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**ABSTRACT**

During the 1966-67 school year, as part of its efforts towards decentralization, the Board of Education of New York City created an autonomous district located in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville area of Brooklyn. The newly formed local board experienced some difficulty in staffing the new district and eventually transferred 19 "uncooperative" teachers to the Central Board for reassignment. This summary action aroused the ire of the United Federation of Teachers and eventually led to a series of strikes in the fall of 1968. These strikes brought on a crisis in the educational life of the city. As the research and development arm of the U.S. Office of Education in New York region, the Center for Urban Education was tied to the school system through its programs in nearly 100 schools. By nature of its contract, it was incumbent upon the Center to respond to the crisis. The Center's approach was established after numerous discussions and decisions arrived at by its Board of Trustees and its Management Group. These decisions are recorded in this report along with descriptions of six action projects engaged in by Center personnel. These projects were: (1) creative energy workshops in the arts; (2) television instruction; (3) training of parent-instructors; (4) workshops on post-strike problems; (5) descriptions by two superintendents of events during strikes in their districts; and (6) a survey of community attitudes in one district. Also included are reflections on the strike situation excerpted from the Center's leading publications.

(Author/JF)

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CRISIS RESPONSE

A report of activities of  
the Center for Urban Education  
during the school strikes in  
New York City in the Fall of 1968

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## PREFACE

The dispute that closed down the New York City schools for more than two months in the Fall of 1968 brought on a crisis in the educational life of the city. As the research and development arm of the United States Office of Education in the New York region, the Center for Urban Education was tied to the school system through its programs in nearly one hundred schools. By nature of its contract, it was incumbent upon the Center to respond to the crisis.

The Center's approach was established after numerous discussions and decisions arrived at by its Board of Trustees and its Management Group. These are recorded in the pages that follow. The material describing the action projects is arranged according to the six major areas that engaged the Center personnel. Included also in this report are reflections of the strike situation found in the Center's leading publications, The Urban Review and The Center Forum.

As chairman of the Crisis Program Committee, I am pleased to present this history of the Center's Crisis Response.

Eugene T. Maleska  
Associate Director

## I. THE CRISIS: The Three Teacher Strikes, September 9 - November 20, 1968

### Background

During the 1966-67 school year, as part of its efforts towards decentralization, the Board of Education of New York City created an autonomous district located in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville area of Brooklyn. In these efforts it was assisted by the Ford Foundation financially, and by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT) morally and politically. The new district (hereinafter referred to as Ocean Hill) was one of the three demonstration districts in New York City, set up to test the first major experiment in local community control of schools.

A planning group made up of Ocean Hill community representatives began meeting in February 1967. For the next six months, they held discussions with members of the Mayor's Office of Educational Affairs and with the central Board's administrative staff. Finally, in August 1967, they submitted to the Board a written set of proposals outlining the powers, responsibilities, and duties of a local governing board, and by the end of the month, elected such a board and selected a Project Administrator. Among other items was the provision that the local board would be directly answerable to the New York City Superintendent of Schools and to the State Commissioner of Education.

As the first day of school drew near in September 1967, there was still no response from the central Board to the local board's proposals.

In fact, according to the Niemeyer Report,<sup>1</sup> as of July 30, 1968, the local board was "still awaiting the specific delineation of powers and authority to be granted."<sup>2</sup> But when five incumbent principals quit the district before the beginning of the school year, the local board proceeded to appoint five replacements, all of whom had state certification, though none was on the approved central Board list. When the UFT called a brief citywide strike the following week on bread-and-butter issues, the local board interpreted it as the union's negative reaction to the appointments. This interpretation was confirmed when the appointments were challenged in the courts shortly after the strike settlement by the Council of Supervisory Associations (CSA), an action in which the UFT entered an "amicus curiae" on the side of the supervisors.

In a sense this episode may be said to have marked the first significant break between Ocean Hill and the UFT. The community now felt the union was out to kill the experiment. The teacher members resigned from the local board and began to characterize the governing board as black extremists. By November 1967, all assistant principals had left Ocean Hill, in support of the CSA and UFT position. A large number

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<sup>1</sup> The Niemeyer Report was the final report of an advisory commission appointed July 1, 1967 by the central Board to study school decentralization with particular emphasis on the three experimental districts. The commission's full title was the Advisory and Evaluation Committee on Decentralization to the Board of Education of the City of New York. Its report, titled, "An Evaluative Study of the Process of School Decentralization in New York City," was submitted to the central Board on July 30, 1968 and released in September 1968.

<sup>2</sup> Niemeyer Report, p. 91.

of teachers also began to transfer out of the district, creating some serious shortages. A sizable group remained who were critical of the demonstration project.

In an effort to shore up its defense of the experiment, the local board decided in May 1968 to reassign 19 of what it called the "most uncooperative" teachers and administrators, first within the district, and then, when this power was denied, to another district, and finally, when this too was denied, to central Board headquarters for reassignment. These actions took place against the backdrop of argument around the concepts of decentralization. As the Niemeyer Report stated:

Under normal circumstances the Demonstration Project (Ocean Hill) might have been able to accomplish the transfer of "unsatisfactory" personnel informally, but a larger struggle was being waged in the New York State Legislature over a general proposal to decentralize the entire school system.<sup>3</sup>

The New York Civil Liberties Union, which examined the question of the transfer of the 19 teachers and which did not condone the acknowledged punitive nature of at least four of the teacher transfers, concluded:

It is clear that under present standards, the Superintendent of Schools has the power to transfer teachers without due process. If the Superintendent's powers are transferred to Unit Administrators under decentralization, as they should have been in the experimental districts, then the Unit Administrator would have the power to transfer teachers without due process. There is no question that under present standards, the United Federation of Teachers

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<sup>3</sup>Niemeyer Report, p. 95.

created the due process issue out of thin air.<sup>4</sup>  
 (*Italics theirs*)

In response to pressure from the central Board and the Union, the local board finally submitted written charges but refused to reinstate the teachers. The Union promptly called a district-wide strike for the last six weeks of the term, thus stripping the Ocean Hill schools of professional staff and in effect, leaving the graduating classes stranded. During the summer, the local board hired replacements for some 200 of the original 315 teachers who were granted transfers out of the district by the Superintendent of Schools.

#### Chronology of the Three Strikes

During the last week of August 1968, the UFT Delegate Assembly voted a citywide strike for opening day of school, unless agreement was reached covering the status of Union teachers in all decentralized districts. On Sunday, September 8, the UFT membership voted 12,021 to 1,716 to strike.

#### Strike No. 1, September 9 and 10

This strike lasted two days. Of the City's 57,000 teachers, 54,000 stayed out.

On Wednesday, September 11, teachers returned to work, with the option to close schools again within 48 hours in the event the agreements with Ocean Hill reinstating the teachers were broken. Though the local board had stated that it would not "prevent" the return of the teachers, Ocean Hill residents demonstrated in front of the schools to bar the teachers. The next day the central Board asked State Commissioner of Education, James E. Allen to intercede.

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<sup>4</sup>"The Burden of Blame," Vol. XVI, No. 9, November 1968.

Strike No. 2, September 13-30

This strike lasted for over two weeks. In the interim, Commissioner Allen ordered suspension of the local board, then rescinded the order; the disputed teachers were ordered back by the central Board, though the local board was allowed to keep the teachers it hired to replace them. The strike ended when the Union and the central Board agreed that disputed teachers would return to classroom duties.

Teachers were readmitted to Ocean Hill schools. But the community again in its demonstrations underscored the charge of "harassment" made by the Union.

On October 6, the central Board suspended the local board for 30 days on the grounds that it has not assigned teachers to classroom duties. Two days later, the Unit Administrator, Rhody McCoy, and seven of his eight principals were reassigned to central Board headquarters. McCoy refused the reassignment and remained in Ocean Hill.

Strike No. 3, October 14 - November 17

The UFT demands at this juncture were: JHS 271 was to be kept closed. (That school had been the site of demonstrations, arrests, and disorders causing it to be shut down and then reopened during the two-week interval between Strikes No. 1 and No. 2.) Only principals who would abide by the September 10 and September 30 agreements were to be returned. Ocean Hill was to be declared a failure, and its governing board, unit administrator, teachers, and supervisors were to be permanently removed. Finally, the eight schools in the district were to be returned to the central Board's jurisdiction.

In the settlement ending the strike, the UFT and the central Board, without, however, the participation of the local board, agreed to the plan placing Ocean Hill under state trusteeship, with the governing board and the unit administrator to remain suspended until Commissioner Allen acted. The Commissioner was to hear charges of four teachers accused of harassment by union teachers. Involuntary transfers would be covered by the arbitration machinery of the contract.

In the immediate aftermath, the following actions took place:

The unit administrator, Rhody McCoy, was reinstated; the governing board, however, remained suspended until March. Charges against the four teachers were dropped for insufficient evidence. The Court of Appeals overruled the lower courts and declared legal the central Board's special position of Demonstration School Principal, with the result that the three Ocean Hill principals were reinstated.

## II. THE CENTER RESPONSE: Dilemma, Discussions, and Decisions

As early as Spring 1968, the Center Management Group was alert to the explosive situation existing in Ocean Hill. As strike possibilities increased during the summer, the most frequent query in Center planning sessions was, "How are we going to carry out our program if the strike occurs?" Later the question became: "How are we going to carry on our program if the strike is prolonged?"

The Center lives on the same rhythms as the school system, and the fact that the strike threat could not become a reality in July and August made it entirely feasible for Center personnel to conduct business as usual.

On September 10, with the strike a reality, Dr. Robert A. Dentler, Director, convened the Management Group for what proved to be the first of three special meetings devoted to appraisal of the Center's role during the initial strike weeks. With more accuracy than he could then prove, Dr. Dentler prophesied: "This is different. Gut issues, not salary wranglings, are involved." The consensus, however, was that the strike would be of short duration. This hopeful outlook appeared confirmed that same afternoon when a strike settlement was announced.

When the strike resumed, Center personnel made every effort to reshape Center programs in preparation for changed school conditions. Additionally, discussions got underway for delineating the Center's role in an educational crisis that was engulfing the city.

### Center Settlement Efforts

Center administrators made numerous proposals during the strike period concerning ways the Center might be able to expedite or facilitate settlement of the Ocean Hill dispute.

A mediation proposal by Dr. Eugene T. Maleska, Associate Director, on September 12 (Appendix A) embraced the concept of offering the Center office as a neutral meeting ground where Center personnel would moderate but take no other role in discussions among teacher representatives, at least one member of the governing board, and representatives of the community groups of Ocean Hill.

Dr. Dentler telegraphed Mayor John Lindsay, the Board of Education, Superintendent Bernard E. Donovan, and State Commissioner of Education Allen urging support of Reverend Milton A. Galamison's mediation proposal of October 2 (Appendix B). The Director asserted the Center's willingness and ability to play a part in the implementation of this proposal.

Dr. Mortimer Kreuter advanced a suggestion (Appendix C) that the 83 teachers involved in the controversy be transferred to a new experimental slum area school wherein the Union could try out many of their own proposals concerning class size, election of building principal, etc.

The Center's intentions, however well-meant, had little effect. As Mr. Raymond A. Drecher, Assistant Director, phrased it: "The fantasy of the Center's becoming the impartial arbitrator, leading the parties to an amicable solution is an attractive one but. . . in the highly charged atmosphere of the day. . . hardly feasible."

### Contingency Plans

Internally, anxiety concerning the Center's role in a city without public education increased in direct ratio to prolongation of the teachers' strike. It was becoming increasingly obvious that the Center's operation did not fit the realities of a struck school system.

All seven major components of the Center program were dependent upon the Center's access to some 100 city schools. An alternative to this program was needed. It was outlined by Dr. Dentler at the Board of Trustees' meeting, September 27 (Appendix D). The alternative program, Plan B, described 12 projects in which the Center might become involved if the basic program, Plan A, could not be carried out. In compliance with the Trustees' directive, Dr. Dentler detailed the contingency plan in a working paper (Appendix E).

Plan B represented the distillation of the second Management Group meeting, held on September 25 (Appendix F). It was based on suggestions that are summarized in the Management Group Minutes (Appendix G). At this meeting two direct activities were reported already under way: (1) An attempt to stimulate local television stations to increase education programming (see page 25); (2) An effort to assist college bound high school seniors.

Both Trustees and the Management faced the dilemma of how the Center could take a direct role in the educational processes of the city without jeopardizing the Center's long-range effectiveness.

Could Center personnel work in the experimental school districts or the ever-mushrooming neighborhood schools without being labelled

strikebreakers? Should the Center work with nonstriking teachers in the public schools which continued to open their doors? How would striking teachers react? What coloration would any overt action taken during the strike period give to the Center's poststrike image?

Among the alternatives considered were: (1) Should the Center move out of New York City because it was impossible to conduct research and development in the midst of extreme conflict? (2) Should the Center divert its activities to suburban schools? (3) Should the Center overload its Glen Cove and Bridgeport resources? (4) Should the Center again attempt to open long-desired sites in New Jersey?

The answer to these questions was affirmed by the Management Group on October 23 and confirmed by Center Trustees on October 25. In the words of Dr. Dentler, even though the Center is authorized to work any place in the world, inside or outside the United States, "We cannot let ourselves off the hook by working in Denver. We have to make a difference in this city."

The intensity of the conflict in mid-October made it clear that the strike would be extremely prolonged (Appendix H). Dr. Dentler and Dr. Maleska agreed that Contingency Plan B (Appendix E) was inadequate and that a larger, more definite response was needed. Their search for that answer again resulted in reaffirmation of the Center's commitment to education: As a quasi-public organization of educators, the Center must accept the responsibility for enabling some children to continue learning and to be instructed -- whether by nonstriking teacher, parent, or concerned citizen. As a research and development organization the Center

must accept the responsibility for making a contribution to the teaching and learning process. Such a contribution could be most meaningful if done, not when life calmed down, but while the crisis was going on. In fact, a significant project in itself would be to investigate how research and development can be conducted in the midst of crisis.

### Mandate for Action

On Wednesday, October 23, Dr. Dentler convened the committee listed in Appendix I. He mandated action with the statement: "The Center for Urban Education must make a substantial effort to cooperate with people struggling to save children during the crisis."

The Director announced that Dr. Maleska would head a Crisis Response Committee in all Center efforts to join with school officials, parents, teachers, and volunteer teachers who, regardless of political posture, were making an effort to carry on. He added that, subject to confirmation by the Board of Trustees, the Center would offer materials, render consultative and training assistance, and participate directly where desirable in day-to-day activities.

To expedite action, projects were to be confined to a few selected sites for qualitative rather than quantitative effort. Such sites might be among the experimental school districts, or the regular districts where a superintendent or principal had struggled to keep the schools open, or the churches, public housing community centers, and parochial schools that had been opened to children.

The Crisis Response Committee was directed to consider the roles of automation, teaching machines, small group instruction, and utilization

of parent talent in their educational efforts. The Committee's aim would be to reach the following personnel who continued to be engaged in the education of children:

Teachers assigned to ungraded elementary classes.

Secondary school teachers assigned to elementary classes.

Teachers with little training in teaching of basic skills or meager knowledge of grouping procedures.

Parents or paraprofessionals serving as teachers or tutors of small groups.

Students serving as tutors or peer group leaders.

The following five guidelines were established:

1. Through Community Action and Neighborhood Youth Corps groups, assist communities to survey parent and neighborhood talent that might be used in educational efforts.
2. Conduct training sessions for parents, teachers, paraprofessionals, either on a district basis or in centrally located facilities. Techniques of flexible grouping, individualized instruction, and general methodology would be covered.
3. Provide for "trainees" structured instructional material such as the Center's own Profiles for first three grades, the Basic Reading Programs, and the Board of Education Math Cycles.
4. Supplement trainee efforts with teaching machines and materials from companies such as Grolier, General Learning, and Bell and Howell.
5. Provide such pupil materials as basic texts, workbooks, library books, and programmed instructional books.

The Center proposal for action programs during the balance of the strike crisis was presented to the Trustees at the regular Trustees' meeting on October 25 (Appendix K). The Trustees concurred that the Center should aid in the present crisis and that demonstration projects could be important since it could well be assumed that the strike foreshadowed continuing disorganization of public education.

The Trustees, however, argued at some length the proposal that the Center function in experimental schools, regular district schools, and freedom schools. They cautioned against aggravating tensions or undertaking actions that might make the Center a target for criticism.

The Trustees also made four suggestions concerning specific possibilities for Center action. Two of these will be described in detail later in this report. Two others, although not implemented during the remaining days of the crisis, are summarized here because they may merit consideration on a future occasion.

1. Dr. A. C. Stewart proposed that the New York Urban Coalition be asked to support a Center request to the U.S. Office of Education for funds to buy, if necessary, television time to be used for educational purposes.

2. Dr. Benjamin Rosner suggested that one or two pages in a newspaper daily carry exercises which parents might induce children to undertake.

The appropriate overall role of the Center in the public school crisis was set forth in the following motion made by Dr. Harry N. Rivlin, seconded by Dr. Stewart, and passed unanimously by the Trustees:

In the light of the present emergency conditions in the New York City schools, we recommend that the staff seek to ameliorate the negative effects on our children by working with parents and community groups outside a formal school setting, and we further recommend that the staff study how these negative results can be corrected after school resumes.

Subsequent to the meeting, Dr. Dentler advised all members of the

Crisis Committee that:

The Board of Trustees . . . this morning . . . accepted in essence the proposal . . . (of) 23 October . . . . They recommended, however, that the Center work outside of New York City educational institutions, both public and freedom schools, and (that the Center) focus its efforts on programs providing assistance to children who are not able to attend schools . . . .

### III. SIX CENTER CRISIS RESPONSE PROJECTS

The ideas presented in response to numerous requests, reports, and meetings on the Center alternatives during the strike were sifted and resifted. From them six projects were developed, and these are described in the following pages.

Three of the projects were highly successful; three may be considered near misses or outright failures in achieving immediate results. The causes for failure, despite the validity of the ideas themselves, are worthy of careful scrutiny, and, in the event of another similar crisis, resurrection of one or more of these projects is a distinct possibility. Budget allocations and actual expenditures are listed in Appendices L and M, respectively.

PROJECT NO. 1

## CREATIVE ENERGY WORKSHOPS IN THE ARTS

Supervisor: Mr. Raymond A. Drescher, Assistant Director, Curriculum Development

Operations Director: Mr. Thomas J. Scott, Senior Staff Associate, Curriculum Development

Consultant: Miss Nadine Bilski

The Center launched the Creative Energy Workshops in the Arts in the belief that bringing the artist into the schools would enrich the curriculum. The project was introduced into nine city schools two weeks after the October 23 mandate for action. Despite a number of inevitable misunderstandings, there is every reason to believe that the strike emergency was the mother of innovations which were exciting, worthwhile, and, in most instances, significant.

Miss Nadine Bilski was retained as consultant for the project. An actress, Miss Bilski had demonstrated her ability to marshal talent rapidly in her work for the "Design-In" held in Central Park a year or two earlier. Miss Bilski's recruitment efforts complemented those of Mr. Scott who is avocationally an active artist, and prior to coming to the Center, had been supervisor of student teaching at Pratt Institute.

Although initially neither the size of budget allotment was known, nor the number of artists who could be interested or utilized, recruitment, nevertheless, was launched by telephone, telegraph, mail, and the grapevine of the art world. A one-page questionnaire (see Appendix N) was prepared and submitted to all artists who manifested interest in the still somewhat amorphous project. Immediate response was obtained from

the 39 artists and film groups listed in Appendix O, thus insuring an adequate representation of artists from the worlds of theatre, writing, dance, music, visual arts, and films.

### Location Search

Simultaneous with artist recruitment, a quest for adequate sites and facilities was underway. First choice for the experimental project was Harlem.

Mindful of the Center Trustees' recommendation to work outside regular or freedom school structures, site researchers sought neutral halls. But no meeting place with a capacity of more than 25 or 30 persons could be located in Harlem. Clearly such a capacity was inadequate for the projects being contemplated.

The site search widened. A suggestion was advanced that Center establish workshops in five or six districts and, taking a leaf from professional football clubs, field a taxi squad of artists who could be deployed over a sizable part of the city. Program Director Eugene Maleska vetoed this approach and asked that the experiment be confined to one district.

Finally, an available hall with a capacity of 200 persons was discovered in District 16 in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn. Since schools in that district had been kept open, with attendance as high as 40 and 60 percent on many days, District Superintendent Abraham P. Tauchner was asked to arrange for cooperation of the schools to hold a post-3:00 P.M. series of workshops in the large hall.

Mr. Tauchner urged that the Center should present the proposed workshops during the regular school day. He was convinced that it would be impossible to persuade any appreciable number of pupils to go to another hall after 3:00 P.M.; they were already assembled in the schools, and maximum numbers could be served inside the schools. He pleaded for "support of our effort to keep these schools open," adding, "since the Center is obviously an ally in wanting to help children, why not go the full distance and use school facilities?" The schools were provided with safety devices, coverage, and guarantees, as well as those facilities essential to the Creative Energy Workshops, which would otherwise have to be provided by the Center at considerable expense. Mr. Tauchner stated that the Center was free to take the program into the streets, but that he was interested only if the experiments were staged within his schools.

Informed of the District Superintendent's position, Dr. Dentler discussed the situation with the Chairman of the Board of Trustees and obtained the necessary approval.

#### Orientation Sessions

Two meetings to orient artists were held between October 28 and November 5. At the first meeting, Mr. Scott and Miss Bilski expressed their hopes that through introduction of art in a workshop format rather than in the traditional classroom atmosphere, artists would develop a new relationship with schools. Mr. Scott stated the Center's belief that artists would be welcomed because they would bring new esthetic products and experiences into the schools. He defined the major purposes of the Creative Energy Project as follows:

1. To provide for children whose educational program had been interrupted the enrichment and new expressive resources of workshop activities that offer direct contact with artists and performers in such disciplines of self-expression and communication as theatre, dance, painting, music, creative writing, and filmmaking.

While the voices of parents and teachers have been heard in the angry struggle to clarify structures of education, almost nothing is known about the feelings and concerns of those in whose name the struggle is being fought. Nothing had been heard from the pupils. How can and how will they express themselves? What is their report from the center of a storm which must surely have changed their regard for schools, teachers, and parents? What will their individual and group expressions tell us about their reactions, their needs, their understanding? What has been lost? What has been gained? By enlisting the aid of artists who are willing and able to act as catalysts, this project can provide some extraordinary outlets for constructive expression. The children need to tell us and we need to hear from them now.

2. To introduce experiences and opportunities which, in addition to meeting the immediate needs, could endure as part of an enlarged access to the arts for the children involved and their teachers.

For children the approach to art is like their approach to play -- serious and involved. Their pride in their creations indicates the importance children invest in them. The special opportunity presented by the project can also be a test of the values of the artist-in-residence concept for elementary and secondary schools. The experience as

well as the results of the workshops can be shared most productively with students, teachers, parents, administrators, and researchers.

3. To aid school situations and personnel with such workshops during the difficult period of restoring instructional programs.

By scheduling and circulating these workshops in coordination with the facilities and times made available at the various schools during the remaining period in this semester, the students and artists should be able to bring forth valuable creative statements.

The second briefing session for artists set forth the ground rules of the budgetary and administrative side of the operation. The fact that budget limitations made it impossible for the Center to stipulate how long this project could be maintained aroused some objections. There was a concerted move by the artists to force a commitment to fund programs through January. Dr. Maleska pointed out that the Center's fiscal year ended November 30, and that no one at the Center yet knew the amount of money that would be allocated for 1969-70 operations. (As a matter of fact, a later announcement that the new allocation was a "continuation budget" dealt a severe blow to the Creative Energy project.)

Despite some grumbling the artists for the most part accepted the final arrangements. Certainly their work in the schools was conducted with nearly universal elan. It is entirely probable that the artists believed, as Mr. Scott stated: "What we do have a future."

### The Workshops

Some 40 artists set up Creative Energy Workshops in nine cooperating elementary schools in District 16, Brooklyn (Appendix P). Eleven artists

were actors, five were writers, five dancers, five musicians, ten were from the visual arts field, and three were filmmakers. The filmmakers were members of "Commediation," an organization that is named for its interest in community, communications, and media.

### Film

The first artists to go into the schools were the Commediation film group. Commediation had a specific idea of what to do. The principals of the group (an actor, a painter, a graphic artist, a cameraman) seek to and often succeed in conferring an art status on videotape.

In the schools, they shot more than 12 hours of film. The completed film is now at the Center Headquarters in the company of a 12 x 20 foot vinyl balloon that is covered with a vivid variety of paintings. Part of the film is devoted to meetings such as the one held by the original group of artists who invited other artists to join them in an early appraisal of the first workshops. There is much footage concerning other workshops such as the dances.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the videotape operation was the filming of regular class sessions. Teachers and pupils were able to look at each other, and almost within themselves, to see in a wholly new way how each acted and reacted. Played back to the participants within seconds, the films had an electrifying impact. "Rap" sessions, in which participants talked freely and without regard for the cameras, revealed authentic emotions. One piece of film, for example, records a boy solemnly explaining to his cronies that the reason for the strike is that

"some boy killed a teacher." One gets an unmistakable impression that many young pupils felt that somehow their peers or they themselves were responsible for the entire crisis. This unplanned discovery was completely understandable when one considers that the schools were surrounded by police for much of the strike period.

### Graffiti

A poet elicited reactions from the youngsters by having them do "Graffiti writing" about the strike: "What do you think of Albert Shanker? Who is responsible for the strike? Do you want your teachers to come back? These were the types of questions children responded to on the chalkboard, and their answers were often revelatory of their genuine feelings. "The white teachers are scared! They don't care if we don't get an education!"

### Giant Balloons

One artist introduced schools to the newest in art technology by bringing sheets of vinyl, heat sealers, and special vinyl paint into the schools. Pupils molded the material into huge inflated forms and, for the first time, completely uninhibited by these unorthodox materials, they painted enthusiastically on curved, transparent surfaces. They learned about spatial relations as never before. They saw friends in reverse when each stood on opposite sides of the huge sausage-like constructions. They enjoyed being able to stand inside their own art product.

Dance

Many of the artists were familiar with African tribal dances. They taught these dances to youngsters as recreational rather than educational activities and, in the process, stimulated more physical fitness activity than traditional calisthenics. The possibilities of the dance were barely tapped, but horizons opened for its use in the English and Social Studies classes.

Acting

An actor brought the daily newspaper into his workshop. He read an article concerning a family evicted for nonpayment of rent. He then proceeded to have the pupils improvise a play around the article. One boy played the landlord, another the policeman, several represented the tenants. This was a situation with which the pupils were familiar. They improvised both dialogue and action with authority.

Sculpture

A sculptor whose sideline was carpentry instructed his group in "junk sculpture." His students used bolts, shelf supports, an auto tire, a window curtain, and a dilapidated chair to make what The New York Times called "Erector Set" sculpture.

Poetry

The natural feel youngsters have for rhythm and sounds was well evidenced by a boy who wrote:

I dig me.  
Dig I me.  
Me I dig.  
Dig me I.  
Me dig I.

### Some Conclusions

Whatever flaws may have existed in this response to the crisis, there is little room to doubt that the artist-in-school concept is sound, exciting, and good education. It is equally patent that New York City is the foremost location in the world for implementation of such a concept.

Refinements will have to be made on a future effort. In some instances, for example, there is need for artists to work together. There will be need, too, for more indoctrination concerning the intrinsic educational value of creative activities. During the period following the strike, all energies were directed to "catching up" academically; there was no time for so-called "trivious games."

During the strike, the Center personnel and artists worked with many acting administrators. When the strike terminated, there were occasional instances where the returning administrators had to be assured that the Creative Energy Project was not a strikebreaking activity. In most instances, this goal was readily accomplished.

A fitting fillip for the entire project was given during Christmas week. CBS-TV, ABC-TV, Channel 13, and radio station WNYC covered an exhibit of the Creative Energy products of District 16 pupils. The exhibit itself opened on December 21 at the New York Shakespeare Festival's Theatre, 425 Lafayette Street. It continued to draw enthusiastic crowds through February 28, 1969. The New York Times on December 24, 1968 devoted a four-column story to the exhibit, including a three-column photograph of a mural of black and brown people. (Appendix Q)

PROJECT NO. 2

## TELEVISION INSTRUCTION

Supervisors: Dr. Mortimer Kreuter, Dr. Stanley Soles

Coordinators: Mr. Stanley Lisser, Dr. Ruth Berken, Mr. Arthur Tobier

Both the Trustees and the Management Group agreed that the mass media should be urged to take on a new and constructive role as instructional vehicles during the strike period.

In addition to insertion of daily exercises in the press mentioned earlier, radio programs were suggested to supplement National Educational Television with six hours of programming, two hours each for elementary, junior high, and senior high levels.

The bulk of recommendations, however, centered on the possibilities offered by commercial television. Dr. Kreuter suggested that the Center promote a TV program that would provide news about college board and Regents examinations and college placement operations. Dr. Soles outlined a television series that would guide parents in establishing a climate for learning at home and also publicize field trips which mothers might welcome for their offspring.

On October 17, Dr. Soles wrote to WNBC and WCBS to urge substantial educational programming. WCBS-TV Vice President Ralph Daniels, in his reply on October 28, expressed his station's concern about competing educational activities during a labor-management dispute. He also cited a special WCBS program being aired daily at 12:30 P.M. to assist pupils scheduled to take Regents examinations. On October 29, Mr. Tom Parro of WNBC-TV affirmed by letter that Aline Saarinen would be featured daily

at 5:55 P.M. in a special five-minute series, "Show and Tell." The program was designed to announce events and to suggest activities of interest to parents and children. The Center was invited to submit further suggestions and to arrange for a meeting with Mr. Larry Johnson.

Dr. Soles met with Mr. Johnson and several members of his staff on Wednesday, November 6, ostensibly to discuss the Center's crisis response activities and the possibility of the Center's serving as a resource on the entire decentralization issue. They suggested that the Center prepare a sheet of "Helpful Hints," which Miss Saerinen would, via "Show and Tell," invite parents to write for. Mr. Johnson reported that he and other station representatives had already met with Dr. James Macandrew, director of educational radio and TV for the Board of Education and coordinator of television education efforts during the strike period. An outcome of this meeting was that WNBC-TV decided to start an instructional series on American and English Literature, and WCBS-TV assumed responsibility for science and mathematics in conjunction with the City University of New York. Mr. Johnson also reported that starting December 2, WNBC-TV would re-run a series entitled Read Your Way Up.

#### The Center's Own Television Series

Now the Center tried a different approach, one in which it would assume responsibility for preparing demonstration television programs. Dr. Kreuter assigned Dr. Ruth Berken to work with Mr. Stanley Lisser to formulate specifics.

Four points were established at the outset:

1. The Center's purpose was to prepare educational programs featuring worthwhile activities that could be carried out at home both during and subsequent to each television program.

2. Science offered the best springboard and the most opportunities for such activities. Children could undertake these in or around the house, at little or no expense because homes are generally well supplied with usable items. Further, the subject area itself provided wide latitude for follow-up activities.

3. Four half-hour programs would be presented. The first would introduce the program to parents. Each of the three remaining programs would be designed for a specific age level: five to seven, eight and nine, and ten and eleven.

4. Miss Muriel Green would be retained to prepare scripts. Miss Green, a consultant for District 29, is the author of many elementary science curriculum and resource units who had also prepared television programs under a Ford Foundation grant.

Miss Green prepared the format for all four programs. She detailed the first half-hour program, and this script (Appendix R) was to be used in discussions with television program directors as tangible evidence of the type and quality of offering which the Center proposed.

Unfortunately, the project did not develop as had been hoped.

Dr. Maleska had agreed that two approaches could be made: (1) The Center would tape programs for a given station to air as a public service, or, if necessary (2) the Center would buy time and present each program live. Both approaches were in line with suggestions made by Trustees at the October 25 meeting.

Mr. Lisser enlisted the aid of Mr. Arthur Tobier, the Center's public information officer, to make the contacts with one or more local television stations who were willing to air the Center's science series.

To speed matters, efforts were made by telephone to arrange interviews with these stations. The answers from Channels 2 and 4 were playbacks of replies given earlier to Dr. Soles. Channel 13 was, of course, entirely committed to educational television programming but unable to handle an additional series at that time. It proved impossible to get through to officers of sufficient authority at Channels 7, 9, and 11.

Channel 5, however, kept the project committee's hopes alive. This local station was already airing several emergency school programs aimed particularly at high school seniors who faced important examinations.

On Friday, November 8, when the Center officials met with a program director at Channel 5, the series proposal was cordially received. The director, however, requested additional time over the weekend to mull over the entire situation. But when Monday arrived, Mr. Lisser was unable to make further contact with him. And so the project was forced to end.

### Analysis

Why did the Center's television effort fail?

It is probable that more than one station shared the trepidation about labor-management conflicts that only WCBS-TV expressed to Center personnel.

Unquestionably time commitments were a factor. Although television stations often cancelled programs during other emergencies, they did so

with their own news staff taking over. Of all the local stations only Channel 13 has a full complement of educators who could take over in the event outside sources failed to deliver.

There is every reason, too, to believe that the same uncertainty about the future that permeated the Center itself at the beginning of the crisis also affected the broadcasters. Why gear up so extensively and expensively when the strike had to end soon?

Still another factor was the series itself. A package of four programs does not interest an industry which deals in packages of 13 to 39 programs for a series.

Finally, there was the Center's own expertise insofar as television is concerned. The Center's experience with the medium had been solely with educational programming. The Center's major thrust had, to date, been with school systems. These factors account in part for the Center staff's inability to get through to the creative people in commercial television who were on a high enough level to authorize the proposed experiment.

PROJECT NO. 3

## PARENT-INSTRUCTORS

Supervisors: Dr. Stanley Soles, assisted by Dr. Thelma Williams

Curriculum Consultants: Mr. Raymond A. Drescher, assisted by Miss Margaret Kiernan

Site Coordinator: Mrs. Rita Rock

Dr. Maleska and the Crisis Response Committee were unanimous in their feeling that the Center should make a major attempt to determine how effectively adults who had no teacher training could conduct an educational effort with children.

The Center's task in such efforts would be fourfold:

1. Select a site and a site coordinator.
2. Recruit and train a corps of parents to work with pupils.
3. Recruit pupils and create a "curriculum" for them.
4. Supply teaching materials, pay for services of the parent corps, and maintain close liaison with same.

Site and Coordinator

Prior to joining the Center staff, Dr. Maleska had been superintendent of District 8, and Mr. Drescher had been principal of P.S. 138 in that Bronx district. Their intimate knowledge of the area and its community leaders was the chief factor in selecting District 8.

Dr. Stewart Lucey, the present district superintendent, was most receptive to the suggestion. Mrs. Rita Rock, a community leader who had previously worked with Dr. Maleska, was equally enthusiastic in her acceptance of his November 1 telephone invitation for her to become site coordinator for a project that was still amorphous.

Mrs. Rock is a member of District 8's local school board, former president of the P.S. 36 Parent Association, and current president of the Castle Hill Tenants Council.

The Castle Hill housing development consists of 2,025 apartments of four, five, and six rooms. The housing had been opened for occupancy in 1959 for middle income families (\$6,336 to \$9,250 per year). Though there are a few subsidized families in the project, the area is not eligible for poverty funds, and the Center's proposal was accordingly received with great enthusiasm.

The Castle Hill Houses are served by P.S. 36 and 138. Both schools were closed when the project was initiated. Neither school had a tutorial program. Despite the fact that 40 percent of the pupils were reading below grade level, the reading record of the schools was the second highest in the city.

Ethnically the residents were integrated, with one-third each being Puerto Ricans, other whites, and Negroes. Families averaging four children accounted for over 7,000 children in the high-rise buildings. On the immediate periphery in private homes were another thousand or more children.

#### Recruitment of Mothers

Within 24 hours of her discussion with Dr. Maleska, Mrs. Rock began recruiting the corps of mothers who were to be utilized as parent-instructors. Her basic criterion was community leadership rather than educational background. She was not concerned about whether there were or

were not elementary school children in the mothers' households, but she did seek mothers who had shown their community-mindedness through work with and for adults or children. The 20 members of the project included Brownie and Boy Scout leaders, active church workers, teacher aides, and present and former leaders of parent associations. Very consciously, Mrs. Rock balanced the group ethnically. She also deliberately recruited from private homes and from each of the high-rise apartment buildings.

Parental reaction to the recruitment effort was interesting in two respects: (1) No one turned the invitation down; (2) No one asked about compensation. When told about payment, respondents most often said: "Oh, that's nice." Mrs. Rock ascribed the enthusiastic response to the fact that the Center was offering something for the Castle Hill children which was above and beyond anything available either in regular public school or in Interim schools. "Never," added Mrs. Rock, "did any question of strikebreaking arise."

#### Shaping the Project

Dr. Maleska and Mr. Drescher approved a pay schedule of \$5.00 per hour for the site coordinator and \$2.50 per hour for parent-instructors. New York City Board of Education hourly rates for paraprofessionals range from \$1.75 to \$2.50 for those with college experience. The Center's rate of pay seemed reasonable since participants would be using their own homes, supplying electricity, even -- it turned out -- a snack!

The Center agreed that the operational program should be worked out with the parents. There was no intention to impose, but it did seem highly desirable to propose, a structure. The proposal subsequently adopted included five items:

1. The heart of the experiment would be an effort to improve the reading skills of youngsters reading below grade level.
2. Only pupils in grades three, four, five, and six would be enrolled. It was imperative that pupils have some knowledge of how to read. There was the fear, too, that younger children might wander or be disruptive.
3. Sessions would be limited to two hours on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday. Wednesdays, when many children were ordinarily released for religious instruction, would be utilized by the Center as periods for regular training of parent-instructors. The two-hour period was sufficient to make an educational impact, and attention could be maintained for that period.
4. The Center "schools" would meet from 1:00 P.M. to 3:00 P.M., thereby avoiding conflict with the many Interim Schools operating in the area each morning.
5. Only three to five youngsters would be assigned to meet in the home of each parent-instructor.

The structure bore a remarkable resemblance to a Cub Pack, with Mrs. Rock as Cubmaster and the parent-instructors as Den Mothers. The resemblance developed even further when it was proposed that one hour of the two be devoted to dramatics, simple craft work, listening activities, and discussion of current events.

During the second hour, however, when definite reading skills were to be taught, a commercial product designed for this purpose would be used. Science Research Associates (SRA) Reading Laboratories were selected because they are highly structured, not too sophisticated for use by nonprofessionals, yet sufficiently designed to have an impact. The Labs also permit pupils to start at their own reading level. Still another bonus, discovered later, was that the Labs were relatively un-intimidating because most of the parent-instructors had previously been exposed to them.

Mr. Drescher and Miss Kierman concurred that the 2A Labs were the most suitable for the project since the children's reading levels extended from 2.0 to 9.0. Perceptive comments from parent-instructors prompted addition of several 1C Labs for pupils with even lower reading levels.

The cost factor (approximately \$80 per Lab) made it necessary to order one for every two groups. One group would use a Lab from 1:00 to 2:00 P.M., then turn it over to a second group for the final hour of each session.

An interesting sidelight is that SRA's New York City representative, Mr. Melvin Feinstein, arranged with his Chicago headquarters to have the Labs delivered to Mrs. Rock's apartment within 48 hours after the order was placed.

#### Training Session No. 1

The prospect existed for this and all other Center Crisis Response projects that preparations would go for naught because a strike settlement

could occur at any time. Nevertheless, the consensus was to proceed as though each project was forever.

On Thursday, November 7, the Center personnel met in Mrs. Rock's apartment to conduct the first training session for parent-instructors. Despite hurricane conditions, all 15 mothers recruited by that date were present. The administrations of P.S. 36 and 138 had, of course, been notified of the project, and an acting principal from one of the schools was present for this kick-off meeting. The Center representatives were Dr. Soles, Dr. Williams, Mr. Drescher, and Miss Kiernan.

Time was devoted to presenting and gaining ratification for the structural items described as "Shaping the Project." Mr. Drescher explained that the Center hoped for a "catch-up" program which would differ from a standard remedial reading program and be an adjunct to Interim or regular school offerings but not a replacement for them. Miss Kiernan displayed the SRA kits, explained the reasons they were recommended, and highlighted how they were to be used.

After discussing community aspects of this experimentation, Dr. Soles was besieged with questions which clearly indicated the anxiety of the mothers present. Many had had tutorial experience but had never worked with groups. Several confessed that they were scared to death. A number asked about their status: "Why were we singled out? What credentials do we have that our neighbors lack? How do we explain what we are doing?"

The balance of the morning was devoted to allaying these fears through discussion of utilizing previous experiences, building on

strengths, and employing imagination to convert home supplies and situations for program uses.

Use of the second of the two hours for active and varied activities was explored further at the second training session. Always the theme was that the children must enjoy the sessions.

### Pupil Recruitment

Mrs. Rock and the parent-instructors launched their pupil recruitment campaign on November 8. They went directly to teachers in the Interim schools meeting in church basements, apartments, and community halls. Their request was simple: "Can you give us the names of children in grades 3 to 6 who are reading below grade level?"

"Literally," reported Mrs. Rock, "we were deluged with lists." Parent-instructors added their own recommendations.

Step two was to visit the parents of children who had been recommended for help. Not one parent refused the invitation to enroll his child (children) in the Center program. No one protested that his offspring was on grade level. The community attitude seemed to be: "Something to benefit our children is going on."

As a long-time community leader, Mrs. Rock made every effort to utilize this project to foster "togetherness." Since half the Castle Hill children go to P.S. 36 which feeds into one Junior High School while the other half go to P.S. 138 and another Junior High, there had been little parental intermingling before this time. Mrs. Rock, therefore, separated her pupils not only by grade levels but by buildings.

She made a definite effort to involve parents and children from both the high-rise apartments and the peripheral private dwellings. In instances where there was more than one child from the same family, the children were assigned to different parent-instructors.

This careful cross-pollination produced 15 groups. The accuracy of the appraisals of reading ability was confirmed by the discovery that in regular school all these pupils had been assigned to remedial reading classes. The additional discovery that all these pupils also attended Interim schools throughout the strike indicated strong parental support.

#### Training Session No. 2

On Tuesday, November 12, the second training session for parent-instructors was held at Mrs. Rock's apartment. Again, despite a torrential downpour, all but four of the original participating mothers were present. The four absentees had withdrawn reluctantly because P.S. 36 had opened that day. Several of these mothers were teacher-aides and all felt that their first responsibility was to the children. Mrs. Rock recruited replacements immediately but was unable to maintain the same ethnic balance as had been originally established. (That there was no racism involved in this instance is substantiated by the fact that the same mothers, at the end of the school strike, telephoned Mrs. Rock to offer their services again and to re-enroll their children.)

Once administrative details were cleared away, the session was devoted to three subjects:

1. Use of SRA kits.

2. Activities for the Non-Reading Hour.

3. Small Group Teaching Techniques .

Mr. Feinstein of SRA showed the components of a diagnostic test that would enable parent-instructors to establish a pupil's approximate reading level. He then demonstrated the actual use of the Skill Builders, the Power Builders, and the Rate Builders.

Materials for the second-hour activities proposed by the Center representatives included such items as Sears Roebuck catalogs, consumer reports, stamps, and free literature such as the New York State Department's pamphlet on "Rescue Breathing and Resuscitation." All would encourage reading, speaking, computing and comparisons, based on children's interests.

The final portion of the session was conducted by Dr. Soles to further allay the anxieties evidenced on November 7. He described three basic techniques for increasing trainee participation (Appendix S):

1. How to ask questions that get an extended rather than Yes-No response.

2. How to utilize pupil errors to improve rather than retard learning.

3. How to re-direct pupil comments to reduce trainer-talk and increase pupil participation.

### "School"

The first teaching sessions were scheduled for 1:00 P.M. Thursday, November 14. A few children did not appear for the first session but parent-instructors had realistically decided in advance that seldom would there be a day when all assignees reported.

Several youngsters went to the wrong location and were re-shuffled, thanks to the effective communication between each group and Mrs. Rock. But the great majority of "trainees" appeared in a happy, curious, enthusiastic mood. Parent-instructors discovered that miraculously all their fears disappeared within minutes.

"The children loved it," stated Mrs. Rock, who, after the first day, spent the 1:00 to 3:00 P.M. period visiting her dens. The novelty of being part of a small group, the fact that they were encouraged to give their individual views, the discovery that they could read and make progress at their own rate, delighted the youngsters.

### Adjustments

A series of boat-rocking events punctuated the entire "schooling" effort.

First there was the dislocation caused by the opening of P.S. 36 on November 13. Should the program be continued now that the school was open, or should it be dropped just when everything was geared to go? The Center offered an option: If trainees were not going back to school because the strike was still on and if parental clearance could be obtained, the program could be launched on schedule. Every parent was contacted. Only six pupils were being sent to regular school. Parents

of all others in the program gave verbal assurance of their desire to see the Center program implemented because they would not allow their children to go to regular school until the strike was over.

The end of the strike on November 20 caused the next dislocation. Unable to assure any long-range continuation of the project, the Center had agreed that the programs would be funded through November. So, on November 21, a determined Mrs. Rock and her colleagues shifted their program to 3:00 to 5:00 P.M. No pupils were lost in the process, but some reassignment was made because it was clear that having at least two groups meet in the same building minimized the problem of sharing SRA kits.

Still one other major obstacle emerged on Monday, November 25 when as per strike agreement, the school day was extended by 45 minutes. Many youngsters assigned to parent-instructors left their homes at 7:30 A.M. and commencing November 25, did not return until after 5:00 P.M. Their regular day now made it impossible for them to report to their groups before 3:30 P.M. Yet they did so right up to Thanksgiving Day. The periods during which the mothers could work with the youngsters were shorter. It was dark when these very young children left for their homes at the end of a very long day.

The need was felt so profoundly by both youngsters and mothers that every effort was made to keep the program going. Many mothers volunteered to continue without pay if the Center would allow them to keep the materials.

There was some feedback from the teachers who had returned to their classrooms. Their most frequently expressed comments indicated that they

felt trained teachers could do the reading-improvement job better than the average parent.

The program terminated on November 30; the obstacles to fruitful continuation were too great.

### Evaluation

No real evaluation of skill-teaching effectiveness can be made for what in effect amounted to nine sessions and a maximum of 15 to 16 hours for the youngsters who attended every meeting.

There is no doubt in Mrs. Rock's mind of the need for such a program. She is an eloquent advocate of the "community-togetherness" bonus of the project.

Possibilities for further research were suggested by the discovery that many Puerto Rican children were completely bilingual orally yet often deplorably below grade level in reading. The frequency of families where four and five children were all well below reading level also poses a challenge.

Perhaps the most heartening aspect of this project was the interest, the realism, and the perceptiveness shown by the participating parent-teachers. They proved what can be accomplished when people work together in a spirit of harmony toward a common good.

PROJECT NO. 4

## WORKSHOPS ON POST-STRIKE PROBLEMS

Supervisor: Dr. Stanley Soles

From the onset of the strike, the dominant feeling was expressed in the words of Dr. Dentler: "The Center has the obligation to do something constructive to help get ready for the time when the strike is over because that is when teaching and learning will break down or be facilitated."

Plans to deal with issues that might confront school personnel when the strike was over represented a potential for long-term benefits. Involved in the dynamics of the situation were pupils, the community (particularly parents), school administrators, striking and nonstriking teachers. How could the distances between these various publics be bridged? How could understanding be increased, hostilities reduced, progress accelerated?

There was an almost immediate consensus that exploration of the problem should, at least initially, be confined to one school so that soundings could be made in depth. An elementary school on the West Side of Manhattan was selected by Dr. Soles after several days of data-gathering from striking and nonstriking teachers, a number of administrators, and parents in several communities. The target school was one where the principal was struggling to keep the doors open and where a number of teachers and pupils were reporting daily.

### The Workshop Approach

Originally some consideration was given to retreats wherein dissidents might be brought together. But the exigencies of the strike now made it apparent that small Workshops were more flexible and more feasible. Each Workshop group would be asked to identify issues and ways to meet them. It was hoped that orientation to all problems would be from the viewpoint of how youngsters rather than adults could be assisted. In addition to the inner family Workshops, comparable sessions would be held with specialists such as psychologists, psychiatrists, guidance personnel, and other consultants.

The Workshops were scheduled in three clusters somewhere between October 30 and November 5 to 9, and on November 11.

### Problem Areas

Even though a key aspect would be participant identification of issues, thought was given to the type of questions that might be considered. Possible starting points were: (a) pupil grouping and re-assignment, (b) parental attitudes at resumption of instruction, and (c) instructional problems based on the mix of pupils in three categories. These would be: (1) pupils who had had no school during the crisis, (2) those who had attended freedom schools, and (3) pupils who had attended those regular public schools which had remained open during the strike.

### Meeting with Union Representatives

In mid-October, Dr. Soles met with the target school's Union chapter chairman and representatives of the chapter's executive committee.

Several members of the Union group opposed the proposed intervention by an outside agency on the grounds that it was the professional responsibility of each teacher to handle his own class once classes were resumed. The same spokesmen were of the opinion that return to normal would be no problem and would be accomplished in a very short time.

It was obvious, moreover, that the hostility of the striking teachers toward nonstriking colleagues was at this time so strong that getting these two groups together in a Workshop setting would accomplish absolutely nothing.

Dr. Soles then suggested that only the striking teachers participate in such a Workshop. The Union representatives were somewhat receptive to this possibility. They stated, however, that the proposal would have to be presented to the Union chapter's membership for decision. The membership meeting was set for November 1.

Meanwhile, Dr. Soles drafted a series of open-ended questions that might be used to stimulate thought and discussion at the Workshop sessions (Appendix T).

Teachers were to consider strategies they might follow to compensate for the shortened semester.

Administrators might address themselves to post-strike grouping of children and the conflicting interests of teachers in resuming regular classes.

Parents and general community Workshop participants could concern themselves with ways in which a proper learning atmosphere and attitude toward school could be established in the home.

### Nonstriking Teachers

An exploration of specialist interest in the Workshop proposal produced clearcut evidence that such interest was high, and availability of psychiatrists and others would present no problem.

Not so encouraging were ploys in the direction of nonstriking teachers. The day-to-day working situation during the strike period was tremendously exhausting. The prospect of extending the day to attend the proposed Workshops was greeted with polite but firm disinterest.

### Union Members

Dr. Soles made his presentation to the Union chapter membership on November 1 at a meeting held in the apartment of one of the Union members. Attendance was high.

Equally high was the polarity between striking and nonstriking teachers. By this date, more teachers had returned to classrooms. Those who, like the ones present at this meeting, were still out had increased the depth of their conviction about how right they were. These striking teachers regarded their nonstriking counterparts as apostates.

Coupled with the hardened attitude toward nonstriking teachers was the Union's suspicion of the Center's motivation. It was obvious that some members took toward the Center's representative the same stance as that of a quarreling husband and wife when a third party seeks to intervene.

Dr. Soles indicated that the group would be serving an advance planning role and results would be distributed to 900 other schools. But

the Union membership voted not to engage in the proposed post-strike Workshops. The problems were real, it was agreed, but would be taken care of when school resumed.

There was no amplification of the negative response, and Dr. Soles was not present when the voting was conducted.

### Aftermath

On December 5, Dr. Soles ascertained from the principal of the target school that teachers and pupils had resumed operations with relative ease. The principal had held a number of joint sessions in which the staff had worked out such matters as grouping by retaining intact those pupils who during the strike had been assembled from various classes.

In those schools which had been completely closed throughout the strike, there seems to have been even less dislocation because all teachers returned together.

The strike-settlement agreement to extend the school day and hold school on normal holidays represents the type of decision that was made with insufficient appraisal of rationale in terms of educational soundness. It was this type of last-minute decision that the Center project aimed to avoid.

### Evaluation

The Workshops on Post-Strike Problems project was, in the immediate context of Fall 1968, a failure. Could it have worked? What kind of sanctions would have made it more feasible for a third party to intervene successfully?

Not inconceivably the daily ebb and flow of strike considerations precluded thoughts of tomorrow's problems. Can Workshops be conducted more successfully in periods of relative calm and the results utilized in the next post-crisis period? There should be further exploration.

PROJECT NO. 5

## REPORTS FROM THE FIELD: TWO SUPERINTENDENTS

Supervisor: Dr. Eugene T. Maleska

The fighting general and the sideline observer see battlefield action very differently.

Why did at least one district superintendent order his principals to open their schools at any cost and, in the event of noncompliance, threaten to bring insubordinates up on charges? Why did still another superintendent steadfastly keep his schools closed? What were the dynamics of the situation in a district where the superintendent urged his principals to open their schools and, without the use of punitive threats, manage to be successful in his appeal? What was the view from Ocean Hill?

For answers to these questions Dr. Maleska invited field reports from representative leaders in a variety of situations in the hope that such documents would be of genuine assistance to the Center personnel's future planning. Initially by telephone and subsequently by letter, Dr. Maleska approached:

1. Dr. Bernard Friedman, who had appealed successfully to his principals to keep their schools open.
2. A superintendent (who asked to remain anonymous), who had ordered his principals to open their schools.
3. Dr. Charles Shapp who had seen fit to keep his schools closed.
4. Reverend Herbert Oliver, President of the Ocean Hill Governing Board, and the District Administrator, Mr. Rhody McCoy.

Each administrator was asked to write about the role he had played during the strike, that he describe his own day-to-day situations, the problems that emerged, and his response to them. Anonymity, if requested, was assured and, depending on the time given to each report, compensation ranging from \$500 to \$1,000 was stipulated. The deadline was set for January 15, 1969.

Also to be included in the report were assessments of all personnel connected with the strike and of the effect the crisis had on the achievement and attitudes of children and upon the community itself. Finally, there was the hope that each respondent would preview, and make recommendations to meet, the problems likely to arise when full-time schooling was resumed.

Responses were varied. One superintendent stated flatly that the situation in his district was so explosive that he would in effect be committing professional suicide were he to accede to the writing proposal, anonymity notwithstanding.

The Ocean Hill representatives were so preoccupied that, despite an expression of interest, they could not manage the time for the project.

Only Dr. Friedman and Dr. Shapp submitted reports, which follow.

## THE STRIKE - DISTRICT 7 STYLE

-by Dr. Bernard Friedman, District Superintendent

This is a report of what happened in one school district in New York City during the school strike of 1968, as seen by one district superintendent. I have described the situation from a personal point of view, combining fact and opinion to characterize how my decisions and actions affected the strike in the district. I have set forth assessments of the groups who were involved, and here and there offered observations on the problems that arose within each group.

Although Ocean Hill was the eye of the storm, District 7 in the South Bronx experienced enough of the thunder, blasts, and downpour to know it had been through a tempest, too. The marked difference is that the storm in District 7 was intermittent, less fierce, and sooner over. How we weathered it follows.

### The School District

District 7, comprising most of the South Bronx, is one of 33 in New York City, 30 regular, 3 experimental. The district has some 35,000 pupils, about average for a regular district. There are 26 schools -- 19 elementary, 4 intermediate, 2 vocational high schools, 1 special school. For comparison, Ocean Hill has 3,000 pupils in 8 schools -- 6 elementary and 2 intermediate.

The area of District 7, seven densely populated square miles south of 161 Street in the Borough of the Bronx, is one of the most seriously impacted poverty areas, not only in New York City but in the nation. It

ranks high in deteriorated housing, dependency, unemployment, unwed teenage mothers, drug addiction, infant mortality, truancy, school dropouts, venereal disease. Forty percent of the families have incomes under \$4,000 a year. One hospital, with the second highest emergency count in the city, serves the entire population -- almost 200,000 people. Until recently, there was a dearth of civic organizations, citizenship participation, indigenous leadership. The anti-poverty agencies, self-help groups, and similar organizations are modifying this lack.

It is an area in which alienation exists -- between itself and the rest of the city, and between individuals and groups within it based on ethnic, economic, and social differences. Often a street separating public housing from deteriorated housing is as sharp a delineation as between suburb and city. There is often separation also and friction between old and new residents, between blacks and Puerto Ricans.

Population percentages have changed dramatically in recent years. The densely built-up residential areas were completed and reached their peak in the early part of the century. In the absence of private housing is an index of deprivation, none has been built in 50 years. In the same period, 11 public housing projects have been built. Twenty years ago, 90 percent of the residents were non-Puerto Rican white, mostly Irish, German, and Italian. Currently it is estimated that 65 percent are Puerto Rican, 30 percent are Negro, and 5 percent are non-Puerto Rican white.

As in other economically depressed areas, the schools of the South Bronx have great pupil mobility, many beginning teachers, staffing

difficulty, overcrowding, language barriers. Although much has been done and is being done under present limitations, these problems still remain as serious challenges to the schools and to the community.

The pupil ethnic ratios in the District 7 schools are about the same as the adult population ratios. Citywide the school ethnic breakdown is as follows: Puerto Rican -- about 21 percent, Negro -- about 30 percent, others -- about 49 percent; in District 7 it is about 65 percent Puerto Rican, 30 percent Negro, 5 percent others.

Ethnic teacher ratios are encouragingly better. Much, however, remains to be done to bring Negro and Puerto Rican teachers into the school system and into the district. Of 1,800 teachers in District 7, there are about 350 Negro teachers (about 20 percent), and about 60 Hispanic (about 3 percent). The citywide percentage is probably 10 percent for Negroes and 1 percent for Hispanic teachers out of about 56,000 members of the pedagogical staff.

Experience ratios among teachers compare unfavorably with citywide averages. Fewer than 700 of the 1,800 teachers have more than three years' experience. About 600 are substitutes. Some 500 are regularly appointed teachers who are still on probation.

Achievement in reading and mathematics is below national levels but slow and steady progress is being made through a number of worthwhile programs.

The constellation of factors, in summary, that characterizes District 7 consists of widespread poverty, lamentable de facto ghettoization, egregious civic neglect, striking inequality of opportunity, serious educational limitations. The schools are accused of having failed the

children of the South Bronx, but the dismal streets of the community are eloquent testimony to the deeper failure of our civic and political leaders and are forceful reminders of the disparity between what we as a nation promise and what we deliver.

The South Bronx is the stage on which the drama of the strike took place. The cast included the Board of Education, striking teachers, nonstriking teachers, supervisors, police, pupils, anti-poverty agencies, custodians, paraprofessionals, the Local School Board, parents and the district superintendent. We were all, in Dostoevsky's words, "excited and did not understand one another. Each thought that he alone had the truth and was wretched looking at the others, beat himself on the breast, wept, and wrung his hands. Each did not know how to judge and could not agree what to consider evil and what good."

#### The Board of Education

Once a month during the strike, the Superintendent of Schools met with the district superintendents at central headquarters for review of administration procedures or clarification of problems arising from the strike. On a Sunday morning in November, the district superintendent and the Local School Board members met with the Board of Education for a review of the decentralization guidelines that were being prepared under the state law (Marchi Bill).

Communication with the district was generally in writing or by phone. A significant communication, and the one that reinforced and legitimized the opening of schools in District 7, was a telegram received from the Board of Education on September 15, 1968.

You are directed to open the schools in your district on Monday, September 16. Teachers and pupils who wish to enter the schools must be permitted to do so. Decision about the subsequent closing of the school to the pupils for the health and safety of the children still rests with you. Any such closing should be a last resort and staff should be deployed to useful duties in the school as needed. School custodians are being instructed to take orders from you, superseding orders from the principals. We are counting on your good judgment in this difficult situation.

This was a most supportive directive. It was straightforward and unmistakable in intent and direction. It was authoritative. It strengthened the resolution of the district superintendents, particularly those whose schools were located in black and Puerto Rican communities.

A second directive that was also significant and helpful was sent during the custodial strike:

Wherever a competent teacher of a school appears and is willing to assume responsibility for supervision of the school such a person should be designated to open the school. If you judge that there is no teacher competent to assume such responsibility, and if it is necessary for the safety and welfare of any children to keep the school closed, please keep a log of your actions.

Central headquarters functioned well under the pressure it was enduring. With its innumerable difficulties, it managed to send lunches, prepare payrolls, review federally-funded programs, analyze district budgets. In fact, the Superintendent of Schools, at an early morning hour, before he had a meeting later in the morning at the Mayor's office, spent an hour with the Local School Board Chairman and myself, reviewing our proposed budget. To us, it was a clear message that the strike could not and did not interrupt the long-range needs and plans that would require implementation after the strike was over.

### The Local School Board

The Local School Board's position during the strike coincided strongly with mine, that is, that the schools should be open and effectively operating whenever possible. To that end, the board members were constantly engaged in visiting the schools assigned to them (each member had two or three), discussing with heads of schools problems or difficulties, meeting and consulting with me on what steps to take to keep the district calm. That the district was relatively calm is in no small measure attributable to the work of the Local School Board. They conferred easily, readily, and fully with any group that sought them out -- supervisors or anti-poverty agencies. They responded to calls from schools or parents for advice, help, or intervention. They were in constant touch with me, and I with them.

It was during this period that the Local School Board took its first strong step as a decentralized board. It responded to its responsibility to elect the district superintendent. Their deliberations took place late in August and early in September. They nominated me at a crowded public hearing on Monday, September 9, 1968, the first day of school, the first strike day. My unanimous election and the warm support of the community and school representatives were satisfying, and with a strike underway and the augury of a volatile, challenging, and difficult school year, it was reassuring to have a Local School Board that was judicious in temperament, reflective in decision, and courageous in not surrendering its legal prerogatives.

In September 1968, the composition of the Board was two Negroes, three Puerto Ricans, and four non-Puerto Rican whites; two are men, seven, women. All have had close, cooperative relations with the schools. All are objectively critical of the schools when the situation merits it. Although each member is closely allied to the community, each also has attachments to his or her schools, and commends those things that deserve approbation.

Their point of view did not win the full approval of everyone in this district during the strike. The Local School Board was faulted by some for not doing more to get wider school attendance, for not preferring legal charges against custodians, for not taking steps against principals who were out. Others faulted them for being overtly pro-community. In spite of these criticisms, they had widespread support, and continued their efforts to reduce antagonisms, conciliate positions, keep the schools educational viable, and work toward the reinstatement of a fear-free school district at the end of the strike. In my judgment, they succeeded in these efforts.

Their interim position now after the strike is a most challenging one. They do not know what the legislature will do to their tenure or their duties. Nevertheless, they continue working many hours voluntarily (they are an unpaid group), carrying out the new, enlarged, and difficult responsibilities assigned to them under the interim Marchi bill. They have handled the criticisms leveled against them without anger and with tact. They have avoided political or personal entanglements. They are committed to providing the best education to children. That they

weathered the difficulties of the strike so well is a tribute to their quality as a Local School Board.

### The Teaching Staff

The staff of District 7 can be described in general as being younger and less experienced, having higher mobility, and consisting of more substitutes, men, black, and Hispanic teachers, than districts more economically favored. In spite of shortcomings in college preparation and in inservice training, the teachers are by most standards a concerned and effective group. No one denies that more intensive and widespread upgrading is required. Efforts in this area are constantly being increased.

The teachers of the district are assigned as follows:

		<u>No. of Teachers</u>	<u>No. of Pupils</u>
Elementary schools	19	1169	25,550
Intermediate & JHS	4	450	6,680
Vocational H.S.	2	226	3,330
Special School	<u>1</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>300</u>
	26	1865	35,830

For the record, these are teacher attendance<sup>1</sup> figures for representative days during the strike:

	<u>Elementary</u>		<u>J.H.S.</u>		<u>H.S.</u>	
	<u>Pres.</u>	<u>Abs.</u>	<u>Pres.</u>	<u>Abs.</u>	<u>Pres.</u>	<u>Abs.</u>
9/9 1st day, 1st strike	210	1059	72	370	3	222
9/13 1st day, 2nd strike	128	1074	54	383	2	224
9/19 middle, 2nd strike	181	1051	75	367	2	224
9/27 last day, 2nd strike	207	1042	84	364	4	222
10/14 1st day, 3rd strike	247	1032	106	362	4	226
10/28 11th day, 3rd strike	282	948	101	357	0	226
11/4 16th day, 3rd strike	332	913	110	352	0	226
11/15 23rd day, last day	359	906	111	350	14	212

On September 13, the day of smallest teacher attendance, 184 teachers of the total staff of 1,865 were present. There were 2,582 pupils out of 35,830. The teacher-pupil ratio was 1 to 14.

On November 15, the day of largest teacher attendance, there were 484 teachers present. There were 6,564 pupils. The teacher-pupil ratio was 1 to 14.

District 7 ultimately achieved 25 percent in teacher attendance and 17 percent in pupil attendance. Citywide attendance was about 15 percent for teachers and about 11 percent for pupils.

A one-day table for the entire district is presented below.

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<sup>1</sup>Present teachers included substitutes. Absent teachers are those on payroll of school as of the beginning of the term.

## ATTENDANCE FOR OCTOBER 28, 11th DAY OF THIRD STRIKE

For Schools with Principals in Attendance

Register	Pupils Present	Teachers <sup>1</sup> Present	Average Class Size	Teachers Out
A 1100	225	9	25	81
B 830	539	35	16	0
C 1300	415	12	34	51
D 1380	270	20	13	50
E 1400	400	40	10	34
F 1600	520	28	18	40
G 1000	85	5	17	40
H 1450	300	14	21	47
I 1300	275	11	25	48
J 1730	95	16	6	96
K <u>2100</u>	<u>125</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>127</u>
15190	3249	220	14+	614

For Schools with Principals Out

Register	Pupils Present	Teachers <sup>1</sup> Present	Average Class Size	Teachers Out
L 300	0	0	0	20
M 1300	296	14	21	37
N 900	186	7	27	35
O 1600	1	3	0	64
P 2500	422	17	25	94
Q 740	0	0	0	49
R 1300	42	9	5	58
S 1800	222	11	20	72
T 1800	300	15	20	65
U 1100	270	13	20	35
V 1200	405	19	21	41
W 1200	200	30	7	43
X 1600	195	25	8	82
Y 1600	0	0	0	110
Z <u>1700</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>117</u>
20640	2539	163	14+	917

Citywide figures on this day - over 300 schools open out of 900; over 4,000 teachers present out of 57,000; over 35,000 pupils present out of 1,130,000.

<sup>1</sup>Present teachers included substitutes. Absent teachers are those on payroll of school as of the beginning of the term.

### The Striking Teacher

I had many occasions to talk to striking teachers in my district -- on the picket lines, in interim schools, at their meetings, in my office. Their reasons for striking were similar to those of teachers in other parts of the city, but these reasons were given added impetus, according to them, by events that had occurred in District 7 over the past year. For example, one anti-poverty organization, without permission or announcement of purpose, had sent observers into schools to evaluate school programs. Another group had come into a school and had begun a fracas during which they punched a principal and hit a teacher so hard he required stitches in his mouth. Individuals had constantly asserted at public meetings that the teachers and supervisors were incompetent, unqualified, and uncaring. Broad generalizations like these began to annoy teachers and make them more responsive to, and concerned with, similar incidents in other areas of the city.

I understood these feelings. Nevertheless, I believed, and still believe, that school people are obligated to respond both to causes as well as to effects. Activism and militancy, in my opinion, grow out of the frustration of unfulfilled aspirations. Parents in my district have much to be concerned about. Open enrollment and free choice transfer have dwindled to the vanishing point. Overcrowding in the schools still exists. There are no places in the kindergartens for over 200 five-year-olds. Not enough of our junior high school graduates go into college tracks in high school. The direction of teacher transfers is out of the district, not within it. We have a disproportionate share of new teachers.

Not enough heads of schools reflect the ethnic groups of the district. Reading and mathematics scores are below the national norms.

In conversations with teachers I urged that the way to meet the demands of militants is to review the criticisms made of the schools and set to work to eliminate the weaknesses. It means working with militants without excluding others -- supervisors, teachers, local school board, parents, agencies. One of the positive outgrowths of the strike is a growing acceptance of this point of view. I sense a feeling among most of the staff and the community for a closer working relationship between them. There is a growing recognition that both need each other if there is to be any improvement in the district.

But that was not the prevailing feeling during the strike. There was strong emotional conflict. Repeatedly, teachers averred their wish to cooperate with "interested parents" but coupled this with strong reaffirmation that "self-styled" leaders were not truly interested people. One or two exchanges of racial and religious epithets between pickets and parents created district-wide tensions that are still not entirely gone, although such exchanges were limited to one school. Parenthetically, only at this school did a massive number of pickets appear, and almost all of them were men high school teachers from a school in another area.

Other events seemed to solidify the union teachers' determination to strike. At one school a parent president told teachers at a faculty conference on September 6, that if teachers remained out they need not bother to come back. In response, a teacher told me that she was not

"strike happy," but that when an "unauthorized self-declared authority" could threaten her, she protested by withholding her services.

The strike was an example of the new politics of confrontation in which groups push hard, use threats, intimidation, sometimes muscle. It did not take long to produce inflamed feelings and hardened points of view. Each side was convinced it was right; each side had to win. Ultimately common sense prevailed because both groups knew that the answers were not in District 7, but in the hands of the Mayor, the Board of Education, the President of the UFT. Nevertheless, union teachers observed that surrender to threats doomed the UFT to loss of some of its powers, to the consequent reduction of security for its members. These teachers were determined to fight for and to defend and preserve the UFT's privileges and position.

One difficulty many teachers had was to reconcile their sympathy to the civil rights movement with their sudden and unsought-for struggle with the very ones whom they had so long been committed to help. What could a teacher do who is torn between minority unrest which he would like to alleviate, and the union standards he had to retain in order to survive? From my observations, such a teacher struck and then hoped for a rapid termination of the strike; picketed peacefully, or went to an interim school; hoped for a conflict-free return to school; looked forward to working with the community on that return (and may even have advocated decentralization and community participation); felt that the racial issue was overblown and that his real concern was simply to create an effective classroom.

When the strike was over teachers renewed ties with the parents in their schools. They came to Local School Board meetings, met with me at my office, became more active in their school parent associations, and tried in other ways to establish better communication with parents.

Some hard feelings existed between those teachers who struck and those who crossed picket lines; yet little or no overt verbal abuse occurred nor was there any violence. As was happening all over the city, strikers phoned to exert pressure on nonstrikers, and the other way around. One can see, however, by studying the figures on teacher attendance, that the points of view were fairly well fixed, for relatively few were persuaded on ideological grounds to change their minds.

Two interim schools were formed by striking teachers, one at a housing center and the other at a park recreation center. Pupils attended both regularly for several hours in the morning. The teachers worked without pay, were regular in attendance, and came prepared. As time went on the number of teachers volunteering dwindled, but there were always enough to teach the pupils who came. The classes I visited were well taught. I cannot say whether the pupils' presence in the interim schools reflected their parents' opinions about the strike. It may be so. Those parents may have wanted to have their children in school. Both interim schools were set up by faculties who had almost in a complete body absented themselves from their respective schools. The choice for the parents, then, was the interim school or no school. Parents I spoke to praised the teachers of these schools for their devotion, but refrained from making comments on the merits of the strike.

The erosion in the solidarity of the strikers was slight, but it did exist. Very few teachers returned because they had re-examined the issues and had changed their minds. Some others who returned were young men with draft deferments who were apprehensive that their deferments would be revoked. The majority of those who did return were those who felt the financial pinch severely and had little collateral against which to make loans.

Among the strikers many took temporary work, especially in offices, department stores, or in businesses of their friends, relatives, parents, or in-laws. From comments I heard during the strike, it never appeared that a sense of desperation about money weakened the determination of the teachers to continue to stay out.

About 50 teachers did not return when school resumed after the third strike. Almost all of these were substitute teachers who probably found other more financially and professionally rewarding work. Few, if any, regular teachers did not return despite the repeatedly voiced concern that many had sought and received contracts in suburban school systems.

### The Nonstriking Teachers

At the beginning of the strike about 300 of the 1,800 teachers reported for work. Over 200 of nonstriking teachers were Negro and Puerto Rican, of a total of almost 400 Negro and Puerto Rican teachers. The others were predominantly young, new teachers -- most of them in their first year of teaching -- who had no strong union affiliation or who felt ideologically close to the Ocean Hill side. Some who came to work

simply needed the income. Others were concerned about their draft status. Still others, a very few, were union teachers in disagreement with the strike.

As the strike continued, substitutes, locked out of their own schools in other parts of the Bronx, sought and got work in the District 7 schools as pupil attendance grew. Regular teachers from other areas were turned down for such work. I told them that temporary assignment during the strike could not be approved, unless it carried with it a transfer application to remain in the district at the end of the strike. One such transfer took place.

I spoke to those teaching to find out why they came in. Negro teachers, strong majorities in almost every school, believed that they were engaged in a justifiable struggle for minority rights and better education. Hispanic teachers were a little more reticent in discussion. Some teachers felt the strike was hurting pupils. Some believed in decentralization and thought they could advance it by working. Some were not satisfied that the strike was necessary or constructive.

Crossing a picket line was frightening for many, especially for those newly assigned. It meant being maligned, receiving calls at home, facing possible social ostracism, being called "scabs." There were no reported incidents of threats by pickets or intimidating phone calls. Police reported to me that except for isolated incidents at two schools, working teachers came and left their schools unmolested.

The working teachers generally cooperated with their supervisor, whether he was the regular or the acting principal. In most schools

teachers took an active part in the custodial care of the school, in informing parents, in creating programs. In other ways they were cooperative also. Teachers taught unfamiliar grades; teacher absence was negligible; preparation periods were not asked for; paraprofessionals were welcomed and used advantageously.

Difficulties in general were taken graciously. For example, teachers often had to teach in rooms that were not their own. Materials that were requested were sometimes not available. New and inexperienced teachers sometimes received insufficient help. Morale, nevertheless, was relatively high. In those schools that were well attended and staffed with effective supervisors, better planning and a more stable educational environment prevailed.

In one school, the acting principal was inexperienced. The situation became delicate but the teachers met together, discussed the problems that had arisen, and helped each other find solutions. In another school, where excitement and unrest developed from unpleasant picketing incidents, the acting principal acted firmly to prevent pupils from becoming disrespectful and undisciplined. She capitalized on parent help and a cooperative corps of teachers.

Of the 12 acting principals assigned to be in charge of schools in the absence of the principal, ten were Negroes. Of these, three were curriculum coordinators who were on my district staff and the others, except for one new teacher, were experienced, reliable, effective teachers who I knew could effectively tackle the difficulties likely to be encountered. And, indeed they managed very well. They rarely called

for help, and they handled all the emergencies, including the custodial difficulty, with good judgment and dispatch.

### The Union

The relationship of the Union with district superintendents is, under ordinary circumstances, a peripheral one. We, as a group, had no part in the collective bargaining agreement. Our prime function was to interpret and implement the terms of the contract of 1967, especially in the area of grievances not resolved at the school level. It had not been usual procedure for district superintendents to have meetings with school Union chapter chairmen. This unfortunate lack of communication between us persisted even through the period the Union was discussing, approving, and finally carrying out the strike. When, during a confrontation between pickets and parents, sordid racial slurs were expressed, communication then took place. The Union came to protest. From this first meeting further contacts developed. At one time, the Union came to explore post-strike possibilities. At another, I spoke at a meeting of chapter chairmen to review with them my reasons for keeping the schools open.

Overall, my contacts, conversations, and exchange of views took place on a catch-as-catch-can basis -- in restaurants, at picket lines, at parent meetings, on street corners. Such haphazard contact was not good for either of us. Polarization and hardened positions had already trapped the central figures in the strike. The difficulties in District 7 might have been reduced if more exchanges had taken place between teachers and the district superintendent. Since hindsight should produce

useful foresight, we (the Union and I) have begun a series of regular meetings, once the strike was settled. The hope is that the Union can also have such meaningful meetings with the Local School Board, the anti-poverty agencies, and other interested groups. The strike settlement clearly indicated that the Union had power which can not be ignored. Since it has also indicated it wishes to work productively to improve community relationships and to improve education programs, we are working together to foster this desire, and in fact to extend it.

I look forward to help from the Union on the following fronts: intensifying and extending their participation in teacher recruitment; deepening their involvement in curriculum development, course evaluation, and preparation of funded programs; accepting larger and more meaningful roles for parents and community in school policy decisions; organizing the community to get the massive social investment of the millions of dollars needed in District 7 to improve the physical plants, to upgrade the staff, to construct new schools, to expand the paraprofessional programs, to extend education downward from five years and upward to old age.

The most important task for all -- Union, community, district superintendent, and others -- one that is being neglected in the fierce internecine struggle, is to work together for the elimination of poverty, to rebuild the decaying houses that stand alongside every one of our schools, to eradicate every one of the vile conditions of social, economic, and political inequality that now weigh so crushingly on parents and children. My feelings are that the Union has accepted these aims and goals. I know that a beginning has already been made.

### The Supervisors

On Thursday afternoon, September 5, 1968, 78 supervisors of District 7 -- principals, assistants to principals, department chairmen, and bureau supervisors -- met at a school library in the district to discuss and vote on the following Council of Supervisory Associations resolution:

The Executive Board of the CSA deplors the failure of the Board of Education to protect teachers and supervisors against the flagrant and constant violation of their basic rights. It demands that teachers and supervisors who have been illegally removed from their positions in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and in other districts in the city be given due process under the law.

If, because of the above reasons, there is a teachers' strike on Monday, September 9, the CSA for the safety of the children, for the protection of public property, and in support of due process, calls upon the Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools to close all schools, immediately.

In the event that schools are not officially closed, the CSA calls upon its members to do the following:

Not to open the schools nor to admit children so that their safety will not be jeopardized. . . .

The discussion was far ranging and thoughtful. Little argument was "ad hominem." The most cogent argument given for supporting the resolution was the experience that a principal in the district had had at the closing of the previous school year; his departure from the district had been initiated and actively pushed by an anti-poverty group. Because his transfer was still being negotiated, his case was very much on every supervisor's mind on the day of the meeting. Speakers urging adoption of the resolution emphasized that the basic issue -- using the principal's case -- was the violation of the personal, professional, and legal

rights of supervisors by self-appointed extremists who, often not parents of pupils in school, had, in the words of the supervisors, taken the role of accuser, prosecutor, and judge. Stressed also were the instances of public revilement and denunciation that supervisors had been subjected to and the intimidations and threats that they had suffered.

Towards the end of the discussion, I asked to speak. I expressed my understanding for the point of view expressed, but disagreed that a supervisors' strike in collaboration with the teachers' was an answer to the present difficulties that we were in. To begin with, I did not then nor now believe in the "domino theory" -- that militant activists were intent on picking off supervisors one by one, and that the fall of one increased geometrically the danger and ease of the falling of the others in the district. Second, the supervisors had made and were making excellent progress in both educational programs and community relations. Principals were becoming increasingly sensitive to Negro and Puerto Rican aspirations and were actively working to implement programs to fulfill them. I saw involvement in the strike as a possible crippling factor in this progress. Third, some 200 supervisors, teachers, parents, and community leaders had spent a weekend together the past May at a State University on Long Island to analyze the district's needs so that all could work toward setting goals. I was concerned that a strike in which supervisors were involved would shatter the positive outgrowths of that weekend. Furthermore, I argued (quoting from Tennyson) that:

The old order changeth, yielding place to new,  
And God fulfills himself in many ways,  
Lest one good custom should corrupt the world.

It appeared to me then, and does now, that the status quo cannot always be defended for itself, but only for its merits. If there were in the old order weaknesses or lacks in supervisor selection, curriculum development, community participation, pupils' achievement, and the other areas so frequently written about, it became an obligation of the professional staff, particularly the supervisors, to propose and fight for necessary improvements. It was too late for fingerpointing, i.e., the community blaming the schools for inadequate instruction and the school blaming the community for inadequate support. I suggested strongly that a strike would intensify this mutual recrimination, perhaps to a point of no return. Finally, I said that I planned to come in if the Superintendent of Schools would decide to open schools and I would assign a temporary principal to each school in which no licensed supervisor was present. I had taken an oath to carry out the instructions of the Superintendent and the Board of Education. The closing of a school was to my mind a lockout of teachers, lunch workers, custodial helpers, and others who wished to work and/or needed to work. It was also a deprivation of the rights of pupils whose parents wanted them to attend school.

The supervisors listened attentively to my statement and the discussion on the resolution continued. The vote was:

	<u>District 7</u>	<u>Citywide</u>
For	68 ... 87.2 percent	2,311 ... 94.6 percent
Against	8 ... 10.2 percent	90 ... 3.7 percent
Abstention	2 ... 2.6 percent	43 ... 1.8 percent

On Monday, September 9, 1968 the schools were struck. Of 121 supervisors, 46 came in, 65 stayed out. Most of the principals came; most of the assistant-to-principals and chairmen did not. It may have been that the principals had their own strong convictions or were more responsive to my point of view. The other supervisors, more recently appointed and possibly former Union members as teachers, were more responsive to the arguments of the Union. A representative chart of supervisory attendance indicates that support for the strike grew as time went on.

ATTENDANCE OF SUPERVISORS

		<u>Principals</u>		<u>Asst. Prin.</u>		<u>Chairmen of Departments</u>	
		<u>In</u>	<u>Out</u>	<u>In</u>	<u>Out</u>	<u>In</u>	<u>Out</u>
9/9	1st day, 1st strike	25	1	20	47	1	17
9/13	1st day, 2nd strike	23	3	25	42	3	15
9/19	middle, 2nd strike	23	3	20	47	3	15
9/27	last day, 2nd strike	21	5	19	48	1	17
10/14	1st day, 3rd strike	23	3	27	40	4	14
10/18	Custodial strike	17	9	13	54	1	17
10/28	11th day, 3rd strike	14	12	10	57	3	15
11/4	16th day, 3rd strike	15	11	18	47	1	17
11/15	23rd day, last day	15	11	18	46	2	16

It can be seen that in the beginning the strike was strongly supported by the assistant principals and chairmen but by only one principal. Those who were out quickly formed themselves into a group who met daily, just outside the boundary of the district, to discuss issues, plan rallies, report on meetings attended, plan picketing to maintain morale, and rally more principals to the strike. To them the issues at stake -- due process and the security of teachers and supervisors -- were very

real issues, particularly to those working in poverty areas. They viewed the Mayor and the Board of Education as being unwilling or unable, for political or other reasons, to take actions that would safeguard the positions of the professional staff. They recognized that the UFT had significant power and that without alignment with it, the supervisors were a weak, powerless group.

Alignment was already in the air. A few supervisors were already seeking alliance with the Teamsters Union in order to get more muscle. Others wanted to see more militant action on the part of the CSA. One principal who stayed out thought that many principals inwardly supported and applauded the strike but didn't have the courage to take part in it. By the end of the strike 11 heads of schools were out.

The 15 principals who came in to work seemed motivated by several reasons. Several said bluntly that children should not be pawns in power struggles between adults. Several believed in wider community participation and felt it could best be advanced by their attendance. Others seemed to take objective views, indicating their determination to head their own schools as long as pupils and teachers were attending. Two were of minority status and opposed the strike. All were highly praised by community people for coming to work and carrying out effective education under the limitations the strike imposed.

There was no doubt in my mind that my position was right but that it would be condemned by some supervisors. An extreme example of supervisor condemnation is the following excerpt of a letter I received:

You have behaved like a coward and betrayed your colleagues. You are helping them to destroy the

the community and the schools and to threaten, harass and intimidate law abiding citizens. Your actions are repulsive, reprehensible and indefensible.

During the strike I was aware of the fact that there was a great deal of concern among supervisors because I opened schools and kept them open. The concern stemmed, I think, from their lack of understanding that the role of the superintendent had changed. New pipers were calling the tunes, and sometimes the tunes were unknown or hard to play. Supervisors who still clung to the former perceptions of the district superintendent were disappointed, even angry. Those who saw him, or better yet themselves, in new roles were not upset either by the activities or the choices they had to make for themselves or that the district superintendent was making. Ultimately, it boiled down to Thoreau's maxim, "If a man does not keep pace with his companions, perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music which he hears, however measured or far away."

### The Pupils

At some time or another, most or all of the schools were open, with pupil attendance varying from zero to 60 percent. To give an indication of the total number who attended, I have selected the following representative days:

## PUPIL ATTENDANCE

	Elem.	Int. & J.H.S.	H.S.
9/9 1st day, 1st strike	2,991	1,129	0
9/13 1st day, 2nd strike	2,206	356	20
9/19 middle, 2nd strike	2,916	321	18
9/27 last day, 2nd strike	4,247	389	13
10/14 1st day, 3rd strike	5,614	564	0
10/18 Custodial strike	2,590	272	0
10/28 11th day, 3rd strike	5,173	615	0
11/4 16th day, 3rd strike	5,402	655	0
11/15 23rd day, last day of strike	6,276	360	128

Several deductions can be drawn from these figures. Of the over 35,000 students in the district there were never more than 18 percent, nor fewer than 7 percent present. There was a slow but consistent increase in the number of pupils returning, especially as the third strike continued and the administration and teaching staffs in the schools became stabilized and developed effective educational programs.

I visited some schools every day and observed the following:

Most of the pupils who came were there for these reasons:

1. Their parents were actively opposed to the strike or conversely, actively supported the position of the governing board in Ocean Hill.
2. They enjoyed school, were self-motivated, and wanted to attend, regardless of the issues involved.
3. Their parents were either unaware of or unconcerned about the issues involved, but hearing that the schools were opened, sent their children.
4. Some of them drifted back for a want of better alternatives.

In the schools, there was noticeably good behavior. Most of the children who were in school were aware of the issues of the strike. In most classes, especially above the fourth grade, teachers and pupils reviewed the daily events.

Continuity of instruction and effective teaching were seriously hampered by the shifting attendance of pupils and teachers, the off-again, on-again strike, the custodial disruption, and the makeshift devices (doubling up classes, using early childhood teachers for older children) that were used to handle the exigencies.

Some pupils I spoke to viewed the strike as a sad thing because they were parted from their regular classmates and their assigned teachers; their lessons were sometimes inappropriate, repetitious, or simply time-filling; there were frequent changes of teachers; there was concern about missing school work that would not be made up after the strike was over.

It should be noted that there was a sharp diminution in school vandalism in the district during the strike. This improvement may have resulted from a feeling among potential vandals that the schools were being administered during this period by those sympathetic, or least hostile, to community participation. Repeatedly, nonstriking teachers reminded pupils that the schools belonged to them and their parents and that they should care for and respect them. Pupils who did not attend may have felt free enough because of their nonattendance to avoid engaging in angry and destructive acts against the school.

What can one say of the almost 30,000 pupils in the district who did not attend school for the greater part of the strike? Many efforts

were made to induce them to return. All the schools were open. Teachers were available. Sound trucks supplied by anti-poverty agencies drove through the streets of the South Bronx urging pupils to return. Thousands of leaflets printed by these same agencies were distributed. House-to-house canvasses were made by them. Rallies were held on weekends in St. Mary's Park and during the week in many school auditoriums. Pupils attending urged friends to return. Dr. Donovan's repeated statements on television that the schools were open failed to bring pupils back in appreciable numbers.

From conversations with parents I heard that the prime reason for their keeping pupils home was fear of violence near or in the schools. Parents saw pickets, policemen, and anti-pickets and became apprehensive over the safety of their children. They observed within the school the initial confusion and uncertainty created by the absence of hundreds of teachers. Under such circumstances they were reluctant to allow their children to attend school. As time went on and administrative order was established, a trickle of pupils began to return, but not in great numbers. The conditioning of remaining home during the strike had become too strong.

Several factors other than fear affected attendance. Many of the older elementary school and junior high school pupils were plainly truant. All attendance procedures to follow up on illegal absence or home noncooperation broke down. Pupils could be absent with impunity because teachers could neither keep accurate accounting of attendance nor seek help from the Bureau of Attendance to bring truants into school.

More children were sent to school than reported. What is so noteworthy and interesting about this large group of absent pupils was their disinclination to mischief. Few, if any, entered any open school for disruptive purposes. Few arrests of adolescents were made during the period. Although hundreds of pupils were in the streets and playgrounds in warm weather during school hours, they were always seemly in their behavior. None of the post-strike rebellion or hostility that occurred among high school students was apparent during the strike.

Parents offered other reasons for nonattendance. They were concerned that only marginal learning would take place. Some parents supported the teachers' strike. Some needed the help of the children at home. Others said that their own high school children, locked out of school, could instruct their younger brothers and sisters. Many parents took temporary work while their teenage children kept house. My own observation leads me to believe that in many cases children themselves made the decision as to whether or not to go to school by inducing parents to believe that the schools were neither safe, interesting, nor worthwhile. Another possibility is that the large nonattendance was due to widespread apathy and indifference among parents. There may also have been a reluctance to be involved in what appeared to them to be a frightful battle that they were being thrust into against their will. Camus has said that there are "victimizers and victims." There can be no doubt that whoever else was a victim in this strike, the real ten-week losers were the pupils.

### The Custodians

The custodians played a unique and unexpected role in the strike. During the past stoppages, they did not interfere with the opening of schools or with maintenance. Neither did they themselves strike. In fact, they crossed picket lines in order to do their tasks.

This time, however, Local 891, International Union of Operating Engineers, did not prevent the custodians from closing schools on Friday, October 18, this in spite of the Board of Education directive that schools were to be open. The lawyer for the Union said the school custodians were not on strike but were respecting picket lines, even though October 18 was the sixteenth day of the strike.

I determined at once that I would open all the locked schools, by force if necessary, so that pupil instruction could continue. To begin with, the president of the Board of Education said that the schools should be opened, by force if necessary. Second, children -- young and unsuspecting -- had gathered at the schools, unaware that the schools were to be closed. Schools had been opened all along and pupils and their parents assumed schools would continue to be so. Third, teachers had arrived and wanted to work. Their employment and civil rights were impaired.

There was no unanimity among the custodians. Some wanted to work but could not defy the Union. One who worked on October 18 stayed out for the rest of the time. Others who stayed out gave their front door keys to the principals or heads of schools but turned off water, heat, lights, and gas. Still others stayed out, but left helpers to care for

the buildings. Two were so pro-Union that they put every obstacle in the way of effective operation, by changing tumblers of front door locks, cutting phone wires, removing boiler parts. The following is a first-hand account of one principal.

On Friday, October 18, I found the building locked. The custodian was standing outside the school. He said he would not open the school because it "would jeopardize my people." He would not give me the keys. I scaled the fence and found a door to enter. I was able to turn on the lights. These events were witnessed by the patrolman assigned to the school.

On Monday, I had to borrow a ladder to enter the building. I called a locksmith to change the lock on the outside door. When I returned that same evening, to check the building, I found the new lock had been tampered with and made inoperable.

On Tuesday, I again had to enter the building through the first story window. No lights worked. I discovered that the three main fuses controlling the entire electrical system had been removed. I called a licensed electrician who replaced the fuses.

I gave authority to every principal, regular or acting, to open his or her school. In one school, a window was broken; in another, a door was pried open. In several schools, locksmiths opened the doors. My action angered or disappointed many teachers and supervisors. Many are still resentful. But I felt a responsibility to the children who wanted to go to school and to their parents and, as I have said, to the teachers who wished to work. Certainly, the most active community people wanted the schools open, too, and were helpful in several cases in doing so.

Opening the schools was only the beginning of the custodial difficulties. Getting heat, running water, and electricity became more severe

problems. Less severe was neglect of cleaning and maintenance. Heat was not seriously required until the end of October because the days were fairly warm. We made efforts to find licensed stationary engineers to work the boilers but were not successful. We sent two men to the Fire Department to take tests for the license. One passed and was used in one school; the other did not qualify. Electricity and water were turned on by private contractors whose fees were paid for by the Board of Education. Locksmith and other services were similarly paid for. The anti-poverty agencies helped in getting these services.

Custodial help was both voluntary and paid for. In some schools parents swept floors, cleaned bathrooms, and helped with housekeeping chores. In other schools, we engaged community people at custodial rates to do these tasks. In those schools where parents believed that custodians might return at night to thwart them in keeping the school open, we engaged community guards. In some schools, groups of teachers and parents remained overnight. From my observation and conversation, these participatory activities were carried out with a high regard for the education of children and the safety of the school.

When the custodians returned on October 31, there was no effort on the part of parents to keep them out. Not only did retaliatory acts not materialize, but schools continued to function even more effectively than before the strike. It seemed that custodians were more sharply aware of community feeling and desirous of becoming more accommodating and understanding of them. Almost all heads of schools noted that the custodians continued to serve their schools effectively and cooperatively upon their return.

### The Police

Two precincts -- the 40th and the 42nd -- provided police protection for District 7. Both have captains who were actively engaged in and deeply concerned with preventing any untoward incidents that would inflame the community. Both were in frequent communication with me and with the schools, either through their assigned men or their visits to school by patrol car. Each responded promptly and effectively when trouble was apparent. Both captains were unfailingly courteous and attentive to complaints whether made by strikers or others. I did not get a single complaint about the behavior or attitude of a single officer during the period of the strike.

Policemen to whom I talked told me that they saw their role as impartial mediators and as preventers of violence. On two occasions when confrontations were building up, the police acted firmly and expeditiously to separate the striking teachers and the counter pickets of the community, requesting that the teachers picket in a confined area away from the entrance of the school. In one case almost 100 teachers paraded in a cordoned-off area formed by police barricades; in the other the teachers were asked to picket on the other side of the street from the school. These actions alleviated tensions and proved to be a deciding factor in the elimination of violence in the district. In both cases the precinct captains and a sufficient corps of men were present.

There was a policeman at each school almost all the time. By preventing unlawful action, the police felt they were best accomplishing their objectives; protecting life and property and maintaining order.

They maintained the rights of the public to use the sidewalk and permitted picketing and counterpicketing as determined by their commanding officer.

From my own continuous observation, the police displayed a high degree of tact and patience, especially in coping with the daily problems at the two schools mentioned, where the sharp difference of opinions, use of defamatory and inflammatory epithets, surging crowds, and unrestrained angers created an ever mounting degree of conflict and tension between pickets and counter pickets. The praise for police behavior was widespread, and fully given by business, community, strike, and school leaders.

#### The Parents and Paraprofessionals

In District 7 over 500 paraprofessionals, community people, and parents of school children are working in the schools as aides or teacher helpers. Of these, one group works within the classroom in such tasks as distributing supplies and books, patrolling halls and lunchrooms, checking attendance, etc. Probably better than any other group in the community, these community residents can closely observe the day-to-day work of the school. In accordance with their perceptions and insights they are able to judge what is going on.

School aides who work outside the classroom have been employed for at least ten years. Principals select them and retain them unless they are dismissed for cause. The other paraprofessionals, who are generally classroom helpers, are paid either with centralized or decentralized funds (Elementary and Secondary Education Act, Title I). Employment under this law requires prior consultation with the recognized anti-poverty

council in the community to ascertain that the paraprofessionals are both poor and community residents. By and large, school people have initiated selection, though from time to time the agencies have referred people to the schools.

What has happened is that many of the paraprofessionals tend to feel a prime job connection to the anti-poverty agency. At the same time they have strong loyalties to the administration and teachers of the school in which they work.

This conflict of interest came to a serious head during the strike. The position of the anti-poverty agencies, strongly supported and encouraged by the citywide central agency, the Council Against Poverty, was unshakably against the strike. The teachers, on the other hand, with whom the paraprofessionals worked, were picketing the schools and urging paraprofessionals not to enter. Both vied continuously and earnestly for their support. In the long run, most of the paraprofessionals reported for work.

The reasons became clear as the strike went on. Because the average earnings were \$67.50 a week (30 hours at \$2.25 an hour), the income was important. When the overtones of the strike became less legal in nature and more emotional, the paraprofessionals, almost all black and Puerto Rican, moved toward the anti-poverty agency point of view, if not through conviction, then through persuasion. Many, like the teachers, felt obligations to the children who were attending school.

Within each school paraprofessionals helped assemble and distribute pupils, handled vexatious discipline problems, patrolled doors, halls,

toilets and lunchrooms, worked with small groups. Curiously enough, they were not too effective in convincing large numbers of the nonattenders to come to school.

There have been almost no complaints from returning teachers about tense or unpleasant relationships with the paraprofessionals who are assigned to their classes. It is likely that both groups have grown in understanding and respect for one another. The paraprofessionals were not unobservant. They saw the crippling effect of no education on 30,000 pupils who did not attend school. They saw scores of fine teachers who returned after the strike planning work, teaching well, deeply concerned. It was apparent that there was no immediate replacement for the 50,000 Union teachers. This thought was strongly voiced at Local School Board meetings, at parent meetings, and to school people.

The teachers who work with paraprofessionals are profiting from the experience. The sense of partnership and sharing in the classroom is a forecast of extended cooperation between teachers and the outside community.

There is, of course, residual suspicion. Some teachers view paraprofessionals as negative observers of their work and would prefer not to have them. There may be a few such negative observers but they are no more of a threat to a good teacher than is a custodial helper, lunch worker, or school aide. To avoid difficulties, however, I asked principals to review the assignments of paraprofessionals in detail and with sensitivity, and to make changes that would strengthen the program.

I find the use of paraprofessionals a direct route to more meaningful community participation in the school. To involve parents in each

classroom, and in other areas of the school, or to use them as family assistants to induce parents to come to school-based activities, is to weave parents genuinely into the fabric of school participation. If, at the same time, we develop career ladders for them, devise effective on-the-job training sessions, extend the scope of their responsibilities, and do everything possible to weld parents and staff into a cohesive whole, then we can develop an informed, concerned, aware, and responsible corps of parents who draw their knowledge from direct, firsthand connection with the school. Some of the other fruits of such a program I have already touched on -- the improved education and the growing mutual regard of teachers and parents for one another. To get real involvement and participation of community residents is a goal toward which an enriched paraprofessional program promises to move us.

#### Parents and the Community Agencies

Community control of school can live or die right here. I don't know any parent willing to let Shanker dictate his or her child's educational future. We are incensed about the illegal strike and the board's attempt to subsidize the strikers and using our kids to do it.

Here, in capsulated form, were the feelings of the outspoken leaders of the South Bronx. They want community control; they want to reduce the strength of the Union; they are suspicious of the Board of Education (the Establishment). Not all the people in the community, by any means, share these feelings. The large uncommitted group is being actively wooed to adopt the same views as those espoused by the vocal and active leaders.

These leaders are primarily those of the anti-poverty agencies, those community action groups sponsored by the Office of Economic Opportunity through the Council Against Poverty of the Human Resources Administration. During the strike, on a district level, the agencies had several direct objectives: to keep the schools open, to encourage pupils to attend the open schools, to persuade teachers to renounce the strike and come in to teach. On a citywide level, they participated in anti-strike protests, demonstrations, advocacy meetings, counterpicketing. Their activities in the district, although sustained and forceful, were rarely disorderly. They did not engage in disruptive anti-picketing except in one school where a large number of pickets from another district were brought in. They did not interfere with the internal operations of opened schools nor make any attempt to influence the policy or objectives of the open schools. Where interference occurred, individuals, acting as such, were responsible.

Because my objective -- to open the schools and provide continuing education for the pupils -- coincided with that of the anti-poverty agencies, our relationship was good. Strong Union members, however, viewed this bond with resentment.

The efforts of the anti-poverty agencies in getting schools open and urging pupils to attend were carried out through the use of leaflets, rallies, sound trucks, signs in store windows, meetings, phone calls, and personal visits. Thousands of leaflets were distributed. A typical leaflet, 8½x11, displayed a large red apple and these boldly printed words:

## SCHOOLS

ARE OPEN

In the South Bronx

We have teachers -

Where are your children?

Another leaflet, somewhat fuller, was a montage of UFT signs, with these sentences printed below:

Due process for our children is long overdue.

Our children have been mis-educated and mistreated.

Two-thirds of our children are drop-outs or push-outs from high school.

Where is due process or any process of education for them?

Why are the teachers still on strike?

They are on strike against the black and Puerto Rican community.

They want to keep us in our place.

OUR PLACE IS IN THE SCHOOLS

Community control! That means parents and community making sure our children get a decent education! Making the decisions that will guarantee our children's future.

The children will be in school. Parents, paraprofessionals, community people, and decent teachers will be there with them.

Sound trucks rode through the streets of the South Bronx announcing in English and in Spanish that the schools were open and urging parents to send their children. Street rallies were held in St. Mary's Park, but drew a small audience. Evening meetings were sparsely attended. Paraprofessionals working in the school were asked to ring door bells to get children to school. Some did; others didn't.

The pragmatic fact is that with all the effort made to get pupils to attend, the attendance never reached a district-wide average of 20 percent, although in some schools the attendance approached 50 percent,

and in one, the bilingual school, it went above that figure. The effect of the anti-poverty agencies on attendance in District 7 is not measurable. One can only say that the overall average seemed small in view of the strong efforts made.

The power of the anti-poverty agencies was demonstrated, however, during the custodians' strike. The agency people were tireless in their efforts to open schools and to service them once the schools were open. They got locksmiths when others refused to cross picket lines. In one school they helped a principal climb a ladder to the second floor to open the front door from the inside. In another, anti-poverty agency people and teachers used a crowbar. In a third, an anti-poverty director smashed a lower floor window.

After the schools were open, heads of schools received help in providing services for pupils. The anti-poverty agencies helped get plumbers to turn on water, electricians to turn on lights, stationary engineers to be certified to care for the boilers. They helped recruit guards for overnight protection of the schools and custodial helpers to maintain cleanliness, although these two groups were mostly recruited by the schools. Parenthetically, all services were paid for by the central Board of Education.

One agency also mimeographed and distributed to school personnel instructions on how to obtain the custodial items mentioned. These notes were painstakingly and thoroughly prepared. Every aspect of the custodial problem was analyzed with scrupulous attention to detail. The instructions concerned keys, locksmiths, water, lights, police, school

protection. This agency was excellently organized, very well informed, and thoroughly committed to getting and keeping the schools open.

The other agencies in the community, and the churches also, were engaged in opening schools and having pupils attend, but in more limited ways.

I feel that the more limited participation by the churches and other agencies representing blacks and Puerto Ricans reduced the possibility of bitterness reaching a danger point. This moderation isolated implacable groups, reduced fear of reprisals, helped conciliation between teachers and community. Had every agency and every church group joined the anti-poverty groups in an all-out attack on the Union, the return of the teachers would have created unbelievable tensions and anxieties. As it was, the return of the teachers was trouble-free and relatively smooth. Obviously, parents had not built up an antipathy to the teacher enough to create any severe or repeated incident, confrontation, act of harassment, or intimidation.

Many of the parents and residents have still suspended judgment about the strike, or see some merit (and demerit) in the views of the community activists and Union teachers. This uncommitted group is the keystone to who controls the schools. This must be well known to the two contending groups, to the politicians, and to the central board. The community activists, especially the anti-poverty agencies, have planned many activities to build up such an allegiance to them. They are planning them with skill and insight, working with paraprofessionals, parents' associations, non-Union teachers, and other sympathetic school

people. They are aware that in the long run it is the widest base of support that counts, whether to get votes to select local school board members, to mount legislative action, or to have numbers for any planned activity.

The teachers, as a group, have also begun to work to develop an alliance with uncommitted parents, agencies, and residents. Individual teachers have always done so, but the Union as an organization has not. This was not because of restrictions by the Union's central authority or because of repudiation by the community, per se. It seems to have been a failure to recognize the growing strength and influence of the activists and the anti-poverty agencies in the black and Puerto Rican communities. The Union won the strike; it has by no means won the affection or the respect of the people in these communities. If Union teachers are to get it, and in the process reduce the prestige and authority of the anti-poverty activists, they will certainly have to develop new methods and approaches to their participation in community activities. If they don't, they will soon find themselves lonely and isolated in a restless, suspicious, and censorious community.

### Conclusion

The strike dramatically pitted against each other two groups that a short time earlier had seemed to share common goals and purposes. For some years the two had traveled on parallel roads, headed toward a better America. But both groups have now been touched by the new militancy in American life and have been on the march -- teachers for higher salaries, better working conditions, a voice in determining school policies;

blacks and Puerto Ricans, to win redress of a long list of legitimate grievances.

In this new militant era, teachers have used the political and economic strength of organized labor, defied state laws and court orders, and employed the ultimate weapon -- the strike -- to enforce their demands.

The minority community has marched forward too, not so well organized, or well financed as the teachers' Union, but with clearly articulated goals, founded on strongly-documented grievances. These complaints are well known: teaspoon integration, the dehumanization of black people, the racist basis of our society.

Society has reminded the community of Macbeth's words:

we but teach  
Bloody instruction, which, being taught return  
To plague the inventor.

The new agenda to remove the complaints is focused on using the same methods that the Union found effective -- militancy, pressure, organization. The goal is to create a true link between minority parents and the school. The requisite is community control. Its definition is fiscal control; power to hire and fire; the right to bargain collectively with teachers; the right to develop curriculum.

If the minority communities have their way, there can be no Union. If the Union has its way, there can be no community control. Is reconciliation possible? I think so.

John Doar, President of the Board of Education, was quoted in The New York Times as having said, "There's no real evil intent on any side.

It's just the way all the forces in the city have worked." I believe it. I believe, too, that we have not yet really begun to address ourselves to improving our ghetto schools. We have not manifested an effective effort to bring to poor children education comparable to that provided in private, suburban, or middle-class urban areas; not when overcrowding, inexperienced staffs, meager social services, inadequate materials prevail. We need strong voices who believe in public education to fight for funds, facilities, and personnel. Nationwide, ghetto schools have been as deprived as the pupils who attend them. Their staffs have been hobbled by an ungenerous society, elements of which have then symbolically beat them when they could not walk a straight line. The schools are institutions of society that are as good as society wishes them to be. Perhaps they will improve as our national priorities and purposes do. In the immediate future, I see little hope for substantial improvement. Inevitably, we will have continuing pressure for community authority over ghetto schools to determine what their children will learn, how they will learn it, and who will teach them. And the inevitable resistance will take place.

The challenge to the political leaders -- from President to assemblyman; to the educational leaders -- from Superintendent to student teacher; to the Union officials -- from CIO-AFL president to chapter chairman; to all citizens -- from the wealthiest to the most humble; to all, it is unparalleled, frightful, desperate. The ghetto public schools are an arena in which we cannot and must not lose lest we bring to prophetic fulfillment the words of Yeats:

Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;  
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,  
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed  
    and everywhere the ceremony  
    of innocence is drowned;  
The best lack all conviction,  
    while the worst are full  
    of passionate intensity.

## THE STRIKE - DISTRICT 10 STYLE

-by Dr. Charles M. Shapp, District Superintendent

Time has elapsed since the school strike. Now an attempt can be made at a calm, organized presentation of events that were hectic and tense when they happened. These events took place in District 10, located in the northwestern corner of the Bronx. The community is preponderantly middle class, with a small segment of lower class population at the southern end of the district.

Very early in the crisis it became clear that this was no ordinary strike in which salary and conditions were an issue. During such stop-pages one expects a considerable degree of hostility between teachers and supervisors, between teachers and resentful parents, between striking and nonstriking personnel.

This last strike was very different. For the first time the great majority of supervisors and teachers found common cause for a work stoppage. The basic issue, as I view it, was a definition of decentralization: would it permit complete community control or would it call for only limited community participation? The majority of professionals and the major sector of the citizenry saw the issue in terms of job security, due process, and the status of trade unionism in a decentralized school system. Professionals and citizens on the other side acted out of conviction that decentralization must mean community control, especially for minority groups, and that all other issues were essentially secondary. A struggle over principles such as these could not avoid becoming bitter to the verge of violence. Although District 10 is far from Ocean Hill,

events at several schools in this community indicated all too well the depth of hostility that prevailed among teachers and among parents.

The primary goal of a district superintendent, to my mind, was to prevent as far as possible aggressive acts that would exacerbate feelings. Even more, I had to plan for the peace; some day the strike would end; teachers, supervisors, pupils and parents would have to resume normal relations. The lower the pitch of the anger, the sooner calm could be reestablished.

A Statistical View of District 10

SCHOOLS IN DISTRICT

Number	School Level	Capacity	Register	±
16	K-6 Elementary	13,168	13,537	+ 369
4	K-6 Elementary Located in J.H.S.	1,506	1,597	+ 91
7	7-9 Junior High Schools	8,155	8,872	+ 717
3	Academic High Schools	11,883	15,207	+3,324
30	Schools	34,712	39,213	+4,501

## ETHNIC BREAKDOWN CATEGORIES

N. & P.R. %	Other %	Elem.	J.H.S.	H.S.
91-100	0-10	1	1	-
81-90	11-20	1	-	-
71-80	21-30	-	-	1
61-70	31-40	2	1	-
51-60	41-50	2	2	2
41-50	51-60	3	1	-
31-40	61-70	4	1	-
21-30	71-80	3	-	-
11-20	81-90	1	-	-
0-10	91-100	3	-	-

INTRA-BUSING FROM  
POVERTY AREAS 1,616

INTERBUSING FROM  
OUTSIDE DISTRICT 300

Planning for District 10 required careful consideration of various factors specifically characteristic of this community. The community at large is exceptionally pro-trade union. The teachers in the schools of the district had demonstrated, in previous strikes, solid loyalty to the UFT. (In this strike only 60 teachers out of more than 2,000 reported for duty.) A great many teachers working in other districts reside in the community and are leaders in forming community opinion. The district office is located in the middle of the housing development built

many years ago by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union for its members. Old, retired residents of these houses volunteered to carry signs on the picket lines and were vociferous in their denunciation of nonstriking teachers!

The situation was different in the southern rim of our district where three of the district schools are located. Residents of this section include many Negro and Puerto Rican families with fewer socioeconomic advantages than those enjoyed by the people in the rest of the school district. Here a number of parents expressed opposition to the action of the teachers and supervisors and demanded that the schools be opened. Some were openly sympathetic to the Ocean Hill cause; but many were working parents who desperately needed to get their children into school during the working day.

#### The Role of the Local School Board

Although I did not foresee it at the outset, another factor was to be of serious import to me both professionally and personally. In a move toward decentralization, the New York State Legislature had just enacted the Marchi Bill requiring that, beginning with the school year (1968-69), all district superintendents serve under contracts with Local School Boards and not with the Board of Education. I myself had signed such a contract and it was for a term of just one school year. It was not long before I had to face contradictory instructions -- those from central Board headquarters and those from the Local School Board. I would have to decide which, in my role of district superintendent, I had to follow.

The Board of Education and the Superintendent of Schools declared the action of the teachers and supervisors to be a strike in violation of state law. They further declared that schools would be open. The President of the Board of Education, speaking on television, told the public that a school could be opened if even one teacher were on hand. I received a copy of a memorandum from the Superintendent of Schools to the Board of Education stating that schools should be open wherever this could be done without danger to the welfare and safety of the children. When building custodians refused to cross picket lines to open buildings, a series of bulletins listed precautions to be taken in handling heating and lighting equipment. In some instances, certificates of competency had to be obtained for any personnel using such equipment. (Later, in opening two schools in my district, I chose to disregard this requirement. Knowing how difficult it would be to obtain such certification, I felt that insistence on certificates would be seen as a deliberate effort on my part to obstruct the opening of these buildings.)

The Local School Board met in executive session to consider the situation. Its decision was communicated to the President of the Board of Education in the following letter:

Dear Mr. Doar:

In view of the Central Board of Education's mandate to open schools and in attempting to fulfill our educational responsibility to the parents and children in District 10, and since there are some teachers who want to teach and parents who want to send their children to schools that are presently closed, we, as a Local School Board in District 10, recommend to the District Superintendent that we do not wish any schools to be opened unless the following criteria are met:

- a. There must be a licensed supervisor in charge, namely a principal, assistant to principal or administrative assistant.
- b. There must be approximately 15% of the school's own teaching staff present to better insure the safety of the children and control of the building.
- c. If additional teachers are needed to bring the school to a normal pupil-teacher ratio of 30 children to one teacher, teachers from other schools who hold the appropriate license may be sent into the school to teach.

Very truly yours,

LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD NO. 10

In the ensuing weeks, the Local School Board, sensitive to the insistence of some people for a change in policy, held two open meetings to hear from the community. On both occasions there was general discussion from the floor and a roll call of Parent Association presidents or their representatives. At both meetings the overwhelming opinion was in support of the Local School Board criteria for opening schools. A small fraction urged no openings whatsoever until the strike was settled. A still smaller group expressed opposition to the strike and recommended opening schools without regard for any criteria. Subsequently, at an executive meeting called to reconsider the safety criteria, one change was made, namely, that a school could be opened with a supervisor from another school or another district. (Justification for the Local School Board criteria was demonstrated at the Grace Dodge Vocational High School. In the midst of the strike, Grace Dodge was returned to Headquarters' control in accordance with the Interim Decentralization Program. A few days later the High School office at Headquarters, on the plea of a group

of Dodge teachers, agreed to open that school without regard to criteria set up by the Local School Board. One day after the school opened the teachers themselves requested of Headquarters that the school be closed because they were unable to control the students in the building. The Headquarters office did close the school immediately.)

### The Role of the District Superintendent

#### The Open Schools

Nonstriking teachers unable to get into their buildings had been asked to come to my office. I met with them several times to answer questions and to present the position taken by the Local School Board. This group was made up of 15 percent of the teachers of P.S. 59, and a teacher from another school who had passed the Assistant Principal's examination. With this staff, P.S. 59 was opened. I sent in ten teachers from other schools to help provide the fullest possible service.

When the decision had been made to open P.S. 59, Mrs. Aida Richardson, who had been designated as temporary supervisor, was told by the police of the 46th Precinct that she would have to report to that Precinct every day to obtain the keys to the building and would have to return them. Mrs. Richardson called me the very first day to tell me that she simply could not make these trips to the police station. I drove over and discussed the matter with the captain. I took the responsibility of giving a set of keys to Mrs. Richardson who was then able to open and close the school without any unnecessary inconvenience.

When I brought the keys to the school I found a large picket line in front of the school. Inside the building nonstriking teachers and

several parents told me there had been some unpleasant incidents between the strikers and nonstrikers; it was also alleged that some of the pickets had discouraged children from entering the building. I went outside and talked with representatives of the pickets. I insisted that there be no interference by pickets. After some discussion I was able to convince the pickets that they would be well advised to accept the mandate of the Local School Board and not to interfere with the teachers who were operating in the school within the criteria set up by the Board. Though some minor complaint came up once or twice thereafter, the situation at P.S. 59 remained satisfactory. Some days later a delegation of teachers and parents from Niles Junior High School (J-118 Bronx) came to ask that school be opened. They had the required 1 percent of the staff and a qualified Assistant Principal from another district. This school was duly opened.

While the engineers were on strike, the building was cold. Both open schools had teachers who came from other schools and even from other districts; since they did not know the children, the initiation of a meaningful educational program was not easy.

The number of children attending each day varied sharply with many of the children attending only sporadically. Nevertheless such classes as were conducted were orderly and were engaged in some educational effort.

## ATTENDANCE STATISTICS AT TWO SCHOOLS

	P.S. 59 Bronx		JHS 118 Bronx (Niles JHS)	
	Teachers	Pupils	Teachers	Pupils
10/16	7	50		
10/17	15	300		
10/18	11	262		
10/21	9	240		
10/22	10	179		
10/23	10	79		
10/24	9	127		
10/25	10	160		
10/28	9	132		
10/29	10	179	11	75
10/30	10	280	13	90
10/31	11	200	15	90
11/1	12	160	16	50
11/4	12	194	16	131
11/5	12	170	16	135
11/6	12	230	18	130
11/7	11	219	17	135
11/8	12	280	21	141
11/12	11	150	19	60
11/13	11	218	18	109
11/14	13	310	20	151
11/15	16	309	21	135
11/18	15	258	17	125

### The Closed Schools

The two most crucial situations I faced involved the Bronx High School of Science and, later, Riverdale Junior High School (J-141 Bronx). A telephone call early one morning informed me that the Bronx High School of Science had been entered and that a group of teachers and students were occupying the lobby. I hurried down to the school with one Local School Board member who happened to be in my office. We found the students and eight teachers together with several parents occupying the front lobby of the building. A dozen policemen had arrived and were standing by. I called the teachers together and spoke to them briefly about keeping the situation under control. No one had asked me to authorize the opening of this school, nor did the staff on hand meet the Local School Board requirements. Nonetheless, I decided not to ask the police to clear the building. The attitudes of the students, the teachers, and the police convinced me that such an order would have created a dangerous situation in which the youngsters might have been hurt. The very next day word came down that, under the terms of the Interim Decentralization Plan, the Bronx High School of Science and Grace Dodge Vocational High School in this District were to be returned to central Board control. I, therefore, had no further role in events at either school.

On the other hand, incidents that developed at the Riverdale Junior High School presented many difficult problems. Here again, I was informed one morning that children and teachers were in the building. I arrived at the school to find a crowd outside with police barring the doors. Inside I found a teacher from Walton High School acting as

supervisor; about 30 children were in class working with a teacher, while about 20 parents were in the principal's office. I informed the group that I had not authorized the opening of this building and that it was open in violation of the criteria set down by the Local School Board. I made it clear that there was no one on hand with authority to accept responsibility for supervising the school, and I refused to make any firm commitments about keeping the building open in the future. Here again, I deliberately refrained from asking the police to clear the building lest some children or parents be injured.

That evening the Local School Board met for its regular executive meeting. Parents appeared, requesting permission to speak. The board voted a variance in procedures to permit speakers. The great majority of those who spoke urged the Local School Board not to alter its criteria on school openings. Several referred specifically to J.H.S. 141, insisting that it not be opened without safeguards.

The board reaffirmed its stand, but made the one change already mentioned: to open a school, the supervisor need not be from that school; one from another school or district would be acceptable.

Work for that night did not end with the close of the board meeting at midnight. Just prior to adjournment, a police officer came in to inform me that some parents had entered Riverdale Junior High School prepared to sit in overnight, through Election Day and until Wednesday morning, in order to enforce the opening of the school that day. (Riverdale Junior High School was designated as a polling place for Election Day.) He added that representatives of one of the political parties had indicated that the vote at this polling place would be challenged if the

sit-ins were in the building during the balloting. I suggested that the police remove the trespassers, but the officer refused unless I entered a formal complaint.

At 12:30 a.m. I arrived at the school only to be told by the patrolman on duty that I could not enter without a specific order from the lieutenant at the precinct office. Off I drove to the police station where, after a delay, a lieutenant dispatched a sergeant to get me inside the school.

In the lobby of Riverdale Junior High School there were four or five policemen and three parents, one a woman, geared and provisioned for a long siege -- blankets, electric lamps, food, books, etc. During a half-hour of argument with the sit-ins, I refused to promise to open the school without Local School Board safeguards. I pleaded that they leave the building because the presidential election was important to the community and should not be jeopardized. They asked what I would do if they did not comply, and I answered, "I shall order your arrest." They looked at each other, quietly gathered their equipment, and left.

Wednesday, the day after Election Day, found a very large crowd in front of Riverdale Junior High School. On arrival I could not find one teacher from the school or anyone in supervisory authority ready to operate the school, to organize instruction. Therefore, acting on the decision of the Local School Board as reaffirmed on the preceding night, I told the police to allow no one into the building.

I am reliably informed that three people opposed to the closing went to Livingston Street, where they succeeded in reaching top echelon

officials, including the President of the Board of Education. Late that night I received a telephone call at home from a staff member at headquarters informing me that the Board of Education, at its meeting that evening, had voted that any decisions by Local School Boards setting conditions for opening of schools were to be disregarded. On asking whether I could get that order in writing, I was told that I could not.

Thursday the situation became worse. A large crowd gathered at the school door demanding that the school remain closed. Word had reached them that the three parents who had gone to the Board on Wednesday had seen the Board President. They had also heard that I had been ordered to disregard any guidelines set up by the Local School Board. Several people began to talk about "getting tough." About 150 people formed a motorcade and went down to Livingston Street to present their point of view. They were seen by Mr. John Lotz, a member of the Board of Education. He promised to present to Dr. Donovan and the Board, the delegation's support of the Local School Board position and to inform the community of any decisions. To the best of my knowledge these parents did not get any response at any time.

The crowds at Riverdale Junior High School were larger on Friday. Although neither a supervisor nor a single teacher of the school was on hand, a small group of parents, some with no children at that school, tried unsuccessfully to force their way through the police line and into the school building.

At noon, Assistant Superintendent Harry Wolfson arrived from headquarters with orders to see whether the school could be opened. He

reviewed the situation; he noted that the crowds were not disposed to seeing the school opened; that no teacher of the school was willing to enter; that there was no supervisor available. Mr. Wolfson agreed that Riverdale Junior High School had best remain closed.

School was closed officially for Monday, Veterans Day. The Local School Board which had already held a number of open meetings, called another on Tuesday following. Only five Local School Board members were present. (By this time, the other four had taken the minority position on the issue, three of them being willing to remove all the restrictions the Local School Board had set up. It was one of these three who had been trying to break through the police guard to open Riverdale Junior High School.)

The meeting was attended by approximately 1,500 people. Almost all upheld the Local School Board vigorously. A very unpleasant indication of the depth of antagonism was the booing and hissing of the few opposition speakers.

Just before this meeting had begun, Deputy Superintendent Brown called me to state that he would be at Riverdale Junior High School the next morning, in an effort to open the school. I arranged for him to be met by a few parents who wanted the school opened, by some teachers who wanted to work, and by some Local School Board members. We were to convene at P.S. 24, located just behind Riverdale Junior High School, in the hope of avoiding any untoward incident with the large number of pickets at the junior high.

Tuesday dawned ugly, with snow, sleet, and high winds. Dr. Brown appeared at P.S. 24. The parents arrived, leading about 30 children. Neither Dr. Brown nor I had asked for or expected children to be brought in at this point. Inevitably this development quickly came to the attention of the picketing teachers and parents and soon the crowds were at the door of P.S. 24, clamoring to be heard. We hurriedly got the children into the building away from the pickets.

Five teachers were present ready to teach at Riverdale Junior High School. One was from Morris High School, in District 9, a school that was open and to which, on request, I had sent six nonstriking teachers. The teacher said that she considered herself more needed here than at her own school. Dr. Brown ordered her to return to Morris High School at once.

Of the remaining four, one was from Walton High School, one from Mosholu Junior High School (80 Bronx) and two from Tetard Junior High School (143 Bronx). The latter is about one mile from Riverdale Junior High School. With no instructors from the latter school and with two from Junior High School 143, Dr. Brown decided that a fair compromise would be to open the latter school. The teacher from Junior High School 80 volunteered to serve as supervisor.

I told Dr. Brown that neither I nor my Board considered this arrangement safe for the children, especially in view of the fact that no parents from Tetard Junior High School had asked for that school to be open. Dr. Brown disagreed. He ordered buses to pick up the Riverdale children and take them to Tetard Junior High School the next morning. He also instructed me to be on hand to see that his instructions were carried out.

The reaction of the parents was to tell the children to sit down and refuse to leave the building. Five parents and about 20 children refused to leave the school. Dr. Brown refused to change his decision.

For the next three days I was present at Tetard Junior High School every morning. No children appeared because none had boarded the buses which were waiting at Junior High School 141. No children from Junior High School 143 appeared. The volunteer supervisor failed to show up; one young lady stepped out of a parked car at 10 A.M., just after I had announced that Junior High School 143 could not be open, and said she was ready to go to work. After three days we gave up the attempt to open Tetard Junior High School.

Community opinion was unmistakably demonstrated one Sunday at a meeting that I knew nothing about at the time it was held.

A group of people had formed an ad hoc committee to open schools. They distributed leaflets throughout the district calling for a community-wide meeting at Fordham University. As reported to me subsequently, rumors began to fly during Friday and Saturday that this committee was planning to use this meeting to "fire" the Local School Board and me.

True or not, this rumor raced through the district. On Sunday, crowds estimated at 5,000 to 7,000 gathered at the University to oppose the committee's alleged plan. The outcome was a meeting that voted support to the Local School Board and circulated a petition asking the Board of Education to honor the Local School Board criteria. Several thousand signatures were gathered and sent to Livingston Street.

### Some Conclusions

Although the vast majority in the community understood and approved of the steps I had to take, there were the unavoidable indignities that I had to suffer. There were teacher pickets who were bitter that I should allow even two schools to open. From the other side came the charge that I was a bigot. When City Hall made a hopeless muddle of checks for the nonstrikers, I was accused of withholding their money deliberately. Worst of all, I lived several unhappy days with the knowledge that people in high places at Livingston Street were asking that I be charged with insubordination for refusing to open schools regardless of any safeguards.

I could not but look with some cynicism upon my situation. On the one hand I was in danger of being brought up for being insubordinate to the central Board of Education, when it was precisely this type of action on the part of another district administrator that played a great part in starting the strike and for which no charges were ever brought. On the other hand, I could not but worry about the reaction of my Local Board if I chose to disregard their mandate. I felt as though I had the sword of Damocles hanging over me while the pit of possible unemployment lay below me.

Today I feel that my actions were correct. The Board of Education had the right to declare schools open. But since the Superintendent of Schools stipulated that opening must not jeopardize children's safety, I felt that a Local School Board had the right to set minimum safety precautions. Having been compelled by law to serve under a contract to this

Local School Board, I had an obligation to implement their policy directives.

It should be said, too, that my ready acceptance of the Local School Board position was dictated by my own professional judgment. My years of experience had taught me to be concerned with the consequences of having children move about a school building without adequate supervision.

My efforts to maintain, as far as possible, friendly professional relations with all parties in the controversy may have proved fairly successful judging by one major result: In the time that has passed since the strike, there has been not a single hint of an act of hostility or reprisal in any of the schools in District 10.

PROJECT NO. 6SURVEY OF COMMUNITY ATTITUDES,  
DISTRICT 5, MANHATTAN

Principal Investigators: Dr. Gladys Lang, Dr. Leo S. Goldstein,  
assisted by Mr. Roy Mallett

As part of its program of action research the Center undertook a study with the following objectives, thus stated in its proposal submitted to and approved by the Office of Education:

- (1) To determine the impact that the New York City 1968 teachers' strike has had on children and parents and to draw implications for meliorating any negative effects;
- (2) To make any relevant recommendations stemming from the findings.

District 5 in Manhattan had managed to open all its schools during the third strike but, as in other districts where schools were in operation, attendance figures were down, especially among the Spanish-speaking population, who were popularly believed to be opposed to the strike. Towards the end of October, the Center agreed to launch a survey, with the aim of furnishing the district superintendent with information he needed: Why weren't children coming to school? Did parents know the school was open? If not, how could information to this effect best reach them? If so, were they in sympathy with the teachers' cause, unwilling to cross picket lines, afraid for their children's safety, or convinced that with regular teachers not in their classrooms, there was no learning going on anyway?

Beyond this, moreover, the research staff had to prepare for the day when the strike would be over. Facing them were two main problems:

(1) What effects would the series of strikes have had on the children both academically and psychologically? Had the children been taught at home, at interim schools staffed by volunteer teachers, or attended special classes in museums, churches, etc.? In what ways would children have been "harmed" as their elders wrangled? Would they have "benefited" in any way? (2) What temporary or lasting effects would the strike have had on relationships between parents, between parents and teachers? Had there been an increase in tensions between blacks and whites, between Negroes and Jews?

To gather answers to these questions, the Center planned to interview a representative sample of some 1,000 parents whose children were enrolled in a selected sample of ten elementary schools of the district. In order to gather and process data as quickly as possible, it was decided to construct a short pre-coded interview schedule, with only a few ended questions, that would consume no more (on the average) than 15 minutes of the respondent's time and would be suitable for use either in a telephone or face-to-face interview. Since it was expected that a minimum of three weeks would be needed to complete the interviewing, it was necessary to devise a questionnaire that could still be utilized (with minor adaptations) should the strike end before all interviews were completed.

The survey instrument was tested on November 15 and adjustments made on the basis of preliminary interviews. As it happened, the conference on the final form for the questionnaire (prior to "fielding" it) was taking place just as the end of the third strike was announced.

Accordingly, the "post-strike" version of the interview was utilized, while a new "strike" version was readied. (See Appendix U.) The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) of the University of Chicago was selected, a contract drawn, and approval given by the Office of Education.

NORC sent a letter (Appendix V) to the parent sample. Where name and area suggested the possibility that English might not be understood by recipients, a second letter was enclosed with the message in Spanish (Appendix W). The letters asked for cooperation in the study, but made it clear that cooperation was purely voluntary and all information would be strictly confidential.

#### Telephone Interviews

Except where a respondent did not have a telephone and in those instances where contact was not made after four or five calls, all interviews were conducted by telephone to speed results. In more than 1,000 attempts, only 14 respondents refused to answer the Center questions. One telephone interview, incidentally, was conducted in Spanish, another in French. (See Tables 1, 2, 3.)\* A few interviews were conducted on November 20, the day teachers and pupils returned en masse. The bulk of the interviews were held between November 25 and December 7.

#### Findings

While the study could no longer serve its original, highly pragmatic purpose, it could increase our understanding of parental responses to

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\*All tables appear in Appendix X.

crises in the public schools and the implications of these responses for future school policy.

The questions narrowed down to the following: Who attended or stayed out of school during the third strike? To what extent was attendance or nonattendance a symbolic act signifying support for or opposition to the strike? We begin to answer these queries by looking at the district and its parents and at who went to school and why.

### The District and its Parents

On October 1, 1967, District 5 in Manhattan was supervising the education of more than 27,000 children, of whom almost one-half were Negroes, almost one-fourth Puerto Rican, and another fourth white, Chinese, or ethnically "other" than Negro or Puerto Rican. There was one high school, the new and mammoth Brandeis High, with almost 5,200 students, four junior high schools attended by nearly 5,300 students and 18 elementary schools (including one for disturbed children) with close to 17,000 pupils. In November 1968 -- the time of our study -- there were 20 elementary schools (two of them "paired," i.e., operating as one school).

Our sample of 941 parents, each of whom had at least one child in one of ten elementary schools in the district, reflects a diversity of backgrounds. (See Tables 4, 5.) Almost one-fourth (23.9 percent) are white or of Asian heritage; 46 percent are black; and 20 percent are Hispano-Americans (mainly Puerto Rican but including some of Dominican, Cuban, and other Spanish-speaking backgrounds). Some of their children attend schools -- near Central Park West -- in which the dominant group numerically is "white," as at P.S. 76 in Harlem; or schools on the West

Side -- in the 100's nearer to Broadway -- where the largest number of students are Puerto Rican, as at P.S. 165. The paired schools, P.S. 191 and P.S. 199, in the Lincoln Center area at the southernmost tip of the large district, are ethnically mixed schools, with blacks, whites, and Spanish-speaking children in relatively balanced proportions.

Over one-third of parents interviewed (35.4 percent) identified themselves as Catholic, accounting for about one-fifth of the whites (20.9); nearly one-half indicated they were Protestant, including about one-fifth (21.4 percent) of the white parents. Over one-third of all white parents said they were Jewish. Nearly 7 percent of the parents said they had no preferred religion, accounting for 18.1 percent of all white parents. There was a scattering of other affiliations: Jehovah's Witnesses, Hindus, Muslims, Greek Orthodox; as well as one avowed atheist and one Confucian.

Among the white respondents -- almost all female -- 59 percent had had some college training, graduated from college or professional school. This compares to 7.3 percent of the black respondents and 5 percent of the Spanish-Americans. At the other extreme, over one-half (52.5 percent) of the Spanish-American parents had never attended high school; about two-fifths of the Negro parents had not attended high school, and over one-half (56.7 percent) of the Negro parents had not completed high school.

Analysis of these data, together with data on occupation, would indicate that the socioeconomic gap between the "typical" white parent and the "typical" black or Spanish-speaking parent in this school district

is greater than that between white and black parents with children in other city school districts. To pinpoint the disparity: while just three white mothers (1.4 percent) were on welfare, 28.6 percent of the black mothers and 23.8 percent of the Spanish-Americans were dependent on relief. Again, while nearly one-fifth of the white mothers are native New Yorkers, only 3.3 percent of the blacks and 0.4 percent of Spanish-speaking mothers were born in the city. Over three-fourths of the Negro mothers were born in the South; 70.2 percent of the Spanish-American mothers were born in Puerto Rico; almost all others in some Caribbean country. Still, almost half the whites were born outside the United States -- 22 percent in Western Europe (Italy, France, etc.), 18 percent in Eastern Europe (Hungary, etc.). The close match between birthplaces of father and mother suggests that many couples -- both white and black -- migrated to New York City after marriage and are thus relatively recent newcomers to New York.

#### Who Went to School and Why

Nearly three-fifths of all parents sent their children to school almost every day during the strike. (See Tables 8, 9.) Of all parents who knew the child's school was open, 878, or more than 90 percent, sent the pupil to school. At the other extreme, only less than one-tenth of those who knew the school was open did not send the child to school at all during the strike.

Asked whether their child's school was open at any time during the strike that began on October 15, more than nine-tenths of the parents

answered, "Yes." (See Table 6.) Of those answering "No," a disproportionately high number were Spanish-Americans, with Negro mothers least apt to believe the school was closed. (See Table 7.) Most confusion seems to have occurred in "paired" schools where only one building was being used during the strike; a high proportion (almost half) of "No" answers among blacks, whites, and the Spanish-Americans is accounted for when we consider the distribution of responses by ethnicity and by school. Some of this "misinformation" may be attributed to a "technicality," i.e., those parents whose "half" school was closed gave a literal response of "No," although knowing the other half was open. Still we believe that most of the parents answering "No" did not know the school was "open." Without belaboring the point we offer in support of this hypothesis the fact that the "No" responses were rather evenly divided between the two "half schools."

A higher percentage of Negro and Spanish-speaking parents who knew the school was open relied on the mass media for information. White parents were more likely to depend on word-of-mouth information. What is indicated is that most white children attended a school in their immediate neighborhood while a significant proportion of "others" were bused into the school or walked a long distance.

About one-fifth of the white parents gave as a reason for not sending their child to school the fact that they favored the strike. Three-fifths of all parents not sending the child to school said that it was a matter of the child's safety or psychological well-being. Two-thirds of all the parents sending their child to school thought he would miss

his school work. About one-sixth of all those sending their child to school saw it as a symbolic gesture against the strike. This is approximately the same proportion of all parents who did not send their child to school as a symbolic gesture favoring the strike.

In general, white parents were more likely to view both sending a child or not sending a child to school as a symbolic act representing support or opposition to the strike. All the groups gave as a main reason for sending the child to school the fear that he would miss too much school work if he did not attend. The main reason for not sending was that harm might come to the child. The Spanish-speaking parents were most fearful. In this group there was the least association between the attitudes towards the strike and behavior.

More whites than blacks or Spanish-speaking encountered difficulties in finding ways to care for their child or to supervise him. About 15 percent of all parents gave as a reason for sending their child to school the fact that they had no way to take care of him. (See Tables 10, 11.)

#### Some Conclusions

It appears that being opposed to or supporting the strike was more closely related to the educational attainment of the parents than to any other factor, including religion.

A major lesson of these findings is that it is dangerous to assess support for or opposition to either a school strike or a school boycott by looking at attendance figures. Only a small minority of both black and white parents either sent or did not send their children to school

because they wanted to show their support for or opposition to the strike. The majority of parents were more concerned about the possible psychological or physical harm to the child and about the educational benefits that are associated with attendance or nonattendance.

#### IV. THE CENTER PERIODICALS

Of the many publications produced by the Center, only two are issued on a regular basis and circulated to a readership that is nationwide. The Urban Review, a magazine, is published bimonthly during the school year. The Center Forum, a newsletter, appears eight or nine times in the course of the calendar year. Both journals reflected the crisis according to their individual editorial bent. The most direct and clearcut references to the strike have been assembled for this record and are presented in this section.

##### THE URBAN REVIEW

As the bimonthly publication of the Center, The Urban Review reflected the New York school crisis somewhat out of sink because of its publishing schedule. Echoes of the strike reverberated in the Review long after the strike was settled.

The first issue for the school year 1968-69 appeared in September but was assembled some one and two months earlier. It made no mention of the teachers' strike. The next issue, November 1968 (vol. 3, no. 2), featured an interview with Albert Shanker, president of the Union. Prepared and written by Review editor, Joseph Lederer, during August 1968, this article made no direct reference to the strike, but it did touch on a number of points that illuminated the Union position. Excerpts from Mr. Shanker's answers are presented here:

##### On tenure for teachers:

I believe in accountability for teachers. But first we must develop ways of testing children that will

show us not merely the final score but also how well these children are doing as measured against all other children who face the same types of problems. That is, if I am a teacher in this particular school, am I doing as well with these children year in, year out, as other teachers who have children whose parents also make \$130,000 a year and who move once every 3 years and so forth and so on. Or whose parents make only \$2,000 a year.

Now once that is established it ought to be fairly easy to remove teachers who consistently perform on the lowest levels as compared with their colleagues who face the same kinds of problems. Tenure means that you can only dismiss somebody for cause. If you can show that a teacher was consistently performing poorly, that would be cause and you could remove the teacher.

...Looking at it historically, tenure is the price you pay if you want teachers to be able to speak their minds and teach freely. If you have a system in which teachers can be dismissed without any cause, it means that I, as a teacher, constantly have to teach what it is that I think my boss believes in. I cannot teach with a view toward teaching the truth as I see it. I have to teach the truth as the fellow who can fire me sees it. Tenure says that you can't get rid of somebody unless you can show that he's doing something that's bad. Well, if somebody's been working for 3, 7, 12, 15 years, shouldn't you be able to show that he's not functioning properly if you want to get rid of him?

...One of the major failures of our schools is the assumption we make that just because somebody's gone to college and possesses that sheepskin or piece of paper, we can put him into a school and he can function properly. We don't do that in any other profession. Doctors do not practice medicine without an internship. Lawyers, more and more, do not go out and practice on their own without having worked on a type of apprenticeship basis within a firm. I think it's about time that we made this social investment, saying to ourselves that no teacher will simply be thrown into a classroom and told to teach, realizing that you must develop a rather slow and painful process over a period of one or two or three years, which helps to introduce the teacher to the practical world of teaching.

On the role of the local school board:

I'm not much one for local school boards or local communities. I don't believe very much in the warmth of the little Mississippi or Alabama town. I never felt that the small town was a warm place for me or for members of other minority groups. I've always felt that the big city was a much warmer place, and that because of its cosmopolitan nature and its multiple groups, each with the power to check other groups from doing certain things wrong, the bigness of our country, the bigness of our cities, is something I felt much more positive about. My own feelings are that small communities, small school boards, really cannot provide the necessary variety of educational programs. They can't provide a proper base of financial support. And the smaller the community and the school board, the greater the likelihood of bigotry and provincialism: To say nothing of there being less talent. I favor a gradual movement toward metropolitan school systems which include urban and suburban areas. I favor a gradual movement toward state school systems and gradual movement toward school systems and where several states combine their school systems and where there is heavy federal financing and federal control.

Now I understand that we're going through a period where localism is becoming more and more popular, where on the one hand there's a good deal of disappointment with the fact that big government has been unable to provide very good answers to many of our problems. There is a movement within the black community, having experienced the frustration and bitterness of the fight on integration, which says: "Well, the hell with it; since they prevented us from integrating we'll do it ourselves, and there's no reason we can't." My own views on this are not designed to elicit a great deal of applause; nevertheless I think that metropolitanism and federalism are what we're eventually going to come back to if we want to solve our problem. If we're to develop the kind of accountability we're talking about, it really has to be done as part of a national purpose. When you get a deteriorating school system, the people with money get out and move elsewhere, and the people without money are stuck there, and that's what localism essentially means. In housing, in education, in everything else.

You see, other parts of the country -- the suburban and rural areas -- are moving toward consolidation of school districts because they know that local control is a myth, that they can't do anything within their own locality. But the big cities are heading in the opposite direction. They're saying the problem is bigness, and the solution is breaking up into smaller units. So it's part of a pendulum that exists in the life of societies and organizations. Business goes through it and so does government; there are movements from relative centralization to relative decentralization, back and forth. I don't view this as a permanent movement....The notion of local control is wrong because, basically, it is aimed not at solving a problem but at giving temporary satisfaction to people while their problem continues to grow.

Parents might very well be afraid to complain to their school board. The local school board would have powers over their children. It would, like any other bureaucracy, be rather sensitive to criticism. Most parents would feel freer to complain to a central bureaucracy, which is somewhat impersonal, than to complain locally about some nasty thing that their own community residents are doing to them....I think people in New York City feel a lot freer to criticize the mayor and the Board of Education and the United Federation of Teachers than people in a small town in Alabama to criticize their mayor, or board of education, or any other official in that town. It's easier for reprisals to take place, on almost every level, in a small, relatively homogeneous community than within a large city.

#### On decentralization of New York City schools:

...First, we have to separate the concept of decentralization from the concept of local popular or political control. It is possible -- and indeed it should happen -- that people at various levels ought to be able to make appropriate decisions. That is, teachers must make appropriate decisions if they're going to help children in their classrooms, and principals must have the power to make decisions, and so must district superintendents. In that sense, you have to have decentralization, because you can't say that you're going to run a mammoth system from somebody's vest pocket in a central headquarters.

But that doesn't mean that you have to have local boards of education. Large motor companies with highly centralized boards can develop forms of administrative decentralization within highly centralized systems. What we're really talking about is not decentralization in the sense of distributing the power of the central bureaucracy to a number of centers. We're really asking whether parents and others within local communities should have many of these powers. If you couple that question with another which is usually assumed -- namely, will the granting or the taking of such powers by local groups result in increased educational achievement within those areas? -- that's what we're really talking about.

I'd say the answer is no. And we have national evidence to support it. That is, you would have to show me that children in rural and suburban areas, where the parents elect their own school boards and hire and fire their superintendent, do better in school (once you have controlled for socioeconomic class)...You'd have to take comparable parts of a city where the parents do not have local control, and comparable suburban areas where the parents do have local control, but where there's the same socioeconomic status....And everything I have seen indicates that whether local parents vote for the local school board and hire the superintendent is absolutely irrelevant when measured from the vantage point of educational output. In the first place, if you look at school board elections all across the country, very few parents give a damn. They don't vote. They only vote when it means a tax increase, and then they usually come out to vote against frills.

I think that local control does have other values. I think it will bring about a good deal of satisfaction within local communities. See, right now the people of Harlem can be up in arms -- and they are. (Not enough, by the way. All the recent polls show that there's a high degree of satisfaction with the schools; I think there should be more dissatisfaction than there is.) Now, at any rate, they can be dissatisfied with the Board of Education, the mayor, the teachers, the principals, etc., etc. But once the school system is decentralized, and each community has its own local board,

that dissatisfaction will be channelized. Instead of blaming the teachers or the Board of Ed, or the mayor, or a lack of funds, they can blame their own local group that they elected, and every two years they can kick the culprits out and elect another group of powerless people to continue with that school system. You can develop a lot of satisfaction when you tell people that the failures are due to the group they, themselves, elected. It really defuses an explosive situation.

Look at the pressure that now exists to get more money, better programs, reduced class size, more psychologists, more social workers, newer buildings. Much of the steam will be taken out of that rebelliousness and hostility now aimed at City Hall and the Board of Education. Instead, each year a new local group will make new promises and be kicked out and so forth, and of course they'll be pretty powerless to do anything because they will not have their own taxing powers, given the same limitations that the boards in Long Island and in Westchester have...

I regard decentralization as a kind of opium. It gives people the trappings of power and local control without really giving them the ability to do anything. And that's the main reason I'm not very happy about it. I think that the existing rebelliousness and hostility toward the failure of the system are very healthy, as long as you channel them to get something more effective. But then you turn around and say, "Well, instead of something better, we're going to let your own local people be responsible for this mess, and if you don't like the local people you elect next year, who are still going to have this mess, well, kick them out the year after and put in another bunch of local people who'll be responsible for it." I think it's one of the greatest political schemes that's ever been devised for defusing a very explosive situation. But when you're dealing with the possibilities of revolution and violence, one shouldn't give serious consideration to gimmicks of this sort.

...I think decentralization has no educational value at all. I do not believe that there is any evidence to show that parental participation in the politics of education has any effect on the educational achievement of children, and this will be

even less so in New York City, where under the Bundy and Lindsay schemes, the parents don't even vote for their local school boards. They vote for a delegate who goes to another meeting. The election is so indirect that I doubt you'll even get 15 percent coming out, which is the national average.

But I do think that there is a politics to decentralization, and the politics is one of giving local people satisfaction with a failing institution by saying to them: "Well, look, you don't like what we're doing, go do it yourself...."

Up to now I have been speaking out as an educator -- a school man -- in pointing out the irrelevance of decentralization, that I support decentralization as does the UFT. We view it as a political bluff rather than an educational one.

I guess the best way to express my views on this stems from my own background as a union leader. Those of us who have been in the forefront of the union are not so interested in the ways of a salary increase or any other particular benefits -- but in the human dignity which comes to teachers when they participate in making decisions affecting their lives.

It is on the basis of the desire of people to participate that increased community and parental participation must be supported....

Teachers should have the major voice in professional matters, parents and community in policy matters.

The following issue, January 1969 (vol. 3, no. 3), printed in revised version of a talk made by Dr. Thomas Pettigrew in July 1968 at an Office of Education-Teachers College Institute on "The Relationship between School Decentralization and Racial Integration." His comments that refer to the strike situation are culled here:

New York is unique in its bigness. There's no denying that the Bundy report defines, and is trying to get at, some very real issues. There is a concept in a particular sociological study of large organizations called "effective organizational

span of control," and I am convinced, with many of the critics of New York schools, like Kenneth Clark, that the New York school system long ago passed the point of effective organizational span of control. If you are not convinced, you ought to take a visit to Livingston Street and see what ineffective span of control really means. In most American school systems the span of control is not an issue as it is in New York.

Decentralization's second real issue is parental involvement. I want to stress both words, parental and involvement. Parental -- not organized leaders who are not parents of the children in the schools. In the three so-called local control school districts in New York City in what I consider to be the Ford Foundation's abortive experiment, many of the parents have no more say about what is going on than they ever had. But leaders interested in power -- though not too interested in education -- have a great deal to say; this is not necessarily bad, but I think the real issue is parental involvement more than the political power issue which has, up to now, always been with us.

And involvement is not synonymous with control. I believe that full control, as its advocates talk about it, is possible only if the local board has control of and full access to the tax base. To the extent that it does not, it does not really have control. I am afraid that this false sense of control is being perpetrated on some of the parents in some of the areas in and out of New York. In any case, involvement means decision power, it does not mean total control.

These are real issues, and they can not be overlooked or swept under the rug. But the question I would pose is: can they not be faced effectively without some of the damaging consequences that I am sure would flow from the plan's major proposal, the creation of 30 to 60 little districts -- homogeneous districts, not only in terms of race but also in terms of class (which would be more damaging than the race, if you accept the Coleman findings) and religion? In other words, 60 ghettos, sealed in structurally, where local people have a vested interest in keeping the structure that way, even if the education is inferior. I think this is a regressive step. Floyd McKissick, in a letter

to The New Republic, used the Coleman report data on fate control to show that Negroes who had fate control did better, much better, on achievement scores, controlling for other variables; and he argued that this was an argument for separatism, black schools, black teachers, black control. He omitted one fact of the Coleman report: fate control was much more likely to be found in Negro children who are in desegregated schools, not within all-black schools.

Now the critical concept that should underlie the effort toward decentralization, it seems to me, is the concept of community. We speak of the community, community control, community school board, but how are we going to define community? If you define it in terms of a heterogeneous area, then decentralization is not in conflict with integration but, on the contrary, is one way of helping to achieve integration in a large city. Decentralization and integration are not necessarily in conflict; but they do conflict in the way they have been presented in New York by the Bundy plan.

In the same issue, as part of the series begun in September, the Review editor interviewed Leonard Covello, a founder of the teachers' union, first principal of Benjamin Franklin High School, and though now retired, still active as an educational leader. His views on community control, with reference to Ocean Hill, are quoted below.

In the 30's my aim was to bring the community into the school, so that our youngsters might better grow into understanding and participating citizens. We developed a community advisory council, inviting representatives from education and religious organizations, foreign-born groups, social service agencies, civic groups, prominent citizens, business and professional groups, and municipal departments. But it wasn't easy to make these people understand that the school wanted them. They said, "What do you mean? That's your job. We have nothing to do with the school." And I answered, "We want you to become involved in the education of our children."

Today, of course, there are some communities -- or at least powerful elements in them -- that are demanding more than involvement. They're demanding control. It's a step filled with many difficulties, it's going to take a long time to work it out. But I see it as one of the most wholesome developments that has taken place in New York City.

...The community itself is taking the initiative. In the old days, if I wanted to do something that departed from routine, and asked for permission or support, the answer was usually 'no'. I learned very early never to ask questions, but simply go ahead and do what I thought was right. If we were going to have a parade or improved housing, we went ahead and paraded. We held all kinds of exhibits and activities for the student and the community; we often rented storefronts near the school for this purpose. When we decided that we wanted a cleaner neighborhood, we planned a sanitation drive. When our Civics Club wanted to establish a vest pocket playground at 115th Street, the plan was worked out with the students. First they got permission from the owner to use the lot. Then they made the necessary arrangements with the Sanitation Department to clean the lot and contacted the Manhattan Borough President's office to have it paved. They went to the Police Athletic League to get personnel and finally, arranged a television show to secure funds for equipment. Step by step, we finally achieved what we had set out to do. We had many such experiences.

So you see, we at the school took the initiative. Today it's the community that is demanding control of its schools and of its children's education. I support the concept of community control of our schools in New York City. Decentralization of the system into 30 school districts means that every district will have a population of at least 200,000 people. Once clear and definite guide lines have been worked out and agreed upon, decentralization and community control will result in better, more meaningful education.

The clash between the community and the teachers union disturbs me greatly. I've been a member of the teachers union since 1916, when about a dozen of us at Clinton formed one of its first chapters. I remember in those early days three of our members

were thrown out of the school system for joining the union. I've been a member ever since. But I don't believe that the proper response to the problems brought on by decentralization and local control is to close all the schools. It could and should have been settled on the local level. If I had been a principal during the teachers strike, I'd have kept my school open. The strike produced chaos and bitterness that will have long and painful repercussions. I was back at Benjamin Franklin during the strike. About 90 teachers reported for duty, many of them union members who opposed a citywide strike as unnecessary and divisive. At least 120 teachers stayed away. "Look at the situation here," the principal said to me. "When we finally settle this, what's going to happen? We have a divided faculty. It's a tragic thing."

The whole concept of community control has to be tested and worked out very, very carefully. But I believe it can be made to work. Look at I.S. 201 in East Harlem. They had a good deal of strife in their struggle for local control. But if you go there now, you'll find the experiment is working. They had a fine graduation exercise in the spring of 1968, and their program of education seems to be moving in the right direction, with knowledgeable and dedicated community people involved in carrying out the plan.

My feeling is that we should concentrate on trying to find some solution and let these experiments live. I strongly disapprove of the demand to declare Ocean Hill a failure. That, in my opinion, is a very extreme position. The people in charge there will never accede to it. I certainly wouldn't if I were in their place.

The most direct statement about the strike appeared in the letters column of the February 1969 issue (vol. 3, no. 4). Jack Bloomfield, principal of Egbert J.H.S. 2, Staten Island, formerly principal of J.H.S. 271 in Ocean Hill, presented his view of the strike's background. The complete letter follows:

Sir: Recent issues of The Urban Review have touched on the question of community control: e.g., in your interviews with Albert Shanker [November 1968] and Leonard Covello [January 1969]. I would like to add to this discussion some personal observations that grew out of my two and a half years as the principal of John M. Coleman Junior High School 271 (in Brooklyn's Ocean Hill section) as well as field supervisor for a summer of a storefront school in Ocean Hill managed by Brooklyn College and funded by the National Defense Education Act.

Until the entry into the local picture of the Ford Foundation and its planning board in July 1967, there was a peaceful, mutually satisfying, organic relationship between Junior High 271 and the community. This was attested to as late as June 1967 by Mrs. Elaine Rooke (the P.T.A. President of JHS 271), Assemblyman Samuel D. Wright (a parent of one of our children), and Assemblywoman Shirley Chisholm, among others. All three had helped to organize the Ocean Hill Community Council. Graduation week in June 1967 saw awards being presented by Mrs. Rooke and the P.T.A. to a member of the administration of the school for his work with the community. Late in June, there was an integrated evening social party at the home of a P.T.A. executive board member which was attended by parents, teachers, supervisors and their spouses. Pertinent here is my philosophy, which was stated in one of our school notices: "As I have said in many different ways, I see our school as an organic part of community life, as a touchstone for progress for each and every member of the community and, therefore, as a tangible symbol of hope for all who come into contact with the school...."

These were not mere words. Knowing as we did the problems our [community's] parents faced with joblessness, job discrimination, poverty, welfare and poor housing, we in the school initiated moves and provided leadership for programs to develop neighborhood consciousness, to step up school-community activities, to improve inter-cultural understanding and to create community self-identification. In 1965, there had been an amorphous no-man's land between Bedford Stuyvesant, Brownsville, East New York, and Bushwick. By 1967, with school-community planning, there was now an Ocean Hill, an Ocean Hill Community Council, and a thrust for greater

school-community participation in the creation of a John M. Coleman Junior High School 271 multi-purpose center which would concern itself not only with school affairs but, after school hours, with vocational training, youth recreation, mental health, housing, welfare, employment, problems of family living, and legal matters. By this time, the school had arranged with the Council to have in operation a Brooklyn College Adult Education-John M. Coleman Community College, a Brooklyn Doctors Symphony Orchestra Concert for music scholarships for our students, and summer programs for our students as part of 'Sports Unlimited' and Brooklyn College's storefront schools. In addition, the Ocean Hill Community Council cosponsored with J.H.S. 271 a program of internship and leadership training, known as the Coleman Community Core. This project brought the school the first prize in the 'Mayor's Salute to Youth'.

There are many reasons why Rhody McCoy's Governing Board eliminated the Ocean Hill Community Council by not allowing it to meet, and why those elements in the mass media who were partial to McCoy kept the Community Council's existence a secret. One reason for not revealing the truth is that the facts would undermine the rationale of the ruling by Justice Francis Bergan of the New York State Court of Appeals. He declared that there was a definite need in Ocean Hill for creating the Governing Board's demonstration school principals. By his reasoning, these new principals, replacing the old, could "run a more community controlled school than we have ever asked a principal to operate before." This very community orientation was, according to Justice Bergan, a "valid ground for distinction" between demonstration school principals and those who were selected under present civil service regulations. Naturally, therefore, it would be embarrassing to the Governing Board and to the courts if it became known that the principal of J.H.S. 271, for instance, who had been selected in the traditional manner under the merit system, had been so community-minded that not only had he worked closely with the Ocean Hill Community Council but he had also stimulated community leaders to create it. Better to keep the whole matter quiet, than to raise questions not easily answered.

Then again, if the full facts about the Council's wholesome school-community relations were known, many sincere supporters of the Governing Board might have had second thoughts. After all, the Governing Board had come to power on the crest of a wave of feeling that communities needed a role in school matters. Their *raison d'etre* would vanish if that role had been filled already.

One fundamental premise on which the experimental project was based was that the 'community' needed to take complete control of the school because the bureaucratic establishment was so centralized that it was, as a consequence, unable to meet the needs of local people. This made the local school officials insensitive to the community. It would be disastrous to have to admit that a representative local community group -- one that existed in Ocean Hill before the Governing Board came upon the scene -- had found the teachers and administrators of the school extremely cooperative and understanding.

It is obvious that the Ocean Hill Community Council was a threat to the legitimacy of the Ocean Hill Brownsville Demonstration District Governing Board. This could make it a competitor in the local rivalry for funds. As a consultant to the Governing Board stated: "All power flows from the source of the money." Thus, it was logical for the Board to destroy the opposition if it was to monopolize control over the budget.

Of importance, too, was the fact that the Ocean Hill Community Council had been traveling a moderate path. It was developing into a showcase that had to be destroyed if opinion was to be polarized on the matter of community control. The very memory of the Council had to be extinguished; the public could then be told: 'if you don't get complete community control, you don't really get to work with the schools at all. The only way you can get schools to work with you is to force them.'

In point of fact, the Ocean Hill community, because it was composed of every element in the neighborhood, was essentially a moderating influence. It was attentive to all points of view, ranging from conservative to militant. Such an organization would not take kindly to the steamroller tactics later followed by the Governing Board.

Finally, the Ocean Hill Community Council was a neighborhood organization that had grown slowly from local roots. It had functioned under a constitution and it had been incorporated under state law. For outsiders to take it over by infiltration would pose difficulties. To replace it would be much easier. This is exactly what the Ocean Hill Governing Board was able to do.

In the summer of 1967, the Ford Foundation's planning board hurriedly constituted itself into a 'Governing Board' even before the teacher representatives, who were on vacation, could be elected to it. A rump group of parents on this 'Governing Board' selected the 'community representatives,' who were mainly not from the neighborhood. This was followed by meetings which took place without notification to any of the professional staff and some meetings which were held in 'executive session.' Then, Rhody McCoy, who had been 'acting administrator' since the beginning of July, was nominated by the Governing Board officially to the Board of Education. His statements on personnel policy, made quite openly, indicated an ethnic orientation and an antipathy toward many of those in service. The teachers on the Governing Board asked the union to defend them from pressures which had been mounted to force them out. Eventually, many of the teachers of the district transferred, as did numerous supervisors.

They left, white and black, not because they opposed the community, but because they were facing an antagonistic governing board and administrator who had taken control of local education without consulting the real community.

In the next issue, April 1969 (vol. 3, no. 5), only casual and oblique reference was made to the crisis. The lead article, "Educational Reform: Two Views," which was subtitled "Change the Premise," and authored by James W. Elsbery, Assistant Director of the Center, characterized the strike as follows:

...Here is a case, as so often happens, where the subverted value was directly related to the fundamental principles of those forced to make a choice

between conflicting value sets. Two tenets of the traditional teachers credo are that all children be taught with impartiality, enabling them to learn to the best of their respective abilities, and that all children be taught respect for the law. Educators, union officials, teachers, parents and students themselves were aware that formal learning could not take place for 1.1 million New York City children if a teachers strike closed the schools. The striking teachers were knowingly breaking the law. The immediate educational needs of the child, white and nonwhite, were for the most part disregarded for the sake of values other than educating children or maintaining the law. Such conflicts in values impede the raising of academic achievement for all children....

The companion piece, written by Robert J. Havighurst, was titled "Change the Child." Among other things it was highly critical of the press treatment of the strike, as in this question posed by the author:

Why does the press devote so much space to the controversy around local community control of the schools in Ocean Hill-Brownsville, which probably has very little bearing on what children learn in school?

Castigating critics of the educational establishment, Havighurst commented, "One would suppose that the teachers strike last fall was the sure sign of the death of public education in New York."

In its final issue for the school year, June 1969, (vol. 3, no. 6), the Review included a short article by Arthur E. Salz, titled "Policy-making under Decentralization: the Role of Collective Bargaining at the Local Level." The author summarized the strike in this manner:

The crisis in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville school district of New York City, which led to three teachers strikes and closed the schools to the city's million children, is understandably the focus of concern for educator and laymen alike....Two things have clearly emerged from the recent events in New York City: one is that the educational leadership in the black and Puerto Rican communities

see the control of hiring and firing of teachers as the crucial issue in the future success of decentralization and are willing to go to extreme lengths to win this right; the other is that union teachers are steadfastly defending their job security, traditionally the prime objective of organized labor, and are willing to use their ultimate weapon to insure due process in the firing or transferring of teachers.

The remainder of the article projects the problems likely to arise from the strike settlement and suggests some solutions.

### THE CENTER FORUM

At the time of its first issue for the 1968-69 school year (September 15, 1968, vol. 3, no. 1), The Center Forum was primarily a house organ, featuring news about the Center and the Center staff. Its lead article, "Effecting Change in a Crisis," was in the nature of a "state of the union" address to the staff by Dr. Robert A. Dentler, Director. In his speech, Dr. Dentler made the following direct reference to the strike, then in its second week:

...The Center cannot rescue the present situation. It cannot arbitrate, mediate, or negotiate the conflict -- which will be a long one, whether the teachers' strike persists or is called off.

But the Center can offer well-developed programs that speak to improving the quality of teaching and learning and the quality of community-school relations. It is to such programs that parties in conflict will have to turn sooner or later. The conflict thus offers us no excuse for delay or inaction. We have much to do by way of developing alternatives that will be used, if they deserve use, by rebuilding big city education....

The only other direct reference to the strike in this issue was in the introduction to a piece titled, "The Radicalization of a School Parent," by Eleanor Magid. The author was one of a group of mothers

who in an effort to open their closed school in District 1 had precipitated and witnessed one of the many scenes of violence that characterized the strike. The article itself describes the events of the preceding spring, but the introduction, written by Arthur Tobier, editor of the Forum, concludes with the following report:

At the end of the week, with most schools in the city closed, P.S. 63 was opened and operated in an atmosphere, spreading throughout the district, that increasingly is drawing to itself the emotional trappings of revolution without the interior consistency. There are strung-out officials, strike-breaking teachers, a vocal minority of extremists, a confused, incensed majority almost too paralyzed to move now that the social institution that served it is unable to function.

It seems to be the context in which schools in many parts of the city will operate this year. But if the events that precipitated the conflict at P.S. 63 are any standard, the ground on which an intelligent resolution might be made hasn't been lost so much as ignored. People who now find themselves at opposing ends of the school conflict want the same thing.

The next issue, dated October 20, 1968 (vol. 3, no. 2), included a contribution by Joseph Lobenthal, Jr., a lawyer and local school board member. His article, "Why Isn't the School Conflict Being Adjudicated?" was intended "to open a discussion that will continue in future issues." Since the legal aspect of "due process" was the technical basis of the strike, the author attempted to present a point of view, one paradoxically heard only rarely during the crisis -- the view of the courts.

At the present juncture in the battle for control over our educational apparatus, the courts have been patently cold-shouldered except as a matter of calculated strategy. Therefore, it is all the

more significant that on each side so much energy should be devoted to calling the public's attention to an adversary's supposed transgression of the law. Thus, various participants maintain that the teachers' strike was "illegal," that the Board of Education failed in its contractual and legislated "obligations," that professionals were denied "due process," and that local communities have been prevented from exercising a "right" to effect their own destinies.

...what we are now witnessing is the pre-legal battle for control over the law in the realm of educational administration. The C.S.A.-U.F.T. axis and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville coalition are fighting to have the law recognize certain (different) classes of people as holders of primary legal rights. The courts cannot be helpful during this alley-fighting stage because their main function is officially to validate and ratify the results of the struggle now going on.

The court's real job is to make informed estimates about the practical necessity for acknowledging change and accommodating new holders of "rights." The tools for this job are a body of doctrines that may be reassigned priority every time a new case is decided. The "flexibility" of our system boils down to a judicial appreciation of the elastic limit of the gap that can exist between legal opinion and the facts of life. Rather than rules of law and appeals courts, the main check on every judge is the necessity for him to satisfy his customers -- by and large; if he loses their faith, social institutions take to the streets.

By the time the next issue of the Forum appeared on November 13, 1968 (vol. 3, no. 3), Center policy had prescribed a change in focus for that periodical. The Forum ceased to be simply a "house organ;" it was now to devote itself to discussion of wide-ranging aspects of urban education, with each separate issue built around a central theme.

Accordingly, the lead article in the new expanded journal was an indepth analysis of the Ocean Hill community by Agee Ward, a social

scientist. Its ten-page length prohibits its reprinting in this document, but its chief intent was to present the view of Ocean Hill residents vis-a-vis the schools in their community. It is a painstaking and sympathetic study of the needs and aspirations, the reactions and actions of the people most directly affected by the Ocean Hill controversy.

Also in the same issue, Dr. Dentler contributed an article, "Brownsville: Community or Staging Area," in the course of which he noted:

The conflict over (not in) the quest for local control in Ocean Hill-Brownsville offers a vivid illustration of the difficulties entailed in exerting planful control over economic and technological changes. There, as elsewhere, political parties (increasingly national in character), federal and state agencies, labor unions and great corporate industries act out their complex, barely visible strategies upon a neighborhood stage -- projected electronically through the media in a refracted light.

Albert Shanker's politically motivated charges of Ford Foundation complicity in the Ocean Hill-Brownsville dispute illustrate this point. He exaggerates and caricatures the foundation's role to be sure, but he does point to a profile of interest group alignments. He also reveals projectively the sense in which organized labor, from the city's Central Labor Council on up, is participating in the same staging process.

...We can learn from the significant triumphs of neighborhood groups in both the I.S. 201 experimental district and Brownsville that in the agonizing and uncertain transition from the mosaic pattern toward new types of local participation, many urban dwellers are prepared to risk much in their quest for a new sense of community. And, we can learn that this readiness to take great risks, when combined with a democratically organized determination to accomplish specific changes, can prevail in spite of (and in part, because of) the staging process itself.

The final article in this issue, "Fourth Estate," was a critique of press coverage of community views during the course of the strike, without however mentioning the word "strike." It was written by Morton Inger of the Center's Mass Media Committee.

The themes of the following issues, December 23, 1968 (vol. 3, no. 4) and March 1, 1969 (vol. 3, no. 5), were "Desegregation/Integration" and "Curriculum," respectively. No reference was made to the strike situation.

The last issue containing a reference to the strike was dated May 15, 1969 (vol. 3, no. 6). It featured a front-page photograph of Rhody McCoy and some associates, highlighting the theme of "Community Control/Decentralization."

**APPENDIX**

## APPENDIX A

12 September 1968

To: Dr. Dentler  
From: Dr. Maleska  
Subject: A Proposal for Mediating the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Impasse

The Problem:

The governing board and a group of militant neighborhood people, including some parents, do not want certain teachers to enter their classrooms. These teachers insist on their right to do so.

Although around-the-clock discussions have been held among higher officials, no significant effort has been made to provide such discussions for the central figures in the dispute.

The Strategy:

The Center for Urban Education offers to conduct CUE-IN sessions, or talk-together meetings in which small groups will discuss their differences. These groups will be composed of:

- (1) Two members of the Center staff (Negro and white)
- (2) Two teachers
- (3) At least one member of the governing board
- (4) Two of the militant neighborhood people

The Procedure:

- (1) All participants, except staff members will be paid \$10.00 per hour for their time and effort.
- (2) All sessions will be conducted on a neutral ground, namely the Center headquarters.
- (3) No decision will be made by the Center staff; their role is merely to moderate discussions and try to get the participants to listen to the points advanced by their "adversaries."
- (4) Hopefully, some of the participants themselves will reach agreements as to recommendations for extricating all parties as gracefully as possible from the tangle of turmoil.

## APPENDIX A (cont'd)

The Goals:

- (1) Clarification of the issues.
- (2) Understanding of the motives and actions of the "other side."
- (3) More light; less heat.
- \*\*\* (4) A possible rapprochement, in which teachers will be allowed to enter their classrooms but will apply for and accept transfers within a week.

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\*\*\* This should not be stated as a recommendation by Center mediators, but should be elicited from the participants.

APPENDIX B  
MANAGEMENT GROUP MEETING

25 September 1968

Present: R. Dentler, L. Perkins, E. Maleska, R. Drescher,  
M. Eidlen, J. Elsbery, L. Goldstein, M. Kreuter,  
G. Lang, N. Mann, S. Soles, I. Badillo, B. Taylor, Recorder

The advice of the Management Group was sought to provide alternate courses of action to the program plans for the coming year in the event that the teachers strike in New York City schools continues for some time, thereby crippling the strategies for field testing and implementing projects of the Curriculum Development Program. Each member of the group read a prepared statement analyzing the issues of the strike and offering possible alternatives for the Center program which the Director summarized:

1. The Center could interpret, clarify and study this strike in a disinterested role to inform the future.
2. The Center could offer alternative schooling to some of the students of this city.
3. The Center might develop, test and implement its program through private and parochial schools.
4. The Center might focus its attention on areas lying outside of New York City, e.g., from Wyandach and Bridgeport to St. Louis.
5. The Center might amplify its leadership training efforts.
6. It might develop liaison with colleges to train students for future teaching assignments with the materials which we are developing here.

## APPENDIX B (cont'd)

7. It might give additional training to teachers and paraprofessionals.

8. The Center might act as an intermediary among the parties to the dispute.

9. The Center might indicate its readiness to supply "good offices."

10. The Center might use sotto voce influence among the parties to the dispute.

11. Increased efforts to plan for future implementation of Center programs by cooperation with New York City teachers might be made.

12. The Center might intensify its public information and relations effort throughout the region.

In commenting on the most feasible of the suggestions, discussions centered around the possibility of doing research, providing alternative schooling, and supplying "good offices." Though no specific conclusions were reached, general accord supported the research possibility and that of offering support and resources to the parties involved in the strike.

## APPENDIX C

EXCERPT FROM MINUTES OF  
CUE BOARD OF TRUSTEES

September 27, 1968

"In the midst of meticulous planning of program components, contingency planning was overlooked. There is a plan which is called Plan "A" which has seven parts to it for which the Center is staffed, committed, and ready to go, depending upon the ability to work in some 100 public schools. Plan "B" is a contingency plan containing a description of 12 projects the Center might become involved in if any part of Plan "A" cannot be carried out.

Dr. Stewart stated that the Center had a complex operational problem and Plan "B" should be circulated to the Board of Trustees as a working paper.

Dr. Dentler said that he will send out a statement of contingencies and get some prompt reaction to the ordering of new priorities."

## APPENDIX D

EXCERPT FROM MINUTES OF  
MANAGEMENT GROUP MEETING

October 4, 1968

Present: R. Dentler, L. Perkins, E. Maleska, R. Drescher,  
M. Kreuter, S. Soles, G. Lang, L. Goldstein,  
J. Elsbery, S. Lisser, M. Eidlén, I. Badillo,  
A. Tobier, S. Hodges, Recorder

Dr. Dentler stated that a memo was being sent to each Trustee and Management Group member outlining proposed changes in the Center's program in light of the continuing crisis within public education in New York City. The Trustees and Managers were asked to respond to this memo with suggestions and criticisms. The Board, at the last meeting, cautioned the Center not to rush into any quick decisions in this regard. Dr. Dentler stated that in the interim he had sent a telegram to Mayor Lindsay and copies to the Board of Education, Dr. Donovan, James Allen, and others supporting a proposal to solve the conflict in Ocean Hill-Brownsville. The proposal is the one made public by Milton Galamison on October 2. Milton Galamison's proposal is an attempt to change a severe social problem into a Harvard-linked R & D project. The Center is willing and able to play a part in this approach to improving education in Ocean Hill-Brownsville.

## APPENDIX E

CENTER FOR URBAN EDUCATION  
105 Madison Avenue  
New York City 10016

MEMORANDUM

Date: October 7, 1968

To: Robert A. Dentler

From: Mortimer Kreuter

Subject: Suggestion for Resolving Ocean Hill-U.F.T. Conflict

In response to your query for suggestions on how to move the subject-named controversy off its frightening course, please be advised of the following:

1. The U.F.T. should be offered an opportunity to allow the transfer of the 83 teachers in the controversy to a new experimental slum area school, either elementary or I.S. level in another part of Brooklyn or Manhattan, to be run as a demonstration school by the professional group.

2. The experimental school, or a teachers cooperative school, would enable the union to try out a number of proposals it has set forth as meeting its own ambitions: smaller class size; election of building principal; involvement of the teaching staff in administrative and curriculum decisions; increasing school-community interactions through the union chapter; effective handling of the disruptive child; experimentation with team teaching and the newly-emerging paraprofessionals position. The 83 teachers would participate in the setting up of such a school over the next several months and hopefully a new building without worn-out traditions or customs would be made available. For its part, Ocean Hill would allow the teachers to remain for the time it takes to open the new school.

3. The experimental school would be responsible to a board of directors to be selected or elected, from the community, business, arts, science, public representatives concerned with public education and willing to serve. It would be decentralized from the Board, have a budget, follow state mandates on accountability.

4. The advantages of this proposal are:

4.1 It would offer the union an honorable way out of the impasse. If, in fact, the 83 teachers are clearly capable -- and there is reason to believe that many are also passionately concerned with

## APPENDIX E (cont'd)

urban slum schooling, they would have the first opportunity of any public school teachers in the city to organize and run a school according to their skills, competencies, and ambitions, from the ground up.

4.2 It would offer the Ocean Hill board an opportunity to rid itself of teachers it does not want in its district.

4.3 It would offer the union an opportunity to show what it could do in open rivalry to improve children's education in a new and dramatic way.

4.4 It would throw out an alternative route for both sides to avoid warfare.

4.5 It would offer the union in the long run an opportunity to have a headstart in preparing itself in the forthcoming struggle for the public schools where surely the alternatives to public education (public vouchers for private schools, entrepreneurial schemes, and parochial education) are coming at the union full steam ahead.

5. The disadvantages of this proposal are:

5.1 The union would reject it as not addressing the due process issue.

5.2 The city would not support such a scheme.

5.3 The Ocean Hill people would reject it. (Although I fail to see why if the 83 teachers were transferred to another school even one they would run themselves the Ocean Hill people should be concerned).

Clearly, the proposal is not likely to be amenable to wide institutionalization nor does it solve the due process issue raised by the union. On the other hand, the 83 teachers have been reinstated to Ocean Hill. Should they now be offered an alternative means of practicing their craft honorably -- even excitingly -- in a publicly supported experimental teachers cooperative, I would hope that their union would see a way for them to leave a situation in which there can be no winners, the union teachers, least of all.

cc; E. T. Maleska

## APPENDIX F

October 10, 1968

## MEMORANDUM

To: Board of Trustees and Management Group

From: Robert A. Dentler

Subject: Alternative Program Plans

Assuming a continuing crisis within public education in New York City, it is necessary to establish Center program plans that depart from the BASIC PROGRAM PLAN document prepared this summer and distributed on September 15. In keeping with suggestions from Board members at the September 27 meeting, I have outlined below the changes that I believe should be taken promptly. Your prompt comments and suggestions are requested.

1. The plans of the curriculum development components may be continued much as projected, with occasional changes in school sites:

A. Instructional Profiles work is continuing satisfactorily and needs no modification as a result of the crisis, save in the fact that alternative schools outside of the city may have to be secured for cooperative field testing.

B. The Early Reading Experiment has lost some schools in the crisis already (e.g., PS 73 in Ocean Hill), but the Experiment is off and running in most schools and cannot be relocated because it is longitudinal in design and is entering its third year.

C. Tri-University Science is college based and is proceeding satisfactorily at present.

D. Urban Planning Social Studies will not enter its new field testing phase until the Winter term; hence much can be done in the meanwhile at headquarters with perfecting and enlarging the instructional materials. New sites may have to be identified, as in New Jersey, Connecticut, Westchester, and Long Island.

2. The plans of the Community Development Committee may require more basic revising:

A. Decentralization should be recast as work on Parent Participation and Local Control, which were the main elements projected in any case. Some of the functions scheduled presupposed a legislative

## APPENDIX F (cont'd)

basis for decentralization culminating in the Spring of 1969. Current evidence suggests that this basis will not develop, or that its form will be too tentative to enable change.

1. For these reasons, the Decentralization Group should greatly intensify its efforts to interpret, clarify, and plan the future nature of effective parental participation in and increased local control over public education. Survey analyses, cost and benefit analyses, system analyses, and interpretations of the educational aspects of changing trends in parental participation should become a special charge of this Group in conjunction with the Communications Committee. Conferences, TV presentations, and colloquia should supplement printed communication.

B. Desegregation efforts should focus upon the several school districts within the metropolitan region where basic changes are being introduced with regard to student transfer programs, redistricting, and curriculum extensions. This work should be conducted conjointly with the appropriate state and local public agencies.

3. Support Services:

A. Educational Research should continue to emphasize its efforts to field test the elements of the Curriculum Development Committee's products. This will entail corresponding shifts in school sites. The basic program of this Committee should not change except insofar as our Title I Evaluation Studies may be delayed or in some cases terminated as a result of recurrent strikes.

B. The teacher preparing activities of the Educational Personnel Committee need to change only in relation to changes in school sites as developed by the Curriculum Development Committee and the Site Coordinator.

C. Social Research should concentrate its energies upon studies of the New York City crisis itself. Its resources should be devoted to supporting the work of the Decentralization Group. Older agendas of work on the mass media may be completed within the time now available.

D. The Communications Committee should strengthen the quality of its publications, its library utilization program, and its program reference service. It should provide media through which the clarifying and planning functions of the Decentralization Group may be carried out.

## APPENDIX F (cont'd)

4. This alternative plan leaves open for future consideration these recommendations:

A. Provision of technical assistance to the New York State Education Department or similar agencies in coping with researchable and planning aspects of the crisis.

B. Use of released time in schedule to develop alternative sources of funding for programs to be conducted during 1970 and 1971, in the face of changing federal relations.

C. Increased emphasis upon staff and educational leadership training in the region, including training of nonprofessionals.

D. Intensified efforts to develop uses of the mass media, commercial and educational, as instructional vehicles to be used in lieu of public schooling in the city.

5. This alternative plan rejects the following suggested activities as inappropriate or beyond the resources and competencies of the Center:

A. Action as an intermediary in the disputes.

B. Development of alternative educational services for children in New York City, e.g., volunteer schools, nonpublic schools, laboratory schools.

C. Redeployment of all programs and resources to districts outside New York City.

D. Involvement of the Center in the teacher education programs of colleges and universities.

APPENDIX G  
ANALYSIS AND RESPONSE

Raymond A. Drescher

With the increasingly polarized positions taken by Ocean Hill-Brownsville and the professional groups, there seems little chance for a quick settlement of the dispute. The armed force of a federalized National Guard, which helped to establish a modus vivendi in the deep South during the school integration crisis, seems unacceptable as a solution to all parties concerned, and in this volatile situation might conceivably lead to bloodshed on a large scale. The increasing concern of organized labor might evince itself in something as drastic as a general strike, although how this would lead to a constructive solution, I cannot foresee.

The economic pressure on teachers whose incomes are cut off will shortly make itself felt. Many have found temporary positions but this does not solve their financial problems. I cannot help but feel that the almost solid ranks of the striking teachers will start crumbling in another week or so.

The fantasy of the Center's becoming the impartial arbitrator, leading the parties to an amicable solution is an attractive one but hardly feasible. In the highly charged atmosphere of the day, even if we offered our good offices, what solution could we possibly come up with?

Because of the strike, the Curriculum Committee must delay its implementation of the Instructional Profiles and other components in our major area of concern, New York City. However, we plan to use other areas as "dry runs" on the implementation of various components, as follows:

- (1) Working with Bridgeport in liaison with Mr. Eidlen. We will implement our Instructional Profiles, Social Studies 4-5, and probably the Wann-Robison materials there.
- (2) Sending 50-75 copies of the Instructional Profiles to the mid-western Laboratory, for immediate implementation there.
- (3) Offering the Wann-Robison materials to Wyandanch, Long Island for introduction and implementation.
- (4) Planning jointly with the Teacher Personnel and Field Services Committee for introduction and evaluation in areas mentioned in (1), (2) and (3).

## APPENDIX G (cont'd)

- (5) Preparing a viable master plan, again with the Teacher Personnel and Field Services Committees, for implementation and evaluation of the Instructional Profiles project in New York City, as the present crisis is resolved.

APPENDIX G-1  
J. Elsbery

The present immediate school crisis has no immediate long range solution. Lines of demarcation have so clearly been drawn and are continuing to be drawn by interested power groups that even once existing immediate interim steps are no longer feasible.

The issues are more than decentralization and they are all invested and permeated with power (man's present or likely future means to any existing or future goods) at their roots. Some of the groups include: UFT with the AFT and other general unions behind them -- specifically in the city, however, there are those unions which are up for contract time. The NEA is also a disturbing shadow presence for the UFT. There is political involvement in that local control in one sector (Ocean Hill -- black sector) of the political structure may now mean that local control in other sectors will be asked for. This local control presently is being asked for by one minority at the exclusion of the others as some see it. The upcoming election raises a host of issues related to political power and who will be in vs. out.

Over and above this over simplistic response which is more or less than adequate, descriptive outline of power problems, there is the issue of decentralization itself and the state legislature. In light of the above, where should we go: where should we place our emphasis? I suggest the following possibilities; that we open a school on non-public property and continue aspects of our work with better controls and evaluations than ever before; because of our control over all phases of the work, the Community Development Committee continue its work and

## APPENDIX G-1 (cont'd)

analyzing existing happenings; the Curriculum Development Committee test its material (the Profile) on teachers in public and nonpublic schools -- develop a program to train teachers to employ materials as intended -- being on strike doesn't prevent teachers from being employed in this phase of the work. Attitudinal studies related to this issue should be done in specified areas based upon ethnicity, involvement, effect of this crisis on them, etc. We should learn something tangible from this situation and be able to employ it in our development work in the Community Development Committee for the future. Such questions as where is the formal and informal power structures in the white and black communities should be answered? Where is the liaison between the black political structure and the formal white political structure and how effective is it in understanding the black community and its movement?

We should also be dealing with the problems to be encountered in decentralization and alternative to both the problems and decentralization itself if such exist.

These are but a few ideas that cover both the curriculum and community committees including the service components.

## APPENDIX G-2

To: Management Group & R. A. Dentler  
From: Stan Soles  
Re: Response to "School Crisis in New York City"

The current school crisis is a reflection and result of a number of seemingly separate matters, and the suggestions to offer Center's response is related to the way the problem is defined.

Narrowly -- The current strike and the Center's response.

1. The Center is not a party of the dispute, but an interested outsider. As such there are both advantages and disadvantages. Any analysis of the "nature of the Problem" however valuable is subject to the difficulties of being heard by the conflicting interest groups currently in the dispute. As outsiders we have the potentiality of providing some consultation regarding sub-issues, but the acceptance of these proposed compromises depends upon some preception of the Center as credible, and trustworthy. Stress and polarization have increased to such an extent that I believe that actors within the drama of the strike are becoming more distrustful. The Center's neutral role in the past may be associated with being an enemy. Therefore, I am reluctant to assume that we could serve in an over-all mediating role. We could propose various alternatives, specifics, but not take credit for these efforts in any public way. Participants in the strike mediation must themselves work with the existing units.

2. Possible sources to be used. Commissioner Allen, some coalition of UFT, OB, NYC and USOE -- new mediation committee.

3. The Center is not a mediation service, but staff as individuals have a number of ideas on specifics. Max Wolff proposed some considerations be given to the early retirement of staff to make place for minority group persons. Others have proposed specifics to deal with a 30 day moratorium during which time the issues be pursued by the independent committee and schools be reopened. My point is that during the past few weeks, Center staff have acted individually, but no systematic sharing of suggestions and of effective way of reaching decision makers has been made known.

4. The issues of the strike seem to me to be linked with the effort on the part of the Union to maintain city wide negotiation and the cry of "due process" and job security is only one part of the collective bargaining emphasis. The union has neglected to deal with "professionalism" and with possible alliance with parents and reform

## APPENDIX G-2 (cont'd)

of the present failing system of education. The Center could make a contribution by dealing with the issues involved with each interest group, but the danger here will be in raising new concerns rather than reducing the number of issues to be settled.

5. The current proposal to turn OB over to the state, is one filled with difficulties, as Mr. Eidlen has pointed out.

6. The proposal to return to the situation of the past and halt all changes for a period of time is a "cooling off period."

7. The use of police to enforce Board of Education decisions may produce violence.

## APPENDIX G-3

## D. Outerbridge

The current strike, I believe, is not based on educational issues, nor even on improving the teacher's position in the classroom (of last year's fight on More Effective Schools). I believe that what both Shanker and Ocean Hill-Brownsville are attempting to do is to establish policy on the basis of precedent, that is to say the conflict is not attempting to force absolute legal decisions. If that hunch is correct then the demonstration, i.e. this strike, becomes crucial; for it can shape future practice without having to resolve legal, administrative, semantic, and political differences. Settlement in these terms does not, of course, preclude new encounters in the future on such differences.

I believe that the factors of the dispute are largely irrelevant to the Center's response as I do not believe the Center can help settle the dispute. The question is what should we be doing? If the Basic Program Plans are valid, it seems to me that the answer is that for the short term we merely sit out the closed-school duration. Long term action should involve efforts to insure that the Plans remain realistic and implementable when the real crisis arrives: city-wide decentralization without installed (much less, developed) better educational practice.

If the current dispute invalidates the Basic Program Plans, then the Center must reconceive its program and objectives to insure relevance.

## APPENDIX G-4

## AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT DISPUTE - Monroe Eidlen

The lack of leadership of the Central Board of Education over the past many years has created power vacuums in the community as well as among the professional staff.

The struggle currently being waged is merely the prelude to the battle that will take place over the Central Board's plan for Decentralization in December. Each side is seeking the advantages of higher ground now, for the larger struggle later.

The lowest aspects of the relevant questions have risen to the surface and other vital questions have been totally submerged in this crisis. For example, the governing board if free of the cumbersome by-laws of New York City would presently be powerless to displace ten teachers let alone one hundred. The state education law would prevent their removal from the district. However, the basic questions about tenure laws in New York State remain unresolved.

I would suggest that the Center support the proposition that the Union, the Community and the parents unite to provide education of the children. Some strategies for this may be:

1. To use teachers and volunteers to staff the schools in the same terms that hospital staff man their facilities in providing services during the hospital strike.
2. If it is not feasible to use the schools then the use of other community facilities should be considered. It may be possible to provide services for children along the lines of Superintendent Donovan's proposal for the opening of schools this year (the use of greatly reduced staff and the children exploring "New York as the classroom.")

Perhaps the willingness of the teachers to work with community groups and parents to organize classes will do much to reduce the polarization of racial and group feelings.

The Center should serve the public's attention to the primary issues involved in providing for greater community participation in education.

What are the feasible alternatives in obtaining greater community participation control? What are the inherent responsibilities and restrictions mandated by the existing education and other laws?

## APPENDIX G-4 (cont'd)

The model of the present suburban school districts is too faulty to merit discussion. The organization and structure of power needed to deal with the crisis has not yet been presented. No existing model will suffice. I feel the Center could make a contribution toward a construction of such a model.

I also feel the Center could serve on a consultant basis in setting up training programs for developing community leadership for participation in the new education model.

## APPENDIX G-5

G. Lang

About the only thing I can be sure of is that the strike is going to end sometime. I'm just surprised that there hasn't been more of a vocal stir among parents -- white and black -- throughout the city, that they haven't risen up and seized the schools. The big question for the Center: what will be the lasting effects of the strike and what can we do about it?

1. I think that white teachers and, especially, white administrators are finished in some -- but not all -- of the black communities. Moreover, I think the Center -- being identified as white and close to the school system -- is not going to be able to get far in working with teachers and administrators -- let alone the Governing Boards in the three decentralized areas. Besides so many other people are trying to work there.

2. I think, as I said last time, that we should turn our efforts, first, to other districts in New York which will be given opportunities for local control. Whenever this is mentioned -- Queens, Brooklyn, etc. -- people immediately think you're talking about "middle-class" people and all-white areas. There are very few such areas left in New York (save for interstices like Glendale, etc.). These areas have all the problems that we have been concerned about for a long time -- parent control, integration, low achievement, inexperienced teachers, etc. And, moreover, it's in these areas that the future of New York is going to be determined. Are these people going to move out? Will New York schools become as segregated black as in Washington, D.C.?

Can you make the school system work?

## APPENDIX G-5 (cont'd)

3. I think also we should turn our attention to the suburbs where the pattern of New York is being repeated -- I don't mean Glen Cove or Scarsdale -- I do mean Wyandanch, Hempstead and areas where many refugees from the present strike -- both teachers and students are going to be running.

4. I would like to see us stop working as much as we have through the school systems and work more through the parents themselves.

## APPENDIX G-6

Management Group Meeting  
September 25, 1968

SCHOOL CRISIS IN N.Y.C.  
L. S. Goldstein

As with all social phenomena, antecedent events must be identified as leading to the present crisis. I certainly can't label them all because they cover a span of three hundred years.

In more recent times, inequities existing in our educational system have been identified and publicized, leading to a growing community awareness in some parts of the city that their kids aren't getting a fair shake. The feeling has grown that if the city ("The Board") can't do the job -- give us (the community) a chance to do for ourselves ("decentralization").

On the other side, you have the U.F.T. with its own bag of problems -- a paramount concern being job security in all its ramifications. Last year's teachers' strike was more than a subtle indication that the U.F.T. was prepared to fight for its "rights" no matter what the consequences.

The present conflict, as I see it, is in the main one of a "power struggle" between a community testing how far it can go along the lines of local autonomy and the union determined to protect its "rights" at all costs. Caught in the middle are the kids who are being denied education -- even poor education. The Board and the Mayor to date have been ineffectual. Probably no headway will be made until the community accedes to the union's demands regarding "protection" of the reinstated teachers.

## APPENDIX G-6 (cont'd)

C.U.E. in a sense is an innocent bystander being inhibited somewhat in its operation because the N.Y.C. schools serve as laboratories for some Center activities. Some things we might consider:

1. Using our "good offices" as intermediaries in trying to bring a halt to the strike.
2. Organize a "think tank" to suggest means of preventing such crises in the future.
3. For the present, those activities which need classroom subjects might attempt to "recruit" kids into a program, i.e., set up a temporary school of our own.

## APPENDIX G-7

CENTER FOR URBAN EDUCATION  
105 Madison Avenue  
New York City 10016

MEMORANDUM

Date: September 25, 1968

To: Management Group  
From: M. Kreuter  
Subject: Analysis of the Teachers Strike

My impressions, necessarily limited, on the teachers strike are as follows:

1. The strike is a rear-guard action taken by the teachers union in the face of an historical imperative -- the politicalization of the urban Negro people. Probably politicalization has been on-going in New York since the thirties and forties when the young Negro militants of that period (Powell, Jack, others) saw the Negro people's future lying in the legislative or judicial arena. Today's group see the action in terms of social institutions.

2. Therefore, if I am correct about item 1 above, the teachers union is foredoomed to failure: it cannot avoid the on-rush of participatory democracy as now being re-written in Ocean Hill and central Harlem. In plain fact, the middle-class mores of academic freedom, teacher tenure, and what is called due process for the public servant, hard-won though they may have been, mean literally nothing to the central city Negroes. Since none of those employment perquisites have ever been in any substantial degree gained by Negroes of the laboring -- or underclasses in the core cities, they couldn't care less if teachers

## APPENDIX G-7 (cont'd)

are transferred or barred or dismissed peremptorily or otherwise. What is wanted is adequate -- strangely enough not great or creative or radicalized - education for black children. Black teachers in the union, although their professional interests lie with their white colleagues, will have to align themselves with the community groups.

3. All this is, of course, speculation. For the immediate period, Lindsay has two courses: break the teachers union or break the community group. I believe he will be forced to back the union because Van Arsdale is nipping at his heels. Thus, the Mayor will have to buy off or beat Ocean Hill into submission. Exactly how this will happen is anybody's conjecture; the decision I suspect, will rest on who's got the power. Right now the combined union and Board of Education and legally constituted forces have it. Ultimately, the community groups have it.

Suggestions for the Center in this Period

a. The Center must continue to serve any group which fosters the Center's aims. Hence, we can have it all ways -- Ocean Hill, the union, the city, the public, the universities. Each group needs something from us. Accordingly, the Center should proceed as usual, no sides to be taken except that which serves the urban education theme of the organization. The Center should be willing to provide for all sides immediate research aid, memoranda, data, evidence useful in coming to grips with the issues. To a certain degree, we affected the outcomes of the 1967 strike (MES). We can make an impact on the current issue by offering our enormous resources and trained personnel.

## APPENDIX G-7 (cont'd)

b. The Center is equipped to monitor and record the various actions. It can serve a great purpose if it subjects the happenings to the techniques of analysis and implication. Thus, a later generation would benefit by the on-site, on the spot social scientific, not journalistic, record of these days.

c. After the strike ends, the Center can help the region by disseminating its findings to key decision-makers, superintendents, commissioners, union heads, community group governing boards by offering a continuing series of colloquia, seminars, orientations.

I am sure that our discussion today will yield additional leads for the Center's action.

## APPENDIX G-8

September 25, 1968

N. Mann

It is my opinion that the issues in the current school crisis go deeper than the Ocean Hill dispute. Obviously, both sides are holding fast to their current positions in order to establish patterns of precedents for use when full decentralization is implemented. I, therefore anticipate a long strike.

From the administrative side, I am loath to suggest what form the Center's response should take. I wish to point out however, that funds allocated for the various programs in the schools are not being spent and are accruing as uncommitted. I would recommend that alternative uses for these funds be developed so that they will be expended between now and November 30, rather than turning them back to the U.S.O.E.

## APPENDIX H

EXCERPT FROM MINUTES OF  
MANAGEMENT GROUP MEETING

October 18, 1968

"Again it was observed that the Center is working in a city where there is no public education, and it is necessary for the Center to respond to that crisis. Again the alternatives were raised: whether in a temporary situation in the schools the Center should seek means of adaptation of its present programs or whether the Center should develop programs to be implemented when the schools open in answer to the instructional and administrative needs resulting from the strike.

The Assistant Directors of the Curriculum Development, Social Research, Educational Research and Educational Personnel Committees agreed that their staffs could be assigned to a new task as formulated for the Center. It was observed that interim activities might have to use funds more quickly than normal operations require."

APPENDIX I  
CRISIS RESPONSE GROUP

Dentler

Inger

Maleska

Lewis

Soles

Moragne

Kreuter

Taylor

Lang

Tobier

Goldstein

Fox

Drescher

Silberling

Barnett

Thomas

Scott

McClane

Wood

Wisniewski

## APPENDIX J

REPORT OF COMMITTEE CONSIDERING A SUBSTANTIAL EFFORT TO COOPERATE WITH  
THE TEACHERS AND PARENTS TO SERVE DURING THE CURRENT SCHOOL CRISIS

Members of the committee: Maleska, Kreuter, Drescher, Taylor, Silberling,  
Thomas

October 23, 1968

The question of attitude was discussed again in the committee meeting and it was agreed that an unemotional approach was best to use in servicing the district or neighborhood schools.

Recommendations dealt with where CUE should function, with whom, and how assistances might be given.

The chief thrust would be the experimental districts with second consideration given to the functioning schools in Friedman, Tauchner, Jacobson, Shapiro, and Gaines district.

Temporary neighborhood schools would also be contacted for possible means of assistances. Efforts would be made to limit the number involved to one school in each of the districts. (Total = 6 to 9).

Since immediate action may be necessary, a survey of the needs would be conducted by members of the committee. Visits would be made to the facilities and the final site selections would be based on the most urgent needs.

People to be serviced by the special program include the following:

Teachers assigned to the ungraded classes in the elementary schools.

High school teachers assigned to the elementary school.

Teachers with meager knowledge of grouping procedures.

Teachers with little training in the teaching of the basic skills.

Paraprofessionals serving as teachers or tutors of small groups.

Students serving as tutors or peer group leaders.

## APPENDIX J (cont'd)

The following suggestions were made concerning how the groups might best be serviced:

1. Providing structured instructional material for use by teachers, parent-teachers, or paraprofessionals. Suggested materials were the Profiles for the first three grades, the Intensive and Basic Reading Programs and the Board of Education Math Cycles.
2. Providing pupil materials such as basic texts, workbooks, library books, or programmed instructional books.
3. Providing teaching machines and appropriate "soft wear." Companies suggested: Grolier, General Learning, Bell and Howell.
4. Conducting training sessions for teachers, parent-teachers, and paraprofessionals. Training sessions may be conducted district-wide or in centrally located facilities. Sessions would include discussion of flexible grouping techniques, individualized instruction, and methodology. The estimated cost of each training session would be \$7,000 and the suggested pay scale for attendance would be \$15.00 for teachers and \$10.00 a session for the preprofessionals. Instructors would be paid \$50.00 per session.
5. Cooperating with schools in the planning of field trips by providing funds for transportation and necessary entrance fees. Training sessions would highlight the necessary pre- and post- activities.
6. Assisting communities in conducting a survey of the parent and neighborhood talents which might be used in the temporary schools. Community action and Neighborhood Corps groups could be used in gathering data for these surveys.

A second meeting of the committee will be called after the Trustee meeting.

## APPENDIX K

EXCERPT FROM MINUTES OF  
CUE BOARD OF TRUSTEES MEETING

October 25, 1968

Interim Response to School Crisis

Dr. Dentler presented to the Board a proposal from the staff to the Trustees concerning the appropriate role the Center might play in the public school crisis in the City.

The proposal is to join with school officers, parents, teachers, and volunteer teachers in several schools in the public school system who are presently making an effort to carry on irrespective of the political postures of the various parties. The Center would offer materials, consultative assistance, training assistance, and direct participation in the day-to-day activities. The Center wishes also to make a contribution to teaching -- a contribution to the advance planning effort to cope with problems caused by the teachers' strike.

Dr. Gordon said that this proposal is likely to greatly aggravate the situation and would suggest an alternative that would be nonpolitical. There are almost as many children in makeshift freedom schools that are run by the union, labor, and clergy as there presently are in the public school system. Dr. Gordon would not want to support any move that would aggravate the tension and reflect adversely on the Center.

Dr. Maleska clarified that the three types of schools the Center is thinking of helping are: experimental district, regular district, and the freedom school.

Dr. Rosner suggested that the Center make an effort to persuade a commercial television network in the New York City area to donate about two hours a day for educational purposes as a public service.

Dr. Dentler replied that the major networks had all been approached for this purpose and that the replies have been negative as they are all under contract for available time and were unwilling to assume the loss of revenue which would result from failing to honor their contracts.

Dr. Stewart suggested that The New York Urban Coalition be asked to support the Center's request to the U.S. Office of Education for funds to buy television time if necessary.

Dr. Rivlin suggested that the Center concentrate on a study of the losses being sustained as a result of the strike and develop recommendations for therapeutic and remedial action to be taken after the strike. Research should be done to see what is happening to the children; where they are losing, and where they may be gaining, and what is happening in the various communities.

Dr. Rosner expressed interest in knowing whether or not it is possible for the Center to publish in the daily newspaper a page or two of exercises for parents that they might use for the children.

Mr. Deighton stated that as soon as the Center shows up in any one of the three kinds of schools, it will be a target for criticism that it is favoring one side or one group against another. Dr. Gordon concurred; he also said he agreed with the Center that a demonstration project could be very important but recommended that the Center not carry it out in the context of the school system itself.

Dr. Dentler said that while he understood the political problems involved in much of what is being proposed he, nevertheless, felt that the Center's work should not be totally constricted because of these problems.

Dr. Rosner contended that this struggle has become a contest that extends far beyond education; that it is in part a contest for power between different groups. Education is only the first battleground in which the conflict is being acted out. The ground rules for the present battlefield are the same as those that obtain in any labor-management dispute. He saw a need to establish new ground rules more appropriate to this kind of contest. One of the functions he thought the Center might adopt is to engage political scientists, economists, and sociologists to wrestle with the problem of defining the different rules for labor-management disputes that affect the public. Dr. Dentler replied that work in this area has commenced and will continue.

Dr. Dentler said that he interpreted the discussion to indicate that the Trustees would encourage the Center to take an active part in educational and related problems caused by the strike but that its activities should be carried on sites not associated with the public school system; that it should not intervene in the present school dispute; and that special efforts should be made to provide mass information of what is learned during this period.

Dr. Fischer summarized that the Board appeared to agree that the Center should

1. do something to help in the present school crisis;

2. search for ways to ameliorate the consequences;
3. improve teacher training in the shortest possible time; and
4. study the problems of community forces and dynamics to see what the broad implications are for education.

Motion by Dr. Rivlin:

In light of the present emergency conditions in the New York City schools, we recommend that the staff seek to ameliorate the negative effects on our children by working with parents and community groups outside a formal school setting, and we further recommend that the staff study how these negative results can be corrected after school resumes.

Seconded by Dr. Stewart and unanimously carried.

## APPENDIX L

CENTER FOR URBAN EDUCATION  
105 Madison Avenue  
New York City 10016

MEMORANDUM

Date: November 14, 1968

To: Dr. Dentler, Mr. Perkins  
From: E. T. Maleska  
Subject: Crisis Response of the Center

I want to summarize for your information the actions that have been taken under my direction to implement the mandate for action given at the last meeting of the Trustees of the Center. Six special programs have been planned and are in varying states of implementation in response to the present educational crisis. They are as follows.

1. Parent Training Program in Community Where Local Schools are Closed

This program is under the direction of Mr. Drescher and Dr. Soles. The site is in the Castle Hill area of the Bronx. Small groups of parents are being trained in how to provide some educational help for their children while the strike continues. The program would not terminate concurrently with the termination of the strike, but would continue for a brief period of time. The cost of this program is:

Materials of instruction	\$1,000
Weekly salary for parents and trainers, \$600 per week for six weeks	3,600

2. Provision of Enrichment Program Through the Arts for Selected Schools in District 16, Brooklyn (Mr. Tauchner)

This program is under the direction of Mr. Scott and supervised by Mr. Drescher. Groups of artists will provide enrichment programs in the public schools which are open during the school day. The cost of this is:

Salaries and materials	\$20,000
------------------------	----------

3. Survey of Parent Attitudes in District 5, Manhattan - Dr. Jacobson

All of the schools in this district are open, but large numbers of children are not attending school. The purpose of the parent survey would be to determine why children are not in school and to obtain reactions from parents to the strike. This program is under the direction of Drs. Lang and Goldstein. The interviewing, with an instrument designed by the Center, will be conducted by NORC. The cost for the program is as follows:

NORC Interview Cost	\$15,000
Analysis of Data	5,000

4. T. V. Presentations

This program is under the direction of Dr. Kreuter and Mr. Drescher. The purpose of this program is to prepare four half hour T.V. Programs directed to children who are not attending schools. The programs would provide suggestions for educational activities which can be done both in and outside the home. The first program would be aimed at adults to prepare them for the subsequent programs and explain the intent and the simple materials which would be needed. The other programs would be prepared for three different elementary school age levels - 5-7, 8-9, 10-12. The programs have been prepared and we are presently endeavoring to obtain time on a commercial television station. This is proving difficult. The cost of the program will depend on whether or not we have to prepare tapes and whether we have to purchase television time or receive it as a public service. The estimated cost at a minimal basis is:

Personnel and materials	\$5,000
-------------------------	---------

5. Analysis of Actions Taken During the Strike

I have asked three assistant superintendents to write a summary of the actions they have taken during the strike and why they have taken these actions in response to the crisis. Two of the superintendents have opened their schools and kept them open. One superintendent has all schools in his district but one closed. I would also hope that Mr. McCoy and Mr. Oliver would write similar statements for us. This would provide material for in-house discussion by Center staff and would not necessarily form the basis for a publication. Anticipated cost:

Consultant fees to writers	\$7,000
----------------------------	---------

6. Post Strike Problems

Dr. Soles is trying to arrange a series of meetings with striking and non-striking teachers to discuss problems which will arise when the strike is settled. This may involve week-end retreats with some groups. The expenses would be those incurred in arranging meetings of these groups of teachers and supervisors. Anticipated cost:

Meeting expenses	\$3,000
------------------	---------

Mr. Lisser is coordinating the programs and a more detailed report on progress will be prepared by November 15, 1968.

Budget Summary

Program 1 - Parent Training	\$ 4,600
Program 2 - Enrichment Program	20,000
Program 3 - Parent Survey	20,000
Program 4 - T.V. Programs	5,000
Program 5 - Analysis of Actions	7,000
Program 6 - Post Strike Problems	3,000
	<hr/>
Total	\$59,600

This is the present total requested and we may not expend the full sum in all listed programs. Program 2 may entail a greater expense depending on the length of time for which the program is conducted. The above funding should carry the programs through December 31.

cc: Mr. Drescher  
 Dr. Soles  
 Mr. Scott  
 Dr. Lang  
 Dr. Goldstein  
 Mr. Mann

## APPENDIX M

## ACTUAL EXPENDITURES FOR CRISIS RESPONSE PROJECTS

Controller Norman Mann

Creative Energy Workshops . . . . .	\$26,500
Television Instruction. . . . .	500
Parent-Instructors. . . . .	2,300
Workshops on Post-Strike Problems . . . . .	---
Reports from the Field. . . . .	2,600
Survey of Community Attitudes . . . . .	13,500
	<hr/>
Total. . . . .	\$45,400

APPENDIX N

C R E A T I V E E N E R G Y: A Crisis Response by the  
Center for Urban Education

INFORMATION FROM PARTICIPANTS

Miss  
Mrs.  
Mr.

\_\_\_\_\_

First

Initial

Last

Address

City

Zip Code

Phone Number

Alternate

Media, Discipline or Name of Workshop you offer

Professional Associates -- Required \_\_\_\_\_ (number)  
Desirable \_\_\_\_\_ (number)

Assistants (student, parent) Required \_\_\_\_\_ (number)  
Desirable \_\_\_\_\_ (number)

Estimate per student of tools and materials (type and quantity)  
you will require for each Workshop session.

	<u>Type of Space</u>	<u>Numbers and Ages of students</u>	
Minimum	_____	_____	_____
Desirable	_____	_____	_____
Maximum	_____	_____	_____

	<u>Mon.</u>	<u>Tues.</u>	<u>Wed.</u>	<u>Thur.</u>	<u>Fri.</u>	
(Not Available X)	AM	AM	AM	AM	AM	(approx. 9 to 12)
Time - (Preferred 0)	PM	PM	PM	PM	PM	(approx. 12 to 3)

CREATIVE ENERGY ART WORKSHOPS  
Assignment Distribution  
November

APPENDIX 0

		8	11	12	13	14	15	18	19	20	21	22
THEATRE	MARTIN BARD				XX							
	VINIE BURROWS											
	WILLIAM DUKE											
	STEPHEN WANGH Free Thea				XX							
	JOSEPH MYDELL											
	AMY OLATUNJI				X	XX	XX					
	MICHAEL OLATUNJI				OX							
	LAROQUE BEY								X*			
	PETER SCHUMAN											
	NANNA BARROW								XO			
BETTY LOMAX												
WRITING	LENNOX RAPHAEL				OX	OX	OX	OX				
	ERIC CHEYFITZ				XX	XX	XX	XO				
	ART BERGER						XX	XX				
	CLARENCE MAJOR											
	GARRETT ROBINSON											
DANCE	HERNS DUPLAN				XX	XX	XX	XX				
	MARIA CARMEN ESTRADA											
	HELEN WESER				OX							
	ELEO POMARE											
	ZOBEIDA PASCUAL											
MUSIC	JACK MCLEAN				XX		XX					XX
	SCOTT HOLT				XX		XX					XX
	DUKE JORDAN				XX		XX					XX
	RENE MCLEAN											
	CARMEN MOORE											
VISUAL ART	GEORGE SMITH Tejumola						XO					
	CARL TITOLO						XO					
	CHRISTINA CASTRO				XX	XX	XX	XX				
	VIRGINIA COX				XX		XX					
	MARLENE FRIEDMAN				XX	XX	XX	XX				
	CHARLES RHINELANDER						OX	OX	XX			
	DAVID RIGSBY				XX	XX	XX	OX				
	HANS DORFLINGER											
	STUART KLEIN											
	MONICA BIESNER											
FILM	CHARLES HOSSON							XO				
	ERNEST DUNKLEY							XO*				
	COMEDIATION ASSOC'S	XX	XX									

## APPENDIX P

November 8, 1968

C R E A V I T Y E N E R G Y: A Crisis Response by the  
Center for Urban Education

.....

Nine Cooperating Schools:

P.S. 26                   452-6118  
1010 Lafayette Ave.  
B'klyn, N.Y. 11221  
Miss Gloria Saunders, Prin.

J.H.S. 35               772-4545  
272 McDonough St.  
B'klyn, N.Y. 11233  
Mr. Adolph Dembo, Prin.

P.S. 309               452-5005  
794 Monroe St.  
B'klyn, N.Y. 11221  
Mr. Leonard Clark

P.S. 262               493-8822  
500 Macon St.  
B'klyn, N.Y. 11233  
Mrs. Dorothy Gardner

P.S. 243               772-3050  
1580 Dean St.  
B'klyn, N.Y. 11213  
Mrs. Margaret Buffington

P.S. 21               773-3900  
180 Chauncey St.  
B'klyn, N.Y. 11233  
Mrs. Alice Uzoaga, Prin.

P.S. 5               491-5555  
820 Hancock St.  
B'klyn, N.Y. 11233  
Mr. Max Wilson, Prin.

P.S. 304               491-1300  
280 Hart St.  
B'klyn, N.Y. 11206  
Mr. Aubrey Nicholson

P.S. 129               452-7752  
640 Quincy St.  
B'klyn, N.Y. 11221  
Mrs. Cleo Ricci

.....

Liaison:

Thomas J. Scott, Proj. Dir.  
889-7277, WA 5-2994

Miss Nadine Bilski, Consultant  
Cybern Education, Inc. PL 8-5544

Office of Mr. Abraham Tauchner  
Asst. Supt. District 16, B'klyn  
Mrs. Joyce Coppin   452-1095  
Miss Loretta Boyce   452-2632  
                          452-3774  
(P.S. 26 Annex)   452-2580

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1968

## Pupils Exhibit Poignant Art on Teachers' Strike

By RICHARD F. SHEPARD

A child's-eye-view of the recent teachers' strike occupying the spacious lobby of the New York Shakespeare Festival's Public Theater at 425 Lafayette Street.

Dozens of items, created by children who went to schools in Ocean Hill-Brownsville and other areas where schools were open during the long strike, include drawings, junk sculpture, compositions and poetry, videotapes of classroom sessions and drawings. Upstaging the smaller objects is a 12-foot high, 20-foot long vinyl balloon covered with a vivid variety of paintings.

The exhibit opened formally yesterday, but it has been set up in the lobby for a few days. Joseph Papp, director of the festival, said, "We can't get people into the theater on time because they want to see the exhibit."

The written material, especially, indicates a bewildering kaleidoscope of attitudes held by the youngsters who attended classes in the struck schools.

One elementary schoolboy wrote a brief essay:

"Oh Mr. Berger I hope you come back soon. I like all of your fancy tone I hope that you enjoyed use and I hope we don't give you all that fee from Anthony Brown."

A reproduction of chalked commentary on a blackboard bespoke different viewpoints from many children:

"I think they should come back so we can learn—Ricky"

"I don't need you. Don't even come back till next year! I don't miss you."


"I think the teachers should come back and teach a little math. I love math. No homework. They shouldn't take an advantage of children because they got no children."

"We need a new mayor. Teachers don't care. We have to have a good education."

"The white teachers are scare. They care if we get an education. We love our own kinds. They don't want us, black children, to get an education."

A large mural represented the faces of black people and people. Alongside one of the faces, a painted caption said: "A noble African leader."

Children in one class



The New York Times

A mural of faces of black and brown people, one with comment: "A noble African leader"

pieced together a giant "Erector Set" sculpture, using shelf girders, bolts, an old tire, a discarded window curtain and a dilapidated small chair.

The project was started when the strike began by the Center for Urban Education, an organization devoted to improving educational practices in metropolitan area schools and financed largely by the United States Office of Education.

The center organized a creative-energy project, to work in the schools during and after the strike. Under the direction of Thomas Scott, a senior staff member of the center, it hired 40 artists and

sent them into the schools with materials and ideas.

"This is not protest art," said Mr. Scott. "It is an exhibition of creativity by children from 8 to 14 years old, who interpret ideas in terms of their own mystique. We felt that something good should come out of this crisis, and esthetic education has long been neglected in the curriculum."

From 600 to 800 youngsters participated in the project, which also took in theater games and vocal presentations. A videotape machine was operated by children in classrooms and the results, taken both by professionals and youngsters, are also being televised in the lobby.

Much of the material relates to general topics other than the strike, such as cultural, ethnic and human themes.

For instance, a ninth-grader at P.S. 129, Alvin Davis, wrote: "I dig me. Dig I me. Me I Dig. I me dig. Dig Me I. Me dig I." "I feel good, Good feel I. Feel I good. I good feel. Good I Feel."

## APPENDIX R

## YOU, YOUR CHILD AND SCIENCE

Time	Content	Video
V.O	<p>Wheels turn, magnets push and pull, bulbs light, plants grow, men orbit in space and children everywhere want to know why.</p>	<p>Toy cars, magnets lighted bulb growing plant Apollo 7 model</p>
	<p>Have you ever stopped to think of the questions children ask? They may start with how, what, or why -- but they're most usually related to themselves or to their immediate environment. How can we capture and nourish this curiosity and help children understand the wonders around them?</p>	
	<p>The first thing we can do is provide the materials which will help them find the answers. This may be special equipment like the kind I have here (Name each)</p>	<p>magnifying glass compass simple motor, magnets</p>
	<p>Or they can be whatever materials happen to be around the house like those I have here. (Name each)</p>	<p>Paper cups, rubber bands, pins, scissors, pencils, sugar, plastic tray cup of water 6 balls of soft clay</p>
	<p>Or they may be supplies that you can buy in a hardware store, like those here. (Name each)</p>	<p>dry cell (1=1/22) flashlight cell, bell wire, knife switch, bulb, socket (1=1/22 ea); bell magnet</p>
	<p>Or they may be things which children can find outdoors like some of the things I have here. (Name each)</p>	<p>Assorted rocks Assorted leaves variety of seeds.</p>
	<p>Now how can we use these materials to (Accidently drop clay) Pick up clay - start to Put it down - look up</p>	

Time	Content	Video
	<p>You know, this kind of accident -- dropping things -- happens day in and day out to children everywhere. Why not take advantage of such a situation and help children to find out what happens to thing after its falls.</p>	
	<p>Let's take this ball of clay and shape it into a ball.</p>	Close-up of clay
	<p>It feels smooth and soft (smell clay). It even has a smell -- almost like soil.</p>	
	<p>(Roll ball of clay on table). It also rolls like a ball.</p>	close-up of rolling
	<p>What do you think will happen to it after it falls?</p>	
	<p>It might make a sound when it hits the floor; it might roll; it might get out of shape.</p>	
	<p>Let's drop it and find out.</p>	
	<p>(Start to drop clay -- and stop).</p>	
	<p>Wait a minute! If I drop this, what can we compare it with to find out if anything happened? Well, we can take one of the clay balls here on the table and roll it into the same shape. In that way one will serve as a control, and the other will be used in the experiment.</p>	
	<p>(Start to drop clay). How high shall I hold my arm? Shall I try waist high?</p>	
	<p>(Drop clay ball) Did you hear anything? It sounded like "Plop."</p>	Close-up of clean ball falling and hitting floor
	<p>(Pick up clay). Did anything happen to it?</p>	Close-up of flattened clay
	<p>It looks like one side got flattened. Let's compare it with the one that wasn't dropped.</p>	Close-up of two balls of clay

Time	Content	Video
	(Touch round surface-Comment) (Touch flat surface-Comment) (Roll both balls of clay)	
	Which one rolls best? Yes -- the one that was not dropped.	
	(Pick up ball of clay with flat bottom).	
	I wonder what would happen if I dropped it from a higher position -- say shoulder high.	
	What do you think?	
	Will it come out as flat as it is now -- or will it be flatter? Let's try it and see. First, let's put one round ball of clay here. This is how it looks before it's dropped.	Close-up.
	Let's put this ball of clay with the flat bottom over here. This is how it looks when it's dropped from waist high.	
	Now let's drop this third ball of clay from shoulder high. (Drop clay)	Close-up of clay ball falling and hitting floor.
	(Pick up ball of clay) Examine.	Close-up of clay
	Is this any different from the other ball of clay with the flat bottom? Let's see.	
	(Pick up both balls of clay - Examine carefully)	Close-up
	Which ball of clay is flattened more? That's right -- the one dropped from shoulder high. What can we say then? When a soft ball of clay falls from a higher place, it flattens more.	
	In addition to learning what happens when a soft ball of clay hits a hard surface, you've seen how a catastrophe can become a meaningful experiment. And in the course of this experiment you've seen the necessity for having a control, the senses (smelling, touching, observing, hearing, and the many processes involved.)	Close-up of chart Experimenting Observing Predicting Measuring  Interpreting Generalizing

Time	Content	Video
	<p>The next time pencils or crayons are dropped, sugar is spilled or water is poured, try doing this little experiment and help children discover the unique characteristics of a variety of materials.</p>	
	<p>Try it with children of all ages -- the very young, the young, the older, still older, and the very old.</p>	
	<p>In the next few programs we're not going to depend upon accidents to have experiments. Children will be exploring the area of magnetism and electricity and the materials to be used are those right here. They can be purchased at any local hardware store or five and dime and the cost for all these materials is about _____.</p>	<p>Close-up bell wire, assorted magnets, dry cell, flashlight cell socket, bulb (1=1/22) knife switches, bell</p>
	<p>The programs are designed to help children learn how to put things together, make things happen, find out what things are and, above all, reason.</p>	
	<p>Many of the same science processes that took place today will occur again -- but not necessarily in the same order.</p>	<p>Close-up of chart</p>
	<p>And experimenting isn't the only way of finding out. Reading helps, too.</p>	
	<p>Here's a book you might enjoy reading to a child -- or giving it to him to read.</p>	<p>Close-up of book</p>
	<p>It's called "Teaching Science With Everyday Things." The authors are Victor E. Schmidt and Verne N. Rockcastle, and it's illustrated by Raymond F. Houlihan. The publisher is the McGraw Hill Book Co.</p>	

Time	Content	Video
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If you have any questions you would like answered or if you wish to make any comments or suggestions, I'd be delighted to hear from you.

Just write to:  
Miss Muriel Green  
Center for Urban Education  
105 Madison Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10016

Close-up of card

I shall look forward to hearing from you.

Bye for Now!

## APPENDIX S

Center for Urban Education

Parent Participation Project

## HOW TO INCREASE TRAINEE PARTICIPATION

In working with children in informal learning situations it is well to keep in mind trainers have certain objectives, but so do the children. In some situations it may be more appropriate for the parent-trainer to talk about some information to the children. In other situations the goal may be to encourage the participation of the children, or the participation of the trainees. In spite of our good intentions, there are times that methods we use actually block reaching goals.

In working with a small group it is possible to use a few simple techniques so that one actually encourages trainee participation and decreases trainer talk. It is not as easy as one may assume, but it can be learned. How may one go about increasing trainee participation when this is an objective?

There are three principles that are involved in an analysis of reducing trainer talk and maximizing pupil participation or trainee participation. These three principles deal with the following:

1. Types of Questions Raised by the Trainer (Parent-helper)
2. Ways of Responding to the Incorrect Responses (or error)
3. Principle of redirection

These three principles are interrelated in working with small informal groups. Is it better to ask a series of rapid fire questions that call for specific answers? Is it wise to ask questions that deal with such specific types of questions as Who, What, When or Where? Should one ask a "fill-in" type of question? Should one ask a yes/no type of question? If the objective is to increase pupil participation then one should avoid all of the above type of questions as much as possible.

If one is seeking to encourage pupil participation, trainee talk, then one should use questions that call for the following: (a) Grouping of responses (b) Ordering of relationships (c) multiple type responses and no single answer is sufficient. In order to gain pupil talk, avoid fill in, yes/no and the Who, What, When and Where type questions. Instead use questions that call for such things as the following:

Why	Discuss	Interpret	Explain	Justify
Cite Information		What Generalizations from Series of Specific Facts?		
Causes	Ordering	Multiple Responses		

You can develop a series of questions that actually encourage longer responses and avoid the single specific yes-no type response.

Since in the informal groups with children there will be times that incorrect responses are made, it is important for the parent-helper to know some of the effective ways of treating incorrect responses so as to maximize pupil participation. Most of the research on punishment indicates that one is better off rewarding proper or correct behavior than responding to incorrect behavior. Knowledge of results of incorrect behavior is important, but it does not tell the correct response.

Reward the correct behavior. Punishment may stop the wrong behavior but it does not encourage further participation toward the goals. Emphasize the positive. This topic is very complex and our own habits prevent easy skill development. We communicate rewards not only by what we say but how we say it and our "look" or nonverbal gesture language all indicate approval or disapproval. Children sense whether adults approve or disapprove of their behavior, these things are clear, but to encourage pupil or trainee participation, it is well to emphasize reward the correct behavior.

In the dynamics of small informal groups, parent helpers may use the principle of redirection as a way of building upon the questions that encourage longer responses, and rewarding the correct responses. In other words, it is not merely a matter of asking questions, but of dealing with incorrect responses in such a way as to encourage further efforts. The principle of redirection is a way of getting more quantity and quality in responses. It helps get the trainee or pupil into the act of learning. The point is to avoid the usual "question-answer, question-answer, question-answer" but instead to have "response-response, response-response." As noted above, the form of the question may influence the type of response or answer, however the role of the parent aide, or trainer is crucial. The trainer may encourage pupils or children to respond to each other in a number of ways. The trainer may -- pause -- wait for response. (2) acknowledge the name of the person or child wanting to respond by name, (3) by a simple nod of the head, or "look" and "nod" -- this gesture language is understood; (4) combine gesture and numbers by "nod" head three times as you look at three children who all want to participate: "First John, Second Mary, and Third Stan"; (5) limit or focus participation to the topic of discussion. For example, the group may have discussed what they have been doing during the strike, then the discussion shifts to the election, one person seeks to return to talk about other activities, yet others wish to discuss the election. It is important to be accepting

of their interest in participating, but to redirect the discussion back to the topic that others want to continue. Redirecting can be done with rephrasing, it can be done with reformulating, it can be done with comments, but these skills are not simple and must take into account the way the participants may be all tied up in their own words and resent your attempt to reformulate.

All of the above elements are important in increasing pupil participation and trainee talk and decreasing trainer talk or parent helper talk. Types of questions asked that call for longer response, acceptance of responses even when incorrect, but rewarding correct responses, and (3) using redirection by nonverbal and supportive ways are all important. For example, if a group has discussed responses for some time, a trainer may reformulate and attempt to raise discussion to a higher level as follows: "We have been giving examples of what your children have been doing and learning while school is closed -- what would you say as a group are the main types of things that you have been doing? (Or) what are we saying that we can do with our time? Note that there is an effort to bring the group together, there is no one specific yes/no answer, but an effort to encourage generalizations and thoughts of others in the group. This analysis has been designed not to teach you how to do it, but to present you with some of the ideas that you may apply by creating a series of questions, use of nonverbal techniques in responding, and rewarding the correct responses. In these ways you are likely to increase pupil participation, and even to decrease trainer talk. These remarks do not imply that for some objectives "trainer talk" is not an appropriate technique to use.

## APPENDIX T

EXCERPT FROM SOLES MEMO OF OCTOBER 29, 1968

## POST-STRIKE PROBLEMS

Suggested questions for Workshop ParticipantsTeachers

1. What are the major instructional matters of concern to teachers once the strike ends?
  - (a) Pupils out during the entire strike
  - (b) Pupils in school during the strike
  - (c) Pupils in community schools during the strike
2. What are some of the strategies that teachers may follow given a shorter semester -- less actual class time?
3. How do such practices homework, more instructional emphasis on concepts, more emphasis on drill, pertain to instruction?
4. What effects of the strike may surface during the initial return to the school that become constructive learning experience rather than barriers to learning?
5. What are some of the ways that relationships of the class may be established, and climate for learning developed?
6. How may out of school learning experiences during the strike be used as a bridge to in school experiences?
7. How may inexperienced teachers rely upon experienced teachers yet promote mutual respect for each other's contribution?
8. What are some of ways that teachers may react with understanding to the concerns of parents for the interests of their children?
9. What are some of the diagnostic tools, evaluation, review devices that may be of some value in grouping within a class and yet provide for changes over time?
10. What are some of the channels that teachers may follow in handling requests, supplies for instruction?
11. What are some of the ways that teachers may utilize the work accomplished and learning achieved by the children as schooling is resumed?

12. What are some of the roles around the school of teacher aides, nonprofessionals and volunteer parents that may help upon the resumption of schooling?

### Pupils

There are major differences in line with various stages of development. The concerns for first grade are not the same for high school.

Some children have been in school during part of the strike, others have not. This means that there are differences in grouping and schooling experience since September.

1. How can these differences in schooling be taken into account?
2. Since there may be less actual class time, what strategies may be used that are least likely to make the learning situation worse.
  - A. Transfer of Training
  - B. Continuity of Experiences
  - C. Children Under Pressure
    - (1) Schools, Parents, and Peer Groups as Sources
    - (2) Is More Better?
    - (3) Challenge instead of Pressure
  - D. Role of homework, and parent support for school work
  - E. Survey or Intensive Study
  - F. Role of Drill and Practice
3. Importance of peer groups in building the learning climate.
4. Children may reflect negative even hostile attitudes on the part of parents toward the school.
5. What is the school's policy regarding the groups formed during the strike -- (children in school)?
6. What can be done by teachers to build assurance and perception of themselves as a competent authority figure, when many have "let the children down" by striking (NY Times)?

Administrative -- Staff and Instructional Matters

1. How can the returning teachers and students be so organized that the achievement outcomes of students will be as high as during the regular semester, yet not impair the mental health of children?
2. How can the grouping and regrouping of children be handled so that the interests of parents in keeping groups intact, the interest of the teachers in resumption of regular classes, and the overall grouping policies of the school may be carried out?
3. How can the administrator insure that planning for instruction by teachers combines the skills of experienced and inexperienced teachers? What provisions may be made?
4. What are some of the ways that the principal may restore communication or build communication between teachers and parents regarding the school?
5. What does an inventory of supplies, materials and workbooks and other materials reveal for the use of teachers in carrying out instruction?
6. What are the school procedures for pupil assignment difficulties and confusions that arise during the transition? What special temporary arrangements?
7. How does feedback of concerns from teachers reflect itself in changes in school practices?
8. How can the administrator and chapter chairman work together in the interest of the staff and the school?
9. What are some of the ways the school principal and staff may offset any possible racial incidents, what are ways of promoting sound intergroup relations -- (This may involve teachers more than in the past).
10. What are some of the ways that community may support sound intergroup relations?
11. How may the principal cope with cognitive dissonance on the part of staff members and community persons who persist in bringing up the strike, and may cite "incidents" and seek to create issues?

Parent and Community Concerns

1. How can school functioning be resumed with a minimum of disturbance to the learning and interests of children?
2. How can the parents go about creating a proper learning atmosphere and attitudes toward school in the home?
  - (a) Children have picked up parents hostility during the strike,
  - (b) Children have become discouraged in the authority symbol.
3. How can parents encourage the challenge of learning, yet avoid undue pressure that may create additional side effects?
4. What are some of the ways that parents may express their collective concerns about school practices, due to the strike, developed since the strike? What avenues are open to the parents?
5. What meetings are to be held that would give a chance for parents and teachers to discuss matters of mutual concern?
6. What ways may parent representatives, room mothers, or Parent Association representative of the school channel the thinking of parents and their interests?
7. What are some of the ways the school plans to provide further information regarding decentralization and community control?
8. What are some of the ways that parents may contribute to better attitudes among parents toward the school, toward teachers, etc.?

NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER  
University of Chicago

TIME STARTED: _____	AM
	PM

CASE NO: 

--	--	--	--

  
1-4

1. IF OBVIOUS, CODE WITHOUT ASKING: What is your relationship to \_\_\_\_\_  
(CHILD's NAME)

- Mother . . . . . 1 5-
- Grandmother . . . . . 2
- Aunt . . . . . 3
- Older sister . . . . . 4
- Father . . . . . 5
- Other (SPECIFY) . . . . . 6

2. Was P.S. NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_ where (CHILD's NAME) is registered open at any  
(SCHOOL NUMBER)  
time during the strike which started October 15?

- Yes . . . . . 1 6-
- No (GO TO Q. 6) . . . . . 2

3. When did the school first open (during the strike)? (PROBE FOR BEST GUESS)

	Day	Month	7-10
--	-----	-------	------

4. During the strike, did you send (CHILD's NAME) to school at P.S. (NUMBER) almost every day that the school was open, about half the days, just a few days, or not at all?

- Almost every day . . . . . 1 11-
- About half the days . . . . . 2
- Just a few days . . . . . 3
- Not at all . . . . . 4

5. During the strike, how did you first find out (his/her) school was open -- Did you hear about this from the school, from a newspaper, or from some other place?  
CODE AS MANY AS APPLY.

- School (aide, principal, teacher) . . . . . 1 12-
- Newspaper . . . . . 2
- Child . . . . . 3
- Neighbor (other parent) . . . . . 4
- Radio or TV . . . . . 5
- Sound truck, poster, official notice . . . . . 6
- I saw for myself . . . . . 7
- Other (SPECIFY) . . . . . 8

13-  
14-

6. (IF "NO" TO Q. 2, READ: It is my understanding that P.S. (NUMBER) was open during the strike) -- Now, during the strike, some parents at P.S. (NUMBER) sent their children to school when it was open, and some parents did not.

Here are some reasons why parents did not send their children to school. In your opinion, which is the one most important reason why parents did not send their children to school. (READ ALL CATEGORIES BEFORE CIRCLING A CODE)

(CIRCLE ONE CODE ONLY)

- |   |   |     |
|---|---|-----|
| A. Because they did not want their children to cross a picket line. . . . . | 1 | 15- |
| B. Because parents supported teachers . . . . .                             | 2 | 16- |
| C. Because there was no real teaching going on. . . . .                     | 3 |     |
| D. Because parents were afraid for the child's safety . . . . .             | 4 |     |
| E. Because the situation was too confusing or upsetting for the child       | 5 |     |
| F. or because of some other reason? (SPECIFY). . . . .                      | 6 |     |

7. Here are some reasons why parents did send their children to school during the strike. In your opinion, which is the one most important reason why parents did send their children to school? (READ ALL CATEGORIES BEFORE CIRCLING A CODE)

(CIRCLE ONE CODE ONLY)

- |   |   |     |
|---|---|-----|
| A. Because parents were opposed to the strike . . . . .               | 1 | 17- |
| B. Because parents had to go to work. . . . .                         | 2 |     |
| C. Because the child would miss too much school work if he didn't go. | 3 |     |
| D. or because of some other reason? (SPECIFY). . . . .                | 4 |     |

8. At any time during the Fall strike, did (CHILD) receive any formal or informal lessons in some place other than P.S. (NUMBER)?

- |                           |   |     |
|---------------------------|---|-----|
| Yes (ASK A - E) . . . . . | 1 | 18- |
| No (GO TO Q. 9) . . . . . | 2 |     |

IF YES, ASK A - E

- |  |                               |   |     |
|--|-------------------------------|---|-----|
| A. Where was this? (CODE AS MANY AS APPLY) | Church. . . . .               | 1 | 19- |
|  | Private school. . . . .       | 2 |     |
|  | Parochial school. . . . .     | 3 |     |
|  | Private home. . . . .         | 4 |     |
|  | Public school outside N.Y.C.. | 5 |     |
|  | Other (SPECIFY) . . . . .     | 6 |     |

QUESTION 8 CONTINUED

- B. Who taught the children?
- |                             |   |     |
|-----------------------------|---|-----|
| Striking teachers . . . . . | 1 | 20- |
| Parents . . . . .           | 2 |     |
| Other (SPECIFY) . . . . .   | 3 |     |
- C. Who organized this schooling?
- |                               |   |     |
|-------------------------------|---|-----|
| Parents in the community. . . | 1 | 21- |
| Organization (SPECIFY). . . . | 2 |     |
| Church (SPECIFY). . . . .     | 3 |     |
| Volunteer teachers. . . . .   | 4 |     |
| Other (SPECIFY) . . . . .     | 5 |     |
- D. Were regular school classes held or was the main idea to keep the children busy -- playing, listening to music, going on trips?
- |                           |   |     |
|---------------------------|---|-----|
| Regular classes . . . . . | 1 | 22- |
| Other (SPECIFY) . . . . . | 2 |     |
- E. How many weeks did (he/she) attend?
- |                                |   |     |
|--------------------------------|---|-----|
| Less than 1 week. . . . .      | 1 | 23- |
| 1 week, less than 2 . . . . .  | 2 |     |
| 2 weeks, less than 3. . . . .  | 3 |     |
| 3 weeks, less than 4. . . . .  | 4 |     |
| 4 weeks - length of strike . . | 5 |     |

9. At any time during the strike, did (CHILD) go to a museum?
- |                     |   |     |
|---------------------|---|-----|
| Yes . . . . .       | 1 | 24- |
| No. . . . .         | 2 |     |
| Don't know. . . . . | 3 |     |

10. At any time during the strike did (CHILD) attend the classes for school children held at the Metropolitan Museum of Art?
- |               |   |     |
|---------------|---|-----|
| Yes . . . . . | 1 | 25- |
| No. . . . .   | 2 |     |

11. (At any time during the strike) Did (CHILD) watch school programs for children broadcast on television?
- |                       |   |     |
|-----------------------|---|-----|
| Yes (ASK A) . . . . . | 1 | 26- |
| No. . . . .           | 2 |     |

IF YES

- A. Which channels did (he/she) watch most regularly? (CODE AS MANY AS APPLY)

- |                     |   |     |
|---------------------|---|-----|
| Channel 2 . . . . . | 1 | 27- |
| Channel 4 . . . . . | 2 |     |
| Channel 5 . . . . . | 3 |     |
| Channel 7 . . . . . | 4 |     |
| Channel 9 . . . . . | 5 |     |
| Channel 11. . . . . | 6 |     |
| Channel 13. . . . . | 7 |     |
| Channel 25. . . . . | 8 |     |
| Channel 31. . . . . | 1 | 28- |
| Channel 47. . . . . | 2 |     |

12. At any time during the strike, did (CHILD) go to the library regularly, at least once a week?
- |  |               |   |     |
|--|---------------|---|-----|
|  | Yes . . . . . | 1 |     |
|  | No. . . . .   | 2 | 29- |
- 

13. At any time during the strike, did (CHILD) receive any special assistance from any other organization or person in keeping up with (his/her) reading, arithmetic, or other basic subjects?
- |  |                       |   |     |
|--|-----------------------|---|-----|
|  | Yes (ASK A) . . . . . | 1 |     |
|  | No. . . . .           | 2 | 30- |

IF YES

- A. What persons or organizations offered this help? (RECORD VERBATIM AND CODE)

	Parent volunteer group. . . . .	1	
	Teacher volunteer group . . . . .	2	31-
	Other (SPECIFY) . . . . .	3	

---

14. Before the strike began, were you working or expecting to work during the time (CHILD) was in school?
- |  |                         |   |     |
|--|-------------------------|---|-----|
|  | Yes (ASK A-C) . . . . . | 1 |     |
|  | No. . . . .             | 2 | 32- |

IF YES, ASK A-C

- A. During the strike, did you work the same hours you usually work or were planning to work, or did you have to change your hours because of the strike, or did you not work at all?

	Worked same hours . . . . .	1	
	Had to change hours . . . . .	2	33-
	Did not work at all . . . . .	3	

- B. When you do work, what kind of work do you do?

OCCUPATION: \_\_\_\_\_ 34-  
 (PROBE: What do you actually do on your job?)

INDUSTRY: \_\_\_\_\_ 35-  
 (PROBE: In what business or industry is that?)

- C. In general, when you are working and (CHILD) is not in school, is (he/she) able to look after (himself/herself), or do other children look after (him/her), or does someone else look after (him/her), or must (he/she) be in school in order for you to work?

	Looks after himself . . . . .	1	
	Other children look after . . . . .	2	36-
	Someone else looks after (SPECIFY) . . . . .	3	
	Must be in school in order to work . . . . .	4	

Now some questions about the strike --

15. In general, did you oppose it or support it, or weren't you quite sure where you stood?

Opposed . . . . .	1	37-
Supported it (SKIP TO Q. 17).	2	
Not sure (SKIP TO Q. 18). . .	3	

IF RESPONDENT OPPOSED THE STRIKE, ASK Q. 16

16. Did you do anything to show your opposition to the strike -- For instance did you -- (CIRCLE ONE CODE FOR EACH ITEM)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
A. Picket at (CHILD's) school . . . . .	1	2	38-
B. Picket at any other school . . . . .	1	2	39-
C. Sign a petition or write a letter against the strike . .	1	2	40-
D. Volunteer to help out at a public school . . . . .	1	2	41-
E. Attend any meetings in opposition to the strike. . . . .	1	2	42-
F. Did you do anything else? (SPECIFY). . . . .	1	2	43-

IF RESPONDENT SUPPORTED THE STRIKE, ASK Q. 17

17. Did you do anything to show your support of the strike -- For instance, did you -- (CIRCLE ONE CODE FOR EACH ITEM)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
A. Picket at (CHILD's) school . . . . .	1	2	44-
B. Picket at any other school . . . . .	1	2	45-
C. Sign a petition or write a letter supporting the strike.	1	2	46-
D. Volunteer to help out at an interim school . . . . .	1	2	47-
E. Attend any meetings in support of the strike . . . . .	1	2	48-
F. Did you do anything else? (SPECIFY). . . . .	1	2	49-

18. Was there any person or group whose part in the strike you especially resented?

Yes (ASK A & B) . . . . . 1 50-  
 No. . . . . 2

IF YES, ASK A & B

A. Who was that? 51-  
 52-

B. What did you resent about (him/them) 53-  
 54-  
 55-

19. Was there any way in which (CHILD) was harmed by the strike? (In what other way was (he/she) harmed?)

56-  
 57-  
 58-

20. Was there any way in which (CHILD) has benefitted from the strike? (In what other way did (he/she) benefit?)

59-  
 60-  
 61-

21. Has the strike led you to make any decisions about your child's future -- For instance, are you seriously considering any of the following -- (CIRCLE ONE CODE FOR EACH ITEM)

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>No</u>	
A. Putting him in private school. . . . .	1	2	62-
B. Moving out of New York City. . . . .	1	2	63-
C. Putting him in parochial school. . . . .	1	2	64-
D. Anything else? (SPECIFY) . . . . .	1	2	65-

22. Now that the strike is over, would you say you are generally in favor of local control of the schools, generally opposed to it, or not on one side or the other?

In favor. . . . .	1	66-
Opposed . . . . .	2	
Not on one side or the other.	3	

23. Would you say there has been an increase in bad feelings between black and white parents in your neighborhood as a result of the strike?

Yes . . . . .	1	67-
No. . . . .	2	
Not sure. . . . .	3	

24. And what about the parents and teachers in the schools in this neighborhood -- Would you say there has been an increase in bad feelings between parents and teachers here as a result of the strike?

Yes . . . . .	1	68-
No. . . . .	2	
Not sure. . . . .	3	

25. In general, has there been any increase in anti-Jewish feelings in your neighborhood as a result of the strike?

Yes . . . . .	1	69-
No. . . . .	2	
Not sure. . . . .	3	

26. In general, has there been any increase in race prejudice against black people in this neighborhood as a result of the strike?

Yes . . . . .	1	70-
No. . . . .	2	
Not sure. . . . .	3	

71-8

BEGIN DECK

Now just a few background questions and we will be through --

27. What was the highest grade you completed in school?

Less than 8th grade . . . . .	1	5-
Completed 8th grade . . . . .	2	
Some high school. . . . .	3	
Completed high school . . . . .	4	
Some college. . . . .	5	
Completed college or beyond .	6	

28. A. What is the occupation of the chief breadwinner in the family?

OCCUPATION: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (PROBE: What exactly does (he/she) do?)

6-  
7-

B. In what industry is that?

INDUSTRY: \_\_\_\_\_  
 (PROBE: In what business or industry is that?)

8-  
9-

29. How many younger sisters and brothers does (CHILD) have? \_\_\_\_\_

10-

30. How many older sisters and brothers does (CHILD) have? \_\_\_\_\_

11-

31. Is any close relative of yours a teacher or school supervisor?

Yes . . . . . 1 12-  
 No. . . . . 2

32. Did you attend at least one meeting of the PA or PTA during the last school year?

Yes . . . . . 1 13-  
 No. . . . . 2

33. Are you, or have you ever been a PA or PTA officer or school aide?

Yes . . . . . 1 14-  
 No. . . . . 2

34. (OPTIONAL) What is your religion?

Protestant (SPECIFY DENOMINATION) . . . . . 1 15-  
 Catholic. . . . . 2  
 Jewish. . . . . 3  
 Other (SPECIFY) . . . . . 4  
 None. . . . . 5

35. (OPTIONAL) What is your race -- white, black, or something else?

White . . . . . 1 16-  
 Black . . . . . 2  
 Other (SPECIFY) . . . . . 3

Thank you very much.

TIME INTERVIEW _____	AM
COMPLETED :	PM

Interview completed: By telephone. . . 1 17-  
 In person . . . . 2

Date of Interview: \_\_\_\_\_ 18-21

VIEWER'S SIGNATURE: \_\_\_\_\_



## APPENDIX V

national opinion research center.

NORC

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

New York Office

55 Fifth Ave., New York, N. Y. 10003  
ALgonquin 5-5290

Pearl Zinner

Eastern Field Director

Dear Parent:

The current school crisis has become a matter of great public concern to the people of this city. The National Opinion Research Center is conducting a research study to measure the attitudes and opinions of parents who are directly affected by the situation.

The National Opinion Research Center is an established non-profit, non-commercial research agency affiliated with the University of Chicago. Every year we interview thousands of Americans for impartial studies as a public service.

A professional interviewer from our staff will contact you within a few days to conduct a short interview. The questions are very simple, and all responses will be held in the strictest confidence. The result will appear only in statistical form, no individual will ever be identified.

We think that you will find this an interesting and worthwhile opportunity to contribute to such an important issue. Please feel free to call me at the above number if you have any questions about this survey.

Sincerely,



Pearl Zinner  
Eastern Field Director

PZ:rrm

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

New York Office

55 Fifth Ave., New York, N. Y. 10003  
ALgonquin 5-5290

Pearl Zinner

Eastern Field Director

November 19, 1968

Estimado(a)

La actual crisis escolar se ha convertido en una cuestión de gran inquietud pública para la gente de esta ciudad. Es por esta razón, de suma importancia que nosotros evaluemos las actitudes y opiniones de los padres que son directamente afectados por esta situación.

El National Opinion Research Center es una reputada agencia no comercial, afiliada a la Universidad de Chicago. Cada año entrevistamos a miles de personas en estudios imparciales de beneficio público.

Para poder llevar a cabo esto, le estamos pidiendo a una de nuestras entrevistadoras profesionales que se ponga en contacto con usted en los próximos días para hacerle una pequeña entrevista. Las preguntas son muy sencillas, y todas las respuestas serán mantenidas en la más estricta confidencia. Los resultados aparecerán solamente en forma de estadísticas, sin que nadie sea identificado en ninguna ocasión.

Sabemos que usted encontrará esta oportunidad interesante y de valor para contribuir a tan importante causa. Si tiene alguna duda con respecto a esta encuesta, siéntase en libertad de llamarme al número telefónico indicado arriba.

Sinceramente,



Pearl Zinner  
Eastern Field Director

PZ:vh

## APPENDIX X-1

Table 1.

Original Sample, Interviews Completed,  
and Interviews Not Completed (by reasons)

School	Total Completed	LOSSES						Total NIRs	Total
		Ref. & B.O.	Unable to Locate	Not Home	Dup. Child In P.S.	Child No Longer in P.S.	Misc. (Other)		
191	90	3	22	4	4	1	1	35	125
199	83	3	16	3	4	1	2	29	112
9	94	0	19	2	0	7	3	31	125
84	108	4	12	6	2	10	0	34	142
163	93	3	15	1	3	2	5	29	122
179	90	0	15	4	1	2	0	22	112
145	87	0	23	2	10	1	1	37	124
165	99	2	14	6	4	6	0	32	131
149	92	2	16	7	10	3	2	40	132
76	105	2	13	9	9	1	4	38	143
<b>Total</b>	<b>941</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>327</b>	<b>1268</b>

## APPENDIX X-2

TABLE 2

## TELEPHONE AND FACE-TO-FACE INTERVIEWS -- BY ETHNICITY

Type of interview	White		Black		Spanish		Other		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Telephone interview	186	88.6	297	68.4	180	63.8	14	93.3	677	71.9
Personal interview	24	11.4	137	31.6	102	36.2	1	6.7	264	28.1
All interviews	210	100.0	434	100.0	282	100.0	15	100.0	941	100.0

## APPENDIX X-3

TABLE 3

PER CENT OF TOTAL INTERVIEWS COMPLETED

BY GIVEN DATES

Ethnic Background of Parent	25% Interviews Completed by:	50% Interviews Completed by:	75% Interviews Completed by:
White	Nov. 24	Nov. 26	Dec. 1
Black	Nov. 25	Nov. 27	Dec. 3
Spanish	Nov. 26	Nov. 30	Dec. 5

## APPENDIX X-4

TABLE 4

## RELATIONSHIP OF RESPONDENT TO CHILD BY ETHNICITY

	White		Black		Spanish		Other		Total	
	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%	#	%
Mother	193	91.9	371	85.5	250	88.7	10	66.7	824	87.6
Father	7	3.3	15	3.5	15	5.3	3	20.0	40	4.3
Older Brother- Sister			10	2.3	4	1.4	1	6.7	15	1.6
Other Relatives- Aunt, Uncle, Grandparent	8	3.8	30	6.9	9	3.2	1	6.7	48	5.1
Other non-rela- tives Legal Guardian, House- keeper	1	0.5	6	1.4	3	1.1			10	1.1
Mother and Father	1	0.5	2	0.5	1	0.4			4	0.4
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>210</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>434</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>282</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>100.1</b>	<b>941</b>	<b>100.1</b>
Female Respondent or female present	203	96.7	415	95.6	267	94.7	10	66.7	895	95.1

## APPENDIX X-5

TABLE 5

Distribution of respondents by ethnic background --

by School

School	White	Black	Spanish	Other	Total
P.S. # 9	45 (47.9)	14 (14.9)	32 (34.0)	3 (3.2)	94 (100.0)
84	51 (47.2)	26 (24.1)	28 (25.9)	3 (2.8)	108 (100.0)
199	38 (45.8)	27 (32.5)	15 (18.1)	3 (3.6)	83 (100.0)
191	27 (30.0)	31 (34.4)	31 (34.4)	1 (1.1)	90 (99.9)
163	19 (20.4)	40 (43.0)	31 (33.3)	3 (3.2)	93 (99.9)
165	13 (13.1)	26 (26.3)	58 (58.6)	2 (2.0)	99 (100.0)
145	11 (12.6)	26 (29.9)	50 (57.5)	-	87 (100.0)
179	4 (4.4)	55 (61.1)	31 (34.4)	-	90 (99.9)
149	1 (1.1)	87 (94.6)	4 (4.3)	-	92 (100.0)
76	1 (1.0)	102 (97.1)	2 (1.9)	-	105 (100.0)
	210 (22.3)	434 (46.1)	282 (30.0)	15 (1.6)	941 (100.0)

## APPENDIX X-6

TABLE 6

KNOWLEDGE REGARDING SCHOOL BEING OPEN -- BY ETHNICITY

NUMBER AND PER CENT ANSWERING "NO" TO QUESTION #2

"WAS P.S. \_\_\_\_\_ OPEN AT ANY TIME DURING THE

STRIKE WHICH STARTED OCTOBER 15?"

	Respondents	Number Believing School Closed	Per Cent
White	210	15	7.1
Black	434	13	3.0
Spanish	282	32	11.3
Other	15	3	20.0
All	941	63	7.2

## APPENDIX X-7

TABLE 7

NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS ANSWERING "NO" TO QUESTION: "WAS P.S. \_\_\_\_\_ OPEN  
AT ANY TIME DURING THE STRIKE WHICH STARTED OCTOBER 15?"  
(by school, by ethnicity)

	WHITE	BLACK	SPANISH	OTHER	TOTAL
P.S. # 9	6	2	6	1	15
P.S. # 84			2		2
P.S. # 199	5	2	5	2	14
P.S. # 191	4	6	8		18
P.S. # 163					-
P.S. # 165			3		3
P.S. # 145			4		4
P.S. # 179		1	4		5
P.S. # 149					-
P.S. # 76		2			2
	15	13	32	3	63

## APPENDIX X-8

TABLE 8

RESPONDENTS BELIEVING SCHOOL WAS OPEN AND SENDING CHILD TO SCHOOL  
ALMOST EVERY DAY DURING STRIKE

	White		Black		Spanish American		Other Races	
P.S. # 9	28/39	71.8%	9/12	75.0%	10/26	38.5%	1/2	50.0%
P.S. # 84	41/51	80.4	23/26	88.5	13/26	50.0	2/3	66.7
P.S. # 199	18/33	54.5	17/25	68.0	5/8	62.5	1/1	100.0
P.S. # 191	11/23	47.8	18/25	72.0	10/23	43.5		
P.S. # 163	8/19	42.1	24/40	60.0	9/31	29.0	3/3	100.0
P.S. # 165	9/13	69.2	12/26	46.2	19/54	35.2	2/2	100.0
P.S. # 145	7/11	63.6	16/26	61.5	25/45	55.6		
P.S. # 179	1/4	25.0	26/54	48.1	9/27	33.3		
P.S. # 149	1/1	100.0	74/87	85.1	2/4	50.0		
P.S. # 76	1/1	100.0	80/100	80.0	1/2	50.0		
<b>TOTAL</b>	125	64.1%	299	71.4%	103	41.9%	9	75.0%
<b>Per Cent Not Sending At All</b>		19.0%		7.4%		19.5%		8.3%

## APPENDIX X-9

TABLE 9

RESPONDENTS BELIEVING SCHOOL WAS OPEN AND NOT SENDING CHILD TO SCHOOL  
AT ALL DURING STRIKE

	White		Black		Spanish Americans		Other Races	
P.S. # 9	5/39	12.8%	1/12	8.3%	7/26	26.9%		
P.S. # 84	5/51	9.8			2/26	7.7	1/3	33.3%
P.S. # 199	7/33	21.2	6/25	24.0	2/8	25.0		
P.S. # 191	7/23	30.4	1/25	4.0	7/23	30.4		
P.S. # 163	7/19	36.8	7/40	17.5	8/31	25.8		
P.S. # 165	2/13	15.4	4/26	15.4	11/54	20.4		
P.S. # 145	2/11	18.2	3/26	11.5	5/45	11.1		
P.S. # 179	2/4	50.0	4/54	7.4	5/27	18.5		
P.S. # 149			1/87	1.1				
P.S. # 76			4/100	4.0	1/2	50.0		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>19.0%</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>7.4%</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>19.5%</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>8.3%</b>

## APPENDIX X-10

TABLE 10

WORKING RESPONDENTS AFFECTED BY STRIKE

	Per Cent of Working Respondents		Per Cent of All Respondents	
Whites	33/100	23.0%	33/210	15.7%
Blacks	25/142	17.6	25/434	5.8
Spanish-Americans	15/76	19.7	15/282	5.3
Other	2/10	20.0	2/15	13.3
Total	75/328	22.9%	75/941	8.0%

## APPENDIX X-11

TABLE 11

ANALYSIS OF FACTS RE. "WORKING"

ON WHOM WAS STRIKE THE "HARDEST"

	Usually Working		Could Not Work		Had To Change Hours	
	#	% of Total Respondents	#	% of Usually Working	#	% of Usually Working
Whites	100	47.6%	13	13.0%	20	20.0%
Blacks	142	32.7	14	9.9	11	7.7
Spanish-American	76	27.0	7	9.2	8	10.5
Others	10	66.7	1	10.0	1	10.0
Total	328	34.9	35	10.7	40	12.2