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ABSTRACT

The aim of this inquiry was to evaluate the existing literature on moral evaluation and development, to develop a model to clarify the concepts of moral judgement, development and commitment, and to specify their sources, structures, and interrelations. The purpose was to try to resolve whether these concepts are best understood from an instinctivist, operant conditioning, social learning, or stage-theory approach. Current issues in the field, significant scientific theory, and the relevance of these matters for public policy are discussed. Research procedures included: a review of the literature; construction of a classification scheme of essential elements in the theories reviewed; an application of these elements to classes of human characteristics; and an attempt to evolve a value-free concept of the moral domain. Findings dealt with generalizations about theories of human behavior and moral action. Implications of the findings present negative warnings about prevalent attitudes toward the inculcation of moral codes which stress democratic liberalism. The bibliography partially lists the pertinent literature (72 documents) and lists all works analyzed in the research process. (Author/KSM)

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Final Report

Project #A²b114: OEG-²~~1~~-2-2b114

Moral Education: Development of a Model

by

Educational Testing Service

Princeton, New Jersey

7.9.77 9:00 PS

A. THE PROBLEM

The overall aim of this inquiry was to critically evaluate the existing theoretical and empirical literature regarding moral evaluation and moral development, in the hope that some of the crucial matters now disputed by representatives of various theoretical approaches might be resolved. Preliminary study of the literature suggested that at least some of the impasses, if not the most difficult ones, arose from competing and unmatched conceptualizations of three processes: (1) the act of moral valuation or judgment; (2) growth and development of the "moral sense"; and (3) commitment to or achievement of a given stage of moral orientation. It was felt, therefore, that if these three terms could be clarified, and if the relations among them could be specified, some of the more difficult disputes might thereby be clarified at least to the point of indicating future ways in which the disputes might be resolved.

Toward that end, it was proposed to try to develop a model which would clearly specify the contents and boundaries of these three concepts in such a way that their sources, structures and interrelations could also be specified. If that could be achieved then it might in turn be possible to resolve such issues as whether moral action, development and commitment are best understood from an instinctivist point of view; or an operant conditioning approach; or a social learning perspective; or from the views advanced by those who advocate some form of stage-theory, and who postulate both "inner structures" that provide

the templates for moral activity and certain environmental forces that make it possible for these formal templates to become functioning aspects of the human organism.

A partial list of some of the major issues at dispute will help indicate the state of the field at the present time. These issues include the following:

1. How is the domain of moral activity to be distinguished from cognitive and affective behaviors?
2. Using a different principle of classification, how is moral activity to be distinguished from aesthetic and instrumental-technical behavior? Here the focus is not upon the basic human faculty that is involved, but rather upon the quality of the relationship between the human actor and the object-in-relationship.
3. How do humans come to make moral judgments and evaluations that are clearly at varying levels of complexity; e.g. they take into account consequences for self and others in quite different ways and amounts? Is the variance due to genetic differences? To richness of environmental interaction? To the types of models available for emulation? To the amount of deliberate teaching and socialization? To the stage of readiness of the individual? And is that stage of readiness a function simply of training and conditioning? Or is there a preprogrammed set of structures such that there is an age-timed and sequential set of stages that must be passed through?
4. How dependent and/or otherwise interrelated are stages of cognitive, affective and moral development?
5. Can one sensibly talk of persistent, reinforcement-free, and relatively irreversible stages of moral development?

6. Is it possible to describe and empirically demonstrate the existence of stages of moral development that are trans-cultural and that can be formulated free of specific cultural content?

B. Significant Scientific Theory

The act of moral judgment can and must be conceptualized in analytic terms, independent of any connections, implied or otherwise, between moral and cognitive and affective structures, so that the relationships of moral structures with these other structures can then be analyzed. Given such a conceptualization, the analysis of the process of change implied in the term "moral development" would then require additional variables relevant to the change-process. Thus, the possible relevance of such variables as age, genetics traces, and parental models for such change could be pursued. In the same vein, the decision as to the "stage" of moral behavior to which the person was committed, or at which he was fixed could be reached without falling prey to confusing arguments as to whether in fact the behavior in question was "truly" moral, or only pre-moral or conventionally moral.

A word of further clarification will help here. The literature on moral development abounds with disputes as to how properly to decide how "fully" moral is a given act (of choice, judgment, or other form of behavior.) Some of the points at dispute seem irresolvable precisely because the disputants conceptualize moral behavior differently; they do not agree on the contents and boundaries of the domain, and hence cannot agree as to the what is the phenomenon to be explained and what is to be treated as part of the explanatory set of variables. The argument thus frequently mixes considerations relevant to all three aspects: moral judgment, moral development and moral commitment. Clarification

of these terms beforehand would help obviate at least some of the confusion, and should thereby make it possible to specify the interconnections among moral judgment, development, commitment, and the bearing of other variables from the cognitive and affective realms upon these three processes.

For example: it seems to be presently impossible empirically to decide between the two following competing formulations:

(1) The individual will seek to do what others will approve if he is rewarded for so doing, and so that he can continue to receive the rewards which are promised vs. (2) The individual seeks to be correct and to manifest competence, and hence seeks rewards which confirm his judgment that he has been correct and competent. In the first formulation (advanced by the theory of operant conditioning) reward-seeking is seen as the motive for moral behavior. In the second formulation (advanced by cognitive-development theories) "confirmation of competence" is seen as the motive for behavior. The quest for "competence-confirmation" is seen, moreover, apart of "intrinsic structure" of one stage of moral development. Hence, "reward-seeking" as a "motive" is held to be characteristic of a "lower" stage of moral development. By contrast, operant conditioning theory makes no such assumption at all. Rather, it is concerned with describing the conditions under which the desired behavior will be elicited. It will not deal with "internal states" such as are implied in "quest for competence" and other such "intrinsic structures". Hence, this dispute cannot yield a solution as formulated. For if the issue is whether the "quest for competence" is actually present, one cannot, on the one hand, assume it to be present, anymore than on the other hand, can one rule it out of attention on the grounds that it does

not fit one's model of explanation.

A decision on this controversy can be reached, if at all, only if it is first agreed as to whether the "quest for competence" is a form of behavior whose existence is to be tested empirically, or whether it will remain as an assumption about inner structures that must be made if one is to be able to account for other behavior, such as differential responses to various reward-reinforcements. If the former decision is reached, then the cognitive-developmental school would be required to operationalize the variable for purposes of empirical testing. If the latter decision is reached, then the operant conditioning school would be required to show that it can account for differences in the attractiveness of reward-reinforcements without invoking the differential relevance of some reinforcers over others. That is, it would be required to explain why the same rewards offered by different people seem to have very different reinforcement effects.

If it could do so without resort to the differential relevance of these reinforcers for the actor's as he pursues his quest for confirmation of his competence, then the cognitive developmental school would be required to demonstrate why it continues to evoke this "inner structure" as an explanatory variable. If, however, it cannot do so, then the operant conditioning school would be required to show the grounds for rejecting the assumed "inner structure". These same kinds of considerations apply to the disputes among all the theoretical schools specified above. The continuing presence of these unresolved disputes in the field of moral psychology and sociology, in spite of a massive amount of empirical research, indicates the crucial importance of resolving definitional and conceptual problems at the outset.

RELEVANCE FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND INTERVENTION

In addition to the relevance of these matters for theoretical developments in the field of moral studies, there are other implications of these theories for matters of public policy. These include the bearing of these theories on: (1) the moral, affective and cognitive education of all children at home and in the schools; (2) the differences in the educational treatments applied to high and low performing children; (3) the strategies for inculcating commitment to democratic values; and (4) the treatment of people whose behaviors are defined as morally deviant. Put in ordinary terms, it seems to matter a great deal whether people believe that humans are "by nature" good and bad, industrious and lazy, honest and dishonest; or whether they "learn" to respond in these ways; or whether there is a combination of genetics and environmental forces that determines their conduct. It also seems to matter much, especially in the conduct of education, whether people believe that there are natural stages so that children will not be "pushed" prematurely or delayed overly in their potential moral growth. Finally, it matters whether people believe that all forms of behavior are equipotential in the human being, or whether some forms, particularly "anti-social behavior," come naturally more easily than others because they are in some sense the "natural cut" of human beings.

Thus, prepositions regarding the moral nature of man and the process of moral development lead to notions about the proper time sequencing of moral and cognitive learning; they also define the range of possibly relevant factors, including the kinds of interventions that can be made effectively by adults as they seek to shape the moral and

cognitive growth of children. In some cases, the failure of children to be able to conform to moral codes is taken as evidence of permanent moral "inadequacy". Perhaps even more consequential is that reported tendency in schools to define a child's inability to perform at expected cognitive levels as "moral inadequacy," as revealed in the use of morally evocative terms such as "good and "bad" to describe the levels of cognitive performance, and in the use of moral sanctions to elicit "better" cognitive performance.

Such tendencies to attach morally opprobrious labels to children's conduct are enacted sometimes without much regard for their appositeness or whether the behavior was in the child's repertoire of possibilities, and without concern for the adequacy of the required motivational nutrition. These moral derogations may have weighty negative implications for the fates of underprivileged children who may simply be unable to "respond" to moral "exhortation" because they lack those resources and facilitations relevant to cognitive success in schools as they are now conducted. Moreover, these labels easily serve as the initiating steps in the process of the self-fulfillment of the prophecies contained in them. The child labeled as inadequate is treated as such and, through such treatment, is made inadequate.

Similar pygmalion-type effects are seen in the adult community, most particularly in the "vicious circle" in which "deviant" adults get entrapped. For, once a person has offended the norms, and has been publicly defined and labeled as "undesirable" or "dangerous" there is a high probability he will be treated in those terms. As a consequence, he may find himself locked into stigmatizing and infantilizing situations, usually under confinement. In turn, these treatments have a high probability

of launching their "victims" onto permanent careers in deviance. This is most often the case for adults defined as "criminal by nature," and hence as "incorrigible".

Finally, ideas about moral development have serious implications for the endurance and strength of democratic society. The line of connection here has to do with what is believed about how easy or difficult it is to instill "liberal democratic" values, and how easy or difficult it is for children and adults to persist in such values, in the face of temptations to the contrary. If, for example, it is not as easy to inculcate the value of honesty as dishonesty, then, any society that counts on easily securing commitment to honest behavior is likely to find itself in serious trouble. The same may be said of such other values as fairness vs. unfairness, altruism vs. selfishness, peacefulness vs. violence, and cooperativeness vs. competitiveness. It is therefore crucial that the question of the greater or lesser naturalness of these opposite forms of behavior should be examined.

In turn, this requires a conceptual clarification of the realm of moral action, so that the appropriateness of moral judgments of behavior can be agreed upon. Also required is an understanding of how moral behavior, so conceptualized, is shaped and formed; how the individual normally extends his moral sense laterally and vertically; and how he may come to achieve (or fail to achieve) a certain stage of moral conduct that others have achieved (or failed to achieve). For one hypothetical example: if it is not understood that the ability to take others into account in reckoning one's own choices may vary with the amount of "stake" one has in the going system, then, those who deviate from expectations because they have not been adequately nourished by a lively sense of stake, are likely to be treated in punitive ways.

In turn these may only serve further to deepen their incapacity to conform to normative expectations.

C. PROCEDURES FOLLOWED IN THE RESEARCH

It must be understood at the outset that this was a project that was clearly exploratory in character, and required that one allow for a great deal of openness. For it was unsure where our initial inquiries would lead us, as we pursued the goal of conceptual clarification and model-construction. Moreover, the requirement of critical evaluation of existing theory and research necessarily meant that we had to be prepared to follow various tangents as they insinuated themselves upon our attention. In sum, this was a project in which reading, thinking, discussing and writing were mixed in ways that could not be predicted beforehand nor, of course, specified in advance. But some recapitulation can now be made of the course of the work.

There was at the outset a body of the most obviously relevant literature that had to be read anew with our particular problems in mind. This literature is found--as our bibliography suggested--in the most diverse fields: biology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, religion and aesthetics, among others.

I approached this literature with the following general questions in mind:

1. What notion of the "natural" in human behavior does the author start from? Is this notion explicit or implicit? In what ways is the notion made manifest? How aware is the author of the extent to which he is operating with certain basic ideas about the "natural" in human behavior? To what extent and in what ways is he influenced in his

observations and his conclusions by his ideas about human nature?

2. Within the author's conception of human nature, what place is given to the moral dimension of such nature? Is this dimension distinguished from others, such as the aesthetic, the technical-instrumental, the religious? By what criteria? Is the moral dimension seen as one of the basic dimensions of human nature and behavior, or as derived from others? What difference does this make so far as subsequent analyses and judgments are concerned?

3. Does the author have a conception of moral maturity as against pre-moral, incomplete or undeveloped moral stature? Along what dimensions are these distinctions made?

4. In regard to the basic dimensions of human existence, what role does the author ascribe to genetically based instincts? To genetic pre-programming and "deep structures"? To social learning? To the requirements of survival in group life? To the interaction of genetic and environmental variables?

5. Does the author see different dimensions of human behavior as being differently dependent on genetic vs. environmental factors? For example, does he see language structures but not moral conduct as preprogrammed? By what criteria does he decide these questions? What evidence convinces him?

6. If he is a stage-theorist, what dynamic forces does he invoke to explain the movement of the individual (or society) through the various stages? How inevitable does he assume such development to be? Can the full sequence be aborted? By what factors? How much do social-stage theorists rely on generic human nature to account for social stage development and sequencing?

7. For those authors who have definite notions of moral stage development--either ontogenetic or phylogentic, or both--do they see the same fundamental dynamics at work in the moral domains as in other domains of human behavior? That is, is moral behavior, growth and development seen as another version of a more general theme or as something very special and different?

8. Is the author seriously concerned with the problem of evidence, especially as it refers to the question of genetic vs. environmental factors in human behavior? Does he advance formal criteria by which decisions are to be made in this sphere? Are the same requirements of evidence and proof imposed on all spheres of human conduct, or, for example, is the question of the proof of genetic elements in "intelligence" treated differently than that of genetic elements in moral behaviors?

These were some of the more general questions to which I was alert as I read my way through a body of literature. To assist me in this program I had the part time services of an extraordinarily capable young scholar, who had been trained in philosophy, anthropology, sociology, linguistics and psychology. Insofar as his time schedule permitted he read the same materials as I did. We talked at great length about the notions we derived from our reading.

Our next steps involved giving some formal order to our emerging body of findings. But it became apparent that such order could not be introduced with regard to problems of moral behavior alone. Rather, it was indispensable to locate the moral in the context of other major domains of activity and other aspects of human makeup and functioning.

In short, the inquiry became unavoidably broadened into one concerned with differing theories of human nature in general.

It thus seemed important at that point to develop a short hand scheme for digesting and recording the essential elements of the theories encountered in our reading so that a typology would be aimed at ordering four essential elements in each of the theories:

- (1) the claimed sources of the human trait or behavior; (e.g. biological, psychological, socio-cultural, climatic, geographical, divine, etc).
- (2) the range of variation assumed to be possible in the trait and the sources of that variation;
- (3) the spatial and temporal patterning of the trait and the sources of that patterning.
- (4) the extent to which the trait was seen to be primary, secondary or even more derivation, relative to other traits and to patterned behavior in general.

This scheme was to be applied to six large classes of human characteristics, as follows: (1) abilities; (2) appetites; (3) institutional patterns; (4) feelings and attitudes; (5) modalities; (6) traits.

Below are listed samples of the types of entries considered under each class:

1. Abilities

Cognitive capacities--
Linguistic
Logical-Causal
Mathematical
Musical
Literary
Perceptual capacities--
Spatial
Identificatory

2. Appetites

Violence, destruction
Sex (intrusion)
Hunger (incorporation)
Excretion
Retention
Rest

3. Institutional Patterns

Political
Economic
Recreational
Kinship
Educational-socializational
Health (mental and physical)
Meaning and purpose (religion, science, art, music,
philosophy)

4. Feelings and Attitudes

Love
Hate
Trust
Shame
Guilt
Identity
Integrity
Despair
Fear
Anxiety
Jealousy
Affection
Frustration
Disgust

5. Modalities

Normative
Integrative
Affective
Religious
Mythical
Rational-cognitive
Aleatory-spontaneous

6. Traits

Territoriality-openess
Industriousness-laziness
Reciprocity-self-centeredness
Gentleness-aggressivity
Good humor-anger
Active-passive
Retentiveness-giving
Irritability-calm
Sadism-Masochism
Obduracy-flexibility
Optimism-pessimism
Autonomy-dependence

This classificatory scheme is meant to be suggestive and partial, and not exhaustive or final. But it does serve as a beginning point in the ordering of an enormous amount of diverse material found in the literature on human behavior.

Further specifications for the coding and tabulation of materials, included establishing a continuum of presence or absence of a trait or modality -- ranging from "always" to "never"; and for the time of appearance, from "present at birth" to "arrives at indeterminate and varying stage." Additionally the degree of importance was codified on a range from "Sole determinant", at one pole, to "intervening secondary determinant" on the other.

This schema has been applied to a selected list of major works chosen specifically with the aim of getting a representative sample of the range of thought. The main criterion sampling specified a continuum from works that were dominantly or purely genetically-oriented (e.g., classical works on Instinct theory and modern works such as Lorenz, D. Morris and R. Ardrey) to those that were dominantly or purely socio-cultural in their orientation (e.g., Leslie White's *The Evolution of Culture*). We used this criterion for sampling for two reasons: 1) the genetics vs. environment contrast is the most dominant one in the minds of the lay public and the theories it "accepts" and 2) it is also the most contended point at issue in the intellectual world that concerns itself with human nature in general and with moral nature in particular. One might also add that preliminary analysis showed that the single most influential force that shapes theories in general is the initial conviction of the author regarding the source, (genetic, environmental or other) of the trait and the space-and-time patterning of the trait.

While this activity (classification, etc.) was being carried on, the special focus on the moral domain was kept high in our attention. Regarding the moral domain, we were asking the same kind of questions as were being asked in general regarding all human traits and behaviors. But we were also asking more pointed questions as well.

Perhaps most important among these more specific questions regarding the moral domain was that of the possibility of arriving at an analytic conceptualization of that domain that would be value-neutral or value-free. The reason for this quest was three fold: 1) the terms in which moral behavior is usually discussed are such that favorable and unfavorable sets toward items of behavior are induced, albeit unwittingly, by the very terms used to "describe" the behavior. Thus, "dishonesty" immediately invokes unfavorable connotations relative to honesty; and so do treason vs. loyalty, selfishness vs. altruism, peacefulness vs. bellicosity, etc. We felt it crucially important therefore to work toward a concept of moral behavior that would somehow manage, at least partially, to deplete the ordinary discourse about behavior of its value-loaded connotations, so that the behavior could all be treated equally as human phenomena; 2) our second reason for pursuing this value-free concept of moral behavior was to make it possible to arrive at a formulation that would be truly trans-cultural; 3) both the foregoing reasons combine to give the third, namely, the need to arrive at a concept that would refer to a behavior whose variability could be examined, and whose development, laterally and vertically in psychological and social space and time, could also be analyzed.

This goal of value-free conceptualization was pursued, procedurally speaking, by constant exchange between myself and my assistant, as we read various documents and as we came to see the problems involved. It is not possible to elaborate the procedures in any greater detail. One might say that we had a continuing series of two-man seminars throughout the year in which thoroughly free exchange of ideas, based on common concerns and common data, was the rule of conduct. It is therefore not possible to say how fruitful this procedure was as compared with alternatives we might have pursued. All one can say is that one has a feeling that a great deal of clarification, at least of some of the problems, was achieved by this method. Shortly it will be seen that I have also been led by this year's work to a more ample realization of the tasks ahead of me as I try to give more order to the thinking and writing on moral development, as these are found both by themselves and lodged in more general works on human nature.

D. FINDINGS

Just as our procedures were rather unorthodox as compared with traditional "scientific" procedures of inquiry, so too, our findings must be reported in relatively unorthodox ways. Instead of a manuscript in which various of the topics here are examined in some detail, I shall instead confine myself to indicating certain provisional general conclusions about crucial issues that seem to me reasonable to advance at this point, even if only as hypotheses. Future work on these materials will take the form of extended inquiry and formal exposition, in which the best evidence available to me will be presented in support of the notions I here advance, unless, in the interim, I am compelled by the weight of contrary evidence

to re-formulate my judgments. I shall indicate these preliminary findings under certain very general headings, avowing once again that these are provisional and exemplary, rather than final and complete.

I. ON GENERAL THEORIES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

1. With few exceptions, biologicistic thinking about human nature and human behavior dominates the published materials on these matters, particularly when "fundamental" traits of humans are being considered.
2. At the same time, there has been a noticeable change over time from nearly total biologicistic orientation to a substantial admixture of environmentalistic-learning theories of human traits and behavior.
3. Virtually all theories that refer to human "needs" as basic motives in behavior imply or explicitly claim some biological grounding for these needs, and more often than not see the biological bases as primary variables that determine the degree of presence of the trait, the range of variability and the time- and space-patterning.
4. By the same tokens, such needs are seen as primary determinants of all other forms of behavior.
5. Again by the same tokens, most writers assume that once one postulates the presence of a biologically-grounded need, the explanation of behavior connected with that need can be achieved by referring the behavior to the need. Few writers perceive that the questions of the genesis of primordial energy systems, and that of the patterning of these energy systems into highly specific and particular cultural shapes, are separate questions. Hence much of the variability in the ways in which "needs" are expressed is ignored in preference for stressing the common core to which

all these forms seem able to be "reduced". That X is "nothing more than" a form of Y is by far the preferred scheme of explanation found in most works on human behavior.

6. As a corollary, the notion of emergent levels of behavior and the corresponding need for emergent levels of analysis seems to be only dimly perceived and then only by a few writers in the field.

7. A new and erudite-sounding mystique has been introduced into social and psychological science, in the shape of an appeal to the "evolutionary adaptive" character of various human behavior forms, as a way of "explaining" the emergence and the patterning of those forms. Few of the writers who resort to this new mystique seem the least bit concerned with the range of alternate evolutionary adaptations that might just as easily have been made, and perhaps, at least hypothetically, with much greater evolutionary adaptiveness.

8. The appeal to evolutionary adaptiveness as a determining principle that governs the emergence and patterning of human behavior is often no more than a modernized version of the Candide-doctrine that "that which is must be, for if it did not have to be, then it would not be". Since in principle this is a meaningless statement because it cannot be falsified, it is unworthy of intellectual respect. Yet it seems to have great appeal.

Our suspicion is that it is a way to deal with "unknowns" without apparently resorting to the now largely discredited notion of "instincts".

9. In sociological and anthropological writing, but primarily in the

former, the reliance on "functional fit as an explanation of a behavior form or an institutional arrangement is the functional equivalent of the geneticist's reliance on "evolutionary adaptiveness". Both doctrines are identical in form, with the sole exception that an indeterminate time-span is included in the latter, while the former is presumably synchronic. In "functionalism", the error consists in failing to see alternative functional arrangements that might serve intended ends as well if not better than those now in force. A further failure involves not understanding that in any society where the good things of life are unequally distributed, the functional arrangements at any given time tend largely to reflect the positive interests of those with power to command the distribution of resources, so that those without such power are likely to find themselves incurring the negative consequences of arrangements that are positively functional for the well-to-do. In sum, a new version of the doctrine of "inevitability" has been introduced, replacing the earlier version of divine will and the subsequent doctrine of "instinct". The new doctrine is no less "mysterious" for all its new secular euphemisms.

10. This new doctrine renders the analysis of social change relatively meaningless in two senses: 1) it assumes that all past changes "had" to occur as they did; and 2) it prevents the development of any theory that might make the prediction of social change possible. The ease with which previous change is post-dictively explained is matched, then, by the difficulty with which predictive social change could be expressed in probabilistic terms.

11. Two new theories regarding human behavior have been introduced in

relatively recent years that fall between the older doctrine of instincts, on the one hand, and the newer doctrines of environmentalism and emergent social forms, on the other. These are best presented by "structuralism" in anthropology, (Levy- Strauss) and transformational grammar and its doctrine of deep traces in the field of linguistics, (Noam Chomsky). Both these seem at the moment more acceptable than instinctivism, because they are somewhat less mysterious, and more acceptable than total environmentalism because they are less dependent on the notion of the total amorphousness of the human organism. A corresponding development in psychology is found in the works of Piaget and in a latter day spin off in the form of "cognitive-developmental" theory, such as that advocated by L. Kohlberg. These "stage theorists" seek to combine the power of Freud's notions of inevitable genetically-triggered sequences of development with an approach that incorporates variables derived from environing circumstances. The concern for the character of the interaction between environment and genetical structures is variable as among these various "stage theorists". Levy-Strauss, pays least attention, since his primary concern is with the common core of natural form of thought to which the most diverse forms of myths can be reduced. The greatest concern with environmental variables is found in the works of writers such as Erik Erikson and Lawrence Kohlberg. But all subscribe to some version of the common-human ground plan which imparts a basic trans-cultural similarity to all humans.

12. The quest for what is common to all human experience, and the belief that the common sets that mold for and the limits on the possible variations, is dominant in most theorizing today. Correspondingly, the interest in what is different as among humans and the sources of those differences are diminished. One may say that there is a fundamental faith among

most theorists that there is an important amount of "commonness" in the species, far beyond simple anatomical and physical similarity and that, secondly, what is common is more important both for scientific theory to investigate, and as a determinant of human fate.

14. The greatest concern for empirical evidence to support the notion of - "deep traces" or "intrinsic structures" is found among a few theorists (such as Chomsky and Kohlberg) who at least try to show why they believe that empirically observed patterns of behavior cannot be adequately accounted for by theories that do not presuppose some such deep traces or intrinsic structures. Virtually all others who write on these subjects rely on a usually concealed form of circular reasoning, in which the codes are developed to translate behavior-forms down to their presumptive common sub-strata, and then the coded transcriptions are pointed to as evidence of the existence of those sub-strata scholars such as Levy-Strauss are most sophisticated in this effort; popular writers such as R. Ardrey and Desmond Morris are most simple-minded and inept.

15. Geneticists are perhaps most to "blame" for current modes and fashions in explanation of human behavior particularly because of the uncorrected overinterpretation of their notion that once the genetic code is "cracked" there will be total predictability over all human behavior. While few say this explicitly, it is to be found as a widespread implicit assumption in much genetic and quasigenetic writing on human behavior. Since this doctrine automatically rejects the notion of non-reducible emergent forms of behavior and the corresponding need for emergent levels of analysis, it proves to be an infeasible notion, as put. That same infeasibility ultimately renders it meaningless. But its great appeal is not to be denied.

16. Most writers--geneticists and others--ignore rather than examine the problem of similarities and differences in the species, in the sense that they do not adequately confront the issues involved, especially those raised by the notion of "level of analysis". This issue can be highlighted by the question "How significant is a significant difference?" That the answer depends on certain other assumptions is evident, especially when one takes into account the total uniqueness of all living things, down to each atomic particle. Hence, any assumptions about "basic similarities" among all humans necessarily presuppose judgments about realms of differences that will be ignored. This looms as a major problem for anyone writing about human nature.

II. FINDINGS WITH REGARD TO MORAL ACTION

1. Most writings on the subject of the moral dimension in human behavior see "moral action" (including judgments, valuations, laws, codes, rules, etc.) as in some way "inherent" in the species.

2. This "inherency" however is not as often seen to be an "intrinsic structure" or "deep trace" as are other forms of behavior, particularly language, cognitive models, temperamental responses, etc. There is an evident reluctance on the part of those outside the "divine" and "instinctivist" schools to assign a biological basis to moral behavior.

3. In this regard, it can be said that moral conduct is seen by most non-instinctivistic writers as secondary and derivative, rather than primary and determining in human makeup and conduct. This is evident in the extent to which such conduct is seen as deriving from the requirements of group survival rather than as "in the nature" of the human being.

Morality is seen as less compelling, and hence more subject to variation both in quality and quantity, than "basic human needs" such as for food, sleep, etc., and the institutional responses to these needs.

4. The less compelling nature of moral conduct does not however render it less avoidable in the majority of writings on the subject. Rather, its less compelling character is evidenced, according to most writings, in the great variety of moral codes possible and in the frequency of deviation from all established codes.

5. Seen primarily as rules, moral codes are seen therefore as more subject to human volition, more open in the possibilities of variation, and less determined in regard to the content such codes "must" have if they are to respond effectively to the underlying pressures, however these are analyzed.

6. Moral codes are also seen by most writers as relatively weak in their controls over behavior, as against the compelling character of other basic forms of human response. Against moral conduct, writers pose a variety of stronger and more powerful human needs and wishes.

7. Such strength and power as moral codes are seen to have are thought by most writers to reside in the social sanctions which are ever present and which are invoked to induce conformity to rules.

8. Moral codes are compared most often with other relatively weak and volatile behaviors, such as aesthetic codes and judgments, religious beliefs, political preferences, and other such "secondary" formations in human behavior.

9. On this level of analysis, moral behaviors are seen as everywhere present, however varied. Here, too, one notes the universal presence of aesthetic standards, rules of cognitive knowledge and logic, and varied forms of economic, educational and political systems. So, as most see the matter, morals are universal; secondary and derivative; relatively weak in their effects on human behavior; indispensable to some form of group survival; inherently subject to great variability; and always in balance with some amount of deviation that is viewed as variably dangerous and needing restraint through sanctions.

10. Most writers on the subject do not explicitly define the boundaries of the moral domain. Instead, they make passing reference to judgments of "right" and "wrong" and "good" and "bad" as constitutive of the realm.

11. The term most associated with the moral realm is that of "obligation" and its reciprocal "entitlement" or "right" and the moral "good and bad" from the aesthetic, technical, and cognitive versions of wrong and right, and bad and good.

12. While earlier thinkers attempted to derive "obligations" from some notion of "natural law", more modern writers derive "obligation" from some assumed state of social needs, with obligation and reciprocity seen as unavoidable considerations for group maintenance.

13. Unlike cognitive and aesthetic growth and development, the moral realm is seen by most writers as one in which the fullest possible development is equally available to all human beings, i.e., there are no differential natural talents. Even though it is acknowledged that some training may be required for "high moral conduct" the effects of

such training are not thought to be as dependent on special talents as is believed of the cognitive and aesthetic realms of conduct. This equi-availability of full moral development to all people, regardless of differences in cognitive talent, may serve as a major justification for the doctrine of the "even handedness" of the law.

14. The major exception to the foregoing generalization is found among a small number of sociologists who argue that there are differential abilities to conform to moral codes that vary with the amount of resources needed to acquire the sense of moral obligation, and the differential senses of "stake" in society that is required to "motivate" people to conform to existing codes. While legal scholars and legal codes make allowances for differential degrees of responsibility for deviant conduct, they see these as statistically exceptional rather than systemically regular occurrences.

15. All societies draw a distinction, however, between at least two classes of people who are considered differently capable of behaving "morally" namely, adults and youth, (though there is much variability among societies in the ages at which adult moral responsibility is said to ensue). The second most frequent differentiation of moral ability involves males vs. females, whose "natural" temperaments and other inborn tendencies are believed to make them more and less capable of observing codes and norms.

16. With the exception of "existentialists" and "phenomenologists," most writers on moral codes see certain forms of behavior as intrinsically more moral than others. That is, most reject the code of total relativism, and seek instead to lodge their preferred moral codes in some assumed

inevabilities or self-evidently true statements about the good and the bad and the right and the wrong. That is, they take certain moral codes as "given" in some sense of that word.

17. Some writers derive what they believe is a natural moral code from other "natural" developments in humans, such as stages of psycho-sexual growth. The moral is equated with healthy, and the healthy in turn with what is considered to be the natural ontogentic evolutionary sequence in humans.

18. In a similar type of argument, some writers try to derive their preferences for certain moral codes over others, and to explain the statistical dominance of some codes from some notion of the greater evolutionary adaptiveness of certain codes over others. But this leads into all kinds of contradictions, such as when one confronts the "positive" functions of population destruction, through war and famine, for a society that cannot sustain its present level of population at its present level of technology.

19. A modern version of "intrinsic structures" of moral behavior is found in stage theorists: notably, Piaget, Erik Erikson and younger students such as Jane Loevinger and Lawrence Kohlberg. These vary in the extent to which they ascribe influence to environmental factors and the kind of influence they possess. But they are joined in their assumption of natural sequences of moral development, starting with the amoral or premoral child and going to the fully moral adult.

20. These structures are assumed to be an intrinsic part of human growth, as much as the structures of cognitive and physical development. They are seen not simply as levels of readiness for certain moral comprehensions; but rather as having specific content, principally involving, in the most developed form, such things as "Conscience or principle orientation. Orientation not only to actually ordained social rules but to principles of choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency. Orientation to conscience as a directing agent and to mutual respect and trust." (Kohlberg's Stage # 6.) Similarly, consider Erikson's eighth stage at which one gets the fullest representation of trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, intimacy, generativity and integrity. Both Kohlberg and Erikson, and others such as Piaget, believe that such stages of moral development are transcultural; that they represent a movement from immaturity and lack of development to maturity and fullness of development; that they are therefore "low" and "high" in an evaluative sense, though this is denied. But for these stages, as with Freud's psychosexual stages, the individual who has not reached the fullest stage of development is "inadequate" or "imperfect" as compared with others who have achieved the "fullness" of their moral growth.

21. These authors vary somewhat but not greatly with regard to their ideas about the amount of regression and reversibility that is possible once a stage has been reached; the extent to which each stage incorporates or disregards or sheds the characteristics of the previous stage; the amount of cognitive vs. affective elements present in moral functioning; and the dependence for adequate moral growth upon correlated adequate growth in the cognitive and affective faculties.

22. The leading opponents of the stage theorists are the radical behaviorists. They make no assumptions about irreversibility or permanence, or intrinsic structures. Rather they think in terms of continuous operant reinforcement as a requisite of continuous behavior on a given level of conduct. Less in opposition to the stage theorists are the social-learning theorists who see much more variability, less hierarchy, less inherent structure, if any at all, and much more dependence of moral growth upon social and psychological nutrition and indoctrination.

23. In our judgment, none of the three major schools of thought (behaviorism, vs. social learning vs. cognitive-development) has a sufficiently decisive edge either in conceptual clarity or weight of evidence to permit a decisive preference much less an exclusive preference for one approach over the other. The empirical evidence on all the contested issues seems much too moot; the inadequacy of learning theories does not seem as self-evident as claimed by cognitive-developmentalists; the need to invoke deep structures does not therefore seem as justified or demanded; the transcultural character of the moral judgments listed as characteristics of various stages does not seem as well documented as claimed; the statistical frequency of some form of regression and responsibility albeit in a minority rather than a majority of the cases casts doubt on the notion of irreversibility; the identification of "high" moral character with certain elements particularly and specifically characteristic of rational-liberal democratic behavior in modern industrial societies casts further doubt on the claim of the pan-universality of the moral stages, and upon the very notion of inner-structured stages itself.

24. The persistence of contradictory moral codes in various cultures, and in any single culture over time, along with the high frequency of documented deviation from all moral codes, whatever their content, suggests strongly that any assumption about the naturalness of and ease with which rational-liberal norms can be inculcated may be seriously in error. The statistical rarity of fully developed individuals, whether psychosexually, ego-wise or morally, also casts serious doubt on the claim that these postulated stages are "empirical entities." Rather, it seems that three other judgments are more consonant with the facts in front of us: a) the forms of behavior sponsored under the aegis of the liberal-democratic-rational code of conduct are probably the most difficult codes to instill and to maintain with any degree of predictable conformity. Interests, needs and values that are intrinsically opposed to the liberal-democratic value ethos seem to create great difficulties in the socialization into the democratic ethos, and to persist as powerful temptations toward continuing violation of the liberal-democratic value system; b) No judgments can be made about the superiority or inferiority of one set of moral codes over another, or about the highness or lowness of various stages of moral development except as one introduces other criteria of evaluation. These ultimately beg the question rather than resolve it. This is in effect to say that no one has yet shown grounds on which to assert that later stages represent a "higher" form of moral development than earlier stages. Nor have the criteria by which such a judgment might be made been argued convincingly: c) the claim that certain moral codes are trans-cultural has not been convincingly demonstrated and cannot even be tested until specific cultural content is depleted from the stages, as currently formulated.

E. HYPOTHESES FOR FUTURE WORK

I. THE MORAL ACT AND THE BOUNDARIES OF THE MORAL DOMAIN

We advance the following tentative formulations suggested by the findings just listed as guides to future inquiry.

1. All behavior is capable of being judged as moral or immoral, regardless of its degree of development, sophistication, or whatever.
2. All societies in fact exercise such judgments regarding behavior, though they are enormously variable in the content of their judgments.
3. There is no definable empirical entity of "moral behavior" per se; BUT all human beings, individually and in the aggregate, act in terms of moral codes.
4. The conditions under which societies throughout the world today and at all times in human history impose judgments of good and bad and right and wrong on behavior are the following:
 - a. When it is assumed that the actor has awareness of possible alternatives to his behavior;
 - b. When the behavior (choice) is lodged in a context of reciprocal role playing, such that a network of obligations and entitlements is involved and either sustained or interfered with;
 - c. When it is assumed that the actor is aware of this network and of the high probability that his actions will have consequences for the well-being of others in the network.
 - d. When the need to preserve the network of reciprocity is considered sufficiently important to warrant the use of sanctions to induce desired behavior and to retrain undesired behavior.

Societies vary in the differential stress they lay on one or another of these four ingredients. But they are uniform in the fact that some aspect of all four dimensions is present whenever the judgments of good and bad are made. In short, these four ingredients are constitutive of the moral realm or domain. Conduct may be said to be properly assigned to the moral realm (rather than the cognitive, or affective or aesthetic), when it fulfills these four conditions.

In effect we are here defining the moral domain in terms of what we have found to be empirically true about the conditions under which moral judgments are always and everywhere considered to be proper. The correctness of our observations can be tested by examining the moral and legal codes of any society to discover whether moral judgments and sanctions are imposed in the absence of any of these four ingredients. A supplementary test is to be found in the grounds on which individuals are exculpated or excused from moral judgment, or are treated less harshly than they otherwise would be. These events occur only when and if at least one of the four defining elements is judged absent, by reason of age, insanity, or other incompetence or inadequacy. A corrolary support of our claim is found in the fact that exculpation from the moral judgment varies usually with the degree of absence of these ingredients, i.e. the more the ingredients that are absent, the greater the exculpation for moral judgment. The single but important exception to this rule is the distinctive treatment societies accord to persons judged to be strangers or non-members.

Other "discrepancies," such as much harsher treatment for minor offenses by "undesirable social types" than is accorded to major offenses by "desirable social types" (e.g., differential sentencing of blue collar vs. white collar criminals) are to be accounted for either as inconsistencies that arise from inequalities in power, or from biased versions of the amount of harm attributed to deviant behavior (e.g., the harm of a street mugging as against the harm of air pollution).

Finally, one fact that cannot easily be incorporated in this scheme is the extent to which severity of sanctions varies with the degree to which the violator is assumed to be "naturally inclined" to such violations. (e.g., the harsher sentences meted out to multiple criminal offenders). This is not, however, trans-cultural. Rather it is most widespread in deeply stratified societies.

II. MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND COMMITMENT

It should be noted that it has not been possible to specify when an individual is behaving in a moral fashion, nor to attach moral qualities to acts per se. Rather what we have done is to specify when any action will be viewed as subject to moral judgment and to correlated sanctions by the social group or society in which the action takes place. In effect this says that all actions per se are neutral with regard to their "moral" qualities until they are placed by others in a context within which qualities get attached to them.

This formulation raises problems about such terms as "moral sense" or "moral stature" when these terms are applied to individuals. For to speak of an individual's moral sense, one must now speak of two things: (1) the sense or awareness that an individual has of the moral definitions that prevail in his society or some trans-social group with which he identifies; (2) as a corollary we speak of an individual as having high moral stature when he behaves in accordance with rules of conduct of which we approve, and when we find that he is not easily led away from those rules by other considerations. He has high stature especially if he is stringent with himself regarding those rules, often at the pain of some self-denial that "lesser" individuals would not have the "moral strength" to suffer.

There seem to be few problems with this formulation when we have in mind moral systems of which we approve. But we confront serious problems when we think of such a rule-bound and rule-observing individual in totalitarian-genocidal society, which has rules of conduct of which we highly disapprove. Can we say that such a person is highly moral? Highly well developed in his moral sense?

We see no way to avoid using the same terms here if we are to keep to our four-fold specification of moral behavior. That is, if an individual makes a choice, knowing there were alternatives, and if this choice involves actions that have effects on a network of reciprocity and obligations in which the individual is involved, and if he knows of the probable consequences for the well being of others of his choices, and if he knows that there are sanctions to enforce the rules: then, his actions are in the moral realm. As can be seen, then, it is not only eminently possible, but, indeed, logically exigent that we speak of the morals of fascist societies

as well as those of democratic societies, and the morals of those involved in cruelty to others as well as those involved in kindness. To deny the term "moral" to the former because we do not like the kind of behavior would reduce our inquiry to meaninglessness. The same absurd reduction would be achieved by saying that we will call behavior moral only if the individual, knowing about consequences for the well-being of others, cares about those other's well-being as much as he cares about his own, and attunes his acts accordingly. At that point, we would be specifying some version of the ideal Judaeo-Christian Code of the golden rule, but we would not be specifying any trans-cultural moral domain.

Hence we are forced to conclude that the search for a trans-cultural specification of morality and of moral development requires that we accept the application of those terms to any and all codes of behavior, and not simply those we prefer or that we personally think are correct. By this token, then, any theory of morality that invokes culturally-specific and particular stands on various issues of action and choice must fall short of achieving the goal of transculturality. Thus, Kohlberg's stages 5 and 6, the "highest" and "best developed" in his hierarchy of six stages, clearly involve democratic-liberal values. Moreover when these have been internalized, so that the individual acts out of internal commitment to them, he is judged to be even more morally developed, especially if he acts without reference to the "why" or the correctness of the decision. In the same vein, the Ericksonian emphasis on trust, autonomy, integrity and individual self-realization are highly culturally-specific in their loadings. They cannot possibly be said to be transcultural, for in fact they do not represent what any and all cultures desire or always enable their members to achieve.

Apropos of the notion of irrevisibility, it has nowhere been shown that the intellectual free-booter or "luftmensch" cannot function at any and all levels at which he chooses to function. This point was made with telling force in the dialogue between the Yogi and the Commissar in Arthur Koestler's book by the same name. While Koestler rescued our wounded liberal consciences by appealing to the nobility of the Yogi, this was clearly a sentimental appeal, and not one predicated on any logic of the case.

If in response it is said that if the individual had really achieved the fullness of democratic value commitment he could not then become the fascist wise-guy, one would have to suspect that the argument had been made meaningless in that one could not conceivably falsify the claim that "once a genuine democrat, always a genuine democrat" if all failures or reversions are taken as evidence that the "democratic" stage had not really been reached.

This suggests that there is a serious general "flaw in the doctrine of irreversibility, and in the use of irreversibility as a criterion of commitment to a given level of moral behavior. We see this doctrine as posing two great difficulties. If on the one hand it is claimed that if there are reversals, then the "later stage" have not really been reached, then it becomes impossible to falsify the claim of irreversibility.

If, on the otherhand, a more modest claim is made, to the effect that an individual will be said to be committed to a given stage when, under normal circumstances, he will probably far more often prefer the given stage to any prior stage of moral conduct, then we have to ask whether less normal circumstances might produce a higher percent of regression. If this turns out to be so, then we must seriously wonder about non-reversibility as the criterion of commitment. Our suspicion is that the claimed non-regression or irreversibility have not been tried out under sufficiently pressing circumstances to provide a sufficiently stringent test of the doctrine. The 1973 Milgram experiment in obedience seem to me to support this point far more than does it lend themselves to the relatively easy going interpretation that has been made of it by those development theorists who see the liberal-democrat as the apotheosis of moral conduct.

To meet the difficulties which these considerations pose, we propose the following alternative formulations regarding the concepts of moral development and moral commitment. We shall say that we will speak of development as consisting in the acquisition by the individual of the requisite awarenesses that are specified in the criteria of morality:

- (1) an awareness of alternative possible forms of conduct or choice;
- (2) an awareness of the network of obligations and reciprocities in

which his actions are enmeshed; (3) an awareness that his actions may have consequences for the well being of others; and (4) an awareness of the presence of positive and negative sanctions regarding his proposed choice. If he acts with these awarenesses-- as fully as many be reasonably expected of a reasonably well informed individual--then we shall have to speak of him as being fully morally developed. Put more cleanly, if he is as aware as he needs to be to make as enlightened a choice as he can possibly make, given his other values, then he is fully morally developed. Other individuals with less awareness, either less depth in any one dimension, or lacking awareness in one or more dimension altogether, would be considered less well morally developed. This definition, we acknowledge, would make it possibly to speak equally of fully morally developed fascists and fully morally developed democrats.

This now makes it possible to define "moral commitment". We shall speak of an individual as being committed to a given code of moral conduct when in a statistically significant percentage of cases he adheres in the face of temptations to the contrary to the behavior he judges to be correct at his stated level of awareness. But we urge that this be considered a probabilistic matter, in the sense that commitment must always be seen as provisional and modifiable by circumstances and context to the point of reversibility or extinction. Any non-probabilistic, non-contingent definition of commitment will lead to the great awkwardness, namely, that commitment to the "highest" levels of moral conduct will at best be rare.

We turn finally to the idea central to stage-theories that the human becomes ready for succeeding stages in a regular order of succession and hence cannot reach full commitment or involvement, for example to stage 3 without first having passed through stage 2, etc.

One suspects that this doctrine may be true of the process by which one reaches the final stage in the liberal-democratic value system. But there is no evidence to bring forward for this scalar quality of moral stage development when those stages are depleted of culturally-specific content and are defined in value-neutral terms. Our version of moral development sees that development in terms of increasing degrees of awareness of four aspects of behavior: alternatives, networks, consequences and sanctions. Without[^]now attempting to formulate specific stages, one can argue that since they represent continuing growth in awareness, they are in effect cognitive growth patterns. They involve added elements of experience; added sophistication; added realizations of the interactive nature of the social fabric and hence of the probable counter-responses of others. By definition, of course, one cannot get to a greater degree of awareness without first passing through a lesser degree of awareness. But we suspect that as in all cognitive growth patterns, there are likely to be numerous and varied profiles of growth here, such that individuals can make quantum leaps along the way, while others may never achieve even a modest degree of awareness.

The inability or failure to achieve full awareness may be a function of lack of cognitive ability; or lack of experience; or lack of a particular set of experiences; or the presence of affective blocks to those awarenesses when they are seen as threatening to the psychic capital the individual possesses. In short, the possibilities of full scale moral development are intimately bound up to the possibilities of full scale cognitive development of the kinds specified and may therefore be as variable by natural talent as is cognitive development in general. Still, we are unable here to formulate specific stages of moral development. Nor can we state the conditions under which such awarenesses are likely to be at a maximum, except in the most general terms that describe the ideal circumstances for cognitive development. For the social wisdom and knowledge implied in the contents of moral development may represent a very special kind of cognitive growth. We shall need to know a lot more than we now do before we can say under what circumstances any individual is likely to achieve the maximum requisite awareness of the effects of his behavior on others.

The final nagging question to be addressed here concerns the extent to which there is any causal connection between the four kinds of awarenesses, on the one hand, and any specific moral code on the other. That is, it is reasonable to assume that the more aware individuals become along the dimensions specified, the more likely are they to conform to a liberal-democratic value system? Or, alternatively, is it true that the more an individual has become committed to the liberal-democratic ethos, the more likely is he to increase his awarenesses as specified?

These are two quite different questions. The first suggests that added awareness will produce added commitment to democratic values. The second suggests that added commitment to democratic values, however acquired, will produce added awarenesses. Both questions can be put to the empirical test and should be--if somehow we can contrive experimental situations in which the respondents can be made value-neutral at the outset.

Cognitive-developmental stage-theory tends to assume a close connection between the two ingredients--awareness and democratic values--such that the stages are defined in terms of both. By this theory, added awareness of consequences for others is accompanied, unavoidably it would seem, by added concern for those others and their well being. But we insist that this has nowhere been demonstrated. Rather, it has been assumed, and only on the flimsy basis that subjects exhibited both elements, i.e. both the requisite awarenesses and the liberal values. Since, however, it can indisputably be shown that these are analytically separable variables, it is imperative that the degree of their empirical independence or dependence or cohesion be tested. We remind ourselves that the full-fledged fascist can be possessed of all the awarenesses that characterize the liberal democrat, and yet "use" these awarenesses in the service of quite opposite values. The hypothesis is therefore strongly suggested that these two sets of elements--awarenesses and values--are not only analytically but empirically separable as well. That would mean that their conjunction, when it occurs, is a particular cultural product, and cannot be claimed to be trans-cultural. Future work in this field will therefore necessarily take up this question in its many puzzling and intriguing ramifications.

IMPLICATIONS OF THESE FINDINGS:

We have now come to a point in our work where at best we are capable of issuing negative warnings about prevalent bland assumptions regarding the ease of inculcation of moral codes that stress democratic liberal values. But even here we must be cautious since we have not adduced the evidence regarding the susceptibility of such values to being overridden by temptations to the contrary. We can say, however, that our pursuits this past year lead us to believe that it will be possible, with additional work, to support such negative warnings with forceful evidence. Similarly, our work leads us to believe that further inquiry will show how difficult if not impossible it may be to show that there are "intrinsic structures" or "deep traces" in human beings, that incline humans toward certain special forms of conduct. We are not saying that all forms of behavior are equipotential. Rather, we are saying that the evidence more strongly suggests that there are no deep traces for any form of conduct such that they cannot easily be reversed. Moreover, instead of thinking in terms of deep traces or intrinsic structures, it would be preferable to think in terms of the continuing competition of various codes of conduct, including the life-long prevalence of tendencies that strongly resemble the primordial strivings of the unsocialized child. These persist, we would argue, not because they are more deeply traced than more altruistic, learned patterns, but because they are simply far more gratifying, when all other conditions are equal. If this is so, then any society seeking to evoke "adult" and more "socialized" patterns of striving, has to create

conditions under which the gratifications accruing from "altruistic," "other oriented" conduct, or the fears of negative sanctions for not exhibiting such behavior, are powerful enough to outweigh the promised gratifications which the child and the adult seek when there are no prevailing restraints to the contrary. In one sense then, the forms of behavior valued most in liberal-democratic societies seem to run most strongly against the natural grain of the human, where that grain is defined in terms of what the child is like by nature at birth. In this regard, liberal-democratic codes of moral behavior ask most for the least possible return.

These suggestions have grave implications for moral pedagogy; for the socialization of children; for the treatment of deviants, and for the stability of democratic society. We need therefore to press our inquiry further into these matters to be able to determine whether they are as sound as we now suspect them to be. That is the stage in our work to which this project has brought us.

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While it would be possible to list anew various works we have consulted in full or in part, it will serve the purpose equally well if we attach here the bibliography we submitted with the original proposal and indicate, with an asterik, those works on which we have relied the most in one way or another during the past year of work. That list follows:

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The following is a list of works that were analyzed in accordance with the scheme of classification described on pages 12 - 14.

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Errata:

p. 4 line 17 should read:

"is seen, moreover, as a part of the "intrinsic structure" " etc/

p. 12., line 12: last word should be "derivative"

p. 14 line 14: the word "for" should be inserted between "criterion" and "sampling".

line 15: fourth word should be "were"

line 16: the word "by" should be inserted between "such as" and "Lorenz"

line 18: a comma should be inserted after "White's" and the book title, Evolution of Culture should read The Science of Culture

p. 15 line 19: fourth word should be "pursuing"

p. 16 line 10: the word "of" should be inserted between "clarification" and "at"

line 18: fourth word should read "in relatively..."

p. 19 line 1: quotation marks should come after word "fit"

p. 20 line 22: second word should read "ground"

line 25: comma should be inserted after words "mold for", and after words "limits on"

p. 21 line 2: 6th. word should read "anatomical"

line 14: sentence should end after word "sub-strata".

Next word "Scholars" should be capitalized as beginning of new sentence

p. 24 line 14: comma should be inserted after word "right", and the words "is distinguished" should follow immediately after words "good and bad".

p. 26 line 10: the words "over others" should be deleted

p. 28 line 13: second word should read "empirical"

p. 35 line 1: sixth word should read "irreversibility"

p. 36 line 5: the word "stage" should be "stages"

p. 39 line 22: sentence should read, "That is, is it..."

p. 40 line 7: the words "or value-equal" should be inserted after word "value-neutral".

Second from last Page (unnumbered).

1. "Chromsky" should read "Chomsky"

2. "Juizing a" should read "Huizinga"

3. Last title on page should be underscored.