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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this investigation was to describe behaviors observed as comprising leadership contention and gender differences in groups. As defined in this study, leadership contention differs from leadership in that it is comprised of behaviors individuals derive from their beliefs about what leaders do and is also specifically concerned with a developmental process through time. Following a review of the literature which proved to be inadequate in providing logically valid hypotheses, the next step in the investigation was the analysis of communicative behaviors of three groups of five people recorded on video tape during 4-hour periods. The bulk of the study is devoted to explaining the logical paradoxes encountered in studying leadership contention and gender differences and to demonstrating the role of the researcher's socialization in his or her construction of the group under investigation. The study concludes with a brief description of an alternative way of approaching subject matter so that paradoxes created by researcher socialization can be employed to discover new and fruitful ways to investigate and construct social reality.

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GENDER DIFFERENCES AND LEADERSHIP CONTENTION: A CASE STUDY IN THE
RHETORIC OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

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Ms. Johnson is Assistant Professor and Mr. Benson is Associate Professor of Speech Communication at The Pennsylvania State University. This case study is only one of many stories which could be told about social psychology of this research project. Another would be the fate of research teams which are too large to be managed with limited resources of time. The authors thank Richard Barton, Judith Haupt, Mark McCray, and Donna Schimeneck for their assistance in taping the group interactions. They gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Kenneth D. Frandsen, William Hunsicker, Judy Page, and Maria Rudden for their assistance in collecting and initiating discussion of the data.

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Letter to the Editor, Ms. magazine, July, 1973:

In 1969, I wrote job descriptions for the department of which I was the supervisor. In reading them over the other day, I was astonished to realize that in the descriptions for my own job and that of my professional subordinate, I had referred to the incumbent as "he." For all the secretarial and clerical positions the incumbent was referred to as "she"! At the time all of my staff members were female! I hate the phrase "You've come a long way, baby," but that's what I was compelled to whistle to myself after I got through clicking.

It is difficult for people to think of "leaders" as female. Leadership of political, religious, and economic institutions has traditionally been a male prerogative. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that most researchers who have looked at leadership have looked at male leaders. In experimental studies of leadership, for example, females are typically excluded from the subject pool.¹

The original intent of the research project reported here was to study "gender and communication strategies of leadership contenders." In the process of conducting the research we discovered that the most interesting conclusions were not drawn from the data "out there"--the behavior of the subjects--but from the relationship of our own socialization--socializations into gender roles and into the role of researcher--to our construction of interpretations of the data. We are not the first to observe that both the process and the product of research are functions of the ontologies of researchers.² Nor are we the first to observe that, in particular, the gender roles of researchers condition their perspectives on data.³ Despite the recognition by philosophers of science and others that the relationship of the researcher to the subject matter is an important variable in the research process, there have not been

many published case studies which describe the relationship. This paper does not report the investigation originally planned. Rather, it reports the results of our study of the methods and assumptions we used to study gender and leadership. It describes the process by which we came to realize that our actions as social scientists constructed a rhetoric designed to explain to ourselves the rhetorical behaviors of research subjects. And to fabricate the symbolic bridge to cross from our own observations to the behavior of our subjects, we needed to use the constructs of social scientific research, with its own rhetoric about leadership, gender, and social reality. This report concerns the relations of three symbolic systems: the behavior of subjects in small groups; the corpus of social scientific knowledge about gender and leadership; and our own purposes, methods, and social agendas.

In the Spring of 1973, we thought that in a year we would be able to report on the ways the behaviors of men and women differed as they contended for the leadership of small groups. Instead, in the Spring of 1974, we found ourselves forced to accept a series of conclusions which challenge our original assumptions.

1. Common definitions of leadership (both "what the leader does" and "a shared function which provides for the group's needs") are confounded with stereotyped maleness. Therefore, studying gender differences in "leadership" using these definitions makes no sense because those who are labeled as "leader" or "contributing to the leadership" are those who display stereotyped male characteristics regardless of their biological sex.
2. Despite our efforts to avoid imposing our own views of the world on our research (by not positing operational definitions of leadership), we the researchers were constructing the situation we sought to study.

As social scientists we were not, and could not be, neutral observers of a world "out there." The world we observed was one interpreted through our own beliefs about important concepts such as leader-like behavior.

3. Our subjects were not behaving in a situation which existed apart from their own behaviors and assumptions. Rather they, like we, were engaged in constructing a symbolic environment of social control based on their own unstated, and probably unstatable, attitudes and assumptions.
4. As social scientists, and particularly as scientists interested in communication behaviors, we can learn much about the world by investigating how people use their communication to negotiate equivalent definitions of the world. Leadership, we assert, is not a process which exists independently "out there," but a complex of concepts which exist in the imaginations of both researchers and subjects. We can study leadership as an "ethnomethod"--a method used by people to create for themselves the impressions that there is social order in the world.⁴
5. The ethnomethods of both subjects and researchers may be described as rhetorical behavior. Social behavior and social science both function to adjust people to ideas and ideas to people.⁵

Initial Assumptions and Purposes

When we began our investigation of "gender and communication strategies of leadership contenders" our belief was that the communication behaviors of people who are competing for the leadership position in a group would sort by gender. It seemed pretty obvious to us that females "act differently" than males. We did not presume, however, that we could posit operational definitions

of leadership contention. Rather, the purpose of the investigation was to describe behaviors we observed as comprising leadership contention. The focus of the study was to be on "leadership contention" rather than leadership per se. We saw two principal differences between the conceptions of leadership and leadership contention. Leadership contention, as we conceived of it, is comprised of individual behaviors of people which are in some sense derived from their beliefs about what leaders do. Leadership contention also differs from leadership because it is specifically concerned with a developmental process through time. We wanted to observe the development of patterns of leadership from the time a group of people began to meet.

Although we wanted to allow the behaviors of subjects to define leadership contention, we did assume initially that leadership contention is competition for the position which people call "the leader." This definition has been used by others.⁶ We did not assume that there is a single person in any group who is "the leader," but did assume leadership contention to be behavior engaged in by individuals in a group based on their attitudes and assumptions about what it means to be "leader." Our belief was that females might define leader behaviors differently than males, and therefore, they would behave differently than males in competing for the position of leader. Implicitly we were asking "who wins" and how behaviors which sort by gender are like to contribute to "winning."

Our initial review of the literature provided little help in understanding gender differences in leadership contention. Very few researchers have looked at gender differences; even fewer have looked at differences in leadership behavior. We generated from the research of others many questions directed at discovering gender differences in competing for leadership. But we concluded from our review of the literature that "at present empirical literature raises more questions than it answers. Moreover, hypotheses drawn from this literature

would not be logically valid. To explore these questions [generated from others' research] and produce adequate hypotheses we need reliable systems for observing and comparing communication strategies".⁷

The next step in our investigation was the analysis of communicative behaviors recorded on twelve hours of videotape. We had tapes of three groups of five people; the groups competed against one another in the Parker Brothers board game called "Risk." Members of the groups knew each other only slightly at the beginning of the game; we were interested in observing who, if anyone, emerged as the leader(s) in each group during the four hour period.⁸ We did not expect to make generalizations about gender differences based on this data alone. Through intensive analysis of a long period of leadership emergence, however, we hoped to generate some "grounded theory" about possible gender differences and a category system for observation. The theory and category system could then be tested in a larger sample.⁹

In the process of trying to apply standard conceptions of "leader," "leadership," and "leadership contention"--even without specifying operational definitions--we discovered that these conceptions were inadequate. We decided they were inadequate for two reasons: (1) they did not help us to understand the data, and (2) they led us into logical paradoxes when we tried to use them to observe gender differences. In this paper we make only general references to the content of the taped group interactions we observed. Our observations were critical in the generation of arguments presented here, but to describe behaviors we observed in the detail necessary to use these observations in support of our arguments is beyond the scope of this particular paper. The bulk of the paper is devoted to explaining the logical paradoxes we encountered in studying leadership contention and gender differences and to demonstrate the role of the researcher's socialization on his or her construction of the world under investigation. In the final section we describe briefly an alternative way of approaching subject matter which we believe can

employ the paradoxes created by researcher socialization to discover new and fruitful ways to investigate and construct social reality.

Conceptual Dilemmas of Leadership and Leadership Contention

Our original conception of leadership contention was that it is competition to become "the leader." This conception proved to be both too broad and too confining. It failed to direct our attention to particular behaviors (as operational definitions would have) and it also seemed to contradict much of what we saw in actual behaviors. It was not broad enough to encompass "leadership" as we saw it. Our definition of "leadership contention" could not in practice be separated from "leadership" because it depended upon our ability to identify people who were leaders or at least those who were performing a "leadership function."

Our dilemma was that we wanted the subjects' behaviors to define "leadership contention" but we first had to identify which people were contending for leadership. We did not want to ask subjects to identify "leaders" as others have done because it was the behavior generated in the group setting, not behavior generated by our questionnaire, that we wanted to investigate. From the beginning we had been committed to the proposition that the beliefs which guide behavior in a situation may not be the beliefs people report; therefore, we wanted to generate reconstructed beliefs from the patterns of behaviors of subjects.

Our research strategy (we are not able to proclaim a philosophy of research) demanded that we look at behaviors rather than putting complete faith in the reports of participants. But our way of looking at social behavior does not permit us to argue that behavior is any more real than the ideas held by a participant about what is happening--only that there is likely to be a difference between participant reports and the researcher's description

and interpretation of events. The difference, in turn, is a relation which itself becomes part of the research data. In this we differ from Ray Birdwhistell and other communication researchers who seem to argue that there is a discernible difference between what is really happening (stance or body motion in a context, for instance) and what a subject might describe himself as having done and meant.¹⁰

Birdwhistell does argue persuasively against what he calls the "analytic informant temptation," which he defines as the temptation to consult the subject as an expert rather than as an informant able to provide data, and he warns that even the observer is likely to have blind spots. Our difference from Birdwhistell stems from the subject matter of our inquiry. When Birdwhistell searches for a morphology of kinesic behavior, he necessarily assumes that there is an order to be found, though he places the order in culture rather than in nature. But we are investigating the ideas of leadership and contention, and it is our position that in this area, although behaviors are actual, leadership is a concept. Hence, a definition of leadership must be sought from behaviors, informants, and social science, and relations among definitions subjected to analysis. Our method also borrows from the rhetorical criticism of literature a working assumption that the meaning of a literary work must be sought through close analysis of the work itself, though reports by an author may also provide useful insight.

Three ways of identifying "the leader" based on behaviors were available to us. We could identify "the leader" as the person with the highest status, as the person whose proposals are adopted, or as the person who is permitted to engage in certain behaviors (for example, "initiating structure"). We were locked into a conception of leadership emergence as a win-loss situation for members of a group. All three approaches to identifying "leaders" assume that there is one single definition of leadership (though the particular

definition encompassed by each approach is somewhat different). If leadership is "status" then those who have status have "won" the leadership; others have lost. If leadership is a set of behaviors then those who are permitted to engage in those behaviors are the "winners."

At this point we realized the crucial paradox of studying gender and leadership contention. By any definition of leadership acceptable to most people including our social science colleagues (status, influence, assertiveness), females must "lose." The concept of "leadership" is confounded with stereotyped maleness. Janet Yerby recognizes this problem only implicitly in her study of "Female Leadership in Small Problem-solving Groups" when she observes:

Female socialization practices in the American Culture reinforce women's negative values toward themselves and non-assertive orientations toward their environments. Such socializations are related to the development of leadership-associated traits in small problem-solving groups. . . .Female socialization processes tend to discourage specific behaviors in women associated with leadership potential.¹¹

The study of gender differences in leadership contention (defined as competing to become "the leader") makes no sense because the winners of leadership contests are those who display stereotyped male characteristics regardless of their biological sex. We decided to abandon our original definition of leadership contention because we found ourselves in a tautology. The word "leader" has gender: leader is "male."

Our concern at this point was how to remove the notion of "leader" from our conceptualization of leadership. As long as we thought of "leader," we, as researchers, were going to confound our own definitions with those of our subjects. When they behaved in ways which we defined as leader-like, we would claim that they were leadership contenders, when they did not, we would not define them as leadership contenders. If our conceptualizations were to be persuasive to other social scientists, our definitions of leader-like behaviors would have to be those acceptable to other social scientists. This

put us right back to defining leadership as status, influence, assertiveness no matter how subtly stated with expressions such as "task orientation." We were still defining leadership as stereotypical male behaviors.

In an effort to avoid defining leadership as "what the leader does" we considered adopting the definition of leadership as a "shared function" among some or all of the members of a group. According to this definition, leadership is not a characteristic or position of an individual, but rather acts, perceptions, and attitudes whose functioning together results in the direction of a group.¹² This definition does not envision leadership as a relationship between person ("the leader") and act (leading behavior), but rather between one act and another irrespective of the characteristics of those performing the acts. Leadership according to this definition is not a characteristic of any individual, but rather is a characteristic of the group-as-a-whole.¹³ As such, it should not logically have gender. Patton and Giffin state the perspective of leadership as a characteristic of the group-as-a-whole this way: "We view leadership as a role that provides for vital group needs by exerting influence toward the attainment of group goals. Leadership, according to this definition, is a process. It is present no matter who the individuals are taking leadership or what their influences."¹⁴

Conceptions of leadership such as the one summarized and advocated by Giffin and Patton seem to assert that there is one set of behaviors which define leadership. Any good social scientist, of course, will rush to add that the particular set will vary with characteristics of the task environment. Nonetheless, in any given instance there is what one might call a "leadership situation," analogous perhaps to a "rhetorical situation,"¹⁵ which exists in the "real world" and is discoverable by would-be influencers of the group. The leadership situation constrains behavior so that the problem of effective leadership is one of finding the best way of exerting influence

toward the accomplishment of a goal in that particular situation. A definition of leadership apart from the individuals who engage in the behavior encourages the social scientist to conceive of a situation as existing apart from the people whose behaviors create it. Individual behavior varies, but with this definition, the variation is explained as a function of (1) how well the individual understands the demands of the group situation, and (2) how well he can do what is required by the situation.¹⁶

The conception of leadership as a shared function has much to recommend it. Principally, it emphasizes that leadership is "transactional" and must be understood in terms of mutual influence. It recognizes that all or most of the members of a group contribute to the group's direction. But there are two interrelated problems with the definition. Early in our research project we rejected this conception of leadership because it is counter-intuitive to some degree. It locates actions apart from the individuals performing the actions. Even the social scientists who advocate this definition of leadership occasionally lapse into discussions of leadership as what leaders do and talk about the "effectiveness of the leader."¹⁷ Upon reconsidering this conception we decided that its chief problem was that it did not help us out of our dilemma. Even with this conception, the researcher must define what constitutes "leadership" because the researcher has to define which behaviors in a group are the leadership behaviors. According to Patton and Giffin, the leadership behaviors are those which "provide for vital group needs by exerting influence toward the attainment of group goals." The question is, how does one move from the theoretical definition toward an operational definition that can be used to record the behaviors observed? Even defining leadership as a "process" and a "shared function" among group members, we discovered that we were still looking at winning and losing. We were forced to admit that the winners were those who defined the situation as we did, and who successfully exerted

influence in the direction that confirmed our notions of where the group should be moving.

A brief example will perhaps best illustrate this point. We thought that one of the most interesting people in the three groups was a very "assertive" woman whom we very shortly concluded was the "leader" of her all female group. She initiated the structure of the group, explained the task to the group, made all of the suggestions which became group decisions; she asked others for suggestions, and answered all the questions about the task. She sat with the game board facing toward her; the others sat in a semi-circle around her. She engaged little "power tricks" such as holding a match in her hand for several seconds before lighting a cigarette while she explained "crucial tactics" and gave her opinion about what the enemy groups were doing. By all of our stereotypes of a leader; she was it. We declared that she "wore the pants" in her group. In another group there was a woman who hardly spoke at all during the game. She was not allowed to say much about the game (others interrupted her; others used sarcastic remarks to indicate to her that her questions about the game were naive). As researchers we concluded that the group was really in trouble; although there were three experienced players in the group, they were losing. There were abundant signs of discontent. The other people in this group tried to play with the television cameras; they tapped loudly on the microphones. One person left the room between each turn at play. There were many things we thought the group needed and she did none of them. By our definition of "what the group needed," she did not contribute to the "leadership." The paper that she wrote analyzing the interactions of her group during the games revealed a different picture of what might have been happening, however. To her, the goal was not winning the game; it was finding interesting data to write about in the required report. She assumed that was not simply her

personal goal, but, in fact, the group goal. She acted in such a way that she exerted influence toward the group goal as she defined it. She influenced the group toward accomplishment of the goal by her silence and her occasional "naive" comments. Although we were most reluctant to assume that the beliefs she later described in her written report were the operative beliefs guiding her behavior during the game, the difference between description of what she said was going on and our assumptions about what was going on illustrated to us that to define "leadership" as those behaviors which contribute to the group goal does not remove the researcher from the necessity of identifying behaviors which are "leader-like."

The question was: Could we call both Amy (the assertive one) and Jean (the silent one) "leadership contenders?" Our greatest problem was that we were reluctant simply to take behaviors at face value and ask: If this behavior is contending for leadership, what is the definition of leadership implied? When we watched Amy, we had no trouble; her behavior matched our expectations. But when the behavior was sitting, occasionally smiling and nodding silently, our own socialization about what behaviors are leader-like led us to resist defining the behavior as leadership contention. If we had asked the subjects to identify leaders, they too would have named the task-oriented, assertive people. Jean would not have claimed to be a leader. She was manipulating, sometimes consciously, the situation, but in her analysis she names other people as the "leaders."

Ernest Bormann, in a series of studies with student groups at the university of Minnesota, investigated the process of leader emergence. His observations are additional evidence for our conclusion that females are disadvantaged by popular notions--both the researchers' and the members'--of what leaders

should be and should do. Bormann stated that groups with strong female leadership contenders had great difficulty achieving a stable role system because group members were reluctant to let women become "the leader." Bormann operationalized leaders as those identified by group members as "leaders." He concluded that those who were seen as "leaders" in mixed groups were male.

"In case histories of discussion-class groups included in the Minnesota Studies, women rarely emerged as the leader in a coeducational group containing two or more men. . . . In groups composed of women and two or more men, the woman contender for leadership apparently posed some problems simply because she was a woman. Men usually refused to follow directions given by a woman in the presence of other men. Some expressed the opinion in their interviews, questionnaires, and diaries that women should obey and men should lead. In some groups the men even expressed doubts as to the advisability of women getting higher education . . ."18

The problem, as we saw it, was this: the concept of leadership is defined with stereotyped male characteristics. This situation may have resulted from the historical association of formal leadership with people socialized into the male gender. For us as researchers one way out of the problem would be to turn ideology on its head and root for the ladies. We could ask, as a way of structuring our research, what does group behavior look like if we assume that the women (or the female role types) are hidden leaders? Or, we could simply assume that all members of the group were leading and look for gender differences in styles of leadership.

We saw that what we wanted to ask necessarily depended not only on what we wanted to know, but what we were equipped to know and why we wanted to know it. As a research team we had our own dilemma. We started out by trying

to find a non-sexist set of assumptions upon which to base a study of the influence of gender on leadership contention. We also wanted to contribute to human liberation by understanding the conditions and behaviors that led to male success at winning leadership. But we were not clear whether we wanted (1) to find out what men were doing that made them successful and teach women to do it as well, or (2) to discover the conditions that led to male success and develop a uniquely female rhetorical strategy for competing for success in a given situation, or (3) to look for a way of defining gender relations that would say to those who did not get promoted to leadership that after all a group was a system and so every member played his/her role in it, by definition, or (4) to prove that the notion of leader was crypto-totalitarian and that we should be able to find in the behavior of those who were not winning leadership not a definition for failure but a pattern for anarchy.¹⁹ These options, we discovered, closely parallel the debate over what to do about Black English in America.

Any such approach would be frankly ideological, and yet it was clear that at this stage in the development of the social "sciences" any questions asked about such value-laden concepts as leadership probably could not help being relevant to the values of the researchers. And yet we were aware that ideology might well provide a way of papering over genuine problems of theory and behavior. Our problem was to use our values to generate questions the answers to which would be insights rather than slogans.

We believed that the way out of our problem was to relate our own questions to the video tapes we were studying and to the most promising theory and research on leadership. A few researchers have investigated the way behaviors relate to leadership. The literature shows a repeated pattern: behavior is observed and differences in behavior are described.

Then, the behaviors engaged in by males are defined by concepts associated with leaders. The major relevant studies have reported on communication role, achievement motivation, and persuasibility.

Research on Gender and Leadership Contention

Communication Role -- Singer's investigation of behavioral differences between men and women provides an excellent illustration of how as researchers we construct our conclusions. Singer posited that women are as "manipulative" as men, but that the communication strategies they use to manipulate others to their advantage differ from those of men. He hypothesized that "women use manipulative strategies--those of physique"; his research supported this conclusion.²⁰ However, Singer's research did not involve observing communication strategies. He supported his argument with correlations between ratings of physical attractiveness and academic achievement (controlling for verbal and quantitative ability) among first-born females, and with self reports of first-born females which indicated that they sit in the front of the room, see the instructor after class, and in his office, more frequently than later-born females. "Manipulation" is undoubtedly a popular concept associated with leadership. Singer concluded that women do manipulate. But his choice of a research paradigm did not allow him to investigate the kind of "manipulation" a female leader would use. He found it reasonable to confine his observations to (low status) female students' manipulations of (high status) male professors. As Singer constructs the situation, females achieve power through their use of their "body," not their verbal ability. We question his conclusions about behavioral differences without observing actual behaviors; however, to the extent that he has identified gender differences, it is the behavior of males, not females, which fits our cultural stereotypes of leadership behavior.

Those researchers who have observed and recorded communication role behavior and sorted the behaviors by gender likewise conclude that males are more likely to perform leader-like behaviors. These researchers generally distinguish leaders from non-leaders by (1) the total amount that they talk (leaders talk more) and (2) the function of their talk. There are two kinds of communication roles which are important in the management of groups: instrumental or task roles and socio-emotional roles. Women have been found to talk less and to specialize the supportive or socio-emotional roles.²¹ Jesse Barnard suggests that women achieve social influence through the use of the social skill of "stroking"--putting themselves in a subordinate position and engaging in "aggressive listening." It is not through assertions of authority, but through asking for suggestions, directions, opinions, and feelings that women influence groups. Barnard describes Madame de Staell as "perhaps the best talker ever. . . . Her remarkable talent consisted not so much in communicating her own ideas as in inspiring and helping others to formulate theirs. It was in this, rather than in her inspired flights, that her power resided."²² The question is: can we define "aggressive listening" as leadership? Leadership theorists of the "shared function" school might say yes. But even these theorists will occasionally lapse into the popular conception of leadership as task specialization. The summary which Fred L. Strodbeck and Richard Mann provide of the findings of Parsons, Bales and Shils' research on role division in the family illustrates this lapse: "The authors state their thesis that the instrumental leadership of the father and the socio-emotional specialization of the mother is a pervasive pattern with important implications for such matters as: the effective socialization of the child; the stability of the nuclear family and effective socialization of latent personality patterns of males and females."²³

Our conclusion from this review of research on communication role was that males and females evidently do engage in different kinds of behaviors, and that given our stereotypes about what constitutes leader-like behaviors, we would conclude that males are more often contributors to the leadership of a group. Our conclusion would, of course, result from our stereotypes and those of the people we watched. Gender differences found in the distribution of achievement motivation and persuasibility also provide excellent examples of the researcher's role in the construction of conclusions.

Achievement motivation.--Bormann observes that in the Minnesota Studies the first characteristic of successful competitors for "leader" was that they wanted to become leaders. Desire for leadership position may be conceptualized as part of the construct "achievement motivation" or "n ach" (need, achievement). Achievement motivation has typically been measured using content analysis of projective stories written by subjects under arousal conditions emphasizing leadership capacity and intelligence. Subjects are told that they are to engage in tasks which "directly indicate a person's general level of intelligence. . .[and] demonstrate whether or not a person is suited to be a leader."²⁴ According to McClelland, these instructions may be expected to arouse achievement motivation because "they stress the fact that the individual is about to be evaluated in terms of standards of excellence--intelligence and leadership capability--which are ordinarily of considerable importance to men [!] in American culture."²⁵ The conditions do, in fact, appear to arouse achievement motivation in men. However, researchers have not been consistently successful in arousing achievement motivation in females using these conditions.²⁶

The conclusion of some psychologists is that females, in general, are not motivated to achieve, i.e. they are not driven to "win."²⁷ They hypothesize that females who do achieve do so out of needs for affiliation, that is, needs for social and interpersonal rewards.

In other words, males achieve out of a desire for achievement; females achieve out of the need to be accepted. If this is a reasonable interpretation of empirical findings, the implications for female patterns of leadership contention are important. Our typical stereotypes of leaders do not include high need for affiliation. For example, in a letter recommending one of his students for an administrative position, one department chairman wrote:

. . .has desire to be an administrator in six or seven years. . . green as far as administration goes. . . very interested in student problems and his good rapport. . . biggest drawback is that he still has great desire to be accepted, but this ~~should~~ [sic] can be controlled.

Implicit in our intuitive understandings of leadership is the belief that effective leaders must be "firm," and not evidence much desire for acceptance by followers. One interpretation of research on achievement motivation and women is that women do not aspire to leadership positions and that when they do it is because of a desire to be liked (hence, they are unlikely to perform adequately as leaders).

Stein and Bailey disagree with this interpretation of the achievement motivation data. They propose that females are indeed motivated to achieve, but that "the areas of their achievement are dictated partially by cultural definitions of feminine activities and interests, i. e. by their sex roles."²⁸ In other words, females use different behavioral referents to define success. Females, they claim, are motivated to seek expressions of their achievement motivation in social situations. Research on achievement motivation which uses conditions of social skills has resulted in arousal of achievement motivation among women.²⁹ If need for affiliation per se were the motivation for success among women, one would expect to find women more sensitive to social approval in studies of social reinforcement. However, there is no evidence to support such a difference.³⁰ Therefore, it seems reasonable that women seek achievement in social skills as the culturally acceptable expressions of their need for

achievement. The question is whose definition of achievement motivation one will accept. Stein and Bailey argue that a researcher should not interpret the findings from research on achievement motivation without considering the cultural stereotypes which both researchers and subjects use to define the research situation.

Uesugi and Vinacke investigated gender differences in coalition formation in a competitive game.³¹ Their dependent measures were the coalition outcomes, but they describe in passing some of the interaction among female competitors relevant to the achievement motivation construct. Their descriptions indicate that females generally are not motivated to compete as males are. The difference between males and females, however, seemed to be not simply the presence or absence of motivation to achieve in a competitive situation, but the way the situation was defined by males and females. Females did not define the situation as a competitive one. They behaved in such a way that the task became a cooperative one.

The men had gratifyingly manifested the sort of behavior that the (male) experimenters has expected. Thus, they seemed to enter with gusto into the game, bargaining competitively, making the best "deals" they could, and in short, striving to win. The behavior of the females was puzzlingly different. For them, the situation appeared to provide an opportunity for social interaction. It resembled more nearly a discussion than a competitive-bargaining situation. At first, we wondered whether they actually understood the purpose of the game at all. Later, we came to the conclusion that, at least in many instances, the women did not see the objective to be a matter of winning, so much as a problem of arranging a "fair" outcome, one that would be satisfactory to all three players. For example, there were frequent efforts to resort to rules which would make competition unnecessary. Among such rules were agreements to allocate the prize equally to all three participants or to divide it in strict accordance with the weights. On occasion, they would decide to rotate coalitions by turns, or they might agree that the two weaker would automatically become allies. These phenomena were strikingly evident, even though it was difficult to determine the reasons for them.³²

Achievement motivation is presumed to be an internal "drive" which varies in intensity by individual, gender, and social class.³³ We are suggesting that differences in measured achievement motivation may not be

be differences in "drives" but differences in the way people construct the meaning of situations. To the extent that we socialize males and females to interpret situations differently, we can expect to find differences in the manifestations of achievement motivation. In the Uesugi and Vinacke study, for example, we could not conclude that male subjects were more motivated to achieve leadership in the form of "control" over their situation simply because they were competing against each other for prizes as the experimenters expected them to do. Females were controlling their environment just as much, perhaps even more, because they disregarded the definition of the situation "sent" to them by the male experimenters and played the game according to their own rules. In a sense, they "won"; they "beat" the experimenters in the implicit negotiation to establish a definition of proper conduct for themselves as subjects. They established a definition of their relationship to the group task and a definition of the distribution of power among group members which was different from the definition of male subjects playing the game. Using the male experimenters' definition of the situation, females showed little achievement motivation to "win." If one abstracts a definition of the situation from the female subjects' behavior, however, it is evident that they evidenced high achievement in the situation.

Persuasibility.--Another area of research on gender differences which is relevant to leadership contention is persuasibility. The relationship of persuasibility to leadership is tied to the popular belief noted earlier that leaders must be "firm"--leaders are the influencers. Good leaders must rely more on their own perceptions than on external influences. Most research on persuasibility and gender has concluded that on the average, females are more persuasible than males.³⁴ Females rely less on "sense data" and more on the opinions of others than males.³⁵ The chief criticism of this research, like research on achievement motivation, is that the stimulus offered

to subjects has a gender bias. Typically, social problems or political issues are used as the persuasive messages in experiments. Such topics are defined by our culture as the male domain. Therefore, women have lower ego involvement; their attitudes are more easily changed on such topics for the topics have little saliency for them. Females who aspire to the position of "the leader" do not fully accept cultural definitions of male and female domains. There is some reason to doubt that females competing to be the leader would prove to be more persuasible than males.

There is also reason to question whether persuasibility is an undesirable characteristic of leaders. Renisis Likert, in summarizing findings of research on leadership and group effectiveness, stresses findings which indicate that one characteristic of effective leaders is willingness to be influenced by their work group.³⁶ Others have observed that leadership is a transactional process in which both leaders and members mutually influence one another. In other words, leaders and member "trade"; leaders achieve their positions by rewarding followers in various ways--one important way is by being willing to be influenced.³⁷

Norman R. F. Maier investigated gender differences in "leader dominance," that is, the leader's commitment to one particular solution to a group problem and persistence in getting group agreement to that solution when group members have personal preferences for other solutions.³⁸ Thus Maier was investigating whether females as leaders were generally more persuasible than males. He hypothesized that females would be less "committed" to proposals they had come up with than to proposals the experimenters had told them to enforce. Females would lack confident of their own interpretation of "sense data." He found that males were equally committed to those proposals they generated and those given to them. Females on the other hand played a less "dominant" role in situations which were "unstructured"--where they had to find their own

solution--than in situations which were structured for them in that the solution was supplied. The experimental task involved a role-playing situation in which the "leader" played a foreman who conducted a discussion with three workers about a possible change of work rules. In half the situations the leader was instructed to try to get the workers to adopt a particular work rule change which would increase productivity, but would result in more boring jobs for the workers. In the "unstructured" situations the leader was allowed to see some "data" from which the conclusion could easily be drawn that such a change of work rules would result in increased productivity. Subjects were instructed: "You found these data interesting and the question of whether they might suggest a way to increase productivity naturally occurred to you. Therefore, you have decided to take up the problem with the men." In groups with female leaders and "unstructured" task condition, the group adopted the worker's preference and the "integrative" solution more often than the solution which Maier thought the leader should prefer. In other research using this same "change of work rules" task, Maier has reported that the "integrative" solution is the high quality solution.³⁹ Maier's conclusion in this study, however, was that females play a "less dominant" role "behaviorwise, females appear to have less confidence in their problem solving ability." Another equally reasonable explanation, we believe, is that females defined the leadership situation differently. Unless told to try to get a particular proposal adopted by the experimenter, they did not define the situation as one in which they had to "win." They may have had confidence equal to that of male subjects that the worker's solution or the integrative solution was the best in this case. As with research on achievement motivation, we have a choice of whose definition of the situation we are going to accept. Here the experimenter defined leader self-reliance and confidence as pushing the proposal he thought the leader should prefer.

Most males subjects did so; fewer females subjects did. We argue that an equally reasonable explanation is that a female subject when instructed to "take the subject up with the men" did not define the situation as one in which her job was to manipulate group members into accepting new work rules which would be undesirable to them.

Conceptual Framework

We began this study by asking a very simple, one might say simplistic, question: Are there gender differences in the behavioral style of people as they compete with one another to attain the position of "leader" in face-to-face groups? We learned from the research of others (for example, Strodbeck and Mann) that indeed there are behavioral differences among group members which sort by gender. But we were not convinced that these differences helped us to understand much about leadership contention because we had to define what behaviors constituted competition to become "the leader." Using our own definitions--whether or not our definitions were supplemented by the verbal reports of subjects about what constitutes leadership--we were ignoring much of the rich information relevant to leadership contention we thought we were seeing on the videotapes. Rather than accepting and amplifying the rather obvious conclusions from the research of others, we redefined our conception to one more in keeping with our original intent.

It was clear to us that not all the people playing Risk were competing to become "the leader" by any standard definition of leadership, but that all were engaged in a process of negotiating a definition of the leadership situation. When we expanded the definition of leadership contention to include more than the behaviors of those actually competing for the position of leader, we necessarily involved ourselves in a much more fundamental question--the Hobbesian question of how social order is created and sustained. Social order

among any group of people, it seemed to us, must rest in part on the consensual definitions of the leadership situation which people negotiate.⁴⁰ Three questions in particular seem to be negotiated in the process of leadership contention:

1. What are the taken-for-granted assumptions on which group members base their social routines in relationship to one another and the common activity required by the task?⁴¹
2. What will be the power distribution among members of the group?
3. Who will be allowed to have what influence in task decision-making?

As we became aware of the extent to which our beliefs as researchers were leading us the construct the situation we thought we were observing, we became aware that our subjects must also be constructing their situation. One of the subjects mentioned earlier, Jean, thought she was only observing behavior; it was clear to us that her own behavior was substantially contributing to the definition of the leadership situation and hence was an inseparable part of what she was observing.⁴² This paper has been a report of the research task as we constructed it. We are proposing that researchers who seek to study leadership study how subjects use their communicative behaviors to construct a definition of the leadership situation. The concern should not be simply with the resulting definitions themselves, but with the processes by which group members negotiate these definitions.

This approach to the study of leadership contention is that of the ethnomethodologist who asks, "what are the methods employed by those under study in creating, maintaining, and altering their presupposition that a social order, forcing certain kinds of behaviors, actually exists "out there" in the "real world." "Ethnomethods" are the "people's methods". Harold Garfinkle and other ethnomethodologists claim that social scientists do not

escape their "folk" methods when they begin scientific research; folk methods of apprehending the world underlie scientific method.⁴³ We believe that our investigation of research on gender differences and leadership contention supports his claim that indeed a "scientific investigation" of leadership behaviors is little more than the scientist's construction of the meaning of leadership in society. Given this, then, it makes sense to study the methods that all of us use to negotiate definitions of leadership. In searching for an ethnomethodology for defining leadership situations we are embracing the following epistemological and metaphysical assumptions of the ethnomethodologist:

1. In all interaction situations humans attempt to construct the appearance of consensus over relevant features of the interaction setting.
2. These setting features can include attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and other cognitions about the nature of the social setting in which they interact.
3. Humans engage in a variety of explicit and implicit interpersonal practices and methods to construct, maintain, and perhaps alter the appearance of consensus over these setting features.
4. Such interpersonal practices and methods result in the assembling and disassembling of what can be termed an "occasioned corpus"--that is, the perception by interacting humans that the current setting has an orderly and understandable structure.
5. This appearance of consensus is not only the result of agreement of the substance and content of the occasioned corpus, but also a reflection of each participant's compliance with the "rules" and "procedures" for assemblage and disassemblage of this consensus. In communicating, in however subtle a manner, that parties accept

the implicit rules for constructing an occasioned corpus, they go a long way to establishing consensus over what is "out there" in the interaction setting.

6. In each interaction situation, the rules for constructing the occasioned corpus will be unique in some respects and hence not completely generalizable to other settings--thus requiring that humans in each and every interaction situation use interpersonal methods in search for agreement on the implicit rules for the assemblage of an occasioned corpus.
7. Thus, by constructing, reaffirming, or altering the rules for constructing an occasioned corpus, members in a setting are able to offer to each other the appearance of an orderly and connected world "out there" which "compels" certain perceptions and actions on their part.⁴⁴

It is not within the scope of this paper to outline methods which can be used to study ethnomethods. Several others have described their methods of studying the communication behaviors of people negotiating a definitions of social order.⁴⁵ We do believe that analysis of behavior over an extended period of time in simulated situations such as the Risk game is an exceptionally good way of studying the "process of creating, sustaining, and changing the occasioned corpus" (in this case the definition of the leadership situation). The game is after all a "simulation" within the larger system of a university course (which anyone knows is not the "real world") and yet there is the problem of each member of the group of what he or she is going to do. The problem is precisely one of creating the semblance of what the world is so that one has some guidance in deciding how to behave. Tapes represent a visual record of people negotiating a definition of social order in the world in which they find themselves.

Berger and Luckman have observed that males and females "inhabit" different worlds; there are gender differences in the social construction of reality.⁴⁶ It seemed reasonable to us, therefore, that if there are gender differences which make a difference, they are a function of the different ways men and women contribute to the interpretation of the meaning of the world around them. Gender differences derive from the different patterns of socialization of males and females; they should manifest themselves in differences in the behavior of people as they negotiate definitions of social order. Not only will males and females have different preferences about the assumptions on which social routines should be based, the distribution of power, and the characteristics of people who are permitted various kinds of power in task decision-making, they should use observably different methods to try to obtain their preferred definition. Borrowing the language of the ethnomethodologist, the question for research is: Are there gender differences in the directly observable behaviors of people as they participate in the process of creating, sustaining, and changing the occasioned corpus?

We have subtitled this essay a "case study in the rhetoric of social research." We considered identifying it a "social psychology of research" because we have been concerned with concepts commonly used by social psychologists, such as socialization. Because we have been concerned with ferreting out underlying assumptions, we might have called it a philosophical inquiry into research methods. We chose to call our activities rhetorical because we feel that it has been our methods of discovery as rhetorical critics, rhetorical theorists, and rhetors which resulted in our conclusions.

We define rhetoric in part as a way of knowing⁴⁷ and in this investigation we have been concerned with epistemology. Rhetorical knowing is knowing with-- an act of sharing assumptions and behaviors as opposed to the act of contemplating an infinite truth or observing an undoubted fact. We believe that

traditional conceptions of leadership pay too little attention to the role of the researcher in constructing his own conclusions. The influence of cultural stereotypes on research conclusions is particularly evident in the study of leadership and gender differences. We have suggested an alternative set of epistemological assumptions which we believe can lead us as researchers to knowledge less constrained by our own views of the world because, in part, they sensitize us to the effect of our views on what we think to be the world. We are not concerned with any one element or relation, but with the relations among elements and relations: the group members and their methods of constructing a social reality, the implied nature of that reality, and the purposes and methods of the researchers.

If our analysis has merit it should be possible to confirm it by further research. We suspect that the circular logic revealed in the research literature on gender and leadership would be paralleled in research investigating the relation of social goals (leadership, wealth, status) and group membership (religion, race, sex, age). In addition, we believe that our analysis should be tested by detailed attempts to relate it to group behaviors. But even if our perspective helps to explain group behavior, our analysis warns us, the evidence will not require assent. The rhetoric of social science is such that a variety of differing theories are likely to be confirmed by the evidence the theory makes it possible to generate.

Rhetoric is also a way of doing - a way of fabricating (symbolic) social forms to influence other social forms.⁴⁸ We have tried, albeit indirectly, to make some social comment on cultural stereotypes of male and female. As rhetors, we wish to make clear our position on leadership contention and gender roles. We admit that our message may only in part be supported by the data we have presented. Society, as we see it, has created some real problems by partially opening up social roles. For all are now expected to compete for

success in the open society, but society is so arranged that not all can be successful. The small group with an emerging leader is one such situation. The leader is defined as the most successful member and yet not all members of a mixed group are equally suited by social definitions to "win" the position. In accepting the bet, a woman accepts the bind.

The democratic impulse in modern social science may suggest that we try to wriggle off the hook of leadership by modifying definitions or altering conditions. Should we, as social scientists, try to ameliorate the situation so that all have an equal opportunity to win? Or should we try to do away with the leader altogether and parcel out his functions to the group as a whole, thereby creating a mode wherein people can succeed without winning over others? Are these the only alternatives to discovering and adjusting people to a presumed biological imperative -- telling women, in effect, that there is no point in trying to break out of a natural role but at the same time invoking a "welfare" mentality in which women are denied certain social roles but more or less grudgingly allowed to share in the "rewards" earned by those who have access to success?

You have been reading rhetoric about a rhetoric about a rhetoric. We have argued that one of the activities engaged in by people in groups is the rhetorical process of negotiating a definition of the leadership situation. We have also argued that there is a rhetoric of social scientific research on the relations of gender to leadership which defines leadership as what men do. And we have drawn attention to our own rhetoric as an attempt to negotiate a definition of the leadership (and research) situation in which gender is not defined as a handicap.

Are you saying that males are more likely to be actual leaders or that the social scientists who have studied the question are biased or sexist?

Given the definition of leader shared by society and accurately identified by the social scientist, what the social scientist has described is an actual state of affairs (therefore unbiased) based on a consensus of male superiority (therefore biased).

Isn't that a contradiction?

Yes, it is by discovering our contradictions that we make social life accessible to analysis by making its rules visible.

Isn't there a danger that your argument is circular?

Yes, that's the point. At present, the literature is also circular. Social scientists claim to study leadership as a process or as a set of mutually influencing behaviors. But there must be criteria for distinguishing which functions are "leadership functions." Ultimately even the social scientist's definition of leadership must rest on some ideas about what leaders do. At present in our society these activities correlate more, in public life, with men than with women. The condition must exist because of biology or culture. If culture, either the relation is determined or it is not. If not, leadership is a self-fulfilling cultural expectation. As social scientists we perpetuate the expectation while claiming to unmask it.

Stop the circle; we want to get off!

NOTES

¹See for example, James W. Julian, Edwin P. Hollander, and C. Robert Regula, "Endorsement of the Group Spokesman as a Function of His Source of Authority, Competencies, and Successes," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 11 (1969), 42-44.

²See for example, Paul Diesing, Patterns of Discovery in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971).

³See, for example, Jessie Barnard, "My Four Revolutions: An Autobiographical History of the ASA," American Journal of Sociology 78 (January 1973).

⁴See for example, Harold Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Englewood Cliffs, N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1967); Jonathan H. Turner, The Structure of Sociological Theory (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1974), p. 324.

⁵Donald C. Bryant, "Rhetoric: Its Function and Scope," QJS 39 (1953), p. 413.

⁶See Ernest Bormann, Discussion and Group Methods Theory and Practice (New York: Harper and Row, 1969).

⁷One group was all-male; one was all-female; one was two-females and three males. "Risk" is intended to be played by individuals competing against one another; we modified the game so that three groups, each having identical boards in three different rooms, competed as teams against one another. The game is a variant of chess; the board is a world map; the object is world conquest. The groups were videotaped using two cameras for each group; both cameras fed into a single tape.

⁸Bonnie Johnson and Thomas W. Benson, "Gender and Communication Strategies of Leadership Contenders: A Proposal," unpublished manuscript, 1973.

⁹For a discussion of the process of generating theory from data see B.G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory Strategies for Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).

- ¹⁰Ray L. Birdwhistell, Kinesics and Contexts: Essays on Body Motion Communication (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970) pp. 190-191.
- ¹¹Janel Yerby, "Female Leadership in Small Problem Solving Groups" Unpublished Manuscript presented for the Speech Communication of American Convention, New York City, November, 1974.
- ¹²See for example, Edwin P. Hollander and James W. Julian, "Contemporary Trends in the Analysis of Leadership Processes," Psychological Bulletin, 71 (1969), 387-97.
- ¹³Rhetorical theorists will notice that our conceptual approach owes much to the works of Kenneth Burke, who formulated the idea that the explanation of social acts is likely to be found in a set of relationships or ratios among the elements of a symbolic system. Our debt to him is too comprehensive to be acknowledged by a page reference.
- ¹⁴Bobby R. Patton and Kim Giffin, Problem-Solving Group Interaction (New York: Harper, 1973), p. 68.
- ¹⁵Lloyd Bitzer, "The Rhetorical Situation," Philosophy and Rhetoric, 1 (1968) 7-14.
- ¹⁶See for example, Theodore Mills, The Sociology of Small Groups (Englewood Cliffs; Prentice-Hall) 1967, pp. 96-98.
- ¹⁷See for example, Hollander and Julian.
- ¹⁸The phrase is from Leonard I. Krimerman and Lewis Perry (eds.) Patterns of Anarchy (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1966).
- ¹⁹Bormann, p. 219. One researcher in the Minnesota Studies, Calvin Mortensen, examined the communicative behaviors of those identified as the "leaders." He found that those seen as leaders "specialized" in communication that could be reliably coded into such categories as: introducing and formulating goals, tasks,

and procedures; eliciting communication; delegating and direction action; and integrating and summarizing group activity. See "A Content Analysis of Leadership Communication in Small, Task-directed Groups," Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1964; discussed in Bormann, p. 204.

²⁰J. W. Singer, "The Use of Manipulative Strategies: Machiavellianism and Attractiveness," Sociometry, 27 (1954), 128-151.

²¹F. L. Strodbeck, "Husband-wife Interaction over Revealed Differences," American Sociological Review, 16 (1951), 468-473; F. L. Strodbeck, and R. D. Mann, "Sex-role differentiation in Jury Deliberations," Sociometry, 19 (1956), 3-11; Talcott Parsons, Robert Bales, and Edward Shils, Working Papers in the Theory of Action (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1953).

²²Jesse Barnard, The Sex Game Communication Between the Sexes (New York: Atheneum, 1972), p. 138.

²³Strodbeck and Mann, p. 156. Italics ours.

²⁴D. C. McClellan, J. R. Atkinson, R. A. Clark and E. L. Lowell, The Achievement Motive (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953), p. 105.

²⁵D. C. McClellan, The Achieving Society (New York: Litton, 1961), p. 40.

²⁶Veroff, S. Wilcox, and J. W. Atkinson, "The Achievement Motive in High School and College Age Women," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1 (1967), 362-371.

²⁷Veroff, Wilcox, and Atkinson, 1953; J. Veroff, "Social Comparison and the Development of Achievement Motivation," in C. P. Smith (ed.) Achievement Related Motives in Children (New York: Russell Sage, 1969); V. J. Crandall, "Achievement" in H. W. Stevenson (ed.) Child Psychology, Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, 62 (1963, Part 1), 416-459.

²⁸A. H. Stein and M. M. Bailey. "The Socialization of Achievement Motivation

in Females" Unpublished paper presented for the convention of American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1972.

²⁹For example see, E. French and G. S. Lesser, "Some characteristics of the Achievement Motive in Women," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 68 (1964), 119-129.

³⁰Stein and Bailey, 1972.

³¹T. K. Uesugi and W. E. Vinacke, "Strategy in a Femine Game," Sociometry, 26 (1963), 78-88; see also, J.R. Bond and W. E. Vinacke, "Coalitions in Mixed Triads," Sociometry, 24(1961), 61-75.

³²Uesugi and Vinacke, 1963, p. 78.

³³McClelland, 1961.

³⁴See for example, Thomas M. Scheidel, "Sex and Persuasibility," Speech Monographs, 30 (1963), 353-358.

³⁵Irvin Janis and P. Field, "Sex Differences," in I. Janis, et al. (eds.) Personality and Persuasibility (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959).

³⁶Renis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

³⁷See Hollander and Julian, 1969.

³⁸Norman R. F. Maier, "Male versus Female Discussion Leaders," Personal Psychology, 23 (1970), 455-461.

³⁹Norman R. F. Maier and R. Hoffman, "Acceptance and Quality of Solutions as Related to Leader's Attitude Toward Disagreement in Group Problem Solving" Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 1 (1965), 373-386.

⁴⁰Of course, group members were constructing more than a leadership situation. Leadership happens to be the focus of our study. It is one of several constructs under negotiation by a group in any ongoing interaction.

⁴¹For discussions of the role of taken-for-granted assumptions in communicative social routines see Garfinkle; Turner; Leonard C. Hawes, "Interpersonal Communication: The Enactment of Routines." Exploration in Speech Communication (Columbus: Charles Merrill Publishing Co., 1973).

⁴²When we use the expression "leadership situation" in this context, we do not mean it to be analogous to Bitzer's "rhetorical situation" which we alluded to earlier. We are not conceiving of a "leadership situation" as an independent variable shaping behavioral constraints, although it is, of course, partly that. Leadership situation is also a "dependent variable" which results from behavior. Our concern, however, is not solely with the leadership situation itself whether as independent or dependent variable. Although we use the singular, we are not conceiving of one "leadership situation" as a directly observable phenomenon "out there" in the "real world." Rather, leadership situations are functions of the interrelationships among values, beliefs, actions, and scenes. Any person's perception of what the leadership situation "is" in a given situation will vary with his or her beliefs and perspective for viewing the situation. Anthropologist Anthony Wallace describes the prerequisites for the "psychic unity" of groups in terms which we find helpful for describing the requisite unity of definitions of situations. Members of a group do not need "identical" perceptions of a situation in order to coordinate their behaviors. Rather, through communication and learning, people develop perceptions which are "equivalent." "Each overt event in a sequence serves as a stimulus to all participants (including the actor himself, via 'feedback'), each of whom defines the new situation differently and produces a response. A simple example of this kind of system would be an evenly-matched pair of people playing a game of tennis: the velocities of the ball and of the players are the common stimulus sequence, and the responses of the competitors approximate equivalence with respect to footwork

and stroking. To the extent that the meanings are equivalent, the grouped responses will be 'organized,'" See "The Psychic Unity of Human Groups," in B. Kaplan (ed.) Studying Personality Cross-Culturally (Evanston, Ill: Row, Peterson, 1961), p. 151. Our point is that each person's perception of what the leadership situation "is" will be different, but that given time to interact the perceptions will become "equivalent" and permit individuals to coordinate their behaviors with one another in responding to a common sequences of stimuli.

⁴³Turner, 1974, p. 323.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 324-325.

⁴⁵See Garfinkle, 1967; Leonard C. Hawes, "Accomplishing Social Systems: A Transactional Perspective, Unpublished Manuscript Read at the Visiting Scholars program series at Queens College, 1973.

⁴⁶Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967), p. 168.

⁴⁷Gerard Hauser, "Rhetoric as a way of Knowing" Today's Speech 19 (1971), 43-48, Thomas W. Benson, "Rhetoric and Autobiography: The Case of Malcolm X," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 60(1974), p.1.

⁴⁸Benson, p. 1.