanations have been termed "formulating"

by Garfinkel and Sacks (1971). The second purpose is to identify the

social meaning of different forms of "explaining what we are doing now."

To do this we must locate the speech act formulating in the context

of the whole speech event counseling interview, and consider sociolinguistic

functions of formulation in the conduct of interaction face to face.

We will attempt to show how in formulating, counselors can say more

than they mean or mean more than they say, implicitly communicating to the student

the counselor's expectations of the student's ability to do what he is

told to do during the encounter, to understand advice given, or to achieve a

desired future goal.

The paper has three main sections. In the first, key terms and issues

are defined. In the second section, two types of formulation--"explicit"

and "implicit"--are illustrated by examples of utterances and by quantitative

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summaries of differences in the form of doing formulation. Briefly

noted in the third and final section are implications t our "micro-

ethnographic" analysis of school talk for a general theory of inter-ethnic

relations.

I. DEFINITION OF TERMS

1.1 Explicit and Implicit Formulation

Garfinkel and Sacks use the term formulation to stand for

"conversationalists' practices of saying-in-so-many-words-what-we-are-

doing." (1971: 351) The following quote from a counseling encounter

illustrates formulation in the specific sense of the term: (formulation

is underlined)

> 1)a C: Now ah...as far as next semester, why don't we
> give some thought to ah...to what you'd like to take
> there. Do you plan on continuing along this P.E. major?

In this example the counselor is "decontextualizing" interactional

process. He has attempted to reduce the ambiguity of what-I-want-us-to-

be-doing-now by trying to say so 'n so many words. We characterize this

type of formulation as explicit. In other cases the counselor and student

talk about what-we-are-doing-now without making explicit references to the

meta-conversational content of their talk. We characterize this

as implicit formulation.

> 2)a C: OK, now this sem ster.
>   b S: This semester?
>   c C: English 102?
>   d S: A "C", probably a "C".
>   e C: You are a student here, right?
>   f S: Yeah.
>   g C: (Registered) in the school?
>   h S: I...
>   i C: All right, English 10. ...Right?
>   j S: Yeah.
>   k C: Math?
>   l S: Naw, I didn't take math.

If we were to rewrite the implicit formulations in the passage above to make them explicit we might get the following lines: for 2-b ("This semester?") rewrite "Do you want me to tell you the courses I am taking this semester or the grades in those courses?". For 2-c ("English 102?") rewrite "I want you to tell me the courses you are taking, not the grades." For 2-d (A "C", probably a "C"), rewrite "I'm assuming you want me to tell you my grades rather than the courses I am taking this semester." For 2-e ("You are a student here, right?") rewrite "That (2-d) is the wrong answer. You have been a student here long enough to know that at this point in these interviews I want to know what courses you have taken, not what grades you got in those courses." For 2-g ("in the school?") rewrite "You are still not giving me the right answer. You took my question literally instead of figuratively." For 2-n rewrite "I know I'm doing something wrong but I'm not sure what to do next." For 2-i ('all right...right?') rewrite "All right, let's start over from the beginning. I am telling you to give me course numbers as answers as I ask you if you are now taking English 102... Right?" For 2-k rewrite "By asking you the next question I am telling you that you now are giving the correct answers to the question-answer sequence I want to go through." (Note that question 2-k has the double function of asking for new information and telling the student he gave the correct answer to the previous question.)

Rewriting the formulation utterances to make explicit their meaning is a problematic exercise[1] but to the extent that it is possible in any degree it is only possible by considering the function of the utterance in the total speech event or "language game" There are various terminologies and procedures for doing this that are current in the specialized fields

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[1] The reasons that rewriting is problematic will be considered later in this section.

of "ordirary language philosophy," "generative semantics", and the
"ethnography of speaking" or "sociolinguistics". Some details of these
different analytic schema are mutually inconsistent but there are general
similarities among them. We will sketch the issues and terminologies
in broad strokes below.

1.2 Formulation as an "Illocutionary Act"

J. L. Austin, following the thinking of the late Wittgenstein, made a
distinction between saying things and doing (performing) things saying
things. He distinguished between locutionary and illocutionary a ; (Austin
1962: 98), suggesting that illocution involves the performance of more
than just speaking an utterance. Illocutionary acts are identified by per-
formative verbs, such as asking a question, warning someone, or promising
to do something. Features of social and interactional context as well
as linguistic form are involved in judging whether or not an illocutionary
act has been successfully accomplished, e.g., for a speaker to perform the
correct syntax and phonology in saying a marriage vow, while secretly intending
to get a divorce the next week, is to perform the locution correctly but
not to do the illocution "promising," which for successful performance
involves the extralinguistic considerations of sincerity, lack of coercion,
etc.

> "...we can see that in order to explain what can go wrong with
> statements we cannot just concentrate on the proposition
> involved....as has been done traditionally. We must consider
> the total situation in which the utterance is issued...if we are to
> see the parallel between statements and performative utterances
> and how each can go wrong." (Austin 1962: 18)

By calling for analysis of the illocutionary act in terms of the
total context of speech situation, Austin follows Wittgenstein's notion
of meaning as constituent in the total organization of a lanaguage game.
In the Philosophical Investigations (1958) Wittgenstein comments on the

semantic analysis of words:

> "One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to <u>look at</u>
> its use and learn from that." (Pl, sect. 340)

In <u>The Blue and Brown Books</u> (1958)
He extends the same principle to the analysis of utterances:

> "...Let us see what use we make of such an expression
> as 'This face says something' that is, what the situations
> are in which we use this expression, what sentences would precede or
> follow it (what kind of conversation it is a part of)."

Language games have their own order, but many of them cannot be abstracted from the social world within which the game occurs. This is especially true for illocutionary acts. Searle (1969) refines Austin's notions of the extralinguistic conditions that must be met in order that an illocutionary act be performed successfully. Here are the linguistic and extralinguistic conditions involved in performing the illocutionary act <u>promising</u> sincerely and non-defectively (Searle 1969: 57-59):

> "1. Normal input and output conditions obtain (both
>   know language, are not deaf, etc.)
>
> 2. S(speaker) expresses the proposition that p in the utterance
>   of T (sentence)
>
> 3. In expressing that p, S predicates a future act A of S
>
> 4. H (hearer) would prefer S's doing A to his not doing A,
>   and S believes H would prefer his doing A to his not doing A
>
> 5. It is not obvious to both S and H that S will do A in the
>   normal course of events.
>
> 6. S intends to do A (sincerity condition)
>
> 7. S intends that the utterance of T will place him under
>   an obligation to do A (essential condition)
>
> 8. S intends (i-I) to produce in H the knowledge (K) that
>   the utterance of T is to count as placing S under an
>   obligation to do A. S intends to produce K by means
>   of the recognition of (i-I) and he intends (i-I) to be
>   recognized in virtue of (by means of) H's knowledge of
>   the meaning of T.

9. The semantic rules of the dialect spoken by S and
   H are such that T is correctly and sincerely uttered
   if and only if conditions 1-8 obtain."

Searle identifie four rule types as conditions for characterizing such

rules as 1-9 above: (a) rules for propositional content, (b) Preparatory

condition, (c) sincerity condition, and (d) essential condition. All conditions

must be met for the indefectible performance of an illocutionary act.

In addition to the typology of consitutive rules for illocutionary

acts, Searle presents a typology of acts (1969: 66-67). Two of his types are

"advising" and "warning". The speech function we are concerned with

in this paper--formulation--can be either advice or warning, or both at

once. Here are Searle's conditions for the illocutionary acts advise

and warn (1969: 67).

	Advise	Warn
Propositional content	Future act A of H (hearer).	Future event or state, etc., E.
Preparatory condition	1. H has some reason to believe A will benefit H.	1. H has reason to believe E will occur and is not in H's interest.
	2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H will do A in the normal course of events.	2. It is not obvious to both S and H that E will occur.
Sincerity condition	S believes A will benefit H	S believes E is not in H's best interest.
Essential condition	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that A is in H's best interest.	Counts as an undertaking to the effect that E is not in H's best interest.

Contrary to what one might
suppose advice is not a species
of requesting. It is interest-
ing to compare "advise" with
"urge," "advocate," and "re-
commend." Advising you is
not trying to get you to do
something in the sense that
requesting is. Advising is
more like telling you what
is best for you.

Warning is like advising, rather
than requesting. It is not,
I think, necessarily an attempt
to get you to take evasive action.
Notice that the above account
is of categorical not hypo-
thetical warnings. Most warnings
are probably hypothetical: "If
you do not do X then Y will occur."

1.3   The Notion of Presupposition

The underlying conditions can also be termed presuppositions

and were so termed by Austin (1962: 48ff). This seems to be the

preferred term of the generative semanticists associated with Fillmore.

Keenan, for example, defines presuppositions as "those conditions that

the world must meet in order for the sentence to make literal sense."

(Keenan 1971: 45). Presupposition as used by Austin and Searle refers only

to the necessary conditions for the nondefectible performance of an illocutionary

act. According to Garner (1971: 38-40) Fillmore uses presupposition more

loosely to include non-necessary conditions, or speaker implication (see

also Grice, 1961). Garner terms this the presupposition of sentences

(Utterance acts) rather than of the analytic construct illocutionary act.

While this may be bad logic we think it is appropriate for sociolinguistic

semantic analysis, because the semantic complexity of natural language produced

in actual speech situations cannot be comprehended by the logical models

of ordinary language philosophy.

Searle himself refers to the semantic complexity of actual speech in

actual speech situations in the following example (Searle 1969: 70):

> "...It is important to realize that one and the same utterance may
> constitute the performance of several different illocutionary acts...
> suppose at a party a wife says 'it's really quite late.' That
> utterance may be at one level a statement of fact; to her inter-
> locutor, who has just remarked on how early it was, it may be (and
> be intended as) an objection to her husband; it may be (and be intended
> as) a suggestion or even a request('Let's go home') as well as
> a warning ('You'll feel rotten in the morning if you don't')."

Despite this complexity, Searle asserts earlier in his work that

although we can mean more than we say, "whatever can be meant can be said."

He terms this the principle of expressibility (Searle 1969: 19):

"even in cases where it is in fact impossible to say exactly
what I mean it is in principle possible to come to be able
to say exactly what I mean. I can in principle if not in
fact increase my knowledge of the language...or I can...
enrich the language by introducing new terms or other devices into
it...For any meaning X and any speaker S whenever S means
(intends to convey, wishes to communicate in an utterance, etc.) X
then it is possible that there is some expression E such that
E is an exact expression of or formulation of X. Symbolically
(s) (X) (S means X $\rightarrow$ F ($\exists$E) (E is an exact expression of X)."

1.4 "A Principle of Inexpressibility" in Natural Language

The principle of expressibility overlooks crucial sociolinguistic

facts. First, given that natural language is produced in interaction be-

tween at least two persons, any attempt by speaker A to explain what he

is saying communicates something new about the social relationship be-

tween Speaker A and Speaker B, i.e, any attempt to clarify referential meaning

has social meaning. No matter how definite a speaker becomes in trying

to say what he means, he continuously adds social meaning by implication[1]

in his attempts to explain himself.

Second, the natural language produced in face-to-face interaction

is inherently indexical, and therefore to some extent ambiguous. This is

the point made by Moerman (1969,   in his critique of semantic elicitation

techniques in cognitive anthropology. It is also the central tenet of the

ethnomethodologists--Garfinkel and his associates.

In their article on formulation, Garfinkel and Sacks maintain

that all attempts to explain face to face what-we-are-doing/meaning are

inherently problematic (Garfinkel and Sacks 1971: 353):

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[1] In Cicourel's terms (1972 the social relationship between speakers
is always dynamic--role and status are continuously being renegotiated,
implicitly as well as explicitly. In Goffman's terms, (1959: 1)   definition
of situation is continuously changing in subtle ways.

"...in that formulations consist of glosses, and in that the
properties that formulations exhibit as notational 1. plays....
are properties of indexical expressions, the very resources of
natural language assure that doing formulating is itself for
members a routine source of complaints. faults, troubles,
and recommended remedies, essentially."

In Searle's terms, the essential ambiguity of utterance acts by
which speakers attempt to perform the illocutionary act explaining/formulating
cause the performance of explaining/formulating to be defectible to some
degree in every case.

We maintain, with Garfinkel that given essentially contexted nature of
speech face to face, the conduct of face to face interaction necessarily
involves speaker implication--indeed is constituted by speaker implication,
and that therefore to study natural language what we must examine is not only
the necessary (presupposed) conditions underlying utterance acts, but the
non-necessary (implied) conditions as well.

·This means not only that as members of encounters we can never say what
we mean in so many words, but that as researchers we can never be sure
what informants meant in their attempts to explain what they meant to each
other. Our attempts to rewrite what they say on the basis of logical con-
siderations (presupposition) cannot exhaust the full potential meaning
of their utterances (presupposition plus implication).

1.5 Formulation in the Perspective of "Ethnography of Speaking"

We have reviewed terminology and issues in the study of illocutionary
acts by philosophers of language to illustrate the complexity of semantic
judgments interlocutors must make in understanding the meaning of advising
or warning or formulating. But actual speakers in everyday life do not
perform illocutionary acts. They perform what Searle terms utterance
acts. These are what Hymes (1962) terms speech acts, which are components

of speech events that occur in and are semantically embedded in speech situations.

Searle's example of the sentence a woman could say at a party, "It's really quite late," would be characterized by Hymes as a speech act. The meaning of the speech act varies, in terms of who the speaker is as a social person to various hearers--conversational partner, guest, wife.[1]

Examples such as Searle's illustration how different referential (and social) meanings can be communicated by the same linguistic form to different hearers, depending on their social relationship with the speaker. Blom and Gumperz (1972) consider how the same speaker and hearer can convey different social meanings through using different linguistic forms. They studied "code-switchin g"within the same speech event (a conversation between fellow villagers)--switching back and forth between the syntacically different language forms of "standard" Norwegian and "nonstandard" local dialect. The non-standard and standard language forms were employed for different topics (which varied in degree of intimacy, c.f. Simmel, 1950: 126) and for communicating changes in the ongoing social relationship of rights and obligations between speakers. Blom and Gumperz term these changes "situational shifts" (1972: 424-426).

For our speech event, "school gatekeeping encounter" the findings of Blom and Gumperz suggest that differences in the language form by which formulation is attempted may indicate changes in the social relationship between speakers--either changes across time in the same interview due to renegotiation of role and status (Cicourel, op. cit.), or to differences in social relationship from one interview to another according to the social personage of each interviewee.

[1] This is the situational factor "sender" notes by Hymes.(1962)

This led us to a number of researchable questions:

1. What aspects of the social personage (social identity) of interviewees vary from one interview to another?

2. What aspects of the form of language and interactional process employed in doing explicit and implicit formulation vary from one interview to another?

3. What is the relationship between variation in (1) and in (2)?

One aspect of language form that seemed to vary according to social personage was the form of advising/warning by giving commands. The first example presented earlier illustrates one form of command:

Example 1) C: <u>Why don't be give some thought to ah...</u> <u>to what you'd like to take there</u> (next semester).

The syntactic form for this imperative is an interrogative--a why-question. Green (n.d.) terms this use of the syntax of a request to issue a command as a "wh-imperative." She argues that requests presuppose that the speaker does not have authority over the hearer, and that the hearer has a number of options available to choose from (including the option of refusing to fulfill the request.) Conversely, imperatives presuppose authority by the speaker over the hearer.

It seems to us that for a speaker with authority over the hearer (counselor) to use successfully the why-question form in performing a speech function inconsistent with that form (a command), there must be a contextual "reading" of meaning by the hearer that involves the speaker. The whimperative is a role-distancing device (c.f. Goffman 1961:105-106) by which a social super-ordinate can "say" to a subordinate "I am a person with authority over you, but I choose to act as if I didn't, thereby telling you to regard me as 'nice.'" The illocutionary force of "pledging niceness" can be vitiated by distrust

in the hearer. So it is risky to attempt an indefectible performance of a whimperative in speech situations in which the hearer is likely to distrust the speaker. Yet it is precisely in these situations of potential distrust that we may want to say to the other, "Trust me."

We consider the use of a whimperative in such social situations as a "damaged metaphorical" shift (c.f. Gumperz, ibid.), or a twisted meta-message (c.f. Bateson, 1955). [1] The white counselors quoted in Example 1 employed whimperatives only in encounters with students whose social personage (Black) included membership in a social group whose members are conventionally considered likely to distrust white people. In encounters with white students the counselor gave commands in imperative linguistic form.

1.6 Some aspects of Social Personage--Ethnicity, Pan-ethnicity, and Co-membership

Ethnicity (actually ethnicity/race) is one of the social identification classes for persons according to which variations in formulation style were examined. We mean by "ethnicity" the nontechnical American definition--member-ship in a nationality or racial group. Ethnic categories represented in the examples reported in this paper include Italian-American, Irish-American, and Black American.

Ethnic group membership is only one aspect of the social identity ("status set," "cumulative status") presented face to face. Other attributes of status include organizational terms for definition such as "last year student", 2nd year student", "student with 3.5 grade average." Parsons (1951) terms these universalistic attributes

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[1] In the example given "why don't we give some thought," it is also interesting that the speaker, who is white, uses the pronoun of solidarity("we," c.f. Brown and Gilman, 1960) in talking to a student who is Black. This additional metaphoric content produces a "double-double" message.

of status.

In addition, particularistic attributes of status other than ethnicity were always revealed by the counselor and the student, some-times inadvertently, othertimes intentionally and strategically (c.f. Barth, 1969). One such particularistic attribute we termed "pan-ethnicity." This is a more generalized identification category than ethnicity. It tends to predict, with some exceptions, a combination of nationality/ race, social class, residence, and religious affiliation. One pan-ethnic category in our sample was "white ethnic people" (Italian,Polish, Irish-Americans who tend to be lower-middle or middle class and to live in neighborhoods near the outer rim of the city or in non-elite suburbs, and tend to be members of the Roman Catholic Church). The other pan-ethnic category was "Third World people" (Black, Puerto Rican, and Mexican-Americans who tend to be working class or unemployed "underclass," reside nearer the center of the city, and tend to be Protestant, in the case of Blacks, or members of the Roman Catholic Church, in the case of Latins.) Members of a pan-ethnic category may be culturally different (Italian/ Polish, Black/Mexican) but socially similar in terms of rank, residence, recency of arrival, etc.

Folk terminology ("Third World," 'Middle American") tends to support the "emic" validity of our notion of pan-ethnicity as an analytic construct. In addition, for the 82 gatekeeping encounters in our total sample, pan-ethnicity predicts such outcomes of the encounter as "friendliness", "special help", and "interaction process symmetry" better than does ethnicity.[1]

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[1]This suggests that other factors in addition to cultural sharing are accounting for the treatment received by interviewees. This finding and its implications are discussed in detail in Erickson 1973a, 1973b, and 1973c.

One more class of attributes of status seemed to affect the micro social structure of the encounter, and to predict differences in formulation style. This was an identification class even more generalized than that of pan-ethnicity. We termed this social category "co-membership" and ranked encounters in our sample as "low," "medium," or "high" in co-membership. "Co-membership" refers to particularistic commonalities between two speakers that may include ethnicity, cultural similarity, or social rank but may also transcend them. Co-membership is often not initially obvious to participants in an encounter (as is race and often ethnicity). Examples of the "leakage" of co-membership during face to face interaction would be (1) an Irish-American counselor and a Chicano student both revealing that they had attended the same parochial school, or (2) an Italian-American counselor revealing that he had been a high school wrestling coach and a Polish student revealing that he was on the junior college wrestling team.

Neither of these attributes of status (the "old school tie," and "wrestling") are "ethnic" but both are particularistic. Neither are defined by the universalistic rules of the junior college as relevant interactional "resources" within the frame of the gatekeeping encounter. Indeed the "leakage" of such particularistic attributes of status as ethnicity, pan-ethnicity, or co-membership is proscribed by the formal organization's charter, as found in the junior college catalogue. Yet ethnicity, pan-ethnicity, and co-membership seem to affect the treatment received by students and the form of language employed by counselors more than any universalistic attributes of student status, such as grades and test scores.

II.

EXAMPLES OF EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT FORMULATION

2.1 Variations in the Use of Explicit Formulation

One counselor at a public junior college ("Fulton Junior College") used formulation differently in advising different students to check for further information about something the students should do or wanted to do. Language form varied according to the social personage of the student, specifically the student's pan-ethnicity and co-membership (for this Irish-American counselor there were no intra-ethnic interviews, so for him we have only pan-ethnic comparisons).

In the first example the student was Black (inter pan-ethnic encounter) and the co-membership was "low". The counselor did explicit formulation using a whimperative:

> 3) a C: OK...if you want to stay in the medical field
>   have you examined what areas in the medical
>   field you could go into?...uh with a college degree?
>   b S: ...No...
>   c C: May I suggest that you do that?
>   d S: ...Well you...do you...("What do you mean, 'that'?")
>   e C: A sstr...with a...with a straight...a college degree
>   ...what...areas of medicine you could go into or what
>   areas in the field of medicine you could go into?
>   ("I mean what I just said in 3-a")
>   f S: Yeah... (spoken without paralinguistic markers of
>   agreement or enthusiasm)

In the next example the student was Polish-American (intra pan-ethnic encounter) and the co-membership was "medium". The counselor begins with an altered whimperative (or"what-perative") formulation ("What I would suggest") and then changes it to a straight imperative ("Check with her"):

> 4) a C: ---(indicates editorial omission) inasmuch as you've
>   had English 101 and Math 101, uh...what I would suggest
>   that you take, uh...would be English 102 which is a
>   ...sequence to 101---you say you're not doing too
>   well in math right now?

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b S:  No.
c C:  Mmhm, probably when...what I would suggest you do
      is check with your teacher and uh...see what...
      who do you have this semester?
d S:  Uh...I can't think; a...Steinitz.
e C:  Steinitz, ah...check with her and ask her what her
      ideas are with regards to either going on---in Math 102
      or whether she thinks it might be advantageous for
      you to move from Math 101 to 103...Okay?
f S:  Okay.
```

A few speaking turns earlier in the same encounter two more explicit

formulations occur, both semi-direct commands--one, in the form of "let me give

you" another a comment by the counselor on his suggestion that the student

consider transfering from Fulton Junior College to a four year school of lower

rank ("Catholic U.") rather than to a higher ranking school ("State"):

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4-1) a  C:  ...Let me give you another reason for not going
            to State. (both laugh)...ah...State's business
            school...is ah...very, very tough on transfer
            courses from Fulton--as far as, you know, directly
            transferring from Fulton to State you couldn't
            do it---whereas a school like Catholic U., I...
            I'm kinda pushing Catholic U. (both laugh) it
            sounds like it anyhow, uh...is...uh...going to
            be much more liberal in their transfer policy,
            so you might want to investigate this.
```

Here the counselor follows his formulating comment "I'm kinda pushing

Catholic U" with another masked command in slightly different form than

a whimperative, indicated above by a broken dotted line. ("You might want

to investigate" can be rewritten as an imperative.)

In the next example the student was Polish-American and the co-membership

was "high." Rather than using whimperative formulations or "might want to"

imperatives the counselor urges the student simply and directly to check

on transfer requirements:

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5) a  C:  --one of the things you could do is check.
   b  S:  Yeah  I will...I gonna get in on that.
   c  C:  Please do that, because the sooner you know,
          the easier it's gonna be for you to make a
          decision---
                *            *              *
      S:  I'm trying for the "A" in there...I'm trying,
          I'm bustin' for it.
      C:  Okay, please do me one favor and check with State.
```

In performing commands directly the counselor has simplified the micro-social structure of the encounter by not attempting to mask his authority over the student by role distancing. In addition he communicates that his exercise of authority over the student is beneficent, by showing personal concern for the student's outcomes, adding "Please do that--do me one favor" to the command "Check with State."

The quotes from the three different encounters illustrate different means of telling a student to do something. When the student was a fellow pan-ethnic with high co-membership (Example 5) tne Irish-American counselor used direct commands and no formulation. When the student was a fellow pan-ethnic but with medium co-membership (examples 4 and 4-1) the counselor employed mixed forms for commands--direct commands, altered whimperatives, and an explicit formulation that editorialized on the directness of his urging. When the student was not a fellow pan-ethnic and had low co-membership (Example 3) the counselor used an explicit formulation in pure whimperative form ("May I suggest that you do that?"

The first example of formulation presented in the paper comes from another inter pan-ethnic, low co-membership encounter between the same Irish-American counselor and a different Black student. Again, the "whimperative" is employed.

> 1) a C: Now, as far as next semester...Why don't we
> give some though to ah...to what you'd
> like to take there---

In contrast, in an encounter between this counselor and yet another Black student with whom the counselor has medium co-membership, we find the same lack of formulation and directness of commands that characterized

example 5 in which the student was Polish-American with high co-

membership. The counselor is discussing the student's transfer to a

four year school, a transfer planned for the next fall.

> 6) a C: If you find that you're gonna...that you're gonna
>   have to come back here, please stop in and see...give me
>   a buzz during the summer
>   b S: Okay
>   c C: The minute you find out definitely...from Southeastern
>   State that you won't be accepted...let me know
>   or...conversely if you find out that you are going
>   to be accepted I'd like to know that too, but
>   there isn't nearly the a...the necessity. Okay?

Here the commands are direct ("stop in and see--give me a buzz--let

me know"). The counselor has authority over the student and will use

it to help him (the counselor has another job for the summer and so corrects

"stop in" to "give me a buzz", which presupposes that the student has

the counselor's home telephone number.) (He did in fact have it.) Before,

during, and after this interview the counselor had gone out of his way to

be helpful to this student in a benevolent, albeit patronizing way.

Notice also that the counselor communicates the expectation that the student

might not be admitted to four year school ("the minute you find out

definitely--that you won't be accepted"). Because the expectation is com-

municated explicitly, however, the counselor is in touch with it, and corrects

himself ("conversely if you find out that you are going to be accepted--").

In Example 3, from the low-comembership encounter with a Black

student illustrated earlier the counselor communicates low expectations,

but does it implicitly through formulating by whimperative: Because

the expectation is communicated through syntax rather than lexicon the counselor

may be unaware of what he is doing.

> 3) a C: ---have you examined what areas in the medical
>   field you could go into?
>   S: ...No...

c C: May I suggest that you do that?("By my
metaphoric way of explaining that you should
have looked into this before coming to see me
I am telling you that you are a person who
does not know what he is doing")

The student commented on this passage while watching a video-
tape of his encounter with the counselor:

3a) Student Viewing Session Comment
S: I think that uh...right there instead of
telling me that uh...asking me and I
checked into uh...what kind fields I could
go in with a straight degree I think he
shoulda then maybe given me a few suggestions
like saying well, ah...you can go on to
become a pediatrician, or...obstetrician...
things like this instead of ah asking
me had I checked into it and telling me...
that I should check into it---

The student has interpreted "May I suggest that you do that?"

as telling, not requesting or suggesting. The counselor's low expectations

are made explicit later in the interview, when he suggests that the stu-

dent (who had originally said he was interested in "something in the field

of medicine", a strategically vague opener) become a male nurse with a

four year degree.

After suggesting the male nurse career option (to which the student

responded noncommitally), re-suggesting it, and advising toward it

even though the student did not show interest nonverbally or verbally,

the counselor then editorialized on what he had been doing in a

formulation analogous to the one in Example 4-1 (Polish-American student

with medium co-membership) "I'm kinda pushing Catholic U---":

3-1) a C: (long silence) You're gonna...uh...if you're
thinking of goin on...or if you're thinking
of nursing...as I'm think of nursing (student
laughs slightly)for you. But if you ever start
thinking of nursing...you're gonna find th...some of
the courses that you're taking here are probably

> not the appropriate courses that you should be taking.
> (What I am saying is that not only are you not
> going to make it in medicine; you may have difficulty
> getting into a four year school at all.")

In summary, the amount and the style of explicit formulation used by the counselor in the examples presented here, varies according to the pan-ethnic status of the student, and according to the amount of co-membership with the student. Co-membership occasionally over-rides pan-ethnicity, as in example 4 in which the Polish-American student was of the same pan-ethnic class as the counselor (and the counselor used formulation and whimperative) but had "medium" co-membership, and in example 6, in which the Black student was of a different pan-ethnic class ("Third World") from the counselor but had medium co-membership. In that case the counselor did not use formulation or whimperative.

2.2 Implicit Formulation as Indexical Repair

As Garfinkel and Sacks use the term, <u>formulation</u> refers to trying-to-say-in-so-many-words-what-we-are-doing-now. It is an explanation that one is explaining what he means; an attempt to repair the indexicality of talk face to face, which as Garfinkel and Sacks maintain, is inherently and essentially indexical.[1]

In a more general sense, <u>formulation</u> can be taken to mean <u>any</u> <u>attempt to repair the indexicality of talk face to face</u>, whether or not the indexical repair is labeled as such by the attempt to state it in-so-many-words. <u>Implicit formulation</u>, then, can refer to any attempt at indexical repair that is not stated in-so-many-words, such as our example 2:

---

[1] "Indexicality" refers to the inherent property of language as ambiguous. Lexical items, like items in an index, refer to much more "meaning" or "information" than the items state in-so-many-words (or morphemes, or information bits). "Indexical repair" then, is an attempt to state more explicitly more of that to which a lexical item or phrase refers, e.g., this footnote is an attempt at indexical repair. Indexical repair can also be an attempt to restate the same "amount" of meaning metaphorically, as in example 2 . For further discussion, see Bar-Hillel 1952.

```
2) a C:  OK, now this semester.
     S:  This semeste ? ("What should I be doing?")
     C:  English 102?  ("Give me course numbers")
     S:  A "C", probably a "C".
     C:  You are a student here, right?  ("You have been
         around long enough to know the routine--course numbers
         before grades")
```

It seems to us that such implicit formulations have social meaning. For

a speaker to explain something just said or direct the conversation by

not saying in-so-many-words that he is doing explaining or directing

and for the speaker to present the explanation itself in indexical form, may

be a way of saying to the hearer "You are 'one of us'--a person who under-

stands things without my having to tell you in-so-many-words." Stating

implicitly a formulation or explanation presupposes a hearer capable of under-

standing what was said (provided that Searle's "sincerity" condition

obtains, and the speaker is not attempting to confuse or mystify the hearer.

or say to him "You are an outsider" by producing an unintelligible utterance.)

If we are correct in our assumption that formulation/explanation

always presupposes and therefore implies in performance some kind of social

distance between speaker and hearer (because "among us such things go

without saying"), then we would expect to see less indexical repair,

explicit or implicit, among persons similar to one another on some dimension,

such as ethnicity, pan-ethnicity, or co-membership. On the other hand,

persons who are very similar along one social dimension but different in

terms of organizational membership position (one of them a "counselor"

member, the other a "student" member) might do more explanation/formulation

(the counselor would want to be especially sure the student understood

the questions asked).

2.3 A "Double Hypothesis" for Indexical Repairs

Following this line of reasoning one would expect that there would

be more formulation/explanation in inter-ethnic and low co-membership encounters,

and also in intra-ethnic and high co-membership encounters. (Actually,

we would expect more _formulat on_ inter-ethnically and more _explanation_

intra-ethnically, but the data available from the two counselors used as

examples here did not permit this comparison). We tested this "bi-modal"

hypothesis on a sample of encounters between 13 students and two counselors.

When the number of all indexical repairs was totaled for each encounter

we found that overall there was more indexical repair inter ethnically

and inter pan-ethnically, and also that there was more indexical repair in

those encounters ranked _high_ and _low_ in co-membership than in those

encounters ranked _medium_ in co-membership. Thus both propositions in

our slightly unorthodox hypothesis were confirmed. The following

tables illustrate the findings and the stylistic differences between the

two counselors. (All the utterance examples presented earlier have

been from the counselor designated "1" in the tables, except example

2, which is from the counselor designated "2".)

INSTANCES OF INDEXICAL REPAIR

Counselor 1

	(n)	% of Lines in Transcript	Average # of repairs	Average length of repairs (lines of transcript)	Average # of repairs initiated by		Average length of repairs initiated by	
					Student	Counselor	Student	Counselor
Pan-ethnic	(2)	52	15.0	4.1	5.0	10.0	3.5	4.5
Inter Pan-ethnic	(3)	65	17.3	3.1	5.3	12.0	2.6	3.4
High Co-Membership	(1)	55	18.0	3.8	8	10	3.5	4.0
Medium Co-Membership	(2)	53	13.0	3.3	2.5	11.5	3.0	3.4
Low Co-Membership	(2)	66	15.0	3.5	6.5	12.5	2.6	3.9
	5							

Counselor 2

	(n)	% of Lines in Transcript	Ave # of repairs	Ave length of repairs	Ave # of repairs initiated by		Ave length of repairs initiated by	
					Student	Counselor	Student	Counselor
... ethnic	(5)	32	8.2	4.6	3.4	4.8	4.5	4.8
... r Ethnic	(3)	39	9.0	4.7	3.7	5.3	3.6	5.4
High Co-Mem.	(2)	30	11.5	4.1	5.5	6	4.2	4.3
Medium Co-Mem.	(3)	32	6.0	4.3	2.3	3.7	4.7	4.1
Low Co-Mem.	(3)	40	9.0	5.3	3.3	5.7	3.7	6.2
	8							

Both Counselors Combined

	(n)	% of Lines in Transcript	Ave # of repairs	Ave length of repairs	Ave # of repairs initiated by		Ave length of repairs initiated by	
					Student	Counselor	Student	Counselor
High Co-Mem.	(3)	37	13.7	4.0	6.3	7.3	3.9	4.2
Medium Co-Mem.	(5)	40	8.8	3.8	2.4	6.4	4.0	3.7
Low Co-Mem.	(5)	50	13.0	4.2	4.6	8.4	3.1	4.8
Overall	13	42	11.5	4.0	4.2	7.4	3.6	4.3

2.4 Examples of Implicit and Explicit Formulation from Counselor 2

Indexicality can be repaired explicitly or implicitly. The second counselor, an Italian-American, tended to use implicit indexical repair with students who were also Italian-American. He used explicit indexical repair more frequently with Polish-American students (for this counselor we do not have any examples of inter pan-ethnic encounters).

Characteristically, after beginning the interview by asking the student to fill out a schedule card Counselor 2 would give an ambiguous command, "OK, this semester..." This command, framed as an explicit formulation, might read "OK, at this point in the interview I want to know what courses you are taking this semester. Since I have here in front of me a list of the courses you registered for I will read off the list and you tell me whether or not you are taking the course."

In the next example, in an interview with a Polish-American student who has medium co-membership with the counselor, the ambiguity of "OK, this semester..." is repaired explicitly by the counselor.

```
7) a C:  --OK, this semester....English 102?
   b S:  You mean, uh...
   c C:  No, no....these are the courses you're taking
   d S:  Yes.
   e C:  English 102, Engineering 131...
   f S:  Yes.
```

The same need for indexical repair occurs in an encounter with an Italian-American student, with whom the counselor has high co-membership.

Indexical repair is conducted implicitly by the counselor, and repair attempts are continued in the implicit form appropriate for organizational "insiders" even though the student shows he is having trouble understanding. This is the now familiar Example 2.

```
2) a C:  OK, now this semester.
   b S:  This semester? ("Grades or courses?")
   c C:  English 102? ("Give me courses")
   d S:  A "C", probably a "C".
```

    e C: <u>You are a student here, right</u>? ("As an insider
        you are supposed to know these routines without
        my telling you")
    f S: Yeah.
    g C: (registered) <u>in the school</u>? ("I meant the last
        question figuratively, not literally")
    h S: <u>I...</u>("I don't know what to do next")
    i C: <u>All right</u>, English 102...<u>Right</u>? ("Say 'yes' to courses")
    j S: Yeah.
    k C: <u>Math</u>? ("Your last answer was correct and now I will go on")

A bit earlier in the same encounter implicit indexical repair

takes place, this time as a response by the student to an implicit command

for more information about why the student failed a course.

    2-1) a C: Data Processing 111?
        b S: An "F."
        c C: <u>That's your major, data processing--right</u>? ("Tell
           me why you got an 'F'")
        d S: Yeah, well I was ...I just talked with him and he said
           it was 'cause of excessive absences.
        e C: <u>Good for you, good for you</u>. Math 101? ("What I am
           telling you is that's <u>not</u> good, but at least you
           didn't fail because you couldn't do the work.
           Now back to the question-answer sequence.")

Despite the student's failure outside the encounter in the classroom the

counselor does not preach him a sermon on the intrinsic goodness of performing

the student role well. A few moments later the student "fails" within

the frame of the encounter itself, by not understanding the question-

answer routine about <u>courses this semester</u> (Example 2-a through k). In

the very next utterance (1) the student reveals something else wrong

about his performance outside the encounter--he didn't take math.

Here the counselor performs indexical repair and formulation explicitly--

this could be serious:

    2-2) k C: Math?
        l S: Naw, I didn't take math.
        m C: <u>Did you register for it</u>? ("I am checking to
           be sure you are not in trouble)
        n S: No...I registered for speech instead of Math 'cause I.
        o C: <u>No, we don't have to drop your math class now</u>.

> You're not registered. <u>See if you're registered</u>
> <u>in it and you don't attend you're gonna receive an "F"</u>
> <u>at the end of the semester.</u> ("I'm still asking to be
> sure you are not in trouble.")

p S: Naw, I didn't even get a class card for it.

q C: OK, all right. Data Processing 112?

r S: Yeah, I have that.

s C: (Data Processing) 115?

t S: Yeah.

u C: All right, what else?

v S: And speech--I wanna drop that.

w C: <u>Pardon me...You're all right, Sal..</u> (student laughs)
> when you gonna start working on that..<u>Let's check out</u>
> <u>all your grades here</u>--("By the pauses and my "all right"
> I am saying that you are a rapscallion who has been here
> in this junior college for five years and still hasn't
> graduated, but I like you. And by going on to total up
> your grades I am telling you othat I am going to let you
> get by again with taking fewer than the minimum required
> courses, and that I am letting you get by with it without
> preaching you a sermon on it.")

Here, despite "failure" outside and inside the frame of the encounter,

the student is still given "special help" (waiving or bending organizational

rules), and is given it indexically, as an insider. Explicit formulation

is employed ("See if you're registered--") to be sure the student is not in

bureaucratic difficulty. It is also employed ("Let's check out all you

grades here--") to indicate the start of a new routine, instead of

continuation in the previous routine, the next subroutine (or "slot") of

which could have been a sermon on the student's transgressions.

The student referred to 2-2w when he watched his interview on video-

tape:

> 2-3) I really feel at ease because he's..he always seems to be
> joking with me. That's one good point right there. 'Cause
> ..like my mind is clear. Usually when I go in for an interview
> or anything my mind is kind of fuzzy, 'cause you know I'm ner-
> vous and everything, but he makes me feel at ease.. I can
> get what I want. 'Cause usually when I go in there I
> already know what I want, and sort of like it's a channel,
> you know, I'm going through.

This cordiality is in sharp contrast to another interview by the

same counselor with a Polish-American student with whom he has low co-member-

ship. Here indexical repair and formulation is done in a hostile manner.

8) a C: All right, now choose...two courses from your
        general ed.
   b S: Choose two of these courses.
   c C: Right..any two of those courses.
   d S: Can I ask for what?
   e C: ...Could you ask for what?...For next semester...
        For September.
   f S: Oh, OK.

Again with the same student later in the interview:

8-1) a C: All right, now let's have an elective..let's have a
          couple of electives..Do you want any more Business courses?
          (Nonverbal assent from student) All right, you want
          Business Law? Marketing? Uhhh...
     b S: You might as...uh Business Law?
     c C: Why Business Law?
     d S: I'm..Well I..I guess wouldn't you want..i you wanna
          ever ge in..I'm thinking some time maybe about getting
          my own business..You know and uh..you'll know more about
          it if you take Business Law..
     e C: Just so you don't choose it because I said it.
          ("I'm telling you implicitly you need to assure me
          that you really want to take it.")
     f S: No..oh that's what I..I'm saying it because of that
          ("What I just said in line d is what I really meant")
     g C: Well, so far 3, 6, 9, 12, 13 hours..("By counting
          the hours out loud I am telling you that your last
          answer was satisfactory and that we are now moving
          on into a new routine.")

The "Just so you don't choose it because I said it" is an editorial

on the interviewer's coerciveness that is reminiscent of Counselor 1's comment

in 3-1 ("--or rather as I'm thinking of nursing for you.").

One final example of "hostile" means of repairing indexicality and

doing formulation implicitly occurs still later in the same interview with

the Polish-American student with low co-membership:

8-1) a C: You took a lot of remedial courses here.
     b S: I know that's what hurt me.
     c C: Well no it didn't hurt you..It kept (student overlaps
          next line here) ("I'm telling you that 8-1 b was the
          wrong answer")
     d S: No it didn't hurt me, it helped me
     e C: --its preparing you for next few years. .You know
          without these remediation courses you may not be
          here..agree?
     f S: I agree.

In summary, the amount of indexical repairs used by counselors in the above examples does not vary according to the pan ethnic status of the student or according to the amount of co-membership with the student. (See the tables at the end of section 2-3.) The aspect of indexical repairs which does vary according to the amount of co-membership the counselor had with the student is the style the counselor used in repairing indexicality.[1] The counselor repaired indexicality using implicit formulation in high co-membership interviews, as in examples 2, 2-1, and 2-2. In low co-membership interviews, the counselor repaired indexicality using explicit formulation, as in examples 8, 8-1 and 8-2.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF INTERACTION AND INTER-ETHNIC RELATIONS

We have reported differences in the frequency and style of formulation done by school counselors and students in urban junior college in the United States. These differences, while interesting in themselves, also have more general theoretical implications. Our findings relate closely to the symbolic interactionist model for inter-ethnic relations proposed by Barth (1969).

Following Barth and Goffman (1961) we have made a number of assumptions. First, we assume that in order for interaction to take place, individuals confronting each other face to face need to know "who they are" as social persons. Second, we assume that in encounters

---

[1] The number of examples used to make this point is very small. The data contain many more examples which illustrate this point, but these could not be included because of limitations of time and space. These examples are being compiled in an appendix, which will be available at a future date from the authors.

between strangers in complex polyethnic societies, "who we are" can be
problematic especially at the beginning of an encounter. Third, we
assume that part cipants in institutionalized encounters between
strangers begin with a few "givens" around which roles can be constructed
--some persons are superordinate, others subordinate, some possess
information and author ty and represent organizational interests, others
seel informat on or the disposition of their individual case in a way that
maximizes the'r person 1 interest. Fourth, we assume that in most
developed soc eties, universalistic relevance rules apply to bureaucratic
encounters. These rul s prescribe attending to such particularistic
attributes of status a ethnicity, race, sex, and religious affiliation.
They forbid constructi 3 one's own role vis a vis another in terms of
these particularistic aspects of social personage. (A counselor's
relationship of rights and obligations with a student, for example, is
supposed to be constructed only around such universalistic attributes
of status as grades, test scores, academic program, and courses and
course sequences completed.)

But the "givens" with which an encounter begins, such as
superordination/subordination and student grades, do not exhaust all the
options by which roles can be constructed or situations defined. In
actual practice the roles that develop face to face are much more complex;
differentiated according to particularistic aspects of social personage
that are formally proscribed by universalistic relevance rules, yet that
become extremely important features of definition of situation. These
additional aspects of personage are discovered by participants during
the course of an encounter. It may be that face to face interaction cannot

proceed without being grounded in particularistic attributes of status
--these attributes are continuously present to encounter participants in
the form of "diacritical marks" of status--dress, accent, demeanor
(c.f. Barth 1969: 14-18). It seems that they cannot be ignored.

We have illustrated ways of speaking that seem dependent on
particularistic attributes of status, such as ethnicity. "Whimperatives,"
with their contradictory social meanings, were employed mostly in inter
pan-ethnic encounters by one counselor. Implicit indexical repair,
conducted in a language of solidarity which presupposes "insider knowledge"
by the hearer, was employed most in intra-ethnic encounters by another
counselor. By employing or not employing certain language forms in
doing formulation the counselor exhibits diacritica of his definition of
the person he is talking to. Implicit indexical repair, for example,
is a means of saying "you are one of us."

The student's participation in these ways of speaking in itself
influences the ongoing definition of situation. For a student to show under-
standing of an implicit indexical repair is to demonstrate the "member"
knowledge presupposed by the language of the repair. The display of
such knowledge is diacritical--it confirms the student's status as "one
of us" rather than "one of them." Conversely, to show lack of under-
standing during the course of an encounter can change the counselor's
definition of the social personage of the student, and introduce the
influence of self-fulfilling prophecy on the counselor's subsequent
behavior. In the following example from counselor 2 with a Polish-American
student, the student, who speaks with a noticeable accent, "loses" an
interactional "point" by not understanding the question "what did you get?"

A few lines after this failure in face to face performance, the coun-
selor asks, "You didn't fail anything, did you?" ("I'm telling you that you
are a poor risk academically").

```
9) a C:   What did you get in your Biology 101 last semester?
   b S:   Whad' I get?
   c C:   What did you get for a grade?
   d S:   B.
   e C:   B?
   f S:   Yeah.
   g C:   How 'bout Speech 101?
   h S:   Speech, uh..uh, I th..I think, I..I didn't get that one.
   i C:   What do you mean you didn't get it?
   j S:   I got some incomplete.
   k C:   Ah..how come?
   l S:   Th..then, I uh, ma..I did complete them.  You know, then
          I make up the test..and then they gave me that..
   m C:   Did you make up the tests?
   n S:   The grades..Yes, I did.
   o C:   You don't know all the grades you got, though.
   p S:   I didn't _____ any C;s.
   q C:   You didn't fail anything, didja?
```

Barth contends (1969:17) that systematic constraints on role definition
at the microsocial level of the face to face encounter reflect the articulation
among and separation between ethnic groups at the macrosocial level. In our
data we see that the ways in which speakers reveal "who they are" and reveal
their expectations for who the other is (by such diacritica as formulation)
are dependent upon ethnicity, but also transcend ethnicity. Ethnicity, as a
category of social ascription, may generalize to pan-ethnicity, and pan-
ethnicity may generalize to co-membership. Along with the language of sol-
idarity goes a likelihood of special help from the counselor...bending or
waiving bureaucratic rules. Under certain conditions of co-membership between
persons of differing ethnicity the same manner of formulation may be used as
that used between fellow ethnics.

Co-membership broadens the range of ways that encounters can be grounded
particularistically. In a poly-ethnic society in which many institutionalized
encounters between strangers are likely to be inter-ethnic, co-membership
increases the likelihood of some kind of particularistic "leakage" within the

institutionalized encounters between strangers are likely to be inter-ethnic, co-membership increases the likelihood of some kind of particularistic "leakage" within the frame of the encounter. This increases the likelihood of more exceptions being made to universalistic rules for the disposition of cases, as persons in authority, such as counselors (or physicians, policemen, social workers) respond to the person they are talking to with the hospitality they are obliged to offer to fellow members (in one way or another) of the same urban village.

Thus the tendency of encounter participants to violate universalistic relevance rules, combined with the availability of co-membership to the ethnically "different" as a means of establishing some form of particularistic sharing, seems to provide necessary "play" in an otherwise too rigid and oversimplified social system. In a poly-ethnic industrial society, if persons did not have some means of violating the system's universalistic rules, they would be limited to grossly undifferentiated ways of perceiving and responding to others. Co-membership may provide enough "tolerance" (in the mechanical sense) for the social machine of a complex modern society to continue to operate.

It seems to us that this "play" is adaptive. It builds in exceptions to the rules as part of the rules. The "leakage" of particularistic aspects of definition of situation into institutionalized encounters in formal organizational settings may be so pervasive that attempts to limit relevance rules to universalistic attributes of status are bound to have limited success. Indeed these attempts if successful would be to our way of thin ing maladaptive. Movements for universalistic reform

in the delivery of educational, medical, legal, and other "human"
services may not lead to social amelioration, but to societal and
interactional paralysis.

A WHIMSICAL EXAMPLE OF FORMULATION

(See Example 8, page 27. "... I ask for what?, Coul
ask for what?..:For nex   m s   ."?

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