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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to determine if a confident potential partisan group will tend to rely on persuasion as a means of influence, if an alienated potential partisan group will tend to rely on constraint as a means of influence, and if a neutral potential partisan group will tend to rely on inducement as a means of influence. Student volunteers were allotted pegs and instructed to build bridges on a peg board. The subjects worked in groups of four. However, one member of the group was a confederate of the experimenter and was assigned the supervisory position for each group. The subjects were allowed to work the problem of building bridges for about two minutes before they were asked to stop. They were then allotted more pegs and asked to continue building. This procedure was repeated three times. Following the third time, each group member was given an opportunity to express himself about the allocation method used. To control this communication each subject was given a listing of six influence statements. The Trust Test was also administered. The most dominant characteristic of the results was the high proportion of persuasion choices across conditions.  
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Choice of Influence As a Function of  
Degree of Conflict Within a Hierarchy

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CHOICE OF INFLUENCE AS A FUNCTION OF  
DEGREE OF CONFLICT WITHIN A HIERARCHY\*

The setting for the drama of change has never varied. Mankind has been and is divided into three parts: The Haves, the Have-Nots, and the Have-a-Little, Want Mores. On the top are the Haves. . . . The Haves want to keep things as they are . . . . . On the bottom are the world's Have-Nots. . . . The Haves want to keep; the Have-Nots want to get. . . . They have nowhere to go but up. . . .

Between the Haves and Have-Nots are the Have-a-Little, Want Mores. . . . Torn between upholding the status quo to protect the little they have, yet wanting change so they can get more, they become split personalities. . . . Generally, they seek the safe way, where they can profit by change and yet not risk losing the little they have.

Saul Alinsky<sup>1</sup>

The single-minded function of the three groups identified by Alinsky is to influence those who have the power to allocate resources so that those in power will distribute those resources in ways beneficial to the interests of their particular group. By definition, those in power have allocated past resources in ways that have discriminated against one group, favored another, and left a third undecided about the probability of being favored or disfavored in the future.

What has been identified as the social influence process is the manner in which the groups in a society influence the distribution of resources by other groups and by authorities. The study of the social influence process, then, would become the study of the means by which particular groups attempt to satisfy their goals. Such a study would include an ambitious attempt to discern the probability any particular means of influence will be used by any particular group. The purpose of this brief paper is to make a preliminary report on a proposed series of experimental attempts to discover what influence mode is chosen given varying degrees of conflict present within hierarchical relationships.

This study focuses on hierarchical relationships since such alignments describe commonly found social conflict cases. As Harold Kelley noted: "The importance of research on the problem of status-differentiation lies primarily in the numerical predominance in our culture of hierarchical groups over undifferentiated ones."<sup>2</sup> Even in the event most (by numerical measures) conflict cases were not across such vertical relationships, there is little question that the more essential and more significant cases involve hierarchical situations. Governments in the process of allocating collected resources to partisan groups, business management in the process of inducing production from labor, and certain individuals in the process of influencing the behavior of those in their span of control, are all common forms of hierarchical relationships.

In all of these cases, the relationship is defined in terms of the power one party has over the other. By definition, a hierarchy assumes an unequal status between the involved parties. For the purpose of this research, the nature of the inequality is predicated on one party being in a position of power over the other. Power is defined, simply, as one party being in a position to effect the behavior of the other party. As a definition for power, the previous statement is sufficient. The concept of power has attracted much attention in the literature. Although sources differ on specific characteristics of power, there are some points of general agreement. One such characteristic significant to this study is that power is "potential influence."<sup>3</sup> As a "potential," power then becomes an unobservable force that can only be discerned in terms of behavioral consequences that can only infer the presence of "power." Use of the definition above must reflect these behavioral consequences.<sup>4</sup> These consequences are not direct measures of power. For example, any attempted measure of power must give consideration to the complex nature of the relationship of the involved parties.<sup>5</sup> Even here complexities multiply as the power-holder in any given relationship need not act to produce behavioral consequences of his power in other parties.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, any attempted measure of power must give consideration to the complex nature of the types of resources and use of resources necessary to a power position. Having available resources is a contingency of power and related to the degree of power available. Resources vary according to the relationship of the parties involved (domain) and are related to a variety of conditions for which the resources are applicable (range).<sup>7</sup> Finally, no discussion of power can fail to note the added complexity of dealing with the costs of using power. Generally costs are expressed in terms of "opportunities foregone."<sup>8</sup> More specifically, costs are often expressed in resources consumed.<sup>9</sup>

Different sources list different bases of power.<sup>10</sup> In general, these lists are also indicative of the types of influence used by those with power. Some of the specific influence types will be considered later. One particular type deserves close attention here. In a hierarchy, power is usually manifested by one party having authority over the other. For purposes of definition, authority means a power relationship accepted by both parties whereby one party willingly complies with the requests of the other party either because the latter is perceived as having expert technical knowledge in the area in which both are involved or the latter is perceived as having "bureaucratic authority" rooted in the organizational pattern in which both are involved.<sup>11</sup> In either case, the authority derives power from the perceived legitimacy-to-govern granted by the other.<sup>12</sup> An authority is a person in the group who can make binding decisions for the group.

How the authority communicates decisions and allocations of resources becomes a central concern to how he can exercise his power and how he can retain a span of power. Likewise, how those over whom the authority has power express their wishes to the authority helps further define the nature of the power relationship. Fundamentally, the art of communication is intrinsically tied to the meaning of power. The entire social influence process becomes a communication network defined in terms of power relations. These communication networks, to the extent they are influence dominated, are kinetic power channels.

Since the authority can exercise power only in terms of what the group considers legitimate, the relationship between the authority and those over whom he has authority must be understood. Conceptually, the authority operates within a delicate span of control resting between those areas the group feels are justified aspects of decision-making and unjustified aspects. In a true sense, the authority is always subject to being rebuked by those over whom he exercises power.<sup>13</sup> At first glance, the authority appears to be locked in a partial paradox: he exercises power over others and they control the span of his power.

One way of understanding the authority's relationship with those over whom he has authority is to borrow principles from coalition theory. The legitimacy of an authority's power rests with the nature of coalitions formed by those over whom the authority has power.<sup>14</sup> Consider the situation of A-B-C-...-N where A is the authority and B-C-...-N are those over whom the authority has power. The authority has this power as long as the coalition of A and others is more powerful than other coalitions. A three-party group would arrange itself (A-B)-C. In these cases, the authority can exercise that power the strongest coalition considers within the authority's span of control and within a range of vested legitimate power. If the authority attempts to exercise control outside of this vested legitimate power, he can expect the coalition to possibly form against him [A-(B-C)] and rebuke his right to either make that particular decision or, in more severe cases, to serve as the authority for the group.<sup>15</sup>

As mentioned before, how the authority or those over whom he has authority communicate and attempt to influence each other is a central concern to the entire power relationship. Several studies have focused on the hierarchical relationship in terms of communication behavior exhibited in the relationship.<sup>16</sup> These studies help in seeking an understanding of what influence patterns can be expected within hierarchies, particularly upward communication.

Alinsky's division of social groups referred to before is more than just a convenient partitioning. His pattern of observing upward communication influence patterns fits neatly into several social and political science theories and most relevantly into William Gamson's categories of potential partisans.<sup>17</sup>

In Gamson's terminology, potential partisans are sets "of actors who, for a given decision, are affected by the outcome in some 'significant' way."<sup>18</sup> These "actors" are the subordinates, the employees, the constituents under the power of the authority. They are "potential" partisans in that the question is left open whether they will attempt to influence the decisions of the authority. These potential partisans can be divided into three groups roughly resembling the Alinsky division: confident, neutral, and alienated.

Potential partisans classified as "confident" are those that have been richly favored through past decisions made by the authorities. David Apter refers to this group in society as the elites.<sup>19</sup> Elites closely identify with the authorities since, in most cases, the authorities have been drawn from their group. The elites have been generally responsible for elevating one of their own to power and feel that the close relationship established should result in preferred favors from the authority since, it is assumed,

any one of their group could easily have been (will be) the authority. The belief held by this group that the authority will favor them is underscored in Gamson's definition for the confident group. He notes "confidence in authorities means that they are perceived as the group's agents . . . ."20 As a result of such a perceived relationship, the confident group believes that the preferred outputs of the system will be in their favor. The confident group feels that the probability the authority will act in their favor on any given decision approaches 1.00.

This kind of belief, and the likelihood expressed in probabilities, is known as political trust. Political trust is the presumed probability that the political system will provide preferred decisions even when left untended. For the confident group, the probability level for political trust approaches 1.00. For other groups, other appropriate probability levels will be suggested ranging to 0.00.

High trust levels, as found for confident groups, have direct implications on the interaction these groups have with authorities. First of all, the general nature of the communication should be expected to be accurate and informative in nature. Research directed at this issue is reasonably conclusive in showing that high levels of trust result in more accurate information flow to the authorities.<sup>21</sup> Furthermore, as one study concluded, the relationship between the authority and trust was the single greatest effect on accuracy of communication.<sup>22</sup> To the extent that an accurate and informative source for communication has reason to influence the receiver of the communication, the most significant method of influence would be in the selectivity and organization of the information. Control of information flow can be an effective strategic tool with broad and influential implications for the hierarchy.<sup>23</sup> Within a hierarchy such control, even if only partial, over information flow becomes a critical concern.<sup>24</sup> In short, the most potent resources available to the confident group are access to communication channels and identification with the authority. The influence type generally defined in these resource terms is persuasion.<sup>25</sup> Consequently, if the confident group would feel a desire to influence the authority, they would most reasonably use persuasive techniques. This assumption follows Raven and Kruglanski's view that "the rational agent should evaluate his bases of power and select that base combination which is most likely to produce change."<sup>26</sup>

The rationale for the confident group using persuasive techniques need not rest on the argument that such influence best utilizes available resources. Persuasion is a form of influence involving a change in orientation or attitude. Persuasion directs its attention to the values and needs of the target and indicates contingencies of which the target is not aware. It appeals to general psychological dimensions and seeks to convince without reliance on threats or promises. Since, by definition, the authority has predilection to the claims of the confident group, the group has no rational reason for incurring excess influence costs by using other influence methods. According to Gamson, the use of persuasion causes no situation cost and the changes in resources, if any, are not an intrinsic part of the influence attempt.<sup>27</sup>

Potential partisans classified as "alienated" are those that have been "richly" disfavored through past decisions made by the authorities. Con-

siderable attention has been given this group of potential partisans since this group is generally represented as a radical, volatile, and generally violence prone segment of society. Although a great deal of material is available, it differs considerably in conclusions and observations made of the groups and their influence methods.

Part of the general confusion in dealing with the alienated group arises from a problem of definition. Kim Giffin helps clarify some of the important differences in conceptualizations of alienation: "In the professional literature on the alienated person there are two technical conceptualizations: (1) social alienation, and (2) psychological alienation. The first is primarily concerned with an individual's communication behavior; the second is concerned with a person's view of his social environment and of himself."<sup>28</sup>

Of course, the two conceptualizations are linked since an individual's view of his social environment and self is integral to the communication behavior he manifests.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, the perception of self is related to two dimensions of alienation noted by Melvin Seeman and are particularly important to the study undertaken here. One of these dimensions is powerlessness: "This variant of alienation can be conceived as the expectancy or probability held by the individual that his own behavior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcomes, or reinforcements, he seeks."<sup>30</sup> The other dimension is meaningfulness: "One might operationalize this aspect of alienation by focusing upon the fact that it is characterized by a low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about future outcomes of behavior can be made."<sup>31</sup> These two dimensions neatly relate to Giffin's division and hypothesize a relationship about expectancy that will be discussed later. One other dimension defined by Seeman referred to "normlessness" which he considered as an expectancy that socially unapproved behaviors are required to achieve given goals. Both the normlessness and powerlessness dimensions have been experimentally tested and both were found to be most distinct for alienated subjects.<sup>32</sup>

Some caution in using the term "alienation" must be expressed. Genuine and complete alienation usually means total withdrawal from interaction. Although such complete withdrawal is unlikely, the tendency to withdraw suggests that communication would also be restricted and activity would be brought to a gradual halt. David Schwartz has shown that such withdrawal patterns need not affect both political alienation and psychological alienation.<sup>33</sup> In fact, he has classified a series of stages for progressive political alienation and, in this researcher's interpretation, none of the stages result in total withdrawal.<sup>34</sup>

The probabilities referred to by Seeman have not been specified or tested. The closest approximation found was offered by Gamson as part of his discussion of the three potential partisan groups. Gamson proposes that alienation is the belief that the authorities will respond favorably to the interests of this group with a probability approaching 0.00.<sup>35</sup> (For purposes of consistency, the reader is reminded that this probability is the level of political trust held by the group.)

These feelings of alienation are not without consequences for the individual. As Schwartz notes, the alienated often seek further information

to test their beliefs in the system.<sup>36</sup> Operating almost as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the individual tends to seek others who are alienated and tends to concentrate on material supporting the reasons he finds for being alienated. These conditions promote communication of shared feelings and encourage others to engage in activity--particularly protest activity.<sup>37</sup> Groups find cohesiveness in the members' feelings of political alienation.<sup>38</sup> Logically, these particular groups would be most likely to fit the population groups to which Eric Hoffer<sup>39</sup> and Frantz Fanon<sup>40</sup> appeal.

A discussion of political alienation and the resultant consequences cannot ignore the relative deprivation literature. Briefly, relative deprivation refers to an individual's perceived discrepancy between his value expectations and value capabilities. Value expectations are the resources to which he believes he is rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the resources or product he feels he is capable of obtaining or maintaining given the social means available. David Aberle defines relative deprivation as "the negative discrepancy between what man legitimately expects and what he is receiving."<sup>41</sup>

The relative deprivation theories help anchor an understanding of the direction and means of influence used by alienated groups. Ted Gurr states the relationship clearly: "Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence. The linked concepts of discontent and deprivation comprise most of the psychological states implicit or explicit in such theoretical notions about the causes of violence as frustration, alienation, drive and goal conflicts, exigency, and strain."<sup>42</sup>

In terms of a hierarchy, the feelings of deprivation and/or alienation are directly related to political trust levels. An authority cannot expect to disfavor one group continually without eroding the political trust the group has for the authority.<sup>43</sup> There are sufficient numbers of case studies documenting the estrangement resulting from continual discriminatory behavior.<sup>44</sup> At least two empirical studies testing directly for political trust levels confirmed that willingness to participate and participation in riots was most likely to occur among those with low political trust levels.<sup>45</sup>

As is becoming evident from the relative deprivation literature and the political trust literature regarding alienated groups, the influence mode likely to be used by this group is of a coercive or violent type. Gamson classifies these as constraint influence. By definition, a resource which is used to create new disadvantages for the authority is a constraint.<sup>46</sup> Common types of constraint are threats, violence, blackmail, and coercion.

The logic behind presuming that a constraint mode of influence will be used by an alienated group develops from the relationship between the group and the authority. As detailed previously, the alienated group is estranged from the authority, has been deprived of benefits, and, consequently, is distrustful about future decisions left to the authority. To obtain compliance with their wishes, the alienated group feels obligated to use force or coercion. In effect, they have nothing to lose since opportunity costs are so low.<sup>47</sup> They have, in fact, much to gain in terms of possibly redefining the power structure<sup>48</sup> and in possibly gaining symbolic (if not real) increase in self-esteem.<sup>49</sup>

Not all theorists agree that the constraint mode will be the choice by the alienated group. James Tedeschi presents an interesting argument drawn from his review of the research. He contends that the most viable alternative is ingratiation.<sup>50</sup> He supports this by citing a series of studies (all by the same principal researcher) of the ingratiation influence form. Tedeschi has also argued that the constraint choice is unlikely since the alienated group has, by definition, no resources to make the influence effective.<sup>51</sup> His conclusion is that "until the surprisingly small amount of experimental evidence bearing on the effects of status on the exercise of influence is considerably expanded, these speculations must be accepted for what they are-- untested hypotheses."<sup>52</sup>

The third classification of potential partisans is the neutral. Gamsop defines the neutral group as being genuinely "neutral." He notes that they have a low probability of even attempting influence except on content issues. He claims they find the authorities moderately competent and having no particular bias for or against their group. The neutral group has a political trust orientation of 0.5. That is, they predict the authority will not necessarily be generous or punitive to them but will provide for their interests about one-half of the time. Very little is said about this group (possibly due to their not having a constituency among social scientists). No research could be found that related directly to the group and only brief theoretical statements by Gamsop were available for positing likely influence choices made by this group.

Gamsop did suggest this group is most likely to use inducement modes of influence.<sup>53</sup> These modes are defined as influence that brings new advantages for the authority. Forms of inducements are rewards, bribes, and political favors. The neutral group is likely to use these methods because the group has no other alternative. They cannot rely on persuasion since they have no faith that the authority values their worth. They are not interested in constraint modes because they run the risk of a retaliation or a change in disposition that would reduce their standing with the authority. Inducements, particularly rewards, carry a benign intent that does not energize defensive behavior associated with constraints.

#### STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

In summary, three social categories of potential partisans have been defined according to their political trust orientation to an authority. Arguments have been stated supporting likely influence choices made by each group: (1) A confident potential partisan group will tend to rely on persuasion as a means of influence; (2) An alienated potential partisan group will tend to rely on constraint as a means of influence; and (3) A neutral potential partisan group will tend to rely on inducement as a means of influence. These relationships are expressed below in terms of absolute and relative hypotheses. The three main hypotheses are absolute and reflect the relationships given before. Below each main hypothesis are two corollary hypotheses expressing related relative relationships that should occur by reasoning from the same arguments given before.

- I. The proportion of persuasion influence choices selected by the confident partisan group will equal 1.00.
  - A. The proportion of persuasion influence choices selected by the confident partisan group will be greater than the proportion of inducement or constraint choices selected by the confident group.
  - B. The proportion of persuasion influence choices selected by the confident partisan group will be greater than the proportion of persuasion choices selected by the neutral and alienated partisan groups.
  
- II. The proportion of inducement influence choices selected by the neutral partisan group will equal 1.00.
  - A. The proportion of inducement influence choices selected by the neutral partisan group will be greater than the proportion of persuasion or constraint choices selected by the neutral group.
  - B. The proportion of inducement influence choices selected by the neutral partisan group will be greater than the proportion of inducement influence choices selected by the confident or the alienated partisan groups.
  
- III. The proportion of constraint influence choices selected by the alienated partisan group will equal 1.00.
  - A. The proportion of constraint influence choices selected by the alienated partisan group will be greater than the proportion of persuasion or inducement choices selected by the alienated group.
  - B. The proportion of constraint influence choices selected by the alienated partisan group will be greater than the proportion of constraint influence choices selected by the confident or neutral groups.

Table I represents visually the 3x3 table resulting from the hypothesized relationships. Columns are identified as conditions of confident (C), neutral (N), and alienated (A). Rows are identified as modes of influence persuasion (P), inducement (I), and constraint (C). Each cell has been lettered and below the table are the nine hypotheses stated in terms of Table I.

TABLE I

		<u>Condition</u>		
		C	N	A
<u>Mode of Influence</u>	P	a	b	c
	I	d	e	f
	C	g	h	i

- I.  $p(a) = 1.00$ 
  - A.  $p(a) > p(d)$  or  $p(g)$
  - B.  $p(a) > p(b)$  or  $p(c)$
- II.  $p(e) = 1.00$ 
  - A.  $p(e) > p(b)$  or  $p(h)$
  - B.  $p(e) > p(d)$  or  $p(f)$
- III.  $p(i) = 1.00$ 
  - A.  $p(i) > p(c)$  or  $p(f)$
  - B.  $p(i) > p(g)$  or  $p(h)$

#### METHOD

In this particular study, the complex and varied sets of variables that must be allowed to operate simultaneously and without undue experimental influence seemed particularly conducive to simulation methodology. The use of simulation techniques was used here in the hopes of acquiring the advantages of simulation methodology that are unique to this kind of communication research.<sup>54</sup> In particular, since the previous discussion underscored the complex dimensions present in a hierarchical conflict state, a simulation seemed appropriate for assuring that the sociological and psychological dimensions of interaction within a hierarchy would remain intact.

The simulation used was a metaphorical representation of an organization engaged in producing some product. Among the important specific constraints present in this model was a production-efficiency condition and an assumed bureaucratic, equal knowledge, authority. That is, the "employees" were paid according to the number of units each could produce and the supervisor in charge was not known by the subjects to possess superior or inferior knowledge about how production could be improved.

The actual task consisted of each subject being allocated pegs which, when properly ordered on a peg board, allowed pieces called "bridges" to be linked across the top of the pegs. The subjects were paid according to the number of bridges they could successfully build. The task of building these bridges involved some insight and creativity.

The subjects for the experiment conducted in this preliminary phase of the research project were fifty-one student volunteers. The subjects were brought into a classroom and seated in groups of three along with a fourth member assumed to be a fellow subject. In fact, the fourth member of each group was a confederate of the experimenter's and was assigned the supervisory position for each group.

Once seated, each subject was given a peg board, each group was given a supply of bridges, and each supervisor was given a supply of pegs. The subjects were told that this was a perception experiment designed to test a two-level problem-solving task. They were told that one of them was designated the supervisor for the group and that he/she would be responsible for allocating the pegs in such a way as to maximize the total number of bridges produced by the group. The subjects were told that the supervisor, at the end of the experiment, who had been able to get the most number of bridges from his group would be paid \$5.00. Each member of the group was told he/she would be paid three cents for every bridge built during the experiment. Group members were shown how a bridge was built. All were reminded that no talking would be allowed. They were all told they could continually rearrange their pegs on their boards as they sought more productive patterns. Supervisors were told, in front of the subjects, that they could allocate pegs to members of their group in any manner they saw fit, including reclaiming pegs from one person and giving them to another person. In fact, the supervisors were all trained to follow a strict allocation procedure for the three rounds of allocation to be allowed.

The three political trust conditions (confident, neutral, alienated) were randomly ordered prior to the subjects entering the room. Subjects ordered themselves in groups. No attempt was made, or even considered, to assign conditions to subjects according to ability to build bridges. The allocation procedure for inducing the political trust conditions is shown in TABLE II. The minus numbers are pegs removed from the member's board.

TABLE II

		<u>Political Trust Inducement</u>		
		<u>Condition</u>		
		Confident	Neutral	Alienated
<u>Allocation Round:</u>	0 (Start)	7	7	7
	1	5	3	2
	2	2	1	-1
	3	5	0	-1

Following the initial allocation, the subjects were allowed to work the problem of building bridges for about two minutes. The experimenter asked them to stop and then instructed the supervisors to allocate some of their pegs. This procedure was repeated three times. Following the third time and after a couple of minutes had passed, the experimenter announced that the task was half finished and each group member would be given an opportunity to express themselves to the supervisor about the allocation method being used.

To control this communication, and to be able to tabulate the kind of influence mode used, each subject was given a sheet of paper listing six influence statements. Each subject was told to indicate which statement best expressed what he/she would like to say to the supervisor. These six statements were two persuasion, two inducement, and two constraint influence appeals. All six statements had been submitted to a panel of the experimenter's colleagues familiar with Gamson's definitions and all members of the panel had agreed on the influence-type represented in the statements.

Once the subjects had checked a statement, each was asked to complete a six item Trust Test. This test was intended as a check against the induced conditions. The test items and test scale were drawn directly from a Trust Test used by H. Andrew Michener and Richard Zeller.<sup>55</sup> This test was used because it was a direct application of Gamson's definition for the conditions of political trust and it had a reported reliability coefficient of .885.

After the Trust Test was completed, each subject was asked to complete the control segment of William Schutz's FIRO-B test.<sup>56</sup> The purpose of this test was to probe for possible orientation bias subjects might have to a hierarchical relationship. The control dimension attempts to measure an "expressed" control ("I try to exert control and influence over others") and a "wanted" control ("I want others to control and influence me"). The validity of the test has been reported as high and the reproducibility has been established at .94.

## RESULTS

Since each group consisted of one each of the political trust conditions, the fifty-one subjects divided into equal cells of seventeen for each condition.

Trust Test scores were computed for the subjects. The mean trust scores for the confident, neutral and alienated groups were 12.82, 7.24 and 1.47 respectively. These mean scores were significantly different at the .05 level for all comparisons using a standard t test. On a scale of 18 to -18 these scores are too high for the neutral and alienated conditions. Desirable scores for the neutral condition would approximate 0 and scores of -6 to -18 for the alienated condition. Michener and Zeller had respective scores of 10.02, 3.67 and -5.84. An analysis of the test using Flanagan's Formula showed a reliability

of .59. This is particularly curious since Flanagan's Formula is equivalent to Cronbach's Alpha used by Michener and Zeller. The trust items are similar and the trust scale is identical yet there is considerable difference in the reliability figures. Furthermore, discussions with the subjects after each experimental run and observations by the experimenter and the supervisors indicate obvious frustration behavior by the alienated subjects that was not present in the trust scores. The number of bridges built under each condition is a related operational indicator of political trust as defined by Gamson (assuming subjects maximized the number of bridges they could build with the available pegs). The number of bridges built by subjects in each condition were appreciably different from each other with the confident condition producing more than three times the number of bridges the alienated group produced. The alienated subject (and the neutral subject to a lesser extent) being able to observe the frantic bridge-building of the confident subject and the resultant accumulation of money did indicate in the trust test that the supervisor was playing favorites with others and neglecting his interests. That trust test score for the alienated group was significantly lower at the .05 level than the score for the neutral group and significantly lower at the .001 level than the score for the confident group. A more sophisticated and complete analysis of the Trust Test is being conducted.

FIRO-B scores were calculated for all subjects across both the "expressed" and "wanted" dimension. Since the control measure is assumed to be independent of any experimental conditions, no bias was expected for scores within condition. No bias was found. Scores were ordered according to "expressed" scores exceeding "wanted" scores and vice versa. Neither ordering showed a difference in trust scores from the overall mean trust scores for each condition. A difference did exist between orderings for the alienated condition at the .01 level. In this case, subjects indicating a greater desire to exert control than to be controlled in the alienated condition trusted the supervisor more than subjects indicating a greater desire to be controlled than to exert control. Subjects in the latter case also showed a higher proportion of inducement and constraint choices than the former grouping.

In terms of influence modes, those subjects indicating a greater desire to exert control than to be controlled selected the persuasion mode across all conditions proportionally more than those who indicated a greater desire to be controlled than to exert control. Persuasion was selected .889 proportion of the time in the former case and .480 proportion of the time in the latter case. This difference is statistically significant.

Observation of the conditions showed a disproportionate number of females in the neutral condition (twelve of seventeen). Factoring responses according to sex of subject across all conditions showed no apparent bias. A further factoring according to the sex of subject and sex of the supervisor showed no apparent bias.

Table III shows the distribution of influence choices for each condition. As is evident, persuasion is the dominant choice for all conditions.

TABLE III

		<u>Condition</u>		
		C	N	A
<u>Influence Choice</u>	P	16	9	10
	I	1	4	6
	C	0	4	1

Table IV shows the proportion for each influence choice as a part of the total influence choices for the condition (first number in each cell) or as part of the total influence choice for the particular influence mode (second number in each cell).

When Table IV is expressed in terms of the hypotheses, it is apparent that only hypothesis IA ( $p(a) > p(d)$  or  $p(g)$ ) can be directly accepted. A test of proportions was used to discover if hypothesis I ( $p(a) = 1.00$ ) could be accepted. The test showed that

TABLE IV

		<u>Condition</u>		
		C	N	A
<u>Influence Choice</u>	P	.94/.46	.53/.26	.58/.29
	I	.06/.09	.23/.36	.35/.55
	C	.00/.00	.23/.80	.06/.20

.94 was not significantly different from 1.00 at the .05 level of confidence. All other hypotheses could not be accepted.

## DISCUSSION

The most dominant characteristic of the results is the very high proportion of persuasion choices across all conditions. Of course any conclusion drawn from these results must be tempered against the possibility that two of the trust conditions were not present in the form described in the discussion of theory. The Trust Test scores appear to be too high to give confidence to having realistic and valid political trust conditions for the neutral and alienated conditions. Statistical tests indicate the presence of three distinct groups. Face validity tests indicate the presence of a confident level and two other levels. The surprisingly low reliability level for the Trust Test requires further inspection of its validity measurement of political trust. All of these factors indicate only that dynamics are operating to produce distinct treatments but that the results all tend in the same direction.

These kinds of results bring difficult times to a researcher as he attempts to determine whether the simulation or the theory is faulty.<sup>57</sup> A number of test questions can be proposed to help resolve this issue. Central to the validity of the simulation used here is whether the simulation could produce balanced confidence, neutral, and alienated conditions. Part of the perceived problem is the difficulty of the task possibly allows the subjects to feel the supervisor actually is making decisions based on equity. Subjects may feel the supervisor is justified in either not allocating or removing pegs since they "obviously" are not doing well. In short, relative deprivation may be present but the degree of deprivation is insufficient for the subjects to feel alienated. A related explanation based on the previous discussion is that, since there is only one subject per condition in each group, those receiving the alienated condition may need someone to help confirm the authority is biased and that decisions are not being made on equity principles.

The results from the control segment of the FIRO-B scores would suggest some sort of masochism hypothesis--those wanting to be controlled use high risk influence methods. Although this researcher will not pursue such issues, there is evidence for following through with a systematic test of other psychological dimensions.<sup>58</sup> Two possible dimensions for testing are authoritarianism and machiavellianism.

These issues govern the essential methodological questions and will be a central concern for the coming stages of the research project. Granting limitations to generalization caused by these issues being unresolved, several intriguing questions can still be raised from these results.

The first main and the first corollary hypotheses were confirmed. The second corollary hypothesis could not be confirmed primarily because of the compounding effect of dominant persuasion choices in the other two conditions. In fact, none of the second corollary hypotheses could be confirmed for the same reason.

This predominance of persuasion in the neutral condition may be an artifact of the neutral condition being a "low confident" condition. That would not, of course, explain the high number of constraint choices. Because so little is known about the neutral condition, it is difficult to speculate which choice will be selected much less why a choice is selected. Since the neutral condition assumes a mutual detachment from the authority leading to apathetic views about the authority's decision-making motivations, the neutral may very well not give a lot of thought to the kind of influence most appropriate. When faced with the opportunity to communicate, a certain failure to fully comprehend what is happening may force a random rather than systematic choice. The authority contributes to this by varying rewards and punishments. The proportion of choices for each influence mode was better balanced in the neutral condition than in any other condition and would, therefore, support such a view.

The predominance of persuasion choices in the alienated condition is curious but not overwhelmingly surprising. Several possible explanations can be explored.

The easiest explanation is that the alienated felt resigned to their fate and did not wish the possible retaliation associated with constraint influence. This is a plausible explanation since the alienated were at least making some money but if the authority continued to reclaim pegs, they would make no money. This explanation has been called the "self-protective" theory. It assumes that ". . . the power high-ranking individuals possess, and the resultant attempt on the part of the 'lows' to have maximally beneficial relations with 'highs' . . .,"<sup>59</sup> creates an uneasiness. Research efforts have not fully discovered the limits of the perception of legitimate power. Authorities wield great power conferred by others and others will comply with startling demands by those in authority.<sup>60</sup> Such legitimacy could conceivably thwart an outward expression of aggression at low conflict levels.

Cohen's research efforts found that the influence patterns used by lows differed according to the lows desire for upward mobility. He says: ". . . those with low rank who can move upward communicate in a way guaranteed to protect and enhance their relations with the highs who exercise that control; those with low rank for whom mobility upward is impossible have less need to communicate to the upper level in such a friendly, promotive, and task-oriented fashion."<sup>61</sup> This research may have accidentally touched that issue. The FIRO-B scores show that those wanting to control used significantly more persuasion choices than those not desiring to control. In fact, those with higher "expressed" than "wanted" control scores for the alienated condition chose persuasion .833 proportion of the time while those with higher "wanted" than "expressed" control scores for the alienated condition chose persuasion .400 proportion of the time. Although no mobility in any direction could have been presumed, people with higher "expressed" control scores would be expected to have a psychological disposition to respond in the same manner as upward mobile people.

As to the predominance of persuasion across all conditions (.686 proportion of the selections), several plausible arguments can be made. The most obvious is that, for low level conflict states, persuasion is a socially acceptable and intended influence choice. Michener and Zeller, in testing similar hypotheses from a different approach, found that "regardless of subjects' initial trust in authorities, they used persuasion more than inducement and inducement more than constraint."<sup>62</sup> Those are identical with the results found here except in the neutral condition an equal number of inducement and constraint choices were made. They presumed the use of persuasion was possibly related to the low cost involved. Certainly attention needs to be given that issue.

The research effort reported here is, quite admittedly, preliminary. Countless more questions were raised than answered from this brief exploration. The second planned stage is to develop a series of alternative simulations for inducing the different political trust levels. Once these questions of method are resolved and less tentative statements of results are made, other variations of the basic hierarchical relationship need to be varied in order to discover more about the fundamental relationship. The third planned stage of the research involves varying the type of authority in the relationship. A significant body of literature proposes that different authority types prompt different communication patterns from partisans. Little empirical research has confirmed those propositions. The fourth planned stage will explore the relative deprivation theories and explore more closely the relationship between deprivation and influence modes. So far, the research efforts have only centered on violence. The fifth planned stage of research will attempt to explore the effects of the equity-efficiency argument hinted at several times before. Do people really respond in terms of "what is good for the company is good for me"? The sixth stage of research is to discover more about the contagion effects developing from inducing trust conditions with groups within groups.

The social influence process deserves greater attention from communication scholars. When one considers the serious questions raised about the nature of man's communicative attempts to influence man, it is surprising this has been such a neglected area of concern.

Currently, the activity in social influence theory is in what Thomas Kuhn would refer to as "preparadigmatic."<sup>63</sup> Research is random and generally limited to one study. Theory development is casual and framed by anecdotal evidence. What is demanded is systematic and imaginative approaches that are pursued until completed. This paper is a preliminary report on the issues and approaches one researcher is taking to acquire greater knowledge about an important communication form. Hopefully the concepts and questions raised in this attempt will stimulate others to join him.

## FOOTNOTES

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